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in SOUit
 

GNING THE STATE
edited by. \ASIMIN AMBA

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Women and Governance in South Asia: Re-imagining the State

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Women and Governance in South Asia: Re-imagining the State
Edited by Yasmin Tambiah
An ICES Project
International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Colombo, Sri Lanka

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International Centre for Ethnic Studies 2, Kynsey Terrace, Colombo 8, Sri Lanka
Copyright (C) 2002 by ICES
ISBN 955-580-070-7
Printed by Unie Arts (Pvt) Ltd
No.48 B, Bloemendhal Road Colombo 3
iw

Contents
Acknowledgements
introduction
Politics and Gendered Space I Political Engagements III Gender and the State IV The State and Gendered Civil Society V Negotiating Citizenship VI Re-imagining the State VII Conclusion
Nepal (Shtri Shakti)
Introduction
I Social Change and Political Participation: Women's Quest for Political Space
III State-Women Interface: Negotiation of
Citizenship
IV State-Women Interface: Mediation
by Civil Organisations
V State-Women Interface: Multiple Roles
of Political Parties
VI Nepali Women's Visions of the State
VII Conclusion and Recommendations
Annexe
Bangladesh (Ain O Salish Kendra)
I II III
introduction
Objectives of the Survey
Social Change and Political Participation
in Bangladesh
State-women interface: Mediation by political parties and local bodies
, Vg
xiii
12 18 25 27 29 33
37
37
47
59
67
74 86 94 99
103
103 14
138
40

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Annexe
State-women interface: Women and men in microfinancing State-women interface: Negotiating citizenship and challenging the state Emerging concepts of politics, governance, government, state Conclusion: Women's visions of the state
Pakistan (Shirkat Gah)
State Structures and Processes Impacting on Women Research Findings
Wumen's spaces and perceptions of self Institutions of mediation and negotiation Governance: issues, expectations and performance The state and its institutions: Interaction and perceptions Participation in, and perceptions of, politics Attitudes towards politicians: Men vs women Obstacles to women's participation Deterioration in politics and self-imposed barriers
Summary of survey findings
III Conclusions and Recommendations
Annexe
North India (Ekatra)
I Introduction
Political Participation of Women III Women's Experience in Local Self
Government IV Women’s lnterface with the State:
Negotiation of Citizenship
vi
144
146
160 64 167
177
77ן 97 197 207
26
22 226 23 236
237
239 .
242 261
277 . 277 288
302
312

V
VI Annexe
State-Women interface: Mediation by Political Parties, NGOs and other Civil Society Organisations Re-imagining the State: Women's Visions
South India (Asmita Resource Centre for homen)
Introduction
Women in Local Bodies: A Report
III
from Tamilnadu The context: The history of local governance in Tamilnadu Research methodology Somer observations based on the survey The empowerment of women in politics Women's perception of governance and the state The beginning of empowerment
Defining Citizenship: Issues in Women's Leadership in Andhra Pradesh
Methodology Survey of women sarpanches in Telangana Self-help groups in Kalva village, Kurnool district, Rayalaseema Koya Women in West Godavari, Coastal Andhra
Women and Democratic Process in Kerala
lntroduction
Historical context
Methodology The Kerala model: Citizenship, community and the state Social and demographic trends Looking beyond the model Women and the planning process
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320 328 335
345 345
348
348 349 355 361
362 363
364 367 368
374
389 389 390 391
392 395 398 40

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• Defining women's interests 407 - Political empowerment 40
• Conceptions of the state and politics 44
Sri Lanka (International Centre for Ethnic Studies) 421
III
V
Introduction 421 Sri Lanka: Past and Present 427 Transcending Barriers: Women's Activism
in Post Colonial Sri Lanka 453
Cooperation and Conflict: Women's Interaction with the State and Negotiation of Citizenship 469 Women Re-imagining the State 48
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Table
Table Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Tables Nepal
Women's Representatives/Participation in Elections, Government and Parties Women Representatives in Party Committees Women's Candidacy and Representation in the House of Representatives Role of State: Who is looking after each of the following services? Role of State: Who should look after each of the following services? Who should own the following sectors?
Bangladesh Distribution of the households who faced problems with regard to important events in life Identification of the causes resposible for the problems faced by different respondents with regard to important life events Women's participation in the decision making of the family Distribution of the answers to the question why they Cast VOteS Answers to the question why women's participation in party politics is less Response to the question how women's political participation may be effective Response to the question whether the respondents have witnessed themselves any violence against women/children d Responses to the questions on how women's violence can be stopped
Female participation in governance: Bangladesh
Pakistan Distribution of women respondents in survey sample by province urban/rural Women's self-perception of involvement in key decisions (%)
ix
54 78
79
99
00 Ol
67
168
169
170
7
72
173
174
75
26
262

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Table Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table Table
Table
Table Table
Table Table Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table Table
10 -
- 2
3145
d
8
Major factors negatively affecting women's status (%) Three major constraints personally faced by women in achieving desired goals (%) Institution/ Individual approached by family for
dispute resolution (%)
Categories of problems for which different institutions approached by respondents' families (%) Reasons for wanting continuation of prevalent traditional system (%) Perceived usefulness of institutions in dispute resolution (%) Key national social-political issues as identified by respondents (%) Characteristics of good government identified by women and men (%) Key local issues identified by respondents Respondents' reasons for believing a government was beneficial Reasons stated for interest in electoral process (%) Reasons for voting in a particular way (%) Opinions about male and female politicians (%)
North India Sample Size in the Study States, 1998 Women in Parliament, 1952-98 Respondents by Awareness of Reservations in PRIs and Sample States, 1998 Elected Members who have attended Panchayat Meetings and Sample States, 1998 Elected Women Representatives (EWRs) by Reasons for Contesting in PRI Elections and Sample States Respondents by “Does state represent you' and Sample States, 1998 Respondents by Should state reduce responsibility' and Sample States, 1998 Respondents by 'Who can make it better', 1998 Respondents who have Voted in the Past and Sample States, 1998
2
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270 27
272 273
274 275
335 336
337
339
340
34 342
343

Table 1.1 - Table 1.2 -
Table 1.3 -
Table 14Table t .5- Table 1.6 - Table 2.1 -
Table 2.2- Table 2.3 -
Table 2.4- Table 2.5-
Table 2.6 -
Table 2.7-
Table 2.8- Table 3.1 - Table 3.2 -
Table 3.3 -
Table 3.4- Table 3.5 - Table 3.6 - Table 3.7- Table 3.8 - Table 3.9 -
Table 1 -
Table 2 - Table 3 -
South India Tamilnadu panchayat election results Reservation status of elected women members in different local bodies in Tamilnadu Political affiliation of elected women members in different local bodies Demographic profile for three districts Literacy levels in three districts Sample of respondents Population and sex ratio in three districts, Andhra Pradesh Literate population in three districts, Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe population in three districts, Andhra Pradesh Women in local self-government, Andhra Pradesh District-wise profile of sarpanches in Andhra Pradesh Mandal-wise list of women sarpanches in Mahbubnagar District Distribution of women sarpanches according to caste and religion (respondents only) Orvakal mandal, Kurnool District Crimes against women (1993-1997) Number of representatives in district council elections, 1991 Representation of women (from Kerala) in the parliament (Lok Sabha) and the state assembly Grama panchayat members (1998) Councillors of corporations (1998) Women chairpersons of municipalities (1998) District panchayat presidents (1998) Councillors (SC/ST) Councillors of municipalities (1998)
Sri Lanka Women's Representation in Parliament (2000 and 1994) Women in Provincial Councils Women in Local Government
Χί
351 352 352 354
37
372 375 400
40
402 403 413 43 43 414 415
432 432 433

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Table 4 Table 5
Table 6 Table 7 Table 8 Table 9 Table 10
Membership in Community Organisations Reasons for Non-participation
Responsibility for Law and Justice Responsibility for Finances and Taxes Responsibility for Social Welfare Responsibility for Schools, Water and Housing Ownership of Resources
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484 484
493 494 495 496 497

Acknowledgements
The ideas and labours of many people formed and nurtured this project, “Women and Governance/Democratic Process in South Asia: Re-imagining the State", from its inception.
Deep gratitude to the Ford Foundation, not only for funding the project, but also for the keen attention and input of its former Programme Officers, Mallika Dutt, Terence George and Geeta Misra, to the formulation of the project proposal. Thank you also to Mark Robinson at Ford for his continued support.
Srilatha Batliwala, Ratna Kapur, Revathi Narayanan and Nirantar (New Delhi) shared their ideas at the Planning Meeting in New Delhi, in 1997, and helped clarify the areas that would most merit investigation. This project would not have kick-started without them.
My thanks also to Professor Sirima Kiribamune of ICES, Kandy, for her feedback to the project idea, especially on the Sri Lanka study.
Colleagues at the International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Colombo, in the Administrative, Finance, and Library departments, contributed in many ways to ensure that the project moved to a conclusion. Very special thanks are due to two of them - Radhika Coomaraswamy, Senior Project Advisor, for her ongoing support, critical input and feedback; and Tharanga de Silva for her help in organizing the project's conferences, and acting as liaison between ICES and me while I was away from Sri Lanka.
Nicky Bastian patiently read the research reports as an indispensable second “pair of eyes' - a copy editor who both identified several information blanks and re-wrote many unwieldy sentences. Norbert Antony did the text layout.
Needless to say, the biggest debt, both mine and that of ICES, is to the colleagues from the six research teams-Ain O Salish Kendra, Asmita, Ekatra, Shirkat Gah, Shtri Shakti, and the International Centre for Ethnic Studies. From them I learned the merits of cooperative endeavour, and to trust that devolving certain decision-making powers could enrich and promote an initiative, not hinder it. This project would have been nothing without them.
My deep and fond thanks to you all.
Yasmin Tambiah Project Coordinator International Centre for Ethnic Studies Colombo, May 2002.
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Women and Governance in South Asia: Re-imagining the State
Introduction
Yasmin Tambiah
in the last decade of the 20th century and into the 21, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka have experienced significant changes in the matrices of state development and national infrastructure. They have also been affected by the consequences of civil society initiatives that range from ensuring equal access to justice and resources to managing and resolving ethnic conflict. While scholars have traced the broader social and political implications of such alterations, thereby assessing the implications of attendant change in the political culture of ordinary citizens, social scientists, policy makers and initiators of civil society campaigns have often been compelled to work with a partial picture of the needs of communities and individual citizens. This flawed image reflects a particular gendered bias - that of male political culture and public decision making. For, while South Asia has a tradition of female heads of state (with the exception, thus far, of Nepal) and the limited presence of women in other ranks of national administration, it is relatively rarely that one hears female citizens (whether informed by, or independent of, class, caste, religious and ethnic distinction) articulate their experience of governance, their visions for a state that would empower them and their communities, and their recommendations for political change that would positively affect the polity as a whole.
Given that women and girls constitute nearly half the national polity, and that the sexual division of labour, including bearing the cultural markers of ethnic difference. compels women to be directly affected by both microand macro-political transformations, the absence or minimising of women's opinions, visions and experiences seriously skews the projected results of such national transformations. It also makes women and their aspirations absent from the worldview of planners and implementers of national policy, except in the most circumscribed of roles as biological reproducers and

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homemakers. Exceptional instances where women are permitted to be visible underscore this problem. Women appear to figure prominently in the discourse on governance and democratic process primarily when their rights, bodies and resources threaten to become sites of contests for state power or stateafforded privileges among different caste, class, religious or ethnic groups. Frequently, in such situations, the active participation of female citizens themselves in the articulation of rights and responsibilities continues to be. obstructed or obscured.
When women do engage with the state and its institutions, it is with the reinforced awareness that the state rarely engages with them as autonomous citizens, a privilege in treatment that appears to be limited to men. Women are frequently still dealt with as appendages of male kin, secondary contributors to local and national economies, and electorates with event-specific value. The norm for women's experience of the state and its agents (experiences mediated by factors such as caste, class and ethnicity) is that of dealing with a complex, even contradictory, gargantuan entity that is at the least unfriendly and at the most overtly hostile to theii. Nevertheless, in the absence of an imaginable alternative, this same state is also looked to for succour and standard setting -- the welfare state that formulates laws and policies aimed at rectifying social and economic inequalities.
The chequered history of the consequences of women's mobilisation in political movements in South Asia, and their contributions to national political destinies at levels other than as head of state, also exemplify such contradictory forces and issues. Women of different class, caste, religious and ethnic backgrounds have played important roles in the independence movements and past struggles for democracy, while more recent anti-systemic impulses in South Asia have recruited women cadres in other than caretaking positions. Characteristically, however, women's political ambitions
For example, the 1995 debates on the Penal Code in Sri Lanka. The Shah Bano case in India in 1986 provides a familiar earlier instance. The contemporary participation of women in religious nationalist endeavours. Such as Hindutva, while providing women the opportunity to enter public space has done little to interrogate their conventional roles as mothers, wives and home-makers (see, for instance, Sarkar, Tanika. and Butalia. Urvashi, eds. Women and the Hindu Right: A Collection of Essays. Kali for Women. New Delhi. 995 and Jeffery, Patricia. and Basu. Amrita, eds. Resisting the Sacred and the Secular. Iomen's Activism and Politicized Religion in Sotth afsta. Kali for Women. New Delhi. 999.)
2 The recruitment of women as fighters and suicide bombers by the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (TTE) in Sri Lanka is a key example.
2

in post-independence and post-revolutionary contexts have been thwarted by pressures to return to domesticity and thereby abandon the public space, the traditional domain of political activity.
In the context of “mainstream" politics, the example of the 1996 Bangladeshi elections demonstrates how active cultivation of women's potential to influence the course of government can result in significant macrolevel political change for all citizens. But there remains the question to what extent women's mobilisation to affect the outcome of a general election has translated into concrete, long-term implications for their sustained political awareness and capacity to participate meaningfully in public life. For, as women's rights advocates, activists and women members of political parties themselves have pointed out, political parties may woo women as supporters in their electoral campaigns but pay very little attention afterwards to them and to their needs.
In the same type of forum, notably in India, debates on how to increase the ratio of women in politics have led to campaigns and actions for reservations for women in parliament and local government bodies, as well as in party nomination lists. While reservations at the level of local government, such as panchayati raj, have provided hopeful instances of success in India, the move to have such allocations at the parliamentary level continues to suffer setbacks. Some opponents to the provision have argued that reservations for women would result in these seats being filled by the female kin of male politicians, who would consequently act as proxies of their men folk, rather than by women capable in their own right. Some success stories in the panchayats point to the contrary - where women placed to act as proxies have, after election, seized the opportunity to empower themselves in the interests of their communities. Their understanding of, and engagement with, politics have also indicated that women in local government are more likely to pay attention to the daily needs of their community compared with their male counterparts. Nevertheless, the challenges faced by elected female representatives in realising their official responsibilities remain formidable, even in contexts whereaffirmative action programmes are operational. Such challenges compromise effective governance.
in South Asia, these realities continue to provoke critical questions in an era where the international women's rights movement and other mobilisations for social and economic justice have challenged states and inter-governmental bodies to deal concretely with systemic gender injustice: What are the obstacles women face regarding political participation? How do women experience the state'? How does gender mediate governance?
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What can we learn from regional examples about women empowered to stand for election and to engage in public decision making? In spite of global and regional awareness of the core problems and certain policies articulated to attempt rectification, at the beginning of the 2 century these concerns remain urgent. Given the shared geo-political realities and overlaps in several social, cultural and economic constructs, it is important and useful to examine such concerns at the national and cross-national levels in South Asia. In turn, analyses conducted at both local and comparative levels would simultaneously benefit, benefit from, and reinforce support for national and cross-national strategies that are being developed and implemented for more effective empowerment by and for women citizens engaged in transforming the state in South Asia. These are the issues that informed the conceptualisation of this project.
The Project
“Women and Governance/Democratic Process in South Asia: Re-imagining the State' was a regional project launched in 1998 by the International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Colombo, Sri Lanka. It was carried out in partnership with Shtrii Shakti (Nepal). Shirkat Gah (Pakistan), Ain O Salish Kendra (Bangladesh), Ekatra (North India) and Asmita (South India) with input and funding from the Ford Foundation. The project was catalysed by several of the concerns expressed above regarding women's engagement with the state and democratic processes in South Asia. These included the needs to (i) examine women's relationships with the state, especiaiiy in the context of increasing ethno-religious hostilities and centre-periphery tensions, (ii) establish why, in spite of a history of women heads of state, participation of women citizens in the different levels of government and in other public decision-making forums were minimal in the absence of affirmative action initiatives, (iii) understand the nature of women's engagement in politics where such opportunities existed, and (iv) foreground women's visions/revisions of the state. The research was intended to explore such issues under two main themes:
(a) Women's engagement with formal political processes, and (b) Women's engagement with, and visions of the state.
The research studies were to be a basis for further research, policy development, trainings and other actions in the areas of women's participation in politics and governance which were to be conceptualised subsequently by
4

each partner institution, depending on national and/or regional needs, independently or collaboratively as required.
Methodologies
Through planning meetings with project research partners and Ford's programme officers, it was decided that research would be carried out by means of archival investigation, a survey, focus group discussions (FGDs), relevant case studies and select in-depth interviews. The point of entry into research for each partner was animated by the primary concern or cluster of concerns in each country (or region in the case of India) that affected women's participation in politics and women's relationships with the state. While the survey questionnaire carried, in common, a select group of questions to establish the experience and perceptions of the state by women and by a control group of men (10%), the remainder of the questionnaire was to reflect the particular concerns established per country or region by each partner. Subjects of FGDs and interviews were left to the discretion of each partner, but with the understanding that they would reflect the diversity of women in each state. Each research study was to be organised so as to encompass six main themes:
(I) Women's political participation
(l) The relationship between gender, politics and the state as foregrounded through the specific national concern identified by the research partner
(III) State-women interface: Negotiation of citizenship
(IV) State-women interface: Mediation by civil organisations
(V) Women's visions of the state
(VI) Recommendations
In addition there would be discussions on concepts of "government”, “state' and "governance" as they emerged from FGDs and interviews. While ICES was to publish a comparative volume, each research partner organisation had the liberty to circulate their respective full report and to translate it into local languages. The six studies reflect research conducted primarily in 19981999, with more recent informational updates in some cases.
The following concerns were identified by each partner as meriting investigation:
(a) Shtrii Shakti: The current position of women in Nepali politics and
governance within the framework of the state-society interface.
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(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
Ain O Salish Kendra: Given that politics comprises all activities of cooperation and conflict in regard to organising the use. production and distribution of various resources (human, natural, financial and ideological) the two key questions addressed are (i) how are Bangladeshi women discriminated against in accessing resources and (ii) how can women's participation be enhanced to ensure such access.
Ekatra: The impact and influence of caste and other socio-cultural diversities such as class and religion (which are central to the regional and national political processes) on women's political participation in North India.
Asmita: Women's political experience at grassroots level, their notions of politics, governance and citizenship, and the ways in which caste, class, rural/urban background have mediated these in South India.
Shirkat Gah: Given the virtual lack of interaction by women with state institutions and personnel in Pakistan, the study explores which institutions - formal and informal - exist in women's lives and their opinions on these so as to identify viable entry points, support mechanisms and potential obstacles to increasing women's spaces.
International Centre for Ethnic Studies: The role of political and social violence in determining the engagement of women in political processes, and the nature of women's relationships with the state in Sri Lanka.
Key Cross-cutting Issues
In the following broad assessment of women, politics and the state, it must be borne in mind that, while several commonalities among South Asian societies make possible an investigation with a regional focus, the diversities - political, social, economic and cultural - that do exist within and across states preclude the possibility of developing a uniform set of responses to resolve emerging issues. For instance, while four of the five countries that
Some of the analytical frameworks and issues that follow in this introduction' also appear in Tambiah. Yasmin. The impact of gender inequality on governance. A Global Overvien' on Gender and Governance, UNDP. New Delhi. 200l.
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comprise the project were once colonies of western powers and secured independence from them in the mid 20" century, the development of the state in these countries has had key parallels and equally significant differences. While in all the States the fetidal elites still hold considerable power at the local, if not national, levels, Pakistan and Bangladesh have also experienced lengthy terms of military rule. Nepal is a kingdom newly experiencing parliamentary democracy, and India and Sri Lanka are democracies beset by significant centre-periphery tensions, including armed conflict. Accordingly, the discussions that follow strive to outline the shared, concerns emerging from the studies, as well as deviations that underscore the specific manifestations of, and responses to, a select challenge.
I. Politics and Gendered Space
(i) The private and the public
Demarcation between the spheres designated as public” and “private" remains a salient factor in any discussion of gender, politics and governance. Politics may be formal, as in political party-related activity in contests for state power, or informal, as in mobilisations intended to interrogate and challenge prevailing arrangements of power in realms such as gender, relations, caste, ethnic or religious formations. However, in either case, political action is almost invariably characterised by its “public nature, i.e. the need for activity and association outside the domestic realm. In South Asia, as elsewhere, what constitutes the public and the private continues to operate in overtly gendered terms. Notions of masculinity frame the public, worldly space, and femininity the private and domestic, even as this divide (like the construction of gender) is constantly contested and re-mapped, especially by women. It is inevitable, then, that this segregation has direct implications for women, posing critical obstacles in the way of political participation and engagement with the state. The ramifications of such Segregation are simultaneously mediated by factors such as class, caste, ethnicity, religion, and the rural/urban location.
Firstly, this split between the public and the private is implicated in gendered notions of idealised or acceptable social behaviour. A demure, chaste woman cannot, by definition, also be a public actor. Complying with expectations of chastity and modesty means confining oneself to the domestic environs, not associating with men outside the family circle, and especially
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not engaging in any behaviour that may be interpreted as shameless or immodest, and therefore immoral. Such attitudes also have multiple, interrelated, negative implications for women's material independence and access to education, both usually requiring entry into public spaces, and both essential to locating women as autonomous citizens, complementary to their position within their families and communities.
Secondly, constraints for women are made operational even within the private domain, with direct implications for their activity in the public realm. The sexual division of labour, which includes maintaining a household, caring for children and older kin, as well as working in the fields or engaging in other income-generating work that benefits the family, was noted by many women as a key obstacle to participation in political or other organisational activity. This focus on the domestic also meant that women felt pressured to eschew any knowledge of 'outside matters, including politics. Men too would invoke women's domestic responsibilities to discourage their venturing into the public realm. Additionally, in a bid to maintain the gendered division of space and associated notions of morality, male kin may resort to coercion or violence to prevent women from engaging in various types of public, social intercourse.
Thirdly, the bounds of domesticity and private space determine permitted degrees of mobility, where mobility is invested with different meanings and significance depending on its purpose. In Nepal, for instance, public mobility appears to be the key factor determining women's location in politics. Upper caste women, who have been able to take advantage of the mobility that access to the process of modernisation allows, dominate the political arena, a dominance also supported by their privileged location in pre-existing social and political hierarchies. While women from other caste and ethnic groups, and geographical locations, are mobile for economic endeavours and because of cultural permission, such women are, nonetheless, discouraged from leaving the domestic space for explicitly political activity. Female mobility is most permissible either when the activity involved is likely to benefit the family and is carried out within its purview, even if the physical bounds perse are stretched, or when domesticity permeates an aspect of the activity that requires mobility. For example, women may travel away from their homes to participate in religious functions, bereavements or family celebrations. Mobility is then permissible where the forum of participation still fits within the bounds of the domestic-religion, for instance, falls within
4 Shtrii Shakti report. Shirkat Gah also confirmed the point that mobility for
economics does not automatically mean mobility for politics as well.
8

the parametres of acceptable female behaviour. The Bangladesh study reveals that women from either end of the class hierarchy are likely to have greater mobility in contrast to middle-class women. Ethnicity and religious identity too have an impact on permissions and sanctions. Bangladeshi Hindu and Christian women, and Pakistani Christian women. saw themselves as being more mobile than their Muslim counterparts, even as minority women in both countries were likely to face discrimination regarding access to education, employment and social justice.'
The vigilance with which the private is bound is intimately linked with the operations of the patriarchal family in South Asia. In Bangladesh and Pakistan, for instance, women observed that the organisation of the patriarchal family inhibited women's autonomy and mobility much more than any actions by the state. The cloistering of women in explicit and implicit ways compromised their self-confidence and confined their social roles, a limitation that translated into inhibitions and obstacles in public space. For instance, women in formal politics have found that extremely low expectations were held of their capacity to act autonomously and competently in party or other administrative roles. Or they have felt intimidated dealing with the police and the law courts, institutions that have an endemic reputation for hostility towards women in terms of both personnel and process. The fact that several women were keener to have greater decision-making power in family affairs rather than in community matters reflects the experience of powerlessness for many women in family contexts," whether in relation to ensuring their own well-being, capacity to make choices about their sexual and reproductive lives, or the ability to have an effective choice in their own marriage.
Material bases are also linked intimately with the private and public. Discriminatory inheritance laws undermine women's capacity to maintain themselves independently outside marriage or other family formations. Such laws also compromise women in the context of political participation. Given that, in general, women are less likely to be financially autonomous than men, and are therefore less likely to have independent monetary resources for electioneering, they are further disadvantaged when inheritance laws deny them access to family capital to support their political initiatives. Several
s Ain () Salish Kendra report
Ain O Salish Kendra and Shirkat Gah reports Ain O Salish Kendra and Shirkat Gah reports Shirkat Gah report Shirkat Gìah report

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women who were interviewed, or participated in the FGDs, in Pakistan directly linked a woman's personal income and material resources. in addition to age and education, with the degrees of her capacity to make decisions autonomously and to be more mobile.
(ii) Literacy and education
Literacy and education are identified by women at all Social and economic levels as being of critical importance to any type of engagement in public or political space. In the surveys, interviews and FGDs, the point was strongly made that poor levels of literacy impel women to question their self worth, and therefore their capacity for decisive interventions both within and outside the family. A poignant example from Pakistan is one where women mentioned that one of their greatest desires was simply to be educated," a reflection of one of the most profound experiences of disempowerment to which many women in South Asia are still subjected. Other women, such as those elected to panchayats, recounted numerous instances where the fact that they were illiterate had been used by male counterparts to deride them personally or to disqualify their recommendations to the council.' The deprivation of education has been the consequence not only of familial patriarchal values, but also of the state, in certain instances, when it has moved to forestall the instruction of girls and women, even when communities themselves have been supportive of such education.' It is noteworthy that in Nepal and Pakistan, as well as in other countries, both women and men identified. education as important to women's advancement, sometimes even above is economic empowerment.o
High levels of female literacy do not, however, automatically guarantee a higher presence of women in public decision-making positions, or increased political participation. Sri Lanka provides a key example of this, indicating thereby that universal access to education must be associated with other social changes to be an effective factor in advancing women. Linked with this is the quality and content of education. Women who acquire literacy and education but who do so through texts and instructors that reinforce gender stereotypes, are unlikely to engage in transforming their
O Shirkat Gah report
As imita and Ekatra reports
Shirkat (iah report
s Ain O Salish Kendra, Shtrii Shakti and Shirkat Ciah reports
O

fundamental realities and social relations. beginning in the household, and therefore be less likely to deem themselves political actors in public.
In some contexts, levels of literacy may inform understandings of politics and engagement with the state. In Nepal, for instance, respondents who were either illiterate or with very limited education saw elections primarily as a process for choosing a proper candidate, whereas educated respondents, including those who had attended university, understood electoral politics in more complicated terms, such as the exercise of a citizen's right, the selection of an appropriate candidate to represent them, and the opportunity to exercise the choice to accept or reject a particular party's policy and programmes. In other contexts, as in Pakistan, the level of education did not significantly inform perceptions of politics, or affect interactions with state institutions.'
(iii) Religion
Religion and religious ideologies have been employed to significant effect in South Asian politics and state formation. Religion was made critical in the partition of lndia at independence, and has been instrumentally used in contemporary politics in the region as a whole. While women's bodies and women's rights have often been the terrain on which power plays have been conducted in the name of religion, in the different surveys women did not consistently identify religion as a major obstruction to public activity. In Pakistan and Bangladesh for instance, women pointed to family control rather than religious ideology as debilitating. Women in rural Bangladesh also identified the instrumental use of religion by male leaders, not religion per se, as the constraint. In contrast to situations where women have experienced greater confinement in the name of religion, other women have participated actively in political movements premised on religious nationalism. In the context of Hindutva, for example, the attraction for women lies in the movement's success in justifying women's entry into public space (jobs, political mobilisation) while maintaining intact the conventional gender roles of (long-suffering) wife and mother.'
Shtri i Shakti report Shirkat (ilah report Ekatra report, and Jeffery and Basu, op. cit.
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II. Political Engagements
For women in South Asia, the challenges to engaging in politics are as great as those faced in the bid to access and participate meaningfully in various other public forums. The confinement of women to the private, domesticated realm is a key obstacle to mobilising women in either formal (party-based) politics or in informal (NGO-centred or non-party mass organisational) politics. The issues faced by women contesting elections through formal political processes foreground the nature of political culture in the region, as well as underscore the links between (to use Deniz Kandyoti's terms) "private patriarchy and "public patriarchy, among others.
(i) Dynastic politics
Politics in the region continues in large measure to maintain intact feudal hierarchies and associated dynamics of power and patronage, implicating men as well as women. The various political dynasties, such as the Bandaranaikes, Gandhis, Mujibs and Bhuttos who have been heads of state, provide the most obvious examples. Consequently, women in politics, similar to (and perhaps even more so than) their male counterparts, are likely to emerge from so-called political families. These families are usually located at the top of the national class and caste ladder, and are members of the landowning elite, even if they also command loyalties in urban contexts. While this configuration has important implications for meaningful democratic politics (where, ideally, leaders would enterge or be nominated primarily because of their commitments to the well-being of the community, rather than their membership in elite families) it has particular implications for WOmen.
Many women in positions of political leadership in South Asia, especially at the national, federal, state and provincial levels (less so at local levels), are the daughters, wives and, frequently, widows of prominent male politicians. This, in turn, determines how a woman accesses a political arena where kinship networking overrides loyalties based on political ideology and non-kin affiliations. She is heavily dependent, at least at the outset of her political career, on the electoral support accorded to her family as well
Shirkat Gah report. See also Kandyoti. Deniz. “Nationalism and its Discontents.' im ד! WLM1. Dossier 20 December 1997 (first published in 1991 by Millenium: Journal
of International Studies).
2

as on the financial support of male kin, since it is rarely that she herself will have independent means of income sufficient for seeding political endeavour. Women are thus both supported and constrained by their location in a feudal environment, if they come from privilege. Women who lack such family connections may have a minimal chance of entering politics. unless they have been elected through social capital acquired by their own community work or through NGO encouragement and support.
(ii) Trials and travails of elected women representatives
The path to elected representation offers a prohibitive obstacle course to women. At the provincial and national levels, political parties are far more likely to nominate men rather than women as electoral candidates, even when policies (such as quotas) are in place to encourage greater female representation at the level of candidacy. Women (if they are not from families of the political elite) may need to cultivate the patronage of a senior male politician, and consequently feel that they are permanently beholden to their patron.' They are also likely to be compromised because of inadequate financial resources to cultivate the electorate. At the local level, where local elites may dominate, gender and caste may connive to block lower caste women from candidacy, through harassment and intimidation.' While the 73' and 74th constitutional amendments in India provided for 33% representation of women in panchayats, women are not always allowed to carry out their mandates. There are several instances where women have been put in place as proxies of their husbands or other male kin. Women in Such circumstances have not always passively accepted their lot, frequently attempting to assert themselves in spite of concerted efforts by male kin to confine them." In other instances, the compulsion to meet the 33% reservation has resulted in women being elected unopposed after having been unanimously nominated by the entire village, indicative of the fact that candidates were chosen and endorsed by the pre-existing structures of power within that village rather than by any effort to expand the reach of democratic process.
Women who are successfully elected as representatives encounter several other challenges. Firstly, they are more likely than their male
8 ICES report
9 Asmita report
20 Asmita and Ekatra reports
2 Asmita report (e.g. from Tamil Nadu)
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Page 17
counterparts to be subjected to a moralistic gaze. Some have dealt with this by deploying “respectability upon entering politics, articulated as an insistence on modesty and emphasis on prioritising home and family over political commitments, as much as by the image of the "good mother who serves the people as she does her family. While such moves blur the boundaries between exclusive constructions of the private and the public, they also limit the possibilities for women in public office to develop and project other models of behaviour and self-presentation. Secondly, the devaluing of women's capabilities, and assignment of limited roles, in a broader social context finds expression in political space through the roles imposed on, and expectations made of, elected women representatives. For instance, they may have greater responsibilities than male counterparts, but have fewer resources with which to fulfil these, reminiscent of a female home-maker obliged to stretch very limited resources to meet diverse needs. Elected women's authority may be compromised when their suggestions are rejected by male committee presidents or council colleagues, and their efficacy brought under scrutiny. Within elected bodies, men receive more favoured positions and duties that yield greater social power. If by chance women are proxies to male kin (as in certain panchayat situations in India), they may be compelled to defer to the men, regardless of whether or not they (women) are competent in their own right. Women's minimal exposure to politics and little or no training in political duties may undermine their interventions as well. However, to the contrary, while their perception of politics may have been limited by their confinement to local bodies, several women representatives have demonstrated a clear understanding of the functioning of local bodies. Many of them also see their election as an opportunity in empowerment, evident in the experience of representing their community at the panchayat, and in dealing with government officials and the police on matters ranging from provision of development resources to countering gender and caste violence.
Caste and ethnicity are two other factors that link with gender to challenge elected women representatives. Both the Ekatra and Asmita reports
22 For example. de Alwis. Malathi. Gender. Politics and the “Respectable Lady” , în
P. Jeganathan and Q. Ismail, eds... (tinymaking the Nation. Social Scientists Association. Colombo. 1995. pp. 137-157.
Ain O Salish Kendra report
bkatra report
M - Asmita report (Tamil Nadu)
14

identified caste as a major obstacle to effective action by Scheduled Caste (SC) and Other Backward Caste (OBC) women representatives in lindia. There are many examples of SC and OBC women having their work hampered
s
by upper caste men or even by men of their own caste, of not being allocated
responsibilities, or of having their opinions dismissed. They are also vulnerable to accusations of corruption and abuse of power, and to being
dismissed on this basis when their (male) accusers or co-political actors are
in league with (male) agents of the state.
(iii) Political parties
The nature of South Asian politics is determined in large measure by political
parties and their behaviours. Party loyalties, therefore, rather than the .
competence of individual candidates, undergird the political forum, and women as a constituency risk losing out. Women in political parties, unless they happen to be party leaders by virtue of their family location or other male political patronage, are unlikely to fare well. Party women are usually confined to the lower echelons of power, with little chance of advancement. Their activities are generally limited to vote-bolstering during elections, or to social work efforts that promote the party's image. Parties are also infamous
for limiting the numbers of women for party positions or electoral candidacy.
to the quota recommended, where such quotas exist, rather than using the
quota as a minimum.
Across the region, women's wings in political parties have provided a poor training ground for women interested in running for political office, as the wings are usually activated to further party objectives rather than women's political empowerment. Its auxiliary status also means that a women's wing is unlikely to protest the party's failure to meet the gender quota objectives.
Few women in general are nominated as candidates, even if, in some
contexts, they are twice as likely to win as men, and fewer still have access to finances from within the party unless they come from class privilege. Because party patronage by senior male politicians, rather than the competency of an individual is often key to promotions, it compels an ongoing dependency on men even when women have otherwise proven their
Asmita report (Andhra Pradesh)
27 Ekatra report
28 Ekatra report
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competency or popularity through community activity. The de-prioritising of women's issues within the party, and the discouragement of developing platforms on women's issues, whether within or across parties, are echoed by elected women representatives as well. Typically, women Members of Parliament, like their male counterparts, are likely to vote along party lines on women’s issues rather than espouse a bipartisan or non-partisan approach, and can use the argument of impartiality to justify their insensitivity or inactivity on gendered issues.
(iv) The (women’s) vote
Regardless of the extent of exposure topolitics, many women perceive casting the vote as a “national duty." Unless subjected to voter education, as in Bangladesh, few illiterate or undereducated women are likely to see voting as a political right rather than as a duty, or to make an explicit connection between voting and the capacity to have an impact on government, compared with their educated counterparts. More lettered women also saw electoral campaigns as a means to stay abreast of political developments. In contrast, in contexts such as the state of Uttar Pradesh in North India where political culture has been fractious and violent, women voters, regardless of their status, were very aware of their power as a vote bank, and consequently their capacity as voters to elect or reject a government. In other instances, such as in Pakistan, several women were not registered to vote. Through the invocation of purdah, they were not allowed to obtain their ID cards, a prerequisite to casting one's bailot, an instance of connivance between male citizens and the state against the fundamental rights of women. Some of the studies also caution against regarding voting as a measure of women's interest or its lack in matters of political importance, as "politics" was often understood by women to be equal to voting in a situation where who wins or loses an election makes little difference in most women's lives.
Sources of influence on how (and for whom) a woman casts her vote was a key issue emerging from the project surveys. Overall, a familyinfluenced voting pattern affecting both men and women reflected the
Ekatra report Ekatra report 3. Shirkat Gah report
Ekatra report Shirkat Gah report
6

enduring feudal or patron-client relationship, where a family has always voted for that family, and where balloting endorsed the persistence of existing social hierarchies. Women were more likely than men to concur that men influenced their voting, but denied that they felt pressured by male kin to vote for a particular candidate. In some instances, women were more concerned about the pressure brought to bear upon them by the local elite rather than by family men, although being influenced to vote by men in the family is prominent because of the perception that men are better informed on politics and what happens outside the home. Patterns of pressure or its lack sometimes varied significantly within a state, where province-based responses were informed by women's access to politics or the degree of political awareness within that province.
(v) Women politicians and their (female) voters
The relationship between women in politics and women as voters is more likely to be tension-filled than "sisterly'. Women voters want women politicians to be sensitive to gender concerns but, at the same time, expect that their interventions in governance will go beyond the “soft” portfolios such as education, health, social welfare or women's affairs. In Nepal, female voters who supported leading women politicians complained that their representatives had largely failed to deliver any women-specific actions after they had been elected and joined the executive, even though the politicians had campaigned on women's concerns platforms. In Pakistan, neither women normen had illusions about the competence andhonesty offemale politicians but many felt that only women would improve the lot of other women. About 50% of both women and men interviewed there, favoured women's electoral involvement even though rural men were anxious about who would mind the home if women took to politics, and queried whether women could competently negotiate on behalf of the state. Urban men did not have such reservations, but were reluctant to see their women kin enter politics. Sometimes women and men were equally cynical about national level politics, arguing that politicians were more invested in gaining personal power and money, rather than in serving the electorate.
34 Shirkat Gah and iCES reports
3S Shirkat Gah report
36 Shirkat Gah report. For instance, urban Sindhi women were less likely to be pressured than rural Baluch women, but women in rural and urban Sindh evinced a higher level of interest in politics.
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(vi) Affirmative action and its limits
Affirmative action measures, such as reservations and quotas for women, have long been hailed by activists as the central means to rectify the imbalance of women in politics and other key decision making public posts. Affirmative action may be especially necessary to arrest the pattern of only women from privileged families accessing such positions. But, as the Indian debate on reservations in the Lok Sabha have indicated, it is not aposition easily shared by most men, and some women, in politics. Besides, the efficacy of affirmative actions depends on how quotas are filled. In Bangladesh, for instance, elected parliamentarians nominate those who will fill the 10% women's quota at the national level. Critics favour direct election to those reserved seats rather than nominations, while some interviewees preferred to strengthen those women already in government rather than endorse quotas. In Pakistan, many excuses have been made as to why promises of reservations in national assemblies cannot be fulfilled. There, as in India, the women's reservation issue is often held hostage to other political deals and manoeuvres. In spite of the argument that reservations were as likely to keep women disempowered as to give them a foothold through affirmative action, several women favoured reservations as a means to empowerment in public political space in order to implement policies that would alleviate women's "private" burdens (childcare, search for potable water etc.) and which would subsequently also empower them in private space.'
III. Gender and the State
(i) Postpartum trends in the postcolonial South Asian state
The nature of each contemporary state in South Asia is as intimately linked with a (mostly) shared history of colonialism (Nepal being the exception) as it is with the trajectories in governance selected by the national elites that succeeded to power at independence. The particular experience of colonial government or monarchy had in large measure precluded the development of a substantial indigenous bourgeoisie, effectively leaving landed families and clans to continue their dominance of politics in the decades immediately following independence, or at the onset of “democratic" government. While
7 Asmita report (Tamil Nadu)
18

subsequent histories of state development have taken different directions (such as frequent military regimes in Pakistan, and later Bangladesh, with interregnums of elected governments, civilian governments in India and Sri Lanka that have sometimes forestalled elections and/or resorted to lengthy periods of emergency rule, and in Nepal a monarchy that has an uneasy relationship with a recently democratising Society) changes in the ways each state has envisaged its relationship with female citizens have been slow. In some ways, notional change or stasis can be linked with changes in the relationship between citizen and state.
As the Shirkat Gah study points out, the notion of equality of all citizens is a relatively new concept internationally, and its precise meanings in regard to gender are still evolving and contested. In the period of anticolonial struggle, civil society or non-state actors were the catalyst for sociopolitical transformation of the colonial state and its accountability to the governed. After independence, citizens came to rely on the postcolonial state as the catalyst for such transformations, through changes in law and policy for the benefit of its citizens. The state also came to be relied upon as the key deliverer of welfare needs.
There appears to have been a parallel change in women's location and activism, moving from active political engagement in independence struggles to gradual domestic retirement as a recipient of the welfare measures of the state. This latter arrangement appears to undergird the state's current relationship with women citizens, intimately informed by constraining constructions of femininity and gender-role stereotypes which remain vulnerable to manipulation by law makers and policy definers in pursuit of particular political programmes. Such partialities notwithstanding, women in the studies were insistent that only a democratic state (and, in a multireligious polity, one that was also secular) would provide the impetus and space for redressing gender inequality.
Such consequences are complicated by the differentiated integration of provinces or sub-states into the larger national administrative unit, a reality regarding which many women are aware. Issues such as unequal development, resource availability and access, and the power relationship between the sub-unit and the centre, have consequences for the citizenry as a whole. In spite of select moves to privatisation, the state remains the key catalyst and mediator of development programmes, and despite claims that it intervenes to promote the interests of all, continues to operate with pre-existing gender ideologies intact. The result for women is hardly encouraging. For instance, while the international and national women's movements, the United Nations Decade for Women and U.N. sponsored global women's conferences were
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instrumental in the establishment of Ministries of Women's Affairs and Women's Bureaux to integrate women more effectively into national development plans, such ministries have been consistently understaffed and under-funded, and lack stature compared with other national ministries. Women are also likely to be treated as passive recipients of welfare measures, and marginalised as voiceless targets of development aid, rather than be cultivated as persons whose input into processes of development are as vital as that of their male counterparts. Within developmental policy-making in South Asian states, women citizens are most likely to have been acknowledged in their reproductive capacities, scripted with a negative value as targets of population control programmes, rather than in any other role. Women are also likely still to be acknowledged in development policies and resource distribution as appendages to men and as secondary wage earners, regardless of the significant increase in female-headed households, and in deliberate ignorance of instances where women have held land titles.' These and other such experiences raise the question of how much women are truly likely to benefit from access to resources within a hegemonic, gender-discriminatory, yet resource-providing, state and its discourses.
(ii) The state in armed conflict and ethno-religious
hostilities: Friend/foe
The provision and maintenance of security, against external enemies and internal disrupters, have been a prerogative of the state. In South Asia this has also translated into suppression of dissent or the forcible maintenance of a regime in power by subvention of the armed forces. Militarisation has had two types of implications for women. On the one hand, increasing militarisation by definition exacerbates the vulnerability of all women, regardless of their ethnic or class location, even while minority women remain especially vulnerable if their community is perceived as the disrupter. It exemplifies how the gendered undertones of state ideology accommodate anti-woman violence, while at the same time women might look to the state to protect them from violations. The fallout of inter-state war or internal conflict have also gradually compelled some states, such as Sri Lanka, to deal, albeit reluctantly, with the changing construction of the woman citizen
38 it must be noted here that ordinary citizens, women as well as men, are infrequently
polled or engaged with in planning development schemes. 39 ICES report
20

consequent to conflict and displacement. For instance, women now need to be regarded as heads of households rather than “dependent wives." In turn, women are also compelled to deal directly with the state and its agents in their personal rather than proxy capacities, given the loss or vulnerability of male kin. Thus, by the absence of male citizens, female citizens are pushed to interact closely with the state, and compel the state to recognise their subjective presence, ironically in a context of great risk and danger.
On the other hand, where serving in the armed forces or police, long denied to women, has recently, within limits, become a possibility, women are now positioned to represent the repressive arm of the state as well. They are also increasingly positioned to threaten or challenge the state as armed personnel, as in the examples of armed, anti-systemic movements women have joined or been recruited into, such the LTTE in Sri Lanka, rejecting thereby a simplistic reduction into the passive recipient of protection by a fatherly state. However, in instances where military regimes have long held power and women are denied membership in the armed forces, as in Pakistan, they are consequently denied key roles in public-decision making. But, conversely, membership in the armed forces of the state does not guarantee that women will thereby secure roles as public leaders.
It is in the context of militarisation that women have also mobilised outside of conventional political forums to challenge the state, often complicating ideas about state power and relational responsibilities in the process. For instance, women mobilising as family members of military personnel who have "disappeared' in war and demanding a response from the state highlight the state's accountability to its citizens who were mobilised and deployed in the purpose of defending the state. Women engaging in such efforts face the risk of being branded as traitors for exposing the uncaring aspect of the supposedly paternalistic state. Alternatively, women mobilising in peace movements have also striven to challenge and expose the state's repressive measures, sometimes deploying the role of motherhood to check its excesses, i.e. women invoke the primary nomination accorded them by the state to challenge the state's own failures in "parenting", although not without retaliations by the state which has inverted the notion of concerned mothers to vilify calls for peace and state accountability."
-0 |CES report, and de Alwis, Malathi, Motherhood as a Space of Protest. in
Patricia Jeffery and Amrita Basu. eds. Resisting the Sacred and the Secular op.cit. pp. 185-201.
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(iii) The state and women workers
The problematic relationship between the state and its female citizens has become increasingly acerbic in the context of capital and labour. Women have been shifted to the periphery of the national economy as a consequence of modernization, even as they are becoming increasingly critical to the same economy." Globalisation has seen both a significant gendering of the labour force, as well as its corollary - the feminisation of poverty. The state has been instrumental in ensuring the docility of labour to ensure foreign investment, such as by banning strikes in Export Processing/Free Trade Zones, and has been party to the exploitation of labour by multinational corporations through its role in projecting an image of the passive female worker. The state also needs to increase its initiatives to ensure the personal and occupational safety of female workers in the EPZs/FTZs, and of migrant Women workers, whose income swells the Gross National Product.
In addition, given that the welfarist role of the South Asian state has been increasingly compromised through its compliance with structural adjustment programmes imposed by international monetary institutions, women have been pressured to take on the increased responsibilities in caretaking and other reproductive labour sloughed off on to them by the state.' As the Bangladesh study points out, a state's population control policies may be directed at controlling women's reproductive capacities in order to release women into productive labour, but in reality women are driven to work by destitution and the consequences of structural adjustment programmes and are met with the depression of their wages resulting from women's conditional entry into the labour force.
In all the studies, the majority of women were critical of and opposed to privatisation, compared with most men, the only areas that merited some consideration of private enterprise being health and education. Women also felt that a compromise of the state's regulatory and directive capacity in the areas of resource access and allocation (such as cuts in public/welfare expenditure) would further erode the capacity of women and the poor to compete for scarce resources. At the same time, these women were also mindful of the drawbacks of such state intervention.
- Shirkat Gah report
-12 Ain O Salish Kendra and Ekatra reports -3 Ekatra report. The example provided is an aspect of the Chipko movement, where international visibility for the struggle led the state to declare forests as national preservcs, thereby denying options to the same women who agitated for greater access
to forest resources and their management.
22

The gender bias of the state also emerges in instances where resource allocation becomes an issue. The state projects itself as co-operative when income generation is the focus, because income generation can be justified as alleviating the situation of the entire community through a socialising of the private care-taking function of women. But it turns hostile when resource allocation requires enactment of the norms of equal” citizenship, recognising women as land-holders, primary wage-earners of heads of households, independent of or equal to men."
w
(iv) The state and law reform
In South Asia, the law has remained a favoured site for confronting the gender bias of the state. However, the efforts of women's rights activists have frequently been compromised for two key reasons: (i) The endemic sexism of the legal system itself, and (2) the limited impact of legal changes because inadequate attention has been paid to changing simultaneously the functioning of related institutions, and to raising public awareness on the implications of changes in the law. The law continues, nevertheless, as a site that offers an important blueprint of the nature of relationships between the slate and its (female) citizens. For instance, the law reifies women as wives and mothers, but simultaneously discriminates against married women on questions such as bequeathing citizenship to offspring, and bodily integrity within marriage. It has also frequently been the site where contests between ethno-religious communities for stakes in the state have been articulated, with gender becoming a terrain for legal battles that ignore minority women's needs and refuse them space for their own articulations, especially pronounced in contexts of ethnic polarisation and the fragile political alliances of incumbent governments.
Most citizens, both women and men, experience constraints accessing the state's justice system, marked by chronic delays in judicial processes. There is a general perception that justice is available only for the class privileged. Some women may also reject the state as a site of justice, Seeing it rather as acting in collusion with other formations repressive of women, such as family and religious hierarchies. Others prefer to keep the state out of family matters, or turn to the courts only as a last resort. Few South
Examples from ICES report Ai () Salish Kendra report s Shirkat Gah report
s
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Asians consider the police in favourable terms. But the expectation that the State should provide justice prevails, even ifmany persons are compelled to, or prefer to, take their problems elsewhere to more accessible institutions, such as to the local political elite or traditional forums, for dispute resolution. There is also, however, an ambivalence with regard to approaching institutions outside the family for problem solving - if women are allowed to approach such institutions at all. In some instances, rural women do prefer to approach such bodies rather than the formal courts," choosing the local, politically- - elected elite rather than the traditional elite who are perceived to be more gender-biased." The local political elite may also have the critical advantage ofan elected woman representative available for consultation or intervention (especially so if an electoral quota has mandated one). Local elite women are often regarded as potential mediators between victimised women and justice-related state organs.
The general distrust of state institutions, such as the police and iaw courts, and their perceived responsibility for increasing incidents of dowry murders and rape, may also push women and men to seek justice through local panchayats or party networks." Local sites of arbitration may be preferred as the known, accessible, Swift-acting devil of local dispute resolution rather than an unknown, delaying, inaccessible demon of the central state. even if such local bodies traditionally have no women functionaries, or are rarely accessed directly by women themselves. In fact, in scnne instances such as in Pakistan, the state might actually rely on local arbitration bodies to provide for problem resolution within the local context rather that bring a matter to court, or when it is felt that the existing state mechanisms will not be able to address a situation competently or adequately. Rural women, in contrast to urban women, might consider such bodies actually capable of rendering justice acceptable to women. Neither women nor men, however, had aay illusion that such forums would be free of power plays and exertions of influence by the local elites in Bangladesh. nonMuslims were more positive about salish (local bodies for arbitration procedures) than Muslims, perhaps because non-Muslims themselves are often part of the rural elite.
47 Ain O Salish Kendra and Shirkat Gah reports 48 Shtri i Shakti report
49 Asmita report (Tamil Nadu)
50 Ain O Salish Kendra and Shirkat Gah reports 5. Ain O Salish Kendra report
24

IV The State and Gendered Civil Society
(i) Women's movements and the state
In South Asia, as in most other regions of the world, the development an fortunes of the women's movement has been closely linked with the progress or setbacks of the state and associated political forces. Mobilisation to promote women's education, check repressive Social practices and revoke certain oppressive laws was an important aspect of reform and independence movements in the 20th century. Women in contemporary social change movements, ranging from the Nepal pro-democracy agitation to the resistance of the Chakma in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, have continued to argue that promoting the rights of women cannot occur independent of overall movements for democracy and social justice, including equal treatment for ethnic minorities and depressed castes and classes. While women's mobilisation has catalysed or compelled the state to alter some of its policies to accommodate women's needs, the women's movement has often suffered setbacks when the democratic capacities of the state are compromised through military regimes or other authoritarian governments, with the result that non-governmental organisations (NGOs) including women’s NGOs, have been attacked for challenging discriminatory or repressive actions of the regime in power. In extreme circumstances, laws have even been passed authorising the state to intervene in NGO functioning, ostensibly to check alleged corruption but a move that can also target NGOs that oppose or are critical of a particular regime.
Further, given that the South Asian state tends to act so as to maintain intact the gender imbalance in society, rather than interrogate gender relations in a fundamental way, it is likely to support those women's organisations perceived as non-confrontational and promoting the state's policies. For instance, those that focus on poverty alleviation and economic development are more likely to find favour than those that might challenge state policies which are gender-discriminating, such as in the areas of law, citizenship or the distribution of land resources. Several women's organisations associated with development have striven to function independently of any political party, and to cultivate Support from the state through such neutral'
Exceptions to this do exist. however, as in the opportunities made available to women during the Ayub military regime in Pakistan (Shirkat Gah report). 53 lCES report
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positioning. While this strategy has enabled women to secure more access to public space and decision making, the confinement of such organisations to community development level has also compromised their capacity to assert themselves in politicised forums, since the state can now more easily ignore or dismiss them when they do intervene on issues of political importance.
The state has, nevertheless, been compelled to recognise the value of NGOs, especially in the context of globalisation and economic restructuring. In particular, it recognises that NGOs are positioned to provide services that the state cannot deliver to its citizens. NGOs are thus implicated in the maintenance and reformation of the state, even though there rarely are explicit joint ventures between NGOs and local government bodies, legal provisions to facilitate cooperative activity notwithstanding.
(ii) Women’s NGOs, informal and formal politics
NGOs play a key role in providing space for women to cultivate political awareness and actively participate in politics, or to challenge the status quo and various systems of discrimination, from outside party-dominated spaces. As the Shirkat Gah study points out, NGOs may have a limited impact on a Society compared with the apparatus of the state, but they can still play an important role by supporting women's interventions and providing opportunities for leadership. Nationally and regionally, NGO networks form effective pressure groups to keep women's issues, such as inheritance rights, violence against women, and equal access to education and employment, at the fore. The particular strength of such formations is that they provide the opportunity for women to cultivate a collective social power to confront and negotiate with the state for the causes they espouse. In particular, if their interventions are rooted in a feminist perspective that underscores the need for a multifaceted approach to challenging gender inequality by simultaneous consideration of concerns such as poverty, caste hierarchy and sectarianism, then they also afford the opportunity for women to understand the interconnections between, say, income generation and the merits of women's material autonomy. For instance, in Bangladesh, access to micro-credit systems empowered poor women to be less dependent on class-privileged people for work and resources."
S. Shtri i Shakti report
Ekatra and ICES reports Shtri i Shakti report 57 Ain O Salish Kendra report
55
S6
26

NGOs have also made decisive interventions in shoring up elected women representatives. Both studies on India, by ASmita and Ekatra, established that, where women's NGOs were active, elected women representatives were more likely to be aware of provisions in the formal political process. While some NGOs have undertaken training programmes to strengthen the efficacy of women representatives, thereby underscoring the opportunities possible through such links, others have desisted from such activity in order to maintain “neutrality from party-style or mainstreamed politics.'
(iii) Relationships between women's NGOs and other civil
society organisations
Perhaps the most noteworthy alliances between women's NGOs and other civil society institutions emerge in the context of either resisting or contesting an authoritarian state, as in working on human rights initiatives or protesting press censorship, on the one hand, or linking up to promote sectarian impulses, as in the case of RSS institutions promoting Hindutva, in India, on the other. As Shirkat Gah reminds us, civil Society does not simply mean prodemocratic, pro-feminist forces, but also conservative, anti-feminist, religious extremism that resorts to violence in pursuit of a political agenda. There is also a third type of alliance, where NGOS may work to assist women's political activity that is unconnected with established parties or political forums like panchayats. For instance, in Himachal Pradesh, the NGO PAPN provided assistance to the anti-quarry and anti-liquor struggle spearheaded by women.'
V. Negotiating Citizenship
(i) Conventional notions of citizenship and gendered
implications
Citizenship, at its most fundamental level, connotes the relationship between citizens and their state, where the state is expected to respect, safeguard and promote the rights of its citizens while the latter discharge their responsibilities
58 AS in states such as Karnataka (Asmita report)
59 Shtri i Shakti report 60 Ekatra report
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to a state that, they hope, represents them equally without favouring any select group. However, it appears that unequal gendered notions of citizenship are central to discourses of the state, regardless of assertions of equality. Historically, women's entitlement to citizenship has been determined by their relationships to men and subordinated to the place they had in their community, giving them therefore an 'auxiliary status. Furthermore, rather than treat its citizens on par in other respects and disavow sectarian or ethnonationalist policies, South Asian states, as much as ethno-religious communities, have often selectively mobilised ethno-religious identities for political and economic ends, often with negative ramifications for women across ethnic and religious groups.
The state's failure to ensure gender equality has compelled women's activists either to hold the state accountable for the abuse of power regarding gender, and pressure it to meet welfare commitments, or to eschew reliance upon it. As have other movements for social transformation, the women's movement, including at the grassroots, has pressured the state through nonparty political mobilization and advocacy to redefine the state's responsibilities towards them, utilising the discourse of basic needs and fundamental rights to press for initiatives such as anti-liquor laws and State programmes to safeguard the environment.' Significantly (perhaps because women have overwhelmingly had the need to be responsible thrust upon them, compared with their male counterparts) women citizens have also sought to establish what their responsibilities are, along with their rights, in re-articulating their relationship with the state.
(ii) Contested definitions of citizenship
Women in various formations have, through their activism, also contested the conventional definitions of citizenship and consequent relationship with the state. They have sought to re-negotiate the meanings of citizenship through encounters with the state and its officers. For instance, while continuing to regard the state as the source of laws that protect them, Koya tribal Women in Andhra Pradesh have been compelled to confront the State's officers as compromisers of that same law. Elsewhere, the state was perceived as abetting anti-women violence through the continued provision of liquor licenses, even subsequent to women's protests. Various laws in the region
6 Shirkat Gah report
62 Asmita and Ekatra reports
63 Asmita report (Andhra Pradesh) 64 Asmita report (Tamil Nadu)
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still discriminate sexually in residency laws and acquisition of citizenship, maintaining thereby the nationalist creation of the gendered “other", perpetuated in spite of constitutional provisos of non-discrimination.' Discriminatory pronouncements are most evident in the perpetuation of laws regarding inheritance and genderbiased land distribution. For instance, wives may be declared ineligible to receive land re-distributed by the state, male heads of household are assumed to be the norm, regardless of practices to the contrary, and inheritance is recast in terms of primogeniture by the state, ignoring existing, local inheritance practices that allow for women to inherit as substantially as men. At the same time, the state continues to be invoked as the site for justice, when laws that prohibit alienation of land are drawn upon to contest such alienations that are abetted by state actors.''
VI. Re-imagining the State
(i) Mediated perceptions of the state
Women's perceptions and experiences of the state and therefore definition of a state's responsibilities are, in large measure, mediated by an array of socio-economic and ethno-religious factors. For several women in South Asia who have minimal exposure to the public realm, politics is equated with electoral politics and voting. Others who have greater mobility and cause to challenge the state and its policies, whether by accident or design, including students and workers, see politics as the competitive tendency and jousts for power that permeate all levels of government. Proportionately fewer women see politics as a matrix of power processes informing the assertion of fundamental rights and negotiation of various entitlements from the state, and the value of women's direct representation in democratic process. Women from depressed castes or classes, and from ethnic minorities, may see politics as a means to retain or regain their identity and self-dignity. They understand the violence, to which they are subjected, as part of the regime of terror directed at them by the state, and hence politics also is a means to regain their dignity as women and as minorities.'
6S For instance Sri Lanka, ICES report
66 ICES report 67 Asmita report (Andhra Pradesh) 68 Ain O Salish Kendra report
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(ii) Government, state and governance
In the course of the research process, important insights into the understandings and definitions of concepts such as “governance," state' and government' emerged. For comparison, some of the essentials of governance emerging from a social science context might be considered. For instance, Ain O Salish Kendra proposes that governance includes (a) the legitimacy of government, which depends on the existence of participatory processes and the consent of those who are governed; (b) the accountability of both political and official elements of government for their actions and the existence of mechanisms to call individuals and institutions to account; (c) the competence of a government to formulate appropriate policies, make timely decisions, implement them effectively and deliver services; and (d) respect for human rights and the rule of law to guarantee individual and group rights and Security, in order to provide a framework for economic and social activity and to allow and encourage participation of all citizens.
Many interviewees and survey respondents demonstrated very limited understanding of the difference between “government” and “state'. Among those who identified a difference, some said that they felt a sense of entitlement as citizens within the state, regardless of the government in power, whereas any particular government could represent the interests of select persons or communities. Definitions of governance were also mediated by Socio-political locations of persons in relation to the state, which informed their expectations of what constituted good governance.” Most women felt represented by the State, even in contexts of political unrest that resulted in citizens experiencing the armed presence of the state," while in other contexts women felt that the state encompassed them all, regardless of political affiliation, while the government, transitory and party-specific, did not always represent the interests of all. The location of minority women vis a vis the state depended on the relationship of the minority community with the majority, and especially their relationship with the majority-dominated State at any given in Oment.
8 Ain O Satish Kendra report
7() The Ekatra report points out that even in a troubled region such as the Punjab. a relatively small proportion of women polled felt that they were not represented by the State.
7|| CES report
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(iii) Expectations- and re-visions of the state
The capacity to re-imagine the state was both affected by and limited by the fact that in South Asia, women and men had rarely, if ever, experienced or been encouraged to imagine a viable alternative to the organising principles and functioning of an overarching state. This was true even if, as an institution, the state was inefficient and frequently corrupt and repressive. So women and men continue to perceive themselves as being located in relationship to the State, and in large measure expect the state to continue its many roles. rather than reduce its interventions. There was sometimes even a desire to see the state increase its intervening or mediating role. However, in all cases, women were very clear that the state fell far short of what it could do to alleviate the lives of its citizens.
Most women envision a democratic, participatory, accountable, nondiscriminatory and gender sensitive state that is committed to a transparency of the processes of governing. Many also saw the state as a provider of law, order and peace as women were disproportionately victimized by violence. of all types.' They also wished for a state where religion or ethnicity would not be used for political gains. Others, especially if they were from disenfranchised minority communities, emphasised the need for a state to guarantee security (physical and economic), and to maintain the rule of law, including respect for fundamental rights and retention of land. It was often felt that a decentralised state was more likely than a centralised one to address everyday, local concerns.'
Ensuring participatory government is critically important so that development plans, sensitive to citizens needs, are prepared internally rather than imposed from the outside as is likely to happen under structural adjustment programmes. In North India, many women felt that ensuring equitable distribution of resources along economic lines will ensure equitable distribution along caste lines as well." There was also emphasis on the need to improve the state's regulatory and distributive functions. In short, women wish to see the welfare state persist, acting as a provider of resources and
Ekatra report
Asmita and Ekatra reports Asmita and Ain O Salish Kendra reports Ekatra report
Ekatra report
Shtri i Shakti report
3.

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employment, a site of adjudication, and as the owner and maintainer of essential services. While citizenry and community may have a shared investment in resource ownership, with the state holding resources in trust for people, the state - whether acting in its centralised or de-centralised capacities - was still expected to administer such resource distribution." Existing degrees of, or increased, intervention by the state notwithstanding, a considerable proportion wanted NGOs and civil society groups or the community to take on service delivery. For women, education and health were the two areas where they were open to considering interventions by the private sector, especially if the respondents came from urban, middle class backgrounds (as they were the persons who could access such service alternatives to the state). In comparison, some of the men surveyed or interviewed, especially if they were from the urban upper and middle classes, favoured private sector interventions in areas such as health, education and banking.
In considering a more focussed profile, Pakistan provides an interesting example of gendered expectations and views of the state. In the Shirkat Gah study, while both women and men were concerned with the economic factors of good governance, including unemployment, women were more likely to prioritise inflation, and men, corruption. While proportionately more men than women were likely to be concerned with the question of law and order, prioritising the law and order situation over the provision of basic needs varied by province, depending on the immediacy of law and order concerns. Poor sanitation and the poor provision of basic facilities such as electricity and roads, as well as over-population, were other key concerns for women. More men than women thought the private sector should take over some state roles, especially in the areas of education and health, and in the provision of water facilities and roads. In the matter of the relationship between religion and the state, women in rural areas were especially aware of the instrumental negative use of Islam for political ends. In general, women, like men, placed primacy on the economic and social well-being of people in non-religious terms, taking their Muslim identity as a given. Thus, while Islam is an important framework for people, it is a framework for social interaction and not seen as part of the state's responsibilities.
78 Ain O Salish Kendra and ICES reports
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VII. Conclusion
Women in South Asia continue to make bids to participate more effectively in the public and political life of their countries, to advance their own interests and those of their communities, and to negotiate the meanings of gendersensitive citizenship. On Such fronts, women meet a range of challenges. The opportunity to enter politics and contribute meaningfully to national governance is determined by factors such as education, mobility, financial capacity, the sexual division of labour, familial and community Support or constraints on the one hand, and by political systems, including the inhospitable terrains of political parties and political processes, on the other. The state's willingness to intervene on behalf of women as a "group', or to create an environment and opportunities that promote women's participation, is, in turn, informed by the interests of state and political actors in securing or maintaining power. In South Asia, these interests have manifested themselves as the manipulation of ethnic and religious sentiments of citizens, the protection of existing social hierarchies and incumbent political elites, and the use of gender as the terrain for negotiating the maintenance or reformulation of political alliances, often regardless of the interests of women themselves. For women, the results of such actions are compounded by the hurdles faced by states of the global south in the contemporary international
TCI.
In an era marked by the global movement of capital and labour, and the demand for infrastructural adjustments in the states of the global south as mandated by international financial institutions, it is predominantly women who face the primary debilitations of shifts in state commitments. Women are largely dependent on the state for resources and services that make it possible for them, at least minimally, to cope with the discriminatory sexual division of labour, an inequality that in itself compromises any bid at material autonomy and accompanying freedoms. Withdrawal of the state from its welfare functions will burden women still further. While the root causes of the under-development or uneven development of a state may be complex, what is clear is that any attempt to devise solutions at any level of policymaking within a state cannot hope to be effective unless the lives and concerns of women are given serious consideration, and they are drawn in as public decision-makers and political actors to articulate their anxieties and aspirations, as well as voice the concerns of the communities with which they are linked.
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Select recommendations emerging from the six reports for the promotion of women in politics, and for increasing the state's accountability to women citizens
(A)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(B)
(l)
Women in Politics
Reservations for women at all levels of formal political structures to ensure that a critical mass of women are active, in order to evolve a broader concept of democracy and gender-sensitive governance. The induction of women into the hierarchy of political parties through quotas for women as office bearers, and meaningful quotas of seats (including safe seats) to be contested by women. Pro-active roles for the women's wing of political parties, rather than a passive, auxiliary status. Training of elected members (women and men) in legislative processes so that position duties and the extent of power and responsibility are made clear, and capacity building promoted. Elimination of proxy representation in order to restrict the furthering of family interests. Changing of sexist attitudes overall, with gender-sensitisation made mandatory at all levels of government and bureaucracy, to include recognition of women's roles and capacities as leaders, their rights as women, and sensitivity to the particular realities of women marginalised on the basis of ethnicity, religion, caste, class, or other Social status. Increasing the knowledge base of politics and political activity among women, and demystifying political ideologies through greater debate and information sharing, in order to increase awareness on the manipulation and marginalisation of women by political parties. Formation of a women's party to cut across partisan loyalties and restrictions, and to address gender issues explicitly. The establishment of stronger networks between women in political structures (such as the parliament and assemblies) and women's activists and women's groups who are outside the formal systems.
Women and the State
Establishment of a permanent National Commission on the Status of Women with statutory powers, and parallel bodies at more localised levels.
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(2)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Ensuring a sufficient budget for, and adequate numbers of trained personnel in, the Ministry for Women's Affairs, and the Women's Bureaux, and effective networking with other ministries and government departments. Institutionalising processes to ensure accountability and transparency of state mechanisms at all levels. Effecting requisite structural changes in state institutions to ensure participation from below. Building up opposition to communalist organisations that attempt to coopt women for their own political agendas, through the development of alternate political perspectives in interaction with formations such as trade unions, political parties, people's movements, human rights groups and noncommunalist NGOs. Given that women need the cooperation of men to overcome patriarchy, creating awareness among, and sensitising, different constituencies of men through programmes initiated by NGOs, civil society organisations, and the state. Citizens need to underscore, through discussion, debate and joint initiatives, the role of civil society in the transformation of political culture, including ensuring increased accountability of the state to its women citizens. Citizens need to lobby to increase the pro-active efforts of the state to ensure women's participation in policy-making, to expand the provision of state employment opportunities to promote women's empowerment, and to decrease political influence in the functioning of state mechanisms in different fields.
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Nepal
Shtrii Shakti
Introduction
At the threshold of the twenty-first century South Asian society is facing a number of complex problems. and several emerging issues have been inadequately addressed at both theoretical and practical levels. The problems women face now, especially their relationships with the state, need to be explored further for agenda-setting in the new millennium. The much-used phrase, the patrimonial state, conveys meanings relative to longstanding social norms, values and behaviour based on the inequality of the sexes, male as superior and female as subordinate, but it does not specify a particular political structure and process of interaction between citizens and political institutions. The well-established theory that the state consists of four integral components - people, territory, government and sovereignty - can hardly contribute to mapping out the relationship between women and the state. A non-sectarian view and a non-parochial approach are, therefore, required while re-imagining the state from women's perspective.
International declarations and resolutions, particularly the United Nations world conferences on women, from Mexico through Beijing, provide
Shtrii Shakti Research Team: Coordinator: Indira Shrestha; Researcher. Krishna
Hachhethu; Research Assistants: Ramesh Narayan Shrestha and Shaguni Singh. Field Surveyors: Alka Shrestha. Ananta Shrestha Bhagwati Khadga. Gita Puri. Krishna
Giri, Meena Nakarmi. Ramesh Karki, Ramesh N. Shrestha, Shailesh Shrestha. Shaguni Singh. Shikha Prasai, Suman Aryal and Pritam Lal Shrestha (Manager, Adm/Finance). Text of Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948; Convention on the Political Rights of Women 1952: Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. The First UN World Conference on Women, Mexico, 1975. The Second IN World Conference on Women. Copenhagen. 1980; \airobi For card-looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women. Nairobi, 1985. The Fourth UN World Conference on Women, Beijing, 1995.
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the layout for women's participation in state affairs. By codifying universal norms, values and laws related to the improvement of the status of women in social, economic, political and other fields, the international conventions visualised a highly responsive and sensitised state vis-a-vis women. The state, as conceived and highlighted by these conventions, is a highly significant institution which will dedicate itself to the task of transforming the political landscape by espousing gender equality in all spheres.
However, state structures, especially in South Asia, hardly operate in the standard manner envisaged by the fora of global reformers. Most countries of the world are signatories to the international declarations and conventions on equal opportunity and non-discrimination between men and women, but no substantial improvement is evident in the overall position of women in society. Women's presence in various spheres of public life, particularly in politics, remains very low. In essence, the conclusion arrived at by Najma Chowdhury and Barbara J. Nelson may be cited here: 'In no country do women have political status, access, or influence equal to men’s.’
Based on experiences and experiments that showed that women's emancipation could not be achieved under the existing male-dominated state structure, new thinking has emerged. International organisations, too, have shifted their focus from primary reliance on the state for the improvement of women's status, to complementing this with the need for women's active intervention in the state apparatus for their own empowerment. Some points incorporated in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW Article 7) and the UN World Conference in Beijing are worth mentioning, as they show how this new thinking is worked out in women's relations with the state and politics. The Beijing Conference made women's empowerment the central thrust for action in the twenty-first century. Considering the inequality between men and won in power-sharing and decision-making to be a critical area of concern, it emphasised the need to: (a) take measures to ensure women's equal access to and full participation in power Structure and decision-making; (b) increase women's capacity to participate in decision-making and leadership'."
The central theme of this new thinking is that women's empowerment, i.e., visible, active and effective involvement of women in all public spheres,
s Nelson, Barbara. and Chowdhury. Najma. Redefining Politics: Patterns of Women's Political Engagement from a Global Perspective. in Barbara J. Nelson and Najma Chowdhury, eds. Women and Politics Worldy ide. Oxford University Press. Delhi. 1997, p. 3.
4 United Nations. Fourth World Conference on Women (Bulletin), 14 September 1995.
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particularly in the state structures and political processes, as well as their participation at all levels of the decision-making process, could bring about restructuring of the state in such a way that the state will have to become more responsive and accountable to the needs and problems of women. Whether the state will absorb this new thinking is debatable. Nevertheless it provides a sound ideological justification for the new women's movement that follows the principles of women's empowerment. Women's empowerment, as defined by a group of women activists of South Asian countries, means a process by which the powerless and disempowered gain a greater share of control over material and intellectual resources, and challenge the ideology of patriarchy and gender-based discrimination against women in all institutions and structures of society.
Indeed, the principles of women's empowerment have certainly brought a new dimension to the understanding of the state, politics, government and democracy. With the concept of women's empowerment as a blueprint for action, the state can no longer remain a male-dominated institution; it needs to be changed and restructured. For women, the restructuring of the state means inclusion of the female section of society in the state's power structure. Thus a gender-balanced state' may be a more appropriate term to describe the nature of a state attuned to women's empowerment.
The advance of new thinking on the state leads to change in the understanding of politics. Taking into consideration women's increasing assertion and intervention in political affairs, politics at present cannot be confined to what is understood by classical definitions such as the struggle for power', 'a game of the political elite', or the structure of ruler-ruled relations'. From a gender perspective, the degree and nature of women's participation becomes the key variable giving meaning, content and value to measuring the manifestations of politics.
Participation is another central parameter defining democracy from women's perspective. Democracy cannot be narrowed down to the legitimacy of the electoral system and legal and theoretical equality between men and women on their rights to vote and to be candidates in elections. The extent of women's representation and actual participation in the overall political structures and processes of policy formulation and decision-making give a more accurate and balanced picture of participatory democracy. The International Parliamentary Union's (IPU) definition could be more
See Batliwala. Srilatha, ed. Womens Empowerment in South Asia. Concepts and Practices. FAO (FF-C/AD) and ASPBAE. New Delhi. 1996.
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appropriate to understand the notion of democracy from women's point of view. Accordingly, ... promoting a more equitable sharing of political power and responsibility between men and women will enable society to benefit from the specific input and talents of women as much as those of men and, above all, give real meaning to the concept of democracy. The traditional definition of government, consisting of three organs, the legislative, the executive and the judiciary, is less important in the new context. Rather, knowing how many parliamentarians, ministers and judges are women as compared to men, and how effective are the roles played by these women, will lead to a better understanding of the nature and type of governance in question. Governance, in this context, refers to the manner of exercising power and process of participation in policy-making, either through direct involvement in the formal political structure or through lobbying by civil organisations. Again. from women's perspective, the notion of governance covers a wide range of activities ranging from the grassroots women's movements to the representation of women in the formal political structure, along with putting women's views and perceptions at the core of public policy formulation and programme implementation.
The South Asiam context
Does the state as envisaged from the perspective of women's empowerment exist in South Asian countries, Nepal in particular? Or is it a goal that can be achieved only in the distant future? For the common people of South Asia, including women irrespective of their national identity, the state is basically conceived to be integral to the notion of power; it is thus not different from the government. The legacy of a shared history of colonial rule (except in the case of Nepal), the sporadic tenure of a democratic regime (in Bangladesh and Pakistan) or its lack (until the 1980s in Nepal), the impact of feudal socio-economic structures, and authoritarian political culture have all strongly influenced the shaping of people's perception of the State, the government and politics as synonymous. Even after independence, the collapsing of a leader's image with state identity (India is Indira (Gandhi), Indira is India, for instance) remains a common feature of South Asia. Given these backgrounds, one can put the state, government and politics into one basket of political power structure, which is different from the social structures and organisations of South Asian societies.
t International Parliamentary tinion. Women and Political Power, PU. Geneva.
1992. p. 4.
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Beyond a power-related image of the state, the wish for a welfare state is a common phenomenon in South Asia. Accordingly, the state is considered as an institution which has responsibility for the social, economic and political well-being of the citizens by providing social-economic needs (education, health, drinking water, roads, communications, etc.) and other services (law and order, security, justice, guarantee of human rights, etc.). The State is also viewed as the primary dispenser and provider of funds for development.
The modern states of South Asia have an ambiguous approach to women. On the one hand, each state of this region is credited with initiating a number of legal reforms to liberate women from cruel social practices and blatant exploitation; on the other, state functionaries have leant towards the revival of casteism, communalism and religious bigotry, all of which tend to revive and reproduce patriarchal societal relations. In the conflict between women's quest for change and the conservatives' stand for status quo, the states in this region have usually favoured conservative and traditional forces.
The scenario of the representation of South Asian women in governance and political processes presents a mixed picture. in Bangladesh, women are relatively in a more enviable position because of reservations for women of 10% in the parliament, 10-15% in administration and 30% in local government. The system of one third reservation for women at all levels of local elected bodies in India, as provided by the Indian Constitution after its 73' and 74th Amendments in 1994, is a major breakthrough to bring about change in state-women relations.” In its proposals for a new constitution, Sri Lanka recently suggested a 25% women quota in local government (plans that have since been shelved). In Pakistan, there were approximately 10% of women's representatives in local elected bodies. Since a large number of women are involved at least in local politics and governance, the old notion of politics as an exclusive male bastion has now begun to erode,
See Hasan, Zoya. Forging lalentities: Gender Communities and the State. Kali for Women. New Delhi. 1994, Shirkat Gah. Women in Politics. Participation and Representation in Pakistan. Shirkat Gah. Lahore. 1988. Agro-forestry. Basic Health and Co-operatives. Nepal. and Women Awareness Centre, Nepal. Political Empowerment. Bangladesh Perspective. Toniards Equal Political Power. South Asian Womens foice, ABC/Nepal and WACN. Kathmandu. 1995. See for detail Kaushik. Susheela. Women Panchas in Position: A Study of Panchayat Raj in Haryana, Centre for Development Studies and Action. New Delhi, 1997: Kaushik. Susheela. compiled. Knocking at the Asale Bastion. Women in Politics, National Conmission for Women. New Delhi. 1997.
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The contemporary state in some South Asian countries is seen in a different light where state-women interactions have altered as a consequence of the increase in grassroots women's movements and the proliferation of non-political women's organisations, which are providing alternative political space to women outside political parties and other formal political platforms.' India and Bangladesh have good records of civil society movements carried out through NGOs, including women's organisations. NGOs and other civil organisations have also contributed to women's power to confront and to bargain with the state and the government over politics and women's issues. In other countries the results are more convoluted. For instance. Sri Lankan women have had greater potential to influence public policy formulation because of a high women's literacy rate, one that has positively contributed to enhancing political awareness and consciousness.' Women's involvement in certain political spheres in Sri Lanka through civil society, trade union movements and even violent political confrontation is higher than the average South Asian standard - but the representation of women in formal structures of power remains abysmally low.
Nepal: Changing state-women relations
Considering the state as the public forum for citizens' actions, the statewomen relations in Nepal have changed at three major historical junctures. Women were completely excluded from the public domain in education, administration, politics and in other public affairs until the mid twentieth century. Although the unification of the country in 768 marked the emergence of Nepal as a nation, the country largely operated as a primitive state, one that was an alien entity for women. As the existence of the state was concomitant with its limited responsibilities (i.e., collection of taxes, maintenance of law and order, and protection of the people from outside intervention), the state-citizen relations were minimal, and women had little concern with the state. Their role outside the family did not go beyond the boundary of community, and the law discriminated against women. Apart from the single instance of abolition of the sati system in June 1920, the Nepali state formalised and legitimised patriarchy through the promulgation of Muluki Ain (civil code) in 1854, which was based on the Hindu ethos. Hinduism is, by and large, discriminatory against women and so was/is the
0 Purushothaman. Sangeetha. The Emponierment of Women in India. Grassroots
Womens Vety'orks and the State. Sage Publications. New Delhi, 1998. Abeyesekera. Sunila, Country Gender.--Analysis: Sri Lanka. SllDA, Stockholm, l99l.
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civil code. By enforcing the Hindu ethos as state-protected ideology, the Nepali state during its earlier stages totally excluded women from the public domain.
Without much change in the entity of the Nepali state as a discriminatory institution against women, it began to be partly viewed as a provider of services to the citizens, including women, when Nepal started the modernisation process in the mid twentieth century. This modernisation involved expanding its active interventions in several areas including the judicial system, which were previously entrusted to traditional institutions. By de-linking women-community relations in the process of governance, the modernisation of the state has helped to bring women out from the traditional practice of complete seclusion. Bringing women under the purview of state law and policy was a decisive departure from the past. Like any other modern state, Nepal appears eager to identify itself with certain egalitarian and secular values, in words if not in deeds. Thus constitutionally and legally women are said to be equal to men since the promulgation of the 1951 Interim Constitution, followed by subsequent legal enactment. Nevertheless, a study carried out by Shtrii Shakti (henceforth S2) has found nine discriminatory provisions in the new civil code that contradict the constitutional provision of equality between men and women.' By making polygamy punishable and granting divorce rights and conditional property rights to women through the enforcement of this civil code, the state provided some relief from discriminatory social practices against women. Following women and development values, women's literacy, maternity, health, family planning, etc., have also come within the purview of state responsibilities.
Theoretically, the image of Nepal as a welfare state vis-a-vis women further got a boost once the principles of women in development (WID) began to be reflected in the state's manifest policy, programmes and objectives. Following the first national study on the status of women in Nepal (1977-81), the identity of women as a distinct group with needs to be specifically addressed was acknowledged for the first time in development planning after the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1980-85). A number of structural adjustments were made, and several policies and programmes formulated, to ensure increased women's participation in national development in key Sectors such as agriculture, forestry, industry, education and health. However, the gap between precept and practice persists, and state functionaries lag far behind the ideology of the state in matters concerning women. There is a
2 See S2. Women in Nepal. Current Situation and Recommendations for Change.
GWPIG. Kathmandu, n.d.
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wide gap between women's expectations and the state's performance. The recently published Human Development Report of Nepal shows that there is high gender disparity as measured by the Gender Development index (GDI), which looks at life expectancy, educational attainment and income. Using the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), which examines participation in politics, the administration, the professions and income, the same disparity is seen.'
The same report however states that. GDI values for Nepal for the period 1970-1997 show that there has been considerable improvement in the capabilities of women in relation to men during the period.' Women have started making their presence felt in the public domain since Nepal began following women and development and then WID principles. The interactions between the state and women have been extended and expanded over time. Nevertheless the inclusion of women in the formal power structure of the state and in decision-making processes is still overlooked. With the realisation, at least at the theoretical level, of the need for women's equitable sharing in power relationships and in mainstream politics, the gender and development concept has recently been introduced.
The state-women relations entered a new phase after the restoration of democracy in Nepal in 1990. The democratic state of Nepal became preoccupied with WID principles, as reflected in the constitutional provisions of directive principles of the state that consider women as one of the disadvantaged sections of society requiring redress.
Some distinct changes in the position of women and their perceptions regarding the political structure and processes are visible. Viewed from the perspective of women's movements that arose after the restoration of democracy, women's empowerment appears to have been the central thrust of such movement. In the past, under the partyless panchayat regime, empowerment was narrowly understood in terms of socio-economic development; but, since the restoration of democracy, more emphasis has been placed on political empowerment. Nepali women now want to see multiparty democracy leading to the advancement of participatory democracy. There is increasing political awareness and consciousness of women's issues and problems among Nepali women, and this has already generated a number of grassroots women's movements in different parts of the country. Women are increasingly asserting their wish to be actively involved in the processes
3. See gender section. Nepal South Asian Centre. Nepal Human Development Report
Al 998. NSAC. Kathmandu. 1998 14 Ibid. p. 45.
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of governance. The shift of women's issues from state-controlled business, as under the party less panchayat system in the past, to a public platform agenda, is a highly visible change occasioned by the democratic environment. Women have new political space with the legalisation of political parties and emergence of women-related interest/pressure groups. NGOs and civil organisations.
This study analyses the current position of women in Nepali politics and governance within the framework of the state-society interface. Women are considered as a social force that confronts as well as collaborates with the state. Civil organisations and political parties are expected to play a mediating role between social interests and political power. The mass of population, the state, civil organisations and political parties are considered to be key players, and the interplay of these actors in determining the level of women's political participation in Nepal will be the central assessment theme.
To explore women's role and their relations with politics, government and state, a wide range of research tools and techniques was used. In addition to archival research, workshops, a national level seminar and central level interviews, a field study was conducted in six sample districts (Dhankuta, Dhanusha, Kathmandu, Kaski, Dang and Doti) representing different ecological zones, development regions, and caste/ethnic/tribal groups. 450 women and 50 men from a cross-section of society, commoners, professionals, social workers, development activists and politicians were selected for questionnaire administration. Focus group discussions were carried out with 250 persons, and personal interviews at the local level with 90 persons; 10% of these were men. The findings of both the archival research and the field survey are presented analytically rather than by simple statistical enumeration. In addition to the above tools and techniques, data from prior national studies undertaken by S2 in over 15 districts have been used in the analysis of the study.
The paper is organised into seven sections. First the introduction, which gives a brief thematic treatment of women's perception of the state, politics and government, especially with reference to Nepal's experience. Women's low representation in the formal political structure of Nepal and their problems and prospects are dealt with in the second part under the heading 'Social Change and Political Participation in Nepal: Women's Quest for Political Space'. How Nepali women's growing political consciousness on gender issues is affecting their involvement in informal politics is covered in the third section, State-Women Interface: Negotiation of Citizenship'. The potential and active roles of civil organisations and NGOs in linking
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women's needs and problems with the state/government policy is explored under the heading State- Women Interface: Mediation by Civil Organisations. How political parties can contribute to increasing women's political participation is covered in State-Women Interface: Multiple Roles of Political Parties. Section six explores Nepali Women's Vision of the State' and in Conclusion, a number of recommendations are made to suggest strategies and approaches for realising the state as envisaged by women.
46

Social Change and Political Participation: Women's Quest for Political Space
In part because of the legacy of the authoritarian partyless panchayat system (1960-90), which allowed for only a 'restrictive political participation', politics in Nepal has long been understood either as inclusion in the formal structure of mainstream politics, or involvement in 'extra systemic opposition against the establishment. This narrow definition neither suits the broader framework of democracy nor women's increasing assertion of their will for political participation. Women's political participation needs to be redefined in the context of a range of activities, from their participation and powersharing within the household, to their involvement in the community and the State's local and formal structures. Their expressed opinions on women's issues and other national problems; the ways they express interests and negotiate with the state/government machinery, backed by lobby and pressure tactics; their association with non-political organisations which enter into negotiations with the state authority either explicitly or implicitly; their affiliation with political parties and other political organisations; their involvement in various activities and movements; and their participation in periodic elections should be considered within the broad context of women's participation. A high degree of mobility is a sine qua non for participation in politics. Whether the socio-cultural milieu of the country allows Nepali women to be mobile is thus a vital issue.
Mobility and social structure
Nepali society is pluralistic, consisting of more than 26 caste/ethnic communities and over 50 linguistic groups. This multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-lingual society can be broadly divided into two major categories: Indo-Aryan and Tibeto-Burman; and five sub-categories: (1) hill high caste;
s
See Baral. i.ok Ray. Oppositional Politics in Nepal, Abhinav. New Delhi, 1977; Nepals Politics of Referendum: A Study of Groups, Personalities and Trends, Vikas, New Delhi. 1983: Shaha. Rishikesh. Essays in the Practice of Government in Nepal. Manohar. Delhi. 1982.
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(2) plain high caste; (3) hill/plain occupational castes (Indo-Aryan); (4) hill ethnic; and (5) hill and plain tribes (Tibeto-Burman).
Most of the previous studies on the status of Nepali women have commonly concluded that gender roles are less stratified in the Tibeto-Burman groups than in the Indo-Aryan groups. The women of occupational castes in the Indo-Aryan groups, however, enjoy considerable freedom both within and outside the family. The women of the Tibeto-Burman community not only enjoy equal status in the domestic sphere, but also considerable power and authority in relation to the men. Women in the hill ethnic, tribal and occupational castes are granted a higher degree of public mobility by their respective cultures and traditions. In the high caste groups in the Hindu community, gender roles are much more stratified because of their religious prescription for women's subordination under men' and their culture based on a patrilineal inheritance system and the purity of the female body'.'
;,ぎ
6 See series on the status of women in Nepal published in 2 volumes and several parts by the Centre for Economic Development and Administration (CEDA). Tribhuvan University, 1979 to 1981: Meena Acharya and Lynn Bennet, Statistical Profile of Nepalese Women: A Critical Review (Vol. 1, Part. 1). CEDA, Kathmandu, 1979; Lynn Bennet, Tradition and Change in the Legal Status of Nepalese Women (Vol. l, Part.2), CEDA, Kathmandu. 1979, Bina Pradhan, Institutions Concerning Women in Nepal (Vol. 1, Part.3). CEDA. Kathmandu, 1979; Indira Shrestha, Annotated Bibliography on Women in Nepal (Vol.1, Part.4); Pushkar Raj Reejal. Integration of Women in Development - The case of Nepal (Vol.l. Part. 5); Meena Acharya, The Maithali Women of Sirsia (Vol.2, Part. 1), CEDA, Kathmandu. 198: Augusta Molnar, The Kham Magar Women of Thabang (Vol. 2, Part.2), CEDA. Kathmandu. 1981: Drone Rajauria. The Tharu Women of Sukhrv var (Vol.2. Part.3), CEDA, Kathmandu, 1981; Sidney Schuler, The Women of Baragaon (Vol.2, Part. 5), CEDA, Kathmandu. 1981: Bina Pradhan, The Nem var Women of Bulu (Vol.2, Part.6), CEDA. Kathmandu, 1981 : Lynn Bennet, The Parbatiya Women of Bakundol (Vol.2, Part. 7). CEDA, Kathmandu. 1981; Meena Acharya and Lynn Bennet. The Rural Women of Nepal. An Aggregate Analysis and Summary of 8 illage Studies, CEDA, Kathmandu. 1982. Lynn Bennet, Dangerous Wives and Sacred Sisters: Social and Symbolic Roles of High Caste Women in Nepal, Columbia University Press. New York, 1983: Indra Majpuria, Nepalese Women. A livid Account of the Status and Role of Nepalese Women in the Total Spectrum of Life. Religious, Social, Economic. Political and Legal. M. Devi. Lashkar. 1987: Durga Ghimire, ed, Momen and Development, CEDA. Kathmandu, 1987: Hari Bansh Jha, Empowering Women of Mahottari District: A Case Study of Selected Village Development Committees, Centre for Economic and Technical Studies, Kathmandu, 1997.
,Bista Dor Bahadur. Fatalism and Development: Nepals Struggle for Modernization 7ן
Orient Longman. Calcutta, 1991. pp. 61-75. 8 Acharya, Meena, Political Participation of Women in Nepal, in Barbara J. Nelson
and Najma Chowdhury, op. cit. p. 480.
48.

Women of Hindu high castes, i.e., Brahmins, Chhetris and upper caste Newars, are allowed only a limited and regulated mobility.
This present study reconfirms the different status of women in the two cultural group entities by looking at constraints faced by different groups. There are three broad categories of constraints: personal (lack of education, lack of awareness, poverty), family/community (household responsibilities, lack of support from family and community) and political (violence, politics of sabotage, inadequate reservations provisions, financial resources). Women from the hill ethnic, tribal and occupational castes face constraints from the family and community to a lesser degree than their counterparts in the Brahmin, Chhetri and Newar caste groups. Two differing views expressed by women from different castes during focus group discussions in Kathmandu are worth mentioning here. Ms. Vijaya Laxmi Sahi, a middle-aged woman from an occupational caste said, "My husband always encourages me to be involved in areas of public domain but since I am less educated and less enlightened, I cannot actively participate in politics. Ms. Gita Upreti, an educated woman from the Brahmin caste, did not feel much personal constraint, rather she experienced some constraints due to household burdens', and lack of sufficient support from the family and community for her active political participation.
The factor of personal constraint is a point that Upretidid not consider to be significant, but was emphasised by Sahi. Women from ethnic, tribal and occupational castes have opportunities for public mobility because of their respective family and cultural value systems, but their external mobility is mainly related to socio-cultural activities or directed by their struggle for economic survival. Their exposure to modernisation is very limited, and the trend of schooling for girls is only just beginning. The women of these communities are highly under-represented in all public spheres where women participate. This shows that public mobility emanating from cultural values or from economic survival strategies does not automatically have a meaningful correlation with political participation.
Women from the hill high caste groups have more extensive involvement in politics than women from othersections of society. The caste/ ethnic breakdown of women candidates from major political parties in the 1994 general elections showed that the hill high castes (Brahmins, Chhetris and Newars) were overwhelmingly represented (from a minimum of 73% to a maximum 100%). One way of interpreting this over-representation of
9 Centre for Retired Public Servants. Peoples eraict. An Analysis of the Result of
General Elections 1994. CRPS, Kathmandu, 1994.
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hill high caste women and under-representation of hill ethnic/tribal women in the public sphere is that it is a corollary to caste/ethnicity-based unequal distribution of power in which other ethnic groups are marginalised.' The present study, however, suggests that it is the capacity for public mobility, more than any other factor, which determines the position of women in politics. The overwhelming presence of the hill high caste women in all public spheres of the female domain suggests that the public mobility gained through the modernisation process has a strong co-relation with political participation. The mobility acquired through the modernisation process provides the women with a sense of empowerment that has a positive repercussion on their willingness to overcome traditional constraints imposed by the family and community value systems.
If the traditional division of labour between male and female is separated from the category of family/community constraints, then social and traditional constraints are quite limited. Data confirmed that the family comes up as the main source of political socialisation of the respondents. In response to a multi-coded question on sources of political interest, family scored the highest at 26%, followed by other sources, i.e., peer group (24%), political parties (22%), educational institutions (11%), political events (6%), parties' women's wing (3%) and others (8%). S2's previous study on elected. women ward representatives (1997/98) also suggested that they considered household responsibilities, such as cooking, cleaning, washing and child care, as constraints preventing them from taking public responsibilities as elected representatives, even when they had family support in their decision to contest the elections. The elected women ward representatives indeed felt a positive change in the attitude of family and community towards them after they were elected, but they emphasised personal constraints, i.e., lack of education, political knowledge and confidence, financial resources, etc., as reasons for their inability to hold political office effectively.’
In view of the fact that women from all caste/ethnic groups emphasised personal constraints as the major factor preventing their political participation, the model of caste/ethnic divergence in the private/public domain does not over-determine the capacities affecting women in politics. Its weight could also be questioned from another perspective - class values are gradually
20 Bista. op, cit. Bhattachan, Krishna. 'Women in Govermance in Nepal'. paper presented in a two-day national seminar on Momen and Governance. Democratic Process in South Asia. Reimagining the State. Nepal Chapter, organised by S2 in June 1998.
2 Shtrii Shakti(S2), National Gender Analysis on Elected Women Ward Representatives,
report submitted to United Nations Development Programme. Nepal. March 1988.
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overtaking caste values in the thinking and behaviour of Nepali people across all groups. The under-representation of women from ethnic/tribal groups and occupational castes, and the predominance of their counterparts from the hill high caste groups in all public spheres, could be used to formulate a hypothesis that the public mobility gained through the modernisation process has a stronger co-relation with political participation than that of public mobility emanating from cultural value systems.
Mobility and modernisation
Education is one of the most important indicators of modernisation, contributing to public mobility and thus political participation. Irrespective of strict gender stratification, the very different groups of women of the plain high caste group of Dhanusha district and the Gurung community (hill ethnic) of Kaski district, have only marginal representation in the public sphere, e.g., in politics, administration and others. A point of commonality between these groups of women is their disadvantaged position in the area of education. Women from other communities, e.g., the Rai/Limbus of Dhankuta district, and the Tharus of Dang district, who are also poorly educated, have a similar experience. Educated women, irrespective of their caste/ethnic identity, possess a higher degree of political awareness. Ms. Laxmi Limbu of Dhankuta district and Ms. Sarada Jha (plain caste Brahmin) of Dhanusa districts, both highly educated, showed their own personal ability and competence while leading focus group discussions held in their respective districts. This competence was similar to the quality of participation shown by other educated Brahmin, Chhetri and Newar women in focus groups discussions in other sampled districts.
Three questions related to political awareness were put: composition of the Village Development Committee (VDC), name and party affiliation of the member of parliament (MP) representing their own parliamentary constituency, and understanding of the parliament. Only 13%, 51%, and 33% respectively of illiterate respondents gave the correct answer, against the figures of 49%, 86%, and 80% respectively gained by women educated up to grade 1. The level of political understanding among literate people with some schooling stands between these two.
The impact of education, or its lack, is also reflected in women's understanding of elections. Most of the illiterate respondents viewed elections as choosing a proper candidate, whereas respondents educated up to the university level pointed out broader meanings, such as the exercise of citizens' rights, the selection of a proper candidate, and choosing a particular party's
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policy and programmes. Electoral participation by illiterate women stands at two extremes, only to vote or to stand as a candidate, mostly for the reserved seat for women at ward level. Other modes of involvement in elections, e.g., through attending mass meetings, campaigning, addressing meetings and fund raising, were virtually absent. The indifference of highly educated persons towards holding the lower posts of elected bodies is shown by the fact that their electoral participation through contesting elections was only 15%. Most educated respondents were involved in elections either as simple voters or as campaigners, fund raisers or vote mobilisers.
Education, along with development in other sectors, makes a difference among the women of the same community as far as public mobility and political participation is concerned. The representation of women from Brahmin and Chhetri castes of Doti district in the Far Western Region is very low in comparison to their caste counterparts of other development regions, because the Far Western Region is the most underdeveloped area of the country. The recent study of human development in Nepal also shows a co-relation between GDI and GEM. The gender disparity in terms of GDI is higher in the Far Western Region, and gender inequality in terms of GEM is acute in this region. The value of GEM for women is much higher in Kathmandu and Lalitpur, the two big cities of Nepal.
The impact of modernisation can also be seen in the context of rural/ urban differences in public mobility and political participation. I he information collected through focus group discussions and personal interviews at local level in sampled districts suggests that the horizon of political knowledge among average urban women, irrespective of their caste/ ethnic identity, is higher than that of their rural counterparts. Most rural women involved in the political sphere, either through party or a local elected body, equated the notion of political participation with freedom of expression, voting rights, the right to contest elections and have party affiliation, whereas many women politicians involved in urban politics also stressed the struggle they had undergone for their involvement in governance and the decisionmaking processes.
The co-relation between gender and modernisation explains the lower political participation of Nepali women: they are far behind men in taking advantage of modernisation. Female literacy is just 25%, compared with 54% for male.' Women's life expectancy is 52.4 years, whereas that of men
22 Nepal South Asian Centre, op. cit. 23 Ministry of Education/HMG, Educational Statistics of Nepal 1992, Ministry of
Hducation/HMG, Kathmandu, 1994.
52

is 55.4 years. The maternal mortality rate is 875 per 100,000 live births, which is the highest in South Asia and among the highest in the world.' Unlike men who are involved in the formal economic sector with visible cash earnings, most Nepali women devote themselves to domestic activities, subsistence and conventional economic activities. Women have access to land, food crops, livestock, business and equipment, but they do not have control over them. Consequently, women's contribution to the household decision-making process has declined between the years 1978 to 1994.' The gender disparity in the distribution of benefits of modernisation, as shown by the indicators of education, health and employment, has resulted in differences in the status for men and women in terms of their representation in the formal political structure, as shown in the table below.
The table shows the presence of women in marginal numbers at various levels of the elected bodies, including political parties. The highest representation is in the lowest rung of the elected body - 19%; this is 1% less than the 20% reserved at the ward committee (the lowest unit of the VDC or municipality). The election of women to parliament did not exceed the 5% reservation quota. There is no reservation among elected members of DDCs, so women's presence in this intermediate body is just 1% nationally and zero in sampled areas. Women's position in the three major political parties (this is also true of smaller parties) is weak. Even the general provision of 10% women's representation at each level of the party structure, as mandated by the constitutions of the given parties, was found not to be fully observed, except in the composition of the NC's central committee and the UML's village committees. Women's representation at different levels of the party committee generally stood at only 5-10%.
24 Central Bureau of Statistics, Planning Commission/HMG, Population Census of Nepal
1991, Department of Statistics, Planning Commission/HMG, Kathmandu, 1991. 2s Quoted in Shrestha, indira, intra-Household Dynamics and Rural Household Food
Security: A Case Study of Nepal, paper presented to FAO's Regional Consultation Workshop in Bangkok, September 1998.
Shtrii Shakti (S2), Women, Development and Democracy: A Study of the Socio-Economic Changes in the Status of Women in Nepal (1981-1993), S2. Kathmandu, 1995.
.S2, 1988, op. cit לג
The conclusion about decline of women's role in household decision-making was drawn through measuring five indicators: farm management. domestic expenditure. education of children, travel, disposal of household products. See S2, 1995, op.cit.
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'səŋIIedyosunu 3 pue sƆCIA 61 pue suɔļuļsıp 9 pələAoɔ „Seale pəIdues, əųL sınırısıp 31 ouļuļpulau əųı uį pỊou əq sou pỊnoɔ suoŋɔɔɓə əəuỊs suɔŋŋsip Lç uỊ suoŋɔələ lɛɔoỊ L66|| əų. Jo sųnsəli əų pəpnỊous (33msuluoɔ ŋuəuudosəAəG 1ɔŋŋsįGI) 1ɔŋŋsip puɛ Kųjediosunuŋɔầes||A. Jo suəquəuu ɔų. Jo əunāų seuoụeu əųL
(%.L)(%9)(%0.1)(%9) | əJļuəO JO 一寸£98Z| 188--09+90Z| 9+L | QuƏUuB ||Jed (%8)(%8)(%9)(%0)(%s) ƐƐ |0 || 9 || || 0 ||60 ||SŹ60Çf786}ɔĮJĮSIGI (%6)(%0 I)(%8)(%81)(%61) | KųIedỊosunu

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in 1978 to 493 in 1993. Besides, as education contributes to knowledge, job opportunities and interaction with the outside world beyond the family and home locality, to be educated means to enjoy an enhanced social status for both men and women.
The increase in life expectancy from 25.7 to 52.6 years between 1951 and 1991, and decline in infant female mortality from 155.4 to 101 per thousand in the last decade indicate women's increasing access to health facilities. Women now account for 50% of persons involved in the healthcare field in Nepal. The increase in women's employment in non-agricultural and manufacturing sectors increased from 12.2% to 19.5% and from 12.2% to 27.3% respectively from 1981 to 1991 in urban areas. Equivalent figures for women in rural areas are from 17.9 to 20.7% in the non-agricultural sector, and from 16.5 to 20.9% in the manufacturing sector.
Women at the grassroots level of most of the sample sites acknowledge Some change in their status and position, but these changes varied according to locality. The women of Dhankuta district stressed their involvement in income generating activities. In Dhanusha, gradual improvement in public mobility among the women of the plain caste group was appreciated. Women's activism against domestic violence in Kaski, Dang and Doti was widely lauded. The decline in the bonded labour system provided an opportunity for public mobility to the Tharu community in Dang district. The women of Doti district pointed out the decrease in the practice of untouchability, and a declining tradition of offering bribes by parents of daughters to the family of the prospective husband as remarkable social reforms. One commonly articulated positive change, felt by women of most of the sampled districts, was the availability of basic services, i.e., drinking water, health posts, educational facilities, roads, etc., although none of these facilities is adequate. Women experienced change in the area of social reforms, e.g., decrease in child marriage and polygamy, and a growing awareness of the need for girls' education and female adult education.
33 Quoted in Chalise. Suresh. and Adhikary, Milan. Women in Politics in Nepal,
Centre for Consolidation of Democracy (CCD), Kathmandu, 1996, p. 13.
34 Central Bureau of Statistics, Planning Commission/HMG, op. cit.
35 Ibid.
36 National Planning Commission/HMG. The United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women. A Country Report of Nepal, National Planning Commission. Kathmandu, 1995, p. 3.
37 Central Bureau of Statistics, Planning Commission/HMG. op. cit.
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The change appearing in the social and economic position of Nepali women did not, however, help increase their representation in the formal power structure. This does not mean, though, that change in women's socioeconomic condition has nothing to do with women's participation in politics. The rise of women political activists is a distinctly new phenomenon. Out of the total 500 respondents, the political background of 194 women who were directly involved either in political parties, or in parties' women's organisations, or in local elected bodies, was recorded. The political profile of these 94 women political activists suggests a significant increase in their involvement in active politics over time: 12 in the 1990 mass movement, 2 in the 1991 general elections, 28 in the 1992 local elections, 31 in the 1994 mid-term parliamentary elections, and 90 in the 1997 local elections. A number of opinion polls also revealed this increase in women's political awareness.'
The change in the social and economic position of women and their exposure to modernisation has been further accelerated by the advent of a liberal political environment after 1990. But women share a general tendency to political frustration on account of increasing social evils, political instability, price rises, corruption, etc. They do not find any significant impact of democracy in areas such as economic development, social Security and justice. However, they highly appreciated the impact of the multi-party system in spreading the principle of equality, liberty and freedom among the masses of the country. So the change in the level of thinking in terms of political awareness, consciousness regarding women's issues, etc., seem to have impacted more than material changes women have experienced over the past eight years. In essence, the advent of democracy has provided a sense of independence among women, which in turn has inspired them to overcome barriers of traditional political, cultural and behavioural norms. Change in the socio-economic position of women and their increasing political awareness/consciousness mutually reinforce each other, thus facilitating women's quest for more political space.
A democratic state facilitates and encourages citizens to create space for civil and political movements. In the past, under the authoritarian, partyless, panchayat regime, Nepal as an absolute state commanded and controlled all social affairs, and therefore discouraged all kinds of social movements, including the feminist movement. The women's movement at
38 S2, 1988. op. cit: Nepal Opinion Survey Centre. Political Opinion Survey 1993,
NOSC, Kathmandu, 994: Service Extension and Action Research for Communities in the Hills, Political Opinion Survey 1994, SEARCH. Kathmandu. 1994.
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that time was mainly integrated within the broad struggle for democracy. A separate women's movement, different from other political movements, is a new phenomenon that appeared only after the restoration of democracy. Each major political party has revived its women's wing, providing a venue for women in politics. Women's representation in politics is ensured by a reservation quota at all levels of elected bodies, and also by advancing a system of quotas in the structure of political parties' organisations at both the central and local levels.
Women's activism through non-formal political structures is accelerating. The restoration of the multi-party system has been accompanied by the rise of interest/pressure groups, NGOs and other social groups. There are thousands of NGOs working in different fields. The existence of about 70 women-specific NGOs in Kathmandu valley alone was recorded in 1994.' The contribution of these non-political and non-governmental organisations is not limited to increasing awareness, advocacy and mobilisation of social strength, as they also help in preparing potential politicians. The past study on elected women ward representatives explored the relationship between women's associations, NGOs and political recruitment. It was found that a majority of elected women ward representatives had been affiliated with non-political social development organisations, i.e., self-help groups or community-based organisations, before they were elected as people's representatives from different political parties." Among the 500 respondents in this study, 183 had affiliations with different kinds of social and economic groups. This represents a general trend of women's quest for collective strength. These organisations provide women with a new political space separate from the conventional political platform: from these organisations they gain collective social power to confront/negotiate with the state for the causes they espouse.
39 Didi Bahini/Innovative Forum and Community Development, Directory of Women
.NGOs, Didi Bahini/IFCD, Kathmandu, 1994. 40 S2. 1988, op. cit.
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III
State-Women Interface: Negotiation of Citizenship
Citizenship means identification of a person with the nation to winich she/he belongs. Citizenship thus stands for equality, liberty and independence in human relations, including man-woman relations. Its redefinition is worthwhile in the Nepali context since the status of people as citizens (nagarik) is different from their position as subjects (praja). A subject is subordinate to and dependent upon the king. The relationship between the subject and the ruler is similar to that between a woman and a man under the Hindu ethos, as stated in Manusmiriti, 'Women should be under the strict control and supervision of their father until marriage, under the control of the husband after marriage, and that of a son after the death of the husband.' The regulation of gender relations and the ruler-ruled relations under a subject/ dependency value system contradict the notion of citizenship. Under the principles of citizenship, the government is expected to be responsible, accountable and responsive, and the people need to be alert, vigilant, articulate and participatory in governance. To allow women to become meaningful and active citizens of a country requires two interrelated changes: liberation from their traditional culture of silence/submission, and independence from family controi in women's public relations, including the spheres of politics and government. Whereas Nepal has a fairly long history of women's struggle for active citizenship, women now need to become truly involved in interaction with the state and its machinery.
History of the women's movement
The history of the women's movement in Nepal goes back to the formation
of women's organisations between 1920 and 1940. The first was a Women's Committee formed under the convenership of Divya Devi Koirala.' Though
Quoted in Bista. Dor Bahadur. Fatalism and Development: Nepals Struggle for
Modernication. Orient Longman. Calcutta. 1991. Swaroop. Kamala. Review of the Status of Nepali Women'. paper presented at a national seminar on Women and Governance. Democratic Process in South Asia. Reimagining the State. Nepal Chapter. organised by S2 in June 1998.
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this and others were non-political organisations, and their objectives were limited to social reform, the autocratic Rana regime banned such Social activism. The Nepal Women's Association (NWA), formed in 1948 under the late Mangala Devi Singh, was the first women's political organisation which condemned the Nepal Civil Act 1947 (the first constitution of the country although it was never enacted) on the grounds that it denied voting rights to women. In fact the NWA was a by-product of the eventually successful anti-Rana revolution, launched by the Nepali Congress Party (NC). its proximity to the NC led to a split after the formation of the All Nepal Women's Association (ANWA), a pro-Communist women's group, in the post-Rana period.
Despite the division of women's political organisations along party lines, these splinter groups and several other women's organisations worked together on issues of common concern. For example, the NWA and ANWA jointly sponsored a street demonstration against the composition of the advisory assembly in 1953 (all 35 members were male). Subsequently four women were included in the reconstituted advisory assembly in 1954. A token representation of two women was made in the parliament in 195960, one accommodated in the council of ministers and the other elected to the post of deputy chairperson to the upper house. Women leaders and activists at that time tried to raise issues of social reform, such as women's education, domestic violence, child marriage and polygamy as part of the political agenda. Despite their efforts, the women's movement was bogged down in the dismantling of democracy by a royal coup in December 1960. Women lost their political platform because of the ban on political parties' women's wings. The newly established partyless panchayat system prohibited the formation of any voluntary organisation, either women-specific or other, except those that were state-sponsored, such as the Nepal Organisation of Women (NOW). Nevertheless, the impact of international trends, particularly the UN International Decade of Women, was reflected in the Nepali government making some efforts to improve the social and economic position of women in areas such as education, health, employment and income generation." Leading women who were involved in the activities of NOW
43 Bhusal. Pushpa, Gender and Democracy: Women's Quest for Political Space. paper presented at a national seminar on Women and Governance Democratic Process in South Asia. Reimagining the State. Nepal Chapter, organised by S2 in June 1998.
44 Acharya. Meena. 'Political Participation of Women in Nepal' op. cit. p. 484.
is See for detail Pradhan, Bina and Shrestha, Indira. Foreign Aid and Women', in Integrated Development Systems, Foreign Aid and Development in Nepal. IDS, Kathmandu, 1983. pp. 99-143.
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ad the opportunity to become part of the national legislature, and members f the cabinet. In essence, however, NOW was confined to defending the partyless regime rather than working for the women's cause. The state controlled all women's activities through the Social Services Coordination Council (SSCC) under the patronage of the queen. This had a women's cell, the Women's Services Coordination Council (WSCC). There was a complete absence of any voluntary women's movement, either at the grassroots or at he national level, until 1990. The only platform that was available for political ctivists was to become involved in oppositional politics through banned political parties. Integration of the women's movement into the broader cause of democracy and human rights continued, though in a subdued form, until the 1990 popular uprising in which a large number of women were visibly and actively involved. The restoration of democracy through this mass movement gave a feeling of self-confidence to more women, inspiring them to overcome traditional political culture and behaviour. The advent of democracy has indeed facilitated the women, as citizens of the country, to legitimately interact with the government and the state. .
Stepping towards a new political culture
Are women now in a position to seize the opportunities granted by the liberal political atmosphere to interact with the state as citizens? Two different views were expressed on this question. Many respondents were of the opinion that the culture of silence and habit of submission were still holding back a large number of Nepali women. They did, however, acknowledge that women: of the new generation were more articulate and assertive than in the older generation. The aggregated data of individual respondents suggests that women are heading towards the acquisition of a new culture. They are more aware and more independent of family control insofar as their attitude, beliefs, and orientation towards politics are concerned. This trend would naturally shape the political culture of the people (women) of the new generation." Hence it can be assumed that their level of political awareness will naturally have an impact on their political behaviour and socialisation.
Unlike patriarchy's prescription over the family, in regard to the political behaviour of women Nepali women appear largely independent. While the family scored highest (26%) among the different single 'sources
-46 Almond, Gabriel, and Powell. G.B. Comparative Politics: A Developmental
...tpproach. Feffer and Simons Inc. New York, 1966, pp. 27-48.
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of political interest, the combined strength of other sources of political socialisation is much higher than the family. Similarly the family contributed to electoral motivation only by 21%, and the traditional factors of family and kinship' and 'caste and ethnic consideration combined scored only 23% in their influence on voting behaviour. The “feminist penchant for voting on the basis of gender issues did not feature as a strong criterion for respondents' electoral behaviour. Party affiliation, ideological inclination, leadership and other qualities of a candidate overwhelmingly impacted on their voting behaviour. This suggests that the family. especially male kin, have less influence on the political and electoral behaviour of Nepali women than elsewhere. This is a positive indication of the development of an articulate political culture in the female section of the society.
A non-conventional and egalitarian outlook was found among the women in their perceptions of some of the pressing issues concerning women. This is reflected in their support for the inheritance of property rights by daughters, the anti-alcohol/gambling movement and widow re-marriage by the overwhelming majority of respondents. Nearly one-third of them favoured abortion rights for women. Apparently, women's political awareness on issues of female concern has already developed to the stage of interest articulation.
Interest articulation and collective action
Two questions were asked to measure women's interaction with formal political institutions and the state machinery. The first dealt with problems they face individually and collectively. Social problems such as work burden, exploitation, discrimination, purdah, dowry, polygamy, insecurity, etc., Scored the highest, followed by economic problems (poverty, unemployment, lack of skills), unavailability of basic services (drinking water, fuel, health, roads, etc.), and lack of political awareness and lack of opportunity to exercise fundamental rights. The second question was related to their relations with the public institutions that deal with these problems. Some 42% of the 500 respondents had never approached any public institution to resolve their problems. They therefore represented the tradition of women's silence around problem resolution. However, a majority (58%) of respondents had articulated their problems with the concerned bodies. The public institutions they had approached, in preferential order, were: local elected bodies (ward committee and VDC/municipality), political parties women's wings, political parties, the police/administration and DDC respectively. Some of them cultivated others', like friends, neighbours, members of the local elite, NGOs, etc., to resolve the problems they faced.
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Local elected bodies appear to be the main avenue for women to air their problems. The role of the community head and other traditional local conscience keepers in the management of local disputes has declined rapidly. due to the excessive politicisation of society since the restoration of democracy in 1990. Politicians holding posts in parties and in elected bodies have emerged as the dominant elite, handling the responsibility of managing community and local disputes and problems. Women prefer the local political elite to articulate their problems partly because the traditional elite are more gender-biased, and partly because the law also grants some judicial power to the local elected bodies. The presence of women, at least one at each level of the elected bodies (either through election or nomination under the reservation quota), provides a comfortable space for women to articulate their problems. The study on elected women ward representatives found that they were mainly involved in resolving family disputes related to women's problems." Women activists working in political parties, local elected bodies and NGOs see the tendency among women to articulate problems increasing over time. It has been observed that women suffering from domestic violence, polygamy, the threat of divorce or other exploitation seek help from women members of the political elite to resolve their problems.
Many women felt that state functionaries did not take their grievances seriously when they dealt with them individually. Domestic violence, polygamy, deprivation of property rights and rape are some of the key issues on which women seek assistance and cooperation from the police, the administration and the courts. The authorities on their part stress that their priority while dealing with such individual cases is to restore harmony within the family rather than favouring the victims. Women see it in a different light: they say that the persons in authority often dismiss such cases or adopt dilatory tactics to discourage their reporting in the first place. Mediation by local women elite is a common practice in relations between women and government. Since individual dealings with the state machinery do not often yield the desired results, women have increasingly used the strategy of collective action on issues of their concern. In each sampled district, there were several records of women's collective action in different forms - e.g., sending a delegation to a municipality or a DDC to present demands for drinking water, health facilities, school building, road construction. Women
47 Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs/FIMG. The Act of Village Development Committee and The Act of District Development Committee 1992 (amended in 1997), MOLIPA. Kathmandu, 1997.
48 S2. 1988. op. cit.
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also took part in rallies, protests and demonstrations, and they picketed the office of the district administration and the police in cases of domestic violence. trafficking, rape and other forms of exploitation of women. Most respondents felt that the use of women's collective strength in a forceful manner often brought positive results.
Women's increasing political awareness, coupled with the timely airing of their problems, has generated collective actions aimed at far-reaching change. The issue of equal inheritance of parental property by women is currently emerging as a major agenda of the women's movement in Nepal, and could be regarded as the best example of women's assertions in the public/political domain. Two female advocates, Ms. Mira Dhungana and Ms. Mira Khanal, have filed a case with the Supreme Court stating that gender discrimination in the civil code with regard to inheritance of parental property should be repealed, as it contradicts the constitutional provision of non-discrimination on the basis of sex. The Court's direction to the government to review all legal provisions which incorporate gender inequality, without disturbing social harmony generated a number of advocacy groups. Similarly, the death of a prostitute returned from Bombay, said to be the first Nepali woman victim of AIDS, generated massive awareness against girl trafficking at the national level. Several NGOs dealing with this problem began operating in different parts of the country. A yearlong national campaign against girl trafficking was launched with the joint collaboration of the police, ABC/Nepal (an NGO) and Padma Kanya Campus (a women's college in Kathmandu).
At the local level in the sample districts there are records of women's activism launched for various causes. One from each sample district is given below to illustrate the trend of women's increasing interaction with the state and their intervention in governance:
. In Dhankuta district, women have organised themselves into groups for different types of economic activities (credit and saving cooperatives in particular). They deal with banks and other line agencies, particularly with the Women's Development Division under the DDCs, collectively.
2. in Dhanusa, women's awareness of and consciousness regarding the problems of domestic violence, sexual harassment, rape and dowry death have led to the formation of several NGOs committed to fighting against social discrimination. These NGOs have repeatedly mobilised women in their rallies, demonstrations, picketing, etc., which have
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brought some positive results, such as prohibition of the sale of alcohol in the city in the evening, with Rs. 1,000 penalty for persons violating this rule.
Women imprisoned for 20 years as a result of committing infanticide. which, when analysed from the pro-choice and human rights positions, led to setting up a Halfway House in Budhanilkantha. Kathmandu (1993) by S2. This centre has now expanded to house women victims of all kinds.
A large-scale demonstration against a case of child rape in Thamel, Kathmandu, culminated in the formation of the Women's Pressure Group that later developed into the most active and prominent women's pressure group in the country.
The police mishandled the suspected murder of a woman in Pokhara, Kaski district, in connection with dowry, declaring it to be a case of suicide. The police were suspected of taking bribes and they released the accused murderer from custody. Women working in political parties and NGOs successfully organised a massive protest rally in the city. They themselves apprehended the culprits and handed them over to the police, and the case was sent to court.
Awareness of the bonded labour system in Dang district led to the formation of the Chaudhary Women's Welfare Centre, an NGO, which has provided various services to the Tharu community, particularly in adult education and credit for small economic activities.
The determination of women in Doti district to fight alcohol abuse and domestic violence inspired them to take collective action. As a consequence of their constant organising efforts, they succeeded in mobilising the support of political parties, the police and the administration in declaring the whole area of Doti district as a dry (alcohol-free) area.
These scattered cases of women's activism are manifestations of women's quest for change, liberation from social inhibitions, redress of grievances, and creation of economic opportunities through their own efforts. State functionaries were compelled to hear women, to acknowledge their needs and problems and to respond positively by introducing certain regulations at the local level. The examples cited indicate women's inherent potential to
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effect change by involving themselves in the governance process at the micro level. The Mothers Groups in Kaski district present an exemplary case of women's activism at the grassroots level.
In all sampled villages and townships of Kaski district, there are Mothers Groups down to the ward level. The idea of the formation of such groups had come only after the advance of democracy, and it was initially a product of women's determination to fight againstalcohol abuse and gambling (which had led to widespread domestic violence). As the police and the concerned VDC did not act on the women's request to ban gambling and alcohol, the women (organised as Mothers Groups) forcibly removed bhatti (shops selling locally produced liquor), and laid down fines of Rs. 250 for cases of gambling or alcohol abuse. The police, the administration and the VDC later endorsed the decision taken by the Mothers Groups. As a result, not only did domestic violence against women decrease in the entire area, but the status of women in their families also improved. The Mothers Groups later expanded their activities to cover social and health awareness programmes, the management of small-scale saving and credit programmes, mobilisation of women for voluntary services in rural infrastructure development, e.g., forest management and construction of schools, health, posts, roads and temples. These groups also worked as advocacy and pressure groups taking up cases of women who were victimised by their families. Their collective actions extended from the local community level to district headquarters, where their delegations would go to demand funds and other resources to carry out development activities in their locality.
Instances of successful women's activism at the grassroots level indicate that women are creating their own space in governance, albeit to a limited extent at the local level. They make rules and implement these themselves, and these have a visible impact on maintaining peace and order in the village, reducing violence, suppression and exploitation of women and generating self-sustaining economic activities. Overall, women's enhanced political awareness and their consciousness of issues of female concern are increasing. Their desire to change the prevalent situation of exploitation and suppression of women has impelled them to venture forth into hitherto unknown territory. They are largely independent of family control in their political behaviour, many of them are politically articulate, and issues concerning women are being confidently handled through collective action. However, a cautionary note needs to be inserted here. In the absence of sustainable mechanism, women's activism would be reduced to mere reactions to immediate events rather than a sustained movement on issues and causes in the long-term interest of women. Both civil society and political parties have vital roles in supporting the future course of the women's movement in Nepal.
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IV
State-Women Interface: Mediation by Civil Organisations
Since the restoration of democracy in 1990, Nepal has seen the emergence of a women's activism/movement, the mobilisation of women as women for women, and the acknowledgement of some women's problems as national issues. Several women in the study stated that non-governmental and nonpolitical organisations should be credited for their substantial roles in bringing about these positive developments. This implies that such organisations have contributed significantly to give women an understanding of the need for political participation in governance, if not in government. Political participation in its broader sense is the involvement of members of society in the decision-making process of the system'." One of the multiplicity of ways people can participate in politics and governance is endeavouring to influence public policy formulation. Women-specific civil organisations provide an alternative political space outside political parties and the formal political structure, where collective action by female citizens allows negotiation with the state. It is now increasingly being recognised that a "critical mass is necessary to bring about real change within the existing structure, and this means having an active part in decisions regarding power structure and resource distribution.
Women's organisations might well take on the role of linking women's needs and problems with state/government policy. The inclusion of women activists from several NGOs by the Ministry of Women and Social Welfare (MOWSW) in the formulation of action plans for Nepal, pursuant to the Beijing declarations of twelve critical areas of concern, shows the potential of this intermediate role for NGOs. National planning, government reports and state laws acknowledge the imperative of involving non-governmental
49
50
Almond and Powell, op.cit. Ministry of Women and Social Welfare/IMG. Gender Equality and Women Empowerment: National Action Plan. MOWSW. Kathmandu. 1997.
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and non-political organisations in public policy formulation, particularly at the local level.
NGOs and women's development
The restoration of multi-party democracy brought in its wake a host of different civil organisations. The mushrooming of women's NGOs is shown by the record registration of 5,728 WIDNGOs by the Social Welfare Council as of 1997. This figure does not include those registered at the offices of district administration. In the sampled districts there are many local women's NGOs: the least being 5 in Dhankuta and Doti districts, and the most l l in Dhanusha and Dang. Kathmandu, of course, may have more than a hundred of such organisations, and most of them claim to be of national status. There are several other NGOs which are not female-specific, but which consider the development of women to be one of the areas of their intervention. The current study reveals the increasing tendency of women to become involved; in different kinds of civil organisation. Out of 500 respondents of this study, 183 were affiliated with organised activities, 51.3% in women specific organisations and the remaining 48.6% in other organisations that have women's development programmes. Among the respondents not affiliated to any civil organisations, 120 were aware of the operation of nongovernmental and non-political organisations in their locality.
This boom in different kinds of civil organisations and the increasing number of their members has resulted in a new dimension of citizen politics, including female politics. An expert on the NGO movement says, NGOs operate at both micro and macro levels. At the micro level, NGO activities offer material services, social services, financial services, capacity building, process facilitation, mediation, and reconciliation. At the macro level, NGOs are able to lobby policy advocacy, public education, public mobilisation,
5 See National Planning Commission/HMG. Ninth Five Year Plan (1998-2002), NPC, Kathmandu. 1998, Decentralization Committee/HMG, Report on Decentralization and Local Self-Government 1997, Decentralization Committee/ HMG. Lalitpur. 1997: Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs/HMG, Act of illage Development Committee and Act of District Development Committee (amended in l997). MOLPA, Kathmandu, l997.
52 i.ama, Stephanie Tawa. Remarks on the Political within the Nepali Women's Movement, in Studies in Nepali History and Society, Vol.2, No.2. December 1997, pp. 27-35.
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monitoring compliance, reconciliation and mediation. Despite the proliferation of non-political and non-governmental organisations, and their potential to link between women and the state, the picture is not very encouraging. Despite legal provision for collaboration between the local government and civil organisations, there is hardly any record of joint efforts being made by the governmental and non-governmental organisations in any of the sampled districts. They operated separately, and the lack of coordination was obvious. A government commission also felt this. interactions between NGO activists and leaders or the rank and file of political parties were also negligible. Government authorities and party leaders at the local level shared the national belief that NGOs’ interventions in development were a by-product of the donor strategy of bypassing government structures when channelling funds for local development. The financial dependency of NGOs on donors is their main weakness. Donors, on the other hand, have their own complaints against the NGO clients, and say that NGOs often further their own interests rather than the cause for which they are working.
A study on NGOs in Nepal confirmed that a large number of NGOs,
are more involved in business than in social activism'. A former member of the National Planning Commission opened a new controversy, "... many civil society organisations in Nepal are no better than the state institutions in terms of transparency, accountability and efficiency'. Many question the credibility of NGOs, including those who benefit from NGO development
s Tamang, Deepak, “Women's Empowerment Movement in a Democratic Nepali
Society, paper presented at a national seminar on Women and Governance, Democratic Process in South Asia. Reimagining the State, Nepal Chapter organised by S2 in June 1998. Decentralization Committee/HMG. Report on Decentralization and Local SelfGovernment 1997, op. cit. p. 134. This view was clearly stated by Mariam Montengue, representative of the National Democratic Institute for Foreign Affairs, Washington D.C., in an interview with S2 staff on 16 July 1998. Another American in charge of the Women Empowerment section of USAID/Nepal expressed a similar view in a round table discussion on preliminary finding of this report. See Rademacher, Anne, and Tamang Deepak. Democracy, Development and NGOs, SEARCH, Kathmandu, n.d... p. 38. Vidya, Bal Gopal. 'Comment on Mr. Deepak Tamang's Paper Entitled Women's Empowerment Movement in a Democratic Nepali Society, presented at a national Seminar on Women and Governance Democratic Process in South Asia. Reimagining the State, Nepal Chapter organised by S2 in June 1998.
S5
S6
57
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activities. The people's general perception is that NGOs have, by and large, provided a link between the donor's priority and society, instead of mediating between people's interest and government policy. Women-related organisations share these problems of credibility. Ms. Kamala Panta, Assistant Minister for MOWSW at that time of interview in July 1998, said, “There is a lack of meaningful dialogue and coordination between the ministry and women NGOs, although it happens sporadically. Apart from the complex problems of coordinating people's interest, national priorities, and donor preferences, there are deep divisions and mutual distrust among the potential key actors in the NGO scenario. Added to these problems is the lack of conceptual understanding of perspectives among the stakeholders.
However, despite the problems of NGOs’ credibility, their contributions in raising the status of women in society cannot be overlooked. There are, however, differences between the grassroots level understanding of women's activism, women's movement and women's empowerment, and NGOs areas of intervention. Most women's NGOs continue to adopt a WD/ women and development approach, focusing on the relationship between women and development. Only a few NGOs, like S2, have addressed gender development as a cross-cutting issue in their intervention packages addressing socio-economic development of the community, Questioned about which women's issues were being addressed by NGOs, economic activities were most often mentioned, followed by social development programmes and Social reforms. Only 47 respondents felt that some non-governmental and non-political organisations, e.g., local branches of national organisations like the human rights organisation, INSEC, Women Pressure Group and a few local NGOs, had programmes related to women's political participation. Regarding the various measures taken for women's political empowerment, these organisations concentrated on awareness building and mobilisation. Their efforts to articulate women's interests before the state and government authorities, and to apply pressure by lobbying them, were very minimal. Their interaction with political parties and the parties' women's organisations was negligible.
S8 Shrestha. Shanta Laxmi. WED. WAD. GAD Approaches to Women Development'. Reflections. Vol. i. No. 1 January 1994: Jama. Stephanic Tawa, Political Participation of Women in Nepal, Dhruba Kumar, ed. State. Leadership and Politics in Vepal, Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies/Tribhuvan University (CNAS/TU), Kathmandu, 1995, pp. 178: Des Chene. Mary. Nepali Women's Movement: Experiences, Critiqucs, Commentaries. Studies in Nepali History and Society. Vol.2, No. 2, December 1997. pp. 29 -297.
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The above data suggests that women's political empowerment is not currently carried out by WIDNGOs. It may be speculated that NGOs’ ethics of neutrality, which is a subject of debate in Nepal, limits their intervention efforts. There are, however, many ways in which they could intervene while keeping their political neutrality intact. As WIDNGOs have not yet explored ways in which they might contribute to women's political empowerment, their potential to advance the women's movement is doubted. As explained above, women's empowerment is different from simple development. The women of the sampled villages of Dhankuta district, where NGO intervention was higher than in the selected villages of Doti district, said they did not feel the existence of the women's movement in their locality. The women of the sampled sites of Doti district affirmed the presence of the women's movement, and referred to their collective action against domestic violence, alcohol and gambling as specific examples. They saw the Mothers Groups, which mobilised women against exploitation, as far more important catalysts for women's empowerment than NGOs that rendered services in the areas of education, health, employment, etc. Women's empowerment seems to be equated with open demonstrations of women's collective strength through rallies, campaigning, picketing, etc.
Pressure groups and the women's movement
Despite the limitations of WID NGOs to generate the women's movement and women's political empowerment, they have indirectly but visibly contributed to the creation of women's pressure groups through networking among themselves and also with other relevant organisations. Individual NGOs often tend to set their agenda in accordance with the donors' priority, but NGO networks can distance themselves from donors. NGO networks as pressure groups effectively contribute to women's empowerment in diverse ways, from awareness building and advocacy, to organising rallies, protests, and campaigns on women's concerns. Women pressure groups were found to be far more able than individual NGOs to use women's collective strength to confront state authority in the women's cause. The contribution of women's pressure groups in keeping women's inheritance rights as a lively national issue will be briefly elaborated on as a case study of a civil organisation's linking role between women's interests and State power.
As mentioned above, the genesis of the women's movement on women's rights to inherit parental property dates back to a petition filed with the Supreme Court on 31 May 1993 by two women advocates, Meera Dhungana and Meera Khanal. The petition requested a repeal of the legal
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provision of property rights, as it was inconsistent with the constitutional provision of non-discrimination on the basis of sex. The Court's positive response to this case, directing the government on 3rd August 1995 to review all laws that fostered gender inequality, prompted the NGOs to make the issue a subject of national debate. The Women's Security Pressure Group (WSPG), formed in 1992 by around 100 women-related organisations, both political and non-government, started with advocacy and built up public opinion through seminars and campaigns in many parts of the country. Meanwhile it also drafted a separate new bill on property rights, and handed that to the MOWSW and the Ministry of Law. The WSPG helped the MOWSW to launch a country-wide campaign before the ministry itself drafted a new bill. A network of international NGOs (INGOs) and the Legal Reform Commission also prepared their own separate drafts of a bill on property rights. While women's rights activists were ultimately foiled in their attempts to bring in a separate bill, the Ministry of Law did present a bill to amend the civil code that incorporated certain amendments suggested by the NGO groups.' From the time this bill was tabled in parliament in 1996, the WSPG applied pressure by picketing at the gate of the central secretariat and by lobbying political parties, parliament and government. Women's activism on this issue was so intense that some activists shouted slogans for equal property rights inside the house of representatives in September 1998: while the house was in session.
The most successful part of the WSPG's movement was to mobilise political support from the women's wings of the major political parties, which was reflected in several memoranda they submitted to parliament and to the prime minister.' Their support was manifested by forceful demonstrations: 200 women activists who participated in a picketing programme organised by NWA (the women's wing of the Nepali Congress Party) were arrested in April 1998. The women's wing of the CPN-UML carried out a signature campaign throughout the country and held regional level seminars in 1997 in favour of women's struggles for equal property rights. The mobilisation of parties’ women's wings did have an impact on party policy: two major
59 Sancharika Samuha/Nepal. Research and Advocacy Programme for the Promotion.
of Equal Property Rights, a proposal submitted to SNV (Netherlands Development Organisation)/Nepal.
60 Text of Memorandums Submitted to Prime Minister by Nepal Women Association (Women's Wing of Nepali Congress Party) in March 1998, in April 1998; Text of Memorandums Submitted to Prime Minister by All Nepal Women's Association (Womens, Wing of Communist Party of Nepal Unified Marxist-Leninist) in August 998.
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communist parties, CPN-UML and Male, issued whips to their own
parliamentarians during the fourteenth session of parliament (June-October
1998) to cast their votes in favour of the bill to amend the civil code. However,
the ruling Nepali Congress Party inexplicably delayed the passing of the bill
at this session. Consequently the issue of women's equal property rights is
still pending in the parliament without being resolved. The energy that the
WSPG demonstrated in the initial phase of the property rights movement
has also slackened over time. It was formed under the leadership of the
women's wing of the CPN-UML, whose president, Sahana Pradhan, had held the post of coordinator of the WSPG from its formation. After the split
of CPN-UML into two parties in March 1997, the impact of the WSPG has
declined considerably. Factions within the group that had leanings towards
the NepaliCongress Party had already deplored the dominance of communists
in the WSPG. The trend of splintering NGO networks along party lines has
considerably eroded the effectiveness of such networks to act as a pressure, group espousing the women's cause.
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V
State-Women Interface: Multiple Roles of Political Parties
One of the major functions of political parties is to articulate and aggregate the interests of the people. Political parties, like civil organisations, play a link role between women's needs and government policy. But unlike WD NGOs and pressure groups, political parties do not confine themselves solely to bridging between women and the state. Since a party is a political platform it provides a venue for women's political participation. Another way in which parties can contribute to women's political empowerment is by sending women representatives to the elected bodies of local and central governments. The experiences of Scandinavian countries, where women have higher representation at all levels of decision-making bodies (local government, parliament and cabinet) than in any other part of the world, suggests that the most important strategy for women's empowerment is intervention in political parties.' Among the multiplicity of ways political parties can contribute to women's political empowerment, three are especially noteworthy: (i) articulation of women's experiences, visions, problems, needs and interests; (2) the integration of women into the party apparatus; and (3) representation in the various levels of elected bodies.
The restoration of the multi-party system in Nepal in 1990 was the beginning of expansion of the political space accessible to women in politics and governance. In the broad spectrum of Nepali politics, the major political parties can be divided into three ideological groups. The Nepali Congress (NC), formed in 1947, represents a democratic and centrist party whose ideological belief in “equality, independence and freedom' for women is moulded within its avowed goal of democracy and socialism.' The Communist Party of Nepal, Unified Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML) and its splinter group, Communist Party of Nepal, Marxist-Leninist (CPN-ML)
61 Lovenduski, Joni, Introduction: the Dynamic of Gender and Party, in Joni Lovenduski and Pippa Norris, eds., Gender and Political Parties, Sage Publications, London, 1993. pp. 1- 15.
62 An Introduction to Nepali Congress (Booklet). Central Office of NC, Kathmandu,
199.
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perceive women's emancipation as part of their broader goal of 'emancipation of the proletariat from exploitation." The Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP, which was also divided in January 1998) represents the rightist and conservative forces of the country, with a political background going back to the dismantled party less panchayat system under an absolute monarchy. Its traditional thinking, that improvements in the position of women should be achieved through a welfare approach, has continued unchanged, despite its new commitment to democracy, liberalisation and globalisation.' Despite the divergence of the political/ideological credentials of the major political parties of Nepal, there is a broad consensus among them in their avowed goal for Nepali women. The end of gender discrimination through the granting of special priorities to women in sectors such as education, health, employment, and by offering other economic opportunities, is their common target as enunciated in their election manifestos.' The need for women's reasonable' and equitable representation at all levels of formal political structures and their participation in the decision-making process was a new commitment incorporated into each of the parties' 1994 election manifestos.
Interest articulation
Unfortunately there is a large gap between the parties formal commitment and their behaviour towards women. Their concern for women's problems seems general and vague, not supported by specific policy and programme guiding principles. Over the past decade of democracy each of the parties has held executive power at least twice, but the only noteworthy and remarkable contributions to women's empowerment were the NC
63 The Constitution of Communist Party of Nepal - Unified Marxist Leninist (amended
in 1997), Kathmandu: Central Office of CPN-UML, 1997: The Constitution of Communist Party of Nepal. Marxist Leninist, Central Office of CPN-ML, Kathmandu, 1997.
64 The Constitution of Rashtriya Prajatantra Party. Central Office of RPP. Kathmandu, 1992: The Constitution of Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (Chand). Central Office of
RPP (Chand). Kathmandu, 1997.
6S Election Manifesto of Nepali Congress 1991: Election Manifesto of Nepali Congress 1994: Election Manifesto of Communist Party of Nepal. Unified Marxist 1991: Election Manifesto of Communist Party of Nepal. Unified Marxist 1994: Election Manifesto of Rashtriya Prajatantra Party 1991: Election Manifesto of Rashtriya Prajatantra Party 1994.
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government's introduction of a system of 'one woman teacher in each primary school, and the CPN-UML government's allocation of a small monthly pension to destitute widows. Significantly, not a single bill directly related to women has been discussed or passed by parliament. The parties are gradually becoming power- and state-oriented structures rather than propeople feminist organisations,' and this has had the effect of taking parties away from women's problems.
Women at the grassroots level feel that political parties have largely failed to address women's needs and concerns. Two points of view expressed by respondents are worth mentioning: first, that gender has not yet been considered an important factor in party-building campaigns; second, that women's issues and problems are not acknowledged on the major agenda during elections. Issues of infrastructure building dominate elections in Nepal. Most of the candidates, irrespective of their party affiliation, have sought the people's mandate on the basis of promises to provide services such as drinking water, schools, health posts, roads, transportation and communication, etc. Women feel that male candidates hardly ever mention women's problems, even in their election speeches and campaigns. In contrast, women candidates of the sample areas (Lila Koirala from parliamentary constituency 2 of Dhanusha district, and Sahana Pradhan of constituency 6 of Kathmandu district) focused on the exploitation of women as one of the key issues of their election agendas. They also committed themselves to work for women's causes by fighting for child care, maternity health, female education, income generation and women's representation in the decisionmaking process. After the election period, however, therc appeared to be no difference between male and female representatives. Female voters who supported leading women politicians complained that their representatives had largely failed to deliver any women-specific actions after they had been elected and joined the executive body.
Only 21% (of 500 respondents) reported that political parties had articulated women's problems and issues in a cursory manner. Another question was set to elicit more specific answers: "In your observation, what are the major gender issues raised by the party you belong to or the party that you like? The response of the majority remained the same: that political parties did not address women's problems at all. For those who affirmed their party's concern regarding women's needs and priorities, social reform
66 Hachhethu. Krishna, Political Parties, Political Crisis, Problems of Governability, in Dhruba Kumar. ed. Domestic Conflict and Crisis of Governability in Nepal, Kathmandu: Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies (CNAS) Kathmandu, 2000, pp. 90-16,
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(education, social equality and dealing with domestic violence, dowry, polygamy, and oppression by men) was of paramount importance, whereas economic issues (skill development, employment, inheritance rights) and women's political participation, leadership and reservations figured low.
Integration
The picture of women's integration in party structures is poor, to say the least. Nevertheless some positive changes have taken place recently. Women's participation in party politics in the past was largely confined to involvement in the party-led struggle for democracy. Since the restoration of the multiparty system, women's activities have been related to electoral campaigns. The acquisition of party membership is another way of being involved in party politics, but party women are rarely involved in the formulation of party policy and programmes. Integrating fully into a political party depends on the inclusion of women in the party's decision-making bodies.
The NC, CPN-UML, and RPP have two major branches, legislative and executive, in their organisational structures from village to the central level. The party's legislative branch is called the “convention or 'congress', and the executive body is known as the “committee'. The party convention or congress is a powerful body that takes all major policy decisions. The CPN-UML has a separate provision for women's representation in its congress, so women constituted 11% of the total representatives in its Fifth National Congress, held in Kathmandu in January-February 1993." The NC and the RPP have not yet introduced this system. The representation of women members in the national conventions of these two parties was recorded as less than 5%." However, the NC recently introduced a provision of 10% women's representation at all levels of the party committee (the executive body) through an amendment to its party constitution in 1997.' The CPNUML and the RPP followed suit, by formalising their previous practice of women's inclusion in the executive committee. The table below shows the integration of women in the executive bodies of Nepal's three major political parties in the sample areas. It shows that women's representation at all levels of the party committee of the three major political parties is less than their own formal provision of 10% reservation for women.
67 'Glimpse of Communist Party of Nepal (UML)'s Fifth National Congress. New Era,
(published by Foreign Affairs Department of CPN-UML). April 1993.
List of Participants of Nepali Congress' 9th National Convention 1996: List of Participants of RPP's 2" National Convention, 1997. Constitution of Nepali Congress (amended in 1997).
68
77.


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Women's representation in government through political parties
The low number of women candidates in elections under the multi-party system Suggests the extent of gender insensitivity of political parties. In the last two general elections held after the restoration of democracy, the number of women candidates increased only by 9 individuals, from a total of 79 in the 1991 elections to 86 in the 1994 elections. The figures in the Table adjoining show that none of the major parties nominated women candidates in addition to the minimum (5% reservation) required by the constitution.
Two different views are aired in the debate about reservations for women candidates. One view is that without provision for reservations women's representation in parliament cannot be ensured," while others argue that at least some women are elected to parliament even in countries where such reservation is not available, e.g., in Pakistan. Even in the last years of the panchayat regime, when there were no reserved seats for women, women constituted 5.7% of the 140 members of the national panchayat (unicameral legislature). This was 2.3% higher than in the second parliament after the restoration of democracy. It is further argued that the women who were elected in the 1991 and the 1994 parliamentary elections had strong political background and personal ability. A study on women's candidacy in Kathmandu valley in the 1991 election showed that out of 30 women candidates for ten constituencies in Kathmandu, Bhaktapur and Lalitpur, 26 failed to obtain even 1% of the votes. With this finding it was concluded that political parties manoeuvred the wornen into contesting for the least hopeful constituencies.” The crux of the issue was not reservations, but the commitment of political parties and their leaders. It is widely felt that political parties have used the provision of the constitution negatively with regard to women's candidacy in elections.
70 Bhusal. Pushpa. Gender and Democracy: Women's Quest for Political Spaces, paper presented at a national seminar on Women and Governance/Democratic Process in South Asia. Reimagining the State, Nepal Chapter: organised by S2 in June 1998.
Giri. Sarita Comment on a Paper Entitled Gender and Democracy: Women's ו 7 Quest for Political Spaces. presented at a national seminar on Women and Governance Democratic Process in South Asia: Reimagining the State, Nepal Chapter organised by S2 in June 1998.
72 Kaini. Prabha Devi. The Constitution of Nepal 1990 and Women's Candidacy: A Social and Political Survey (in Nepali), Contribution to Nepalese Studies. Vol.21, No.2 July 1994.
80

The rapid increase in the number of women representatives in elected bodies at village level from less than 1% in 1992 to 19% in 1997 became possible only after the introduction of 20% reservation for women at ward level elections. The absence of women, or the presence of women only in small numbers, at all higher posts of local elected bodies, ranging from ward chairperson to DDC president, remained unchanged, since there are no reservations for these posts. This suggests that a system of reservations could make a significant difference in women's representation in elected bodies, but there is still a lack of political commitment in political parties to encourage women's representation and participation in decision-making bodies. The parties gender bias is reflected in their ignoring the legal mandate to have one female nomination to the DDC in four out of six sample districts even one year after the completion of local elections. Similar instances were found in most of the sample VDCs.
Gender discrimination is widely felt among the women involved in local politics and governance. Some 194 women politicians, who were reselected from the total 500 respondents, were asked about their participation in political party and elected body meetings. Their responses were disappointing and disheartening. 20-25% never attended, mainly because they had never been invited to such meetings. Attendance in meetings was recorded at 56-75%, but only 21-36% attended regularly and 35-39% occasionally. Some 39% of those who attended the meeting said that they listened to what other people said rather than speaking themselves. Considering the low figure of women's attendance and the roles they play in party meetings, one could conclude that mere representation in the formal political structure, without the backing of a capacity building programme, does not ensure the participation of women in decision-making either under the aegis of political parties or in the government.
Many women politicians, irrespective of their party affiliation, were of the view that their inclusion in the party committee or in elected bodies was merely decorative and symbolic. Most women of all political parties sitting as members in the party local committee or as people's representatives had the common experience that their presence in the meetings was most often overlooked, and not acknowledged when debates and discussions on general subjects were held. Their advice and opinion were only sought on issues of female concern, but their male counterparts rarely took their point of view seriously. The experience of Tulasa Dahal, a member of CPN-UML's district committee of Dhanusha district, could be cited here as a representative case. She said, 'Women's issues are always put at the end of the agenda during the party meetings. The party meetings most often conclude without touching the last agenda item.'
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Women's wings of political parties
Part of the reason for the prevalence of gender bias in party politics can be found in the ineffectiveness of parties women's wings. Most of the parties have their own front organisation dealing with women's affairs. Two major party-based women's organisations are the NWA (NC) and ANWA (CPNUML). With hundreds of thousands of members (ANWA had 400,000 in 1996), both the NWA and the ANWA have their own organisational network down to district and city levels, even at the village level in some areas. Considering their membership and the institutional base at the grassroots level, these two women's organisations have huge potential to give impetus to the women's movement in Nepal. However it seems that women's interests come only after the party's interests in both the NWA and the ANWA.
Since NWA and ANWA are political organisations, each of them has two faces, partyness and womanhood'. It is generally observed that these organisations largely fail to maintain a balance in their twin responsibilities of promoting women's interests as well as party interests. The women of the sampled areas have the common experience of finding the leaders of NWA and ANWA on their doorstep mainly at the time of elections. Recently the national conference of ANWA was held under the slogan, 'The voice of Nepali women is victory of CPN-UML in the forthcoming elections.'" However, the resolution passed by that conference demanding an increase in the number of women candidates was placed before the public in the least noticeable manner. The activists of both women's organisations have realised that the relationship between the party and the party's women's wing is not reciprocal, rather it is tilted more favourably towards the party. In the 10point progress report on political activities prepared by the ANWA and presented to its third national conference in 1993, nine points were related to its involvement in programmes called by its parent party, CPN-UML. Only one point covered its contribution to an issue directly related to women, where protests, demonstrations and lobbying work had been undertaken against girl trafficking and child rape.'
73 Pradhan, Sahana, (president of ANWA). Direction of Nepalese Women's Struggle, informal Sector Service Centre, Women in Politics: National Conference on Women 1996, INSEC, Kathmandu, 1997, p. 54.
74 Kathmandu Post, December 1998.
75 Reports and Resolutions of All Nepal Women Associations 3 National Conference,
1993. central office of ANWA, Kathmandu, 1993, pp. 8-10.
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These shortcomings do not mean that parties women's wings have not involved themselves in negotiations with their own respective party and with the government. At the grassroots level, activists in women's organisations have energetically involved themselves in civil organisationled anti-alcohol/gambling movements, playing significant roles in mobilising the support of political parties and exerting strong pressures on local government to take positive actions. The ANWA succeeded in putting a provision in the CPN-UML party code of conduct stating that party workers and leaders indulging in polygamy should be considered to have committed a crime and be subjected to disciplinary action. The confrontations by district level organisations of both NWA and ANWA with their own respective parties, when they called for an increase in the number of women candidates, particularly in the 1997 local elections, were also noteworthy.
At the central level, the NWA and the ANWA successfully pleaded for consent of their parties on the issue of women's equal property rights and on the need for 20% reservations for women in elections to ward committees. Moreover, the question of women's inclusion in the party's formal structure came out during the meeting of NC's national congress in 1994, when the NWA moved a resolution calling for 20% reservation for women at all levels of the party's organisation and in the party's candidacy. The party's national congress of 1997 provided for 10% reservation for its women cadres in party structure at all levels and among the party's candidates for both local and general elections. NC president and prime minister, Girija Prasad Koirala, publicly declared his party's plan to put up lO% women candidates in the parliamentary elections of 4th May 1999. However, only 14 (6.83%) seats were granted to women when the party announced all its 205 candidates. No protest, no opposition and no resentment has been shown by the party's women activists, despite this failure of the party to live up to its own commitment. This reflects the tendency among women political activists to compromise and sacrifice the women's cause according to the wish of the party and its leaders. Since the parties are poorly gender-oriented, they lack a clear vision and proper strategy to use the vast potential they have to generate and strengthen the women's movement in Nepal.
There is a distinct gap between the main activities and particular programmes of women's wings. Most of their time and energy are spent in assisting the execution of party directives, and even their own programmes are mostly development oriented and similar to those of WID NGOs. Both the NWA and the ANWA have had several programmes in areas of adult female literacy, women's health, painting classes, vocational training, skill
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development, environmental protection and legal services for women.” None of them, however, has a clear vision, policy, plan or programme on political education for women and the much-needed programme on capacity building for women's representatives to elected bodies, which would have a direct impact on women's effective political participation in decision-making structures and processes. It is an anomaly to find that the parties' women's wings have so little concern for women's political empowerment.
There are statistical figures that suggest that women's political empowerment is not a priority among women politicians (those who hold formal posts in one or more of three political platforms: party committee, party's women's organisation and elected bodies). 194 women politicians, re-selected from the total 500 respondents, were specifically asked the question: 'Being a woman politician, what are the three major functions that you should do? What issues do you raise when you participate in meetings of political parties and of elected bodies? Only 15-17% of answers mentioned women's political empowerment through the launching of programmes on political awareness building and campaigning to open up opportunities for women's political participation. Most of them felt that their primary responsibility was to assist in infrastructure building and to work to improve women's social and economic position. In replying to the question about how they contributed to the women's political movement, most of them stressed awareness building, advocacy, membership drives and organisation development and management.
In general, the female section of society in the sample areas was found to be critical of women politicians and, more often than not, cynical in regard to political parties. They believed that women at the higher levels of formal political structure (party, parliament and government) were as capable as any of their male counterparts and could do a lot for women if they were sensitised and committed. They thought that women politicians at the local level were more sincere, but they were personally less capable of doing anything substantial for women. The lack of clarity about the role and responsibilities of elected women representatives made women politicians vulnerable to their male counterparts' political one-upmanship. Capacity building is the strategy most local women politicians emphasised they needed. Women respondents were quite critical of their own parties. Apart from complaining about the betrayal of their hopes and the lack of help from their respective party in launching capacity building programmes, the women
76 bid. p. 10-12. Nepal Womens Association (Booklet), Central Office of NWA.
Kathmandu, n.d.
84

expressed anger that their parties completely ignored them after they were elected.
Women's resentment of political parties was found to be quite pervasive. Most women from the grassroots level were of the view that political parties, and especially the parties women activists, highlighted women's needs and problems, e.g., education, health, income generation, property rights, domestic violence, child marriage, polygamy, girl trafficking, etc., only during election campaigns. Once the elections were over, no sincere effort was made to carry out any of the assurances made during the time of elections. Nevertheless, some of the party's women activists were found to, be active in dealing with individual women's problems. To sum up, the oft-, repeated complaint of the respondents was that political parties used women's voting power, but they cheated them by not being sincere in delivering on their electoral promises.
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V
Nepali Women's Visions of the State
Despite their inherent potential as arbiters of change, Nepal's political parties and NGOs have made only token contributions to linking women's problems and needs with formal state structures and authorities. Women are empowering themselves through their interaction with the state's power structure, but their participation in the decision-making process has yet to be properly streamlined. Nepali women largely remain distanced from the axes of state power. As was spelled out in the Human Development Report of Nepal, Glender empowerment in Nepal is abysmally low in relation to the achievement at the regional and international level. The global GEM is more than double that of Nepal. Women in all South Asian countries, except in Pakistan, are more empowered than women in Nepal. In the given context, re-imagining the Nepali state from the perspective of women's empowerment would be an ideal, perhaps an achievable long-term goal. The vision of the state in the minds of Nepali women at this stage mainly embraces the state's regulative and distributive functions. Women wish for efficient exercise of the state's regulative capabilities, e.g., policy making and law enforcement, to prevent gender exploitation and to encourage positive discrimination towards women. They are also in favour of enlarging the state's delivery capacities, since they perceive the state as a provider of services to the citizens.
Women defined the state as:
l. An institution which has traditionally provided basic needs, i.e., water,
education, health, etc., to the people;
2. A mechanism regulating human relations through law making and
rule execution;
3. A distinct entity separate from both the private sector and the
community (which are currently emerging to break the state's monopoly in providing basic needs services);
4. A symbol of the general will of the people, representing the full range
of caste/ethnicity and class; and
77 Nepal South Asian Centre. op. cit. p. 49.
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5. A permanent institution different from the government (which is
changeable)."*
The common elements between the government and the state are power and politics, but the government is exclusively confined to the people's elected representatives and the institutions of their representatives (VDC, DDC, parliament, cabinet), whereas the state refers to on-going operative organs and concepts such as the courts, the bureaucracy, the army, the police, etc.
Self-projection of the Nepali state
If the constitution is the mirror of the state, Nepal projects itself as a genderneutral state, because it ensures equality between men and women. It recognises women as disadvantaged sections of society deserving special privileges from the state, but only in limited areas such as education, health and employment.' This privilege approach, unlike the empowerment approach, limits the role of the state to that of dispenser of welfare. The state, using the framework of welfare programmes, can only provide nominal services. For instance, the benefits women received during the Eighth Five Year Plan (1993-97) were limited to the recruitment of around 4,150 women teachers, the granting of some scholarships for girl students, the expansion of productive credit facilities to 650 VDCs of 67 districts, a safe maternity programme in 10 districts, etc. The MOWSW then realised that the privileges or welfare approach did not help in bridging the gender gap and women remained far behind in development. The state's reorientation towards women was incorporated in the Ninth Five Year Plan, which declares 'gender equality, gender mainstreaming and women’s empowerment as one of its objectives. This new orientation matches the empowerment approach, which believes that the more women assert their right as citizens the more
78 The Nepali word for state is raiya, which is broader than sarkar, which means
government.
See Directive Principles and Policies of the State, Constitution of the Kingdom of
Nepal 1990.
80 National Planning Commission/HMG, Ninth Five-Year Plan, 1998-2002. NPC.
Kathmandu. 1998. pp. 669-670.
8 MOWSW/HMG. Country Report Nepal. Presented to Commemorating Beijing, South
Asian Regional Meeting. September 9-10, 1998. p. 10.
82 National Planning Commission/HMG, Approach Paper of 9 Plan, 1998-2002 NPC.
Kathmandu. 998.
79
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the state becomes responsive to women's concerns. But considering the lack of specific policies, programmes and strategies congruent with the manifest objective of gender mainstreaming and women's empowerment, no substantial change appears in the state's self-projection as simply a provider of welfare to women. The table below lists certain initiatives taken by Nepal at the macro level vis-a-vis women's development.
State's Initiatives for Women after Restoration of Democracy
Ideological commitment
O Equality between men and women
O No discrimination on the basis of sex in the application of law
Equal pay for both men and women for similar work
Special privileges for women in education, health and employment Abolition of sex discrimination, women's empowerment and gender
mainstreaming (goals of the Ninth Five Year Plan)
Structural adjustment
O Establishment of a Women's Development Division in Ministries of
Agriculture, Education and Water Resources"
O Formation of a Women's Cell in the National Planning Commission
O Establishment of a separate Ministry of Women and Social Welfare
O Constituting a Women and Children Development Council under the
chairmanship of the prime minister
Welfare measures
Scholarships for girl students
One female teacher for each primary school
O Pension to widows
Recruitment of maternal and child health workers, and female community health workers at each health post
O Women-targeted credit programme under the schemes of production
credit for rural women, small farmer development project, and micro credit for rural women
* A Women's Development Division in some other ministries such as those of Labour and of local Development had already been set up prior to the advent of democracy in 1990.
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Positive discrimination on GEM sectors
5% of total candidates of each political party for parliamentary elections should be women
卷 5% seat reservation for women in the 60-member national assembly
20% reservation for women in elections to 5-member ward committees
h Reservation of one seat for women among nominated members at all
levels of local government: village development council/village development committee, municipality council/municipality, district development council/district development committee
Extension of age bar to 40 years to enter government service as against 35 years for men
In comparison with the state's broader ideological commitment towards women, its actual practical contribution to women's representation and participation in the government and administration is negligible. There have been demands for structural adjustment and appropriate remedial measures, but these have been carried out without practical measures that would be in line with the state's proclaimed ideology regarding gender mainstreaming and women's empowerment. The structural adjustment programme appears to have been guided by division of responsibilities among line agencies that distribute the state's welfare package under different titles. Budgetary. allocations of 0.14% of regular expenditures and 0.05% of development expenditures under the title of Women and Social Welfare out of the total Rs. 69 billion annual budget of the 1998/99 fiscal year are meaningless in the given context."
The state's advocacy of WID principles and its welfare approach are also manifested at the micro level. Grassroots level women in the sample districts feel the presence of the state through its programmes in women's literacy, scholarships to girl students, health facilities, family planning, production credit, skill training, income generation activities, etc. But programmes related to awareness-building, advocacy, and capacity building (which would be directly related to women's empowerment) are mostly nonexistent. So by its policies, programmes and actions the state projects itself as provider of welfare to women. The way the state projects itself to the people has a strong impact on women's understanding of and expectations from the state.
83 Budget Speech of the fiscal year 1998-99, Kathmandu: His Majesty's Government/
Ministry of Finance, 1998.
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Visions of the state: Perspective differences between men and women
The image of Nepal as a welfare state is very strong in the mindset of the Nepali people, and more so among the women. Yet the brainstorming session for re-imagining the state held during a national seminar in June 1998, followed by a series of focus group discussions in sample districts, showed certain common and certain different elements in the perspectives of male and female participants, and also between rural and urban dwellers. The Kathmandu-based intelligentsia, professionals, policy makers, planners, and political practitioners were articulate in urging for a 'reformed state'. For them a reformed state meant a reduction in the state's roles and responsibilities. This might be a reflection of the changing lifestyle of urban people (capital dwellers in particular), who tend to send their children to private schools, go to private clinics and nursing homes for medical treatment and shop in department stores. Their argument for the reduction of the state's roles is supported by two interrelated factors. First, the Nepali state has a new face since the restoration of multi-party democracy in 1990. A democratic state, in theory, is tantamount to a responsive state, and not an 'activist state'. Second, there is the need to consider the rise of civil society, the NGO movement and the current wave of privatisation, liberalisation and globalisation which directly curtail the state's power and responsibilities. Nepal's quest for integration into the global trend is well reflected by the distribution of capital investment between the private and public sectors for the Ninth Five Year plan. The private sector is expected to invest 67% of its estimated budget of Rs. 3,994 billion. This is a clear indication that the state itself is planning to reduce its roles and responsibilities drastically.
Support for curtailing the state's responsibilities represents the opinion of only a smallportion (16%) of the 500 respondents. Opposing the generally male argument for the reduction of the state's role on the grounds of democracy, privatisation and civil society, leading women activists and women politicians advocated the state's omnipresence. The positive and negative impacts upon women of economic liberalisation and globalisation is yet to be explored in Nepal’s context, but there was a consensus among women participants about the power of the state's role in relation to women. The crux of their logic was that women were fighting against the state not to reduce its role, but rather to reorient it as an instrument of positive engendered
National Planning Commission/HMG, Approach Paper op. cit, p. 74.
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action. So re-imagining of the state from the feminist perspective is to reorient the activist and interventionist state, making it as woman-friendly as possible through various strategic interventions.
Nepali women's preference for an omnipresent state, however, does not mean that they see the contemporary state as their ally. They are aware of the paradoxical roles of the state. The state has initiated and framed several laws making violence against women, child marriage, polygamy, girl
trafficking, dowry, etc., punishable. However, state functionaries have not
effectively executed state laws, and there have been several instances of non-implementation and violation of laws, rules and regulations relating to women by state functionaries. The police are notorious for contravening
regulations, except in one sample district in Doti where the police provided
support to the women's anti-alcohol/gambling movement. For women, seeking justice from the courts and administration is an extremely lengthy,
paper-oriented and expensive process. The women in the sample districts.
were disappointed in the workings of the government at both the local and the central level. Only 22.8% of the respondents said that their respective VDC/municipality had initiated some minor programmes for women, such as female literacy, knitting and weaving, and skill training. The higher the level of government, the less sympathy towards women. Only a few respondents (5.6% and 6.4% respectively) noted the existence of women's programmes under the purview of DDC and parliament. Women in the sample districts were therefore frustrated by the non-performance of the local and central governments with regards to women.
The state exists as a leviathan in the minds of women when they expressed their expectations of it. Women from the grassroots level in sample districts desire all kinds of services from the state, ranging from skills development in weaving to women's representation at the higher political level. The potential of the state to reduce gender differences in societal relations was least emphasised by the men. Women, on the other hand, gave equal importance to social problems (child marriage, girl trafficking, dowry, etc.), economic opportunities (credit, skill development, income generation, etc.) and political empowerment (rights, opportunities, reservations, participation in decision-making). Women feel that all these social problems, economic opportunities and the political empowerment of women should be addressed by the state. Quantitative data confirms women's visions favouring an increased role for the state. The sectors they identified for further expansion of the state's responsibilities were, in preferential order: areas related to basic needs, infrastructure development, industry and employment, social security and others (see Annexe Tables l, 2 and 3).
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Urge for an activist state
The image of the state as provider of services to the citizens is deeply rooted in the minds of Nepali people, both male and female. Private and community sectors were suggested to the respondents as alternative avenues from which people could get some kind of service, but the state's high profile was distinct as the main provider of services. This is quite natural when one considers that the traditional ways of schooling, medical treatment and justice delivery by pancha bhaladami (an informal unit of elderly wise persons) have declined as a result of modernisation processes. Modernisation of Nepali society is tantamount to the expansion of the state's scope and boundaries in relation to society. Ever since Nepal entered the modern phase in the mid-20th century, it has projected itself as a welfare state, irrespective of changes in the political regime. The democratic state of Nepal has inherited the state's welfare image despite the integration of the national economy into the global wave of privatisation and liberalisation. Privatisation is an emerging phenomenon that is mostly concentrated in Kathmandu valley. People from other parts of the country have rarely been exposed to services provided by the private sector except perhaps private schools, which are appearing even in remote villages. Part of the reason behind the people's over-dependency on the state could be found in the political communication between the social actors and key political actors of the state under the multi-party system. The major political parties in Nepal profess the ideology of communism or socialism, and these ideologies always stand for the state's highhandedness in statesociety relations.
Three sectors, public (state and government), private and community, were put before the respondents as providers of services in 13 areas (education, health, water, roads, electricity, food, housing, finance, tax, law and order, justice, legislation and other social services). In the given 13 areas, the public sector at present enjoys a lion's share (63.07%), followed by the private sector (24.94%) and community sector (7.32%). The state appeared to be the main provider of services in the areas of education, health, water, electricity, law and order, and justice. The government (elected body) topped others in its contribution to roads, tax, legislation and other social services. A majority of respondents felt that it was an individual’s private responsibility to provide their own food and housing. A sizeable number of respondents used the private sector in education, health and water (33%, 23% and 19% respectively). Those who were taking services from the private sector argued that it was providing quality service and was more efficient than the public SectOr.
92

But the presence of the state in the minds of women was found to be deeper and stronger than was warranted by the actual position of the state as a provider of services. There were interventions by NGOs and INGOs in all the sample villages, except in Kathmandu, in areas like education, health, skill development, credit/saving schemes, income generation, drinking water, etc., but the respondents gave only nominal acknowledgement to the contribution made by these organisations. Moreover, when they were asked to give their recommendations about the roles of the public, private and community sectors in the given 3 areas for the future, almost all respondents prescribed the intensification and expansion of the state's role. The prescription for the state's further intervention increased to the extent of 80.16%, which obviously means they were opting for a decrease in the roles of the private sector for the future. Due to the lack of service motive and the high cost of services provided by the private sectors, there is high demand for state intervention to regulate private institutions. The main reason behind the prescription for an expansion of the state's role was simply that women knew that it was the responsibility of the state and the government to deliver services to the people. Most of the women strongly argued that it was the responsibility of the state and the government to provide services to the citizens. The impression is that they consider the state meeting its responsibilities to coincide with their assertion of rights as citizens. Women's empowerment was not spelled out clearly in their vision of the activist state. It is to be hoped that the envisaged activist state's agenda will gradually emerge in women's empowerment activities.
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V
Conclusion and Recommendations
A mixed picture of prospects and challenges emerges when re-imagining the state from the feminist perspective of women's empowerment in the Nepali context. Some positive developments in this area are increased political awareness, articulation of women's interests, assertion of women's rights, development ofan articulate political culture, the rise of women's activism at the grassroots level, independence from family control in women's political behaviour, increase in the initiatives and activities of civil organisations, the emergence of pressure groups, the expansion of public space for collective action, and an increasing tendency for advocacy. and lobbying on women's issues. These indicators suggest the emergence of a favourable environment for women's empowerment in the future. However, the potential of female citizens to effectively utilise such environmental benefits have not yet been translated into reality. This is mainly because of the restrictions placed on women by the legacy of the patriarchal mode of social interaction, which is reflected in the pattern of behaviour of the political parties, administrators and other state actors. The unequal distribution of power and resources between men and women has not changed much over time. NGOs are blamed for not properly linking women's problems and needs with the state's power and authority. State functionaries are largely ineffective and incapable of helping out the female section of society. Moreover the lack of political will and commitment of political parties and their leaders is widely perceived to be a major obstacle in promoting women's participation in politics, governance and in the government.
The need of the day is to change women's position of 'exclusion' to that of inclusion', especially in the state power structure and in the decision-making processes. Women's mobility outside the family is a prerequisite for this. Public mobility gained by women through their exposure to modern life has had direct and strong co-relations with women's political participation. There is a consensus that education is the most important factor for enhancing women's mobility in public spheres, including in politics and the government. There is already a strong recommendation for free and compulsory girl education in the country. To educate women and girls means to empower them.
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Women's resentment against political parties is widespread. The political parties in Nepal have not yet considered gender as a component of the party-building process. Despite apparent concern shown by political parties for women's empowerment through the introduction of a quota system for women in their formal structures at all levels of the party, political leadership is handicapped, by and large, by the legacy of patriarchy. In addition to the physical presence of women in party organisations, there should be political will and commitment of party leaders, backed by a clear vision and specific policy strategies for women. Reorientation of political parties with a gender perspective means full acknowledgement of the potential of women to lend dynamism to the party in the long run.
Women-specific NGOs have, of course, contributed to the empowerment of women through their intervention in education, skill training, income generation, sensitisation activities, etc. Their credibility, however, has largely been put to question by society as well as by the government because of their over-dependence upon donors, their misuse of resources, affiliation with particular political parties, and, above all, their lack of professionalism. Community-based voluntary organisations like the Mothers Groups appear to be more effective in generating collective action by women. A reorientation in channelling the development resources could thus be effected through direct funding to such groups. One assumption is that women at the grassroots level will benefit more if resources are directly channelled to women-specific community-based organisations. This would not mean . underestimating NGOs potential to link women and state power. NGOs should not be overburdened as development activists. They could be more effective in the area of women's empowerment if they were more involved in programmes of awareness, advocacy, gender sensitisation, and conceptual clarity on gender issues. Experience shows that NGOs have developed, pressure groups by networking, and such pressure groups are effective and powerful in confronting the state and the government on women's issues.
Reorientation needs to occur in the state and the government. There is a distinct gap between the state's proclaimed goal of gender mainstreaming and women's empowerment, and its policy and programmes that are overburdened by WID principles and the welfare approach. By continuing with its WID and welfare policy approach, the state can bring about only a minor change in the social and economic position of women: there will be no progress towards the avowed goal of women's empowerment. Although social reformation and economic opportunities for women supplement and complement women's empowerment, the essence of empowerment is a different thing. The notion of empowerment is closely related to politics,
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government and governance and it, therefore, covers the process of linking women's experiences, visions, problems and needs with the state's power and authority structure. To be specific, women's empowerment entails three sets of activities:
Generating a critical mass of women (preferably young women) within a group of civil organisations or institutions. This critical mass could be used to show the collective strength of female citizens to generate women's activism;
Ensuring sufficient women's representation and participation in the formal political structures and processes;
Sponsoring a gendered analysis of governance that will expose the reality and severity of women's subordinate position. In doing so it. will challenge the existing power structures and question their legitimacy. When the experience, voices, and needs of over half the productive citizens are not reflected in the decisions that are made, this increasingly marginalises women.
Some recommendations for women's empowerment, specifically made by women at the grassroots level, that directly relate to the women's movement and women's political participation are listed below:
Intervention in political parties
Political parties are like the steersmen in a multi-party system. These are the only legitimate institutions in a democracy that will produce and provide leaders for the government and the state. The experiences of Scandinavian countries suggest that intervention in and by political parties is the best strategy to increase women's participation in politics and in the decisionmaking bodies of formal state institutions. Among the several ways of intervention in parties, two approaches must be considered. One: parties often patronise persons having long records of service in the party. So women must penetrate in larger numbers as members, as workers, and then as leaders. Two: parties set ideology and formulate policy and programmes and these become the government's plan of action when the party forms the government. So sensitising the parties and their leaders in gender and governance is very important. Advocacy and lobbying by developing networks among the parties' women workers/leaders and women activists of civil society are expected to
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bring about the desired result by placing women's experience and needs as an important agenda of political parties.
Establishment of a League of Women Voters
Nepalipolitical parties are increasingly becoming election-oriented. The third parliamentary elections were held on 3" May 1999. The establishment of the League of Women Voters at both central and local level is expected to help the political parties to become more sensitive to women's issues. There cannot be much expectation that women would vote along feminist lines, but the league's psychological effects will be quite substantial in correlating women's voting power with party election agendas. Women activists from civil organisations and NGOs could contribute significantly to this kind of league by establishing and extending their networks.
An increase in reservations
Reservations, as a strategy for women's inclusion in politics and government, are generally accepted in all South Asian countries. The demand for more reservations is on the agendas of women's movements in this region, including Nepal. However, candidacy reservation in parliamentary elections does not assure women's representation. To have a seat quota rather than candidacy reservation in the districts having more than three parliamentary constituencies would definitely increase women's representation in parliament. This proposed system could be applied in elections to local government, VDCs and DDCs, instead of the present system of nominating one woman in the local-elected bodies.
Capacity building
Pleading for women's representation in politics and the government because of their marginalised status is condescending to say the least. The need is to establish the self-confidence, self-worthiness, and self-capability of women as effective participants in decision-making structures and processes. Women's physical presence at all levels of elected bodies should be supported by their effective participation. It is widely felt that most women's representatives in local government are handicapped by their own personal constraints. Women holding posts in parties and elected bodies are strategic persons, and their performance will determine society's continued support for the demand for women's empowerment through their increasing
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representation and participation in politics and government. So specific policy measures should be taken by the government, political parties and the NGOs or civil society to enhance the capacity of women who are already instrategic positions. To oversee this, potential NGOs with built-in capability should be. identified, and strengthening provisions made available.
Constitution of a caucus group
It is widely felt that women politicians are not behaving as women. Because ofloyalty to individual parties, women politicians fail to unite even on vital issues of concern to women. For instance, a private bill against rape tabled in 1993 by the female parliamentarian Sahana Pradhan (CPN-UML) was not supported by other female legislators of the then ruling NC party, although the bill should have been a matter of concern to all women parliamentarians. The constitution of a caucus group of women at all levels, from the VDC to the parliament, could be an effective means for ensuring support across party lines for women's issues. The caucus group would keep the womanhood of female politicians in focus all the time; it would, indeed, provide a platform for consensus building among the women of different parties on issues of common concern. The unity and integration of women politicians of different political parties could also be developed by constituting a federation of women's representatives at different levels, like a federation of elected women ward representatives, federation of women members of DDC, and women MPs, etc. The idea behind constituting a caucus group and federation would be that these would help the consolidation of women's power for action in the public domain.
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Bangladesh
Ain O Salish Kendra
Introduction
The issue of governance, globally, has emerged largely within the context of the post-cold war experience of liberalising economies, as well as the parallel democratising forces unleashed in Eastern Europe and in many developing countries. In Bangladesh changes along these lines were imminent, but whereas the liberalisation of the economy could betraced from the mid 1970s, first emerging as the agenda of a military regime, the democratising process emerged as a strong movement against the military-backed regimes in the early 1990s.
The research team at Ain O Salish Kendra was made up as follows. Core researchers: Meghna Guhathakurta, Suraiya Begum and Naseem Akhter Husain. Research - assistants: Sohela Nazneen and Lailufar Yasmin. Field supervisor. Hasina Ahmed. Field assistants: Lailufar Yasmin, Sonia Sultana Ashrafee. Kazi Lailum Munira and Bilkis Akhter
Sobhan, Rehman, ed., Towards a Theory of Governance and Development: Learning from East Asia, Dhaka, University Press Limited. 1998. The first elected government of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was toppled by a military coup in 1975. Major General Ziaur Rahman came into power and led the first martial law regime until 1977, when he floated the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and held national elections through which he became the constitutional head of the republic. In May 1982 rebels within the army assassinated him. His civilian government stayed intact, but not for long. General Ershad, the commander-in-chief of the army, assumed control. Martial law was declared again in March 1982 and, following in his predecessor's footsteps. General Ershad launched his own party. the Bangladesh Jatiyo Party. and called general elections in 1986. Despite reports of widespread rigging. Ershad constitutionally became president. Countrywide demonstrations followed against his autocratic rule, and finally, in December 1990.
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After independence in 1971, the Bangladesh state opted for a path of development that could be called non-capitalist. The First Five Year Plan (1971-75) assumed a mixed economy in a state of transition to a fully socialist system. The Plan, aside from nationalising key industries, enunciated the need to limit private ownership of the means of production and ensure the right to work. It required that conditions be created for the emancipation of the toiling masses from all forms of exploitation, and that equal opportunity be given to all citizens. All forms of unearned income were to be discouraged, and private ownership of the means of production limited as prescribed by the law. But worldwide recession and local floods created such havoc in the economy that planners and the political leadership found it impossible to deal with the situation without external help. The disasters of 1974 and a bloody coup d'état toppled the government of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and brought in a military regime. The Two Year Plan (1978-80) was formulated to consolidate the position of the new government in power, but it was the Second Five Year Plan (1980-85) that indicated major changes in the development orientation of the government. The main focus of this Plan was on the reduction of poverty through the growth of income and employment by adopting strategies oriented towards the alleviation of poverty in the development of the rural sector, especially where the vast majority of the poor live. All other strategies were to be built around this principle. Although it maintained that the cornerstone of rural development was agricultural development, it also maintained that it was not necessary to interfere with the ownership of land.
A more significant indication of change in the government's development orientation was to be seen in its investment policy. It was felt that the initiative, drive and energy of the individual should be given greater opportunity to flourish and contribute to economic development. The government adopted a policy of encouraging the private sector in a major way. This strategy linked itself to World Bank-inspired strategies of exportled industrialisation, and resulted in the creation of export-processing Zones
he was forced out of power by pro-democratic forces represented by the united force of a coalition consisting of the main opposition parties. A caretaker government took over and held free and fair elections by March 1991, when the BNP was voted into power and parliamentary democracy was reinstituted. Towards the end of the five year term of the BNP a movement led by the opposition Awami League sought to formalise the institutionalisation of the caretaker government in order to ensure free and fair elections.
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in Dhaka and the ports of Chittagong and Chalna. The continuation of this policy was to be noted in subsequent Third and Fourth Five Year Plan periods, which spanned another period of martial law and the military-backed regime of General Ershad, up to the current period of parliamentary democracy in Bangladesh.
Politically, Bangladesh has followed a course which has taken it from a parliamentary democracy to presidential rule to successive coup d'états followed by martial law interspersed by elections which voted into power autocratic regimes with entrenched military interests (the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and Jatiyo Party). But resistance and the contestation of authority have always been part of the political culture of Bangladesh, and time and again people both within and outside political parties have demonstrated this power through various protest movements. The anti-Ershad or anti-autocracy movement from 1987, which culminated in 1990 in the collapse of the Ershad regime and the ensuing elections of 1991, bringing parliamentary democracy back to the political arena, demonstrated the strength of civil society in Bangladesh.
The issue of governance in Bangladesh, as elsewhere, includes both the political and economic, the partisan as well as the developmental; the interface between government and the governed. It implies:
(a) The legitimacy of government, which depends on the existence of
participatory processes and the consent of those who are governed.
(b) The accountability of both political and official elements of government for their actions, and the existence of mechanisms to call individuals and institutions to account.
(c) The competence of government to formulate appropriate policies, make timely decisions, implement them effectively, and deliver services; respect for human rights and the rule of law to guarantee individual and group rights; and security to provide a framework for economic and social activity and to allow and encourage participation of all citizens.
Given the above criteria, one may rightly point out gaps in governance in the Bangladesh context. But the purpose of this report is to situate women in the picture - to see how they themselves perceive the situation, how they would like to imagine a state which could perhaps offer them the opportunities and rights of which they have been deprived. In order to gain a clearer focus on this issue we tried to conceptualise the problem in the following manner.
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The conceptual scheme
In order to understand women's participation in the processes, which also constitute the elements, of governance, we need a broader definition of politics, which will embrace both formal and informal spheres. To us, therefore, politics comprises all activities of cooperation and conflict whereby one organises the use, production and distribution of resources - human, natural, financial and ideological. As such, the two key questions of our present research are:
(i) How are women discriminated against in relation to access to resources
(human, natural, financial and ideological)? (ii) How can women's participation be enhanced to ensure this access?
In addressing these questions our theoretical understanding is that women in Bangladesh are neglected regarding their equal rights, and are marginalised with regard to participation because they belong to the subordinate group. Therefore our major focus is on the categorisation of women as the dominated stratum in the hegemonic construction of male domination. We need to locate women within the structures in which they exist and by which they are controlled, especially the patriarchal ideological and discursive state StructureS.
The constitutional provisions and socio-economic interventions of
the Bangladesh state tell us about the gender thrust of the state. We describe the main features of this in our next section. But it is our contention that they mystify the real status that the state bestows upon women. In our definition the Bangladesh state is a patriarchalone where gender relations are based on gender discrimination. The state, along with its institutions, is strengthening gender discrimination in order to perpetuate the privileges of the male ruling class. Therefore our argument is that women demanding access to resources in a system that gives power to men would still mean the submission of women to existing discriminatory processes. We may proceed by focusing on women as actors within the system, but we also need to focus on women as actors in struggles towards the construction of their identity through everyday resistance and organised protests. Women's perceptions need to
Guhathakurta, Meghna, The AidDiscourse and the Politics of Gender: A Perspective from Bangladesh, in The Journal of Social Studies, Centre for Social Studies, Dhaka, No.65. July 1994, pp. 101-114.
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be understood so that knowledge about re-imagining the state and remaking the context towards establishing an oppression-free society may be enhanced and enriched.
Objectives of the research
With these theoretical assumptions, the present research will examine two basic issues - gender discrimination and participation - at two levels. First we will focus on state agencies that, despite discriminatory norms and practices, are formulating policies for gender equality and extending services. Here our objective is to identify to what extent women benefit from access to resources within the dominant discourse. Second we will focus on the ways in which women exercise agency and challenge the existing order to create a new situation, although outwardly they may remain a part of the repressive normative order. Here our objective would be to identify a subversive discourse, which deconstructs the existing patriarchal framework and seeks to construct an alternative one.
Key concepts
We now define in depth two of our key concepts - discrimination and participation.
Discrimination
By gender discrimination we mean:
(a) inequality of status and opportunity between women and men;
(b) denial of justice to women in social, economic and political spheres;
(c) ideological justification of inequality by patriarchy and state, both
being partial to women's interests.
Religious and social norms often ascribe two different moral standards for men and women, attributing women with virtues that tend to confine them to a limited role. Laws recognise and preserve these inequalities of position, especially laws relating to marriage, divorce, inheritance, custody and guardianship. Codes of male dominance and control of female sexuality again justify these discriminations. Access to resources is discriminatory. Women are denied equality in personal, economic, sexual, social, educational and cultural spheres. Women often cannot exercise freedom even with regard to
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their own bodies or with regard to expression of beliefs, values or norms of personal conduct. Above all, the state has an underlying definition of femininity that is central to its policies of welfarism. This definition also sets a limit to the extent and nature of its response to the oppression of women.
Participation
Usually participation means women's engagement in the public sphere. This would mean women adapting to the existing structure of power relations, specifically relations of gender. Our argument is that women's access to public resources will not automatically empower them to exercise influence upon public decisions if the status quo remains the same. Our observations however do not lead us to neglect or belittle the potential contribution that women could make in the public sphere and in the existing power structure. However our understanding is that participation should include women's initiatives to change the situational context of their subjugation by a male discourse. Thus we attempt to identify gender relations along the mechanisms of power relations operating in the Bangladesh state. Our queries will be at two levels:
(a) How do women make themselves seen and their voices heard in the
existing situation?
(b) What are the perceptions of women regarding alternatives, and how
are they working to change the situation?
Bangladesh state policies on women
The Bangladesh state caters to diverse fragmented and often contradictory interests, for example, international capital, donor governments, the rural rich, the urban middle class, and certain state functionaries such as the army, police and bureaucracy. Such fragmentation in the state's discourse is reflected in the adhoc and contradictory nature of its policies, especially those relating to women. We first outline some of the interventions made by the Bangladesh state regarding gender issues, and then analyse some of the underlying assumptions and contradictions inherent in these state policies.
The first steps to involve women in development activities in Bangladesh in the post-independence period were taken in 1972, through the establishment of the Bangladesh National Women's Rehabilitation Board. In July 1974 it came to be known as the Bangladesh Women's Rehabilitation and Welfare Foundation. These institutions were set up to help women affected by the Liberation War. In 1976, the scope of women-related activities
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was expanded through the formation of the Jatiyo Mahila Shongstha, a national women's organisation.
The Women in Development (WID) school of thought made its entry into Bangladesh during the first UN Women's Decade from 1975 to 1985. It was accompanied by a simultaneous rethinking of the development strategy of the trickle-down approach of the modernisation school, and the introduction of the basic needs approach. Through this new approach, women, along with the landless and target groups, were selected as beneficiaries of the development process, the emphasis of which had shifted from large-scale infrastructure development to small-scale project-oriented development. This was also the point where many local-level NGOs with close contact with the grassroots entered the development scene.
But by the 1980s this trend was coming under assault as well. Were women really benefiting from this targeting approach, or were they in reality becoming victims of tokenism? Many governments like Bangladesh, which accepted WID programmes more for political expediency than a genuine concern for women's development, were actually happy to construct separate ministries for women and design separate programmes for women in marginal areas, as long as it did not disturb the mainstream discourse which remained pro-infrastructure. Women therefore entered the development process as an appendage, and women's concerns came to be increasingly ghettoised in policy circles. As a response to this critique, another debate emerged regarding the planning and implementation of women's development. Should it constitute a separate area in the national development process? Or should it be reoriented or recast so as to reflect women's concerns adequately so that women's participation in development and their human dignity and social status improved at a satisfactory pace? This latter stream of thought has come to be called “mainstreaming women, and is reflected in the Fourth Five Year Plan. But in this Plan mainstreaming was interpreted to mean that effort should be made to include women in all policy sectors, rather than advocate change in the overall framework of development policy.
Mainstreaming women as a development strategy arose at about the same time as another slogan in the development field - privatisation and marketisation - which emphasised the removal of all state control and subsidies and the free play of market forces. But even in this development climate it is recognised that a certain amount of state intervention and affirmative action will be needed for gender-based development. The Fourth Five Year Plan reflects the dual implications of this strategy. In its introduction it states that:
Guhathakurta, Meghna, op, cit.
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There are two main ways of integrating women into the development process and for improving their condition. One process tends to highlight the gender differences and brings men and women into greater competition for existing job opportunities. The second process emphasises more the complementary relationship between men and women and tends to develop them as a whole with focus on the integrative aspects of the family.
But while this was the official view, a different kind of definition of mainstreaming women can be discerned, one that originates from years of mobilising women at the grassroots level (both NGOs and women's organisations), and one which derives strength from the many protest movements in which women have participated, e.g., the language movement of 1952, the Anti-Ayub movement of 1969, the Liberation Struggle and the anti-autocracy movement of 1990. This counter-interpretation runs as follows: problems of gender discrimination and exploitation cannot be understood or resolved in a piecemeal manner through the initiation of isolated projects and programmes. Gender exploitation has to be understood within the context of a patriarchal world order dominated by neo-colonial relations, and fundamental questions have to be posed about the legal rights of women, their exploitation and oppressive notions of sexuality perpetrated by sociocultural and religious norms. Such an approach is supported by feminist groups within the women's movement, the smaller, more politicised, NGOs (i.e., those NGOs concerned with conscientisation and empowerment of vulnerable groups rather than concentrating on welfare programmes), and human rights organisations, and is thus far removed from any official interpretation of WID concerns.
Control over women's reproductive behaviour and labour
From a more structural perspective the Bangladesh state may be seen to intervene at two levels, in the sphere of the reproduction of labour, and at the level of social or ideological reproduction, which help to keep intact existing discriminating practices among gender relations. As far as biological
6 Guhathakurta, Meghna, Gender Violence in Bangladesh: the Role of the State', in The Journal of Social Studies, Centre for Social Studies. Dhaka, No. 30. October, 1985, pp. 77-90.
10

reproduction is concerned, the Bangladesh state follows an interventionist strategy that seeks to establish control over women's bodies and sexuality. The problem of overpopulation has been given top consideration by the government of Bangladesh as an issue that is integrally related to the development process. Theoretically, a natural corollary to a genuine and effective birth control policy would have been the release of women's labour into productive spheres of activity. Practically, however, apart from a few urban sectors, the picture that emerges is quite different. Regardless of the adoption of birth control methods, an increasing number of women and their children have been driven to work out of sheer destitution. At the same time women traditionally engaged in agricultural production (given the existing division of labour), e.g., in paddy husking, have been increasingly displaced and marginalised due to mechanisation in such spheres. State policies or strategies regarding women in production thus tended to encourage those activities that were considered profitable. Hence women became a source of cheap labour which could depress the general wage level. They were also potential sources for capital formation, in the area of savings, as is to be seen in the many women's cooperatives, especially in the rural areas.
Ideological reproduction of gender relations by the state
Whereas the policies reviewed above uphold in general the same tenet as that of international capital (e.g., to free women's labour, to encourage control over women's reproductive behaviour), the policies followed by the Bangladesh state on the ideological plane run in quite converse directions, and indeed often negate or fragment the above-mentioned tenets of development. This ideological plane consists of those processes within society that help the perpetuation, imposition and internalisation of male-dominant values and existing oppressive structures in society in which women are subordinated. Such processes may embrace social customs and practices, religious codes and beliefs, and social legislation, which often seek to sustain and support discriminatory practices.
For example, two different types of laws are prevalent in Bangladesh, the public and the personal. The first is based on Roman law, and the latter on religious texts conforming to respective religious communities. Personal law has not undergone any reform over the past years, hence the position of women under these laws makes them vulnerable. Apart from extreme cases of violence, disputes over property, divorce and polygamy, all falls within the scope of personal law.
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Women's struggles and movements
Until very recently the women's movement in Bangladesh could well have been termed as being in an embryonic stage. Although historical figures such as Begum Rokeya or Pritilata have served to remind us that women in Bangladesh have always struggled against injustice and discrimination, the middle class has primarily dominated the women's movement as we know it today. Their main concern was social work, and their programmes, which concentrated on adult education and training in non-formal sectors, resembled establishment views of women and development. Another theme could be noticed among those women who were in the left movement, and for whom the women's movement became subsumed under the greater issue of class struggle. But the general re-thinking of women's issues in the 1970s brought in a fresh approach and infused new life into the women's movement. However two distinct trends were noticeable. One trend emphasised gender equity within the existing structures of society. The other addressed more fundamental questions as being essentially political. Interestingly enough, some of the questions raised by the second school of thought have only recently been accepted by several women's organisations - fighting for women's legal rights and campaigning against illegal trafficking of women and prostitution.”
There exists yet another pressure from society through which women become vocal and more visible. This pressure comes from the series of mass movements both prior to and after independence movements, which have coloured, characterised and shaped our political history and consciousness. From the Language Movement of 1952, through the Liberation War of 1971, and up to the recent mass uprising of 1990, women's participation in the political process has gradually increased. However it is not to be assumed that such movements have necessarily contributed to improving women's status in Society. Women's participation in such movements has been made subservient to causes that have been considered national priorities, such as the fall of the autocratic Ershad regime. Although these issues are important to the nation as a whole, it has often been the case that women's needs got Subsumed under the greater cause. This is also the way in which many political parties use women to demonstrate their strength, whether in mass rallies, election campaigns or protest marches, but the issues which are being fought
7 Chowdhury, Najma, et. al., eds., Women and Politics, Women for Women,
Dhaka, 1994
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for fail to relate to realities of women's oppression. In the movement against the Ershad regime, a departure could be noticed from the above trend. During the 1990 movement, several women's organisations came together under the umbrella of Oikkyoboddho Nari Shomaj (United Women's Platform). This alliance not only declared their allegiance to the movement against Ershad's autocratic regime, but also put forward their own demands in the form of a 17-point programme. They realised that their demands for gender equity could only be realised in the context of a secular and democratic polity. This platform laid the groundwork for future platforms like the Shommilita Nari Shomaj (the Collective Women's Platform) against state violence against women, and the Jouno Nipiron Birodhi Protirodh Mancha (Platform against Sexual Harassment).
Methodology
A combination of research methods was followed in the current research. First, archival research on the existing available literature relevant to the research topic was conducted. It consisted mostly of secondary sources, but some primary sources such as census, policy papers and political pamphlets were also covered. Second, a field survey of 1,000 samples was conducted in both rural and urban areas to gauge women's perceptions about political participation, the state, violence against women, and certain specific areas like attitudes towards garment labourers, education, security and obstacles to women's progress. Third, focus group discussions and in-depth interviews were conducted among sections of women and men to both test the general assumptions of the research as outlined above, as well as to explore those questions or issues which remained unanswered or needed to be probed into from our field survey. The sections interviewed were:
(i) Women in political parties and office, both national and local.
(2) Women and men receiving credit.
(3) Women workers in garment factories.
(4) Women and men in educational institutions.
(5) Women and men of ethnic communities.
(6) Women and men in non-governmental organisations or women rights
3CtlVIStS.
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The objectives of the survey
The survey was administered primarily with a view to have some kind of common basis of comparison of data from all the South Asian countries. However each of the country surveys retained their specific characteristics. The main thrust of our survey was to assess the nature of women's political participation in the public sphere, which included parliament, political parties, local government and the spheres of development and social justice, as well as decision-making in the private sphere. In addition questions were asked on how they perceived violence against women, security, state, government and empowerment. It was expected that such a sample would be able to concretise some of the more general and conceptual schema that we drew up at the beginning, as well as to generate data that would be easy to compare across countries of South Asia.
A field survey of 1,000 samples was conducted in both rural and urban areas, with 500 samples in each area. 10% of the 1,000 samples were male. Given the nature of the questionnaire and budget constraints, the sample was purposively and not randomly selected.
The survey area
The area chosen was Rajoir thana of Madaripur district and Dhaka city. Due to unavoidable circumstances the information gathering at Madaripur had to be discontinued, and about 125 questionnaires were completed at another rural area at Sonargaon thana of Narayanganj district. The team's entry point at Rajoir was through a local NGO, Gono Unnayan Prochesta (GUP). In Sonargaon thana, the host was the relative of a team member. In Dhaka city the team operated independently, but utilised the assistance of friends and relatives to establish contacts and establish rapport - otherwise they would have been exposed to a high level of suspicion, which was more of a problem in the urban setting than the rural. A more or less equal number of upper, middle, and poor households was covered. Below is a brief description of the areas covered.
Rajoir thana is situated in the middle region of Bangladesh, 220 km. South-west of the capital Dhaka and in the hinterland of the River Padma. The thana is approximately 227 square km. and contains 10 unions. The
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main market place is Taker Hat by the Kumar river. The population is around 200,000, with a literacy rate of 28%. There is a proportionate representation of Muslims, Hindus and Christians in the area. Some villages are predominantly Hindu, while others predominantly Muslim. Apart from agricultural occupations, people are involved in trade (often illegal trading across the borders with India), large businesses and entrepreneurship. The area has a number of NGO activities. Most women were found to be members of an organisation. The level of awareness regarding one's civil rights was therefore comparatively high. Rajoir is a low-lying area that is flooded during the monsoon. Because of seasonal flooding the area can grow only one or two rice crops a year. Green vegetables grow in plenty, however. There are also many mills and factories in the area, for example, rice mills, oil mills, flour mills and soap factories. Handicrafts and small cottage industries also predominate in the area due to NGO activity.
Sonargaon thana is one of the seven thanas of Narayanganj district located 26km. north-east of Dhaka. Sonargaon is a historical place. It is said that Emperor Jahangir's capital was located there. On the east of Sonargaon lies the River Meghna. The rivers Padma, Dhaleswari and the Shitalakhya and their tributaries also crisscross the district. Our survey was concentrated in the Shambhupura union, Aminpur union and Sonargaon sadar (proper). Sonargaon thana covers an area of 42,422 acres. Its population is 261,881. The main crop cultivated in this area is rice, although jute, pulses, wheat and Sugar cane are also produced. The residents are predominantly Muslim, with a few Hindu households. The villages we surveyed were generally well off, each household owning at least 4 to 5 bighas of land (1 bigha - 1600 sq. yards or 1337.76 sq. metres). There is a quite a lot of labour migration from the area to Korea, Malaysia and the Middle East. Remittances from abroad have reduced the poverty level in the villages. There are some centres of the NGOs Proshika and BRAC, but generally it is not an area where NGO activity is prominent. There are colleges and schools of importance in this area.
Dhaka is the capital city of Bangladesh. Its history originates in the 7" century. Located in a region washed by the Buriganga, Shitalakhya, Bangshi, and Dhaleshwari, it covers an area of 36,665 acres with a population of about 5,839,642 (1991 census). The literacy rate is 53.9%. There are about 20 thanas in Dhaka city, with 13 thanas located within city limits. From a quiet suburban town in the early 20th century, it has now grown into a megapolis. Our survey covered 12 thanas that included upper and middle class residential areas, slums, the old quarters of Dhaka, and industrial and commercial areas.
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Methodology
It was decided that out of a sample of 1,000, 500 were to be conducted in an urban area and 500 in a rural area. Since this survey was to constitute only part of our study, we selected only one rural area and Dhaka city. The sample therefore was purposive and not random. Due to logistical limitations placed on us, we chose an area in the mid-region of Bangladesh, rather than an outlying area which may have shown other variations.
Our team consisted of four members, all female. Each was assigned 250 questionnaires, half of them in the rural area and half in the urban area. They worked in teams of two, alternating their visit to rural areas and the town. A field coordinator helped in instructing them and settling them down in the villages. This arrangement had to be altered a little due to the illness of one of our team members. Their stay in the rural areas lasted more than two weeks. Because the questionnaires were rather long (taking one to one and a . halfhours each), the time had to be extended. Instructions were also given to cover a proportionate number of households belonging to different classes. The following categories were used:
(a) large Surplus households; (b) small surplus households; (c) subsistence households; (d) temporary deficit households; and (e) chronically deficit households.
Efforts were also made to interview people of diverse religions and ethnicities, as far as possible.
Specific instructions were given to modify and explicate the concepts and words in the questionnaire when it was being administered, depending on the socio-economic and educational backgrounds of the interviewees.
Methodological challenges and problems
. It was difficult to find and interview very rich households and very poor households. Rich people would deny that they were so rich, and poor people would often deny that they were that poor. This is where we emphasised their self-perception rather than their economic assets. For example, a slum dweller would say “Why, I work and eat; what's so wrong with that. I live well. This kind of statement exposed the economic biases inherent in our own thinking.
6

2
3
Time was an important factor. Often the questionnaire had to be explained at length and took too long. People got tired, especially on the question concerning the state, although we tried to shorten it while administering it. It was also interesting to note that in many cases many women of educated and well-off backgrounds could not comprehend or refused to answer questions regarding the state, but women of poorer households were straightforward in their replies. The latter's understanding came from their daily struggles, while the former categories would often hesitate and reflect on the implication or repercussion of their words.
Since Madaripur district was an NGO-dominated area, the women there were sensitised about their rights. On the other hand this also meant that there was a standard way of answering the questions regardless of whether they comprehended them or not. They would often utter Statements like yes, we should be more aware of our rights', without really knowing what rights they meant. This was revealed by some of the control questions in our questionnaire. Also because our host in the Rajoir thana area was an NGO, our team was sometimes mistaken as NGO workers. This had both positive and negative impacts. Positively they were looked upon as friends and welcomed, and negatively there would be a kind of expectation that they would somehow materially benefit from the interview.
in the urban areas, suspicion was the most important obstacle to overcome. This was particularly the case in middle-class households, although the team members approached the households through prior contacts to overcome this problem. Even then, they were often given “motherly or fatherly advice that interviewing strangers in a city was a dangerous job.
It was difficult to explain the difference between state and government to even educated people. This was done through differentiating between regime (e.g., Khaleda regime, Hasina regime, i.e., hasinar amal) and country, i.e., desh or Bangladesh. A 90 year old woman, who otherwise gave a lucid interview, stared blankly when asked the question. When the interviewer laboured to explain by asking her to name the person who governed the land (Desh chalay kay?), she gave a toothless Smile of comprehension and replied Agey to jantam Rani Victoria, ekhon key janina. (Well at one time I knew it was Queen Victoria, I don't who it is now!)
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The nature of the sample
Relationship to household heads
Among the female respondents interviewed, 73% of women in rural households and 70.6% in urban households were wives of (male) household heads. In comparison, 66.6% of male respondents were household heads in rural areas and 76.5% in urban areas. About 7.4% of women were household heads in rural areas and 9.4% in urban areas.
Educational background
In our sample, in the rural areas 28% of women were illiterate, 33.9% had primary schooling, followed by 22.4% with junior secondary, 7.8% secondary, 1.8% graduates, 0.7% post-graduates and technical, 0.2% madrasas and 0.7% others. In comparison, 16.7% males were illiterate, 24.1% primary education, 1.1% junior secondary, 18.5% secondary, 13.0% higher secondary, 13% graduate, 1.9% madrasas.
In the urban areas 13.6% women were illiterate, 12% primary educated. 8.2% junior primary, 9.1% secondary, 11.8% higher secondary, 20% graduate, 22.3% technical, 2.9% others. Men were 13.7% illiterate, 5.9% primary, 2% junior secondary, 11.8% secondary, 13.7% higher secondary, 17.6% graduate, 31.4% postgraduate, 2% madrasas, 2% others. Hence the male and female samples in the urban area did not differ much in terms of educational background.
Age
The majority of both male and female respondents in both urban and rural
areas fell within the range of 16 to 45. A higher number of male respondents were found in the 45 to 60 range in comparison to women.
Marital status
The majority of respondents, both men and women, were married, followed
by unmarried boys, men and women. A relatively large number of widows (8.1%) were interviewed in rural areas.
8 The madrasa is a higher institution of learning in traditional Islamic education. At present in Bangladesh. the madrasa is an educational institution that is parallel to the general educational institution. It has three major degrees: fajil, kamil and dakhi.
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Religious background
Although more than 90% of respondents in the urban area were Muslim, the rural areas revealed a high percentage of Hindus - almost as high as 30% (the national average is 12%). However in the overall total this balanced out, amounting to approximately 16% of the total sample. There was also an unusually high percentage of Christians - the percentage of Christian respondents in our sample was 2.3%, whereas in the national average it is 0.3%." As has been explained before, this was a basic characteristic of the rural area selected.
Occupation
The majority of female respondents were housewives. Nationally, the number. of women in the labour force is relatively small, approximating 2.2 million.
This is due to women's work at home not being properly evaluated in our
national census. People's responses regarding women's work have therefore. drawn on traditional stereotypes: the male breadwinner. Interestingly 13%
of rural men too claimed household chores as an occupation. This is not
uncommon, however, since grihasthi is a Bengali term that, in an agrarian
economy, implies self-employment in agriculture. Professionals (doctors,
lawyers, teachers, etc.) were the highest category for men and second highest
for women. Business was a significant occupation for men, and a substantial
portion of both male and female respondents were students.
Organisational afiliation
In the rural areas an abnormally high number of men and women were associated with NGO group activity (43% for men and 81% for women). In urban areas, whereas most men (54%) belonged to professional organisations, almost an equal number of women belonged to women's organisations as well as professional organisations. About 5% of women belonged to political parties.
Family types and size
The majority of respondents were from nuclear families rather than joint families, although more so in urban areas than rural areas. Over 50% of
9 Bangladesh Population Census 1991. Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of
Planning, Dhaka, 1994.
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respondents in rural areas came from families with more than six family members. In urban areas this was slightly less. In rural areas on average families had one member with an educational background. In the urban areas it averaged two and a half members per household.
Income groups
The majority of rural respondents fell into the 1,001 to 3,000 taka per month income category. In the urban sector more respondents came from the top two income brackets (Tk. 15,000-20,000, and Tk. 20,001 and above). The monthly expenditure chart however shows that the lower income groups in the rural areas also had the highest expenditure, thus indicating their actual impoverishment. In urban areas the largest expenditure was in the higher strata, but the 1,001-3,000 taka group had a significantly high expenditure, indicating the position of the urban poor.
In our survey we categorised households into five types according to the way people perceived themselves. These categories were:
(i) large surplus households;
(ii) small surplus households;
(iii) subsistence households;
(iv) temporary deficit households; and
(v) chronically deficit households.'
As per their self-perception, it has already been mentioned that very few large surplus households admitted to being such, although this was more apparent in urban areas than rural areas. Generally, however, it may be said that more urban households were found to be in the surplus category (both large and small) compared to the rural households. Deficit households were greater in the rural areas than in the urban areas (both occasional and chronic). More subsistence households were in urban than in rural areas.
Women and political participation
In our questionnaire, political participation has been defined in a broadway to include participation both in the private sphere in household decisionmaking, problem-solving, access to resources, material and intellectual, tangible and intangible, as well as participation in formal political organisations, e.g., parties, parliament, etc.
0 Willem Van Schendel used this classification in his book Peasant Mobility. The
Odds of Life in Rural Bangladesh. Van Gorcum, The Netherlands, 198l.
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To reiterate the key questions of our research, we were going to see how women were discriminated against in relation to access to resources, and how women's participation could be enhanced to ensure this access. As such our first point of information, as to whether the interviewees faced any obstacles with regard to access to resources such as education, family assets, etc., gave us the following results (see Table 1).
Over 50% of female respondents and nearly 45% of male respondents in rural areas said they faced problems in getting access to education. In urban areas this was also the chief problem listed, but more by women than men. The second important problem faced by both men and women of rural and urban areas was Subscribing to an ideology (political, personal, religious, etc.). But this was more the case for men than women, and more for urban areas than rural ones. There was significant contrast between male and female respondents on issues of access to ownership of family assets and mobility in public places. 25.9% of rural men said they faced problems in getting ownership of family assets, while only 5.2% of rural women listed it as a problem. In urban areas, too, more men than women (although a much higher percentage of women compared with the rural context) thought it to be a problem. As for mobility in public places, 27.4% of urban women thought it to be a problem compared to 13.5% of rural women, and as for men only 4% of both rural and urban men thought it to be a problem. A large proportion of both rural and urban men thought they faced problems in getting social justice. The numbers were considerably lower for women, though higher for rural women than urban women. More rural men and urban women than their counterparts faced problems in getting employment. The problems regarding religious and ethnic freedom and belonging to a particular organisation came at the bottom of the list, although the latter was more felt by men than women. From the point of view of class, almost all classes faced problems of access to education and social justice, but the lower classes more than the upper class. The lower classes also faced problems of access to ownership of family assets, which was not evident so much among higher classes. Middle and lower classes faced the problem of practising their own ideology, while the middle classes (notably women) had to confront more the problems of mobility in public places - though that was not so true of the upper class or the very poor.
By religious categories, more Hindus and Christians felt discrimination in access to education and social justice than Muslims. This was especially the case of Christian households, who also faced employment problems. It is interesting to note that discrimination due to holding personal beliefs and ideology was apparent throughout all religions, thus implying
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that class was more significant here than other factors. It is also interesting to note that mobility in public places, or crossing cultural boundaries, was a problem mentioned more by Muslims than Hindus or Christians.
We thus see that education and social justice tended to have gender, class and religious biases. Given the gender bias in our legal structure, access to family assets should have been considered to be more favourable to men than women, but more men voiced complaints about access to such resources than women. This could have been because not many women were aware of their rights over such matters, or because in reality the obstacles to such access were too great for them even to aspire towards it. Generally those with a high level of articulation could spell out problems of access or belonging or subscribing to a particular ideology or organisation. Mobility was a problem articulated more in an urban setting (where social restrictions are perhaps less), and accessing social justice more a problem in the rural areas (given the trappings of a rural power elite). Employment was a problem that was articulated mostly by male respondents. This indicated the inherent male bias of a society that treats the man as the primary breadwinner.
Regarding the root cause of the problems mentioned above (Table 2), many more women (especially urban women) compared to men tended to blame patriarchal bias in the family. This trend was also maintained in the case of patriarchal bias in tradition and ritual. More rural women and men however tended to blame religious blindness. Urban women also acknowledged it, but only third in rank in relation to the other two causes mentioned above. A substantial number of women (22.8% for rural and 26.7% for urban women) thought women restricted themselves (self-censorship). A sizeable portion of urban men thought so too. Rural respondents especially thought local elites were to blame and they were supported by 31.4% of urban men. In comparison, relatively few identified the legal and state apparatus, and that too in urban areas.
Interestingly hardly any class or religious bias was noticeable in pinpointing the above-mentioned root causes preventing access to resources. Only more lower class people tended to think that there was patriarchal bias inherent in laws. Christians tended to point to the attitude of local elites and religious blindness and self-censorship of women more than other causes.
Among the additional comments made, people thought that the deterioration of law and order was a primary cause, and that parents would worry too much. Economic insecurity in the family, lack of guardianship and proper family guidance, getting involved in political controversy, and harassment by police were mentioned. People tended to point out both the lack of state services and corruption in the state apparatus as obstacles. One
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person summed it up in this way: “When right becomes wrong, and when wrong becomes right then there is a problem!' ('Naye jokhon annay hoi, annay, jokhon naye hoi tokhon shomoshya. ")
Regarding the role of women in decision-making within the family (Table 3), a large number of women, both rural and urban, thought that they had a role to play in economic and educational decisions of the family. Men also corroborated this. However there was wide discrepancy on how they perceived their economic role. Many upper and middle-class women felt that though they did not earn any money themselves, their husbands gave them freedom to spend it. But rural women seemed to have less of a say in matrimonial and family planning measures (also corroborated by men). Urban women seemed to think they had a say in matrimonial decision-making but not as much in family planning. Giving space for exaggeration of the respondent's claims, one can still see from these figures how the control of female sexuality continues to reside in the male.
Class bias is noticeable only in relation to educational, matrimonial and family planning decisions of women. Fewer respondents of the lower classes seemed to think women had control over such decisions than upper classes. No major difference is seen to be evident across religions, except that no Christians seemed to think that women have a say in matrimonyrelated decisions. However since the sample is so small this cannot be gauged properly.
The additional comments to this question were interesting in that they reflected how many women gave vent to their actual feelings. Some elaborated the internal dynamics of decision-making. As one woman said: “He takes my opinion all right, but does not give it priority. Often it is never implemented. Another said that her husband never takes decisions by himself, but always asks his mother's permission. Before he never listened to me; now that I bring in money, he does. Educated men listen to their wives, but uneducated men don't.' 'Our family is run by my in-laws.’ “Men make their own laws. They don't listen to us! If men want, they keep you, if not they don't.' 'Whenever I get something leat, there's no need for anything else.' “Men don't listen to women due to religion. If a woman is clever, then she can participate in all affairs of the family. He listens to me if it's not important, never when it is important. It all depends on family status.
A question was asked as to why women were not normally called household heads. The majority said that women were economically less capable, secondly they opined that they could not perform all tasks, and thirdly they thought women were illiterate or less educated than men. However more rural men thought that women could not perform all tasks. The class and religious variant did not give any significant results in this question.
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In their additional comments, many remarked that women often lack experience and foresight to be household head due to tradition, more specifically Bengali tradition. Many women felt that a husband was everything for a girl after marriage, and one should not do anything above his head. "This is what community (shomaj) says. “Religion is a factor. This is Allah's strict order: it has been so from time immemorial. This system is the best - women have less responsibility.” “Women suffer from inferiority complex and men want to assert themselves.'
A series of questions were asked which enquired about the respondent's political behaviour in the public space such as voting patterns, participation in local arbitration and mediation, views regarding electoral candidates, etc. Responses to the question why women cast their votes were similar throughout rural and urban areas, as well as between male and female (Table 4). Most respondents answered that they considered it their political right, and secondly they said that it was to ensure their rights. The least response came to the statement that male members of the family dictated the terms of voting. Voting because it was the done thing ranked third. This implied that men and women in Bangladesh had been subjected to a lot of voter's education through the media in the light of the last two elections. Amar vote amidebo, jakey khushi takey debo (I will give my own vote and according to my own choice) is a slogan that has become a household phenomenon. In this context the level of awareness regarding voting as a democratic right has gained much popularity. Of course, this may also mean that people may mechanically respond to the question without giving it much thought, or because it was so obviously the right thing to say.
Many gave honest opinions: “I think its fun. I get to see my neighbours. All this talk about political rights is bullshit, because you see so often that someone else has given your vote for you; then I can't protest, no one does.' 'I don't vote, because I think, where does the candidate get all the money?' 'I vote because I think things will change. “I vote to make my candidate win. “I vote for democracy, for the country's development.” “I don't vote because I have not been enlisted as a voter.
Regarding what attributes respondents look for in a candidate, an equal number of rural men and women named education. Education also ranked high among urban men and women. However the majority of urban men and women looked at party background of the candidate, in significant contrast to the rural areas. But the attribute that ranked the highest among men and women of all areas was leadership. In contrast, financial power ranked the lowest, kinship to a certain extent. It was interesting to note that gender identity did not feature as a strong criterion of voting, least among
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rural women. The very poor did not consider educational background as much as the upper class. The quality of leadership, though given the highest consideration, did not rank as high as with the upper classes. Party background on the other hand was as important as it was to higher classes. Religious minorities gave more prominence to education and leadership quality than to party background.
Additional comments revealed a more materialistic pattern: "Whosoever is willing to do me some good, I vote for him. "I look for the “better option” given the circumstances. “I vote for the party I think will win that year.' I listen to others.' 'l heard that Ershad did a lot of work, so I voted for him. “Whoever vote for, I don't see anything happening. I vote where others vote. “I vote for him who will help the poor.' I vote for whomever I see on TV. I vote for him for his good character. “I voted for him because he is a murrubbi (village elder).
Regarding their attitude towards salish and fatwa (local arbitration procedures and decrees thereof), there was a contrast between rural and urban areas. 50% of rural women thought they rendered justice to women, although it was quite apparent from the media that women were discriminated against in these arbitration courts. The reason for such a response could have been pressure from society and fear. The majority of rural men also thought so. However a sizeable number of men as well as women in rural areas also said that such salishes were used by powerful elites as an instrument to exert influence. Up to 17% of rural men and women thought they were harmful for women. In the urban areas, the majority of women (47.7%) thought these salishes rendered injustice to women, 28.7% thought they were an instrument of the powerful elite, and only 12.7% thought they rendered justice to women. The urban men were evenly distributed in their responses although most of them (33.3%) thought that salishes were harmful. The class-based responses were not significant enough to deduce anything. Interestingly more religious minorities gave a more positive pronouncement towards salishes than their Muslim counterparts. Fear could have contributed to this response. Another reason could have been that since most religious minorities in the rural area were well off and therefore elites themselves, their responses did not vary much from Muslim respondents.
People had strong feelings about salishes. There should be one law in the country. The salish system is fraudulent. The state is very strict regarding women. Both justice and injustice take place in a salish) - but mostly it is filled with superstition. If a salish is made accountable then there is justice, otherwise not. Nowadays it is difficult to control women; I don't think there is anything wrong with the justice system. If a woman has family backing, she gets justice. Justice differs according to high and low.
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Regarding their thoughts about alternative methods to salish practices, the majority of men and women in rural areas thought that legal courts should take over. Only a sizeable number of urban women thought that women should be represented in the salishes (24.5% compared to 10.5% for rural women). More rural women thought that the union parishad should take over the process. Very few urban respondents answered in favour of this. More urban women and men seemed to be in favour of creating a new social system (14.9% and 3.7% respectively). For the rural people this hardly seemed a feasible idea. Obviously those embedded in the repressive society found it harder to change things than those outside it. Significant class responses were that the very poor thought the union parishad the better alternative, and that women should be represented in the process. Very few thought that the legal option was an alternative due perhaps to its very inaccessibility to the poor. A puzzling result was that equal number of very rich and very poor thought that the system should be radically changed. But then the urban voice perhaps made itself felt here. The findings did not differ much in respect to religious categories except that very few religious minorities thought of changing the system.
Some people gave well thought-out suggestions about what to do:
(a) “People in the rural areas should be made aware about state laws, and
unjust verdicts should be made a criminal offence by the state.'
(b) “As an initial step women's representation should be ensured in the salishes. But the real objective should be to establish a rural court system (gramya adalot).”
(c) The villagers will not abide by anything else but a salish because it has become part and parcel of their lives. They have a fear of being ostracised by their community.'
(d) If a woman does not get fair justice in a salish, then she won't get it
in the Supreme Court either.
(e) *Salishkers (arbitrators) should be held responsible and punished for
a “mistrial'.
(f) “The people should protest if there is no justice.'
(g) There is no alternative but to sit at home quietly, because resorting
to law requires a lot of money.'
(h) 'Women's organisations are an alternative.'
Recently the Bangladesh government introduced the system that three seats in local union parishad elections would be reserved for women who would be directly voted in by their constituencies. Responses to what this was
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supposed to achieve were generally positive. The majority thought that it would increase women's awareness, though more rural women thought that it would contribute towards their empowerment. Comparatively not many thought that this would necessarily raise the level of women's political participation. Rural women and urban men seemed to be more sceptical than the rest in maintaining that nothing will change. Although the majority of poor households thought the measure to be empowering and then contributing to raising awareness levels, they were also comparatively more vocal about its pitfalls. Incidentally so too were the very rich, but possibly for different reasons. Religious minorities were less sceptical.
Respondents clarified their opinion in the following way. “If women members remain free from influence, only then will this work.' 'Women would be able to talk freely with a woman member. The member will be more capable of dealing with women's issues. Others, more sceptical, thought: They are there by name, not in work'. 'Women themselves create problems for women, therefore this won't go far. There should be some change, but lots of obstacles will come from the patriarchal system.' 'Only if men give them importance will they be able to function." A few thought it was un-Islamic, and some thought that this is an indication that women's rights are being recognised.
When asked why they thought women's participation in formal politics was so low (Table 5), women both rural and urban mentioned reasons in the following order: insecurity, family objection, lack of education, disapproval by society, gender inequality, lack of skills and economic limitation. No one in the rural areas mentioned being a minority as an obstacle. More rural men however mentioned lack of education, while more urban men mentioned family objection. Both rural and urban men gave similar stress to insecurity (less than women) and disapproval by society. The fact that societal and family disapproval was a middle class value was apparent from class-based data. There was no serious discrepancy from the general findings apparent in the data by religious categories.
Some examples of detailed answers were: “Women feel shy." They are callous, lack courage and merit.” “Not many women understand - those who do, participate.” “They face obstacles from society.” “There is fear of factionalism.” “Women are physically weak.' 'They are god-fearing.' 'The political culture is not conducive to women's participation. They don't venture outdoors so much as men. Religion is a factor.' 'Women think politics is a bother. Their public mobility is restricted. Their hands are full anyway with housework. They are culturally repressed. Politics is still recognised as a male sphere, women are discouraged from entering it.' “Women live as parasites on men.' 'You cannot criticise the party leadership.'
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These comments demonstrate that some people locate the cause within society, some within political parties, others in the women themselves.
Suggestions for making political participation more effective (Table 6) resulted in the majority of men and women wanting more involvement in political organisation or party-based politics. Second came taking part in the decision-making process in the family. Interestingly though more urban women (53.2%) gave their voice in favour of participating in decision-making in the family than any other category. But even more interesting was that though involvement with party-based politics was suggested, very few mentioned participating in elections as a form of political empowerment. The largest voice in favour of this option came from urban males (3.4%). Contrary to expectations, NGO membership was not considered by most as a way of political empowerment, even when one of the rural areas selected registered a high level of NGO activity. Possibly the people themselves have learnt to distinguish the credit-based economic activity which NGOs promulgate from what they perceive as political empowerment. No significant class or religious variations were evident.
There were also many additional comments made by the respondents: Women are forbidden to go outdoors. Politics is not good for women.” “If women come forward in education then it is enough. 'The state should take the initiative to educate and empower them. It is necessary to change the attitude of men and society.’ 'First ghorniti then rainiti, (i.e., first home then politics). Quotas for women.' Women should come into politics through employment. We have to change the present political culture.' " A woman should try to decide for herself first. Her workload at home has to be reduced first. Some role models are necessary first.' 'Women must be free to criticise their party policies.'
Such remarks indicate that there are both traditional as well as innovative thinking on women's political participation.
Views about making parliament effective for women were expressed in the following manner: the majority of rural men and women opined that important discussions on women should be held. They also gave almost equal importance to strengthening support to existing women representatives in the parliament. Urban men and women preferred this latter option, while holding important discussions on women came second in their list. Increasing the numbers of women's representatives ranked third, which is an interesting find in the context of the demands raised by the women's movement in this regard. No significant class or religious variant was evident.
The following suggestions were also made. Women should come in through competitive elections. Men too must be made aware as well as,
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women.” “Positive bills must be passed. “Women parliamentarians should establish links between grassroots and parliament. They should depend on their own strength. Only those who can talk about women's problems should be elected. Parliamentarians in general should change their attitude
regarding women).
Responding to the question regarding how they thought women's development could be made possible, an overwhelming majority in both rural and urban areas of both sexes said through getting education. The second choice was enhancing women's economic empowerment. Only a few rural women (13.2%) replied through NGO membership. The other answers were in comparison insignificant, but, nevertheless, it is interesting to note that about 7.4% of rural men in comparison to 3.1% of rural women replied if the head of the state were a woman. A few urban men and women thought heading the household or holding membership of a political party would lead to women's development. Their rural counterparts were virtually silent on this note. No significant variations were found by class or by religion.
Remarks about women and development consisted of the following. Women's development follows a good marriage. Consciousness-raising and proper networking at the political, cultural, economic and family level.' “Women must become more competitive.' "They should be given more opportunities. She must develop self-respect. Men and women should have equal wages. They should organise themselves. They must be influential in their families.
Women and the state
The question as to who the respondent thought was responsible for various sectors (e.g., law making, justice, law and order, national security, education, irrigation, transport, health, energy, housing, food, finances, taxes and welfare) was answered almost uniformly. The majority of respondents thought that the government was actually, and should be, responsible for all functions. As second choice they named local government, although those in the rural. areas emphasised the role of the local government in most sectors, especially those relating to housing, food and welfare services, compared to the urban sectors. It was mentioned before that the question proved too long even when shortened considerably by the interviewers, and therefore was answered very mechanically. The variations therefore were very small and hardly significant, except in the case of irrigation and welfare where more respondents mentioned society, NGOs and people conducting such activities. The reasons why such activities were performed mostly by governments or
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local government were justified by saying that it was their legal responsibility, and secondly that law-makers were powerful. In some cases they also considered the fact that it was more practical. In the welfare sector a large percentage of the urban population thought the welfare activities were taken over by Society, NGOs and people because no one else took the responsibility. Regarding ownership of forest lands, the majority of all respondents thought it should be state-owned. Only a substantial percentage (12.2%) of urban women thought the community should own it. Both rural and urban men and women thought civic amenities such as electricity, gas, etc., should be state-owned. But more urban people (23.5% male and 18.5% female) thought they should be privately owned. It was widely considered that all other services, such as water, minerals, health, education and banking should be owned by the state. However a sizeable percentage of urban respondents thought that health and education should be privately and communally owned. More urban women spoke of community health ownership than urban men. This was also true for rural women. Rural respondents in general and urban women spoke in favour of community-owned education. The preference for privatisation of all sectors was more evident in urban areas than rural. A large percentage of urban men and women (27.5% and 14.9%) wanted privatised banks compared to rural areas.
The majority of respondents along all class lines voted for state ownership of all the above-mentioned sectors. However among the large surplus households 10-11% thought civic amenities and health institutions should be community-owned. Among small surplus households the following percentages of respondents thought that these sectors should have private ownership: 19.3% for civic amenities, 13.6% for water resources, 12.9% for hospitals and 14.2% for banking. There were a few who thought water resources and hospitals, as well as schools, should be community-owned. Subsistence households considered that ideally forests, water and schools more than other sectors should be community-owned. Among the lower two tiers, very few people voted for anything else but state ownership. Along religious lines the only variation found was that almost 21% of Muslims thought that forest property should be community-owned, and 87% of Christian respondents thought that mineral resources should be communityowned
In response to the question of whether the government represented them, the majority of all respondents said yes, but a large number of urban men and women (33.3% and 35%) said no. In response to whether the state represented them or not, the majority of respondents said yes, but a large proportion of urban men and women said no (21.6% and 23.2%). More
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rural respondents said no, too, in comparison to the previous question. Classbased data revealed no major differences, except a lesser percentage of the very poor than other classes thought that the government represented them. Almost the same figures were true for the question regarding state; representation. Among the people who said no to representation by the government, one remarked: “If the government stays in the capital, then how will it look after us?' Among those who saidyes to state representation, one remarked: “If the state did not represent us, then it would logically be in the hands of a foreign power.'
By religion, fewer Muslims than religious minorities thought that the government represented them. This could be because of the more benign. attitude of religious minorities to the present government. On the question: of state representation, Hindus were more vocal than Christians and Muslims in their assertion. This could be because they followed their own ideals of the Bangladesh state rather than what it actually was, or they could have said it out of fear, since it is quite common to call them Indian agents if they happen to slip up on the usual measure of patriotism.
The overwhelming majority of rural respondents and urban women said they did not want the state to decrease its function. But a sizeable number of urban men and women said yes. This included a larger percentage of men than women (35.3% male and 23.2% female). This was answered almost in reverse to the question as to whether they wanted the state to increase its function, i.e., the majority said yes. Almost the same percentage of urban: men and women who said yes to minimising the role of the state, said no to its expansion. Class-based data revealed that fewer lower class people were in favour of minimising the role of the state in comparison to the two upper tiers taken together. But the question on expanding state powers was more equally voted affirmative along class lines. Here the very rich had the strongest voice. This could be evidence that taking benefits from the state sector created the very rich class in Bangladesh. Along religious lines, the only significant finding was that very few Hindus in comparison to other religious categories said yes to minimising the role of the state, and they were especially strong. in advocating expanded powers.
Almost equal percentages of rural men said that they did or did not go to any institution to solve their problems. A much larger percentage of rural women (78%) said they did not go. The majority of the urban sample also denied they went, but more urban men and women admitted that they sought institutional support than did rural respondents. Here the figure was higher for urban men than urban women. In the class-based data, relatively
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larger percentages of the lower two tiers of classes said they went to some institution or other to solve their problems (25.6% and 30.1% respectively). More respondents among the religious minorities also went in comparison to their Muslim counterparts, although the numbers did not vary significantly. Finally, some comments regarding women's perception of political participation and of the state in respect to existing views or policies of the state on the one hand, and the agenda of the women's movement on the other. From the above, we see that although the Bangladesh state is supposed to be encouraging a privatisation drive, very few women and mostly rural women reflected this as an ideal choice. Rather it was an option mostly preferred by the urban men. Also the fact that the very rich class preferred state expansion reflected the dependency of this class on state resources.
Regarding political participation, we see many opinions expressed which are not reflected in the agenda of the women's movement in Bangladesh. More specifically, they are the struggles of women to achieve decision-making status within the household, especially in spheres of sexuality and reproductive rights. Although Bangladesh now boasts a lower fertility rate, and many studies have attributed it to the education and empowerment of women, our data reveals that family planning is still an area where women, including educated urban women, still do not feel empowered.
Our data has also revealed that increasing women's seats in the parliament (which is one of the demands of the women's movement) is not necessarily perceived by women to be either politically empowering or leading to effective political participation. Rather the emphasis is on strengthening and activating existing resources and institutions on pro-woman issues and debates. This is also true in the case of running for elections and becoming members of NGOs. The Bangladesh state has now reserved three seats for women in the local bodies of union parishad, where women are directly elected. This measure is considered positive for raising the level of awareness of the women, but not necessarily for effective political participation within these institutions. In fact political empowerment is still perceived by the majority as engaging in party-based politics or political organisations as opposed to running for elections, and in contrast to NGO membership concentrating on micro-credit lending. This again is an important finding considering that there is a tendency in Bangladesh (especially among donors and NGOs) to perceive civil society as being led solely by non-party organisations. There is also a great deal of research that tries to show the positive relationship between micro-credit lending and political empowerment, although in many cases the proof is not conclusive.
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Violence against women
Violence against women may be defined to include acts of physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and deprivation of liberty.' The main causes of violence against women in Bangladesh are economic marginalisation, lack of access to resources, and the dependent status of women. Violence against women is also related structurally to patriarchy and patriarchal norms. Gender-based violence and abuses are perpetrated at many different levels and in many different forms, including the recent trend of issuing fatwas (religious decrees) by village power structures against women who were seen as transgressing the borders of morality.
There are ambiguities surrounding the question of violence in Bangladesh. On the one hand, violence against women is held in repugnance and may provoke outrage. On the other hand, such violence is accepted, tolerated, and in a certain context, legitimised, especially in the case of family violence. According to an official estimate at present there are about 50 deaths per thousand women due to pregnancy-related causes, and 67 per thousand women due to unnatural causes. On 22"November 1993, the home minister disclosed in parliament that women accounted for 12,470 of the 21,622 reported suicides since January 1992. These suicides are largely a consequence of dowry and other domestic violence.' Another report states that, in 1984, out of a total of 1,993 recorded murder incidents, 273 (14%) were caused to women. In most cases, the incidents are not reported to the proper authorities for one reason or another.
Crimes against women have been increasing at an alarming rate. According to data collected by the Ain O Salish Kendra, the total number of incidents reported has more than doubled from 628 in 1995 to 1,533 in 1997. Among the different forms of crimes, rape was the most frequently reported. In the last three years, incidents of rape had increased from 38.2% of total reports of violence in 1995 to 49% in 1997. Domestic violence persists as the largest threat to women's security. Up to 50% of all murders in Bangladesh have been attributed to marital violence. Causes of marital violence are attributed to demands for dowry, polygamy, non-payment of dower, custody of children, and suspicion of adultery. Yet domestic violence is not recognised
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, New York, United Nations,
February 23, 1994, (Resolution No. A/RES/48/104).
2 The Daily Star, sub editorial report, 16 January 1994, p. 4.
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as a crime. It is in this context that we phrased our questions regarding violence against women in our survey.
When asked whether respondents have witnessed any violence against women or children (Table 7), the majority of women and men said yes. The numbers were 56.6% of urban women to 58.8% of urban men and 51.8% of rural women to 61.1% of rural men. The class-wise variation was relatively less, but generally poorer respondents witnessed more violence than in richer households. There was no marked difference along religious lines. A considerable number of respondents said that they themselves or their family members had experienced violence: 21.2% of urban women, 15.7% of urban men, 22.4% of rural women and 25.9% of rural men. In the class-based data, more respondents in the poorer households claimed to have experienced violence than in the upper class households. The data by religion did not differ much.
When asked what type of violence the respondents have witnessed, physical violence came first on the list, followed by mental violence. Urban women seemed to have witnessed more mental violence than any other category. However rural men seemed to have witnessed other kinds of violence more than the rest. About 11.1% of rural men said they had witnessed rape. So did 4.3% of rural women and 4.7% of urban women and 5.9% of urban men. Interestingly, there were a few cases where witness of rape of Bengali women by Pakistani soldiers and collaborators during 1971 were mentioned. Rural men more than any other category also witnessed sexual assaults, trafficking as well as coercion into prostitution. In the class-based data, relatively more poor households witnessed physical acts of violence than upper classes, while more mental violence was witnessed by upper classes. No significant variation was found along religious lines.
The majority of respondents were of the opinion that violence against women may be stopped through changing existing attitudes (Table 8), but a larger percentage of urban women and men compared to those in rural areas. An almost equal proportion favoured strict laws, while more rural and urban men compared to women were in favour of making law enforcement agencies more effective. More women than men, especially urban women, advocated changing state policies. A small proportion advocated changing Social institutions. A large number gave additional comments. More poor households advocated stricter laws, and richer households advocated changing existing attitudes. More religious minorities advocated changing attitudes rather than advocating stricter laws or making law-enforcing bodies more effective.
Additional comments were both traditional and radical: The leaders of society (murrubbi) can take responsibility for this, and more anti-violence
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rallies and demonstrations must be held.' Facilitate legal procedures and close the legal gaps." Even on a temporary basis, the Saudi Arabian model of justice should be followed. "One has to stop the dowry/demand system.' Public trial for rape cases. Public and immediate punishment should be dealt out.' Social awareness-raising campaigns. Poor people often do not know to whom they can turn. Neighbourhood resistance should be built up.' 'Women should be more controlled, they have gone too far,' 'Reportage of these incidents have increased because now the media enjoys more freedom. It will only end when human relations are no longer exploitative.
Increasing women's skill and efficiency will help to prevent violence.' Violence will stop if one follows the lslamic way of life. Men have to be made afraid of their sins. “Women must earn and be educated. There must be political commitment.'
Womenos perception of em powerment
Empowerment is a complex, multi-dimensional concept. It may denote women's increased role in decision-making, women's increased capacities to have control over or ability to change situations, or it may imply selfawareness leading to transformative abilities. Keeping in mind the challenges and changes in social and economic conditions facing women in Bangladesh, we focused some questions on this issue.
Recent trends show that women are increasingly taking up new challenges in the market economy. This expansion of women's participation in directly productive employment contributes to the growth of national income and empowers women both economically and socially. Having an independent income creates the potential to enhance women's status at home and in the community.
The most significant change in the urban labour market is the entry of women into formal manufacturing industries, such as garments, pharmaceuticals, electronics and fish processing. Most of these industries are also export-based. In general, women in these industries are better educated and receive job training. Among the new industries garment factories provide an interesting case study, since 90% of the 800,000 workers are female. Many are recent migrants from rural areas, who were previously unemployed or engaged in housework.
In our survey, the majority of men and women thought women's social status had increased because of women's employment in the garment factories. More urban women and men (27.6% and 17.6% respectively), compared to their rural counterparts, thought that women were exploited. However a
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significant number of respondents, especially in the rural areas, qualified their statements in the following way. Social status is both decreasing and increasing.' True. a woman's social status is decreasing but it is good for her; your status really depends on yourself. 'Society despises the parents of a garment factory worker. Even if your income increases, your social status does not. Even if status does not increase, they can at leastfeed themselves.' It is better to stay at home and do handicrafts. It is not proper for young girls to go out - that is why social status decreases. It is true they have increased their income relatively, but they have no security, their salary too is less.' They have increased self-esteem but they are being exploited economically and politically. Their social status is decreasing because they are mixing with lower classes.' Social problems increase, they don't listen to their parents, their mobility creates problems, they can no longer behave in accordance with religious codes. They work out of sheer destitution, but their status decreases.' Hunger drives them to work, whether their status increases or decreases is of no concern to anyone. Maybe their social status does not increase, but their self-awareness certainly does.
Class-based data revealed more poor households thought there was an increase in status than upper class households. The reverse was applicable to those who said that they were exploited. There was no significant difference along religious lines except that very few religious minorities compared to Muslim respondents thought that women were exploited.
Education for women leads to self-reliance. This was the majority opinion of all respondents. Very few answered otherwise, and all classes voted equally for this. Slightly more upper class households said that marrying off educated girls would be more difficult than in poor households. There were hardly any significant variations on religious lines. Some comments were: "It depends on how one would use one's education.' Progress will be very slow, no matter what direction one takes. Even if you are educated, you have problems of mobility. ' An educated woman can educate her children.' 'The present education system does not change one's sense of right and wrong.'
Women felt insecure primarily because they were women. This was the opinion that was voiced by the majority of respondents, regardless of sex. Secondly they reasoned it was because they were physically weak. Third came illiteracy. Lack of property was followed by poverty. The least important reason was felt to be religion or ethnicity. There were a significant number of households that gave other responses: Wives have to remain subordinate to their husbands.' 'Women have to look after their own self-esteem. Lack of economic power. Men's beastly nature. Deterioration of the law and
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order situation.' 'Women are schooled by their family and society to think so. Women are brought up as property of a family. They are brought up as weak. Women feel insecure without guardianship. They do not possess confidence or courage and are helpless. The government is not providing security. ベ Most respondents felt that the most obstructive attitude for women's progreSS Was the attitude that women should be less educated than men. Second came the attitude that women should not question men. Third came the attitude that women should marry and bear children, and finally that Women should earn less than men. Urban women were more vocal about the marriage issue than the earnings issue. Slightly more rural women were vocal about the earnings issue than the marriage one. But a significant number of rural men, women and urban men felt they had to qualify their statements or reinterpret the question. Some of their comments are given below: "It hampers a woman to have too many children.' 'Women can never transcend men, this is Allah's law. “Women are never encouraged or supported by men in their work. Lack of mutual respect.' 'Women do not possess capacity to think in the long term. Male-dominant society is the cause.' 'Women cannot give much time outside the family, men members of the family prevent them from doing so. Women's dependency. “None of the points mentioned above is an obstacle.' 'Women restrain themselves.' 'Lack of awareness of options).
Religious codes are an obstruction.
A higher percentage of the poorer classes than those in the very rich. category thought attitudes regarding education were more obstructive. Upper class respondents, more than those in poorer households, thought that the inability to question men was the problem. More chronically deficit households thought inequality of earning capacities the main problem, more than any other category. Aside from gender differences in education, religious minorities thought getting married and having babies was more of a barrier to women's progress than attitudes towards earning.
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II
Social change and political participation in Bangladesh
The Bangladesh parliament (Jaityo Songhsod) currently holds a unique position in the world. It is the only parliament where women occupy the posts of both the leader of the parliament and the leader of the opposition. This is a striking fact (and indeed a baffling one to many outsiders) in a country where in socio-economic and legal terms women in general occupy a subordinate position to men. In the recent census, out of a population of 115.5 million, women constitute 54.2 million, out of which 43.9 million live in rural areas and only 0.3 million live in urban areas. The literacy rate for women is 25.5% compared to 38.9% for men and 32.4% for the national average. More importantly, patriarchal ideology has largely confined Women to a domestic space. It is not surprising therefore that, despite the almost equal ratio of men and women, politics in the public sphere has remained a male-dominated and a male-centred area,
The Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh gives equal citizenship rights to all regardless of gender, race and religion. Clauses 36 to 39 of the constitution cover this area. According to clauses 66 to 122, the constitution does not discriminate between men and women insofar as their right to hold public posts and their voting rights. On the other hand, in order to encourage women onto the political scene, clause 65 of the constitution stipulates that 10% of parliamentary seats shall be reserved for women as part of an affirmative action clause incorporated in the constitution to redress the historical gender imbalance (Clauses 9 and 28).
This clause did not exclude women from contesting in direct elections for the 300 general seats. The provision for reservation of seats for women was made given the social impediments for women to contest elections openly with men. It was expected that through this clause the rate of women's participation in public affairs would increase, and that eventually there would be no need for the clause. In the first national assembly, from 1973 to 1975, 5 seats were reserved for women. But since the situation did not improve for women towards the end of the decade, the number of seats was raised by way of an amendment to 30 in the second national assembly from 1979 to 1982. This was the rule until its expected lapse by the end of the term of the fifth national assembly in the year 2001. In the last parliamentary session,
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the governing party, the Awami League, brought a bill for the extension of the provision for reserved seats for women. But it was unable to obtain the requisite two-thirds support due to the absence of the opposition party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). At present, there are no reserved seats for women in the parliament of Bangladesh.
There has been a gap between policy and practice regarding the reservation issue. This has created controversy and debates in political circles in general, and within the women's movement in particular. Far from encouraging women to participate in elections, this provision was much criticised by the public since the majority party in power misused it. Because the women were to be indirectly voted in by the 300 elected members, the party controlling the majority of votes in the house usually nominated women from its own party ranks or ideological leanings. This often helped a simple majority party to gain the absolute majority in parliament necessary to form a government. The 30 reserved seats therefore became a vote bank for the ruling party, and the women mere functionaries of that party. The latter characteristic earned the seats the popular designation of the 30 ornaments.' Women rights activists in Bangladesh have critiqued the above provisions made by the state for two reasons:
(a) Women have not been given equal rights in the personal sphere, especially where women do not enjoy equal status in those areas under religious law such as marriage, divorce and custody. This is one of the predominant reasons that the women's movement in Bangladesh is taking up the ‘civil law strategy in demanding a uniform family code.
(b) Their objection is not towards the reservation perse, but they maintain that in order to ensure effective participation these seats should be increased to 100, and that the women be directly elected to the seats and not nominated by parliamentarians as is the current practice. In this way not only would women's participation be numerically strengthened, but would probably also be more effective. However in order for such changes to be brought about both the ruling party and the opposition party would have to come to a consensus since it means an amendment of the constitutional provision - which requires a three-quarters majority in parliament. To date such a consensus does not seem imminent. As has been mentioned above, in our field survey it was revealed that more women and men were in favour of discussing women's issues in the parliament and actively supporting
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existing women representatives there, rather than in increasing women's representation.
Women's entry to politics has been full of obstacles. When local and national level women politicians were interviewed in depth they echoed the sentiments voiced by ordinary women in our survey. The first obstacle they indicated was that politics is not routine work, and, hence, for a woman, who is expected to tend to the household duties, it becomes problematic to first get out of her domestic mould and second to gain social acceptance for her new role. This is where coming from a political family or replacing the man in the family as its representative has its advantages. Given that political work is not paid, family capital becomes important in another way - since women are legally discriminated against in their right to inheritance. Public relations are essential for any politician. Here, too, a woman is disadvantaged due to social values that restrict her mobility. For mainstream political parties the woman question is not a central one. The only way ordinary women make a mark on the political agenda is through their vote, and awareness about voting rights is significant. The Bangladesh government has currently reserved three seats for women in the local bodies of union parishad, where women members would be directly elected. This, together with a massive turnout of women voters in the last two elections, has added a new dimension to women's political participation.
issues of women and governance are located at a nexus where state and gender issues interface. In the section below we review first that area where political partier and local bodies mediate relationships with the state, and, second, where micro-financing processes help to mediate relationships between the state and women.
State-women interface: Mediation by political parties and local bodies
In terms of women participating in the formal processes of politics, the main obstacle is perceived as family and society. Politics is still very much a male. bastion. In this situation, women who have been recently elected as members of the union parishad (UP) admitted that if their husbands had not agreed they would not have been able to stand for election. Many of them said that it was possible for them to participate in elections because their husbands or fathers were either the chairman or a member of the UP. They had wanted their women family members be elected to the seats reserved for women in order to enhance their power base. Those women who did not have husbands
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or family members to back them up claimed that it was their work as family planning worker, school teacher or social worker which helped them get elected. Such work proved to be the social capital through which they could gain acceptance in their area. Aside from these, the role of various NGOs was also important in getting these women elected.
In Bangladesh the use of black money in elections is rampant despite the limits set by the Election Commission. This has been one of the prime obstacles to women wanting to contest elections. Three or four women of those interviewed had spent a lot of money for their election campaigns. One member said that she feels no remorse that so much money has been spent. She complained that money, as a big factor in elections, was the main obstacle to the participation of women from lower income groups.
Others mentioned religious orthodoxy and conservatism as obstacles. In many areas religious leaders give a decree against women participating in elections, even as voters.
Women UP members also mentioned that party-based polarisation was an obstacle to effective participation. For example, one member said: "I am an Awami League supporter in my union, but the chairman of my area is from BNP. As such, nothing that I say is given much attention. Hence cannot work in the way I want to. Another woman mentioned it is essential to change male attitudes if effective women's participation is to be achieved. She gave the following example:
Once the members and chairman of their parishad gathered together to go somewhere. They were to travel in a microbus. The chairman was to sit next to the driver. There were three women members. They demanded to sit in the next row. The men objected. They argued that they each represented three wards, whereas the men represented only one. But the men were adamant, and in the end they left without the women! Later the thana officer took the women in a separate car. Such chauvinism needs to change. In the meetings of the parishad, the men are happy if the women do not speak. They say that the women will bully us and they expect us to accept it? They are not willing to accept women's leadership even in administration.
An experienced NGO male worker maintained that women's participation in the political and electoral process is significant due to the effort put in by both government and the NGOs for the last decade. But, despite the increase
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in participation, it is a failure in terms of its effectiveness. Sometimes women members sent their husbands, instead of being present at these meetings. Or perhaps their husbands had asked their wives to stay back while they attended the meeting. At other times women are asked to sign a resolution without it being properly discussed or being put on the agenda. There is a lack of knowledge and inadequate training as to what their duties should be.
The women members of parliament who were interviewed came up with the following obstacles to women's effective participation in the political process:
(a) Empowerment: women must feel that they need to come to power or that they need power to get things done. Unless they have power, whatever they do will be considered “social work. Women have an ingrained inferiority complex from which they have to break out. (b) Social acceptance: that women should occupy positions of power is now being accepted by society, especially since women hold the two most important political posts in our country. But if the purview of this acceptance is not extended, then participation too will not increase. (c) In politics one cannot live an organised and routine life. Therefore for a woman it is difficult to sacrifice her family for larger political interests. Family members, husband and children demand that she performs first her duty as a wife or mother, and then everything else follows. This attitude hinders her from effectively taking part in the political process. (Two MPs admitted to fulfilling their domestic roles first and then taking on their public duties. If it were any different, then both would feel guilty.) (d) The politics of our country is male-dependent. That is why when political parties give nominations, they depend more on male candidates than female candidates. (e) Education is necessary if one is to aim high in life. (f) Wealth is essential if a woman is to win votes. This is the nature of
current politics in Bangladesh. (g) The current trend for women from the grassroots to come into politics heralds great potential for the future. However, social obstacles such as male-biased attitudes must be removed. (h) Women must confront religious orthodoxy if one is to participate openly in politics, whether in a majority or minority situation.
Regarding their relationship with the state, women of the union parishad mentioned that even after being elected they do not receive attention from
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the state. They complained that they each represent three wards, as compared to the men, who represent only one - yet they receive the same allowance. Men also receive more prominence when they control the distribution of Village Defence Party (VDP) and Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) cards in connection with distribution of wheat to vulnerable groups. The women have proposed a women's committee to look after the welfare of women, but this has not yet been approved. Women UP members also complain that their status as a people's representative is not being recognised since the resources at their disposal are so limited.
Women who are members of political parties or organisations also face challenges. A woman has to be exceptionally brilliant in order to keep up with her male counterparts in the party, or else she is relegated to a back seat. In relation to this one can quote a union parishad member: “Women are like steamed pudding (bhapa pitha...a kind of rice cake with filling). Whenever they wish to rise they are forced down with a lid. Women who were members of the ruling party also voiced similar opinions. The main obstacles came first from their families and then from their male colleagues. They claimed that they had contributed equally towards achieving their party goals, especially when they struggled as the party in opposition. Yet when their party was in power it would be male outsiders', meaning opportunists, who would get positions of power or would surround those in positions of power. As a result, although the party chairperson is a woman they complained that they could not get close to her (she is currently the prime minister), let alone advise her on women's issues.
According to Nasibunnessa, a member of the central committee of the Awami League, currently there are five women members in the central committee. Previously she was the lone woman member in a committee of 55. “I brought up the issue of increasing women's membership in the central committee in the presence of Sheikh Hasina. She conceded and asked me to provide her with five names of women who she could make members. But all my male colleagues had opposed my proposition at that time. That is how male members dominate the party and keep women members cornered.
Women MPs who were nominated and not elected said that although externally there should be no difference between those MPs who are directly elected and those nominated, in practice that is not so.
We find there is a superiority complex among those who are directly elected. Besides, there is a real problem when it comes to the allotment of wheat. They usually get a larger allotment than we do, and yet we represent eight constituencies,
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sometimes covering two districts. But I too am a people's representative. I have to look after the people's welfare. I am not just a showpiece. In that case the huge constituency becomes a problem. This is the way we have to work within the existing state structure.
An MP further stated:
We are not publicly allowed to criticise the ruling party. However we may discuss it within the range of the party. In meetings it is not usual to give prominence to women representatives, although the prime minister has insisted that everyone be treated the same. We are often nominated as members of parliamentary committees but we have no choice in the matter, nor are we informed beforehand.
State-women interface: Women and men in microfinancing
Microfinancing, or credit, has been institutionalised in Bangladesh in a way unparalleled in developing countries. The organisations which have advocated microfinancing in a big way have earned a worldwide reputation, e.g., the Grameen Bank, which is a financial institution registered under the Ministry of Finance, and the larger NGOs like Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), Association of Social Advancement (ASA), Proshika aic numerous other smaller, localised NGOs. Tradition...ally there has been tension between the NGO sector and the government, since the relations were in many senses competitive insofar as it meant control over resources and rural constituencies. But in recent decades, with the donor communities tending to highlight the role of NGOs, the government too (despite differences over specific policies) has come to regard them in more complementary or supplementary terms, i.e., delivering those services which the government is failing to provide. As such the non-governmental sector is playing a role in the process of state formation in Bangladesh.
Women have become prime targets of credit programmes since their lack of access to economic resources has been identified as a cause of their relative impoverishment and powerlessness. It is therefore assumed that increased access to economic resources and productive ventures will not only lead to a rise in income, but increased access to education, health facilities, community participation, and to decreased population growth, gender discrimination and other social ills accompanying poverty.
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Furthermore the conceptofempowerment of women has been applied recently to indicate the conditional and positional aspect of gender. This means that women's position will change if:
(a) some of their practical needs are satisfied, e.g., through access to
credit;
(b) if they can share decision-making power; and
(c) if beliefs, values and attitudes determining gender discrimination and
male dominance decrease.
Our survey however revealed that as much as NGOs have become a survival strategy for poor and marginal households, people did not necessarily consider them to be politically empowering. In our in-depth interviews, women beneficiaries of a small local NGO in Dhaka District, the Palli Mangol Kendra, responded as to how they themselves felt about their "empowerment' - that is to say how they regarded and perceived any change in their condition or position, as well as the processes through which this change was to be brought about.
Women who were able to access credit explained their condition with reference to their past. Previously they had no work or ways of earning income. The male heads of household also remained unemployed occasionally. All women reported that earlier they did not have access to regular cash flow. To the question of whether NGO credit has changed women's economic status, all the respondents said that it was not the credit itself but the income that they earned by utilising a part of the loan that has changed women's economic status. The women observed that while the credit was given in women's names only, it was really given for the poor family as a whole, and for that reason to the male head, who is responsible for the household economy. Women asserted that they have sole ownership of the money from their income generating activities and men have no claim on it. A general comment was that the government and NGOs have made a good decision to give money in the name of, and into the hands of, women, and for which men have to ask. One problem however was the need to control men's economic ventures so as to save funds for the timely repayment of loans for which women are responsible.
Women who had access to credit perceived an improvement in attitude towards them from their family members, which contributed to the enhancement of their position in the household. Moreover, they themselves had more self-respect. Regarding a woman's role in household decisionmaking, women said that their husbands now consulted them about economic
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expenditure, but the main decisions were still taken by men. Regarding their position in society, women opined that in comparison to the poorest groups at the bottom, their position had improved. They also said that rich people do not want to recognise this change in their position, and spread the view that NGO credit borrowers can earn money but not honour. The women's explanation for this is that earlier they were dependent on wealthy people for work, loans and favours, and now such people get neither cheap labour nor unquestioning loyalty.
In the focus group discussions, men emphasised the relative vulnerability of women compared to men because of religiously-determined restrictions on women's mobility. They opined that credit should not be given to women, and women's activities should be confined to the household. In their opinion, NGOs are not empowering women, rather they are encouraging shamelessness (belellapana). A common male attitude was that women could get educated and thereby engage in prestigious jobs. According to them there is nothing prestigious at the village level that women can do with NGO credit. Although there is a negative male attitude towards NGO activities, women beneficiaries are working outside the household and they are not being stopped by forceful means, nor are there any serious protests launched against NGOs in that particular area. However it may be noted that even in the area where we conducted our survey, most respondents said they took their problems to family members rather than organisations like NGOs. So microcredit institutions usually operate as service delivery organisations, and are not in a position to replace traditional institutions like the family or the local power structure in strategies for survival other than the monetary.
State-w om en interface: Negotiating citizenship and challenging the state
It has been mentioned before that the Bangladesh state promulgates policies and issues directives that directly or indirectly affect women's lives and livelihoods, positively or negatively. When women find that these policies run counter to their own interests and survival, they often feel the need to assert their rights either as citizens or by challenging the state. But women are not a homogenous group. They belong to different classes, social positions, ages, ethnic and religious identities. This is true even in a country like Bangladesh, which has often been wrongly celebrated for its relative homogeneity. Hence women of different class, ethnic or subject positions in Bangladesh negotiate their citizenship rights in different ways. Forms of confronting, resisting or challenging the state from their respective subject
46

positions also vary. In our focus group discussions we have thus tried to include the perceptions of the following groups of women, often together with some of their male counterparts, regarding the participation of women in the political process, and the way they confront the state from the experience of their day-to-day activities. We looked at four different sectors where women have raised their voices in protest.
Women workers
The global market in recent years has urged Bangladesh to tread the path of growth through export-oriented industrialisation. This strategy is part of the supply-side model of industrialisation, and entails a global strategy of growth based on an open economy, with trade liberalisation and export-oriented industrialisation as the only viable development strategy. Women workers in the mushrooming garment industry have fitted into this scheme with important socio-political implications for the Bangladesh state. Women's employment in the formal sector in the urban areas of Bangladesh is a relatively new phenomenon. Labour force statistics began to recognise women's existence during the Decade of Women (1976-85), and included them in their calculations due to changes in the definitions of female labour. These statistics illustrate that between 1961 and 1984 the female labour force increased from 0.9 million to 2.7 million, to 3.2 million in 1986, and even up to 5.8 million in 1990-91. Within2 years the female labour force comprised 9% of the total labour force in 1984, up to 10.3% in 1986. Out of these, 25% are involved in the manufacturing sector.
Almost all studies show that garment factory employers are not eager to see their women workers voice demands, much less voice them in a collective, organised manner. Unionisation of labour is strongly discouraged. The establishment encourages the docile, obedient, but skilled and industrious worker's image. Working conditions and terms of payment are often unbearable. Thus, sometimes, even against their own will, the women show signs of resistance and rebellion that often take very organised forms. In describing their forms of resistance Petra Dannecker, in her study of women garment workers,' distinguishes two forms of resistance. The first consists of individual forms of resistance such as resisting the rules and regulations
Hasan, cited in Dannecker, Petra. Between Conformity and Resistance: Women
Garment Workers in Bangladesh, unpublished PhD dissertation, April 1998.
4.
Ibid.
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set by the management, or expectations concerning the workload they are to perform. The second consists of collective action, which may be both spontaneous and sporadic, for example, a demand for overdue payment, or part of a long-term conscientising process, for example, networking or unionisation.
Najma Akhter, currently working in a federation for garment factory workers' unions, has traversed the whole road, from the time she entered the garment factory as a child labourer to her current position as international secretary of the Bangladesh Independent Garment Workers Union Federation (BIGUF). She relates how at first she got involved spontaneously along with other workers in demanding overdue payment, Eid bonuses, extra holidays, and improving working conditions. The management conceded to their demands, but later they sacked many workers who gave leadership to these spontaneous movements. For Najma, the state is ever present in her workplace and life. She would first of all negotiate her demands with her nearest superior, for example, the line superior, and then gradually work herself up the management. In many cases where she had to take up her demand with the highest authority, she saw MPs who owned factories and had their own interests in defending policy-making decisions - for example, when she and her colleagues lobbied the government to get their organisation registered. She also saw how policemen's behaviour changed as strikes by garment workers grew instrength and purpose. In her words, “the police force seemed to have changed their attitude from the Ershad period to the Khaleda Zia period. Before they stopped us and warned us, but later they did not hesitate to beat (lathi charge) us without warning.
Najma has also lost faith in trade unions hosted under a party banner. She describes her bitter experiences with the Workers Party trade union leaders. She related that one day about a thousand garment workers were participating in a road block and sit-down protest. The police had stopped them long before they reached the office headquarters of the factory. The workers therefore settled in for a long wait on the streets, therefore causing a traffic jam. But, meantime, some Workers Party leaders instigated some workers to force their way past the barricade. When they tried to do that, the police charged back with teargas and instantly dispersed the demonstrators. According to Najma, it would have been a better strategy to wait on the streets and cause a traffic jam, so that someone would eventually have had to come out and talk to them. She is convinced that these union leaders had taken bribe from the management. It is incidents like these that have prompted Najma to break out of agitational politics and train herself in labour laws, and thereby train other workers to look after their welfare. Her ideas about
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politics and state, which will be discussed later, are a product of her direct experiences in life.
Another garment factory worker, Shaila, who belonged to a more political organisation, described how, after demonstrating for three months for their salary and overtime, they managed to convince the management to pay them their dues. But on the day of their payment the owner had organised some touts and mastans (hooligans) to rob the workers on their way home so that the money would not reach their families. The girls came to know this ahead of time, so they planned for the boys to get their salary earlier than the girls, so that all 300 workers would go out at the same time in a group. They armed themselves with sharp instruments and blades, and when they were surrounded by mastans, who taunted them, they taunted them in return and put up a tremendous fight. The mastans, outnumbered, eventually fled.
Ethnic communities
According to the 1991 population census, the total number of ethnic minority population in Bangladesh amounted to 1.2 million (1.13% of the total population of Bangladesh). Although numerically insignificant, the ethnic issue became politically significant because of the 24 years of war-like situation in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), an area heavily populated by ethnic minorities who took to arms in their claim for autonomy from the Bangladesh state.
The CHT occupies a physical area of 5,093 sq. miles or 13,295 sq. km., constituting 10% of the total land area of Bangladesh. It shares borders with India and Myanmar, and is inhabited by about thirteen (according to some estimates ten) ethnic groups, among whom the Chakmas, Marmas and Tripuras constitute the majority. Non-indigenous hill people, i.e., Bengalis who are predominantly Muslims, also at present live in the CHT. According to the 1991 census, the total population is 974,465, out of which 501, 45 (i.e. 51%) belong to groups of different ethnic origins. About 49% are Bengalis. It is to be noted that about 70,000 refugees who were in the Indian state of Tripura from 1986 to 1998 are not included in this census report. Out of the total land of the CHT, only about 3.1% is suitable for agricultural cultivation, 18.7% for horticulture and the remaining 72% for forestry.
The main roots of the crisis on the CHT centre around land, the transfer of population from plains districts and the control of administration by noninhabitants of the CHT. Other points of contention are discrimination, deprivation and exploitation in social, cultural, economic and political fields, and the programme of assimilation of the indigenous hill people into the
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majority Bengali population. Of relevance to us is the civil rights movement that grew up side by side with the armed struggle for autonomy among the ethnic people. This movement was spearheaded by a three-pronged frontthe Pahari Gono Parishad, the Pahari Chattra Parishad and the Hill Women's Federation. The latter two were student fronts where women voiced their demands. A group discussion was held with both women and men of these organisations. They were highly articulate and committed student leaders and activists, who had felt the direct brunt of military terror and state repression in their lives. They observed the following about their participation in politics and confrontation with the state.
Military raids were common during the time the Jana Shonghoti Somiti (JSS) was actively fighting a war. People lived in perpetual fear of the army. A young woman, currently a university student, reminisces about her childhood in this way:
I don't like writing about my childhood. Why? The answer too for me is painful. My growing up is mixed with uncertainty, fear and some pleasant memories. The atmosphere in which I grew up is filled more with fear than pleasure. Whenever we used to go out and play or go for a swim in the river, fear accompanied us. We had to be on constant alert, lest we had to run home and warn our father, Hide, the army is coming, or tell uncle, “Quick, run!”. Or the neighbour's son, Please hide! And the girls should all remain in the house until the army leaves the village. Only old people should come out. Sometimes, even they were not spared. And the goats, the chickens, the fruit that we grew ... all had to be surrendered to the army at their command, free of cost. Or else we would be taken to the camp. And camp was a terrifying place!
Curfews were regular and passes were necessary to go to the market. Rationing of goods was common. Every Pahari (hill person) was looked upon with suspicion as apotential Shantibahini, (the codename for the armed resistance). During this time there was hardly any scope for resistance from civilians. After the JSS and the Bangladesh government agreed upon a ceasefire, ordinary people could relax a little because the raids became infrequent, although raids did occur whenever the Shantibahini violated the ceasefire or the military felt they had something to defend.
Another watershed in the intercommunal relations between Paharis and Bengalis in the Hills were the planned settlement of Bengalis from the
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plains land. They were often settled in clustered villages with military camps surrounding them for protection. Chakma, Marma and Tripura villages in the vicinity suffered as a result. Many hill people claimed that intercommunal tension increased. Also the advent of plains land settlers caused a deterioration of law and order. Previously hill people were used to leaving their houses unlocked, but after plains land settlers came in they could no longer do that because theft increased sharply. One of my interviewees described the situation as follows: Before, people left their doors open because there was no fear of theft. But then they started locking doors. Beggars also grew in numbers. Intermingling with each other was not the done thing. The hostility between the old and new settlers was so strong that they were reflected in the derogatory terms they used for each other. Chakmas often called plains people bhangtipoisha (old change), or shoronarthi (refugees). They in turn called the hill people Chakkus, Moghs, etc.
Another girl related how the attitude of the state and its representatives increased hostility. Shomari Chakma, after having witnessed one of the worst massacres in history on the day the Chakmas were celebrating their New Year (Biju), described her feelings in this way:
Some of us went to the army camp, some of us to the police. It was there that we faced the brutal reality of oppression. They made it quite clear to us that they had no feelings for us. Even after hearing of the assault on us they were unconcerned. After the incident we all became silent. We had no problem in understanding that it was the government who had planned these massacres. We realised that this state wanted to eliminate the national identities of all Paharis (hill people). They only want the land, the hills, they do not want us hill people. The army, police, Village Defence Party, Bengali infiltrators and some old Bengali settlers intensified the repression. We were helpless. We were in a sense almost driven to resist, to protest the injustice. Today we know that if we can die without doing anything, then it is better to die by doing something. Whatever oppression we may have to face, we are committed to saving our nation from extinction. Until we realise our fundamental rights, we shall not leave the path of struggle. We know that one day the truth shall prevail.
The resistance of the Paharis therefore determined their definition of politics and the state, and, as we shall see later, the women of these groups were not only talking of their national identities but their gender identities as well.
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Student community
With a national literacy rate of 32.4%, the rate for formal higher education is even more staggering: 12.2% for higher secondary trained (15.4% male and 7.5% female), and 2.3% for graduates (3.2% male and 0.6% female). However it is this tiny privileged percentage who will take up the most lucrative jobs and be put in important policy-making posts. Our survey report also depicted that education was highly related as a factor leading women to self-reliance. Women in rural areas mainly expressed that lack of education was the prime obstruction to their enjoying equal rights with men. Women enjoying credit facilities also felt that it was not money but education that can empower women in any real sense.
Although education is theoretically available to both sexes and the proportion of female students is increasing. disparity between male and female education still remains. One of the main reasons is that social norms create serious obstacles for women to pursue education. Even if a low percentage of women get into educational institutions, they do not find a pro-women environment there. Even universities, that theoretically are supposed to be grounds for the growth of new ideas, reproduce the overarching ideology of patriarchy that subjugates women in various ways. Our focus is on university level education, not only to understand how the most powerful section of our population feels about gender discrimination and politics, but also to look at the various ways they challenge the system. In the history of Bangladesh, the students' movement has been very active in voicing the demands for recognising Bengali as a state language in 1952, in the antimilitary demonstrations against the Ayub regime in 1969, in bringing the demands for autonomy to the foreground and then later actively taking part in the Liberation War of Bangladesh, and finally in the anti-autocratic movements against the Ershad regime. In short, the students have led various pro-democratic mass movements over the last few decades. This has no doubt earned for them a place of honour, but the fact that these movements have never addressed the gender question and have remained male-biased in their orientation is gradually being made evident by: (a) the rewriting of these histories from a feminist perspective, and (b) the dynamics of contemporary movements against sexual harassment in two major campuses of the country.'
5
Islam. Sadaf Noor E., Jahangirnagar Bishwabidyalayae Purushadhipatya: 1993. Suriasto Ain Batiler Chatri Andolon. Chatrider Protirodh O Protibad. (Male Dominance in Jahangirnagar University: Student Protest and Movement Against the 1993 Sunset Law), unpublished paper, 1997.
152.

Our in-depth discussions regarding the gender question, particularly in relation to political participation, took place with: (i) general students of Dhaka University, and (ii) the more politically active students involved in the movement against sexual harassment at Jahangirnagar University, Savar. In addressing the question of women's participation in politics, Dhaka University graduate students were divided along gender lines. The male students insisted that women's participation had increased in formal politics. Female students underlined the fact that mere exercising of voting rights did not constitute participation. They also maintained that women were increasingly being inducted into political parties, but this was more an urban phenomenon rather than a rural one. They foresaw the following problems in the path of increasing women's participation in politics:
(a) Patriarchal social values.
(b) Physical security: sexual harassment for women and physical assault
for men.
(c) Family ideology prevents women from taking part in public events.
(d) Lack of awareness: many women when asked about politics replied that they are neither involved in politics, nor could they understand it.
(e) Being involved in politics is not a status symbol in contemporary
society.
Women students opined that they are forced to confront the state when the state does not give them necessary protection, especially in the streets. In addition they see and feel gender discrimination in education, physical violence and mobility. They feel the state must address such issues. Male students are however envious of the special opportunities that a woman gets through affirmative action. They said that they feel deprived of job opportunities that could have been theirs.
All female and male students portrayed Jahangirnagar University as having male-biased structures and cited the following in support:
1. From its very inception, equal numbers of male and female students were not admitted, and currently the male female student ratio is 65:35. 2. Very few female teachers work there and the ratio is about 80:20; the
percentage of women working in administration is extremely low. Women do not hold powerful positions in the university. 4. Female teachers are not active in the political groups of teachers.
3
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5
Female students are nardly seen in the committee of the students' party.
6. Gender bias is expressed in the use of physical space - for example, women are not seen in the playing fields, swimming pool, gymnasium, Or reStaurantS.
7. Discriminatory rules are in practice, for example, female students are expected to return to their dorms at sunset, but men are free to come and go at any time.
8. Female and male students sit separately in classrooms.
Female students were of the opinion that the family, the university and the state shared the same patriarchal ideology. According to them the family tries to control women's private space. the State attempts to control women in public spaces and the university tries to advocate both. Teachers and the administration, on the other hand, spoke in very conservative and sexist overtones such as the following: "Don't forget that you are a female after all.' 'You cannot do everything that a man can do.'" After successfully completing your education, the first thing for you to do is to have a good marriage. Don't walk fast, don't talk loudly, don't laugh too much.'" As women you have to be modest. Modesty is your beauty and honour; mere education does not help.'
The notion of politics was different for male and female students. All students opined that the existing trend of politics meant that it was a power game', 'money-making, etc. Most of the female students had the view that the present definition of politics has made it men's business. The state, government, party in power or ruling class are responsible for violence in general and violence against women. Male students differed on this point, and in their view everything is decided by the powerful in politics. Male students suggested that women should get more education and should be involved in politics so that they can preserve their interests. They also said that women should not blame men for violence against them, because women are also found to torture other women. A few female students also argued that even many educated women forget about their self dignity, submit to men's will unquestioningly and do not formulate their own world-view. According to these female students, women should stop their tendency to take extra advantages and participate more in the mainstream.
Most of the female students stated that they do not expect justice' from the university, which supports gender inequality. They also stated that women in general should not expect justice from the state, which is maledominated. Women have negative interaction with various institutions of state: police, court, bureaucracy and media. At this stage of discussion, all the male students opined that if the state, religion and ideology are major
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challenges for women, women had to challenge men in the public space because the state has to uphold religious principles of social formation, which discriminate against women. Male students also said that if women consider men as major contenders, and if they take an anti-male stance, then it would have social repercussions against women. Female students added that women would gain more through resistance and movement than asking for justice from a state that is partial, blind and an opponent of women.
The above comments reveal that both the establishment as well as male students felt that women's aspirations had to be limited. Male students on the one hand were ready to recognise the subjugation of women by state, religion and patriarchy, but on the other hand were protective of their privileges when it came to questions of affirmative action. But to be fair there were some male students who joined ranks with female students in leading the demonstration against the hooligans and the university authorities on charges of sexual harassment and sheltering the harassers respectively.
The more vocal protests of the female students of Jahangirnagar University can be attributed to the politicisation process that they underwent through their participation in several organised movements against sexual harassment within their campus:
(a) In 1992, female students led an organised movement when one girl was sexually harassed in the university bus while returning from Dhaka. The girl resisted by slapping the boy on the face. Later female students led demonstrations, signed petitions, held sit-ins outside the vice chancellor's office, and demanded punishment for the culprit. This resulted in the expulsion of the perpetrator.
(b) Female students led a movement in 1993 for lifting the 'sunset law' which required the girls to return to their dormitories before sunset, i.e., 6.00 p.m. Since male students were not expected to do the same this was considered to be derogatory, discriminatory and deprived them of making telephone calls, using library facilities, having discussions with male students or participating in cultural activities or shopping for essentials in Dhaka. The authorities wrote letters of complaint to the guardians against those girls who had protested, but the female students led demonstrations against the authorities and convinced the guardians of the necessity of lifting the sunset law. The authorities did not officially lift the laws, but girls started returning from Dhaka on the night bus, resulting in the authorities having to keep the gates open until the bus returned.
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(c)
(d)
(e)
ln 1995, another movement was led against sexual violence. A male student leader of the then ruling party kidnapped a female student. The female students led processions and petitioned the authorities to punish the culprit. The male students of the ruling party held counterdemonstrations and threatened the female students. The authorities adopted delaying processes and influenced the victim's family on the ground of the girl's shame; as a result the girl left but the male harassers completed their studies.
In 1997, miscreants attacked the night bus from Dhaka and female students protested and demanded punishment of the miscreants. Neither the university authority nor government showed seriousness about it. The female students closed the nearby highway for about seven days. Male students of the ruling party considered it as their failure that girls were protesting against their part in government. In many ways pressures and threats were brought upon the students. Finally, in the presence of the home minister armed police attacked the female students, and beat them as well as teachers who were protecting the students. When the girls were fleeing, male students of the ruling political party beat them up and harassed them in public. None were punished for these offences.
In 1998 female students led a movement against a rape committed by some male student leaders of the ruling party. Female leaders continued organised protests for about two months when they boycotted classes, threatened a hunger strike, gheraoed and locked the office of university authorities, and mobilised different feminist and social worker groups in Dhaka. This was in fact a challenge to the government-supported student party, ruling political party and university administration, which is an ally of the ruling party. A section of the involved parties, along with the teachers, administrators and students in the campus, united against the resisting students in favour of the rapists. The teachers and students who were sympathisers of the protesters were also insulted and threatened by the university authorities and the united front. However the boldness of the female students led them to success, as the authorities had to concede and punish the offenders, although the punishment was only nominal.
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Professional and activist women
The women's movement in Bangladesh has a long heritage and has both contributed to, as well as been strengthened by, the parallel movements for democracy, secularism and civic rights which have characterised the body politic of Bangladesh for the last decade or so. Much of this tradition stems from the broader mass movements both preceding and leading towards the Bangladesh liberation struggle of 1971. Conscious women and women's organisations have felt the need to take their struggles further in their demand for gender equality, and it is because of this that it is generally assumed that the issue of gender discrimination and exploitation in Bangladesh has featured more in the development discourse rather than in mainstream politics. But some of the demands articulated by women have stemmed from their participation in mass-based national movements or through autonomous women's movements. Mass-based women's organisations like the Mahila Parishad, the more recent broad-based coalition of Shommilito Nari Shomaj (United Women's Front) or the Jouno Nipiron Nari Protirodh Moncho (Platform Protesting Sexual Harassment) are examples of organisations or coalitions which have brought to the foreground women's struggles in the broader political arena at critical junctures of history. At other times, women's demands have been expressed through local community-based organisations. The vibrancy of civil society is therefore derived from both these streams. Whereas in the developmental sphere the main actors are Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Community Based Organisations (CBOs), in the sphere of social movements the actors form a mixed conglomerate. They include professional organisations, intellectuals and women's organisations, and some of the left-leaning and mass-based political organisations, including student fronts and trade unions.
Many NGOs, through their experience of close and continued work with women at the rural level, realised that women's development needs to address both poverty and patriarchy which marginalise women and exclude them from channels of socio-economic power and decision-making. Others have focused on social consciousness-raising and gender-sensitising through extensive information generation, dissemination and media campaigns. Currently there are more than 500 organisations with a membership of more than 2,000,000 women. Intense and broad-based campaigns for removing gender discrimination and gender violence through legal redress have been undertaken by both national and local women's organisations. These have included campaigning for an enactment of new and stringent laws providing deterrent punishment for gender violence, enactment of a uniform family
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code to supplant the personal laws perpetuating gender inequality within the family in various religious communities, and full ratification of the UN CEDAW. Other initiatives include mobilisation to confront violence against women enacted by agents of the state.
The rape and murder of Sultana Yasmin Akhter, a 14 year old girl of Dinajpur, in August 1995 by three policemen, and the abduction and subsequent disappearance in June 1996 of Kalpana Chakma, the 23 year old organising secretary of the Hill Women's Federation, an organisation struggling for self-determination of the people of the Hill Tracts, provided a context for the emergence of the platform called the Shommilito Nari Shomaj (United Women's Front). The women's movement had once come together in the 1980s against the increase of violence against women, but many organisations hesitated to identify the state or the institution of patriarchy as the perpetrators of violence." In the case of Yasmin this hesitancy was no longer there. A rebellion in Dinajpur had already brought into focus that the political accountability of the state was in question, but the women's movement also addressed the issue of patriarchal values. A commonplatform of organisations and individuals called the Shommilito Nari Shomaj was formed, from which a concerted movement was launched to demand the trial of Yasmin's rapists and murderers." They declared that this movement would not be an isolated one, but was in concurrence with the movement seeking accountability of the state and instilling democratic values in administration, characteristics evident in the revolt of the people of Dinajpur. Subsequent programmes of Shommilito Nari Shomaj not only took the form of nationwide street demonstrations and protests, but also cultural activities which sought to bring women's issues into the nationalist discourse. For example, a photographic exhibition focusing on women's resistance was held during the celebration of Victory Day on 16 December 1995. It was dedicated to Yasmin. The Shommilito Nari Shomaj also declared that each year, 24th August, the day that Yasmin's body was found on the roadside, should be remembered as a day of resistance to violence against women.
The case of Yasmin has come to symbolise the struggle for a system of fair justice. It became a test case of 'equality before the eyes of the law. Shaheen Anam, member of Shommilito Nari Shomaj, stated: In monito.ing the case, we discovered much to our dismay the loopholes existing in our legal system. These loopholes are obstacles to the speedy dispensation of
6 Guhathakurta, op. cit., The Journal of Social Studies, No. 30, October 1985. 7 Parvez. Altaf, ed., Yasmin, Sommilito Nari Samaj, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 1996, p. 7.
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cases of violence against women, ones that prevent the legal system from functioning properly. Yasmin's case has motivated women's groups and lawyers to examine our legal system and make recommendations for law reforms.' But Yasmin was only the beginning of a series of campaigns led by the women's movement against state violence against women. Other incidents were the abduction and disappearance of Kalpana Chakma, and the demand for redress for the rape of Bengali women by Pakistani soldiers during the Liberation War of 1971, among many others.
lt is in this context that we asked representatives from different women's organisations as well as in their personal capacities to air their views about politics, the state and governance. It resulted in quite a passionate and heated exchange, the main strands of which have been outlined below. Struggle was a key word that recurred again and again. There was no way out for a woman but to struggle and fight for her rights. All women who were asked to speak spoke of their personal struggles with home and family as well as their struggles in the broader sphere, in civil, professional and political life. (There were two men who were present, one did not speak of himself at all, only addressed the women as “they', and the second listened for a while and then left.) Relentless questioning of patriarchal laws, demanding the implementation of existing laws and looking at issues and realities from a woman's perspective, were also considered necessary.
There seemed to be a strange consensus among the women present that in order to look at politics or events from a woman's perspective, one had first and foremost to look at it from a human dimension, if necessary a humane dimension. Turning this statement around, many women observed that this meant women must speak out against violence and abuses at large, not only sexual violence but also a system that was becoming increasingly violent, against the trafficking of arms, against the deterioration of law and order, against corruption. An example which recurred in the dialogue was receiving outrageous telephone bills and confronting the authorities about it. Several women sought the easy way out by letting the men take care of it, but many women were determined to set things right by confronting the authorities and not paying any bribes. Some said it was easier for men to pay bribes because they knew how to play the system and survive. For many women this was difficult to do. Some often took refuge in their femininity, Women however felt that when the crunch came they had to have exposure - for example, a widow who is expected to fall back on her male family members can really help herself if she learns to do these chores for herself,
8 The Daily Star, 25 August 1997, p 2.
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One person said that it is useless to talk of governance in a country where even the fundamental principles of the constitution have been unilaterally altered. She believed that unless secularism and socialism were brought back into state policies. women's rights would flounder. The recent fundamentalist attack on a progressive cultural group, which left ten dead and many wounded, pervaded the discussion like a pall of gloom.
Politics in the final analysis was personal. This was stated time and again in many different ways. An elderly woman, a stalwart of the women's movement, said that it was not enough for a woman to gain voting rights. She told the story of how, just having married into a family, she was asked to vote for a particular party by her in-laws. It was not a party that she wanted to vote for. Being educated she knew that no one could really stop her from voting for the party she wanted. But she felt the earnest desire to confront her brother-in-law and tell him that: (a) he had no business to tell her who to vote for, and (b) that, coming from a progressive family, she could not see how any conscious person could vote for aparty which did not believe in the ideals of the Liberation War. But alas! She could not say all this directly to her brother-in-law, and for that she never forgave herself.
From the above instances, it is clear that gender issues are considered to be marginal and often controversial in mainstream politics. Hence in the near absence of institutional conduits through which one could channel these issues to policy-making circles in a systematic manner, women feel that there is very little else to do but continue their struggle. Women activists have also realised that specific issues like violence against women are related to the more general violence embedded in our social and political structures. However it is also felt that women's perspectives of state, government and politics should be incorporated into mainstream thinking. But while institutional mechanisms would prove useful in the public sphere, addressing gender politics within the family structures would require relatively long term awareness-building processes located in sites such as educational institutions or the media.
Emerging concepts of politics, governance, government and state
As mentioned earlier, the definitions of politics, governance and the state that emerged from the women who were interviewed were a result of their different subject positions and experiences, and hence differed enormously from textbook definitions. Definitions often varied on the one hand between women who were deeply embedded in the current political regime by virtue of holding office, and those, such as workers and members of ethnic
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minorities, who were in continuous confrontation with the state through daily experiences. But approaches to politics, governance, government and the state were often similar across the board. This was especially so when questions of gender discrimination arose with reference to male colleagues, and the way in which they related to the existing state apparatus in comparison with women. The findings are outlined below.
Politics
Women politicians recognised the utility of women being incorporated in a positive way into formal politics, but also recognised the pitfalls of a political process deeply entrenched in power play. They recognised the existence of a more people-oriented or mass-based political movement on the one hand, and, on the other, acknowledged the degeneration of politics into processes that served personal gains. If women's issues were to be considered as part of the political agenda, then obviously one needed to promote the former kind of politics rather than the latter. This is what emerged from the discussion as recorded below.
Newly elected women members of the union parishad said that, to them, politics meant the electoral process and voting rights. Some said it also meant appropriation and also blind faith'. Members of parliament had a slightly more positive and comprehensive view. According to them the central point about politics is to run the country, to develop it and bring peace and harmony. Some said that the other name for politics is attaining power, or else it would not be possible to achieve all this especially as representatives of the people. Politics was also described as away to legitimise social work.
It was maintained that politics always took the crooked path. One MP commented: “I took part in the “Quit India' movement against the British. That was a different kind of politics. For us it was a glorious struggle for independence. For the British it constituted terrorism. Politics is after all a vocation, the parameters of which are vast. There are no limits in politics. Only the people's sentiment must be respected.'
To many women at the grassroots, politics was something in the public sphere as opposed to the private. Recipients of micro-credit described politics as thelatheli/reshareshi (pushing each other or backbiting). Politics was competition and winning through any means, with this politics being visible from the gram panchayat level in the village to national governments.
Najma Akhter, the garment worker, had an interesting way of looking at current politics and differentiated it from the way she would regard it. She
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said that current political trends were nothing but an attempt by a few to stock up votes for the next election. Her definition of politics was that the wheels of industry should run, the workers should get fair pay, and, within this system, the workers will try to obtain their fundamental rights in an organised and informed way.
Ethnic communities who have been under siege by the Bangladesh state define their politics as a means to achieve self-dignity and recognition of their national identity. Women who have been part of the movement for autonomy are very much aware of gender oppression, both from the state as well as from within their own community, and they want their struggles to be recognised by their party members. But it is also true that oppression of ethnic women has been part and parcel of an overall terror regime created by the state, and in this situation the women want to reclaim their dignity dually, as humans and as women.
The student community in general largely understood politics as partybased politics, although they recognised that contests for power and deployment of religious values played a strong part in it. The notion of politics was different for male and female students. All students opined that the existing trend of politics meant that it was a power game', 'money-making', etc. Most of the female students had the view that the present definition of politics has made it men's business. The state, government, party in power or ruling class are responsible for violence in general and violence against women. Women's organisations recognised that politics were both personal and public.
Governance
It was difficult to translate this word into Bengali in a way that was clear to everyone. The word used was shushason, literally meaning 'good rule'. So a large number of people tried to explain it negatively in terms of what was not good about governance. But generally the n: ,re well-informed related it to the way the state conducted its affairs or related with the people as citizens. Establishing the rule of law and governing in accordance with a generally accepted code of conduct was also mentioned several times. Local level leaders said governance is when people act according to the power they have and not more. Protecting the fundamental rights of the people according to the constitution was governance. According to this criterion, governance was considered to be absent in Bangladesh - a position espoused by women's groups and garment workers, as well as members of ethnic communities. For workers, good governance had to do with fair pay and proper terms and
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conditions of work. For ethnic community members, governance had to do with ensuring fundamental human rights, recognition of national identity and legal protection to save their land and communal property from dispossession. Women taking credit interpreted governance to mean the submission to rules and application of rules in a just manner. Women termed it as shashon, where the motive was to keep order and justice from which everybody benefited. They also maintained that in politics ranging from the village panchayat to the national government, politics was overemphasised and governance de-emphasised.
Government
Not much hesitancy arose in indicating the functions of the government. Local leaders said that they were the people's representatives, whose duty it was to run the country on their behalf. Local bodies were especially part of this government. NGO community workers equated power with being the government. The student community, too, defined government as constituting those who could use power to exercise authority. For ethnic communities, government meant not only the central government but also regional councils where priority would be given to indigenous leadership. They also mentioned that during the armed struggle, the military wing had set up a parallel government, which issued directions to the people quite effectively. They had also held arbitration in many villages. Now, after their leaders have signed an agreement with the Bangladesh government, this command structure had fallen apart with nothing effectively replacing it, and therefore people find themselves in more chaos than during the struggle.
State
Many defined state as corresponding to country, since in Bengali the word desh (country) is more in use. For many it implied a population, a territory, a government and sovereignty. For many rural women who were recipients of credit, desh was like mother, and so they argued that, at this level, good governance should be established as in the family for the sake of order and justice. If sarker or government is in charge of good governance, by virtue of competitive methods, then it is quite likely that it will forget its responsibilities after winning the game', i.e., once having won the polls.
Najma Akhter, who had worked in a garment factory for most of her childhood years, defined state very negatively. She mentioned an incident where she was asked to work with a foreigner on labour laws. People told
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her not to trust him; it would mean selling out one's country (desh) or destroying it. Najma later decided to disregard such statements because from bitter experience she had learnt that it was she who was being destroyed and not some abstract entity called desh
The ethnic groups in the CHT were perhaps the first to come up with a counter-discursive practice of the state by demanding autonomy. But even among their leaders there seems to be a lack of clarity of what it really means in institutional and functional terms. It is a concept that increasingly comes under siege, since, after the agreement, both the private and public sectors are keen on developing the CHT as potential oil drilling expeditions trace their way into the hills.
For women's groups, a state which cannot give a minimum degree of security to its citizens in equal degree regardless of race, religion, gender and creed is no state at all.
Conclusion: Women's visions of the state
Asking women to visualise a state that will meet their needs was like asking six blind men to describe an elephant by touching various parts of the elephant's body. Nevertheless it was an interesting exercise, which brought out some thoughtful points. More importantly, it also brought to the foreground the gaps in knowledge and exposure that women feel time and again when confronting alternatives.
A strong sense of welfarism pervaded women's perception of the ideal state. The state as a provider of services, arbitrator of problems and protector has been emphasised by them, especially those in national and local governmental bodies. For example, women union parishad leaders opined: “We want to see a state which will be able to resolve the problems of violence against women, divorce, polygamy, etc. We want to see Such a state which will conduct and implement legal reforms. Members of parliament said a state must give physical security to women. The students' community thought that a state should give women physical and economic security and freedom of movement. Recipients of micro-credit explicated that a state should be the provider of services. In many cases a strong and just state was emphasised. This meant that a state should be able to implement legal reforms and ensure justice.
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Many women, in visualising a woman-friendly state, remained within a developmentalist modernist paradigm. For example, some members of parliament stated that an economically solvent state with progressive industrial policies and literacy is necessary for women's wellbeing. UP leaders said that they needed an 'educated state.
All the above opinions reflect the embodiment of the state as a neutral body, i.e., neutral to class interests. But some women also viewed the state itself as a means of oppression, which made itself evident in two ways: (a) by exploiting women's labour, and (b) by embodying male patriarchal ideologies. Trade union leader Najma Akhter's statement clearly is an example of the first: “I have to dream of such a state since I don't think it is possible in reality. I envision a state that will take care to change attitudes of women workers. They need to be more aware.' Asked whether they were not already aware, she replied in the negative. They are only concerned about getting their due money and feeding their hunger - in other words, their immediate needs. But they must also learn the labour laws and strategise accordingly with a long-term perspective. When asked whether she really thought any state would undertake this task, she replied Well you told me to dream, didn't you? But it is no good dreaming. It is better to face reality.'
Student and women activists were strong in their demands that the state should be free from patriarchy. As one activist claimed: "It is necessary to change attitudes before we can think of any such state. The only state we can think of is a state of mind.'
Ethnic women and men from the resistance movement of CHT felt the need for radical revision. According them they want to see the CHT as an autonomous region within the state of Bangladesh, where they will get constitutional guarantees to protect their cultural identity, where no outsider will dispossess them of the land that is part of their legacy. Furthermore they held that they will not be turned into powerless minorities in their own region. They also demanded that punishing those responsible for mass murder. arson and robbery would help to redress injustices of the past.
It was generally agreed by many that women's perspectives could be integrated only when people-centred secular politics have been institutionalised in the country. A large number of activists were of the opinion, that women's struggle should embrace these basic values of democracy and secularism. A few were also of the opinion that a woman-friendly state could only appear with growing visibility of women in decision-making. One participant however brought up a fundamental question:
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How are we going to imagine or re-imagine such a state if we have only at our disposal existing tools of knowledge which imprison our minds? Our training, our socialisation, are these not barriers to our thought processes which limit us from thinking differently? Can we imagine something radically different except perhaps in our dreams? Then, is it not true that what we are actually doing is observing where the gaps are, or what we are lacking, and then conjuring up a state that makes up for these absences and inadequacies. Are we then changing anything or simply adjusting and adapting to reality?
This was a soul-searching question that led to much passionate discussion, from where it was concluded that actually what needed to be emphasised was the process of unlearning. How much time do we devote to unlearning? Virtually none. We unlearn only when something hits us, when we are taken unawares: it could be sudden widowhood for a woman; the trauma of witnessing genocide for a nation; for a worker the realisation that you are dependent on your own two hands and on no one else. Struggle is therefore almost synonymous with unlearning. For many of us it means a shattering of illusions, for many it means the opening up of new doors, the birth of imagination. Almost all the women cited above have related their own struggles wherever they may be situated. In many instances these stories are not ones of remorse and regret, but of amazing strength and courage. It is essential that we translate this process as creatively as possible into our programmes, into the women's movement and into our politics. It is only then that we will be able to open our doors to a future that could really be different.
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174

Table 9: Female Participation in Governance: Bangladesh
Country: Bangladesh Sources
1980 1995 1999
Women in Parliament (1979) (1991) (1996) Upper House (Total members) Only one house applicable 330* 330* 330* *30 reserved
for women
Number of female members 32 34 4. Female as a % of male 0.74% 49% 4.19%
Lower House (Total members) 2. a. a.
(1982-1990) (1991-1995)(1996-1999) 2 Cabinet (Total members)
(includes state /deputy min.) 133 39 45 Number of female members 4 3 4 Female as a % of male 3.1% 8.33% 9.76% Women in Government (1994) (1996) 3 Total size of civil service
(Secretariat+Dir./Depts+Corps) 943.366 930 93 Total number of female civil servants 85.654 96.519 Female civil servants as a % of male 9.99% 1.58% Percentage of female civil servants in secretariat Diplomatic services (Foreign Affairs ministry) 5.62% 6.8% Bangladesh Missions abroad 3.04% District management (Local Govt. and Co-operatives) 12.02% 72% Commerce & trade 10.50% 2.56% (1993) (1996) Police services 0.6% 0.7% 4
Grand Total - Secretariat 1.03% 1.44% Women in the Judiciary (1999) 5 Total number of judges 836 Total number of female judges 74
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Number of female judges
Supreme court level O High court level O
(1995) (1998) 6
Female lawyers (as a % of male) 2.35% 4.32% Types of cases handled
(subject to availability) N/a N/a Female Voters (1988) (1991) (1996) Total number of registered
voters (in millions) 49,863,829 62,181,743 56,716,235 Total number of registered
female voters (millions) 23,483,885 23,238,204 27,956,941 Total voter turnout
at last election 51.81% 55.45% 75.6%
Female voter turnout
at last election 71% (est.)**
"" This estimate is based on journalistic opinion, as there are no formal statistics
lf data for 1999 is not available, data used for the nearest available year. Similarly, data used for the year closest to 980. or 1995. if data for that year is not available.
available.
Sources:
(l) (2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6) (7)
Bangladesh Election Commission, Statistical Report, LGED, Dhaka, 1991 and 1996. Najma Chowdhury, Women in Development: a Guide Book For Planners (Draft Report),
1994 - Ministry of Establishment, Statistics of Civil Officers and Staff of the Govt. of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, 1994 and 1996. Ministry of Establishment, Statistics of Civil Officers and Staff of the Govt. of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Statistics and Research Celi, Organisation and Management Wing, 1998. Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, Secretariat, Govt. of Bangladesh, 1999. Collected from Bangladesh Bar Council, July, 1999. Collected from Bangladesh Election Commission, Dhaka.
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Pakistan
Shirkat Gah"
State Structures and Processes Impacting on Women
Introduction
At the threshold of the 21st century, notwithstanding greater or lesser reductions in gender biases, the structure and style of nation-states remain distinctively patriarchal. Altering the existing equation so as to include women as primary and equal subjects in the construction of the state is a task that often seems impossible, for, at the heart of it, lie issues of power. The basis of power and how it is exercised, the configuration of forces contending for state power, and their attitude towards women, are critical. The real question then becomes how an essentially powerless group such as women can hope to access power and change the dynamics and structures of power at any level, be it the family, society or the state.
In examining the interface of women, the state and governance one needs to remember that the contemporary presumption of equal citizenship and rights for all being a self-evident foundational principle of nation-states has no basis in history. The famous 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of the French Revolution excluded women from its purview, provoking a woman, Olympes de Gourges, to compose the Declaration of the Rights of Woman and Citizen in 1791. De Gourges' Declaration and supporting actions were considered so outrageous that she was accused of
Authors: Farida Shaheed (Coordinator, Shirkat Gah) and Abbas Rashid (Journalist). Focal Research Team, Shirkat Gah: Malika Moazzama (Coordinator. Research), Shahina Ramzan, Seema Sheikh, Amtul Naheed, Shahnaz lobal, Yasmin Begum.
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"wanting to be a statesman and forgetting the virtues suitable to her sex’, and was guillotined in 1793. Well into the 20th century specific religious, ethnic or racial groups and all women were excluded from the status of citizenship and/or from the rights accorded to male citizens of an approved group. Consequently all excluded groups including women have had to engage in a protracted struggle to gain recognition for their rights as citizens. Equality of all citizens, whether before the law, for access to state-provided opportunities and benefits, or for fulfilling his/her potential, is a relatively new and developing concept of the 20 century. In fact nation-states have consistently differentiated between citizens according to sex, class, race, ethnicity and other factors, and continue to do so.
The state structure and social formation in Pakistan have provided only circumscribed spaces for women's intervention in the political process and the socio-economic realm. Fifty years of independence have done little to remove structural and systemic biases against women. The current situation has to be seen in the light of: (1) the specificities of state-building in South Asia; (2) the framework of the Pakistani state; and (3) the state's attitude towards women. The study shows that women are conscious of many parts of the analysis presented here on the state and its policies, although the articulation is rarely presented cohesively or in the terms used in social sciences.
Of nation-states and women in South Asia
The rise of nation-states in Europe was characterised by several factors that were entirely missing from the South Asian experience of achieving independent statehood. There was no elaboration of state apparatus designed to by-pass the personal whims and dictates of nobles who could potentially challenge the ruler. Instead the colonial administration consolidated the power of the locally influential elites, merely adding an extra tier for itself at the top. There was therefore no shifting of the axis of people's loyalty away from the local aristocracy to a state encompassing that nation - Benedict Anderson's famous 'imagined community'. This has direct implications for women's interaction with the state and its institutions, since this interaction is often mediated through intervening institutions that are not integrated into
2 Callamard, Agnes, Qu'y a t'il dans un mot? What's in a Wordo, first draft, l! August 1997, (on file with Shirkat Gah). For article in French, see http://www.mondediplomatique.fr/1998/03/CALLAMARD/10 138.html.
3 Evans, Richard J., The Feminists, Croom Helm, London, 1977.
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the state's structures and remain largely unacknowledged. The study brings into sharp focus the extent to which women's negotiations for greater autonomy and rights take place outside the framework of state institutions in a space largely, though by no means exclusively, defined by informal institutions and societal norms. The state is not neutral. As articulated by women in this study, societal attitudes permeate the state structures and its institutions. In fact such attitudes are frequently reinforced by state actions and policies. s
Other aspects of the colonial experience directly affected women's access to power and decision-making at the state level. Prior to colonisation, a small coterie of women was able to use their family relations and connections to affect what Rendel calls “backstairs' politics, mirroring the pattern of pre-industrial Europe. This access to power was entirely eliminated when the affairs of state passed into the hands of foreigners (1757-1947), however, except in those princely states that retained their independence or were allowed to function semi-autonomously. Indeed, until the late 19th- early 20 century, the women who left their mark on Indian history belonged to princely states with power to wield, such as the renowned Rani of Jhansi, or the Begums of Bhopal. Nor did other developments open up new avenues for women's participation in public processes.
The nature of industrialisation and its impact was different. “More of a graft on the body of the traditional economy than a metamorphosis of the latter through its own innate compulsions', industrialisation in India was bereft of any indigenous depth, and skewed. After initially opening avenues for women's employment, women's economic participation later underwent a permanent shift to the periphery of the economy in consequence of modernisation and new administrative-legal measures. This rendered
Rendel, Margherita (ed.), Women, Power and Political Systems, Croom Helm, London, 1981. Shaheed, Farida, Women, State and Power: The Dynamics of Variations and Convergence across East and West, in Neelum Hussain, Samiya Mumtaz, Rubina Saigol (eds.), Engendering the Nation State, Vol. , Simorgh. Lahore, 1997, pp. 53-78; Lal. S.K., The Mughal Harem, Aditya Drakashan, New Delhi, 1988: Findly, Ellison Banks, Nur Jahan - Empress of Mughal India, Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford. 993. Banerjee, Nirmala, ‘Working Women in Colonial Bengal: Modernisation and Marginalisation. in Kumkum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid (eds.), Recasting Women: Essays in Colonial History, Kali for Women, New Delhi, 1989, pp. 269-30 l. Banerjee, Nirmala, ibid.
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women's integration into the “modern economy and state even more problematic than in Europe.
The South Asian struggle for sovereignty was neither played out on the basis of nor was it accompanied by, a confrontation between indigenous religious and non-religious power bases. Hence the initial impetus for moving towards secularisation in Europe, via changes in the process and content of law (i.e., to cut the power base of the Church), was missing from the equation in South Asia. As a result, there is far greater social and political space for groups and persons who use a religious idiom to maintain control, to consolidate or to make a bid for power. The role of religion in Pakistan's creation has further complicated matters.
Ironically enough, the struggle for female voting rights in South Asia was far less protracted and intense than in Europe and the USA. In the context of the national struggle for independence, women's rights advocates found allies anongst the nationalist leadership, successfully mobilising the latter's support for including women in the political process. Mobilising greater numbers of people made eminent political sense for the nationalist movement, and the support did give an impetus to women's demands for their rights. But achieving voting rights in the provincial legislatures in the 1920s in India was largely a symbolic victory. The alienation of women from the state's formal apparatus and the modern sector can be judged by the fact that hardly any women qualified for the selective franchise introduced by the Government of India Act (1935). Franchise based on literacy, ownership of land or motor vehicles, being tax-payers, etc., entitled so few women to vote that the franchise was extended to certain female relatives of male voters (including widows or mothers of deceased armed forces personnel) to bolster their numbers. While this increased the absolute number of female voters, it also helped to promote a notion of female citizenship as being auxiliary. It was a notion reinforced by the Act, viewing women as a sub-section of some grouping defined by reference to men (based on religion or ethnic identity). Thus even as concessions were being made for their representation in governance, the handful of female citizens of any account in the eyes of the state were defined collectively and individually through their relationship to male citizens.
Finally, in Europe, the USA and Australasia women directly lobbied for women's political rights and participation with men in their society. In South Asia, such negotiations largely involved indigenous men and colonial rulers and administrators. Only exceptionally did indigenous women directly
8 Shaheed, 1997, op. cit.
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meet with colonial rulers to demand their rights. More commonly indigenous male leaders became the interlocutors for such demands. Direct negotiations for rights with indigenous males were also fairly limited, both interms of the numbers of women and men involved and in the need for mobilising visible mass support for their demands. Probably this legacy of limited direct involvement of women helped create an ethos of the limited participation of women in pubic processes that characterises post-independence trends.
If South Asian women were not the architects of the newly independent states, the fact of sovereignty did little to radically alter the situation. Postindependence women have primarily been the objects/recipients of the projects of state-building and the creation of nations. If this holds true generally, in post-colonial states such as in South Asia the avenues for negotiating their rights and influencing state policies have been further curtailed.
The framework of the Pakistani state
In the context of Pakistan, the following important aspects need to be kept in mind:
(a) Pakistan's genesis as a state-nation rather than a nation-state. (b) A centralised state structure and the denial of co-cultural leadership. (c) The instrumental use of Islam as a legitimising ideology by the elites. (d) The continuation of the feudal structure. (e) Modernisation and functional inequality.
(f) Militarisation of civil society.
The centralised state-nation
Pakistan emerged as an independent entity on 14th August 1947 with a relatively over-developed state structure' and a nation-in-becoming. It was the logic of colonialism that Pakistan inherited a powerful military bureaucracy and a weak political framework. A more enlightened elite would have focused on the task of nation-building. Instead it was the state that was strengthened and militarised, while the nation was taken for granted. The early dispute with India over Kashmir ensured that there was very little
9 Alavi, Hamza, The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh', in
K. Gough and H. P. Sharma (eds.). Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1973.


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resistance to the project. The emphasis, as in colonial times, remained on a law and order regime and on keeping society under control. But, as Deutsch has pointed out, that is not enough, since a failure to integrate elements of society into a cohesive community has direct consequences:
Community is that group of people who can communicate easily with one another. Society comprises all those people who are mobilised from traditional society into the modern, industrial society, thereby entering into close economic, political and social contacts with others... if the growth of the community keeps pace with that of society the nation is smoothly enlarged. If, however, the rate of the expansion of the numbers of those mobilised exceeds that of those who are able to communicate with one another a crisis will occur and the state will fall apart or undergo some major change.'
The lack of communication at the level of society was to have serious implications for state and society in Pakistan. The elite that assumed control soon after independence came largely from the western wing of the country and did not feel obliged to construct a genuinely federal structure in which power would be shared by the constituent units that were distinct in terms of cultural orientation, historical experience and socio-economic development. As such, the centralising logic of the state was not mediated by the decentralising imperative of a culturally differentiated nation. The creation of a unitary state structure represented a grave political distortion. Ordinarily, such a modernising and unifying drive would be defended on the grounds that it pulled traditional communities into the mainstream of the modern nationalist project, with particularly significant implications for women's engagement in the public sphere. In the case of Pakistan, however, as perhaps in that of many other third world countries, modernity was a selective instrument that left large areas of public and social life untouched - not least where this pertained to women.
Modernisation
The modernisation process has, in turn, thrown up groups that espouse extremism and violence and threaten to swamp civil society. These are of
O Quoted in Rashid, Abbas and Shaheed, Farida, Pakistan: Ethno-Politics and
Contending Elites, Discussion Paper 45, UNRISD, 1993.
182

two kinds: ethnic and sectarian. In the latter case, their version of radical lslam excludes women from virtually all public spaces. In the former case, women have been mobilised in large numbers around a sub-nationalist ideology, and their access to public space is far greater. But this may well represent a transition from private patriarchy to a form of public patriarchy. Kandiyoti has argued that, Private patriarchy is based on the relative exclusion of women from arenas of social life other than the household and the appropriation of their services by individual patriarchs within the confines of the home. Public patriarchy is based on employment and the state: women are no longer excluded from the public arena, but subordinated within it'." While one may disagree with the definition of public and private patriarchy provided by Kandiyoti, the phenomenon she describes is clearly visible. In our study this was exemplified by the differentiated rules of mobility that applied to working women. For example, half of the women industrial workers who attended a focus group discussion (all of whom were obviously permitted mobility for work purposes) had had to make an excuse to attend. Moreover one complained that her husband takes all the money she earns, and if she tries to assert herself she is quickly reminded that she needs to be thankful for the 'big concession of being allowed to work at all.
Similarly, when totalitarian political groups mobilise women it is less a move towards liberation and more a substitution of one form of subordination for another. Perceptions of political mobilisation of women, devoid of substance were clearly articulated by women, when they say, political parties use women's votes but never actually do anything for women. In fact, discussions and interviews both show that such a perception is not. limited to the actions of totalitarian or religiously defined political parties. It generally holds true for all political parties. The lack of confidence in the commitment to women on the part of political parties is reflected in the survey, where a majority of women seem to agree that women's participation in political initiatives is necessary because 'only women can do anything for Women.
ln most post-colonial states the assumption that after political, independence the adoption of democratic institutions would mediate existing contradictions in Society along a vertical as well as a horizontal axis has proven largely erroneous. More often than not the institutions, classes, and groups strengthened in line with the colonial imperative simply usurped the democratic high ground to legitimise the perpetuation of their power and
Kandiyoti, Deniz, Dossier 20, Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML), December 1997, p. 9.
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influence. In states across much of the third world democracy was distorted to suit the interests of the military, bureaucracy, feudals and other powerful interest groups. It was either basic' or 'guided', or otherwise appropriately prefixed, to deny its central function of articulating the will of the people, ensuring Supremacy of the law and accountability and providing a framework for the accommodation of conflicting interests.' Neatly side-stepping such expectations on the part of the citizens, the elite took recourse to a version of Islam that suited its interests. It quietly ignored, for instance, the aspect of equity on which Islam lays so much stress. Neither among provinces nor within them was a serious effort made to redress the imbalance of power and resources. Counter-intuitively, since women are presumed to be politically unaware, these aspects were picked up in discussions and interviews.
Functional inequality
In the early 1960s a doctrine of "functional inequality was propounded to justify the concentration of financial and industrial wealth in the hands of a few families. Two land reforms were half-heartedly carried out with the position of tenants and landless workers remaining precarious in large parts of the country. At the time of General Ayub Khan's coup (1958), there was a difference of 30% in the per capita income of what were two wings of the country. By the end of the 2nd Five-Year Plan (1965), the per capita income disparity between the two wings had risen to 61%. While this is a contested figure, there is no dispute about the relative decline of East Pakistan under the Ayub regime. The doctrine of functional inequality was based on the premise that the initial stages of capitalist development required a high degree of inequality. It was revealed that 22 families between them owned 66% of industry, 97% of insurance and 80% of banking. While the corporate militaryindustrial elite was pampered, the percentage of national expenditure devoted to education was the lowest in Asia under Ayub.'
The demand for equity in the realm of politics, economy and culture, however, was suppressed in the name of Islam. That those who assumed the levers of state power should choose to do so was ironic, for it was a largely liberal and westernised leadership that had pushed the demand for Pakistan in the face of strong opposition by hard-line Islamist groups such as the Jamaat-e-Islami in British India. But the demand for Pakistan, nevertheless,
2 Rashid and Shaheed, op. cit.. p. 3. 3 Noman. Omar, Pakistan. Political and Economic History since 1947. Kegan Paul
International, New York & London, 1990.
184

had been couched in an Islamic idiom. lt was to be a homeland for the Muslims of India. With the independence of Pakistan, the elite had a choice: it could either treat the question of Islam as having been settled, or it could put it to an instrumentalist use. It chose the latter course, with particularly unfortunate consequences for women and non-Muslims.
Militatrisation
The long spells of martial law or militarism in politics have systematically undermined and stunted the growth of strong institutions of civil society, led to the militarisation of society, and undermined the potential growth of any leadership, especially political, beyond the traditional feudal class. Militarisation, of course, specifically affects women, since women are not part of the military and simply disappear from the ranks of decision-takers, trendsetters and policy-makers. Military rule sidelines the civil bureaucracy where women's presence has the potential to make an impact, and a similar impact results from the shift from civilian courts to military ones. The implications go beyond the immediate period. The hiatus of women's visible participation inpublic processes reinforces stereotypical perceptions of malefemale domains and gender-appropriate' roles long after the official demise of martial law regimes.
The role of the army has been significant in other ways. As Marek Thee points out, militarism can exist in different ways: a repressive authoritarian regime backed by the military, direct military rule, or civilian rule with the military exerting predominant pressure.' Thee identifies three sets of indicators that determine how militarism will actually manifest itself and impact on people's lives: (a) the military's place in the state system - ruling force or partner; (b) ideological strands - nationalism to xenophobia; (c) nature of state policies -high military expenditure, use of military strength as instrument of politics. In the case of Pakistanthese sets of factors are very relevant.
Land reforms
Pakistan has yet to have effective land reforms or a meaningful progressive system of agricultural income tax, and the landed class continues to retain a
4 Mazari, Shireen, Militarism and the Militarisation of Pakistan's Civil Society: 1977
1990, in Kumar Rupesinghe and Khawar Mumtaz, (eds.), Internal Conflicts in South Asia, PRIO, Oslo. 1996. Mazari, Shireen, ibid.
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major share in political power. Its attitudes manifest themselves well beyond the confines of their own fiefdoms. Land reforms have not been allowed to go through, and neither has a progressive land or income tax system been used as an alternative to changes in land ownership.'
In the study, women themselves identified the feudal environment as a major obstacle to women's participation in political processes. In the land tenure system that Pakistan inherited in 1947, land was largely owned by a proportionately small number of landowners. About 7% of them owned 51% of all land, with the top 1% owning 30% of the land. The first land reforms were carried out under Ayub Khan's martial law regime in 1959. These allowed for individual holdings of 500 acres of irrigated land and 1,000 acres of non-irrigated land. The result in terms of land resumed, its quality and the number of new owners were not impressive. Its major achievement appeared to be capitalist farmers, a new class of owners, who became the major beneficiaries of Ayub's policies.
Announced in 1972, Z.A. Bhutto's land reforms lowered the ceiling of holdings to 150 acres of irrigated and 300 acres of non-irrigated land. There was a guarantee oftenancy, and demands on tenants were also reduced. Again there was not much readjustment of social and economic power in the rural areas. Mainly it was a matter of creating apprehension among large owners, and mostly false hopes among the tenants and the landless. Despite the poor delivery, and attesting to the deep-felt need for such reforms, the fact that Bhutto had distributed land to the landless was advanced by more than one person as a reason for seeing his government as having done the most for Pakistan.
Provincial profiles
The provinces are highly differentiated in social, economic and political terms, as well as in geography and natural resources. Punjab and Sindh have most of the country's agricultural land. Punjab alone has nearly two-thirds of the irrigated and cropped area of the country. It also comprises more than 55% of the country's population. Not surprisingly, therefore, it has dominated politics. In contrast, Baluchistan makes up some 40% of the country's physical land, but only a little over 5% of the population.
Initial differences have been further accentuated through the policies of functional inequality, language and control over resources. For instance,
6 Khan, Mahmood Hussan, Underdevelopment and agrarian structure in Pakistan,
Vanguard Books, Lahore, 1981.
186

Baluchistan, which has the richest natural gas reserves, has been the last province to benefit from this (and still has the lowest percentage of connections in the country). Nor does it benefit from the revenue generated, This is monopolised by the centre. The promotion of Urdu as the national language particularly affected the province of Sindh (and to a lesser extent the North West Frontier Province (NWFP)), where the indigenous written language has a rich cultural and administrative history. Overnight those educated in their mother tongue found themselves declared illiterate, and, on this basis, barred entry into the state machinery and employment benefits. (Language, of course, played a dominant role in the tussle between East and West Pakistan, leading to the independent state of Bangladesh.)
Today the regionally disparate growth rates are primarily due to the unequally developed factors of production in different regions: the level of technology, capital intensity, productivity of the capital structure, and the degree of complementarity offered by the social environment in which the productive forces are required to operate.” There is also the differentiated integration of the provinces and regions within this into the state's formal structure. Baluchistan did not become a province until 1972. Parts of NWFP remained outside the provincial structure of administration, and continued to operate as agencies through political agents. Universal franchise was denied these Federally Administered Tribal Areas until the 1997 elections. That women are aware of and resent such differentiated policies was again clear from discussions and interviews.
Differentiated integration into the state is also reflected in the disjuncture between area-specific customs and Systems of dispute resolution . on the one hand, and the state's institutions on the other. Local configurations of loyalty and power structures integrated into people's traditional systems have a direct bearing upon governance. Indeed, the study indicates that cultural differences are a major driving variable in moulding women's perceptions and experiences of the state.
Women and the state of Pakistan
Women in Pakistan have always had to operate within fairly rigid structures
of patriarchal control. Self-serving notions of honour underlie the institution of purdah (gender segregation and women's seclusion), which seriously
7 Kardar. Shahid, Polarisation in the Regions and Prospects for integration, in S.
Akbar Zaidi (ed.), Regional imbalances and the National Question in Pakistan. Vanguard Eooks, Lahore, 1992, pp. 306–333.
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challenges women's activism and public appearance of any kind. Purdah systematically keeps women out of all public spaces, blocks their access to basic amenities such as health facilities, education, and employment, and prevents women from engaging in the political process, an intrinsically public activity. These notions of honour are justified by reference to culture and religion, and used by those in and out of power to promote, justify and mobilise support for their political agendas.
The barriers to women's public activism produce a vicious cycle. Excluded from the public arena, women are unable to develop the skills and experience needed to become more effective in the political process, be this as part of formal political parties or as part of autonomous women's groups. Women face specific disadvantages in the field of formal politics. The local structures of tribal and feudal power that have functioned as the traditional springboard for much of Pakistan's political leadership exclude women. There are virtually no women amongst the industrialists or traders who have more recently made an entry into electoral politics. Long periods of martial law have further eroded women's participation, and, being excluded from most sections of the armed forces, women are not in a position to make the jump from military service to politics either. Even more dependent than men on their family connections for political leadership, women have had to rely heavily on affirmative action and the political will of the incumbent government to promote an enabling environment for their participation in both the state's institutions and the political process. Indeed, given the uneven playing field, affirmative action, such as reserved seats for women in the parliamentary processard quotas in government service, has been a standing demand of women in and out of parliament since independence.
Until the 1980s, autonomous women's organisations were sporadically active, and a significant element in women's political participation was their field of activity, style of operation, priorities and focus (or lack thereof) on women's issues and rights. Unfortunately the erratic and often fragile links between political actors, women in government and independent advocacy groups reduced the effectiveness of each strand of activism. Not until General Zia ul-Haq's military regime, with its particular brand of Islam (1977-88), started to rescind women's rights overnight, did women's groups feel the need to establish an advocacy lobby for women on a sustained basis. Since then such groups have substantially grown in numbers and have come to play a more consistent and focused role in the debates and advocacy initiatives for women's rights in general, and political participation and representation in particular. For their part, government attitudes towards women's rights and participation have varied significantly.
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Contemporary accounts of the independence movement indicate that the political struggle had somehow generated such enthusiasm that all prejudices and taboos seemed to have been swept away'," providing space for women to change the parameters of their lives to an extent hardly credible'.' Independence ended that period of vibrant activism. Nonetheless, between 1947 and 1956, when the first constitution was framed, Pakistan's coterie of women political activists had enough political experience and commitment to women's rights to push for women's rights in the constitution. Some legislation was enacted to enhance women's participation and rights, and Begum Shah Nawaz, in particular, consciously worked to promote the vital link between women activists outside and inside parliament. The two women members of the constituent assembly' were confronted by conservative factions who, though also small in number, had far greater, political clout - enough to prevent a consensus emerging on key issues relating to women. Many previously active women turned to other matters. Some pursued careers, others opted to work for social reconstruction and welfare, and a small number pursued their political agenda through non-parliamentary groups. By and large the former have been able to count on government support. The latter, especially when perceived as too radical, have had to face opposition from the government and retrogressive elements of society, often working in tandem. The various strands of women's political activism came together only occasionally.
The political turmoil starting in 1956 submerged women's issues. When General Ayub Khan assumed power in 1958 he replaced the constitution and introduced a controlled multi-layered democracy. The system provided for six reserved seats for women, to be elected on the basis of an electoral college comprising the members of the assembly. This allowed women to be present in the assemblies, but it eliminated their political leverage by divorcing them from constituencies - and made women on reserved seats dependent on the largely male electoral college. Women's participation was
Ikramullah, Shaista, S. From Purdah to Parliament. The Cresset Press, London, 1963, p. 124.
19 Cousins, Margaret E., Indian Womanhood Today, Kitabistan, Allahabad, 1941, pp.
57-58.
Begum Jahanara Shahnawaz and Begum Shaista kramullah. Pakistan's first two women legislators helped form the United Front for Women's Rights (UFWR) that actively lobbied for the enactment of the West Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1948 (IX of 1948) and its 1951 amendments, ensuring women the right to inherit property including agricultural holdings.
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eliminated wholesale in the first tier of elections for the basic democrats', where the women elected were few and far between. Hence, although Fatima Jinnah stood for president in the 1965 elections, only the handful of women elected basic democrats qualified to cast their vote for her. At the social level, however, Ayub's martial law regime allowed women space. Even then women's activism appeared only in response to the incumbent prime minister taking a second wife in 1955.
The greatest political mobilisation of women occurred between 1968 and 1977, a period starting with the anti-Ayub Khan movement in 1968 and ending with the anti-Bhutto Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) movement. Large numbers of women actively participated in the anti-Ayub movement, and substantial numbers joined progressive groups. The Z.A. Bhutto era (1971-77) that followed was one of progress for women. The 1973 constitution accorded women a better status, provided for affirmative action by the state, and reserved 10 seats in the national assembly and approximately 10% in the provincial assemblies for a specified period. All government posts and services were opened to women, and women were appointed to high-profile posts." Pakistan celebrated the 1975 International Women's Year and signed the Mexico Declaration. New women's organisations emerged, and older ones expanded their agendas. A Women's Rights Committee was appointed to recommend measures to enhance women's social, legal and economic position, and a Declaration on the Rights of Women in Pakistan was launched in 1976. The Committee's recommendation to form a Women's Division under the federal cabinet was approved. The anti-Bhutto Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) movement of 1977, sparked off by widespread allegations of rigging in the 1977 national elections, ended this phase. Spearheaded by the joint opposition coalition, the movement's demands were articulated by the Jamaat-i-Islami, heralding in a period where religious idiom started to dominate the political discourse.
22 Another collaborative effort followed the response to the incumbent Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali Bogra, taking a second wife in 1955. Starting with a social boycott, this sparked off agitation by women against polygamy both within parliament and outside. Women's activism led to the government-appointed Rashid Commission whose tasks included the review of family laws and culminated in the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961. See Mumtaz, Khawar and Shaheed, Farida, Tivo Steps Forward, One Step Back? Women in Pakistan. Zed Books. London, 1987.
23 In East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), the political mobilisation pre-dates this period. 24 Provincial governor, university vice chancellor and deputy speaker of the national
assembly.
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In July 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq's coup d'état brought in the longest and harshest of Pakistan's many martial law regimes - a dictatorship that justified its authoritarianism through a religious discourse. The era severely reduced the rights of and space available to women and non-Muslims alike on all fronts. Through a much-publicised Islamisation' campaign, the state launched a well-orchestrated move to curtail women's participation in all spheres of life. Rights were rescinded, public visibility reduced, and a cultural agenda adopted that relegated women to the confines of chaddor and chardiwari (the veil and the boundaries of the homestead). Despite this, Zia actually doubled the seats for women in the national assembly, and, paradoxically enough, this period of repression catalysed a dynamic, albeit geographically and socially limited, women's movement.
Zia's death restored the democratic process in 1988, but his legacy has continued into the present. The rapid dismissal of four consecutively elected governments since 1988 testifies to the fragility of democratic institutions. The constitutional provision for women's reserved seats lapsed after the 1988 election and has not been restored. The PPP's minority governments (1988-90, 1993-96) opened up social spaces for women, but failed to leave a mark on the underlying structures or institutions. The first majority government of Nawaz Sharif (PML (N)) had little to offer women. The most recently elected government (with a two-thirds majority in the national assembly) speedily passed several constitutional amendments consolidating the power of the federal government, but notably failed to restore reserved seats for women in the national and provincial assemblies, as repeatedly mentioned by activist women in the study.
At the Societal level, the attitudes promoted during the Zia era appear to have permeated the institutions of the state and civil society, as indicated by several rulings of the judiciary relating to women's rights, especially in matters relating to personal status law and violence against women. The infamous laws introduced by Zia remain on the anvil and continue to plague women and minorities alike. The mushrooming of militant Islamist' politicoreligious parties and sectarian groups has shifted the political debate towards the right and a religious idiom that is particularly unhelpful for women and non-Muslims.
On the more positive side, the number of women's advocacy groups and general human rights groups has steadily increased. These groups network
2卒
See Mumtaz and Shaheed, 1987, op. cit, and Shahla Zia, "Some Experiences of the ܒܚ ܫܒ Women's Movement” pp. 371-414 in Shaping Women's Lives - Laws, Practices and Strategies, eds. Farida Shaheed et al., Shirkat Gah, Lahore, 1998.
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at the national and provincial levels, and more recently concerted efforts have been made to extend networking to the grassroots. Advocacy groups, that have learnt to lobby with the bureaucracy and with political parties, have been helped by the international acceptance of their legitimate role. Experience has enhanced capacity for effective strategising. They are, however, only a small part of an impoverished civil society, and one that is currently under attack from the government itself.
Civil society is itself divided between those trying to support women's rights, a tolerant society and a responsible state, and groups who are pushing in the opposite direction. The latter increasingly project themselves either as the only true protector and spokesperson for a particular ethnic, regional or religious group, or as the only spokesperson for Islam itself. More often than not, such groups are heavily armed and not adverse to the use of violence in the pursuit of their goals. Consequently those who promote women's participation often find themselves caught between the state's lack of commitment and the active opposition of militant armed groups.
Additionally, Pakistani society is fragmented. People seldom govern personal matters by reference to, let alone in accordance with, formal state laws of which they are overwhelmingly ignorant. The disjuncture between the legal provisions and institutions of the state and people's lives may be deliberately perpetuated by local landlords, unhappy with any challenge to their status as sole mediators and adjudicators in their locality, and/or by religious elements or maulvis for similar reasons. Combined with the rules of purdah, this disjuncture further ensures that the institutions of the state do not permeate the lives of most women. The virtual lack of interaction with state institutions and personnel was underscored in the study. The study therefore explored which institutions - formal and informal - existin women's lives, and their opinions on these, so as to identify viable entry points, support mechanisms and potential obstacles to increasing women's spaces.
Provincial differences
Each culturally distinct region has its own social formations and traditional systems of self-governance and dispute resolution. These have a direct bearing on women's negotiations for space and their activism. Obviously there are further differences within provinces, but these could not be explored in the present study. Under colonial rule, some of the traditional systems were incorporated into the state apparatus, albeit in a re-modelled version. In some tribal areas these systems are still operative. Parallel to this, however, in many places people themselves sustained their traditional forums, though
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the degree of relevance to people's lives of such institutions varies considerably. Moreover, none of the traditional systems provided space to women in the decision-making process - indeed most specifically excluded women from even appearing directly.
in Punjab the panchayat, a forum comprising five or more men of a community selected for their age and/or status, was the most common form of dispute resolution. Panchayats are not permanent bodies, nor is membership hereditary, (Panchayats also exist amongst the Hindus of Sindh and Baluchistan, but, there, the members of panchayats are permanent and are only replaced on their death.) The panchayat system today has lost its formality, and the term is loosely used to refer to any collective decisionmaking of local people (also called paryia).
The equivalent forum for Pukhtuns in the NWFP and elsewhere is the jirga. Previously a council or assembly of members of the tribe, the jirga has gradually been reduced to a few khans (influentials) and sardars (heads of tribes or a tribal branch) of a particular area. In Sindh and Baluchistan people have been more dependent on the sole will of a tribal head, the wadera and sardar. These heads can vary from those of families and sub-tribes to a head of tribe. In their areas of influence, the sardars and waderas have far more individual power than in either the panchayat or jirga system.
Matters arbitrated or adjudicated by these forums range from ordinary day-to-day conflicts, to serious types of civil and criminal matters including abduction, kidnapping of women, assaults against women and sometimes blood feuds. Today the jirga wields far greater authority in its areas of operation than the panchayats, and is almost as important in urban as rural areas. In Sindh the traditional systems operate almost exclusively in rural areas and have no urban presence. Serious criminal matters are, however, adjudicated by panchayats in areas where the local feudals have a strong hold and people have little other recourse. Legally people can disregard a panchayat's decision and go to the ordinary courts or other formal institutions, but this has serious social implications for them within the community. Nevertheless, people who disagree with a panchayati decision will take the matter to the police or court. Partly this may be due to the greater integration of the Punjab into the state structures and its greater urbanisation. Indeed in many parts of urban Punjab, the panchayat seems to have virtually disappeared, though the biraderi is still referred to by respondents in this study. Additionally, the councillor elected to the lowest tier of representative government appears to be assuming some of the tasks previously carried out by the panchayat. One needs to remember, however, that in reality the same persons who sit/sat on the panchayat may be those now elected as councillors.
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Further, the study shows that the replacement is only partial, and, for example, criminal cases (murder, rape, abduction, etc.) that fell into the purview of the panchayat, are not taken to the councillor.
The attitude of the state towards these various forums has been ambiguous. Under colonial rule, the jirga was given official recognition and continued to adjudicate on all civil and criminal matters in many parts of NWFP and Baluchistan that were excluded from the rule of ordinary laws. After independence, while state governance was extended to some of these areas, the rest were dealt with under special laws either enacted during British rule or subsequently. These special laws made possible the retention of the jirga in one form or other. The state has also called upon the wadera-faislo system and jirgas, especially when the conflict has grown to include multiple layers of grievances and revenge killings. In the Punjab, panchayats can be called upon by the local administration when they fear a law and order situation, or when they feel the community itself can best solve an issue. Consequently, even though the state does not make provision for these forums, they are unofficially acknowledged and called upon to assist in handling matters at the local community level, or when it is felt that the existing state mechanisms will not be able to address a situation.
Of immediate importance to women is that many of the problems involving daily disputes are taken to these forums. Whereas it would be logical to assume that women's access to panchayats and jirgas would be greater than their access to sardars or waderas, the study shows that women are far more likely to approach the wadera personally in Sindh than to approach the panchayat in Punjab. Though in Punjab women do approach the councillor on their own, the elections to these posts have only been held with regularity in Punjab; in the other provinces women have little experience of councillors. Women from Baluchistan and NWFP did not report approaching the forums themselves. The inability of the state to effectively replace these forums with its own structures, at the time that developments have eroded the structures and influence of traditional systems, has resulted in many citizens being bereft of any forums for resolving disputes, and the lack of justice for women was a constant refrain in the women's focus group discussions that formed one part of the Pakistan study.
The Pakistan study
With a view to eliciting as broad a base as possible for subsequent recommendations, the Pakistan study made a national survey of 1,609 women, carried out between June 10 and July 30, 1998, the mainstay of the research.
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(See Table 1 for distribution; additional select tables are also included in the Annexe.) Using a two-stage clustered random sampling, the survey consists largely of women from low and middle-income groups who are neither socially nor politically active. Analysis of the survey findings provided the groundwork for exploring the opinions, perceptions and analysis of more active women through 21 focus group discussions and 31 in-depth interviews in the first half of 1999. The sample size of the male control group was too small to be of any statistical value. Male responses are only significant as an indication of where there are either close similarities or major differences between the genders. Data from all research components was processed by early 2000.
The vast majority of rural and urban women survey respondents were married (84%), and between the ages of 21 and 50 (80%). Women under 20 years of age and those over 50 are under-represented (respectively 8% and l2%). Close to half the urban women had some formal schooling, 28% having more than 8 years of schooling. Only 21% of the rural sample had some schooling/education, and only 7% had more than 8 years schooling. In contrast, more rural than urban women had some means of income (respectively 24% and 19%), but, whereas 43% of urban women left their homes on a daily basis to carry out this income-generating activity, this dropped to 35.5% of rural women.
Spread across the country, focus group discussions were held in rural and urban areas with working women, political activists, teachers, and those involved in autonomous women's groups. In several places where focus group discussions were held with active women, discussions were also held with non-actives in the locality. Two discussions were held with non-Muslim women: one was held with members of the most active women's lobby during the Zia era, Women's Action Forum; another with a group of women whose family men have been the victims of state violence. Two focus group discussions were held with rural and urban men in Punjab.
Interviewees were chosen for their engagement in public processes, whether political or otherwise, and interviews focused on eliciting women's recommendations for enhancing women's participation in public processes. The majority of the interviewees were and/or are politicians, but more than one-third were engaged in some form of activity other than politics. They ranged from educationists, trade unionists, and lawyers, to human rights activists and businesswomen. They included a policewoman, a TV playwright, former ministers and current ministers. Three men were interviewed: a minister, a leader of a politico-religious party and an ex-politician who is now a leading human rights activist.
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Age, education, economic status and marital status were examined as potentially determinant variables. Marital status was found to be irrelevant. It would appear that Socio-economic Status does influence perceptions - as does education - although often only in combination with other factors. The impact of education was far less significant than could have been expected, even though education emerged as an issue of significant concern among
WO).
Rural-urban variations emerged only after the data was disaggregated by province. Indeed, provincial differences emerged as a driving variable in determining women's experiences and perceptions of the state, public processes, and to some extent their view of gender issues. Province-wise variation underscores the need for differentiated recommendations and interventions that recognise that what is appropriate in one area may be highly inappropriate even for the rural area of the same province, let alone the other provinces.
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I
Research Findings
Women's spaces and perceptions of self
The specific configuration and dynamics of power in a particular context define the spaces within which people are able to act. This applies equally to men and women, but the spaces available to women are fewer in number, narrower and attended by more rules. The ability to intervene in the collective and public processes is to a large extent dependent on the parameters defined at the personal level. It becomes important therefore to understand women's personal spaces and decision-making, as well as their perception of what obstructs or enhances greater involvement.
The study explored the contours of women's decision-making and mobility. It focuses on women's perceptions of these issues. The reality may differ, of course, but perceptions themselves shape actions. In each of the component parts of the study, the inequality between men and women was acknowledged and defined in terms of women's lack of decision-making, curtailed mobility and limited access to opportunities. In a number of interviews, women saw gender-based inequality as a universal phenomenon that, however, has different intensities and expressions.
Regardless of whether they question or accept the basis for it, women note the reality of female-specific and male-specific activities and spaces. There is widespread acceptance of the home defining the realm of women's activities, whereas men deal with and are responsible for tasks outside the home. The contours of these gender-specific spaces change shape according to rural/urban setting, social positions and, most particularly, women's personal experiences. Nor, for the most part, are such spaces seen as immutable. Womenactivists, whether grassroots rural women or upper middle class urban ones, reject gender-based role/space allocations, arguing that all spaces and activities are appropriate for women. However, they too accept that an ability to do what men do does not mean equal status.
In their discourses many women articulate the classic gender division of labour and responsibilities where women's work and space is defined by household activities and childcare. Though many say women work shoulder to shoulder with men, sub-themes of such discourses include the exclusion
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of women, the lack of restrictions on men, the permissions needed by women - though the nature and dynamics of exclusion/inclusion vary, sometimes significantly. Some rural women in Baluchistan, for example, classify religious celebrations (Eidki taqribaat) as being reserved formen, somethingunheard of and Surprising to women from other regions. Students in Sindh point out that even amongst the educated all entertainment spaces are reserved for men, as are sports and games, late night work, and outdoor jobs. In urban NWFP women recognise that women cannot be taxi or bus drivers. In Punjab police Stations are mentioned amongst the exclusively male territories. Women's analysis of why this is so varies. Some link this to religious dictates, others merely say this is the the way things are, Baluch women especially spoke of their specific cultural identity. Feminist activists link the status quo with patriarchy. But the majority do not elaborate on reasons at all.
Rural men and urban politically active men in Punjab see genderdefined spaces and roles differently. Rural men project a far less elastic view of gender-specific roles. According to them, men cultivate the land, and women look after the home. Men work out in the fields, while women help out by bringing them their food in the field and giving fodder to the animals, etc. Even though the group accepted that “men and women work together, they felt there was no need to expand the circle of women's activities. Interestingly, in the perception of these men the somewhat freer system in the rural areas more effectively controls women. As evidence, they note that rural women could/do not make excuses because 'everyone knows what is going on and their activities would immediately be reported. By this same discussion, these men recognise that the situation is not the same in urban Settings.
Urban male political activists articulate a more ambiguous position. Their voices reflect the changing ground reality, and indicate existing attempts to adjust and cope. They accept, for instance, that a woman need not wear a burga since modesty lies within, but, at the same time, believe that a woman's mobility increases her wishes and aspirations. Consequently women should be given more freedom, but within the boundaries of chaddar and chardiwari (the four walls of the home). They accept that women should be free to give their opinions, but are quick to clarify that in our area it is not considered acceptable for women to be out demonstrating on the streets. As justification they say children become neglected when both parents work.
Most women's discussions make clear that both the limitations imposed on women and the spaces available to them vary. For example, Christian women feel they are better off in terms of mobility and space than their Muslim counterparts. The gendered rules for mobility are different in
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the case of earning and other activities. Women working in the industrial labour force both in Karachi and Lahore complain that while going out to work is accepted, any activity beyond the 9-5 routine is frowned upon. Despite years of working, they are queried about coming back late from work, and many had to make excuses to attend the focus group discussions. This would suggest that while economic compulsions may persuade men to let women work, the latter still do not enjoy concomitant freedom to pursue other interests. At the workplace, the general Social resistance to women's mobility and the perception of its being unsuitable adds to the general discrimination against women. Women feel the management uses the excuse of insecurity vis a vis women to deny women promotions and to exclude them from those areas where promotions are more likely (i.e., field jobs where the management feels obliged to provide transport and security, an additional expense). Despite these complaints about restrictions, the survey findings suggest that the mobility afforded women through remunerative work is important. The single most distinguishing trait of the sample of Sindhi women interviewed, who are most supportive of women's participation in public office and state institutions, is the high degree of mobility implied in their remunerative work (see below). ふ The parameters of women's lives are vastly different one from the other, influencing their perceptions of what constitute expanded spaces. In one of the discussions an urban woman spoke of much increased space since she has gained the trust of the family, meaning her in-laws. But the definition of the space turned out to be as limited as being able to stand in line for paying bills and being able to go shopping for her basic groceries. Consequently, when women from different class and cultural backgrounds speak of the factors that enhance decision-making or autonomy, the reality they refer to is substantially different.
Mobility
The survey confirms the differentiated application of rules of mobility. Health, for example, is considered a legitimate reason for women's mobility, and 78% of the women report leaving their locality unaccompanied for health reasons as and when required. Only half as many attend religious activities alone. Indeed, as indicated in the discussions, women's excursions outside their homes for reasons of health and religion have enough legitimacy for these to be used as an effective excuse for venturing beyond the household compound, sometimes for other activities. Social obligations relating to condolences and celebrations provide another framework for mobility
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(respectively 30% and 27%). Urban women are more likely to go to such occasions unaccompanied than rural women. Possibly because this falls into the category of outside tasks assumed to be male responsibilities, less than one-fifth of the women say they visit their children's school. It should be kept in mind that women are likely to say that they move about unaccompanied even if, in fact, they are accompanied by small children.
Mobility patterns vary according to province and rural-urban location. Though Punjabi women are most likely to visit their children's schools, only half report ever going. The percentage of women who had never visited their children's schools progressively increased to a high of 77% in Baluchistan. Punjabi and Sindhi women are more likely to go shopping by themselves than women in the other two provinces. Only one-fifth say they never go, compared with over half in NWFP and 65% in Baluchistan. Religious activities outside their homes provide mobility for twice as many rural women as urban women, except in NWFP. In contrast, due to the difficult terrain and large distances, almost a quarter of Baluch women never go for condolences, though they do attend celebrations.
The differences by age, marital status, rural/urban status and class (barring a miniscule elite) are not particularly significant, except in some instances where rural/urban location seems to make some difference. In our sample, urban women were better educated, more mobile and had greater decision-making powers than rural women. Moreover, women's statements in the focus group discussions indicate that while women may project women's restricted spaces as a given, they are engaged in constant negotiations for elasticity. This is evident in wemen's repeated acknowledgements in the discussions that they sometimes use a pretext to leave their homes for reasons they personally consider legitimate, despite prohibitive social sanctions.
Decision-making
The vast majority of women feel they have a say in decisions relating to their children's marriages and education; only 10% of the surveyed women say they had no input in deciding about the education of their children, less than 20% in decisions relating to their children's marriages. Rural women appear to have less of a say than their urban counterparts (Table 2). Though women say they participate in decisions about their children's education, the fact that the majority never visit their children's school suggests that this is perceived as an outdoor task for men. Such perceptions may be changing. In a discussion of active urban women it was pointed out that it is better for
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women to visit the schools and undertake chores outside the home because otherwise the men lose at least a half to a full day's wages, often more.
Over two-thirds of women feel included in decisions on buying and selling of property in their own name or family property. Somewhat less say they are consulted on family disputes. In stark contrast, only a quarter of the women (26%) feel they had had some input in the critical matter of their own marriages. A bare 12% consider they influenced this decision to a great extent, although provincial perceptions vary. For example, two-fifths of Sindhi women feel they had a say, compared with one quarter of the Punjabis and significantly less in NWFP and Baluchistan (13% and 17% respectively). On the other hand, in both urban and rural NWFP, women believe they have a significant input in decisions relating to their own and family property (two-thirds and two-fifths respectively). This drops to two-fifths and a third respectively amongst the women in Sindh, roughly 28% in Punjab, dropping further to one-fifth and just over one-tenth in Baluchistan.
By and large the male perception (as captured in the survey control group) concurs in the matter of women's say in the marriage and education of their children. Over 90% of the men feel women are involved in such decisions (with respect to the marriage of sons 56% think women are involved to a great extent"). However, 40% of the men expressed the view that women have a say in decisions pertaining to their own marriage (15% to a great extent). Undoubtedly women's perceptions are more accurate on this issue, and the male responses probably reflect a desire to be politically correct in the framework of the survey. Men are less convinced than women, however, of the latter's role in the buying and selling of family property and in the resolution of family disputes, but only about 11% of the men say women have no say at all in these areas. Women's higher perception of involvement could, of course, be wishful thinking.
The varied patterns of women's decision-making powers underline the complexities involved in the process of women's empowerment. Would it be more appropriate to strengthen areas in which women already have some degree of decision-making space, or would this merely result in a quantitative rather than qualitative change? On the other hand, is it advisable to try and break the most intransigent patterns of exclusion? Can decisionmaking in financial matters empower women by itself? Or is women's inclusion in dispute resolutions more important? The study seems to suggest that: (a) intervention strategies will have to region-specific; and (b) that multiple factors would need to be addressed simultaneously. There is also an indication that decision-making correlates positively to education and income. A higher percentage of women in middle-income households have
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a major say in various matters concerning their family, including issues related to property and the education and marriage of their children. In fact, women are more anxious to have greater decision-making powers within the family than in matters relating to the community.
Women themselves believe women's autonomous decision-making increases with age, education, her personal income and material resources, and, especially by the less affluent women, mobility. In a number of interviews and focus group discussions, women indicate that while the income bracket of a woman may have a bearing, (one woman said money has a voice of its own), the determining factor is a woman's own income and decision-making power over its use. Earning an income without control over its use does not necessarily lead to greater autonomy - a sentiment expressed by working women and others. One interviewee pointed out that even when women earn and exercise control over their earnings they spend it largely on their families rather than themselves, and that this did not necessarily lead to personal autonomy. Some say education helps, others that experience counts (as, for example, someone having travelled abroad). The more politically and socially aware interviewees identify financial independence, better education, and exposure to the outside world as factors enhancing women's decision-making powers. Urban-based interviewees often feel urban living is more conducive to women's empowerment than rural.
Empowerment. A multi-factored process
In fact, women almost never speak about a single factor as being sufficient. When a specific factor was identified in a discussion, others put forward counter-examples, e.g., that economic status may be helpful as a rule but the general attitude of the family in question may be more important. Another example was that while education mostly helped women expand their space, one had to question the nature of education being provided. The more politically-aware women gave examples of other countries with high literacy but continued restrictions and limitations on women's decision-making powers. Any given factor therefore may improve the chances of autonomy, but in any particular case this may be nullified by other intervening factors.
The study explored women's perception of the causes of women's oppressed conditions. The vast majority of women in the survey see insufficient education or the lack of it as responsible for women's inferior status (nearly 90%). The institution of purdah (gender segregation and female seclusion) and women's confinement within the home is quoted by nearly two-thirds. Over 40% mention the societal definition of and limitations
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imposed on women's roles. Just over a third cite the lack of financial autonomy and their own assets. About a third say traditional values discourage a more substantive role for women (Table 3). In their discussions women placed more emphasis on societal norms that impede or resist expanded roles for women. Hence one woman who used to accompany her husband to the wholesale thread market for their business said that the other salesmen were so embarrassed at her presence that they kept telling her husband to stop bringing her along. She was fortunate in that her husband rejected this position and argued that if he had no objections and did not feel embarrassed, other men had no business feeling awkward on his behalf.
There is consensus across the provinces that the poor level of education is a primary factor responsible for women's inferior position. In all provinces women also share the view that the institution of purdah contributes to gender imbalance: 46% of women in Sindh, two-thirds in Punjab and NWFP, and a striking 85% of women in Baluchistan identified this as an obstacle. Interestingly enough, three provinces place the limited roles expected of or accepted for women fairly high on the list (between 46% and 54%), but this is barely mentioned by Sindhi women in the survey (5%) - though it cropped up in the Sindh-based focus group discussions. It is worth noting that the lack of decision-making within the family is seen as more important than women's exclusion from community decisions. Being the most immediate site of patriarchal controls over women, decisions within the family are, of course, important. It is possible, however, that women also have greaterselfconfidence in matters relating to the family, and are less sure of themselves with respect to other matters.
Aspirations and perceived obstacles
Though women clearly identify the causes of women's oppression, when asked what they would have liked to become had obstacles not existed, nearly 40% of both rural and urban women deny having faced any hurdles (Table 4). In part, this may have to do with a defensive response or limited ambition to begin with. Perceptions of obstacles are highest in NWFP, where more than three-quarters of the women acknowledge such obstacles, followed by Punjab (68%). Just over half the women in Baluchistan say...they were obstructed in their ambitions. This dropped to around one-third in Sindh. On the surface this would seem to suggest that Pukhtun women are most dissatisfied with their lives, while the Sindhi woman is most content. Yet one needs to ask the extent to which these perceptions are moulded by an acceptance of more limited ambitions in Sindh and Baluchistan than, for
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example, in Punjab. To some extent this seems to be supported by the fact that there was greater diversity of ambitions in Punjab, and a greater focus on material impediments to ambitions such as lack of education and finances, compared with the emphasis placed on socio-cultural ones in Sindh. These are areas that need further investigation.
The failed ambitions of those who acknowledge obstacles in their path principally consist of wanting to become teachers (36%), simply becoming educated (20%), or doctors (17%) - though one-fifth of the women had other ambitions such as a government employee or a religious scholar. In Punjab, teachers head the list (32%), followed by being educated (27%) and doctors (12%); however almost a quarter had other specific ambitions. In Sindh, being educated is the most important ambition (31%), followed by teachers (22%). Though close to a third specify other ambitions, it must be remembered that only one-third of the women say they faced hurdles. In NWFP, being a teacher is by far the most important desire, named by more than half, a quarter said doctors, 15% have more diverse wishes. In Baluchistan, teachers again head the list at 41%, followed by doctors (36%). Rural and urban responses are strikingly similar, indicating that the most accepted professions for women remain those of a teacher and doctor. Equally clear is the paucity of role models that can open up women's horizons.
Just over half the women believe their insufficient level or lack of education to be the major hurdle they have faced personally. Around a third identify traditions and customs favouring males, a quarter traditional religious views, 40% inadequate finances. Interestingly, early marriage is only mentioned by 14%. Surprisingly, roughly the same percentage of men and women say they have faced obstacles (a little over 40%). Insufficient education is seen by 60% of the men as a major constraint. However, the most important obstruction to men's desires is seen as inadequate finances, named by 70%.
Changing realities and varied perceptions of change
The situation is far from static. A clear sense of change is evident in the focus group discussions and interviews, though opinions differ on the extent of change, the areas having changed the most and the priorities accorded different catalysts. Focus group discussions conveyasense offlux with groups voicing contradictory opinions. Definitions of gendered spaces and roles forwarded were contradicted, and exceptions to the rule pointed out. Moreover, women who say that men decide everything and are "kings', for example, later give examples of women's resistance by refusing to do any
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household or child-related work when they are upset with the treatment meted out to them. The women themselves do not seem conscious of the contradictions being voiced. Ofequal importance is that a desire for change is consistently voiced.
The nature of change most commonly identified by interviewees is a far greater awareness amongst women themselves of their role and status. Women are less willing to consider the domestic role of women as their final and exclusive role/responsibility. Desired changes include an improved access to benefits and facilities. Other important changes are: (1) the expansion of accepted roles for women; and (2) some degree of inclusion in decisionmaking. In urban areas, women's expanded role in remunerative work is mentioned fairly often. "Today people want daughters to do all sorts of professions', said one businesswoman. Attitudes towards female education have gone from active resistance to an expressed desire, and, according to a veteran educationist, there is an unprecedented demand from an illiterate rural population. While women still cannot take decisions by themselves, there is an increasing acceptance, at least in some sections of society, that women should be consulted on some matters - for example, their own marriages.
Nevertheless there is fairly wide consensus that in general women are still not involved in decision-making outside the home; many women feel that the pace of change has been far slower than what was required, and that resistance continues to be strong in a male-dominated society. Deepseated biases against women came to the fore in the interviews and discussions. For example, it was pointed out that there is strong resistance to appointing women in key decision-making positions, and that even female legislators like Abida Hussain and Tehmina Daultana do not have much real decision-making power. Many other manifestations were enumerated: men, regardless of education and position, not wanting to give women their rights; the preference given to sons over daughters; women being required to prove themselves far more than men in similar situations; the lower tolerance of mistakes made by women than men, etc. The general perception of women as subservient is another obstacle, as are the multiple roles of women. On the whole women feel that in the framework of a society that has such clear gender-based social inequality, women cannot be autonomous. Consequently many women spoke interms of the need to change people's mindsets, several specifying that discrimination against women is a universal phenomenon
Both women are generally perceived to be important political actors, and they have both been federal ministers,
s
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not restricted to Pakistan. Others noted that frequent disruptions of the political process by the military have been particularly unhelpful.
Education is accorded a high priority by many interviewees and focus group discussions as a means of changing women’s lives and outlooks and broadening their perspectives. Education is also perceived as increasing access to resources, decision-making and status. There is thus considerable frustration expressed by interviewees at the lack of political will to undertake serious measures to increase female literacy and education. One example forwarded is the failure to implement the decade-old proposal to make all primary schools co-educational with an all-female teaching staff. Though the proposal was accepted by even the conservative tribal areas more than a decade ago under General Zia ul Haq's regime, the government continues to plead a shortage of funds for girls schools on the one hand, and people's unwillingness to have co-educational schools on the other. Some feel there is purposeful resistance from vested interests to improving educational levels in general, especially in rural areas. This resistance is intensified in the case of women. An educator responsible for a model path-breaking schooling project in one of the remotest parts of Baluchistan recalled the considerable effort initially required to overcome traditional attitudes and resistance. But, equally, she points out that, once this was achieved, the demand for girls' education has continued to grow rapidly far out-pacing the supply.
Education and change
Notwithstanding the emphasis en education, the higher educational levels of the urban areas in the survey do not indicate significantly higher levels of political engagement or a much more meaningful interaction with the institutions of the state. In this respect, some interviewees questioned the content of education as inadequate and even detrimental. Content matter is seen as reinforcing an inferior status of women through, for example, socalled Islamic values of the veil. One educator expressed the view that schools could not change students' perspective without more general social change, since students are in school for only a few hours a day and are influenced by society at large for the rest of the time. Certainly education perse does not lead to a greater engagement with public processes, as demonstrated in the sharp differences between two focus group discussions held in the same community - one of schoolteachers, and the other of largely illiterate but active women involved in running the school and other community work. In the former, the teachers were largely inarticulate and seemingly unaware of the issues both in their own community and society at large. In contrast, the
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uneducated women in the second group who were engaged in community development work were articulate, aware and enthusiastic participants.
Media and change
Mass media is accorded an important role in catalysing change by exposing people to new ideas and the world beyond the neighbourhood and village. One group of women was struck by a TV series centred on a women's police station. It was important to them that junior policemen saluted and showed respect to the senior woman police officer, and that women were shown as senior and effective policewomen. Another group was impressed by a show where men had been shown serving tea to women, reversing a traditional role. It had certainly left a mark on these rural women who expressed the hope that this would catalyse a change in male attitudes. The media is seen as altering women's own attitudes, so that today every girl wants to see her potential husband before marriage. Most women interviewed feel the media, especially electronic media, has had a major impact in an illiterate society, but this impact is not universally viewed as positive. The majority see electronic media as a crucial means of reaching out to women all over the country, with its own dynamics of changing perceptions of self and society. Others, however, pointed out the stereotypical roles projected of women and the reduction of women to sex symbols. One interviewee said she was shocked to see that the TV had been far more progressive in the seventies than it is in the nineties.
The survey indicates that women rely on TV series as a key source of information on women-related issues, presumably matters such as education, marriage, divorce, inheritance, discrimination etc., the usual themes of serials. Amongst rural women, TV is the most important source after family women; for urban women, however, it is the most important source. Interestingly, satellite television accounts for no more than 5%.
Institutions of mediation and negotiation
The study clearly captures the dilemma of a people caugnt between disintegrating traditional forums and ineffective and often corrupt state institutions. Confronted with a problem, the vast majority of women and men understandably turn to the family and hope the matter can be resolved at this level. Failing this, however, a hierarchy of decision-making and dispute resolution forums comes into play in which women progressively get left out.
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Discussions leave a clear impression of the limited options available to women when confronting a problem. Only exceptionally do women even share their problem with someone outside the immediate family/household, specified as parents, husband or parents-in-law. If the problem remains unresolved it may be discussed with a wider circle of family authority. For many women this demarcates the outer limit of approachable forums. This is more likely to be the case for urban women than rural women. In urban Punjab and Sindh, the only envisaged alternative to the family is the councillor, though opinions on the effectiveness of the councillor vary and only development-related matters are taken to him. The urban male group likewise spoke of the councillor rather than a traditional forum for advice and/or dispute resolution.
In rural settings an “elder' may be asked to intervene. Almost inevitably a man, this elder may be the local landlord, but may also be someone who has gained a reputation of fairness and/or greater experience. Hence preference may be given to an educated person, to a government employee or someone who has worked in the city, or to a person who has performed haj (the pilgrimage to Mecca), etc. Women spoke of the chaudhry, sardar, wadera. In Punjab, the biraderi (larger clan affiliation) was also mentioned. The members of the biraderi may then either settle the matter or decide to call a panchayat. In either case, women are excluded from both the decision and the procedure.
The gender-based separation of matters and responsibilities has several implications, all of which limit women's recourse to others for assistance. First, women are more likely to confront and address issues that are specifically seen as 'family matters. Discussing such issues with outsiders is stigmatised, and, as several focus group discussions explained, “we think it is a matter of shame to bring our personal matters out into the public'. Second, viewing all matters beyond the home as part of the domain of men, women will be, and largely are, excluded from forums external to the family. Third, if the matter at hand is perceived as extending beyond the family, women themselves may automatically transferresponsibility onto men. In a South Punjab focus group discussion, women specified that women do not go anywhere themselves. They talk to the men who take it from there. The men then take the matter either to the biraderi or to the councillor.
The perception of rural Punjabi men is that in case of a dispute men get together and work things out. According to them, women don't interfere; the panchayat is men's work and women cannot be included in this; educated persons are called upon since 'education helps in such matters'. The group included two persons involved in dispute resolution - one a graduate, the
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other an elderly person. They also believe that if the man is intelligent he will work things out himself, otherwise women will come to play the same role - implying that there is nothing inherently deficient in women to prevent w them from assuming this role. Given the pre-eminence placed on the role of the religious authority by the state, and, not infrequently, also by international development agencies, it is important to note that the male focus group discussion pointed out that the imam masjid is purposefully excluded from any decision-making. The reason for this exclusion is that were he perceived as being partisan, some of the people would not want to say their prayers behind him, thereby interfering with his religious duties.
Women are as aware as men of existing institutions/persons approached by their community (73% and 79%), though unexpectedly men mentioned family elders more frequently than women. More in keeping with intuitive assessments, fewer city-based women than rural women could name such institutions (61% and 85%). The paucity of community-based forums beyond the family in urban areas was confirmed in another question discussed below. The forums recognised by womentend to be local notables, members of the local council (the lowest tier of elected government) and the jirga/ panchayat (36%, 32% and 28%). The councillor is far less important for men, who focused on notables and the jirga/panchayat (48% and 44%). Family elders are more important for men than women (cited by 45% and 17% respectively).
The councillors (whether ordinary members or chairpersons) are a more important forum for urban women (40%). Men favour family elders as a forum over councillors in both rural and urban areas; in the latter case they are the preferred forums (cited by 52%). In rural areas, the notables/ influentials are a more important forum for consultation, mentioned by half the women. Discussions indicate such persons can either be men in traditional leadership roles, or newer role models based on education, economic status or experience/reputation. Almost none of the women could name their elected representative at either the provincial or national level. Women's responses confirm that despite the deference to religiosity, the maulvi (local preacher/ priest) is not a figure of major social significance. Only about 5% of the women and 10% of the men mention the maulvias a potential problem solver. It is clear from the discussions that the role of the maulvi is limited in community life.
Councillors are the lowest tier of elected government; the chairman is to the head of the local body.
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The survey confirms that few women ever approach institutions/ individuals in person, and only a slightly greater number say their family had approached such forums. Reluctance to approach an outsider is common to women and men. 63% of the women and roughly the same percentage of men deny having ever experienced a problem that required third party assistance. When women do approach such forums personally it is largely on family matters - nearly 60% of Such cases related to matters such as divorce, inheritance, etc. When family members take up problems/issues on behalf of women, in addition to family matters (28%), these include issues such as resolving land or other financial disputes internal to the family (17%) and non-family disputes (19%). There is also a strong belief amongst women (76%) that disputes should be settled between those involved, a perception shared by men.
Male responses reaffirm this trend of approaching local institutions for settling family matters such as divorce, inheritance, etc., confirming that the family is both a key institution for society's self-regulation as well as the site of considerable tension and conflict. It further indicates a failure of the family and its elders to resolve family matters. It therefore raises the interesting question of why this is so. Are the previous standards and values of the family being increasingly challenged? This is an area that needs further investigation. More than two-thirds of the male respondents had approached family elders for advice/resolution, and nearly half had gone to a traditional forum such as the jirga, panchayat or biraderi.
The ability of women to approach different institutions to redress grievances or solve problems is different in each province. Though the general pattern is to avoid going outside the family for assistance, when forced by circumstances Sindhi women are the most likely to approach an outside institution themselves (30%), compared with a negligible number in the other provinces. In Punjab the role of the councillor is indicated both in the survey and the focus group discussions. There is also a suggestion that the councillor may be replacing the traditional panchayat. Though few Punjabi women approach institutions themselves, five times as many approach the local councillor as the panchayat (44% vs. 8%) (Table 5). However, since both rural and urban women generally approach councillors on developmentrelated problems, the councillor is not a replacement for existing forums that address non-development criminal or civil matters (Table 6).
Virtually everyone assiduously avoids the police. Nearly 80% of the female respondents denied having had a problem that would require police intervention. Only 17% of rural and urban women say their families had gone to the police to seek help: roughly one-third on criminal matters such as theft, rape, murder, etc.; a little over one-fifth on non-family disputes; and
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only 15% on family matters. Significantly, in the rural areas only 19% said they had gone to the police for criminal matters (Tables 5 and 6). Reasons for not approaching the police were clearly stated in discussions, where women and men lamented the corruption of the police. Involving the police is also seen as adding to the problem at hand, not least because, as one group in Peshawar put it, complaining to the police was fraught with the danger of you ending up being accused of a crime.
Nearly two-thirds of the males also deny having had a problem that required police intervention. In their discussion, urban men expressed the process of dispute resolution as being one where the priority is to keep it out of the purview of the state institutions: “We try and resolve it at the level of the family, then the extended family, biraderi, the chaudhry and when all else fails we go to the police. If this happens, both parties will end up spending a lot of money. Of the quarter who had personally sought police intervention, nearly 40% concerned a criminal matter; 20% were family matters (Table 6). The courts do not appear to rate much higher in terms of credibility, and, in one discussion, the women actually said God save us from courts. Social censure particularly prevents women from going to court, but there is no doubt about the general disillusionment with the court's ability to give relief and redress. All of these factors contribute to the fact that only 15% the women acknowledge having faced a problem requiring court intervention; only 12% said their family had sought the intervention of the court at some
that is known to be going on. The social disapproval of courts may combine with a reluctance to admit recourse to state institutions such as the courts or police, which would indicate an inability to resolve issues at the local level. The highest number, 33%, went to court on financial matters, 28% on land disputes (Table 6). This pattern repeats itself in the male responses.
The most significant reason in urban areas given by women for not going to court is that this is time-consuming (33%). In rural areas, however, the major stated reason is that the waderasjirga decides (41%). The latter response suggests an acceptance, possibly enforced, of the existing power structure in their locality. Shirkat Gah's experience of intervening via the formal legal system in a rural setting where this has never been experienced resulted in a confrontation with the local landlord, who was incensed that the matter should be taken out of his hands, challenging his authority.'
28 Naheed, Amtul, and Iqbal, Shahnaz, "Creating Spaces: Shirkat Gah's Outreach Programme", in Farida Shaheed. Sohail Akbar Warraich, Cassandra Balchin and Aisha Gazdar, eds., Shaping Women's Lives - Lanes, Practices and Strategies in Pakistan, Shirkat Gah, Lahore, 1998. pp. 449 - 488.
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In the discussions it transpires that women see the court system as alien, and feel that only someone who is familiar with the system can approach. it. Otherwise it is not only a waste of time, but people get pushed around. Going to court also entailed expenditures and in at least one discussion the women felt that the courts are not women-friendly, so it was unlikely that, women, particularly, would be able to get justice. Exceptionally, the two women who had had personal experience of going to court were positively, impressed, and in Baluchistan women say the court is a more effective forum but that women can rarely exercise this option. Family/tribe members kill most beforehand. Social sanction prevents others from even being seen in court. In Punjab, one of the women felt that you had to have the support of the councillor to go to court, and that women are far less likely to obtain this than men. The rural men's discussion group quite specifically linked the court and police. Delayed court decisions were seen as a major failure of the: judiciary. The impression was of judges sitting around in their chambers and doing nothing all day. A summary of the discussion is as follows: no one gets a hearing in the court; it takes 2-3 years before witnesses are called and then the police ensure that false testimony is recorded; the system favours the criminal instead of the victim. There was also discussion amongst the men of the courts' behaviour with respect to its own members. They pointed out the manner in which the ex-Chief Justice of Pakistan, Sajjad Ali Shah, had been dismissed in 1998 - in their opinion, unjustly.
More than three-quarters of the women (77%) say they never felt the need to seek help from elected representatives, and only 20% say their family had approached the local representative at Some point, mostly on development-related issues. The pattern is exactly the same for male respondents. In sum, this suggests that elected representatives, the police and the courts are all seen as institutions to be approached as a last resort, and preferably done without. Apparently, however, the local councillor is seen as more accessible than the other two, and more “one of us" than the other two. Even then, 8% of urban women failed to approach the councillor for the stated reason that they did not know who the councillor was. In the rural areas, as in the case of the courts, the writ of the wadera/jirga precludes approaching the councillor (29%). In a number of discussions, male and female participants specified that the state machinery is only considered if the local institution failed to resolve the matter. The rural men's discussion noted that only if someone does not accept the verdict of the panchayat is the matter taken to the police. Or, if the panchayat fails to resolve the issue, the men then go to the councillor, member of the provincial assembly (MPA) or member of the national assembly (MNA).
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The study suggests that state institutions have not been able to replace or substitute for previous community-based forums. The exception is the councillor, but the role is largely confined to Punjab, and is limited to development-related matters. A striking 70% of urban women report no available institution in their locality, whether traditional or state alternatives. Exactly the opposite situation exists in rural areas where 70% of the women say there is an existing system, however almost l00% of women in rural and urban NWFP acknowledge the jirga. 20% of women recognise the role of the councillor, but almost all are in Punjab. In Punjab and Sindh, some 15% each of the women recognise the existence of mohalla committees that are virtually unheard of in the other two provinces.' By comparison, almost a quarter of the men acknowledge the mohalla committee, indicating that these newer institutions are as male-dominated/inclined as the older institutions. Virtually all of the respondents who do recognise an institution as operative want it to continue (80% to 90%) - even those that are hierarchical and, as admitted by several women in discussions, not known to be women-friendly.
Choosing between traditional/local institutions and state institutions
Women from the city of Peshawar noted with some envy that at least the villages have the jirga to resolve people's problems, and that because the jirga members have known the parties involved for generations they are more likely to dispense justice. In any case, this was a much faster way of resolving problems than state alternatives, even though these urban women thought that the performance of the jirga would improve were there more women and more educated persons involved.
Given the general disenchantment with the state's institutions, it is perhaps not surprising that whichever local systems/institutions operate, they are viewed as useful. 37% of the respondents said that the jirga, panchayat or biraderi were very useful, and 30% said the same about the chaudhry. Another 28% and 32% respectively said that these institutions were useful to some extent. These preferences, however, appear to be stated in a context in which power is as much at issue as credibility, and the choice may simply be between the devil they know (local) and the devil they don’t (the relatively distant centralised state). This is borne out also by a high of 57% citing the
29 The mohalla committees are a recent invention of the Nawaz Sharif government and
part of the programme for people's participation in governance. The fact that numerous mohalla commitees have been caught indulging in corrupt practices indicates that they are no solution.
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category of any respectable person' as being useful to a great extent in this context. The greatest consensus is on the usefulness of family elders. 60% of the women see them as very useful, and another 21% say they are useful to some extent (Table 8).
It needs to be pointed out that whereas only about 5% mentioned the maulvi as playing a role in dispute resolution, the maulvi was perceived as being useful to a great extent by 9% of the female respondents and to some extent by an additional 3%. This may be because in the second instance the question was not directly related to the role of these institutions/persons in dispute resolutions. It could also be due to the enumerator reading out the options so that the maulvi was specifically named. Respondents may therefore have felt obliged to say something positive about the maulvi when directly asked. Otherwise in the discussions women did not seem to have aparticularly favourable opinion about maulvis. A group of working women believed that the maulvis or ulema had complicated religion; in rural Punjab it was said that they can make life difficult for women. In Peshawar, one group said that our 'ulema do the wrong things and have also set our religion back. The best children in society should become ulema and not the most unintelligent as happens now. As mentioned earlier, women perceive a limited role for maulvis, consulting them only on specific matters. Women in rural NWFP spoke of the changed/changing role of the maulvi. This they put down to the arrival of Afghan refugees who are willing to become imam masjid for a lower pay than local men, but also start interfering in other matters instead of sticking to their main tasks of leading the funeral prayers and performing marriages. 酵 Amongst men the stated reasons for wanting the system to continues are that this is a system of quick justice, no expenses are involved or that it is a familiar, traditional system (Table 7). Concern for quick justice and familiarity are reasons also given by women (35% and 44%). 37% believes problems are better solved locally. High priority is accorded, therefore, to a system that does not appear alien, to the idea of resolving problems locally and to a process of relatively quick justice. The latter is at a premium thanks! to interminable delays in the formal legal system where cases stretch into: decades, causing enormous hardship to litigants with limited resources. This is clearly a widespread sentiment that the Nawaz Sharif government in particular sought to appeal to by going over the top in the other direction, and seeking verdicts literally within days from special courts and military courts, sometimes involving the death penalty.
At least two other reasons for accepting the existing system are suggested by the discussions. The first is the lack of viable alternatives i.e.
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we accept the decision of the panchayat because otherwise it means going to courts which means spending money. The implication here is not that people are necessarily satisfied with the decisions taken by local, informal forums, but that they see no alternative. Were courts more accessible, and if procedures did not involve additional expenses, it is possible that people might start turning to them. Another aspect that came to light in the discussions is that the local, informal forums settle the matter; in other words, while people may be concerned with determining innocence or guilt, they are equally concerned with resolving the dispute quickly. This is a basic difference between traditional forums and the state court system of justice. The state itself is known to call upon Such institutions when the disputes become too complicated and involve multiple families and grievances, precisely because these institutions are seen as a means to settle the matter rather than be the most competent at judging the guilt of those involved. It is in this respect of 'arranging a settlement that the councillor may be replacing or supplementing the traditional forums, rather than in matters of justice. For their part the provincial or national level politicians are only approached, if at all, on major issues - an example in one of the Christian groups was the desire to construct a church, which required government approval at a high level. Finally, in some areas where the state has the least presence, e.g. Baluchistan, the perception is that while it is socially unacceptable to approach either the police or courts, the jirga system is believed to be very effective, particularly in some tribes, such as the Rind and Raisani tribes.
Seeking reform
Nearly half the female respondents feel the systems of dispute resolution need reforms, although a significant 35% did not think reforms necessary. A somewhat higher percentage of men favour reforms (10% more); only 20% want no change. The rest of the men and women had no opinion on the matter. Asked to dilate on the nature of these reforms, 35% of the women would like the traditional system integrated into the formal system. This may indicate a desire to have recourse to some forum in appeal against the verdict of the jirga, etc. 27% said more people should be involved, while 20% said the members of such institutions should be elected. These responses
30 See Shah, Nafisa, Faislo. The Informal Settlement System and Crimes Against Women
in Sindh', in Farida Shaheed, Sohail Akbar Warraich, Cassandra Balchin and Aisha Gazdar, Shaping Women's Lives - Laws, Practices and Strategies in Pakistan, Shirkat Gah, Lahore, 1998, pp. 227-252.
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suggest that while such forums have significant support at the local level, there is also a strong sentiment to move away from the hierarchical, topheavy structuring of these forums. Interestingly, 6% of the respondents suggested that women should be part of the system, though 28% of the Sindh respondents, largely from rural areas, gave this suggestion. The low overall percentage may be there because they feel that this is not a realistic proposal in the given socio-cultural setting. Paradoxically, however, despite Sindh's conservative rural setting, the Benazir Bhutto factor may have encouraged women's desires for change, notwithstanding prevailing conditions.
Desire for reforms was highest amongst Punjabi women (70%). In Sindh close to half the women do not think reforms are needed; this rises to three-quarters of the respondents in NWFP, and reaches 80% in Baluchistan. A strong tribal ethic in NWFP and Baluchistan, and an inherent distrust of modern state systems, may be the reason why those who find the system : functioning or useful do not want it tampered with. Also Sindhi women reported the highest direct access to existing forums. In Punjab the difference may be due to the breaking up of large land holdings in most of northern and central Punjab, and a perceived greater potential for change.
Though the desire for reform is highest in Punjab, the desire for these institutions to be integrated into the formal system has the least support there (a little over a quarter). In the other three provinces a little over half the women were in favour of integrating the traditional systems into the formal legal system. Punjabi men expressed a fear that if the panchayat were integrated into the formal system, it, too, would become unable to provide justice since the government would start appointing its own members to adjudicate.
In the focus group discussions, there is some suggestion that where social organisations or NGOs operate, whether medium or small scale ones, these are seen as an alternative forum to which their problems can be taken. In areas where these do not exist or reach, women emphasized the lack of forums for women to discuss their problems and issues.
Governance: Issues, expectations and performance
Despite many province-based differences, in some areas women displayed a strong uniformity of perceptions and desires. The identification of a lack of education as the first and foremost reason for women's current oppressed status has already been discussed. Additionally, there is some consensus on what they consider to be major issues at the national and local levels, and a shared perspective on what constitutes a good government, even though the specific experience of governments may differ.
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Controlling inflation and unemployment
In the survey, elements of good governance are closely linked to issues identified by women as their main concern. Women and men are primarily concerned about economic policies. Hence, where 91% and 87% of the women surveyed identified inflation and unemployment respectively, the ability to control the former and address the latter headed the characteristics of a good government (Tables 9 and 10). Interestingly enough, significantly fewer men than women specifically mention the issue of inflation (61%). Perhaps for men this is subsumed in the issue of employment, but it is also possible that inflation is a more immediate issue for women in balancing their household budgets. On the other hand, almost half the men identify corruption, a problem only mentioned by Punjabi women. It must be said that men are more likely to face the implications of corruption in their everyday dealings than women. Over-population ranks third amongst women's concerns nationally (33%), and, though far lower on their priority list, is mentioned by nearly 17% of the male respondents as a major national issue. This suggests a potential support for family planning measures among a significant section of the women. Social fragmentation was cited by nearly a quarter of the men, but only mentioned by some women in NWFP.
Beyond inflation and unemployment
Amongst the women, beyond the economic issues of inflation and unemployment, the provinces have different perceptions of national issues. In Baluchistan a little more than half the women see over-population as a major national issue (55%). It is likely that here women are referring to high birth rates, but alternatively it is possible that this is with reference to the higher population of other provinces compared with Baluchistan. This could not be ascertained in the study, and would need to be further explored. In NWFP half the respondents are concerned about social fragmentation. This is particularly striking, since this province displays the greatest rural-urban integration in norms, perceptions and the continued reliance on the traditional institution of the jirga. This perception could stem from the rising outbursts of violent sectarian conflict, but may also be caused by the large influx of Afghan and Kashmiri refugees that women in focus group discussions see as causing social and economic problems. In Sindh overpopulation and an incapable leadership are identified by 28% and 38% respectively, with the former more important in rural areas and the latter in urban areas. In Punjab, one-third see corruption as a problem, closely followed by overpopulation
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and the unsatisfactory performance of government institutions. Urban Punjabi women were more concerned about overpopulation than rural women.
The electronic media may influence perceptions of national issues. Although only 10% of the women rely on newspapers as key sources of information on national issues, 71% look to either the official radio or TV news programmes as an important source of information on national issues. Women also rely on men to a large extent for information on national issues (44%), which may partially explain the similarity in views. Other sources of information were female relatives (27%) and TV series (22%). No one looks to the imam masjid for information on national issues. Clearly, where the electronic media is entirely monopolised by the state, as in the case of Pakistan, it has a certain role to play in the shaping of the respondents' worldview. It is likely, however, that if the state/government enjoys low credibility, so too does the media it is widely seen as controlling, in which case, existing preferences will be reinforced by congruent messages, but dissonant signals will simply be ignored.
There is some consensus on the maintenance of law and order being an important feature of a good government, though there is a sharp difference in the priority accorded. For Sindh and Baluchistan, presumably due to the problems experienced recently, 83% of the women mentioned this, compared with 46% in the other two provinces. This may explain the reverse priority given by Punjab and NWFP to providing basic needs (59% and 57%) compared to 23% in Sindh and 30% in Baluchistan. It would appear, therefore, that in the latter two provinces the immediate crisis in the law and order situation has overtaken the priority accorded other basic needs. Given the emphasis placed on education for women in other responses, focus group discussions and interviews, it is surprising that only a third (Baluchistan) to over two-fifths of the women cited the provision of education as an essential ingredient of good governance.
Priority concerns at the local level are somewhat different, though over half the women (54%) still identified unemployment as a key concern. In Sindh, NWFP and Baluchistan there is consensus that unemployment in general (and to a significant degree women's unemployment) is a major issue. In Punjab this is far less of a concern (35%). Amongst men, close to 70% feel unemployment to be a major local issue, and, interestingly enough, 40% of the men cited female unemployment. In Punjab women prioritised poor sanitation over unemployment (56%) at the local level. It is probable that this is as much due to a difference of on-the-ground reality as to a different perspective. Though not mentioned at the national level, unsatisfactory
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sanitation is identified as a major local issue by roughly half the women (51%). Poor sanitation was consistently more important in the urban areas (66%) than in the rural areas (36%). This was followed by the lack of gas and electricity (32%) and poor roads and transport (40%). Utilities were more of a problem in rural areas in Punjab and Sindh, whereas in the other two provinces it was equally important for both rural and urban locations. Surprisingly education was given the same priority at the local level as at the national level (roughly 15% in both cases). By comparison, 44% of the men view inadequate educational facilities as a major local issue; about the same percentage identifying the lack of adequate health facilities (Table 1 l).
In keeping with their analysis of key national issues, between 8090% of the women think controlling inflation and ensuring employment are essential ingredients of good governments. Men and women concur on the issue of employment, since nearly 90% of the men also feel a good government is one that ensures employment. More women than men (almost 66%) emphasised controlling inflation. The reverse is true of maintaining law and order. This is considered a key characteristic of a good government by 80% of the men and 60% of the women. Half the women see good governance as dependent on the ability to provide basic needs (food/bread, clothing and shelter). 40% of both women and men view the provision of education as an essential characteristic. The difference in the high priority women accord education in determining women's status and the far lower emphasis placed on education for governance seems to suggest a dissonance in women's views regarding the welfare of women and the wellrun state. A little over 30% of the women identify providing healthcare. Interestingly, Islamic laws are not seen as essential to good governance, and the implementation of Islamic laws is cited by only 5% of the women. In fact, only 8% of Punjabi and 5% of Pukhtun women said this is important for good governance; no one in the other provinces mentions this at all (Table 10).
Going by the discussions and interviews, there is a common perception amongst both men and women that politicians (mis)use Islam for their own purposes. It was variously said that religious parties use religion for their own ends and make fools of people', 'politicians use it i.e. religion) for their own purposes. By way of explanation, one person said that, especially in rural areas, religion plays a significant role. Politico-religious parties exploit this, and women and men are attracted by such an agenda, especially when people are facing economic constraints. Some women also express the view that "the religious agenda enables men to control and dominate women'.
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Distinguishing state and government
While a distinction between the state and government is not consciously made, successive governments are seen by a large section of women as having done very little for the country. This would also suggest that a large number of women may be on a defection curve in terms of existing representative institutions. Asked which government had most benefited Pakistan, the highest percentage of women (25%) said no government has benefited the country. Approximately the same number (23%) say Nawaz Sharif's second spell has most benefited Pakistan. 14% say this of Zia and 12% of Ayub. In the rural areas, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto is cited by 14% of the women, ahead of Zia and Ayub, but in the urban areas he trails just behind both. Benazir Bhutto is named by less than 5%. In part, this may have been due to the intense campaign in the media at the time of the survey regarding corruption charges against Benazir and her husband.
But women are not united across provinces. Almost one-third of women from NWFP (31%) view Zia's government as being the best (Islam seems to play a more dominant role in NWFP than elsewhere), a view shared in other provinces by very few (14% in Baluchistan to 7% in Sindh). While close to one quarter of Sindhi women see Benazir's first government as most beneficial, all the other provinces reject her (1-8%). It is also perhaps significant that 17% of Sindhi women quote a better deal for women as a reason for considering a government as having benefited the country (a reason forwarded by less than 7% elsewhere). Punjab and Baluchistan both favour the most recent government of Nawaz Sharif (30% and 25% respectively). This is rejected in Sindh (7%), though supported by one-fifth of the respondents in NWFP (21%). It should be noted, however, that the support expressed for the incumbent government may be an over-statement. Despite the best efforts of the team, there was some apprehension as to how the information may be used, and, on occasion, respondents asked whether their views would be reported back to the government. With respect to earlier governments it is perhaps significant that almost twice as many rural as urban women in Punjab and Sindh consider Bhutto to have given the most benefits to Pakistan, whereas a slightly greater number of urban women in the other two provinces were of this opinion. In contrast, Ayub tended to be viewed more positively by the urban populations of all provinces.
There appears to be somewhat less cynicism or disillusionment amongst the men, since only 10% said that no government had benefited Pakistan. There was also more support for the military regimes of Ayub and Zia, the preferred government of over a quarter of the men. At 12%, there
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was less support for Nawaz Sharif's second spell amongst the men than amongst women, and also less support for Z.A. Bhutto (8%).
Reasons given by women for seeing a particular government as beneficial focused on controlling inflation (43%), or a perception that people were better off (37%). By comparison 27% cited law and order, and only 19% cited a stronger defence. Giving a better deal to women was a reason cited by only 5%, suggesting that this was so remote for most women that they did not seriously consider this as a yardstick. Counter-intuitively, the nuclear explosion also rated only 5% (and that too mostly in rural Punjab). The loss of the BJP in neighbouring India in three post-explosion state elections later in 1998 also seems to indicate that despite the official media hype regarding the explosion and the expressions of jubilation, nuclearisation does not contribute to a popular perception of good governance, at least amongst women (Table 12).
Amongst men, law and order was the most important reason for viewing aparticular government as good, mentioned by 63%. Next in priority is that people were better off, at 55%. Men put twice as much emphasis as women on astrong defence, mentioned by 44%. Surprisingly, about the same number of men cited a better deal for women (compared with only 5% of women). This may of course have been said in view of the overall framework of the present study and the presence of many female enumerators, though the male supervisors and not the women interviewed men. t In sum, it would appear that Zia might be remembered not for his Islamisation but for economically buoyant times. In a women's focus group discussion, it was said that a good government provides employment for boys and girls. The governments of Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq were said to be good because there was no inflation or terrorism (though someone pointed out that in the latter case, this may have been the case for Punjab but not in NWFP). Additionally, drugs, violence, sectarianism and ethnic conflict may not be seen as part of his legacy at the popular level, while Bhutto created expectations that he fell far short of meeting in the economic realm. Similarly, Nawaz Sharif had the advantage of incumbency (during the conduction of the survey), and Benazir seemed to be tarred with corruption charges.
The state and its institutions: Interaction and perceptions
Health and education: Exceptions to the rule
The survey confirmed the intuitive assessment that there is little interaction between women and the state's institutions, and what interaction does exist
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is restricted to the fields of education and health that with time have become socially sanctioned public spaces for women. With the exception of health and education, the vast majority of women (over 80%) do not know any women in any of the departments listed. Two-thirds of the respondents report knowing a woman working in either health or education. This is perhaps not Surprising since Women in fact only comprise 5% of all federal employees, and 2% of those employed in provincial services. Significantly, women have a positive image of women working in government, and about 80% of the relevant respondents see them as doing their work honestly.
About one-third of the women surveyed know men in the departments of health and education and their image is also a positive one, though a slightly lower percentage of women cited men as usually honest. Amongst women, women score slighter higher on honesty than men. In Punjab, for example, 52% of the men employed in the electricity department are deemed dishonest compared with 20% of women; the equivalent percentage for railway employees is 34% for men compared with 16% for women. However it seems that it is more the department than the sex of the employee which colours perception, hence women think of persons employed in banks and the communications departments, male and female, as the least dishonest. By way of an exception, however, in Sindh, 72% of the men in the electrical Supply department are considered dishonest compared with only 22% of the women. In contrast, 95% of men and women employed in health and education are considered to be usually honest. By comparison, in NWFP and Baluchistan women hardly know any women even in the departments of health and education, and have no experience of other departments.
For their part, the men's experience of women in state employment also tends to be limited to the departments of health and education, where two-thirds were able to give their opinions. Over two-thirds of the men think women officials are doing their work honestly in these departments. Roughly the same percentage believes the same about men in these departments. A relatively high percentage of men have some experience of men in the power department, but only 20% regard them as honest. Government employees, male and female, who work in the electrical supply department also top the list of those considered dishonest by women.
Women in office and power
Exactly a third of the women believe that appointing more women to official positions will increase efficiency; almost half (46%) say this will not increase
3. UNICEF, Children and Women in Pakistan: A Situation Analysis, UNICEF, Islamabad,
1998, p.62.
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efficiency. An even higher percentage (70%) of the male respondents think appointing women to official positions will not increase efficiency; close to 20% think it would. This suggests that those opposed to the greater participation of women are fairly clear-cut in their position. Another reason for such a response could be that the question was understood to mean that women be elevated to key posts. On this issue again there is some ambivalence. Even some of those who support greaterparticipation of women in the political arena are not in favour of a woman prime minister, as the job may be beyond a woman's capacity and capabilities. Comparing male and female leaders, a significantly high number, 55%, agreed with the proposition that women leaders do more work for women than male leaders. Only 31% disagreed. Here again there are sharp provincial differences.
An important 69% of Sindhi women say the presence of women in administrative positions will increase efficiency, compared with less than one-third of women in Baluchistan, one quarter in Punjab and less than onefifth in NWFP. This is in keeping with the strong belief amongst Sindhis that women can be leaders (89%), and the rejection of the proposition that women do not do as much for the country as male leaders (85%). Women in NWFP are least convinced of women leaders, just over one quarter (27%) feel women do more for women, and over 80% agree that women do less for the country than males. In fact 21% and 31% respectively did not answer the questions directly, saying instead that women should not be leaders at all. An even greater number of Baluch women voiced a similar opinion (37%), but close to one half do believe women do more for women. More than half the women in Punjab share this sentiment.
The State: Delivering little but not envisioned differently
If the state institutions such as the police and the courts are not relied upon for relief or resolution of problems, and there is little interaction between women and state institutions, there is little to suggest that the state is envisioned in some even vaguely alternative form. The state is perceived as a given, and is expected to provide services that it is clearly seen as no longer providing; the role of non-state institutions in this area were accorded marginal roles. The survey asked what institutions other than government should be entrusted with providing key services or undertaking key responsibilities. More than a third (in some cases close to a half) of the women say they do not know, suggesting that they had not thought about the matter and were therefore unable to respond. But it needs to be said that between a quarter to a third of the men, and in some fields 45% of the men
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also say they do not know. Of the women who expressed an opinion, approximately 70% clearly believe that financial allocations, taxation and legislation are exclusively the prerogative of the state. Amongst men, almost 70% also think financial allocations are the prerogative of the government, but 10% less believe this in the case for legislation; 15% less in the case of taxation.
The role of the private sector and the community
Around 30% of the women favour the private sector's role in providing education and health facilities, and approximately 20% support the idea of private sector contribution in housing, electricity and gas, roads and transport and water facilities. By comparison, about half the men would consider sections other than government for education, health, water facilities and roads. In the case of educational matters and housing, the percentage was a little over one-third. Women do not consider politicians as much of an alternative or supplement to the government for any of these tasks; men even less so. Between 7-12% of the women name politicians as possible contributors to various tasks, but virtually no men do for any task except legislation (7%). Politicians, as seen below, are perceived very negatively.
It is also significant that the community is cited by less than 10% of the women in all aspects excepting "looking after the needy'. While this suggests a lack of confidence with regard to self-governance, it does point to the traditional practice of the community looking after the needy. Amongst the men, the community's responsibilities are again marginalised except in looking after/providing water supplies. About 20% of the relevant male respondents are of the view that the mohalla committee could have a role in provision of security, educational matters, water facilities and looking after the needy. (Mohalla committees were not significant actors for women.) Bearing in mind that one-third to one half of the survey respondents felt unable to answer, one can only say that women are far from satisfied with the government performance in these areas, but are ambivalent about who or what could supplement the government's efforts.
Perception of the army
More often than not, the army was seen positively in Punjab and NWFP. However, this is in large part due to the perception of it being less corrupt (or at least not in a manner that interferes in people's everyday lives). In the words of one woman, “There is no small-scale corruption in the army. There
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is only big-time corruption like in the purchase of billion dollar planes (F16s).' Other reasons for a positive opinion related to the army's role in controlling electrical power theft, emergency work during floods and identifying 'ghost' schools. Notably, all of these were non-military activities. Two focus group discussions mentioned the positive role of the army in bringing the situation of Karachi under control (one in Karachi the other in Peshawar). In contrast, in the province of Baluchistan, which has experienced direct army interventions, urban women were highly critical of the army, saying it is corrupt and furthermore a burden on the budget. Unlike the army, the administrative and law-enforcing agencies of the state were portrayed as harassing people on a daily basis. The lack of harassment by the army was an important factor. A group of rural Punjabi women, for instance, said that only 10% of the people in the army work, while the rest don't; however they don't take bribes.
Perceptions of the state
Women's perceptions of the state were explored in greater depth through the focus group discussions and in interviews. Discussions show that the state is perceived as lacking neutrality with respect to the provinces, religious denominations and classes. The domination of the state by Punjab was pointed out in more than one focus group discussion. In Karachi, women questioned why there was a difference in policies relating to Punjab and Sindh. In NWFP, women voiced a similar sentiment when they pointed out that the relationship should not be one-sided since “if we get flour from Punjab we also give it electricity'. Christian groups were more circumspect about criticising governments and government institutions, and felt constrained to state their loyalty towards Pakistan. Nevertheless, they did say that the state's institutions discriminate against Christians at all levels, including with respect to employment. One of the male groups expressed the view that government institutions discriminated on the basis of class, and were mostly susceptible to bribery. Opinions about state institutions varied, but the overall impression is of disillusionment. There is a perception that the entire façade of the state changes with each government, making state-government differentiation difficult.
The lack of distinction between state and government is reinforced by people's experience. Wholesale changes within the administration with each change of government, mentioned by some, was an indication of the lack of autonomy of the administration vis a vis the government. Others echoed this sentiment, saying that, with the army and religious elements
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entering the political arena, all the state's institutions had become politicised. Others felt that, irrespective of government, government institutions remain inaccessible and their only role is to safeguard their own interests. Still others pointed to inefficiency and corruption, where institutions work for the rich and laws are only made for the poor. Gaining access was not such a problem said one group, sarcastically adding that even the prime minister was now available on the phone. The real issue was one of ensuring that anything gets done. Despite all these problems, in urban areas some women pointed out that the establishment of women police stations had increased their access to the police. Others said that there were good people in the government as well.
There were mixed reactions to the role of the judiciary. Some persons, having had personal experience of the judiciary, felt the courts were effective; the majority strongly felt that justice was not available through the judiciary. In the urban male focus group discussion, participants believed the courts to have become corrupt; as evidence they pointed to the ouster of the ex-chief justice of Pakistan, and the attack on the Supreme Court by politicians of the ruling party. Specifically with respect to women, these men were of the view that the atmosphere and procedures of courts were women-unfriendly. Deep disillusion with the state's judicial system is leading to dangerous ideas. One woman who supported the idea of army courts went so far as to say there may have been some injustice there. But in 90% cases there was justice. I am willing to go along with a system in which one innocent man gets hanged for every ten who are guilty'.
The failure of the state to deliver, the distance between the citizen and the state, the inability of the court to deliver justice in time if at all, force people to look to other institutions for addressing their problems. In most cases such (preferred) institutions are traditional/customary forums of dispute resolution and self-governance. Even when these are also perceived as having biases, the state's poor performance encourages a continuing reliance on such institutions rather than on the modern institutions in the political arena.
Participation in, and perceptions of, politics
In recent years, the inclusion of women in the formal political process has been put forward as a key element in increasing women's decision-making , in public affairs, and thereby ensuring women-appropriate policies and programmes. The United Nations, for instance, calls for at least 33% representation of women in public offices. Activists in Pakistan have supported this call, and reserved seats for women have been on the women's
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agenda since independence, long before the current support for affirmative action. In Pakistan, however, reserved seats for women in parliament have been operative for decades without leading to any substantial change in the ground situation for women. Consequently one needs to ask whether or not women themselves see political participation as a means for change. To what extent is women's lack of participation due to externally-imposed cultural and economic barriers, and to what extent is it due to women's lack of interest in the political arena? Women's participation was captured through the Survey, while concepts of politics and barriers were further explored through indepth interviews and focus group discussions.
Political participation
A first important finding of the survey is that only half of the female respondents said they were interested, to a lesser or greater extent, in election campaigns and the results. Just under 20% expressed great interest. Half said they have no interest at all in the matter. Given the prevalent mood regarding politics and the politicians' general lack of credibility, this is not a discouraging picture.
Curiously enough, amongst the reasons stated for taking an interest in the elections, the highest number of relevant respondents (354 or 45%) said that voting and participating in the elections is a national obligation/ duty (Table 13). This explanation can be constructed as an interesting way of putting it, inasmuch as it appears to foreclose the argument against women participating in the elections, and skirts the more debatable issue, in the given environment, of whether women should participate in the elections by right. However it should be noted that while nearly twice as many men as women said their interest stems from a desire to be aware of national affairs (28% vs. 16%), an equivalent percentage of men also put forward 'national duty. Consequently it seems that this is due more to an inability to explain their interest than a real response to the question.
Women's level of education appears to be positively correlated to the extent of interest in the elections, increasing from 18% of the illiterate to 28% amongst the most educated. Explanations of electoral participation being "a national duty decrease inversely to educational levels, and are replaced with a greater emphasis on this being a means for staying aware of national issues. Two-thirds of the illiterate respondents said electoral participation was a national duty; only a little more than half of those with up to tenth grade gave this response; amongst those with a university degree, this came down to a little under a third. In this last category 43% said their interest
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stemmed from a desire to be aware of national issues, compared to only 26% of those with up to high school education and 16% of the uneducated respondents. This seems to support the contention made above that women's answers were also dependent on an ability to articulate a response. Higher income, however, does not seem to have the same effect as education.
A somewhat lower percentage of women expressed an interest than those having used their right to vote during the last decade (in local, provincial or national elections) - 60% of the 1,609 respondents. This suggests that about 10% had been pushed into participating without having any interest themselves in the processor the outcome. Almost exactly half the respondents had voted in the local bodies elections, more or less the same as in the national and provincial elections.
The reasons forwarded by women for voting in a certain manner revealed a dominant pattern. 75% of the responses suggested the influence of family men, and 30% indicated consistency in the manner in which the household voted. Interestingly, the specific use of their vote was not put down to this being 'a national duty (only 2% mentioning this). 12% of the women said they had voted for a particular candidate because they felt he was likely to fulfill his promises (Table 14). In comparison, 32% of the men gave this as a reason for voting for a particular candidate, followed by agreement with the candidate's socio-political views. Surprisingly, 29% of the male respondents said the men of the house told them to vote the way they did. This suggests that the influence of family men or male elders applies in some measure to the men as well as women of the household.
Educated women seem more sceptical about candidates fulfilling their promises. While 18% of illiterate women voted for a candidate in the belief he would fulfill his promises, this dropped to 13% amongst those with up to high school learning, and dropped further to 5% amongst university graduates. Family men having voted for a certain person was given as a reason by 9% of those who were illiterate, 22% of those with up to high school education and 52% of those in the graduate and above category. Following male leads on voting is not equated with being instructed by males on how to vote, the latter decreasing with educational achievements. 53% of the respondents who were illiterate cited as a reason “men told me to vote this way, whereas 43% of those with up to tenth grade education gave that response and only 28% of those in the graduate and above category. Income did not seem to have a bearing on either answer. While close to 20% from low and middle income groups say they voted for someone because the family had always voted this way', close to 40% in the higher income category gave this as a
eaSO.
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Around three-quarters of the reasons given for not voting can be categorised as technical. 10% had been too young to vote, and some could not find their name on the voters list. The remaining 63% were disqualified either because their vote had not being registered or their national identity card had not been made. These omissions can be put down to a deliberate effort on the part of either the men in the family or the government machinery to deny women the right to vote. At the very least these lacunae indicate a lack of effort/commitment on the part of government to ensure that women are included.
Voting: Influence vs. pressure
Contrary to the general impression, nearly three-quarters of the women denied experiencing any pressure on how they voted. Where pressure does exist, this has not undergone any notable change - 86% said that this had either not reduced at all or only slightly over the last decade. Acknowledgement of pressure is higher amongst rural women, nearly a third of whom seem to vote under pressure (compared with about one-fifth of respondents in urban areas). In the survey women see family men as the source of pressure (75% of relevant respondents). In the discussions, however, women were more concerned about the pressure brought to bear upon them by the local power structure rather than by family men. This was variously expressed as “we vote to stay on the right side of those who are powerful and influential', 'if the local chaudhry suspects we won't vote for him, he starts threatening us', "the poor vote according to the wishes of the member of the local council)'. The perception of pressure is shared by men, who comment that they vote out of fear since the politicians can activate their thugs “who take away our animals', or because those standing belong to our biraderi or are related. Some vote because the politician had mobilised a religious leader, pir, to solicit votes for him. In the opinion of a female politician, votes are given either on the basis of family/clan affiliation, or to settle scores by voting against someone.
It appears that, by and large, women feel they are influenced by, but not under pressure from, family men. Women may accept men's guidance because they see men as more closely associated with the political process and better informed, and hence better able to judge who one should vote for. It should also be noted that while some men also said they vote according to the advice of other family men, an overwhelming 93% denied being subject to any pressure. (Perhaps this is also something men would find more difficult to admit to than women.)
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Level of political engagement
Perceptions of pressures aside, the survey confirms the greater interest and engagement of men in the political arena. Three-quarters of the men expressed an interest in politics, compared with half the women; more than one-third were greatly interested. Where some 60% of the women had voted, over 80% of the men had voted. A failure to vote was almost entirely due to technical reasons, predominantly a non-registration in the electoral roll.
Men's higher level of engagement in the formal political process can be gauged from their greater knowledge of elected representatives, and their strikingly greater participation in political events. More than half of the male respondents said they had participated in a social/political rally or meeting, compared with a negligible 4% of women. Nearly three-quarters of the meetings attended by men revolved around election campaigns: a third had attended a gathering related to some social issue. Similarly, roughly 70% of the men could name their national and provincial assembly representative. Only 13% of the women could name their provincial representative, fewer still their national representative (11%). Amongst women, a significantly higher number (34%) knew the name of their current or previous councillor (local body member), but this is still half the equivalent percentage of men (60%). For women, the proximity of the councillor, who is more likely to be living in the same locality, may make them more accessible. MPAs and MNAs are more likely to be residing for the most part in some major city rather than anywhere near their constituents. In Punjab, where elections to the local bodies have been held regularly, more than half the women were able to identify their councillor by name in rural and urban areas (52% and 58%). This compares with 26% of women in NWFP, 19% in Baluchistan and a negligible number in Sindh. It is possible that were local level elections to be held regularly, women in other provinces may also come to see the councillor (who is included in the formal state structure) as an institution to be approached when they need assistance.
A little more than half the women surveyed favour women's participation in elections, while a little over a third actually oppose women's participation. The rest have no opinion. Opinions do not vary for elections to local government or provincial and national assemblies. Women with either higher levels of education or income tended to be more supportive of women's participation in local bodies than in provincial/national assembly elections. This seems to imply a perception that women are likely to be more effective in the local context, about which they are presumably much more knowledgeable.
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Two-thirds of those who endorse women's participation in elections do so on the basis that only women can improve the situation of women. Women with some education were more inclined to believe that women leaders did more for women (48%) than either illiterate women or those with university education. Possibly the more educated believe that women. leaders did as little for women as male leaders. About a quarter of the respondents think women's participation necessary to improve performances in all fields (Table 15). But, as discussed below, women are sharply divided between provinces. Male respondents are divided roughly down the middle on whether women should participate in both the local and provincial/national elections, half sayingyes and half no. In a reversal of women's views, a little over half the men endorsing women's participation say this is necessary for better performance in all fields; close to a third say only women could improve the situation of women.
Attitude towards politicians: Men vs. women
There is a certain degree of ambivalence about women politicians compared to male politicians. Nearly a third of the respondents had no opinion. Female. politicians were rated less honest and less capable than male politicians, but
almost two-thirds consider some politicians to be good and some bad
irrespective of gender. Similarly, 12% say they are both corrupt. This suggests
that there are no illusions regarding women politicians and no miracles are
expected of them. Yet a significantly high percentage is of the view that
more women should participate in the process to improve the lot of women.
A little over 60% of the male respondents believe some male politicians are
good and some bad, while close to half say the same about female politicians.
Not very different from the impression of female respondents, this seems to
indicate that, at least theoretically, there is no major block in the minds of men regarding female politicians.
Province-specific perceptions
Looking at provinces, the most striking contrast is between NWFP, where women's participation has the least support, and Sindh, that displays the highest support for women's participation and ability. But there are other differences as well. If technical hurdles were largely responsible for having prevented women from casting their votes in the other provinces, in NWFP the single most important obstacle was men not allowing women to vote
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(31%), with a further 14% saying that women's votes were deliberately not registered. This does not mean that patriarchal prohibitions do not operate elsewhere, and, for example, in at least one of the villages surveyed in Punjab, women had been allowed to vote for the first time in the local bodies elections in 1997. The nature and degree of control, however, vary.
Unlike Pukhtun women, who are excluded from the electoral process, Baluch women use their vote more than women in NWFP and Punjab, but seem to vote largely under pressure. 71% of them reported this to be the case. In rural Baluchistan perception of pressure was as high as 80%; in urban areas it was reduced to 40%. Two-fifths of urban women in NWFP also report being under pressure, but fewer rural women seem to experience pressure than urban women. A free use of the vote is most likely in urban Punjab and Sindh, where only 7% and 13% say they vote under pressure, though in rural areas women experience at least twice as much pressure. The influence of men was consistently less amongst urban women; in Baluchistan 54% vs. 71%; in Sindh 28% vs. 51%; and Punjab 31% vs. 48%. Again NWFP presented a different case, where more urban than rural women (41% vs. 35%) say they voted according to the wishes of their men (Table 14). However this dependency on men is perhaps only to be expected when 96% of the women had never attended any political gathering of any sort, and when 44% of women rely on male relatives for information on national issues. Interest in political processes is highest in Sindh, where 77% of those surveyed expressed some or great interest. This may be due to several factors. The fact that the only woman to have been elected head of government (and that, too, twice) hails from Sindh provides a role model. Historically, the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (1983), launched by political parties against Zia's dictatorship, may have a direct bearing, since the movement was most effective in rural Sindh where women were mobilised on a relatively large scale. In urban areas, the ethnically defined political party, the MQM, has also emphasised the mobilisation and inclusion of women. Other than contextual factors, the composition of the Sindh sample may play a role. Sindh had the highest percentage of women earning some money (34%, in rural areas 47%) and was the most mobile. It was in Sindh that the highest percentage of women claimed leaving home on a daily basis for remunerative work (53%), preponderantly in rural areas (56% in rural and 17% in urban areas); as well as the lowest percentage that never leaves their homes for this purpose (20% urban and 13%). In contrast, although 23% of Baluch women reported some means of income, 57% never left their
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homes for this activity. The combination of mobility and earning may influence perceptions.
For whatever reasons, the vast majority of Sindhi women support women's participation in politics (81%), and rural women are even keener. In Punjab and Baluchistan half the women think women should participate, and, in both, urban women are more enthusiastic than rural women (59% vs. 43% and 59% vs. 38%). The least support is demonstrated in NWFP (29%), with marginally more urban women supporting women's participation than rural women. This lesser support may in part be due to a somewhat older sample than in the other provincial samples.
The provincial differences need to be viewed with some caution, however. While the NWFP respondents least approved of women's participation in the electoral process, almost half of them have some interest in politics - though less than one-tenth were greatly interested. 44% of the women expressed an interest in Punjab, equally divided between those with a keen and partial interest. Less than 30% of women in Baluchistan expressed an interest. Fewer women in NWFP or Baluchistan expressed an interest in the electoral process, and this is attributed to a desire to keep oneself informed. of what is happening - more than in the other provinces. Interestingly, only in Sindh do 20% of the women feel elections provide excitement and fun, (Table 13). It may be that for Sindhi women this is as much an accepted 'social event as "political'. Yet, in keeping with the general level of expressed interest and constraints, over 76% of Sindhi women had exercised their right. to vote in the last decade, compared with 65% in Baluchistan, 55% in Punjab and 43% in NWFP.
As reflected in the 25% gap between interest and voting in Baluchistan, and the fact that rural Baluch women seem to vote largely under pressure, the mere fact of voting cannot be counted upon as a true indicator of women's interest in politics. In NWFP, for instance, the pre-testing indicated that Women who say they have no interest in politics often discussed issues such as the events in Afghanistan, ex-Yugoslavia, India and Palestine. On probing this, it was discovered that they equate politics' with elections, and had no interest in who was standing for office, who won or who lost. This may be a recognition that no matter who wins, it makes little difference to their lives.
32 The high percentage of women in the Sindh sample who say they are earning an income seems unrealistic given the statistical profiles of women's work. It is possible that the question was understood in rural Sindh to include agriculture-related work, engaged in close to home, which contributed towards family income. This would explain the much higher rural percentage reporting an income, and also that they report leaving their homes for this purpose on a daily basis.
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Certainly numerous women interviewees felt that women's votes are merely used, or misused, to come into power. Once in power, politicians either ignore or deliberately sideline women and their issues.
For the most part, women see women's political participation as necessary because they feel that only women can improve the situation of women (83%. Sindh, 70% Baluchistan, 53% Punjab). In NWFP however, almost an equal number of women believe women's participation will improve all aspects of governance (49% and 43%). One quarter and two-fifths of women in Baluchistan and Punjab shared the beliefthat women's participation will lead to all-round improvements. Surprisingly enough only 7% of the Sindhi women gave this response, indicating that their support for women's participation derives almost exclusively from a conviction that only women will improve the situation for women. Counter-intuitively, Pukhtun woment are most likely to know the name of their provincial and national representative (for the former especially in rural areas, 34% vs. 21%). In contrast Sindhi women were least knowledgeable about their representatives: hardly any rural women knew their names, and less than 10% of the urban women knew.
The very real differences in cultural context were also indicated by some of the in-depth interviews of politically active women. In Baluchistan, for example, a politician complained about the lack of understanding within her party of the different implications that an action would have in Quetta versus Peshawar.' Another example was of the government proposing to increase the limit for dowry (jahez), when this is a practice that does not exist in Baluchistan, and one that they would not like to encourage.
Politics necessary but largely distasteful
Judging from the fact that half of the women expressed an interest in politics, but that hardly any woman from amongst 1,609 respondents had attended a public rally or gathering, it would seem that many more women aspire for participation in the public realm than are provided the opportunity to do so. One of the stumbling blocks to women's participation may be the perception of contemporary politics. Discussions on what politics means convey a high degree of cynicism. Politics was defined as robbing and looting and making excuses for this, saying one thing and doing another; as a jockeying for
33 Another woman politician pointed, for example, to the impossibility of taking out a women's procession as asked by the party high command since any untoward incident would close the doors of activism to women for years to come.
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power; as being cunning or a snake in the grass; using any and all means to win office and amassing personal wealth once elected. One group said politics was like someone who purchases a buffalo that gives 5 litres of milk a day, then publicly makes a false claim that the buffalo only gives 3 litres a day. It was also likened to someone who sells a bicycle (i.e., a useful implement) in order to satisfy his desire for intoxication (nasha). The most negative description came from a group of rural women that politics is terrorism, and that this is largely urban-based since rural people are by and large 'simple folk. (This conveniently ignores, however, the fact that the vast majority of public representatives in Pakistan are rural landlords.) If, despite this, women voted, it was often seen to be done under some pressure both from the local power structure and from family men.
The male groups were more critical of politics and politicians. Politics was likened to “turning truth into falsehood, and falsehood into truth’ (in this sense politicians were said to be magicians), a way of making money. When one discussant said politics was making laws for the country, the others asked him where did he see the hold of the law in Pakistan. If politicians occasionally do some good work this was usually under pressure from those who have actively supported them during elections; otherwise, the ordinary voter means nothing to politicians and is never allowed access. The urban male focus group discussion distinguished between local politics, which was seen as relatively sincere and provincial, and national politics which was seen as instrumentally used by politicians to get votes in order to make money. Politicians, they believed, refuse to accept any responsibility for the direct concerns of people, such as having sewerage installed or maintained. Instead, politicians directly contributed to the problems by, for instance, giving protection to thieves. They critically pointed out that the government of the time had to all extents and purposes handed matters of governance over to the army. They concluded that "the people who make the laws are those who rob and steal from us'.
Yet, despite all the complaints, women did say that not all politicians were bad, and that sometimes they did manage to get some things done. The hope in casting votes despite the cynicism was that especially those elected to local bodies would help solve the people's problems, that MPAs and MNAs would provide employment, build schools, resolve drainage problems. The positive side of politics was described as bringing about change; electing representatives to work for one's rights; as a means of the members of a society intervening in the running of the state to protect the rights of people. Politics was also positively described as training and as democracy. Some felt that the work of social organisations or NGOs is a positive political participation. There is also a desire to participate. In Peshawar a women's
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discussion group regretted that only a handful of women are recognised as being engaged in the political process; they felt more women need to become active. They aired their resentment at the attitude of a visiting Punjabi male politician who said that “we men) are engaged in politics, what need is there for you women) to get into it'. Women in this and other groups repeatedly said that women's votes are misused, by which they meant being used to bring someone into power without any commitment on their part to womenrelated issues. This was again often repeated in the interviews.
Obstacles to women's participation
Several obstacles to women's entry into politics were pointed out, especially in the interviews. Some related to the general environment of politics, others to the patriarchal system. Two women politicians from opposing parties and ideologies agreed that the feudal nature of politics is a major stumbling block for women. The two, who are not amongst the top leadership, also concur that, while women are now accepted in commercial enterprises (one was the first member of the Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industries, the other a small entrepreneur), there is great resistance to women entering politics from the men themselves. Similarly, a woman senator believed that it is essential for more people to come forward from the middle classes since they form the backbone of democracies everywhere. She also said, however, that men find it more difficult to accept women of their own family entering politics even if they say it is alright for other women to do so. Others were also critical of the feudal nature of politics, and said that the field of women politicians is limited to those who belong to feudal backgrounds where men have been involved in politics. Women's entry is accidental since as a rule in political families the choice is always the men, even if women are better qualified', and because political parties do not support or finance women' and rarely field women candidates.
Many shared the view of one interviewee who stated that “men want power, they indulge in politics to gain power and money'. Resistance to women permeates all fields of active engagement including trade unions. One interviewee said that if there were few women in unions today, it is "because male trade unionists consider the presence of women as the soft belly'. She said the attitude is that if even one woman is raped (or the fear persists of such a danger) all are doomed’. Consequently, in the present framework, the ability of women politicians to positively influence the way political leadership views issues concerning women is seen as very limited. Such an expectation was seen by most as being unrealistic given that women have to overcome opposition from rightist parties, family resistance to women
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joining politics, a lack of financial resources, and also rarely have the support of other women within and outside the party. For example, Nasim Wali Khan, who believes that women's problems are part and parcel of general Societal problems, admitted that, as the provincial head of the ANP in NWFP, she "no longer has time to deal with women's issues'. There is no indication, however, that she has ever given any special attention to women's issues even before assuming this new party leadership. She also shares the opinion of those who believe that it is essential to start increasing women's decisionmaking from the family level. Only after women are included at this level can they hope to play a role in local level politics, and gradually move on to other levels.
Deterioration in politics and self-imposed barriers
The interviews and discussions both convey an impression of the arena of politics having deteriorated over the years. One erstwhile activist said that politics underwent a drastic change for the worse under martial law, and that, in contrast to the earlier pre-Zia period, today the criteria for moving up in the party was that the more brainless you are the higher position you will be in’. Another political activist pointed out that it was only after the Zia period ended that she realised how this latest, and longest, martial law era had transformed politics from a struggle for political ideals to an expensive profession. This was corroborated by a veteran politician whose experience is that earlier politicians “all died in debt, whereas now money flows like water. In her opinion, since no one uses hard-earned money in this way, one has to question the source of the money being spent by politicians. This is in keeping with a general perception that people (i.e., men) come into politics to make money and usually to gain power in order to accumulate more in a self-serving cycle. A similar sentiment was expressed by a woman from Baluchistan, who feels that the men in politics are either all sardars (tribal heads) or desire to become sardars, i.e., someone with more or less unquestioned personal power and considerable social status. Politicians and non-politicians alike mentioned the high expenses entailed in politics, a male politician in fact saying that it is impossible for the ordinary man to do politics, let alone for women. In addition to expenses and end purposes, an experienced politician noted that the political patronage of party decision-makers is critical for advancement in politics. This is true for men and women, but obtaining patronage may be easier for men than for women.
There are self-imposed barriers as well. Women shy away from the exposure and experience of electoral campaigns, where their image is often
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under attack. Women interested in political office may therefore prefer to contest the senate seats, where the electoral college is restricted to assembly members. Senate seats are also seen as being given on merit to a larger extent than the generally elected assembly seats. One woman said she did not enter politics for fear that if she did she would become like the current politicians. In a discussion, working women said that they themselves could not go beyond a certain level of engagement in either politics or unions. This, they explained, was because at a certain point the work involves going to court (and possibly police stations). A woman politician confirming this said that political work revolves around police stations and district courts, where the average constituent needs help. This type of work was not possible for women such as themselves since the interaction involves a virtually allmale set-up. If even unionised women working in industry feel this way, it is likely that others are even more hesitant. But not all women were so pessimistic. In a sumber of focus group discussions, women expressed the view that women can also be political leaders. In one group, the women explained that if women can run the household they can also run the country. Some believed that women would do a better job since they are more hardworking and have greater integrity than men.
It is hardly surprising then that most women feel that it is only possible for women from a moneyed feudal background to enter the political arena, most if not all of them from political families. Consequently, their ability to influence the political environment for women is circumscribed by their own backgrounds and by their party's positions. The general feeling of nonpolitician women was that women politicians had done little either to improve the situation of women or to modify positively the attitudes of men. Women, it was felt, were used in the political process for their votes and for bringing out demonstrations, but their issues were ignored. Women's wings of political parties were almost universally seen as useless or less than useless. A leader in the NWFP said, for instance, that she is proud that, as a secular, democratic party, the ANP has no women's wing. However, she also admitted that her party had failed to fill the seats reserved for women in their party's provincial and national executive bodies.
Women political leaders were often criticised both in interviews and in some of the focus group discussions for “wanting to escape the fact of being women'. The inability of women politicians and activists to make a difference was exemplified by one interviewee in the political leadership's “refusal to accept the proposal for reserved seats for women despite all the hue and cry women are making, while the same politicians had gone ahead and introduced several constitutional amendments. At least one woman felt that it was essential to separate women's issues from general politics,
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otherwise these would always be held hostage to political wrangles and promises never kept. The example she gave was of the bill for reserved seats for women in the assemblies, which had failed to be passed by several assemblies because each time the opposition presented an excuse. Some felt that until the political process is rid of its feudal baggage there is little hope for the political process being conducive to women's participation.
The contradictory opinions voiced by the male focus group discussions are interesting. The rural men objected to women's political leadership saying: “If women become leaders who will look after the children, manage the homestead, cut the fodder? Are we mad to want to “cut our own feet'?' The proof of the inappropriateness of women politicians forwarded by one man was that: Benazir is a leader and that is why her husband is in jail. It just doesn't work. At a more general level, however, they felt that a woman could not be as brave as a man, and this quality is significant when negotiating with another country, for instance. On the other hand, the urban male focus group discussion, that included a high number of political activists from different political parties, was clear that women could be leaders. They gave the examples of Fatima Jinnah, Benazir Bhutto and Indira Gandhi. However, they, too, were clear that they did not want women from their own families or community to become political leaders. A senior woman politician also pointed out this attitude. She contended that men believe that politics is all right for other women, but not for the women of their own family.
Summary of survey findings
Generally the survey underscores that provincial differences are significant
and need to be kept in mind in devising any strategies for change. The major findings of the survey are summarised below:
The state
The state is not imagined or conceptualised by women in any radically different form from men.
O It is seen as a given, and also as falling far short of its obligations.
State institutions responsible for law and order and justice (perceived
as a continuum), such as the police and the courts, are approached with extreme reluctance and almost never by the women personally, but through families and only when absolutely necessary.
豹 The councillor is an exception to this rule. Even though he is connected to the state structure, he is regarded also as a part of the community“lus” rather than “them”.
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O Education, health, etc., are regarded primarily as the responsibility
of the state, with some room for private initiative and partnership.
Mobility
Access to public space for women depends on the nature of the engagement. It is much more possible, for instance, for women to leave the home for health reasons than to go shopping or to visit their children's schools.
It follows that mobility for women is, in a sense, non-convertible. Because a woman can leave home for work, it does not mean that she can equally easily leave home to attend a seminar or to visit friends.
Decision-making
Women participate in decision-making in varying degrees with regard to the education and marriage of their children, but to a much lesser extent in decisions regarding their own marriage or in the transactions pertaining to the sale and purchase of family property.
Traditional institutions
A relatively small but still significant number of women said their families go to the village notable, wadera or sardar to have disputes resolved. Sometimes the women themselves go personally, but this is rare.
8 Those going to such institutions want them to continue. There is some sentiment for reforming these institutions, but not for linking them with the state.
Traditional institutions have been minimised in many urban centres in all provinces except NWFP. They have not been replaced, however, by other effective mechanisms.
Education
攀 The respondents placed a high premium on education.
There is a marked preference for becoming teachers and in some
areas doctors, possibly also because these professions, over time, have become socially sanctioned for women.
Education was also seen, by a significant percentage of respondents, as an end in itself, regardless of the prospects of income-generation
Or a Career.

Participation in the political process
Engagement in politics is not a high priority amongst women, and yet
related responses indicated a sense of not giving up on the political process. A significant percentage of the respondents believe that women in
positions of power and authority do more for women than men in those positions.
Interest in politics was explained in terms of voting being a national duty by a high percentage.
O A very high percentage of those who voted indicated that men
influenced their choice of candidate or party.
. A high percentage of those indicating such influence did not see it in
a negative light.
Religion
O Religion did not emerge as a major concern in the context of governance, i.e., something for the state or government to assume responsibility for. It was seen as a given.
O The maulvi did not emerge as a key figure either within the context of the power structure or in terms of defining norms in either the urban or the rural setting.
Perception of key problems
O Inflation and unemployment were seen as the key issues at the national
level.
O A significant number mentioned over-population as a key issue.
Drainage and sanitation are a key local issue for many women,
especially in urban areas.
Governance
O Women did not see a 'women's problem in isolation from the rest of
Society. As such very few respondents cited doing something for women as an ingredient of good governance.


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III
Conclusions and Recommendations
Key issues: Interviews and focus group discussions
The ease with which women articulate their experiences of private and public spaces disappears when they are asked how obstacles can be overcome and the situation improved. These questions produce a silence in the discussions, or comments such as: Why ask us? Such things are for the educated and well-informed; how can small people like us give recommendations for such a large entity as the government? A lack of self-confidence apart, this underlines the extent to which citizens in general and women in particular are excluded from the debates and processes involved in decision-making. By comparison, those women interviewed who have achieved a certain degree of success in their field had little trouble formulating recommendations, sometimes in great detail. In their discussions, some women managed to overcome initial hesitation and present recommendations, but by and large the recommendations are based on the inputs of interviewees and the general findings of the survey.
The state and its role
Though state institutions such as the police and the courts are not relied upon for relief or for a resolution of problems, there is little to suggest that women envisage the state in some even vaguely alternative form. The state is perceived as a given, and is expected to provide services that it is clearly seen as no longer delivering - this despite the currently low to non-existent interaction between women and state institutions. Though a higher percentage of women interviewed compared to those surveyed were amenable to private sector contribution in some fields, the general move to privatise government functions wholesale was not approved of. Particularly health and education are considered by women to form part of the basic functions and responsibilities of the state, and only partial privatisation appears an acceptable option. There is also a clear impression conveyed by women outside Punjab of a need to decentralise the state's functions and to allow greater autonomy and decision-making to the local people. This was said in
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general terms, as well as specifically with respect to deciding the use of local resources and in hiring government officials. In Sindh, local recruitment for the police and administration was emphasised.
There is consensus that women are excluded from policy-making and widespread agreement that this is detrimental to women's empowerment. Consequently, women believe that it is essential for more women to be involved in government offices, in the judiciary and in the political process, and that special quotas are required to accelerate this process (one suggestion being for 20-25% of all employment opportunities). The larger number of women in senior positions of the bureaucracy in Sindh is considered to make the environment more conducive to women's participation in public institutions and activities.
A number of women emphasise the pivotal role of the state and the government of the time in obstructing or promoting women's participation, and the need for the state to visibly demonstrate its political commitment to upholding the rights and dignity of women. Manifestations of such a commitment include affirmative action in recruitment and promotion policies, and policies that encourage women's participation. Examples of how this could be done included: (1) ensuring that a number of women are recipients of national awards in various fields (currently women are virtually excluded from such awards); (2) appointing women as ambassadors; and (3) including women in government panels and on delegations to international forums. At the heart of the demand is that the state unequivocally demonstrate its progressive attitude towards women and that the government functions as a role model for society as a whole. Implicit in these recommendations is the recognition that little improvement can be expected without state and government support.
While there is the desire for increased political participation (discussed below), women criticise political interference in the working of state institutions and departments. Political appointments, and what is perceived as an incessant re-working of policies, are held responsible for seriously undermining the effectiveness of policies, e.g., those for education and women's empowerment, and the performance of the police. As it is, democratic traditions are at best weak in Pakistan. The situation has been further exacerbated by the political instability of the last decade that has seen some seven governments come and go (including the interim governments). Exasperation led one woman, who until then had hardly participated in the discussion at all, to suddenly stand up and declare, “The solution is simple. Just as there is one God and one Prophet, so too should there only be one government!' Less dramatically, several women point out
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that, desiring to leave its mark, each Successive government stops, sidesteps or actively tries to undo the work of the previous one, resulting in a colossal waste of money and effort. One of the concrete examples presented was the attempt of each government to bring out a new education policy where nothing ever gets implemented, and in the confusion existing systems are allowed to further collapse. A similar situation prevails regarding women's status, where numerous women's commissions have been appointed and have handed in their reports and recommendations without any tangible outcome.
In the interviews a sizeable number of women referred to the 1997 Commission of Inquiry on Women Report that, according to them, has clearly identified many legislative and policy changes that need to be acted upon. One suggestion is to compile all the recommendations contained in the three previous commissions, and give top priority to those mentioned in all three. Accordingly, those mentioned in two would receive second priority, and those mentioned by only one report be given third priority. Though not everyone would agree to this suggestion, that in any case leaves unanswered the issue of possible contradictions between the three, there is a chorus of demands for the government to move away from theory to addressing the needs of women through tangible measures. Exceptionally women referred to the ratification of CEDAW and the need for Pakistan to live up to its commitments. A few articulated the recommendation advanced in several Beijing-related documents (jointly drafted by the government and NGOs) for a permanent commission on the status of women. A permanent commission would ensure that there is a body continuously addressing women's evolving needs, and would be a mechanism to monitor the implementation of affirmative actions and government policies regarding women. It is proposed that this commission be authorised to receive the complaints of women directly. Women emphasise that a permanent commission has to be independent of the government to function effectively, and measures need to be taken to protect its functioning from the potential adverse affects of changes in government'.
Significantly, the Ministry of Women Development is not seen as fulfilling any of the roles identified for a permanent commission. In fact, few women see the ministry in a very positive light. Opinions on its role vary between the ministry being a complete waste of resources to disappointment.
34 The national Plan of Action for women was formally launched by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in August 1998, but its contents were never publicized. Subsequently, the military government that ousted Nawaz Sharif (in October 1999) established the National Commission on the Status of Women in September 2000.
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It is not that women object to the principle of such a ministry, more that most are frustrated with its performance. Criticism of the ministry includes a perception that it lacks initiative/acumen and often expertise, but at the same time women do recognise external factors that impede its performance. These include the ministry not being taken seriously because: (a) it has a limited budget, and (b) until recently it had no provincial departments and therefore had only a very limited presence outside Islamabad. Nor did it have the personnel to bolster its status. Perceived as a fairly inconsequential ministry, it does not attract the right type of bureaucrats, political backing, or cooperation of other departments. Consequently the Ministry of Women Development represents a Symbolic gesture to women rather than a sign of real commitment. In order to give it some clout, it was suggested that the ministry have a male minister and an increased budget (one suggestion was for the ministry to be merged with the social welfare department, which has a sizeable budget and far more personnel). How this could be achieved, and the question of how a male senior member of a political party could be persuaded to take on this ministry, was left unanswered. There was greater agreement on the need for the Ministry of Women Development to network more efficiently with other departments and individuals within these, the police and law and parliamentary affairs being especially mentioned.
Asked what they would do were they to become rulers, women's discussions often reiterate the concerns expressed by women in the survey regarding the need to provide education for all and employment opportunities. The two are seen as linked, and a group of rural women said, `Because of unemployment people have started losing faith in education as well. Given the reins of power, a group of industrial workers would finish unemployment, ensure equity for all, stop black marketing and bribery and open a park for children, the aged and women. The issues therefore are economic well-being, equitable treatment of all citizens, functioning systems and, as indicated by the last item on their agenda, a desire to break the male adult monopoly on entertainment by making some space available to the disadvantaged in society, In this group and in many others, women stressed that they would ensure that women receive justice.
Justice
Though Women rarely formulated concrete steps for overcoming the obstacles, there is no doubt about their deep distress at the lack of forums that provide women justice. In interviews, several women spoke of the need to greatly enhance the number of women in the judiciary and the police.
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Majida Rizvi, the first woman appointed in Pakistan as a High Court judge (Sindh), put the paucity of women in the judiciary down to a lack of political will, and pointed out that in India a woman was appointed to the Kerala High Court as early as 1965. She also felt that the fact that Sindh has over 50 women judges in the lower judiciary, compared with only 10-15 women in the Punjab with twice the population, results from a different attitude towards women in the two provinces. In her opinion, with the exception of Benazir Bhutto, whose government pushed for women in the judiciary, there has been complete resistance to including and promoting women in the judiciary. Many women agree that augmenting the number of women and encouraging them could improve the generally hostile court environment. To overcome the hostile environment and the absence of women in courts, affirmative recruitment and promotion policies are proposed for all levels of the judiciary, including the appointment of government lawyers. Additionally, gender sensitisation programmes were suggested for the entire judiciary, particularly with respect to violence against women. Yet a group of local activist women added a cautionary note. Having initially supported the suggestion put forward of increasing the number of women judges, they then expressed reservations about whether the mere induction of women as judges would make any Substantial difference to what is perceived to be an entirely corrupt system. Perhaps a similar sentiment explains why so many women in the survey support more women being inducted into government departments and participating in the political process, but at the same time do not believe that this will change the performance of these institutions.
Concerning the issue of justice, there is also the problem of women's limited access to courts. A general lack of confidence in courts and an ignorance of the procedures involved are common to men and women, but other factors impede women's access. Aside from this being considered a task outside the home and therefore a male responsibility, women cannot count on support systems if they desire to seek redress in court. In Punjab, one group pointed out that if there is a need to go to court, people from their community usually enlist the support of the local councillor. Women, however, would not receive his support and therefore find this route effectively cut off. The situation is reported to be far worse in Baluchistan, where societal norms actively prevent women from approaching the courts. In discussions and interviews a number of women were convinced that courts are more effective and more likely to give women justice than the informal traditional systems, but were socially out of bounds for women. By way of explanation, they said that there are so few women in Baluchistan's jails because most women are killed by their men before the matter can reach court.
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Consequently, before the state institution can even begin to be an alternative to informal mechanisms, the state will forcefully have to discourage the practice of honour killings instead of allowing it to continue unchecked.
In contrast to the survey findings, which convey an impression that respondents who recognise the existence of informal institutions of dispute resolution/adjudication want these to continue, in interviews or discussions women did not identify the traditional forums as a means of providing women justice. Indeed, several discussions referred to the male and class bias of these institutions. A major criticism of these institutions voiced by women interviewed (apart from their male bias) is their inherently personalised nature, which renders decisions entirely dependent on the personal integrity and character of its individual members. If you are lucky and the persons in the panchayat or jirga or the sardar or wadera happen to be 'good people', you may get a good decision, otherwise not. They are rejected on the basis that they cannot be institutionalised. Even those who see a role for such institutions, see it as limited to settling community-based disputes with respect to drainage, water, inter-family feuds, or even development matters. None of the women see these institutions as a means for resolving women's issues satisfactorily, some specifying that 'serious matters, such as women's issues, should not be taken to such forums. Women rarely have solutions to this perception of a lack of justice. Some women suggest that separate courts be established to provide women legal aid, others speak of state-provided legal aid services and shelters. Amongst the groups with experience of NGOs, some of the women see them as the most accessible resource available to resolve or at least address their issues of justice.
With respect to the desired relationship between informal communitybased institutions and the formal institutions of the state, the rural men oppose the integration of the two for other reasons. They argued against the integration of informal institutions with the state institutions because they fear that such a merger would damage the ability of the panchayat to provide justice, since the state machinery would become involved in appointing members, etc. Men and women often spoke of systems of justice in conjunction with the police.
Police
The police are universally viewed as deeply problematic, and was described by a politician who deals with police cases on a regular basis as not only corrupt, but involved in serious crimes such as running drugs and even kidnapping. Another said that the police only functions effectively for those
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with some clout, i.e., those with the potential to create trouble should it not perform. Problems with the police were not seen as restricted to women alone; everyone, it was stated, has a problem with the police, and overall reforms are badly needed. The female police officer interviewed was critical of the police recruitment system that produced a class system within the department, conditioning police officers to think along class lines. As a result, The Superior class tends to serve only those of the same class, denying access to the public at large. In her opinion it is only possible to change the terrible public image of the police by replacing the current practice of coercive policing with a concept of community policing. This would imply higher interaction with the public, a better recruitment policy, improved pre-service and in-house training and better working conditions. The revamped police force should be able to institute preventive measures instead of being exclusively focused on post-crime intervention, and should be taught to tackle problems without using force - the current practice. Specifically, numerous women believe better pay scales, transport facilities and training opportunities will help eliminate police corruption and improve performance. Generally respondents of all categories felt that improving the police was dependent on a far higher standard of education for the police, some specifying at least a university degree. In addition to technical skills (such as how to register a first information report), training should inculcate respect for women, moral values, and discipline. In Karachi, respondents would like police to be recruited locally and to be answerable to the local inhabitants. More than one respondent emphasised eliminating the influence of politicians in the recruitment and promotion of police personnel.
There is widespread agreement amongst women that the female police force needs to be increased, especially at the officer level, with the caveat that policewomen should be well trained and treated equally to men. Respondents do not think that women police officers are necessarily more sympathetic than policementowards women who are either accused or victims of crimes, but they do feel the presence of more women at senior levels will at least reduce the abuse of women in custody and jails. There is less consensus regarding women police stations, largely because it is not clear how effective these have been. The experience of the woman police officer (who assumed charge of the first such station) was that, where they exist, female police stations have greatly increased women's direct access to the police. She pointed out that previously women who, for example, would get beaten up by men, would still be dependent on men to approach the police. Now the knowledge that there are women at the station encourages women to approach the women's police station directly. However, like others, she felt that a handful of women police stations was insufficient, and each police station
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needed to have more women police. One respondent suggested that there should be at least three to four policewomen to give some protection to the policewomen themselves, some of who were reported to suffer considerable abuse from their male colleagues. The woman police officer expressed a need to change the attitude of male colleagues who do not take women police officers seriously, and to include women in decision-making, since currently planning is done exclusively from a male point of view.
Education
Education is a refrain repeated in many contexts as a key vehicle for changing not only women's lives but also society as a whole. It is considered to help people look at the world with a broader vision', as a means of increasing women's decision-making powers and providing them with more choices in every sphere of life', including enhanced options of generating income or working where this is a desire or need. Although one educationist was of the view that basic education, defined as high school, had to be "made available to everyone so as to give women options and choices', it is generally accepted that “even primary education helps'. Deeply convinced of the need for education, one politician said it should be made legally compulsory, and those not complying should be 'severely punished. Less coercively, it was suggested that incentives be given to parents to send girls to school, possibly through a tax rebate. The more experienced in the field of education spoke of the need to bring in compulsory education gradually, in view of the limited resources available, and to introduce comprehensive policy changes.
Curricula development should be decentralised, allowing provinces to improvise and have textbooks prepared in keeping with current needs and changes in different fields. Informal schooling was stressed as a way of meeting the needs of those working in agriculture and those who drop out of schools. To overcome policy seesaws, it is recommended that the incumbent government work towards building consensus amongst at least the major political actors on a final education policy that no future government should be allowed to modify. Some stressed the type and content of education, as the texts currently used have a lot of discriminatory material, particularly since the Zia era.
Islam, laws and politics
Several interviewees spoke about legislative reform. Though many women simply referred to the 1997 Commission of Enquiry Report and did not bother
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to elaborate specific reforms, some did. One of the concrete legislative changes women desire is a law to curtail domestic violence. Other reforms relate to women's financial rights, ensuring women get property rights in their name, and their share of inheritance, which is their right by law and shariah’. With respect to the last point, one suggestion is to establish a mechanism to ensure compliance in the same way that the Central Board of Revenue checks taxpayments. The other legal reform specifically mentioned was the repeal or reform of the infamous Hudood Ordinances that, amongst others, govern sexual crimes.
Though the male politician agreed with the need for reforming the Hudood Ordinances, his concern was with what he perceived to be a new, emerging problem, i.e., those who marry of their own free choice are accused of zina'. In his opinion the law needed to be amended in a way that “decisions are taken on the basis of reality, since he felt that you cannot repeal such Islamic laws in the country, at best you can impose a penalty for those who register false cases. Women agreed that there may be problems but did not necessarily think them insurmountable. Where opinion differed was on the tactics to be used. One person, who stated that there was no doubt that the Hudood Ordinances are certainly bad laws', said "we need ijtehad. It is generally agreed that difficulties arise because these laws are linked to Islam. Any attempt to reform or repeal them leads to resistance from the maulvis, who manage to stifle opposition. Problems also stem from the fact that, as one woman put it, “even a Muslim who drinks will stand up and defend himself as a Muslim, it's a delicate matter'. Nevertheless, she pointed out that after all the holiday was shifted from Friday to Sunday using the Qur'an, and even though the maulvis made a big fuss it was done because there was a political will to do so. In her view, the solution would be to obtain a favourable fatwa from Islamic universities. (Often, it seems that the term maulvi is used as an inclusive category encompassing the role of politicoreligious parties as well as maulvis as individuals.)
Clearly the Islamic context in Pakistan is important even though women did not emphasise the application of shariah in their concept of good governance, or in their reasons for thinking a particular government had been most beneficial for the country. In this it is clear that women, like men, place primacy on the economic and social well-being of people in nonreligious terms, taking their Muslim identity as a given. Better labour laws, distribution of land to the landless, controlled inflation, better job opportunities, less lawlessness, were some of the specifics identified. Nevertheless, even though the popular understanding of Islam may be far removed from the state's policies, and this may not be perceived as an arena
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for a major role for the government, the issue of women and religion emerged in several discussions both in a positive and negative light. In a Peshawarbased discussion, the women said, “We recognise that man is superior, it is there in Islam.' On the other hand, a pioneer for women's education in a remote area of Baluchistan related how she had used Islam to overcome resistance and to mobilise women by saying Islam says education is obligatory for everyone and, in any case, you will be better able to understand. the Qur'an. She was also of the view that “the shariah is better implemented in Makran giving women more economic security'. As an example she said that the mahr (or dower), usually in the form of property, is written into the marriage contract (nikahnama) and the property deed handed over to the girl's family. In case of a separation or divorce, the woman then has the property. A businesswoman said, "Islam was the first religion to give women their rights. It gives most rights. It is not conservative but broadminded, and respects women. Unfortunately, the image of religion has become that of purdah. Another explained, ‘Islam does not have any restrictions on rights. It says your rights are equal. Though it says in one place men are given preference over women, this I feel is for the protection of women.'
A veteran politician said that her experience was that women are put forward to counter the maulvis because male politicians do not want to endanger their own relationships. In her opinion, the environment in the 1960s was far more conducive to women's empowerment, not least because the religious personalities consulted by the government and involved in politics had a higher level of scholarship than today. Significantly, asked what they would do were they to become rulers, in all focus group discussions only a single woman said she would make laws keeping Islam in front of us'. None of the others even mentioned this aspect, suggesting that while Islam is an important framework for people, it is a framework for social interaction and not seen as part of the state's responsibilities. There is also consensus that politico-religious parties use religion for their own ends. In the opinion of many, however, all political parties do so, and this practice is not approved of. Women repeatedly spoke of being misled, of some parties using the cover of Islam to justify their aims, of using religion to gain power. It would be a mistake however to think that religion can therefore merely be ignored. The challenge lies in devising an effective strategy for simultaneously addressing the social reference point of Islam while curtailing its (mis)use in the political arena.
Interestingly enough, the vast majority of women interviewed do not accept that political parties that define their agendas in a religious idiom have any real following among women. Asked why they thought women
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joined such political parties, the majority tended to give answers such as: “I think they just bring their own women (i.e. relatives) out, the daughters of the men', 'I don't think they have the support of the masses. If you say they have the support of women that's not true. They will gather a crowd to show support but the women will be their relatives not from the masses. There must be some women supporters) but very few. Or such women belong to religious families, they are not very educated. Participating in demonstrations does not mean they are politically aware. It is because of the family environment'. 'Poor women have no say. Whatever party their husband or brother is in, they are pushed into this. There must be something, but the women are used in demonstrations.'
Only three women out of the more than two dozen interviewed (the woman member of such a party was not asked this question) thought that there was genuine support amongst the women. One of them explained it thus:
First it was in reaction to the materialism in the world. The Jamaat-i-Islami women are changing their own image, they now work, drive cars. I used to think it was just the uneducated who were attracted to the dogma but now I find it frightening that educated women too are being drawn to these groups. They don't see contradictions in themselves and are very clear. They are not interested in progressive liberal interpretations of Islam They see men as superior and that women too have a role to play.
Another felt that there must be some jingoism which appeals to these women'. She also pointed out that:
We (women) are not all progressive. They believe in doctrinal Islam and, because of a limited exposure, they think they are guardians of morality. They should be exposed to other Muslim countries where norms are different. I believe in personal choice and women should have the right to veil or not, but if I value someone else's choice they must value mine. Women in these groups get a sense of belonging, of security. They don’t want to challenge the status quo. It must be their religious conditioning. The orthodox religious attitude of selfrighteousness is that they have a monopoly on what is right and wrong and that to my mind is the basis of all fascist movements. Maybe women find a certain status in that.
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Most of the women interviewed argued that such politico-religious parties are hypocritical. One gave the example of how, on the one hand, they condemn all women who demonstrate for women's rights and say that by so doing they are breaking their marriage contract, but: “When it was for the sake of Nizam-e-Mustapha (literally, the rule of Prophet Muhammed) they brought out women. Then what happened to the women's nikah being broken? Well they had better re-perform the nikah for many because when they brought out women for the Pakistan movement, what happened then? What about all their children?
Others spoke of how such parties “use women for their own political ends. Religion is used as bait to attract them. They make promises to women but never fulfill these'. Another opinion was that such parties 'exploit Islam for their own vested interests and use different symbols to scare ignorant people against the sardars' - in other words, to turn the population away from traditional seats of political power. There was also a sense that these parties were not awami or of the masses; they were closed and exclusivist. Some women voiced their apprehensions saying people like us want to keep away from religious groups because of their intolerance. We have apprehensions about them. Significantly such views were expressed across the spectrum of the non-religiously defined parties, including members and supporters of the PPP, PML, ANP, MQM, in all provinces, as well as by activists who are not politicians.
Despite the dissatisfaction that was sometimes vehemently expressed about contemporary politics, there is a conviction that the political process must continue and that ways must be found to improve both the political process and the service delivery of the state. However not all women are unambiguous about the political arena, although most agree with the need for political engagement. Many are uncomfortable with the idea of being part of political parties. Instead, non-activist women, i.e., those who are neither involved in community activities or any form of organisation, nor members of any political party, tend to speak of the need for a 'social group' variously expressed as a centre, club, meeting place or social organisation, rather than a political party. Those with experience of women's NGOs refer time and again to these as an alternative forum for expressing their views and concerns, and as a means for addressing their problems. Some specify the need for NGOs to function as a link between the community and the government, implying the state's institutions as much as the incumbent government. Others
3S She was referring to the movement led by the right wing against Z. A. Bhutto, in 1977,
that adopted "Nizam-e-Mustapha' as its slogan.
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express the view that the NGOs can be an effective channel for women's leadership. Effective leadership amongst women can grow from nongovernmental organisations and these can provide the support to women in the political arena. Some women politicians concurred with this view. One said 'NGOs should make political women their voice and they should be: theirs in turn. NGOs should support women politicians and invite them to their meetings, etc. Women are encouraged by each other's presence and that's how women can strengthen each other. There will be frustration but we must keep pursuing the goals'. An older activist pointed out, however, that NGOs could only play a complementary or supplementary role since they do not have the scale of government, and have limited interaction with the community. The role and achievements of NGOs drew a mixed response from interviewees. Some said that they had not achieved anything, but more said that such groups had helped create awareness, raised important issues, and lobbied for specific policies such as the women police stations and political representation. Several respondents mentioned women's organisations as one of the few support mechanisms available to women.
In a focus group discussion consisting of industrial workers, the proposal for women to express themselves and push for their demands through public protests and demonstrations was welcomed, though the nature of demands was not specified. Another group of industrial workers said that only by formally joining politics as members of political parties could women make a difference. Women are concerned about the lack of any direct link between politicians and women. There is therefore a suggestion for a channel of communication between the two, or for women to be included when legislation is being considered, because otherwise, according to a group of rural Punjabi women, “they do what they like. One group went so far as to suggest that women should have their own representatives, and men their own, at all levels, and these should only be brought together into an integrated system when gender equality has been achieved. Others took a broader view of things, suggesting that it was essential for more women to become Social workers at the neighbourhood or village level, where they can learn about people's problems and gain experience in resolving these. This type of work would automatically bring women into leadership positions from where their entry into politics would be easier and autonomous of male influence. An unusual local woman politician, who has achieved considerable success in her limited local government constituency on her own merit, shares this view. She herself started off as a dispenser in a hospital, and turned to politics after discovering that her willingness to listen to women opened an avenue for large numbers of womento air their problems. Only after she had been helping
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women resolve problems for some years did she decide to enter into politics, successfully contesting the local government seat each time.
There was general support for women's reserved seats in all tiers of the government, and for the strengthening of local government institutions and women's representation in these. As expressed by one woman politician, Women are denied political representation; if they cannot be given their 50% in a male-dominated Muslim society, then at least 25% must be given. It should be said that she herself has won her seat in open contest. A woman not active in party politics feels that reserved seats will 'at least give women some say in the country's affairs, although she also believes that even when women are given ministerial posts, they wield little real influence or power. Some of the more feminist activists specified that although essential at the moment, affirmative action should only be an interim measure, while the basic issues preventing equal competition between women and men were addressed. But the general feeling is that affirmative action is needed in politics since in the current set-up "only those from feudal backgrounds with males in politics can make it'.
Most women reject the previous constitutional provision whereby the sitting members of the parliament and the local government indirectly elected women into reserved seats. This procedure made women entirely dependent on and exclusively accountable to the virtually all-male elected members, while simultaneously depriving them of the political power-base of constituents. Particular concern was expressed about women in local government not being nominated directly. One interviewee described this as "criminal for the advancement of women', a group of local activist women in Faisalabad said such women were at best useless decorations only good for “waving their hands in processions and gatherings. They in fact damaged women's participation. Complaining about the manner in which men make a mockery' of the current provision for women's reserved seats in local government, a woman politician said successful male candidates either put up a female servant or a young student or daughter' of some powerful member of the party as a favour. Although the latter may be more decorative, both the servant and youngster are powerless. A veteran politician who has succeeded in the male-dominated political arena also spoke about the negative repercussions the previous provision had on directly-elected women. The latter she felt are not willing to pander to the egos of male colleagues in the assembly (and have no such need), while those who feel dependent on the whims of their electoral college are not adverse to getting things accomplished by massaging the ego of their male colleagues. As a result, directly-elected women are subjected to a lot of unpleasant criticism for not behaving enough
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like women'. A veteran of the Pakistan Movement believed that women appointed from the top are usually someone's relative, or are nominated to do someone a favour. They have no mass support, no experience and no idea what the issues are. They are also often resented within the party'.
One proposal suggested to overcome this drawback was for these reserved seats to be filled through an exclusively female franchise, although supporters of this idea admitted that the logistical problems involved in such an exercise, especially in rural areas where the constituencies will become enormous, may prove insurmountable. Therefore it was suggested that a committee be given the task of coming up with a viable affirmative action that directly links women with a constituency but reserves seats for women. Many women advocated something along the lines of the Indian Panchayati Raj, where one third of the constituencies are reserved for female candidates in rotation. Women's groups and human rights organisations have forwarded this idea, so far with little success in gaining support from political parties. Even those who favoured restoring the reserved seats under the previous provision thought that there should be strictly followed criteria for such candidates. The women should either have a political background or be a member or a worker of a political party. Others suggested that the women should be able to show concrete work that they had done for their community or for women. One of the women politicians felt that the situation throughout South Asia was similar, and that women could learn from each other, maybe even launch a regional party.
There was no common perception of whether women's participation is more important at one level or another. Some women think that because nothing can be accomplished in Pakistan without strong backing from the top, priority needs to be given to inducting more women in the top echelons of authority and decision-making. Others put the emphasis on the local government level, where they think women can make the greatest contribution. Still others argue that all levels are equally important and need simultaneous action. In this last category, a few nevertheless feel that women's participation can only be sustained if it bases its strength in local bodies as demonstrated in India. Consequently they strongly support the strengthening of this lower tier of government.
To enhance women's participation in the political process, other affirmative actions suggested related to the Political Parties and People's Representation Acts. The suggestions were to make it compulsory for parties to induct women into the party hierarchy by introducing quotas for women as office bearers; award 25-30% of seats being contested by it to women; have a 20% female membership. Proposed percentages varied with some
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suggesting that the percentages should be progressively increased, others that these should decrease or remainsteady. There was, however, little to no confidence expressed (even amongst the government's own party members) in the willingness of the Nawaz Sharif government to deliver on this question. Several women criticised the fact that while several constitutional amendments have been enacted for increasing the powers of the prime minister, women's reserved seats are continuously being postponed on one pretext or another.
Women, politicians and non-politicians alike, see women's lack of financial resources as a major stumbling block to women's effective political representation. Among the concrete suggestions were that the party should Support the campaigns of women politicians, or, alternatively, provide interestfree loans to women candidates. With only two exceptions, women rejected outright the concept of women's wings and their ability to mainstream women in the political process. These are mostly dismissed as a mechanism for mobilising Support during elections, or alternatively for organising women's participation in demonstrations when this is needed to show women's support or to swell the total numbers. Women's wings were generally considered to be devoid of power and sadly lacking in political awareness. The need to increase women's political awareness was also reiterated by a number of interviewees. Recognising that women mainly cast their vote according to what their men tell them, one person said that political education would enable women to distinguish one party from another in terms of programmes and promises, and to use their vote accordingly.
More than one person felt that only educated people should be allowed to enter politics; the urban men's discussion specifically said that only graduates should be allowed to stand for seats. An interesting point made by the male discussion group in rural Punjab was that in fact there is little choice in the current political scenario. The choice is between two main parties, both of whom are bad. There was a need therefore to bring in a better class of politician and political leadership. While many women agreed that it was essential to have male support for all the strategies proposed, the views of the men indicate that there is still along way to go. The suggestion forwarded by the rural men's discussion on how women could influence national politics was that "they should relate their problems to their husbands, who should then convey it to the appropriate level.
Conclusions and questions beyond the study
In each state the specific configuration and dynamics of power set the parameters within which those seeking to institute change must operate. Such
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movements therefore need to both understand and address the range of issues. that flow from the contextual dimensions of power. In this respect, a first step for women's empowerment in Pakistan is to understand how power and influence operate in the state, and, in the light of this, to identify how women can most effectively access power.
John Stuart Mill's 150-year old concept of indirect power being essentially irresponsible, deserves particular attention in Pakistan where feudal operative styles, that are both indirect and devoid of accountability, have not been displaced by the formation of the nation-state. In 50 years of independence, the structures of the emerging industrial sector have failed to dismantle feudal styles. Instead industrialists themselves have chosen to fit into a feudal mode, and Pakistani politics remains predominantly that of patronage and manipulation. Consequently, while formal de-personalised structures of state and politics do exist, the dynamics of real power remain inextricably linked to family and personal connections and systems of patronage (the great potential of indirect and irresponsible power has been amply demonstrated by the influence wielded by politico-religious parties). How, then, can any movement for social reform design its own intervention in a manner that, cognizant of the disjuncture between the formality of power and its actual exercise, is most effective? These are questions implicit in the answers articulated by women and their discussions in the study.
A second area deserving attention stems from the multiple dimensions of the secular/religious divide. While a secular state in which religion is divorced from state law is certainly desirable, this seems an unlikely event in the immediate future. Women's rights movements have rarely, if cver, managed to institute major reforms in isolation, their success depending in large part on their ability to link up with effective allies in the general political arena. Today there is no religious reform movement comparable to those that emerged at the turn of the last century to champion the cause of either human rights or gender equality. Moreover, a religious framework of reform would be unacceptable to most feminists in Pakistan (who are either uncomfortable with such a formulation or reject it outright). Yet, as
6 In his famous 1869 essay, "The Subjugation of Women", Mill argued that it is said that women do not need direct power. having so much indirect power through their influence over their male relatives and connections ... it is true that women have great power. It is part of my case that they have great power, but they have it under the worst possible conditions, because it is indirect. and therefore irresponsible power ..., in Margaret Stacey and Marion Price, Women and Power, Feminist Revie', Vol. 5, 1980, p. 44. Mill's essay was immediately translated into more than a dozen European languages and was pivotal to women's movements throughout Europe.
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demonstrated in the study, if religion is not the main yardstick used by women to judge good governance, it is present in women's lives, in the country's politics and in the social fabric of society. Locating effective allies in the social and political arenas is thus an essential if difficult task for those seeking to empower women. In this context, women understandably underlined the importance of including men in all initiatives for change. Equally important is the challenging task of devising strategies that find resonance amongst the general public, male and female, while avoiding the traps laid by politicoreligious parties and their supporters.
A third point for consideration and possible re-evaluation is the nature of the interaction between those championing women's rights and the state, and the former's expectations of the latter. Although nation-states have never shown any particular inclination to bring about gender equality (or even better rights for women) of their own volition, women's reform movements have consistently sought the assistance of the state in re-constructing more gender-balanced relationships and positions within the family. This is as true of South Asia as elsewhere. A related question is the strategic choice made, and balance achieved, by activists in terms of bringing about broadbased social change on the ground versus legalistic formal changes. In Pakistan, even while activists question aspects of the state and point to its gender bias, a disproportionate amount of energy has been spent formulating and demanding formal change at the state level, be it policy or law. Laws and policies are, of course, important, but, by themselves, they are never enough to change the ground reality. In turn, the focus of attention on legal reforms has diverted energy away from developing self-help measures aimed at addressing issues at the societal level.
Should the state be unreceptive or become hostile to women's demands, this type of dependency on the state for realising objectives can lead to a paralysis, a situation Pakistani women confronted during the Zia period. At both the theoretical and practical levels not enough attention has been paid to, first, how ground changes can be brought about within the family and society, and, second, to how, and indeed whether, such changes could modify the parameters and/or workings of the state. It is clear from the discussions that where NGOs are working effectively with communities, Women do view such groups as a viable alternative for a number of their needs. The study suggests, however, that for such initiatives to make a difference would require a quantum increase in the groundwork of Such
37 See Shaheed, Farida, op. cit.
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groups, and that eventually the real difference will only come about when these social interventions translate into a political movement. There is no indication of such a transformation taking place in the near future.
Lastly, there is no clear articulation of what would constitute an appropriate feminist nation-state or what would replace the nation-state. Holistic projections of what a feminist world may possibly look like have appeared in fiction, more as fantasy scenarios than as socio-political or economic theses. If non-hierarchical structures are to be promoted, there is no answer as to what a non-hierarchical state would look like, what its structure would be, how the economy would function. What would the family look like, if indeed they would exist, and if not, what would replace them? What routes to political power would be legitimate, and how would legitimate political power operate, regulate itself and remain 'feminist'? If feminist theories have not answered such questions, the study does not provide guidelines either, for it is clear that women are seeking improvements within the present system and not seeking to replace it with some other form of collective entity. For the present then, those wanting to promote women's empowerment will have to be content with looking for levers to enhance women's autonomy squarely within the framework of a welfare-oriented state envisaged by women.
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North India
Ekatra!
Introduction
Women's political participation is a key issue in the discourse on human rights and equitable sustainable development in India. The voice of women in policy and decision-making bodies is a necessary prerequisite to just and gender-sensitive policies, and its absence is reflected in the lacunae of the national agenda directed at meeting women's needs and priorities. Viewed in the context of the contribution of women to the national independence movement, and their significant support in sustaining post-independence antisystemic struggles, this gender bias challenges rational analysis. After independence, women's political ambitions were thwarted by pressure to return to the domestic sphere, leaving the public space to men, reminiscent of what happened in the post-war scenario in western nations.
This study of North Indian states explores caste, class, religion, ethnicity and other socio-cultural diversities that are central to the regional and national political processes and to women's political participation. The definition of politics is extended to include both formal as well as non-formal political activity provided through people's movements and other kinds of political mobilisation. Within the formal system, membership in political parties has been the main vehicle for women's participation in politics. The study therefore looks at women's experience in political parties, the use of women's agency as vote catchers using ideological platforms based on religious appeal, and the stand of different parties on the issue of reservation. The other area of formal participation included in the study is the legislative branch, both at the central and state levels.
Women's participation in formal political structures through the Panchayati Raj institutions (PRIs), or local self-government bodies, is another
The Ekatra research team consisted of Rasil Basu. Rekha Bezboruah, Jayanti Banerjee, Chanda Rani Akhouri. Meera Basu, Ghazala Khan, Sreela Das Gupta, and Mamata Dash.
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key area. A million women have entered these institutions of local government through the reservation of 33% seats, and another 4 million who contested were presumably mobilised in the process. The impact of this historic legislation on the bid of women for empowerment and participation in decision-making, both at personal and political levels, is an important area of enquiry. How far they have been able to create and hold their own space, and to what extent the existing political environment obstructs their functioning, have been studied.
This study also looks at:
l. The role of support structures such as women's organisations in empowering women to function with dignity and conviction within the existing patriarchal nexus of the ruling elite and political parties.
2. Women's negotiations of citizenship at a national level through.
constitutional guarantees, legal reforms and amendments, the women's movement and other movements within the informal system.
3
The roles played by family, religion, caste, other diversities or NGOs in promoting or obstructing women's political mobilisation.
From these experiences, an attempt has been made to identify how women understand governance, politics, government and the state, and to arrive at some insights on women's vision of a gender-just state, encompassing the grassroots experiences of the large mass of Indian women, as well as national level perspectives.
Methodology and sampling coverage
The North Indian states covered in the study are Himachal Pradesh (HP), Punjab, Uttar Pradesh (UP) and the National Capital Territory Region (NCTR) of Delhi. The study is not based on a statistically representative sample. Though small, however, the sample was selected on the basis of geographical and political characteristics. Three districts were covered in addition to the state capital in the states of Punjab and HP, six districts in UP and four zones in Delhi. These were determined on the basis of secondary data collection, preliminary visits to the states and interviews with experts in Delhi and in each state. Blocks to be covered in each district were selected in consultation with field teams.
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Research tools used
In order to derive the maximum possible insights different techniques were used in combination, viz. archival research, which provided the historical aspects of women's political growth, and field research conducted through interviews using checklists, questionnaires and focus group discussions. The vast size of the area to be covered and the time available for fieldwork did not allow for a sufficiently large sample that would be representative of all the varied and complex phenomena and issues to be examined.
Selected states: Broad characteristics
Himachal Pradesh
A small (55,673 sq. km.) mountainous Himalayan state, HP is sparsely populated (5.1 million) with a population density of only 93 persons per sq. km. The majority are Hindus (95.90%), followed by 1.72% Muslims, 1.01% Sikhs and 1.37% belonging to other religions. The Scheduled Castes (SC) ordalits comprise 25.3% and Scheduled Tribes (ST)4.2% of the population. Social indicators reveal that the status of women in Himachal is better than in many other states in India. The sex ratio, at 976 females per 1,000 males, is second only to Kerala. A 52.1% female literacy rate compares favourably with 25.3% in UP, although parts of HP, such as Sirmaur, are more backward with a female literacy of 38.45%. Caste differences exist, but without the violent schisms witnessed in UP. The rugged terrain affects the socio-cultural evolution of HP and its economy. Political processes in this relatively peaceful state are still governed by feudal mores, and the most consistent political careers are those of politicians from princely families. After the long reign of the Congress, India's oldest political party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has recently made inroads in Himachal on an anti-Congress rather than its own ideological stand.
2 State Profile 1991 India, Census of India: 1991, Registrar General and Census
Commissioner, India, New Delhi.
3 Ibid.
4 Set up in 1885, the Congress was in the forefront of the movement for independence,
and, after independence, assumed charge as the largest national political party, with Jawaharlal Nehru as the first prime minister. The Bharatiya Janata Party, successor of the Bharatiya Jan Sangh, a right-wing national political party, formed in the early 1980s. represents the conservative section of Hindu Society.
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The women of Himachal are the backbone of the economy, undertaking all arduous tasks related to agriculture, animal care and household chores including collection of firewood and fuel. With the majority of men migrating to the plains in search of employment, women's responsibilities increase. For the same reasons they enjoy greater decision-making powers, both at household and community level. Participation in formal political processes is, however, limited by their economic responsibilities and consequent lack of time.
The selection for the study included Shimla, the capital city, and the three districts of Kangra in lower Himachal, Kinnaur in the trans Himalayan sector and Sirmaur in the underdeveloped, inaccessible, agriculturally poor region falling in the rain shadow of Himachal Pradesh.
Punjab
Punjab, (50,362 sq. km.), the land of five rivers, with a population of about 20 million (four times the size of Himachal), and a density of 403, has witnessed the biggest agricultural success story in India, particularly following the Green Revolution. Punjab's population (excluding Chandigarh, which has a population of 0.64 million) consists of 62.95% Sikhs, 34.46% Hindus, 1.18% Muslims, 1.11% Christians and 0.3% other religions. The SC population in the state is 28.3%, while there are no STs on record. The survey data analyses the clubbed data for Punjab and Chandigarh.
The Akali Dal, one of the oldest regional parties formed in the 1920s, has struggled for the regional interests of the Punjab and the aspirations of the Sikhs. Although the Congress party continued to have a hold in Punjab up to the reorganisation of the state in 1966, its support declined thereafter and the Akalis provided an alternative. From 1983 to 1992 the political situation deteriorated in Punjab. Though elections took place, they were not reflective of popular aspirations and were followed by president's rule intermittently between 1977 and 1992: democracy was suspended for almost 15 years. The counter-terrorist measures undertaken by the state were equally repressive, and led to gradual alienation of the vast population that longed for peace and were inclined to vote for moderation. Although religion is considered a vital mobilising factor in Punjab politics, socio-economic structures dominated by the Jatlandlord class have influenced the politics of the state. Since 1985 a section of Harijans has shifted allegiance from the Congress to the newly formed Dalit Soshit Sangharsh Samaj Samiti, which has emerged as the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP).
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Despite its affluence and high HDI indicators, the status of women in this state is low: the sex ratio is 882, despite a female literacy rate of 50.4%, which is higher than the national average of 39.3%. The low sex ratio is reflective of the preference for the male child. Sex determination tests are increasingly used in Punjab, though there are rural and urban variations in their usage. The Green Revolution in Punjab, and subsequent technological development in agriculture, were instrumental in marginalising women economically, and therefore socially and politically. Only 6 women were elected to the state legislature, as compared to ill men in 1992. The sociocultural structure and patriarchal system have played a pivotal role in defining the status of women. Space for social interventions, for instance, of NGOs, is limited, and there are few women's organisations - with the exception of mahila mandals and the state level organisation, lstri Sabha.
The urban state capital, Chandigarh, along with Amritsar, Ludhiana, and Patiala were selected for study, being representative of three distinct geo-political regions of the Punjab.
Uttar Prattlesh
Uttar Pradesh, the second largest state in area, (294,411 sq. km.), and the most populous in the country (139 million), with a population density of approximately 473, is however one of the least developed states with a sex ratio of 879 and a low female literacy rate of 25.3%. The distribution of population by religion consists of 81.74% Hindus, 13.33% Muslims, 0.48% Sikhs and 4.45% other religions. The caste-group break-up of UP's population consists of 42% OBCs (other backward castes), 21% SCs, 0.2% STs and 20% upper castes.
Politically and historically UP has played a central role in national politics, with many eminent leaders of the independence struggle and of post-independence governments of the powerful Congress Party being from UP. Centre-state linkages were strong because of UP's importance informing the government at the centre. Thus gaining access to state power has been the main preoccupation of the people.
Recent years have witnessed the decline of the Congress in UP, and the rise of new political alignments of the jats, OBCs, and dalits, and the emergence and consolidation of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP). Future political alignments in UP are still unclear in the face of the continuing economic stagnation of the state. Caste polarisations are so acute that political parties are looking for new constituencies: the BJP, for instance, is trying to woo women and youth through various women-specific programmes. The
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BSP, however, does not have a women focus despite the leadership of Mayavati.
Sample areas have been selected prioritising key political and regional characteristics, with a concentration of survey areas in the eastern part of UP: Varanasi, Ayodhya (Faizabad), Amethi (Sultanpur), Akbarpur and Banda. Tehri Garhwal and Udham Singh Nagar (formed as a separate district in 1997 from the Nainital District) were the centre of the recent movement for a separate state, which was passed by the parliament in July 2000 - the state of Uttaranchal came into being in November 2000.
Delli
The city covers an area of 1,483 sq km., with a population of 9 million, and a density of 6,352. The sex ratio is 827, and the female literacy rate is relatively high at 67%. There are 83.67% Hindus, 9.44% Muslims, 4.84% Sikhs and 2.05% belonging to other religions in Delhi. The SC population comprises 19.1% of the population, and there is no indigenous ST population in Delhi apart from migrants.
As the capital, Delhi is the seat of the national government and of state representatives, and has been a centre of political activity for centuries. The presence of formal politics in the physical activity of political upheavals, the lobbying, negotiations and alliances of the political leaders and parties is palpable. Regional leaders have played very vital roles in national politics, as was in evidence when the central government was toppled (1999). Delhi has also been the centre for all negotiations with the government, representations of movements, platforms for decision-making and lobbying by NGOs, and the women's movement, e.g., the lobbying for 33% reservation for women in the parliament. A special characteristic of Delhi is the migration into the city and the semi-rural peripheral areas, with migrants looking at Delhi as the land of economic opportunity. This has led to the growth of urban unauthorised settlements that have, over the years, become important vote banks.
From being a union territory, Delhi became a state in 1998. Political, economic and social characteristics were key factors in the selection of the four urban zones of Delhi.
Sample characteristics.
A total of 1,166 questionnaires (partly structured and partly open-ended) were canvassed among 1,017 females (87.2%) and 149 males (12.8%), which
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comprised 803 general voters (68.9%), and 363 elected members (31.1%). 881 (75.6%) belonging to rural and 285 (24.4%) to urban areas. The details are given in Table 1 (refer Annexe).
The distribution of the sample by religion contained 882 (75.6%) Hindus, 24 (2.1%) Muslims, 16 (1.4%) Christians, 224 (19.2%) Sikhs and 20 (1.7%) Buddhists. This approximately follows the pattern of the respective StateS.
The caste-group distribution of the respondents was as follows: 101 (8.7%) scheduled castes (SC), 68 (5.8%) scheduled tribes (ST), 216 (18.5%) other backward castes (OBC), 759 (65.1%) general caste-groups (GEN) and 22 (1.9%) SC/ST (those with customs like the ST but officially declared as SC, as found in Kinnaur district of Himachal Pradesh).
Age of the respondents varied between 18 to 71 years. 16 (1.4%) were in the age group under 20 years, 2 l l (18.1%) in 20-29 years, 365 (31.3%) in 30-49 years, and 212 (18.2%) in 50 years and over.
The marital status of the sample was as follows: 1,009 married (86.5%), 98 unmarried (8.4%), 51 widowed (4.4%), 8 (0.7%) divorced/ separated.
The level of education of the respondents varied from illiteracy to post-graduate level. The average level of education was low, with 22.8% of the respondents being illiterate and 23.1% educated up to the primary level. There were however 12.1% who were graduates and above, with 2.3% having completed a masters degree.
Occupational distribution of the female respondents indicates that a majority of them (28.6%) were home-makers, while 832 respondents were engaged in different occupations. There were 26.2% agricultural workers, 16% labourers, 11.5% in the service sector, 9.7% in sewing and tailoring, and 8% teachers.
Historical overview
The first wave' of women's political participation and struggle for their rights dates back to the early 20th century, to the struggle for independence from colonial rule. Encouraged by Mahatma Gandhi, women began participating first in the movement for home rule (1916), then in the salt satyagraha and the civil disobedience movements. At the forefront were many illustrious women such as Annie Besant (who became president of the Indian National Congress), followed by other eminent women such as Sarojini Naidu, Kamla DeviChattopadhya, Raj Kumari Amrit Kaur, Lady PirojMehta, Aruna AsafAli and Durgabai Deshmukh.
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Three women's organisations (Women's Indian Association, All India Women's Conference and National Council of Women in India) presented a memorandum to the Second Round Table Conference in 932 to include in the new constitution adult suffrage and mixed general electorates. The Suggestion for reservation, nomination or co-option of women was rejected, as was the demand for total equality. A seminal document in the preindependence period was a report of the sub-committee (appointed by Nehru in 1939) on Women's Role in Planned Economy (WRPE). It argued that women should be considered as individuals and should have the same political, civic and legal rights, Social equality, economic independence and share equally in development as men.
After independence in 1947, with partition and its bloody aftermath of mass migrations and killings, the 1950s and 1960s were marked by a secular, pluralistic, multi-religious, multi-ethnic and culturally composite polity. This environment, and guarantees in the Constitution of India, benefited a certain section of women. Many middle class women entered the service and educational sectors. The government supported the spread of mahila mandals (women's groups) and programmes for women's 'upliftment, albeit from a social welfare perspective. The women's movement however experienced a lull in this period. The Indian National Congress party did not quite live up to its pre-independence promises. Disillusion came when the Uniform Civil Code, which would have ensured legal equality for all women, was shelved. Even the Hindu Code Bill was stalled until 1955-56, when watered-down sections of it were passed as four separate acts dealing with marriage, succession, guardianship, adoption and maintenance. Despite the outcry from some feminists and the resignation of Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar, the father of the Indian constitution, no action was taken on a Uniform Code.
The 'second wave of feminism or feminist activity started in the 1970s, inspired partly by the proclamation of 1975 as International Women's Year by the United Nations and the recommendations of the Mexico City Conference. The backdrop was of political ferment in the country in an era of centralised and often arbitrary governance. The findings of the governmentappointed Committee on the Status of Women in India' noted that, despite constitutional rights that guaranteed equality and power thereby negating the need for affirmative action, women continued to face inequality of status and power. While rejecting statutory reservations in legislative bodies, the Committee called upon political parties to adopt a definite policy regarding
6 India, Ministry of Education and Social Welfare. Towards Equality. Report of the
Committee on the Status of Women in India, Government of india, 1975.
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the percentage of women candidates contesting elections. The report came as a timely wake-up call, and confirmed the suspicions of activists regarding the deteriorating status of women.
It is to be noted that during much of the period (1967-1984) the country had at its helm a woman prime minister, Indira Gandhi. While she inspired many women and was regarded arole model even beyond India, as a politician in the patriarchal mould many of her policies and actions were contrary to women's interests. In fact in the male-dominated political sphere she was credited with being “the only man in her cabinet Paradoxically, the declaration of emergency and the suspension of constitutional and other rights in 1975, at the hands of a woman prime minister, led to a break in the fledgling women's movement and was instrumental in its taking a radical turn. Women became involved in the underground struggle against the establishment between 1975-77. When the emergency was lifted, there was a proliferation of women's grassroots organisations and other issue-based organisations in which women were active. As the women's movement grew and women's studies developed, there was increasing scrutiny of the relationship of women to the state, and of the nexus between social and political processes and the subordination of women. Scholarly research and writings pointed to the social construction of gender and its centrality to the scope of women's political activity. Emphasis was placed on empowerment through mobilisation on specific issues and with special attention to grassroots activity.
The 1980s were marked by religious revivalism and communal politics, leading to a rise in violence in both the public and private spheres, with a consequent adverse impact on women. The political Scene was dominated by the Punjab crisis and the rise of armed extremist groups carrying out terrorist acts in various parts of North India. Serious communal riots with political underpinnings also took atoll on women as the more vulnerable section of society. In the social sphere there was the increasing incidence of "dowry deaths and bride burnings, as well as the infamous Deorala sati case which revived the banned practice of immolating widows on their husband's funeral pyres. Women's groups were engaged in struggles and protests on all these issues, as discussed later in the study.
In the case of Muslims, the major issue became the Shah Bano case for maintenance under provisions of vagrancy in the Indian penal code. Despite lower court and Supreme Court judgments in favour of maintenance, there was widespread agitation by conservative Muslim elements for application of only Muslim personal law. The espousal of the issue by rightwing Hindu organisations did not help the cause of Muslim women. Under the circumstances, the secular women's movement was forced to shelve the
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demand for a uniform civil code once again. The act passed subsequently (Protection of Rights on Divorce) brought into focus how the state was prone to dispensing with gender concerns for partisan political gains. As fundamentalist forces grew, women became the site on which the conflicts over religious and caste identity and tradition came to be centred.
It has been noted that the articulation of people's identities along religious or communal lines was politicised by the ruling party in order to consolidate its power base with the Hindu majority. This was a change of tactics for the Congress, which had previously exploited the minority vote banks. Ironically, this also resulted in projection of the Hindu-Sikh, HinduMuslim and India-Pakistan conflicts as the causal factors of the Punjab problem. This has been termed by some as a turning point, transforming the nature of the state and the political process from secular to communal. It also eroded the broad framework of participation and citizen involvement that the party and, through it, the state had enjoyed so far. The shortsightedness of this policy became apparent in the gradual erosion of the power base of the Congress among minorities, especially in the politically important state Of UP.
The latter half of the 1980s saw increasing tension between Hindus and Muslims, with riots breaking out in various parts of the country. State communalism and majority communalism led to counter communalism by the minorities: the Sikhs, Muslims, and the depressed castes. As identity politics intensified, state policies under supposedly secular Congress governments were often directed towards getting the majority vote, rather than providing adequate protection to the minorities during communal riots against the Sikhs in November 1984 and against Muslims after the demolition of the Babri Masjid in December 1992, instigated by the right-wing Hindu organisations. The 1980s however also saw women make some gains in terms of development opportunities through state-sponsored programmes in different sectors, once the way was shown by private and non-governmental sources. It was a period when the women's movement matured and consolidated itself to face future challenges, as discussed later.
By the 1990s, the Indian polity was more fractured and polarised than ever as “mandalisation (based on caste identity) competed with communalisation (based on religious identity) as the driving force in politics. Reaction to centralised governance also meant the strengthening of regional identities and more power to regional parties, resulting in frequently changing
Kothari, Rajni. Communalism in Indian Politics, Rainbow Publishers Ltd., New Delhi, 1998, p. 44.
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coalition governments - with repercussions for political stability and continuity of policies. In the new millennium, women have to be prepared to deal with these issues and challenges as they aspire to an increased presence in politics and decision-making.
From the lessons learned over the past five decades, women can neither afford to disengage from the state nor to rely on it exclusively. They need to reinforce their own strength, organisation and mobilisation, gain access to the State and the formulation of public policy, and transform it into a genderjust and more equitable state.
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I
Political Participation of Women
In the context of women's engagement with the state and governance, and their formal participation in the decision-making processes, issues that arise are those of governance, representation and the role and nature of the state. Paradigms of state intervention and the capacity to intervene are conditioned by the structure of social relations and the nature and direction of the development process. An assessment of the roles, performance and problems of women who have made it to the decision-making bodies of the state, i.e., the central parliament and the state legislatures, will also highlight the need for state intervention and its limitations.
Issue of governance
The distinction between government' and governance', as well as between state and government, is often unclear. Most of the respondents in our survey, both men and women, generally equated 'state' with government', 'state' being too abstract a concept for them. It is therefore essential to define state as consisting of four essential elements, viz., territory, population, government and sovereignty, with government' being only one of the essential uomponents of the former. Understanding, participati ig in, or changing the nature of state power would therefore involve an analysis of participation in governmental functions or governance'.
Governance has been understood and defined both in a narrow and a broad sense. In its narrow sense it deals with technical, administrative and managerial issues that restrict its scope to a set of rules and institutions, or a system of public administration. In its broad sense it is a process of "democratic politics', which involves conflict resolution, negotiation and co-operation over the use, production and distribution of resources in a plural society. Participation and responsiveness in the process of government, transparency, accountability, assurance of human rights and safety and security to citizens, and the non-arbitrary rule of law are its essential attributes. In this sense governance is much broader than government'.
8 Guhan. S. World Bank on Governance: A critique, in Economic and Political Weekly,
24 January 1998, pp 85-90.
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The relationship between democracy, development and gender is paramount within the discourse on governance. If democratic participation is a necessary prerequisite of good governance, women need to participate and to be actively involved. Thus gender is a salient political factor in participation and representation. Feminists believe in the need for affirmative action for women and other disadvantaged groups in order to move towards significant equality. Liberal democracy, on the other hand, takes the individual as a basic unit in society, discounting differences between individuals. In India, however, where gender is all-pervasive, this can only reinforce gender inequity and inequitable structures and processes.’
International institutions, chiefly the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, are increasingly concerned with the role and the redefinition of the state." Very often when a crisis of governance is talked about, what is essentially meant is a crisis of governability. The World Bank's definition of governance is restricted to an economic role, a special set of policies towards it and the other essentially non-economic aspects, some of which have already been mentioned. Mohit Bhattacharya' enlarges the concept of good governance and issues arising therefrom, beyond the World Bank's narrowly conceived parameters, seeing it as an opportunity to redefine statesociety relationships and use issues around governance to search for new possibilities. However, in the present stage of globalisation the nation-state functions under great pressure emanating from IMF and World Bank conditionalities and the consequent Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) undertaken by the Indian state. These have created inequitable global links on the one hand, and, on the other, led to the feminisation of poverty for certain sections.' The gradual retreat of the welfare state in evidence, and the growing role of the market, would eventually reach a point where the state becomes subservient to the needs of the market. Policy instruments
9 Phillips, Anne. Must Feminists Give up on Liberal Democracy, in Anne Phillips, Democracy and Difference, Pennsylvania State University Press, Philadelphia. 1993, pp. 103-20.
o Sundaram. P.S.A.. On Governance: Balancing Gender Agenda with the National. in Women and Governance. final report, Women's Political Watch, New Delhi. 1997
Bhattacharya, Mohit. Conceptualising Good Governance; in T.N. Chaturvedi, ed., Towards Good Governance, Indian institute of Public Administration, New Delhi.
1999.
United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1998.
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would be used only to entice capital and undertake minimal social expenditure to provide safety nets and infrastructural services to make the regime viable.'
The interconnectedness of polity, economy, society, legal system, media, religion and culture provides the structural context, both national and international, for gender inequality.' Four broad categories of gender inequality are denial of human capabilities, economic opportunities, political power, and legal equality combined with inadequate social protection from violence.'
The role of the state in the context of SAP
The direct and indirect impact of SAP on women has been well documented. All this has affected women's access to infrastructure, employment under food for work schemes' or in industry, and food security, leading to greater vulnerability and exploitation. The above trends raise questions about the role of the state and state intervention. The women's movement has always had ideological differences about state intervention in favour of women. Some argue that, without the intervention of the regulatory and directive power of the state, the poor in general, and women in particular, will face an increasingly unequal competition for scarce resources like credit and productive resources (land, forest, seed, technology, training, etc.). This could easily weaken their struggle against vested interests.' Growing privatisation of communal property resources, such as forests, pastures, gram sabha lands, etc., have also led to women's increasing loss of assets. For example, forests that provided the greatest support to tribals, through access to minor forest produce for nutritional and market purposes, are no longer accessible to them. Connected with the question of assets is women's role in environment and natural resource management (see Part IV). It appears that although state intervention is necessary to protect women's interests,
3 Patnaik. Prabhat, International Capital and National Economic Policy', in Economic
and Political Weekly. Vol. XXIX, No. 12, 12 March 1994.
4. Rao. N., et al, eds., Sites of Change, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and UNDP, New Delhi
1996.
s Ghosh. Jayati, Human Development Report 1995: Considerations from an Indian
Perspective in Sites of Change, ibid.
6 Sharma. Kumud, Choices. Change and Challenge - Gender Issues and Dynamics of New Economic Policies in H. Swaroop and P. Rajput, eds., Women and Globalisation. Ashis Publication House, New Delhi. 994.
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sometimes these interventions appear insensitive and counter-productive. Apart from international pressures, the state's capacity and willingness to intervene are conditioned by societal factors as well.
State and society
The character of the state in India must be looked at by situating it within the socio-historical context, paradigms of state intervention and shifts in state strategy in different periods. The post-independence Indian state adopted a so-called modernistic, rationalistic ideology that would, it was presumed, gradually replace the traditional and irrational'." In fact the historical process of change was far more complex. The conflict between state and society in its basic organisation was a result of this dichotomous model, with the traditional exhibiting a surprising resilience. Institutions of parliamentary democracy are premised on the existence of a highly individuated society. In Indian society, however, most people lived according to social principles fundamentally opposed to individuation, being apt to act according to the membership of groups like castes, religious communities or linguistic blocs.
Trajectory of caste, religion and gender
Some of the enduring forms of social organisation in India are the key to understanding Indian politics. Two of these durable modes of identity are caste and religion. However, patriarchally ordained gender roles cut across both. Caste is essentially a system of power relations within society and social groupings, based on a hierarchy of social, political, cultural and economic relations. Originally a determining principle of Hinduism, the caste system came to pervade major religions such as Islam, Christianity and Sikhism. The caste system has also been one of the determining factors in the subordination of women. Sirinivas in his seminal study' spells out the increasing subordination of women by upper caste Hindu men. Surprisingly, in their aspirations towards upward mobility, lower castes have taken on the restrictions imposed on women of the upper castes.
The categorisation of castes is a complex phenomenon that varies from state to state. Persons are increasingly classified both as OBCs and as
7 Kaviraj. Sudipta, Politics in India, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1997.
8 Sirinivas, M.N., Caste in Modern India and Other Essays, Asia Publishing House,
Bombay, 1962.
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SCs or Dalits because of the quota reservations for them. In some states, for instance Punjab, backward class status is based on an income criterion so the caste factor does not seem to be as entrenched as in other states. Dalit Women are at the lowest rung of the ladder in terms of oppression and exploitation. Oppressed by caste and gender, they are also exploited by class. Conflicts around religion, caste and class have been about gaining power rather than challenging the nature of the state,' and community, caste and religion have now been politically activated as determinants of political power and Struggles.
in the growth of communal and regional politics that has challenged the territorial integrity of the Indian state, gender and class have been subordinated. Since women have figured as crucial markers of identity, state structures have also constructed, reproduced and selectively mobilised the multiple identities of women to serve particular agendas. The resurgence of identity politics in terms of caste and other socio-cultural diversities brings to the forefront the construction of gender and women's multiple identities. No clearer evidence is needed to see the role of the Indian state as gendered than the case of Shah Bano (see Part I). The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986, paved the way for excluding specific groups or communities from culpability for acts abetting crimes against women. It is no coincidence therefore that it was at this time that the demand for legalising sati was made.
Analysing the "complex and paradoxical relationship of women to politicised religion'," it has been observed that religious politics controls as well as affords opportunities for women's activism. Women's acceptance of religious nationalism contradicts feminist theory, while at the same time women have not allowed religious identity to overcome their multiple identities or their traditional roles, even while dissociating from them. Thus women such as Uma Bharati and Sadhvi Rithambra have played an activist role in communal politics, while others have opposed communal politics.
Scholars like Rajni Kothari and Amrita Basu point to the need to distinguish between movements for regional or linguistic identity, which in theoretical terms can be called 'nationality, and those for religious or communal identity. The former have followed a different trajectory from
9 Hasan. Zoya. Quest for Power. Oppositional Movements and Post-Congress Politics
in Uttar Pradesh. Oxford University Press. 1998. p. 3. 20 Basu, Amrita, in Patricia Jeffery and Amrita Basu, eds., Resisting the Sacred and the
Secular, Kali for Women, New Delhi, 1998,
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the latter - for instance, the Hindu nationalist movement. Movements of the former category were curbed in the name of national unity with disastrous consequences. Examples of these were the planned destabilisation of the Akali Dal (a regional Sikh party in Punjab) by Mrs. Gandhi after 1980, and the ouster of the Farooq Abdullah government in Kashmir. The militancy of Hindu nationalism was curbed when the state dealt firmly with it (under Nehru), and escalated when the state was accommodating it, e.g., under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao (also from the Congress Party). In the case of regional or linguistic identity movements on the other hand, once the centre is found to be accommodating relations improve. In Punjab, Kashmir and the North Eastern States, this repression and conflict have taken separatist or secessionist forms. In the case of the Muslims, the scheduled castes and backward classes it has paved the way for violent clashes. Piecemeal ameliorative measures rather than transformation of the system offer only temporary solutions, if any.
Issues of representation
A necessary prerequisite of good governance is participation and active involvement. Women need to participate and be active in decision-making and policy formulation. However, can women really participate equally with men? Do they have equal access to policy and decision-making bodies? Iris Young critiques existing democracy for its failure to recognise the importance of group differentiation of unequal social groups to give voice to women and the marginalised, and argues the need for affirmative action (i.e., reservations) for them.
The issue of reservations in general, and for women in particular, is fraught with problems and opposition by male vested interests, the most serious criticism being that it is undemocratic. The bottom line, however, is that it goes against the patriarchal construct of private/public spheres. It is feared that it will disrupt the system of male control in almost all political institutions, from village councils to parliament. The other difficulty is in determining the percentage of quotas, and quotas within the quota for the disadvantaged caste groups among women.
Questions are raised as to when horizontal participation leads to vertical participation. The experience of the Scandinavian countries indicates
2 Young, Iris, The laeal Community and the Politics of Difference', in Linda Nicholson,
ed. Feminism, Post-modernism. Routledge. London. 1990.
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that something changes when the threshold of a few is crossed. Research by Drude Dahlerup on the five Nordic countries established the threshold at 30-33% of seats.
Fifty years after independence, the most hotly debated issue of gender politics in India still continues to be that of reservations for women in parliament and state legislatures. Supported by women's groups and women parliamentarians, the 81st (now 84") Constitutional Amendment Bill seeks to reserve seats for women in the legislatures at the central and state levels. Since 1996, three successive governments supported the Bill guaranteeing at least 33% seats for women in parliament. Despite the fact that reservations have been included in the manifestos of all major political parties since the 1996 elections the Bill has met with resistance, and successive governments failed to get it passed or tabled in parliament in the years 1997-1998. When Prime Minister Deve Gowdatabled the Bill, the parties representing OBCs created a great uproar, demanding separate reservations. It was then referred to a Joint Select Committee headed by a woman member of parliament, which recommended that the Bill be passed as is and that reservations for OBCs and minorities be taken up for discussion later.
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee secured the support of left parties and Congress to reintroduce the Bill, but it was shelved because of similar opposition. The Janata Dal (Socialist) claimed that the 84th Amendment Bill had no provision for extra horizontal reservation for the OBCs or Muslims. Joined by Laloo Yadav's Rashtriya Janata Dal, Samajwadi Party (OBC), the Bahujan Samajwadi Party of dalits and large factions from within their own parties, the Congress and BJP backed down. With their own focus on the class struggle, the left parties were placed in a bind. The combination of caste, religion and gender came into the forefront in the discussion of the 81st Amendment, and also the 84th. It was the 27% of OBCs that were able to dictate priorities, as against the 49% of women. If passed, the Act would have revolutionised electoral politics. By this affirmative action, its provision of one-third votes for women (one-third reservation of existing SC/ST constituencies for women) would have meant 182 women MPs against the present 43. Its provision of one-third reservation of existing SC/ST constituencies meant there would have been 43 dalit or tribal women MPs. The fact remains, however, that caste rather than gender emerged as the
22 Begin. Monique. Towards a Critical Mass: Women in Politics, 12th J.P.Naik Memorial
Lecture. CWDS, New Delhi. 28th February 1998.
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most potent forum of mobilisation. An angry OBC MP asked, “Who has given you the right to put gender above caste?’
Women's political participation at the central and state levels
The validity of the 'critical mass theory is borne out by an analysis of the performance of women in formal structures. Few as they are, their presence has hardly made a difference on gender issues. Studies which have gone into statistical analysis of women's participation in the electoral process or in the executive, administrative, judicial and local governmental machinery have been based on the assumption that women would feel for and empathise with the problems and aspirations of all women. This is not necessarily true. A few token women representatives are not enough, nor is numerically impressive participation in the political processes, formal and informal, a goal in itself. Whether the political interventions which women seek to make start with women as points of departure, or merely help women to infiltrate systematically the existing hierarchies of power, is relevant. The extent, level and nature, as well as the impact and significance, of such participation for women's rights and living conditions, and the types of feminist issues taken up during the course of this participation, are important components of any proper assessment of women's political participation.
Proceeding with numbers, it is evident from Table 2 (see Annexe) that women do not have even 10% of seats in the parliament and state legislatures, and this has affected women representatives' effective intervention in such assemblies. One of the papers submitted for the 'Study of the Status of Women in India' mentioned that among the private bills and resolutions moved and debated in parliament, there were substantial contributions by women members: Rarely had any of these gone into the statute books but the principles behind them were accepted in many cases. In the first Lok Sabha, Uma Nehru, a member, introduced in 1951 a bill called Dowry Restraint Bill'. It was discussed in 1953 and many women members, such as Subhadra Joshi, Renu Chakravarty and Jayashree Raijee, supported it irrespective of party affiliations. Similar bills were introduced subsequently but they never came up for discussions and thus lapsed automatically.’
23 Misra, Sumit and Ansari, Javed, Scuttling the Bill', India Today, July 1998, pp. 27-32. 24 Saraswathi, S. Women Members of Indian Parliament, a paper prepared for the Indian
Council of Social Science Research, 1973.
25 Chopra, J.K., Women in the Indian Parliament: A Critical Study of Their Role,
Mittal Publications, New Delhi, 1993.
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In general the subjects on which women members spoke were wideranging and sometimes concerned with women's education, abduction of women, etc. Other studies have gone into women's performance as parliamentarians, ministers and opposition members.” What emerges from the discussions of the starred and unstarred questions asked or voting patterns in parliament is that not many women MPs took up the case of women's trials and tribulations. For example, in 1955, regarding the Hindu Succession Act, only one woman member (Maya Devi Chetty of the Congress party) voted for the amendment, whereas eight women MPs (seven belonging to Congress Party and one communist woman MP) voted against the amendment. In the sixth Lok Sabha (March 1977), concern was expressed about the sordid plight of young brides burnt to death for dowry. Some felt that women MPs were not doing enough and could do much more: the women's cause deserved special attention. Others stated that they had been elected by both men and women, and had therefore to rise above gender concerns. In the eighth Lok Sabha (January 1985), one woman member (Congress-I) felt that “the cause of women and injustice to them cannot be raised in a male-dominated society. Opposition women members' work also shows that though they might have been interested in questions and issues related to women, they mostly devoted their time and energy to more general problems, and espoused the cause of the opposition and of their own respective political parties.
The conclusion one can draw is that a strong advocacy of gender issues is only possible with certain preconditions: that women are represented in sufficient numbers, that they are gender-sensitised and that their male colleagues too are gender-sensitised.
The role of political parties
Political parties are the main instruments of participation, and voting within parliament takes place according to directions of party whips. On some of the important matters pertaining to women, e.g., Hindu Code Bill or Shah Bano case, voting took place along party lines. On the question of women's reservation (84th Amendment), however, there was some kind of unity across parties among women parliamentarians.
Insufficient numbers of women leading to their insignificant performance is due in part to political parties, which pay only lip service to
Bhatt, Shanta, Women Parliamentarians of India, Shiva Publishers and Distributors, Udaipur, 1995.
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women's participation. Their manifestos contain 33% reservations but do not get translated into practice when it comes to nomination of party candidates. Winnability of candidates seems to be a criterion forced on women aspirants, even though this is not borne out by facts as the victory rate of women is almost twice as high as male candidates (Table 2). Apart from the reluctance of political parties, there are other factors that hinder women's chances of winning even if they gain nominations. In a study sponsored by the National Commission for Women, some of the factors identified as helping or hindering women's participation are familial, economic (such as raising funds), political (support from party managers, cadres and volunteers), and, above all, the voters' attitude towards women candidates. Though it is true that there are social, economic and political factors responsible for a candidate's given performance, in the case of women candidates Socialisation and gender bias turn out to be additional ones.” The major barriers to women's political participation found by the study are the traditional structure of society and, by extension, the state and political parties. In Punjab, even where they were selected to stand for election women did not get full party support. Growing criminalisation and lack of money and muscle power compounded this. Political parties and their support base in a given constituency are important for winning elections. Therefore, unless parties encourage women's equal participation in their organisations and elections, it will be impossible to bring more women into decision-making levels.
In most of the interviews with women MPs who had apparently been nominated by their respective political parties, the 'caste factor was not articulated as a determining factor. However, an analysis of performance of women candidates suggests that caste is a factor in considering their candidature in a given constituency. It is interesting to find out how winnability of a candidate is established, or, in other words, the considerations for selecting a candidate. The profile of the electorate and the caste base of political parties are relevant parameters in this regard, as evidenced in the case of Rita Singh, the Congress(I) candidate for GhaziabadHapur constituency in 1996. A member of the Jat community, and without any political experience or background, her candidature was a surprise even to the local Congress leaders. In a traditional BJP stronghold over two previous elections, with only 1.5 lakh Jats in an electorate of 1.43 million. the election was fought on religious and communal, as well as caste, lines: the politics of Mandir and Masjid. Added to this was the fact that the
27 Kaushik, Susheela, Knocking At The Male Bastion, National Commission for Women,
New Delhi, 1997, p. 9.
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Congress Party's image had declined in this constituency. Singh did not even poll the SC votes, and women's issues were not mentioned at all.
The role of women in Punjab politics has been insignificant. Even in the state legislative assembly, the number of women is 7 in a house of 117. Akali Dal, BJP and BSP did not put up any woman candidates in the 1996 Lok Sabha elections. By giving 4 seats to women out of 13 in the state, the Congress in Punjab appeared to be the only party giving 33% of seats to women. Another study on Punjab by Pam Rajput identifies similar factors, namely lack of party support, money, political clout, and looking at the state and political parties as extensions of the traditional structure of society. She analysed the Ludhiana Lok Sabha constituency results where the two main contestants were widows, Jaswant Kaur, widow of the slain chief minister of Punjab S. Beant Singh, and Rajinder Kaur Bullara, widow of Prof. Rajinder Singh Gill. Denying a ticket to the sitting MP, Jaswant Kaur was given a ticket but she polled only the second highest number of votes. Nomination was literally thrust upon her at the age of 70, and although she was projected as Punjab Mata, the mother of Punjab, her husband's achievements were not eulogised sufficiently to make her win. Feelings of dissatisfaction among the local Congress politicians were the major impediment for her, though she came in as a widow. A large number of Congress (I) activists joined another political party, i.e., the Akali Dal (Badal), during the elections. Support from the national leadership was not enough, and even The sympathy wave did not translate into votes.' Rajinder Kaur Bullara, although an educated newcomer, did belong to a political family and contested on a wave of sympathy, her husband having been killed in a false encounter. Although she talked about 50% representation for women, both women largely bypassed women's concerns in their Ludhiana constituency.
Some key women in national politics
One of the most noteworthy developments in contemporary Indian political life is the emergence of a number of politically powerful, prominent women. Besides Sonia Gandhi, who nearly became the prime minister of India in 1999 when the BJP government lost its majority in parliament, there are Jayalalitha Jayaram, Mamata Banerjee, Mayawati, and Rabri Devi. Three of them, Jayalalitha, Mamata and Mayawati, are from among the most politically
28 Rajput. Pam and Swaroop. Hemlata, eds., Momen and Globalisation, South Asia
Books, New Delhi, 1994.
29 bid.
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important states in India. Sonia Gandhi is the president of the Indian National Congress, Jayalalitha is the leader of the AIADMK (All India Anna Dravid Munetra Kazagham) and former chief minister of Tamillnadu. Mamata Banerjee is the founder and leader of the Trinamul Congress party of West Bengal and member of the union parliament. Mayawati is a leader of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and was chief minister of Uttar Pradesh twice. Rabri Devi became chief minister when her husband, the then chief minister, was remanded to judicial custody on corruption charges.
To a large extent, the political moorings of each come from a political family or environment, by birth, marriage or other connections. Their upper class and caste backgrounds, except in the case of Mayawati and Mamata Banerjee (who, though a Brahmin, is not upper class), would appear to lend grist to the mill of all those who talk of the 'hahu-beti (daughter-in-law and daughter) and widow syndrome. With the exception of Mamata, all of these leaders rose to power conventionally on the strength of their associations with male leaders, but grew independently in stature with political experience and effective use of political strategy. Their individual profiles or popularity appear to be little affected by considerations of moral integrity and ethics, their appeal lying somewhere between feudal politics, caste politics, and realpolitik.
An analysis of recent political events reveals their importance to the political scene, their power bases, and the significance of their presence for women. In the prevailing framework of a coalition government at the centre and the importance of regional parties, three of them brought about the downfall of the eleven-month old BJP government. With the encouragement of Sonia Gandhi, Jayalalitha withdrew the support of her AIADMK party, which counted for 18 votes, from the ruling coalition government - thus forcing Vajpayee to look to other smaller parties to secure a majority. Mayawati, leader of the BSP, voted against the BJP, thereby bringing down the government. The president of India then asked Sonia Gandhi, as the leader of the opposition Congress Party, to secure the necessary majority to form a government. Despite her initial confidence Sonia was unable to stitch together a majority, thus necessitating fresh elections.
These women achieved power and prominence through diverse means, the most typical being their proximity to politically powerful men. Sonia Gandhi, the Italian-born widow of the assassinated Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, son of Indira Gandhi, heir to the Gandhi-Nehru dynasty, was drawn into the vortex of Indian politics despite her initial reluctance to accept public office. Until May 1999 she was the president of the Indian National Congress, resigning when three members of her party raised questions about her foreign
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origin. She had succeeded in injecting new vigour into Indian politics and uniting the faction-ridden, discredited Congress Party. Her resignation created protests from men, women and youth, demonstrations, and even hunger strikes and threats of self-immolation. As a result of nationwide demands from her office bearers and party members, she withdrew her resignation as party president, and the Congress Party expelled the three members who had questioned her suitability as prime minister. Her great appeal as a national leader is based on a combination of factors. In playing upon the notion that she relinquished her Italian citizenship and became an Indian, Sonia suggested that India could appropriate her foreignness and make her its own. In playing on her role as the dutiful daughter-in-law, she highlighted her closeness to Indira Gandhi, suggesting also that she was a more appropriate heir to the chair than Maneka Gandhi, who was the 'bad' daughter-in-law. It associated her with the mantle of power, and appealed to youth in the same way that Rajiv Gandhi did.
Maneka Gandhi, the other daughter-in-law of Mrs. Gandhi, widow of Sanjay Gandhi, the younger son, has been very active politically, and involved in politics and other issues such as tribal rights, the environment, bio-genetics, animal rights, etc. She has been a minister of state in several ministries at the centre. However, being independent and assertive, she was not the favoured daughter-in-law of Mrs. Gandhi. Her image in the country suffered accordingly, and she was not projected for the top ministerial positions, let alone the role of prime minister.
Jayalalitha is another key player in the present political configuration. A former actress and long-time associate of M.G. Ramachandran (MGR), actor-turned-politician, she was inducted into politics in 1981 and became a Rajya Sabha member in 1983. In 1991, Jayalalitha became chief minister of the southern state of Tamilnadu. Despite charges of corruption in several court cases against her, she continues to have a sizeable following. She withdrew support from the Vajpayee government when the central government refused to dismiss the state government, which was pursuing corruption charges against her. Like Sonia, Jayalalitha rose to power because of complex familial connections with a politician. Jayalalitha suggests that there are varied routes to upward mobility, not only through institutional channels but also through more informal ones.
Mayawati was supported by Kanshi Ram, supremo of the BSP, and, for two terms, the chief minister of the populous and key state of Uttar Pradesh, which was the stronghold of the Congress formany years and more recently of the BJP and BSP. It is significant that a woman, and a dalit at that, was able to bring down the BJP government run predominantly by upper-caste men.
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A possible reason for this phenomenal growth of women's political leadership is due to the system of coalition governments, in which regional and caste-based parties have played a crucial role. These coalitions have provided opportunities both to women as well as to other under-represented groups to be represented at the centre and to influence policy. Some political scientists have described this as India's resurgence of democratic politics, signified by the entry of lower castes into politics, which applies equally to
WOmmen.
Women leaders provide important role models for the electorate. In the course of our interviews in UP, a number of women said that although Mayawati had not done anything for them, they were inspired by her example. “If she has made it, we can too, they stated. Many women commented on how Sonia's gestures and mannerisms reminded them of her mother-in-law, Indira, including her wave of the hand. Although most of these women have not taken up the question of gender equality, Sonia made a commitment to reserving 33% seats for women within the Congress Party structure. This is yet to be implemented, as was caustically reiterated by a woman activist during an interview. Jayalalitha is the only woman leader who has implemented 33% reservations for women at every levelofparty organisation in her AIADMK party. The differences in the styles of these women suggest that politically prominent women need not conform to a single model of womanhood, namely the devout and dutiful mythological Sita figure. Indeed it is striking that they have no male relatives who rival their dominance. Their styles are also strikingly different from one another. At one end of the spectrum is the elegant, sophisticated, cosmopolitan Sonia Gandhi, who is so versatile and adaptable that she wears the clothing of the region she is visiting. At the other end is Mayawati, whose salty language and bluntmanner rival that of her most vitriolic opponents. A recent analysis of the styles of Jayalalitha and Mamata Banerjee highlights the similarities and effectiveness of the two leaders. Both have exhibited courage and political acumen in getting the better of their opponents as well as of the government at the centre. Despite their admirable courage in maintaining their political stance, the lack of a gender-sensitive and secular political ideology does pose questions about women's leadership.
30 Phillipose. Pamela, Indian Express, 9 October 2000, p. 5.
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II
Women's Experience in Local Self Government
Historical background
Panchayati Raj (PR) or local self-government has existed in India among village communities since ancient times. The assembly offive (panch) elderly males constituted the core of the village's administrative, social and judicial structure. These little republics', as they have been referred to, could be viewed as centres for local democracy. However, given the rigid caste demarcations of rural Indian society, the panchayats would inevitably reflect existing local power structures, as is the case even today. The British established the panchayats as representative institutions accountable to the electorate.' By 1920-25, various provinces had passed Panchayat Acts giving them statutory status, although with limited jurisdiction. It is a sad commentary on India's national commitment to democratic decentralisation that, despite a history of the village as the basic unit of administration, the first draft of India's constitution did not find a place for panchayats in it. The muchdebated absence of panchayats resulted in the addition of Article 40 to the constitution, directing the states, of the union to set up village panchayats as units of local self-governance.
Panchayati Raj and women
Very little is known about women in panchayats, which appear to have been mostly male-dominated institutions. The Balwant Rai Mehta Committee, which reviewed, in 1957, the Community Development Programme of 1952, was the first to recommend women's representation with the co-option of two women members. This tokenism was noted in the report of the Committee
3. Metcalfe, Sir Charles, Imperial Gazetteer of India, 1909, Vol. IV, pp 278-79. 32 Ripon Resolution, 18 May 1882. 33 Mathew. George, Panchayati Raj. From Legislation to Movement, Concept Publishing
Company, New Delhi, 1994.
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on the Status of Women in India that recommended the establishment of statutory women's panchayats at the local level, with an integral connection to the gram panchayats (GPs). The Committee observed that rural women's lives, contributions and perspectives were never given weight in development policies and plans. The Committee's recommendation was based on a concern for better attention to women's needs, whereby the panchayats would respond to rural women's critical needs - of literacy, education, legal rights, access to health care, new earning opportunities, and wage discrimination, etc. The committee felt that such an approach would protect women's interests, reduce rural women's social handicaps and provide channels for genuine women leaders to emerge from the grassroots. The recommendations were shelved and important Subsequent reports (such as the Ashok Mehta Committee Report) neither debated the CSWI recommendation nor took it up.
With the growth of the women's movement, the expanding debate on mainstreaming women in development, and the government's growing recognition of the need to integrate women into national plans and processes, a new consciousness emerged on women's participation in political processes. Women's organisations, debating the National Perspective Plan on Women (1988), made a strong case for elected representation of women, especially of poorer sections, SC and ST women, to ensure the emergence of grassroots level leadership and to open an opportunity for their participation in the political process. The panchayat structures offer an institutional mechanism for planning from the grassroots at district, block and village levels, reflecting the aspirations and priorities of the people, especially women. Primarily units of socio-seconomic development, the panchayats were delegated responsibility for 29 development schemes in different sectors (11th schedule of the Indian constitution). However it depends on the State Panchyati Raj Acts as to how many of these subjects are given to panchyats in that particular State.
The 73" and 74th Amendments to the constitution, reserving 33.3% of seats for women at panchayat level, were a response to the on-going debate and the agency of the women's movement. Unlike the controversy over the 81 (now 84th) Amendment Bill, the PR legislation was passed with little dissension. Despite there being no opposition to the unanimous passing of
3. Op. cit., see Footnote no. 6.
35 Mazumdar, V., Why Reservation for Women in Panchayats?’, Background Paper,
CWOS. New Delhi. 1974.
36 Op. cit., see Footnote no. 6.
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the Bill, many doubts have been expressed on several counts. These cover the usual objection at the family level, that women's participation in public life and community leadership would affect the family, and women would become targets of public calumny and violence outside the protection of the family. While elected women representatives (EWRS) have had to contend with such situations, the more serious issues concern their effectiveness as women elected members and their capacity to prioritise gender issues and bringing about social change. Women, it was felt, being illiterate, would be unable to cope with manipulative politics. There was also opposition to reservation of seats, particularly for chairpersons' positions, the post being associated with the opportunity for abuses of power and financial benefit.
Even before these Amendments, women in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Maharashtra contested elections, were nominated to reserved seats and functioned in the panchayats. In all-women panchayats, women were unanimously nominated because men did not wish to create controversy or expose women to contests. However, studies have pointed out that the presence of women members has made a difference to decisionmaking processes and prioritisation of women's needs.
Women have given priority to issues such as safe drinking water, installation of pumps, construction of toilets and village wells and roads, appointment of teachers and the closing of liquor shops. There were instances, as in the Vitner village of Jalgaon District (Maharashtra), where women had playgrounds built, land transferred to 127 women from their husbands' share and toilets constructed in the SC areas. Conscious of their increasing housework and the need to save energy and have some free time, the women in Pidghara (Madhya Pradesh) went for a 27-point action plan that undertook the building of educational and other community-based infrastructure. The experience and action agenda of the seven-member panchayat of Brahmanghar of Pune district was similar. Similar findings also emerged from an earlier EKATRA study. More than 50% of the 300 EWRs who were surveyed for the study showed that despite various constraints they were committed to fulfilling their functions as GP members. The most
37 Kaushik, Sushila, Why Women in Legislatures, at the Meet of Parliamentarians
organised by National Commission for Women. 19 November 1996. 8 EKATRA. Women in Panchayati Raj in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. A
Research Action Project for Maximising Participation. EKATRA, Society for Development Alternative for Women, l l Amrita Shergil Marg, New Delhi, unpublished, 1996.
304

empowered, effective and committed EWRs were those involved in some form of development work, either through mahila mandals, as members of NGOs or as functionaries of government programmes. This group indicated a high potential for motivation and effective participation given adequate training and support. Contrary to expectations, not more than 31% of the sample was in positions of proxy candidates, whose husbands or male relatives acted as the de facto members in the panchayats.
Findings from the study
In the North Indian states covered in the present study, elected members had not been in place long enough to make an adequate assessment of the impact of their presence in the panchayats. However, on aspects such as the level of political awareness and participation, mediating factors affecting their political participation and obstacles faced by them, the findings emerging from the present study are similar to those of previous studies. The sample consisted of 363 elected members out of the total sample of 1,166 respondents from among the general voters.
Political awareness
In order to gauge the level of political awareness among EWRs, questions in the survey covered awareness of reservation, participation in voting and panchayat activities. Among representatives of Panchayati Raj institutions (PRs), levels of political awareness varied depending on the political issue. A little more than half the sample (56%) was aware of the basic issue of reservations in PRIs (Table 3). This was despite the fact that the respondents were aware that they had been elected to reserved seats. In HP, which has not seen many political disturbances and upheavals, 59% of the sample was aware of the issue of reservation. In some areas of HP, NGOs have made an effort to generate awareness on this issue. In UP only 42.2% of the sample was aware of reservation. In contrast awareness in Delhi was 77%, while in Punjab it was 70.3%, even in the absence of NGOs.
Political participation
In their capacity of voters, political participation of women is extraordinarily high (91% of the respondents). The largest proportion of the respondents who voted were in HP (96.7%), followed by UP and Delhi(91%), and Punjab (85%). Most women, and particularly those in UP, were found to be extremely
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aware of their own importance as potential vote banks for parties, and of their power to elect or reject a government.
Another indicator used to assess political participation was the attendance at panchayat meetings. A very large number (93.4%) of the sample attended these meetings (Table 4). Similar to the findings of Ekatra's previous study' on PRIs, only about 30% of the EWRs were proxy, that is to say that the decisions for these women were made by men, either from among their family members or from the particular political coterie amongst the other elected members in the panchayat. At times they were not even consulted on crucial decisions. The husbands spoke on their behalf on all issues. In the absence of their husbands, however, the women appeared to be quite aware of various issues, although they openly stated that their political decisions depended entirely on their husbands. While the problem of proxy' candidates in PRIs is real, there are several aware, strong, articulate and politically active women elected to the PRIs. These women, with or without party backing and against all odds, have succeeded at various levels in making a difference.
Not only economically deprived women suffer from handicaps. Women's political participation can be affected even if they belong to prosperous families. A brief study of three villages' from one of the prosperous districts of Western UP points out that reservations alone cannot change the status of women in the family and society and thereby ensure their participation in local bodies, even if they belong to the majority caste groups. All the women pradhans in the sample villages belonging to betteroff families said that they had agreed to contest due to family pressure and because there was a competition among dalit families for the post of pradhan. In reality, the husbands of these pradhanis met to take decisions. However, even contesting for the election and becoming pradhanis has made a difference in their lives, as it has made them realise that it is their illiteracy that prevents them from playing a more active and responsible role in public affairs.
Panchayat activities
The field data from the surveys indicates that despite initial problems due to
lack of PRI training, and knowledge about duties and functioning powers, exposure and illiteracy, and the barriers of patriarchy, caste and class divides,
39 Ibid. 40 Pai, Sudha, Pradhanis in New Panchayats: Field Notes from Meerut District in
Economic and Political Weekly, 2 May 1998, pp. 1009-100.
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many women have been able to mobilise energies towards improving infrastructural facilities for the village. Very few, however, have been able to address gender-specific problems. In an exceptional case, in the village of Kathma, Kangra District (HP), building and repairing of roads was specifically taken up to alleviate the burden on women, who had to walk 4045 kms. in order to obtain saplings from the block office. Women PRI members were more gender-sensitive than their male counterparts in helping widows to receive their pensions. In Punjab and HP, this role of the women pradhans and sarpanches was highlighted in special interviews and focus group discussions. Conflicts in panchayats on gender issues have mainly occurred around the problem of alcoholism, particularly in HP. To combat this, women continue to use the support bases of mahila mandals and local NGOs.
Caste, diversity and women's political participation
The key factors confronting politics in north India are related to caste and other social differences. Two cases from Uttar Pradesh, namely that of the president of Zilla Parishad, Sultanpur district, and of a municipal councillor from Banda, bring this into sharp focus. Both elected members were harassed by the party in power and forced to face no-confidence motions on charges of corruption and misuse of power. The former was not even sworn in for six months, and facilities such as an office vehicle and telephone were withdrawn. The main reason cited by both women was that they belonged to backward castes. Their election to positions of public: office and power occasioned political jealousy on the part of other politicians who also controlled government officials, making them uncooperative and unsympathetic. The women felt that their contribution to their constituencies and hard work would help them to gain the support both of opposition party members and of upper - caste Hindu women. One of them felt that political parties are working to remove SC and OBC municipal councillors and chairpersons from their positions, so that women and wives of high caste Hindu politicians could be elected and the nexus of corruption re-established in the municipality. In support of her argument that caste and class prove to be impediments in political participation, she cited the case of Chunni Devi, a dalit, illiterate, landless road-building labourer who was doing good work as a pradhan in providing amenities in her area but was removed on charges of corruption. A telling comment by one of them was that 'all politicians had a price ... with politics restricted to salt, onion and oil. She also strongly believed that intelligence and awareness were two factors, which, along with education,
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helped women to fight back. In a parallel situation from Kangra in HP, three respondents who joined politics while at college felt that caste played an important mediating role in formal politics, particularly in obtaining “winnability for tickets. They felt that SC women had to face a lot of hostility, while religion and ethnic identity were not as important.
The following case study' is poignantly illustrative of the situation of dalit women in the political arena: a Zilla Parishad member in Chandauli District of UP won the last ZP elections with the highest number of votes in the state. Yet she remains an untouchable with the upper social strata since she was born a dalit. She explained her lot with rancour:
The victory would have been real if my supporters and co-workers had accepted the sweets I handed out to them on my winning the elections. They did not, because I am a dalit. It made me realise that after all these years of political activism, I continue to carry the untouchable tag. What really hurts is that people come to me with their problems, seek my help, vote for me, and still consider me an untouchable.
The first Muslim woman chairperson of the Rudrapur municipal corporation faced great obstacles even in implementing a government-launched cleanliness drive, mainly because her political party was not in power in the state. As a result, she formed a women's organisation, the Terai Mahila Vikas Sansthan, through which she could undertake development work with some autonomy.
Other case studies have reported that many women sarpanches have had to face no-confidence motions, especially in UP. Misuse of the provisions for a no-confidence motion by socially privileged, elected members against women sarpanches and pradhans and against those from reserved categories' is widespread. A comparison of the incidence of no-confidence motions in the states examined under this study shows a clear caste/class/gender intersection. Women from SC and OBC categories have faced a larger percentage of such motions and, therefore, the number of such motions has been found to be greater in districts with higher SC reservations. In this respect, women are said to be sharing the problems with male representatives
4. Institute of Social Sciences, Panchayati Raj Update, institute of Social Sciences,
New Delhi, January 1999. 42 Buch, Nirmala, From Oppression to Assertion: A Study of Panchayats and Women
in MP Rajasthan and U.P. CWDS (Centre for Women's Development Studies), Unpublished Report. New Delhi. 1999.
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of their caste. To provide a safeguard against connivance, an enactment has been passed in Madhya Pradesh declaring that if any sarpanch had to resign due to a no-confidence motion, then the officiating Sarpanch would have to be from the same social category. This provision needs to be replicated in other states.
Other factors mediating political participation
Respondents were asked about reasons for contesting elections, and whether they belonged to a family with a political background. Personal motivation emerged as the most important driving force influencing both their entry and survival (Table 5), as observed by more than half the women (51.3%) who contested elections. They are politically sensitive and wish to fight for women's rights, development of their areas, and against corruption. Similar responses were obtained from the special category of politically active women interviewed in UP and HP, particularly in the Kangra district. Personal motivation was an important factor even among women from conservative families. In one case, a member from a conservative Muslim family had fought against great odds, including the family, to empower herself. Even bureaucrats and lawyers who were interviewed endorsed this. Rampant alcoholism in the state, which affected the family as a whole and women in particular, brought women forward to participate in political decision-making through the opportunities provided by the PRIs.
Community support, both unanimous and partial, was also found to be a very important factor. Man women stated they contested elections because the people asked us to. A common practice for PRI elections is for the community to take the decision together. Women candidates are often selected from families with a past political history, such as from families of ex-sarpanches. In fact, a large part of this support is from vested interest groups and political coteries. This often means that the women themselves have very little role to play in these and future decisions.
Reservation of seats (18.1%) was the third reason cited. Through the constitutional amendments, the state has provided women with a public platform for decision-making, thereby playing an important mediating role. Reservation of seats has worked in two ways: (i) male members have used women, putting them up as proxy candidates, and (ii) it has created space for women's leadership for politically alert women. In many cases, women have come to power simply on the strength of a 'reserved seat' by taking advantage of the opportunity.
Family support of EWRs plays an important role in controlling their
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political careers. Reservation has enabled families with a political background to be at an advantage in continuing the family legacy by putting up their women members as candidates for the PRIs and thereby retaining power within the family. These erstwhile feudal landlords, who emerged as a class of established local rulers, thus continue to exert their influence on the rural masses. While these EWRs are more often than not proxy candidates, even the people appear to have greater confidence in women of such families. In our sample, 32.2% of EWRs were from families with a political background. The largest proportion was found to be in HP (54.9%). In UP, in particular, the family has provided the most critical support to the EWRs. Many special interviews indicate strong support, especially from husbands. In HP (Kangra), women actively involved in formal political structures at the local level as ZP members, aged 25-34 years, have stated that family support has been one of the most important mediating factors in overcoming gender biases.
Obstacles to women's political participation
Systemic and socio-economic factors appear to affect EWRs at all tiers of government machinery. The nature of problems are varied, such as lack of time due to domestic responsibilities, socio-cultural norms limiting mobility, patriarchal control discouraging women from coming into conflict with men, etc. In answer to the question as to whether any problems were faced in functioning as an EWR, the initial response was negative (83.7%). Such a response may be governed by maily factors which in turn merely reiterate the real problems women face: (i) no interaction with the panchayat and other relevant officers; (ii) inactive or proxy member; (iii) an internalisation of socially defined gender roles, and an inherent acceptance of patriarchy, caste and class barriers; and (iv) non-articulation and inability to identify obstacles. Further probing, reinforced by focus group discussions and special interviews, however, encouraged articulation of actual obstacles faced by many of the EWRS. These included obstructions from one's own political party, and open hostility or ridicule from government officials.
Illiterate women especially have articulated lack of education as an important factorhampering women's political participation. In contrast, some educated urban women perceive illiteracy as having an advantageous aspect. Chairperson of Jaunpur ZP, Kamala Singh, who faced hostility from her husband in discharging her duties, felt that it is different, and perhaps the situation is better for illiterate rural women who get support from husbands precisely because they are illiterate. While some of the most active and
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articulate EWRs are highly educated, (for instance in eastern UP, some of the ZP or municipal corporation members are college lecturers) other women are illiterate, but have a long history of political activity in movements related to environment and alcoholism. Such women, when elected to power, do not allow lack of education to intimidate them. They have, however, articulated the need for education to enhance their capabilities.
Thus, to reiterate, reservations have provided millions of women with the opportunity to contest the elections. While many women are proxy candidates, propelled and controlled by males in the family who having enjoyed power for years are loath to give it up, others have risen to the occasion. These women, some of whom have also contested from unreserved seats, have had to fight against great odds Such as violence, slander and corruption at the time of election. Post-election obstacles include the complexities of local manipulative politics, compounded in some cases by the bureaucracy's reluctance to give up power and delegate financial powers and funds to the panchayats, or to provide back-up support to the elected women. The key issue emerging here is twofold: on the one hand, how best to empower women to meet the challenges offered by the PR legislation, and, on the other, how best to sensitise the existing political environment to enable women to utilise the opportunity offered.
Ibid.
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IV
Women’s Interface with the State: Negotiation of Citizenship
Since the 1970s the women's movement, fuelled by diverse groups and individuals and supported by new research findings and analysis on gender issues through women's studies, has been the chief instrument of women's negotiation of citizenship. This process or women's agency has been varied and multi-pronged, in tune with the diversities of women's identities, affiliations and circumstances. Shedding its urban bias it sought a wider focus, particularly seeking to impact policy at the grassroots. Despite some broad-based and very focused campaigns on issues such as price rises, domestic abuse and other forms of gendered violence, women's struggles have largely been autonomous, premised on local issues prioritised by women of the area. On occasion, women have also joined hands across regions and states to fight for a common cause.
The post-colonial state's failure to ensure equity to women as citizens led women's struggles to focus on their entitlements from the state. While activists such as Gaura Devi and Radha Bhatt from the western UPhills advocated greater community initiative and less dependence on the state, others felt that the state could not be absolved of its responsibility in meeting citizens' needs and requirements. Holding the state accountable became imperative in view of, for example, the new national population policy. The original demand for family planning measures came from the women's movement, but when the issue was taken over by the state policies veered towards coercive and external methods detrimental to women. At times state policy has had counter-productive implications for women. For instance, when the Chipko Movement for women's rights over forest produce drew international attention, this internationalisation of the movement led to a forest policy that declared forests a natural reserve, thereby denying access to women.
44 Banerjee, Nirmala and Mitter, Swasti, Women making a meaningful choice; Technology and New Economic Order', in Economic and Political Weekly, 19 December 1998, pp. 32-54.
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In the process of struggle women have targeted sites not only in their exclusive interests, but also in the interest of the wider community. For example:
l. Legislation: on social practices such as dowry, domestic violence,
rape, custodial rape, divorce and maintenance.
2. Economic rights: minimum wages, equal pay for equal work, recognition of women's economic role and its reflection in national statistics, employment guarantees, the rights of self-employed workers (as most women belong to this category), control of price rises, credit facilities, pensions, land rights, etc.
3. Support services: for health care, including reproductive health and
education, for women and for children.
4. Environment: access to and conservation of natural resources such as forests, common lands and water on which women depend for carrying out their basic responsibilities as homemakers and for protecting the environment for the future.
Identified by different groups of women in specific contexts, these issues were taken up through mass movements, protests, campaigns, lobbying, advocacy and pressure groups, all of them constituting non-party political action beyond voting rights exercised by the mass of Indian women.
Grassroots initiatives
As referred to earlier, the anti-alcohol issue, taken up by rural women's movements with support from NGOs or individuals, was most vigorous in Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, and parts of western Uttar Pradesh, while environmental protection and conservation movements were strongest in the hill districts of HP and UP.
The anti-arrack movement in AP, spearheaded by the left-wing Progressive Organisation of Women (POW), prompted women in other states to support the cause which ultimately led to the fall of the state government. In HP and UP, women have been negotiating on problems centred on alcohol consumption as well as environmental and conservation issues such as the Chipko Andolan, which inspired similar campaigns in other states. In Kangra, the mahila mandals have come together and waged a long battle with the
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government on the alcohol issue. Plans to set up a liquor shop and pub next to a School led to the women's demand to stop the plans and for non-renewal of licenses of existing liquor stores. They faced great opposition from powerful lobbies of men in the area including the district collector (DC), who renewed the pending licence. The support of the youth, however, strengthened the movement, inspiring the women to resume their struggle with hopes of greater sympathy from the new woman DC. Similar movements have also occurred successfully in other parts of the hill areas, such as Sirmaur, where the DC ordered a liquor store in a panchayat to be shut and the mahila mandal pradhan secured the assistance of the police to stop alcoholism by collecting prohibitive fines.
One of the earliest struggles concerning environmental issues was regarding limestone quarrying, taken up by women in Kumaon (UPhills). In Sirmaur (HP), Kinkari Devi spearheaded a movement protesting against limestone mining in an area that was already denuded of forest cover. Mining had caused further environmental imbalance, the drying-up of rivers and disappearance of pasture land. In the course of her struggle, Kinkari Devi had to take on the state, the community, private businessmen and vested interest groups. Her struggle took on national importance when she filed a petition in the Supreme Court. She also appealed to the NGO Forum at Beijing in 1995. Her opponents, however, have managed to wean away her support base mostly by buying people off.
Shimla (capital of HP), an urban area, has also witnessed women's mobilisation around environmental issues. Their demands have included access to potable water and banning of plastic bags, the latter being acceded to recently by the HP government.
There has been recurring demand by the mahila mandals in these areas for developmental programme funds. Women have negotiated at the level of panchayats, the block development officer (BDO), DC, etc. All the movements have overwhelmingly demanded answerability and transparency from the state and its institutions, indicating awareness and perception of their rights and their expectations from the state. It is premised on an understanding that the state has a duty to ensure that its citizens' rights and dignity are not violated by its own laws or by other citizens, even those belonging to powerful groups. It also implies an assumption that people, i.e., citizens, have a right to mediate and have a say on issues that concern them directly.
Mobilisation by women around survival issues has highlighted such development issues as issues of human rights. As Gabrielle Dietrich points out, women have been much more willing to mobilise and act in the public
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sphere on issues that touch their practical gender needs and also have social sanction. However, for most women at this level survival is a way of life and a daily grind that leaves them time for little else. In Kinnaur, an isolated pocket of HP, where women shoulder the entire burden of economic production besides their social responsibilities, they were unwilling to take on the additional task of formal participation in panchayats. Mobilisation and struggle needs to be a continuous process and vigil in the face of the constant threat of marginalisation by the powerful lobbies and vested interests of business in nexus with the representatives of the state itself.
Issues and outcomes
Violence and the uses and limits of law
An issue uniting women across categories is gendered violence, inspiring some of the most broad-based campaigns focused on different types of violence, namely dowry deaths, rape, domestic abuse, custodial violence and, more recently, political and caste-based violence. Women have taken up these demands with the state for legislation or changes in existing laws, better law-enforcement, better facilities and protection. The Mathura rape case involving the rape of a woman in custody was one of the earliest mass campaigns of women. Large-scale mobilisation resulted in the enactment of a law on custodial rape where for the first time in Indian jurisprudence the onus of proof of innocence was put on the accused. This campaign and others related to dowry deaths generated strong support from women in urban centres like Delhi and Mumbai, and also drew out rural women who faced the threat of gender-specific violence in their daily lives. Sustained campaigns and protests also led to a new enactment on dowry, although the new law did not fully meet women's expectations.
Feminist analysis has brought out the complex relationship between the state and civil society and how women have tried to negotiate the boundaries of both. Noting that society and state are both influenced by patriarchal values, and that atrocities against women are used as instruments of political action (e.g., state response in Shah Bano case and Deorala sati case), the law was found to be one of the most powerful instruments to support women's causes. Demands for strengthening and reforming laws, therefore, have been a major focus. A statutory National Commission of Women, a
45 Dietrich, Gabriele, "Can the Women's Movement Become An Anti-Communalist
Force?' in Lokayan Bulletin, Vol.4. No. 6, 1986, pp. 44-58.
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watchdog body overseeing legal provisions with respect to women as well as women-related policies, has supported this. Since its establishment the Commission has taken up several individual cases of gender-based violence or infringement of rights, and has also investigated major atrocities against women, as in the riots following the demolition of the Babri Masjid. The Commission's impact, however, has been constrained by limitations in its constitutional mandate. In spite of these initiatives, an emerging clarity is that legislation that can reflect desired social values, provide a framework for change and be a tool in women's struggles, is not sufficient to actually bring about that change. Legal reform has so far failed to eliminate the structure of Subordination deeply rooted in Social institutions. To women's dismay, although the judiciary gave some favourable judgments in cases related to dowry deaths and custodial rape, the effects were nullified by later judgments that reversed the prior rulings. Evidently patriarchal values are pervasive in both the public and private spheres, and need to be addressed if women are to step out of the boundaries that confine them.
Research and policy initiatives
Women's studies, which emerged as a specific academic discipline drawing on other social sciences, has made an important contribution in the area of women's development and recognition of their economic roles and contribution. The nationwide survey by the Committee on Status of Women in India (CSWI report) has been considered a watershed for the women's movement, and, as a state-sponsored document, became a major instrument for negotiations with the state by both activist and advocacy groups. Among other significant research projects were those bringing out the strong incidence of female-headed households especially among poor communities, thus challenging the assumptions of planners who allocated development loans and credits only to men; research on the needs of the self-employed sector which is dominated by women; as well as attempts to evaluate and quantify women's unpaid labour in the household through time-allocation studies. Research findings also supported women's demands for better services, education, training and health, for the betterment of their lives.
A recognition at the policy level was the inclusion for the first time, in 1980, of women's specific needs in the national plan through a special chapter. This was effected by a process of consultation between women's groups and government representatives, undertaken to arrive at policies that impacted especially on women. The outcomes were some new programmes, credit schemes, and setting up of the National Commission of Women, but many hard-won gains were retracted later. Even when the shift was made
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from welfare to women's development mode in the Sixth Five Year Plan, there was no attempt to recognise the role of patriarchal values that had marginalised women. Hence the impact of such programmes on women's overall conditions and status was limited.
Strategies for em powerment
The division of public and private space in both traditional Indian society and assumptions of the liberal democratic state have inhibited mass participation of women in politics and therefore in democratic processes that affect them. As observed by Shirin Rai,' this separation of spheres is crucial for women, because their exclusion from the public sphere is based upon undemocratic norms and relations in private. The women's movement has challenged women's marginalisation in both spheres and sought to break the barrier between the two with the motto of the personal is political, and for women to assert their rights in both.
Beginning in the 1980s, the setting up of “women's centres by autonomous women's organisations in many cities and mahila mandals in rural centres was to provide integrated support services to women. Through movements like SEWA (Self-Employed Women’s Association), women organised themselves for economic, social and political empowerment. A hallmark of the movement has been its holistic approach, underscoring the inter-relatedness of all aspects of life and identity. In the process of this struggle, women have learnt several lessons and the movement has grown and changed in many ways. Rajni Bakshi' points out that the “women's struggle has been partly a quiet process of sub-surface change, and partly vocal, visible organised effort in welfare, reformist or radical modes. Women's mobilisation has created its own dynamics, over which no particular agency or source has had direct control. Bakshi observes for women to find a voice, they must learn to deal with power and power politics, and that this transition is the responsibility of the women's movement.
46 Rai, Shirin M. Gender and Democratization: Or What Does Democracy Mean for Women in the Third World?, in Democratization, Volume 1, No. 2, Summer 1994, Frank Cass, London, pp. 209-28. 47 Bakshi, Rajni. By Way of An Introduction', in Lokayan Bulletin, New Delhi, Vol. 4,
No. 6, 1986.
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Representation and participation
The issue of women's representation is a clear example of how contested politics around different identities can push it on or off the political agenda (see Part II). Women are now willing to engage directly in the formal political structures, as opposed to their previous preference for non-party political action to bring pressure on the state. The demand for reserved seats for women in the national parliament and state legislatures (discussed in detail in Part il) is the latest negotiating move in women's interface with the state. This answers the need for both representation of women's interests and participation by women themselves in articulating these interests: the two defining aspects of democracy.
Many activists still prefer to remain outside formal politics, but agree that new strategies are needed for both those within the political system and those outside to join hands on issues of common concern to women. Due to the fear of and distaste for the murky political arena, several respondents in the study called for a women's party, where presumably the evils of existing parties would be absent. The majority, however, still prefer a non-party political platform on which women from across divides can come together to act as a lobby for articulating women's interests.
One such initiative is the Joint Action Front for Women (JAFW), formed a few years ago with 79 institutional and individual members from different parts of the country. Another is the All India Democratic Women's Association (AIDWA), an umbrella organisation for left-wing women's groups mainly comprising women from underprivileged sections of society. Both have set out their agendas and their demands on the state. These were reiterated at women's rallies and meetings on the occasion of International Women's Day, 8th March 1999. In India's Golden Jubilee year, JAFW had outlined a “Women's Agenda for Nation Building and Clean Politics', which stressed a new paradigm of clean, transparent, equitable and just politics. The AIDWA resolution, passed by about 6,000 grassroots women activists, deals with the topical issues of price rises, the public distribution system, minority rights and pluralist cultures, untouchability, the women's reservation bill, and violence against Women.
Women-focused interventions by the state in other areas, namely development policy, PRIs, women’s studies, economic/credit issues, etc., have enabled women to achieve greater visibility and voice. There is an expectation among activists that the same can be achieved by mainstreaming women into political structures through reservation: that women will find a voice and exercise their options from a gender perspective. Overall, the
3.18

women's movement has come out in favour of decentralised governance and decision-making, and participatory democracy that will accommodate the views and voices of diverse groups, especially the underprivileged and marginalised.
International dimension
The emergence of women's agency in India, rooted in the national experience and context, also has an international dimension, being closely linked to and part of women's mobilisation worldwide. In this, United Nations initiatives, especially those stemming from the four World Conferences on Women, have been a source of support, awareness and strength. India has participated actively in all four conferences, but, significantly, from Nairobi to Beijing, in the NGO forums the direct input of women through civil society organisations has increased steadily. In Mexico the representation was mainly by the official state delegation; Nairobi had a strong presence of activists at the NGO Forum of the conference; the Beijing conference however had the highest participation of grassroots women drawn from different parts of the country for the NGO Forum. As a result of pre-conference interactions between activists, and the relevant government departments, the country paper reflected concerns of the women's movement. These were further expressed at the NGO Forum, and found their way into the debates in the governmental conference.
An important new insight to emerge from the Beijing Conference', according to Bina Agarwal, o was that macro-economic policy is also an issue of critical importance for women (and therefore a feminist concern). To counter the adverse impacts of globalisation, burdens of structural adjustment packages, feminisation of poverty, etc., women have to become proactive and part of economic decision-making at the macro level. The Beijing 'Platform for Action, endorsed without reservation by the Government of India, recognised the link between the economic and the political spheres. The demand for reservation of seats for women in the highest legislative bodies of the state stems from this realisation, and has emerged through a process of consultation among women across the country as the major issue for negotiation with the state in the late nineties.
48 Agarwal. Bina, The Gender and Environment Debate: Lessons from lndia’ in Sites
of Change, op.cit., see Footnote no. 14. pp. 203-52.
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V
State-Women Interface: Mediation by Political Parties, NGOs and other Civil Society Organisations
Women's experience with political parties
While Part II looks at the macro picture of women's participation as members of political parties, the discussion here is based on opinions and anecdotal evidence gathered from interviewees and survey respondents.
Women's marginal role
While mobilisation of women as members is encouraged by political parties, they are confined mostly to the women's wings of the parties - the BJP's MM, the CPI (M)'s JMS and the Mahila Congress of the Congress Party. Active support for political office or participation at the level of policy and decision-making is hardly forthcoming, and their political careers are limited to the women's wings, which function as social organisations and do not seem to be serious about political issues as they are not entrusted with wider responsibilities. A view expressed by Vinod Jaiswal of Uddham Singh Nagar, who resigned as the Mahila Morcha president in 1992 due to the senior leaders' apathy towards women's concerns, was that women's wings are redundant as women should be given space within the party itself.
Gender bias in selection and support to candidates
Women parliamentarians interviewed felt that parties used women as pawns (mohras), as 'crowd-pullers or to give the party a better look’. Tickets were given on the basis of winnability and the caste support criteria. Respondents also stated that without financial support from the parties for welfare or development work in their constituencies, it was difficult for them to mobilise voters. The record of all political parties across the ideological spectrum is poor as regards fielding of women candidates. Those with links to powerful male politicians, especially family links, are more likely to find electoralberths than strong women leaders with independent achievements.
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This underscores the patriarchal value structure of political parties, whereby women are viewed in their ascribed traditional roles of the private sphere; this is carried over into the public domain. There is also an assumption that such women, drawn into politics through family links or obligations, will be more amenable to (male-dominated) party dictates. The electorate, influenced by the same assumptions, by and large favours such candidates.
Exploitation and harassment
Apart from tokenism with respect to leadership roles, women of the rank and file generally provide the support services within the party just as they do in the household. Resistance to various political pressures results in character assassination, leading women to believe that the present political culture makes major compromises inevitable. In Meerut, a woman who tried to oppose established politicians found that she and her family members were threatened with either rape, murder or kidnapping. Another view was that women's collusion or compromise with corrupt elements in parties was responsible for their poor image, the expectation being that they should charter their own course. An experienced woman leader pointed out that women who come into politics as a result of some crisis in their lives are more vulnerable to exploitative tactics.
In Eastern UP reactions towards the parties were mixed. OBC and dalit women identified with the caste-based politics of leaders such as Mulayam Singh and Mayawati, which had enabled representation and even power for their communities in state and national politics. While all parties in general, and the BJP in particular, exploited women's traditional images as mother, or ‘wife, women said they felt safe in the BJP. For example, Nirmala Singh, chairperson, municipal corporation, Faizabad, joined the BJP as she felt that the party respected women and provided space for them. Other parties such as SP, however, had tried to put pressure on her and forced her to face a no-confidence motion. According to a CPI (M-L) party member, who was previously in the CPI, her present party addresses gender issues both within the party and in society, but in a low-key manner as this is a controversial and sensitive issue. One activist estimated that she would need 10 years in which to work for empowering women Socially and economically, after which she would feel confident of her base for contesting elections.
Limitations and scope of progressive parties
Despite 13% representation in a left party, the resignation of Brinda Karat, a senior party activist, brought into focus the gender bias even in progressive
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parties working for transformational politics. She quit as the party was not prepared to accommodate women in top-level decision-making bodies, underlining the leftist motto of 'class before gender' whereby gender concerns are considered a distraction in the larger issue of class struggle. This standpoint of the left parties has impelled many left-oriented women to quit since the 1970s and form autonomous women's organisations that have spearheaded the women's movement. Others, however, believe it is important to work within the parties to bring about changes and make them gendersensitive, an on-going struggle in the left parties according to some women members. They point out that while the structure of their parties is democratic, the mind-set of many members is feudal. The left parties do not have women's wings but they are supported by leftist mass organisations. Party membership is strictly regulated, recruitment being on an ideological basis.
Leftist women point out that their approach to women's mobilisation is based on the desirability of transformation and change in social structure, gender relations as well as political culture, whereas right-wing parties base their approach on maintenance of the status quo in terms of gender roles as well as socio-economic factors. This explains the recent success of rightwing parties with mobilising women who are coming into the public domain for the first time, and are more comfortable operating within the traditional, i.e., patriarchal, framework with which they are familiar and which most women have internalised. At the same time women welcome the scope this opportunity offers them to operate in the public sphere and articulate some of their concerns. According to leftist women, however, this does not constitute empowerment, as it does not challenge the existing oppressive gender hierarchy. This position is countered by arguments that the very exposure to the public sphere educates women, and over a period of time empowers them if the right lessons are learnt. Right-wing fundamentalist parties successfully mobilising women has also been ascribed to the exclusion and neglect of women by other mainstream national parties, leaving untapped a huge potential source of active support. Recognising this, and in view of the pending Women's Reservation Bill, the Congress Party has recently announced 33% reservation for women in all party posts, but how far this will be actualised is at present an open question. So far the only political party that has ensured a 33% representation for women is AIADMK of Tamilmadu.
Prospects for women in political parties
Political parties today understand the value of the women's vote bank and thus use women members to mobilise women's votes. Although this is an
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improvement on the earlier approach of ignoring women voters, assuming their lack of independent identity and choice, the attitude of parties is still manipulative.
In this kind of situation, the question arises as to whether having a woman at the top will help other women. As stated earlier (Part II), Mayawati’s sudden rise to power as a leader of a dalit party made dalit women feel empowered in eastern UP. This feeling has not however resulted in any real empowerment of these women. In western UP experience showed that, contrary to expectations of average women, female political leaders did not encourage others to rise. Shahin Pervez from Meerut said that Mayawati tried to control her and thus started spreading false rumours about her, although both were in the same party. Expressing similar opinions, some respondents stated that women in politics do not feel safe even if there is a woman as a boss. Several other instances were recorded where women political leaders failed to support or encourage other women in politics, or to pay any special attention to women's interests or concerns. Women in mainstream politics answer this criticism by stating that, as politicians, they cannot cater to any particular group or interest but have to look out for all their constituents and supporters. Activists of the women's movement on the other hand point out that being sensitive and just to women need not be at the cost of any other category.
Commenting on the large number of parties, some respondents felt that there should be just two parties, one in power and the other in opposition, to provide the necessary stability. Another view holds that larger numbers of women in political parties and therefore in political structures (through reservations) would constitute a critical mass. The role played by women parliamentarians confirms this (Part II), although many other inputs and strategies are needed to bring a balanced gender perspective to the state and even civil institutions. Many emphasised long-term processes such as voter education and awareness building among potential women politicians, including EWRs at panchayat level. Numbers alone may not be a sufficient answer. Women in leadership and representative positions must themselves be gender-sensitive and be willing to work for change rather than maintain the status quo.
Role of NGOs: Conclusions based on some of the case studies
Interventions by NGOs have been instrumental in empowering and mobilising women both directly and indirectly, and some of the strongest women's movements in HPhave emerged in areas where NGOs have been functioning
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for a longtime. Chinmaya Tapovan Trust (CTT) in Kangra, People's Action for People in Need (PAPN) in Sirmaur and Society for Upliftment and Training in Rural Areas (SUTRA) in Jagjit Nagar, have recruited women, targeted them for awareness and empowerment, mobilised them as agents of change operating with their support systems. Working through mahila mandals (women's grassroots groups), they have strengthened women to initiate antialcohol movements. The major thrust has been centred around activities for women's welfare development and empowerment. Both PAPN and CTT have helped strengthen mahila mandals to mobilise and support anti-alcohol movements in these areas, a strategy pioneered by SUTRA. Based in Sirmaur district of HP, PAPN's major thrust has centred around activities for women's welfare, development and empowerment. Unlike some other grassroots organisations, however, they have declined to be directly involved in the formal political process, and their role is limited to providing awareness, information, mobilisation and support.
Need-based strategies
NGOs such as PAPN are playing a key role as catalysts for mobilising women and the community in general. They provide the enabling environment for grassroots leaders like Kinkari Devi, who in turn has inspired many mahila mandal members and other women activists in the area who professed to draw their strength from her. She and the other mahila mandal members have been moulded by their exposure to non-party political action, and can provide strong support to women in formal politics if they take up survival issues and related gender issues with which grassroots women are concerned. The NGOs’ strategies have undergone many changes, from a focus on development to organising and mobilising women as the main agents of change in rural society and helping to form a strong federation of mahila mandals. When the new PRIs were announced, the NGOs encouraged mahila mandal members to contest. Some won party tickets either for Congress or BJP. PRI members, after their training under SUTRA and PAPN, have become assertive and active in the panchayats, gaining the respect and cooperation of the officials. Subsequent instances of collusion between officials and corrupt male members emerged. The women, however, were in a position to see through it and deal with it.
The federation formed by SUTRA has decided to function as a pressure group independent of the panchayats, which are perceived as agents of the state. It will however, support gender-related issues taken up by elected panchayat members. SUTRA is now working with panchayats as a whole in
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their developmental role. It has also taken up awareness generation among voters with a view to strengthening gram sabhas.
Types of interventions
NGOs in western UP which started with development work have also been active in mobilising women for political action, such as Dashauli Gram Swarajya Sangh of the Chipko Andolan, the Tarai Mahila Sangathan in Uddhamsingh Nagar, which has been actively involved in various movements including the demand for Uttarakhand, protests against dowry victimisation, dowry death and other socio-political issues. Their success in mobilising the local women is borne out by the fact that women are willing to participate in all activities in vast numbers.
In Meerut a Muslim woman politician, Shaheen Parvez, runs an NGO named Swatantra Mahila Samiti that has mobilised thousands of Muslim women and men for issue-based agitation. Her motivation was the injustice, poverty and marginalisation faced by poor Muslim women. She joined formal politics at the urging of a close male relative also in politics, and contested elections. Her experience with the mainstream parties has been negative. The NGO set up by her provides her the opportunity for action at the grassroots, working for people's needs and also her political support base.
Banda in southern UP has witnessed intensive movements for land reform. Women have played a key role in the arduous struggle that touches on their basic survival needs. The Akhil Bharatiya Samaj Seva Sangathan has provided these women with great support." The Mahila Samakhya, a government intervention programme, has also played a very important role in awareness building and mobilising women in this area. The success of the programme has depended, however, on the implementing NGOs, without whom it may not have had the same impact. The case of the Mahila Samakhya brings out the possibilities of such innovative programmes involving both the state and NGOs in the political education and empowerment of women. The role of NGOs in eastern UP, on the other hand, is not assignificant. With the exception of Varanasi, it was noted that several NGOs are registered in this area without playing an effective mediating role. Some do not function at all. This highlights the phenomenon of paper NGOs’, which become instruments for siphoning off development funds either for political purposes or personal gain. Politicians also set up NGOs in order to gain political leverage among voters, although this is often garbed as social work.
Another reason for the limited mediating role of NGOs is related to the political climate in this area and the intense political mobilisation through
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party politics. Similarly the culture of violence and fear in Punjab for over a decade has not been conducive for NGO interventions, except for some welfare activities. Nor have women come together to take up any causes or articulate their interests in any organised or collective way. Some voluntary organisations have recently taken up gender issues. The Punjab chapter of the Voluntary Health Association of India, for instance, is looking into women's mental health in the aftermath of violence, as well as the increasing incidence of female infanticide. Generally, however, the absence of effective NGOs and women's movements in these regions underscores the need for a strong NGO presence for mobilising women.
Civil society organisations
In India, civil society initiatives in regard to political mobilisation and intervention have not been very strong, although some well-known and successful movements and groups have emerged in recent years. While some organisations, such as the grassroots organisation Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS), working for minimum wages and the right to information, feel that “civil society is an ambiguous term which has limitations in terms of accountability of the people; others, inspired by a vision and understanding of the debate between development processes and modernisation, have emerged or been formed under special circumstances of human rights violations. The People's Union of Civil Liberties (PUCL) and the People's Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) have been very effective in taking up human rights issues. The Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA) (Campaign to Save the Narmada River) has been fighting a sustained battle against the state's moves to displace entire populations, mostly tribals, destroying their livelihood, culture and way of life. The Chattisgarh Mukti Morcha, a trade union, and its women's wing, struggled to chalk out alternate paradigms for what it means to be a citizen of India. It has mobilised women in large numbers, and increased their political consciousness and participation to a great extent in a short span of time. The National Alliance of People's Movements, is, as the name suggests, a federation of movements taking place all over the country, to question and fight against various development projects and policies of the government. These include forums agitating for fishermen's rights, environmental conservation, right to information, fighting against displacement of tribal populations by big dams and power projects, globalisation and SAP, to mention a few.
In the aftermath of state terrorism in Punjab, when facts about atrocities committed on Sikhs, kidnappings and killings of thousands of Sikh men and
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the disposal of dead bodies in the cremation grounds or rivers as 'unclaimed and unidentified came to light, there was a demand for a people's commission. This became imperative when the government commission became nonfunctional in 1998. Due to the repressive and intimidating atmosphere in Punjab, it was perhaps unthinkable that women or families of those who suffered these atrocities would be in a position to speak out. However, with the formation of the People's Commission women have dared to come and depose before the commission, something they would not have done previously. Mrs. Jaswant Singh Khalra, widow of Sardar Jaswant Singh Khalra, who was the first to raise the issue of the missing youth, and was subsequently kidnapped and eliminated himself, made a list of the 'disappeared people and raised it in the Canadian parliament. Mediation of this civil society organisation does seem to have made an impact on women, and under the leadership of Mrs. Khalra they were beginning to get organised.
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VI
Re-imagining the State: Women's Visions
Women's opinion of and vision for the state, its organisation and structure, and its obligations towards its citizens in a gender-sensitive manner, are one of the main areas of the present study. On the basis of women's perception of the role and function of the state, an attempt is made to redefine and reimagine a new state. The overwhelming opinion appears to be that women envision a democratic, participatory, accountable and gender-sensitive state. Re-imagining the state was not an easy task for our respondents. There are constraints imposed on their imagination by knowledge systems. Our conditioning and socialisation in a given knowledge system imposes a constraint that means imagining something outside the system is not possible.' It would be misleading to assume that there is any undifferentiated universal women's vision globally or nationally. Shirin M. Rai argues:
With the growing literature on women and the state in the Third World, which seeks to challenge the universalising language of the western feminist and developmental state discourses about women, the state and struggle, what we need is a continuing and more focused debate about women and the post-colonial state. Third World women come to experience not only national but international economic and political power in the era of economic restructuring and institutional (rather than political) democratisation'.'
"Such a focus', according to her, will also allow us to examine the growing and diverse arenas of women's political activities, which include not only opposition but negotiation, not only struggle but also strategic bargaining spaces that are intersections of the private and the public spheres. How do women perceive the state and how do they re-imagine the state? The extent
39 Dietrich, Gabriele, Alternative Knowledge Systems and Women's Employment: An Organizational Perspective, in Sites of Change. UNDP 1996, pp. 335-63, so Rai. Shirin M., ed., Women and the State: international Perspectives, Taylor and
Francis, London, 1996, p. 6.
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of their exposure and the degree of interaction with the state machinery are the bases on which they can re-imagine the state.
It was found that, barring the articulate section of women, the others could not distinguish between 'state' and government'. Consequently, governmental powers and functions are posited to the state. One of the reasons why 'state had to be disaggregated in thirteen parts was the understanding that communicating the concept of state was difficult. The responses of those surveyed need to be looked at with this understanding. When 21.0% of respondents say that the state does not represent them (Table 6), it is necessary to bear in mind that state and government were considered one and the same. It could be that in all probability what the respondents had in mind was government and not state'. In a liberal democratic country with a multiparty system, government could also mean the political party in power.
Women's vision is affected by existential realities. With their limited exposure, isolation and remoteness, their vision is coloured by local problems. This probably explains why women living in remote hilly areas talked of good roads and transportation facilities in a re-imagined state. It would, however, be misleading to assume that they are incapable of transcending their existential reality. Given the exposure and commitment to a cause, they do demonstrate a global vision. One of our respondents, Kinkari Devi (ref. Part IV), who has been spearheading a movement against limestone mining, seems to have faith in women's worldwide struggle. She feels that if they came together, the world order would change. She has a deep understanding of the linkage between survival needs and the environment. She thinks that the government does not understand the problems of pollution and environment. To tackle these problems without any concern for decreasing forests, water and mountains would be futile and would defy solutions.
When women are talking about the private sector, one has to visualise who exactly is being thought of- perhaps it is only the local contractor who has been given the charge of felling trees or quarrying and mining. It could also perhaps explain why a negative connotation is given to 'private'. This could also be the reason why in response to the question as to who should have the responsibility for certain governmental functions, most of the women (68%, Table 7) said the state should not reduce its responsibilities. Citizenship, i.e., the relationship between the individual and the state, and its implications are not really understood by women (or men). It depends on how women perceive themselves, and the sense of identity they have of themselves. These aspects emerged during the course of an interview with Veena Mazumdar, an eminent political scientist and activist. Recounting her experience of explaining the concept of citizenship to a group of female labourers, she came across what can be termed as a gendered notion or
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understanding of citizenship. When told about different rights associated, with three different types of identities that they carried as voters (who have the right to bring about a change in government), workers (with certain legal rights) and women (with certain special rights), their first reaction was related to their ignorance, nobody told us about it', and the next was to ask for more information in a language that they could follow. But the most surprising was their query: "What are our responsibilities along with these rights?' It could be taken as a women-specific or gender-specific vision, which perhaps arises from their existential experience of carrying various types of responsibilities all their lives, from a very early age. This kind of query should not be taken as a naive one. Instead, it emerges out of a deep understanding of the working of priorities at the grassroots level.
Strikingly similar insights have been articulated by Aruna Roy, the Magsasay Award winner for 2000, who has closely observed and participated in the struggles for survival. She is of the opinion that when we feel we are decision-makers responsibility comes, and both rights and duties get defined. But when we are subjects and recipients of hand-outs, then we are deprived even of the right to decide on priorities. Therefore the crux of the matter lies in the difference between being recipients and decision-makers.
Women's collective or comprehensive vision of the state does not emerge in a well-articulated manner from the responses of our sample of general voters. Yet certain inferences can be drawn from women's expectations of good governance and the state. We do get certain glimpses into whatever their limited vision is, and, if we try to generalise, two major roles seem to be attributed to the state: (i) a provider of services, and (ii) a protector of law and order and peace. When the state is perceived as a provider of goods and services, it appears to be perceived as a welfare state.
Law and order
Women's vision of state as a protector of law and order and peace seems to be a commentary on violence. It also establishes the fact that women prefer peace and 'certainty to violence and 'uncertainty. It is also based on the fact that women have to bear the brunt of political violence and communal riots. Therefore law and order and peace appear to be cherished values. In this role, the state is looked upon as a protector against violence.
State repression
In another related role, the state appears to be the perpetrator of violence when its actions are repressive and women are victims of state repression.
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This takes place when there are custodial rapes or police brutalities. Indiscriminate use of the state's coercive power was seen in Punjab during the days of terrorism and the secessionist movement. Even here the demands made on the state were for greater accountability. This is evident in the formation of the People's Commission, Punjab, to enquire into the disappearances and deaths in encounters.
Almost 70% of respondents said that they thought that the state represented them (Table 6). In Punjab, only 26.6% as against 71.0% of respondents felt that the state does not represent them. Although it had affected women, they had not formed any common platform against the state. It is only now that there is some semblance of a nucleus of women coming together. There has not been any 'mothers front as such, but some of the women's wings of political parties have been involved in relief and rehabilitation work, for example, Punjab lstri Sabha which is closely associated with the left (CPI). It could perhaps be attributed to the fact that torture and violence in the environment (including by the state) had an intimidating effect on women. There was no space available to them to take initiative or action, nor space for any type of intervention by NGOs that could have mobilised women. None of the selected respondents talked in terms of challenging the legitimacy of the state. Instead, they wanted the state to perform better and make amends by involving representatives of all sections of its citizens.
Religion and the state
What has been striking in this regard is that use of religion for political gains was condemned everywhere - even in Himachal Pradesh, where this phenomenon has not been experienced. The vision of the state thus is one where religion is not used for political gains. It may be concluded that a truly secular state would be the opposite of the existing one, which professes to be secular but in practice is not.
Structural adjustment programmes and women's aspirations
A common vision that emerges is for women to have equal access to education, health facilities, employment and provision of social services. In the context of globalisation and structural adjustment programmes, it is of greater significance to highlight women's vision of these entitlements. The question of entitlements, as to who gets what, why, and how of the total available societal resources at any point in time, is at the base of gender justice and the equity issue, and of the Human Development Index. These
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are also the soft areas, which are the first to be axed because of fiscal deficits due to structural adjustment programmes. Popular intervention in policies harmful to the masses can, to some extent, stem the tide.
The responsible and democratic state
It is clear from the responses that women do not wish to have an alternative to the state. To them, the state is the repository of their collective powers and faith, and bears the responsibility of representing them and their needs. This has been borne out by focus group discussions and interviews in the sample areas. It has also emerged that women envision a responsive state, which is the provider of need-based services. The point that 21.0% of women (Table 6) feel that the state does not represent them is indicative of the fact that the state is not responsive to their needs. It is also indicative of the need to have participatory governance. Women in Shimla (a hill station and tourist spot) condemned the irresponsibility of the government in approving unplanned urban expansion without provision of basic water and sanitation facilities. They were categorical that no trickle-down effect was experienced from the tourist revenue on their quality of life. They felt that only planned and peopleoriented development would ensure enhancement of tourism revenues.
Women also articulated the need for equitable and just distribution of resources, an exercise that, according to them, must be the responsibility of the state and the state alone. For instance, women were in favour of poverty alleviation intervention, including reservations in government jobs (the most coveted jobs of all) along economic lines. Some very mature responses emerged from the field on caste and reservations', an issue fraught with tensions in the past few years. Many women felt that ensuring equitable distribution along economic lines would ensure equitable distribution along caste lines as well. One woman in Kinnaur condemned the government's ideas on equitable distribution. She cited the example of a particular programme whereby farmers are entitled to agricultural implements. She said that the programme with its particular criteria of collateral merely ensured that rich farmers grew richer, and the poor ones poorer. Thus there is need for a sensitive, responsive, responsible and representative state.
Women also voiced the need for a state that is accountable to the people. The disappointment with an unresponsive and irresponsible state is evident. “We wish to know what they the state) are doing was a recurring refrain from women, particularly from those involved in informal politics. Their wish for transparency and accountability from the state merely strengthens the belief that, despite its drawbacks, women do not posit an alternative to the state.
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Although not in our sample area, it is of interest to note that another formulation of women's vision of the state emerged from Chatisgarh Mukti Morcha. With a strong membership of women, the CMM came up with a declaration that what women want for workers is an alcohol-free state with fair wages, creches and recreation facilities.
An alternative vision emerged from an elite section of leftist women who visualised an ultimate withering-away of the state. They too, however, visualise a democratic and representative state to take on the responsibility of governance in the interim period, before the people take over direct and decentralised control.
It is interesting to note that more than 68.1% of respondents said that the state should not reduce its responsibilities (Table 7); 10.6% had no opinion, whereas 2.3% wanted state responsibility to be reduced. Even in answer to the question 'Who could make the situation) better?', an overwhelming 64.6% (Table 8) were in favour of the government, and only 1.4% for the NGO and private sector. Among others, 9.1% were in favour of people in consultation with panchayats, and 10.5% were in favour of government, panchayat and local people. As Aruna Roy observed, "The state is the institutionalised face of social responsibility and as such it is expected to play a definitive role within a paradigm of accountability and responsibility.'
Decentralisation and strengthening of local self-government
The desire for a decentralised state with participatory democracy was articulated. Very immediate, localised problems focused on survival issues are considered the domain for intervention by and through PRIs or local self-government. It was assumed by respondents that a greater presence of women in governance would solve the problem of corruption and might lead to better governance. The issue of reservations for women in parliament, however, received a mixed response. It was important to ensure that capable women got inducted. The need for educational qualifications was expressed particularly for parliament and the state assemblies.
Women's political participation
As the quantitative data reveals, women do aspire for greater participation in formal politics and take political participation as voters seriously. Out of the total sample, 91.1% had voted in the past (Table 9). In answer to the question, 'Should women participate in politics?', 91.5% had responded in
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the affirmative; only 7.0% responded in the negative, whereas 1.5% had no opinion. On another related question, whether or not women can change the political culture, 82.8% felt that women could, while 17.2% felt that women could not.
A gender-sensitive state
Demands for a gender-sensitive state emerged in some of the special interviews, with regional differences underlining the existing insensitivity of the state on certain questions. For example, in Uttar Pradesh, which is divided into five economic regions, the hill areas of Uttarakhand shared the vision of Himachal Pradesh, where a greater role for women in management of natural resources is envisaged. Women's visions in areas like Banda in Bundelkhand region of UP, where tribal people are living in abject poverty, is of a state sensitive to women's survival needs. It is not surprising therefore that women are leading the land rights movements. People with individual and NGO initiatives have sought to address the problems of illiteracy, ownership and inheritance of land rights by demanding laws leasing forests to tribals for collection of minor forest produce such as amla, mahua, etc.
Despite the limitations imposed by their knowledge system, women's clarity of vision within the parameters of their existential realities can be translated in terms of real paradigm shifts. In effect, women seek visibility, equity, participation, opportunity to counter discrimination, neglect and marginalisation vis-a-vis the state, freedom from shackles of cultural and social stereotypes, a voice in decision-making in the public sphere, and gender-sensitive state policies. An aggregated vision of the state that emerges is that of a gender-sensitive, secular, participatory, democratic state and an efficient provider of services; a state that works for the uplift of socially and economically weaker sections; and an exploitation-free society which would strive to move towards a system of governance that is “transformed and transformational'.
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South India
As mita Resource Centre for Women
Introduction
This study is an attempt to understand women's perspectives on governance and citizenship through an analysis of women's political participation at the grassroots level. It has mainly focused on women's participation in formal political structures like panchayat institutions, as well as political struggles and voluntary collective mobilisation - looking at the ways in which these have altered/affected their political consciousness as well as their self. perceptions and the objective conditions of their lives. This study also tries to analyse women's political experiences, their notion of politics and governance and the ways in which they have been mediated by caste, class and rural/urban background.
In looking at concrete instances of women's political participation in diverse locales, the study attempts to explore the linkages between women's
Project Coordinator - Kalpana Kannabiran. The coordinators/investigators of the three sections are as follows: (1) Women in Local Bodies: A Report from Tamilnadu - S. Anandhi; (2) Defining Citizenship: Issues in Women's Leadship in Andhra Pradesh - Kalpana Kannabiran; (3) Women and the Democratic Process in Kerala - Meera Velayudhan. The report presents preliminary observations based on archival research and field studies conducted in the South Indian states of Kerala, Tamilnadu and Andhra Pradesh. While the field studies have all been completed, some data analysis, translations and data entry are still in progress.
The research team would like to acknowledge the many individuals and institutions without whose help and support this work would have been impossible: the elected women leaders from Kancheepuram, Vellore and Tiruvallur districts of Tamilnadu: colleagues at the Institute of Development Alternatives, Chennai: the Women sarpanches of Mahbubnagar and Rangareddi districts of Andhra Pradesh: the women and men of Kalva village. Andhra Pradesh: the women and men in the 13 villages of West Godavari District, Andhra Pradesh, Sarada and Sivaramakrishna of Sakthi, West Godavari; Vijayabharathi of UNDP, Kurnool: G. Satyavathi of RADS, Vikarabad. Andhra Pradesh: Amal Charles of STEP, Mahbubnagar, Andhra Pradesh;
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understanding and experience of politics and governance, and the ways in which these have altered or shaped their understanding of the state, citizenship and government. Finally, it looks at what women's notions of political rights are, and what Strategies they have used in furthering/realising these rights on the ground.
The project focuses on three South Indian states-Tamilnadu. Andhra Pradesh and Kerala. Each has its own distinctive history, buth in mainstream politics and in the sites and forms of women's political participation historically. While making for stark differences in context, the distinctness in regional histories also makes for very interesting studies in contrast. In terms of Socio-political formations, the Non Brahmin Movement in Tamilnadu, communist governments in Kerala and the constant interrogation of the state by resistance movements in Andhra provide the location for issues of women and governance. Interestingly, however, across these wide
Fatima Burnad of SIREIO, Arakkonam. Tamillnadu; Fadmini Swaminathan of MIOS, Chennai, K.G. Kannabiran. National President, PUCL, Secunderabad. Mr S.L.S. Ahmed, Secretary. Andhra Pradesh State Election Commission, Hyderabad.: Dr. L.L.Bhavani and Dr. L. Karamchand of Gudivada for their gracious hospitality duting our field trip to West Godavari.
The enthusiasm, cheer and commitment of the elected women representatives of Ernakulam, Alapuzha and Kannur made the study a joyful experience. Prof. R. Radhakrishnan Nair translated a long English questionnaire into Malayalain at short notice. Simon Britto. left activist. helped identify areas of survey in Cochin. provided vital contacts and, with Seema. helped organize a focus group discussion with dalit women. Simon Britto, Seena and Sreeja assisted in the fieldwork for the Kerala study. Aleyamma Vijayan, Mini Sukumaran. Nalini Nayak, Seena (Kerala State Planning Board), members of SAKH) Resource Celitre for Women, and activists of Streeved provided invaluable help. C. P. Jeevan was an immense support at all times.
We would like to place on record our appreciation for the support of our colleagues at Asmita. The painstaking work done by V. Padmini in putting together this report. G. Vijayalakshmi's valuable assistance during fieldwork, and K. Rama and Sujatha's patience in entering masses of data into the computer deserve special mention. Finally, our colleagues from other countries/regions on this project have made our experience memorable. Given the fact that two of us had babies midway through the project within a month of each other, causing considerable inconvenience particularly in terms of disrupting time schedules and being incommunicado from time to time, this report would perhaps never have taken shape without Yasmin Tambiah's gentle, unobtrusive persistence. We are grateful to her for her patience aid good humour. We take this opportunity to thank everyone of you.
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divergences, there is a discomfiting similarity of experience between women in politics in these three states today. While keeping an eye on the distinctness of region, the studies also address these continuities.
To anticipate the questions raised by the study, a critical issue pertains to the relationship between formal office and empowerment. While several instances disconnect the two, the fact that women in local self-government are elected to formal office, rather than being nominated, is a matter of considerable significance. Further, in many cases the absence of real control and political authority exists alongside political will and a consciousness that the reality must be transformed. Although critics of the 73rd and 74th Amendments to the Constitution of India have cited inevitable disempowerment as justification for arguing against these provisions, the fact of having institutionalised elected office and a group of elected incumbents, who might not wield actual power but who are conscious of the need to do so, justifies the provision in our view. We need to recognise the shift, to use MacKinnon's words, from unconsciousness and denial and collaboration to consciousness and resistance and confrontation. Each of the three studies here takes different trajectories in representing this shift.
MacKinnon. Catherine. Feminism Unmodified. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1987, p. 2.
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Women in Local Bodies: A Report from Tamilnadu
The context: The history of local governance in Tamilnadu
Although Tamilnadu has a long history of local government, starting with the country's first municipal corporation set up in Madras in 1687, the essential component of local governance, i.e., decentralisation through the three-tier System of panchayats (district panchayats at the district level, panchayat unions at the block level and village panchayats at the village level) was introduced only in 1920 through the Madras Local Boards Act and Madras Village Panchayat Act. However, until the 1950s there were no seats reserved for women; only reservations for minority groups. The Tamilnadu Panchayat Act of 1958 provided for the co-option of at least one womanto any panchayat body wherever there were no elected women members. In 1981, an amendment was introduced which led to the nomination of a woman member to every village panchayat, and 15% of the posts of panchayat presidents and posts in the panchayat councils were reserved for women. In 1989, through an amendment, 30% of the total seats at the level of village panchayat were reserved for women. In 1991 another amendment stated that if women were not elected to village panchayats they could be co-opted to ensure the 30% reservation. Further, depending on the number of village panchayats in the panchayat union, a maximum of five seats were to be filled by women in the panchayat union council in addition to the two women members who could be nominated by the collector. This act was not implemented as there was no election held to the local bodies till 1996.
The Tamilnadu Panchayat Act 1994
Following the 73rd Amendment to the Constitution of India in 1992, providing one-third reservation for women in local bodies, the Tamilnadu government 教
s For a detailed. historical study on the panchayat system in Tamilnadu see, Rukmani. R. Panchayati Raj Institutions in Tamilnadu - A Historical Review. Madras Institute of Development Studies, Madras. n.d.
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passed the Tamilnadu Panchayats Act 1994 on 23rd April 1994. One of the important provisions of the Act was that one-third of the total number of seats in the panchayat, at every level - village, block and district - should be reserved for women. Also, one-third of the total number of posts of president of the village panchayat, chairperson of the panchayat union and chairperson of the district panchayat were reserved for women. This includes reservations for women who belong to scheduled caste and scheduled tribe (SC/ST) communities. Along with reservations for women, the Act has the provision of reservations for the SC and ST communities for all posts in the panchayats, in proportion to the SC/ST population in the area. Based on this Act, the local body elections in Tamilnadu were held in October 1996. For the first time in the history of panchayat elections, women in large numbers from different socio-economic backgrounds contested and won the election at various levels of the panchayats. The following are the Tamilnadu panchayat election results in terms of gender (Table 1, 1). Details of the number of elected women in different posts in panchayats, and their caste, reservation and political status are given in Table 1.2 and 1.3 below.
Research methodology
This study involved a structured questionnaire survey of 352 women and 39 men, all elected members of local bodies. The sample of respondents was selected by using the Stratified random sampling method.
At the first stage, three districts out of Tamilnadu's 29 districts were identified for the survey. These three districts, Kancheepuram, Thiruvallur and Vellore, have been purposively chosen. Kancheepuram and Thiruvallur districts cover the fringe areas of Madras Metropolitan Agglomeration, and thus enabled us to capture the interface between urban existence and women's political consciousness. Vellore district is primarily rural, and provides the contrasting picture. All three districts have a substantial population of dalits, the most marginalised social group.
In these three districts, using the stratified random sampling method, a certain percentage of women and men from the total elected members for various posts, such as the village panchayat presidents and ward members, panchayat union chairmen and councillors, town panchayat chairmen and ward members and district panchayat members, were selected as respondents. The stratification for our sampling was based on categories like gender, caste (i.e., SC and Backward Caste (BC) women), party affiliation and reservation category from which women were elected. Only 10% of male elected
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members from different panchayats were selected for the survey. The survey of male members, chosen from the same area as women respondents, was essential to understand how the male leaders perceive women's entry into local governance, and in what way their views on governance and the state differ from women's perspectives.' Table 1.6 shows the sample of respondents from the three districts chosen for this study.
Table 1.3 Political affiliation of elected women members in different local bodies
S. No Political Panchayat Town District
party union panchayat panchayat
1. AIADMK 398 37 25 3 BJP 5 66 l 4 CP 40 37 6 5 CPI (M) 28 74 2 6 DMK 900 745 6 7 Congress 13 28 KKSH 8 Janatha Dal 7 11 9 Janatha party 2 57 O MDMK 4) 34 4.
PMK 94 13 TMC 420 366 76 52 IND 476 1,690
TOTAL 2,424 3,480 231
Source: The Election Commission. Tamilnadu. 1996. Note: Members of political parties are not allowed to contest from their party platforms
for village panchayat posts.
The views of male respondents have not been included in this paper as they require more detailed analysis.
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The questionnaire
The questionnaire for the survey was designed to bring out the socio-economic details of the respondents, their level of political consciousness (in terms of their understanding of the state and state-related institutions and their notions of politics and domestic sphere, etc.), and the extent of political participation (in terms of involvement in political parties, grassroots level women's organisations such as mahalir mandrams, local NGOs, community or caste organisations and social movements of different kinds). The questionnaire was finalised after a pilot survey done with the help of Gramma Pengal Munnetra Sangam and Rural Women's Social Education Centre, the two local NGOs working among the women members of local bodies.
Overall there was a favourable response and even active participation from the women members in answering the questionnaire and in interacting with the investigators. However the survey method itself was quite limited in capturing the complexity of the life-worlds of the women who belong to lower classes and castes, who had minimal skills in terms of literacy and limited exposure to conventional political activities. What is also clear from the survey result is that their own worldviews are constituted by certain unbounded. in a sense ambiguous, categories, whether a category of family, sexuality, property or state. To illustrate, most often they are not concerned about legal ownership of land, and, as long as someone within their kin owns it and the women have access to the product of the land, they treat it as if owned by them. Similarly, even when they have broken away from natal or affinitive family, they list members of these families as their family members as though all of them are together as a family.
The case study method
Given the inherent limitation of the questionnaire in capturing this ambiguity in women's perceptions, the case studies have been done through a process of long-winding conversations, which have been transcribed soon after in their own words. About 20 women leaders have been interviewed. This has been supplemented by participating in workshops meant for women ward members organised by NGOs, as these workshops are key sites for women to air their opinions on a range of issues and to dialogue among themselves. The notes taken during these workshops are important inputs about women's political consciousness.
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Some observations based on the survey
1. Women's experience of political power
For many women who have been elected to the local bodies, positions held in the panchayat are the first ever experience of acquiring political power. The survey shows that at various levels of local bodies women have been primarily elected only to the seats reserved for women in general or for dalit women, with the exception of a few who stood in the open constituencies. This means that if not for the reservation of seats for women, women candidates would not have assumed power at the local level. Since there was a compulsion to meet the 33% reservation for women in local bodies, in many villages women have been elected unopposed after being unanimously nominated by the entire village. In other words, the candidates were chosen and endorsed by the pre-existing structures of power within the village.
It is clear from the survey that those women who have been elected to the local bodies, with the exception of a few, have voted only for the political parties to which their husbands or other male members of the family belong. Many of them stated that their participation in the election for the local bodies, and their subsequent roles in the panchayats, were their first experience of political participation and also the first experience of involvement in public activities. However, there are some women who have been active in political parties, local women's organisations such as mahalir mandrams, in the agricultural workers' movement and in NGOs. Even though some of them had been members of the political parties, so far they had not held any important positions within the party other than voting, campaigning during the elections and engaging in a few other party tasks. In spite of this reality, what is interesting to observe from the survey is that many women thus elected have attempted to negotiate and assert their independence and power. This is clear from their articulation of issues that they have been able to raise and strategise for as part of their role in panchayats. Given this, we will briefly discuss the nature of women's experiences in panchayats as expressed during the survey.
It has been almost three years since the panchayat elections took place in Tamilnadu. As we notice from the survey, many women panchayat leaders and members complained that their functions and powers have been very limited since panchayat work has not been adequately delegated to them. Some felt that the higher authorities have hampered their initiatives in their wards or village, such as providing some basic facilities. For instance, women ward members of the village panchayats in Kancheepuram district talked
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about how the panchayat presidents have consciously prevented the ward members from implementing panchayat resolutions. S. Ponni, a dalit ward member, said,
In our panchayat, despite so much of opposition and forceful prevention of ward members from passing resolutions in favour of providing basic facilities to the village, we have managed to pass resolutions to construct water tanks, proper school buildings, provisions for road facilities and irrigation facilities. But our panchayat president, a backward caste woman, refuses to let us implement these resolutions as she herself has been prevented by her male relatives from functioning effectively. In fact, when I resisted the domination of these backward caste men who are not even elected members of the panchayat, I have been abused as a dalit woman and many times they have physically attacked me for questioning the president.
Ramani, another dalit woman ward member from Kancheepuram district, stated that her efforts to build group housing for homeless dalit families had been thwarted by the village panchayat president, an upper caste man, who forcefully took away all the cement bags meant for the construction of those houses. According to her, this was one way the president could counter her popularity among the village people. Jaya, another dalit woman, felt that because she belonged to the untouchable community the panchayat president of her village refused to even listen to her suggestions, and arranged for all activities of the panchayat without consulting the ward members. Similarly, a tribal woman ward member, Vijaya, complained that when the resolutions were put forward for discussion her opinion was always rejected by the president, who indicated to her that she, given her caste location, was not capable of discussing or implementing panchayat resolutions. This is despite the fact that she has regularly been attending all panchayat meetings, is not reluctant to express her opinion and is also very active in carrying out welfare activities.
While this has been the experience of dalit women ward members, some backward caste women ward members, too, felt that the hierarchy and male domination within the panchayat have acted against their effective functioning. Vasanthi, a backward caste ward member, stated that she had no freedom to implement or execute panchayat resolutions. If she had some innovative ideas for effective functioning of the panchayat invariably those
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ideas were rejected. She had been scorned and ridiculed by the male leaders. because she is a woman. Similarly Logammal, a backward caste ward member from St. Thomas Mount panchayat union, stated, "The president, using his power, always misbehaves and refuses to allocate any work for me despite my willingness to carry out activities for my people who have elected me, and it is my utmost duty to implement all promises that I gave the people who elected me. But now I am frustrated as I have been made ineffective by the president."
The experience of village women presidents is not very different from the ward members, despite the fact that the president enjoys more power and autonomy than the ward members. For instance, Lakshmiyammal, a village panchayat president, complained that the male vice-president of her panchayat always refused to sign the vouchers and cheques, and thereby panchayat activities had been stopped. A village panchayat president stated that after she made all efforts to bring in proper road facilities for her village, some men incited the village people to protest against her, and also spread the rumour that she had grabbed all the raw materials meant for the construction of new roads for her personal use. The women panchayat councillors, too, complained that, in order to make them powerless and unpopular among the people, they had not been allocated any responsibilities. Krishnaveni, a union councillor from Wallajabad panchayat union, stated, The chairman does not allocate any responsibilities in the area from where I have been elected. He would always take only my signature in all resolutions of the union. Due to this I have been mentally tortured and made to feel that l cannot work effectively for the people who have elected me.”
Despite these barriers many women leaders stated, as part of their achievements, that they have been able to undertake as many tasks as possible and take care of basic facilities. The major activities undertaken by them, as mentioned by many of them, include provision of drinking water, street lights, electricity, schools, bridges and culverts, issue of loans and identification of beneficiaries for government schemes. Despite lack of information, many women leaders have taken some special interest to find out and implement government schemes for women, and have undertaken other welfare measures for women. For instance, many women respondents stated that for effective local governance which is accountable to people, the panchayat must provide public toilets, proper crèche facilities for the children of working mothers, maternity wards within the village health centres, special bus services for working women, self-employment schemes, scholarship for girl students, and training for women agricultural workers on income generation schemes.
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2. Political power and violence
Nearly all women panchayat members stated that they had to face all kinds of violence, both physical and mental, in the public and domestic spheres, before and after assuming power. Many women ward members did not face problems during thc election, since that post within the panchayat is not considered to be as prestigious or as powerful as the other posts such as the village presidents, union councillors and chairman. Yet when some women ward members took initiatives to carry out panchayat activities in their area, and when they questioned the mismanagement of their panchayats, they were physically attacked and prevented from attending the panchayat meetings. Dalit and tribal women in particular, as stated earlier, were abused because of their caste. A tribal woman ward member stated, "Just because I belong to the lower caste have been humiliated in the panchayat. They (upper caste men) indulged in all sorts of violence to keep me out of the panchayat. Seeing this the public, too, look at me as a lower caste women and do not pay any attention to my words and pay no respect. Because of all these tortures I have decided not to get involved in panchayat functioning and activities.
At the level of village president, many of them stated that there were all kinds of malpractice during the election, like forceful prevention of voters from voting, use of threats, coercion and distribution of arrack and money. As for other women representatives, when women presidents undertook some initiatives in carrying out welfare activities, either their own caste men or the menfolk of their village accused them of being corrupt and inefficient. A backward caste Christian woman president stated that it was the men from the local church, including the pastor of that church, who had been campaigning against her work and also spreading rumours about her. A dalit woman vice-president recalled how men of her own community attempted to implicate her in the illicit liquor trade in order to remove her from the panchayat. In her own words, “After I became the panchayat vice-president, my neighbourhood men, they are from my caste, purposely started illicit liquor brewing right next to my house and spread the rumour that I have initiated this trade. But when they failed, they demolished the bus stand which built for the village people. Now, every day, after consuming liquor, they abuse me in vulgar language. I have now approached the police for protection. The problems faced by the dalit women presidents are a double form of oppression (caste, as well as male oppression from their own community). The following two case studies would illustrate the above point. Killiammal. a 45-year-old dalit woman, is an illiterate coolie worker who does not have a family of her own, and works full time for an upper
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caste, Yadava landlord. Since her village was declared a reserved constituency for dalit woman, the latter, using his power as her landlord, forced her to contest the election. Using his caste and economic status, he ensured that she was elected as the village president. According to Killiammal. her landlord did not heed her pleadings that she has no experience in public life and that she is illiterate, since he knew that he would act as president on her behalf. Ultimately. Killiammal could not refuse his decision to field her as the presidential candidate, since she has no property and is dependent on him for her livelihood. After she won the election she has been forced to address him as Thalaivar, meaning the village panchayat president. In her interview she stated that she does not attend the panchayat meetings without the presence of her landlord, who does all the speaking on her behalf. She is also aware that she is unable to resist his dominance because of her low caste status and the economic dependency. In her words,
After I won the election, I face numerous problems. The entire village opposes me because of my landlord’s intervention in the panchayat. So many times, the village people have protested against the Thalaivar her landlord and his domination in the panchayat. You can see notices of protest all over the place. They even lodged a complaint with the collector. Despite my illiteracy and inexperience in political life, I am aware of all this. But how can fact independently when I am dependent on him for my survival?
The case of Ranganayagi, another dalit women, is quite different. Ranganayagi's public life as a village health worker began in 1987. It is because of her regular contact with each and every household in her village that she could start the Madhar Sangam for women agricultural workers in 1989. The sangam initially was only taking up the problem of lower wages for women agricultural workers. Later on, with a network of women from 49 villages in Chengalpattu district, it took up other issues like drinking water facilities, electricity, and road facilities for all villages. The organisation itself was renamed Mahalir Shakti (women's power). Ranganayagi became the Secretary of the organisation, and has been actively taking up issues like land rights for dalit women, abolition of liquor brewing, and self-employment for dalit women. She has also mobilised about 1,000 rural women for each of the agitations, and often single-handedly planned and organised mass protests in front of police stations and in front of the district collectorate. She is also an executive member of an NGO known as Social Action Movement.
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In 1996, the Mahalir Shakti nominated her to contest the panchayat election for the post of village panchayat president from the constituency reserved for women. As soon as she was nominated, the dalit men of her village who were opposed to her nomination (despite the fact that she belonged to their own community) persuaded the powerful local landlord, who is also an upper caste man, to field an upper caste woman for the same post in order to defeat Ranganayagi. As soon as Ranganayagi assumed power, as the president, Ranganayagi called for the Gram Sabha meeting, which very few village presidents did in their villages. She is also probably one of those very few village presidents who have been remarkably successful in implementing most of the five-year plan of their panchayats. Because of her longtime association with the rural women's organisation, she took special interest in dalit women's welfare. She intervened in matters like sexual harassment, and encouraged inter-caste marriages in her village. As panchayat president she took the initiative to arrange a civil wedding between a dalit woman and a backward caste man, which clearly angered the backward caste men who decided to remove her from the presidential post.
From then on, they aligned with the male panchayat members and petitioned the collector alleging that she had been swindling money from the panchayat, that she was autocratic in deciding panchayat matters and that, being a dalit Christian, she misused her power as panchayat president to carry out missionary activities in the village and indulged in forceful conversion of dalit families to Christianity. While it was clear that the backward caste men wanted to disempower her because she is a dalit woman, the dalit men too were keen on removing her from the panchayat since they had been strongly resenting her anti-liquor campaigns and her successful mobilisation of dalit women against family violence. They were waiting for an opportunity to humiliate her, and thus sent petitions to the collector stating that they had lost confidence in her since she is inefficient and corrupt. Dalit men also sexually harassed Ranganayagi, a widow, and they incited the male panchayat members to pass a resolution against her. According to her it was only the women ward members of the panchayat who supported her, and opposed the resolution to remove her from power. However, based on the petitions sent by the village men, in 1998 the district collector dismissed Ranganayagi from the presidential post. Ranganayagi refused to accept the dismissal, and appealed to the chief minister and the head of the panchayat development board for justice. In 1999. on finding no evidence of corruption or inefficiency on her part, the district collector reinstated her. But at the time of her interview Ranganayagi was yet to receive the collector's order of reinstatement.
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Interviews with women members of local bodies show that the violence experienced by backward caste women is quite different from that of dalit women. For instance, many backward caste women leaders talked about the violence that they encountered in the family and their lack of freedom and rights within their domestic sphere. But, unlike the dalit women, most backward caste women felt secure in public life since they enjoyed community support. For instance, the backward caste women respondents shared their experience of family violence, including continuous suspicion about their sexual fidelity by their husbands, after they were elected as panchayat leaders. One ward member narrated how her husband constantly monitors her movement in the village, and has restricted her activities to just attending the panchayat meetings. She is not allowed to attend any other village meetings. We also noticed from the survey that both dalit and backward caste women have been directly and indirectly prevented by their own. husbands and other male relatives from taking responsibilities in the panchayats, and they have even been prevented from attending regular panchayat meetings. Significantly, in a number of cases, at the higher-level offices of the local bodies such as the panchayat union chairperson and councillors, the male family members of the elected women leaders function as legitimate' elected representatives. For instance, some of the women councillors of the panchayat unions in Vellore district stated that they do not know anything about the functioning of their panchayat, and are simply confined by their husbands to signing official papers.
The em powerment of women in politics
One important aspect that is covered by our survey is how women panchayat leaders perceive the link between the empowerment of women in politics and women's empowerment in the domestic sphere. Most of them felt that the range of problems faced by women in the family and in the community affected their effective participation in public life, and suggested ways to increase women's involvement in politics and in public life. The problems of dowry, unemployment, frequent childbirth, wife battering, alcoholism of men, lack of education among girl children and many other problems were identified as issues to be taken up by their local bodies. Almost all of them felt that reservations for women in various spheres of public life enabled, them to enhance their power in that sphere. While some of them suggested 50% reservation of seats for women in decision-making bodies, particularly in the political sphere, some suggested 33% reservation of seats. Many of them felt that reservation would enable women to acquire political power,
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which would automatically lead to political awareness among women. Some felt that reservations are essential for empowerment of women. Overall, many of them felt that if women enter politics they can alter the existing political culture, counter male domination in the public sphere and pay special attention to women's welfare, which, in their view, would lead to empowerment of women in the family.
Women's perception of governance and the state
Since most of the women respondents have assumed political power only through the panchayat elections, and their activities are still restricted to local level panchayats, their conception of politics itself is confined to interventions in local level issues. However, they do have a clear understanding of the structure and functioning of the local bodies. Some of them pointed out the problems within the existing panchayat structures and suggested the following changes for effective local governance:
(a) Panchayat union councils should have more power to intervene at
the village panchayat level. (b) Interference by local male politicians who are not members of the
panchayat bodies should be stopped. (c) Ward members should be given more powers and autonomy to deal
with issues in their own area. (d) Each member should be entrusted with specific responsibilities to
ensure greater participation. (e) The responsibility to provide all basic facilities should be entrusted to the village panchayat president, and the government must ensure speedy and proper financial assistance to each panchayat. (f) Women's representation should be further increased. (g) There must be an organic link between the village and union
panchayats, and similarly between union and district panchayats.
Although none of them differentiated between state and government, many of them hold the state responsible and accountable for injustices committed to women in the domestic and public spheres. For instance. they see violence against women in the family due to alcoholism of men being encouraged by the state, since it promotes, according to them, illicit liquor brewing. They also express their distrust of state institutions like the police and legal courts, and hold them responsible for the increasing incidence of dowry murders and rape. Instead, many of them said that they prefer to seek justice through
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the local panchayats or party networks. Given their local level experience of approaching only the block development officers and the district collectors, some of them felt the district collector is the ultimate authority and representative of the state. Some of them talked about the responsibilities of the ruling government in ensuring proper governance.
The beginning of empowerment
This survey shows that women's entry into leadership positions in local bodies, even if it appears to be symbolic interms of empowerment of women, has enabling consequences for women in the public sphere. For instance, dalit women claim that until the panchayat elections no woman was ever allowed to attend the caste panchayat meetings or village community level meetings (a practice that still continues in many villages). They are now being invited as panchayat leaders for such meetings, and in some cases they have also been asked to mediate issues like sexual harassment. In other cases, even if they are not allowed to participate, women leaders on their own have joined the meeting, despite strong opposition from the male members of the village community, and have expressed their opinion on village matters. While some of them said they are using this opportunity, many said that they are still reluctant to attend the caste panchayat, as they fear negative responses from their family members and from other women in the village.
Women who have never been part of any form of political or public activities have been politicised by their limited role in the panchayat, in terms of taking up issues like basic needs. For instance, many of them said that each time they take up an issue like building a water tank, they have to represent and speak on behalf of their entire community and argue their case in front of the panchayat leader (who is often an upper caste male). If there is a need they have to approach government institutions and officials like the block development officers and collectors. Some of them have approached the police for the first time to take action against illicit liquor shops and to resolve caste conflicts, and in the case of sexual harassment of women for which they had to mobilise village women. In the process of such activities they had to encounter and tackle opposition from different organised political parties and upper caste men, and to assert their power and independence.
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I
Defining Citizenship: Issues in Women's Leadership in Andhra Pradesh
This project began as an attempt to define citizenship from the standpoint of women who have consciously engaged in politics at different levels. The decision to look at questions of women and governance arose directly from our experience of working with NGOs and emerging grassroots leaders, facilitating the exercise of effective leadership through training and dialogue on issues that shape civil society. In identifying these issues, we were very clear that our political purpose was to bring to the foreground discrimination and the indispensability of human rights frameworks in the understanding of civil society. The timing of our work was also significant. Having campaigned for almost two decades as a part of autonomous women's groups that were essentially non-party formations, and having forged alliances with women in politics in spaces that were free of party control, so to speak, we were now at a point where we were asserting the need and the significance of women's entry into formal bodies - elected positions being one part of this larger structure of formal politics. Needless to say, this preoccupation with governance was part of the globalisation of governance - the imperative of globali governance.
What we found in the process is heartening in parts, but certain basic questions have resurfaced. In all the rhetoric of women's empowerment, literally translated in this context into political power for women, the larger field of patriarchy, with its multiple sites and complexities, has been translated as the right to political representation, the constraints thereof and the success stories. This study will attempt to look at the theoretical implications of women's experiences in politics, and will attempt to understand the ways in which the experience of women in politics is located within or outside patriarchal territories.
The Women and Governance project in Andhra focuses on three case studies, one each in the three regions of the state: Mahbubnagar district of Telangana, Kurnool district of Rayalaseema and West Godavari district of Coastal Andhra.
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Methodology
Both the duration of the project as well as its scope do not allow for a consistent representative sampling of specific groups in each of the districts that might enable a comparative inter-regional perspective on issues related to political participation. The study, therefore, instead of looking for a representative sample, has attempted to look at issues of participation and governance in the margins, as it were - not, for instance, at groups that might constitute the typical subalterns in each region, but those that constitute unlikely ones. A closer look at the composition of the case studies would serve to illustrate this point. Before looking at the case studies, however, it is important to note that an attempt has been made to look at issues of citizenship and governance as they emerge in three different locales: tribal, dalit and minority Muslim on one axis, and formal political structures, self-help groups and struggles for land rights on another. In terms of methodology, each component of the study has used a different methodology, depending on which tools would most effectively address the questions being raised in the study in each specific locale.
The three case studies that were conducted were as follows:
(1) Women sarpanches belonging predominantly to scheduled castes, and to a lesser extent to backward castes and scheduled tribes, in Mahbubnagar district of Telangana. The methodology used was a comprehensive survey through a questionnaire that explored women's responses to status indicators.
(2) Women, predominantly Muslim with a scheduled caste minority from Kalva village in Kurnool district of Rayalaseema, who have organised themselves into self-help groups and taken up village development so effectively that they were awarded the UNDP Race Against Poverty Award a few years ago. The methodology used was detailed interviews and extended interaction with different women in the village.
(3) Women from 13 villages in West Godavari district of Coastal Andhra, all belonging to the Koya tribe, who spearheaded a struggle against the appropriation of tribal lands by non-tribal people in the district. The methodology used was detailed interviews and focus group discussions with women who participated in the struggle, as well as archival research that looked at the history of land struggles in the area. Given the number of villages to be covered, this part of the
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study did not involve extended casual interactions with members of any particular village, but rather took the form of two-hour meetings in each village, in which between five and twenty women and an equal number of men participated.
Survey of women sarpanches in Telangana
The Telangana region in Andhra Pradesh occupies a specific place in the regional history and politics of Andhra Pradesh. Apart from being droughtprone and underdeveloped, Telangana has also the history of the first armed communist uprising in the country, first against an extremely oppressive Nizam's rule, and immediately after against the newly independent Indian state in the 1940s. Later, in the late 1960s, the Telangana movement raised several questions relating to hegemonising moves by the dominant castes of Coastal Andhra, in regard to cultural and political aspects of the state of Andhra Pradesh. Other indicators are: among the mandals that record the lowest literacy rates, 35 are in the Telangana region, 14 in Coastal Andhra and 2 in Rayalaseema. This has to be seen in light of the fact that the Telangana region alone accounts for roughly half the population of the entire state. In agriculture, Telangana has a cultivable area of 6,402,358 hectares as compared to 4,633,304 hectares in Coastal Andhra. Of this, 28.33% of the land receives canal irrigation in Coastal Andhra, whereas only 4.17% of cultivable land in Telangana has any access to canal irrigation. The picture is the same irrespective of what indices of development are used.
In this context, the Telangana has also had an extremely rich history of mass uprisings and peoples struggles against caste, feudalism and extremely repressive and militarised state regimes. The articulation of politics has therefore of necessity engaged with alternate visions of the state and new definitions of citizenship. Looking at local self-governance in this context therefore also helps us to understand how the regional identity of the people of the region frames their politics and their daily lives - and also perhaps how this regional identity is gendered.
The panchayat system has undergone several changes consequent to recommendations of various communities since the 1950s. These changes have been aimed at streamlining the system as well as addressing questions related to more effective decision-making, participatory planning and development.
༨ Vishweshwer Rao, P.L., “Telangana Today: A Status Paper, in S. Simhadri and P. L. Vishweshwer Rao. eds., Telangana: Dimensions of underdevelopment, Centre for Telangana Studies, Hyderabad, 1997. pp. 56-66.
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In 1983 there was a reorganisation of revenue divisions in Andhra with mandals being constituted as new administrative divisions. Ten to fifteen villages were grouped into one mandal, and a total of 1,104 mandals were formed in the state. The three-tier system in Andhra Pradesh therefore consists of the village or gram panchayat, the mandal parishad and the zilla (district) parishad. At each of these levels again there is a structure. The village panchayat, for instance consists of the Sarpanch, the upasarpanch and ward members - all of whom are elected - and the gram Sabha consists of all people domiciled in the village. This study looks at women in leadership positions at the village level, i.e., women Sarpanches.
Table 2.4 Women in Local Self-Government, Andhra Pradesh
Total Total Women Women GP/MPP/ZP Members Members Heads
Gram panchayats 20.538 220,538 73.513 6,846
Mandal parishads 1,092 14,303 4,776 36
Zilla parishads 22 1,092 36 ך
Source: A.P. Rural Academy. Training Manual for Mandal and District Level Elected Representatives, Hyderabad, 1996.
In Table 2.6 below, although State Election Commission records show a total of 434 members, we have found a detailed breakdown for only 298, hence the discrepancy between figures in this particular table and Table 2.5.
A survey was conducted of 266 women sarpanches in one district in Telangana. This part of the study was conducted with the collaboration of STEP, an NGO in Mahbubnagar district. The basic framework of this questionnaire was developed at the National Institute of Advanced Study, Bangalore, for a comprehensive study on the status of women in Karnataka. While retaining the questionnaire with minor modifications, a whole section on political participation has been added. The entire questionnaire was discussed with the field investigators in Mahbubnagar before it was finalised. The difference (in our view an important one) between the Karnataka study and the present one, is that while the former administered the questionnaire
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to village women in a cross-section of villages in Karnataka, the present study attempts to map the responses of elected women leaders to tested status indicators for women. In doing this we hope to be able to look at the linkages between women's status and questions of leadership.
At a very general level, the groups conducting the Survey reported on the responses the survey elicited among the Sarpanches. Most of the responses seemed to reiterate accounts of women functioning primarily as proxies for men in their communities, or of women being in such a disempowered situation that they were not able to be effective leaders. While not taking these responses as final, and asserting the need to look at the results thrown up by the questionnaire, these reports for us underscore the linkages between social status and leadership. A point to note here is that the women whose responses were being reported to us by the investigating team were womer from scheduled caste, scheduled tribe and some women from backward caste communities who had little or no access to formal education. Added to this is the fact that these are women from the most backward region of the state. The multidimensionality and complexity of political participation cannot be greater than in the Telangana. This is why a status study of sarpanches becomes relevant. A look at responses to status indicators gives us more concrete correlates of power in specific contexts and thereby also correlates of effective governance.
Of a total of 434 women incumbents in the gram panchayat system (refer Table 2.5 for details) in Mahbubnagar, the present survey covered 266
WOI16).
Table 2.7 Distribution of Women Sarpanches according to Caste and Religion (respondents only)
Caste/religion No. of respondents
Scheduled caste 32 Scheduled tribe 2 Backward caste 68 Christian 2 Muslim 3. Hindu (caste not reported) - 145 No information 4.
Total 266
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Of these 266 respondents, 248 reported owning some land, while 25l owned a house. In addition, 183 women reported owning animals, 134 jewellery and 146 owned work implements of various kinds. The survey attempted to explore political participation through several multiple choice and open-ended questions. On exercising the right to vote, l 10 women sarpanches reported that their husbands decided who they should vote for, and only 34 of them had actually cast a vote themselves. 265 of them had contested and won the election at the village level only once, and none had ventured beyond the village to the mandal or zilla parishad. Having won the gram panchayat election, 132 of the 266 sarpanches surveyed reported membership of mahila mandals, political parties and/or other support groupS/ collectives. Of these memberships, mahila mandals were the most popular, with 88 women reporting membership. The next in popularity was political parties, with 65 women reporting party membership. Further, having participated in the elections and won, several of these women had taken an active part in campaigning for other party candidates. t
In the course of their work, they felt that women would be more sensitive to women's interests (only one woman out of 194 felt this is not, necessarily true), and most of these women reported campaigning for women. candidates in elections at the local level. 156 women reported that women, could transform the political culture, while 53 felt they did not have the power. Several of these women said they met with other women in the village and discussed their problems, irrespective of whether they could actually effect change. Among the issues most commonly discussed at these meetings were dowry, child marriage, domestic violence, high prices and divorce. Rape, although discussed, was not a frequent topic of discussion, while religion and remarriage did not figure at all. This is to be seen alongside responses to a question of what significance is religion in your personal life', to which 98 stated that it plays a very important role, while 61 said that religion plays no role in their personal life. •
A few general observations from the field data and interactions with women sarpanches during the course of this study will be a useful starting point. Being the most backward region as well as the centre of radical political activity, the Telangana interviews proved unusually difficult. For one thing, while it was practically impossible to have one-to-one interviews with the women sarpanches, filling the questionnaire becoming a collective activity that all those present pitched into. This has to do both with the questionnaire itself being an object of curiosity, and the investigating team and the respondents having very different perceptions of the public and the private. In several instances, either the husband or a son would answer for the woman,
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irrespective of whether the question was about overt politics or personal detail.
The questions about personal detail sought to establish the degree of control over household affairs and reproductive life. While the thandas or tribal settlements exhibited a greater degree of autonomy, the situation of scheduled caste women sarpanches was far from enviable. At a meeting of women sarpanches convened as part of this study, a scheduled caste woman spoke of her extreme vulnerability and inability to do anything in her village as being directly linked to her caste and economic status. An upper caste landlord coveted the post, but he could not contest because the constituency was declared reserved for scheduled castes. In order to retain control, he filed the nomination on behalf of his scheduled caste bonded labourer. The constituency was then declared reserved for women. So he got the labourer's wife to file her nomination. And that is how she got elected. All decisions are conveyed to her through her husband, and she is summoned by the landlord from time to time to report on her activities.
Several scheduled caste women reported that they did not attend village meetings, and signed cheques that were brought to them at home. Although the practice of having a village officer as co-signatory to cheques had been discontinued officially, this was not communicated to the women sarpanches who were largely non-literate. Male co-signatories, they reported, often demanded more than 60% of a cheque amount as a bribe in order to sign. However, what was extremely significant in the telling of experiences of disempowerment was the perception of powerlessness and an extreme unhappiness with their current situation. This led these women elected representatives, theoretically privileged citizens, to interrogate the state's complicity in their denial of citizenship, thus destabilising received definitions of democratic order.
Self-help groups in Kalva village, Kurnool district, Rayalaseema
Over long periods Congress-I dominated Rayalaseema, a dry region that touches the Karnataka border, which is now known for its extremely violent, faction-ridden politics. This politics has for over two decades involved the complete derogation of human rights for women. There are several reasons for locating a case Study in Kurnool district. As has been said earlier, this is an area with a tradition of violent politics, and a virtual absence of women as significant actors in the mainstream political field. And yet resistance movements and efforts at community mobilisation have thrown up women of courage and political will.
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The initial decision to include Kalva in our study came from the
announcement that the sarpanch, a Muslim woman, had won an international award the UNDP Race Against Poverty Award for her work. We had at that time no idea of the demographic profile of the village, or indeed the mandal, and even less of an idea about who were the motivators of rapid socio-economic change in the village. Our initial decision, therefore, was to look at this part of the study as complementary to the survey of sarpanches. It was meant to be an in-depth study of one gram panchayat under the leadership of a woman sarpanch. Within hours of reaching the village, we realised that the study had instead to focus on self-help groups that functioned completely independently of the gram panchayat, the latter playing only a secondary role in village development. Our notions of leadership changed as well. We were no longer looking for a single woman who had spearheaded change, but at a group of women, 300 in number, who together took the future of the village into their hands, and decided to shape their destinies, What to us was initially an interesting fact, a Muslim woman in a leadership position in a region which is not associated with a strong minority presence, turned out to be a completely unexpected demographic profile of an entire mandal. Kalva and three other villages in the Orvakal mandal have a 90% Muslim population. The Muslim population in the entire mandal is as high as 30%. The census, however, records only the proportion of scheduled caste and scheduled tribe population, so the demographic profile is unexpected.
Table 2.8 Orvaka Mandal, Kurnool District
Total population SC ST Literates Total Men Women || Men Women i Men Wommen i Men Women
Orwakal MPP 44.4l 23.000 2l.4il 4,537 4.048 416 385 9,797 4.057 Kalva Village | 3,042 l,523 l5 19 69 74 6 66 4S4 70
Source Census of India 1991, District Census Handbook, for Mahbubnagar, Kurnool and West Godavari.
Kalva: Remembering the past
Zubeda Bee, in her early- or mid-thirties, is one of the most articulate leaders in the village. Speaking about conditions in the village before the formation of self-help sanghas, she says:
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Our village Kalva is in a corner of Orvakallu Mandalam in Kurnool district. When people, visitors, come to the village and get off the bus, they cannot see the village till they actually enter it. If someone asked. We have to go the village. Where is Kalva?” They would be shown the trees and the kalva (creek) and asked to cross it. Then they would arrive at the village. My mother-in-law, mother and other old people tell us the story of the village.
The village I was born in was Gorkallu. I am a daughter-in-law in Kalva. I was married and sent to this village when I was sixteen. It seems everything was fine in the old days. All of a sudden there was an epidemic in the village. According to custom, there was a bazaar for the Brahmins, each caste had its own bazaar according to custom. When the epidemic came it seems most of the people in the village died. They were big landlords. Even in small remote villages, those who had a little land or fields left the village and went away. They went away to Kurnool and places like that. The people who stayed back in the village were those who felt, "If we go away somewhere, we will not be able to survive. If we leave this village and go away, we will not even get coolie work'. Only those who could not survive outside stayed on in Kalva. Nobody knew anything about education there nor did they know anything about family planning. Neither girls nor boys had any education. Not a single doctor used to come to the village. If you talk about extreme poverty, the people of Kalva experienced it.
It was in those conditions that I first came to this village sixteen years ago. Each house had 10 children or 9 children or 6 children or 5 children. This village was full of people and in ruin. No education. Even if everyone felt let's work hard and eat, there was not enough land. What little was there was not good land. If there was a little water that came in from Kalva Bugga, people who were not sick and who had half acre or an acre used it for coconut and mango trees. There was also a little paddy. If children needed new clothes to wear, or if they fell sick all of a sudden, or if they were to be married, it was impossible to get any money. Far away in Betamcherla, they used to give us money at five rupees or six
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rupees interest after first deducting the interest. Also, not everyone who went would get money. We had to take a known person who would stand Surety for us and get the money. It was never possible to get money at the right time. There are a greater number of Muslims in that village. There are a few scheduled caste and backward caste people. And in the houses of the Muslims, even if there was a basketful of children, the wife and children had to be kept at home. The husbands had to go out and earn wages. We had to say fine whether it was gruel or roti and stay home. Women did not know anything at all about money matters. Whatever hardships the man went through, he had to get a thousand rupees from outside. We were unconcerned because we did not know anything. We only knew how to spend it all carelessly, but never understood what money was all about.
In those conditions many people did not find work. Young boys, fifteen years of age, would take with them an eight year old and go away to Hyderabad in Search of work. Many of them work in polish cutting in Hyderabad. Many of them continue to stay there with their wives and children. They come to the village once a year for Ramzan. There are about 500 to 600 people like that. The daughters, the old people and the parents are there. Girls would go to graze buffaloes and goats or just stay at home. All the SC people's houses were huts. The village was surrounded by water. The children from the SC houses would always be playing in the water, unwashed and dirty. Two children even fell in the water and drowned. If you stay to watch the children, there will be no food.
The women in this village, mostly non-literate and poor, organised themselves into groups three years ago at the initial persistence of Vijayabharathi, a
UNDP project officer working the area.
Where Kurnool is concerned, the women of Kalvastate unequivocally
that nothing would have been possible, and their lives would not have changed at all, had it not been for two people: Jayaraj of the Rayalaseema Grameen Bank and Vijayabharathi of UNDP. It is also significant that while they do not entirely dismiss the role of the agencies these people represent, they are also very clear that the agencies were brought to their door and kept thereby
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these people, therefore the emotional and material bond is far greater with these people. Especially in the case of Vijayabharathi - she is seen as the person responsible for forcing them to take charge of their lives. interview after interview refers to the fact that the women of Kalva, particularly the scheduled caste women, had no concept of cleanliness and hygiene, and their lives were characterised by a kind of despondency till Vijayabharathi came and spoke to them of the importance of bathing children and keeping them clean, and on the connection between good health and hygiene. While it is no doubt important to look at issues of governance and citizenship as they are shaped by women at the grassroots level, no less significant is the shaping of these issues by women who are catalysts of change - and gender plays a critical role in both these levels.
The levels of poverty in this village by all accounts were stark, and the scheduled caste families that were at the bottom of the village hierarchy were constantly on the verge of starvation. Scrubbing children and consciously beginning to care for them appear to be a first sign of the women taking stock of their lives. Very soon after this, the SC women organised a creche so that infants and Small children could be cared for when the mothers went to work in the fields. They could not of course afford to pay the woman who was minding the children. She did the job nevertheless till they managed to find government salaries for her and for the teacher. Only the salary structure in the government was four hundred for the teacher and two hundred for the ayah. The women decided this was unfair and pooled in two hundred from the interest on their savings, so both could draw the same salary. . .
Child marriage was another serious problem in the village. One of the young women we spoke with, Nagamani, had been married offat the age of nine to a man much older than her. His first wife had deserted him because he had leprosy. The accounts of this young girl are moving. She speaks of how she did not know what marriage meant:
I did not even know, I have no memory of when they got me married. Three or four years after they got me married, I became big attained puberty. Then after a year my motherin-law came. She said I should stay in her house. I did not know anything. In our houses, after marriage, the girl should not sit on a cot in front of the mother-in-law. I normally sit on a cot. I did not know that I should serve food. I did not know anything. I did not know that I should give them tea when they come or that I should give them water when she came to
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take me. When she came my mother told me, “She is your aththa'. If she was my aunt, she should be the same for my sisters. They were all just sitting around. I did not know anything. We all went together-25 of us. My mother got me ready so she could take me. After she told my mother, my mother put my clothes together, gave me a bath, packed my clothes and all of them tried to send me offalone. I did not have toe rings or a puste around my neck. I don't remember whether I took them off or what happened to them. As my mother was getting me ready, I was crying, saying "If you don't come I will not go alone. Then my sisters beat me a lot and asked me to go. Where was to go? I did not know anything. My mother said it was wrong to say that. Then she said, okay I will come with you. My mother and I, both of us went along with my motherin-law. After we went there I was told the daughter-in-law must not sit on the cot, she should cook for everyone, she must serve food for her mother-in-law and father-in-law. I knew nothing about cooking. I would be playing in my house. My sisters were there. So they would do all the cooking.
After went there I had to wash utensils, sweep the front of the house. I had to cook and didn't know how to. As soon as we reached, they gave us water to wash our feet, we washed. My mother sat on the cot. I sat on the cot. They got angry. There is no use in having brought her here. She sits where her mother sits, and they even stopped talking to my mother. Then my mother understood. Because they said if you sit on the cot like this, your child will also sit on the cot, my mother stopped sitting on the cot and sat on the floor instead. I sat on the floor too. After we had been there for two or three days they asked me to go out with them. My motherin-law asked me to go to the market with her. I told my mother and she said I could go. We went, the two of us. As we were walking she said, you are our daughter-in-law, you should wash utensils, sweep the house, cook. You must do all this work. You sit where your mother sits. How many days will your mother stay here? She kept scolding me, I kept saying, I don't
Aththa could refer to father's sister maternal uncle's wife or mother-in-law. Here,
mother-in-law.
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know how to do all this work. How will I do it? You have to do it. After all you got married, didn't you? There are daughters-in-law in our house. They are doing the work, are they not? I could not reply because I did not understand anything. Then I told my mother. I don't know why, amma, but this is what she said. To which my mother said. Yes. After all she is right. And began quarrelling with her. She brought me back home. For two years after we came back, we did not go to their house. They did not come to our house. Then they made me sit saying that I had grown up.
When she attained puberty, the in-laws came to fetch her, and her mother and sisters beat her for refusing to go. She tried to run away, and that was when Vijayabharathi found her and intervened in the matter.
Muslims in this village are in a numerical majority, 90%, and are also economically better off than the scheduled castes. Some Muslim families own land and/or petty businesses or lease land, while all scheduled caste families work as labourers. The village, perhaps the mandal itself, has witnessed a long history of discrimination against scheduled castes by Muslims, as this account from Marthamma tells us:
No officer would visit our village. If there was a dispute about land, the MRO used to be brought to the village. We would all stand in a line as if he was god. We would try to go closer to him, but they would not let us go close, the Muslims. Hey! Go that side. Far way. He is a big man. Move away. He would stand there. All around him would be Muslims. And we would be far away. That was how this village was. They used to be like that.
Consciousness and identity
In the course of organising there has been a coming together of these two groups, and a collaboration across both class and community. The village has 22 savings groups, each group consisting of people with assets and those without. While there is a consciousness of identity and community in selfperceptions of work and community life, this seems to occupy a secondary position with regard to the work of the village organisation or the Grama Aikya Sangham. The consciousness of community is very present, because there are the very visible markers of community - the burqa for women, and
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beards for the older men. There are also very clearly demarcated circles of social intercourse. While talking to the women, for instance, we raised the question of the greater possibility of inter-community marriages in an environment where girls were not leading restricted lives, and where greater interactions are made possible by the new environment in the village. The spontaneous response was that it was just unthinkable and not at all possible. If the several extremely violent and brutal incidents in different parts of the country where there have been inter-caste/inter-community unions are taken as a marker, then, on a general level, such unions are possible." The reason behind the question was to sound out the women on the possibility of such an event, and what difference it would make to a village that was organised by women on completely new parameters.
During the week that we were in the village, we spent most of our time singing songs for the women and men. We would just go into a particular street and ask the first woman we met whether she would like to hear our songs. Actually we were not asking her - we were just telling her that we wanted to sing! And we would sing. Some days we ended up singing each song ten times in the course of the day, and there were about five songs that we chose. Since Muslim families in this village also speak Urdu, we had decided to sing a couple of Hindi songs as well, one of which was a song on communal harmony: Mandir Masjid. Toward the end of our stay in the village, we came across a family where none of the women were in the credit groups. We were told that the head of the house, an elderly man, would not allow them to join a credit group. We were telling them that they should join the groups when they fell silent all of a sudden. We looked back and saw this old man staring at us very sullenly. Then one of the younger men toldus' very quickly that we should sing our songs for this uncle. And before we could start, he said, “Sing the Babri Masjid song.”
We had to think for a moment, because for us the association was not so much with Babri Masjid as with communal harmony. However we sang the song and several others as well. What happened with this brief interaction was that the question of identity, which until that point had remained at a subterranean level in our conversations with the women, began to bother us. It is true that women across class and community had come together in very significant ways, but suddenly all the cultural markers that, although very visible, had not bothered us till then - both with regard to SC women as well as Muslim women and even some BC women - began to cause unease. The
7 Often all-male panchayats have meted out extremely harsh punishment, sometimes
even death, to offenders.
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fact that it was the men whose recall of the song was associated with Babri Masjid was another question in my mind. We had sung this song several times for the women, but, while there was interest, there was no obvious association with community. At a mandal level meeting therefore, when one of the women asked us to sing that Hindi song, we sang it, and then related the incident with the men, underscoring the association they made with Babri Masjid.
We asked the women why there was such a different response from them. Did Babri Masjid not affect their lives? There was an initial reluctance to speak, arising partly from the fact that internal matters like community had been consciously kept out of the spaces where they came together. On hindsight, this separation is perhaps justifiable, especially in the light of the history of explosive politics in spaces where it does find a place. However, our interest was to look at the different ways in which mobilisation and identity come together, and somewhere also to search for positive instances of that coming together. It was necessary for us to find positive and empowering ways of talking about this with different groups. After an initial reluctance some women came out and said, yes, Babri Masjid did affect their lives, that for the first time they were afraid, and although they knew that their neighbours would not do anything to them, they were still unsure of what forces might intervene to destroy the peace. One woman said for the first time in her life she experienced that kind of fear. They also said their men were much more involved in the whole thing, because they used to read the news and discuss it. Since this happened before the women organised themselves, they were more or less confined to their individual families and had to experience the uncertainty and insecurity alone. The non-Muslim women did not enter into the debate at all. Finally, one young Muslim woman said, 'If something like that happens now, we will know no fear, because we are all together and we make no distinctions of class or community. An analysis of the interviews and testimonies of women of different groups in Kalva will show that class, caste and community are indeed significant cultural markers and determinants of identity.
Self-governance: A beginning
In the course of collective mobilisation, however, there is a potential which has in fact been explored of an “organic solidarity (to adapt a Durkheimian concept) that is a binding and strengthening force. Looking at cultural markers, one of the women was invited to deliver a public lecture in Hyderabad. Journalists from Urdu newspapers asked her why she was still
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wearing a burqa. Her categorical answer was I will not remove my burqa. This is one aspect of culture that requires deeper thought. While the burqa in popular perception is a sign of conservatism and seclusion of women (and is in fact so in most areas), these women in Kurnool have in the course of their work delinked it from orthodoxy, seclusion and restricted mobility, and in an important sense have reduced it to a marker with cultural significance but devoid of connotations of power or dispossession. For our own repertoire of positive images of community, images that erode stereotypical constructions, the communities in Orvakal will be central.
Nagamani, along with adolescent girls in the village, have now formed balika sanghas, and primary on their agenda is stopping child marriage in the village. They told us that whenever they see a stranger coming into the village, they ask to which house they are going, tell them there are no girls below the age of 18 in the village available for marriage), and that if they went ahead and married the girl they would be the losers because the girl would not be allowed to leave the village and a case would be booked against them in the police station.
As a preliminary comment we can perhaps say that the women of Kalva have addressed issues of governance and citizenship by forging an independent relationship with the state - as represented both by the UNDP (the national coordinator being an IAS officer), as well as through the district administration. The issues that they have taken as central in defining political participation and governance are, primarily, social issues that are of immediate relevance to the community. In conclusion, to quote Zubeda Bee:
Whatever you might say, if we believe that the entire responsibility is that of the sarpanch or the group leader, the village can never progress. In our villages, teachers come to the school from other villages. We have to see if they are coming on time and teaching the children. We cannot leave it to the sarpanch, saying as a village elder it is her responsibility. When we live in the village, it is our responsibility to look after all these things. Is the nurse coming or not? There are anganwadi schools. Is the teacher giving children the cereal or not? Is she running the centre properly? Are they making rice for our children in the schools? Are the teachers coming regularly? Are polio drops being given? Because of the janmabhoomi programme, so much work is coming to our village on its own. All these days they would come to us once in a while when they felt like it. Now, every scheme is coming
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to us. Every official is coming, walking to our village from the mandalam. We must tell them what our needs are in the village. If we work in cooperation with them. we can do so many good things in our village. We are working like this in our village. Our village would not have got such a big award if any one person worked alone. Nobody can do this alone. It is only when everyone works together that development is possible. When you look at the village now and say that village has good buildings, the roads are good, it is not the buildings and roads. How are the people in that village? What kind of responsibilities are they taking? How are they moving ahead? These are what are important. This is what you should look for, and that is what we are doing.
“We have got a handful of earth. We must not let it go: Koya Women in West Godavari, Coastal Andhra
While the case studies in Rayalaseema and Telangana looked at the panchayat system and its relevance/relationship to efforts at mobilisation/governance by women, the study of Coastal Andhra is far removed from this context. The areas under study here are the scheduled/agency areas with a predominantly tribal population. While the issues that have been thrown up in the course of the study have undoubtedly to do with governance and citizenship, these questions can only be raised outside of the formal political system that the panchayat represents. Further, the nature of the problem in the agency areas has necessitated a complex and protracted struggle against dominant and hegemonic forces, using or attempting to use both the judiciary and the executive to reinforce existing protection granted by the legislature. While the state is theoretically an ally, the tribal peoples are also confronted with an adversarial state at every step. While there has been a rich and vibrant struggle on the ground, the struggle in West Godavariand other agency areas has also, importantly, involved a struggle for rights in courts of law. It is this complexity that shapes the participation of women in the struggle.
The struggle for autonomy: Using law courts
The AP Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (Act 13 of 1994), passed consequent to the 73 Amendment to the constitution, does not apply to the scheduled areas of the state. While the state government contended that the applicability
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of this provision could be extended to scheduled areas by the discretion of the governor, with the specific purpose of drawing hitherto isolated tribal populations into the mainstream, a writ petition was filed by the vice president of the Gondwana Sangharsh Samiti seeking a declaration by a writ of mandamus that the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act is not applicable to scheduled areas. This petition was upheld. The petitioners argued that scheduled areas came under Schedule V of the Constitution of India as declared by the president of India. They also invoked Article 243 M of the 73 Amendment, which specifically provides for the exclusion of tribal areas from its jurisdiction. The grounds on which the petitioners sought exclusion have been clearly stated in their affidavit.
The affidavit, filed in support of the writ petition, states that due to the large influx of non-tribals into the scheduled areas, the population of the tribals therein has decreased to a considerable extent. This has resulted in a radical transformation of the demographic composition of the scheduled areas. reducing the tribals to a minority in many parts. In spite of the protective legislation, forbidding non-tribals from owning lands in the tribal areas, more than 48% of the agricultural land in the scheduled areas went into the hands of non-tribals. There are 5,913 villages spread over 8 districts - Adilabad, Warangal, Khammam, West Godavari, East Godavari, Visakhapatnam, Vizianagaram, Srikakulam and Mahbubnagar - in an area of 30,293 square kilometres and populated by 33 scheduled tribes.
The total population of the scheduled tribes according to the 1991 census is 42 lakhs, accounting for 6.3% of the total population in the state. The enactment of the Panchayat Raj Act by the state of Andhra Pradesh, and its application in scheduled areas, would result in a subversion of tribal interests that were hitherto safeguarded under Schedule V of the constitution. The provision that protection by Schedule V will be limited only to those instances where the entire territorial constituency lies in the scheduled area, and also if the population of the scheduled tribes in the constituency is more than 50%, resulted in many elective positions in the scheduled areas going in favour of non-tribals. Out of the 46 Mandal Praja Parishads in the scheduled areas, only 33 are reserved in favour of the scheduled tribes. The remaining 13 were brought into the open pool as the percentage of the tribal population in them is less than 50%. The object of enacting Schedule V of the constitution
8 Arka Vasanth Rao vs. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh 1995 (i) Andhra Lavi Times 600
(Ꭰ.Ᏼ.).
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is to preserve and protect the interests of the scheduled tribes in the defined areas.' The writ petition argued that this objective has been watered down by the enactment of the Panchayat Raj Act, which has introduced the population norm for the purpose of reservations, which would only lead to the disappearance of the scheduled area itself over a period of time by the influx of non-tribals.
The non-tribal farmers filed writ petitions in the High Court between 1987 and 1996, which came up for hearing as a batch in October 1997. They contended that they have enjoyed the thousands of acres being cultivated by them for the past 25 years. Their petitions challenged the inclusion of their villages in the Scheduled Areas Acts, and sought a mandamus for declaring the said inclusion as illegal and without jurisdiction. The petitions further contended that the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulation No. 1 of 1959, as amended by Regulation l of 1970, be declared as inoperative for the villages named in the petition.
These non-tribal petitioners further contended that the tribal population in their villages is negligible, and in some instances non-existent. The dispossession of non-tribals of land in the scheduled areas, they argued, was in violation of Article 2 of the Constitution of India - the right to life. This argument was based on the stringency of laws in scheduled areas against non-tribals. It would be pertinent to note here that Regulation i of 1959 bars transfer of land from tribal to non-tribal, while Regulation 1 of 1970 bars transfers of land between non-tribals. The implementation of these two regulations therefore meant the complete negation of ownership and control over land by non-tribals in tribal areas.
The respondents in these petitions were the government of Andhra Pradesh; the district collector, West Godavari; the special deputy collector,
s Under the Government of India Act 1935 (Chapter V) areas covered by Schedule V and V of the constitution were referred to as excluded and partially excluded areas. The present Schedule V deals with the partially excluded areas. If we can go back in history to trace the origin of these special provisions we will find these are first mentioned in the schedules to the Scheduled Districts Act of 1874. Under this Act areas listed out in the schedules required specific treatment. The Montagu Chelmsford Commission's report also recommended the continuation of the specific treatment to people who were living in the Backward Tract. The Government of India Act of 1919 therefore authorised the governor general in council to declare any territory to be a backward tract and made provision to modify laws in their application to these backward tracts.
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tribal welfare; Sakthi, a voluntary organisation impleaded through a government order in 1992; and 122 tribal people who impleaded themselves through a court order in 1997. Of these 122 tribal people, 63 were women between the ages of 18 and 60 years.
Women and the struggle for land: Articulations of the state
The present study involved visits to thirteen villages in two mandals of West Godavari district: Jeelugumilli and Buttayigudem. The villages are: Panduvarigudem and Patachevulavarigudem, hamlets of Darbhagudem village, Vangavarigudem, Barrenkulapadu colony, Taatiramannagudem, Chandramma colony and Sirivarigudem hamlets of Jeelugumilli village, and Palacherla Rajavaram, in Jeelugumilli mandal; Kangalavarigudem, Kommavarigudem, and Regulagunta hamlets in Lakshmudugudem village, Bhoosarajupalli, and Marlagudem in Buttayigudem mandal.
Our attempt in the study was to explore articulations of governance and citizenship by the Koya women of West Godavari that emerged in the course of the struggle for land rights. In fighting for repossession of tribal lands, the state figures as a complex, multi-layered entity, both ally and adversary, central yet marginal, shaping local politics and being shaped by it. References to "the state' are indispensable to any recounting of the land struggle. As has already been detailed, the struggle began as a demand for the implementation of the Land Transfer (Regulation) Act passed by the government. On the ground, therefore, it was a demand for accountability on the part of functionaries of the state, in an important sense, the state, in passing this legislation and others of this kind, makes itself an ally of the tribal population. While making this demand, however, the tribals become actively aware of the fact that the state itselfis a splintered entity in fact,
perhaps not an entity at all. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "
When they asked for the implementation of the legislation, the tribal women had to negotiate with two sets of functionaries - the officials of the mandal revenue department and the police. When they went to the office of the MRO, they found the non-tribal farmers in the office being entertained by the MRO. On seeing the tribal women, the MRO's first reaction was, “Move! Movel Koya Stink! Move! The police, who in fact were there to safeguard the rights of the tribals through the implementation of constitutional provisions, instead went into one village after another threatening to rape the Koya women if they persisted in their demands. When the threats did not dampen the spirit of struggle, cases were booked against these women and they were imprisoned for four to six weeks. The struggle has however been
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successful. Thousands of acres of fertile land have been fallow for over three years now. Non-tribal farmers have not been allowed to enter any of these villages, and the Koyas cultivate as much land as they can afford, and share the produce between villages and families. Some villages cultivate jointly, while others have divided the land up with each family taking responsibility for what is under its control. All the women interviewed were however clear that they did not want joint cultivation to carry on indefinitely, because it was only when individual families had complete control over their land that they would act responsibly towards it. Having won a major battle, however, the women and men are unsure of where they should go from here. Speaking of the importance of the panchayat, one of the men in Barrenkulapadu colony said, “Only men can be sarpanches. What do women know? It is because we are hot blooded and prone to rash acts that we pushed the women forward in the struggle. That was the only way we could ensure that the struggle was relatively peaceful. Women in another village, Marlagudem, said in the presence of the men, "If we had left matters to our men, they would have been bought over by the non-tribal farmers long ago. It was our obstinacy that sustained our gains and kept the land with us.'
Conclusion
The field studies in Andhra Pradesh point to the various ways in which women articulate questions of governance and citizenship, and the various sites in which they do this. We also get a clear sense, from our preliminary findings, of the gendering of the discourse on politics, struggle, rights and the state in these different locales. The view that, for citizenship, life itself must be rooted in land, and that taking control of objective conditions and shaping them involve, as a first step, addressing issues of social justice and welfare, and that development cannot be measured in terms of indices of wealth but in terms of indices of welfare and social equality, is significant. We hope that this study will subsequently lead to assessing how processes of disempowerment are shaped by gender and power at different levels of sociopolitical hierarchies.
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I
Women and the Democratic Process in Kerala
Introduction
Kerala, stretching between the western ghats and the Arabian Sea, with a 590 km. coastline covering nine of its fourteen districts, is one of the smaller states of India. It occupies 1.2% of the country's land area, but holds 3.4% of India's population, i.e., 29 million according to the 1991 census. The density of population was 749 per sq. km., whereas the all-India average was 257 per sq. km.
Kerala came into existence in 1956, when the princely states of Cochin and Travancore merged with the British-administered Malabar. Travancore state was created in the mid 18th century and Cochin in the late eighteenth century, while Malabar was a district of Madras presidency, integrated into British India in stages after the defeat of Tipu Sultan in 1792. In terms of state policy there were marked differences in the three regions in the 19th century and until the formation of Kerala. In terms of commercialisation of agriculture, growth of trade and commerce, education, health, administrative reforms, transport and communication, the states part of Kerala (Travancore and Cochin) moved far ahead of Malabar, ruled directly by the British, Travancore state was more powerful, interventionist, having a bigger bureaucracy, a larger and varied resource base, and the growth of capitalism in agriculture and expansion of trade and commerce was greater than in Cochin state.
Kerala also had distinct settlement patterns. The rural/urban differences are less sharp than in other parts of India. Unlike villages elsewhere in India, in Kerala a larger proportion of rural workers are engaged in activities outside agriculture, in wage, salaried non-agricultural occupations. Houses are not located in clusters, but are scattered, near the fields. The historical relationship between the upper-caste landlords and the slave tillers of the land, the cropping pattern, topography and hydrology have been cited as reasons for this distinct settlement pattern.
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Historical context
The impact of colonisation - changes in land relations, commercialisation and the rise of an educated middle class - underlay the process of social class formation in the later part of the 19th century in Kerala. The divisions of caste, society and the disabilities faced by different social groups when the old, traditional ties began to change provided the basis for cultural hegemony and cultural regeneration. Crucial to these struggles, including the anti-caste movements, was the nature and direction in which changes were sought in inheritance laws, property rights, forms of marriage and family organisation. These informed the social roles of women from varied communities. Studies of Travancore" and Malabar' have indicated that the decline of the authority of women within the matrilineal households was the outcome of interventions by the colonial state, the patrilineal encoding of matrilineal customs in which the role of the social reform movements, in particular the mass anti-caste reform movements, was by no means insignificant.
The shift from matriliny to patriliny entailed new social roles for women. The elements that went into the creation of new social roles for women signified both an attempt to maintain the 'reputation and 'status' of the caste as well as the subordination of women by controlling relations between the sexes within the family. This is evident from the debates on the legal changes sought in property rights, forms of marriage and family organisation during 1900-1920 in Travancore and Cochin. Legal changes enacted thereafter extended the power of men over women, particularly among the Nair, Ezhava and Syrian Christian communities in important spheres: inheritance, property rights and rights to divorce. Contests also emerged between varied traditions both within and across castes and communities even as new forms of power relations developed. Significant struggles by women themselves to change relations within and outside the family, sometimes autonomous, informed the contests between different traditions. Women began to communicate with each other as women, and developed a
0 Velayudhan, Meera. “Reform, Law and Gendered lolentity: Marriage Among Ezhavas of Kerala, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXXIII. No.38. 9 September 1998, pp. 2480-83.
Arunima, G., “Multiple Meanings: Changing Conceptions of Matrilineal Kinship in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Malabar'. Indian Economic and Social History Review. Vol. XVIIl, No. 5.9 April 1996. pp. 603-604.
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distinct discourse of their own in the 1920s and 1930s. Wider changes and their impact on caste and household structures held significant implications for women in terms of support structures and choices. Gains at many levels,
Such as a positive attitude to female education and survival and relative
freedom from caste-related social shackles were, however, combined with
losses in the realm of property rights and subordination of women within the
family. The pronounced shift towards patriliny in terms of property rights,
forms of marriage and family became, perhaps, a part of the wider political
message of the times.
Methodology
This study involved, firstly, the collection of historical data so as to outline the development of notions of citizenship, the nature of the state and peoples' participation in institution-building which have played a key role in the development of modern Kerala. Secondary data (articles, newspaper clippings, leaflets, booklets, etc.) was collected on contemporary women's struggles. Individual discussions were held with activists of varied women's organisations, State and local, focusing on the role of elected women panchayat members. It is necessary to foreground the social, economic and political environment in order to highlight how elected women members negotiate their power, and to identify the factors which impinge on their performance or give a direction to their role, including their role in leadership positions.
Interviews were conducted with women representatives in the State Planning Board, and volunteers/trainers/resource persons involved in the ongoing Peoples' Planning Campaign. Wherever permission was granted and was readily given, efforts were made to observe on-going proceedings of panchayat committee meetings, training programmes of elected women members, a meeting of women representatives of Cochin Corporation to discuss women's projects, review meetings of women's thrift Societies, and meetings of the central government-sponsored Mahila Samakhya Programme in Kerala.
A 24-page (Malayalam) structured questionnaire for 300 elected: women representatives was developed, drawing in part on the study on the status of women in Karnataka by the National Institute of Advanced Study, Bangalore. The sections on political participation and the state (common to the entire project), a section on local history and on the matrilineal/patrilineal. background of families of elected women members were added. The respondents were selected from the districts of: (1) Ernakulam, including
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the islands of Bolghatty, Vypeen, Korungotta, the Cochin corporation, the municipal corporations of Thripunithara and Kalamassery; (2) Alapuzha; and (3) Kannur. These regions were selected to look into aspects of governance in the varied contexts of history of popular struggles, marginalised sections, level of industrialisation and urbanisation, and agrarian changes.
The challenges facing field research were:
To link up with groups working in local areas and to build on this as a continuous association.
To work with varied groups (not only women's groups).
Restrictions on mobility faced by women researchers and field
assistants owing to the insecure social environment and negative social attitudes to women in public life. There was anxiety within families of field assistants who often had to conduct their interviews in the evenings (generally preferred by the elected members), and most field researchers preferred not to be involved in cross-region work.
Maintaining systematic contact with state officials and government departments. Creating openings for feedback on the findings of the study and
working out priority areas for future research.
The Kerala model: Citizenship, community and the state
The mass literacy and high educational levels among women, high female life expectancy at birth and the access of girls and women to health care, are cited as performing the role of women's agency in determining social and economic development. The positive demographic and health indicators: high literacy, including female literacy, high expectancy of life at birth and birth and death rates have been viewed as having their roots in the history of mass and public actions against social, economic and political oppression and varied levels of sustained institution-building. These made the people, in general, more sensitive to their rights as citizens, and the state more responsive to the basic rights of its citizens. A progressive attitude towards female survival and women's education was an integral part of this history.
Awareness of rights as citizens and struggles to demand those rights took on a heightened form in Kerala, with its vibrant political environment and organised labour movement. For example, demands for health facilities have been more sustained in Kerala than other parts of India. To quote from a study,
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If a primary health centre were unmanned for a few days, there would be a massive demonstration at the nearest collectorate led by local leftists, who would demand to be given what they knew they were entitled... The availability of doctors at a primary health facility, and public knowledge that something would be done at any time of the day or night if it is an emergency, has gone a long way to lowering child death.'
Kerala's effective and extensive public distribution system of food (rice, wheat, cooking oil, kerosene, Sugar), and consumer articles at subsided rates, have contributed immensely towards providing nutrition to the poor in particular. Mass actions, with women playing a prominent role in the food movements of the 1940s and setting up of Peoples Food Committees in Travancore', the agrarian struggles for compulsory procurement of grains from the landlords for distribution through fair-price shops, their eventual conversion into producers and consumers co-operatives, all played a significant role in institutionalising more equitable food distribution. However its widespread distribution followed the election of the first communist ministry in 1957 in Kerala, when local food committees were set up for food distribution. Food and consumer articles sold through these outlets form a major part of the consumption basket of households, in particular the poorer households, in Kerala.'
Although the official policy of the erstwhile Travancore and Cochin states and missionary activities created an environment favourable to education, it was the wide support from the social reform movements, in particular those of the oppressed castes, which led to the institutionalisation of comprehensive schooling and mass literacy. Literacy levels rose in the thirties when levels of education among the oppressed castes increased. For example, literacy among the Ezhavas grew when the Ezhava social reform movement became a mass movement. Expansion in enrolment, educational
Mencher, Joan, The Lessons and Non-Lessons of Kerala: Agricultural Labourers and Poverty. Economic and Political Weekly, (1980) Special Number XV. pp. 41-3. Velayudhan. Meera, Caste. Class and Political Organisation of Women in Travancore, Social Scientist, Vol. 9, No. 5-6, May-June, 1991. Koshy. Abraham, A.A. Gopalakrishnan, V. Vijaychandran. N. K. Jayakumar. Report of the Study on the Evaluation of the Public Distribution System in Kerala. Dept. of Civil Supplies, Govt. of India. 1989.
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investment, affirmative actions such as scholarships, fee concessions and equal access to primary Schools laid the foundation of mass education.'
While female literacy was key to mass literacy in Kerala, mass literacy among women was more evident after the 1960s when it spread to the poorest sections and the backward regions. The historical background of progressive attitudes to female survival and female education ensured this shift. As noted by the Protestant missionaries in the late nineteenth century itself, There has never been any decided objection on the part of the Sudras or Ilavars to the elementary instruction of females." Decades of agrarian struggles (1940s to 1970s) mobilised the rural poor not only for their economic rights but also for social and educational advancement. This played a significant role in raising the awareness of the people to their rights, in democratising rural life and creating an environment in favour of mass education and public health facilities. State interventions in the distribution of food, creation of employment, redistribution of assets, health and educational facilities and Social security programmes were the crucial measures that have helped reduce poverty.
Kerala's unique example of social development has its roots in:
(a) The building up of institutions by peoples' movements:
(b) The location of distributive issues as central to all debates/struggles
concerning the state; and
(c) The hegemonic role played by the organised labour movement (irrespective of whether the political parties in power depend on their support) in terms of the state (from fixing minimum wages to monitoring prices of raw materials, or giving pensions to agricultural workers).
State interventions, such as the policy of keeping the police out of labour disputes, creation of mechanisms for dispute resolution (these have their origins in the labour movements of the late 1930s and 40s), have strengthened the labour unions. The state in Kerala has, therefore, been characterised as 'soft and reactive', where capital as a class plays a less influential role.
s Jose. A. V. Agricultural labourers in Kerala. An Historical and Statistical Analysis,
Ph.D. thesis. Centre For Development Studies. Thiruvanthapuram, 1980.
|6 Mateer. Samuel, Native Life in Travancore. W.H. Allen & Co. London. 1883. Reprinted
by Asian Educational Services, Madras, 1991.
Kannan, K. P. Political Economy of Labour and Development in Kerala, Economic
and Political Weekly. Vol. XXXIII, No.52, 26 December 1998-January 1999.
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Only the plantation sector has a capitalist class, mainly small-scale capitalists. Also, the modern manufacturing sector being small, industrial capital itself was negligible. Besides, land reforms enacted in 1967 by the communist-led ministry weakened the emergence of capital in agriculture. Capital as a class in Kerala is mainly mercantile, engaged in small-scale agro-processing activities such as coir, cashew, fisheries, wood, vegetables, oils, etc.'
Slow industrial growth and stagnant agricultural output have combined to produce low incomes and high unemployment. The low economic growth has led to fiscal crises, thereby forcing the state government to reduce its public spending in crucial areas of the Kerala model such as subsidised food for the poor, education, schemes for meals in schools and medical care.
Social and demographic trends
Kerala's unique demographic advances, despite low levels of income, have been attributed to its specific history, to movements for social change and institution-building since the early part of this century, and to policy actions of state governments in the post-independence era. The distinct features that have a bearing on women are as follows:
• Life expectancy at birth was 68.8 years for men and 74.4 years for women in 1990-92.
The infant mortality rate (IMR) was 17 per thousand (rural) and 13 per thousand (urban) live births in 1992. Studies indicate differences between regions and sections of the population. A 1985 study of the fishing community in Thiruvanthapuram revealed a high IMR of 123 per 1000 live births. A study for the years 1985-89 indicated an IMR of 9 per thousand for Ernakulam district, while Palakkad district had 34 per thousand and Malappuram 28 per thousand. The IMR was lowest among Christians, and highest among Muslims. Among Hindus, IMR was highest among Ezhavas and dalits. However, social and cultural attitudes towards female survival are significant, and studies indicate the absence of parental discrimination in providing health care to boys and girls. 90% births take place under institutional care.
Kannan, K.P. ibid.
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Kerala is covered by an extensive network of health care institutions, providing free health care. There is high female use of hospital facilities, but with regional variations.
Women outnumber men, the sex ratio being 1040 females per 1000 males in 1991. This is in striking contrast with the all-India sex ratio of 929 females to 1000 males. However, according to a study of traditional coastal fishing community in Thiruvanthapuram district (1981), the sex ratio stood at 972 women per 1000 men.
The female population of Kerala constitutes 3.6% of total female population of India, according to the 1991 census.
The age distribution of women was changing structurally: for those below 5 years of age it was declining, for those above 60 years age it was increasing. The proportion of the younger female population less than 15 years of age had declined from 34.1% (1981) to 28.4% (1991) of the total female population.
Among the aged, there was a high proportion of widows.
Less than 10% of women in the age group 15-19 were married (1991 census), pointing to an increase in the age at marriage for females.
Nearly 80% of children were born to women in the age group 2029 years, suggesting a shorter span of female fertility.
Kerala has a high literacy rate at 77.96% (1991), with 75.25% literacy among women (the all-India level was 39%).
There are significant differences between districts and sections of the population in literacy rates, with the districts of Kannur, Kasargod, Wayanad, Malappuram, Kozhikode and Palakkad (1991 census) having a lower literacy rate than the rest of the State. Female literacy among the dalits (scheduled castes) at 74.31%, was nearer to the state level female literacy (75.25%). Among the tribals, female literacy was a low 41%.
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There were 1.79 million illiterate women and 0.79 million illiterate males in Kerala, with illiterate women outnumbering illiterate men in a ratio of 9 to 4.
94% of the rural population in the state have access to lower primary school facilities within 1 km. distance and 98% within 2 km.98% of the rural population enjoy access to high school within 8 km. range. Almost one-third of the states revenue is spent on education. This larger share of expenditure on education is a legacy of the past. There is free education in public and private (aided) schools.
Kerala's work participation rates are among the lowest in India at 31.43% (9.5 million workers) in 1991. Women workers numbered 2.35 million and female work participation rate was 15.85%, while male work participation rate was 47.58%. There was a large decline in the number of women agricultural workers under paddy cultivation following the 31% decline in land under paddy cultivation during 1981-91. Women workers under household industries increased by 36% in 1981-91. Women formed over 30% of employees in the public (state) sector.
There were 36,000 anganwadi workers earning Rs.500 per month. Many of them are graduates and post-graduates.
Gender differences in the labour market across caste, income and education categories continue. The sectors where women's workforce is concentrated (coir, cashew processing, etc.) are declining or are stagnant.
Kerala has the highest rates of unemployment for males and females as evident from statistics of registered jobseekers. In September 1997, there were 35.19 lakh unemployed (10% of total unemployed in India) in the active registers at the employment exchanges in Kerala.
In September 1997, there were 19.2 lakh women job seekers (54.5% of the total jobseekers) and 16 lakh male jobseekers. About 76% of them held a Secondary School Leaving Certificate (SSLC) or higher, 3.2 lakh (12%) were pre-degree holders, 1.8 lakh (6.8%)
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were graduate degree holders, and 36,238 (1.4%) were post graduates. Of the total. 1.35 lakhs had technical and professional skills - 94,000 (69.6%o) were TI degree holders, 30,000 diploma holders, 2,100 medical graduates and 7,452 engineering graduates.
Land reforms have given security of dwelling (homestead land) to the rural poor, dalits in general and land to former tenants - in particular the Ezhavas. However, tribals (3.2 lakhs and 1.10% of the population) have lost their lands over the decades, with Kerala having the highest incidence of land alienation by tribals among the states in India.
The Kerala Agricultural Workers Act of 1975 legislated minimum wages, job security and retirement benefits, a limited working day and created arbitration boards for worker-employee disputes. It required local bodies to prepare lists of agricultural workers. Legislation for unemployment insurance for agricultural workers was enacted in 1980-81. Agricultural labour pensions were started in 1982.
Kerala has social security cover for most sections of rural workers such as toddy tappers, headload workers, artisans, fisherfolk, cashew and coir workers and construction workers.
The proportion of rural labour households to all households was 50% in 1983-84. Of all rural households, 93% owned and and 93% owned houses in which they lived.
Looking beyond the model
The state and marginalised sections
It is among the two most marginalised sections in Kerala, the fisherfolk and tribals, that the role of the state has been more contentious. In the fishing sector, the big merchant-exporters, taking advantage of the crisis of the balance of payments in trade in the 1960s, and perceiving the potential of shrimp as a foreign exchange earner, introduced mechanised trawling. They also benefited from the heavy state subsidy for the creation of infrastructure facilities. In the late 1970s, when fisherwomen in Kerala launched a struggle
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demanding transport facilities to go to the market, the development policies of the state came under scrutiny. The women had to beat the arrival of fish from the mechanised landing centres. The introduction of mechanised trawlers affected artisanal work of fisherwomen in particular, i.e., the weaving and mending of fishing nets.
In the face of the persistent political clout wielded by both the merchant-exporters in the fishing sector and the settlers in the tribal areas, intense struggles of fisherfolk and tribals form a significant part of the political landscape of Kerala today. In the case of the tribal people, the demand for declaration of adivasi majority areas as scheduled areas' by the president of India is significant in that the present administrative boundaries, mainly determined during the colonial period, have resulted in the tribal people being marginalised in the state, district and block, and their culture being eroded. o
In recent years violence against women, the emergence of dowryrelated deaths, a beginning of a reversal of the favourable sex-ratio in the 07 age group, the persistent and widespread retrogressive attitudes to women in public life, the prevalence of machismo culture, its reinforcement and perpetuation by the mass media, low work participation rates and high unemployment among women, low representation of women in leadership positions in the trade unions, even in sectors where women form the predominant section of the workers (e.g., coir), point to the urgent need for demystifying fundamental aspects of the Kerala model.
A study of adolescent girls in Kerala highlighted the curtailment of their freedom or swathanthriam and mobility, and how boys have more adhikaram (authority) and avakaasham (rights), how boys can move around more freely than even adult women, who often need permission from male members, often their own sons. The girls' most valued attribute was perceived to be swabhavam or character, and from childhood their mobility was curtailed by instilling fear of gossip and violence. Despite high levels of and access to education, the educational system did little to perpetuate positive feelings about themselves as persons and as women.
9 Bijoy, C.R. Adivasis betrayed: Adivasiland rights in Kerala, Economic and Political
Weekly (1999) 34:22, p. 1329. 20 Joseph, Ammu. Girls and Women in Kerala. Some Less Acknowledged Facts, paper
presented at the International Conference on Kerala's Development Experience, Institute of Social Sciences, New Delhi, 1996
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Table 3.1 Crimes against women (1993-1997)
Crimes against Dowry related Molestation WOIT€) deaths (registered)
1993 1,894 8 468 1994 2,595 9 679 1995 3,313 15 825 1996 4,970 23 1129 1997 7,306 71 1512
Source: State Women's Commission (Kerala), quoting figures provided by State Census Record Bureau, August 1998.
Governance
The historical origins of local self-governing bodies (there were a variety of them) go back to the thorakuttam, desakuttam, nattukuttam, the guilds/bands of medieval Kerala and later to the decentralised feudalism of the Brahmin clergy and Nair nobility who were at the same time landlords and military chieftains. The subordinate sections of society, the low castes, had their own caste/tribal associations. In modern Kerala, the Malayali Memorial (1891) and the Nivarathana Prakshobhanam (1932) were momentous in that the educated upper caste elites, carrying sections of the low castes with them, demanded representation in governance. However, in terms of governance at the village level there were two enactments, namely, the Madras Village Panchayat Act, 1950, covering Malabar, and the Travancore Panchayat Act 1950 extending over the Travancore/Cochin area.
The Kerala Panchayat Act of 1961 integrated into a uniform system the Panchayati Raj and municipal arrangements that existed in the three regions (Cochin, Travancore, Malabar). The activities of the grama panchayat remained confined to traditional civic functions, with departmental controls curbing their autonomy severely. Although the district council law was passed in 1978, it took years of efforts and a change in the political environment to hold elections at the district level in 1991. The Kerala State Assembly had passed legislation in 1989 providing for 30% reservation for women in the district councils.
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Table 3.2 Number of Representatives in District Council Elections, 1991
Total Male Female % Women
Trivandrum 40 28 12 30.0 Quilon 40 28 2 30.0 Pathanamthita 23 16 7 30. Alleppey 38 26 2 31.5 Kottayam 34 23 11 32.3 Idukki 23 16 7 30.4 Ernakulam 40 28 12 30.0 Thrissur 40 28 12 30.0 Palghat 40 28 12 30.0 Malappuram 40 28 12 30.0 Calicut 40 28 2 30.0 Wayanad 20 l4 6 30.0 Cannanore 39 27 12 30.7 Kasargod 20 14 6 30.0
Source: State Election Commission, Thiruvanthapuram (unpublished)
The Left Democratic government (LDF) won 12 of the 14 district councils, while Malappuram, a predominantly Muslim populated area was won by the Congress-I led United Democratic Front (UDF). However, following the defeat of the LDF Government in 1991, the new UDF government withdrew all powers given to the district councils as well as reduced plan allocations made to district councils.
Women and the planning process
Following the enactment of the 73" and 74th Amendments and the coming to power of the Left Democratic government in 1996 in Kerala, the new ministry took a step forward when it allocated 35-40% of the state's Ninth Plan Outlay to programmes drawn up by the local self-governing bodies. The Planning Board outlined the following as the main features of the decentralisation process (the Peoples' Planning Campaign) initiated in August 1996. It aimed at giving greater autonomy to the local bodies in deciding their priorities, and the development of comprehensive area plans by and for each local body. This was to be carried out by mobilising the common people into
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grama Sabha, volunteers and non-official experts. Statutory changes were enacted to grant greater autonomy to the local bodies, to reallocate officials and an Administrative Reforms Committee was set up.
Table 3.3 Representation of women (from Kerala) in the parliament (Lok Sabha) and the state assembly
Year Parliament Year State
(Lok Sabha) Assembly
1957 O 1957-60 6 1962 0 1960-65 7 1967 1965-67 3 1971 1967-70 l 977 O 1970-77 2 1980 1977-80 l 1984 0 1980-82 5 1989 1982-87 4 1991 2 1987-91 8
1991 8
Source: State Election Commission, Thiruvanthapuram (unpublished)
This programme, according to its proponents, aimed at mobilising the people for the new democratic project to improve their daily lives and create a new development culture’.
A 456-strong High Level Guidance Committee set up by the State Planning Board in 1996 included representatives of major women's organisations and prominent women from varied fields of social life. A unit within the Planning Board consisting of two women was set up in August 1996. As part of the efforts to disseminate information on the stages of the plan, the State Planning Board called a meeting of women's organisations. On 17 August 1996, the first meeting to discuss women's issues was held,
2 lsaac, T.M. Thomas, Peopless Planning: Towards a Handbook, Kerala State Planning
Board Publication, Thiruvanthapuram, May 1999.
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and a women and development group formed. In 1997, a woman representative from the State Planning Board found a place in the State Committee of the All India Democratic Women's Association (AIDWA), the women's organisation linked with the CPI (M), the major partner in the ruling Left Democratic Front.
As the initiators of the Peoples Planning Campaign, the Kerala Shastra Sahitya Parishad (KSSP) and its leaders drew on their experiences from the popular literacy movement of the late 1980s and early 1990s. This was among the first action of its kind where public action on a wider social scale on a specific issue required the co-ordinated activities of the state (district administration), elected representatives from local bodies, mass organisations, concerned citizens, specialists, etc. The KSSP was the main initiators of this central government-sponsored literacy programme, and their campaign primers (AKSHARAM) conveyed messages on dignity of labour, food, work, disease prevention, safe drinking water, oral rehydration on the one hand, and the history of the freedom struggle, role of women in panchayats and women's equality on the other hand. Another outgrowth of the literacy movement in several states was the formation of credit/thrift societies by groups of women. The 35,000 unpaid volunteers/instructors included a large section of women.
From all accounts the women's organisations, including those linked to the traditional left parties, were caught unawares and were unable to strategise on the tremendous response from women and the leadership qualities displayed by them in this movement. It was, therefore, not surprising that when women gained the right to 33% representation in local level bodies such as panchayats, the political parties and even the left women's organisations found themselves unprepared in terms of Selection of candidates. Many candidates were drawn from among women activists/ instructors of the literacy movement. The KSSP's Land Literacy Programme (Peoples Resource Mapping Programme) also provided the lessons of combining mass mobilisation with the use of technical expertise to create development plans.
Drawing from these methods of mass mobilisation used by the KSSP, the State Planning Board initiated the Peoples Planning Campaign. Development programmes were to be carried out through mass mobilisation at the three-tier level of gram, block, and Zilla panchayat, and corporations and municipalities in the urban areas, by building wide consensus on each programme. Separate meetings of women, anganwadis, dalits and community leaders, etc., were held prior to the grama Sabhas and ward (municipality, corporation) conventions. The timings (holidays, afternoons) of the grama
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Sabhas were fixed to ensure their maximum participation of these sections. Before launching the grama Sabhas, organisers trained 373 state-level trainers for a week. These trainers taught 10,497 district-level resource persons who, in turn, conducted one-day workshops for 100,000 local activists. Despite the stated goal of ensuring that at least 30% of trainers were women, their presence ranged up to 15%, as evident from one such training programme at Kozhikode.”
The themes for the group discussions (25-50 persons in each group) in the grama Sabha focused on macro-policies and local needs relating to agriculture and irrigation, animal husbandry, fishing, education, health, drinking water and sanitation, housing and welfare, culture, industry, transport, energy, co-operatives, resource mobilisation, women's development and SC/ST development. Each of the groups had one or two trained facilitators who used a questionnaire as a guideline for discussions. Also present were resource persons to encourage listing and analysing problems according to the specific local needs.
A look at select plan documents suggested that the possibility of engendering the sectoral plan components, both conceptually and practically, was immense. Our enquiries also indicated that very few of the facilitators or resource persons were drawn from the women's movement. As initiators of the Peoples' Planning Campaign, the KSSP, drew upon many of its own women members/contacts, women who were associated with the student movement or had 'dropped out of political work following marriage, women activists from the literacy movement, from families who were members or supporters of left parties. While women's organisations such as AIDWA do co-ordinate their activities with other mass organisations linked with CPL (M), their relationship with the KSSP has been much weaker and sometimes contentious. The inner party struggles, groupings and control of mass organisations that this involved, informed the activities of women leaders who had to resort to walk a tightrope for their political survival.
According to several reports, despite years of mass mobilisation and attracting many women members, the leadership of the KSSP was predominantly male. Although not lacking in efforts to form forums for women such as SAMATA, and basing these forums on the economic needs of poor women (credit/saving societies), many of them emerging during the course of its total literacy campaigns, the KSSP's main weakness was its failure to develop a wider social reform programme. This inhibited the
22
Franke R.W. Chasin B.H., Power to the Malayali People, in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXXII, No. 48, p. 3064.
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possibility of it playing an important role in the women's movement. Also, its links. with the political party set-up, perhaps, curbed its own potential. The on-going mass programmes of decentralised development also lack any social message, although they seem to have created opportunities for increasing the social space for interventions by civil society organisations beyond the political party defined framework.
Most of the women's programmes that have emerged or been proposed in the course of the campaign for decentralisation have taken the form of credit/thrift societies, although they are now infused with a new dynamism as their activities can now be linked with the local development planning process. This was evident from the role played by women in 85 or so thrift societies under the SAMATA forum (initiated by KSSP) in Ulloor panchayat in Thiruvanthapuram District. Here, a 1,400 strong procession of women was held, and the convenor of the group, a 27-year old household worker/maid, addressed a public gathering for the first time. According to an activist, this was a significant transformation as household workers/maids have low self-esteem in particular due to the low social status ascribed to such work.
Often dynamic elected women panchayat presidents or members provide the leadership for women's programmes. However, the manner in which they negotiate power with male panchayat members, local party leaders and bosses on the one hand, and with their own family members on the other hand, informs their ability to make an impact. As elections to the local bodies are fought on political party tickets, previous experience of public work can be advantageous provided the concerned elected woman panchayat member picked up the methods of political tightrope-walking. In the context of Kerala, where elections to local bodies are contested under political party banners, and the contest is so keen between two dominant opposing platforms, the LDF and UDF, the space for women's political participation is narrow as there are well-entrenched political interest groups/persons from the local to the state levels.
However, the wide mobilisation that the process of decentralisation involves does provide opportunities for civil society organisations to expand the political space for women. An estimated 2.5 million people took part in the grama Sabhas/ward conventions held in the 14,147 wards of panchayats and urban neighbourhoods. Of the participants, 27% were women. Representation of dalits too was low. Most of the women participants were from the poorer sections, and participation by middle class women was negligible. Before the grama sabhas were initiated, 373 state level trainers were trained. 4,500 volunteers from the panchayats were also trained in 1997.
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Although the aim was to have 30% female presence, only 15% of the participants were women. According to several reports, many of the active women volunteers dropped out owing to the burden of household and child care responsibilities.
The panchayat/municipal-level development seminars in 990 rural panchayats, 50 development blocks, 58 municipalities and corporations produced development reports, each having a section on women and development. The gender components in the reports indicate a stereotyped approach to women's needs and problems (vegetable gardening, sewing cooperatives, etc.). Women are also invisible in the part of the report providing local histories and the sectoral plans.
Sectoral task forces, including the Women and Development Task Force, emerged from these 'development seminars. The task forces review on-going programmes, analyse development issues and solutions suggested at the seminars, prioritise and projectise them into schemes. They also classify the schemes according to the agency for implementation. The formation of expert committees (at block, district, municipal, corporation levels), nominated by the Planning Board over and above the elected members to look into and assess the technical feasibility of each proposal, has been a contentious issue. These committees consist of elected members, the district collector, retired officials/bureaucrats, professionals and academics. Our interviews have suggested that gender biases prevail among the committee members themselves. A woman convenor of one of these committees stated that there was tension in her committee as she had refused to put her signature to a decision with which she was uncomfortable or that was not decided in a democratic manner. In most such cases the issue was one of deciding priorities, and gender concerns were perceived to have low priority. However, in many areas these committees were found to be useful, particularly in assessing technical aspects of a project and learning how this was done. No doubt the women associated with this process gained new skills from this exercise.
Defining women's interests.
Although the Peoples’ Planning Campaign did take some initiatives, few projects for women were finalised in the early stages owing to the lack of a clear conceptual and practical framework for intervention. In the second year of the campaign, the Planning Board gave a directive for the Women's
2} In Kerala. the term 'seminar is often used for large gatherings where speakers present
prepared papers which are distributed to the audience/participants.
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Component Plan. Although 10% of plan funds of local bodies were to be set apart for women's projects, and some did prepare special projects for women, in no district was the target of 10% met. This was an issue that received attention at the inaugural meeting of the central governmentsponsored Kerala Mahila Samakhya programme. 50 women, including panchayat representatives, gram panchayat presidents, block officials, departmental government officials, co-ordinator of the Peoples Planning Campaign, literacy mission volunteers, NGOs, mahila Samajam members and women academicians attended the meeting held on 17th May 1999 at Vamanapuram block, Thiruvanthapuram district.
The district collector, Thiruvanthapuram, Sarada Muraleedharan, stressed that there was a need to review how many projects received priority, whether some of the projects for women had not taken off, and how much effort women themselves made. According to her, the issues identified by panchayats as women's issues were: unemployment, how to use funds, illiteracy, ineffectiveness of mahila samajams, lack of mechanisms to help self-employed, women in public life being mocked, lack of awareness of laws concerning women, low cultural participation, dowry, women's status (how to gain respect), and working out feasible economic programmes. Traditional skills were preferred in taking up projects, and women themselves were not availing themselves of the new projects under the Peoples Planning Campaign in areas such as electronics. As projects were not feasible, banks resisted offering loans. Attitudes take time to change. Many years ago no one thought of curry powder-making as an enterprise, but now it was not looked upon as odd/unique. The collector called for bold measures, keeping in mind women's workload, and stressed the significance of women working in groups to improve their status.
The eight group discussions that followed, organised by panchayat (Kallara, Nellanad, Pullampara, Vamanapuram, Pangode, Nanniyode, Peringamala, Manickal), identified the following issues as women's issues:
Rising unemployment among women. Wage disparity in unorganised sector. Unrecognised domestic work/double burden. Lack of social space for women to voice their needs. Social and family barriers to women leaders exercising power. Rising violence against women. Insecure environment. Low self-esteem and lack of self-confidence among women.
Isaac, op. cit. p. 43
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9. Family distress including family violence related to alcoholism and
drug use. 10. Low cultural participation. ll. Poor reading habits among women. 12. Lack of access to economic resources. 13. High drop-out rate among girls, low quality of education. 14. Absence of effective training and educative programmes. 15. Lack of safe drinking water. 16. Low nutritional status, high incidence of low birth weight babies.
7. Unwed mothers. 18. Prevalence of waterborne diseases, tuberculosis, leprosy.
Interviews suggested that women's projects were often set aside at the implementation stage. Most of the on-going projects in our study areas were the traditional stereotyped projects for women such as garment making, backyard poultry, kitchen gardening, etc. What were women's projects? Was the construction of toilets or a well a woman's programme?
Meanwhile, the Planning Board considered the financial aspects of development programmes for women, and recognised that the amount (4.25%) set aside as grants-in-aid for women's programmes was low. The major source of resource mobilisation for women's projects was from financial institutions and beneficiary contributions. Financial institutional credit accounted for only 10.58% of the outlay of the overall plan, and 23.32% of the outlay of the women's component plan was expected to be financed by financial institutions. The beneficiary contributions were higher by about 10% for the women's projects. Women's projects, therefore, depend more on financial institutions and women's ability to make a significant contribution themselves. A special conference was called by the Planning Board to discuss this issue. Three thousand women, including elected women members, women campaign members and others who attended this conference, highlighted the need for innovative programmes/projects, outlining special measures to ensure wider participation of women and develop methods to impart greater gender sensitisation to the local plans. A simple gender analysis handbook was also prepared.
Commendable though these state-driven and top-down efforts may have been to engender the planning process, there was a need for a wider mobilisation of women, a paradigm shift from only focusing on a single issue or only generating social capital within sections of women (through
2S Isaac, op. cit. p. 43
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economic programmes), to the mainstreaming of gender as an issue of wider concern, to the development of a perspective that could lead to the widening of the politics of democratisation.
Political empowerment
Elections to the local bodies were held in September 1995. Our survey suggests that almost all women have been elected to the seats reserved for women, and the representation of dalits tribal women was still low. Upper caste women are few. Many elected women representatives from CongressI, CP, CPI (M), Kerala Congress, Congress (S) are also active in caste/ community organisations. There is a pronounced perception among elected women members that women can understand women's issues better, and that dalit, tribal and minority women need to be represented by women from their respective communities. The roots of this perception no doubt can be traced to the tremendous impact that social reform movements of different castes and communities have had in shaping social development policies in modern Kerala.
As noted earlier, the compulsion to ensure 33% of women in the representative bodies caught the political parties and women's organisations themselves unprepared. The search for potential candidates led the political parties firstly to search for women with some experience in public life, i.e., women associated with mass organisations of these parties. However, power relations within a political party at the local level defined the process of women's political empowerment. Intervirws with members of women's organisations in reserved constituencies for women indicated that there were cases of local male party leaders overlooking a woman activist with considerable political experience, a forceful personality and public support (a person with leadership qualities), and, instead, nominating a novice to public life.
Some have suggested that male local leaders were well aware that reserved constituencies will shift with each election and so they would like to ensure that there was no threat to their political clout. There are a few cases of seats reserved for women being considered as a weak seat, and a member of a left women's organisation opined that sometimes the male local leadership would rather lose the seat than put up a capable woman candidate. On the other hand, members from women's organisations have cited examples of their members being nominated as candidates, and, following their election, the women members hesitated to put forward independent views to the male party leaders. This limited their freedom of expression and effective
41 O

participation in decision-making processes and opportunities to exercise their political power.
Our survey suggests that women with varied organisational experiences have also been nominated to contest as candidates. In the Cochin corporation, women with earlier experience of working in youth organisations (DYF), women's organisations, agricultural workers associations, etc., have been elected. In the grama panchayats, members of women's organisations (some active), from families who support LDF or UDF, or whose family members, often distant, are activists within a political party, have been elected. At the same time, a political party may put up a number of women without much experience in public life to one representative body such as a municipality. Women themselves were victims of the patriarchal socialisation process, as evident from the comments of some members of a municipality who said (off the record) that they did not wish to enter public life but their husbands (political party leader/member) forced them to do so.
Almost all women candidates, even those contesting as independents, could only contest with the active support of the political parties. At a statelevel training workshop on women in panchayats held at Thiruvanthapuram on 21st-22nd May 1999, women representatives from Alapuzha and Malappuram, including a few Muslim women, stated that though a woman may have a known history of public work, she could not expect to win an election as an independent without the support of political parties. A representative commented, “We cannot see ourselves as standing outside the political party system as a solution unless history itself changes. Women members may stand together on 'women's issues but on political issues' women representatives could not unite, belonging as they did to different political parties. All agreed that women representatives faced problems at many levels, within the panchayat, within the family and Society, and within political parties. They also stressed that there was not enough awareness of rights, particularly among those who had been elected for the first time.
As women who perform varied roles assigned to them by the patriarchal cultural set-up, entering the political arena creates a great deal of uncertainty and anxiety in them initially as they are compelled to look at their given roles and to redefine them, particularly within the family. This is more so in the case of women presidents or chairpersons of representative bodies, as their work, responsibility and mobility are greater. Our Survey suggests that though husbands/male family members may help women to carry out some tasks as elected representatives, women's domestic responsibilities remain unchanged. With very few women's organisations working on the issue of governance, and the media, too, reinforcing and
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perpetuating women's subordinate role, the odds against women are indeed many.
Our survey indicates that a majority of women representatives combine household responsibilities, including child care, collection of water, etc., with their responsibilities as elected members. There are exceptional instances such as that of a representative from Vypeen Island (Ernakulam) whose husband performs the task of purchasing food, oil, kerosene etc., from the ration outlet. This happens to be a nuclear family where the children, including the daughter, are school-going. The daughter, however, helped with other household work. Supportive roles are mainly provided by other women members in the family, be it a mother, sister, mother-in-law or sister-in-law. In the case of a 25-year-old unmarried representative from a grama panchayat (Cochin), her mother took care of all household responsibilities. However, in this case, the father also played a protective' role. Engaged to be married, she did not expect to be in public life after this term in office expired. An elderly woman representative (who has since expired), with long years of experience in public life and as a political leader, stated that she was able to contest the elections only after her retirement from her school teaching post. However, she wrested a seat in an area where the opposing political party held sway for the past twenty years. At the initial stages of our interview with her, her husband stood by and began to answer the questions put forward. When told that the respondent herself should answer the questions, he left the room saying, "I do not mind. On our way out, we came across him at a vegetable shop. He said, “I do all this work too.
Patriarchal relations within the family have an impact on women's decision-making power, in particular their control over income. Each elected member received a salary of Rs. 1,500. A woman member from a grama panchayat stated in a matter of fact manner that the entire amount went into the household income, although her husband did give her Rs.200-300 per month which she spent mainly on her two daughters. Her husband, a driver of a private taxi, spent Rs.500 per month for his expenses of tea, cigarette, etc. However, his alcohol consumption had decreased and he had stopped the occasional violence that he used to inflict on her. An elderly, single, Anglo-Indian representative who lived with her brother's family said that all the family property was in her brother's name and her income was too meagre in any case to make a difference.
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Table 3.5 Councillors of corporations (1998)
Corporation SC ST Others
Total M F | Total M. F Total M. F.
2
46 3 15 - - - 48 3 7 47 31 6
Thiruvanthapuram 4 Ernakulam Kozhikode
:
Source: State Election Commission. Thiruvanthapuram (unpublished)
Table 3.6 Women chairpersons of municipalities (1998)
SC ST Others
Thiruvanthapura 2 Thrissur 5 Kollam - l Pathanamthitta Alleppey - l Palakkad l Malappuram 2 Kozhikode Kannur 3
Source: State Election Commission, Thiruvanthapuram (unpublished)
Table 3.7 District panchayat presidents (1998)
Districts District Panchayat Presidents
Male Female
l4 64.3% 35.7%
Source: State Election Commission. Thiruvanthapuram (unpublished).
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Table 3.8 Councillors (SC/ST)
Category Councillors % of Total
Total 1458 00.00 Women-Total 52 35.0 SC-Total 24 8.50 SC-Women 47 3.22 ST-Total 2 0.4 ST-Women 0.07 Others-Total 1332 91.36 Others-Women 464 3.82
Source: State Election Commission. Thiruvanthapuram (unpublished
Conceptions of the state and politics
In the background of the communist-led governments being elected to power in the state at intervals, there are clearer notions of federalism (centre-state relations) among elected representatives, women and men. Notions of ownership and control over resources too are distinct. For example, when questions were posed about who controlled resources such as water and electricity, the Water Authority and Electricity Board respectively were cited. No doubt water and power were viewed as part of the wider infrastructure facilities to be provided by the state. Power, irrigation and water were also the sectors which were riddled with corruption, wastage and controlled by well-entrenched vested interests. It was, therefore, not surprising that the building of small irrigation works and powerplants and other infrastructure facilities drew tremendous support from the people during the campaigns for decentralised development. Not surprisingly, therefore, a large majority of those interviewed stated that representative decision-making bodies such as panchayats or corporations should have a say in the control (not ownership) of resources such as water and electricity. The KSSP, for example, mobilised the villagers of the Karimba Panchayat (Pallakad) to build a small-scale hydro-electric project using the energy of a waterfall, and linked a smallscale output station to the local grid. Here we see a state-driven programme being carried out through a mass organisation to combat entrenched vested interests which are resistant to change, and whose representatives exist within the state itself.
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On the other hand, in the tribal and fishing community regions, notions of the state being a more comprehensive entity, of being influenced by powerful elite interests, were more pronounced. The struggles themselves have forced an understanding between notions of government and state among: (a) the fishing communities fighting for their survival and the protection of the Coastal Zone Regulation Act; and (b) tribals and their leadership making representations to the president of India against the state government's attempts to legalise the land alienated from the tribals. There was a general awareness that ownership and control of resources rested with the powerful and moneyed, and not with those who toiled hard. On the other hand, most of the respondents, irrespective of the political party to which they belong, were vigorously opposed to privatisation. Ownership and control over productive resources and access, public services such as distribution of essential commodities of daily needs (ration shops/fair price shops), control over prices, and even capability building (literacy programme, village libraries, free education), are viewed as the responsibility of the 'government. It was also interesting to note that the police are viewed as sole controllers of law and order and civil laws, despite the enhanced role of local representative bodies and the enhanced role that women elected representatives now play in resolving social and family conflicts Such as wife-beating, alcohol-related violence, disputes over land/property, etc.
The strong patriarchal values that prevail concerning women's private/ public roles and the increasing machismo culture underline the attitudes of (all) mainstream political parties, and influence women themselves. Involvement in women's organisations or women's issues was not generally viewed as politics', while national issues (inter-State/federal) and oppositional activities were viewed as "politics’. While recognising that the concept of politics does contain the elements of dignity and Self-hood, these are now under tremendous onslaught, in particular by the commercial media and growing machismo culture. At the receiving end are women who are capable, have a sense of self-worth and are able to articulate independent opinions. There is a deep andwide influence of the traditional left conceptions of politics, with its emphasis on notions of class and role in production process. It is imperative that conceptions of women's rights be linked with more clearly defined notions of citizenship for women so that women's representation acquires a truly democratic content.
Elected women members had a greater awareness of national events (the highly charged political environment, communication of information and news), and the problems women face in other regions of India. The process of democratic decentralisation also, no doubt, provided elected
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women members, many of whom were entering public life for the first time, a wider political space, transparency, accountability of their activities, and facilitated day-to-day contact with the local population, training in administration, and a holistic insight into the development planning process.
Almost all members in our survey held that the social environment was insecure and they considered violence against women as a priority issue alongside unemployment. The insecure environment curbed women's mobility, and was a barrier to more comfortable working relations with male members of the representative bodies. A focus group discussion with poor dalit (Pulaya) women, many of them elderly, in Korungotta (Cochin), a small island, on the theme of women in politics', pointed to the prevailing patriarchal social values and the sexist attitudes of male political party members/leaders. Here are some of the statements made by the participants in this discussion:
A woman's character is always questioned.
I participated in a jatha when my eldest son's child was ill. He died later. I was blamed for it. Now I do not feel like going out.
My husband scolds me whenever I go out for any public work. I am not a slave. I have come here because my mind is strong.
Now the environment is unsafe. There were days in the olden times when I travelled far to hear Anna Chandy speak on women's issues
My son is a DYFI (Democratic Youth Federation of India) and youth activist. He said that there was no need for me to go out since he was in public life in any case.
Now, when male party members come around to mobilise, we are careful. In the 40s, the male communist leaders who were underground stayed in our homes. We have made sacrifices, but the returns are disappointing. Of course, this does not mean that we will vote for the
opposition party.
Of course, things have changed but we had to fight for these changes. In the old times we could not enter other peoples homes, even to draw water. After getting hutment rights (with the enactment of land reforms) things improved. In the 1960s, a boy from the dominant Christian community attacked a Pulaya girl. We were denied water. We took a demonstration to the collectorate with our pots and demanded piped water.
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Women participants in the focus group discussions identified the barriers to participation in public life such as unresponsive politicians, feudal attitudes of male party leaders, neglect of distributive issues in some regions resulting in its isolation from social development, sexual harassment by male (colleagues) political activists, intimidation and threats of character assassination to solve political differences. The general public perception too was that women's role should be confined to the private sphere. Yet there was, in general, a willingness to struggle, to avail oneself of and carry forward the democratic gains of the past and to shape the future.
Discussions with activists and members of women's organisations, women members of political parties, women in policy making bodies, women bureaucrats and elected women representatives indicated that the traditional attitude of viewing 'development' (read economic activity) as peripheral to its main concerns had in the past, and to some extent in the present, prevented the women's movement from foregrounding gender concerns within the framework of the institutions of democratic decentralisation from the panchayat level onwards. Broad-basing and engendering the process of decentralisation need a holistic approach and wider social and political Support.
It is generally acknowledged that the political culture in Kerala is predominantly patriarchal and heavily loaded against women in public life, and the ruling left parties are male-dominated. Leaders of women's organisations associated with the left tended to imitate the male leaders. The lack of independent initiative or a forceful presence, and more significantly, an inability to develop a clear perspective on its role, have prevented traditional left women's organisations (which have a wide reach among women) from playing a catalytic role in women's empowerment and engendering the process of social change. Also, in view of the fact that reserved seats for women representatives will change with each election, as per the law, the elected women members, many of who have entered public life for the first time, need the strength of the women's movement to consolidate and carry forward their leadership. The elected women panchayat members can, in turn, provide the much-needed dynamism to the women's movement. The importance of such an interactive process needs to be recognised by the mainstream political parties, and proponents of the decentralisation programmes and the women's movement in Kerala. The challenges lie in the ability of civil society organisations to have an impact on the political system and the on-going transition/negotiations of power, and thereby deependemocracy.
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Interviews with women activists suggest that membership of left women's organisations such as AIDWA increased owing to the Peoples' Planning Campaign, but there was still a lack of clarity within women's organisations on how to intervene effectively in the democratic spaces created by the process of decentralisation. By and large the women's organisations have been responding to the programmes put forward by the State Planning Board, rather than suggesting innovative programmes for women that are sustainable, non-stereotyped and have the potential to transform women's roles and status in the family and Society in a fundamental way.
Wide-ranging discussions with varied women's groups indicated that a predominant section of the autonomous women's groups (except those working among tribals and fishing communities) are less involved with the decentralisation process, and instead focus their activities mainly on lobbying on issues such as violence against women. While the significance of their struggle against violence on women and for a policy on women was immense, it was imperative that broad-based women's movements intervene in the vibrant changes on-going from the panchayat levels onwards and raise a new voice in the debates on democracy and governance.
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Sri Lanka
International Centre for Ethnic Studies
Introduction
South Asian societies face many common problems. One of the foremost among these is how to ensure justice and equality for all women. The failure of the state to empower disadvantaged groups, including women, has necessitated questioning both the assumption that traditional democratic legacies carry with them all the formulae for building equitable and just societies, as well as the role of the state as the key arbiter in ensuring the rights of citizens.
In the immediate post-colonial era the state was perceived as having certain essential responsibilities of defining territorial integrity, looking after the welfare of people within those territorial limits and enacting laws and regulations in order to maintain order and good government. It was thus that the state derived its legitimacy to speak on behalf of all its citizens against external influences, friendly or aggressive, and to justify the right to use force in order to safeguard its own existence. The notion that the state existed for the common good prevailed almost to the point of automatic acceptance of all its actions. Such naivete was natural and perhaps necessary for the emergence of new national identities.
Belief in the normative power of the constitution was essential to this assumption. Inherited British traditions of parliamentary democracy claimed
Authors: Kishali Pinto Jayawardena and Chulani Kodikara. In addition to the authors. the field research team for this study consisted of Mrs. Janista Vaz Gunawardene. Mr. R. Cumarasingham. and Ms. Kamarun Buhary. The questionnaire survey was administered in several provinces principally by Mr. Namal Weerasena. Ms. Lalita Ranatunga, Ms. K.M. Champa Kumuduni, and Ms. S.D. Algama. The authors would particularly like to acknowledge the assistance received from Mrs. Vaz Gunawardene in the field survey, in tabulation of the survey data and in conceptualising the initial drafts of this paper. In addition we would like to thank Mr. S. Hettige of the University of Colombo for assisting us with the methodology for the field survey, and Selvy Thiruchandran and Sepali Kottegoda for very useful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. A special thanks to Yasmin Tambiah and Radhika Coomaraswamy for their invaluable comments and constant support.
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the power of transformative reform through constitutional institutions, and constitutionalism was perceived as the ideal condition of democracy. This, however, soon proved to be a misplaced faith. As communities fragmented and minority grievances resulted in violence, the search began as to how best the state and institutions of the state could be reconstructed. But the subsequent discourse of rectification continued to operate within the old parameters that defined the state as being central to any form of reform. Thus the focus shifted to issues such as a justiciable bill of rights, an independent judiciary, establishing a multi-party system and competitive electoral processes. However, this shift was accompanied by a sense of profound despair arising from the failure of constitutions in many societies to uphold human rights or democratic values, and the stark disparity between constitutional theory and constitutional practices. Reconciling these two has been defined as the foremost crisis of constitutionalism facing this century.
The debate on the constitutional order was situated in South Asia primarily around the failure of constitutionalism to provide for the needs of ethnic minorities, and the need to reflect the multi-ethnic character of the polity. This struggle was particularised by interventions of civil society and watchdog institutions such as the press and the judiciary, including in countries, such as Pakistan and Bangladesh, where military rule has prevailed over the legal order at successive points in time. But women, too, increasingly used these debates for their own struggles for equality. The nation state has become/became the focal point of attack.
Clearly, the impact of the state on the lives of women had been extremely complicated. On the one hand, internally (through its constitution) and internationally (through its ratification of international instruments), the state has been obliged to subscribe to principles and policies that preserve and protect women's rights. On the other hand, injustices done to women by gender-discriminatory laws and practices continue to be condoned by the state within its inflexible sanctioning of the authority of men over women in all spheres of decision-making. In Sri Lanka, for instance, while State expenditure on welfare has had a direct and positive impact on the physical quality of life of women, it has proved negligible in changing patriarchal structures, culture and attitudes or increasing the choices available to women. Representatives of state apparatus have become fluent at paying lip Service
2 Tiruchelvam.N. Crisis of Constitutionalism in South Asia, in Problems of Democracy, Constitutionalism and Political iolence. ed. U. Everding. Goethe Institut, Colombo, 1993. pp. 24-40.
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to women's rights, but women themselves have been prevented from becoming political actors engaged in transforming their own lives and playing a meaningful role in issues of governance.
The reality of the struggle in civil society, between adherents of democracy and pluralism on the one hand, and those of exclusivist nationalism and fundamentalism on the other, meanwhile has added a new dimension to the way women view the state. As Coomaraswamy observes:
Many of the women who believe in the values of democracy and tolerance, not only in crisis but in every day life, are now fighting with their backs against the wall, as movements in civil society emerge which are rooted in the idea of identity politics - a politics which privileges your religious and ethnic identity over others; where birth and blood are more important than rational self-interest; and where communities of language and religion are more important than communities of interest and political belief.
With the divide increasingly polarising women and society, the state reverted to its customarily schizophrenic role, allying with one to promote some ends and the other to promote other ends. Accordingly, it was even argued that such manifestations of nationalism were positive, as they pointed to “citizens beginning to make claims of the state'. The resultant contradictions increasingly challenged the fiction of the “benevolent state', and clearly defined the future challenge for third world women's activists. - -
Such realities and contradictions permeate the subject of women, governance, democracy and the state in Sri Lanka, which scores well on most indicators of gender equality. The country has a justiciable constitutional guarantee of equality, an impressive national machinery for the advancement of women, a physical quality of life for its women commensurate with levels reached by countries with much higher income levels, and women at the highest level of government. Indeed, President Chandrika Kumaratunga (before she took up the presidency in 1994) remarked that “The Sri Lankan
Coomaraswamy, Radhika, “The Principie of Universality and Cultural Diversity’ in Legal Perspectives, Documentation File No 35, Legal Resources for Social Action (India), n.d., p. 25.
Coomaraswamy, ibid. Morris. DMorris, Measuring the Conditions of the World's Poor: The Physical Quality of Life Index, Pergamon, New York, 1979.
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woman does not, unlike her counterparts in the western world, need to stridently fight for liberation...Where political leadership is concerned, the Sri Lankan man seems to have willingly abdicated.'
President Kumaratunge legitimising the myth regarding the politically empowered Sri Lankan woman is, however, only part of the story. While Sri Lankan women enthusiastically claim their rights of franchise, they also remain cribbed, cabined and confined in articulating their own political and social visions beyond the vote. A high degree of literacy (83.1%) is informed by educational norms that reinforce ingrained cultural and social belief systems that restrict the public visibility of women. In the ebb and flow of Sri Lankan civic life, there is little challenge to the construction of the public sphere as male, and of the state as predominantly male-oriented. The notion of full citizenship remains limited to men, while women continue to be marginalised from decision-making processes and differently incorporated as citizens. Though women in Sri Lanka have entered the public sphere in unprecedented numbers in the recent past (perhaps in contrast to other studies in this volume), in testimony to women's equal access to education and (to a lesser extent) employment, pushing through the glass ceiling continues to be difficult, if not impossible. Except for isolated examples, women remain conspicuously absent from mainstream political process and the higher echelons of the national administration.
Even when women's rights, bodies and resources are the sites of struggle and contestation, the active participation of female citizens themselves in the articulation of their rights and responsibilities has been obstructed or obscured. Women's concerns regarding the state and its responsibilities, and women's views, opinions and recommendations for political change with positive ramifications for the polity as a whole, are also inadequately articulated in public fora. Consequently, not only are there far fewer Sri Lankan women than men in political bodies across the board, but a lack of gender sensitivity is also evident in the legislative and policymaking process in particular and in the public sphere in general. The resultant adverse impact on both individual and national development has been acknowledged at the highest levels of government policy formulation.'
In the second instance, women's interactions with the Sri Lankan state, governance and politics have been conducted for the past three decades
6 P. M. Women not marginalised. The Sunday Times, Colombo, 9th October
1994, p. 20.
7 Tambiah. Yasmin, introduction to this volume.
8 Women and Governance. Speech by Minister of Women's Affairs, Hema Ratnayake,
Daily Nen's, Colombo, 10th December 1997, p. 11.
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within a framework of intense conflict. On the one hand, the catalytic role of violence has brought women out of the domestic space into a devastating and devastated public arena. Civil unrest in the south in the late 1980s and the on-going ethnic conflict in the north and east have transformed traditional female roles and catapulted women into hitherto unaccustomed roles of sole breadwinner and head of household (20% of households in Sri Lanka are female-headed). However, the escalating violence has also seen the entrenchment of an extremely authoritarian state, and the legitimising of force as an instrument of coercive action by both State and non-State actors, whether in continuing ethnic tensions, increasing general violence or manifesting specific electoral violence. Thus the Sri Lankan state has shown a remarkable ability to unleash violence and sustain an internal war, while seemingly rooted in the institutions of modern democracy.
Sri Lankan women have dealt with this prevalence of public and personal violence within very personalised and constraining perceptions of governance - that it is primarily male-centric and state-centric. With rare exceptions to this rule, women have been unable to venture out of a purely private, coping with the violence mind frame to a sustained and powerful public articulation of their grievances. Deep patriarchal biases and anxieties rooted in cultural constructs continue to undermine women's potential strengths, and treat them as convenient and helpless victims. This diminishes the individual and collective power that could otherwise have been wielded where such positive interventions are desperately needed. Gender empowerment in Sri Lanka, therefore, continues to be limited to an unenthusiastic compliance with international Standards and norms amidst forces of violent nationalism that have a destructive impact on women citizens. Accordingly, a compelling need exists to "re-imagine' the state not as a passive patriarchal entity but as a vibrant gender-aware force from which women can draw on their rights as equal citizens of the country. It is only from this standpoint that Sri Lankan women can begin to restructure constitutional discourses surrounding the Sri Lankan state and State institutions in order to ensure that modern constitutional arrangements will lead to Social transformations and “engendered' governance.
The ICES Women and Governance study has drawn on archival research, a Survey and focus group discussions among women's groups conducted during the period 1998-1999. The Sri Lanka study focussed on the nature of women's participation in governance, and their visions and experiences of the state amidst continuing violence. The study concentrated on women's involvement in formal political structures within a wider public sphere. We felt that it was important to look at issues of governance and public visibility through a broad lens in the current Sri Lankan context, where
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formal political institutions are inimical to women's participation and mainstream political activity is defined by violence and corruption. Alternative ways and means of public engagement thus assume added significance for women. This was done taking into consideration the backdrop of the diverse social, political and economic changes that have occurred in the country in the post-independence period.
Questions asked from the respondents related to legislative bodies and their formation; political parties, their perceptions of and access to power; how political parties construct women; how women/political activists interact with state machinery; and problems of representation and reservations/quotas and portraits of the general voter. Issues such as women's participation in militant activity, and their possible instigation or tacit approval of political violence such as thuggery which goes against the notion of women as care givers, are examined with particular attention. Thus the multiple impact of violence on women as an impediment to women's political involvement, and as a harbinger of opportunity to transcend confining roles/spaces, is central to the ICES study. Through these themes the ICES study attempts to explore how Sri Lankan women define the state, women's interaction with the state, and the state's current limitations and obligations to women citizens.
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Sri Lanka: Past and present
When the Donoughmore Commission on Constitutional Reform considered the question of universal adult franchise in its deliberations in 1928, it was impossible to deny that ‘Sri Lankan women were at least as competent to vote as were women in India, a considerable number of whom already possessed the franchise.'
The demand for women's franchise in Sri Lanka was spearheaded by the Women's Franchise Union, formed in 1927 (on the suggestion of the Commission). This comprised a group of educated middle class women (themselves wives of politicians) and radical men. Although their lobbying for reform has been described as 'modest and extremely cautious',' their advocacy in demanding that the Donoughmore Commission recommend right to franchise for all women across class and caste boundaries was remarkable. As Agnes de Silva, the leader of the delegation and the secretary of the Union, who gave evidence before the Commission, recounts: “We went in the spirit of crusaders and answered the questions in an inspired manner. Lord Donoughmore asked if we wanted Indian Tamil women labourers on the estates to have the vote. I replied certainly, they are women too. We want all women to have the vote.'
Although the Commission recommended that only women over the age of 30 should be given the vote, when the reforms were implemented in 1931 all women above the age of 21 obtained the right to vote.' This was despite the strong opposition of elder politicians, such as Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan, whose argument was that “it would lead to the destruction of domestic peace, purity and harmony that prevailed in the household'.'
Independence brought rapid progress for Sri Lankan women in the areas of health, education and employment. Today, Sri Lanka is a country
9 Metthananda, T., Women in Sri Lanka. Traditions and Change', in Women at the Crossroads. A Sri Lankan Perspective. (ed) Sirima Kiribamune and Vidyamali Samarasinghe, ICES, Kandy, 1990, p. 68.
O Metthananda. T., op.cit., p. 67.
Jayawardena, Kumari, Feminism in Sri Lanka in the Decade 1975-1985: Third World Perspectives. in Women, Struggles and Strategies, ISIS International, 1986, p. 129.
2 Metthananda, T., 1990, op. cit, p. 67.
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whose praiseworthy Human Development Index (HDI) for women is often cited as a model for developing countries.' While the importance of progress made by Sri Lankan women in education, health, and employment cannot be underestimated, these obviously do not tell the whole story. Sri Lanka remains a classic example of a country where a favourable HDI does not necessarily mean empowerment of women in terms of greater participation in decisionmaking processes. Lanka's HDI rankings are attributable to commitment to social welfare and consistent government spending on welfare in the postindependence period. The state has also taken a number of progressive steps to address the women question, such as the establishment of a Women's Bureau and a Ministry for Women's Affairs, provision of constitutional guarantees of equality and the adoption of a Women's Charter. Nevertheless, government planning and implementation of welfare policies have done little to change patriarchal culture, attitudes and structures, and women's entry into the public sphere continues to be fraught with difficulties. Women's labour force participation rate, which is half that of men, gives an immediate indication of the status of women in the public arena.' Women's representation in public decision-making bodies including political institutions points to an even more dismal scenario.
Where have we gone wrong? Planning for women by the state through the years has been as mothers and wives, with marriage, child-rearing and domesticity seen as a woman's primary and proper destiny. While women still bear the brunt of household responsibilities from cooking and cleaning to looking after children, they are also often compelled to work for wages in the formal or informal economy. In fact official employment statistics hardly recognise the large numbers of women who work as unpaid family members, hired labourers and subsistence producers to supplement the household
3 Female literacy is 83.1, only slightly lower than male literacy at 90.1. Although schoof enrolment is higher for boys at primary level. girls outnumber boys at higher levels including universities. Women enjoy a longer life span than men - 74.2, as against 69.5 years for men. The sex ratio is 100 females to 97.4 males. Maternal mortality is low. While fertility has dropped by 50% over the last three decades, high educational levels attained by Sri Lankan women have been taken to be a key determinant for this steady decline. The average age of marriage has also been steadily rising and is now approximately 25.5 years for women, indicating that family life is no longer considered to be the priority in a woman's life. (Women and Men in Sri Lanka, A Report, Department of Census and Statistics, Colombo, 1995.) Although labour force participation of women is estimated at 31.8% and is only half of that of men, it has shown a fast growth. (Women and Men in Sri Lanka, Department of Census and Statistics. Colombo, 1995).
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income in addition to their household work. While middle and upper class women may have extremely supportive husbands, and be in a position to shift the burden of familial responsibility including the care of children to other female household workers or relatives, the sexual division of labour within the household and the double day of work for women remain a very real obstacle to women's participation in the public sphere as leaders, decision-makers and activists.
Socially learned behaviour and expectations that distinguish between masculinity and femininity, although not immutable over time, have always tended to inhibit women's participation in the public sphere. In the Sri Lankan context, Kumari Jayawardene refers to what is popularly considered attributes of a good woman, which is epitomised in the concept of lajja baya (shame and fear) that still persists in our society. Jayawardena, elaborating on this concept of lajjabaya, states: The do's included chastity, modesty, servility self sacrifice, confinement to home, preoccupation with children, husband relations, husband's friends, not to mention looking after his property. There were also several don'ts including loud talk, laughing, running, idling, and keeping the company of independent (therefore bad) women.'
It is through the socialisation process, which begins at home, that women learn about the construction of the good woman and how to assume that identity. These ideas are then internalised and reproduced from generation to generation. Education has done little to change these attitudes and perceptions, and all along has been a powerful reinforcing factor operating as an agent of socio-cultural reproduction, legitimising gender-role stereotypes. The admirably steamlined system of education pioneered by the British colonial authorities and later the missionaries proceeded on the unshaken rationale that the education of women was necessary in order to create 'good Christian girls who possessed all the necessary virtues of chastity humility and modesty' and presentable housewives. In the postindependence period, although education was perceived as the vehicle to equal development and educational opportunity became, together with food subsidies, health services and other welfarist measures, a goal in the policies directed towards reducing social and economic inequalities', the powerfully limiting force in these authoritatively educational teachings of what was considered to be 'good and proper' has continued to play a dangerously
s Jayawardena, Kumari. op. cit., p. 23.
Jayaweera, Swarna. Women and Education, in Status of Women, University of Colombo, Colombo. 1979, p. 259. :
s
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insistent role in perpetuating and strengthening disempowering thought patterns in Sri Lankan women." This has been accompanied by the role of the media, which, though undergoing extensive change and technological advancement in recent times, has remained a classic propagandist, bombarding the citizenry with images of women predominantly as good mothers and wives.
Violence both within the family and in the community is another aspect of the patriarchal culture, which effectively preempts women's participation in the public sphere. The problem is compounded by the fact that domestic violence continues to be a taboo subject, a well-kept secret. In the ICES survey 91.9% of women said that they have not witnessed violence directed at their children by a family member, and 88.7% of women stated that they had not experienced violence themselves by a family member.' Women leaders in communities however acknowledged that fathers, husbands, brothers and even sons resort to violence to confine women to the domestic sphere and prevent their participation in activities in the public sphere. One woman member of a pradeshiya sabha in the Anuradhapura district told us: In our society, women have their duties and men have theirs. Because of ignorance people accept the status quo and go on. Many of my women supporters love to get involved in canvassing and other activities, but the moment their husbands threaten them, they stop coming even for meetings. This has been my experience.'
Women's representation in formal politics
Despite Sri Lanka being one of the first countries in Asia to give women the right to vote and be elected to political office, woman's representation in formal politics at national, provincial and local government level has remained minimal, depriving women of any effective voice in governance. The eleventh parliament of Sri Lanka, elected in October 2000, has nine female members from a total of 225 members. Eight of these women were elected, while one was appointed from the national list of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). Many of the women elected to the tenth parliament failed to retain their
7 De Alwis, Malathi. “Towards a Feminist Historiography: Reading Gender in the Text of the Nation, in An introduction to Social Theory, eds. R. Coomaraswamy and N. Wickremesinghe. Konark Press. Delhi. 1994, pp. 86-107.
s Women, however, acknowledged that violence within the community is quite high.
9 Interview with Kusuma Ratnayake, member, Thalawa Pradeshiya Sabha.
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seats. The cabinet, which consists of 44 ministers, includes only two women ministers. There is not a single woman deputy minister. The polls saw the defeat of female politicians holding ministerial or deputy ministerial posts, including the Minister of Women's Affairs, Hema Ratnayake, and two high profile deputy ministers (Food and Trade Deputy Minister Sumithra Priyanganie Abeyweera and Deputy Minister Nirupama Rajapakse). Out of the nine women in the new parliament, six are first-timers.
It is important to note that election to parliament and other political institutions since 1989 has been on the basis of a system of proportional representation (PR), which is deemed to be more favourable to women than the earlier first past the post system. However, like many other contradictions in Sri Lanka, PR appears to have further marginalised women from political institutions. With a drop from 4.8% representation to 4% representation, the country appears to have returned to a pre-PR percentage of women representatives in parliament, thereby demonstrating the failure of the proportional system of electioneering to deliver on its promise to bring larger numbers of women into the national legislature.' The Sri Lankan experience thus reflects the truth that PR cannot, in isolation, work for the betterment of women in politics. Its beneficial effects are heavily dependant on the type of political party structures and the social and cultural ethos within which it works itself out. Thus, although in countries sharing similar political cultures such as Germany and Australia, PR has resulted in three to four times more women being elected, in Russia this generalisation is inapplicable because of the lack of a political culture - specifically, the huge numbers of parties and blocks, their underdeveloped structures, the lack of confidence many women face and political parties' ignorance of women's interests.
In provincial councils (which were established in 1989 as a second tier of government) representation is equally low. In the three elections held so far in 1989, 1993 and 1999, women have constituted merely 2.9%, 4.7%, and 3.3% respectively of the total membership of provincial councils.
At local government level the figures become increasingly more negative. According to 1997 statistics, there were a mere 3.4%, 2.6% and 1.7% women representatives respectively in municipal councils, urban councils and pradeshiya sabhas. Only two of the municipal councils are headed by a woman. Only four of the 3,137 pradeshiya sabhas island-wide are headed by women. None of the 35 urban councils is headed by a woman.
20 Pinto Jayawardena, K., Proportional representation, political violence and the
participation of women in the political process. ICES/IDS, unpublished. 2 Karam. Azza (ed.), Women in Parliament. Beyond Numbers, International DEA,
Sweden. 1998.
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Table 1: Women's Representation in Parliament (2000 and 1994)
2000* 1994** Total Women "% Total Women %
Members 225 9 4.0 225 4.8
Cabinet Ministers 44 3 4.5 20 3 50 米米米 20 1. - 28 4. 4.2
Deputy Minister 35 O 0.0 26 5 19.2 来米米 21 1 30 3 10.0
*Sources: Can more women politicians help? (Editorial) Island of 18 January 2001, Island
of 20 October 2000, Daily News of 15 and 19 September 2001.
Beijing Reflections. Women in Sri Lanka 1995-2000, CENWOR, 2000.
*** This refers to a subsequent cabinet reshuffle.
Table 2: Women in Provincial Councils
** Source: Leiten, Tressie, Women in Political Participation and Decision Making. in Post
Province 1999 1993
Total Women % Total Women "%
Western 04 2 9 104 7 6.7 North Central 34 2.9 36 4 . North Western 51 3 5.8 52 3 5.8 Uva 32 1 3.1 34 O 0.0 Central 58 3 5.1 58 1.7 Southern 55 l 1.8 55 2 3.6 Sabaragamuwa 43 l 2.3 44 l 2.3
Total 377 12 3.3 383 18 4.7
16th March 1998.
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Source: Ministry of Women's Affairs - 1998, as published in The Daily News, Colombo,

Table 3: Women in Local Government
1997 1991 Total Women 9% Total Women %
Municipal Councils 252 9 3.4 20 6 2.9 Urban Councils 33 9 2.6 235 6 2.4 Pradeshiya Sabhas || 3,137 55 17 2,632 42 1.6
Source: Leiten, op. cit,
Ethnic composition of women in political office
There is a minority within the minority of women elected to political office. Most women politicians are from the Sinhalese community. Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic nation comprising approximately 74% Sinhalese, 18% Tamils and 8% Muslims. However this diversity in our population is not reflected in the numbers of elected women politicians. Even in the areas where Tamils and Muslims form a majority of the population, representation of women from these ethnic communities has been minimal.
Tamil women in politics
Political representation for Tamil women received a promising start with the election of Naysum Saravanamuttu to the State Council in 1932 from the Colombo North seat. She held this seat for the next 10 years and was a popular politician. Since then, however, there was not a single Tamil woman in the legislature for almost half a century until Ranganayaki Padmanathan was appointed in 1980 to represent the Pothuvil electorate on the death of her brother. Nine years later, in 1989, Rasa Manohari Pulendran was nominated after the assassination of her husband and was subsequently elected to parliament as the UNP member for Vavuniya. She was re-elected in 1994, and was the first-ever Tamil woman to hold a ministerial office as the State Minister of Education. Wellamma Sellasamy has been the only Tamil woman to be elected to a provincial council to date. She was elected to the Western Provincial Council in the 1993 PC election, but failed to get re-elected in the 1999 election.
At local government level, some Tamil women have come forward for election, although the numbers of such women have been insignificant.
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In 1997, local government elections were held in some parts of the Northern Province after almost 16 years. Sarojini Yogeswaran was elected to the Jaffna Municipal Council and became the mayor, but was assassinated by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) a few months later. Yogeswaran, the widow of a one-time MP for Jaffna who was also assassinated by the LTTE, came forward to contest the election from the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) and promised to focus on improving basic facilities such as water and health for her constituents and called for an end to the gun culture. Yogeswaran was doubly inimical to the LTTE, both as a woman politician calling for peace and as a member from a party that the LTTE looked upon as a traitor to the Tamil separatist cause. Her death signaled a lapsing back into hopelessness on the part of the ordinary people in Jaffna, torn between the twin terrors of an occupying army and the brutalities of the LTTE. Her assassination was yet another example of the fact that the LTTE tolerates no threat to its command over the Tamil people in the war-torn areas.
In contrast to the virtual absence of Tamil women in formal political
institutions, they have played a significant and multi-faceted role within the LTTE. Women's participation in the northern struggle changed from nurturing and supporting the activities of their husbands in the 1960s peace protests or satyagrahas, to a more radical militarisation in the 1980s. Analysing the role of Tamil women in this process, Samuel comments that:
Used first as propagandists and service providers, recruiters and fundraisers, women were gradually trained as fighters and used in combat. The LTTE was in the forefront of using women both in traditional units of combat and later on in the exclusive units as "suicide' bombers. Women who could not be recruited
Note that the tone and character of Tamil politics in the last decade and a half has very much been determined by the LTTE and its demand for a separate state in the north and east of the country and the violent and extreme means adopted by it to achieve this end. During this period the LTTE has tried to ensure that no moderate Tamil can function in public life whether as a politician or leader of civil society. Anyone who did not fall in line with their vision of Eelam, and who was involved in any activity that had the potential of developing into a healthier alternative for the people, was/is systematically eliminated. In this process, most moderate Tamils whether male or female are marginalised from mainstream politics. Maunaguru, Sitralega, "Gendering Tamil Nationalism: The Construction of Women in Projects of Protest and Control. in P. Jeganathan and Q. lsmail (eds). (UnJmaking the Nation. The Politics of identity and History in Modern Sri Lanka, Social Scientists Association, Colombo, 1995, pp. 58-175.
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to active fighting were extolled to make the Supreme sacrifice of their children, particularly their sons, to the struggle. Women's roles were extended. They were now wives, mothers and nurturers both of men and the struggle. They were also bearers of sons and daughters, reproducers for and of the struggle, ultimately they were also warriors in the struggle.'
LTTE women cadres are now estimated to make up 50% or more of its fighting force. It is also estimated that from 1986, when women first appeared as militant fighters, up to December 1992, some 381 women have died in the process. The women's wing of the LTTE is a formidable force. They have an independent structure and are involved in political and intelligence work. They engage in equally difficult and dangerous tasks as their male counterparts, and their contribution to the war effort is readily acknowledged. Women are part of the elite suicide battalions and have been singled out for particularly important assignments, such as the assassination of the former Indian Premier Rajiv Gandhi. In this process, there has been a clear abandoning of conventional modes of behaviour and dress, hitherto considered to be indispensable attributes of Tamil womanhood. As Coomaraswamy points out, inequitable social practices that kept unmarried women at home and menstruating women in the back garden have given way to virile forms of mobilisation”.”
One evident result of this militarisation of the Tamil woman is that all major Tamil nationalist groups have addressed the woman question as part of their political agenda, and have accepted the concept of women's liberation even in a limited form, providing an important space for the discussion of issues relating to gender.
Within the ideological space created by debates among Tamil nationalist groups and women's groups on feminism, emancipation and the national liberation struggle, there has emerged the construction of the new Woman (puthumai pen), and feminist activists have used this space to challenge notions of the traditional feminine qualities of passivity and Submissiveness and contest patriarchal aspects of Tamil cultural ideology.”
24 Samuel, Kumudini, "Gender Difference in Conflict Resolution: The Case of Sri Lanka”,
unpublished paper, p. 12.
25 Adele Ann. Women Fighters of Liberation Tigers, released by the Publication Section
of the LTTE. 993
28 Coomaraswamy. Radhika, The Tiger Women and the Question of Emancipation, in
Pravada. Vol. 4, No.9, 1996, p. 8.
27 Maunaguru, Sitralega, op. cit.: pp. 64-168.
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However, while it is recognised that women's participation in the armed struggle has been transformative, the question still remains how permanent these changes are. The Tamil woman soldier who claims equality with male cadres raises many questions relating to autonomy. How independent/autonomous are these women? Is there genuine participation in the political Struggle, or are women being used as mere adjuncts with no autonomy or decision-making power? As Coomaraswamy argues, Despite the celebration of armed women cadre by LTTE's idealogues, there is still no evidence that women are part of the elite decision-making process. They are not initiators of ideas, they are only implementers of policy made by someone else, by men.”*
Ultimately, the 'militarisation of the LTTE women, like their counterparts in the JVP has been within parameters not defined by themselves but by the male leadership of the party. They have been thus ‘empowered from the fetters of conventional Tamil society only to a restricted and subverted extent. Again, as Coomaraswamy points out, “In this context, the Tiger women of the LTTE are really without true political or social empowerment. Until they are given access to decision-making at all levels in a free and democratic manner, they will remain dispossessed.'
Breaking the isolation of Muslim women in politics
Historically, representation of Muslim women in political institutions has been insignificant and can be attributed to a multiplicity of factors, chief among which are lower levels of literacy, norms of seclusion, and priority given to marriage and child-rearing over career. The Muslim male community has been synonymously associated with business and trade, where women have a very limited role to play within the home, engaged in domestic labour and housework. It was only in the late 1970s and the 1980s that new importance was placed on the education of Muslim women (a group that was lowering the literacy rate for the entire community), and more Muslim women began to pursue secondary and higher education.'
Ayisha Rauf was the first Muslim woman to contest an election in Sri Lanka from the Colombo Central multi-member constituency in 1947.
28 Coomaraswamy, Radhika, op. cit.: 1996, p. 9.
29 bid.
30 Knoerzer, Shari. Transformation of Muslim Political identity, in Culture and Politics of Identity in Sri Lanka, eds. Thiruchelvam and Dhattatreya, ICES Colombo, 1998.
*''' : Rauf was of South ilndian origin and came to Sri Lanka in 1944 om her manriage to a
businessman in Sri Lanka. She was a graduate, trained in education and also had experience as a teacher. In 1946 she became the first principal of Muslim Ladies College.
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She contested as an independent candidate, but failed to win a seat. In her second attempt at local government level in 1949 she was elected to the Colombo Municipal Council, becoming the first Muslim woman to be elected to apolitical institution in Sri Lanka, while continuing as principal of Muslim Ladies College. She went on to become the deputy mayor in 1952. Her political career came to a premature end when she was forced to choose between her two careers. In 1961, the school was taken over by the government. As a public servant she could not hold both positions, and opted to resign from politics. For generations of Muslim woman since then her example was not easy to emulate, with very few Muslim women taking to politics even at local government level.
Anjani Umma of the JVP became the first Muslim woman to be elected to a provincial council in 1999. She also became the first Muslim woman to sit in parliament when she was appointed from the JVP national list at the October 2000 parliamentary election. She would have shared this honour with Ferial Ashraff, but for the fact that Mrs. Ashraff was observing iddat and took her place in parliament only in January 2001. Mrs. Ashraff was elected to parliament from the Digamadulla district with more than 80,000 votes at the October 2000 election, after her name was substituted in the nomination list on the sudden and tragic death of her husband, the charismatic leader of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), M. H. M. Ashraff. She also became the leader of the National Unity Alliance set up by her husband and co-leader of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, the first Muslim woman to be leader of a political party. She is also the first Muslim woman to hold a cabinet post as the Minister for Rural Housing, and Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of the Eastern Province. Whether her role will be largely ceremonial in the rigidly structured SLMC, which has been in the forefront of opposing gender reform in parliament, remains to be seen.
Mrs Jezima Ismail, former principal of Muslim Ladies College and a leading educationist might also have entered the eleventh parliament of Sri Lanka if not for the death of Mr. Ashraff. Mrs. Ismail, a close friend of the Ashraff family, was included in the national list of the Peoples Alliance at the request of the late Mr. Ashraff, on the basis of her commitment to
32 Haniffa. Farzana, A Woman of the Brotherhood Ayisha Rauf and the Quest for Muslim
Womens Emancipation (unpublished paper).
33 ldaat is the period of mourning which a Muslim woman has to observe for 4 months and 10 days after the death of her husband. According to conservative religious interpretations of iddat, a widow should be in complete seclusion and can only see Women and close male relatives during this period.
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peace, harmony and national reconciliation, in addition to her tireless work on women's rights including the rights of Muslim women. However, in the aftermath of the election and the scramble for national list seats that occurred in most parties, Mrs Ismail was not appointed.
Women's access to formal politics: Widows, wives and daughters
Political parties play a crucial role informal political processes by determining who is and is not nominated as a candidate for election. The highest decisionmaking body of the party makes this choice. Candidates are chosen from the membership depending on the level of commitment to party policy and active involvement in party initiatives, or purely on grounds of political expediency. . While women's membership and involvement in political parties are through women's wings, and all political parties in Sri Lanka inevitably parade a women's wing, they are dominated by the ideology of the party and have existed mainly in order to mobilise the female constituency at election time and support the men in their parties. As Wimala de Silva points out:
Their main activities are directed towards welfare work, income generation, providing behind the scene Support at meetings and swelling the ranks at rallies. Benefits that can be obtained (e.g., from poverty alleviation programmes) are a powerful draw for some women to join the Kantha Samiti of the ruling party. But even for women who are genuinely interested in politics, membership of a Kantha Samithiya does not pave the way to mainstream politics and political leadership.
The number of women running for political office in Sri Lankahas, of course, dramatically increased since independence. In contrast to the single woman candidate at the first election of 1931, the 1994 parliamentary election Saw
34 The present Peoples Alliance government, like the last one, depends on NUA and SLMC support for its majority in parliament. Mrs. Ismail's inclusion in the national list and Mrs. Ashraff's cabinet position must be seen in the context of the balance of power held by these two parties.
35 De Silva, Wimala, Political Participation of Women in Sri Lanka 1985 - 1995, in Facets of Change: Women in Sri Lanka 1986-1995, CENWOR. Colombo. 1995, p. 240.
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55 female candidates. In the October 2000 parliamentary election there were 117 women candidates. While the large numbers were due to the multiplicity of small political parties that contested, the two main parties, namely the Peoples Alliance and the United National Party, fielded only a disappointing 14 and 8 female candidates respectively. The leftist JVP, now in the thick of mainstream politics with a legacy of anti-Systemic struggle, put forward the most number of women on its behalf, namely 23.
The highest number of women candidates was recorded at the 1999 provincial council election, where there were 198 women candidates. The greater number of women candidates in recent years has however not helped to increase the number of women actually elected to political office. In fact, a comparison of the percentage numbers of women elected to parliament since independence shows that these numbers have remained almost static, Again, this is because political parties have shown little commitment to grooming and supporting dynamic strong women candidates who can compete on the political stage on their own merit. Many independent women candidates fail to get elected because they do not have the prerequisites to successfully contest an election today - money and muscle. Instead, time and time again we see that women elected to political office come from political families - who give them not only financial support but also access to traditional support bases. Thus, if it has not been over the dead bodies of their husband or sons, women's entry into politics has depended largely on male patronage, kinship ties or cultivation of male networks. Thus they have entered politics within existing highly patriarchal structures of Society, and operate within those same limitations.
Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike's entry into politics in 1960, on the assassination of her husband, marked the start of that peculiar South Asian phenomenon of female heads of state coming to power “over the dead bodies' of male relatives. It should be reiterated that, in Sri Lanka, this manner of entry into politics has not been confined to women from elite circles at the highest level of politics, but has had a noticeable domino effect following a violent political climate in the late 1980s. A number of political assassinations at national, provincial and local level, particularly during the late 1980s, have had the effect of bringing a widow, a bereaved mother or daughter on to centre stage at all levels of government.
Of course, wives and daughters have been a feature of Sri Lankan politics from the outset. The first women to enter the state council and later
36 There were however 5,048 male candidates at this election, and in 1994 there were
l,410 male candidates.
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parliament in Sri Lanka were all wives or daughters of politicians, deceased or living. Adeline Molamure, the first woman in the state council, was elected after her father's seat fell vacant on his death. She was also the first woman to sit alongside her husband, Sir Francis Molamure, in the state council. Naysum Saravanamuttu contested the November by-election in 1931 after her husband was unseated by an election petition and lost his civic rights. He later became mayor of Colombo, while she was still a member of the council. Many others followed these politician couples, such as Doreen and S. A. Wickramasinghe, Vivienne and Leslie Gunawardene, Kusuma and Phillip Gunawardene and Selina and N. M. Perera.
A return to couple politics in a very different political context was seen in 1986, with the establishment of provincial councils as a second tier of government between parliament and local level institutions. Many parliamentarians took this opportunity to nominate their wives to provincial councils as a means of strengthening their power base in the provinces. Thus now we have Rani and A. M. S. Adikari, Mary Lareen and Festus Perera, Indrani and D. M. Dassanayake, Nalini and Samaraweera Weerawanni, Berty and Jayani Dissanayake, etc.
But perhaps a distinction ought to be made here. The pioneering women legislators of the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s were not simply wives of politicians. Their political careers were more or less independent from their husbands', and many of them had a history of political activism long before marriage. Veteran leftist politician Vivienne Gunawardene, for instance, has been aptly described as a woman fired with political passion and imbued with an equally strong commitment to women's rights, trade unions, peace and international issues. She was noted for fighting patriarchs, brutal policemen and exploitative employers, as well as political opponents of the ultra left and right. Famed for speaking her mind even at the highest level of her own party, she differed on political issues with other party leaders, including her uncle Phillip and her husband. Her example could be strongly contrasted with the present day proxy women politicians, who not only 'stand in for their husbands, with little or no political will of their own, but are, in fact, proud of this association. When one woman candidate at the January 1999 provincial council election was asked by a local newspaper
37 Wijesekara, Chitra. Women in our Legislature. A Sri Lankan Study (from 1931 - 1977),
Sarvodaya Visva Lekha Printers, Colombo. 1995. 38 Jayawardena, Kumari, “Vivienne Goonewardena: “La Pasionaria” of Sri Lanka.
Pravada, Vol.4, No. 10 & 1 1. 1997, pp. 16-18.
440,

what her vision was for the electorate if she was elected, her reply was that the vision was with her husband and will be implemented by her accordingly." At the same election, the two women who polled the highest number of votes, becoming eligible to be the chief ministers of their respective provinces, later resigned in order to allow their husbands to leave parliament and take oaths as chief ministers (i.e., Nalini Weerawanni in the Uva Province and Jayani Dissanayake in the North Central Province). One candidate went so far as to allow her parliamentarian husband, who was a prominent minister, to make her acceptance speech on her behalf upon winning at the polls. Also significant in this phenomenon is the manner in which such behaviour by 'elected members is accepted without comment from the electorate, and would have gone unremarked were it not for a public interest group challenging the practice on the grounds that it affronted fundamental principles of democratic representation.
These widows, wives and daughters in politics are however merely a symptom of the dynastic nature of politics in South Asia, where family and kinship ties have always played a central role. As with the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty in India, in post-independence Sri Lanka the Senanayakes and the Bandaranaikes have, with few exceptions, dominated the political landscape of the country with their intra-family and inter-family loyalties, alliances, fissions and rivalries, greatly influencing the course of politics in this country. Families have used political parties to enhance their personal standing, influence and power, (and in recent times their wealth), and political parties have relied on kinship ties in place of binding ideologies and principles." Jiggins, in her study of family at the level of parliamentary politics in Sri. Lanka, observes that, despite universal franchise, parliamentary procedures and frequent transfers of power at elections, the grip of a few families on power has been diluted only marginally. Over the years this dynastic trend has simply become more entrenched, extending to all levels of government, allowing many more families to build networks of power from which they exert considerable influence in their communities, from jobs and welfare
39 Interview given by Indrani Dassanayake to the Ravaya newspaper 12 January 1999, shortly prior to the Wayamba provincial council election. Dassanayake, wife of PA parliamentarian D.M. Dassanayake, went on to win the highest number of votes in the province. This husband and wife couple came to be famed for having the greatest record of complaints against them jointly for election violence in the Wayamba January 1999 provincial council election. Jiggins, Janice. Caste and Family in the Politics of the Sinhalese 1947-1976, K.V.G. De Silva, Colombo, 1979.
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subsidies to land grants. In recent elections, in every nomination list of every district one could find the name of the son, daughter or wife of an incumbent, retired or deceased politician.
Male networks and patron-client relationships
In the absence of direct family ties, male networks and patron-client relationships have allowed women to access political space hitherto denied to them. As in the earlier category, however, the very manner of entry to politics based on patronage has acted as an inherent constraint on the ability of these women to break out of established patterns of subordination. The ICES team met a number of women who did not come from overtly politically active families, but who had connections to political leaders in the area and who were invited to contest the election by either a local or national level male politician of senior rank. The latter performs the role of a mediator between the family and candidate, smoothing away any difficulties that may arise in her candidature. Once in power, the woman candidate often feels obliged to these benevolent mediators', consulting them on matters of importance and feeling compelled to follow their advice. Regrettable is the fact that many such women have a background in community work with a good rapport with the people in the area, and would have made strong leaders in their own right if their entry into politics had not been of such a dependant nature. In some of these instances the woman in the family has been selected over the men, as was the case of a woman member of a local government body in the south. She had seven brothers, some of them actively involved in politics, but it was she who was ultimately selected to stand in the local government election. She attributes this to the fact that while her brothers preferred to work behind the scenes, they acknowledge her capability.
The independent candidate
There are rare examples of women who have been able to access formal political space with no class, family or other political connections. These women had considerable community work experience and were pushed into politics by the people in their areas. However, it is only at local government level that women from non-political and non-privileged backgrounds have been able to access the system. Their ability to do so comes from their work within the community, and exemplifies ways in which women can access political space at grassroots level. But once in politics these women find it difficult to ascend the political ladder due to such reasons as the high cost of
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electioneering and the lack of party connections and male patronage. As
much as class background and wealth are critical factors for women from
political families, these considerations carry even more weight for women
who come from non-political backgrounds. Many of the women entering
community level politics are strongly committed to their constituencies, and
are more aware of the problems of women than women politicians at the provincial and central level who enter politics on the springboard of paternalistic support. In this context, it becomes a pressing question whether
reservations for women in Sri Lankan politics would amount to an effective
corrective mechanism.
The gender agenda
Given the nature of women's entry into politics as proxy candidates through male relatives and networks, women's leadership becomes a matter of concern and question. While Mrs. Bandaranaike began her political career with a formidable handicap, typified in the declaration that she was an ignorant housewife coming to parliament after presiding over nothing fiercer than the kitchen fire, she nevertheless went on to become a formidable leader in her own right, demonstrating shrewd political acumen on many occasions. In 1971 she ruthlessly suppressed an armed youth rebellion, and came to be known as the 'only man in the cabinet of the time. Her leadership, which gave the Non-Aligned Movement the initiative to establish the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace during the height of the cold war, and her role in diffusing a possible war between India and China, are still remembered as landmarks in her political career. She survived her civic rights being taken away by the United National Party (UNP) government from 1977-1994. With the return to power of the PA government under the leadership of Chandrika Kumaratunge in 1994, she was appointed prime minister despite her failing health. On her death in October 2000 at the age of 84, the nation mourned “a good leader and a good woman' whose political career had spanned 40 years. Chandrika Kumaratunge's credentials as a charismatic and powerful political leader are acknowledged even by her political opponents, even though she undoubtedly capitalised on the sympathy vote at the presidential election of 1994 - accorded to her both as the daughter of an assassinated father and the widow of a slain husband. She was re-elected to office in 1999 despite a previous term that was marred by unmet promises, failed initiatives and violence.
But how committed have women politicians been to furthering the cause of women and bringing gender to the forefront of national politics?
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To what extent have women leaders of national status in Sri Lanka advanced women's participation in politics, or to what extent have Sri Lankan women politicians themselves been responsible for perpetrating an ideology of male dominance? Generally Sri Lankan women politicians have not asserted women's interests and priorities. While many are adept at paying lip service to the cause of women, the legacy unabashedly affirmed by them is to carry on the agendas of their fathers, husbands, sons or political parties.
During the three regimes so far headed by women (i.e., 1960-1965 and 1970-1977 by Sirimavo Bandaranaike and 1994-2000 by Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunge), the concerns of women within and without the political process could have been given much greater attention. Although during the period 1994-2000 both prime minister and president were women, with considerable executive and legislative power at their disposal, concerns of women in the country have not been adequately addressed. Chandrika Kumaratunge's tenure, for instance, has been hampered by the alliances she has been forced to make to retain power. In 1995, when the age of marriage was raised to l8 for both men and women, no corresponding change could be made in the Muslim law, because of vehement opposition by the Muslim lobby both within and outside parliament. There was no possibility of opposing the Muslim lobby, as Kumaratunge's government depended on the support of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (among other small parties) to maintain its slim majority in parliament.
Nor has there been a greater effort to field more women candidates for election. From 1965-1977, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), headed by Sirimavo Bandaranaike, nominated only four women candidates.' With Kumaratunge taking on the presidency in 1994, seven women were given ministerial (2) or deputy ministerial (5) positions. Despite this cause for optimism, and while differing from her mother to some extent in her public persona, Kumaratunge, too, has not made any effort to address the disempowerment of Sri Lankan women within political and policy-making processes. Instead she has made contrary statements with a populist appeal - thus the flamboyancy of her comment quoted at the beginning of this paper (which received wide publicity at the time she made it), which belies the lived reality of many Sri Lankan women.
What precisely is the reason for this? Is it traceable to the rigidity of prevalent political structures that hamper these national women status figures'
Kamalawathie. I.M., “Women in Parliamentary Politics in Sri Lanka”, in komen At the Crossroads, eds Sirima Kiribamune and Vidyamali Samarasinghe, ICES, Kandy, 1990,
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from openly breaking the mould to which women are expected to conform? Or, on the contrary, is it due to the lack of real initiative on the part of these women politicians themselves, a disinclination to disturb traditional structures of gendered thought and behaviour that have been accepted as the status quo? Does the answer lie in a combination of these two factors? Is it because the primary qualification female political candidates have is a link with a male figure in politics, coupled with minimal understanding of political issues and concerns? Dialogue with some emerging activist women politicians, meanwhile, reveals interesting perspectives on female engagement with the political process. One female parliamentarian from the south to whom the ICES team spoke, explained graphically that to expect women to challenge the party hierarchy or even their colleagues on issues of gender leadership is to be too idealistic:
We will become objects of fun and ridicule if we do so. The non-confrontational approach is the best way to get over this problem. This means that essentially we work the way they want us to but we use this time to establish ourselves more strongly in our electorates, so that when the time comes to push through some definite change, we would be in a stronger position to do so.
The politician in question had come to power after the death of her father at the hands of anti-government forces. Her father was an active politician with whom she had worked for a number of years. She cultivates a deliberately rural appearance as a matter of electoral prudence, and explains that the constituency she represents expects women to dress in a certain manner and to behave in a certain manner, both of which she personally disagrees with but publicly adheres to.
There have been some exceptions to this rule of conformity. Vivienne Gunawardene, for instance, worked tirelessly for the cause of women's empowerment, particularly for the women of the poorer classes, although she refused to be termed a feminist. Ayisha Rauff, the first Muslim woman to be elected to political office in Sri Lanka, worked passionately for the cause of female education among the Muslim community, and recognised the need for greater participation of women in decision-making processes.
More contemporaneously, many of the women we spoke with at local government and provincial council level did show an awareness of gender issues, perhaps due to educational and awareness programmes conducted by NGOs and the wider media coverage of gender issues in recent times. Many of these local level politicians had responded to recent reports of violence
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against women as reported in the media by expressing their concern at meetings or by passing resolutions appealing to the president to strengthen the relevant laws. Many went on to express the feeling that capital punishment ought to be imposed on perpetrators of sex crimes. Surangani Ellawala, a provincial councillor we spoke with, has been inspired by the anti alcohol movement in India, and is hoping to tackle the problem of illicit brewing of liquor by mobilising women in her electorate and providing alternative employment for those involved in the brewing. Her opinion is that Sri Lankan women, despite their higher levels of literacy, lack the militancy of rural women in India.
The end result of these attitudinal assertions is an unfortunate negation, not so much of the personal power and authority of the Bandaranaikes and the Kumaratunges, who function within privileged and protective structures, but of the upward visibility and mobility of ordinary Sri Lankan women in decision-making processes that have vital inplications in their own lives. This in turn has significantly influenced the individual and collective strategies of Sri Lankan women politicians on lesser levels of power, and Sri Lankan women in general, on issues that need to be publicly challenged.
Good women or harlots?
When women do enter the public arena of politics, it is often seen as a Secondary function to their roles as good mothers and wives. Furthermore, their roles as mothers and wives continue to be emphasised sometimes even over their public role. Mrs. Bandaranaike, arguably the most powerful role model for female politicians in Sri Lanka, chose the role of a nurturing mother figure apologetically thrust into politics, who would lead the nation but always be conscious of her femininity and the proper role of women.' She often stressed her identity as a mother over her unique public persona as the first woman head of state. She once said:
I feel most strongly (that) the home is a woman's foremost place of work and influence and looking after her children and husband, duties of highest importance for her to perform.
42 Mrs. Bandaranaike was affectionately know as the mother of the nation or simply amma (mother). A popular slogan during the 1970 general election went like this:
pe amma langa enava ( Mother is coming) Hal seru deka denan'a (with two measures of rice). She has also been referred to as a modern version of Viharamahadevi, the symbol of Sinhalese motherhood and courage (De Alwis, Malathi, The Moral Mother Syndrome, in Pravada, Vol. 6, No. 2&3, 1999), p. 18.
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But women also have their vital role in civic life, they owe a duty to their country, a duty which cannot, must not be shirked and some at least of their time should be devoted to Social welfare work.
On her death recently the eulogies and appreciations in the press admired and praised not only her statesmanship but also her role in bringing up her children as a widow. Many contemporary women politicians continue to reiterate that women politicians have different priorities to male politicians, and that, though they were in politics, they could not neglect their wifely and motherly duties. A young educated woman candidate at the 1999 provincial council election told us: “Of course I always fulfil whatever duties a wife has to do in the house and as a mother. I don't think I have so far neglected them. But the day I really feel that I cannot balance both, then I will give up politics."
It was obvious that public perceptions and expectations played a great part in their reluctance to visit equal familial responsibility on their spouses, even though the impracticality of shouldering such a dual burden was well acknowledged by them. These public expectations transformed into restrictions on individuals of a community were greater when women from the Muslim community attempted to come forward in politics.'
Women are thus compelled to enter public space cloaked in the respectability of wifehood, motherhood or widowhood." The construction of women in the public eye as good mothers and wives means that women's dress, speech and conduct become subjects of intense Scrutiny, making them particularly vulnerable to character assassination and insults if they transgress the boundaries of what is considered proper or respectable for a woman. Thus Vivienne Gunawardene, the fiery leftist politician was branded a Vatti Amma (basket woman) for her forthright manner and fearless campaigning. And even if women politicians are the epitome of good womanhood, there are constant attempts to undermine their presence in the public sphere and to
43 Quoted in Seneviratne, Maureen, Sirimavo Bandranaike, Hansard Publishers,
Colombo, 1975, p. 5.
44 interview with Sharmila Jayawardene, candidate, Western Provincial Council
election, 1999.
4S interviews with Mrs Abdeen, member, Mt.Lavinia Municipal Council and Mrs Hajara
Sally, member. Municipal Council, Galle.
46 De Alwis, Malathi, Gender. Politics and the “Respectable Lady', in (Unmaking The
Nation, eds. Pradeep Jeganathan and Quadri Ismail, Social Scientists' Association. Colombo, 1995, pp. 137-57.
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discredit and silence them by references to their sexuality and morality. For example, in an attempt to undermine Mrs. Bandaranaike's election campaign of 1960, the United National Party launched a vilification campaign of rumours and cartoons in newspapers, portraying her as having fathered her children out of wedlock and as sleeping with a leader of a left party with which she was hoping to form an alliance. Caustic and defamatory media references to her as volupteuse and seducteuse prompted outraged elders to remark that She'll end by spoiling her personal reputation and ruining the family name. On the whole, though, Bandaranaike managed to negate the potential effect of these vitriolic and damaging attacks by her exemplary public and private conduct.
Her example could be contrasted with that of Hema Premadasa, the wife of assassinated former president Ranasinghe Premadasa. Unlike Mrs. Bandaranaike's upper class feudal background, Mrs. Premadasa came from a lower class, low status background, and, on her husband becoming president in 1988, she used her status as first lady and her position as president of the Seva Vanitha movement' to project herself into the limelight through well publicised 'social service events. She also co-opted international Women's Day celebrations, which until then had been the preserve of a few NGOs and some left political parties. Her other various exploits, such as tennis lessons at the Orient Club and riding in Nuwara Eliya, received an equal amount of publicity in the media. Towards the end of Premadasa's term rumours and gossip about her were rife, and there were even scurrilous faxes anonymously circulated attempting to morally degrade her. Despite a promise at her husband's funeral that she would carry on his vision, her political ambitions were thwarted by her own party, providing an exception to the general trend of women succeeding to seats of power over the dead bodies of their husbands. The UNP outmaneuvered her attempts to contest her husband's constituency at the general election of August 1994, partly because it was expedient to distance itself from her husband's brutal regime, but also because she was seen as bold, brash, greedy and ambitious. In the end she was not respectable' enough, even though she envisioned a more radical agenda for Sri Lankan women than any other woman leader in Sri Lanka.'
47 Remark attributed to Paul Deraniyagala, quoted in De Alwis, ibid. 48 The Seva Vanitha movement was set up in 1983 by Elena Jayawardene, wife of J. R. Jayawardena (former president from 1977-1988). It is funded by the President's Fund, and its members comprise wives of all government officials from the grassroots to the level of ministries. The wife of the president is automatically head of the SVM (De Alwis. ibid. p. 145). 49 De Alwis, ibid.
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With Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunge's ascension to power in 1994, discussion accelerated regarding the manner in which women politicians ought to behave. Unlike her mother, Kumaratunge asserted her right to conduct her private life as she pleased and soon became noted for her boisterous terminology in public speech (hitherto used only by those of "a particular class"). However, her casting aside of “respectability" as a sine qua non for women politicians has not been without its own contradictions. Some of these were apparent in cases that she launched, under the Penal Code, against two newspapers for allegedly defaming her. The cases concerned the publication of news items concerning her presence at the latenight party of a fellow parliamentarian. Although an informed public debate on the manner in which such publications expose the inherently sexist attitude of the media were overshadowed by liberal outrage over the use of criminal defamation laws against the media, the legal process revealed interesting perspectives on what is considered socially "proper' behaviour for women politicians.
In the trial courts, the prosecution on behalf of President Kumaratunge argued that the article (which was factually incorrect) was intended to harm the reputation of the President by suggesting that she surreptitiously entered the private suite of a bachelor through the back door of a five star hotel at 12.30 in the night to indulge in sexual pleasures. The defence on the other hand contended that what was essentially a frivolous gossip item did not impugn the character of the President in the light of socially permissible mores of the day, which treated women politicialis as being on a par with male politicians where social mobility was concerned. It was further argued that, in any case, the behaviour of the President in general conformed to such a pattern, and therefore the precise news item in this case was not unsurprising and not worthy of serious remark. Broadly similar arguments were advanced on behalf of the parties in the other case, where a substantially similar news item was published in a Sinhala language newspaper. The two judgements coming out of the trial courts (both cases are presently on appeal) meanwhile disclosed the widely differing responses of the respective judges who heard the separate cases. While, on the one hand, the English newspaper editor was convicted of criminally defaming President Kumaratunge in a decision that emphasised Victorian standards of behaviour for women, and found particular terminology used by the newspaper such as "epicurean tastes' suggestive of immorality, the contrasting judgement by a feminist judge acquitted the Sinhalalanguage editor, on the basis that a reference to a woman
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going alone to a party at midnight cannot be considered defamatorv in any sense of the word.'
Violence: Victims and agents
Sri Lankan politics and negotiations of power in the public sphere over the last 25 years have been marred and defined by violence, both general and context-related. Political thuggery in mainstream political processes has spanned vote rigging and voter intimidation, threats of violence and actual physical violence, violence against political opponents and assassination of political candidates. Further, the whole electoral process has contributed to the criminalisation of our political culture. Under the proportional representation system adopted by the UNP, the preference vote (manape) has bred vicious in-fighting within a party itself, in addition to competition with members of other parties. Furthermore, the on-going civil war and the JVP uprising in the late 1980s resulted in extensive militarisation, arbitrary use of power by state agents under the Prevention of Terrorism Act and Emergency Regulations, and the resultant policing/controlling of civilian spaces, with widespread harassment, intimidation, disappearances and deaths among civilians. Women have had to bear the burden of losing male breadwinners and taking on new roles as heads of household and economic providers for their families. Large numbers of men, women and children have also been displaced due to the conflict.
This legacy of violence has made politics more of a male domain in Sri Lankathan ever before, severely restricting the space available for women to participate at every level, from canvassing and voting to becoming a candidate. After the conclusion of the 1997 local government election, polls monitors declared it to be the most violent in Sri Lanka with a staggering 1,000 or more incidents occurring in less than 30 days.
However, the levels of violence at the North Western provincial council election held in January 1999 surpassed 1997. It was marred by homicides, attempted homicides, assaults on candidates and supporters, arson, damage to property, bombings, intimidation and threats, invasion of polling stations and widespread rigging. A woman candidate at the provincial council election remarked, "If I knew Wayamba (elections) was going to be like this,
50 The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka v Sinha Ratnatunge HC case No 7397/95. The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka v P.A. Bandula Padmakuumara, HC case No 7580/95 D.
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you can rest assured that I would never have contested. It was the worst nightmare of my life.' Women were specifically targeted to deter them from campaigning, officiating as polling agents or simply using their vote, as they are more easily intimidated and scared by such incidents. It also witnessed a number of very gender-specific and sexualised forms of violence that heightened women's vulnerability and discouraged political activity, which necessarily entails working late at night, travelling alone, etc., further marginalising women from mainstream politics in Sri Lanka. In one incident, B. M. Chandrawathie, a 50-year-old grandmother, was beaten with iron bars and rifle butts and asked to remove her clothes. As she explained, “They beat us; when we refused to remove our blouses they threatened to cut off our breasts. In another incident, thugs belonging to a political party threatened to rape a mother in the presence of her two toddlers. When she pleaded with them, one of them threw acid liquid at her, burning her severely. In the Central Province, the leader of the Sinhala and Tamil Rural Women's Network, which contested the election from a feminist platform, was confronted by an open and very public threat from a powerful government Member of Parliament that he would rape her, if necessary, to shut her up'. In the recently concluded parliamentary election votes were not rigged, but rather robbed. Polling cards were forcibly taken on the day of the election by organised thugs in certain electorates, and women were the most vulnerable to such intimidation.
On the flip side, women also emerged as perpetrators of violence. As we have already discussed, statistics on women in politics reveal that an overwhelming majority of women have entered politics as widows, daughters or mothers of assassinated political leaders, with little possibility of reconfiguring the mode of entry into politics. We argue that these women inherit from their male relatives certainstructures of power and processes of influence, if not the means to realise violence. They are also familiar with
s Interview with Gwen Herath, candidate at the North Western Provincial Council
election, 1999 and former member, North Western Provincial Council. 52 De Mel, Neloufer and Nasry, Laila. Distorted Politics. The Wayamba Elections: Setting
a Trend?, Options, No. 17, First Quarter, 1999. pp. 2-4. Tambiah, Yasmin. Gender and Politics. An Asian Commonwealth Overvien, paper presented at the Commonwealth Asian/European Symposium on Gender, Politics, Peace, Conflict Prevention and Resolution, Brighton. March 1998.
Police close eye on political striptease. The Sunday Times of 7 February 1999, p. 4 and 'Atrocities on women of Wayamba. The Sunday Leader of 7 February 1999, p. 3.
S3
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the nature of violence in political culture, which makes it easier for them to negotiate their way in political life. Eventually they may become willing or unwilling perpetrators of violence, and participants in the prevailing corrupt, political ethos. They see themselves as having no opportunity to follow a different path as they are nourished within the system and traditions of political party loyalties.
This was again evident in the recent provincial council election, when certain women candidates infamously distinguished themselves by earning reputations as fearsome as those of their politician husbands. While the role of aggressor remains a point of contention with these women politicians, what is well accepted is that violence is permissible as a necessary form of defence. As a woman municipal councillor told us, During election time the man in me has come to the fore. I have suppressed my femininity and tucked the fall of my saree around my waist and entered the fray. She said she has no other choice against threats that she will be assaulted, cut to pieces and killed. In response to a question whether she answered violence with violence, she replied, 'Yes, we had our groups working for us. Otherwise, it would have been impossible for us to win seats). In contrast, for the average woman the gun culture of politics is an overwhelming deterrent. When the willingness and ability to resort to violence become necessary prerequisites for entering mainstream politics, not many women (or even men) can comply. We agree with the view that political violence of the nature described above does not discriminate between sexes as to its targets. Both men and women with education and integrity have in recent years refused to become part of the current political arena because of such violence.
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I
Transcending Barriers: Women's Activism in Post Colonial Sri Lanka
A period of transition
“We need new strategies for creating consciousnesses, social spaces for those women in the margins, for voices to be heard and faces to be seen, for us to transcend barriers and shackles that patriarchy and the masculine state have imposed.'
The labour movement, the anti imperialist struggle and the left movement in the years prior to independence opened up spaces and opportunities hitherto unknown for women's participation in public and political life in Sri Lanka. Women, individually and collectively, came out of their homes and into the public arena in unprecedented numbers. Those were heady days, characterised by intense political discussion, meetings, demonstrations, resolutions and protests. This was also the period during which a number of autonomous women's groups - some purely welfare-oriented and other oppositional in nature - emerged through the initiative of women of the upper and middles classes who had benefited from Christian or Buddhist missionary education. Through organisations such as the Women's Franchise Union, the All Ceylon Women's Congress and the Women's Political Union legal, economic and political rights of women began to be vigorously articulated.
On the achievement of independence in 1948, women in Sri Lanka had obtained the right to vote. Independence also brought with it rapid progress for women in the areas of health, education and employment. Female literacy, for instance, almost doubled between 1946 and 1981. A number of colonial laws that discriminated against women were also amended, including the Married Women's Property Ordinance of 1923, recognising women's right to juridical equality. This demonstrated the possibility of some advancement through a gradualist programme of reform. The catch was,
55 Women for Peace. Through the eyes of women: A new way of seeing and knowing
our reality. Statement by Women for Peace (October 1995) in Pravada, Vol 4, No 5&6. 1996. pp. 37-38.
Š6 Jayawardena, Kumari, 1986, op. cit.
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however, self-evident, stemming from the very nature of the movement itself. Jayawardena states: “The movement remained limited in involvement to bourgeois and petty bourgeois women; since it existed and worked within the social parameters, it did not question the patriarchial social structures or the role of the family in the subordination of women...'
Moreover, independence in Sri Lanka immediately drew in the spaces available for civil society activism. If the nationalist movements in India and Sri Lanka had placed civil society at the heart of political activity prior to independence, at the end of colonialism the limelight shifted to the state as the catalyst of economic, political and social transformation. In contrast to the militancy of the women's movement at the threshold of independence, independence returned women to domesticity and a reliance on the welfare state to deliver on the needs of women. Thus, although women had made much progress, the general patterns of subordination of women in Sri Lanka remained undisturbed in the first two and a half decades after independence.'
It was in 1975, with the United Nations International Year for Women and the International Decade for Women, that fresh impetus was breathed into the women's movement in Sri Lanka to address persisting inequalities facing women. A number of women's activist groups sprang up in reaction to disillusionment with the postcolonial state, not only with regard to political and civil rights but also social and economic rights. Kantha Handa (Voice of Women), the first autonomous women's organisation informed by a feminist vision, was formed in 1979, followed by a number of others. The main preoccupations of these organisations were education, consciousness-raising on feminist issues and dissemination of information. Kantha Handa began publishing its journal in Sinhala, Tamil and English, addressing abroad range of issues affecting women. In the 1980s, several research-oriented women's organisations were set up - the Centre for Women's Research, Women's Education and Research Centre, Muslim Women's Research and Action Forum - in an attempt to understand the causes of women's subordination and oppression, expose male biases in society, retrieve women's lost history and mainstream gender concerns. A number of rural-based organisations focused on women's low economic status, and strategised onways to improve their income and access to resources.
57 ibid., p. 135.
S8 Coomaraswamy, Radhika, "Civil Society: A South Asian Perspective”, paper presented at meeting on Civil Society and Governance in South Asia organised by the International Centre for Ethnic Studies on 29 August 1998, Colombo.
59 Coomaraswamy, Radhika, “Civil Society: A South Asian Perspective", op, cit.
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While many of these organisations had come together from time to time to work collectively on specific issues, the setting up of the Sri Lanka Women's NGO Forum in 1993 provided a common platform from which these diverse organisations could speak in one voice and develop common strategies. The Forum, which was initially set up to facilitate Sri Lankan women's participation at the Fourth World Conference on Women and the NGO Forum in Beijing in 1995, continues to function as a broad network of approximately 50 independent women's organisations representing community-based development workers and activists, as well as Scholars and researchers who are committed to women's advancement, from every region of the island. The Forum monitors the implementation of the Beijing Platform of Action in Sri Lanka, and acts as a focal point for women's activism in Sri Lanka, thus greatly facilitating networking and sharing of information, establishing linkages between urban- and rural-based organisations, collective action and lobbying.
Through a few select cases outlined below, we will analyse the achievements, successes and failures of the women’s movement in Sri Lanka in terms of activism aimed at improving the economic status of women, and oppositional struggles which have directly confronted State structures. There is also another category of women’s organisations that has grown in the past decade in Sri Lanka as a response to the on-going ethnic conflict and the civil unrest in the south in the late l980s. These organisations function with the primary aim of helping women cope with their personal and public crises upon losing their husbands, fathers and brothers, and being compelled to take over the leadership of their families or being confined to live in refugee camps. The distinction between these different organisations has been made for the sake of clarity and analytical convenience. In reality they are blurred. For instance, many of the more successful economic empowerment organisations are based on a feminist consciousness', and many of the trauma counselling programmes have a strong economic element including conscientisation programmes.
The politics of everyday life: From welfare beneficiaries to economic empowerment
One of the first welfare-oriented women's organisations to be established in Sri Lanka was the Mahila Samithi in 1931. Started by Mary Rutnam, a Canadian doctor, and based on the Women's Institutes in Canada which provided skills and vocational training for economic empowerment of women, the Mahila Samithi trained women in hill it rafts, cookery, home gardening
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etc., and instructed women in health, nutrition, first aid and child care. The Samithi also obtained government assistance for the implementation of various projects. It remains one of the largest welfare-oriented women's organisations in Sri Lanka, with over 600 branches across the country, and has provided inspiration for many similar organisations that have mushroomed across the country. While these efforts have increased material gains of women and overall household income, the fact that they operate within the socially prescribed world for females, featuring cookery demonstrations, needlework classes, training in handicrafts, etc., means that they have had minimal impact on either gender relations or improvement of women's autonomy within the family or the community. The incisive criticism of the Samiti, made by the members of the Eksath Kantha Peramuna (United Women's Front) (see below) is that it made no attempt to change the basic economy of the village, or the system responsible for it (or, we may add, patriarchal structures and values in their communities). Thus the Samithi and organisations similar to it only assist the villager to make the best of her poor circumstances within the existing pattern of life, not fundamentally transform them. These criticisms still remain valid.'
In contrast, a number of grassroots women's organisations set up in the 1970s and 1980s have gone on to make radical transformations in the lives of rural women, precisely because they were willing to challenge the unequal power relations/structures in their homes and their community. Organisations such as the Wilpotha Kantha Ithurum Parishramaya (Wilpotha Women's Savings Scheme) in Chilaw, the Women's Development Federation in Hambantota, and the Sinhala Tamil Rural Women's Network in Nuwara Eliya, have been able to mobilise women in some of the most economically disadvantaged areas in Sri Lanka to overcome poverty and increase their autonomy. The role played by these organisations in creating autonomous spaces for women is particularly significant in view of the highly politicised nature of rural society in Sri Lanka. As Jayadeva Uyangoda points out, the countryside in Sri Lanka is fragmented along political loyalties and civil society is relatively weak. Almost the entire space of civil Society is occupied by politicians, mainly of the ruling party, who exercise control over the public sphere through institutions such as the police, grama niladharis (regional officers), the forestry office, agricultural office, etc.
60 De Mel. Neloufer and Muttetuwegama, Ramani. Sisters in Arms: The Eksath Kantha
Peramuna". Pravada, Vol 4, No. 10&ll, 1997, pp. 22-26.
6 Uyangoda. Jayadeva, "Elections: Why do they beget violence?" in Pravada, Vol. 5.
No. 8, 1998, p. 22.
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Ten women originally started the Wilpotha Kantha thurum Parishramaya in Puttalam district in 1977, simply for the purpose of helping poor women farmers to obtain drought relief, as the relief funds were being taken by their husbands who would then waste it on alcohol. They spoke with the officials concerned and were able to get such relief into their own hands. Subsequently, they set up a 'one rupee a month savings and credit fund, which has in the last 20 years expanded to a revolving fund of Rs. 1,500,000. The fund provides credit for self-employment and incomegenerating activities such as animal husbandry, cottage industries, farming, vegetable cultivation, home gardens and small enterprises like a store. The organisation itself is involved in recycling paper, producing pressed flower cards and envelopes and other handicrafts from raw materials found locally. It provides training in non-traditional vocations for women such as carpentry and masonry. The women exhibit assertiveness, as was well demonstrated when members of the organisation constructed their own community hall in spite of the derision of the men in the area. The organisation works closely with village level institutions and some ministries to implement forestry and nutritional programmes. In 1998 they negotiated with the local Member of Parliament and obtained a one acre plot of land to start an infant food factory. Members of the organisation, speaking to the ICES team, said they intended to produce a healthy infant food that is affordable to rural mothers, pointing out that products like Farleys' and Nestles' are not only expensive but also unavailable in small village stores. They claim that what they are engaged in is an environmental politics (Api karanne parisara deshapalanayak ) in that they were trying to manage their environment without exploiting it. The organisation remains Small and membership is now about 80.
A similar women's organisation, with a slightly different history and a much larger membership, is to be found in the Hambantota district in the south of Sri Lanka. The Women's Development Federation, or the Janashakthi Banku Sangamaya, has a membership of approximately 27,000 women. Unlike the Wilpotha movement, here the impetus for starting the organisation came from the state. Consequent to a study conducted by the government agent of the Hambantota district under the Janasaviya programme (the government poverty alleviation programme at the time), which revealed low nutrition and poor sanitation in the district, rural women's development Societies were formed to organise women to raise awareness on nutrition and sanitation issues. The societies later developed into a federation of banking societies in order to address the question of direct economic empowerment. At present it consists of 458 societies and 67 banks, and provides credit facilities from Rs. 1,000 up to Rs. 100,000 in an area where
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access to credit was extremely limited and women were dependent on pawnbrokers and moneylenders who charged very high rates of interest.'
Women involved in these organisations have gone on to make important material gains. The strategies adopted by these organisations are based on an understanding of the causes of women's powerlessness and Subordination, and overall empowerment has been a central goal. The women members of these organisations have improved the quality of their lives and that of their families. They now have greater mobility and play a greater role in decision-making within their family and community. They have increased bargaining power with local institutions and elites, and enjoy greater access to resources. Karunawathie Menike, the president of the Wilpotha Kantha Ithurum Parishramaya, told us how her life and the lives of other women in her village were transformed through membership in WKIP:
Initially I faced stiff resistance from my husband to my involvement in the organisation, and in order not to displease him further I would make sure my household chores were completed before I left the house for any organisation work. But when the organisation started to do well and l started to bring home my own income, his resistance slowly wore down. Especially because men in the area were finding it very difficult to earn a livelihood. Even though we had land, it was difficult to cultivate due to the harsh dry conditions. I am now able to leave the house anytime. There are days I leave at dawn when I have to make the trip to Colombo to meet with a donor or bring our handicrafts to a client, and return late in the evening (although I still try to cook for the family before I leave the house). When an important decision has to be taken, he always consults me. Often when the children go to him with a problem, he tells them go ask what your mother thinks'. When we started to build our own community hall, the men said "Ah, wait and see they will need us to do the roof, but we didn't wait for them. We even made the roof ourselves. Now our women are being trained in quantity surveying and reading a plan. Recently we organised a pilgrimage to India. Thirty five members from the organisation went. This would have been unthinkable before.
62 Leelasena W. M., and Chitrani Dhammika, 'Women Banking for Success: Women's Development Federation (WDF) in Sri Lanka', in Marilyn Carr, Martha Chen, and Renana Jhabvala, (eds.). Speaking Out. Womens Economic Empowerment in South Asia, Vistaar Publications, 1998, p. 133.
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It is not always an easy process. Karunawathie Menike says she was re-inspired by her visit to Beijing in 1995 (which was made possible by the Sri Lanka Women's NGO Forum), and now tries to incorporate what she learned there in all her projects and programmes.
In Hambantota, too, women are not simply provided with credit. Gender awareness and conscientisation are an integral part of these programmes. Both women and men are also educated in basic nutrition, reproductive health and family planning. When women have other domestic problems, they are supported by friendly advice from fellow workers in the movement. If a woman is facing trouble from her husband, a fellow worker visits her home and intervenes in the dispute in a non-confrontational manner. In fact, they made the point that it was through this process that other prevalent social problems such as high levels of alcohol consumption and the ofteninterlinked problem of domestic violence were being tactfully addressed by the Janashakthi Banku Sangamaya.
One other strategy used by many of these organisations is to work in cooperation with the government of the day while remaining politically neutral. Women's organisations that are welfare-oriented or dealing with economic empowerment have generally been well received by the state, because of the perception that they are non-confrontational. Thus, for instance, when the Premadasa government conceived the Janasaviya poverty alleviation programme, it was envisaged that community-based organisations would work in partnership with the state to implement programmes on nutrition, human resources development and environment. A number of grassroots level women's organisations have benefited from this policy and have received large sums of money to implement a wide range of programmes falling under the areas specified above. Both the women's groups discussed above acted as partner organisations of Janasaviya under the previous government. Although the present government discontinued some of these partnership programmes, they still continue to work with the government. In 1998, the Women's Development Federation, Karunawathie Menike, President of the Wilpotha Kantha Ithurum Parishramaya, together with Wimali Karunaratne of the Sinhala Tamil Rural Women's Network (see below) received a Presidential Award for outstanding contribution to community development,
The relationship between the state and these women's organisations has been built not on loyalty to the party in power, but rather on proven commitment and capability of the organisation. While individual members have their own political affiliations, in the main they have eschewed any direct participation in formal political processes for fear of losing any state patronage that they may receive. The experience of other case studies
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demonstrates, however, that “the economic (like the personal) is political'. Carr goes on to assert that while these organisations may be more geared towards meeting women's practical needs and finding solutions to immediate problems of survival rather than restructuring the social order, the actions that they are compelled to take are political in nature, involving gaining and exercising power.' Whether in Chilaw, Nuwara Eliya, or the deep south, the manner in which these women have been able to renegotiate their relations within the family and the community, and the strategies used by them, provide important lessons for expanding women's autonomous space in the public sphere.
Contesting parties: Towards a direct political participation
A more direct challenge of the prevailing political and state structures is demonstrated by an initiative taken by the Sinhala Tamil Rural Women's Network (STRWN), based in Nuwara Eliya, to contest the provincial council election of 1999 from the Central Province. Wimali Karunaratne, a dynamic young woman started the STRWN in Nuwara Eliya in 1988. Karunaratne started STRWN in an attempt to provide relief to women who were displaced by the conflict, and to protect and promote communal harmony in the hill country where there is a large Indian Tamil population. STRWN later evolved into a community development and social mobilisation organisation, mobilising around issues of poverty alleviation, women's empowerment, micro credit, health and nutrition, education, sexual and reproductive rights and health, environment and peace. The current membership of the organisation including both men and women is estimated at 28,500. They have a male membership of 5,000.
In its involvement in the politics of everyday life, STRWN has taken up issues as diverse as the import of potatoes, construction of a new hydro power plant and rise of identity politics in the district. A major issue was the pauperisation of vegetable cultivators, and particularly potato farmers, in the area, due to government policy that allowed the import of vegetables even during the season. They contended that Sri Lankan farmers were not able to compete with the cheaper imported varieties, thus being completely driven out of the market. STRWN organised a number of protests against the import of potatoes, and also petitioned the government on this and other issues of concern to vegetable cultivators of the district. They were however unsuccessful in getting the government to listen to their demands.
63 Carr et al... ibid. p. 215. 64 Ibid., pp. 25-26.
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Because of the failure of the government to respond to their demands, coupled with an acute sense of frustration and disenchantment with the state of politics, politicians and governance in general, STRWN responded to appeals by the young membership for political leadership by taking the decision to contest the provincial council election held in April 1999. STRWN contested as an independent group. The candidates numbered 18 women and 4 men, who were mainly farmers, vegetable cultivators and teachers with little or no financial or family backing to contest an election, but who had an extensive background in community work in the district. Coming from diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds, nomination of these candidates thus challenged not only the gender bias but also class and ethnic bias in political structures. Karunaratne emphasised that the decision to contest was based on a genuine desire to bring about a change and fulfil the needs of their community within an overall aim of contributing to the process of gender sensitisation and women's empowerment in the country. Karunaratne’s accusatory statement summed up their position: “No governmental authority, legislative body or social service body had been able to make an impact on the plantation community. None has penetrated into problem solving so far.” STRWN believed that the transformative power of their involvement would break the hold of escalating violence and corruption, mismanagement, bureaucratic red tape and inefficiency.
For the ICES team that accompanied Karunaratne and her candidates throughout the last days of their grueling election campaign, it was poignantly hopeful to see male candidates of STRWN proclaiming their policies openly from a gender platform during the many public meetings that were held. Their campaigning was done mainly on foot, and comprised of small pocket meetings in villages and among groups of people. The single van owned by the group would be packed to capacity during campaigning and candidates dropped off one by one at convenient places to take a bus to their respective electorates. The bright posters and leaflets they had printed with donations from well-wishers were in short supply towards election day, and had to be carefully rationed and distributed.
What happened to the STRWN at the election remains a salutary warning to Such organisations that attempt in future to enter active politics. The STRWN failed to win a single seat, and obtained only 2,000 votes in an atmosphere of considerable physical intimidation, which included open threats from a powerful opposing candidate in the government ranks to rape Karunaratne) in order to shut her up. Other reasons also contributed to the defeat. Given the current political scenario and people's disenchantment with politics and politicians, the decision of the STRWN to enter formal politics
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was not seen as a positive step by the general public and also by some of its own members. Many people in Nuwara Eliya, in informal discussions with us, expressed a deep suspicion of the motivation behind the decision to contest an election. It was seen as a quest for power, rather than an effort to improve the quality of life of the community. They expressed regret that an NGO that had done good work in the past had taken such a decision. This hostility and animosity was also perhaps a reaction to the fact that women had come together and organised themselves to challenge a highly male-oriented political arena.
Oppositional movements outside formal politics
Women's activism within oppositional movements that directly challenge the state can be traced back to the nationalist/anti-colonial struggle. A number of upper and middle class women played an outstanding role in the Suriyamal Movement in the 1930s. It was formed to counter the colonial government's policy of sending most of the proceeds of poppy sales on Remembrance Day abroad. The Suriyamal Movement was a parallel campaign beginning from 1931 to collect funds for local ex-servicemen by selling a suriyamala instead of a poppy.
But perhaps the most radical women's organisation to be formed prior to independence was the Ekasath Kantha Peramuna (United Women's Front), even though it was disbanded just a year after it came into existence. During this short period the Front, which was linked with left political parties and comprised professionals and working and middle class women, agitated on, issues such as the rising cost of living, the removal of discrimination againstr women in the entry to the administrative and clerical services of the state, and the improvement of slum conditions. Such antecedents inform recent mobilisation by Sri Lankan women, two of which are considered below - the rights of women workers in Free Trade Zones, and human rights and peace.
Women workers in Free Trade Zones (FTZs)
Free Trade Zones were set up in Sri Lanka soon after the adoption of open economic policies in 1977 to promote “economic growth' through foreign investment. The package of benefits for investors in the zones include tax benefits, loans, land on favourable terms and most of all a cheap, nimble' and well-disciplined labour force. At present there are over 300,000 workers employed in these zones, of which more than 80% are women. It is now one of the major foreign exchange earners for Sri Lanka. The situation of women
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in the zones has, however, been one of exploitation, oppression and poor living standards. Although the country's labour laws apply unchanged in the zones, they are often ignored and observed in the breach. Thus women are severely disadvantaged by low wages, lack of employment benefits such as EPF/ETF and leave entitlements, harsh working conditions, harassment and violence. In addition, they lack adequate housing, and health and transport facilities outside the zone. Trade unions are legally permitted within the zones, but practically banned. Since the 1980s, 'Workers Councils have been set up by the management of some companies to resolve and respond to problems of workers, but they have offered little relief and redress.'
Prior to the parliamentary election of 1994, The Peoples Alliance (PA), in its election manifesto, promised that if they came to power they would promulgate a Workers Charter, which would protect the rights of workers in all sectors of the economy and make way for a more equitable, system of industrial relations. While a charter was formulated during the very first year in power of the PA government, the cabinet did not formally adopt it. The government bowed down to pressure from the Board of Investment (BOI) and other employers groups who protested against the adoption of the charter."
More than 20 years after the first factories and assembly lines in the zones were set up, workers are still unable to form or join trade unions. There have been strikes and sudden revolts, but these have been spontaneous collective action in response to specific incidents, rather than sustained and organised attempts to address the issues facing the workers. It is outside the zone that women have come together to fight for rights of those in FTZs, and to raise awareness about the problems these women face.
In the Katunayake FTZ area, through organisations such as the "Dabindu Collective' and “Kalape Api (We of the Zone), women (only a few of them former employees from FTZs) have come together and created a space to voice specific problems of women workers openly. Dabindu began in 1984 to address issues concerning women workers in FTZs and to highlight the exploitation and injustice within the zone. Among the first activities undertaken by the Collective was to publish a newspaper to bridge the
6S Abeygunawardene, Violet, Hilda, Consey, Samanmalie H.I., Rosa, Kumudhini;
Da Bindu, a space for women workers' in Many Paths, One Goal: Organising Women Workers in Asia, Committee for Asian Women, 1991. -
66 Strong Daughters, A Study of Women Workers in the Free Trade Zones of Sri Lanka,
Women Working Worldwide. March 2000.
67 Dabindu means drops of sweat.
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communication gap between women workers themselves, and workers and the state, the management and other women's and labour organisations. The paper contained testimonies and stories of unjust treatment of women, legal advice, and also creative writing and poetry by workers. It was distributed free of charge. Workers of the Collective would visit hostels in the area and distribute it among the women workers. Hostel owners were however unfriendly and hostile to this enterprise, for they feared that living conditions of the hostels would also be exposed in the paper.' Despite these difficulties the paper became gradually popular and now has a wide circulation. It has become an important campaigner for women workers' rights within the zones. In one incident in 1987, a woman worker named Menike was expelled from work when a poem written by her called life' appeared in the paper. The Collective highlighted the issue in her village, among the media and among other human rights organisations and even took it to parliament. Within three months Menike was back at work. It was a great victory for the Collective.' Since then the Collective has even litigated successfully in the courts on behalf of women workers who are unfairly dismissed or who do not get their EPF and ETF benefits, and for compensation for occupational accidents.
Organising workers within the Zone to address issues relevant to their lives and work, however, remains a problem. The women who come to work in the zone have few expectations. They have come to relieve extreme economic hardship, and have little motivation to organise themselves. The period of employment of women workers in the zone is approximately 5-10 years, within which they hope to boost the family economy a little or save some money to buy some jewellery or furniture for when they marry. These women are willing to tolerate harsh violations of their rights, and do not want to jeopardise this opportunity by protesting against their working conditions and terms. In taking up issues, the women's organisations often have to first overcome resistance by the workers themselves.
Human rights and peace
Women's political activity through civil society and community organisations has not been limited to practical issues of economic survival or to a struggle for gender equality and justice. In a scenario of ethnic conflict and an armed insurrection there has been widespread abuse of human rights by the armed
68 Silva, W. Wilfred Diriya Diyanyo, Fredrich Ebert Stiftung, Colombo, 1997 (Sinhala). 69 lbid., Abeygunawardene et al., op. cit.
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forces and non-state actors, and mass internal displacement. Women have, of necessity, had to mobilise and intervene on wider issues of human rights, conflict resolution and peace. Referring to women's involvement in the human rights movement, Kumudini Samuel writes:
A significant facet of the human rights movement is the number and extent of the involvement of women within its ranks and within the diverse range of its work. Women lawyers, academics, educators, activists, journalists, writers and even politicians have played a key role in the direction of its work. An appreciable number of women also hold leadership positions within human rights organisations and have close interactions with male colleagues."
A. The Mothers Fronts of the North and the South
One of the most significant human rights movements to emerge in the 1980's was the Mothers' Front of the North and South where women from the north and south of Sri Lanka entered the public sphere in a revolutionary way, using their role as mothers in an attempt to ascertain the whereabouts of sons, fathers and husbands who had disappeared.
The northern Mother's Front was formed to demand the release of over 500 men who had been arrested and detained by the armed forces in 1984. The peaceful protests staged by the mothers secured the release of most of the youths, and the women continued to be active, condemning human rights violations by the armed forces and the LTTE against their community, and calling for a political settlement to the ethnic conflict. The southern Mothers' Front emerged in July 1990 during the height of the JVP uprising and the period of counter terror unleashed by the state. By 1992, the Front had a registered membership of approximately 25,000 women from poor rural backgrounds. The exception was the charismatic spokesperson of the Front, Dr Manorani Saravanamuttu. Saravanamuttu was a medical doctor from a prominent and affluent Colombo Tamil family whose own son, Richard de Soyza, a well-known journalist, was abducted and killed by agents of the state in 1990. She gave her support to the Front from a sense of genuine and deep concern for these women who were less fortunate than she. She was in a position to file a habeas corpus application, leave the country when her life
70 Samuel, Kumudini. Gender Difference in Conflict Resolution: The Case of Sri Lanka',
unpublished paper. p. 6.
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was threatened and bring the issue of disappearances before the international human rights community.
The Front kept records of the disappeared, and visited police stations, army camps and detention centres in search of the missing men of their families. It also petitioned state institutions and government offices. It organised marches, rallies, demonstrations and meetings to demand the return of the disappeared, several of which were held in the capital city of Colombo. It voiced its protests in the “emotive discourse of motherhood, through curses, tears and rituals beseeching the gods' and asked merely to be able to raise sons to manhood, have their husbands at home and lead normal lives." As De Alwis further points out, the seemingly unquestionabl. authenticity of their grief and espousal of traditional family values provided the Mothers' Front with an important space for protest unavailable to other organisations at the time'. It played a catalytic role in overthrowing the UNP regime, which had been in power for 17 years, at the 1994 parliamentary. and presidential elections, but since then has retreated from the public political sphere.
There are many examples of women survivors of collective violence who, without other means of institutional redress, have formed themselves into pressure groups and gone on to become formidable political forces. Perhaps the best known is the Association of Mothers and Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo in Argentina. But what remains a puzzle in Sri Lanka is why women from the Southern and northern Fronts were not drawn into mainstream political activity after the change of government in 1994 with their experience in confronting state actors, demonstrating, petitioning to the courts, etc. These women, who came from different class and ethnic backgrounds and who were compelled to familiarise themselves with public political activity, have now completely disappeared from the public sphere. Reasons for the public negation of these women are manifold. In the north, it was obviously impossible to mobilise motherhood in a peace movement in the context of the repressive policies of the LTTE. As long as the Front was expressing
7 De Mel, Neloufer, Crossing the issues - Mother Politics and Women's Politics: Notes on the Contemporary Sri Lankan Women's Movement, unpublished paper: Samuel. Kumudini, Gender Difference in Conflict Resolution: The Case of Sri Lanka. unpublished paper.
7. De Alwis. Malathi. Motherhood as a space of protest: Women's political participation in contemporary Sri Lanka in Appropriating (jender: Women's Activism and Politicized Religion in South Asia. P. Jeffery and A. Basu (eds), Routledge, New York, 1998, p. 185.
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their protest against the state, their activities were useful for the LTTE, but the moment the mothers broadened their activism to a call for peace, LTTE antagonism effectively restricted the lobbying power of the Front.
For the south, we argue that the criminalisation of politics and continuing levels of violence at the community level have made it extremely difficult for women to continue in the public political space even after intense engagement with those very same processes. The hard reality of many of these women's lives, having to cope with being a single parent, severe financial hardship or at best meagre earnings, also proved to be an obstacle to any meaningful participation in the public sphere. There was another key reason why the Front ultimately becoming dysfunctional. Although the southern Mothers' Front had drawn strength from the support and leadership of Dr. Manorani Saravanamuttu, it was convened by two members of parliament in the opposition Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) at the time. On the electoral victory of the PA, the two male coordinators of the Front became ministers in the new government that was formed by the SLFP with support from other minor parties. They set up three commissions to inquire into disappearances at a regional level and provide compensation to the relatives of the disappeared. The relationship between the new government and the Mothers Front then became one of patron and client, although many, women were not necessarily politically affiliated to the SLFP. Some of the Mothers' Front groups continue to work on issues of widows and women as heads of households. They were, however, unable to convert themselves into an independent human rights watchdog body as envisaged by Dr. Saravanamuttu. Saravanamuttu herself went on to form the Centre for Family Services to assist and empower women and children traumatised by the violence. The Centre continues to work in the districts worst affected in the south as well as the north of the country.
In addition, the Mothers Front in the south did not network and established links with their sisters in the north. De Mel feels that if there had been an attempt to achieve a broader coalition that united Sinhala and Tamil women it may have survived to become a powerful protest movement working for peace and a negotiated settlement to the ethnic conflict today.'
B. Women for peace
There have been a number women's coalitions formed from time to time, such as the Women's Action Committee (WAC) (1983-1987), Women for
73 De Mel, unpublished, op. cit.
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Peace (1984), Mothers and Daughters of Lanka (1990-present), and most recently the Women's Coalition for Peace (1997-present), to demand a cessation of hostilities between the LTTE and the state and a negotiated settlement to the ethnic conflict.
The first public appeal by women for peace was made in 1984, when WAC canvassed support among academic and professional women, and published an appeal for peace in the national newspapers in Sinhala, Tamil and English. 100 women, who called themselves Women for Peace, signed the petition. Over 10,000 women from all ethnic and religious groups later signed it. The Women's Coalition for Peace was formed in 1997 and comprises women of all classes and of all political, ethnic, and religious communities. It took its cue from the Irish Women's Coalition, which had a significant impact on the peace process and the Good Friday agreement in Northern Ireland. The Coalition seeks to ensure that women's voices are heard and inform the direction of the peace process. The one strategy that the Coalition hopes to adopt is to intervene publicly in an unrelenting manner through the media, poster campaigns, street demonstrations, etc. As a first step, the Coalition launched a signature campaign and published a statement in local newspapers early in 2000, in order to express its concern over the continuing war and also to announce its formation. It monitors pro-peace and anti-peace initiatives in the press, and actively networks with organisations and political parties working to bring about peace. The Coalition has also taken steps to educate its members about peace processes undertaken in other parts of the world, as well as local initiatives, to enable more effective intervention. The Coalition has repeatedly stressed the need for representation by women at all levels of government, as well as negotiating processes so. that women's points of view will be reflected in the peace process." It should however be noted that, thus far, women's aspirations for peace and their activism within the peace movement have not translated into determining either the content or direction of the peace process.'
74 Murali, Jayadeva. Crusade for Peace: Women's Coalition in the Forefront, Sunday
Times, 5th March 2000. Plus Section, pp. 6-7.
s Samuel, Kumudini. 1999, op. cit.
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III
Cooperation and Conflict: Women's Interaction with the State and Negotiation of Citizenship
Women lobbying: The limits to bargaining
Policy decisions, laws, actions and inactions of the state have important implications for women. Not only do laws promulgated by the state impact differently on men and women, but often the state is in a position to intervene on issues that affect women exclusively, as when regulating the right to abortion or defining what constitutes rape. Women also appear to be more dependent on the state than men.
Given the power of the state to improve, control and police the lives of women, there is an increasing interest among feminists in conceptualising and understanding better the nature of relationships between women and the state. Radical feminists, for instance, see the state as being inherently patriarchal, reflecting the society outside it and inevitably acting to uphold patriarchy. Liberal feminists see the state as an essentially neutral institution from which women have been unfairly excluded but which can, in principle, be used to their advantage." Other feminists, particularly from Scandinavian countries, analysing the welfare state, have identified the potential of the state to further the interests of women in general. They have argued that, because they can get resources from the state, women can escape dependency on individual men. More recent writing has, however, begun to problematise the conceptualization of the state as patriarchal, benevolent and welfare oriented, or neutral. Waylen suggests that it is too simplistic to portray the State as essentially good or bad, and goes on to conceptualise it as a site of Struggle, where the space exists to change gender relations even though the state will, for the most part, act to reinforce female subordination." Charlton
6 Bryson, Valerie. Feminist Political Theory: An introduction, Macmillan Press,
London, 1992. Waylen, Georgina, Gender in Third World Politics, Lynne Rienner Publishers, USA, 1996. pp. 16-17.
77
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and others describe the state as a "plurally constituted, historically and socially created set of institutions which uphold a normative order." This normative. order is constantly being negotiated and challenged by lobbies dominated by men, but with the potential for empowering women." Agarwal, drawing from Sen's theory of cooperative conflicts, characterises women's relationship with the state as one of cooperation and conflict. On the one hand, the state has the power to enact laws and formulate policies in favour of women; but, on the other hand, it can also use its resources and power to reinforce existing gender retrogressive biases.' It is this concept of cooperation and conflict that we will rely on to look at Sri Lankan women's experience of and relationship with the state. We begin with a much-discussed landmark in the history of law reform in Sri Lanka, where the Janus face of the state was very much in evidence.
At the 1994 presidential and parliamentary elections, several women's groups sent to all contesting political parties a policy paper listing a number of critical areas of concern for women in Sri Lanka. The paper identified violence against women as a priority that needed to be addressed by the state. The Peoples Alliance government, which came to power, undertook to reform the 100-year-old Penal Code, with a view to strengthening the provisions dealing with violence against women. The amendments to the Penal Code passed by parliament in 1995 made significant changes to laws dealing with rape and sexual harassment. The amendments relating to rape enhanced the penalty for rape by imposing a minimum of 7 years and a maximum of 20 years imprisonment, and recognised that actual physical injury need not be established to prove rape. Custodial and gang rape, rape of a minor, a pregnant woman or physically disabled woman now carried the minimum penalty of imprisonment for 10 years. The courts were also given the power to award compensation to the victim. The offence of sexual harassment was for the first time legally defined and made a crime punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment.' A significant consultative process was initiated between the state and women's groups with regard to these amendments.
78 Charlton, S., Everett, J., and Staudt, K., Women, the State and Development, SUNY,
New York, 1989.
79 Subramaniam, Ramya, The Politics of Gender and State" in Legal Perspectives,
Documentation File No 35. Legal Resources for Social Action (India), n.d., p. 29.
80 Agarwad, Bina, A Field of Ones Ohi'n. Gender and Land Rights in South Asia, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge. 1994. p. 77.
81 See Penal Code (Amendment) Act No. 22 of 1995.
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However, the two most progressive amendments with far-reaching implications for women's security and bodily integrity did not find their way into the final amendment passed by parliament, because of pressure particularly from the Christian and Muslim lobby within and outside parliament. The original bill, drafted in consultation with women's groups, recognised marital rape as a crime punishable by law, and also recognised the right of a woman to obtain an abortion in situations of rape, incest or foetal abnormality. In the final amendment the provision on marital rape was diluted and limited to situations where husband and wife are judicially separated. The provision on abortion was completely withdrawn. Abortion therefore remains legally possible in Sri Lanka only if the life of the mother is in danger, but over 700 illegal abortions take place daily, with considerable risk to the lives of the women concerned.' While many government and opposition members recognised the need to change these laws, ultimately the pacification of powerful religious lobbies won the day in arguments that completely subordinated women's welfare and security to the interest of the “family and the institution of marriage.
During the same time as the 1995 amendments to the Penal Code, the state raised the age of marriage for both men and women to eighteen years of age. No corresponding change was made in the Muslim law, even though there is no minimum age of marriage for Muslims in Sri Lanka and child marriages are possible under the law. (Note that the Penal Code amendments of 1995 also raised the age of statutory rape from 12 to 16, but an exception was made in respect of married Muslim girls). Speaking in Parliament, the Justice Minister justified this exclusion on the ground that “the Muslim community is entitled to be governed by their own laws, usages and customs and it would not be productive to aim at a level of uniformity which does not
82 Soysa, Priyani, “Women and Health" in Post Beijing Reflections: Women in Sri Lanka
1995 — 2000, CENWOR, Colombo, 2000, p. 46. 83 A similar fate befell the Equal Opportunity Bill, in the face of strong protest by the
Sinhala majority lobby which saw the bill as threatening the composition of established Sinhala Buddhist schools in the country if they were compelled to take in a specified quota of minority students. The Justice Minister withdrew the entire bill from the house after petitions were filed challenging the bill in the Supreme Court. While a workable alternative would have been to ensure that a revised bill be presented to parliament sans some problematic clauses dealing with the jurisdiction of the tribunals set up under it and a general pruning of other ambiguous provisions, the withdrawal of a bill which would have considerably strengthened gender rights in the country again demonstrated the overriding power of confrontational stances taken by majority and minority lobbies on issues that affect women.
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recognise adequately the different cultural traditions and aspirations of the Muslim community. He continued:
It is through respect for a diversity of cultures . . . which enrich our land that the government is making that exception ...It is not a sign of weakness or prevarication but embodies the essence of democratic traditions ... to recognise the different cultural values and to seek to incorporate them all in a comprehensive body of jurisprudence that we give effect to in our country."
The Sri Lankan State has a commendable history of recognising the autonomy of the Muslim minority community to decide the content of their own personal law. Muslim law in Sri Lanka has been successfully reformed by male elites of the community on two occasions, in 1929 and 1956, in an attempt to bring it more in line with the true spirit of Islam. More recent efforts by Muslim women activists to reform these laws so as to give women equal access to divorce, ensure women's consent on marriage and set a minimum of age of marriage, among other changes, have however met with little success. In the face of identity-based politics and the fragile balance of power of governments, minority women have been unable to depend on the state as an ally to reform discriminatory personal laws. The state has been a complicit partner in the continuation of discriminatory practices against women in the name of religion and culture.
The state's discourse on cultural rights of minorities and sensitivity to their values was an all too transparent mask for the political exigencies behind the exclusion of Muslim women from a universally applicable minimum of age of marriage. The ruling PA government's slim majority in Parliament depended on a number of small parties including the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, the self-appointed spokesman within Parliament for the Muslim community. The desire not to alienate its Muslim support, coupled with the polarisation of ethnic identities, makes it increasingly difficult for the government to embark on progressive legal reforms without having them
84 Hansard, Vol. 101, pp. 209-210.
85 See Memorandum submitted by the Muslim Women's Research and Action Forum
to the Muslim Personal Law Reform Committee of 1990. Proportional representation has increased representation from minority parties in parliament and strengthened their bargaining power within parliament, and at the same time undermined the space to lobby for positive legal reform for women within parliament.
86
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perceived by minorities as an infringement on their cultural and religious freedom. In the current Sri Lankan context, the power of the male elites of minority communities is no longer limited to their own personal laws. They have also the power to undermine progressive reforms to the general law applicable to all women in Sri Lanka, as they did in relation to abortion. More recently the reservation for women at local government level, which was included in the draft constitution of 1997, was conspicuously absent in the draft that was debated in Parliament in August 2000, again because Muslim and Tamil parties felt they would not be able to find suitable women candidates.
Thus the extent to which women are able to bargain with the state is limited. The state may cooperate with women on certain issues but not on others, depending on the (patriarchal) interests at stake. This explains why women continue to be differentially incorporated as citizens. It is possible to find a number of instances where female citizens are treated differently to male citizens in Sri Lanka. Personal laws, codified during colonial rule and discriminatory towards women, have remained impervious to change. This has been so even though some of these customary laws were reinterpreted and distorted by the colonial rulers who were influenced by the patriarchal norms prevalent in their own laws at the time.
Interms of the citizenship law, Sri Lankan women who marry foreign nationals do not have the same right to pass citizenship to their spouses and children as do male citizens who marry female foreign nationals. In the case of children, inheriting citizenship through the mother is impossible even if the parents are subsequently divorced, separated or the mother is widowed and she retains custody and is resident in Sri Lanka. Furthermore, until recently, regulations for the granting of residence visas to foreign spouses also discriminated between men and women. While foreign women married to local men had only to establish the fact of marriage to obtain a residence visa, a foreign male spouse of a Sri Lankan woman had to show his ability to earn US$9,000 each year, besides depositing a sum of US$25,000 in a bank. This sum could not be released except with the recommendation of the Controller. Such male spouses were also forbidden to seek employment in Sri Lanka, and could not depend on their wives for financial support. In a fundamental rights case filed in 1999 by a German man married to a Sri Lankan woman (SC application No. 436/99), the Supreme Court directed
87 The draft constitution was tabled in Parliament in August 2000, but was withdrawn
when it became clear that government was unable to obtain a majority as constitutionally stipulated for its passage.
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that the immigration and emigration authorities put their house in order by halting secret and discriminatory practices in awarding residence visas, and draft fresh regulations. Fresh regulations that do not discriminate between male and female foreign spouses of Sri Lankan nationals in the granting of residence visas were adopted by the Ministry of Defence in January 2001 almost two years after the Supreme Court ruling.
Unlike administrative guidelines relating to the granting of residence visas to foreigners, which have now been legally challenged, the offending provisions of the Citizenship Act cannot be brought before the court. This is because the Act was in existence before the current constitution. This constitution keeps in force all existing laws and bars court interference even when the laws in question may be highly unconstitutional. Reform can only be achieved through parliamentary action, and in the absence of strong and sustained pressure this possibility seems unlikely. A recommendation made by the Sri Lanka Law Commission that sections 4 and 5 of the Act need to be amended on grounds of gender equity, and also practical difficulties faced by women, have so far met with disfavour by the defence authorities. These laws continue to be justified on the basis of a deep paranoia that Sri Lankan women would sell themselves to foreigners in marriages of convenience and that alien immigrants would flood the country w
Other openly discriminatory laws exist. In the new settlements of the Mahaweli agricultural system, while both men and women over the age of 18 are eligible for land grants, if a woman is married the land is registered in the name of the husband, who is automatically recognised as head of household. The law also violates the norm of bilateral inheritance recognised by the general law of Sri Lanka, by providing that, in the absence of the nomination of a successor to a settlement in these areas, inheritance devolves in the male line according to the concept of primogeniture where the oldest male obtains preference over all others. Ironically, the Land Development Ordinance (Amendment) Act of 1981 reintroduced the discriminatory inheritance table of the Land Development Ordinance of 1935. Although this amendment was made after the adoption of the present constitution, which guarantees gender equality and recognizes the possibility of challenging discriminatory provisions before they become law, this particular bill went unchallenged because of the lack of public knowledge of the law.'
The immigration guidelines that were made public in the fundamental rights case
brought before the Supreme Court state that Sri Lanka follows a patriarchal system; hence Residence Visas are normally granted only to female spouses of Sri Lankans. Goonesekere. Savitri. “Women, Equality Rights and the Constitution" in Thatched Patio (Speciallssue). Vol.3, No.3, CES, May/June 1990, atp.28.
89 ... !
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In the economic sphere, although liberalisation policies have opened up new employment opportunities for women, the manner in which labour is divided between the sexes is highly gendered. Women's labour has tended to be concentrated in low pay, low status, low mobility, low security, labourintensive, time-consuming jobs with extremely limited prospects for career advancement. Women dominate the two most vital sectors of the economy, Free Trade Zones and migrant labour to West Asia, but they lack formalised channels of access to the state to air a multitude of grievances and to seek redress. The state has also been complicit in the exploitation of women as cheap labour by multinational companies and foreign employers. In the plantation sector, women workers did not receive wages equal with men until 1984. Although plantations have strong trade unions and women often comprise more than 50% of membership, women's representation in the decision-making roles in unions has been minimal. The question remains whether women's economic empowerment has resulted in increased ability to exercise their rights as economic contributors to the country, to articulate their needs and be recognised for their increased potential and capacity as decision makers both in the private as well as in the public sphere.'
The state is generally more likely to cooperate with women on issues that fit into a basic needs approach to development, such as programmes for better delivery of health and educational services or for providing incomeearning opportunities to poor men and women. It is less likely to do so when it relates to shifts in allocation of resources,' or when women are challenging their roles as bearers of identity and culture or as reproducers of the nation. However, even when the state is cooperating with women, it does from the position that women are weak and vulnerable and therefore in need of protection. The constitutional provisions relating to women best exemplify this negative perception. The Constitution of Sri Lanka, while recognising that women shall not be discriminated against on the basis of their sex, goes on to lump women together with children and disabled persons as eligible for special provisions to be made by the state for their advancement (Article 12(4) of the Constitution of Sri Lanka). During the penal code amendments of 1995, as Sunila Abeysekera points out, (e)ven those members of parliament who argued for the liberalisation of abortion did so from a paternalistic and protectionist point of view. Although a few references were
Kottegoda, Sepali, The Economic Empowerment of Women since Independence', in Dialogue. Vols. XXV-XXVI, the Ecumenical Institute for Study and Dialogue. Sri Lanka, 1999.
9. Agarwal, op. cit, p. 78.
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made to women's rights, the concept of women's right to choose did not come up once in the entire debate.'
State machinery to address women's issues: Multiple layers and arenas
Since the late 1970s, the Sri Lankan state has taken a number of steps to address specific problems of women. While some of this has resulted from concerted lobbying by the women's movement, others have been spurred by the United Nations Decade on Women, 'women in development thinking or pressure linked to development aid. One of the first institutions, set up in 1978 exclusively to look into the welfare of women, was the Women's Bureau. It has a broad mandate to promote action for the general improvement of the quality of life of women, act as a coordinating body on women's affairs and promote government policy formulation and implementation for the enhancement of women's participation in national development.' But criticism that it lacks a conceptual framework for programmes has reduced the Bureau to an implementing agency of state development programmes." The Bureau has focused mainly on developing income-generating projects for women, believing that these programmes will improve the quality of life of women and become an entry point to raise awareness of women's issues and foster leadership. Recently the Bureau has undertaken awarenessraising programmes on law and women's rights, health and nutrition, violence against women and sexual harassment, and training of migrant workers. The Bureau has also set up counselling centres in Ratnapura, Galle, Colombo, Katunayake, Koggala, Ratmalana and Biyagama.
A separate Ministry for Women's Affairs was first set up in 1983 due, to lobbying by women's groups and activists. The ministry is responsible for the overall coordination of functions and financial management of all the
92 Abeysekera, Sunila. Some Reflections on Women's Human Rights in the Context of
the Abortion Debate: Sri Lanka 995, (work in progress). paper presented at the Fifth National Convention on Women's Studies, 996, Women's Environment and Development Organisation, Mapping progress: Assessing the implementation of the Beijing Platform, Women's Environment and Development Organisation, 1998. Hassendeen, Shafinaz, National Machinery on Women after Beijing, in Post Beijing Reflections. Women in Sri Lanka 1995-2000, CENWOR, Colombo, 2000, p. 205, quoting Jayaweera.
98 Ibid., p. 206.
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agencies coming under it, such as the Women's Bureau and the National Committee on Women (see below), for mainstreaming gender and formulating, implementing and monitoring policies, programmes and projects for the empowerment of women. In 1997, it received an increased budgetary allocation, and it has taken initiatives to review discriminatory laws against women, mainstream gender in all projects of the various ministries and work closely with women's NGOs. However, it still lacks institutional commitment to its own mandate, and depends on individuals to carry it through.
In October 1981, Sri Lanka ratified the International Convention against the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) only two months after it came into force. In 1991, the country formulated its own Women's Charter. The initial impetus for a Women's Charter came from the then president, Ranasinghe Premadasa, on Women's Day 1990. He later invited women activists to assist in the drafting of the Charter. The Charter is based on the principles of the CEDAW standards, but keeps in mind the specific contextual situation of women in Sri Lanka. Thus, for instance, it gives more emphasis to economic and social rights, and recognises a gradual approach to reform of the diverse family laws. Other important provisions include the obligation imposed on the state not only to ensure equal access to education, but also to eliminate gender role stereotypes in the content of education, and to take all possible measures to eliminate violence against women.' A National Committee on Women was subsequently set up to monitor the implementation of the provisions of the Charter. The National Committee is soon to be converted to a National Commission for Women with quasi-judicial powers to hear complaints of women and provide redress. Sri Lanka has also formulated, in consultation with women’s NGOs, a national action plan to implement the Beijing Platform of Action. The plan identifies eight priority areas (seen as being most relevant for Sri Lanka), and sets down short term, medium term, and long term Strategies for governmental, non-governmental and quasi-governmental institutions.”
An important area of tension between state and women continues to be that of law and law enforcement. The Sri Lankan woman's experience with law, its enforcement and related institutions of the state, is illustrative of another point made by feminists analysing the state, i.e., that it is not one
Coomaraswamy, Radhika. The Women's Charter. An Introduction, in Law and Society Fortnightly Review, 16 June 1992, Vol. II. No. 40. pp.7-9.
National Plan of Action for Women in Sri Lanka-Towards Gender Equality, Ministry. of Transport, Environment and Women's Affairs, 1996.
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monolithic overarchingentity, but has multiple layers and arenas. As Agarwal points out:
The State itselfcan be seen as an arena of gender contestation between parties with varying understanding of and commitment to reducing (or reinforcing) gender hierarchies. These contestations can be between state officials within a department, between different tiers of the state apparatus (such as policy making and policy implementation bodies), and/or between different regional elements of the state structure...'
Acknowledging that insensitivity of police officers to the problems faced by women was a major issue that had to be addressed, a special unit was established in 1993 at the police headquarters in Colombo to deal with cases of violence against women and children. Subsequently, women's and children's desks were set up at some 33 police stations throughout the country. The desks were also mandated to monitor and give priority consideration to these issues by entertaining and investigating complaints and taking cases to court. A 24-hour hotline was to be maintained to facilitate complaints and immediate action.' Their functioning has, however, been critiqued by lawyers - and activists dealing with issues of gender-based violence. The desks are understaffed and run by women who are inadequately trained to deal with complaints of domestic violence and rape. Meanwhile, it is ironic that reports of rape and sexual assault have been on the rise since the amendment of the penal code in 1995, testifying to the impotency of black letter law. The point has been made that people ought to have demanded, and legislators ought to have implemented, specific programmes for awareness-raising of the new laws, along with the laws' enactment in 1995. This was not considered a priority, with the Ministry of Women's Affairs assuming scant responsibility in this regard. This is just one example where a quantitative increase in the number of laws, policies and institutions has not meant that there has been a corresponding qualitative improvement in the lives of Sri Lankan women, in a context where many of the institutional mechanisms set up by the state have been compromised by limited resources and inefficiency.
Again, the dual construction of the state and the multiplicity of its arenas are perhaps most intensely experienced by women of the minority Tamil community in contemporary Sri Lanka. In the context of the civil war
98. Agarwal, op. cit, p. 79.
99 CENWOR, Evaluation of Women's and Children's Desks in Police Stations,
CENWOR, Colombo, 1997.
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waged by the state against the separatist fighters of the LTTE, the state is conceptualised as an "abuser and destroyer'. In the past 5 years, with the escalation of the conflict, the armed forces and the police have been responsible for gross violations of human rights of Tamil men and women. The state has been responsible for illegal arrests and detention, disappearances and torture. We have already discussed how the conflict impacts on women. Women have had to bear the trauma of losing male family members, shoulder the sole responsibility of bringing up children, supporting their families and earning a livelihood. Women are also highly visible targets of violence and harassment and suffer particularly from the poor security situation in the border areas. As Rajasingham-Senanayake points out, women's mobility and ability to go out to work are severely curtailed by the fear of being caught in the crossfire and the 'gendered politics' of body searches at checkpoints, usually conducted by armed youth trained in the arts of terror, torture and the degradation of their victims. Although rape has not been practised systematically as a weapon of war by either party in the conflict (unlike in Bosnia), there have been several incidents of checkpoint rape by the government's security forces,' among the most brutal of reported incidents being the rape and murder of Krishanthi Kumaraswamy by eight soldiers and one policeman on duty at the Chemmani checkpoint, and the subsequent murder of her mother, brother and neighbour who went in search of her.
At the same time that it is regarded a perpetrator of violations against its citizens, the state has also attempted to provide relief to displaced women, and has responded to appeals for justice against the violation of human rights of Tamil people by its own institutions. The courts and other mechanisms of the state, such as the Human Rights Commission, the Commissions on Disappearances and the Anti Harassment Committee, have provided a limited space for Tamil citizens to contest violations of their rights by the armed forces and police, and obtain some relief and redress. For instance, women from the north and east were able to obtain compensation from the Disappearances Commissions appointed by the state for the disappearances of their husbands, sons or fathers. In the Krishanthi Kumaraswamy case, the government, in its haste to convict the perpetrators of the crime, violated the rule of law and the human rights of its own agents who were the accused.' The intense lobbying carried out by women's groups within and outside the
Rajasingham-Senanayake. Darini. After Victimhood: Women's Empowerment in War and Displacement. Pravada, Vol. 6 No. 2 & 3, 1999. pp. 25-30. Kois, Lisa, Beyond the Rhetoric: Human Rights and Breakdown of the Rule of Law -The Krishanti Kumaraswamy Case, (unpublished outline for a paper)
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country and international opinion clearly influenced the trajectory of this case, but it also obscures the many cases of rape by the armed forces which have gone unreported and unpunished. Since then, the momentum caused by the Kumaraswamy verdict has petered out. Other cases, similarly gruesome in nature, remain to be pursued. Members of the forces who engage in blatantly unconstitutional acts under the Prevention of Terrorism Act and Emergency Regulations often continue to do so with impunity, and interventions by the courts have been able to correct injustices only in very individual situations, which are more the exception rather than the rule. Arbitrary arrests, disappearances and torture by state agents continue to be reported, the National Human Rights Commission is still struggling to prove itself and its ambitious mandate, and the state has yet to account to the families of those who disappeared in the south of the country during the years of terror, 1988-1989.
The state, together with international agencies such as UNHCR, has also been responsible for the welfare of displaced persons, their rehabilitation and resettlement, and the reconstruction of villages and towns affected by the conflict, which are in areas under the control of the state. However, as Rajasingham-Senanayake argues (see above) most of the relief efforts undertaken by the government have not explored how they can contribute to recovery from individual trauma and social suffering and facilitate women's empowerment in and through the conflict. She states that many gender programmes organised by the government relief and rehabilitation authority and NGOs still remain within conventional development thinking, rather than attempting to work out culturally appropriate and effective strategies for women's empowerment in the context of the social transformations that have occurred over a long period of armed conflict and displacement.
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IV
Women re-imagining the state
“Women! It's time to begin, begin all over again. Rethink your position, our positions. Redefine yourselves, ourselves. To say we have done it is not enough. We need to go beyond the limits that others have set forus and see what new and creative, positive possibilities could lie ahead. Together, as women, we can do it. Together we can be women for peace.'
The post-colonial Sri Lankan state has tended to be heavily centralised, welfare-oriented and dominated by elite bourgeois men. This has undergone some changes in the last 25 years. The move to an open economic policy in 977 necessitated fundamental alterations in the economic role of the state. It has moved from being provider and distributor of goods and services, to facilitating production and distribution by the private sector. The process saw the first attempts towards dismantling major welfare facilities such as the state health care and education systems, as these were deemed expenditure that the country could ill afford. Thus, government expenditure on health and education as a proportion of GDP has remained almost constant in the last two decades despite the massive increase in demand for such services. The welfare state is also under siege due to a massive increase in defence expenditure. In the post-independence period and until the 1970s, Sri Lanka's defence budget had been well below 0.5% of the GDP and just above 1% even in the early 1980s. Since 1983, however, defence expenditure has progressively increased, reaching 6% of the GDP by 1996.
Structural adjustment and trade liberalization since 1977 have also had a significant impact on women's employment. With the state's entry into an expanding global economy dominated by transnational companies and international institutions, the market became a central arbiter in determining the value accorded to labour and natural resources. The inability of the state to protect the needs of its women citizens during this period of change has been marked, as evident in the struggles of women workers in the FreeTrade
O2
03
Women for Peace, op. cit. Institute of Policy Studies, Sri Lanka: State of the Economy 1999, institute of Policy Studies. Colombo, October 1999.
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Zones and of vegetable farmers in the Central Province in our study. This has been accompanied by the erosion of the power of the state in relation to the promotion of public interests and public good. With the opening up of the market and the availability of cheaper goods many self-employed women also lost traditional means of earning a livelihood. As Swarna Jayaweera points out, women in the handloom industry offer one of the most vivid illustrations of this fact. Out of approximately 60,000 women employed in the handloom sector in the 1970s, an estimated 40,000 lost their jobs with the introduction of freemarket policies, while the balance battled for survival over the next few years.'
In spite of this change in the development and economic realpolitik, Sri Lankan women continue to see the state/government mainly as a deliverer ofessential services and the provider of employment for their children, the continuance of which is essential to their own lives. There is therefore a considerable gap between women's experiences of the state and their expectations of the state. This dissonance is made worse by the fact that, despite a very substantial feeling of frustration at the “benevolent welfare state's failure to deliver on many occasions, many in the ICES study continue to expect that the state/government will increase its responsibility in crucial areas. Of the respondents surveyed in the ICES study, 50.4% identified the areas of key responsibility in this regard associal reform, community services and employment. However, 30.6% of the respondents felt that the welfare burden on the government was perhaps too much and could be shifted to civil society groups, NGOs, etc., and, indeed, that these institutions might be in a better position to deal effectively with these issues. It is also interesting that the high profiles maintained by activist NGOs in the community is reflected by the 65% of respondents overall who opined that it was better to work for social change through NGOs.
Sri Lanka has also attempted to move from a centralised state to a devolved state. The 13th amendment to the constitution implied wide devolution of power to the provinces, and profound changes in the way decisions affecting the polity were to be taken and implemented. The promise of devolution has however not been realised, with the culture of centralisation being a formidable barrier to effective devolution. Even local level institutions such as municipal councils, urban councils and pradeshiyasabhas have little
0. Jayaweera. Swarna, Structural Adjustment Policies, Industrial Development and
Women in Sri Lanka, in Mortgaging Womens Lives. Feminist Critiques of Structural Adjustment, Zed Books, London, 1994, pp. 96-115.
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power and less money to implement programmes which serve the needs of local communities. Most people, including women, remain marginalised from processes of decision-making and governance. Several women and men surveyed reiterated that they had no say in community decision-making.
Again, because of people's experience of devolution, which has simply meant more bureaucratic tangles and red tape, men and women still rely on an overarching centralised government to deal with issues such as law and justice, finances and taxes, social welfare and schools, water and housing. Very few people felt that such matters could be dealt with effectively at the local level. (See tables at end of chapter.)
On the other hand, in questions deading with ownership of resources such as forests, utilities, water and minerals, though the percentages resting ownership of these in the state were substantial (ranging from 42% to 56% by both female and male respondents), a significant minority (ranging from 32% to 40%) made it plain that the people could also claim ownership of these resources, thus emphasising the fact that the state holds them in trust for the people. The responsibility for the administration and maintenance of such resources were, however, laid squarely on the shoulders of the state.
There also appears to be little opportunity and motivation for men and women to organise at community and village level to address issues affecting their lives. Some of the more dynamic women's organisations included in this study are not the norm but, rather, exceptional situations where women have organised in order to empower themselves and their communities and address problems at the local level. Generally women's participation in community level organisations is mostly limited to traditional welfare-oriented organisations and credit societies. In the survey only 39.5% of women held membership in any community organisations, whereas 61.1% of men claimed to hold membership in some sort of community level organisation. However, both men's and women's participation in community level organisations were mainly in maranadara samithis (which provide financial and other support to family members of recently bereaved persons). Of the women who were members in a community organisation, almost half of them, 43.7%, were members of maranadara samithis, 17.2% were in samurdhi organisations, 13.5% were in Sanasa Banking Societies and 9.7% were members of the school development societies. Of the males 75% were members of maranadara societies.
Reasons among women for non-participation in community organizations ranged from no time, male involvement, no active Society in the village or town, to there being no interest.
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Table 4: Membership in Community Organisations
Organisations Female Mate
No. % No. %
Cooperative Society 16 8.6 l 2.7 Rural Development Society 5 8. 5 13.8 Religious organisations 26 14.0 6 16.6 Maranadara society 8 43.7 27 750 Sarvodaya 10 5.4 l 2.7 SanaSa 25 13.5 3 8.3 Samurdhi 32 17.2 6 6.6 Youth organisation 13 7.0 5 3.8 Women's organisation 3 16.7 School Development Society 18 9.7 l 2.7 Other 34 8.3 5 13.8
Table 5: Reasons for non-participation
Organisations Female Male
No. % No. %
No active society 42 14.9 2 l No time 56 19.9 7 Others members in the family are involved (usually males) 44 15.6 New to the area 3 17 5 27.7 Do not like to get involved 21 7.4 No interest 30 10.6 5.6 No opportunity 29 0.3 2 1.1 Difficult to travel 3 1. Other 9 3.2 Don't know 3 11 Did not respond 12 4.2 5.6
Total 282 1 000 18 00.0
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A gender-balanced state?
We have already made reference to another characteristic of the contemporary Sri Lankan state. It is male-dominated. The ICES survey revealed, however, that women and men do envisage a more gender-balanced state. In relation to formal politics, the majority of women (86.8%) surveyed in the ICES survey, together with their male counterparts (85.2%), agreed in principle that women should enter politics, and asserted categorically that politics is not a male activity. However, an overwhelming 72.4% of women stated that even if they had the opportunity to contest an election, they would not do so. Women respondents cited a dislike for politics as the main reason (20.8%), followed closely by the fear that political involvement might interfere with their family responsibilities (19.2%). A substantial 17.1% however saw their own lack of ability and "non-worthiness' as a reason, indicating that despite formal education, social habits of negatively positioning women continued to operate as powerful inhibitions. Another 9.6% felt that they were insufficiently educated. This "non-worthiness is again reflected in the apparent inability of the women respondents to assert their power to change the present political culture (only 2.0% asserted this ability).
An almost equal number of male respondents (72.2%) asserted that they too would not contest an election; 20.5% said it was because they did not like politics, and a further 17.5% stated that they did not like the current political culture. Even among men, lack of ability (10.2%) and inadequate education (12.8%) figured among the reasons for not contesting an election. However, 63.3% of women and 57.4% of men concurred that it was more difficult for women than men to be active in politics.
Reservations for women - the need for a critical mass
The low representation of women in political institutions is not unique to Sri Lanka. It is an almost global phenomenon, with very few exceptions. However it is now almost universally recognised that a "critical mass' of women in political institutions is pivotal for the real advancement and empowerment of women: not only to accurately reflect the composition of our societies, in which women number more than 50% of the population, but also to ensure that women's concerns and interests are fully addressed. One way to achieve this is through a quota or reservation system for women. In India, a 33% reservation at the level of local government or panchayats has been successful in bringing almost a million women into these institutions and significantly altering the balance of power at local level. In Sri Lanka, while women
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activists are convinced of the need for reservations for women at all levels of government, politicians are still debating it. A provision to reserve 25% of seats at local government level was included in the government's proposal for a new constitution." It was considered presumably in recognition of the fact that although rural women exercise their vote and participate in political activity, there is a wide gender imbalance in local councils. Local level politics is perceived to be more accessible to women than either provincial or national politics. It is perhaps only at local level that a woman coming from a nonpolitical background with no substantial financial backing can successfully access public political space. Ironically, representation of women is also lowest at this level. Statistics of local government elections conducted during the last 25 years indicate that female representation has never exceeded 5%. Even the youth quota has not benefited young women as it did young men.' However, when the draft constitution was taken up for debate in August 2000, the provision was not included on the request of the leader of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, who felt he might not be able to find sufficient female candidates.
Originally the provision for a reservation for women was included on the initiative of the government, and not as a result of any concerted lobbying on the part of women's groups in the country. In the last three years, however, women's groups have actively lobbied for adequate representation of women in public decision-making bodies, including political institutions, as an issue of critical concern for women in Sri Lanka. During nominations to the 1999 provincial council election and 2000 parliamentary election, a number of women's groups, including the Sri Lanka Women's NGO Forum and the National Committee for Women, lobbied all the main political parties and appealed for more nominations for women. Political participation of women was also the first theme of a two-year media campaign launched by the NGO Forum in 1997 (a coalition of women's organisations), to raise awareness at the national level on issues of concern in the Beijing Platform for Action. Since the withdrawal of the 25% reservation in August 2000, women's groups are now lobbying to have it put back in the draft constitution.
The discussion surrounding a quota for women has raised two key concerns: first, the exact percentage of the reservation, and, second, the need for reservations even at provincial and national/parliamentary levels. There
05 Para. 42 of regional list, 1997 draft.
Since 1990, subsequent to a recommendation made by the Youth Commission, it was decreed that 40% of candidates at local and provincial government had to bd youth candidates. i.e. between the ages of l8 and 35 years.
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is no consensus among women about the percentage of the quota. Some want as much as 50%. Others would settle for 40% or 30%. Women's groups appear to have settled on 33%. While women's groups have made it clear that a reservation at local level is insufficient, there is a debate whether a more appropriate and effective way of implementing a reservation, at least at parliamentary and provincial level for women in government, would be through the use of a national list of exclusively women. Under the electoral system in Sri Lanka, a 50-member national list would guarantee approximately 22% of the places in the 225-member parliament to women. The 50 places would be allocated in proportion to the total vote received nationally by the political parties that compete, and the parties would be compelled to nominate women only. This suggestion would effectively meet a practical problem of finding women equipped to deal with the violence and financial burdens that contesting would currently involve.
Many professional women that we spoke with, while recognising the need to increase women's representation at all levels of government, favour a list system. They are unwilling to go through the process of an election campaign which entails huge expenditure, thuggery and violence. Manel Abeysekera, a woman diplomat and a renowned activist, stated at a recent meeting that she would hate to be a chit MP, but she could see no alternative. A list system carries with it its own shortcomings, however. There is no guarantee that the lists would not be filled by wives and daughters of politicians already in power. As one woman municipal councillor pointed out to us, The people in power will fill it with their own relatives and wives. What is prevalent in politics today is personal profit. That is why nothing works. Irrespective of the manner in which the reservations quota is implemented, several other fundamental difficulties remain. Although the percentage of women in political institutions has remained more or less the same since the first state council of 1931, the number of women running for political office has been increasing over the years. At the 1994 parliamentary election there were 55 women candidates. In the 1999 provincial council election there were a substantial number of female candidates, but finding suitable, qualified female and male candidates remains a problem.
Overall, however, there seems to be a consensus in the body politic that the reservations proposal ought to be implemented. Thus 85.7% of the women respondents and 85.2% of the male respondents interviewed in the ICES survey stated categorically that they approved of reservations for women. Perceptions among both women and men regarding women's political ability and leadership qualities were also positive; 90% of female respondents and 92.2% of males asserted categorically that politics is not a male activity.
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73.7% of women and 72.2% of men opined that agender balance in political institutions would promote the country's development. Such positions also suggest astrong base from which to lobby for women's increased participation as political candidates - only 15.8% females and 18.4% males considered gender an important consideration in assessing their choice of political representative. 78.8% women respondents and 79.5% male respondents disagreed with the proposition that women would not be good public/political decision-makers.
26.6% of female respondents felt that more women should be politically active because they could best address women's problems, while 19.6% of male respondents thought women had the capacity to transform politics. From the women themselves, only a mere 2.0% claimed for themselves such a transformative ability. Proceeding from this, the ICES team, in their focus group discussions, attempted to address the mindset that looks at women politicians as being there merely to tackle women problems', and thus being satisfied with women politicians being allotted 'soft' ministries like environment, health and women's affairs. What came out strongly from these interviews and focus group discussions was that, if reservations at local government level and later at provincial and parliamentary level are to make a qualitative difference, the overriding need is for those women politicians who access and work within the political processes to be acutely gendersensitive and committed to making a change. How equipped are women politicians to take on this challenge?
Women's engagement with politics, governance and the state
It is as voters exercising their right to elect members to legislative bodies that most women in Sri Lanka have traditionally exerted the greatest influence on the course of politics and issues of governance. From the time women obtained the right to vote it has been seen as an important civic responsibility, and there has been enthusiastic participation in the electoral process. The long queues at polling booths during elections have always had a more or less equal number of men and women. Thus in the general elections conducted up to 1977, the female voter participation rate came very close to that of the male, the whole surpassing 80% in each of the elections.'" In the ICES survey, 67.3% of the women and 68.5% of the men had voted at the election held immediately prior to the survey.
07 Kamalawathie, l.M., op. cit.
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However, women's decisions on whom to vote for continue to be strongly influenced by the family. The power of the family-based vote pattern prevalent in the rural areas of Sri Lanka, as opposed to individual preferences, was evident in the fact that a substantial percentage, 33.1%, of women respondents in the ICES survey stated that they voted for a particular party because the family belonged to that party', a decision in which the male members of the family inevitably played a major role. (A cumulative percentage of 11.1% also gave family-based voting patterns as influencing their voting decision, with 3.1% stating that they vote for an individual because their family has always voted for him/her', and 8.0% saying that it was because their family had 'always voted for a given family'.) Only 9.0% of the respondents, however, stated that they voted the way the men in their family voted. Among this multiplicity of family-based voting patterns, it is also noteworthy that the policies of the party played a not unimportant role, coming a close second with 20.2%. This trend is borne out again in the questions regarding which criteria a voter would consider importantificalled upon to vote between two candidates, where 27.9% of the respondents stated that it would depend on to which party the individual belonged. Once the party loyalties were firmly in place, then only would individual qualities, such as honesty, integrity and leadership, matter. Apart from voting, only a few women actively participated in political initiatives at the village level. For instance, only 15.4% of women were members in a political party, whereas 35.2% of men held membership in a political party. Of these women, very few were committee members at the central or branch level and fewer still were office bearers.
If Sri Lankan women are to become truly empowered to engage in political processes to transform and have more control over their lives, there is a need to widen women's understanding of concepts such as politics, governance, democracy and the state. Despite a much vaunted literacy level and awareness of current political news and debates maintained through the print and electronic media, women's understanding and perceptions of politics appear to be limited to the political power structure, voting and electoral processes. Only a few women interpreted politics as a multidimensional concept, underpinning individual and civil rights and economic and social rights. Again, at first glance, both men and women in Sri Lanka do not adequately appreciate the concept of representation inherent in democracy. The ICES study specifically asked questions targeted at understandings of the state. A substantial majority of women (approximately 66.0%) across the board, from women living in rural hamlets to political leaders in cities to women heading well-known economic empowerment programmes in the country, did not see a difference between the state and government, or did
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see the government as merely the engine of state and a temporary entity elected by the people and directly answerable to the people. However it is interesting to observe that 81.6% of the respondents claimed to themselves the right to feel that the government/state (in view of the fact that these terms were used interchangeably by them) represented them, out of which 23.3% said that this was so because they were citizens.
The wider question of civic representation in terms of being a citizen of the state, and thus claiming inherent rights by virtue of that citizenship, were also raised in some of the focus group discussions and individual interviews, revealing certain provocative insights. Thus a pradeshiya sabha member from the North Western Province expressed it in this manner: 'Whatever government comes to power, we have shares in the state (Koy rajaya awath, apirajaye kotas karayo). Say, for example, that I need to dig a well in the village. This government has to give money for that. We have the right to shout and demand for it.'
Again, out of the 23% of women surveyed who saw a differenc between state and government, many found it difficult to elaborate on that difference, while a yet smaller minority who attempted to define the difference saw it in a variety of ways. In one sense, they looked at the state as a continuing entity within which governments come and go at periodic intervals. From this perspective the government was seen as an instrument that rules the body politic. Respondents claimed to themselves the power to change governments but not, as such, the state. Other went further and saw the government as representing particular interests and the state as representing all, the latter being an entity through which the rights of all communities would be safeguarded. Refreshingly, it has to be mentioned that the iatter view, although articulated by persons small in number, was not that of uniformly educated persons, or persons who were politicised either through studying political science or being actively engaged in politics. The extreme diversity is best seen in three such respondents who were, respectively, an Indian Tamil small-shop owner, a vegetable seller from the south of the country and a woman pradeshiya sabha member who was a radical contrast to the regular woman politicians. Their opinion came from their interest and concern about social issues, based very often on media scrutiny and discussion. Again, an individually refreshing viewpoint was expressed by a woman politician, who said:
The government is the ruling party. The state, on the other hand, encompasses the ruling party, the opposition, small
08 Interview with Kumari Ekanayake. member, Mawathagama Pradeshiya Sabha.
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parties as well as the minorities, representing all the people. There will be ideas and suggestions coming from all these parties, and the government has to be attentive to these different voices and different needs. I think we have to change the channels of communication between the government and the people (the state). The government has to listen to the state.'
It was evident from the interviews and the focus group discussions conducted by us that the question of how women understand and experience political participation has to be seen in an in verall context of deep-seated disillusionment with political parties and political processes. This disillusionment stems not only from the violence that has become so embedded in politics, but also from the inability of successive governments to fulfil their service-delivery roles. In addition, it appears that these responses come from a position that seems to bypass the responsibilities that women themselves would have to bear in order to ensure that civil society functions effectively. Thus, in areas such as land, community, law and justice the respondents admitted to an almost complete abdication of their right to influence decision-making within the community.
Despite their limited understanding of the governance process, are there pointers in the ICES study that indicate that Sri Lankan women are: able to envision a more gender-equal and gender-just nonviolent state? How does such a state begin to be formed? Interviewees gave different perspectives to the ICES team. As one woman local government politician articulated rather forcefully:
I think it will be a pity if women continue to get "organised' by individual political parties such as the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the United National Party (UNP). Talented and able women in our country have to be selected and motivated not from the parties themselves but by independent institutions and they should be educated about the situation in the country, the importance of education, the prevailing shortcomings in the system. They should be given training in leadership qualities. They should be able to select any party they wish. These women leaders can then work for the benefit of society whether they join a particular political party or work as independents.
09 interview with Kusuma Ratnayake. pradeshiyasabha member. Talawa. Anuradhapura.
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She herself was a party ranker in the SLFP her views thus coming from her personal experience of working within a highly male-centred and manipulative party structure. Again, it is worth noting that among women politicians there is a certain sense of women power irrespective of party differences, as was put very well by one woman local government member from the opposition telling us that she gets upset when people quote Sirimavo Bandaranaike and Chandrika Kumaratunge and then say that women politicians have ruined the country: "Although I am from a different party, it is quite upsetting to hear such statements... However, women power by itself is insufficient because people do not necessarily vote for women. This will change in the future because people are disgruntled with both the main parties but it will take time. :
Again, a lone pradeshiya sabha woman member asserted that there. should be at least 40% participation of women at local government level on the basis that: As women, I think it might be possible to cross party lines and work together, take a bipartisan approach on at least some of the problems. I sometimes feel very alone.' Above all, what the ICES study highlights is not so much that women voters in Sri Lanka cannot claim for themselves the , ability to transform the state, but that such power has not hitherto been effectively claimed by them, leading the government to maintain an attitude of complacency as far as dominant gender issues are concerned. In addition, women's groups in the country have often preferred not to confront these issues head on.
It is important to unravel and demystify the concept of the state, and particularly the concept of a paternalistic' and benevolent state, but also to displace women's limited expectations of the state as evident in the ICES study. There is a need for a fundamental attitudinal change in Sri Lankan woman voters so that they can utilise their new expectations of the state and political processes as a political lever to pressure women who have already accessed and worked within the mainstream political process. With the presence of a greater number of women representatives in political bodies, the national political agenda could be revitalised. Women's perceptions of the state and their visions for changes in political culture and state structure will necessarily be structured and focused in order to develop and realise local and national level policies that more adequately incorporate the perspectives and needs of female citizens. This in turn would influence the directions of governance, so as to create a state that realistically reflects the aspirations of its entire polity.
0. Interview with Kusuma Ratnayake, pradeshiyasabha member, Talawa, Anuradhapura.
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Page 260

his in Tabiah is a Research Fellow
at lCES, Colombo, And Coordinated the
Wопhen and Coveпапce in South Asia project.
Jacket Design: Robert Crusz


Page 261
This Volume brings together six studi and (eo:Vermance/Democratic Pro State, carried out by the six organisa
The research draws on archives,
discussions to access two sets of is political processes, and Women's ex intended to inform initiatives that Will governance at the local, national and
Shtri Shakti(S2) in Nepal is an act
building a gender equitable societyth and need-based intervention includ attain conceptual clarity on gender value-based approach.
Shirkat Gah formed in Pakista
empowerment for social justice and it runS OCall to international level aО building initiatives through program Development and Reproductive Rig ment. A fS inter VentionS are S publications and networking.
Ain O Salish Kendra is a legal
Bangladesh. it translates its commi gender equality, democracy and hu providing legal aid and advocating f
Ekatra (meaning together in Hindi) is for Women's advancement in the No Work is political and social empowe artisans, and studies related to Wome documentation, evaluation and train
Asmita Resource Centre for Won bring a feminist perspective to the p to build a social order that empo development and peace. It works t Women in their communities, promo power relations, and interpret tradit rainer han reStricit WOnen
The International Centre for Eth Committed to the advancement of
through research and contributions etnic relations and Conflict resolutio
PRINTED BYUNIEARTS (PW) ;
 

SS conducted under the project, Women ess in South Asia: Re-imagining the
OS GeSCribed bellOW.
interviews, a survey and focus group sues women's engagement with formal periences and visions of the state. It is promote Women's active engagement in
regional levels.
On-research organisation contributing to rough research, training, documentation, g networking and advocacy. It aims to and sustainable development using a
in 1975, aims to realise Women's ocial justice for women's empowerment. ocacy and grassroots-focused capacityes on Women and Law, Sustainable ts, and Women's Economic Empowerpported by research, documentation,
aid and human rights organization in
ments to the principles and practice of an rights by raising public awareness. social change.
is a Delhi-based NGO working since 1988 rth Indian states. The focus of Ekata's ment, design and marketing support to n's issues. Its activities include research,
9.
len Works in the South Indian region to olitical discourse of the State, and Seeks ers women and promotes sustainable O support the growth of self-esteem of
te their confidence to analyse unequal || on and culture in ways that strengthen
nic Studies (Colombo, Sri Lanka) is uman rights, including women's rights, to policy development in the areas of governance, gender relations, and law.
ISBN 955-580-0707
DCOLOMBO 3. TEL: 330195,