


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# PEOPLE'S VERDICT ON TSUNAMI RECOVERY IN SRI LANKA

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**Muttukrishna Sarvananthan**



**People's Verdict on Tsunami Recovery  
in Sri Lanka**

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**Muttukrishna Sarvananthan**

**International Centre for Ethnic Studies  
Colombo, Sri Lanka**

**International Centre for Ethnic Studies**  
2, Kynsey Terrace, Colombo 8, Sri Lanka

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**RESEARCH STUDY TEAM**

**Muttukrishna Sarvananthan** - Lead Researcher & Author  
Ph.D. (Wales). M.Sc. (Bristol). M.Sc. (Salford). B.A. (Hons) (Delhi).

**Hewa Madihage Priyanga Sanjeevanie** – Research Associate  
M.A. (Colombo). B.A. (Ruhunu).

**Selliah Varatharajan** – Database & Data Processing Officer

**Gurunnanselage Dona Narmada Nilusha** – Data Entry Officer

**Nishanthi Kanagasabai** – Data Entry Officer

**Abdul Razeek Farzan** - Field Survey Co-ordinator – Ampara &  
Batticaloa Districts

**Gustinna Wadu Kaushal Ganaesh Nandasiri** - Field Survey  
Co-ordinator – Galle, Hambantota & Matara Districts

**Selvarajah Karthikeyan** - Field Survey Co-ordinator – Jaffna  
District

**Mahadevan Karunanithy** – Field Survey Co-ordinator -  
Trincomalee District

In addition to the foregoing persons, there were 38 young persons (20 females and 18 males) involved in the conduct of questionnaire-based interviews in seven districts (three in the East, one in the North, and three in the South) of the country, whose names are not included here due to brevity of space. An overwhelming majority of this field staff was in fact chosen from the tsunami-affected households, as our meagre contribution to the people who have suffered enormously in this tragedy of nature.

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All errors, of omission and commission, and views expressed in this study are solely the responsibility of the author and not of the UNICEF, ICES, or other members of the research team.

**Muttukrishna Sarvananthan**

Lead Researcher & Author

March 2007

savi@slt.lk

**ACRONYMS / ABBREVIATIONS / GLOSSARY**

<b>ADB</b>	– Asian Development Bank	<b>OECD</b>	– Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
<b>CBSL</b>	– Central Bank of Sri Lanka	<b>PDS</b>	– Planning and Development Secretariat (of the LTTE)
<b>CFS</b>	– Consumer Finances and Socio-Economic Survey	<b>PGDP</b>	– Provincial Gross Domestic Product
<b>DCS</b>	– Department of Census and Statistics	<b>RADA</b>	– Reconstruction And Development Authority (successor to TAFREN)
<b>DS</b>	– Divisional Secretariat (sub-district unit of public administration)	<b>SA</b>	– South Asia
<b>EHED</b>	– Eastern Humanitarian and Economic Development	<b>SEA</b>	– South East Asia
<b>FCCI</b>	– Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industries	<b>TAFREN</b>	– Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation (predecessor to RADA)
<b>GDP</b>	– Gross Domestic Product	<b>TI</b>	– Transparency International
<b>GoSL</b>	– Government of Sri Lanka	<b>TRO</b>	– Tamils' Rehabilitation Organisation
<b>HIES</b>	– Household Income and Expenditure Survey	<b>Tsunami</b>	– an exceptionally large tidal wave, a series of long high sea waves caused by earth movement
<b>ILO</b>	– International Labour Organisation	<b>UNDP</b>	– United Nations Development Programme
<b>INR</b>	– Indian Rupee	<b>UNICEF</b>	– United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
<b>IOM</b>	– International Organization for Migration	<b>USD</b>	– United States Dollar
<b>JBIC</b>	– Japan Bank for International Co-operation	<b>WB</b>	– World Bank
<b>JICA</b>	– Japan International Co-operation Agency	<b>WFP</b>	– World Food Programme
<b>LKR</b>	– (Sri) Lankan Rupee		
<b>LTTE</b>	– Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam		
<b>ODI</b>	– Overseas Development Institute		

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## ABSTRACT

This is an empirical research study based on a questionnaire-based survey of 3,000 tsunami-affected households in the east, north, and south of Sri Lanka, incorporating 1,000 households in each region, and secondary data and literature. The objectives of this study are:

- (i) To provide a comparative perspective of the impact of the tsunami and the recovery process.
- (ii) To assess the socio-economic background of the affected people in different parts of the country, prior to and after the tsunami.
- (iii) To evaluate the services rendered and the disbursement of relief to the affected people in different regions of the country.
- (iv) To assess the provision of temporary and permanent housing to the affected people in different regions of the country.
- (v) To identify particular issues and concerns pertaining to women and children.
- (vi) To find out the expectations of the affected people with regard to their future employment, and
- (vii) To find out the opinions of the people affected, about various aspects of the recovery process.

The tsunami of 2004 struck a number of countries in the Indian Ocean in Asia and Africa. However, the degrees of human, physical, socio-economic, and environmental impacts of the tsunami have been different in different sub-regions, countries, and geographical regions within countries. While the heaviest human, physical, and social destructions have been on Indonesia followed by that on Sri Lanka and India, the heaviest economic and environmental impacts have been on the Maldives. Besides, only certain parts of the affected countries and certain economic sub-sectors bore the brunt of the tsunami, and therefore the impacts on the population have been lopsided.

Similarly, within Sri Lanka, the tsunami struck different geographical areas, sub-sectors, and peoples differently. Thus, though the human, physical, social, and environmental destructions have been heaviest in the east and the south, the heaviest economic impact has been on the north, because of its meagre local economy. Further, because of the tsunami's geographical concentration and nature of the northern economy, the fisheries sub-sector and the fishing community bore the brunt of the natural catastrophe, which was already severely affected by a quarter century of civil war.

The empirical results of the household survey undertaken for this study reveal the following:

1. There has been a marginal reduction in the size of households in the post-tsunami compared to the pre-tsunami period. While the reduction in the household size could enhance the living conditions and environment, it also depletes the social capital of extended family networks that help enormously in terms of coping strategies during times of crisis, within households and communities.
2. There was a significant rise in unemployment among the tsunami-affected households, i.e. among both heads of households (respondent as well as spouse). Unemployment was very high even at the time the tsunami struck, i.e. 37% among the respondents and 42% among the spouses of respondents. The unemployment rate among the respondents increased after the tsunami to 54%, and to 53% among the spouses of respondents. The unemployment (among both the respondents and their spouses) was greatest in the north prior to the tsunami (42% and 47% respectively), but was greatest (among both the respondents and their spouses) in the south after the tsunami (57% and 56% respectively). However, the occupational patterns of both the respondents and their spouses have hardly changed in the post-tsunami period.

3. Poverty, in terms of both headcount and severity, has increased after the tsunami in comparison to what it was before in all three regions under consideration. Overall, while 64% of the households were deemed poor before the tsunami (severity-35%), it increased to 80% after the tsunami (severity-57%). The headcount and severity of poverty was greatest in the north both in the pre- and post-tsunami period. Thus, while 82.5% of the households were deemed poor in the north before the tsunami (severity-68%), it increased to 94% after the tsunami (severity-81%). However, while the east had the second highest poverty level (headcount-64% as well as severity-24%) prior to the tsunami, the south had the second highest poverty level (headcount-76% as well as severity-47%) after the tsunami.
4. The survey results indicate that the highest loss of children was in the south followed by the east. Although nearly 5,000 children were reported to be orphaned (lost at least one parent) by the tsunami in Sri Lanka, very little welfare programmes have been launched for them by the government or the donors. The majority of the children in the households surveyed were either of non-school-going age or were at home after completing schooling both prior to and after the tsunami. The second highest share of children were attending school before as well as after the tsunami. The number of children who had stopped going to school after the tsunami was marginal. Financial hardship was the primary reason for children dropping out of school, as well as further/higher education after the tsunami.
5. A vast majority of the affected people (>80%) have received various relief payments in cash or in kind, such as funeral allowances, cooking utensils allowances, and relief coupons. However, the majority of the affected people did not get relief for the stipulated period of 32 weeks. Whatever little corruption existed in the tsunami relief, was largely confined to the north followed by to the east. Over 90% of the

- affected households have received the monthly livelihood allowance (cash grant) as well, but only for three or four months against the stipulated period of six months. Again the north had the highest number of affected households receiving livelihood allowances for a shorter period. A bulk of the relief in terms of food and clothing in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami was provided by the local communities and neighbouring villages.
6. Besides, a significant majority (>70%) of the affected households did not experience any discrimination in the distribution of relief. However, considerable number of households who experienced discrimination cited bribery and corruption (44%) as the primary reason, followed by political patronage (43%) for such discrimination. Racial, religious, or caste-based discrimination in relief disbursement was very marginal in Sri Lanka, in the aftermath of the tsunami.
7. A vast majority of the tsunami-affected households in Sri Lanka have been living in concrete houses (75%) owned by them (>80%) at the time of the tsunami. The south had the highest share of affected households living in concrete houses prior to the tsunami (91%), followed by the east (84%). On the other hand, the east had the highest share of owner occupied houses prior to the tsunami (94%), followed by the south (84%). On both counts, the north had the least (48% and 66% respectively).
8. Construction of houses for the affected households (whose houses had been completely damaged/destroyed by the tsunami) has been the most difficult and slowest in the entire reconstruction/recovery phase. Almost half of the tsunami-affected households were still languishing in transitory/temporary shelters at the time of the survey; it was highest in the east (62%) and south (42%).
9. There seems to be inequity in the distribution of permanent houses thus far. The highest number of recipients of

permanent houses among the surveyed households was in the north (36.5%), followed by the south (21%) despite that the majority of the houses damaged by the tsunami were in the east (67%).

10. Those who are not provided with a newly constructed house were to receive a housing reconstruction grant (paid in two instalments) from the government, sponsored mainly by the World Bank. A vast majority of the affected households (73%) had not received this grant at the time of the survey. The highest share of households who have not received the housing reconstruction grant was in the north (82%), followed by the east (72%). Further, an overwhelming majority (93%) of the affected households felt that the housing reconstruction and repair grants were inadequate for their needs.
11. Surprisingly, the majority of the households (61%) were in agreement with the original buffer zone stipulation for reconstruction of houses along the coast, which was highest in the east (65%), followed by the south (60%). Nevertheless, a significant proportion of households were against the original buffer zone stipulation, which was highest in the north (42.5%), followed by the south (40%). Moreover, a majority of the households (53%) have experienced displacement due to the civil war (in the north and east) prior to the tsunami, which was overwhelmingly in the north (87%) and a smaller share in the east (19%).
12. Overwhelming majority of the temporary shelters (82%) were built by international, national and local NGOs (60%), and individual philanthropists (22%). However, a significant majority of the households (68%) were not satisfied with the temporary shelters. Dissatisfaction with temporary shelters was highest in the east (84%) followed by the south (63%). Further, a significant majority of the households (71%) had not been consulted or their preferences taken

into account in the construction of their temporary shelters. Moreover, a majority of the permanent houses were also built by the I/NGOs (60%). In contrast to temporary shelters, a significant majority of the households (70%) were satisfied with their permanent homes, highest shares being in the north (93%) and the south (60%). Nevertheless, only a simple majority of the households (57%) had been consulted and their preferences taken into account, prior to building their permanent houses, again the highest shares being in the north (83%) and south (44%).

13. An overwhelming majority of the affected households (>94%) were unaware of any physical or verbal abuse/harassment of women or children either in relief camps or temporary shelters. Whatever little abuse/harassment took place was mostly in the east, followed by the south.
14. There were hardly any health problems in the aftermath of the tsunami in Sri Lanka in contrast to popular expectation. A vast majority of the affected households had safe sanitary facilities and clean water supply both in the relief camps (78% and 76% respectively) and temporary shelters (78% and 70% respectively). There was a serious lack of privacy in relief camps (63%). Though it has improved a bit, a significant proportion of the households (48%) still lacked adequate privacy in their temporary shelters. On the other hand, the vast majority of households felt secure both in the relief camps (84%) as well as in the temporary shelters (86%). An overwhelming majority who fell ill either in relief camps (84%) or temporary shelters (78%) received prompt medical attention.
15. In terms of employment, the vast majority (90%) wished to continue the same vocation as before the tsunami. As a corollary, only about a third of the respondents wished to undergo skills training, in order to switch occupations. However, a smaller majority of children of the respondent

households (69%) wanted to continue their pre-tsunami vocation. While the majority of the households do have educational and health services near their temporary shelters or permanent abodes (61%), a significant share (39%) do not have such services nearby.

16. A vast majority of affected households were not satisfied with the services provided by the government (77%) or the local (district/provincial based) NGOs (56%) in the aftermath of the tsunami. However, the majority of the households were satisfied with the services of the national NGOs (55%), the highest share being in the north (59%), followed by the east (56%). Similarly, while the majority of households were satisfied with the services provided by the INGOs (55%) (again the highest share being in the north-59%, followed by the east-56%), a considerable majority was dissatisfied with the services of bilateral (65%) and multilateral (53%) organisations. An overwhelming majority of the households (86%) denied religious conversions taking place in the guise of tsunami relief work. However, the small number who admitted such conversions taking place was largely in the south (20%) and east (17%).
17. Nearly two-thirds of the tsunami-affected households have coped with the post-tsunami situation "reasonably" (65%), and another small percentage "well" (5%). Nonetheless, a considerable proportion (30%) has not done well or reasonably in terms of coping with the tragedy. This result indicates lack of psycho-social support to the victims of the tsunami. A majority of the households expecting permanent houses are expecting the government to build the same (53%), which is contrary to the experience thus far.

The following suggestions are made to improve the delivery, responsiveness, participation of the affected people, and communication and transparency in decision-making and implementation of the remaining tsunami reconstruction/recovery

work to be done in Sri Lanka. As things stand today, it would take at least five years (i.e. end 2009) for full recovery from the devastation of the tsunami in Sri Lanka. Two years have passed and at least there are three more years to go. Therefore, it is still not too late to make amends.


- (i) While maintaining equity in the delivery of assistance to different regions/districts, not only the impact of the tsunami on different regions/districts, the extent and nature of the respective local economies should also be taken into consideration.
- (ii) Even at this late stage the GoSL and the donor community should launch a dedicated assistance programme for the tsunami orphans throughout the country, in order to secure their future, and grant an incentive package for those who have dropped-out, to return to school.
- (iii) All reconstruction and recovery assistance (monetary or in-kind) should be given in the joint names of the heads of households (husband & wife). Currently, only permanent houses or housing reconstruction grants are due to the affected people. Therefore, the principle of joint ownership should be adhered to in the housing give-away or grants.
- (iv) The government should constitute Ombudsman offices in all affected DS areas to receive complaints from the affected people, and each Ombudsman office should adjudicate on the complaints received. This is particularly important for the housing construction programme, which is largely not met so far.
- (v) A rolling survey of tsunami-affected households should be undertaken periodically, (e.g. every six months) to track changes in living conditions, livelihood restoration, and recovery of tsunami-affected households. That is, the same households should be surveyed periodically to monitor the



progress until five years after the tsunami. This rolling survey should have an in-built poverty tracking system as well.

- (vi) Case studies on the merits and demerits of different relief programmes, such as food-for-work programmes, cash-for-work programmes, livelihood allowance (cash grants), and housing reconstruction grants by different donors should be undertaken, to ascertain the efficacy of such programmes. Lessons learned would be of use in the future.
- (vii) A cost-benefit analysis of the entire relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction activities should be undertaken to find out the costs and benefits of recovery strategies adopted in Sri Lanka, by different governmental, non-governmental, and donor agencies.

### Cartography of Tsunami Affected Areas in Sri Lanka



# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Background

On 26<sup>th</sup> December 2004 an earthquake measuring 9.0 on the Richter scale struck under the sea, off the Coast of the Island of Sumatra in Indonesia that triggered a tsunami across the Indian Ocean countries in South East and South Asia, and East Africa<sup>1</sup>. It brought untold misery to the people of Asia, particularly in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and India. Whilst the sheer magnitude of the devastation spanning over several countries and several geographic regions shook the world, it also elicited unprecedented pouring of compassion and sympathy, by way of monetary donations by concerned citizens, private corporate sector, countries, and international organisations across the globe.

For Sri Lanka, in its entire history there was no other incident that devastated the country more than the tsunami of 2004. Although undergoing a protracted civil war over the past two decades, within an hour, the tsunami took away around 35,000 lives, whereas two decades of civil war took away around 65,000 lives. Thus, Sri Lanka has never experienced a human-made or natural disaster of this scale and intensity. Sri Lanka has had no prior experience in handling such a natural disaster unlike many other countries in Asia. Hence, the initial response to the calamity by the government was chaotic, to say the least.

Nonetheless, this unprecedented natural calamity also brought about the unprecedented attention of the international community, towards ailing Sri Lanka. With the change of government in April 2004, resumption of peace talks between the government and the rebel group (LTTE) was even more remote. Further, with severe drought and rising world oil prices during the

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<sup>1</sup> For scientific reasons for the wide geographical spread of the tsunami see Athukorala and Resosudarmo (2005) and references therein.

later half of 2004, the economy was in the doldrums. Amidst this gloomy socio-economic and political scenario, the tsunami was a respite to the government of Sri Lanka.

This was because, for once the tsunami brought about a very rare common bonding among the masses throughout the country within the affected as well as the non-affected communities. Besides, many heads of governments and international organisations, dropped by to express their sorrow and sympathy, along with commitments of grant aid. Further, the G7 countries offered a debt moratorium for 2005, which greatly bolstered the economy despite the huge cost of relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction.

## 1.2 Objectives

The broad objective of this research study is to map out the recovery process from the impact of the tsunami, as experienced by the affected peoples themselves in different geographical areas of Sri Lanka, and to contribute to the policy and implementation discourses among the government, donor, and private/individual actors involved in the rehabilitation and reconstruction activities.

Specific objectives of this research study are:

- To provide a comparative perspective of the impact of the tsunami globally and within the country, and the recovery process.
- To assess the socio-economic background of the affected people in the eastern, northern, and southern coasts of the country, prior to, and after the tsunami.
- To evaluate the services rendered and the disbursement of relief to the affected people in different regions of the country, by the government, I/NGOs, donor agencies, and individual philanthropists.

- To assess the provision of temporary and permanent housing to the affected people in different regions of the country, one year after the tsunami.
- To identify particular issues and concerns pertaining to women and children.
- To find out the expectations of the affected people as regards their future employment.
- To find out the opinions of the affected people, as regards adequacy of relief and rehabilitation assistance, services provided by different service providers, new places of residence, and other socio economic concerns.

All the foregoing were investigated in the targeted districts and regions, roughly one year (12-15 months) after the tsunami, in order to assess the progress thus far, and feed into the remaining reconstruction/recovery process and activities. The limitation of the study is, that it does not evaluate the reconstruction/recovery of public goods and services such as schools/colleges of further education, hospitals/primary health care centres, power supply, telecommunications, roads, public buildings, etc, which were damaged by the tsunami.

## 1.3 Rationale

Although quite a few studies have been undertaken within the country and globally on the experiences of tsunami affected people in Sri Lanka, they are by and large based on qualitative research methodologies such as anecdotes, narratives, ethnographic and case studies and/or confined to a particular village/town, district, region, sector/sub-sector and recovery activity (Alailima, 2006; Domroes, 2006; Human Rights Center of the University of California and East-West Center, 2005; Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka and CUCEC, 2005; IPS, 2006; Jayasuriya, et al, 2005; Mel and Ruwanpura, 2006; Moonesinghe, 2006; Steele, et al, 2006).

Hence, this study fills the knowledge gap of a survey based quantitative and qualitative study of the tsunami-affected communities in the three worst affected regions, viz. east, north, and south, of Sri Lanka to find out the similarities and differences on the road to recovery, by different gender, area, ethnic, and religious communities. Thus, this study complements the existing body of knowledge and literature on the tsunami tragedy in the country as well as outside the country. This is the largest survey based empirical study on the impact of the tsunami undertaken in Sri Lanka thus far.

#### 1.4 Research Process and Methodologies

This policy-oriented empirical study was undertaken through the following modes:

- Reading and collection of qualitative and quantitative data from secondary sources, i.e. from the Department of Census and Statistics, Central Bank, and TAFREN of the GoSL, PDS of the LTTE, and studies undertaken by other local, national, and international institutions, organisations, and individuals. Browsing scholarly articles in academic journals was also utilised.
- Attending several workshops/symposiums/seminars organized by government institutions, donor agencies, and civil society organisations within the country and listening to the voices and concerns of grassroots level activists and other stakeholders.
- Collection of primary data through questionnaire-based random sample survey of 1,000 tsunami-affected households, each from the worst affected coastal regions, namely east, north, and south. While all three districts of the east (Ampara, Batticaloa, and Trincomalee) and south (Galle, Hambantota, and Matara) were covered by the survey only one district in the north (Jaffna) was covered.

Writing up of the study by integrating the primary and secondary data and assessing the recovery performance thus far, and proposing the future course of policy and action for various stakeholders.

The survey questionnaire had a total of 111 questions to meet the aforementioned objectives of the study. The questionnaire had eleven sections:


- (i) Interviewer (to be completed by the interviewer)
- (ii) Respondent (details of the respondent and the household)
- (iii) Spouse (information about the respondent's spouse if any)
- (iv) Children (information about the respondent's children if any)
- (v) Relief
- (vi) Housing
- (vii) Gender (questions in this section were asked from the female head/member of the household)
- (viii) Employment
- (ix) Health
- (x) Future, and
- (xi) General.

Most of the questions were closed while a few were open-ended. That is, for most of the questions the respondents had to answer one of the optional answers provided. All the respondents were over 18 years of age and represented themselves as well as the household. The questionnaire was in two vernacular languages as well as English. Interviews were conducted in pre-tsunami homes of affected people, homes of relatives and friends of the displaced, rented dwellings, relief tents, transitory shelters, and permanent houses.

The total number of questionnaire-based interviews conducted was 3,000 tsunami-affected households, split between 1,000 each in three (out of four) affected coastal regions (east, north, and south). The sample size was 2.3% of the total number of households displaced by the tsunami in the east, north, and south (127,993 – derived from Table 5). Whilst the survey covered



all three affected districts each in the east and south, it covered only one out of three affected districts in the north, because the other two (Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu districts) are under the control of the LTTE where independent surveys could not be undertaken. The total number of questionnaires incorporated for analytical purposes was only 2,988; divided into 1,000 from the east, 999 from the north, and 989 from the south. However, all the questions were not answered by all the respondents because of non-applicability or some other reason. Thus, the east represented 33.5%, north 33.4%, and south 33.1% out of the total sample size of 2,988 incorporated for analysis.



Source: Table 1

The 1,000 sample households in the east were distributed as 600 in the Ampara district, 296 in the Batticaloa district, and 104 in the Trincomalee district, in the order of the severity of the impact of tsunami in terms of death, displacement, and damaged houses (see Table 5). All 999 sample households in the north were from the Jaffna district. Further, out of the 989 sample households in the south, 400 were in the Galle district, 300 were in the Hambantota district, and 289 were in the Matara district, again in the order of the severity of the impact of tsunami in terms of

death, displacement, and damaged houses (see Table 5). Moreover, almost all the tsunami-affected divisional secretariat (DS) areas in each of the districts were covered by the survey (see Table 1).

The distribution of the sample by district was as follows: While the Ampara district accounted for 71.0% of the total deaths (10,436 out of 14,691) and 47.5% of the total displaced families (38,866 out of 81,905) in the east, the sample size of Ampara accounted for 60.0% of the total sample in the east (600 out of 1,000). On the other hand, the Batticaloa district accounted for 21.6% of the total deaths (3,177 out of 14,691) and 37.3% of the total displaced families (30,545 out of 81,905) in the east, but the sample size of Batticaloa accounted for 29.6% of the total sample in the east (296 out of 1,000). Similarly, while 7.3% of the total deaths (1,078 out of 14,691) and 15.3% of the total displaced families (12,494 out of 81,905) in the east were in the Trincomalee district, 10.4% of the total sample in the east was in Trincomalee (104 out of 1,000).


While the entire sample in the north (100% or 999) was in the Jaffna district, only 40.5% of the total deaths (2,640 out of 6,523) and 62.8% of the total displaced families (10,827 out of 17,241) in the north were in Jaffna. In the south, while the Galle district accounted for 42.1% of the total deaths (4,248 out of 10,090) and 80.7% of the total displaced families (23,278 out of 28,847) in the region, district sample size was 40.4% of the regional total (400 out of 989). On the other hand, the Hambantota district accounted for 44.6% of the total deaths (4,500 out of 10,090) and 11.6% of the total displaced families (3,334 out of 28,847) in the region, but represented 30.3% of the total sample in the region (300 out of 989). The Matara district, while accounting for 13.3% of the total deaths (1,342 out of 10,090) and 7.7% of the total displaced families (2,235 out of 28,847) in the region, accounted for 29.2% of the total sample in the south (289 out of 989).

The sample size by district could not be distributed in proportion to the number of displaced families because of conflicting numbers of displaced families and damaged houses reported by different authorities (TAFREN, PDS, DCS, donors, et al) at different times. Moreover, in many districts there were

considerable numbers of non-affected households claiming relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction assistance as well. Thus, not all the registered displaced families would have been actually affected by the tsunami. The foregoing problems encountered in sample distribution and selection is quite common in conflict and disaster situations like that of Sri Lanka. Furthermore, in conflict and disaster situations, population will be in and out of displacement at different time periods. Therefore, the number of displaced would be a flow variable in a given time period.

The gender distribution of the total sample was 56.5% female and 43.5% male respondents<sup>2</sup>. By region, female sample was 57.7% in the east, 57.5% in the north, and 54.4% in the south. Similarly, male sample was 42.3% in the east, 42.5% in the north, and 45.6% in the south. Further, district-wise breakdown of the sample by gender is also available (see Table 2).


The ethnic distribution of the total sample was 29.1% Muslim, 27.3% Sinhalese, and 43.5% Tamil. By region, Muslim respondents comprised 67.5% in the east and 19.9% in the south, Sinhalese respondents comprised 2.5% in the east and 80.1% in the south,




Source: Table 2

<sup>2</sup> Whereas 53% of the interviewees were females (20) and 47% were males (18).

and Tamil respondents comprised 30.0% in the east and 100% in the north. District-wise breakdown of the ethnic sample is also available (see Table 2).



Source: Table 2



Source: Table 2



By religion the total respondents were distributed as 26.9% Buddhists, 13.8% Christians, 29.9% Hindus, and 29.4% Islamists. Buddhists comprised 78.6% of the sample in the south and 2.3% in the east; Christians comprised 34.5% of the sample in the north, 5.6% in the east, and 1.5% in the south; Hindus comprised 65.5% of the sample in the north and 24.4% in the east; Islamists comprised 67.7% of the sample in the east and 19.9% in the south. Buddhists dominated in southern districts, Hindus and Christians dominated in the Jaffna district, and Islamic people dominated in the Ampara district (Table 2).

The survey questionnaire requested the interviewers to guess the caste of the respondents from the name or occupation. The purpose of this question was to find out caste discrimination, if any, in the disbursement of relief and the distribution of rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance. However, the response was very poor and disappointing, particularly in the east and the north. Overall, the caste of 71.9% of the total respondents was unknown. Out of the known castes of respondents, 13.8% were Karawa or Karayar (i.e. the fishing community in Sinhala and Tamil respectively), followed by Govi (farming/land owning community) (4.4%), Durawa (coconut/ palmyrah toddy tapping)


(4.3%), Salagama (cinnamon peelers/cultivators) (3.5%), and the rest just 2.1% (Table 3).

By age group, the largest share of respondents were over 50 years (29.5%) and the least share was in the age group of <20 years (1.4%). Besides, 17% of the respondents were in the age group of 20-29 years, 26.2% of the respondents were in the age group of 30-39 years, and 26% was in the age group of 40-49 years.

This study commenced on September 01, 2005. The first three months were spent on secondary literature search, preparation of the questionnaire, and undertaking the pilot survey in all three target regions. The questionnaire underwent a consultation and review process involving in-house researchers, external interested persons, and UNICEF personnel. The regional field survey co-ordinators were trained in Colombo during November 2005. The regional field survey co-ordinators in turn, trained their respective interviewers/enumerators in the field. Further, a pilot survey of 5-10 household interviews was conducted in each of the three regions during November 2005.

The field survey was undertaken during December 2005 to April 2006. Although it was originally planned to complete the field survey in two months, it eventually took about four months because of the deteriorating security situation in the east and the north, since early-December 2005. Field survey in all three regions began at the same time in early-December 2005, but was completed at different times. Field survey in the south was completed by end-February 2006, in the east it was completed by end-March 2006, and in the north by mid-April 2006. These different time periods of field survey may have biased the results to a certain extent.

A database was constructed using Microsoft Access and the data were fed in, as and when filled-up questionnaires were returned from the field. Once data entry was completed, the data were transferred and processed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). Data entry, editing, and processing continued till July 31, 2006. Finally, August-October 2006 was occupied by the write-up of the study. The first draft of the study



underwent external and internal review processes and the study was finalised in March 2007, after addressing criticisms, comments and suggestions from the reviewers.

## 1.5 Organisation of the study

This study is divided into six chapters as follows:

Chapter 1 sets out the background to the study, lays out the objectives, identifies the rationale, elaborates the research process and methodologies adopted, and outlines the organisation of the study.

Chapter 2 will present and analyse the impact of the tsunami on Asia by sub-region and country. The impact would also be discussed by sectors and sub-sectors.

Chapter 3 will present and analyse the impact of the tsunami on Sri Lanka by region/province and district. The impact would also be discussed by sectors and sub-sectors.

Chapter 4 will outline and analyse the nature and extent of the local/provincial economies affected by the tsunami in Sri Lanka, which would be very useful for the recovery policy formulation.

Chapter 5 will present and analyse the field survey results, and compare and contrast the results of other studies undertaken in Sri Lanka as well as other tsunami-affected countries in Asia. This is the core chapter of the study.

Chapter 6 will summarise the key findings of the study, identify the strength and weaknesses in the recovery process, and make suggestions to policy makers regarding implementation of projects and programmes for the remaining tsunami recovery work to be done.

A list of references is provided at the end. Further, the entire statistical tables are catalogued in the appendix.

It has to be remembered that there were many non-affected households as well seeking relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction (housing) assistance throughout the country<sup>3</sup>. The author's hunch is that **at least** 10% of the officially registered displaced families throughout the country may not have been directly affected by the tsunami. This could have biased the results of the survey to a certain extent.

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See Auditor General's Report. <http://www.auditorgeneral.lk/reports/> and Sarvananthan (2005a).



## CHAPTER 2

### Impact of the Tsunami on Asia

#### 2.1 Introduction


The tsunami wreaked havoc in two continents, three sub-regions, and in many countries situated in the Indian Ocean. India, Indonesia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Myanmar, Seychelles, Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand were the countries directly affected by the tsunami of 2004. However, Indonesia (Aceh province), India (Tamilnadu state and Andaman and Nicobar islands), Sri Lanka, and Thailand (6 provinces in the west coast) were the worst affected countries in terms of the number of deaths caused by the tsunami.

#### 2.2 Deaths, Displacement & Destruction

We have compiled data for three countries each, in Africa (Kenya, Madagascar, and Somalia), South Asia (India, Maldives, and Sri Lanka), and South East Asia (Indonesia, Myanmar, and Thailand). Accordingly, altogether nearly 300,000 died, nearly 1.85 million people were displaced, and nearly 440,000 houses were fully or partially damaged (cannot be used) due to the tsunami. By sub-region, South East Asia accounted for almost 82% of the deaths, South Asia for 18%, and Africa for just 0.1%. In contrast, South Asia accounted for 66% of the total displaced population, followed by South East Asia 33.7%, and Africa just 0.4%. Further, in terms of fully or partially damaged houses, 59% were in South Asia, 30% were in South East Asia, and 11% in Africa (Table 4).

Indonesia accounted for almost 238,000 or 80% of the total deaths due to the tsunami. Sri Lanka accounted for almost 37,000 (including the missing) or 12.4% of the total deaths. India accounted

for more than 16,000 deaths or 5.5% of the total. Deaths in Thailand were more than 5,000 or 1.8% of the total. The foregoing four countries accounted for 99.85% of the total deaths due to the tsunami (Table 4).



Source: Table 4

In contrast, India accounted for the highest number of the displaced population due to the tsunami. That is, almost 648,000 were displaced in India, which was 35% of the total. In Indonesia, 617,000 were displaced which amounted to 33.4% of the total. Further, almost 30% or 550,000 of the total displaced were in Sri Lanka. Hence, India, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka accounted for over 98% of the total displaced population due to the tsunami (Table 4).

Similarly, the highest number of houses fully or partially damaged due to the tsunami was in India, followed by Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Somalia; 36% of the total or 154,000 houses were damaged in India; 29% of the total or 127,300 houses were damaged in Indonesia; 22.4% of the total or almost 98,000 houses were damaged in Sri Lanka; 11.4% of the total or 50,000 houses were damaged in Somalia. Thus, India, Indonesia, Somalia, and Sri Lanka accounted for over 98% of the total number of houses damaged due to the tsunami (Table 4).

In addition to deaths, displacement, and damage to houses, there were destruction of economic infrastructure (power supply, telecommunications and roads), social infrastructure (schools and hospitals), fishing boats and equipments, hotels and tourism infrastructure, small and medium enterprises, and the environment.

### 2.3 Economic Impact

The direct and indirect economic impacts of the tsunami differ from country to country depending on the extent of physical damage caused, size of the economy at the national and local levels, and the economic activities that were affected and its contribution to the national and local economies. Besides, the economic impact of the tsunami may differ at the national level and the local level.

Although the destruction and displacement caused by the tsunami in the Maldives was the lowest compared to all other affected countries (barring Myanmar), the total financial loss in the Maldives was 53% of its GDP. On the other hand, in the worst affected Indonesia, the total financial loss was equivalent to only 2.3% of its GDP (Athukorala and Resosudarmo, 2005: 14). In Sri Lanka, the second worst affected country, the total financial loss was equal to 5.2% of its GDP. In India and Thailand, the total financial loss was 0.3% and 0.8% of GDP respectively (Sugiyarto and Hagiwara, 2005: 6).

Further, damage caused to the tourism sector in Sri Lanka did not affect the overall economy because tourism contributes only 0.7% to the GDP, whereas in the Maldives the damage to the tourism sector had severe impact on the economy, because it contributes almost one-third to the GDP (Munasinghe, 2006: 23). In the same way, Aceh contributes only 2% to the GDP of Indonesia and half the provincial GDP of Aceh is derived from oil and natural gas, which were not affected by the tsunami. Besides, tourism is not a significant sub-sector in Aceh (Sugiyarto and Hagiwara, 2005: 7). Therefore, despite severe destruction, the tsunami did not have much effect on the Indonesian economy or the macro economy of the Aceh province.

On the other hand, while the hotels and restaurants sub-sector contributed only 3.8% to the national economy, it contributed 44.3% to the economy of the Phuket province in Thailand in 2002 (Munasinghe, 2006: 23). Hence, though the tsunami did not affect the national economy of Thailand it did severely affect the local economy of Phuket province, one of the six provinces affected by the tsunami. However, the tourism industry in the Maldives and Thailand recovered quicker than in Sri Lanka because they are linked to large international chains of hotels and tour operators, and were insured with large international insurance companies.

In addition to the direct costs of destruction, there are indirect costs such as foregone productive activities such as fishing, tourism, etc, loss of fiscal revenue to the national and local governments, loss of backward and forward linkages to the rest of the economy (for example, loss of tourism also results in losses in food and beverages, handicraft, air travel markets, etc), and losses incurred by the insurance industry (albeit limited). However, these indirect costs would be partly compensated by relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction activities, boost to the construction industry, rise in new insurance cover against natural calamities, and rise in insurance premium on natural calamities. Insurance cover in the affected regions of the countries was very minimal because of low penetration of the insurance market and poverty of those places.

Except in the tourism industry, life insurance and private property insurance cover among the affected communities in all the countries were very low. Non-life insurance premium was only USD 4 in India, USD 8 in Indonesia, USD 7 in Sri Lanka, and USD 27.6 in Thailand. As a corollary, the non-life insurance premium as a percentage of the GDP was only 0.62% in India, 0.83% in Indonesia, 0.74% in Sri Lanka, and 1.19% in Thailand (Munasinghe, 2006: 33). Hence, the tsunami would have had very little impact on the insurance industry of the respective countries.

The tsunami also elicited unprecedented support from the international community by way of monetary contributions. The total estimated needs were around USD 10 billion (Indonesia \$5 billion, Sri Lanka and India \$2 billion each, Maldives \$0.4 billion),

which the donors pledged to fund. Perhaps for the first time, pledges were followed by actual disbursements. According to the office of the UN special envoy for tsunami recovery, almost 80% or USD 8 billion was disbursed by the end of 2005 (cited in Munasinghe 2006: 25). By September 2006, the total pledges amounted to USD 13 billion (Indonesia \$8 billion, Sri Lanka \$2.4 billion, India \$0.8 billion, Maldives \$0.4 billion). Out of the total pledges made thus far, 45% (USD 6 billion) was from bilateral donors including the EU, 38% (USD 5 billion) was from private companies and individuals, and 16% was from international financial institutions such as the ADB and WB<sup>4</sup>.

Although Munasinghe (2006: 189, 192) claimed that the number of women who died was four times higher than that of male deaths due to the tsunami, in India, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka there is no data available on this score.

## 2.4 Conclusion

The impact of the tsunami on different countries has been different under different criteria. While the worst affected countries had the least impact on their national economies, the least affected countries (like the Maldives) had the greatest impact on their national economies. Even within countries, the worst affected regions had the least impact on their local economies, while the least affected regions had the greatest impact on their local economies. For example, while the worst affected Tamilnadu state experienced the least impact on its regional economy, the less affected Andaman and Nicobar Islands had the greatest impact on its island economy.

This is due to a variety of factors in different countries and regions within countries; topography of the affected region, population concentration in affected areas, the nature and extent of the local economy, the contribution of the local economy to the regional and national economy, etc.

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.tsunamispecialenvoy.org/financial/>

## CHAPTER 3

# Impact of the Tsunami on Sri Lanka

## 3.1 Introduction

The tsunami hit the eastern, northern, southern, and western coasts of Sri Lanka. However, the impact in the western coast was only marginal. Altogether 4 coastal provinces out of the total 9 provinces, and 12 out of the total 25 districts in the country were affected by the tsunami. Although the impact of the tsunami on the macro economy of Sri Lanka was only marginal, it did considerably hurt the local economies of the eastern, northern, and southern coastal areas. The fisheries sub-sector was the worst affected, followed by tourism, micro and small enterprises, and crop agriculture sub-sectors.

The impact of the tsunami on economic activities had similarities as well as differences in various regions of the country. Along the eastern coast, the worst affected economic activities were fishing, micro and small enterprises, and tourism. Along the northern coast, the worst affected economic activities were fishing and crop agriculture (due to the intruding salty seawater contaminating the soil). There was no tourism along the northern coastal areas. Along the southern coast, fishing, tourism, and micro and small enterprises were the worst affected economic activities.

## 3.2 Deaths, Displacement & Destruction


As we noted in the previous chapter, after Indonesia, Sri Lanka was the second worst affected country by the tsunami. In Sri Lanka, almost 37,000 people were presumed dead (including the missing persons), over half a million people were displaced (143,500 families), and nearly 98,000 houses were fully or partially damaged (that cannot be used) due to the tsunami.

The worst affected region in Sri Lanka due to the tsunami was the eastern coastline, followed by the southern, northern, and



western coastlines. Out of the total accounted deaths (circa 32,000), almost 15,000 or 46% were in the east, 10,000 or almost 32% were in the south, 6,500 or 20.5% were in the north, and 554 or almost 2% were in the west. Out of the total displaced families (143,500), 57% or almost 82,000 families were in the east, 20% or almost 29,000 families were in the south, 12% or over 17,000 families were in the north, and almost 11% or 15,500 families were in the west (Table 5).

Further, the Ampara district accounted for the largest, i.e. almost 33% or 14,700, recorded deaths due to the tsunami. The second largest number of recorded deaths was in the Hambantota district with 14% of the total or 4,500 in number. The third largest was in the Galle district with 4,248 or 13.3% of the total. The Mullaitivu district accounted for the fourth largest number of deaths of 3,323 or 10.4% of the total. The Batticaloa district had the fifth highest number of deaths of 3,177 or 10% of the total. The sixth highest number of deaths was in the Jaffna district with 2,640 deaths or 8.3% of the total (Table 5). The foregoing six districts (out of the twelve affected districts) accounted for almost 90% of the total deaths due to the tsunami.



Source: Table 5

The Ampara district again topped the share of the displaced families with 27% of the total or almost 38,900 displaced families.

The second largest number of displaced families was in the Trincomalee district with little over 30,500 or 21% of the total. The Galle district had nearly 23,300 displaced families or 16% of the total. The Batticaloa district had almost 12,500 displaced families or almost 9% of the total. The fifth largest number of displaced families was in the Jaffna district with little over 10,800 families or 7.5% of the total (Table 5). The foregoing five districts (out of the twelve affected districts) accounted for 80% of the total displaced families due to the tsunami.

The highest number of houses fully or partially damaged (that cannot be used) was again in the Ampara district with 27,562 damaged houses or 28% of the total, followed by the Batticaloa district with 17,708 damaged houses or 18% of the total. The third highest number of damaged houses was in the Galle district accounting for almost 12,500 or 13% of the total. The Matara district accounted for 9% of the total or almost 8,900 damaged houses. The fifth largest number of damaged houses was in the Trincomalee district with 8,665 or almost 9% of the total (Table 5). Altogether, 77% of the damaged houses were in the foregoing five districts (out of the twelve affected districts).

### 3.3 Economic Impact

The total direct cost of physical destruction caused by the tsunami was estimated to be USD 1 billion, out of which private assets accounted for 70% or USD 700 million. Destruction and damage of houses cost USD 300-350 million. Physical losses to the tourism infrastructure and equipment were worth USD 250 million. The fisheries infrastructure and equipment losses cost USD 100 million (ADB/JBIC/JICA/WB, 2005).

The replacement cost of the physical destruction was estimated to be around USD 1.5 billion. Out of the estimated total rehabilitation and reconstruction cost, 41% is for the Eastern Province, 29% for the Southern Province, 17% for the Northern Province, and 13% for the Western Province. By sectors, Housing is expected to cost 33% of the total, followed by Roads (15%), Tourism (10%), Railways (10%), Fisheries (9%), Water and

Sanitation (9%), Health (7%), Power (5%), and Education (3%) (ADB/JBIC/JICA/WB, 2005: 22). However, the government's effort to "build-back better" was estimated to cost almost USD 2 billion at 2005 prices (TAFREN, 2005).

Strangely, the economic growth of Sri Lanka was not affected by the impact of the tsunami. Sri Lanka recorded 6% growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) in real terms during 2005, which was the same as the forecast made prior to the tsunami. This was in spite of the early-2005 forecast of 0.5% drop in GDP growth for the fiscal year 2005, due to the effects of the tsunami. The non-reduction in the economic growth rate was because the worst affected provinces and affected sectors/sub-sectors make only a small contribution to the national economy. Besides, losses incurred by the fisheries and tourism sub-sectors were largely offset by rise in construction sub-sector, and some services. Furthermore, donor fund flows and debt moratorium had substantially offset the negative impacts.

The impact of the tsunami on coastal populations also differed from district to district. While less than 20% of the coastal population in the Galle, Hambantota, and Matara districts were affected, in the Kilinochchi district 35%, and in the Ampara and Mullaitivu districts 80% of the coastal population were affected (Munasinghe, 2006: 103). Island-wide, almost two-thirds of the fisheries sub-sector has been affected, including six out of twelve fisheries harbours in the country made unusable. Moreover, two-thirds of the total fishing fleet of about 30,000 was destroyed or damaged. The fisheries sub-sector employs about 250,000 people and about one million people depend on the sector for their livelihood. Besides, fish consumption provides 65% of the animal protein of the people in Sri Lanka (TAFREN, 2005). There was a 45% drop in the fish catch in 2005 compared to the previous year (Central Bank Annual Report 2005).

In addition, according to a survey undertaken by the FCCI, over 5,000 micro and small enterprises have been affected along the eastern, northern (Jaffna district), and southern coasts. It was also reported that over 10,000 jobs in the tourism sub-sector were lost due to the tsunami along the eastern, southern, and western coasts.

In the Ampara and Batticaloa districts in the eastern coast, around 5,000 farming families were affected (i.e. 55% of the total farming families affected throughout the country) and their crops destroyed. In the Ampara and Mullaitivu districts, the paddy crop was the worst affected in terms of land extent, along with cashew and other field crops in the Batticaloa district. In addition, 7,500 cattle, 63,000 birds, and nearly 150,000 poultry were reported to be killed by the tsunami (Munasinghe, 2006: 105).

Losses in the tourism sector were estimated to be about USD 250 million, which is little less than the annual earnings from tourism in Sri Lanka in recent years. Roughly, one-third of the hotels along the southern and eastern coasts (i.e. 84 out of 242) were fully or partially damaged by the tsunami. In addition, two-thirds of the 2,800 unregistered hotels and guesthouses were damaged. About 30,000 tourism-related jobs were reported to be lost (Munasinghe, 2006: 109). The total tourist arrivals dropped by a quarter in 2005, in comparison to the previous year (Central Bank Annual Report 2005).

Although no hard data is available, anecdotal evidence suggests that more women than men died due to the tsunami in Sri Lanka<sup>5</sup>. Besides, a higher proportion of women and children were affected than men in terms of displacement, vulnerability, etc. The tsunami struck Sri Lanka on a Sunday morning between 08.20 and 10.00 hours. Firstly, men were mostly out of their homes and perhaps could escape. Secondly, men were able to run faster, climb up trees or other high elevations, than women and children. Thirdly, traditional dresses worn by women as well as their long hair were hindrances to escaping the rampaging sea. Deaths of a large number of women have left many homes with men caring for their children, which they are not used to. Many orphaned children (loss of at least one parent) were handed over to faith-based and other childcare institutions. Evidence from other tsunami-

<sup>5</sup> National Council on Women (2005), *Tsunami affected households in Sri Lanka: analysis of impact including gender disaggregated data*, Colombo.

affected countries also suggests that the majority of the victims of tsunami were women and children (Human Rights Center of the University of California and East-West Center, 2005: 13; Oxfam, 2005a: 3).

### 3.4 Conclusion

Though the eastern and southern provinces were the worst hit regions by the tsunami, the economic impact was severest in the northern province because of lowest extent of the local economy (see the following chapter). Besides, the tsunami was a double blow to the northern economy, which was already severely run down by a quarter century of civil war.

## CHAPTER 4

# Local Economies of the Affected Provinces

### 4.1 Introduction

As noted in the previous chapter, at the macro level, Sri Lankan economy was hardly affected by the tsunami. That is, the net impact of the tsunami on the macro economy was nil.

This is because the sectors/sub-sectors contributing most to the national economy, i.e. garments and textiles, food and beverages, plantation agriculture (coconut, tea, and rubber), crop agriculture including livestock, construction, transport and communication, wholesale and retail trade, and the financial sector, were not much affected by the tsunami. The fishing sub-sector was the worst affected due to the tsunami. Although tourism, micro and small enterprises, and crop agriculture were affected to some extent in certain coastal areas, diversion of demand to the rest of the respective sub-sectors in the interior parts of the country compensated for the losses incurred in the coastal areas.

This chapter analyses the extent and nature of the local economies of coastal provinces affected by the tsunami.

### 4.2 Extent of the Local Economies


As mentioned in the previous chapter, four coastal provinces were affected by the tsunami. The worst affected eastern province is one of the low<sup>6</sup> contributors to the national economy along with the northern, north central, and uva provinces. The second worst affected southern province is one of the medium<sup>7</sup> contributors to the national economy along with the central, north western, and sabaragamuwa provinces. The third worst affected northern province is the lowest contributor to the national economy between

<sup>6</sup> Less than 6% contribution to the national GDP.

<sup>7</sup> 6% - 12% contribution to the GDP.



1991 and 2004. The least affected western province is the highest<sup>8</sup> contributor to the national economy contributing 40%-51% during the period 1990-2004 (Table 6).



Source: Table 6

The foregoing figures demonstrate the reason for the non-reduction in the growth rate of the national GDP in 2005, due to the impact of the tsunami. The worst affected three provinces contributed the most 18.7% to the national GDP in 2003 during the period 1990-2004 (Table 6). Besides, even in these three provinces only the coastal areas were affected, which do not contribute much to the respective PGDPs.

Although the proportion of households under the official poverty line in the country (as a whole) declined to 23% in 2002 (from 26% in 1995/6), in the tsunami affected eastern, northern, and southern provinces it was higher but lower in the western province. In the southern province, households under the official poverty line were 23.6% and in the combined eastern and northern provinces it was almost 31.8% (DCS, Household Income and

<sup>8</sup> Over 12% contribution to the national GDP.

Expenditure Survey 2002). However, poverty data of the eastern and northern provinces is not very reliable. Nevertheless, it is indisputable that the eastern and northern provinces are both among the poorest provinces (along with north central and uva provinces) in the country (see also Sarvananthan, 2005).

### 4.3 Nature of the Local Economies

The single largest sectoral contribution to the local economies of the affected provinces is by the services<sup>9</sup> sector, which is the same as at the national level. The second largest sectoral contribution to the local economies of the three worst affected provinces is by the agriculture<sup>10</sup> sector, and in the least affected western province it is the industrial<sup>11</sup> sector (same as at the national level).

In the worst affected eastern province, the services sector contributed almost 40% to the PGDP, followed by the agriculture sector with nearly 35% contribution to the PGDP during the period 2000-2004. The industrial sector contributed only about 26% to the PGDP during the same period (Table 7). During the time of the ceasefire (2002-2004) the contributions of the agriculture and industrial sectors had increased while the contribution of the services sector had declined in the eastern province.

In the second worst affected southern province, the services sector contributed almost 45% to the provincial economy, followed by the agriculture sector with 36.5% contribution during 2000-2004. On the other hand, the industrial sector contributed

<sup>9</sup> Services sector includes wholesale and retail trade (domestic and external), transport, storage and communication (posts and telecommunications), financial services, real estate and business services, and public administration, defence and other government services, and private social, community and personal services.

<sup>10</sup> Agriculture sector includes food and cash crops, forestry, livestock, and fishing.

<sup>11</sup> Industrial sector includes manufacturing, mining and quarrying, construction, and utilities (electricity and water).



only 18.5% to the provincial economy during the same period (Table 7).

In the third worst affected northern province, the services sector contributed almost 70% to the PGDP during 2000-2004 (the highest in the country). Further, the agriculture sector contributed only about 24% and the industrial sector a paltry 7% to the provincial economy (Table 7). During the time of the ceasefire (2002-2004), while the agriculture sector's contribution increased, contributions of the services and industrial sectors declined in the northern economy.

In the least affected western province, the services sector accounted for 63% of the provincial economy, followed by the industrial sector with 33% during 2000-2004. On the other hand, the agriculture sector accounted for a paltry 4% of the provincial economy during the same period (Table 7).

The foregoing figures indicate the differences in the nature and composition of the local economies in the affected provinces. As a result, the intensity of the impact of the tsunami is also bound to be different in different provinces. Moreover, although agriculture's contribution to the local economies in the three worst affected provinces is lower than the services sector, a larger proportion of the employed population is in the agriculture sector. This is a paradox of these affected local economies, and perhaps the national economy as well.

For example, while the agriculture sector contributed 33% to the PGDP of the eastern province in 2004, when it accommodated 38% of the employed population in the same year; it was 36% and 41% respectively in the southern province; it was 28% and 38% respectively in the north; and it was 3% and 6% respectively in the western province<sup>12</sup>. That is, the share of the labour force in the agriculture sector is higher than agriculture sector's contribution to the provincial economies. This means that the agriculture sector has underemployment or disguised unemployment with low productivity.

<sup>12</sup> Department of Census and Statistics, *Labour Force and Socio-Economic Survey 2004*, Colombo.

As noted in the previous chapter, fisheries, tourism, and micro and small enterprises were the worst affected sub-sectors due to the tsunami in Sri Lanka. There is a false perception that the fisheries sub-sector plays a prominent role in the economy of Sri Lanka, because it is an island state. However, the fisheries sub-sector contributed only 2.3% to the national GDP in 2004, which was 4% in 1980 and 2.8% in 1990. Hotels and restaurants contributed only a paltry 0.7% to the national GDP in 2004. Micro and small industries contributed only 1.2% to the national GDP in 2004 (Central Bank Annual Report 2004). Hence, altogether the worst affected sub-sectors contributed less than 5% to the national GDP.

Nevertheless, the foregoing national level data hide variations in different provinces. For example, although the fishing sub-sector contributed only 0.8% to the local economy of the western province, it contributed 5.3% to the local economy of the southern province, and 12% to the local economies of the eastern as well as the northern provinces in 2003 (Table 8). Further, while the hotels and restaurant sub-sector in the southern province contributed higher share to the local economy than the same sub-sector's contribution to the national economy, it contributed a lower share (compared to national level contribution) to the local economy in the eastern and northern provinces (derived from the Central Bank Annual Report 2004).

Moreover, while in the southern province, the fisheries sub-sector is only the sixth largest contributor to the local economy (after crop agriculture, wholesale and retail trade, transport, storage and communication, manufacturing, and public administration and defence sub-sectors), in the eastern province the fisheries sub-sector is the third largest contributor to the local economy (after crop agriculture and manufacturing sub-sectors). In the northern province also the fisheries sub-sector is the third largest contributor to the local economy (after public administration and defence and crop agriculture) (see Table 8).

The foregoing data indicate that though the tsunami may not have affected the macro- economy of Sri Lanka, it would have certainly affected the local economies of the three worst affected

coastal provinces, namely the eastern, northern, and southern provinces. This is because the worst affected sub-sectors contribute a much higher proportion to the local provincial economies than to the national economy. Moreover, a negative impact of the tsunami on the local economies would be more pronounced in the eastern and northern provinces than in the southern province, because the worst affected sub-sectors contribute twice as much in the eastern and northern provinces than in the southern province. However, the 2005 provincial economic data is not available yet

#### 4.4 Conclusion

The northern economy is the lowest among all the provinces in Sri Lanka. Further, the eastern economy is one of the lowest and the southern economy is somewhere in the middle, out of all the provincial economies. As a corollary, apart from the western provincial economy, the southern provincial economy is expected to rebound quicker than the other two provincial economies (eastern and northern). Moreover, the northern economy would take the longest time to recover from the impact of the tsunami, because of its low economic base at the time of the tsunami.

## CHAPTER 5

### People's Experiences and Expectations

#### 5.1 Introduction

The government, donor agencies, and the civil society agreed from the outset, that the tsunami reconstruction and recovery process should be guided by five cardinal principles as follows:

- (i) Resource allocations based on identified needs and local priorities.
- (ii) Subsidiarity, i.e. designing and implementation of projects/programmes by the lowest level of the government administrative structure, with the central government setting broad policy framework and standards.
- (iii) Consultation with affected communities and stakeholders.
- (iv) Communication and transparency in decision-making and implementation.
- (v) Reduction of vulnerabilities to future disasters (Donor/Civil Society Post-Tsunami Steering Committee, 2005). This empirical study was aimed at, *inter alia*, testing the fulfillment of (or lack thereof) these cardinal principles by all the stakeholders.

This chapter outlines and analyses the results of the empirical study undertaken among the tsunami-affected communities in the east, north, and south of the country, to determine the effectiveness of the recovery process and see whether the expectations of the affected communities have been fulfilled. This empirical study is based on a questionnaire-based random sample survey of 1,000 households in each of the three regions. However, for data analysis, the following numbers of samples were taken onboard – east 1,000, north 999, and south 989. The distribution of the sample by region, district, gender, ethnicity, and religion was provided in Chapter 1.

## 5.2 Household Characteristics

This section analyses the essential characteristics of the households both before and after the tsunami, which would help devising appropriate policies for the recovery. That is, household size, household income, employment (of both the self and the spouse), children, and education and employment of children before and after the tsunami, are compared and contrasted.

### Size of households

Before the tsunami, 21.6% (644) of the total respondents had five-member household, which marginally declined to 20.6% (616) after the tsunami. Before the tsunami, 21.3% (635) of respondents had four-member household, which increased to 23.1% (691) after the tsunami. Before the tsunami, 17.7% (530) of respondents had three-member household, which increased to 19.3% (577) after the tsunami. However, before the tsunami, 14.0% (418) of respondents had six-member household, which declined to 12.6% (377) after the tsunami. On the other hand, 12.3% (369) of respondents had one/two-member household before the tsunami, which increased to 13.3% (397) after the tsunami. But, 10.8% (323) of respondents had seven/eight-member household before the tsunami, which declined to 9.2% (275) after the tsunami (Tables 9&10). The foregoing data reveal that the size of households has declined after the tsunami compared to before it; while households with five-members and above have declined, four-member (and less) households have increased after the tsunami.

There are positive and negative implications of the reduction of the household size in the aftermath of the tsunami. One of the reasons for the reduction in the household size could be the uniform size of the transitory shelters provided to all affected households, irrespective of the size of household. The author has witnessed, during field visits, one or two person households living in the same size transitory shelter, as six or eight person households. The reduction in household size could be also due to splitting up of

extended families, in order to qualify for a donor-given permanent house for each family. Each nuclear family receiving a permanent house could have positive implications for healthy living.

However, the negative implication of the reduction in the household size is, that it tears apart social capital in terms of family and clan networks and solidarity at times of crisis. During times of human-made and natural disasters, community and family networks play a significant role in coping mechanisms and mitigating the impact of such disasters.


### Employment

Unemployment, and thereby poverty was rife among the tsunami affected communities in the east, north, and south, both before and after the tsunami, as revealed by the employment data of the joint heads of households (respondent plus the spouse) who were surveyed for this empirical study.

More than 63% of the respondents were employed prior to the tsunami, but was only 45.6% at the time of the survey. Thus, even 12-15 months after the tsunami, a significant proportion (17.7%) of the respondents were unemployed as a result of the tsunami. It is also important to note that among the surveyed population, more than one-third (i.e. 36.7%) was unemployed even before the tsunami (Table 11). This is an indication that poverty was rife among the affected people, even prior to the tsunami, which was naturally accentuated after the tsunami. Moreover, even 12-15 months after the tsunami, a majority of the respondents (i.e. 54.4%) were unemployed (Table 11).

According to the survey results, fishing was the occupation of the highest proportion of the respondents prior to the tsunami, followed by self-employment, labourer, and micro and small entrepreneur. That is, 39.7% of the respondents were involved in fishing, 23.0% in self-employment, 12.8% as labourers, and 5.3% in micro & small entrepreneurship before the tsunami. A similar pattern of occupation was observed after the tsunami as well. Thus, 51.8% of the respondents were involved in fishing, 12.7% were labourers, 11.7% were self-employed, and 8.4% were

involved in micro and small entrepreneurship after the tsunami. These results indicate that fishing was the worst affected sub-sector, followed by self-employment, home gardening, micro and small enterprises (the latter may also include tourism-related enterprises). While the proportion of the respondents involved in fishing increased after the tsunami (from 40% to 52%), the proportion of those involved in self-employment cum micro and small entrepreneurship declined (from 28% to 20%).




Source: Survey Results

By region, prior to the tsunami, the largest proportion of employed people was in the south (67.0%), closely followed by the east (65.1%). The least number of employed was in the north (57.7%) (Table 11). As a corollary, unemployment was greatest in the north prior to the tsunami. However, 12-15 months after the tsunami, the largest share of the employed population was in the north

(47.7%) followed by the east (46.0%) and the south (43.0%) (Table 11). Hence, unemployment was greatest in the south 12-15 months after the tsunami. This may also indicate that employment generation during the reconstruction process has been relatively greater in the north than in the south or east. Thus, we could claim that post-tsunami reconstruction has been relatively more employment-intensive in the north, than in the other two regions, which could be partly due to labour intensive construction work.

It is also important to note that almost 58.4% of the spouses of respondents were employed prior to the tsunami, and 41.6% were unemployed (Table 11). But, at the time of the survey, only 46.6% of the spouses of respondents were employed while 53.4% were unemployed. Hence, while a majority (58.4%) of the spouses were employed before the tsunami, only a minority (46.6%) were in employment 12-15 months after the tsunami (Table 11). In other words, unemployment has increased among the spouses of respondents, as a result of the tsunami.



Source: Survey Results

Further, according to the survey results, fishing was the occupation of the majority of the spouses of respondents prior to and after the tsunami. That is, 54.8% of the spouses of respondents before the tsunami and 53.6% after the tsunami were fisherpersons. The second largest occupational category was that of a labourer, which accounted for 21.5% and 21.9% of the occupation of the spouses of respondents before and after the tsunami respectively. The foregoing figures indicate that there has not been much change in the type of occupation among the spouses of respondents before and after the tsunami. However, before the tsunami 12.6% of the spouses of respondents were involved in micro and small entrepreneurship and another 11.5% were involved in self-employment, which declined to 8.7% and 4.7% respectively after the tsunami. Hence, there was almost a 10.7% drop in micro and small enterprise, home gardening, and self-employment occupations among the spouses of respondents after the tsunami.

The largest proportion of the spouses of respondents in employment prior to the tsunami was in the east (60.1%), closely followed by the south (59.4%) and the north (55.3%). Similarly, the largest proportion of the spouses of respondents in employment after the tsunami was also in the east (50.8%), followed by the north (44.7%) and the south (43.8%) (Table 11). However, while the south experienced the highest drop in the employment of spouses of respondents (-15.6%) after the tsunami, the north experienced a drop of (-) 10.6% and the east (-) 9.3%.

### Income

The household income data from the survey reveal that a majority of the tsunami-affected households live in absolute poverty. Moreover, the income of households has dropped significantly, and remains so even 12-15 months after the tsunami. According to the survey results, on average each respondent household had 2.4 children before the tsunami and 2.3 children after the tsunami. Hence, the average size of the households (interviewed for the

survey) was at least<sup>13</sup> 4.4 before the tsunami and at least 4.3 after the tsunami. Therefore, households having an income lower than LKR.5,000 per month (i.e. LKR.1,136 or 1,163 per person per month before and after the tsunami respectively) is deemed absolutely poor for the purpose of this study.

However, the official national poverty line of Sri Lanka was LKR.1,928 per person per month in January 2006. The official poverty line for each district is available except the eight districts of the eastern and northern provinces. Accordingly, the poverty line for Galle was LKR. 1,986, Matara LKR. 1,889, and LKR.1,812 for Hambantota<sup>14</sup>. According to the latest (2002) Household Income and Expenditure Survey undertaken by the Department of Census and Statistics, 23.6% of the households in the southern province were deemed poor; a district-wise breakdown was - Galle 21.7%, Matara 23.2%, and Hambantota 27.8%. Although no official poverty data exists for the eastern and northern provinces it is estimated to be over 30% (see also Sarvananthan, 2005b).

The share of tsunami-affected households earning LKR.3,000 or less per month increased from 35.2% prior to the tsunami, to 57.0% after the tsunami (it would have been even higher immediately after the tsunami). Further, the share of tsunami-affected households earning Rs.3,001 to 5,000 per month dropped from 28.9% before, to 23.1% after the tsunami<sup>15</sup> (Table 12). Hence, while 64% of the tsunami-affected households were earning less than LKR.5,000 per month before the tsunami, it increased to 80% after the tsunami. That is, even prior to the tsunami, almost two-thirds of the households were in absolute poverty, which naturally increased to four-fifths after the tsunami (i.e. 12-15 months after). Thus, even 12-15 months after the

<sup>13</sup> Because households may have more members than children and their parents (for example, grandparents, grandchildren, etc).

<sup>14</sup> <http://www.statistics.gov.lk/index.asp>

<sup>15</sup> The post-tsunami household income of survey respondents does not include relief and livelihood assistance payments provided by the government/donors, because by the time of the survey all these have virtually stopped (see section 5.3 below).



tsunami, a higher proportion of affected households were in absolute poverty than before the tsunami. If we apply the official national poverty line, households receiving less than Rs.8,483 before the tsunami and Rs.8,290 after the tsunami are deemed poor. Accordingly, nearly 87% of the households prior to the tsunami and nearly 93% of the households after the tsunami were absolutely poor.

Further, the share of the higher income-earning households has dropped after the tsunami. For instance, households earning between LKR.5,001 and 10,000 per month were 23% of the total respondents before the tsunami, that dropped to 13% after the tsunami. Similarly, households earning LKR.10,001-15,000 per month were almost 9% before the tsunami, which dropped to 4.8% after the tsunami. Further, 3% of the respondents had an household income of LKR.15,001-20,000 per month prior to the tsunami, which declined to 1.5% after the tsunami. Moreover, 0.8% of the respondents had an household income of LKR.20,000 or over per month before the tsunami, that declined by half, to 0.5% after the tsunami (Table 12).

In summary, before the tsunami 64% of the households had an income of LKR.5,000 or less per month and the remaining 36% had an income greater than LKR.5,000 per month. However, after the tsunami, the share of households having an income of LKR.5,000 or less per month increased to 80% and the remaining 20% had an income greater than Rs.5,000 per month. Besides, it can be observed that, while the share of households earning an income of LKR.3,000 or less per month had increased (from 35.2% to 57.0%), the share of households earning an income over LKR.3,000 (in all the income groups) had declined (from 64.8% to 43%) after the tsunami, in comparison to pre-tsunami household incomes.

The survey also revealed that, before the tsunami, the northern province had the largest share of households earning LKR.5,000 or less per month, i.e. 82.5%. The eastern province had the second largest share of households earning LKR.5,000 or less per month before the tsunami, i.e. 64.1%. The share of households earning LKR.5,000 or less per month in the southern

province before the tsunami was 45.6% (Table 12). Further, it is also important to note that in terms of severity of poverty, while a bulk of the households (67.7% out of 82.5%) earning LKR.5,000 or less in the north was actually earning LKR.3,000 or less, the bulk of the households earning LKR.5,000 or less in the east (40.4% out of 64.1%) and the south (31.5% out of 45.6%) was earning LKR.3,001-LKR.5,000 per month (Table 12). Hence, it is clearly evident from the survey result that the north was the poorest region prior to the tsunami (out of the three provinces under consideration in this study), followed by the east, which is consistent with an earlier study on poverty in the east and the north (Sarvananthan, 2005b). Thus, not only in terms of headcount poverty, but in terms of severity of poverty as well, the north was the poorest prior to the tsunami.

Similarly, after the tsunami the north had the largest share of households earning LKR.5,000 or less per month, i.e. 94.0%. However, the south had the second largest share of households earning LKR.5,000 or less after the tsunami, i.e. 76.3%. The east had 69.9% of the households earning LKR.5,000 or less per month after the tsunami (Table 12). As before the tsunami, the bulk of the households in the north earning LKR.5,000 or less per month was actually earning LKR.3,000 or less (i.e. 81% out of 94%) after the tsunami as well. Further, in the east (42.7% out of 69.9%) and in the south (47.1% out of 76.3%) as well the majority of the households earning LKR.5,000 or less, was in fact earning LKR.3,000 or less after the tsunami (Table 12), which is the reverse of the pre-tsunami situation. Hence, after the tsunami also the north is the poorest region (out of the three provinces under consideration in this study), and followed by the south. These figures also indicate the rise in severity of poverty after the tsunami, in all three regions under consideration.

Poverty in the north, prior to as well as after the tsunami, would have been even greater, had we included the Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu districts in the survey, because, although no official data exists, anecdotal evidence suggests higher levels of poverty in those districts compared to the Jaffna district.

By district, Jaffna had the highest proportion of households living in poverty (i.e. Rs.5,000 or less) both before (82.5%) and after (94.0%) the tsunami. While the Batticaloa district had the second highest proportion of households living in poverty before the tsunami (79.8%), the Hambantota district had the second highest after the tsunami (92.2%). Similarly, while the Trincomalee district had the third highest proportion of households living in poverty before the tsunami (61.2%), it was the Batticaloa district after the tsunami (80.4%) (Table 12).

### Children

Households that were surveyed for this study had a total of 7,173 children before the tsunami, which decreased to 6,956 after the tsunami. Hence, 217 children were missing 12-15 months after the tsunami. There could be several reasons for these missing children. It could be that their lives have been taken away by the tsunami, or have been given to an orphanage having lost one of the parents, or in the care of a relative, or have left home for further/higher education or employment, or have been abducted for trafficking or combat (Human Rights Center of the University of California & East-West Center, 2005: 66). Unfortunately, the survey questionnaire did not probe the reason for missing children from the respondents. However, from our field observations we conclude that a bulk of the missing children were indeed casualties of the tsunami. On average, there were 2.4 children per household prior to the tsunami, which dropped negligibly to 2.3 in the aftermath of the tsunami.

The highest number of children in the respondent households was in the east, followed by the south and the north before, as well as, after the tsunami. That is, 2,481 (34.6%) children were in the east, 2,427 (33.8%) were in the south, and 2,265 (31.6%) were in the north before the tsunami. Similarly, 2,420 (34.8%) children were in the east, 2,286 (32.9%) children were in the south, and 2,250 (32.3%) children were in the north after the tsunami. Further, the highest drop in the number of children after the tsunami was

in the south (-141), followed by in the east (-61) and in the north (-15). Thus, 65% of the 'missing' children were in the south, 28% in the east, and 7% in the north.

By gender, the largest number of children after the tsunami was male. That is, 3,559 or 51.2% of the total were male children and the rest 3,397 or 48.8% were female children. Male children outnumbered female children in all three regions – by 104 in the east, by 40 in the north, and by 18 in the south.

According to the Commissioner for Probation and Child Care Services, there were 4,819 tsunami orphans in Sri Lanka (3,739 lost one parent and 1,080 lost both parents) (Human Rights Center of the University of California and East-West Center, 2005: 66), but very little welfare programmes have been launched for them either by the government or the donors. In India, the Tamilnadu state government has opened a bank account with a deposit of INR.500,000 (USD.11,500) in the name of each and every orphan due to the tsunami. The beneficiary can withdraw this money only when s/he reaches the age of eighteen (Human Rights Center of the University of California and East-West Center, 2005: 22).

### Education of children

The majority of the children of tsunami-affected households were neither school going, nor in further/higher education, nor in employment, prior to, as well as, after the tsunami. That is, 50.0% (3,588 out of 7,173) and 52.0% (3,616 out of 6,956) of the children prior to and after the tsunami respectively were neither studying nor in employment (derived from Tables 13 & 15). That is, either they were under the age of school going children (<5 years old) or they were staying at home after completing or dropping out of school. Also note that the share of homebound children has increased by 2% (28 in number) after the tsunami.

The second largest number of children was school going at the time of the tsunami, as well as afterwards. That is, 2,672 or 37.3% were school going prior to the tsunami and 2,443 or 35.1% were school going after the tsunami. By region, the largest number of children attending school prior to and after the tsunami was in



the east (1,014 and 973), followed by the north (848 and 745) and the south (810 and 725) (Table 13). Besides, there were more school going girls than boys both before and after the tsunami. That is, before the tsunami there were 1,371 girls and 1,301 boys, and after the tsunami there were 1,229 girls and 1,214 boys attending school. Further, girls outnumbered boys in the north and south (while it was equal in the east) before the tsunami, and boys outnumbered girls in the east and south (while it was the reverse in the north) after the tsunami (Table 13). Also note that the number of school going children has dropped by 2% (229 in number) after the tsunami (see also Human Rights Commission and CUCEC, 2005: 4).

The third largest number of children was working at the time of the tsunami as well as afterwards (see the following section for details). Only a small proportion of children were into further/higher education at the time of the tsunami, as well as afterwards. That is, only 253 or 3.5% of the total children were in further/higher education before the tsunami, which declined to 213 or 3.1% after the tsunami. The number of children in further/higher education was highest in the south (87 & 84 respectively), closely followed by in the east (86 & 79 respectively) both before and after the tsunami. The least number of children in further/higher education was in the north; i.e. 80 before and 50 after the tsunami (Table 13). Hence, the greatest drop in the number of children in further/higher education was in the north, accounting for 75% (30 out of 40) of the total drop.

Furthermore, girls outnumbered boys in further/higher education before and after the tsunami. That is, 133 and 108 girls were in further/higher education before and after the tsunami respectively, against 120 and 105 boys respectively (Table 13). By region, girls outnumbered boys in the north as well as the south, but it was the reverse in the east, before, as well as after the tsunami, (see Table 13). Also note that the drop in the number of children in further/higher education was greater among girls (-25) than boys (-15). Thus, the gender gap in further/higher education has greatly narrowed after the tsunami, despite girls still outnumbering boys marginally.

In total, in our sample households, 229 children appear to have stopped going to school and 40 children appear to have dropped out of further/higher education after the tsunami (altogether 269). On the other hand, 28 more children were homebound and 24 more children were in employment (see the following section) after the tsunami. Besides, 217 children were missing after the tsunami, as noted above. Hence, the missing children, as well as the increase in homebound and employed children, adds up to 269, which tallies with the total of presumed dropouts from school as well as from further/higher education.

Among the households having children dropped out of school after the tsunami, an overwhelming majority cited financial hardship as the reason for their children not attending school. That is, almost 74% of the households mentioned financial hardship as the reason for their children not attending school after the tsunami, which was noted under the 'other' category. Further, another 10.6% of the households cited unavailability of books, 7.6% cited non-availability of transport to school, 6.6% cited non-availability of school uniform, and only 1.3% cited unavailability of school nearby their new abode (Table 14). One qualitative study undertaken through focus group meetings in 13 affected districts revealed that there is high rate of absenteeism at school even 7-9 months after the tsunami, among the tsunami-affected children possibly due to trauma (Human Rights Commission and CUCEC, 2005: 4).

Among the households having children discontinued further/higher education after the tsunami (37), again a vast majority cited financial hardship as the reason for discontinuation of further/higher education. That is, 73.0% of tsunami-affected households mentioned 'financial difficulties' as the reason, followed by 10.8% due to lack of clothing and stationery, 8.1% due to lack of transport, and another 8.1% due to lack of safety. Further, among the households having children who were made unemployed due to the tsunami (36), 91.7% of the households mentioned loss of equipment/implements, 5.6% mentioned disability, and 2.8% mentioned non-availability of transport, as the cause of their unemployment.

### Employment of children

Out of the total number of children in the respondent households, 9.2% (660 out of 7,173) were in employment prior to the tsunami, which increased marginally to 9.8% (684 out of 6,956) after the tsunami. By region, the largest number of employed children was in the south (310 before and 295 after) followed by the east (176 before and 196 after) both before and after the tsunami. The north had the least number of children employed, i.e. 174 before and 193 after the tsunami (Table 15). However, there was only a negligible difference between the east and north as regards the number of employed children of respondent households. On the other hand, the gap between the south and the east and north was significant.

Further, boys outnumbered girls among the employed children of tsunami-affected households both before (498 boys vs. 162 girls) and after the tsunami (527 boys vs. 157 girls). Besides, while the number of boys in employment increased, the number of girls in employment dropped after the tsunami. Moreover, the gender gap among employed children was greatest in the east and the north, compared to the south both before and after the tsunami (Table 15).

### 5.3 Relief

The government and various donor agencies offered a series of relief and welfare assistance to the tsunami-affected people, immediately from the tragedy onwards, which perhaps goes on to date. Overseas governments, inter-governmental organisations, multilateral organisations, global corporate sector, local and international non-profit organisations, domestic private sector, and individual philanthropists both at home and abroad generously funded these relief and welfare programmes. In fact, the total pledges made for reconstruction and recovery activities were in excess of the identified needs. Furthermore, perhaps for the first time (at times of disaster), pledges and commitments were followed up with actual payments<sup>16</sup>.

<sup>16</sup> <http://www.tsunamispecialenvoy.org/>

In the history of disasters to hit developing countries, donations from the private corporate sector for tsunami relief and rehabilitation was unprecedented. In a trans-national comparative analysis of corporate giving for the three major disasters in 2005, viz. tsunami (Asia), hurricane Katrina (United States), and earthquake (Pakistan), Munir and Jamal (2005: 5) found that Katrina attracted USD.331, tsunami USD.91, and earthquake just USD.6 per displaced person. This analysis was based on data from 23 trans-national corporations, 70 percent of which were American and the rest European. Accordingly, these 23 trans-national corporations<sup>17</sup> donated USD.142 million to the tsunami, USD.99 million to the hurricane, and USD.20 million to the earthquake (Munir and Jamla, 2005: 4).

This section tries to find out people's travails in receiving relief and welfare assistance from various benefactors. Equity, fairness, and timeliness in relief disbursement are analysed.

### Funeral allowance

Soon after the tsunami, the government offered LKR.15,000 (USD 150) per household which had lost at least one person as a result of the tsunami, for funeral expenses. Accordingly, 334 respondent households had received LKR.15,000 towards funeral expenses, which was 84.1% of the total number of households that was eligible in our sample (397). However, 40 households (10.1%) received a lesser amount than LKR.15,000, and 23 households (5.8%) did not receive any money at all (Table 16). Despite few households not receiving any money at all and few more receiving lesser amounts (most probably due to siphoning off by someone down the delivery line) it was good to know that bulk of the deserving people have received the relief money.

<sup>17</sup> Alcatel, American Express, BASF, Bayer, Chevron-Caltex, Citi group, Coca Cola, GSK, Intel, Johnson and Johnson, Kodak, MERK, Microsoft, Monsanto, Motorola, Nokia, Pepsi Cola, Pfizer, Procter and Gamble, Shell, Siemens, Unilever, and Wyeth.

In addition to the government, some charitable and/or religious organisations also did help out some households to meet their funeral expenses. Accordingly, 64 households in our sample did receive some help from a non-government source to meet the funeral expenses, which was only 17.2% of the total respondents to this question (373). Thus, 82.8% of the respondent households did not receive any financial help from a second source. The organisations identified by the respondents were Samurdhi Bank (21), TRO (19), EHED (8), FORUT (2), Sewa Lanka (2), and World Vision (1).

By region, the largest proportion of households receiving the full amount of funeral allowance was in the south (89.2%), followed by the east (80.1%). Northern households accounted for the least share of recipients of the full amount of funeral allowance (78.5%). Among the households that received lesser amounts, the highest proportion was in the north (12.3%), followed by the south (9.7%) and the east (9.6%). The highest proportion of households having received nothing at all was in the east (10.3%), closely followed by the north (9.2%) (Table 16). Therefore, despite highest number of deaths due to the tsunami was reported in the east and second highest in the south (Table 5), the highest proportion of recipients of funeral allowances was in the south and the second highest in the east.

By district, the highest share of recipients of funeral allowances was in the Hambantota district (100%) followed by in the Trincomalee district (90%), and Galle district (81.3%) (Table 16). This was despite the fact that the Ampara district (10,436) had more than double the number of deaths than the Hambantota district (4,500) (Table 5).

### Cooking utensils allowance

The government also gave an immediate grant of LKR 2,500 (USD 25) per displaced household to purchase cooking utensils to be used in relief tents. Again it was good to know that the bulk of the tsunami-affected households had received this grant. That is, survey results reveal that 85.2% of the households (2,498) have received LKR 2,500 for the purchase of cooking utensils. Another

12.4% of the households (364) received no money at all for the purchase of cooking utensils. Further, 71 households (2.4%) received lesser than the stipulated amount (Table 17). Hence, almost 15% of the tsunami-affected households have experienced part or full siphoning off of their entitlement or have been simply overlooked.

In addition to the government, several donor agencies and I/NGOs provided cooking utensils (in kind) to affected households, in various parts of the country. Accordingly, 66.6% of the affected households have received cooking utensils in kind, but the remaining 33.4% have not received from any other party (Table 17). The survey respondents identified 23 donor organisations that provided cooking utensils to them; out of which the Red Cross (731), UNHCR (634), World Vision (306), Sewa Lanka (179), UNICEF (133), Oxfam (115), Care International (108), and Sarvodaya (94) had the highest frequency.

Again, affected households in the south received the highest share of cooking utensils allowance of LKR 2,500 given by the government (91.4% or 901), closely followed by the east (89.6% or 892), and the lowest being the north (74.1% or 705). As a corollary, the highest share of households not receiving any money at all was in the north (18.7% or 178), followed by the east (10.1% or 101), and the least being the south (8.6% or 85). Further, households receiving lesser amounts were totally in the north (68 out of 71) and the east (3 out of 71) (Table 17). The foregoing figures demonstrate that the bulk of the non-payment and under-payment of cooking utensils allowance was in the north, followed by the east, which could also indicate that malpractices and/or administrative lapses were greater in the north and the east than in the south. This result corroborates with an earlier study (Sarvanathan, 2005a).

In contrast, the highest share of affected households receiving cooking utensils in kind from various donor agencies was in the north (77.9% or 767), followed by the south (72.5% or 713), and the least being the east (49.4% or 489). By district, the highest share of recipients of government allowances for cooking

utensils was in the Matara district (95.5%), closely followed by the Batticaloa district (94.9%) and the Galle district (94.0%). On the other hand, the highest share of non-recipients of cooking utensils allowance was in the Trincomalee district (22.3%), but the highest share of under-payment of cooking utensils allowance was in the Jaffna district (7.2%) (Table 17).

### Relief coupons

The government provided relief coupons to the affected people to the value of LKR.375 (USD.3.75) per person per week for 32 weeks (8 months). This was split into LKR.175 (USD.1.75) worth of essential food items in kind<sup>18</sup> and LKR.200 (USD.2) was paid in cash towards non-food items (to be chosen by the recipients). The World Food Programme sponsored this relief effort.

Accordingly, a vast majority of the affected households, i.e. 97.2% (2,905), did receive the relief coupons and only 2.8% (83) did not. In the south 98.8% (977) received the relief coupons, while it was 96.8% (967) in the north and 96.1% (961) in the east. Further, Galle (99.3%), Matara (99.3%), and Hambantota (97.7%) districts had the highest shares of recipients of relief coupons. However, the share of non-recipient households (albeit very low) was highest in the east (3.9%) and closely followed by in the north (3.2%). Besides, by district, the highest shares of non-recipients were in Trincomalee (5.8%), Ampara (4.0%), and Jaffna (3.2%) (Table 18). Thus, whatever little malpractices and/or administrative lapses existed in the distribution of relief coupons, it was greatest in the east and north, particularly in Trincomalee, Ampara and Jaffna districts.

Further, each and every member of the household was entitled to the LKR.375 worth relief coupons. However, only 89% (2,615) of the affected households have received relief coupons for all the members in the household, and only some members of

<sup>18</sup> Rice or Wheat flour 2,800 grammes per person per week, Dhal (lentils) 420 grammes per person per week, Sugar 140 grammes per person per week, & Cooking oil 140 grammes per person per week.

the rest 11% (327) of the households have received relief coupons. The highest share of recipients for all the members in the household was in the south (96.7%), followed by in the east (88.2%). The least share of recipients for all the members was in the north (81.6%). By district, the highest shares of recipients for all the members were in Hambantota (99.0%), followed by Ampara (96.9%) and Matara (96.0%). As a corollary, 18.4% of the households in the north and 11.8% of the households in the east did not receive relief coupons for all the members, which was only 3.3% in the south. By district, 27.8% of the households in Batticaloa, 18.4% of the households in Jaffna, and 15.4% in Trincomalee did not receive relief coupons for all the members (Table 18). This again demonstrates that malpractices and/or administrative lapses in relief disbursement were highest in the east and north, particularly in the Batticaloa and the Jaffna districts.

Moreover, each member of the household was entitled to get relief coupons for a period of 32 weeks or 8 months. However, a majority of affected households did not receive so. That is, only 37.7% (1,081) of the households received for the full 32 weeks and the rest 62.3% (1,785) received for a lesser number of weeks. Ironically, not a single household in the east received relief coupons for 32 weeks. The highest share of households that received for 32 weeks was in the south (82.5%), followed by the north (30.1%). By district, the highest shares of households that received relief coupons for the full period were in Matara (99.0%), followed by Galle (94.2%). On the other hand, the highest share of households receiving relief coupons for lesser than the stipulated period was in the east (100.0%), followed by the north (69.9%). In the south, only 17.5% of the households received for a shorter period. By district, the highest shares of recipients of relief coupons for a shorter period were in Ampara, Batticaloa, and Trincomalee (100.0% each), followed by Jaffna (69.9%) (Table 18). Once again malpractices and/or administrative lapses in relief distribution were greatest in the east and north.

The distribution of relief coupons commenced at different times in different districts. In some districts it commenced only in April, i.e. three months after the tsunami. Hence, 31.1% of the

affected households were still getting relief items and cash payments at the time of the survey. The highest shares of such late recipients were in the north (42.4%), followed by the south (31.9%). By district, the highest shares of households still getting relief coupons were in Galle (49.4%), Jaffna (42.4%), Ampara (27.0%), and Matara (26.3%) (Table 18). This result indicates that the distribution of relief coupons commenced late in the Galle, Jaffna, Ampara, and Matara districts.

In sum, malpractices and/or administrative lapses in the distribution of relief coupons were greatest in the north and east, particularly in the Jaffna, Ampara, and Batticaloa districts. These results tally with a previous study (albeit a smaller scale one) highlighting specific modalities of siphoning off tsunami relief in the north<sup>19</sup> based on fieldwork in the LTTE-controlled areas (see Sarvananthan, 2005a). Jaffna and Batticaloa districts, despite largely under the control of the government, also have significant indirect control by the LTTE. The Auditor General of Sri Lanka also highlighted specific modalities of corruption in relief disbursements<sup>20</sup> in Kalmunai and Sainthamaruthu DS areas (Ampara district), Hikkaduwa DS area (Galle district), Tangalle DS area (Hambantota district), and the Mannar district in an interim report dated June 30, 2005<sup>21</sup>.

Corruption in tsunami relief came to surface in late-2006 in the Jaffna peninsula. Since the closure of the A9 highway from August 12, 2006 there is an acute shortage of food items in the peninsula. Some of the tsunami relief items siphoned off last year (2005) have come to the market through the Multi Purpose Co-operative Societies (MPCSs) recently. There were imported

<sup>19</sup> Underpayment of due entitlements, undeserving claimants, pilferage of relief goods, and non-payment of cash grants.

<sup>20</sup> Relief coupons given to unaffected people in Ampara district, unauthorised payments made in Ampara district, though Mannar district (north) was not affected by the tsunami over LKR.1 million has been spent for the supply of cooked meals to displaced people, overpayment for damaged houses in Tangalle, etc.

<sup>21</sup> <http://www.auditorgeneral.lk/reports/>

canned fish with the label "not for sale" and packets of wheat flour with "donated by World Food Programme" sticker for sale in the MPCSSs in the peninsula recently. These were part of the loot of tsunami relief that took place in the north as revealed in Sarvananthan (2005a).

### Livelihood allowance

In addition to the relief coupons (cash and in kind), the government also provided a cash grant of LKR.5,000 (USD.50) per household per month towards livelihood restoration, which was sponsored by the World Bank. The rationale behind this livelihood allowance was that, while the relief coupons were essential for basic survival of the affected people, additional cash grant was necessary for re-starting their livelihood activities such as fishing, micro and small enterprises, etc. However, tsunami-affected public sector employees were not given the grant. The livelihood grant was originally planned to be given for a period of six months. Please note that this was for the entire household, whereas the relief coupons were for each member of the household.

Once again, an overwhelming majority of the affected households did receive the livelihood allowance. That is, 92.5% (2,765) of the households received the allowance at least for a few months. The highest share of recipients was in the south (93.6%) and very closely followed by in the east (92.9%). The least share was in the north (91.1%). Hence, the shares of recipients were not much different between regions. Trincomalee (97.1%), Matara (96.2%), and Galle (95.5%) districts had the largest shares of recipients (Table 19). However, 3.8% (115) of the households did not receive the livelihood grant at all and 3.6% (108) of the households received less than the stipulated amount. The highest share of non-recipient households was in the east (5.2%) followed by the south (3.3%) and the north (2.9%). Further, Ampara (6.7%), Hambantota (4.3%), and Batticaloa (4.1%) districts had the largest shares of non-recipient households. Moreover, the highest shares of households that received lesser amounts were in the north (6.0%), followed by the south (3.0%). Hambantota (7.0%) and Jaffna

(6.0%) districts had the largest shares of households that received lesser amounts (Table 19).

Besides, a bulk of the affected households received the livelihood grant for only 3 or 4 months. That is, 92.5% (2,608) of the affected households received for 3 or 4 months only, and another 5.9% (167) received only for 1 or 2 months. Further, only 43 households (1.6%) received for 5 or 6 months (Table 19). Thus, 98.4% of the affected households received monthly livelihood allowances for less than 5 months. Shares of households that received livelihood allowances for 3 or 4 months were highest in the north (95.4%) and the east (93.1%), and closely followed by the south (89.2%). Jaffna (95.4%), Batticaloa (95.1%), and Ampara (94.8%) districts had the highest shares of households that received livelihood allowances for 3 or 4 months. On the other hand, the highest share of households that received livelihood allowances for 1 or 2 months was in the south (10.3%), followed by the east (5.2%). Besides, Trincomalee (21.6%), Matara (15.2%), and Hambantota (10.6%) districts had the highest shares of households that received livelihood allowances for 1 or 2 months. The north topped the share of households that received livelihood allowances for 5 or 6 months (2.4%), followed by the east (1.7%). Ampara (2.7%) and Jaffna (2.4%) districts topped the share of households that received livelihood allowances for 5 or 6 months (Table 19). The foregoing data reveal that the duration of livelihood grant has been erratic among different tsunami-affected regions. However, the north (97.8%) and the east (94.8%) topped the regions that received livelihood grant for 3-6 months, closely followed by the south (89.7%).

Commencement of the payment of livelihood grant also differed from place to place. However, only 5.4% of the households (155) were still getting the livelihood grant at the time of the survey. The south had the highest share of households receiving livelihood allowance at the time of the survey (6.4%), closely followed by the north (5.8%). Galle (15.2%), Batticaloa (6.2%), and Jaffna (5.8%) districts had the highest shares of households that were still getting the livelihood allowance at the time of the survey (Table 19).

In addition to the foregoing cash and in-kind relief assistance provided by the government (largely sponsored by donors), several I/NGOs and bilateral/multilateral donor agencies provided in-kind livelihood restoration assistance to affected communities. Several donors donated fishing boats, fishing nets, agricultural implements, self-employment equipment, etc, to affected fisherpersons, farmers, and micro entrepreneurs. These donations had distorted the markets for these items in areas where they were distributed. In fact, according to anecdotal evidence, there was over supply of these in-kind donations whereby fisherpersons got more than one boat or more than required fishing nets from multiple donors, which resulted in recipients selling the excess stock at below market price, thereby distorting the markets for these items.

Moreover, there were leakages and pilferages of in-kind livelihood restoration assistance provided by various donors. For example, several non-affected people got in-kind livelihood restoration assistance from various donors. Besides, such donations were leaked or pilfered by people in-charge of distribution. When the Sri Lankan security forces captured several LTTE military camps in the Eastern Province in December 2006 and January 2007, several tsunami donation items were in the possession of the rebels, including fishing boats donated by Save the Children Fund (British INGO) and medicine donated by Zoa Refugee Care (Dutch INGO). There would be many more such items in the possession of the LTTE when the security forces eventually enter the LTTE-stronghold of Vanni region in the Northern Province, which could further confirm the findings of Sarvananthan (2005a).

### **Source of relief immediately after the tsunami**

The government's response to the tsunami tragedy was very slow and lukewarm, partly because the administrative mechanism of the government has never experienced a calamity of such proportion. Besides, tsunami struck the day after Christmas and the last week of the year is traditionally a go-slow period in public administration. In this circumstance, the survey wanted to find

out how the affected people coped in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami. The survey found that the local communities and neighbouring villages were the ones to offer immediate help (in terms of food and clothing) to the displaced households.

Thus, 45.3% of the affected households received food from local communities, 17.7% received from neighbouring villages (noted in the 'other' category), 17.1% received from relatives, and only 11.2% received from the NGOs (Table 20). Hence, about 80% of the affected households received food immediately after the disaster from local and neighbouring communities and relatives. Further, 28.7% of the affected households received clothing from local communities, 25.4% from NGOs, 18.6% from relatives, and 17.3% from neighbouring villages (noted in the 'other' category) (Table 20). Hence, 64.6% of the affected households received clothing immediately after the tsunami from local and neighbouring communities and relatives.

Moreover, only a tiny proportion of the affected people did not receive any food (0.5%) or clothing (2.1%) from outsiders immediately after the tsunami, and only a tiny proportion did receive food (1.3%) or clothing (0.3%) from the local government (see Table 20). The foregoing results reveal enormous spontaneous compassion shown by local communities, irrespective of ethnicity, religion, caste, or class, in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami, towards the affected people. Nonetheless, there is some concern that such spontaneous compassion, immediately after the tsunami, has given way to envy and resentment due to the influx of unprecedented aid and attention to the tsunami-affected communities (Human Rights Commission and CUCEC, 2005: 6).

### **Favouritism in disbursement of relief**

Usually, in Sri Lanka, welfare programmes are plagued by political patronage and favouritism. In this context, it is quite heartening to note that 71.4% of the affected households did not experience or witness any favouritism in the distribution of relief after the tsunami. Nevertheless, considerable proportion, i.e. 28.6%, did experience or witness patronage and favouritism. The highest share of

households experiencing or witnessing favouritism in tsunami relief was in the south (61.5%), followed by the east (18.3%). The survey also revealed that the single largest share of households (i.e. 44.2%) identified bribery and corruption (noted in the "other" category) as the basis of favouritism, closely followed by political patronage (43.0%). The highest share of households citing bribery and corruption as the cause for favouritism, was in the south (53.3%), followed by the east (24.9%), and the highest share citing political patronage as the cause for favouritism was in the east (53.6%), followed by the south (44.0%). Gladly, ethnic, religious, or caste-based favouritism was quite marginal in the distribution of tsunami relief in Sri Lanka. Only 5.6% of the households identified ethnic favouritism, 5.0% identified religious favouritism<sup>22</sup>, and 2.2% identified caste favouritism in tsunami relief (Table 21). The north had the highest shares of households that experienced or witnessed ethnic (31.1%), religious (32.8%), or caste (23.0%) favouritism in tsunami relief.

However, a village level qualitative study has identified some instances of ethnic discrimination in certain districts of Sri Lanka (Human Rights Commission and CUCEC, 2005: 5). Further, in Tamilnadu (India), tsunami-affected Dalits and Adivasis were said to be discriminated in relief and rehabilitation assistance (Mohan and Narrain, 2005; Human Rights Center of the University of California and East-West Center, 2005: 17-18). For an island undergoing a protracted ethnic conflict for the past quarter century, the foregoing results are encouraging. Nevertheless, bribery and corruption and political patronage are scourges of modern societies. Appropriate measures should be taken to eradicate such blatant undermining of sound governance in the country.

In conclusion of this sub-section, it is fair to claim that various relief and welfare programmes undertaken after the tsunami have reached significant majority of the affected households in all three

<sup>22</sup> However, in India religious favouritism in disbursement of relief by faith-based NGOs was identified in some districts in Tamilnadu state (Human Rights Center of the University of California and East-West Center, 2005: 24).



regions surveyed. Hence, the government and the donor agencies have performed reasonably well in reaching out to the affected people. Whatever small-scale malpractices and/or administrative lapses existed in the distribution of relief and welfare assistance have been relatively higher in the north and east than in the south, presumably due to dual authority (GoSL and the LTTE) in these conflict areas. It is also important to highlight that discrimination in the disbursement of relief and welfare assistance has been quite low.

However, relief and rehabilitation package provided to the tsunami-affected people in neighbouring India was much more generous than in Sri Lanka, particularly because the affected people were provided relief by both the central and state governments<sup>23</sup>. The Tamilnadu state government made a payment of INR.100,000 (USD.2,300) to the next of kin of each deceased person. On top of it, the Prime Minister's office also made a one-off payment of INR.100,000 to the next of kin of each person who died in the tsunami. Further, the central government offered an immediate relief package that included INR.4,000 (USD.92) cash plus rice, fuel, cooking stove, and vessel for water. Additionally, for three months (February-April 2005) the state government offered a relief package consisting of INR.1,000 (USD.23) in cash and goods worth INR.526 (USD.12) per month to every member of the affected households. Moreover, owners of fishing boats were compensated in cash between INR.25,000 (catamarans USD.575) to INR.500,000 (mechanised boats USD.11,500) depending on the extent of damage caused by the tsunami. In addition, various NGOs provided variety of relief packages (Human Rights Center of the University of California and East-West Center, 2005: 16).

<sup>23</sup> This could be a potential marketing tool for advocacy groups promoting a federal system of governance in Sri Lanka to resolve the long running ethnic conflict.

**Comparison of Tsunami Relief in India & Sri Lanka**

Type of Relief by the government	India (Tamilnadu state)	Sri Lanka
Compensation to the next of kin of the deceased	USD.4,600	USD.150
Cooking utensils	Cooking stove & utensils per household	USD.25 per household
Relief-in-kind	USD.12 per person per month + rice, fuel, etc.	USD.15 per person per month
Livelihood allowance	USD.115	USD.50
Fishing boats	USD.575 – USD.11,500	New boats
Housing grant	USD.3,450 (see section 5.4 below)	USD.2,500 (see section 5.4 below)
Grant to orphans	USD.11,500 per orphan	None

There is an endless debate on the best or most appropriate way of providence of relief in the aftermath of natural or human-made disasters. Some prefer food or relief-in-kind and others prefer cash grants. The advocates of the former argue that basic needs of the affected/displaced people have to be met in order to prevent starvation and death, while advocates of cash grants argue that providing food or relief-in-kind would make the affected people dependent on relief for a longer period; instead, if cash grant (for

a limited period) is provided, it will enable the recipients to get onto their feet sooner and empower the affected people through freedom of choice. The World Food Programme (WFP) is an advocate of the former while the ILO and various INGOs are advocates of the latter. This debate between cash transfers and transfers-in-kind is not only confined to poverty alleviation in the context of emergencies such as natural or human-made disasters, but in longer-term development discourse as well. Recent interest in this perennial debate was rekindled by the publication of a series of articles in the special issues of *Development Policy Review* (2006) and *Disasters* (2006). Whilst the articles in the former journal debate the pros and cons of cash transfers as means of poverty alleviation in normal development discourse, articles in the latter journal debate the pros and cons of cash transfers as a means of poverty alleviation in emergencies such as natural or human-made disasters.

In the aftermath of the tsunami in Sri Lanka, the WFP implemented food-for-work programmes, while INGOs such as Oxfam and CARE International implemented cash-for-work programmes among selected tsunami-affected communities, though these were not widespread. The ILO was in the forefront of promoting the idea of providing livelihood grants to tsunami-affected households (for a limited period of course) in Sri Lanka, in addition to food aid. The rationale was that, while food aid was necessary for sustenance of life, cash grant was necessary to revive the livelihoods of the affected people. Despite opposition from some development partners like the World Bank the government accepted the proposal of the ILO on livelihood grant.

There is evidence from various parts of the developing world that food aid distorts local agriculture markets and cash grants (usually given to the head of the household who would be mostly male) lead to growing alcoholism and tobacco usage (wasteful expenditure in general) among male members of the households. However, a growing body of literature provides empirical evidence that cash grants are utilised sensibly by recipients, women in the households do share such grants, and cash grant is the most cost-effective way of disbursement of relief (for a literature review

see Harvey, 2006; Harvey, 2005, and references therein; Skoufias, 2003). Recent investigation of a cash-for-work programme implemented by Mercy Corps (INGO) in Aceh (Indonesia) has arrived at the conclusion that cash-for-work programmes by infusing liquid cash into a depleted monetary economy and thereby boosting the local economies are superior to food-for-work programmes, because they are easier to implement (lesser transaction costs) and does less harm to local agricultural markets (Doocy, Shannon, et al, 2006).

However, the foregoing study does not investigate the flip side of the cash-for-work programmes; i.e. because most of the participants in cash-for-work programmes would be males, women and children in the households may not get their due share even for their basic needs. Alcoholism, tobacco and drug usage among male members of the affected households have created lot of problems for females and children in tsunami-affected communities in India and the Maldives (see Human Rights Center of the University of California and East-West Center, 2005), and conflict-affected communities in Sri Lanka (Sarvananthan, et al, 1995). Therefore, further investigations into the merits and demerits of various forms of relief in the aftermath of natural and human-made disasters are required.

In Indonesia, given the circumstance that no cash grant was offered to tsunami-affected households in Aceh, cash-for-work programme was a great boon to the affected communities and hence its popularity. In the same way, cash grant (LKR.5,000 per month per household) provided to tsunami-affected households in Sri Lanka has ameliorated the post-tsunami economic desolation of families and communities.

#### 5.4 Housing

As noted in Chapter 3, out of the total tsunami reconstruction expenditures anticipated in Sri Lanka, one-third was destined for housing reconstruction. Not only in monetary terms, but also in terms of buffer zone stipulation, land availability and identification, other logistical matters, and customer preferences, the housing

reconstruction programme for the tsunami-affected households has been the most arduous of all the recovery activities. Even two years after the tsunami, housing reconstruction efforts continue to be the most commented and criticised part of the entire post-tsunami recovery efforts in the country.

However, 'build-back better' means infrastructure facilities need to be upgraded along with housing reconstruction. Lack of building materials such as sand, brick, wood, skilled labour, etc, has contributed to the delay. Replenishing this stock, partly lost in the tsunami, takes time. This ground reality needs to be appreciated by all concerned.

### Type of current residence

More than a year after the tsunami, almost half (46.7%) the tsunami-affected households were in transitory or temporary shelters. Further 22.4% of the tsunami-affected households were in their pre-tsunami homes, and another 21.2% of the households have been provided with new permanent homes. Thus, only 43.6% of the tsunami-affected households were living in permanent residences more than twelve months after the tsunami. Moreover, 5.3% of the affected households were living in the home of a friend or relative, 3.8% of the households were still languishing in relief tents, and 0.6% of the households were living in rented homes (Table 22). The foregoing data reveal the slow progress of construction of permanent homes for tsunami-affected people in Sri Lanka.

The highest share of households having received permanent homes built by a donor was in the north (36.5%), followed by the south (21.0%) and the east (6.2%). By district, highest shares of recipients of permanent homes were in Jaffna (36.5%), Galle (28.5%), Hambantota (21.3%), and Batticaloa (14.9%) (Table 22). Households living in transitory shelter were highest in the east (62.0%), followed by the south (42.3%) and the north (35.9%). The Ampara district had the highest share of households living in transitory shelters (72.0%), followed by Hambantota (55.3%), Matara (50.2%), Batticaloa (47.3%), and Trincomalee (46.2%)

districts (Table 22). At the same time, the highest share of affected households living in their pre-tsunami homes was in the south (32.0%), followed by the east (21.9%) and the north (13.4%). Galle (38.3%), Matara (35.3%), and Trincomalee (27.9%) districts had the largest share of households living in their pre-tsunami homes (Table 22).

Ampara, the worst affected district, had the highest share of households living in transitory shelter. Further, the Ampara district had the lowest share of households that have received permanent houses (2.2%) among the seven districts surveyed. The Ampara district, despite accounting for 28% (27,562) of the total number of houses damaged in the country (97,865), had only 2.2% of the respondent households living in a permanent houses (built by donors), and 72.0% of the respondent households living in transitory shelter by the time of the survey. On the other hand, the Batticaloa district, which accounted for the second highest number of houses damaged in the tsunami (i.e. 18% or 17,708), had 14.9% of the respondent households living in permanent houses (built by donors) (see Tables 5 & 22). Hence, the Ampara district seems to be lagging far behind other tsunami-affected districts in terms of housing reconstruction. Coastal areas in the Ampara district are densely populated and therefore lack of suitable land has been a major constraint to housing reconstruction there, whilst the need has been the greatest.

### Type of pre-tsunami residence

It is also important to note that a significant majority of the tsunami-affected households, i.e. 74.4% (2,222), were living in concrete houses before the tsunami. This is in contrast to India and Indonesia where the majority of the tsunami-affected households were reported to be living in wooden or tin shack or cadjun hut. The second highest share of the affected households was living in cadjun hut (14.2% or 423) followed by in tin shed (11.1% or 333). Only 10 affected households did not have a house to live prior to the tsunami, 9 of which were in Jaffna (Table 23).

By region, the share of affected households living in concrete houses prior to the tsunami was greatest in the south (91.4%), followed by the east (83.7%). The least share of households living in concrete houses was in the north (48.1%). On the other hand, the highest shares of affected households living in cadjun hut and tin shed (before the tsunami) were in the north, i.e. 31.3% and 19.6% respectively. The corresponding shares in the east were 7.5% and 8.7% respectively, and in the south 3.5% and 5.1% respectively (Table 23). By district, Hambantota (95.0%), Galle (91.3%), and Ampara (86.2%) districts had the highest shares of households living in concrete houses before the tsunami. On the other hand, the highest proportions of households living in cadjun hut and tin shed were in Jaffna (31.3% and 19.6% respectively), followed by Batticaloa (10.1% in cadjun hut) and Trincomalee (14.4% in tin shed).

Moreover, it is striking that 81.3% (2,429) of the tsunami-affected households owned their residence prior to the tsunami; second highest share lived in relatives' home (9.3% or 278) followed by in rented property (3.3% or 99) (Table 23). Share of households living in own houses was highest in the east (93.8%), followed by the south (83.8%) and the north (66.3%). On the other hand, the highest share living in relatives' home and rented home was in the north (13.2% and 4.6% respectively), followed by the south (11.6% and 3.3% respectively) (Table 23). The Ampara district topped the districts in terms of having the highest share of owned houses prior to the tsunami (96.5%), followed by Batticaloa (90.5%) and Trincomalee (87.5%) (Table 23).

### Extent of damage and repair

The homes of a majority of the affected households were fully damaged and a significant proportion of homes were partly damaged. Only a tiny proportion of the affected households did not have any damage to their home. Thus, 60.9% (1,820) of the households had their home fully damaged and another 35.6% (1,064) had their home partly damaged. Only 3.5% of the households (104) did not have any damage to their home (Table

24). The largest proportion of fully damaged houses was in the east (67.0%), followed by the north (58.7%) and the south (57.0%). The highest proportion of partly damaged houses was in the south (41.4%), followed by the north (34.0%) and the east (31.5%). On the other hand, the highest proportion of no damage was reported in the north (7.3%), followed by the south (1.6%) and the east (1.5%) (Table 24). The highest proportions of fully damaged houses were in Batticaloa (79.1%), Hambantota (68.7%), and Ampara (62.8%) districts. Similarly, the highest proportions of partly damaged houses were in Matara (49.5%), Galle (44.8%) and Trincomalee (42.3%) districts (Table 24).

A vast majority of the partly or fully damaged houses have not been repaired or rebuilt at the time of the survey (12-15 months after the tsunami). That is, 69.8% (1,928) of the damaged houses have not been repaired nor rebuilt. The largest shares of non-repaired or un-built houses were in the east (80.3%), followed by the north (71.6%). Ampara (88.0%), Hambantota (86.4%), and Jaffna (71.6%) districts had the highest shares of non-repaired or un-built houses. Out of the repaired or rebuilt houses, the highest proportion was built by affected households themselves (8.4%) or by personal/private benefactors<sup>24</sup> (8.3%). The INGOs accounted for 7.8% of the houses and NGOs for 5.8% of the houses repaired/rebuilt (Table 24). These figures demonstrate the individual enterprise of tsunami-affected population. The highest proportions of self-repaired/built and by personal/private benefactors were in the south (20.1% and 13.7% respectively), particularly in the Galle district (21.1% & 22.4% respectively). In contrast, the highest proportion of houses repaired/rebuilt by the INGOs and NGOs was in the north (9.5% & 10.5% respectively). Batticaloa district had the highest share of houses repaired/rebuilt by the INGOs (20.7%) and Trincomalee (10.9%) and Jaffna (10.5%) districts had the highest shares of houses repaired/rebuilt by the NGOs (Table 24).

<sup>24</sup> Noted by the 'other' category.

### Housing reconstruction grant

The GoSL signed Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) with several INGOs, NGOs, and private corporations for the building of new permanent houses for the tsunami-affected families. Those families, not offered a readymade home, were provided with a cash grant of LKR.250,000 (USD.2,500). This grant is made in two installments; first being LKR.100,000 (USD.1,000) and upon satisfactory completion of the first stage of building, the balance LKR.150,000 (USD.1,500) is disbursed. For partially damaged houses, a grant of LKR.100,000 (USD.1,000) was provided for repair in two installments. The World Bank is the major sponsor of this housing reconstruction grant. In contrast, in neighbouring India, every fully damaged house was compensated with a new house worth INR.150,000 (USD.3,450) (Human Rights Center of the University of California and East-West Center, 2005: 19). This is not withstanding the fact that most of the affected households in India were living in cadjun huts or tin sheds prior to the tsunami, and construction materials and labour are much cheaper than in Sri Lanka.

By the time of the survey, a significant majority of the affected households had not received any housing grant at all. That is, 73.2% (2,020) of the affected households had not received any money at all for the reconstruction of permanent houses<sup>25</sup>. The highest share of affected households that had not received any housing grant at the time of the survey was in the north (82.0%), followed by the east (71.6%) and the south (65.6%). Trincomalee (94.3%), Hambantota (85%), Jaffna (82%), and Ampara (81.5%) districts had the highest shares of households not receiving the housing reconstruction grant by the time of the survey (Table 25).

The next highest share of the affected households, i.e.10.8%, received an amount lesser than mentioned above. By region, the south (18.2%) and the east (11.7%) had the highest shares of

<sup>25</sup> This may include ineligible households as well.

households receiving less than the stipulated amounts, while only 2.9% of the households in the north received lesser amounts. By district, Galle (32.3%), Batticaloa (17.6%), and Ampara (9.5%) had the largest shares of households receiving lesser amounts. Only 10.2% (279) of the affected households had received the first instalment of LKR.100,000 and another 4.9% (138) had received the full amount of LKR.250,000. The highest share of households receiving the first instalment was in the south (14.3%), followed by the north (9.2%) and the east (7.0%). Besides, only 25 households (0.8%) have received LKR.25,000 for repair of their partially damaged houses, out of which 17 (1.8%) were in the north (Table 25).

Further, an overwhelming majority of the affected households opined that the cash grant offered by the government for repair or rebuilding of their homes was not adequate. That is, 92.9% (2,224) of the households opined that the housing grant was inadequate and only 7.1% (171) said it was adequate. The highest share of households that felt housing repair/reconstruction grant inadequate, was in the east (96.4%), followed by the south (93.0%) and the north (89.7%). As a corollary, the highest share of households that felt the grant adequate was in the north (10.3%), followed by the south (7.0%).

Given the fact that almost 75% of the affected households were living in concrete houses before the tsunami (Table 23), it is understandable that the vast majority of affected households felt that the housing grant was inadequate. There are several I/NGOs that have spent more than LKR.600,000 to build a new house for the affected families in various parts of the country. Perhaps the government also feels that LKR.250,000 is totally inadequate, however, due to resource constraints the government has not hiked the amount to date. There is also anecdotal evidence of families demanding new houses or housing grants, without being affected by the tsunami. The government has a flexible attitude towards such undeserving claimants keeping in view of their poverty and/or conflict situation. However, such undeserving claimants raise the total demand for housing grants and thereby limit the amount paid.



## Buffer zone

The majority of the houses fully or partly damaged due to the tsunami were illegal settlements along the coast. The coast conservation department of the government owns the land in which these houses were built. Even several tourist hotels along the southern and eastern coast have encroached on state-owned land. These illegal settlements increased the deaths and destruction to property, in the tsunami.

Keeping in view of this human-made hazard, the government stipulated in January 2005 that no new building should be constructed within 100 metres from the coast in the southern province and within 200 metres from the coast in the eastern and northern provinces. However, this stipulation was reported to be unpopular with the affected people (especially fisherpersons) as well as hoteliers, because it would negatively affect their respective trade. Just before the Presidential election in November 2005 this buffer zone was reduced to 50 metres in the south and 100 metres in the eastern and northern provinces. It has been further reduced in early 2006 after the election of the new President. In India too there was stiff opposition to relocation from existing properties. A survey undertaken by coalition of NGOs in early 2005 in 61 villages throughout 8 districts affected by the tsunami in Tamilnadu state revealed that 95% of the affected people did not want to move from their pre-tsunami habitats (cited in Human Rights Center of the University of California and East-West Center, 2005: 20).

In this background, the present survey asked the affected households about their opinion on the buffer zone. Strangely, a majority of the affected households, i.e. 61.0% (1,796), were in agreement with the buffer zone stipulation by the government. Further, the largest proportion of households agreeing with the buffer zone stipulation was in the east (65.4%), followed by the south (60.2%) and the north (57.5%). Ampara (68.6%), Trincomalee (66.3%), Galle (62.8%), and Matara (60.5%) districts had the largest shares of households in agreement with the buffer zone (Table 26). It is important to remember that Ampara had the largest and Galle the third largest number of deaths due to the tsunami (Table 5).

Nevertheless, a significant proportion of the affected households, i.e. 39.0% (1,147), did not agree with the buffer zone stipulation. The largest proportion of households not agreeing with the buffer zone was in the north (42.5%), followed by the south (39.8%) and the east (34.6%). The highest shares of households in disagreement were in Hambantota (43.6%), Jaffna (42.5%), and Batticaloa (41.6%) districts (Table 26).

It is important to remember that by the time most of the interviews were conducted (i.e. first quarter 2006) the original buffer zone stipulation has been drastically reduced, which may have elicited positive response from the respondents.

## Multiple displacements

The displaced people due to tsunami in the north and the east may have been displaced before as well, due to the conflict. The survey wanted to identify such multiple displacements. A simple majority of the respondent households have been displaced earlier as well due to the civil war, particularly in the north. Altogether 1,034 (52.6%) respondent households have been displaced before, due to the civil war, out of which 857 (87.0%) households were in the north (i.e. Jaffna), 176 (18.9%) were in the east, and only one household (16.7%) was in the south (Galle). Jaffna (87.0%), Trincomalee (57.3%), Batticaloa (23.4%), Galle (16.7%), and Ampara (10.0%) districts have experienced multiple displacements (Table 27). Although the Galle district was not directly affected by the conflict, it could be an internally displaced household from the east.

However, a significant proportion, i.e. 47.4% (932), of respondent households have not been displaced before due to the civil war; the south (98.0%) and the east (81.1%) accounting for the highest shares of households not experiencing displacement due to the civil war. By district, the highest shares of households not experiencing displacement due to the civil war were in Ampara (90.0%), Galle (83.3%), and Batticaloa (76.6%) districts (Table 27). It is important to note that one-third of the total sample households (1,022 out of 2,988) did not answer this question,

presumably because it was not applicable to them. The bulk of the non-respondents were understandably in the south.

During the time of civil war people could have been displaced more than once in different time periods. Accordingly, 20.4% of the respondent households have been displaced once before, due to the civil war, 12.3% have been displaced twice, and 28.2% (highest proportion) of the households have been displaced more than twice due to the civil war (Table 27). Please note that a significant proportion, i.e. 39.1%, did not answer this part of the question.

### Benefactor and satisfaction of temporary shelter

The majority of the tsunami-affected households were dissatisfied with temporary shelters. That is, 68.3% (1,524) of the households were dissatisfied and only 31.7% (708) were satisfied (Table 28). This is understandable, given the fact that almost 75% of the affected households were living in concrete houses before the tsunami, whereas temporary/transitory shelters had a concrete floor but covered by tin sheets (including the roof). Further, temporary shelters do not have a kitchen, and the common bathrooms and toilets were at a distance. Moreover, all the temporary shelters were uniform in size irrespective of the household size. A qualitative study undertaken through focus group meetings in 13 tsunami-affected districts also concluded that people felt the temporary/transitory shelters to be "uncomfortable, unsanitary, and unsafe. .... Women in particular feel that these shelters provide little privacy and security" (Human Rights Commission and CUCEC, 2005: 3).

The greatest dissatisfaction of the temporary shelters was in the east where 83.8% was dissatisfied, followed by the south (62.7%) and the north (54.0%). Ampara (91.7%), Batticaloa (77.5%), Hambantota (76.2%), and Matara (69.9%) districts had the largest shares of dissatisfied households (Table 28). The highest proportion of satisfied households about the temporary shelters was in the north (46%), followed by the south (37.3%). Galle (53.2%), Jaffna (46.0%), and Trincomalee (41.7%) districts had the largest proportions of satisfied households (Table 28).

The majority of the temporary shelters for affected families have been built by non-governmental organisations (international, national & local). Temporary shelters for single largest proportion of the affected households (34.5% or 863) have been built by INGOs. The second highest proportion of the affected households, i.e. 22.3% or 557, have been provided temporary shelter by private philanthropists (businesses as well as individuals)<sup>26</sup>. The third largest proportion of the affected households, i.e. 21.4% or 535, have received temporary shelters from national NGOs. Further, 84 (3.4%) households have been provided by local NGOs (based in the district/province). Only 75 households (3% of the total respondents) have received from the government (Table 28). Hence, almost 60% of the temporary shelters have been provided by non-governmental organisations and a further 22% have been provided by the private sector. The foregoing figures indicate the dominant role played by the private and non-governmental sectors in the construction of temporary shelter for tsunami-affected households.

However, due to the urgency of the task ahead, a significant majority of affected households, i.e. 71.3% (1,390), have not been consulted or their preferences taken into account in the construction of temporary shelters. For example, household size was not taken into consideration in determining the space of temporary shelters. The highest share of households not consulted was in the east (80.9%), followed by the south (77.7%). In the north, 48.7% of the households were not consulted. Hambantota (92.1%), Ampara (82.5%), Batticaloa (79.1%), and Trincomalee (76.7%) districts had the largest shares of households that have not been consulted. Nonetheless, preferences of 28.7% of the affected households have been taken into account. The highest share of consulted households were in the north (51.3%), followed by the south (22.3%) and the east (19.1%) (Table 28).

<sup>26</sup> Denoted by 'other' category.

### Benefactor and satisfaction of permanent shelter

In contrast to temporary shelters, a significant majority of affected households were in fact satisfied with the permanent shelters provided by various donors (albeit very limited numbers so far). That is, 69.7% (689) of households were satisfied with the permanent shelters and 30.3% (300) were dissatisfied<sup>27</sup>. The highest proportion of satisfied households were in the north (93.1%), followed by the south (59.9%) and the east (38.7%). Jaffna (93.1%), Galle (69.7%), and Matara (64.0%) districts topped the number of satisfied households (Table 29). High satisfaction rate in the north is understandable given the fact that only less than half the affected households in the north had a concrete house prior to the tsunami (Table 23), whereas all the permanent houses are made of concrete. Among the dissatisfied households, highest share was in the east (61.3%) followed by in the south (40.1%). Trincomalee (76.3%), Hambantota (67.8%), and Ampara (60.5%) districts topped the number of dissatisfied households (see Table 29).

A majority of the permanent houses have been built by non-governmental organisations-international, national, and local (i.e. 488 out of the total 826 or 59%)<sup>28</sup>. Again INGOs accounted for the single largest share of permanent shelters built by the time of the survey (albeit a smaller share than in the case of temporary shelters). That is, 19.7% (377) of the permanent homes have been built by the INGOs. The second largest share of 12.0% (229) has been built by private philanthropists (individuals and businesses)<sup>29</sup>.

<sup>27</sup> Note that more households than the ones living in permanent shelters (635 according to Table 22) have answered this question. Perhaps the households whose permanent shelters are in the making have also answered this question.

<sup>28</sup> While according to Table 22 only 635 households were living in permanent shelters, 826 households seem to have received permanent shelters according to Table 29. Perhaps the households whose permanent shelters are in the making have also answered this question.

<sup>29</sup> Denoted by 'other' category.

The next highest share was accounted for by the government, i.e. 5.7% or 109. National NGOs accounted for 4.2% or 81 permanent houses built. Only 30 permanent houses have been built by the local NGOs (based in the district/province) (Table 29). By region, the north has been the largest recipient of permanent homes at the time of the survey (i.e. 390 out of the total 826 or 47.2%), followed by the south (293 or 35.5%) and the east (143 or 17.3%). The north's higher share could be due to the longer time period taken to complete the survey. While the highest share of permanent houses built by non-governmental organisations was in the north (41.6%), the highest share built by private philanthropists (26.3%) and the government (9.3%) was in the south (Table 29).

One of the cardinal principles proposed to be followed in the construction of permanent houses was consultation with the affected families as to their needs and preferences. In contrast to the case of temporary shelters, a majority of the recipients of permanent houses have been consulted and their preferences taken into account. That is, 57.0% of the affected households have been consulted prior to building their permanent homes. The highest share of those consulted was in the north (82.8%), followed by the south (43.9%) and the east (30.5%). Jaffna (82.8%), Galle (61.3%), and Batticaloa (58.7%) districts topped in terms of consultation (see Table 30). However, 43.0% of the affected households have not been consulted or their preferences taken into account. The largest share not consulted was in the east (69.5%), followed by the south (56.1%).

### Recipients' contribution to permanent shelter

Further, many recipients of permanent shelters also made (or expect to make) some contribution in kind and/or cash for building their permanent homes. Accordingly, 41.4% (526) of the respondent households have provided their labour, 37.2% (472) have provided land, and 19.3% (245) have provided 'other' contributions. Only 2% (26) made cash contributions towards their permanent homes. While labour contribution was highest in the north (49.1%) and the east (45.8%), land contribution was highest in the south (53.4%) and the north (37.5%) (Table 30).

## Ownership of land

There was/is some controversy about the ownership of permanent shelters, because the ownership of permanent houses was vested in the name of male heads of household. However, many tsunami-affected houses were reported to have been owned by the female head of household prior to the tsunami. Therefore, it is natural for those females to expect the ownership of new permanent homes to be vested in their name. But, many affected households have lost the title deeds to their land and home in the tsunami (Human Rights Commission and CUCEC, 2005: 3). Therefore, the survey probed the ownership of property prior to the tsunami and the ownership of permanent homes if delivered. This question was asked from the female members of the households interviewed.

Accordingly, before the tsunami, female heads of households owned 45.4% (1,326) of the affected land and property. The 'other' party owned the second largest share, i.e. 26.8% or 782. This 'other' means state-owned land. As pointed out earlier, most houses along the coasts are illegal settlements on state-owned lands. Another 14.5% of the respondents (424) reported that their husband owned the property before the tsunami. Both wife and husband jointly owned the remaining 13.3% (390) of the properties before the tsunami (Table 31).

However, the single largest share of respondent households, i.e. 38.1% or 690, opined that the state would own the land and/or the permanent house built for them after the tsunami. The second largest share of respondent households, i.e. 35.6% or 644, reported that female heads own (or would own) the land/permanent house distributed or about to be distributed after the tsunami. Another 13.8% (249) is or would be owned by the husband and 12.5% (227) is or would be owned by both (Table 31).

The foregoing results indicate that higher proportion of state-owned and lower proportion of female-owned land and property is envisaged, if the current trend continues in the tsunami reconstruction. Besides, dual ownership and male-ownership is also expected to drop, albeit marginally. Therefore, it is essential that ownership ambiguities of permanent houses are resolved

equitably sooner than later. While the pre-tsunami ownership pattern within households should not be altered, the state should alienate its ownership to beneficiaries (i.e. joint heads of households). Land rights and ownership disputes (sometimes violent) have cropped up in other countries affected by the tsunami (Human Rights Center of the University of California and East-West Center, 2005: 4).

Housing continues to be the most challenging of all reconstruction and recovery efforts in Sri Lanka. Only a small proportion of the required permanent houses seems to have been completed nearly two years after the tsunami. That is, only 20% (circa 10,000) out of the total requirement of houses (circa 50,000) has been built almost two years after the tsunami (i.e. by September 2006). Although, according to the present survey, the highest share of permanent shelters completed was in the north (57.4%) (Table 22), according to the Tsunami Housing Reconstruction Unit (THRU), the highest share of permanent shelters completed was in the south (67.2%). Hambantota district itself accounted for 43.4% of the total number of permanent shelters completed in the country by January 31, 2006 (Alailima, 2006: 26). This inequity in permanent shelter building was due to political patronage, because Hambantota is the home district of the present President of Sri Lanka, who was the Prime Minister at the time of the tsunami, until November 2005.

At the time of the survey, almost three-fourths of the affected households seem to have not received housing reconstruction grant provided by the government. The north and the south seem to have got most of the permanent houses completed thus far despite about 55% of the damaged houses were in the east, particularly in the Ampara district (see Table 5). This anomaly is due to the fact that, while the government had looked after the interests of the affected households in the south, and the donor-LTTE combine had looked after the interests of the north, the east was left in the lurch. The author hopes that the government and the donor community would take this situation seriously and urgently and rectify the past mistakes and shortcomings in the remaining work to be completed.

## 5.5 Gender and Children

Immediately after the tsunami, there were some disturbing media reports about harassment, abuse, and even rape of women. Later, there were some reports of harassment and abuse of women in the relief camps. There were also reports of abduction of children immediately after the tsunami, and later from the relief camps, for trafficking to foreign countries, as well as for combat purpose. However, the present survey did not find these issues to be of any significance. All the questions under this section were asked from female heads of households. Besides, to be sensitive to the respondents, instead of asking whether they have personally experienced any harassment/abuse, the survey asked whether the respondents were aware of such harassment/abuse.

### Harassment of women

Accordingly, 97.1% (2,899) of the households were unaware of any physical abuse of women, and just 2.9% of the households were aware of such incidences. While all three regions strongly denied any abuse (> 95%), out of the small number of abuses known, the highest share was in the east (5.1%) followed by the south (3.1%). Only 5 households (0.5%) were aware of abuse of women in the north. Batticaloa (12.5% or 37) and Matara (7.6% or 22) districts had the largest shares of households that were aware of physical abuse of women after the tsunami (Table 32).

However, a slightly higher proportion of the affected households (i.e. 5.9% or 175) were aware of verbal abuse of women after the tsunami. Again the east (12.3%) topped, and the south (3.5%) followed. In the north, only 1.7% of the households were aware of verbal abuse of women. Ampara (13.7%), Batticaloa (13.3%), and Matara (8.0%) topped the districts (Table 32). Further, a vast majority of the physical and verbal abuse took place in the relief camps (77.9% or 134) and another 14.0% (24) took place in the temporary shelters. Moreover, 4.7% (8) of the abuse took place in a public space, and 2.9% (5) in the home of a relative or friend (Table 32).

### Harassment of children

The survey detected very little physical or verbal abuse of children either. Only 68 respondent households (2.3%) were aware of any physical abuse of children in the aftermath of the tsunami. By region, again the east (4.2%) topped followed by the south (2.1%). Only 5 households (0.5%) in the north were aware of child abuse. Batticaloa (13.2%) and Matara (6.6%) topped the districts (Table 33).

Similarly, only 147 households (4.9%) were aware of verbal abuse of children. The east (10.9%) and the south (3.1%) accounted for most of the known cases of verbal abuse of children. Batticaloa (12.9%), Ampara (10.7%), Trincomalee (6.8%), and Matara (6.6%) topped the districts (Table 33).

Moreover, relief camps were the places where a bulk of the child abuse seems to have taken place, followed by in the temporary shelters. Thus, 75.7% (109) of the known child abuses took place in relief camps and another 13.9% (20) took place in temporary shelters. Further, an equal share of abuses took place in open spaces (4.2%) as well as at own homes (4.2%). The rest, i.e. 2.1%, took place in the homes of a relative or a friend (Table 33).

In sum, harassments or abuses of women and children have been very minimal contrary to media hype. However, whatever little that has taken place, was largely in the east and the south, particularly in Ampara, Batticaloa, and Matara districts. In India too, violence against or abuse of women and children and human trafficking in the aftermath of the tsunami were very minimal, though verbal and physical harassment did exist to a limited extent (Human Rights Center of the University of California and East-West Center, 2005: 21,22).

Nevertheless, women have been almost entirely excluded from decision-making processes of relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction/recovery efforts. Cash grants for the restoration of livelihoods and housing reconstruction were given to the heads of household who are mostly male. Involvement of or consultations with women in the designing and layout of transitory and permanent

houses have been absent. Overall, women's fundamental rights have been breached with impunity by the government, donor agencies, I/NGOs, and individual philanthropists. This has been the case in all the tsunami-affected countries as well, according to more than 50,000 tsunami-affected people interviewed in 95 villages and urban areas in India, Indonesia, Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Thailand during November 2005 (Action Aid, 2006: 41-48).

## 5.6 Health

Many countries experience health problems soon after any disaster, be it human-made or natural. Especially, natural disasters are accompanied with spread of diseases due to lack of safe water and sanitation facilities. Remarkably, there was hardly any health problem in any of the regions affected by the tsunami in Sri Lanka or in any other country. Unlike in the displacements due to the conflict, the tsunami displaced half a million people within just a few hours, which was unprecedented in Sri Lanka. Despite the enormity of the catastrophe, health care services of the country along with the Red Cross, coped with the situation well.

### Sanitation and water

Coastal populations usually have little safe sanitary facilities at their habitats. In this context, it was remarkable that 77.5% of the affected households (2,040) had adequate sanitary facilities in the relief camps. The availability of sanitary facilities was greatest in the north (94.8%), followed by the south (73.1%) and the east (63.9%). Jaffna (94.8% or 902), Matara (79.8%), Hambantota (76.6%), and Batticaloa (72.0%) districts had the highest shares of households with sanitary facilities in relief camps (Table 34). Nevertheless, a considerable proportion, i.e. 22.5% (591), did not have sanitary facilities in the relief camps. The non-availability of sanitary facilities was greatest in the east (36.1%) and the south (26.9%). Trincomalee (48.5%), Ampara (38.2%) and Galle (34.8%) districts had the highest shares of non-availability of sanitary facilities (Table 34).

The availability of sanitary facilities in the temporary shelters were marginally higher than in the relief camps. Thus, 78.4% of the affected households (1,952) had sanitary facilities in their temporary shelters. The south (83.7%) accounted for the largest share of availability of sanitary facilities in temporary shelters, followed by the north (78.9%) and the east (73.5%). Matara (94.5%), Hambantota (87.5%), and Batticaloa (80.0%) had the highest shares, by district (Table 34). However, 21.6% (538) of the households did not have sanitary facilities in the temporary shelters; the highest shares being in the east (26.5%) and the north (21.1%). Trincomalee (35.1%), Ampara (28.5%), and Galle (26.3%) districts had the highest shares of non-availability of sanitary facilities in the temporary shelters (Table 34).

The availability of safe water for drinking and washing in the relief camps was also quite high, with 76.0% (2,003) of the affected households having access. It was highest in the north (94.1%), followed by the south (73.2%) and the east (60.4%). Jaffna (94.1%) Matara (85.4%), and Galle (73.1%) districts had the largest shares of households with access to safe water in the relief camps (Table 34). Nonetheless, 24.0% of the households did not have safe water in the relief camps; highest shares being in the east (39.6%) and the south (26.8%). Trincomalee (62.6%), Batticaloa (38.2%), Hambantota (38.2%), and Ampara (36.4%) districts had the highest shares with no safe water availability in the relief camps (Table 34).

Ironically, a lesser share of households did have access to safe water for drinking and washing in the temporary shelters than in the relief camps, soon after the tsunami. That is, only 70.2% (1,754) of households did have safe water in their temporary shelters. The north (82.5%) and the south (81.0%) had roughly the same proportion of households with safe water availability, followed by the east (50.9%). By district Matara (95.0%), Jaffna (82.5%), and Galle (80.3%) had the largest shares (Table 34). Unfortunately, 29.8% of the affected households did not have safe water in their temporary shelters; the east accounting for the highest share (49.1%), followed by the south (19.0%) and the north (17.5%). Ampara (54.7%), Trincomalee (46.9%), and



Batticaloa (39.5%) districts had the largest shares of households without safe water in their temporary shelters (Table 34).

Given the fact that a vast majority of the tsunami-affected households are still in temporary shelters, both the government and the donors should ensure availability of safe water and sanitary facilities to all of them, even at this late stage of two years after the tsunami. Since this survey was conducted 12-15 months after the tsunami, services may have improved afterwards.

### Privacy and safety

There was little privacy in the relief camps but has improved in the temporary shelters. That is, 62.6% (1,632) of the affected households had inadequate privacy in the relief camps. The highest share of households lacking adequate privacy in the relief camps was in the south (81.0%), followed by the east (77.8%) and the north (33.0%). Hambantota (90.9%) Ampara (90.1%), and Matara (84.2%) topped the districts on the issue of inadequate privacy in the relief camps. However, 37.4% (977) of the affected households had adequate privacy in the relief camps, the north (67.0%) accounting for the highest share (Table 35).

On the other hand, 52.3% (1,300) of the affected households had adequate privacy in the temporary shelters, but 47.7% (1,188) do not. The highest share of households having adequate privacy in their temporary shelters was in the north (68.5%), followed by the east (47.8%) and the south (41.3%). Jaffna (68.5%), Galle (58.0%), Ampara (49.4%), and Batticaloa (48.6%) districts had the largest shares of households with adequate privacy (Table 35). Out of the households with inadequate privacy in the temporary shelters, the highest share was in the south (58.7%) followed by the east (52.2%). Matara (71.9%), Hambantota (68.9%), and Trincomalee (63.5%) topped the districts.

Women were very much concerned about lack of privacy and security both in the relief tents as well as the temporary shelters, which was a serious issue in India as well (Human Rights Center of the University of California and East-West Center, 2005: 21). The reason why the affected households in the north (Jaffna)

were relatively more satisfied with the issue of privacy in the relief camps and the temporary shelters could be that, lesser share of them were living in concrete houses prior to the tsunami than other regions (see Table 23). Thus, the living conditions in the north (Jaffna), prior to the tsunami, were not much different from the relief tents or the temporary shelters.

Further, an overwhelming majority of the affected households felt that safety of children was adequate both in the relief camps as well as in the temporary shelters. Thus, 83.9% (1,985) of the affected households opined that their children were safe in the relief camps; largest share being in the north (99.1%), followed by the south (76.3%) and the east (76.1%). Jaffna (99.1%), Galle (97.8%), and Batticaloa (86.4%) topped the districts in terms of safety of children in the relief camps. A slightly higher proportion, i.e. 86.3% (1,873), of the affected households were satisfied with safety of their children in the temporary shelters. Again, the north had the highest share of satisfied households, i.e. 99.1%, followed by the south (80.9%) and the east (80.6%). Jaffna (99.1%), Galle (98.2%), and Batticaloa (86.8%) districts had the highest shares of satisfied households in terms of safety of children in the temporary shelters (Table 35).

### Sickness and treatment

It was monsoon season in the eastern and northern regions of the country at the time of the tsunami. Therefore, displacement from their homes due to the tsunami and taking refuge in open spaces and public buildings did bring about minor sicknesses like influenza, nausea, and colds among the displaced, especially among children and elderly.

According to the survey, 39.7% (1,183) of the affected households had at least one member who was ill, immediately after the tsunami in the relief camps. The highest proportion of people falling ill was in the north (41.7%) and the east (41.1%). Hambantota (48.7%), Ampara (44.2%), and Jaffna (41.7%) districts had the highest shares of households falling ill in the relief camps (Table 36). However, the vast majority of the people who

fell ill did get prompt medical care in the relief camps. Thus, 83.6% of those fell ill, got prompt medical attention in the relief camps. Again the share of affected households getting prompt medical attention was highest in the north (85.1%), followed by the south (83.7%) and the east (82.2%) (Table 36).

A lower share of the affected people got ill in their temporary shelters. That is, only 19.3% of the affected households (533) had at least one member who got ill in the temporary shelters. Once again, the north (29.3%) had the highest share of affected households having at least one member falling ill in the temporary shelters, followed by the east (15.9%) and the south (11.9%) (Table 36). Moreover, a lower share of households received prompt medical care in the temporary shelters, than in the relief camps. Thus, 78.2% (435) of the affected households received prompt medical attention in the temporary shelters. The north had the highest share of households receiving prompt medical attention (89.3%), followed by the east (72.2%) and the south (58.9%) (Table 36).

The Red Cross from several countries provided voluntary health care services immediately after the tsunami in the relief camps. However, in temporary shelters, such services were less, because of the long duration of temporary shelters. Overall, Sri Lanka has coped well in preventing diseases in the aftermath of the tsunami disaster. The government, donor agencies, INGOs, NGOs, and local communities, played valuable roles in preventing or mitigating the health hazards.

## 5.7 Employment

We noted in section 5.2, that a majority of the respondents and their spouses were involved in fishing, both prior to and after the tsunami. Fishing is a generational occupation. The survey wanted to find out whether the affected people would be interested in changing their occupation due to the traumatic experience caused by the tsunami. The answer was an emphatic 'no'. That is, 89.5% (2,003) of the respondents wished to continue the same job they

did prior to the tsunami. The highest share wanting to continue in the same job was in the north (94.3%), followed by the south (87.5) and the east (85.7%). Jaffna (94.3%), Batticaloa (91.6%), and Hambantota (90.1%) districts had the highest shares wanting to continue in the same job (Table 37). The highest share not wanting to do the same job as before was in the east (14.3%), followed by the south (12.5%) (Table 37).

Further, only 33.1% of the respondents (866) were interested in undergoing skills training, in order to change their occupation. The greatest interest in skills training was in the east (48.3%) and the south (34.3%). Only 14.3% of the respondents in the north were interested in skills training. Batticaloa (58.9%), Ampara (47.8%), Galle (37.1%), and Hambantota (36.7%) districts had the highest shares interested in skills training (Table 37).

To the question whether their children would like to continue the same job as before the tsunami, a considerable majority said "yes", i.e. 68.6% or 383. The highest share of children wanting to do the same job by region was in the south (90.8%), followed by the east (67.8%) and the north (59.7%). Hence, a greater share of children were willing to change occupation (31.4%), than their parents (10.5%). The highest shares of children willing to change jobs were in the north (40.3%) and the east (32.2%) (Table 37). This result corroborates with a survey undertaken in the north prior to the tsunami (Sarvananthan, 2006)

## 5.8 Satisfaction and Concerns

This section presents and analyses the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the affected households, on service provision by various institutions (including the government) in the aftermath of the tsunami, till the time of the survey. It also gauges how people have coped with the post-tsunami situation until the time of the survey. Besides, it also clears some misunderstandings about the role of certain international organisations involved in post-tsunami work in Sri Lanka.

### **Educational and health facilities at the current place of residence**

Educational (school) and health (hospital/dispensary) facilities were available for 61.2% of the affected households (1,826) in their new habitats (temporary or permanent) at the time of the survey. The highest share of households having educational and health facilities near their new places of residence was in the south (71.2%), followed by the north (57.9%) and the east (54.5%). Matara (94.1%), Galle (87.8%), and Trincomalee (70.2%) districts had the highest shares of households with educational and health facilities in their new areas of residence (Table 38).

However, a considerable proportion of the affected households, i.e. 38.8% (1,160), did not have educational and health facilities near their present place of residence. The east (45.5%) and the north (42.1%) had the highest shares of affected households not having educational and health facilities near their new habitats. Hambantota (73.0%), Batticaloa (57.8%), Ampara (42.2%), and Jaffna (42.1%) districts had the largest shares of households without educational and health facilities closer to their temporary or permanent homes (Table 38).

Therefore, the government and the donors need to improve educational and health facilities near temporary shelters of the affected communities and in their new permanent habitats.

### **Satisfaction with domestic relief organisations**

There were many criticisms against the government as well as non-governmental organisations on their response to recovery from the tsunami, in the popular media. So the survey wanted to find out from the affected people what their opinion was about the services of the government and the domestic non-governmental organisations in the aftermath of the tsunami. An overwhelming majority of the tsunami-affected households were dissatisfied with the services provided by the government to affected people. A majority were dissatisfied with the services of the local (district/province based) NGOs, but a majority of the affected households

were indeed satisfied with the services provided by the national NGOs.

That is, 77.0% (2,298) of the affected households were dissatisfied with the services provided by the government. The highest share of dissatisfied households were in the south (81.3%), closely followed by the east (76.3%) and the north (73.4%). The highest dissatisfaction with the government was in the Hambantota (93.7%), Batticaloa (93.2%), Matara (85.1%), and Trincomalee (83.7) districts (Table 39).

Similarly, 56.2% (1,675) of the affected households were not satisfied with the services provided by the local NGOs. Again, the highest share of households not satisfied with the services of local NGOs was in the south (67.3%), followed by the east (55.9%) and the north (45.3%). The Hambantota (89.3%), Batticaloa (86.5%), and Trincomalee (63.5%) districts had the highest shares of households not satisfied with the local NGOs (Table 39).

However, 55% (1,644) of the affected households were satisfied with the services provided by the national NGOs in the aftermath of the tsunami. Such satisfaction was highest in the north (59.4%), followed by the east (56.1%) and the south (49.5%). Ampara (73.8%), Galle (69.0%), Jaffna (59.4%), and Trincomalee (51.4%) topped the districts as regards satisfaction with the services of the national NGOs (Table 39). Nonetheless, dissatisfaction with the national NGOs was also high; i.e. 45.0% (1,344) of the affected households were dissatisfied. Dissatisfaction was highest in the south (50.5%), followed by the east (43.9%) and the north (40.6%). By districts, Batticaloa (78.3%), Hambantota (69.3%), and Matara (57.8%) had the highest dissatisfaction with the national NGOs (Table 39).

### **Satisfaction with external relief organisations**

There were also severe criticisms of the INGOs and foreign donor agencies in the media, regarding their contribution to recovery from the tsunami tragedy. However, a majority of the affected households were satisfied with the services of the INGOs in the

aftermath of the tsunami, though the majority were not satisfied with bilateral and multilateral donor agencies.

Thus, 55% (1,644) of the affected households were satisfied with the services provided by the INGOs. As in the case of the national NGOs, the satisfaction rate was highest in the north (59.4%), followed by the east (56.1%) and the south (49.5%). However, dissatisfaction with INGOs was also quite high; i.e. 45.0% or 1,344. Dissatisfaction with INGOs by region was in the reverse order of that with satisfaction (Table 40).

However, 64.5% (1,915) of the affected households were not satisfied with the services provided by the bilateral donor agencies after the tsunami, and 52.5% (1,569) were not satisfied with the services provided by the multilateral donor agencies. The south had the largest share of households not satisfied with the bilateral donors (71.0%), closely followed by the north (68.8%) and the east (53.7%) (Table 40). Similarly, dissatisfaction with the multilateral donor agencies was greatest in the south (64.5%), followed by the north (49.6%) and the east (43.6%). By districts, dissatisfaction with multilateral donor agencies was greatest in Hambantota, (96.0%), Batticaloa (79.4%), and Matara (66.1%) (Table 40).

We cannot take the opinion of the affected households, regarding the services provided by the bilateral donors, on face value, because, though the bulk of the programmes/projects of the INGOs were sponsored by bilateral donor agencies, the recipients hardly knew that fact. Therefore, the INGOs usually get the credit that is also due to the bilateral donors. Thus, when the affected households said they were satisfied with the services provided by the INGOs, it would indirectly mean the bilateral donors as well.

### Religious conversions

There was a bit of noise made about suspected religious conversions taking place after the tsunami, by some faith-based I/NGOs in certain parts of the country. Thus, one study noted "In many places, people also express concern about organizations

carrying-out relief work with the explicit mandates or implicit agendas for religious conversions" (Human Rights Commission and CUCEC, 2005: 5). Therefore, this survey consciously wanted to find out the truth about this hearsay.

The tsunami-affected households throughout the country emphatically denied such alleged religious conversions taking place. That is, 85.9% of the affected households (2,568) denied such allegations. The denial of religious conversions taking place was greatest in the north (95.0%), followed by the east (82.8%) and the south (80.0%). Hambantota (99.3%), Jaffna (95.0%), Matara (90.3%), and Batticaloa (88.2%) districts had the highest proportions of households denying religious conversions in the pretext of tsunami relief work (Table 41).

Nevertheless, 14.1% of the affected households (420) confirmed that they were indeed aware of religious conversions taking place in the pretext of tsunami relief. The highest share of households aware of religious conversions was in the south followed by the east. Thus, 20.0% of the affected households in the south and 17.2% households in the east were aware of religious conversions after the tsunami. Only 5.0% of the households were aware of religious conversions in the north. Galle (42.0%), Trincomalee (25.0%), Ampara (18.5%), and Batticaloa (11.8%) districts had the highest shares of households knowing of religious conversions in the aftermath of the tsunami (Table 41).

### Coping post-tsunami situation and expectation of permanent house

The majority of the affected households opined that they have coped with the tsunami tragedy "reasonably" and another small proportion coped "well". That is, 65.0% (1,943) of the affected households have coped reasonably and 5.2% (156) have coped well. However, a significant proportion of the affected households, i.e. 29.8% or 889, have not coped well. The highest share of households that have not coped well was in the south (52.3%), followed by the north (20.9%) and the east (16.3%). Besides, while the highest share of households having coped "reasonably"

was in the east (80.1%), the highest share having coped "well" was in the north (9.7%) (Table 42). This result indicates lack of psycho-social support to the victims of tsunami in Sri Lanka.

Over 95% (2,069) of the affected households were looking forward to their due permanent house. The highest proportion looking forward to permanent houses was in the south (98.2%), followed by the east (94.3%) and the north (94.0%). Matara (99.5%), Hambantota (99.1%), Ampara (96.9%), and Galle (96.4%) districts had the highest proportions of households looking forward to permanent houses (Table 42).

The majority of the respondents were expecting the government to build their permanent houses, notwithstanding the fact that government has hardly built any permanent house directly for the tsunami victims. Thus, 52.7% of the respondents (759) were expecting the government to build their permanent houses, while 31.9% (460) was expecting an INGO to build their permanent houses. Further 10.7% of the respondents (154) were expecting a NGO to build their permanent houses, and 4.7% of the respondents (67) were expecting to build themselves (Table 42). But, according to the survey, over two-thirds of the respondents did not know when they would get their permanent houses.

## 5.9 Conclusion

At the beginning of this chapter we alluded to five cardinal principles, jointly laid down by the government, donor agencies, and the civil society, for tsunami reconstruction and recovery process in Sri Lanka. However, none of these principles seem to have been followed by almost all the institutions and individuals involved in post-tsunami recovery programmes in Sri Lanka. There have been discrepancies in resource allocation according to the needs of local communities. Particularly the eastern province seems to have been marginalised. Designing and implementation of recovery programmes have been by and large centralised at the TAFREN/RADA, donor offices based in Colombo, and INGO offices based in Colombo with little participation of the periphery.

There was hardly any consultation with the affected communities. Decision-making processes and implementation mechanisms have been hardly transparent and consultative. It is premature to pass judgment on the fifth principle of reducing vulnerabilities to future disasters.

In spite of the foregoing shortcomings, the outreach of relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance have been good and leakages and corruption in distribution appear to be limited. Nonetheless, construction of houses is very slow and the satisfaction rate of completed houses is low. At this rate of housing reconstruction, it would take at least 5 years to complete the housing reconstruction programme. Parity of status among genders in relief disbursement has not been met. Children who have lost at least one parent appear to have been overlooked.

## CHAPTER 6

### Conclusions

The tsunami of 2004 struck a number of countries in the Indian Ocean in Asia and Africa. However, the degree of human, physical, socio-economic, and environmental impacts of the tsunami has been different in different sub-regions, countries, and geographical regions within countries. While the heaviest human, physical, and social destructions have been on Indonesia, followed by on Sri Lanka and India, the heaviest economic and environmental impacts have been on the Maldives. Besides, only certain parts of the affected countries and certain economic sub-sectors bore the brunt of the tsunami, and therefore the impacts on the population have been lopsided.

Similarly, within Sri Lanka, the tsunami struck different geographical areas, sub-sectors, and peoples differently. Thus, though the human, physical, social, and environmental destructions have been heaviest in the east and the south, the heaviest economic impact has been on the north, because of its meagre local economy. Further, because of the tsunami's geographical concentration, and the nature of the northern economy, the fisheries sub-sector and the fishing community bore the brunt of the natural catastrophe, which were already severely affected by a quarter century of civil war.

The empirical results of the household survey undertaken for this study reveal the following:

#### Household characteristics

On household characteristics, there has been a marginal reduction in the size of households in the post-tsunami period, compared to the pre-tsunami period. While the reduction in the household size could enhance the living conditions and environment, it also depletes the social capital of extended family networks that help

enormously in terms of coping strategies during times of crisis, within households and communities.

There was a significant rise in unemployment among the tsunami-affected households, i.e. among both heads of households (respondents as well as spouses). Unemployment was very high even at the time the tsunami struck, i.e. 37% among the respondents and 42% among the spouses of respondents. Unemployment rate among the respondents increased after the tsunami to 54%, and to 53% among the spouses of respondents. Unemployment (among both the respondents and their spouses) was greatest in the north prior to the tsunami (42% and 47% respectively), but was greatest (among both the respondents and their spouses) in the south after the tsunami (57% & 56% respectively). However, the occupational patterns of both the respondents and their spouses have hardly changed in the post-tsunami period.

Poverty, in terms of both headcount and severity, has increased after the tsunami, in comparison to before, in all the three regions under consideration. Overall, while 64% of the households were deemed poor before the tsunami (severity-35%), it increased to 80% after the tsunami (severity-57%). The headcount and severity of poverty was greatest in the north both pre- and post-tsunami. Thus, while 82.5% of the households were deemed poor in the north before the tsunami (severity-68%), it increased to 94% after the tsunami (severity-81%). However, while the east had the second highest poverty level (headcount-64% as well as severity-24%) prior to the tsunami, the south had the second highest poverty level (headcount-76% as well as severity-47%) after the tsunami.

The total number of children among the surveyed households has dropped by 217 after the tsunami; most of them would have been killed by the tsunami. The survey results indicate that the highest loss of children was in the south (-141), followed by the east (-61). Although nearly 5,000 children were reported to be orphaned (lost at least one parent) by the tsunami in Sri Lanka, very little welfare programmes have been launched for them by the government or the donors. The majority of the children in the



households surveyed were either of non-school-going age or were at home after completing schooling, both prior to and after the tsunami. The second highest share of children were attending school before as well as after the tsunami. The number of children who had stopped going to school after the tsunami was marginal (28). Financial hardship was the primary reason for children dropping out of school, as well as further/higher education, after the tsunami. Employed children in the surveyed households increased marginally after the tsunami; while the number of male children in employment increased, employment among female children dropped after the tsunami.

### Relief

On distribution of relief, a vast majority (>80%) of affected people have received various relief payments in cash or in kind, such as funeral allowance, cooking utensils allowance, and relief coupons. However, a majority of the affected people (62%) did not get relief for the stipulated period of 32 weeks. Whatever little corruption existed in the tsunami relief was largely confined to the north, followed by the east. Over 90% of the affected households have received the monthly livelihood allowance (cash grant) as well, but only for three or four months (92.5%) as against the stipulated six months. Again, the north had the highest share of affected households (95%) receiving livelihood allowance for a shorter period. The highest shares of the households received relief in terms of food (63%) and clothing (46%) in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami from the local communities and neighbouring villages.

Besides, a significant majority (>70%) of the affected households did not experience any discrimination in the distribution of relief. However, a considerable number of households, who experienced discrimination, cited bribery and corruption (44%) as the primary reason, followed by political patronage (43%), for such discrimination. Racial, religious, or caste-based discrimination in relief disbursement was very marginal in Sri Lanka in the aftermath of the tsunami, in contrast to Tamilnadu, India.

### Shelter

A vast majority of the tsunami-affected households in Sri Lanka have been living in concrete houses (almost 75%) at the time of the tsunami and owned by them (>80%). The south had the highest share of affected households living in concrete houses prior to the tsunami (91%), followed by the east (84%). On the other hand, the east had a higher share of owner occupied houses prior to the tsunami (94%), followed by the south (84%). On both counts the north had the least (48% and 66% respectively).

Construction of houses for the affected households (whose houses have been completely damaged/destroyed by the tsunami) has been the most difficult and slowest in the entire reconstruction/recovery phase. Almost half the tsunami-affected households (47%) were still languishing in transitory/temporary shelters at the time of the survey. Latest data indicate that only 20% of the total housing requirement (circa 10,000 out of circa 50,000) has been fulfilled, almost two years after the tsunami (i.e. by September 2006).

There seems to be inequity in the distribution of permanent houses thus far. The highest share of recipients of permanent houses among the surveyed households was in the north (36.5%), followed by the south (21%), despite a majority of the houses damaged by the tsunami was in the east (67%). Those who are not provided with a newly constructed house were to receive a housing reconstruction grant (paid in two installments) from the government, sponsored mainly by the World Bank. A vast majority (73%) of the affected households have not received this grant at the time of the survey. The highest share of households who have not received the housing reconstruction grant was in the north (82%), followed by the east (72%). Further, an overwhelming majority (93%) of the affected households felt that the housing reconstruction and repair grants were inadequate for their needs.

Surprisingly, the majority (61%) of the households were in agreement with the original buffer zone stipulation for reconstruction of houses along the coast, which was highest in the east (65%), followed by the south (60%). Nevertheless, a

significant proportion of households (39%) were against the buffer zone stipulation, which was highest in the north (42.5%), followed by the south (40%). Moreover, a majority (53%) of the households have experienced displacement due to the civil war (in the north and east) prior to the tsunami, which was overwhelmingly in the north (87%) and a small proportion in the east (19%).

An overwhelming majority of the temporary shelters (82%) were built by international, national, and local NGOs (60%), and individual philanthropists (22%). However, a significant majority of the households (68%) were not satisfied with the temporary shelters. Dissatisfaction with temporary shelters was highest in the east (84%), followed by the south (63%). Further, a significant majority of the households (71%) have not been consulted or their preferences taken into account in the construction of their temporary shelters. Moreover, the majority of the permanent houses (almost 60%) were built by the I/NGOs. In contrast to temporary shelters, a significant majority of the households (70%) were satisfied with their permanent homes; the highest shares being in the north (93%) and the south (60%). Nevertheless, only a simple majority (57%) of households have been consulted and their preferences taken into account prior to building their permanent houses, again the highest shares being in the north (83%) and the south (44%).

### Gender and children

Large majority of the affected households were unaware of any physical or verbal abuse/harassment of women (97% and 94% respectively) or children (98% and 95% respectively), either in the relief camps or the temporary shelters. Whatever little abuse/harassment took place was mostly in the east, followed by the south. Nonetheless, women have been largely excluded from relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction/recovery processes.

### Health

There were hardly any health problems in the aftermath of the tsunami in any of the affected countries including Sri Lanka, in

contrast to popular expectation. The vast majority of the affected households (>70%) had safe sanitary facilities and clean water supply, both in the relief camps as well as the temporary shelters. There was a serious lack of privacy in the relief camps (63% said so). Though it has improved a bit, a significant proportion of the households (48%) still lacked adequate privacy in their temporary shelters. On the other hand, a vast majority of the households felt secure both in the relief camps (84%) as well as in the temporary shelters (86%). The majority who fell ill either in the relief camps (84%) or the temporary shelters (78%) received prompt medical attention.

### Employment

In terms of employment, the vast majority (90%) wished to continue the same vocation as before the tsunami. As a corollary, only about a third of the respondents wished to undergo skills training, in order to switch occupation. However, only a smaller majority of children of the respondent households (69%) wanted to continue their pre-tsunami vocation. While a majority of the households (61%) do have educational and health services near their temporary shelters or permanent abodes, a significant share (nearly 39%) do not have such services nearby.

### Satisfaction with service providers

The vast majority of the affected households were not satisfied with the services provided by the government (77%) or the local (district/provincial based) NGOs (56%), in the aftermath of the tsunami. However, a majority of the households were satisfied with the services of the national NGOs (55%), the highest share being in the north (59%), followed by the east (56%). Similarly, while the majority of the households were satisfied with the services provided by the INGOs (55%) (again the highest share being in the north-59%, followed by the east-56%), a considerable majority was dissatisfied with the services of bilateral (64.5%) and multilateral (52.5%) organisations. An overwhelming majority

of the households (86%) denied religious conversions taking place in the guise of tsunami relief work. However, the small number who admitted such conversions were largely in the south (20%) and the east (17%).

### **Coping efforts**

Nearly two-thirds of the tsunami-affected households (65%) have coped with the post-tsunami situation “reasonably” and another 5% “well”. Nonetheless, a considerable proportion (30%) has not done well in terms of coping with the tragedy. This result indicates lack of psycho-social support to the victims of the tsunami. A majority of the households expecting permanent houses (53%) are expecting the government to build the same, which is contrary to the experience thus far.

### **Cross-country performance**

Overall, out of the three worst affected countries by the tsunami, viz. Indonesia, Sri Lanka and India, it appears that India has done the most to the affected people, not only in terms of the quantity and quality of relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction assistance provided (monetary as well as non-monetary), but also in terms of the timely delivery of such assistance. The relative efficacy of the Indian administrative system has been lauded by many independent evaluators (Action Aid International, 2006; Forced Migration Review, 2005: 42-47; Human Rights Center of the University of California and East-West Center, 2005: 13-26; Oxfam, 2005a and 2005b). It has to be remembered that the Indian administrative system is quite used to such natural calamities, which are almost yearly occurrences, though may not be to the extent of the tsunami. India spurned foreign grants offered by various bilateral and multilateral organisations, and the debt moratorium offered by the G7 countries. Though India spurned foreign assistance for relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction of the affected people and private property, it did accept concessionary loans from multilateral organisations (ADB & WB) for the

reconstruction of the damaged economic and social infrastructure such as roads and bridges, telecommunications, transport system, schools, and hospitals.

Although Sri Lanka seems to have fallen behind India in terms of the extent of relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction assistance provided to the affected people and communities, and timely delivery of such assistance, it appears to have done relatively better than Indonesia. Both in terms of the quantum of relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction assistance and in terms of the timely delivery of temporary and permanent housing needs, Sri Lanka lags far behind India. This is in spite of the fact that almost the entire tsunami recovery assistance in Sri Lanka was provided by donors and INGOs, plus the USD.500 million worth of debt moratorium for one year (2005). Sri Lanka's own expenditure on tsunami relief and reconstruction was limited to duty waivers provided for the import of tsunami-relief and reconstruction goods from abroad for six months after the tsunami, and allocation of state lands for building of permanent houses for the affected population. Furthermore, Sri Lanka's per capita GDP of USD.1,100 in 2005 was more than double that of India's. Moreover, India had 100,000 more displaced people (650,000) to look after than Sri Lanka (550,000).

The foregoing figures demonstrate the lacuna in the political and administrative systems in Sri Lanka, despite having greater external financial assistance. However, it has to be mentioned that more than half the tsunami-affected areas in Sri Lanka is affected by an ongoing conflict as well, whereas tsunami-affected areas in India are not afflicted by conflict. The tsunami experience again reinforces the argument that pumping greater financial resources into developing countries would not necessarily improve the living conditions of the people.

Indonesia seems to be the worst performing country in terms of tsunami recovery out of the three worst affected countries in Asia, despite the fact that the total displaced population in Indonesia is slightly lower than in India and it's per capita income is marginally higher than that of India's (Action Aid International, 2006; Forced Migration Review, 2005: 19-29; Human Rights

Center of the University of California and East-West Center, 2005). Besides, though Indonesia did not accept the debt moratorium offered by the G7 countries, external donors including INGOs fund the bulk of the tsunami recovery activities.

### Suggestions for improvements and bridging the gaps

The following suggestions are made to improve the delivery, responsiveness, participation of the affected people, and communication and transparency in decision-making and implementation of the remaining tsunami reconstruction/recovery work to be done in Sri Lanka. As things stand today, it would take at least five years (i.e. end 2009) for the full recovery from the devastation of the tsunami in Sri Lanka. Two years have passed and there are three more years to go. Therefore, it is still not too late to make amends.

1. While maintaining equity in the delivery of assistance to different regions/districts, not only the impact of the tsunami on different regions/districts, but also the extent and nature of the respective local economies should be taken into consideration.
2. Even at this late stage, the GoSL and the donor community should launch a dedicated assistance programme for the tsunami orphans throughout the country in order to secure their future, and incentive package for those who have dropped-out to return to school.
3. All reconstruction and recovery assistance (monetary or in-kind) should be given in the joint names of the heads of households (wife and husband). Currently, only permanent houses or housing reconstruction grants are due to the affected people. Therefore, the principle of joint ownership should be adhered to in the housing giveaways or grants.
4. The government should constitute ombudsman offices in all affected Divisional Secretariat (DS) areas, to receive

complaints from the affected people regarding any discrimination, unfair treatment, violation of fundamental rights, lack of consultation, etc, experienced during the course of recovery, and each ombudsman office should adjudicate on the complaints received. This is urgently required because of inordinate delay in the construction of permanent houses. The idea of establishment of ombudsman offices was originally mooted by the Human Rights Center of the University of California and East-West Center (2005: 3).

5. A rolling survey of tsunami-affected households should be undertaken periodically (e.g. every six months) to track changes in living conditions, livelihood restoration, and recovery of tsunami-affected households. That is, the same households should be surveyed periodically (say every six months) to monitor the progress until five years after the tsunami. This rolling survey should have an in-built poverty tracking system as well.
6. Case studies on the merits and demerits of different relief programmes such as food-for-work programmes, cash-for-work programmes, livelihood allowance (cash grants), and housing reconstruction grants by different donors should be undertaken to ascertain the efficacy of such programmes. Lessons learned would be of use in the future.
7. A cost-benefit analysis of the entire relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction activities should be undertaken to find out the costs and benefits of recovery strategies adopted in Sri Lanka by different governmental, non-governmental, and donor agencies. This is all the more important in the context of post-tsunami reconstruction, because for the first time in history, the financial pledges and commitments exceeded the needs of many countries (including Sri Lanka), and the actual disbursement was very high compared to most other post-disaster situations<sup>30</sup>. Internationally, there is a growing

<sup>30</sup> <http://www.tsunamispecialenvoy.org/financial/>

disquiet about the humanitarian aid industry spurred by natural and human-made calamities such as the tsunami (see Rajasingham-Senanayake, 2006; Action Aid International, 2005). This author feels that, in lieu of several types of relief assistance provided by several benefactors, it would have been cost-effective to provide an all-inclusive one-off grant of LKR. 1-2 million (USD. 10,000-20,000) per affected family (depending on the size of families and the extent of losses incurred by each family), and allow the recipients to choose their appropriate needs and priorities. Given that there were nearly 150,000 tsunami-displaced families in Sri Lanka, this proposal would have cost between USD. 1.5-3 billion, which was affordable given the generosity of the global community towards the tsunami victims. This all-inclusive one-off cash grant (perhaps in instalments) could have greatly reduced transaction costs and multiplicity of overhead costs of the government, non-governmental organisations, and donor agencies

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**TABLE 1: Respondents by Divisional Secretariat Area**

DS Area	EAST		Trincomeale		NORTH		Jaffna		SOUTH		Galle		Hambantota		Matara		TOTAL			
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%		
Aldalichenni	106	3.6															106	3.6		
Akkarajattu	88	2.9															88	2.9		
Alaydiyverbu	41	1.4															41	1.4		
Kalimnai	144	4.8															144	4.8		
Keritivu	30	1.0															30	1.0		
Lahugala	1	0.0															1	0.0		
Ninlavur	108	3.6															108	3.6		
Pottuvil	41	1.4															41	1.4		
Sainthararubu	41	1.4															41	1.4		
<b>Sub Total Amp</b>	<b>600</b>	<b>20.1</b>	<b>600</b>	<b>20.1</b>													<b>600</b>	<b>20.1</b>		
Kittanbudy	58	1.9															58	1.9		
Mannani Nor	96	3.4															96	3.4		
Mannaniyattu	66	2.3															66	2.3		
Mannani Soa	76	2.5															76	2.5		
<b>Sub Total Batt</b>	<b>296</b>	<b>10.1</b>															<b>296</b>	<b>10.1</b>		
Kinniya	15	0.6															15	0.6		
Kuchcheveli	33	1.1															33	1.1		
Muthur	24	0.8															24	0.8		
Town&Gravets	32	1.0															32	1.0		
<b>Sub Total Trinco</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>3.5</b>															<b>104</b>	<b>3.5</b>		
Vadamarschi E							442	14.8									442	14.8		
Vadamarschi N							557	18.6									557	18.6		
<b>Sub Total Jaffna</b>							<b>999</b>	<b>33.4</b>									<b>999</b>	<b>33.4</b>		
Amalangoda																				
Balanayya																				
Bentota																				
Galle Fort Grav																				
Habarubawa																				
Hickadewa																				
Hambantota																				
Tangalle																				
Devunwara																				
Dickwela																				
Matara Fort Gr																				
Weligama																				
<b>Sub Total Matara</b>																				
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1000</b>	<b>33.7</b>	<b>600</b>	<b>20.1</b>	<b>296</b>	<b>10.1</b>	<b>999</b>	<b>33.4</b>	<b>999</b>	<b>33.4</b>	<b>989</b>	<b>32.9</b>	<b>400</b>	<b>13.4</b>	<b>300</b>	<b>9.9</b>	<b>289</b>	<b>9.6</b>	<b>2988</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Survey Results.

**TABLE 2: Respondents by Gender, Ethnicity, and Religion**  
(Percentage)

Region / District	GENDER			ETHNICITY				RELIGION				
	Female	Male	Total	Muslim	Tamil	Sinhalese	Total	Buddhist	Christian	Hindu	Islam	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<b>EAST</b>	57.7	42.3	100.0	67.5	30.0	2.5	100.0	2.3	5.6	24.4	67.7	100.0
Ampara	58.7	41.3	100.0	86.8	12.5	0.7	100.0	0.5	6.7	5.8	87.0	100.0
Batticaloa	54.7	45.3	100.0	35.5	64.2	0.3	100.0	0.0	3.7	60.5	35.8	100.0
Trincomalee	60.6	39.4	100.0	47.1	33.7	19.2	100.0	19.2	4.8	28.8	47.1	100.0
<b>NORTH</b>	57.5	42.5	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	34.5	65.5	0.0	100.0
Jaffna	57.5	42.5	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	34.5	65.5	0.0	100.0
<b>SOUTH</b>	54.4	45.6	100.0	19.9	0.0	80.1	100.0	78.6	1.5	0.0	19.9	100.0
Galle	74.0	26.0	100.0	12.5	0.0	87.5	100.0	86.5	1.0	0.0	12.5	100.0
Hambantota	36.0	64.0	100.0	32.3	0.0	67.7	100.0	66.3	1.3	0.0	32.3	100.0
Matara	46.4	53.6	100.0	17.3	0.0	82.7	100.0	80.3	2.4	0.0	17.3	100.0
<b>TOTAL</b>	56.5	43.5	100.0	29.1	43.5	27.3	100.0	26.9	13.8	29.9	29.4	100.0

Source: Survey Results.

**TABLE 3: Respondents by Caste**

Caste	Ampara		Batticaloa		Trincomalee		Jaffna		Galle		Hambantota		Matara		Total	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Durawa									2	0.1	3	0.1	124	4.1	129	4.3
Govi					2	0.1			90	3	15	0.5	24	0.8	131	4.4
Hakuru											9	0.3			9	0.3
Hatagama											1	0	2	0.1	3	0.1
Hinna															3	0.1
Ja									3	0.1					6	0.2
Karawa									2	0.1			4	0.1	6	0.2
Karayar									136	4.6	140	4.7	67	2.2	343	11.4
Nawandana							73	2.4			15	0.5	1	0.0	16	0.5
Rajaka													4	0.1	4	0.1
Salagama									92	3.0	12	0.4	2	0.1	106	3.5
Sankar									9	0.3			4	0.1	13	0.4
Wahampura									10	0.3					10	0.3
No/Not Answered	600	20.1	296	10.0	102	3.4	926	31.0	56	1.9	105	3.5	57	1.9	2,142	71.9
<b>TOTAL</b>	600	20.1	296	10.0	104	3.5	999	33.4	400	13.4	300	10.0	289	9.5	2,988	100.0

Source: Survey Results.

TABLE 4: Impact of the Tsunami by Region and Country

Region / Country	Number of dead	Number of displaced people	Number of houses fully or partially damaged (cannot be used)
<b>Africa</b>	<b>301</b>	<b>7,000</b>	<b>50,000</b>
Kenya	1	1,000	N.A
Madagascar	0	1,000	N.A
Somalia	300	5,000	50,000
<b>Africa as a share of the total</b>	<b>0.1%</b>	<b>0.4%</b>	<b>11.4%</b>
<b>South Asia</b>	<b>53,329</b>	<b>1,219,262</b>	<b>257,212</b>
India	16,389	647,599	154,000
Maldives	82	21,663	5,347
Sri Lanka	36,858	550,000	97,865
<b>SA as a share of the total</b>	<b>18.0%</b>	<b>65.9%</b>	<b>58.9%</b>
<b>South East Asia</b>	<b>243,425</b>	<b>623,200</b>	<b>129,570</b>
Indonesia	237,971	617,000	127,300
Myanmar	61	3,200	1,300
Thailand	5,393	3,000	970
<b>SEA as a share of the total</b>	<b>81.9%</b>	<b>33.7%</b>	<b>29.7%</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>297,055</b>	<b>1,849,462</b>	<b>436,782</b>

Source: various

TABLE 5: Impact of the Tsunami by Province and District

Province / District	Number of dead	Number of displaced families	Number of houses fully or partially damaged (cannot be used)	Population 2004
<b>Eastern Province</b>	<b>14,691</b>	<b>81,905</b>	<b>53,935</b>	<b>1,540,000</b>
Ampara	10,436	38,866	27,562	613,000
Batticaloa	3,177	30,545	17,708	544,000
Trincomalee	1,078	12,494	8,665	383,000
<b>EP as a share of the total</b>	<b>46.1%</b>	<b>57.1%</b>	<b>55.1%</b>	<b>7.9%</b>
<b>Northern Province</b>	<b>6,523</b>	<b>17,241</b>	<b>11,106</b>	<b>1,122,000</b>
Jaffna	2,640	10,827	5,408	596,000
Kilinochchi	560	407	246	143,000
Mullaitivu	3,323	6,007	5,452	144,000
<b>NP as a share of the total</b>	<b>20.5%</b>	<b>12.0%</b>	<b>11.3%</b>	<b>5.8%</b>
<b>Southern Province</b>	<b>10,090</b>	<b>28,847</b>	<b>23,905</b>	<b>2,346,000</b>
Galle	4,248	23,278	12,499	1,020,000
Hambantota	4,500	3,334	2,508	538,000
Matara	1,342	2,235	8,898	788,000
<b>SP as a share of the total</b>	<b>31.7%</b>	<b>20.1%</b>	<b>24.4%</b>	<b>12.1%</b>
<b>Western Province</b>	<b>554</b>	<b>15,507</b>	<b>8,919</b>	<b>5,526,000</b>
Colombo	130	8,140	5,727	2,342,000
Gampaha	145	308	692	2,099,000
Kalutara	279	7,059	2,500	1,085,000
<b>WP as a share of the total</b>	<b>1.7%</b>	<b>10.8%</b>	<b>9.1%</b>	<b>28.4%</b>
<b>SRI LANKA</b>	<b>31,858 + circa 5,000 missing</b>	<b>143,500</b>	<b>97,865</b>	<b>19,462,000</b>

Source: Department of Census and Statistics & TAFREN.

TABLE 6: Gross Domestic Product by Province 1990 – 2004

Province	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Eastern Province	4.2 (13)	4.5 (14)	4.7 (15)	4.7 (17)	4.5 (17)	4.6 (18)	4.8 (34)	5.0 (40)	5.5 (50)	5.0 (50)	4.5 (51)	5.0 (62)	4.9 (69)	6.1 (96)	5.4 (98)
Northern Province	4.4 (13)	3.8 (12)	3.6 (12)	3.2 (11)	3.2 (12)	3.1 (12)	2.4 (17)	2.8 (22)	2.9 (26)	2.5 (25)	2.1 (24)	2.4 (29)	2.6 (37)	2.7 (43)	2.9 (51)
Southern Province	9.5 (28)	9.8 (31)	9.6 (32)	9.7 (34)	9.6 (36)	9.5 (37)	9.0 (62)	8.8 (71)	9.3 (85)	9.6 (95)	9.4 (106)	9.7 (121)	9.5 (134)	9.9 (155)	9.3 (168)
Western Province	40.2 (121)	40.4 (127)	41.4 (136)	41.5 (146)	41.9 (157)	42.3 (167)	43.7 (304)	44.3 (356)	45.3 (413)	48.7 (485)	49.6 (558)	48.3 (601)	48.1 (675)	49.7 (777)	51.0 (918)
<b>Sri Lanka</b>	<b>100.0 (300)</b>	<b>100.0 (313)</b>	<b>100.0 (329)</b>	<b>100.0 (353)</b>	<b>100.0 (373)</b>	<b>100.0 (395)</b>	<b>100.0 (696)</b>	<b>100.0 (804)</b>	<b>100.0 (913)</b>	<b>100.0 (995)</b>	<b>100.0 (1125)</b>	<b>100.0 (1246)</b>	<b>100.0 (1403)</b>	<b>100.0 (1563)</b>	<b>100.0 (1801)</b>

Source: Author's calculations based on the following:

1990-1995 - Department of National Planning, Colombo, cited in North East Provincial Council (2002: 284).  
1996-2004 - Central Bank of Sri Lanka, *Annual Report 2003 & 2005*, Statistical Appendix Table 4.

Note: (a) Numbers in parenthesis are rounded to nearest full LKR billion. (b) 1990-1995 figures are in constant prices (1990) while 1996-2004 figures are in current prices. (c) Figures for 2004 are provisional.

TABLE 7: Sectoral Composition of Gross Domestic Product by Province (percentage) 2000 - 2004

Province	Agriculture					Industry					Services				
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Eastern Province	30.3	34.8	37.5	36.4	33.3	24.8	25.7	22.7	29.8	28.1	45.0	39.5	39.8	33.8	38.6
Northern Province	18.5	21.0	26.5	28.4	28.0	7.4	7.0	6.5	6.9	6.8	74.1	72.0	67.1	64.7	65.3
Southern Province	38.2	34.4	39.2	35.1	35.9	14.6	17.6	17.1	23.4	19.9	47.2	47.9	43.7	41.5	44.2
Western Province	4.6	4.8	4.4	3.3	2.9	35.3	32.9	32.5	31.2	32.3	60.0	62.3	63.2	65.5	64.7
<b>Sri Lanka</b>	<b>19.4</b>	<b>20.1</b>	<b>20.5</b>	<b>19.0</b>	<b>17.8</b>	<b>27.3</b>	<b>26.8</b>	<b>26.3</b>	<b>26.4</b>	<b>26.8</b>	<b>53.3</b>	<b>53.1</b>	<b>53.2</b>	<b>54.6</b>	<b>55.4</b>

Source: Author's calculations based on Central Bank of Sri Lanka, *Annual Report 2005*, Statistical Appendix Table 4, Colombo.

Note: (a) Agriculture sector includes food and cash crops, forestry, livestock, and fishing. (b) Industrial sector includes manufacturing, mining & quarrying, construction, and utilities (electricity & water). (c) Services sector includes wholesale & retail trade (domestic & external), transport, storage & communication (post & telecommunication), financial services, real estate & business services, and public administration, defence & other government services, and private social, community & personal services. (d) Figures for 2004 are provisional.



**TABLE 8: Decomposition of Sectoral Contributions to Provincial GDP 2003**

Sector	Eastern Province		Northern Province		Southern Province		Western Province		Sri Lanka	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
<b>Agriculture, Forestry &amp; Fishing</b>										
Agriculture			40.6		28.7		37.3		3.4	
Forestry			25.7		16.3		29.4		2.5	
Fishing			3.0		0.4		2.6		0.1	
<b>Industry</b>			11.9		12.0		5.3		0.8	
Mining & Quarrying			23.6		6.7		17.9		32.2	
Manufacturing			1.8		2.7		1.7		0.7	
Construction			18.4		0.2		10.7		19.5	
Electricity, Gas, Water & Sanitary			1.9		1.7		4.0		10.2	
<b>Services</b>			1.5		2.0		1.6		1.8	
Transport, Storage & Communication			35.4		64.5		44.8		64.4	
Wholesale and Retail Trade			8.8		8.9		12.5		16.0	
Banking, Insurance & Real Estate			8.9		9.6		18.7		24.0	
Ownership of Dwellings			1.3		1.0		2.6		16.7	
Public Administration and Defence			2.3		3.4		2.1		0.9	
Other Services			11.5		37.8		5.5		2.2	
			2.6		3.9		3.4		4.7	
										54.6
										13.8
										20.1
										9.9
										1.6
										5.2
										3.9

Source: Authors calculations based on Central Bank of Sri Lanka, *Economic and Social Statistics of Sri Lanka 2005*, pp32.  
 Note: Provincial GDP data in this table is provisional.

**TABLE 9: Size of Households Before the Tsunami**

Region / District	1&2		3		4		5		6		7&8		9&10		>10		TOTAL	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
<b>EAST</b>	108	10.8	200	20.0	225	22.5	225	22.5	131	13.1	99	9.9	11	1.1	1	0.1	1000	100.0
Ampara	65	10.8	121	20.2	142	23.7	129	21.5	78	13.0	60	10.0	4	0.7	1	0.2	600	100.0
Batticaloa	39	13.2	59	19.9	56	18.9	70	23.6	40	13.5	27	9.1	5	1.7	0	0	296	100.0
Trincomalee	4	3.8	20	19.2	27	26.0	26	25.0	13	12.5	12	11.5	2	1.9	0	0	104	100.0
<b>NORTH</b>	187	18.7	147	14.7	159	15.9	195	19.5	155	15.5	123	12.3	22	2.2	11	1.1	999	100.0
Jaffna	187	18.7	147	14.7	159	15.9	195	19.5	155	15.5	123	12.3	22	2.2	11	1.1	999	100.0
<b>SOUTH</b>	74	7.5	183	18.5	251	25.4	224	22.6	132	13.3	101	10.2	18	1.8	6	0.6	989	100.0
Galle	26	6.5	73	18.3	100	25.0	87	21.8	61	15.3	42	10.5	10	2.5	1	0.3	400	100.0
Hambantota	16	5.3	54	18.0	78	26.0	71	23.7	42	14.0	30	10.0	4	1.3	5	1.7	300	100.0
Matara	32	11.1	56	19.4	73	25.3	66	22.8	29	10.0	29	10.0	4	1.4	0	0	289	100.0
<b>TOTAL</b>	369	12.3	530	17.7	635	21.3	644	21.6	418	14.0	323	10.8	51	1.7	18	0.6	2988	100.0

Source: Survey Results.

**TABLE 10: Size of Households after the Tsunami**

Region/ District	1&2		3		4		5		6		7&8		9&10		>10		TOTAL	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
<b>EAST</b>	107	10.7	205	20.5	262	26.2	214	21.4	127	12.7	79	7.9	6	0.6	0	0.0	1000	100.0
Ampara	61	10.2	123	20.5	179	29.8	114	19.0	76	12.7	46	7.7	1	0.0	0	0.0	600	100.0
Batticaloa	41	13.9	61	20.6	54	18.2	73	24.7	37	12.5	26	8.8	4	1.4	0	0.0	296	100.0
Trincomalee	5	4.8	21	20.2	29	27.9	27	26.0	14	13.5	7	6.7	1	1.0	0	0.0	104	100.0
<b>NORTH</b>	174	17.4	165	16.5	162	16.2	200	20.0	145	14.5	123	12.3	20	2.0	10	1.0	999	100.0
Jaffna	174	17.4	165	16.5	162	16.2	200	20.0	145	14.5	123	12.3	20	2.0	10	1.0	999	100.0
<b>SOUTH</b>	116	11.7	207	20.9	267	27.0	202	20.4	105	10.6	73	7.4	16	1.6	3	0.3	989	100.0
Galle	30	7.5	87	21.8	102	25.5	87	21.8	48	12.0	35	8.8	10	2.5	1	0.3	400	100.0
Hambantota	43	14.3	64	21.3	84	28.0	57	19.0	33	11.0	15	5.0	3	1.0	1	0.3	300	100.0
Matara	43	14.9	56	19.4	81	28.0	58	20.1	24	8.3	23	8.0	3	1.0	1	0.3	289	100.0
<b>TOTAL</b>	397	13.3	577	19.3	691	23.1	616	20.6	377	12.6	275	9.2	42	1.4	13	0.4	2988	100.0

Source: Survey Results.

**TABLE 11: Employment Before and After the Tsunami**

Region/ District	RESPONDENT						SPOUSE							
	Before Tsunami			After Tsunami			Before Tsunami			After Tsunami				
	Yes	No	%	Yes	No	%	Yes	No	%	Yes	No	%		
<b>EAST</b>	651	65.1	34.9	460	46.0	54.0	523	60.1	347	39.9	431	50.8	417	49.2
Ampara	393	65.5	207	34.5	261	43.5	339	56.5	335	63.7	191	36.3	279	54.5
Batticaloa	191	64.5	105	35.5	147	49.7	149	50.3	134	53.4	117	46.6	106	43.6
Trincomalee	67	64.4	37	35.6	52	50.0	52	50.0	54	58.1	39	41.9	46	49.5
<b>NORTH</b>	576	57.7	423	42.3	477	47.7	522	52.3	425	55.3	343	46.7	331	44.7
Jaffna	576	57.7	423	42.3	477	47.7	522	52.3	425	55.3	343	46.7	331	44.7
<b>SOUTH</b>	663	67.0	326	33.0	425	43.0	564	57.0	475	59.4	325	40.6	336	43.8
Galle	232	58.0	168	42.0	132	33.0	268	67.0	238	77.5	69	22.5	179	59.5
Hambantota	227	75.7	73	24.3	136	45.3	164	54.7	102	41.6	143	58.4	51	22.5
Matara	204	70.6	85	29.4	157	54.3	132	45.7	135	54.4	113	45.6	106	44.4
<b>TOTAL</b>	1890	63.3	1098	36.7	1362	45.6	1626	54.4	1423	58.4	1015	41.6	1098	46.6

Source: Survey Results.

Note: Some respondents did not have a spouse

**TABLE 12: Monthly Household Income Before and After the Tsunami**  
(Percentage)

Region / District	< or = 3,000		3,001 - 5,000		5,001 - 10,000		10,001 - 15,000		15,001 - 20,000		= or > 20,001		TOTAL	
	Before	After	Before	After	Before	After	Before	After	Before	After	Before	After	Before	After
<b>EAST</b>	23.7	42.7	40.4	27.2	22.5	18.2	11.1	8.8	2.0	2.3	0.3	0.7	100.0	100.0
Ampara	13.0	31.2	43.8	33.4	24.7	20.5	15.6	11.4	2.7	2.9	0.2	0.7	100.0	100.0
Batticaloa	42.6	64.9	37.2	15.5	15.2	11.5	4.1	5.4	0.7	2.0	0.3	0.7	100.0	100.0
Trincomalee	31.1	45.6	30.1	25.2	30.1	24.3	5.8	3.9	1.9	0.0	1.0	1.0	100.0	100.0
<b>NORTH</b>	67.7	81.0	14.8	13.0	10.7	4.9	5.6	0.9	1.1	0.2	0.1	0.0	100.0	100.0
Jaffna	67.7	81.0	14.8	13.0	10.7	4.9	5.6	0.9	1.1	0.2	0.1	0.0	100.0	100.0
<b>SOUTH</b>	14.1	47.1	31.5	29.2	36.3	16.2	10.1	4.7	5.9	1.8	2.1	0.9	100.0	100.0
Galle	9.5	22.3	25.6	40.6	42.4	26.6	14.0	7.5	5.5	1.8	3.0	1.3	100.0	100.0
Hambantota	10.7	75.6	36.2	16.6	36.9	5.1	7.0	1.4	8.1	1.4	1.0	0.0	100.0	100.0
Matara	24.0	52.4	34.8	26.2	27.2	13.3	7.7	4.2	4.2	2.4	2.1	1.4	100.0	100.0
<b>TOTAL</b>	35.2	57.0	28.9	23.1	23.1	13.1	8.9	4.8	3.0	1.5	0.8	0.5	100.0	100.0

Source: Survey Results.

**TABLE 13: Education of Children Before and After the Tsunami**

Region / District	SCHOOL												HIGHER EDUCATION											
	Before Tsunami						After Tsunami						Before Tsunami						After Tsunami					
	No	%	Boys	Girls	Total	%	No	%	Boys	Girls	Total	%	No	%	Boys	Girls	Total	%	No	%	Boys	Girls	Total	
<b>EAST</b>	507	50.0	507	50.0	1014	100	482	49.5	491	50.5	973	100	30	34.9	56	65.1	86	100	29	36.7	50	63.3	79	100
Ampara	310	50.7	301	49.3	611	100	289	49.8	291	50.2	580	100	19	32.8	39	67.2	58	100	15	28.3	38	71.7	53	100
Batticaloa	148	50.3	146	49.7	294	100	148	51.0	142	49.0	290	100	7	41.2	10	58.8	17	100	11	61.1	7	38.9	18	100
Trincomalee	49	45.0	60	55.0	109	100	45	43.7	58	56.3	103	100	4	36.4	7	63.6	11	100	3	37.5	5	62.5	8	100
<b>NORTH</b>	450	53.1	398	46.9	848	100	392	52.6	353	47.4	745	100	48	60.0	32	40.0	80	100	31	62.0	19	38.0	50	100
Jaffna	450	53.1	398	46.9	848	100	392	52.6	353	47.4	745	100	48	60.0	32	40.0	80	100	31	62.0	19	38.0	50	100
<b>SOUTH</b>	414	51.1	396	48.9	810	100	355	49.0	370	51.0	725	100	55	63.2	32	36.8	87	100	48	57.1	36	42.9	84	100
Galle	148	49.7	150	50.3	298	100	126	46.5	145	53.5	271	100	18	52.9	16	47.1	34	100	18	52.9	16	47.1	34	100
Hambantota	143	51.4	135	48.6	278	100	118	49.0	123	51.0	241	100	3	100	0	0.0	3	100	9	60.0	6	40.0	15	100
Matara	123	52.6	111	47.4	234	100	111	52.1	102	47.9	213	100	34	68.0	16	32.0	50	100	21	60.0	14	40.0	35	100
<b>TOTAL</b>	1371	51.3	1301	48.7	2672	100	1229	50.3	1214	49.7	2443	100	133	52.6	120	47.4	253	100	108	50.7	105	49.3	213	100

Source: Survey Results.

**TABLE 14: Reasons for Children Not Attending School After the Tsunami**

Region / District	No school nearby		No transport		No clothing		No books		Other		TOTAL	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
<b>EAST</b>	1	0.5	2	1.0	5	2.4	6	2.9	196	93.3	210	100.0
Ampara	1	0.6	1	0.6	0	0.0	4	2.5	155	96.3	161	100.0
Batticaloa	0	0.0	1	2.5	1	2.5	2	5.0	36	90.0	40	100.0
Trincomalae	0	0.0	0	0.0	4	44.4	0	0.0	5	55.6	9	100.0
<b>NORTH</b>	0	0.0	21	24.7	15	17.6	22	25.9	27	31.8	85	100.0
Jaffna	0	0.0	21	24.7	15	17.6	22	25.9	27	31.8	85	100.0
<b>SOUTH</b>	3	42.9	0	0.0	0	0.0	4	57.1	0	0.0	7	100.0
Galle	1	50.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	50.0	0	0.0	2	100.0
Hambantota	1	33.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	66.7	0	0.0	3	100.0
Matara	1	50.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	50.0	0	0.0	2	100.0
<b>TOTAL</b>	4	1.3	23	7.6	20	6.6	32	10.6	223	73.8	302	100.0

Source: Survey Results.

**TABLE 15: Employment of Children Before and After the Tsunami**

Region / District	Before Tsunami		Total		After Tsunami		Total					
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%				
<b>EAST</b>	35	19.9	141	80.1	176	100.0	33	16.8	163	83.2	196	100.0
Ampara	24	21.6	87	78.4	111	100.0	21	17.5	99	82.5	120	100.0
Batticaloa	7	16.3	36	83.7	43	100.0	8	16.7	40	83.3	48	100.0
Trincomalae	4	18.2	18	81.8	22	100.0	4	14.3	24	85.7	28	100.0
<b>NORTH</b>	25	14.4	149	85.6	174	100.0	31	16.1	162	83.9	193	100.0
Jaffna	25	14.4	149	85.6	174	100.0	31	16.1	162	83.9	193	100.0
<b>SOUTH</b>	102	32.9	208	67.1	310	100.0	93	31.5	202	68.5	295	100.0
Galle	57	34.8	107	65.2	164	100.0	49	31.8	105	68.2	154	100.0
Hambantota	18	28.6	45	71.4	63	100.0	17	26.2	48	73.8	65	100.0
Matara	27	32.5	56	67.5	83	100.0	27	35.5	49	64.5	76	100.0
<b>TOTAL</b>	162	24.5	498	75.5	660	100.0	157	23.0	527	77.0	684	100.0

Source: Survey Results.  
Note: Not Applicable

**TABLE 16: Receipt of Payment for Funeral Expenses**

Region / District	Funeral Expenses Received from the Government										Funeral Expenses Received from other Organisations					
	Rs.15,000		Nothing		Other amount		Total		Yes		No		Total			
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%		
<b>EAST</b>	117	80.1	15	10.3	14	9.6	146	100.0	39	26.9	106	73.1	145	100.0		
Ampara	88	80.0	13	11.8	9	8.2	110	100.0	24	22.0	85	78.0	109	100.0		
Batticaloa	11	68.8	0	0.0	5	31.3	16	100.0	2	12.5	14	87.5	16	100.0		
Trincomalee	18	90.0	2	10.0	0	0.0	20	100.0	13	65.0	7	35.0	20	100.0		
<b>NORTH</b>	51	78.5	6	9.2	8	12.3	65	100.0	22	40.0	33	60.0	55	100.0		
Jaffna	51	78.5	6	9.2	8	12.3	65	100.0	22	40.0	33	60.0	55	100.0		
<b>SOUTH</b>	166	89.2	2	1.1	18	9.7	186	100.0	3	1.7	170	98.3	173	100.0		
Galle	39	81.3	2	4.2	7	14.6	48	100.0	1	2.3	43	97.7	44	100.0		
Hambantota	93	100.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	93	100.0	0	0.0	87	100.0	87	100.0		
Matara	34	75.6	0	0.0	11	24.4	45	100.0	2	4.8	40	95.2	42	100.0		
<b>TOTAL</b>	334	84.1	23	5.8	40	10.1	397	100.0	64	17.2	309	82.8	373	100.0		

Source: Survey Results.

**TABLE 17: Receipt of Allowance for Cooking Utensils**

Region / District	Cooking utensils allowance received from the Government										Cooking utensils allowance received from other organisations					
	Rs.2,500		Nothing		Other amount		Total		Yes		No		Total			
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%		
<b>EAST</b>	892	89.6	101	10.1	3	0.3	996	100.0	489	49.4	500	50.6	989	100.0		
Ampara	534	89.3	63	10.5	1	0.2	598	100.0	348	59.1	241	40.9	589	100.0		
Batticaloa	280	94.9	15	5.1	0	0.0	295	100.0	95	32.1	201	67.9	296	100.0		
Trincomalee	78	75.7	23	22.3	2	1.9	103	100.0	46	44.2	58	55.8	104	100.0		
<b>NORTH</b>	705	74.1	178	18.7	68	7.2	951	100.0	767	77.9	217	22.1	984	100.0		
Jaffna	705	74.1	178	18.7	68	7.2	951	100.0	767	77.9	217	22.1	984	100.0		
<b>SOUTH</b>	901	91.4	85	8.6	0	0.0	986	100.0	713	72.5	270	27.5	983	100.0		
Galle	374	94.0	24	6.0	0	0.0	398	100.0	307	77.1	91	22.9	398	100.0		
Hambantota	252	84.0	48	16.0	0	0.0	300	100.0	149	49.8	150	50.2	299	100.0		
Matara	275	95.5	13	4.5	0	0.0	288	100.0	257	89.9	29	10.1	286	100.0		
<b>TOTAL</b>	2498	85.2	364	12.4	71	2.4	2933	100.0	1969	66.6	987	33.4	2956	100.0		

Source: Survey Results.

**TABLE 18: Receipt of Weekly Food and Non-Food Relief**

Region / District	Respondent			All members of the household						Number of weeks received						Still getting at the time of interview								
	Yes		No	TOTAL		No		TOTAL		32 weeks		Other		TOTAL		Yes		No		TOTAL				
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%		
<b>EAST</b>	961	96.1	39	3.9	1000	100	868	88.2	116	11.8	984	100	0	0.0	971	100	971	100	191	19.1	809	80.9	1000	100
Ampara	576	96.0	24	4.0	600	100	567	96.9	18	3.1	585	100	0	0.0	581	100	581	100	162	27.0	438	73.0	600	100
Batticaloa	287	97.0	9	3.0	296	100	213	72.2	82	27.8	295	100	0	0.0	290	100	290	100	17	5.7	279	94.3	296	100
Trincomalee	98	94.2	6	5.8	104	100	88	84.6	16	15.4	104	100	0	0.0	100	100	100	100	12	11.5	92	88.5	104	100
<b>NORTH</b>	967	96.8	32	3.2	999	100	792	81.6	178	18.4	970	100	277	30.1	644	69.9	921	100	420	42.4	570	57.6	990	100
Jaffna	967	96.8	32	3.2	999	100	792	81.6	178	18.4	970	100	277	30.1	644	69.9	921	100	420	42.4	570	57.6	990	100
<b>SOUTH</b>	977	98.8	12	1.2	989	100	955	96.7	33	3.3	988	100	804	82.5	170	17.5	974	100	315	31.9	671	68.1	986	100
Galle	397	99.3	3	0.8	400	100	382	95.5	18	4.5	400	100	372	94.2	23	5.8	395	100	196	49.4	201	50.6	397	100
Hambantota	293	97.7	7	2.3	300	100	287	99.0	3	1.0	290	100	148	30.7	144	49.3	292	100	43	14.3	257	85.7	300	100
Matara	287	99.3	2	0.7	289	100	286	96.0	12	4.0	298	100	284	99.0	3	1.0	287	100	76	26.3	213	73.7	289	100
<b>TOTAL</b>	2905	97.2	83	2.8	2988	100	2615	88.9	327	11.1	2942	100	1081	37.7	1785	62.3	2866	100	926	31.1	2050	68.9	2976	100

Source: Survey Results.

**TABLE 19: Receipt of Monthly Household Cash Allowance**

Region / District	Household cash allowance of Rs.5,000						Household cash allowance of Rs.5,000						Number of months received						Still getting at the time of interview					
	Yes		No		TOTAL		1&2		3&4		5&6		TOTAL		Yes		No		TOTAL					
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%				
<b>EAST</b>	929	92.9	53	5.2	18	1.8	1000	100.0	49	5.2	877	93.1	16	1.7	942	100.0	37	3.8	927	96.2	964	100.0		
Ampara	553	92.2	40	6.7	7	1.2	600	100.0	14	2.5	524	94.8	15	2.7	553	100.0	19	3.3	549	96.7	568	100.0		
Batticaloa	275	92.9	12	4.1	9	3.0	296	100.0	13	4.5	273	95.1	1	0.3	287	100.0	18	6.2	274	93.8	292	100.0		
Trincomalee	101	97.1	1	1.0	2	1.9	104	100.0	22	21.6	80	78.4	0	0.0	102	100.0	0	0.0	104	100.0	104	100.0		
<b>NORTH</b>	910	91.1	29	2.9	60	6.0	999	100.0	20	2.2	879	95.4	22	2.4	921	100.0	56	5.8	912	94.2	968	100.0		
Jaffna	910	91.1	29	2.9	60	6.0	999	100.0	20	2.2	879	95.4	22	2.4	921	100.0	56	5.8	912	94.2	968	100.0		
<b>SOUTH</b>	926	93.6	33	3.3	30	3.0	989	100.0	28	10.3	852	89.2	5	0.5	955	100.0	62	6.4	901	93.6	963	100.0		
Galle	382	95.5	13	3.3	5	1.3	400	100.0	31	6.2	362	93.5	1	0.3	387	100.0	59	15.2	328	84.8	387	100.0		
Hambantota	266	88.7	13	4.3	21	7.0	300	100.0	43	15.2	250	87.7	4	1.4	283	100.0	1	0.3	287	99.3	288	100.0		
Matara	278	96.2	7	2.4	4	1.4	289	100.0	43	15.2	240	84.8	0	0.0	283	100.0	2	0.7	286	99.3	288	100.0		
<b>TOTAL</b>	2765	92.5	115	3.8	108	3.6	2988	100.0	167	5.9	2608	92.5	43	1.6	2818	100.0	155	5.4	2740	94.6	2895	100.0		

Source: Survey Results.



**TABLE 20: Source of Relief Immediately After the Tsunami**  
(Percentage)

Region / District	FOOD						CLOTHES									
	Relative	Friend	Local community	NGO	Government	None	Other	Total	Relative	Friend	Local community	NGO	Government	None	Other	Total
<b>EAST</b>	27.6	11.4	28.8	3.9	2.5	0.5	25.3	100.0	29.1	10.6	27.1	6.8	0.2	1.1	25.1	100.0
Ampara	36.2	11.8	25.3	1.2	1.0	0.3	24.2	100.0	36.7	12.2	24.5	1.2	0.3	0.8	24.3	100.0
Batticaloa	14.2	12.8	39.9	6.8	6.4	0.0	19.9	100.0	20.6	9.1	36.5	14.5	0.0	0.3	18.9	100.0
Trincomalee	16.3	4.8	17.3	11.5	0.0	2.9	47.1	100.0	9.6	5.8	15.4	17.3	0.0	4.8	47.1	100.0
<b>NORTH</b>	4.0	5.4	51.8	28.8	1.1	1.2	7.7	100.0	2.1	7.3	10.8	67.9	0.4	4.4	7.1	100.0
Jaffna	4.0	5.4	51.8	28.8	1.1	1.2	7.7	100.0	2.1	7.3	10.8	67.9	0.4	4.4	7.1	100.0
<b>SOUTH</b>	19.7	3.7	55.1	0.5	0.3	0.6	20.0	100.0	24.7	3.9	48.7	1.4	0.2	1.3	19.7	100.0
Galle	15.8	3.3	50.3	0.0	0.0	0.8	30.0	100.0	19.0	3.5	43.8	1.5	0.0	2.0	30.3	100.0
Hambantota	23.3	4.3	67.0	1.7	0.3	0.3	3.0	100.0	34.7	5.3	55.7	2.0	0.0	0.3	2.0	100.0
Matara	21.5	3.8	49.5	0.0	0.7	0.7	23.9	100.0	22.1	3.1	48.4	0.7	0.7	1.4	23.5	100.0
<b>TOTAL</b>	17.1	6.9	45.3	11.2	1.3	0.5	17.7	100.0	18.6	7.4	28.7	25.4	0.3	2.1	17.3	100.0

Source: Survey Results.

**TABLE 21: Favouritism in Disbursement of Relief**

Region / District	Are you aware of any favouritism?			What is the basis of favouritism?														
	Yes	No	TOTAL	Political		Ethnic		Religion		Caste		Other		TOTAL				
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%		
<b>EAST</b>	182	18.3	815	81.7	997	100.0	97	53.6	24	13.3	13	7.2	2	1.1	45	24.9	181	100.0
Ampara	111	18.6	486	81.4	597	100.0	47	42.7	12	10.9	11	10.0	2	1.8	38	34.5	110	100.0
Batticaloa	30	10.1	266	89.9	296	100.0	21	67.7	6	19.4	2	6.5	0	0.0	2	6.5	31	100.0
Trincomalee	41	39.4	63	60.6	104	100.0	29	72.5	6	15.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	5	12.5	40	100.0
<b>NORTH</b>	64	6.5	927	93.5	991	100.0	1	1.6	19	31.1	20	32.8	14	23.0	7	11.5	61	100.0
Jaffna	64	6.5	927	93.5	991	100.0	1	1.6	19	31.1	20	32.8	14	23.0	7	11.5	61	100.0
<b>SOUTH</b>	605	61.5	378	38.5	983	100.0	266	44.0	4	0.7	9	1.5	3	0.5	322	53.3	604	100.0
Galle	234	59.4	160	40.6	394	100.0	93	39.4	4	1.7	4	1.7	2	0.8	133	56.4	236	100.0
Hambantota	226	75.3	74	24.7	300	100.0	86	38.6	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.4	136	61.0	223	100.0
Matara	145	50.2	144	49.8	289	100.0	87	60.0	0	0.0	5	3.4	0	0.0	53	36.6	145	100.0
<b>TOTAL</b>	851	28.6	2120	71.4	2971	100.0	364	43.0	47	5.6	42	5.0	19	2.2	374	44.2	846	100.0

Source: Survey Results.

**TABLE 22: Current Shelter of Respondents**

Region / District	Permanent home		Transitory home		Relief tent		Pre-tsunami home		Relative's / friend's home		Rented home		TOTAL	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
<b>EAST</b>	62	6.2	620	62.0	74	7.4	219	21.9	12	1.2	13	1.3	1,000	100.0
Ampara	13	2.2	432	72.0	8	1.3	127	21.2	9	1.5	11	1.8	600	100.0
Batticaloa	44	14.9	140	47.3	46	15.5	63	21.3	2	0.7	1	0.3	296	100.0
Trincomalee	5	4.8	48	46.2	20	19.2	29	27.9	1	1.0	1	1.0	104	100.0
<b>NORTH</b>	365	36.5	359	35.9	23	2.3	134	13.4	116	11.6	2	0.2	999	100.0
Jaffna	365	36.5	359	35.9	23	2.3	134	13.4	116	11.6	2	0.2	999	100.0
<b>SOUTH</b>	208	21.0	418	42.3	14	1.4	316	32.0	28	2.8	5	0.5	989	100.0
Galle	114	28.5	107	26.8	11	2.8	153	38.3	14	3.5	1	0.3	400	100.0
Hambantota	64	21.3	166	55.3	2	0.7	61	20.3	6	2.0	1	0.3	300	100.0
Matara	30	10.4	145	50.2	1	0.3	102	35.3	8	2.8	3	1.0	289	100.0
<b>TOTAL</b>	635	21.2	1,397	46.7	111	3.8	669	22.4	156	5.3	20	0.6	2,988	100.0

Source: Survey Results.

**TABLE 23: Type of Residence Before the Tsunami**

Region / District	Type of house before tsunami												Type of occupancy before tsunami																															
	Cajjun hut				Tin shed				Concrete house				None				Total				Owned				Rented				Relative's house				Friend's house				Other				Total			
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%								
<b>EAST</b>	75	7.5	87	8.7	837	83.7	1	0.1	1000	100	938	93.8	20	2.0	31	3.1	3	0.3	8	0.8	1000	100																						
Ampara	37	6.2	46	7.7	517	86.2	0	0.0	600	100	579	96.5	9	1.5	7	1.2	2	0.3	3	0.5	600	100																						
Batticaloa	30	10.1	26	8.8	240	81.1	0	0.0	296	100	268	90.5	7	2.4	20	6.8	1	0.3	0	0.0	296	100																						
Trincomalee	8	7.7	15	14.4	80	76.9	1	1.0	104	100	91	87.5	4	3.8	4	3.8	0	0.0	5	4.8	104	100																						
<b>NORTH</b>	313	31.3	196	19.6	481	48.1	9	0.9	999	100	662	66.3	46	4.6	132	13.2	12	1.2	147	14.7	999	100																						
Jaffna	313	31.3	196	19.6	481	48.1	9	0.9	999	100	662	66.3	46	4.6	132	13.2	12	1.2	147	14.7	999	100																						
<b>SOUTH</b>	35	3.5	50	5.1	904	91.4	0	0.0	989	100	829	83.8	33	3.3	115	11.6	0	0.0	12	1.2	989	100																						
Galle	13	3.3	22	5.5	365	91.3	0	0.0	400	100	340	85.0	14	3.5	36	9.0	0	0.0	10	2.5	400	100																						
Hambantota	6	2.0	9	3.0	285	95.0	0	0.0	300	100	259	86.3	9	3.0	31	10.3	0	0.0	1	0.3	300	100																						
Matara	16	5.5	19	6.6	254	87.9	0	0.0	289	100	230	79.6	10	3.5	48	16.6	0	0.0	1	0.3	289	100																						
<b>TOTAL</b>	423	14.2	333	11.1	2222	74.4	10	0.3	2988	100	2429	81.3	99	3.3	278	9.3	15	0.5	167	5.6	2988	100																						

Source: Survey Results.

**TABLE 24: Extent of Damage and Repair to House**

Region / District	Extent of damage to house												Who repaired / rebuilt the house?																									
	Fully damaged			Partly damaged			No damage			Total			NGO			INGO			Self			Other			None			Total										
	No	%		No	%		No	%		No	%		No	%		No	%		No	%		No	%		No	%		No	%									
<b>EAST</b>	670	67.0	315	31.5	15	1.5	1000	100.0	27	2.8	73	7.7	38	4.0	49	5.2	762	80.3	949	100.0																		
Ampara	377	62.8	209	34.8	14	2.3	600	100.0	3	0.5	10	1.8	8	1.4	47	8.3	500	88.0	568	100.0																		
Batticaloa	234	79.1	62	20.9	0	0.0	296	100.0	13	4.6	58	20.7	1	0.4	2	0.7	206	73.6	280	100.0																		
Trincomalee	59	56.7	44	42.3	1	1.0	104	100.0	11	10.9	5	5.0	29	28.7	0	0.0	56	55.4	101	100.0																		
<b>NORTH</b>	586	58.7	340	34.0	73	7.3	999	100.0	99	10.5	90	9.5	19	2.0	60	6.4	675	71.6	943	100.0																		
Jaffna	586	58.7	340	34.0	73	7.3	999	100.0	99	10.5	90	9.5	19	2.0	60	6.4	675	71.6	943	100.0																		
<b>SOUTH</b>	564	57.0	409	41.4	16	1.6	989	100.0	33	3.8	53	6.1	175	20.1	119	13.7	491	56.4	871	100.0																		
Galle	216	54.0	179	44.8	5	1.3	400	100.0	30	7.9	36	9.5	80	21.1	85	22.4	148	39.1	379	100.0																		
Hambantota	206	68.7	87	29.0	7	2.3	300	100.0	0	0.0	5	1.8	28	10.0	5	1.8	242	86.4	280	100.0																		
Matara	142	49.1	143	49.5	4	1.4	289	100.0	3	1.4	12	5.7	67	31.6	29	13.7	101	47.6	212	100.0																		
<b>TOTAL</b>	1820	60.9	1064	35.6	104	3.5	2988	100.0	159	5.8	216	7.8	232	8.4	228	8.3	1928	69.8	2763	100.0																		

Source: Survey Results.

**TABLE 25: Receipt of Money for Housing Reconstruction**

Region / District	Payment made by the government for housing reconstruction												Was it sufficient to repair or rebuild house?																							
	LKR 25,000			LKR 100,000			LKR 250,000			None			Any other amount			Total			Yes			No			Total											
	No	%		No	%		No	%		No	%		No	%		No	%		No	%		No	%		No	%		No	%							
<b>EAST</b>	4	0.4	65	7.0	86	9.3	664	71.6	108	11.7	927	100.0	26	3.6	694	96.4	720	100.0																		
Ampara	3	0.6	44	8.1	2	0.4	444	81.5	52	9.5	545	100.0	12	3.1	375	96.9	387	100.0																		
Batticaloa	1	0.3	21	7.1	83	28.1	138	46.8	52	17.6	295	100.0	13	5.4	227	94.6	240	100.0																		
Trincomalee	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	1.1	82	94.3	4	4.6	87	100.0	1	1.1	92	98.9	93	100.0																		
<b>NORTH</b>	17	1.8	86	9.2	39	4.2	769	82.0	27	2.9	938	100.0	85	10.3	737	89.7	822	100.0																		
Jaffna	17	1.8	86	9.2	39	4.2	769	82.0	27	2.9	938	100.0	85	10.3	737	89.7	822	100.0																		
<b>SOUTH</b>	4	0.4	128	14.3	13	1.5	587	65.6	163	18.2	895	100.0	60	7.0	793	93.0	853	100.0																		
Galle	2	0.5	27	6.9	0	0.0	237	60.3	127	32.3	393	100.0	42	12.3	299	87.7	341	100.0																		
Hambantota	1	0.3	16	5.4	4	1.4	250	85.0	23	7.8	294	100.0	3	1.2	255	98.8	258	100.0																		
Matara	1	0.5	85	40.9	9	4.3	100	48.1	13	6.3	208	100.0	15	5.9	239	94.1	254	100.0																		
<b>TOTAL</b>	25	0.8	279	10.2	138	4.9	2020	73.2	298	10.8	2760	100.0	171	7.1	2224	92.9	2395	100.0																		

Source: Survey Results.

**TABLE 26: Opinion on the Buffer Zone**

Region / District	Do you agree with the buffer zone stipulated by the government?					
	YES			NO		
	No	%	No	%	No	%
<b>EAST</b>	647	65.4	343	34.6	990	100.0
Ampara	405	68.6	185	31.4	590	100.0
Batticaloa	173	58.4	123	41.6	296	100.0
Trincornalee	69	66.3	35	33.7	104	100.0
<b>NORTH</b>	561	57.5	415	42.5	976	100.0
Jaffna	561	57.5	415	42.5	976	100.0
<b>SOUTH</b>	588	60.2	389	39.8	977	100.0
Galle	248	62.8	147	37.2	395	100.0
Hambantota	167	56.4	129	43.6	296	100.0
Matara	173	60.5	113	39.5	286	100.0
<b>TOTAL</b>	1796	61.0	1147	39.0	2943	100.0

Source: Survey Results.

**TABLE 27: Displacement due to the Civil War prior to the Tsunami**

Region / District	Were you displaced by the civil war before the tsunami?						If 'Yes' how many times?					
	YES			NO			Once		Twice		> Twice	
	No	%	TOTAL	No	%	TOTAL	No	%	No	%	No	%
<b>EAST</b>	176	18.9	755	81.1	931	100.0						
Ampara	57	10.0	515	90.0	572	100.0						
Batticaloa	60	23.4	196	76.6	256	100.0						
Trincornalee	59	57.3	44	42.7	103	100.0						
<b>NORTH</b>	857	87.0	128	13.0	985	100.0						
Jaffna	857	87.0	128	13.0	985	100.0						
<b>SOUTH</b>	1	2.0	49	98.0	50	100.0						
Galle	1	16.7	5	83.3	6	100.0						
Hambantota	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	100.0						
Matara	0	0.0	44	100.0	44	100.0						
<b>TOTAL</b>	1034	52.6	932	47.4	1966	100.0	211	20.4	127	12.3	292	28.2

Source: Survey Results.

**TABLE 28: Benefactor and Satisfaction of Temporary Shelter**

Region / District	Are you satisfied with the temporary shelter?										Who provided you the temporary shelter?										Were your preferences taken into account in building your temporary shelter?														
	YES					NO					TOTAL					Govt		Local NGO		National NGO		International NGO		Other		None		Total		YES		NO		TOTAL	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	
<b>EAST</b>	137	16.2	708	83.8	845	100	4	0.4	44	4.8	180	19.7	538	58.8	30	3.3	119	13.0	915	100	158	19.1	669	80.9	827	100									
Ampara	42	8.3	463	91.7	505	100	0	0.0	3	0.6	124	23.4	352	66.3	23	4.3	29	5.5	531	100	88	17.5	415	82.5	503	100									
Batticaloa	55	22.5	189	77.5	244	100	1	0.3	17	5.8	37	12.6	169	57.5	5	1.7	65	22.1	294	100	49	20.9	185	79.1	234	100									
Trincomalee	40	41.7	56	58.3	96	100	3	3.3	24	26.7	19	21.1	17	18.9	2	2.2	25	27.8	90	100	21	23.3	69	76.7	90	100									
<b>NORTH</b>	283	46.0	332	54.0	615	100	55	7.1	27	3.5	108	13.8	170	21.8	188	24.1	232	29.7	780	100	268	51.3	254	48.7	522	100									
Jaffna	283	46.0	332	54.0	615	100	55	7.1	27	3.5	108	13.8	170	21.8	188	24.1	232	29.7	780	100	268	51.3	254	48.7	522	100									
<b>SOUTH</b>	288	37.3	484	62.7	772	100	16	2.0	13	1.6	247	30.6	155	19.2	339	42.0	38	4.7	808	100	134	22.3	467	77.7	601	100									
Galle	63	23.8	202	76.2	265	100	1	0.4	6	1.8	78	23.1	33	9.8	188	55.8	29	8.6	337	100	70	32.3	147	67.7	217	100									
Hambantota	58	30.1	135	69.9	193	100	12	6.1	3	1.5	67	34.0	38	19.3	75	38.1	2	1.0	197	100	46	29.5	110	70.5	156	100									
Matara	708	31.7	1524	68.3	2232	100	75	3.0	84	3.4	535	21.4	863	34.5	557	22.3	389	15.5	2503	100	560	28.7	1390	71.3	1950	100									
<b>TOTAL</b>																																			

Source: Survey Results.

**TABLE 29: Benefactor and Satisfaction of Permanent Shelter**

Region / District	Are you satisfied with the permanent shelter?						Who provided you the permanent shelter?																		
	YES			NO			TOTAL			Govern ment		Local NGO		National NGO		International NGO		Other		None		Total			
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	
<b>EAST</b>	70	38.7	111	61.3	181	100.0	8	1.3	4	0.6	8	1.3	83	13.1	40	6.3	493	77.5	636	100.0					
Ampara	15	39.5	23	60.5	38	100.0	3	0.9	0	0.0	3	0.9	14	4.4	31	9.7	268	84.0	319	100.0					
Batticaloa	36	57.1	27	42.9	63	100.0	1	0.4	1	0.4	0	0.0	46	20.4	7	3.1	170	75.6	225	100.0					
Trincomalee	19	23.8	61	76.3	80	100.0	4	4.3	3	3.3	5	5.4	23	25.0	2	2.2	55	59.8	92	100.0					
<b>NORTH</b>	379	93.1	28	6.9	407	100.0	49	6.8	12	1.7	50	6.9	237	33.0	42	5.8	329	45.8	719	100.0					
Jaffna	379	93.1	28	6.9	407	100.0	49	6.8	12	1.7	50	6.9	237	33.0	42	5.8	329	45.8	719	100.0					
<b>SOUTH</b>	240	59.9	161	40.1	401	100.0	52	9.3	14	2.5	23	4.1	57	10.2	147	26.3	267	47.7	560	100.0					
Galle	147	69.7	64	30.3	211	100.0	28	8.8	1	0.3	21	6.6	49	15.5	73	23.0	145	45.7	317	100.0					
Hambantota	29	32.2	61	67.8	90	100.0	4	2.6	13	8.6	2	1.3	4	2.6	55	36.2	74	48.7	152	100.0					
Matara	64	64.0	36	36.0	100	100.0	20	22.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	4	4.4	19	20.9	48	52.7	91	100.0					
<b>TOTAL</b>	689	69.7	300	30.3	989	100.0	109	5.7	30	1.6	81	4.2	377	19.7	229	12.0	1089	56.9	1915	100.0					

Source: Survey Results.

**TABLE 30: Contribution of the Recipients to Permanent Shelter**

Region / District	Was the recipient's preference/s taken into account in building the permanent shelter?						What was the recipient's contribution to building the permanent house?											
	YES						NO						TOTAL					
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
<b>EAST</b>	64	30.5	146	69.5	210	100.0	77	25.8	137	45.8	10	3.3	75	25.1	299	100.0		
Ampara	6	8.8	62	91.2	68	100.0	17	10.2	102	61.1	7	4.2	41	24.6	167	100.0		
Batticaloa	37	58.7	26	41.3	63	100.0	52	49.5	33	31.4	3	2.9	17	16.2	105	100.0		
Trincomalee	21	26.6	58	73.4	79	100.0	8	29.6	2	7.4	0	0.0	17	63.0	27	100.0		
<b>NORTH</b>	341	82.8	71	17.2	412	100.0	290	37.5	380	49.1	14	1.8	90	11.6	774	100.0		
Jaffna	341	82.8	71	17.2	412	100.0	290	37.5	380	49.1	14	1.8	90	11.6	774	100.0		
<b>SOUTH</b>	170	43.9	217	56.1	387	100.0	105	53.4	9	4.6	2	1.0	80	40.8	196	100.0		
Galle	103	61.3	65	38.7	168	100.0	69	49.3	6	4.3	0	0.0	65	46.4	140	100.0		
Hambantota	43	26.4	120	73.6	163	100.0	16	59.3	2	7.4	2	7.4	7	25.9	27	100.0		
Matara	24	42.9	32	57.1	56	100.0	20	69.0	1	3.4	0	0.0	8	27.6	29	100.0		
<b>TOTAL</b>	575	57.0	434	43.0	1009	100.0	472	37.2	526	41.4	26	2.0	245	19.3	1269	100.0		

Source: Survey Results.

**TABLE 31: Ownership of Land Before and After the Tsunami**

Region / District	Ownership of land before tsunami												Ownership of land/permanent house after tsunami																											
	Respondent				Husband				Both				Other				TOTAL				Respondent				Husband				Both				Other				TOTAL			
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%						
<b>EAST</b>	542	55.1	136	13.8	155	15.8	150	15.3	983	100.0	87	36.6	34	14.3	15	6.3	102	42.9	238	100.0																				
Ampara	369	63.1	72	12.3	54	9.2	90	15.4	585	100.0	20	18.7	7	6.5	1	0.9	79	73.8	107	100.0																				
Batticaloa	122	41.5	40	13.6	91	31.0	41	13.9	294	100.0	37	69.8	1	1.9	5	9.4	10	18.9	53	100.0																				
Trincomalee	51	49.0	24	23.1	10	9.6	19	18.3	104	100.0	30	38.5	26	33.3	9	11.5	13	16.7	78	100.0																				
<b>NORTH</b>	243	25.0	74	7.6	209	21.5	445	45.8	971	100.0	203	21.9	60	6.5	194	21.0	469	50.6	926	100.0																				
Jaffna	243	25.0	74	7.6	209	21.5	445	45.8	971	100.0	203	21.9	60	6.5	194	21.0	469	50.6	926	100.0																				
<b>SOUTH</b>	541	55.9	214	22.1	26	2.7	187	19.3	968	100.0	354	54.8	155	24.0	18	2.8	119	18.4	646	100.0																				
Galle	203	51.7	95	24.2	13	3.3	82	20.9	393	100.0	181	57.1	82	25.9	11	3.5	43	13.6	317	100.0																				
Hambantota	198	66.9	50	16.9	9	3.0	39	13.2	296	100.0	69	53.5	19	14.7	3	2.3	38	29.5	129	100.0																				
Matara	140	50.2	69	24.7	4	1.4	66	23.7	279	100.0	104	52.0	54	27.0	4	2.0	38	19.0	200	100.0																				
<b>TOTAL</b>	1326	45.4	424	14.5	390	13.3	782	26.8	2922	100.0	644	35.6	249	13.8	227	12.5	690	38.1	1810	100.0																				

Source: Survey Results.

Note: This question was asked from the female member of the households interviewed.



**TABLE 32: Harassment of Women**

Region / District	Aware of any physical abuse of women						Aware of any verbal abuse of women						Place of such abuse if any											
	YES			NO			YES			NO			Relief camp		Own home		Home of relative/friend		Temporary shelter		Other		Total	
	No	%	TOTAL	No	%	TOTAL	No	%	TOTAL	No	%	TOTAL	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
<b>EAST</b>	51	5.1	947	94.9	998	100	123	12.3	874	87.7	997	100	91	75.8	1	0.8	2	1.7	19	15.8	7	5.8	120	100
Ampara	12	2.0	587	98.0	599	100	82	13.7	518	86.3	600	100	65	82.3	0	0.0	2	2.5	5	6.3	7	8.9	79	100
Batticaloa	37	12.5	259	87.5	296	100	39	13.3	255	86.7	294	100	25	64.1	0	0.0	0	0.0	14	35.9	0	0.0	39	100
Trincomalee	2	1.9	101	98.1	103	100	2	1.9	101	98.1	103	100	1	50.0	1	50.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	100
<b>NORTH</b>	5	0.5	994	99.5	999	100	17	1.7	982	98.3	999	100	7	46.7	0	0.0	3	20.0	5	33.3	0	0.0	15	100
Jaffna	5	0.5	994	99.5	999	100	17	1.7	982	98.3	999	100	7	46.7	0	0.0	3	20.0	5	33.3	0	0.0	15	100
<b>SOUTH</b>	31	3.1	958	96.9	989	100	35	3.5	954	96.5	989	100	36	97.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	2.7	37	100
Galle	8	2.0	392	98.0	400	100	7	1.8	393	98.3	400	100	8	88.9	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	11.1	9	100
Hambantota	1	0.3	299	99.7	300	100	5	1.7	295	98.3	300	100	5	100	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	5	100
Matara	22	7.6	267	92.4	289	100	23	8.0	266	92.0	289	100	23	100	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	23	100
<b>TOTAL</b>	87	2.9	2899	97.1	2986	100	175	5.9	2810	94.1	2985	100	134	77.9	1	0.6	5	2.9	24	14.0	8	4.7	172	100

Source: Survey Results.

Note: This question was asked from the female member of the households interviewed.

**TABLE 33: Harassment of Children**

Region / District	Aware of any physical abuse of children						Aware of any verbal abuse of children						Place of such abuse if any											
	YES			NO			YES			NO			Relief camp		Own home		Home of relative/friend		Temporary shelter		Other		Total	
	No	%	TOTAL	No	%	TOTAL	No	%	TOTAL	No	%	TOTAL	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
<b>EAST</b>	42	4.2	957	95.8	999	100	109	10.9	889	89.1	998	100	80	74.1	3	2.8	2	1.9	18	16.7	5	4.6	108	100
Ampara	2	0.3	598	99.7	600	100	64	10.7	536	89.3	600	100	52	83.9	2	3.2	2	3.2	2	3.2	4	6.5	62	100
Batticaloa	39	13.2	257	86.8	296	100	38	12.9	257	87.1	295	100	24	61.5	0	0.0	0	0.0	14	35.9	1	2.6	39	100
Trincomalee	1	1.0	102	99.0	103	100	7	6.8	96	93.2	103	100	4	57.1	1	14.3	0	0.0	2	28.6	0	0.0	7	100
<b>NORTH</b>	5	0.5	994	99.5	999	100	7	0.7	992	99.3	999	100	3	33.3	3	33.3	0	0.0	2	22.2	1	11.1	9	100
Jaffna	5	0.5	994	99.5	999	100	7	0.7	992	99.3	999	100	3	33.3	3	33.3	0	0.0	2	22.2	1	11.1	9	100
<b>SOUTH</b>	21	2.1	967	97.9	988	100	31	3.1	957	96.9	988	100	26	96.3	0	0.0	1	3.7	0	0.0	0	0.0	27	100
Galle	1	0.3	398	99.7	399	100	11	2.8	389	97.3	400	100	6	85.7	0	0.0	1	14.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	7	100
Hambantota	1	0.3	299	99.7	300	100	1	0.3	298	99.7	299	100	1	100	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	100
Matara	19	6.6	270	93.4	289	100	19	6.6	270	93.4	289	100	19	100	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	19	100
<b>TOTAL</b>	68	2.3	2918	97.7	2986	100	147	4.9	2838	95.1	2985	100	109	75.7	6	4.2	3	2.1	20	13.9	6	4.2	144	100

Source: Survey Results.

Note: This question was asked from the female member of the households interviewed.

**TABLE 34: Sanitary and Water Facilities**

Region / District	Availability of sanitary facility in the relief camp						Availability of sanitary facility in the temporary shelter						Availability of sufficient water for drinking & washing in the relief camp						Availability of sufficient water for drinking & washing in the temporary shelter					
	YES		NO		TOTAL		YES		NO		TOTAL		YES		NO		TOTAL		YES		NO		TOTAL	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
<b>EAST</b>	620	63.9	351	36.1	971	100	684	73.5	247	26.5	931	100	591	60.4	387	39.6	978	100	474	50.9	458	49.1	932	100
Ampara	357	61.8	221	38.2	578	100	389	71.5	155	28.5	544	100	371	63.6	212	36.4	583	100	247	45.3	298	54.7	545	100
Batticaloa	213	72.0	83	28.0	296	100	232	80.0	58	20.0	290	100	183	61.8	113	38.2	296	100	176	60.5	115	39.5	291	100
Trincomalee	50	51.5	47	48.5	97	100	63	64.9	34	35.1	97	100	37	37.4	62	62.6	99	100	51	53.1	45	46.9	96	100
<b>NORTH</b>	902	94.8	49	5.2	951	100	615	78.9	164	21.1	779	100	899	94.1	56	5.9	955	100	646	82.5	137	17.5	783	100
Jaffna	902	94.8	49	5.2	951	100	615	78.9	164	21.1	779	100	899	94.1	56	5.9	955	100	646	82.5	137	17.5	783	100
<b>SOUTH</b>	518	73.1	191	26.9	709	100	653	83.7	127	16.3	780	100	513	73.2	188	26.8	701	100	634	81.0	149	19.0	783	100
Galle	182	65.2	97	34.8	279	100	233	73.7	83	26.3	316	100	201	73.1	74	26.9	275	100	256	80.3	63	19.7	319	100
Hambantota	170	76.6	52	23.4	222	100	232	87.5	33	12.5	265	100	136	61.8	84	38.2	220	100	189	71.3	76	28.7	265	100
Matara	166	79.8	42	20.2	208	100	188	94.5	11	5.5	199	100	176	85.4	30	14.6	206	100	189	95.0	10	5.0	199	100
<b>TOTAL</b>	2040	77.5	591	22.5	2631	100	1952	78.4	538	21.6	2490	100	2003	76.0	631	24.0	2634	100	1754	70.2	744	29.8	2498	100

Source: Survey Results.

**TABLE 35: Privacy and Safety of Children**

Region / District	Adequate privacy in the relief camp						Adequate privacy in the temporary shelter						Adequate safety for children in the relief camp						Adequate safety for children in the temporary shelter					
	YES		NO		TOTAL		YES		NO		TOTAL		YES		NO		TOTAL		YES		NO		TOTAL	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
<b>EAST</b>	215	22.2	753	77.8	968	100	441	47.8	481	52.2	922	100	731	76.1	229	23.9	960	100	745	80.6	179	19.4	924	100
Ampara	57	9.9	519	90.1	576	100	264	49.4	270	50.6	534	100	414	72.5	157	27.5	571	100	426	77.9	121	22.1	547	100
Batticaloa	131	44.3	165	55.7	296	100	142	48.6	150	51.4	292	100	254	86.4	40	13.6	294	100	250	86.8	38	13.2	288	100
Trincomalee	27	28.1	69	71.9	96	100	35	36.5	61	63.5	96	100	63	66.3	32	33.7	95	100	69	77.5	20	22.5	89	100
<b>NORTH</b>	628	67.0	309	33.0	937	100	535	68.5	246	31.5	781	100	786	99.1	7	0.9	793	100	654	99.1	6	0.9	660	100
Jaffna	628	67.0	309	33.0	937	100	535	68.5	246	31.5	781	100	786	99.1	7	0.9	793	100	654	99.1	6	0.9	660	100
<b>SOUTH</b>	134	19.0	570	81.0	704	100	324	41.3	461	58.7	785	100	468	76.3	145	23.7	613	100	474	80.9	112	19.1	586	100
Galle	81	29.3	195	70.7	276	100	185	58.0	134	42.0	319	100	226	97.8	5	2.2	231	100	224	98.2	4	1.8	228	100
Hambantota	20	9.1	199	90.9	219	100	83	31.1	184	68.9	267	100	113	58.2	81	41.8	194	100	145	72.1	56	27.9	201	100
Matara	33	15.8	176	84.2	209	100	56	28.1	143	71.9	199	100	129	68.6	59	31.4	188	100	105	66.9	52	33.1	157	100
<b>TOTAL</b>	977	37.4	1632	62.6	2609	100	1300	52.3	1188	47.7	2488	100	1985	83.9	381	16.1	2366	100	1873	86.3	297	13.7	2170	100

Source: Survey Results.

**TABLE 36: Sickness and Treatment after the Tsunami**

Region / District	Did any member of the household get sick in the relief camp?						Did they get prompt medical service?						Did any member of the household get sick in the temporary shelter?						Did they get prompt medical service at the temporary shelter?					
	YES		NO		TOTAL		YES		NO		TOTAL		YES		NO		TOTAL		YES		NO		TOTAL	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
<b>EAST</b>	410	41.1	588	58.9	998	100	359	82.2	78	17.8	437	100	152	15.9	803	84.1	955	100	122	72.2	47	27.8	169	100
Ampara	265	44.2	334	55.8	599	100	228	86.4	36	13.6	264	100	103	17.9	471	82.1	574	100	82	79.6	21	20.4	103	100
Batticaloa	114	38.6	181	61.4	295	100	107	82.9	22	17.1	129	100	37	12.7	255	87.3	292	100	31	75.6	10	24.4	41	100
<b>NORTH</b>	415	41.7	580	58.3	995	100	371	85.1	65	14.9	436	100	279	29.3	674	70.7	953	100	250	89.3	30	10.7	280	100
Jaffna	415	41.7	580	58.3	995	100	371	85.1	65	14.9	436	100	279	29.3	674	70.7	953	100	250	89.3	30	10.7	280	100
<b>SOUTH</b>	358	36.3	629	63.7	987	100	313	83.7	61	16.3	374	100	102	11.9	757	88.1	859	100	63	58.9	44	41.1	107	100
Galle	109	27.3	291	72.8	400	100	100	83.3	20	16.7	120	100	16	4.5	339	95.5	355	100	14	66.7	7	33.3	21	100
Hambantota	146	48.7	154	51.3	300	100	122	84.7	22	15.3	144	100	53	18.3	237	81.7	290	100	18	34.6	34	65.4	52	100
Matara	103	35.9	184	64.1	287	100	91	82.7	19	17.3	110	100	33	15.4	181	84.6	214	100	31	91.2	3	8.8	34	100
<b>TOTAL</b>	1183	39.7	1797	60.3	2980	100	1043	83.6	204	16.4	1247	100	533	19.3	2234	80.7	2767	100	435	78.2	121	21.8	556	100

Source: Survey Results.

**TABLE 37: Job Preference**

Region / District	Do you want to do the same job as before the tsunami?						Are you interested in undergoing skills training in order to take up a new job?						Do you children want to do the same job as before the tsunami?					
	YES		NO		TOTAL		YES		NO		TOTAL		YES		NO		TOTAL	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
<b>EAST</b>	731	85.7	122	14.3	853	100.0	452	48.3	483	51.7	935	100.0	162	67.8	77	32.2	239	100.0
Ampara	392	82.0	86	18.0	478	100.0	260	47.8	284	52.2	544	100.0	84	78.5	23	21.5	107	100.0
Batticaloa	252	91.6	23	8.4	275	100.0	172	58.9	120	41.1	292	100.0	47	90.4	5	9.6	52	100.0
Trincomalee	87	87.0	13	13.0	100	100.0	20	20.2	79	79.8	99	100.0	31	38.8	49	61.3	80	100.0
<b>NORTH</b>	822	94.3	50	5.7	872	100.0	117	14.3	702	85.7	819	100.0	132	59.7	89	40.3	221	100.0
Jaffna	822	94.3	50	5.7	872	100.0	117	14.3	702	85.7	819	100.0	132	59.7	89	40.3	221	100.0
<b>SOUTH</b>	450	87.5	64	12.5	514	100.0	297	34.3	569	65.7	866	100.0	89	90.8	9	9.2	98	100.0
Galle	155	85.2	27	14.8	182	100.0	137	37.1	232	62.9	369	100.0	49	90.7	5	9.3	54	100.0
Hambantota	200	90.1	22	9.9	222	100.0	108	36.7	186	63.3	294	100.0	30	90.9	3	9.1	33	100.0
Matara	95	86.4	15	13.6	110	100.0	52	25.6	151	74.4	203	100.0	10	90.9	1	9.1	11	100.0
<b>TOTAL</b>	2003	89.5	236	10.5	2239	100.0	866	33.1	1754	66.9	2620	100.0	383	68.6	175	31.4	558	100.0

Source: Survey Results.

**TABLE 38: Educational & Health Facilities at the Current Place of Residence**

Region / District	Availability of educational and health facilities at the current place of residence											
	YES					NO					TOTAL	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%		
<b>EAST</b>	544	54.5	455	45.5	999	100.0						
Ampara	346	57.8	253	42.2	599	100.0						
Batticaloa	125	42.2	171	57.8	296	100.0						
Trincomalee	73	70.2	31	29.8	104	100.0						
<b>NORTH</b>	578	57.9	420	42.1	998	100.0						
Jaffna	578	57.9	420	42.1	998	100.0						
<b>SOUTH</b>	704	71.2	285	28.8	989	100.0						
Galle	351	87.8	49	12.3	400	100.0						
Hambantota	81	27.0	219	73.0	300	100.0						
Matara	272	94.1	17	5.9	289	100.0						
<b>TOTAL</b>	1826	61.2	1160	38.8	2986	100.0						

Source: Survey Results.

**TABLE 39: Satisfaction with Domestic Relief Organisations**

Region / District	Are you satisfied with the assistance provided by the Government?										Are you satisfied with the assistance provided by the local NGOs?										Are you satisfied with the assistance provided by the national NGOs?											
	YES					NO					YES					NO					YES					NO						
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%				
<b>EAST</b>	237	23.7	761	76.3	998	100.0	439	44.1	556	55.9	995	100.0	561	56.1	439	43.9	1000	100.0														
Ampara	200	33.4	398	66.6	598	100.0	361	60.7	234	39.3	595	100.0	443	73.8	157	26.2	600	100.0														
Batticaloa	20	6.8	276	93.2	296	100.0	40	13.5	256	86.5	296	100.0	64	21.6	232	78.3	296	100.0														
Trincomalee	17	16.3	87	83.7	104	100.0	38	36.5	66	63.5	104	100.0	54	51.9	50	48.1	104	100.0														
<b>NORTH</b>	266	26.6	733	73.4	999	100.0	546	54.7	453	45.3	999	100.0	593	59.4	406	40.6	999	100.0														
Jaffna	266	26.6	733	73.4	999	100.0	546	54.7	453	45.3	999	100.0	593	59.4	406	40.6	999	100.0														
<b>SOUTH</b>	185	18.7	804	81.3	989	100.0	323	32.7	666	67.3	989	100.0	490	49.5	499	50.5	989	100.0														
Galle	123	30.8	277	69.3	400	100.0	175	43.8	225	56.3	400	100.0	276	69.0	124	31.0	400	100.0														
Hambantota	19	6.3	281	93.7	300	100.0	32	10.7	268	89.3	300	100.0	92	30.7	208	69.3	300	100.0														
Matara	43	14.9	246	85.1	289	100.0	116	40.1	173	59.9	289	100.0	122	42.2	167	57.8	289	100.0														
<b>TOTAL</b>	688	23.0	2298	77.0	2986	100.0	1308	43.8	1675	56.2	2983	100.0	1644	55.0	1344	45.0	2988	100.0														

Source: Survey Results.

**TABLE 40: Satisfaction with External Relief Organisations**

Region / District	Are you satisfied with the assistance provided by the INGOs?				Are you satisfied with the assistance provided by the bilateral donor agencies?				Are you satisfied with the assistance provided by the multilateral donor agencies?									
	YES		NO		YES		NO		YES		NO							
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%						
<b>EAST</b>	561	56.1	439	43.9	1000	100.0	458	46.3	531	53.7	989	100.0	564	56.4	436	43.6	1000	100.0
Ampara	443	73.8	157	26.2	600	100.0	358	60.8	231	39.2	589	100.0	447	74.5	153	25.5	600	100.0
Batticaloa	64	21.6	232	78.4	296	100.0	53	17.9	243	82.1	296	100.0	61	20.6	235	79.4	296	100.0
Trincomalee	54	51.9	50	48.1	104	100.0	47	45.2	57	54.8	104	100.0	56	53.8	48	46.2	104	100.0
<b>NORTH</b>	593	59.4	406	40.6	999	100.0	310	31.2	684	68.8	994	100.0	503	50.4	495	49.6	998	100.0
Jaffna	593	59.4	406	40.6	999	100.0	310	31.2	684	68.8	994	100.0	503	50.4	495	49.6	998	100.0
<b>SOUTH</b>	490	49.5	499	50.5	989	100.0	286	29.0	700	71.0	986	100.0	351	35.5	638	64.5	989	100.0
Galle	276	69.0	124	31.0	400	100.0	182	45.6	217	54.4	399	100.0	241	60.3	159	39.8	400	100.0
Hambantota	92	30.7	208	69.3	300	100.0	12	4.0	286	96.0	298	100.0	12	4.0	288	96.0	300	100.0
Matara	122	42.2	167	57.8	289	100.0	92	31.8	197	68.2	289	100.0	98	33.9	191	66.1	289	100.0
<b>TOTAL</b>	1644	55.0	1344	45.0	2988	100.0	1054	35.5	1915	64.5	2969	100.0	1418	47.5	1569	52.5	2987	100.0

Source: Survey Results.

**TABLE 41: Religious Conversions**

Region / District	Are you aware of any religious conversions in the aftermath of the tsunami?				TOTAL			
	YES		NO		YES		NO	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
<b>EAST</b>	172	17.2	828	82.8	1000	100.0		
Ampara	111	18.5	489	81.5	600	100.0		
Batticaloa	35	11.8	261	88.2	296	100.0		
Trincomalee	26	25.0	78	75.0	104	100.0		
<b>NORTH</b>	50	5.0	949	95.0	999	100.0		
Jaffna	50	5.0	949	95.0	999	100.0		
<b>SOUTH</b>	198	20.0	791	80.0	989	100.0		
Galle	168	42.0	232	58.0	400	100.0		
Hambantota	2	0.7	298	99.3	300	100.0		
Matara	28	9.7	261	90.3	289	100.0		
<b>TOTAL</b>	420	14.1	2568	85.9	2988	100.0		

Source: Survey Results.

**TABLE 42: Coping with the Post-Tsunami Situation and Expectation of Permanent House**

Region / District	Coped with the post-tsunami situation										Looking forward to the permanent house										Who will build the permanent house?																											
	Well			Reasonably			Not well			TOTAL			YES			NO			TOTAL			Self			Government			NGO			INGO			TOTAL														
	No	%		No	%		No	%		No	%		No	%		No	%		No	%		No	%		No	%		No	%		No	%		No	%													
<b>EAST</b>	36	3.6	80.1	80.1	16.3	1000	100	812	94.3	49	5.7	861	100	23	6.4	126	35.2	47	13.1	162	45.3	358	100	18	3.0	526	87.7	56	9.3	600	100	468	96.9	15	3.1	483	100	0	0.0	107	78.7	5	3.7	24	17.6	136	100	
Ampara	5	1.7	205	69.3	86	29.1	296	100	247	89.5	29	10.5	276	100	1	0.7	9	6.4	21	15.0	109	77.9	140	100	13	12.5	70	67.3	21	20.2	104	100	97	95.1	5	4.9	102	100	22	26.8	10	12.2	21	25.6	29	35.4	82	100
Batticaloa	97	9.7	693	69.4	209	20.9	999	100	598	94.0	38	6.0	636	100	11	2.0	375	68.1	55	10.0	110	20.0	551	100	23	2.3	449	45.4	517	52.3	989	100	659	98.2	12	1.8	671	100	33	6.2	258	48.6	52	9.8	188	35.4	531	100
Trincomalee	14	3.5	224	56.0	162	40.5	400	100	244	96.4	9	3.6	253	100	22	12.4	106	59.6	20	11.2	30	16.9	178	100	97	9.7	693	69.4	209	20.9	999	100	598	94.0	38	6.0	636	100	11	2.0	375	68.1	55	10.0	110	20.0	551	100
Jaffna	1	0.3	100	33.3	199	66.3	300	100	210	99.1	2	0.9	212	100	4	2.2	12	6.5	24	13.0	144	78.3	184	100	23	2.3	449	45.4	517	52.3	989	100	659	98.2	12	1.8	671	100	33	6.2	258	48.6	52	9.8	188	35.4	531	100
SOUTH	8	2.8	125	43.3	156	54.0	289	100	205	99.5	1	0.5	206	100	7	4.1	140	82.8	8	4.7	14	8.3	169	100	14	3.5	224	56.0	162	40.5	400	100	244	96.4	9	3.6	253	100	22	12.4	106	59.6	20	11.2	30	16.9	178	100
Galle	1	0.3	100	33.3	199	66.3	300	100	210	99.1	2	0.9	212	100	4	2.2	12	6.5	24	13.0	144	78.3	184	100	23	2.3	449	45.4	517	52.3	989	100	659	98.2	12	1.8	671	100	33	6.2	258	48.6	52	9.8	188	35.4	531	100
Hambantota	8	2.8	125	43.3	156	54.0	289	100	205	99.5	1	0.5	206	100	7	4.1	140	82.8	8	4.7	14	8.3	169	100	14	3.5	224	56.0	162	40.5	400	100	244	96.4	9	3.6	253	100	22	12.4	106	59.6	20	11.2	30	16.9	178	100
Matara	156	5.2	1943	65.0	889	29.8	2988	100	2069	95.4	99	4.6	2168	100	67	4.7	759	52.7	154	10.7	460	31.9	1440	100	156	5.2	1943	65.0	889	29.8	2988	100	2069	95.4	99	4.6	2168	100	67	4.7	759	52.7	154	10.7	460	31.9	1440	100
<b>TOTAL</b>	156	5.2	1943	65.0	889	29.8	2988	100	2069	95.4	99	4.6	2168	100	67	4.7	759	52.7	154	10.7	460	31.9	1440	100	156	5.2	1943	65.0	889	29.8	2988	100	2069	95.4	99	4.6	2168	100	67	4.7	759	52.7	154	10.7	460	31.9	1440	100

Source: Survey Results.





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## ABOUT THE BOOK

This is an empirical research study based on a questionnaire-based survey of 3,000 tsunami-affected households in the East, North, and South of Sri Lanka, incorporating 1,000 households in each region, and secondary data and literature.

The objectives of this study are: (i) to provide a comparative perspective of the impact of the tsunami and the recovery process, (ii) to assess the socio-economic background of the affected people in different parts of the country, prior to and after the tsunami, (iii) to evaluate the services rendered and the disbursement of relief to the affected people in different regions of the country, (iv) to assess the provision of temporary and permanent housing to the affected people in different regions of the country, (v) to identify particular issues and concerns pertaining to women and children, (vi) to find out the expectations of the affected people with regard to their future employment, and (vii) to find out the opinions of the people affected, about various aspects of the recovery process.

Some suggestions are made to improve the delivery, responsiveness, participation of the affected people, and communication and transparency in decision-making and implementation of the remaining tsunami reconstruction/ recovery work to be done in Sri Lanka.



## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

**Muttukrishna Sarvananthan** hails from Point Pedro (Northern Sri Lanka) and is the Principal Researcher of the Point Pedro Institute of Development, Point Pedro, Sri Lanka.

He has authored/co-authored/edited books on the Economy of the Conflict Region in Sri Lanka, Children of War, Smuggling between India and Sri Lanka, Gender Implications of Conflict in Sri Lanka, and Economic Reforms in Sri Lanka. Further, he has published articles on Indo-Sri Lanka Trade, Poverty and Income Inequality, and Civil War and the Economy in Sri Lanka in *Contemporary South Asia* (Oxford), *Economic and Political Weekly* (Mumbai), *Faultlines: Writings on Conflict and Resolution* (New Delhi), *Indian Journal of Regional Science* (Kolkata), *Journal of Contemporary Asia* (Manila), *South Asia Economic Journal* (New Delhi), *Sri Lanka Economic Journal* (Colombo), *Sri Lanka Journal of Social Sciences* (Colombo), and *Third World Quarterly* (Oxford).

He has obtained a Doctorate in Development Economics at the Centre for Development Studies, University of Wales, Swansea, Master of Science in Development Planning and Administration at the Department of Social Policy and Social Planning, University of Bristol, Master of Science (Economics) in Economic Development at the Department of Economics, University of Salford, and Bachelor of Arts (Honours) in Economics at the Kirori Mal College, University of Delhi.

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