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Northerr Insi;
G. L. Peiris Thomas (Charia Ra Wa
 

gining
anka
Ireland
ited by asundram
ibutors Fraser Carmel Roulston e = M. Somasundram

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REMAGNING SRI LANKA Northern Ireland Insights

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REMAGNING SRI LANKA
Northern Ireland Insights
Edited by M. Somasundram
Contributors: G. L. Peiris, Thomas Fraser, Carmel Roulston, Charitha Ratwatte, M. Somasundram
International Centre for Ethnic Studies

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International Centre for Ethnic Studies 2 Kynsey Terrace, Colombo 8, Sri Lanka.
Tel: 94-1 - 685085,94-1 - 679745 Fax: 94 - 1 - 698048 E-mail:iceswebG?sri.lanka.net Website: www.icescmb.slt.lk
REMAGNING SRI LANKA: NORTHERN IRELAND INSIGHTS
Edited: M. Somasundram
Copyright: International Centre for Ethnic Studies 1999
All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or utilised in any form or by any means. electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system without permission, in writing, from the International Centre for Ethnic Studies
ISBN 955-580-037-5
Reprint: 2008
Printed by: Unie Arts (Pvt) Ltd.

Contents
Introduction Convivencia M. Somasundram
1. 15Issues of the Northern Ireland Experience
Relevant to Sri Lanka
G. L. Peiris
2. The Northern Ireland Agreement as a
Model for Divided Societies
Thomas G. Fraser
3. Did Women make a Difference? The Northern
Ireland Women's Coalition in the Peace Process
Carmel Roulston
4. The Northern Ireland Agreement:
Thimpu Principles Applied to a Society with
Two Mind Sets?
M. Somasundram
5. Issues from Northern Ireland Experience: Relevance to Sri Lanka Considered
J. Charitha Ratwate
Documents
Appendix A : Northern Ireland Agreement
Appendix B : (a) Ministers Draft Constitution 1944
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27
42
67
82
141

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(b) The Ceylon (Constitution) Order in
Counci 1946
Appendix C : Sinhala and Tamil as Official Languages
Appendix D :
Appendix E :
1. State Council
Motion of G. K.W. Perera Motion of J. R. Jayewardene Motion of V. Nalliah
2. The Official Language Act
No. 33 of 1956
3. Tamil Language (Special Provisions)
Act No. 28 of 1958
4. Constitution of Sri Lanka (1972) -
Language Provisions
5. Constitution of Sri Lanka (1977) -
Language Provisions
6. 16th Amendment to Constitution
(1988) - Language Provisions
7. Government Proposals for
Constitutional Reforms (1997)-Language Provisions
8. Official Language Commission
(1991) - Selected Provisions
Bandaranaike -
Chelvanayakam Pact 1957
Federal Party Resolutions - 28th July 1957
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141
144
144
146
147
150
153
159
164
172
181
185

Appendix IF :
Appendix G :
Appendix H:
Appendix II :
Appendix J :
Appendix K :
Appendix L :
Appendix M :
Appendix N
Appendix O :
Statement of Minimum Demands by Federal Party to UNP and SLFP (1960)
Dudley Senanayake - Chelvanayakam Pact (1965)
Buddhism as Official Religion
1. Constituton - 1972
2. Constitution - 1978
3. Government Proposals for
Constitutional Reforms (1997)
Vaddukoddai Resolution 1976
Annexure C
Indo - Sri Lanka Agreement (1987)
Mangala Moonesinghe Report (1992) Interim Report - Parliamentary Select
Committee
Speech V. Prabhakaran - National Heroes Day 27. 11.98.
: Interview with President
Kumaratunga (1/1/99) (Frontline)
Interview with Leader of the Opposition
Ranil Wickremasinghe (1/1/99) - (Frontline)
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188
191
193
194
202
205
217
225
232
257

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Introduction
Convivencia
"Reformism was an impossible solution for any vital problem, at a critical moment when the basic structures had to be changed, and however slow the progress might be later on, the initial step must be a complete break with the existing order which had fulfilled its purpose, and was now only a drag on future progress'
Jawaharlal Nehru
"To become or not to become: That is the question'
Mrs. Rhys David
The twelfth and thirteenth centuries were an interesting period in the history of Spain. Part of Spain was an Islamic state but having Christians and several other parts were Catholic with varying percentages of Islamic adherents. Jews were present in both types. Modern Spanish historians refer to experiments in Convivencia as being characteristic of the period. The word literally means "living together' and highlights the work-a-day arrangements for a multi-cultural society where persons of different ethnicities, histories, languages, faiths, cultures, traditions and creeds co-existed amicably. It was a coalition of coalitions with vetoes for groups on issues which deal with their heart identity. The glue that held it together was civic virtue meant to enhance the common good. A group was not

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sacrificed for the perceived welfare of other groups-however large- or the whole. Convivencia is an inclusive concept. The Catholic counter reformation that followed in the fourteenth century reversed Convivencia. It was Catholicism Only where one core group of true believers was considered to be worthy. It was an exclusive concept based on a fundamentalist interpretation of true belief. The modus vivendi represented by Convivencia was shattered by the counter reformation, not only by persecuting Muslims and Jews, but also dissenting Christians. A Convivencia society, chequered in its pasts and nuanced in its allegiances, was now being replaced by an explicit unwillingness to tolerate deviations from a single set of cultural norms laid down under the authority of a fundamentalist hegemonic Catholic Taliban.
The British period of Sri Lankan history (Ceylon before 1972) could also be termed a Convivencia. The British (17981948) abandoned the religious persecutions of the Dutch, who followed the Portuguese (both 1505-1748). Under both their hegemonic governance the Muslims were specially targeted. 1505-1798 was no Convivencia. Prior to the arrival of the Portuguese (1505) the existing pre-modern civil societies also practised Convivencia. People of different ethnicities lived under rulers who may or may not have belonged to their own. For example the last set of kings of the Sinhala kingdom of Kandy were Tamils. There is also evidence that Tamil was the court language but these features were not significant in a Society where Convivencia prevailed. In these pre-modern societies concepts of nation and nation-state, being western constructs obtaining ballast from the industrial revolution, had no meaning. The prevalence of civic virtue in society was shown when Kandyan Sinhalese had very generously succoured the Muslims when they had been persecuted and driven away by the Portuguese and the Dutch.

The highwater mark of British ruling arrangements may have been the election of a Tamil by a restricted electorate consisting overwhelmingly of Sinhalese. This electorate rejected one of its own though caste considerations may have been a sub-text. With independence demands increasing, the British realised that they had responsibility to shape the form and direction of de-colonisation. They did so by creating British structures to be implemented by a set of house trained Brown Sahibs. The Donoughmore proposals (1931), which were an early modern template of devolution, were meant to offer constitutional structure to Convivenica. In these proposals there were elaborate principles, which the Northern Ireland Agreement (Appendix A) was subsequently to mimic, to ensure power sharing though the Donoughmore proposals abolished communal electorates. The Donoughmore proposals also offered universal adult franchise, against the almost unanimous opinion of the leaders of Sri Lanka, but were against majoritarianism. Democracy was not to be a mere numbers game. The Commissioners had faith that an average adult, with mother wit, will be able to use these powers in a balanced manner. Regrettably, after a few years of working the spirit of the Donoughmore Constitution, an anti-Convivencia sentimentsimilar to the counter reformation-took over. By arithmetical aggression, power sharing arrangements were nullified and, in 1935, a hegemonic pan-Sinhala Board of Ministers was created. The establishment of this hegemonic pan-Sinhala Ministry in 1935 mocked the elaborate arrangements made in the Donoughmore Constitution for the participation of minorities in national decision making. Arithmetical aggression ensured a constitutional regression. This ill-advised political scavenging wrenched Sri Lanka from the promising present tense to the dead past tense. 1935 broke the mould of Convivencia and is a convenient marker for the beginning of events, which has eventually led to a liberation movement committed to fighting

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hegemonism, seeking a separate state. It should be noted that the Northern Ireland Agreement has incorporated elaborate provisions to prevent such a coup de Arithmetic.
The halting shift towards marginalisation of the minorities, through a stark exercise of hegemonic and oppressive majoritarianism, gathered pace after political independence (1948). The Tamil workers of the plantations were disenfranchised though their labour provided the two highest foreign exchange earners for the country. They were considered only wage earners with no citizenship rights. This mocked the Donoughmore grant of universal franchise. It was followed, in 1956, with the Sinhala Only language Act (Appendix C) which denied their language - Tamil- to about 20% of Sri Lanka's population. The Sinhala Only language act could be considered the equivalent of the 1935 Nuremburg Laws which denied public service employment to the Jews. The act reduced employment prospects for Tamils in the public services. At independence Tamils were disproportionately represented, (over 35%), in the public services particularly at the higher levels. "From 1956 to 1970, the proportions of Tamils employed by the state fell from 60 to 10 percent in the professions, from 30 to 5 percent in the administrative service, from 50 to 5 percent in the clerical service, and from 40 to 1 percent in the armed services" (Amita Shastri"Government Policy and Ethnic Crisis in Sri Lanka" in Michael E. Brown and Sumit Ganguly (eds), Government Policies and Ethnic Relations in Asia and the Pacific (Cambridge, MA, 1997) pg 146). 1935 set in train political marginalisation. 1956 set in train employment and cultural marginalisation. The counter reformation was at work.
There were misgivings however, among the Sinhalese themselves, about emerging trends towards a Sinhala Volk. In 1962 there was an attempted coup against the elected government which was sponsoring these tendencies. It was betrayed by a Sinhala-Buddhist organiser and failed. The arguments in support for the coup turned out to be prophetic

that a volk will lead to illiberalism. But if democracy was saved by the failure it was its majoritarian version. Under the succeeding democracy 1/3rd of the country is now under army rule, more than half the time Sri Lanka was ruled under emergency when democratic safeguards were suspended. When the chips were down Wayamba 99 (below) occurred, revealing the true quality of the prevailing Sri Lankan democracy. It is quite conceivable that if the coup had been successful Sri Lanka would have been a Singapore today. Instead she is sending domestic servants to that country for employment.
Tamil politicians made efforts to inveigle reasonable concessions to political, cultural and employment marginalisation. This was facilitated by they belonging to the same class and upper castes as the Sinhala ruling groups. The Tamil political leaders were, almost always, lawyers who considered politics to be a side show to their main task of practising their profession. A deep commitment to a cause, other than their own development, was minimal. Both the Sinhala and Tamil leaders were also deracinated with western cultural and emotional mores and English as their preferred mode of communication. Thus the Tamil leaders were able to strike deconcentration deals with the then governments the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam pact 1958 (Appendix D) the Dudley Senanayake-Chelvanayakam pact 1965 (Appendix G) being examples. Since both negotiating parties belonged to the same class these agreements were horse trades- with weak bonds - for they were not based on a genuine and firm realignment of forces. Class interests were dominant but national scale political amnesia was easy when politically lensed internal Sinhala dynamics, of two grasping ruling dynasties- not divided by ideology but on how to extract returns for political investment- were in a competitive race for power. With the slightest heat the weak bonds gave way and strategic and tactical myopia took over. Both these agreements were windows of opportunity. The country paid dearly for not taking

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advantage of either of these agreements for each was unilaterally disowned by the negotiating government when it realised that political divisiveness within class interests compelled each to do so. Their reneging were not proofs of boldness but of desperation. Perfidy became the prevailing norm though the Arab noun Taquiya - expedient duplicity - may be more appropriate. (This fermenting divisiveness, within the two ruling dynasties, took an extraordinarily violent and bitter turn in the sub-national Wayamba provincial council election of January 1999).
The disowning of each agreement marched to the drum beat of government sponsored anti-Tamil riots. With every antiTamil riot oppositional violence among the Tamil youth occurred.The Tamil politicians, richly immersed in Gandhian non violence- which by some alchemy was expected to transmute helplessness to strength- were comfortable in lawyerly debate. They did not understand that politics, with its layered contradictory meanings, were about the art of the possible and its means were deals, cunning, intrigues gamesmanship and double crosses. Power is the energy of politics. It has been stated that an honest politician is one who, after having been bought, stays bought. Conscience had very little to do with politics principle being measured by the degree of its flexibility. Politics is a hard school with little in it for the Graces. The lostling Tamil politicians were unaware that they were stuck in a structural impossibility, the Kerensky trap of liberalism, when facing a mobilising Sinhala-Buddhism which had state power in its control. They continued to engage in Sisyphean endeavours of squaring the liberal circle. No solution was possible in a structure of majoritarian politics where the Tamils, like the Catholics of Northern Ireland, would never ever be able to claim or influence state power. Lacking political depth and, finessed at every turn, the fey Tamil politicians capability of managing the situation decreased. Their credibility was slowly getting eroded.
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Yet Tamil politicians, imbued with infinite Panglossian faith, continued to work for a negotiated settlement even within the existing constitutional framework of an unitary state (Appendices E and F) despite being repeatedly jilted. But the counter reformation marched on inexorably. The 1972 constitution was a triumph of non-Donoughmore hegemonism for it was an embodiment of uglied Convivencia principles. The Sinhalese were consecrated the core nation (the Volk) of Sri Lanka and the island a Sinhala-dwipa. Sinhala Only gained constitutional entrenchment. Not a comma could be changed without a 2/3rd majority and the Sinhala people were 75% of the population. For the first time Buddhism became a state religion (Appendix H). All efforts of political scientists to separate religion and the State and create a secular constitution, as befits a modern State, were abandoned. The contrast with India is illuminating. Her constitution is unabashedly secular despite a 80% Hindu population. The present government (BJB) has a Hindu orientation but is unable to change the secular basis. It is in government but not in power. The 1972 Sri Lanka constitution was a constitution of Sinhala-Buddhists by the Sinhala-Buddhists for SinhalaBuddhists. Tamil protests were summarily rejected. It was an exclusive constitution which was only of value to a core group determined by birth. Other groups could not relate to the core group except as Supplicants. It appeared that freedom was sought from the British, not for liberation, but to create smaller local empires in its turn. The core group wanted it all. The legal and administrative foundations for a Volk and now a Reich were firmly laid. Only repressive violence (as against legitimate violence) and conquest, by the state, were left for their completion. These were soon to follow. The rotting of the Convivencia state had begun. The Hegelian opposite, of a foundation for secession by a subject people who were denied any stake in the country, was also laid. One strand in the post-independence history of Sri Lanka is the entrepreneurial manufacture of implacable enmities.

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The 1971 constitution was quickly used to deal visceral blows against the Tamils. The government undertook a comprehensive programme of nationalisation which prevented Tamils, deprived of employment in the public sector because of the Sinhala Only act, undertaking private sector entrepreneurial activity. Education had always been an instrument of upward mobility in Sri Lanka. Tertiary eduction was an area of intense competition. A policy of affirmative action, favouring the majority, was now introduced denying Tamils fair entry, on the basis of raw marks, to the Universities. The qualified but denied Tamil youth, reflecting on the entry of less qualified students purely because of their core race, took the inevitable step of joining the growing band of militants, like the Sinn Fein in North Ireland, advocating oppositional violence. Tamils were not to be the Jews of Nazi Germany who acquiesced mutely in their own destruction. The explosive combination of University level intelligence, moved by a deep feeling of injustice and deprivation, and wielding arms in oppositional violence required political maturity of the highest level to combat. Far from dealing with it the national ruling class offered no evidence that they were even aware of the problem.
The jilted Tamil politicians, now unable to resist the militant pressure- which was yet under their increasingly tenuous control- took the decisive but albeit reluctant step of moving the Vaddukoddai Resolution 1976 (Appendix I). The resolution stated the intention of declaring an independent and sovereign Tamil state. The Vaddukoddai Resolution was the lagged linear response to the pan-Sinhala Ministry of 1935.
The message of disenchantment and the burgeoning resentment of the Tamils did not percolate into the Sinhala ruling class. The 1977 government, which romped in with 5/ 6's majority had declared in its manifesto that the settlement of this issue was central to its aims. But after gaining power it
placed the problem on the backburner. There were anti-Tamil
riots almost every year increasing the pressure on the Tamil
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politicians and being further fertile recruiting ground for the militants. Despite the Vaddukoddai resolution the Tamil politicians continued to try accommodation and blessed the government's District Development Council (DDC) proposal of creating Bantustans. Again Taquiya was followed. The government made an inept attempt to rig the elections and, for good measure, burnt down the world renowned Jaffna library, located in the heartland of the Tamils. The DDC scheme was given up in derision. The reaction of a government, now short of ideas, was to solve the problem of oppositional violence through repressive violence using the military. The Army Commander was given a fatuous carte-blanche to end the militancy within six months. The quick finish that was envisaged ended as a quirk. Oppositional violence, fertilised by the blood of its victims, graduated into an insurgency, developed into an armed rebellion and is now a continuing civil war. The violent militants also displaced the non-violent politicians as Tamil leaders. The Sinhala politicians, of both parties, have to take responsibility for this tragic turn of events. Instead of nurturing the Tamil politicians, by meeting them even one-eighths of the way, they completely marginalised them, got them condemned. as terrorists and ejected them from Parliament. The vacuum was filled by the militants. The country has paid a heavy price for this short-sightedness.
The political line of the Tamil politicians climaxed with the Vaddukoddai Resolution.The acceptance of the later DDC scheme, after the Resolution was passed, was the reaction of aghast Tamil politicians, at their self-discovery of unsuspected vertebralism in passing this Resolution.But with the failure of the DDC scheme all was lost. The militants took over specially after 1983. The contrast between the non-violent Tamil politicians and the violent militants could not be more stark. None of the leading militants were lawyers, their full time devotion was to their cause. They were drawn from the deprived and the dispossessed of the lower castes. Their cultural source of Sustenance was indigenous, based on the
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Tamil language. Tamil was their tongue, their ears, their brain, the very blood of their hearts, veins and arteries. To confront a mobilised Sinhala-Buddhism there now emerged a mobilised Tamilism paving the way for a clash of civilisations. The Sinhala leadership however viewed them as a bunch of terrorists. They refused to recognise the question as to why a placid people like the Tamils should take up arms. The Sinhala politicians were as politically inept as the Tamil politicians of earlier times.
1983 was a decisive point in the history of Sri Lanka. It was a government sponsored anti-Tamil riot, which was taken over and expanded, by a group of its supporters, into a minutely planned genocide, with the ethnicised police watching in bemusement. It was a pogrom and a program. It was a pogrom because it was a massacre of unarmed Tamil civilians, it was a program because of the systematic destruction of Tamil economic resources. 1983 was the more vigorous and thorough carrying out of the objectives of 1935 (Pan Sinhala Ministry) but by other means. Pre-1983 Tamils would never have visualised a 1983. Post-1983 Tamils would never again accept another 1983. 1983 entered the psyche of the Tamils in the same manner as the holocaust has for the Jews. But there was a crucial difference. The Germans, in the main, were either complicit, acquiesced, or were indifferent to this pogrom. Yet at this critical moment in Sri Lanka Convivencia was evident. When the full horror of the actions of their government became evident, the Sinhalese, similar to when the Kandyan Sinhalese welcomed the hapless Muslim victims of Portuguese and Dutch religious persecutions, opened their hearts and homes, at considerable personal risk, to the refugeeised Tamils and gave extraordinarily generous support to assist with their rapid rehabilitation. It was civic virtue at its finest. In the darkest moment it was the highest act of redemption. At the level of the people Convivencia was alive and well. The problem was with their political representatives in search of partisan benefit.
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Upto 1983 Tamils clung to the belief that change should be achieved through established channels those of parliaments and fine speeches. After 1983, balking at their injustices, Tamils matured to a deep Tamil awareness of their aspirations. Since then, eschewing mere constitutional arrangements within Sri Lanka, they demanded the recognition of an homeland within Sri Lanka where Tamils could live in dignity, safety, and fulfil their aspirations. The Tamil homeland was a narrow concept within a wider nation of Sri Lanka. This narrow homeland concept could be appropriated by other ethnicities, including Sinhala-Buddhist. Sri Lanka will therefore re-become a Convivencia, a wider Union based on narrower homelands. It was a quaint idea whose time had come and, if need be, the Tamils were willing to use blood and iron to achieve it. A lesson that they had learnt from Sri Lankan governments was expedient duplicity. Agreements struck could be repudiated if it suited their purpose. Sri Lanka could not be the same anymore.
A new Convivencia now needs to be struck. This Con vivencia will be where Tamil aspirations would be satisfied, without threatening a modern Sri Lankan democracy, a democracy where the aspirations of the other ethnicities would also be satisfied. It should deal specifically with the atavistic security, fears of the majority community. Tamils have also to be given a clear reason for hope, of progress within this Convivencia, where there would be no discriminatory barriers to entry or exit. Simultaneously there needs to be an acceptance of pluralism and cultural diversity in Sri Lanka and this diversity not be taken as a sign of a country's weakness.
Sinhala politicians having suddenly become aware, after 1983, that they were sitting on a volcano looked around in wild surmise and sought solution. But they clutched at past paradigms. The naively romantic leadership of the Tamils had been taken over by a set of “boys' considered by the government as village yokels who could not speak English.
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Tamil expectations were now totally different. Yet what was offered was more of the same adding bells and whistles to what existed. There was a 13th amendment to the constitution (1988) which was attempted to be implemented with an Expeditionary Force from India. This amendment introduced a critical variant on decentralisation. The earlier exercises were of deconcentration. The 13th amendment was of devolution. But these proposals were not implemented for they were fudge. The Donoughmore Commissioners were agreeable to de volve substantial powers of internal selfgovernment to the non-white population of Sri Lanka but the non-white population was not willing to devolve the same powers to their own non-whites, in their turn, although there was constitutional provision for it.
The 1994 government was enthusiastically voted in on a specific peace mandate. Draft proposals for constitutional reforms were offered by the new government, in 1995, and formalised in 1997 but are languishing without being submitted to parliament. These proposals are like the Sacred Tooth Relic, to be placed on exhibition once a year to bedazzle the Aid Group meeting, and then put in cold storage. In contrast to the frozen 1997 proposals, the Tony Blair's government in Britain achieved agreement in Northern Ireland within an year of it gaining power. Yet the 1997 proposals were an advance for they abandoned a fundamental of the Sinhala position. The proposals accepted a Federal rather than an Unitary state.
In the meanwhile the militants, seeing no hope, have escalated violence to the level of a civil war. It is now raging with horrible civilian outrages and flagrant abuse of human rights being perpetrated by both sides. The militant's basis had also broadened from oppositional violence to the defence and maintenance of dignity. The government had also changed from repressive violence to conquest including undertaking, like in Guernica, air sorties against the civilian Tamil population. It is an uncanny replay of the Serb-Kosovo conflict. One side is now referring to pluralism the other to real estate. There are
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more armed state personnel of the state per head of Sri Lanka population then anywhere else in the world though less than 1%, of them, are Tamils. Sri Lanka service casualties per head of population are higher than Vietnam for the United States. 5.5% of the GDP is allocated for the war effort. A respected private think tank, Marga, has calculated that in 15 years of the war, 2 1/2 years of gross national product has been foregone. The Institute of Policy Studies (IPS), a government sponsored think tank, using more conservative figures, calculates it to be 1 1/2 years. The consequences are predictable, poverty and deprivation are increasing, Social Services and infrastructural facilities are collapsing. In order to import war material the exchange rate is over valued by about 15% - 20%, thus discriminating against exports-and the domestic servants in the Middle East-and hollowing their production capacity. Investment and maintenance are foregone reducing competitiveness in the world market. Instances of infant deaths, as a result of starvation, have also been reported. There have been a large number of desertions which are directly linked to the high incidence of grave crime. The government which came to power on a peace platform, but now on a decided military mode, has unleashed a 'war for peace’ campaign. This is the mother of betrayals. Like the British, who targeted the civilian Sinhala population of Bintenne and Well assa during the 1818 rebellion against them, the Government has targeted the civilian population of the Wanni, who are Tamils, applying a policy of nutritional deprivation and medicine denial despite surplus availability of these items in the hands of the NGO's. Independent households have been refugeeised into teeming and festering concentration camps where educational facilities are a minimum. The then government (1992) adequately fed 1.7 million refugees. The 1994 government is quibbling about 450,000.
On the 50th anniversary of her political independence, Sri Lanka could be considered a failing State, a state ceasing to function even in its core activities. Only the coercive forces

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of the military and criminalised parts of the state work and that too with bribery lubricating the system. There is widespread plunder of state resources. Private armies, the equivalent of Ton-Ton Macoutes, are the civic forces. The most rewarding entrepreneurial activity is war contracting with active lobbies having Access to political decision makers. It is economic development through other means. The most vivid manifestation of this failing state was the Wayamba provincial council election of January 1999 where, following on widespread rigging aided by Ton-Ton Macoutes, the government promoted the senior police officers in charge. Society is now pre-occupied with just safe living. Sri Lanka is rapidly moving towards a Haiti or a Congo. In an extraordinary paradox the Tamil areas, because they are under Army rule, have some form of rule of law and accountability though not much. The army struck a Faustian bargain with discredited Tamil sub-groups to levy taxes (poll, transport and on business), even permitting the occasional murder, so long as they could be sources of information to the army. The Sinhala areas are moving towards a State of nature the rule by criminal gangs. An example was of criminal gangs determining the elections, held on 28/3/99, for the staid Board of Control for Cricket in Sri Lanka. Abduction for ran som cannot be far behind. Britain granted independence to Sri Lanka with an unequalled public administration. Fifty years on, Leviathan has replaced Convivencia. The root cause for the unmaking of the state was ethnic in origin.
The are no problems which cannot be solved only solutions which have not been discovered. It is the duty of every Sri Lankan to search for these solutions. The Northern Ireland Agreement could possibly provide the template for the detente required in Sri Lanka. The manner by which the Northern Ireland agreement was struck is instructive. It was neither a unilateral offer, like the 1997 Government proposals of constitutional reforms, nor a deal struck outside and enforced like the 13th amendment to the constitution. In order
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to arrive at the Northern Ireland agreement all the stakeholders were invited. The British government was also a stakeholder. Similarly in Sri Lanka the Sri Lanka government should be considered a stakeholder not a choreographer. Prof. G.L.Peiris, in Chapter One of this volume, has indicated the 15 elements of the agreement relevant to Sri Lanka. M. Somasundram in Chapter Four has highlighted the similarities of Northern Ireland and Sri Lankan situations and Charitha Ratwatte has given the private sector angle in Chapter Five.
To enable the Agreement to be reached there was a conscious effort to navigate between wild hopes, competing visions and different ethnicities, in order to create a functioning reality, to benefit the people of Northern Ireland who had upto now lived by denying reality. But such a task can only be undertaken by a mediator not a facilitator. A facilitator deals mostly with the logistics of the operation letting events take their course. A mediator, on the other hand, offers different options, ideas, perspectives, alternatives, with a nagging persistence, in order to break any impasse and manage the process to Success. In Sri Lanka a mediator would find that, . at the initial stages, he is dealing with shadows in a hall of mirrors. This is because all sides have become so duplicitiously expedient that they would be posturing. An experienced mediator would see through their play acting. A breakthrough can be achieved only if two parameters were respected. The first parameter is that the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka cannot be compromised. The second parameter is that the Thimpu Principles should be accepted. These are not contradictions as the South African constitution has shown. The leader of the dominant militant group has accepted both parameters (Appendix M) stating that this is the last window of opportunity. Otherwise the Rubicon will be crossed. The government has not accepted the second parameter. The government, hell bent on military victory, like the 1977

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government which gave 6 months for a military victory, has not accepted the offer for talks either although the Leader of the Opposition has done so (Appendix O). Yet, if Politico- khaki capitalist-war lobby pressures were resisted, anything is possible within these parameters. An essential is that hoary, invalid concepts of sovereignty need to be abandoned, as the Northern Ireland Agreement did, as well as traditional paradigms. That agreement accepted four concentric circles. The first was of North Ireland proper the second, North Ireland in the British Isles, the third, of Ireland and the fourth, of Europe. There are responsibilities attached to each concentric circle. The approval for the arrangement was obtained only from North Ireland through a referendum. This Agreement deliberately sought to establish a Convivencia.
If the will and the effort were present in Sri Lanka it is difficult to see why Convivencia cannot be restored. To do So a re-imagination of the State, nationhood, Sovereignty are required and fresh political approaches adopted to enable Sri Lanka to transit to a full democracy permitting the blossoming of pluralism and cultural identities and removing all forms of ethnic discontents. The staged approach will necessarily have to be small bore, at each stage there being sundry plaudits but no grand prizes. The basis for it would be confederation within which there will be four concentric circles. The innermost circle will be a Tamil homeland (and other homelands). The innermost circle will be embedded in the second which will be Sri Lanka where sovereignty would be exercised as appropriate to a small third world country living on handouts and in hock to international finance agencies. The third will be Tamil Nadu of India and the fourth the country that will guarantee the Agreement and has the authority and muscle for independent rectification. Its authority should include the use of military force to prevent secession. The fourth circle is required because there have been too many instances of unilateral reneging on Agreements, to satisfy parochial political pressures,
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to trust future Sri Lankan governments. Without factoring Tamil Nadu into the equation no durable Agreement could be struck. Like in Northern Ireland, only the approval of the inhabitants pf the innermost circle(s) need be obtained by a referendum. The other circles have no stake in how the innermost circle(s) manage their affairs except for dealing with issues of secession.
The post-independence debate dealt with the nature of the Sri Lankan state, whether it was to be plural and secular (a Convivencia) or be monistic and non-secular founded on race and religion (a Volk). In resolving this debate Sri Lanka has thrown up no statesmen though there was a plentiful supply of pornographers of politics. It was a debate Suppressing memory, a tale of missed opportunities, messed relationships and mussed obligations. Promises, like hearts, were offered to be broken, windows of opportunity were quickly shut. A viable and ongoing Convivencia was abandoned to cater to short term political needs. Periodic repair jobs were speedily short circuited for the same reason. Politicians never missed opportunities for missing opportunities. The result was a totally avoidable ethnic conflict which has now matured into a civil war. Ethnic conflict is like diabetes it slowly but surely debilitates every organ of governance. The prevailing coma of governance is due to pathological ethnicity. The non-violent group, who should have been sponsored and sustained, was marginalised, even condemned as terrorists and ejected from Parliament, abandoned and thrown to the wolves. And the wolves, maturing from oppositional violence to civil war, have now taken over. But they have opened one last window of opportunity. The challenge facing the Sri Lankan nation is of generating political entrepreneurship and credibility, to restore a re-centred Convivencia, leading to a domestication of the wolves, and induce them to shift from civil war to non-violent opposition for eventual incorporation into a pre-1935

Page 16
framework. They have to be domesticated not cowed. To do so, both have to put their pasts behind them however excruciating the pains of the wounds they have suffered. If successful in this effort the revamping of Sri Lankan democratic structures and systems into richer contexts becomes real. If this were not done the next debate will be cartography, on the specific boundaries of two states. Political entrepreneurship was the answer in Northern Ireland and it led to similar domestication though with teething problems. In Sri Lanka political scavenging led to the formation of the Pan-Sinhala Ministry which shifted her from the present tense to the past tense and set her sailing towards the medieval age. Like in that age criminal gangs are now staking territory, which they hold as feudal fiefs, till the next crime lord sends them on their way. The consequence is that the primary economic activity of today, like in medieval times, is domestic servitude. It is imperative that political entrepreneurship now lever her from the past tense to the future tense to tack Sri Lanka to the 21st century and the information age.To become or not to become, is not the question, but an answer.
M. Somasundram

1
15 ISSues of the Northern Ireland Agreement Relevant to Sri Lanka
G.L.Pieris
The Northern Ireland Agreement is a valuable exercise successfully undertaken in the United Kingdom. A light at the end of the tunnel is visible to a vexed and convoluted problem. Sri Lanka should look at attempts made elsewhere, to solve similar problems faced by her, and adapt them to circumstances, traditions and complexities of her local internal situation.
Before dealing with the 15 issues of the Northern Ireland Agreement relevant to Sri Lanka three preliminary reflections will be useful. The first was graphically made by HRH Charles, the Prince of Wales, personally to me. He made the perceptive observation that one of the most difficult things in these situations is to put the past beyond one. The pain, the anguish, the suffering which dominated the past has to be regarded as a matter of history. It should be treated as a closed chapter. A fresh beginning has to be made. This is easy to say but difficult to do, emotionally and spiritually, within oneself. Prince Charles's point is well taken. It is a great pity that so many have to die and be maimed and how much more of it needs to occur before a practical sensible approach to the problem is decided. There is also a contrary view, that the very fact that so many have died means no concession or minimum
* An adapted version of the speech delivered by Hon. G. L. Pieris on
5th September 1998.

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2 Reimagining Sri Lanka: Northern Ireland Insights
concessions be made. Otherwise these people who have given up their lives have done so in vain. This is an inversion not only of logic but also of basic human values. It supports Prince Charles's point that it is excruciatingly difficult to put the past behind and make a fresh beginning. This idea is convincingly articulated in the Declaration of Support of the Northern Ireland Agreement. It states in section 2
"The tragedies of the past have left a deep and profoundly regrettable legacy of suffering. We must never forget those who have died or been injured and their families. But we can best honour them through a fresh start, in which we firmly dedicate ourselves to the achievement of reconciliation, tolerance and mutual trust and to the protection and vindication of the human rights of all"
This is the point of departure
The second reflection is that to achieve a durable and lasting solution, which has roots so deep in our history, it is necessary to arrive at a cross party consensus across the entirety of the political spectrum. In this regard one of the basic problems in this part of the world is a very high degree of political polarisation. It is not a phenomenon that is restricted to this country but regrettably envelopes the entirety of the sub-continent of India. It is very difficult for political parties, when dealing with genuinely national questions, to take a broad national view of the problem. This is not an apportionment of blame nor calling each other names but it seems a genuine problem. It is necessary to overcome this obstacle in order to see the light at the end of the tunnel.
The third reflection is that, while there is no need to reinvent the wheel, it certainly makes sense to learn from what happens elsewhere. These problems are not unique. Countries and civilisations, throughout the progress of mankind, had to

15 Issues of the Northern Ireland Agreement 3
deal with common problems. It is necessary to evaluate critically similar experiences of other countries of the world but be sufficiently creative. Adaptability, flexibility and resilience of mind and outlook are necessary, to come to terms with the significantly different problems which prevail in Sri Lanka at the present time.
There are 15 features of the Northern Ireland Agreement which are of particular relevance to Sri Lanka. Firstly it acknowledges substantial differences that exist among different parties which should not present an insuperable barrier to solution. Section 5 of the Declaration of Support StatCS
"We acknowledge the substantial differences between our continuing, and equally legitimate, political aspirations. However, we will endeavour to strive in every practical way towards reconcilation and rappro chment within the framework of democratic and agreed arrangements"
This is an important principle, it is what public policy is all about. It emphasises social engineering i.e reconciling and balancing competing interests in a manner that ensures the well being of the community at large. The magnitude of the differences which seem to exist between the warring parties should not be a matter for intimidation or discouragement. Ways have to be found of narrowing the chasms and the gulfs which exist and bridging these differences.
The second principle that is emphasised in the Northern Ireland Agreement is that of good faith. Without good faith nothing else is going to work. Section 5 of the Declaration of Support states
"We pledge that we will, in good faith, work to ensure the success of each and everyone of the arrangements to be established under this agreement"

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4 Reimagining Sri Lanka: Northern Ireland Insights
It is very important to keep this principle in mind. Some Sri Lankans tend to have misgivings about how these powers will be used and whether there should not be restrictions and curtailments. If this were to be so these powers should not be devolved in the first place. If power were to be devolved with the conviction that it is going to be abused and it is necessary to do everything that human ingenuity can conceive, to circumscribe these powers, then there is a total absence of good faith. By being defensive and stultifying the very power that is being devolved, is taking back with one hand the powers given with the other. This was the fundamental criticism of the 13th amendment to the constitution the present constitutional structure of the country. The hall marks of a desirable and lasting solution are good faith, understanding, trust and confidence. These are underpinnings of a desirable and lasting Solution.
The third principle is, when dealing with problems which have so complicated a history, the necessity to accept certain arrangements as a transitional compromises, compromises may be far from perfect. It is to make do with something, which, : though not fully satisfactory, is yet a way of launching the entire initiative. It is essentially an outlook predicated on pragmatism. This pragmatism is reflected in Strand One of the Northern Ireland Agreement. Section 2 provides for the 108 member Assembly to be elected from the existing Westminster constituencies. The principle is to use the existing constituencies as a point of departure. In Sri Lanka there are proposed experiments, of a far reaching nature, with regard to electoral systems. These changes are not likely to be effected in the near future because there are too many conflicts and too many divergences to be resolved. It will be useful to begin with a slight adaptation of the status quo and build on that foundation. This valuable principle of pragmatism has been accepted, at least by implication, in the Northern Ireland Agreement.

15 Issues of the Northern Ireland Agreement 5
The fourth principle recognises clearly, though not explicitly, that respect for human rights is the basic principle of this arrangement. This is the basic foundation, the sheet anchor, on which to build. It will convince ethnic groups and minorities that justice, fair play, equitable treatment begins with the individual who is, after all, the basic unit of society. There is incorporation, in legal and constitutional structures, provisions that will militate against a cavalier transgression of human rights. This has been done effectively in the Northern Ireland Agreement. Section 5 of Strand One of the Northern Ireland Agreement provides for safeguards, among others, as
"(b) the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland supplementing it, which neither the Assembly nor public bodies can infringe, together with a Human Rights Commission;
(c) arrangements to provide that key decisions on legislation are proofed to ensure that they do not infringe, together with a Human Rights Commission".
The Northern Ireland Agreement has a series of provisions which strengthen structures that would ensure that there would be no infractions or violations of individual human rights. This is not only indispensible it is an integral part of a culture that will guarantee the arrangements intended to allay minority fears.
The fifth principle is that there is a timely and refreshing emphasis on the equality of opportunity. This is a seminal provision incorporated into the Northern Ireland Agreement. It is of practical consequence to Sri Lanka. Equality of opportunity, with regard to recruitment to the public services, entry to the University etc., are of everyday concern to the people. The Northern Ireland Agreement envisages an Equality Commission. It is in the forefront of structures envisaged and are pivotal and fundamental. A suggestion has been made that

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6 Reimagining Sri Lanka: Northern Ireland Insights
Sri Lanka enact a Race Relations Bill similar to that operating in the United Kingdom. Serious consideration is being given to this possibility.
The sixth principle is of immediate practical relevance to Sri Lanka that of a basic legislative regime and a weighted legislative regime. The basic legislative regime is where a simple majority is the norm but the Northern Ireland Agreement provided certain exceptions, under the safeguards section, where
"(d) Arrangements to ensure key decisions are taken on a
cross community basis;
(1) either parallel consent, ie. a majority of those members present and voting, including a majority of the unionist and nationalist designations present and voting;
(b) or a weighted majority (60%) of members present and voting, including at least 40% of each of the nation list and unionist designations present and voting."
It is not enough for measures of a certain kind falling within the ambit of a certain category to be adopted by a single majority of those present and voting in the legislature. A majority is also required from those who belong to a particular ethnic, cultural or racial gorups. This is the principle which occupies a prominant place in the abortive Charlotteville Town agreement in Canada. This is where the Federal government of Canada was legislating for the cultural and minority rights of those in Quebec. Under this agreement it was necessary for a majority of Francophone Senators in the Canadian Senate to vote on measures. Otherwise it will not acquire the status of law. These are ways of allaying minority fears and preventing the emergence and growth of a capricious and oppressive majoritariansm. It is a valuable ideal to take note of.

15 Issues of the Northern Ireland Agreement 7
The seventh principle deals with a deficiency in our political culture which operates on the principle that the winner takes all. The Northern Ireland Agreement provides for minority interests to be represented in various bodies, not least of which, are Executive bodies. Provision is made for an Executive Committee to oversee some Executive function. Chairs and Deputy Chairs are allocated to parties in broad proportion, on the basis of the d'Hondt system, by reference to the number of seats each party has in the Assembly. It ensures the opportunity for all members to be committee members. Depending on the numerical strength of a particular party the system allocates a number of seats to that party in the legislative and executive bodies. The British had earlier tried out this system in Sri Lanka, with considerable success, in the period 1931-1948. It was called the Donoughmore system of Executive Committees. The State Council (the Supreme legislature) was divided into Executive Committees and each committee had members who had different ideas and perceptions. The United National Party at the parliamentary select committee deliberations made the valuable suggestion that in the proposed Regional Councils, when the Boards of Ministers are constituted, to let opposition members too have certain number seats on a pro-rata basis depending on their numerical strength. This is a valuable principle for seriously dealing with the polarisation referred to earlier. The process of Sharing power, of give and take, compromise and engagement in significant policy issues are vital. There are nothing more important to solve our present problems.
The eighth point is the recognition of the utmost importance that of the fullest participation by civil society in North Ireland. This accepts that the vigour and vitality of participation of all elements of civil society are important. There are no matters which can be comfortably and complacently left exclusively and entirely in the hands of politicians of whatever party or,

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8 Reimagining Sri Lanka: Northern Ireland Insights
ܟܚ
colour they belong. This principle, of the paramountcy of the involvement of civil society, is vividly captured in Strand I section 34 which reads:
"A consultative Civic Forum will be established. It will comprise representatives of the business, trade unions and voluntary sectors and such other sectors as agreed by the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister. It will act as a consultative mechanism on social, economic and cultural issues. The First Minister and the Deputy First Minister will by agreement provide administrative support for the Civic Forum and establish guidelines for the selection of representatives of the Civic Forum."
In Sri Lanka the universites, academics, bureaucrats, student leaders, clergy will play a vital and indispensible role in this a I Շa.
The ninth principle is that the Northern Ireland Agreement makes transitional arrangements for review of the operations of the Agreement. It does not believe that the Agreement that has evolved is a perfect structure. A beginning has to be made in a faltering, modest, tentative manner. The beginning cannot be perfect. But critical assessments have to be made as the agreement goes into operation. This type of valuable practical approach pervades and permeates all the provisions in the Northern Ireland Agreement.
The tenth principle found in the Northern Ireland Agreement is that valuable mechanisms are put in place to amicably resolve disputes which may well arise among the entities created. One example in Sri Lanka would be the Finance Commission. It is charged with the responsibility of allocating pecuniary resources to various Regional Councils. Disputes may arise on this score, between the Regional Council and the Finance Commission or even among Regional Councils.

15 Issues of the Northern Ireland Agreement 9
It is necessary to have adjudicative structures which can command the confidence of all concerned enabling the emergence of speedy and satisfying solutions.
The eleventh principle emphasises the importance of unifying mechanisms. Earlier there was divergence, conflict, acrimony, rancour and even hatred pervading the system. The Northern Ireland Agreement has set up certain in situtions and structures that bring together living people their interests and institutions. An example is the North-South Ministerial Council. The North-South Ministerial Council is envisioned to operate as an unifying institution of Ireland.
The twelfth principle is an extension of the eleventh but applying to para-Ireland. It is the setting up of the BritishIrish Council and covers, envelopes and engulfs the entirely of the British Isles. This is a valuable mechanism that replaces mistrust and hatred and replaces them with understanding and compassion. These are institutional structures which have been established and warrant study by other countries which have to deal with similar problems in the turgid and turbulent parts of the world they occupy.
The thirteenth principle is the emphasis accorded to reconciliation. This emphasis is similar to that accorded by the South African government and seen in the workings of Desmond Tutu's Truth Commisison. At the end of a conflict it is not necessary to exact condign punishment or apply the Criminal Law in its full rigour. The Truth Commission operates on a different principle of full disclosure and spontaneous contrition. It is argued that the articulation of spontaneous contrition puts the pain behind. It leads to the recognition that loved ones, who had suffered, are no longer in the world of the living. It also enables acceptance that it is valueless to live in a state of empty vacuous hope. It enables the recognition of reality for what it is pick up the pieces and go on with life.

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10 Reimagining Sri Lanka: Northern Ireland Insights
This is the conceptual underpinning on which such an exercise is founded. Similar mechanisms recognising the importance of reconciliation find a central place in the Northern Ireland Agreement.
The fourteenth principle is the rightful importance ascribed to security. The North Ireland Agrement refers, in section 2 the Chapter on "Security" to
(1) the reduction of the number and the role of the Armed forces deployed in Northern Ireland to levels compatible with a normal peaceful society;
(2) the removal of security installations;
(3) the removal of emergency powers in Northern Ireland;
These are very important considerations for Sri Lanka for the security establishment has a habit of feeding on itself. There are vast economic interests which become entrenched and consolidated as the conflict goes on. It operates over time. It is a very potent factor that operates against of a durable and lasting Solution.
The fifteenth principle deals with Decommissioning. The North Ireland Agreement states under the chapter "Decommissioning" section 2
"They note the progress made by the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning and the government in developing schemes which can represent a workable basis for achie ving the decommissioning of illegally held arms in the possession of paramilitary groups".

15 Issues of the Northern Ireland Agreement 11
This is a problem all countries which have confronted problems of this nature have to deal. The most difficult problem which Sri Lanka has to resolve is the rehabilitation after the advent of peace. There are a large number of people to whom violence has become a way of life. They have wielded a kind of power that no government in the world can ever expect to wield. It is power bereft of any form of responsibility. It is a power that literally flows out of a barrel of a gun. The problem is to how to rehabilitate such people into society fully, constructively and pragmatically. This is the central problem for which Sri Lanka will have to prepare as the light at the end of the tunnel begins to be seen. The active involvement of civil sociey is vital in this process.
The fifteen principles which have been dealt with,deriving out of the Northern Ireland Agreement, offer a great deal of inspiration and guidance in the search for a solution to Sri Lanka's own ethnic problem.

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2
The Northern Ireland Agreement as a Model for Divided Societies
Thomas G. Fraser
Introduction
The political agreement reached in Northern Ireland on 10 April 1998 is seen as marking a new departure in the political and constitutional history of Northern Ireland, and of the island of Ireland. The Agreement was reached between the two sovereign governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. More importantly, it was reached amongst most of the political parties in Northern Ireland, parties of widely different ideologies, representing two traditions which had been locked in bitter dispute for at least a century. It was also agreed to by three political parties representing armed groups which had been engaged in violence for thirty years. By the time the Agreement came into effect, the Northern Ireland situation had claimed 3,247 lives and cost billions of pounds to the British exchequer. Northern Ireland has been Western Europe's most intractable ethnic dispute since the Second World War. The purpose of this paper is to identify the nature of the Northern Ireland problem, to examine previous attempts at resolving the conflict and why they failed, and to explain the forces which generated the present peace process. Finally, it will analyse the Agreement, identifying the key elements which are currently forming the basis for political and constitutional compromise. To what extent can this provide a model for other divided societies?

The Northern Ireland Agreement as a Model..... 13
The Northern Ireland Problem
There are at least four Northern Ireland problems, which are interlocked. Any solution has to address all four.
1. The Irish-British Problem
Ireland's problem has been that it has been both too close and too far from Britain. It was far away enough to retain its own identity. That difference of identity was sharpened in the 16th century when the three elements of Britain viz. England, Scotland and Wales, became Protestant, while Ireland remained Catholic. But Ireland was too close to Britain, only twenty miles at the nearest point, to escape the attentions of its larger neighbour. Over the centuries, the British saw Ireland as essential to their security. In 1801, during the wars with France, this was recognised by the formal Union of the two countries, which became the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. This Union ultimately failed. In the 19th century Irish nationalists asserted a distinctive Irish identity and argued that the Union had failed Ireland economically. The Great Famine of 1845-1849, in which one million died and one million emigrated, seemed to confirm this. In 1919 the war of Independence began, which ended in the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, and independence in 1922.
2. The Nationalist-Unionist Problem
But Irish Nationalism was not straightforward. As it developed, Irish Nationalism had certain defining elements:
(a) Economics. Nationalist economists argued that an lirish parliament in Dublin would promote Irish interests, unlike the Union parliament in London.

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14 Reimagining Sri Lanka: Northern Ireland Insights
(b) Culture. Nationalists wished to safeguard and promote a distinctively Irish culture against the dominant British culture. This included such elements as literature, Irish sports, and, above all, the Irish language. Culture was increasingly defined in Irish or Gaelic terms. They drew their inspiration from the myths and legends of the Irish past.
(c) Territory. Since Ireland was geographically an island, Nationalists believed it was entitled to national selfdetermination.
(d) Religion. The prime generating force behind Irish Nationalism
was religion. Some Protestants were Nationalists, but
overwhelmingly Nationalists saw Catholicism as marking them out as distinctively Irish.
3. Ulster Unionism
In the early 17th century, large parts of Ulster were settled by Protestant settlers from Scotland and England. The purpose of this plantation of Ulster was establish a community which would identify with British interests in Ireland. Native Irish were dispossessed of their land and a bitter conflict broke out. Crucial events took place in the period 1688-1690. In the conflict over the British throne Irish Catholics supported the Catholic James 11, while Protestants rallied to William Ill, Prince of Orange. During the 105-day siege of Londonderry in 1688-1689, Protestants defended the city against an Irish Catholic Army. On 12 July 1690, William III defeated James 11 at the decisive Battle of the Boyne. These events confirmed a Protestant ascendency in Ireland for the next hundred years and are still vital to understanding the current situation. In the 19th century, Ulster industrialised, unlike the rest of Ireland. Ulster Protestants formed the Ulster Unionist movement which refused to identify with Irish Nationalism, seeing their future as linked with Britain. Why?

The Northern Ireland Agreement as a Model..... 15
(a) Economy. Ulster's industries were linked with British markets
and resources.
(b) Culture. Protestants identified with British culture, especially the English language.Their inspiration came from the Siege of Londonderry and the Battle of the Boyne, events which Nationalists saw as leading to their subjugation. Protestants commemorated these events, especially through the formation of the Orange Order, an exclusively Protestant order whose name honoured the memory of King William III, Prince of Orange.
(c) Territory. For Unionists the national territory was not Ireland
but the British Isles.
(d) Religion. Protestants formed 25% of the Irish population. An Irish parliament in Dublin would inevitably lead to Catholic domination.
4. The fourth dimension to the Northern Irish problem which needs to be noted is a continuing tension between constitutional politics and violence what in Ireland is called physical force'. These have been difficult to reconcile.
The Solutions
1. Partition
In 1920 the British government passed the Government of Ireland Act.This envisaged setting up a parliament in Dublin for 28 overwhelmingly Catholic and Nationalist counties. The six predominantly Protestant and Unionist counties of Antrim, Armagh, Down, Londonderry, Fermanagh and Tyrone were to remain part of the United Kingdom, with a devolved parliament and government

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Reimagining Sri Lanka: Northern Ireland Insights
in Belfast. This was to be called Northern Ireland. In addition, there was to be a Council of Ireland to foster future Irish unity and discuss matters of concern to both parts of Ireland. The Government of Ireland Act is the basis of the present structure of Ireland, especially Northern Ireland.
2.
(a)
(b)
What were the defects in the partition solution?
The fundamental problem was,and remains, that the six counties of Northern Ireland were far from exclusively Protestant and Unionist. Two counties, Fermanagh and Tyrone, had Catholic majorities of 55%. The second largest city, Londonderry, had a Catholic majority of 66%. Overall, the Catholic/Nationalist population of Northern Ireland was 34%; it has since grown to 42%. The Catholic community was too small to challenge for effective power, but too large to be assimilated into the Protestant structures of Northern Ireland. The Catholic minority looked to the day when Ireland would be re-united and remained overwhelmingly Nationalist in belief. The Agreement is the most recent attempt to deal with this dilemma, which is at the core of the Northern Ireland problem.
The system of government left Catholics excluded from
political power. Although sovereign authority remained with the British parliament in London, to which Northern Ireland sent members, effective power was exercised by the local parliament in Belfast. This was set up on the Westminster model" but this rests on the principle that political power. changes with the wishes of the electorate. In Northern Ireland this was never the case, since Unionists were always in the majority. Not only did Nationalists never form the government, but permanent Unionist control meant that patterns of discrimination built up which favoured the Protestant

(c)
3.
The Northern Ireland Agreement as a Model..... 17
community and left the Catholic minority even more alienated and marginalised.
This was compounded by economic decline. Economic difficulties meant that the Protestant majority was less inclined to make gestures to the Catholic minority which might win support for lorthern Ireland.
1968-1972. The Collapse of the 1920 Settlement
In the years 1968-1972, Nationalist frustrations in Northern Ireland finally boiled over. In 1968 Civil Rights protests demanded the removal of the most obvious Catholic grievances. In 1970 there was serious rioting between Catholics and Protestants, with a number of deaths. This had the following results:
(a)
(b)
(c)
The British army was used in a peacekeeping role, which meant that effective responsibility was passing from the devolved government in Belfast to the government in London.
At the end of 1969 the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) was formed, initially to defend Catholic areas from Protestant attack. By the summer of 1970, the IRA had engaged in hostilities to end partition, beginning attacks on both the British army and the locally-recruited police force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). By 1972, the IRA had become a formidable force. Its political wing was the Provisional Sinn Fein.
Under the pressure of these events, the Ulster Unionist Party fell apart. By 1972, there was the Ulster Unionist Party, led by the Northern Ireland Prime Minister Brian Faulkner, but this was badly split. A rival party, the Democratic Unionist Party, was formed by a Protestant clergyman, the Reverend

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18 Reimagining Sri Lanka: Northern Ireland Insights
Ian Paisley. Two armed groups were formed on the Protestant side, the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), which carried out attacks against the IRA and the Catholic community. The fragmentation of the Unionist community was to prove a major difficulty in finding a settlement, and still does.
(d) A new constitutional Nationalist party,the Social Democratic and Labour Party, was formed. Opposed to violence, it had to compete with Sinn Fein for Catholic votes, especially in the 1980s and 1990s. Hence, it was also difficult to find a common voice on the Nationalist side.
1. New Solutions
In 1972, faced with a deteriorating security situation, the British government abolished the government and parliament in Belfast. Its strategy was to find a constitutional structure which would meet the wish of the Protestant majority to remain part of the United Kingdom, while giving Catholics some say in government and acknowledging their sense of being Irish.
1. The Sunningdale Agreement 1973-1974
The major attempt by the British and Irish governments to create a new structure was the Sunningdale Agreement, reached with Brian Faulkner's Unionists and the SDLP in December 1973. It proposed to set up a new devolved Assembly, with an Executive in which the Unionists and SDLP would share power. The Agreement included a Council of Ireland.The Executive worked for five months until it was overthrown by a major strike, organised by Protestant workers and supported by the UDA and UVF. Why did the settlement fail?:

The Northern Ireland Agreement as a Model..... 19
(a) The negotiations did not include the Democratic Unionists, the UDA and UVF. Brian Faulkner's Unionist Party also split on the Agreement.The political base for the Agreement in the Protestant community proved too small. Faulkner could never deliver sufficient Unionists - the other parties to the Agreement failed to understand this.
(b) Protestants who might have supported sharing power with the SDLP would not agree to a Council of Ireland. Faced with the IRA campaign, they felt they were being pushed into a united Ireland - this was the basis of the May 1974 strike.
2. Stalemate and the political rise of Sinn Fein
Politics stagnated until 1981 when IRA prisoners began a hunger strike. Bobby Sands and nine other prisoners died. During the hunger strike, Sands won the constituency of Fermanagh-South Tyrone to parliament in London. In November 1981, Sinn Fein articulated a new strategy of the armalite and the ballot box. In 1983 the Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams won the West Belfast seat in parliament. At the same time, the IRA campaign continued. In October 1984, it came close to killing Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in a bomb attack.
3. The Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985
In an attempt to move the political situation forward, the British and Irish governments entered into negotiations. Amongst other objectives they hoped to sustain the SDLP in the face of the advance of Sinn Fein, and to shock the Unionists into the need to negotiate. The Anglo-Irish Agreement left Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom, but set up structures which would give the government of the Republic a consultative role in Northern Ireland's affairs. But

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20 Keimagining Sri Lanka: Northern Ireland Insights
the overall effect was to embitter Unionists, especially as they had been deliberately excluded from the negotiations. The result was to delay real negotiations on Northern lireland's future.
Political Progress
In 1991-1992, the British government began a new political initiative.marked by two policy statements. The first, in 1989, was that the IRA could not be defeated by political means alone. The second, in 1991, was that future discussions would focus upon three relationships, those within Northern Ireland, those between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic, and those between the British and Irish governments.This structure was ultimately embodied in the Agreement.
Within Northern Ireland,two strands were developing. The first was an escalation of violence. The strategy of the UDA and UVF was to attack Nationalist targets to convince the Catholic population that there was too high a price to pay for the IRA campaign. In an incompetent attempt to attack the UDA leadership the IRA killed ten innocent people in Belfast in October 1993; in retaliation the UDA killed seven people near Londonderry.
Despite such violence, political moves were being made. In December 1993, the British and Irish governments issued the Downing Street Declaration. This tried to send signals to both paramilitaries; to Nationalists it conceded that it was for the people of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively, to exercise the right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish'. Unionists were reassured that such self-determination 'must be achieved and exercised with and subject to the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland'. -

The Northern Ireland Agreement as a Model..... 21
Breakthrough
These moves were reinforced in discussions between the leader of the SDLP. John Hume, and the Sinn Fein President, Gerry Adams. On 31 August 1994, the IRA announced a complete ceasefire, to be followed on 13 October by the UDA and UVF. These ceasefires were partly an admission that no side was winning the armed struggle. In response, in February 1995 the British and Irish governments issued the Framework Documents. These sustained Northern Ireland's position in the United Kingdom, but with strong all-Ireland bodies at governmental and civil service level intended to win Nationalist support. Unionists were slow to grasp that the documents reinforced their position.
In fact, progress proved uneven. The British government and the Unionists tried to insist on the decommissioning of IRA arms prior to substantive negotiations. In February 1996, the IRA ended its ceasefire with a large bomb in London. In May 1997, a new British government with a strong majority was able to move ahead. In July the IRA ceasefire was restored and substantive negotiations were able to take place. These involved all the main political parties, though not the Democratic Unionist Party or the smaller United Kingdom Unionist Party, which between them represented 40% of the Protestant electorate.
The Agreement
The negotiations had an independent chairman, the American Senator George Mitchell. Those taking part included the British and Irish governments, the Ulster Unionist Party, the SDLP, Sinn Fein, the moderate Alliance Party and the Women's Coalition. Two parties associated with the UVF and the UDA also took part, the Progressive Unionist Party and the Ulster Democratic Party.
The Agreement brokered by Mitchell was concluded on 10 April, only after direct involvement by the British Prime Minister,

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22 Reimagining Sri Lanka: Northern Ireland Insights
Tony Blair, and his Irish counterpart, Bertie Ahern. In many respects it reflected the earlier Framework Documents, though there were noticeable moves in the Unionist direction, especially in acknowledging 'that while a substantial section of the people of Northern Ireland share the legitimate wish of the people of the island of Ireland for a united Ireland, the present wish of the people of Northern Ireland, freely exercised and legitimate, is to maintain the Union and, accordingly, that Northern Ireland's status as part of the United Kingdom reflects and relies upon that wish; and that it would be wrong to make any change in the status of Northern Ireland save with the consent of a majority of its people'. Two points need to be noted here. Firstly, in accepting this Nationalists, especially Sinn Fein, were making a historic compromise with partition. Secondly, the basis of the Union was now firmly placed on the consent of the people - this was seen both as a guarantee to Unionists and a reassurance to Nationalists that Britain had no other interest in Northern Ireland. It enabled Sinn Fein to see the Agreement as a transitionary phase to a united Ireland. To facilitate both political traditions certain constitutional changes were to be made. On the British side, the 1920 Government of Ireland which embodied British jurisdiction and had partitioned Ireland was to be repealed. Instead, it was 'declared that Northern Ireland in its entirety remain part of the United Kingdom and shall not cease to be so without the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland voting in a poll'. For its part, the Republic of Ireland agreed to repeal Articles 2 and 3 of its 1937 Constitution which claimed jurisdiction over the whole island. It recognised 'that a united Ireland shall be brought about only by peaceful means with the consent of the people, democratically expressed, in both jurisdictions in the Island'.
The Agreement set out new principles, for the internal government of Northern Ireland through a 108-member Assembly, elected by proportional representation. Governmental responsibilities would be allocated according to party strength in the Assembly and

The Northern Ireland Agreement as a Model..... 23
mechanisms were set in place to ensure that key decisions would have all-party support. Key decisions would require either'a majority of those members present and voting,including a majority of the unionist and nationalist designations present and voting; or a weighted majority (60%) of members present and voting, including at least 40% of each of the nationalist and unionist designations present and voting'. The Assembly was to have legislative and executive powers, though parliament at Westminster also retained the power to legislate for Northern Ireland. The Executive was to be headed by a First Minister and a Deputy First Minister, elected on a cross-community basis. They would preside over an Executive Committee allocated to parties on the basis of the number of seats they held in the Assembly. Those elected to office had to be pledged to democratic, non-violent means.
These complex mechanisms were necessary to assure Nationalists that there would be no return to the Unionist-dominated parliamentary system which had existed between 1921 and 1972. Nationalists would not have agreed otherwise. Nationalists had their Irish identity and aspirations acknowledged through the operation of a North/South Ministerial Council, drawn from the Assembly and the government in Dublin. Its decisions were to be by agreement,an essential condition for Unionist consent. It was to deal with matters of potential all-Ireland interest such as aspects of agriculture, transport, tourism, and educational qualifications. Finally, there was to be a British-Irish Council, representing the British and Irish governments, the Northern Ireland Assembly, together with the devolved parliaments in Scotland and Wales. This, too, would deal with such issues as transport links, cultural issues and the environment.
Further key elements dealt with human rights and equality. In particular, the British government pledged itself to 'take resolute action to promote the (lrish) language'. Other aspects were more contentious,especially for Unionists. The section on the decommissioning of arms required all parties 'to reaffirm their

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24 Reimagining Sri Lanka: Northern Ireland Insights
commitment to the total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations, and 'to use any influence they have, to achieve the decommissioning of all paramilitary arms within two years'. It was a crucial point for the IRA that they should not be seen to be surrendering to the British authorities. On the controversial issue of policing, the Agreement set out arrangements for an independent Commission to make recommendations for future policing arrangements'. This clearly involved the future of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, which was 93% Protestant. Undoubtedly the most contentious element was the section on prisoner releases, vital if Sinn Fein, the Progressive Unionists and the Ulster Democratic Party were to endorse the proposals. This set out a schedule for advancing the release dates for prisoners belonging to paramilitary organisations observing a ceasefire, and certainly within two years. Finally it was explicitly set out that the various elements in the Agreement were 'interlocking and interdependent'- political parties would not have the luxury of choosing which parts they accepted and which they did not.
It was a complex agreement in which it could be argued that Nationalists had made the greater compromises. But the SDLP and the great majority of Sinn Fein endorsed it, as did the Alliance Party and the Women's Coalition. The outright rejection of the Democratic Unionists and the United Kingdom Unionists was predictable, but less so was that of other sections of Unionism. The Progressive Unionists and the Ulster Democratic Party gave full support, implying the backing of the UVF and UDA. But while the Ulster Unionist Party leader, David Trimble secured the backing of his party's ruling council, there was a dangerous erosion of support.Even before the negotiations were concluded, key members of his negotiating team had been unable to follow him into acceptance. Interestingly, their main objections were to the provisions on prisoner release and arms decommissioning, rather than the constitutional arrangements. This posed a serious threat to the Agreement's acceptance by the Protestant electorate.

The Northern Ireland Agreement as a Model..... 25
On the Nationalist side it was immediately clear that supporters of the SDLP and the Sinn Fein would vote overwhelmingly for the Agreement. But polls conducted by the British government indicated a large measure of unease amongst Unionists and supporters of Trimble privately indicated their concern over the possible outcome. In the end it took a substantial personal commitment by British Prime Minister Tony Blair to reassure Unionists over prisoner releases and arms decommissioning. When the referendum was held in Northern Ireland on 2 May, the Agreement was endorsed by 71.2% of the electorate.The result seemed to show that the Unionist section of the electorate had backed the Agreement, albeit by a narrow margin.The elections to the Assembly, held on 25 June, broadly confirmed this picture. Of the parties supporting the Agreement, the Ulster Unionists won 28 seats, the SDLP 24, Sinn Fein 18, Alliance 6, the Progressive Unionists 2, and the Women's Coalition 2. For the opponents, the Democratic Unionists won 20, the United Kingdom Unionists 5, and Independent Unionists 3. Potentially, the new First Minister designate, David Trimble, was in the difficult position of commanding a Unionist group of 30 against a combined Unionist opposition group of 28. This clearly reflected continuing unease in the Protestant community over the Agreement.
Even so, the referendum was the most significant electoral result in Northern lireland's history. Nationalists had voted to work within a partitionist structure, while Unionists had endorsed an arrangement to share power and operate joint bodies with the Irish Republic. A majority of Unionists had come to terms with the reality that the only effective Union was one which politicians in London could uphold and one which made Nationalists feel included. Opposition certainly remained amongst a substantial section of the Unionist population, but most Unionist politicians seemed willing to accept the verdict of the referendum. Less predictable was the reaction of extreme sections of IRA which opposed a settlement giving less than a united Ireland. It was this group, calling itself the Real IRA, which exploded a major bomb in the small town of Omagh

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on 15 August, killing 28 people. The widespread reaction against this action in all sections of the community forced even this group to suspend its operations. There is now no significant armed group which has not ceased to campaign.
I Prepared from a lecture delivered by Professor Thomas G. Fraser at the seminar on "The Northern Ireland Agreement" held in Sri Lanka on 5th September 1998).

3
Did Women make a Difference
The Northern Ireland Women's Coalition in the Peace Process
Carmel Roulston
1. Still holding our breath...
Arriving in Northern Ireland to oversee the final stages in the completion of the Northern Ireland Peace Agreement, Prime Minister Blair spoke of feeling "the hand of history on our shoulders". During those days, all of Northern Ireland seemed to hold its breath, witnessing events which might allow us to be able to put behind us almost thirty years of civil strife, but which might also have resulted in failure, deadlock and continued conflict. In the event, on April 10th 1998, we took a step forward. In the few intervening months, however, we have had many more occasions to feel alarm and anticipate setbacks; even the most optimistic are not yet ready to celebrate the end of our conflicts. Mr. Blair has returned a few times, to console and encourage. At the time of writing this paper, he is once more visiting Northern Ireland to sympathise with the victims of the Omagh bombing and to propose the introduction of further emergency powers to make easier the arrest and imprisonment of its perpetrators.
That bombing and its aftermath - like the violence and murders during the crisis over the Orange march at Dumcree in July - have brought back into focus the dangers which still surround

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the complex but fragile structure which is the "Good Friday Agreement" and the amount of work which is still required for it to be transformed into a secure future for our country. Nevertheless, the signing of the Agreement, and its endorsement by the overwhelming majority of voters in both states in Ireland, represent important steps forward on the path to reconciliation and partnership among the parties to the conflict. The issues on which it is possible to reach accommodation have been redefined and enlarged. New potential for compromise has been identified and new ways of working towards a settlement of differences have been explored. It is possible to isolate the intransigent and uncompromising on both sides of the major divide: the popular endorsement of the Agreement provides a good basis on which to build new structures. This paper examines one which worked for, signed and campaigned for acceptance of the Agreement: the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition (NIWC). It will discuss its origins, its aims, its methods of work and its role in the peace process. It will try to assess its role in the peace process from 1996 to the present and to determine what, if any, difference its presence there has made for women in Northern Ireland,
2. Women, politics and society in Northern Ireland
As many commentators have pointed out, the conflict over national identities and allegiances in Northern Ireland, with its dimension of sectarian aggression tended to reinforce the desire for community solidarity and therefore perpetuated "patriarchal ideologies." The traditional link between nationalism (both orange and green) and their respective churches has ensured that the ultra-conservative view of women as both the property of, and the inferior of men remains strongly entrenched in Irish society." It is important not to exaggerate this tendency; changes in politics and society which were experienced throughout Europe from the 1960s also had their effects in Northern Ireland.

Did Women make a Difference? 29
The position of women is not uniformly subordinate nor entirely restricted to the domestic sphere. In 1961, less than 30% of married women were in paid employment, by the 1990s, this had risen to 60%. In 1959, only 12% of mothers with pre-school age children were in the workforce. By 1990, 43% of this group were employed, a figure lower than the UK average (53%) a disparity explained by fewer opportunities for part-time work rather than "traditional attitudes". There is still a marked sexual division in employment patterns, resulting in women being concentrated in a small number of - usually - lower-paid occupations. Women are, however, increasingly likely to take action, through bodies such as the Equal Opportunities Commission or trades unions, to seek redress for discrimination or harassment.
If, by the 1990s, it was accepted that women had a place in the world of paid work, the same could not be said for that of mainstream politics. Of the 17 MPs sent to Westminster or the 3 Members of the European Parliament, none are women, nor are there any women candidates likely to be elected in the near future. In the 1994 European elections there were 4 women candidates, including Mary Clarke-Glass former chair of the Equal Opportunities Commission for Northern Ireland who stood for the Alliance party. Her share of the poll was 4.1%, representing a small decline on previous Alliance performances. In local government, councils have few powers but some of them include "women's concerns" such as playgrounds and environmental issues. Of 26 local councils, 3 have no women member, 9 have only one woman member and, overall 12.4% of councillors are women. Some of the political parties. including the SDLP, Sinn Fein, the recently-formed loyalist Progressive Unionist Party and the Alliance party began, in the 1980s, to construct programmes for increasing women's representation on executive committees and in lists of candidates, but women are very far from having significant influence or being close to leadership positions in most parties.

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Yet, large numbers of women have for many years, involved themselves in the work of grassroots and voluntary sector campaigns, often unrecognised and unrewarded. The government of Northern Ireland through executive action, the limited democratic accountability and the continuing violent conflict compelled both men and WOmen, especially from socially excluded groups, to find alternative ways of influencing policy decisions. Networks of community-based and voluntary organisations were created pursuing goals of community improvement and dialogue across religious and political difference. This community-based channel of participation was seen by many as the basis for a revived civil society in Northern Ireland, which will be essential for future political stability, and as an important part of the process of achieving a durable settlement. Ruth Lister, for example, saw the work of groups in working-class communities as being "of value not only for its tangible achievements and outputs, but also for the less tangible impact it has on deprived communities and, potentially, the wider body politic." In her view, the work of the community groups would be part of an essential process of reconciliation and reconstruction, making a potentially important contribution to the search for a settlement and the process of reconstruction which would need to follow." One of the most striking features of women and politics in Northern Ireland has been the extent to which women's participation and representation has taken place within such community-based groups.
Since the mid-1970s, women's centres have been created in many rural and urban areas of Northern Ireland initially as a result of the efforts of feminist groups. The number of centres grew in the 1980s, providing an invaluable space in which women could seek advice, meet other women, take part in leisure and educational activities and so on. However, many of them have been vulnerable to reductions in funding and in some areas they have been the target of the hostility of some local politicians. The increase in the number of centres stimulated the creation of campaigning groups of and for women. There is a wide variety of groups and centres, some of

Did Women make a Difference? 31
which have been established in response to demands from women in the area, but others of which have been the result of initiatives from local government community development officers or from charitable organisations. There has been little consistency in the funding of women's activities of any sort in Northern Ireland. The grants awarded are usually comparatively small; it is not clear which agencies are responsible for providing them and there is a lack of transparency in the criteria for making awards. Some funding bodies require that the group undertake some "cross-community" or reconciliation activities if they are to satisfy the criteria. Given the conditions which prevail in many parts of Northern Ireland such requirements can undermine the ability of groups and centres to provide the necessary safe space for women, given that some local politicians and paramilitary groups have been known to take action to prevent such initiatives.
While women's development is regarded as essential for community development in general, it appears often to be seen as a means of allowing women to become a "resource", an influence for stability, rather than to encourage women to participate on equal terms in the formulation of goals and strategies for the community. Women's groups in working-class communities find themselves required to direct their attention towards a wide range of activities, including childcare, adult education classes, youth work and other support services. The preferred objectives and outcomes, then, are those that benefit families and the community in general, an extension of women's domestic caring responsibilities. In other community groups, women are also often to be found performing many roles, given the tasks of fostering support service for other women but also expected to contribute to the wider aims of the group. Nevertheless, it is clear that such groups, even given these constraints, opened up possibilities for women to change and improve their conditions of life. For many of those involved, the experience of such activism has been positive. As the principal vehicle for women's participation in Northern Ireland, they have provided a means by

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which women's interests and needs can be articulated and in which differences among women can be expressed and negotiated. Much of the support for the creation of the NIWC came from women active in such groups.
3. A window of opportunity
What appeared at the time to be a potential obstacle to the peace process paradoxically provided a chance for women to make their way to the peace talks table. From 1993 when it became clear that the Irish and British governments were firmly committed to renewed efforts to open political dialogue, some groups of women activists began to feel alarmed at the possibility that new political structures. would be created which focused on unionist and nationalist identities and interests, neglecting other needs and allegiances. The masculine dominance of mainstream politics, and the suspicion with which the larger parties viewed community activism, seemed likely to mean that women, and women's concerns, would be less likely to find representation in the future. To change this situation. however, appeared difficult. In the context of political violence and stalemate, as one writer observed, "nothing is more important than achieving a workable, peaceful political settlement. Hence, it may seem to some political scientists, politicians or citizens of Northern Ireland a political luxury or irrelevance to be thinking about the political representation of women." Such dilemmas will be familiar to those concerned with women's position and status in other conflictual or crisis situations. It was also the case that women, too, were divided about the way to a settlement of Northern Ireland's national conflict. The history of the feminist movement in the 1970s and 80s shows repeated efforts to unite around issues of common concern to Catholic and Protestant, unionist and nationalist women coming to grief over disagreements about national identity and allegiance.
As it became clear that a new round of inter-party talks, with some chance of greater success, was about to be launched,

Did Women make a Difference?. 33
groups of women who were active in a variety of organisations decided to take positive action. Two related aims motivated their initiatives; firstly, to ensure that women were not pushed to the sidelines and secondly, by involving people with experience of working in many different contexts and first-hand knowledge of exclusion and its effects, to increase the chances of success of the new peace. A series of conferences was convened in which women from every sector in Northern Ireland attempted to find ways in which women could articulate their aspirations, needs and ideas without having to sacrifice their concerns as members of one or other community in order to speak women. The conferences also tried to find ways in which these ideas could be pressed upon policy-makers and to devise institutions which would allow for women ( and other groups) to press their concerns in the future. At this point, the "window of opportunity" for women's involvement was opened. Early in 1996, the British Conservative government, under pressure from the Ulster Unionist party announced that participation in the multi-party peace talks would be decided through elections to a Northern Ireland Forum. This decision was very unwelcome to the majority of nationalists, however, one of the women's networks (the NI Women's European Platform) produced a paper on "gender proofing" the elections, and the talks. This was received positively by the relevant officials and an electoral system was devised which seemed likely to ensure representation of some of the Smaller political parties at the talks. While the goverment's primary purpose was to ensure that the parties linked to loyalist para-militaries would be there, the system offered hope to groups concerned with "other" interests - labour, environment and women. At a hastily convened meeting of community activists, trades unionists and individuals, on April 17th 1996, it was decided to form a women's party to contest the elections: the NI Women's Coalition (NIWC) was born. Agreeing to put a party name on a ballot-paper, of course, is a long way from creating a party or building support. Could the NIWC avoid the pitfalls that had trapped earlier attempts to create a unified women's movement

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and attract support from all sectors of women? There was certainly a great deal of scepticism, criticism and even hostility from many women as well as men. The question of the political relevance of such a party to the big political questions was soon raised, as was that of competing for votes with other identities. However, the experiences of women working together at community level proved significant enough to overcome the doubts of sufficient numbers of people. A strong list of candidates emerged and an electoral platform which could fuse ideas about women's representation with ideas about political dialogue was drawn up. After a campaign which managed to combine humour and drama with serious political commentary - the key slogan was "Say goodbye to the dinosaurs!" - the NIWC became one of 10 parties elected to the forum and permitted to send two delegates to the multiparty talks. Unfortunately, as the NIWC arrived, one of the key nationalist parties was excluded: because of the ending of the IRA cease-fire in February 1996 Sinn Fein was not permitted to join the peace-talks. For a year after the elections, little progress was made on political dialogue within the talks. However, the NIWC was able to play a part in creating structures and frameworks for proceeding to an agreement, and to build its own Support and policy-making structures. When the IRA cease-fire was resumed. and Sinn Fein re-entered the talks, the NIWC delegates, and their back-up team, had already found a distinctive voice in which to deliver some clear messages.
4. Promoting dialogue promoting inclusion
The NIWC was one of only three parties elected to the Talks and the Forum which could claim to have "cross-community" membership and support. The Alliance party, formed in the 1970s aimed to find common ground among Catholics and Protestants and to find structures which would ensure the protection of minority rights within whatever kind of state might exist in Northern Ireland. The other was the Labour Coalition, a party which was also formed shortly

Did Women make a Difference? 35
before the elections in an attempt to ensure that class issues and social inequalities would not be neglected in the Talks. Like the women's movement, the labour movement in Northern Ireland has suffered division and disarray as its potential members found it difficult to give priority to their interests as workers over their identities as unionists or nationalists. The NIWC had something in common with both these parties but differed from them, not only in its attentiveness to gender inequalities but also in the insights it brought and the approach it took to the problem of creating Solidarity across difference. These insights came from the experiences of women (and men) in community-based groups, building alliances and working for common purposes, despite deep and sincerely-held political, national or religious differences. They also came from some of the reflections of feminist writers from South Africa, Sri Lanka, Russia and the Middle East, as well as Europe and the USA on the "ethnocentrism" and even racism which had been built into secondwave feminism. So the NIWC had learned that common purposes must come out of respect for and acceptance of differences rather than from expecting people to be prepared to transcend or disavow community identities. From its inception, the NIWC has tried to adopt an approach of principled dialogue and accomodation, both within the party and in its relationships with other parties and political aCtOrS.
Within the Party this has involved a series of meetings and discussions where all points of view are genuinely listened to with respect and where agreement on policies and principles is arrived at through attempts to understand opposing positions. Certain core values and principles were arrived at forming a framework within which discussion could take place. Agreements were reached stepby-step, with difficult issues given longer time in order to keep the process going. There was a commitment to respect human rights and civil liberties to aiming for social equality and to justice. Running through all these values and practices was a common theme of

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regard for a process which allowed all voices to be heard and for all to be facilitated to speak.
Translated into the hard realities of Northern Irish politics, this meant that the NIWC consistently - and often solely - called for the inclusion of all parties in the Talks process, without preconditions. This meant calling for the admittance of Sinn Fein before an IRA cease-fire and arguing against the expulsion of Loyalist parties when their paramilitary cease-fire were breached. It also meant continually calling for an end to paramilitary violence and demanding that the parties linked to paramilitary groups demonstrate their willingness to achieve an end to violence. To many unionists, the NIWC appeared to be supporting a republican agenda to be part of the "pan-nationalist alliance" which they feared was winning a lot of ground. To republicans the NIWC often seemed to be calling for "surrender" and to be working for a restoration of devolved government which would be compatible with unionist aims. Again, on the issue of reform of the police force, or the release of paramilitary prisoners the NIWC had to find workable policies that would encourage accommodation and keep the process going.
As the multi-party talks continued, through continual crises and deadlocks, the NIWC negotiators faced many occasions on which their policies were misunderstood or misrepresented. Any group or party which came into the public arena throughout the history of Northern Ireland, but especially over the years since 1968/69, has had to face the challenge: where do you stand on the question of Northern Ireland's statehood? Are you for the union with Britain or for a united Ireland. Thanks to its own unique methods of reaching accommodation and also thanks to the framework of this new peace process the NIWC was able to offer a new kind of answer to this question. In effect, their argument was, this is in many ways an out-date question in the late twentieth century when sovereignty and statehood was being transformed and re-negotiated. It might now be possible to create new types of institutions and relationships

Did Women make a Difference? 37
which would reflect and honour both nationalist and unionist identities and traditions, but also allow other aspirations and allegiances to emerge. The format of the talks, in many ways, proved very compatible with the NIWC methodology. One of the key principles was that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed", which meant that no party could hope to secure agreement on issues of importance to itself without contributing to compromise on other issues. Parties in the talks had to remind themselves continually of the importance of the process as a whole and to weigh their "bottom-line" issues against the possibility of undoing the achievements that had already been reached, however insufficient or tenuous they may have appeared at any time.
The Women's Coalition worked to keep this momentum going by offering to talk and listen to all the parties in the process, as well as to some who had left or were excluded and to act as a conduit between parties which were not yet ready to meet face-to-face. Being prepared to negotiate with or on behalf of any party willing to enter dialogue, and being open-minded about possible outcomes meant that they could on occasions assist in the building of trust and facilitate exchanges of positions between parties. Not all parties were willing to accept the NIWC as mediators, but some on occasions found their interventions helpful.
5. Did the NIWC make a difference?
In many conflicts, perhaps especially in ethnic or national conflicts. there are participants who believe they have more to gain by continuing the war than by looking for peace. In the long term or in a global sense we are all better off with peace and stability, but in the short term some groups or communities can advance their interests through violence and conflict. There will also be some parties or leaders whose continued existence, status and power derives from the conflict and who will work very hard to prevent a settlement. This has been true over the years of parties to the

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Northern Ireland conflict. War and violence in most cultures and societies are thought of as inherently "masculine' activities. For the most part it is thought women as more likely to prefer peace. While recent studies, and social changes, have led to question such generalisations there is still a tendency to assume that women -with their closer connections to nurturing and protecting children and families - will be peacemakers rather than warmongers. But when at policy-making institutions are looked at there are very few women entrusted with the task of settling the snarled "big" questions.
Closer study of any conflict situation shows that the roles women are required to play are usually more complex and often contradictory, while the actual women in any real situation may themselves have mixed feelings about what they want and how they can achieve their objectives. Often, women will prefer to identify as part of "the struggle" rather than as part of the neutral camp. In Northern Ireland, women have been expected depending on their circumstances, to be peacemakers, to be above the conflict to be loyal supporters of one or other side occasionally to be combatants or, more usually to be the mainstay of private and family life in the midst of turmoil. Women have been more often seen as the victims of the conflict, which they are often assumed to have no responsibility for perpetuating. One of the justifications for promoting women's entry into politics in this, as in many other situations, has been that women will be both more realistic and more conciliatory. In general, however, for many of the men in powerful positions, if women are thought of as not part of the war it is assumed that they cannot be part of making the peace.
Women themselves are of course the occupiers of many different positions and perspectives: neutral peacemakers, intransigent loyalists or republicans, impatient with all sides, defenders of communities. As has been seen, the majority of women have found it impossible or chosen not to put their interests as women above their interests as loyalists. republicans or any other identity. However, as the new peace process was getting under way, many women

Did Women make a Difference? 39
were beginning to look at these identities from a "women's perspective" and to begin to claim a right to define and re-define them. The NIWC was able to appeal to women who wanted to see progress towards a settlement who believed that women had perspectives which were likely to be different from those of the majority of men and who also wanted to defend and show solidarity with their religious or national community or social group. When the NIWC entered the 1996 election campaign, many were doubtful or disparaging about what it could offer as a "single-issue" party to the wider peace process, Nationalist and unionist parties are, of course, also devoted to a single-issue platform but because this issue is concerned with sovereignty and statehood it has more salience and
Statu S.
What the NIWC managed, however, was to fuse together the issues of the injustice of women's exclusion from political structures with a broader package of ideas about dialogue and conciliation, justice and equity. These ideas were inspired by and based upon the practices and principles forged by many women over years of working in families, in campaigns and in their communities. And, to some extent, being a new voice untainted by "baggage" from the past the NIWC could, by their efforts and perseverance, win the trust of people from many different backgrounds. While the NIWC could not claim to have the support of, or represent, all women, it is distinguished by having members and supporters from all parts of the Northern Ireland population including men. Its support has increased, as the recent elections to the new Assembly demonstrated. Despite a somewhat unfavourable electoral system and with virtually no money the NIWC won two seats and secured a very respectable vote in other constituencies.
It would be foolish and arrogant to make exaggerated or inflated claims for the contribution of the NIWC to the securing of the Agreement or the success of the referendum campaign. It is possible, however, to argue that the NIWC has made a difference

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to the peace process over the months since it formation. Firstly, by the style of leadership which it adopted, it has shown that women can be resolute and consistent in pursuit of goals without having to appear tough or domineering. This, it should be noted required a lot of long meetings, research, professionalism. Secondly, by being open to dialogue and persuasion the NIWC has been able to build alliances and make common cause with people from many different persuasions. Thirdly, by building upon, identifying with and bringing into the talks the experiences of many years of cross-community work by NIWC members and others, the negotiators were able to show how much agreement might be possible, given a certain amount of goodwill. Finally, by its commitment to a particular type of process - fair, inclusive, based on mutual respect, empathy and dialogue across differences - the NIWC continually reminded the public of what it stood to gain by supporting this latest peace initiative.
There are, of course, many other people and groups whose contribution made the process possible in the first place, and ensured its continuation through very difficult times. For perhaps the first time, however, the NIWC brought the voices of women to the negotiating table and allowed women to be the makers of history in Ireland.
Notes
1. Monica McWilliams: "The Church, the State and the Women's Movement in Northern Ireland" in A. Smyth (ed) The Irish Women's
Studies Reader, Dublin, Attico Press, 1993.
Carmel Roulston: "Equal Opportunities for Women" in A. Aughey & D. Morrow (eds) Northern Ireland Politics, Longman, London, 1996.
Ruth Lister: "Social Policy in a Divided Community" Irish Journal of Sociolgy, 1994, 4, pp. 27-50.

Did Women make a Difference? 41
Lis Porter: "Political Representation of Women in Northern Ireland", Politics 1998, 18, pps.25-33.
Camel Roulston: "Women on the Margin: The Women's Movement in Northern Ireland. 1973-1995", in Lois A. West (ed) Feminist Nationalism, Routledge, New York, 1997.
The electoral system was a variation of a regional party list system, with 90 candidates elected from constituencies and a further 10 elected through a second tier, whereby the ten parties with the highest votes were awarded two seats each. The NIWC came ninth.
Lois A. West "Introduction", in Lois A. West, op.cit.
(Prepared from a lecture delivered by Ms Carmel Roulston at
the seminar on "The Northern Ireland Agreement" held in Sri Lanka on 5th September 1998.)

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4
The Northern Ireland Agreement: Thimpu Principles Applied to a Society with Two Mind Sets?
M. Somasundram
"We can continue with the hatred, the despair and the killing, treating people as if they were not parts of humanity; or we can try to settle our differences by negotiation, by discussion and by debate. I treated Gerry Adams and the members of Sinn Fein in the same way as I treated any human being"
Prime Minister Tony Blair
"Don't curse the darkness: Light a candle"
Chinese Proverb
1. Governance and Two Mind Sets
The new concepts of Governance have many attractions yet these very same properties had caused a number of disputes sometimes fatal. One of them, Devolution, could be called the "Helen of Governance". It has launched a thousand and more seminars/workshops with no let up. Seminars/workshops are like squid, they release a cloud of ink and speed away. The Northern Ireland Agreement (Agreement) is one manifestation of Governance at work. It is a landmark political settlement

Thimpu Principles Applied to a Society with Two Mind Sets? 43
which extracted concessions from fiercely antagonist parties. The mind sets which caused the problems, needing this Agreement for rescue, have many similarities to those of Sri Lanka. This Agreement could be a stimulus to thought on how to approach Sri Lankan problems. With such knowledge further Governance tragedies become preventible. The ink released could possibly help to draft a Sri Lankan agreement. Governance has been defined by the World Bank as the "manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social management". In this definition power is the central factor. It is a masculine definition. The Northern Ireland conflict appeared intractable, for it had got elevated to the level of a power clash of civilisations a grating of two histories. (In political science its study would be called the essentialist approach). It was the spawn of two different mind sets. A mind set could be defined as a fixed mental attitude or disposition that pre-determines a person's responses to and the interpretation of situations. One pathological symptom of an entrenched mind set is the constant carping about minor details of the historical past. This could become quite an industry for archival and excavating historians and their various fellow travellers. They have transformed history into a commodity this intellectual property now being placed on the market. Their role appears to be to make the past un certain particularly by viewing the past through the spectacles of the present. Not for them a douche of cold bold objective historical interpretation that provides new worlds of broadened understanding and places events in perspective.
The beginnings of the conflict were deep in the European middle ages drawing out of religious wars between Catholics and Protestants. Ireland was Catholic but was conquered by the Protestant British. While under the British rule, Ireland sullenly kept on nursing her Catholic heritage, resentments and grievances. Following on independence in 1920 though, there weren't any Irish Commissions or Catholic Commissions attempting to take revenge on the past. Neither did Ireland go

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whingeing to Britain demanding apologies yet begging for subventions. Ireland embarked on a self-confident programme of development. Her per capita income is now higher than England. The northern part of Ireland (Ulster), which was excised from Ireland, became pre-dominantly British, because of colonisation stock from England, Wales and Scotland, which changed its demographic proportions.
The Irish war of Independence was fought viciously with the British carrying out war for peace campaigns of repression against the civilian population, the Black and Tans being an example. Well assa and Bintenne, during the British suppression of the 1818 rebellion in Sri Lanka's are equivalents. Leading Irish freedom fighters were branded terrorists and summarily executed. Keppitipola (1818) and Puran Appu (1848) in Sri Lanka suffered similar punishment. All of them, posthumously, have become national heroes. Yasser Arafat enjoyed this transformation in his lifetime. An individual long condemned as a terrorist, Gerry Adams, is now been treated as a human being by the British Prime Minister. Whether an individual is a terrorist or a national hero seems to be a matter of dates.
When Ireland gained her independence it was without Protestant Ulster which became part of the United Kingdom. Yet independent Ireland did not reconcile herself to this loss. She considered the whole of Ireland as an indivisible Irishdwipa and included sections in her constitution making this irredentist claim. In addition, Ireland covered herself with infamy, by imposing fundamentalist Catholic values, even on non-catholics, through legislation. Independent Ireland started life, not as a modern secular state, but as a medieval religious one. The Protestants, on the other hand, considered Ulster as their traditional homeland, the land of the free. The actions of the Irish Catholic Taliban made them ultra-Protestant. They were convinced of their superiority both because of the higher income levels then prevailing in Ulster and their stereotypical view that Catholics were coolies (Paddies) only capable of breeding children. Catholics were considered as in Ulster but

Thimpu Principles Applied to a Society with Two Mind Sets? 45
not of it. Protestants considered themselves as of Britain but not in it. Their different histories glued them apart.
Protestant triumphalism was marked annually with a series of marches (there were 3 100 a year), particularly commemorating the equivalent of the Dutugemunu-Elara wars, where the Protestant William of Orange drove his Catholic father-in-law, James II, out of Ireland following his victory in the Battle of Boyne (1690). The Protestants called themselves loyalists because they were loyal to the United Kingdom, while the Catholics called themselves nationalists because they pledged loyalty to an Irish-dwipa. At the time of independence Protestants were 70% of the population. Today it is 58%.
The basic problem in Northern Ireland arose out of two tribes trying to maintain their exclusive ascriptive identities. The majoritarian Protestants, having captured hegemonic control over the state, denied 'the other', adopting a crusading stance of being the last guardians of embattled Protestantism against popish Catholicism. They settled comfortably in this niche provided them by natural selection and, in a Darwinian manner, defended it against all comers. All significant positions of civil and military authority were held by them following on a policy of Protestantism only. The monolithic political party of governance of the Protestants was the Ulster Unionist Party, functioning from a building called Stormont, and it ensured that the cake was distributed only among the Protestants. Governance for Stormont was a Zero Sum game.The majority Protestants had a minority complex their biggest fear being getting absorbed into a Catholic Ireland and thereby losing their identity. Sections 2 and 3 of the irish constitution laying claim to the whole of Ireland were a red rag, as were the legislatively imposed Catholic values, constantly reminding them of their vulnerability. The Protestants claimed that they had nowhere else to go while the Catholics could go back to Ireland.

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The beleaguered Catholics refused to get assimilated though they felt that they were on the margins of a confessional state. In it symbols were important, like the Sri symbol in Sri Lanka.The repeated reminders of their servitude, as symbolised in triumphal Protestant marches through their neighbourhoods, were an affront.There was no offer of a soothing balm or a hope for a separate North Ireland entity to emerge, within which both groups could live in dignity, since there was a deep distrust of cross community partnerships. (Political scientists consider such relationships as instrumental). For this reason the Catholics always hankered after union with a Greater Ireland thereby further reinforcing Protestant prejudices.The Catholics were an advanced minority who had a majority complex though always looked longingly at the border.They would not acquiesce under duress.
Northern Ireland became a ghetto society, a residential apartheid, with only 5% living in mixed neighbourhoods and 3% attending mixed schools. Most individuals developed exquisite mental masonry skills for building psychic walls. Each group knew more about aliens of science fiction than members of the other group. Inter-religious marriages were actively discouraged and the intrepid few venturing on them were liable to get shot. Since associational and quotidian relationships were minimal polarisation seemed almost total making Cardinal Newman to cry out in despair "Oh how we hate one another for the love of the same God". The problem appeared intractable and the approach adopted, by succeeding British governments, was to treat the problem as a low intensity conflict absorbing losses, whether they be human or materials. This was negative Governance a policy of the accommodation of impotence. A positive Governance policy of shifting from an essentialist approach to an instrumentalist approach was not considered.
But, there are no problems which cannot be solved only solutions which haven't so far been discovered. Successful strategic solutions lie in seeing what everyone has seen yet

Thimpu Principles Applied to a Society with Two Mind Sets? 47
thinking what nobody has thought. This is true even for dealing with issues of Governance. This approach may be termed entrepreneurial Governance. The challenge now offered was to seek paradigmatic insights leading to strategic solutions, however imperfect, which could thaw societies, frozen in their mind sets, condemned to continual conflict because of tribal suspicions based on cultural practices and genetic disposition. A successful solution is one where both sides should be in a position to claim victory. The thought of Mary Wollstonecraft would undergird this challenge "No man chooses evil because it is evil, he only mistakes it for happiness which is the good he seeks". The entrepreneurial Governance approach to solution could be on two lines. The first is the conservative one of accepting ethnicity, that is cultural identity, as a parameter, and building a geared system that accommodates its internal and external conflictual consequences.This, being an essentialist continuation, could be called incremental Governance. The second is the radical shifting to the instrumental approach, that is structuring a political system that transcends ethnicity by being based on concepts of citizenship of the nation-state as the primary determinant.This could be called transforming Governance. It is possible for these two to follow in sequence. The incremental approach could be considered the intermediate first stage leading, over time, to a coales cing with the second the transforming approach. Granted the impotence that has so far prevailed in dealing with the overall problem the first may be called the short term Viagra solution, the second, the long term constructed solution.
As opposed to the aggressive formulations of Governance advocated by the World Bank, those of the Third Way offer a gentle feminine approach. The World Bank definition deals with power the Third Way with relationships. The Third Way thinking is led by both President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Tony Blair. It is the middle path between the hard market orientations of Reagan-Thatcher and the hard centralism of

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the traditional socialists. The Third Way has delineated seven areas for attention they being the global order, civil society, the nation-state, government, the welfare state, politics, and the economy. Except for the global order and the welfare state all the other areas are relevant to the Northern Ireland situation. It is argued in this paper that the earlier aggressive approach has been replaced, in the Agreement, by the softer approach of the Third Way. It is also argued that the Thimpu Principles are part of the softer approach. A successful modus vivendi would lead to Convivencia, a concept discussed in the introduction to this volume.
2. Pre-1969 Political Arrangements
The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), which was the only ruler of Ulster after its merger with Britain in 1921, had its roots in the mid 1880's when it was formed as an all Ireland Protestant party. It was a counter weight to Parnell's Catholic dominated Home Rule Party. The UUP government was called the Stormont. Class wise it represented the Protestant landowners and the professional and business fraternities.The Protestant working class was kept in place by invoking the bogey of Catholicism. Right through its existence the Stormont had a violent underside. Protestant Edward Carson, a former Solicitor General in Lord Salisbury's government, colluded with the Germans in smuggling 25,000 rifles and three million rounds of ammunition in 1914 to arm the Protestant para-military group called the Ulster Volunteer Force (the Larne incident). In 1922 J.W. Nixon a member of the Royal Ulster Constabulary led an ethnic cleansing group that wiped out the family of Owen McMohan a leading Catholic of Ulster. Private terror was used for public purposes. If constitutional means did not suffice state terror was readily available to cow the hapless Catholics. The Stormont had the support of an NGO called the Orange Order, founded in 1795, and named after Protestant King William of Orange. It had a widespread network of active cells formed

Thimpu Principles Applied to a Society with Two MindSets? 49
out of a membership of 60,000. Its specific aim was to save Protestantism. Its support base was so pervasive and so committed that it gained an outsize voice in the affairs of Stormont. Every Stormont Chief Minister had been an Orangeman. Any Chief Minister who was suspected of attempting to compromise, with even moderate Catholics, was quickly punished. Two Protestant party leaders, Terrence O'Neil in 1969 and Brian Faulkner in 1974 had to resign under Orange Order pressure. The Stormont also had sectarian support from the Protestant religious right whose leader, Rev Ian Paisley, was part Ayatollah part Mahanayake, with his own political party, the Ulster Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). He was the chief spin doctor for the primacy of the Protestants and creative enough to raise resistance to an art form. He was able to systematically outflank every effort of Stormont, working with moderate Protestants, to come into any accommodation with the moderate Catholics. Bigotry and the ruling class were a self-reinforcing combination in a politics of exclusion. In addition to these three there was a rich alphabet soup of initials representing fringe groups, individuals, factions etc. Some of them were VUPP, UUUM, UUUP, UUUC, UPNI, UPUP. PUP, UDP, UKUP, UU, UUU, UL, UIV, UI and even an UUUU. Each one of them contained a U which stood for Ulster and most of them another U which stood for Unionist. Sri Lanka is not the only country using scrabble tiles as acronyms for political parties.
The Catholics were confronted with an entrenched . majoritarian order which denied them any participation in the political, civil and administration life of North Ireland.There was no Catholic also. Stormont had close links with the British ruling classes and there appeared no point in appealing to Westminster. In this situation the Catholics had three options, first the Vichy option, that is to work within the system become cardboard cutouts and collect crumbs for themselves falling from the Protestant table. The second option was to adopt the moderate line try to work with all parties without compromising

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the principles of Catholic identity. The Catholic Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) adopted this policy. The third option was to work for union with Ireland either through democratic means failing which through violence. This was the policy of Sinn Fein with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) as its forceful implementor. The IRA was born out of the Catholic uprising of Easter 1916. Its leader, Padraig Pearce, bequeathed to it the cult of violence as solution and selfsacrifice as means. The Sinn Fein, in addition to its Catholic supporters on both sides of the Irish border, had a ready catchment among the Irish diaspora specially in the United States. During British rule, particularly after the Great Potato famine, about 2-3 million Irish had emigrated. Their natural increase now numbers 40 million. The IRA campaign of violence was a riposte to the violence of Stormont wielding state power. Both of them used para-militaries who unleashed terror in the neighbourhoods they controlled. Those who fell foul of them were lucky to escape only with knee-cappings and punishment beatings.The IRA terror campaign had a extraterritorial dimension for it was extended to even mainland Great Britain whose hapless civilians were maimed and killed.
Obviously this tit for tat terror was self defeating. It could end in peace but the peace of the cemetery. If this situation had to be changed it could only be by undertaking a fundamental re-appraisal of concepts of Governance which had so far prevailed in Ulster and by implication in the United Kingdom. It lay in shifting from an essentialist approach to an instrumentalist approach. Two load bearing beams which needed to be introduced were power sharing and participation particularly in societies which suffered an asymmetric distribution of power and influence. Simultaneously majoritarianism, however seductive the numbers game appears for a democracy, has to be abandoned. The fundamentals of the Westminster model of democracy needed to be replaced. By this means the polity would shift from a gemeinschaft to a gesellschaft. The paradigm that also needed to be shifted was

Thimpu Principles Applied to a Society with Two Mind Sets? 51
from a nation-state to a nations-state. The implication is that internal sovereignty no longer resides in an all powerful central government, but at different levels of the polity (subsidiarity) appropriate to their concerns. The collection of internal sovereignties are bound together within a skin of a territory.The defining factor of external sovereignty is geography not law. The responsibility of the central government is both dermatology-preventing the skin from erupting-, and polemology- use the science of war to defend the skin from attack from other external sovereignties. It is not the responsibility of the central government to undermine interna sovereignties. The United Kingdom was earlier united by an erasure of internal political diversity. With the Agreement she will be united by its accommodation. Entrepreneurial Governance compels a re-thinking of prevailing concepts of law and political science. These principles are not eternal, like the laws of physics, but biological- changing according to the altered needs of society. All these concepts would lie within a rubric of Third Way thinking leading to a Convivencia.
3. Post-1969 Political Arrangements
By 1969 both the internal and external environments of North Ireland changed. The coolie stereotype of the North Ireland Catholics was no longer valid because education had added value to them. This created a professional Catholic middle class particularly of lawyers. Prescription had replaced ascription. The nature of economic activity also changed. It was shifting from manual pre-occupations to more high tech operations. Ireland was increasingly getting secularised. The Secular European imagination was also getting embarrassed with this last redoubt of an obsolete medieval religious conflict in her midst. The younger Catholic generation, chafing at their parent's mute acceptance of their fate, let loose events, which in 1969 erupted as major civil rights protests, led very often by young girls. A leader was Margaret Devlin. Every skirmish

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led to angry, often violent, confrontation. Stormont could not ignore them, particularly because of Westminster concerns and world-wide media attention. Its response was predictable. Dinosaur Stormont had no new ideas other than the Pavlovian response. A vigorous program of repression was unleashed but this turned out to be of dubious value and now counter productive. Stormont had become a bruised institution. An embarrassed Westminster took over direct rule of Ulster.
In 1974 Britain was governed by the Conservatives with Edward Heath as Prime Minister and Willie Whitelaw as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.They thought the unthinkable. The numbers game of democracy was unsuitable for Northern Ireland because the entrenched majority would never transfer enough votes for a clamorous minority to secure the votes to lay hands on the levers of power. Since there was no hope of getting power through the ballot box the only other alternative, for this minority, was through violence. Governance in Northern Ireland has so far been all about cake and its sharing to be achieved through power. The Conservatives realised that the only viable solution now possible was to devise a system which guarantees both communities a hand in running North Ireland that is develop an institutionalist component within the instrumentalist approach. After intensive discussions with all parties, except significantly the Sinn Fein and the IRA, Whitelaw brokered a deal, called the Sunningdale Agreement, which created an assembly and a power sharing executive. Brian Faulkner was the head of Stormont. These ideas were unacceptable to him just weeks before the deal but he succumbed to Westminster pressure. But he underestimated the power of the Orange Order and Rev Paisley. They forced him to resign by sponsoring a strike of the Protestant workers of Ulster. Westminster resumed direct rule.
The Sunningdale agreement was a window of opportunity abandoned, like the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam pact, the Dudley Senanayake-Chel van ayakam pact, the District Development Council scheme (DDC) and the 13th Amendment

Thimpu Principles Applied to a Society with Two Mind Sets? 53
in Sri Lanka, abandoned due to sectarian pressure. This episode confirmed that the problem of change was not with the minority but the majority. Yet 1974 is significant. It initiated a process of unbraiding majoritarianism, which had prevailed in Ulster from 1921. This unbraiding was completed in the Blair-Mowlem initiative of 1997. In Sri Lanka majoritarianism prevailed from the Donoughmore Constitution of 1931. The process of unravelling majoritarianism was initiated as an unexpected byproduct of 1983. The entire devolution debate, in Sri Lanka, is about unravelling, whether it should move on, stop or revert. This debate is continuing with apparently no end.
Following the failure of the Sunningdale agreement half hearted attempts were made to strike other agreements eg the 1985 Hillsborough Anglo-Irish Agreement. All of them failed for one significant reason, the Sinn Fein and the IRA were not invited. Both of them were considered terrorist organisations and therefore beyond the pale. Both Westminster and Stormont decided who the leaders of the Catholics should be and they were the SDLP. It was only with the SLDP that discussions were held. The Sinn Fein and the IRA responded to exclusion with a more intensified terror campaign.They raised terrorism to almost a level of civil war. There was perpetual violence, only interrupted by fleeting cease-fires, which were greeted with euphoria, but quickly reverted to despair when the violence re-commenced. The head of Sinn Fein was Gerry Adams became an ogre figure for the Protestants. Far from welcoming him for talks the Protestants refused to tolerate him even in the same room. Prime Minister Tony Blair had to be hastily whisked away from a Protestant gathering when it was rumoured that he had shaken the hands of Gerry Adams. The dream of Stormont was, after a military victory over the Sinn Fein was assured, to get Gerry Adams to crawl on his knees to them. The Catholic voters were unconvinced and voted him a Member of Parliament. He however cannot function as a member because he refused to take an oath of allegiance to the Queen, (shades of the 6th

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Amendment), who also happens to be the head of the Protestant Church.This stand-off symbolised the intractability of the Northern Ireland conflict. Only a fresh mind thinking on new lines could break the impasse. Jnterestingly enough the thoughts which did break it were similar to the Thimpu Principles, developed independently to solve the Sri Lankan problem, though probably remaining unknown to the Irish.
4. The Northern Ireland Agreement
Tony Blair's Labour government, since re-capturing power on 1st May 1997 with 55% of the vote, had been pushing a number of initiatives to implement his new vision with a new deal. Among them were a frenzy of constitutional changes. Within the last 1 1/2 years he has introduced devolution in Scotland, deconcentration in Wales, got approval for direct election of the Mayor of London-as a precursor of direct election to other major local government bodies-initiated reforms of the House of Lords, appointed Lord Jenkins to recommend on electoral reform, undertook the preparation of a White Paper on local government-due anytime-, published a Freedom of Information Act and strengthened the power of judges by incorporating British law into the European Convention on Human Rights.The reform of the Monarchy and the House of Commons is envisaged. The constitutional changes introduced in Northern Ireland, as a result of the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, is part of this avalanche of reforms. But a significant point has to be noted.There is no overriding constitutional ideology within which these reforms have taken place. Each change was meant to respond to a specific local problem.There is no onesize-fits-all (kokatath thailaya) approach. As Ralph Waldo Emerson said "a foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds adored by little statesmen and divines". An example of a one size-fits-all approach is the constitutional change brought about by the 13th Amendment. This amendment was an attempt to settle an ethnic problem in one part of the country but a

Thimpu Principles Applied to a Society with Two Mind Sets? 55
foolish consistency laid down that it should be writ large in areas where there were no ethnic problems and did not need these provisions nor was there a demand for them. The irony lies in that the only area where the provisions of the amendment do not operate is the very area it was supposed to help.
A fresh look was taken at the fundamentals of politics of Northern Ireland. Normal politics lie in mediating the active competition between a variety of social, economic, cultural, special and group interests. Success lies in the acceptance, by these interests, of a reasonable balance struck by politics. In Northern Ireland the existing balance was awry. The Protestants were considered the core nation. The minority Catholics were offered the politics of demeaning concession, to grow like vines round the sturdy tree of the core nation. A new approach would have to start with restating the relationship between nation, state, land and religion. A fundamental reshaping of political institutions was needed to reflect such a redrawing. This reshaping would have to be pragmatic rather than flaming.
The new government started with a number of advantages. Because of the extraordinary majority it obtained at the polls it no longer needed to depend on the Ulster Members of Parliament for survival. The country was weary of the continuous bloodletting.The Irish state had also become fully secular thus becoming less repellent to the Protestants. In addition the Irish state had become an economic success attracting very high foreign direct investment and enjoying one of the highest growth rates in the developed world. Much to the chagrin of the Protestants the per capita of Ireland had now exceeded Ulster. A similar feeling will overcome Sri Lanka when, in the near future, the per capita of Tamil Nadu exceeds hers and illicit immigration to Tamil Nadu takes place from Sri Lanka. Catholics, who were considered coolies, were now captains of industry. The emergence of the European Union transformed geographical perceptions. Ulster, the Irish

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state, Britain were all parts of Europe where only regions mattered not states or mini-states. With this convergence of factors Tony Blair's government grabbed the main chance for regeneration. A marketing insight is that positioning is everything. Arthur Schlesinger said that "democratic politics is the search for remedy". Tony Blair was well positioned for an entrepreneurial search for the Governance of remedy.
Tony Blair was ably supported by his Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Mo Mowlem. She had a PhD in political science and a well deserved reputation for achieving results by persistent and nagging attention to details and a charm that would that would have softened the Sphinx. She also showed extraordinary physical courage. When negotiations were threatening to be stymied, because of the opposition of the influential Protestant prisoners of the Maze, she met them alone without security guards and persuaded them otherwise. The occasion got the Odyssean leader with a Dionysian underling not wanting in Apollonian capabilities. Gods smile on the brave. As luck would have it there was readily available, an outsider, to chair the negotiations. Senator Mitchell of the United States mediated the whole process. Senator Mitchell was a mediator not a facilitator. As a mediator he was able to bring to bear the full weight of the United States in support of the outcome and chivvy the proceedings along. The search for solution was through negotiations. All stakeholders in the conflict were invited to the negotiation table including the detested Sinn Fein and the IRA. Gerry Adams took the offer though the fate of Michael Collins, who in the 1918's was assassinated for doing the equivalent, would have been very much on his mind. In protracted negotiations, the tedious process of winnowing the postures from the substantive issues had to be repeatedly undertaken without losing cool. The negotiations were tricky if not byzantine. Finally the Good Friday Agreement was reached. It was political entrepreneurship of the highest class.

Thimpu Principles Applied to a Society with Two Mind Sets? 57
The details of the Agreement are available in Cm 3883 issued by the British Government and included in this volume as Appendix A. It was a document of inclusion. There were three strands. The first provides for a democratically elected Assembly and an Executive Authority in North Ireland which, through a complicated system, prevents majoritarianism. The Executive is formed in proportion to the votes gained thus abandoning a sacrosanct rule of cabinet government that of collective responsibility. It has many similarities to Donoughmore's Executive Committees. Strand Two is the creation of a North/South Ministerial Council where the political executives of Ulster and Ireland could discuss common issues thus questioning hoary concepts of sovereignty. Strand Three is the creation of a British-Irish Council. It is composed of the British and Irish governments, the devolved institutions of Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales, Isle of Man and the Channel Islands. It is meant to "promote the harmonious and mutually beneficial development of the totality of the relationships among the people". There will also be a BritishIrish Intergovernmental Conference. In addition to these three strands there is heavy emphasis on rights, safeguards and equality of opportunity. There will be new human rights institutions in Ulster and Ireland. Northern Ireland law will be incorporated into the European Convention on Human Rights. Provisions for the decommissioning of arms-a touchy issue for the Protestants-, security and policing-a touchy issue for the Catholics-, and justice have been included. Most important of all is the resounding support given to democratic choice. The Irish also agreed to delete their irredentist claim to the whole of Ireland.
The proposals offered in the agreement are a pragmatic combination of incremental Governance and transforming Governance. The majoritarian structure turned into a consociational one. Naturally there was opposition from extremists on both sides. Rev Ian Paisley called it the Bad Friday Agreement. Protestant red-necks carried out arson

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attacks on 130 Catholic homes, 10 Catholic churches and 13 Catholic schools so far. The extreme Catholics did not stay quiet.The faction calling itself the Real IRA carried out a horrifying bomb attack in Omagh. The bomb did not distinguish between Catholic or Protestant. But the democratic process sustained the Agreement. The referendum of 22 May 1998 supported the government though by a whisker. Yet it gave the government a referendum bounce which enabled it to move forward. In politics, like in romance, a reticent or winsome approach never wins worthwhile gains. The results of the June 25th 1998 assembly elections were also tight with hardliners just 2 seats shy of aborting the whole power sharing scheme. The next test is the composition of the executive in which the Sinn Fein is entitled to a place. But the Protestant Chief Minister has refused to offer one unless Sinn Fein disarms. North Ireland's halting passage to a new political future is a fraught one.
The Agreement is a legal one based on different principles of political theory. By itself it will not ensure a new multicultural society. For this to be achieved other academic disciplines have to be brought into the scenario. It is time for them to change from being comfortable critics of others to being their objects. Historians should not concentrate only in making the past uncertain but also work to make the future certain. Anthropologists should work on creating new rituals, totems and cultures appropriate to the new multi-religious society. Sociologists could help by demarcating new lines of social interaction. Institution builders have the major task of devising complex Structures.
An interesting feature of the Northern Ireland process is the active participation of civil society institutions. The Northern Ireland's Women's Coalition had been very vigorous in taking pro-active steps for building this new society. Its statement is worth repeating,

Thimpu Principles Applied to a Society with Two Mind Sets?
"When the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition came to these negotiations we welcomed them with an optimism borne out of necessity. We are still optimistic, but even more conscious now of the historic challenges and opportunities that face us all. We owe it to all those who have suffered and died over the past three decades to grasp this opportunity to build a society that will stand as a living testimony to the victims of the troubles.
If we are to achieve this task we must do it together. Not by monopolising power, but by sharing it. Not by seeking to shatter the aspirations of any sector of our society, but by creating a space for them. Not by being restricted by a politics of anger, resentment and rigidity, but by daring to envisage a politics that can be open and imaginative, and even courageous.
It is our belief that there are many around this table who, through their actions, have shown that such politics is possible. We believe that the new politics we are now creating will incorporate the principles of equality, inclusiveness and human rights. Human rights and equality are not a victory for one group over another, they are basic requirements that must form the bedrock of society. A society
which we should feel proud to be able to fashion
for our children.
The amazing pool of international good will has always been on call when needed. And perhaps, most importantly, the sense that people and communities across Northern Ireland--and beyond
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-willed and hoped and prayed that this process would succeed.
Even in the darkest of days over the last two years there has always been that echo -- 'If only our politicians would sit down together, talk to each other and come to an agreement' -- and now, at last, we have. We understand we are only at the start of a peace process. Peace will not simply happen, it must be built through a sense of mutual respect and accommodation of our differences. It requires honest recognition that change is inevitable, and that it is the primary role of political leadership to manage that change in a manner that will include people in this divided society of ours. This policy of inclusion must also ensure that those communities who have suffered most during the years of violence, will benefit from this peace.
We must develop a sense of confidence that will allow us to envisage a future that is not about victory or defeat, but is about forging new relationships".
No better manifesto could be offered on Con vivencia principles.
5. Thimpu Principles
Mohan Edirisinha, in his article "Critical Overview: Constitutionalism, Conflict Resolution and the Limits of the Draft Constitution" in the book "Draft Constitution of Sri Lanka - Critical Aspects" clarifies the Thimpu Principles. He states that

Thimpu Principles Applied to a Society with Two Mind Sets? 61
"The four cardinal principles placed before the Sri Lanka government delegation at the Thimpu talks by the six Tamil organisations represented there (the TULF, LTTE, EPRLF, EROS, PLOTE and TELO) were
1. Recognition of the Tamils of Sri Lanka as a distinct
nationality;
2. Recognition of an identified Tamil homeland and the
guarantee of its territorial integrity.
3. Based on the above, the recognition of the inalienable
right of self determination of the Tamil nation;
4. The recognition of the right to full citizenship and other fundamental democratic rights of all Tamils who look upon the island as their country.
The first three principles were rejected by the Government delegation on the grounds that they necessarily implied the destruction of an united Sri Lanka.The leader of the delegation, H.W. Jayewardene said,
"... If the first three principles are to be taken at their face value and given their accepted legal meaning, they are wholly unacceptable to the government. They must be rejected for the reason that they constitute a negation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, they are detrimental to a united Sri Lanka and are inimical to the interests of the several communities, ethnic and religious in our country"
Mr. Jayewardene assumed that they had an "accepted legal meaning" and that they would necessarily violate the sovereignty and unity of the country.This is not so"

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Nothing has caused, in the devolution debate of Sri Lanka, greater reservations than the claim of self-determination and of homeland.These have been raised to the level of a test of loyalty of whether one is Sri Lankan or no. In this emotionally charged atmosphere it would be useful if a cold logical analysis were made of the whole issue.
Reference was made to H W. Jayawardene's view that self-determination was inimical to the sovereignty of Sri Lanka. Edirisinha questions it. Self-determination got international recognition through the efforts of US President Woodrow Wilson who included it in his 14 points. Subsequently there were three main waves of self-determination the first, following the break of the Axis powers the second, following the breakup of the Euro-American empires and the third, following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. All these newly formed nation-states followed the Berlin 2 principle, laid down in 1870, of preserving established borders.The subsequent creation of Bangladesh, the Czech and Slovak republics were exceptions. In the case of Bangladesh it was through violent means, like the 13 colonies which formed the United States, and the other two through a Velvet Revolution. The question now posed is whether the principle of the Velvet Revolution should not be extended to those, who through democratic choice, have opted to separate or have a homeland. In short the Berlin 2 principle is no longer to be held sacrosanct.The Agreement on these matters is specific. It will
(i) recognise the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its status, whether they prefer to continue to support the Union with Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland;
(ii) recognise that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts

Thimpu Principles Applied to a Society with Two Mind Sets? 63
(iii)
(1ν)
(v)
respectively and without external impediment, to
exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of
consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South,
to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish, accepting that this right must be achieved and exercised
with and subject to the agreement and consent of a
majority of the people of Northern Ireland.
acknowledge that while a substantial section of the people in Northern Ireland share the legitimate wish of a majority of the people of the island of Ireland for a united Ireland, the present wish of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, freely exercised and legitimate, is to maintain the Union and, accordingly, that Northern Ireland's status as part of the United Kingdom reflects and relies upon that wish; and that it would be wrong to make any change in the status of Northern Ireland save with the consent of a majority of its people.
affirm that if, in the future, the people of the island of Ireland exercise their right of self-determination on the basis set out in sections (i) and (ii) above to bring about a united Ireland, it will be a binding obligation on both Governments to introduce and support in their respective Parliaments legislation to give effect to that wish;
affirm that whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, the power of the sovereign government with jurisdiction there shall be exercised with rigorous impartiality on behalf of all the people in the diversity of their identities and traditions and shall be founded on the principles of full respect for, and equality of, civil, political, social and cultural rights, of freedom from discrimination for all

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(vi)
Reimagining Sri Lanka: Northern Ireland Insights
citizens, and of parity of esteem and of just and equal treatment for the identity, ethos, and aspirations of both communities;
recognise the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or both, as they may so choose, and accordingly confirm that their right to hold both British and Irish citizenship is accepted by both Governments and would not be affected by any future change in the status of Northern Ireland.
Some points are significant
First, the future of Northern Ireland will be decided, by free choice, only by the inhabitants of Northern Ireland,
Second, the inhabitants of Northern Ireland, by free choice, could decide to join the Irish Republic,
Third, no other individuals whether from Britain or the Irish Republic have a say in the decisions of the inhabitants of Northern Ireland,
Fourth, the inhabitants of Northern Ireland have a right to dual citizenship accepting the principle of a nationsState.
A fear in Sri Lanka, to conceding self-determination, is that of possible secession. In this context the comments of Edrisinha may be noted
"-- Recognition of the right to self determination in the new Constitution (of Sri Lanka) should not include the right to secession. A provision similar

Thimpu Principles Applied to a Society with Two MindSets? 65
to Article 235 of the South African Constitution should be included in the Constitution and should encapsulate the approach of that Constitution to the question of self-determination.---Such an approach rules out the right to secession by a region acting unilaterally".
To resolve Sri Lanka's impasse the only parameter that operates should be the prevention of secession. Every thing else, internal structures, processes, systems, asymmetries are open for negotiated remedy. Once they are resolved and legitimised by the people through the electoral process, they become internal sovereignties, which have to be respected by the Central Government. Any differences of opinion could only be adjudicated by the Judiciary. These are the operational details of Convivencia principles relevant to Sri Lanka.
6. Conclusion
The North Ireland Agreement set out to exorcise the demons of history and commence a fresh collective journey learning from the failures of the past. Tony Blair called it the "hand of history". It is a cliche that those who do not know their history are fated to suffer a re-run. Very often this repeat has proven, not a farce, but a greater tragedy than the first. In this context it would be germane to ponder the question posed by Barbara Tuchman as to why nations deliberately adopt policies which go against their own interests. She offers four case studies in her book "The March of Folly".They are the fall of Troy, the Protestant reformation caused by jealous Popes, Britain's loss of the thirteen colonies and the American intervention in Vietnam. In each case there were reasonable acceptable alternatives available and they were widely known. These alternatives are amazingly close to the Convivencia approach. Yet those in authority - politicians, advisors, bureaucratspigheadedly spurned them, preferring the easy path that led to

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disaster with the inevitability of a Greek tragedy. The case of the 13 colonies is particularly relevant to Sri Lanka. Separatist George Washington was able to take advantage of British policy failures to form a separate nation despite only 30% supporting him. A terrorist to the British he became a national hero to the Americans.
In Sri Lanka's run-up to the first independence struggle the example of the Irish struggle influenced Anagarika Dharmapala, A E Goonesinghe, P Arunachalam among others. Sri Lanka is now engaged in a second struggle for independence.The Northern Ireland Agreement, its contents, the methods by which it was arrived are all relevant and would surely offer insights. Institching the Agreement the political art was critical. Politics, practised in the noblest sense, is in finding flexible solutions to human problems, discovering formulae to avoid shedding blood not to engorge in it. Obstinacy is not policy but the lack of it. Mature politicians, experienced in give and take, do not permit petty personal considerations to debase the pursuit of the holy mandate entrusted that of searching for peace to replace war. By creatively finding alternatives, by bringing all to the negotiating table, seemingly insoluble problems are offered a remedy. The result would enable people, including opponents, to break with entrenched viewpoints and cease brooding on failures to which they have contributed and passionately defended, and together build future success. The Northern Ireland Agreement offers this promise. It is the first triumph of the Third Way. Sri Lanka could be the second if the opportunity were only grasped.

S
Issues from Northern Ireland Experience: Relevance to Sri Lanka Considered
J. Charitha Ratwatte
1. War at a Stalemate
Over a period of time major sections of the antagonists in Northern Ireland came to realize that the war was at a stalemate. The British Army said that they "could contain the IRA Provos, but could not eradicate them"...The IRA Provos said "they could continue to kill Brits, but could not get the British Army out of Ireland". The British Government issued a statement that they "had no strategic or economic interests in remaining in Ireland".
To the ordinary people, the average Protestant or Catholic living in poverty in Belfast, deprived of basic services due to the war, losing relatives, friends and colleagues due to indiscriminate violence, the war was meaningless. Women's groups, which felt that the worst affected were vulnerable women and children, manifested their frustrations in various ways and very effectively. The public revulsion to the Omagh bombing by the Real IRA, after the cease fire had been operational for some time, showed that violence will never again be tolerated as a means of solving what is essentially a political problem though there appeared to be no final military Solution.
The parties to the talks in Northern Ireland accepted some fundamental points; that they will honour the principle of

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consent and respect the view of the majority democratically expressed; that violence will not be used as a method of achieving their ends. Even Gerry Adams of the Sinn Fein had condemned the Omagh bombing in no uncertain and in unequivocal terms.
In Sri Lanka, there seems to be a degree of war weariness, but according to one viewpoint, the government is on a brink of a stupendous victory, so imminent that policemen and army personnel cannot be withdrawn to provide security for Provincial Council elections. Another view point is that the Liberation Tigers of Thamil Eelam (LTTE) need not win, they have only to survive and strike occasionally. A third was that, a military solution, even if it meant beating the LTTE hard enough to force them to the table for talks, appeared to be considered by the policy makers a plausible strategy. In what sense a punch drunk Tiger, hammered so hard that it has to crawl to the table will talk, or whether it will talk at all, is the question.
2. Decommissioning
Except the extreme non-violent Protestant party, who walked out of the talks, everyohe else were very frank and candid about the whole issue of decommissioning. The members of the leading Protestant party in fact said that what the IRA decommissions in the morning, they could buy in the market in the afternoon'. Another small former militant Loyalist group (PUP) said, 'first build trust among the communities, decommissioning will happen after that'. Sinn Fein had not even appointed a representative to the Decommissioning Committee, but on the 3rd of September, came the news that they have nominated Mike McGuinness, their chief negotiator at the talks, as their representative for decommissioning negotiations. This is probably after the embarrassment of the Omagh bombing and the consequent British and Irish governments draconian' legislation to combat hard core violent terrorists.

Issues from Northern Ireland Experience 69
In Sri Lanka the government seems to have laid down that a LTTE disarming should be a precondition for talks. This seems impractical. The LTTE had disarmed before when Yogi handed over his pistol to General Attygalle under the watchful eyes of the Indian Peace Keeping Force. What followed is history. No man of violence will willingly give up his weapons unless he is confident that he is not under threat. Therefore some confidence building measures seem to be necessary. The Leader of the Opposition has called for unconditional talks with the LTTE using a facilitator.There may be a window of opportunity here, to talk while fighting, at least as a preliminary step, thereafter, to stop the killing.
However, here again the stumbling block will be those who are claiming that the army is on the brink of a major victory in battle. The fact that there has been no major military operation from June 1998, when the much-heralded break out from Killinochchi resulted in about 200 soldiers being killed and the immediate imposition of military censorship, does not seem to enter the equation.
3. A Devolution Oriented Environment within the
Nation and the Region
In the British Isles there is a pro devolution environment. The Labour government in power in London set up a Parliament for Scotland and an Assembly for Wales. There is already an Assembly for Northern Ireland. The Westminster government is committed to devolution, it was an important part of its election manifesto. The people are confident that it will take place and that power will flow to the periphery. This gives confidence to the Nationalists that they won't be dominated by the British, as they have been in the past under direct rule. Under the Agreement there is going to be a Council for the Isles,consisting of Representatives of the Parliament of Britain, Scotland and Ireland and the Assemblies of Northern Ireland and Wales. There is also going to be a joint Cabinet Committee

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of the British and Irish Cabinets and the Council of Ministers. of Northern Ireland to look into common problems.
At that same time the whole European movement meant that the nation state has less of a meaning in Europe. The Parliaments of Britain and Ireland lose some of their power to the European Parliament, Whitehall bureaucrats cede authority to bureaucrats in Brussels and the House of Lords cedes some jurisdiction to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.
The fears the Loyalists and the Nationalists in Northern Ireland, of domination by the Protestants in London or the Papists in Dublin are therefore mitigated. The pan European institutions have given confidence of fair treatment in an objective way instead of unfair subjective discrimination so far practised.Therefore it can be said that there is a serious movement towards the devolution of power in the British Isles and Europe which strengthens the peace process in Northern Ireland.
Compare Sri Lanka. When devolution was first introduced by the 13th amendment to the constitution, the party now in government opposed it. The party in power at that time, though professing devolution, moved administratively-in an active manner- to undermine devolution to the provincial level, although in fairness it must be said that there was some effective effort to strengthen and empower the divisional levels.
The present government has proposed a constitutional package, which devolves power to regions. But it has not got the support in the country at large. The LTTE has rejected it out of hand, the UNP is not supporting it, and the Moslems seem divided on the issue. The government has lost its credibility, of being genuinely for devolution, by postponing elections for the Provincial Councils on the grounds that a great victory in war is imminent and that they cannot spare policemen and soldiers from the battle front to ensure a Provincial Council election! The matter is before the Supreme

Issues from Northern Ireland Experience 71
Court, but it has been lost before the Court of the People, the common man's feeling is that the government is running scared of holding the Provincial Council elections because it knows it will lose. So much for a pro-devolution environment. The matter is simply not taken seriously in Sri Lanka.
There is also an important regional analogy. India is a major player in Sri Lanka's ethnicity problems. If Indira Gandhi had not, in the early 1980's, authorized the Directorate of Intelligence of the Government of India and the Research and Analysis Wing of the Cabinet Office of the Government of India to work with and support, train and arm the LTTE and the other Tamil militants, respectively, this problem would have remained a domestic Sri Lankan problem. Once India stepped in, it became a regional problem. What is commonly known as the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora' and the vicious diplomatic offensive which the Indian Foreign Ministry unleashed against the Jayewardene government, to isolate it from the rest of the world, while at the same time the Indian Government actively Supporting the militant groups, has made it an international problem. As one senior Indian official told the author after he had retired, remember that this is the Indian Ocean, not the South Asian Sea'
How is it possible to deal with a big, aggressive, neighbour having expansionist dreams, which has millions of Tamils only 19 miles across the sea from Sri Lanka, from sticking its nose into Sri Lanka affairs, at the behest of Tamil Nadu politicians trying to gain popularity at home by trying to be the saviour of their Sri Lankan Tamil brethren across the Palk Strait? Recent developments, which has given Sri Lanka's close neighbour an aggressive Hindutva reincarnation with nuclear weapons capacity certainly compounds the issue.
Therefore India has to be contained, How? Can it be by equivalent evolutionary structures like the Council of the Isles, the European Economic Community, and the European Commission on Human Rights? Will SAARC do this, not in its present incarnation, in which the rules do not allow regional

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disputes among SAARC members to be discussed but in some other evolved form2. What is the extra- national institutional mechanism that will help the residents of Jaffna feel that they can be protected from abusive behaviour by a Colombo government, or help the Muslim residents of the Eastern province to feel protected from a Tamil dominated Regional/ Provincial Council? Is it by a South Asian Ombudsman, Human Rights Commission for SAARC Or even have a counter balance to the expansionist aggressiveness of the South Block in New Delhi through a South Asian Secretariat like what the Europeans have at Brussels or a political entity such as the European Parliament? The need is that there must be a true and credible spirit of regional cooperation with extra national systems and structures, which will protect vulnerable minorities from abuse from their own rulers, at national state/provincial/ regional or local levels. These solutions may be light years away. The European analogy will not apply immediately. However the possibility of national entities which attract the faith of Sri Lankans, that they would be protected citizens from political, racial, religious and language based discrimination and victimization could and should be built.
On the India issue, what can be done, is that Sri Lanka can have an effective India policy to deal with this assertive neighbour. It should be policy based conducted by the rules and conventions of diplomacy and national self interest, not one based and on mythical family connections' nor one based on emotional perceptions of an India which produced Gauthama Buddha and Mahatma Gandhi. That India has long gone into oblivion! What we need in the short, medium and long term is a pragmatic and practical India policy based on Sri Lanka's national self-interest.
4. International Support
The British and Irish Governments put their full weight behind the Northern Ireland agreement. The American Government

Issues from Northern Ireland Experience 73
also virtually underwrote the agreement. Loyalists had always perceived the Americans as pro-Nationalists and apologists for the IRA Provo's. But Judge Mitchell, as Chairman of the peace talks, set out an image of fairness that set the tone for further proceedings.
5. Role of Businessmen
As in the case of South Africa, the businessmen of Northern Ireland moved aggressively to support the peace agenda. They formed a group of 7 to support the process. The Group consisted of - The Confederation of British Industry, the Institute of Directors, the Northern Ireland Chamber of Commerce and Industry (these three are the key business bodies in Northern Ireland), the Northern Ireland Committee of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (the umbrella' trade union), the Northern Ireland Hospitality Association (the representative of hotels and other hospitality interests), the Northern Ireland Growth Challenge (a private sector initiative undertaken to gear up a vigorous thrust on the economic front), the Northern Ireland Economic Council (an advisory group to the government on economic policy). The Federation of Small Business (which speaks for small companies mainly in the retail sector) later joined the Group.
The basic philosophy which drove the Group could be summarized as follows:
"Business at all levels has a responsibility, to put every ounce of energy into the race for growth in a very competitive world. But it is severely handicapped if it has to operate in an environment which destroys confidence. It is essential that those both inside and outside Northern Ireland who have to make investment decisions based on an assessment of risk should possess that confidence.

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Community stability is a crucial factor in the assessment. A society which does not eschew violence and turmoil- whatever the perceived justification- is on the road to nowhere."
The Group functioned as a consortium of interests, in the pursuit of very clear objectives, intervening on significant issues when the need arose, at what was considered strategic opportunities. The ability to speak with one voice and intervene at the appropriate time, supporting initiatives which were key to the peace process, was the strategy adopted by the group. The Group had two primary aims:
1. It Sought to encourage the political parties to persist with the process of negotiation until a settlement was reached.
2. To get across to the population, at large, the same message Which the Group was communicating to the political parties, Since the politicians needed public support in order to move forward and since the best political initiatives could be eroded by riots in the street. For this the Group issued a series of public statements at critical junctures.
The Group functioned in diverse ways, using collective meetings with all political parties, letters to leaders of all political parties, press statements, articles in business and other journals, meeting with government officials and ministers. Critical moments, at which the Group should intervene were selected very carefully and selectively, for example, at the time of impasse over the Drumcree Parade, at the time of the near break down of the peace talks due to the intransigence of one particular party, at the time of visits by British Ministers to Belfast, at times of particularly vicious violence, etc.
The Group, within a small time frame of two years has created a consortium which now has achieved ready brand recognition' throughout Northern Ireland, as a body that has

Issues from Northern Ireland Experience 75
been consistently in favour of moving foward confidently towards the creation of a better future from which all will benefit through the resolute tackling of social and economic issues, in which all the traditions which make up Irish society will enjoy parity of esteem; and in which both Northern and Southern Ireland (the Irish Republic) will co-operate to mutual advantage.
The work they have been doing would have gone a long way towards creating the environment which brought into being the concept of a Civic Forum' which is a component of the Good Friday agreement and may lead to the creation of a viable and effective forum for Civil Society organizations in Northern Ireland in the future.
6. Is There a Minority in Northern Ireland?
The Protestants and Catholics are almost equal in numbers, the difference is under 20%. This closeness of the figures, provides an impetus for a very high threshold of violence, but also a stalemate that no side can win. It is also possible to foster a spirit of accommodation when numbers are so close. In any event the birth rates of the Protestant and the Catholics in Northern Ireland are such that by the year 2025 there will be a Catholic majority. One commentator referred to the agreement as "one for this generation! Let us stop the killing now, the future will look after itself".
But in Sri Lanka where the minority is much less in number any reasonable concession is seen as a betrayal. There is a further complication caused by the fact that the so called minority sees itself as a nation in its own right. Also just across the Park Strait, there are over 60 million Tamils in India. Regionally therefore, the Sinhalese feel they are a minority. Also in demographic terms the Muslims, it is said, have the highest birth rate among the races in Sri Lanka, which in time to come may cause further complications. Sri Lanka too, may

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need a solution for this generation, to stop the killing now, the future could look after itself.
7. Practical Segregation - Integration or Partition?
In Northern Ireland there is a physical segregation of the poor Protestants and Catholics. They are separated and kept separate by design. The economically more affluent have the purchasing power to buy themselves out of the troubles.
In Sri Lanka the two major communities, outside the North, are highly integrated. The Muslims, outside the East are scattered in little pockets all over the island. In the East there are three communities. Ethnic cleansing has driven the Moslems and the few Sinhalese who were there, out of the North, over time. In an integrated society (outside the North) can one talk of a homeland of one particular race? Does it mean that all those of that race who live outside the home land' will have to pack their bags and get back? One is reminded of the horrors of partition in India. It will be noted that the Irish problem is also a result of a partition.
8. Human Rights, Minority Rights, Double Majority,
Council of Ministers
The Northern Ireland human rights group is not a government sponsored one. It draws its funds from donors and is fiercely independent. In Sri Lanka there is an official Human Rights Commission of the government which does not have much credibility. There are private groups, which have greater credibility.
In the Northern Ireland Assembly minority rights are protected in an unique way. All Assembly men have to register as Nationalists or Loyalists at the inception. The Women's Group Members refused to do so saying they do not accept these male chauvinist distinctions. A special compromise was

Issues from Northern Ireland Experience 77
effected for them. All important proposals have to get a minimum 40% approval within the Loyalist group separately and within the Nationalist group separately, and then an overall 2/3rd majority when both groups vote together. This is a safeguard against the 'tyranny of the majority' which we have seen so often, and the 'tyranny of the minority' which we see in the Sri Lanka Parliament body.
In Sri Lanka, Section 29 of the Soulbury Constitution or the 2/3rds majority plus referendum required by the 1977 Constitution do not provide the same type of protection to minority rights.
The Northern Ireland Council of Ministers consists of representatives of all parties which have won a stipulated number of seats. This is somewhat similar to the Donoughmore Constitution of 1931 in Sri Lanka. It forces politicians, having diverse views, to work together for the common good, instead of trying to destroy each other, after labeling themselves as government and opposition, as the Westminster model does.This tends to happen especially, when thrust upon an alien culture and tradition.
9. Powerful Government and Bipartisan Approach
Tony Blair's New Labour Government has a clear majority in the House of Commons, unlike his predecessor John Major's Conservatives who were dependent on Rev. Ian Paisley's Ulster Unionist Party for their majority in the House of Commons. Major's freedom to manoeuvre was badly constrained. Blair, on the other hand, could act decisively and boldly, Secretary of State Mo Mowlam could seem to do irrational things like visiting the Maze Prison, without risking the survival of the government. As against this the PA government depends on the minorities for survival in Parliament though its major constituent- the SLFP- is at heart a Sinhala Buddhist party. It initially tried to act boldly, got a negative reaction from its core supporters and has now got cold feet.

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John Major, a Conservative former Prime Minister of Britain, went with his Labour successor to Belfast to support a "YES" vote in the referendum on the agreement. The Conservative Party acted very responsibly throughout the process. Whatever party was in power in London, did not play petty politics with Northern Ireland, in the last decade at least. Imagine this happening in Sri Lanka, where very effort to sort this problem viz the Bandaranaike - Chelvanayakam Pact, the Dudley - Chelvanayakam Pact, the 13th amendment to the Constitution, the 1997 proposal (the Package) - have always been thwarted by base and venal politics.
10. Conclusion
The peace deal in Northern Ireland was a deal which could only be done by allowing both sides to claim victory initially. The Ulster Unionists hailed it as a victory which strengthened the union between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom. Sinn Fein took the position that it backed the deal only because it moved decisively in the direction of a United Ireland. Both cannot be right.
Then why is the deal a big breakthrough? For two reasons, it has accepted non-violence and the principle of consent as basic. Sinn Fein and the IRA seem to have accepted the position that Northern Ireland cannot be forced into a united Ireland at the point of a gun. The Real IRA, The Continuity IRA, the Committee for 32 Counties and the INLA have also been shamed into acccepting that Northern Ireland cannot be bombed into a United Ireland by the public outrage shown after the Omagh bomb atrocity. The moderate majority, among the Nationalists and the Loyalists,has accepted the principle that the fate of Northern Ireland will be decided by the will of the majority of its people, democratically expressed.
The agreement prepares the ground for far reaching changes to the government, the policing and the administration

Issues from Northern Ireland Experience 79
of justice in Northern Ireland and ensures that in the elected Assembly at Stormont, the "Tyranny of the Majority' will not be possible.
What lessons are there for Sri Lanka? Will our antagonists accept the principle of non-violence and the principle of consent? War weariness played a major part in Northern Ireland. Will the censored fatigue of the killing fields affect Sri Lanka in the same way? Can a weak government, kept alive by minority votes, do bold or decisive things? Will the opposition parties be able to interact responsibly with a government, which constantly and publicly abuses them, to bring about a settlement acceptable to the moderates among the Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim communities?
The IRA, in all its various manifestations, has a brutal and indefensible history. But it is more than a terrorist movement, its political representatives, the Sinn Fein got around 17% of the vote. The LTTE has also a brutal and indefensible history, but will it ever reconcile itself to be judged by a popular vote? The agents of the Sri Lanka government have also committed atrocities, will there be transparency on those?
The American Senator, Judge Mitchell, was the facilitator who became the mediator. He was strongly backed by the British and Irish Governments, President Clinton, Britain's PM Tony Blair, and Irish PM Bertie Ahern. The US virtually under wrote the agreement. Who will be Sri Lanka's Mitchell? Who will underwrite a Sri Lanka accord?
Britain sent Junior Minister Fox who got the government and the opposition to come to a limited agreement, agreeing not to make political capital out of concessions made while one was in government, and when the other was in opposition. It was a historic agreement, considering the post-1956 history of Sri Lanka. But that seems to have died or more realistically killed.

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India has publicly stated that she would not want big powers to play around in this very "Indian of Oceans'. In any event after Rajiv's assassination, the South Block in New Delhi and the Indian Army will think one thousand times before heading south of Kanyakumari Point on any adventurist escapades at the bidding of the Tamil Nadu politicians.
Can our erstwhile politicians make the sacrifices that have been made in Belfast'? This is the question.
(This paper was written following a visit to Northern Ireland,
facilitated by INCORE - Initiative On Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity).

DOCUMENTS

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Appendix A
The Northern Ireland Agreement Belfast Agreement)
10th April (Good Friday) 1998
Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations

Appendix A 83
Contents
Declaration of Support 85
Constitutional Issues 87
Annex A: Draft Clauses/Schedules for
Incorporation in British Legislation Annex B: Irish Government Draft Legislation
Strand One:
94
Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland
Strand Two:
105
North/South Ministerial Council
Strand Three: 111
British - Irish Council British - Irish Intergovernmental Conference
Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity 115
Human Rights
United Kingdom Legislation New Institutions in Northern Ireland Comparable Steps by the Irish Government A Joint Committee Reconciliation and Victims of Violence Economic,Social and Cultural Issues
Decommissioning 123
Security 124

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Policing and Justice 125
Annex A: Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland Annex B: Review of the Criminal Justice System
Prisoners * 132
Validation, Implementation and Review 133
Validation and Implementation Review Procedures Following Implementation
Annexure
Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland

Appendix A 85
Declaration of Support
We, the participants in the multi-party negotiations, believe that the agreement we have negotiated offers a truly historic opportunity for a new beginning.
The tragedies of the past have left a deep and profoundly regrettable legacy of suffering. We must never forget those who have died or been injured, and their families. But we can best honour them through a fresh start, in which we firmly dedicate ourselves to the achievement of reconciliation, tolerance, and mutual trust, and to the protection and vindication of the human rights of all.
We are committed to partnership, equality and mutual respect as the basis of relationships within Northern Ireland, between North and South, and between these islands.
We reaffirm our total and absolute commitment to exclusively democratic and peaceful means of resolving differences on political issues, and our opposition to any use or threat of force by others for any political purpose, whether in regard to this agreement or otherwise.
We acknowledge the substantial differences between our continuing, and equally legitimate, political aspirations. However, we will endeavour to strive in every practical way towards reconciliation and rapprochement within the framework of democratic and agreed arrangements. We pledge that we will, in good faith, work to ensure the success of each and every one of the arrangements to be established under this agreement. It is accepted that all of

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the institutional and constitutional arrangements-an Assembly in Northern Ireland, a North/South Ministerial Council, implementation bodies, a British-Irish Council and a British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference and any amendments to British Acts of Parliament and the Constitution of Ireland-are interlocking and interdependent and that in particular the functioning of the Assembly and the North/South Council are so closely interrelated that the success of each depends on that of the other.
Accordingly, in a spirit of concord, we strongly commend this agreement to the people, North and South, for their approval.

Appendix A 87
Constitutional Issues
The participants endorse the commitment made by the British and Irish Governments that, in a new British-Irish Agreement replacing the Anglo-lrish Agreement, they will:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
recognise the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its status, whether they prefer to continue to support the Union with Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland;
recognise that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively and without external impediment, to exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South,to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish, accepting that this right must be achieved and exercised with and subject to the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland;
acknowledge that while a substantial section of the people in Northern Ireland share the legitimate wish of a majority of the people of the island of Ireland for a united Ireland, the present wish of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, freely exercised and legitimate, is to maintain the Union and, accordingly, that Northern Ireland's status as part of the United Kingdom reflects and relies upon that wish; and that it would be wrong to make any change in the status of Northern Ireland save with the consent of a majority of its people;

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(iv) affirm that if, in the future, the people of the Ireland
of Ireland exercise their right of self-determination on the basis set out in sections (i) and (ii) above to bring about a united Ireland, it will be a binding obligation on both Governments to introduce and Support in their respective Parliaments legislation to give effect to that wish;
(v) affirm that whatever choice is freely exercised by a
(vi)
majority of the people of Northern Ireland, the power of the sovereign government with jurisdiction there shall be exercised with rigorous impartiality on behalf of all the people in the diversity of their identities and traditions and shall be founded on the principles of full respect for, and equality of, civil, political, social and cultural rights, of freedom from discrimination for all citizens,and of parity of esteem and of just and equal treatment for the identity, ethos, and aspirations of both communities;
recognise the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or both, as they may so choose, and accordingly confirm that their right to hold both British and Irish citizenship is accepted by both Governments and would not be affected by any future change in the status of Northern Ireland.
The participants also note that the two Governments have accordingly undertaken in the context of this comprehensive political agreement, to propose and support changes in, respectively, the Constitution of Ireland and in
British legislation relating to the constitutional status of
Northern Ireland.

Appendix A 89
ANNEX A
Draft Clauses/Schedules for Incorporation in British Legislation
1.
(1)
(2)
It is hereby declared that Northern Ireland in its entirety remains part of the United Kingdom and shall not cease to be so without the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland voting in a poll held for the purposes of this section in accordance with Schedule
But if the wish expressed by a majority in such a poll is that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland, the Secretary of State shall lay before Parliament such proposals to give effect to that wish as may be agreed between Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of Ireland.
The Government of Ireland Act 1920 is repealed; and this Act shall have effect notwithstanding any other previous enactment.
Schedule 1
Polls for the purpose of Section 1
The Secretary of State may by order direct the holding of a poll for the purposes of section 1 on a date specified in the order.

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Subject to paragraph 3, the Secretary of State shall exercise the power under paragraph 1 if at any time it appears likely to him that a majority of those voting would express a wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland.
Secretary of State shall not make an order under paragraph 1 earlier than seven years after the holding of a previous
poll under this Schedule.
(Remaining paragraphs along the lines of paragraphs 2 and 3 of existing Schedule 1 to 1973 Act.)
ANNEX B
Irish Government Draft Legislation to amend the Constitution
Add to Article 29 the following sections:
7.
The State may consent to be bound by the BritishIrish Agreement done at Belfast on the 10th day of 1998, hereinafter called the Agreement.
Any institution established by or under the Agreement may exercise the powers and functions thereby conferred on it in respect of all or any part of the island of Ireland notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution conferring a like power or function on any person or any organ of State appointed under

(i)
Appendix A
or created or established by or under this Constitution. Any power or function conferred on such an institution in relation to the settlement or resolution of disputes or controversies may be in addition to or in substitution for any like power or function conferred by this Constitution on any such person or organ of State as aforesaid.
If the Government declare that the State has become obliged, pursuant to the Agreement, to give effect to the amendment of this Constitution referred to therein, then, notwithstanding Article 46 here of this Constitution shall be amended as follows:
the following Articles shall be substituted for Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish text: "2. Irish text to be inserted here 3. Irish text to be inserted here)"
(ii) the following Articles shall be substituted for
Articles 2 and 3 of the English text:
"Article 2
It is the entitlement and birthright of every person
born in the island of Ireland, which includes its islands and seas, to be part of the Irish nation.That is also the entitlement of all persons otherwise qualified in accordance with law to be citizens of Ireland. Furthermore, the Irish nation cherishes its special affinity with people of Irish ancestry living abroad who share its cultural identity and heritage.
91

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Article 3
It is the firm will of the Irish nation, in harmony and friendship, to unite all the people who share the territory of the island of Ireland, in all the diversity of their identities and traditions, recognising that an united Ireland shall be brought about only by peaceful means with the consent of a majority of the people, democratically expressed, in both jurisdictions in the island. Until then, the laws enacted by the Parliament established by this Constitution shall have the like area and extent of application as the laws enacted by the Parliament that existed immediately before the coming into operation of this Constitution.
Institutions with executive powers and functions that are shared between those jurisdictions may be established by their respective responsible authorities for Stated purposes and may exercise powers and functions in respect of all or any part of the island."
iii. the following section shall be added to the Irish
text of this Article:
"8. Irish text to be inserted here)" and
iv. the following section shall be added to the
English text of this Article:
" 8. The State may exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction in accordance with the generally recognised principles of international law."

Appendix A 93
If a declaration under this section is made, this subsection and subsection 3, other than the amendment of this Constitution effected thereby, and subsection 5 of this section shall be omitted from every official text of this Constitution published thereafter, but notwithstanding such omission this section shall continue to have the force of law.
If such a declaration is not made within twelve months of this section being added to this Constitution or such longer period as may be provided for by law, this section shall cease to have effect and shall be omitted from every official text of this Constitution published thereafter.

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STRAND ONE
Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland
This agreement provides for a democratically elected Assembly in Northern Ireland which is inclusive in its membership, capable of exercising executive and legislative authority, and subject to safeguards to protect the rights and interests of all sides of the community.
The Assembly
108-member Assembly will be elected by PR(STV) from existing Westminster constituencies.
The Assembly will exercise full legislative and executive authority in respect of those matters currently within the responsibility of the six Northern Ireland Government Departments,with the possibility of taking on responsibility for other matters as detailed elsewhere in this agreement.
The Assembly - operating where appropriate on a crosscommunity basis - will be the prime source of authority in respect of all devolved responsibilities.
Safeguards
There will be safeguards to ensure that all sections of the community can participate and work together successfully in the operation of these institutions and that all sections of the community are protected, including:
(a) allocations of Committee Chairs, Ministers and Committee membership in proportion to party strengths;

Appendix A 95
(b) the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland supplementing it, which neither the Assembly nor public bodies can infringe, together with a Human Rights Commission;
(c) arrangements to provide that key decisions and legislation are proofed to ensure that they do not infringe the ECHR and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland;
(d) arrangements to ensure key decisions are taken on
a cross-community basis;
(i) either parallel consent, i.e. a majority of those members present and voting, including a majority of the unionist and nationalist designations present and voting;
(ii) or a weighted majority (60%) of members present and voting, including at least 40% of each of the nationalist and unionist designations present and voting.
Key decisions requiring cross-community support will be designated in advance, including election of the Chair of the Assembly, the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, standing orders and budget allocations. In other cases such decisions could be triggered by a petition of concern brought by a significant minority of Assembly members (30/108),
Operation of the Assembly
6. At their first meeting, members of the Assembly will register a designation of identity- nationalist, unionist or

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other- for the purposes of measuring cross-community Support in Assembly votes under the relevant provisions above.
The Chair and Deputy Chair of the Assembly will be elected on a cross-community basis, as set out in paragraph 5(d) above.
There will be a Committee for each of the main executive functions of the Northern Ireland Administration. The Chairs and Deputy Chairs of the Assembly Committees will be allocated proportionally, using the d'Hondt system. Membership of the Committees will be in broad proportion to party strengths in the Assembly to ensure that the opportunity of Committee places is available to all members.
The Committees will have a scrutiny, policy development and consultation role with respect to the Department with which each is associated, and will have a role in initiation of legislation. They will have the power to:
consider and advise on Departmental budgets and Annual Plans in the context of the overall budget
allocation;
approve relevant secondary legislation and take the Committee stage of relevant primary legislation;
call for persons and papers;
initiate enquiries and make reports;
consider and advise on matters brought to the Committee by its Minister.

10.
11.
12.
3.
Appendix A 97
Standing Committees other than Departmental Committees may be established as may be required from time to time.
The Assembly may appoint a special Committee to examine and report on whether a measure or proposal for legislation is in conformity with equality requirements, including the ECHR/Bill of Rights. The Committee shall have the power to call people and papers to assist in its consideration of the matter. The Assembly shall then consider the report of the Committee and can determine the matter in accordance with the cross-community consent procedure.
The above special procedure shall be followed when requested by the Executive Committee, or by the relevant Departmental Committee, voting on a cross-community basis.
When there is a petition of concern as in 5(d) above, the Assembly shall vote to determine whether the measure may proceed without reference to this special procedure. If this fails to achieve Support on a cross-community basis, as in 5(d) above, the special procedure shall be followed.
Executive Authority
14.
15.
16.
Executive authority to be discharged on behalf of the Assembly by a First Minister and Deputy First Minister and up to ten Ministers with Departmental responsibilities.
The First Minister and Deputy First Minister shall be jointly elected into office by the Assembly voting on a crosscommunity basis, according to 5(d)(II) above.
Following the election of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, the posts of Ministers will be allocated to

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17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
Reimagining Sri Lanka: Northern Ireland Insights
parties on the basis of the d'Hondt system by reference to the number of seats each party has in the Assembly.
The Ministers will constitute an Executive Committee, which will be convened, and presided over, by the First Minister and Deputy First Minister. - :
The duties of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister will include, inter alia, dealing with and co-ordinating the work of the Executive Committee and the response of the Northern Ireland administration to external relationships.
The Executive Committee will provide a forum for the discussion of, and agreement on, issues which cut across the responsibilities of two or more Ministers, for prioritising executive and legislative proposals and for recommending a common position where necessary (e.g. in dealing with external relationships).
The Executive Committee will seek to agree each year, and review as necessary, a programme incorporating an agreed budget linked to policies and programmes, subject to approval by the Assembly, after scrutiny in Assembly Committees, on a cross-community basis.
A party may decline the opportunity to nominate a person to serve as a Minister or may subsequently change its nominee.
All the Northern Ireland Departments will be headed by a Minister. All Ministers will liaise regularly with their respective Committee.
As a condition of appointment, Ministers, including the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, will affirm the terms of a Pledge of Office (Annex A) undertaking to discharge

24.
25.
Appendix A 99
effectively and in good faith all the responsibilities attaching to their office.
Ministers will have full executive authority in their respective areas of responsibility, within any broad programme agreed by the Executive Committee and endorsed by the Assembly as a whole.
An individual may be removed from office following a decision of the Assembly taken on a cross-community basis, if (s)he loses the confidence of the Assembly, voting on a cross-community basis, for failure to meet his or her responsibilities including, inter alia, those set out in the Pledge of Office. Those who hold office should use only democratic, non-violent means, and those who do not should be excluded or removed from office under these provisions.
Legislation
26.
The Assembly will have authority to pass primary legislation for Northern Ireland in devolved areas, subject tO:
(a) the ECHR and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland supplementing it which, if the courts found to be breached would render the relevant legislation null and void;
(b) decisions by simple majority of members voting, except when decision on a cross-community basis is required.
(c) detailed scrutiny and approval in the relevant
Departmental Committee;

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28.
29.
Reimagining Sri Lanka: Northern Ireland Insights
(d) mechanisms, based on arrangements proposed for the Scottish Parliament, to ensure suitable coordination, and avoid disputes, between the Assembly and the Westminster Parliament;
(e) option of the Assembly seeking to include Northern Ireland provisions in United Kingdom-wide legislation in the Westminister Parliament, especially on devolved issues where parity is normally maintained (e.g. Social security, company law).
The Assembly will have authority to legislate in reserved areas with the approval of the Secretary of State and subject to Parliamentary control.
Disputes over legislative competence will be decided by the Courts.
Legislation could be initiated by an individual, a Committee or a Minister.
Relations with other Institutions
30.
31.
Arrangements to represent the Assembly as a whole, at Summit level and in dealings with other institutions, will be in accordance with paragraph 18, and will be such as to ensure cross-community involvement.
Terms will be agreed between appropriate Assembly representatives and the Government of the United Kingdom to ensure effective co-ordination and input by Ministers to national policy-making, including on EU issues.

32.
33.
34.
Appendix A 101
Role of Secretary of State:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
to remain responsible for NIO matters not devolved to the Assembly, subject to regular consultation with the Assembly and Ministers;
to approve and lay before the Westminster Parliament any Assembly legislation on reserved matters;
to represent Northern Ireland interests in the United Kingdom Cabinet;
to have the right to attend the Assembly at their invitation.
The Westminster Parliament (whose power to make legislation for Northern Ireland would remain unaffected)
will;
(a)
(b)
(c)
legislate for non-devolved issues, other than where the Assembly legislates with the approval of the Secretary of State and subject to the control of Parliament;
to legislate as necessary to ensure the United Kingdom's international obligations are met in respect of Northern Ireland;
scrutinise, including through the Northern Ireland Grand and Select Committees, the responsibilities of
the Secretary of State.
A consultative Civic Forum will be established. It will comprise representatives of the business, trade unions and

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voluntary sectors and such other sectors as agreed by the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister. It will act as a consultative mechanism on social, economic and cultural issues. The First Minister and the Deputy First Minister will by agreement provide administrative support for the Civic Forum and establish guidelines for the selection of representatives to the Civic Forum.
Transitional Arrangements
35.
The Assembly will meet first for the purpose of organisation, without legislative or executive powers, to resolve its standing orders and working practices and make preparations for the effective functioning of the Assembly, the British-Irish Council and the North/South Ministerial Council and associated implementation bodies. In this transitional period, those members of the Assembly serving as shadow Ministers shall affirm their commitment to nonviolence and exclusively peaceful and democratic means and their opposition to any use or threat of force by others for any political purpose; to work in good faith to bring the new arrangements into being; and to observe the spirit of the Pledge of Office applying to appointed Ministers.
Review
36.
After a specified period there will be a review of these arrangements, including the details of electoral arrangements and of the Assembly's procedures, with a view to agreeing any adjustments necessary in the interests of efficiency and fairness.

Appendix A 103
Annex A
Pledge of Office
To pledge:
(a) to discharge in good faith all the duties of office;
(b) commitment to non-violence and exclusively peaceful and
democratic means;
(c) serve all the people of Northern Ireland equally, and to act in accordance with the general obligations on government to promote equality and prevent discrimination;
(d) to participate with colleagues in the preparation of a
programme for government;
(e) to operate within the framework of that programme when agreed within the Executive Committee and endorsed by the Assembly;
(f) to support and to act in accordance with all decisions of
the Executive Committee and Assembly;
(g) to comply with the Ministerial Code of Conduct.
Code of Conduct
Ministers must at all times:
observe the highest standards of propriety and regularity involving impartiality, integrity and objectivity in relationship to the stewardship of public funds;

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be accountable to users of services, the community and, through the Assembly, for the activities within their responsibilities, their stewardship of public funds and the extent to which key performance targets and objectives have been met;
ensure all reasonable requests for information from the Assembly, users of services and individual citizens are complied with; and the Departments and their staff conduct their dealings with the public in an open and responsible way;
follow the seven principles of public life set out by Committee on Standards in Public Life; comply with this code and with rules relating to the use of public funds; operate in a way conducive to promoting good community relations and equality of treatment; not use information gained in the course of their service for personal gain; nor seek to use the opportunity of public service to promote their private interests;
ensure they comply with any rules on the acceptance of gifts and hospitality that might be offered;
declare any personal or business interests which may conflict with their responsibilities. The Assembly will retain a Register of Interests. Individuals must ensure that any direct or indirect pecuniary interests which members of the public might reasonably think could influence their judgement are listed in the Register of Interests;

Appendix A 105
STRAND TWO
North/South Ministerial Council
Under a new British/Irish Agreement dealing with the totality of relationships, and related legislation at Westminster and in the Oireachtas, a North/South Ministerial Council to be established to bring together those with executive responsibilities in Northern Ireland and the Irish Government, to develop consultation, co-operation and action within the island of Ireland including through implementation on an all-island and cross-border basis - on matters of mutual interest within the competence of the Administrations, North and South.
All Council decisions to be by agreement between the two sides. Northern Ireland to be represented by the First Minister, Deputy First Minister and any relevant Ministers, the Irish Government by the Taoiseach and relevant Ministers, all operating in accordance with the rules for democratic authority and accountability in force in the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Oireachtas respectively. Participation in the Council to be one of the essential responsibilities attaching to relevant posts in the two Administrations. If a holder of a relevant post will not participate normally in the Council, the Taoiseach in the case of the Irish Government and the First and Deputy First Minister in the case of the Northern Ireland Administration to be able to make alternative arrangements.
The Council to meet in different formats:
(i) in plenary format twice a year, with Northern Ireland representation led by the First Minister and Deputy

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(ii)
(iii)
First Minister and the Irish Government led by the Taoiseach; in specific sectoral formats on a regular and frequent basis with each side represented by the appropriate Minister;
in an appropriate format to consider institutional or cross sectoral matters (including in relation to the EU) and to resolve disagreement.
Agendas for all meetings to be settled by prior agreement between the two sides, but it will be open to either to propose any matter for consideration or action.
The Council:
5.
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
to exchange information, discuss and consult with a view to co-operating on matters of mutual interest within the competence of both Administrations, North and South;
to use best endeavours to reach agreement on the adoption of common policies, in areas where there is a mutual cross-border and all-island benefit, and which are within the competence of both Administrations, North and South, making determined efforts to overcome any disagreements;
to take decisions by agreement on policies for implementation Separately in each jurisdiction, in relevant meaningful areas within the competence of both Administrations, North and South.
to take decisions by agreement on policies and action at an all-island and cross-border level to be implemented by the bodies to be established as set out in paragraphs 8 and 9 below.

Appendix A 107
Each side to be in a position to take decisions in the Council within the defined authority of those attending, through the arrangements in place for co-ordination of executive functions within each jurisdiction. Each side tó remain accountable to the Assembly and Oireachtas respectively, whose approval, through the arrangements in place on either side, would be required for decisions beyond the defined authority of those attending.
As soon as practically possible after elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly, inaugural meetings will take place of the Assembly, the British/Irish Council and the North/South Ministerial Council in their transitional forms. All three institutions will meet regularly and frequently on this basis during the period between the elections to the Assembly, and the transfer of powers to the Assembly, in order to establish their modus operandi.
During the transitional period between the elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly and the transfer of power to it, representatives of the Northern Ireland transitional Administration and the Irish Government operating in the North/South Ministerial Council will undertake a work programme, in consultation with the British Government, covering at least 12 Subject areas, with a view to identifying and agreeing by 31 October 1998 areas where co-operation and implementation for mutual benefit will take place. Such areas may include matters in the list set out in the Annex.
As part of the work programme, the Council will identify and agree at least 6 matters for co-operation and implementation in each of the following categories:
(i) Matters where existing bodies will be the appropriate mechanisms for co-operation in each separate jurisdiction;

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11.
12.
13.
14.
108 Reimagining Sri Lanka: Northern Ireland Insights
(ii) Matters where the co-operation will take place through agreed implementation bodies on a crossborder or all-island level.
The two Governments will make necessary legislative and other enabling preparations to ensure, as an absolute commitment, that these bodies, which have been agreed as a result of the work programme, function at the time of the inception of the British-Irish Agreement and the transfer of powers, with legislative authority for these bodies transferred to the Assembly as soon as possible thereafter. Other arrangements for the agreed co-operation will also commence contemporaneously with the transfer of powers to the Assembly.
The implementation bodies will have a clear operational remit. They will implement on an all-island and cross-border basis policies agreed in the Council.
Any further development of these arrangements to be by agreement in the Council and with the specific endorsement of the Northern Ireland Assembly and Oireachtas, subject to the extent of the competences and responsibility of the two Administrations.
It is understood that the North/South Ministerial Council and the Northern Ireland Assembly are mutually interdependent, and that one cannot successfully function without the other.
Disagreements within the Council to be addressed in the format described at paragraph 3(iii) above or in the plenary format. By agreement between the two sides, experts could be appointed to consider a particular matter and report.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
Appendix A 109
Funding to be provided by the two Administrations on the basis that the Council and the implementation bodies constitute a necessary public function.
The Council to be supported by a standing joint Secretariat, staffed by members of the Northern Ireland Civil Service and the Irish Civil Service.
The Council to consider the European Union dimension of relevant matters, including the implementation of EU policies and programmes and proposals under consideration in the EU framework. Arrangements to be made to ensure that the views of the Council are taken into account and represented appropriately at relevant EU meetings.
The Northern Ireland Assembly and the Oireachtas to consider developing a joint parliamentary forum, bringing together equal numbers from both institutions for discussion of matters of mutual interest and concern.
Consideration to be given to the establishment of an independent consultative forum appointed by the two Administrations, representative of civil society, comprising the social partners and other members with expertise in social, cultural, economic and other issues.
ANNEX
Areas for North/South co-operation and implementation may include the following:
1.
2.
Agriculture - animal and plant health.
Education - teacher qualifications and exchanges.

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10.
11.
12.
Reimagining Sri Lanka: Northern Ireland Insights
Transport - strategic transport planning.
Environment - environmental protection, pollution, water quality, and waste management.
Waterways - inland waterways.
Social Security/Social Welfare - entitlements of crossborder workers and fraud control.
Tourism - promotion, marketing, research, and product development.
Relevant EA. Programmes such as SPPR, INTERREC, Leader 11 and their successors.
Inland fisheries.
Aquaculture and marine matters.
Health: accident and emergency services and other related cross-border issues.
Urban and rural development.
Others to be considered by the shadow North/South Council.

Appendix A 111
STRAND THREE
British-Irish Council
A British-Irish Council (BIC) will be established under a new British-Irish Agreement to promote the harmonious and mutually beneficial development of the totality of relationships among the peoples of these islands.
Membership of the BIC will comprise representatives of the British and Irish Governments, devolved institutions in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, when established, and, if appropriate, elsewhere in the United Kingdom, together with representatives of the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands.
The BIC will meet in different formats: at summit level, twice per year; in specific sectoral formats on a regular basis, with each side represented by the appropriate Minister; in an appropriate format to consider crossSectoral matters.
Representatives of members will operate in accordance with whatever procedures for democratic authority and accountability are in force in their respective elected institutions.
The BIC will exchange information, discuss, consult and use best endeavours to reach agreement on co-operation on matters of mutual interest within the competence of the relevant Administrations. Suitable issues for early discussion in the BIC could include transport links,

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10.
Reimagining Sri Lanka: Northern Ireland Insights
agricultural issues, environmental issues, cultural issues, health issues, education issues and approaches to EA. issues. Suitable arrangements to be made for practical co-operation on agreed policies.
In will be open to the BIC to agree common policies or common actions. Individual members may opt not to participate in such common policies and common action.
The BIC normally will operate by consensus. In relation to decisions on common policies or common actions, including their means of implementation, it will operate by agreement of all members participating in such policies or actions.
The members of the BIC, on a basis to be agreed between them, will provide such financial support as it may require.
A secretariat for the BIC will be provided by the British and Irish Governments in co-ordination with officials
of each of the other members.
In addition to the structures provided for under this agreement, it will be open to two or more members to develop bilateral or multilateral arrangements between them. Such arrangements could include, subject to the agreement of the members concerned, mechanisms to enable consultation, co-operation and joint decisionmaking on matters of mutual interest; and mechanisms to implement any joint decisions they may reach. These arrangements will not require the prior approval of the BIC as a whole and will operate independently of it.

11.
12.
Appendix A. 113
The elected institutions of the members will be encouraged to develop interparliamentary links, perhaps building on the British-Irish Interparliamentary Body.
The full membership of the BIC will keep under review the workings of the Council, including a formal published review at an appropriate time after the Agreement comes into effect and will contribute as appropriate to any review of the overall political agreement arising from the multi-party negotiations.
British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference
There will be a new British-Irish Agreement dealing with the totality of relationships. It will establish a standing British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, which will subsume both the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council and the Intergovernmental Conference established under the 1985 Agreement.
The Conference will bring together the British and Irish Governments to promote bilateral co-operation at all levels on all matters of mutual interest within the competence of both Governments.
The Conference will meet as required at Summit level (Prime Minister and Taoiseach). Other-wise, Governments will be represented by appropriate Ministers. Advisers, including police and security advisers, will attend as appropriate.
All decisions will be by agreement between both Governments. The Governments will make determined

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efforts to resolve disagreements between them. There will be no derogation from the sovereignty of either Government.
In recognition of the Irish Government's special interest in Northern Ireland and of the extent to which issues of mutual concern arise in relation to Northern Ireland, there will be regular and frequent meetings of the Conference concerned with non-devolved Northern Ireland matters, on which the Irish Government may put forward views and proposals. These meetings, to be co-chaired by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, would also deal with all-island and cross-border co-operation on non-devolved.
Co-operation within the framework of the Conference will include facilitation of co-operation in security matters. The Conference also will address, in particular, the areas of rights, justice, prisons and policing in Northern Ireland (unless and until responsibility is devolved to a Northern Ireland administration) and will intensify co-operation between the two Governments on the all-island or crossborder aspects of these matters.
Relevant executive members of the Northern Ireland Administration will be involved in meetings of the Conference, and in the reviews referred to in paragraph 9 below to discuss non-devolved Northern Ireland matters.
The Conference will be supported by officials of the British and Irish Governments, including by a standing joint Secretariat of officials dealing with non-devolved Northern Ireland matters.

Appendix A 115
The Conference will keep under review the workings of the new British-Irish Agreement and the machinery and institutions established under it, including a formal published review three years after the Agreement comes into effect. Representatives of the Northern Ireland Administration will be invited to express views to the Conference in this COInteXt.
The Conference will contribute as appropriate to any review of the overall political agreement arising from the multi-party negotiations but will have no power to override the democratic arrangements set up by this Agreement.
Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity
Human Rights
1.
The parties affirm their commitment to the mutual respect, the civil rights and the religious liberties of everyone in the community. Against the background of the recent history of communal conflict, the parties affirm in particular:
the right of free political thought;
the right to freedom and expression of religion;
the right to pursue democratically national and political aspirations;
the right to seek constitutional change by peaceful and legitimate means;
the right to freely choose one's place of residence;

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the right to equal opportunity in all social and economic activity, regardless of class, creed, disability, gender or ethnicity;
the right to freedom from sectarian harassment; and
the right of women to full and equal political participation.
United Kingdom Legislation
2. The British Government will complete incorporation into Northern Ireland law of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), with direct access to the courts, and remedies for breach of the Convention, including power for the courts to overrule Assembly legislation on grounds of inconsistency.
3. Subject to the outcome of public consultation underway, the British Government intends, as a particular priority, to create a statutory obligation on public authorities in Northern Ireland to carry out all their functions with due regard to the need to promote equality of opportunity in relation to religion and political opinion; gender; race; disability; age; marital status; dependants; and sexual orientation. Public bodies would be required to draw up statutory schemes showing how they would implement this obligation. Such schemes would cover arrangements for policy appraisal, including an assessment of impact on relevant categories, public consultation, public access to information and services, monitoring and timetables.

New
Appendix A 117
The new Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (see paragraph 5 below) will be invited to consult and to advise on the scope for defining in Westminster legislation, rights supplementary to those in the European Convention on Human Rights, to reflect the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland, drawing as appropriate on international instruments and experience. These additional rights to reflect the principles of mutual respect for the identity and ethos of both communities and parity of esteem, and taken together with the ECHR - to constitute a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. Among the issues for consideration by the Commission will be:
the formulation of a general obligation on government and public bodies fully to respect, on the basis of equality of treatment, the identity and ethos of both communities in Northern Ireland; and H a clear formulation of the rights not to be discriminated against and to equality of opportunity in both the public and private sectors.
Institutions in Northern Ireland
A new Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, with membership from Northern Ireland reflecting the community balance, will be established by Westminister legislation, independent of Government, with an extended and enhanced role beyond that currently exercised by the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights, to include keeping under review the adequacy and effectiveness of laws and practices, making recommendations to Government as necessary; providing information and promoting awareness of

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human rights; considering draft legislation referred to them by the new Assembly; and, in appropriate cases, bringing court proceedings or providing assistance to individuals doing so.
Subject to the outcome of public consultation currently underway, the British Government intends a new statutory Equality Commission to replace the Fair Employment Commission, the Equal Opportunities Commission (NI), the Commission for Racial Equality (NI) and the Disability Council. Such a unified Commission will advise on, validate and monitor the statutory obligation and will investigate complaints of default.
It would be open to a new Northern Ireland Assembly to consider bringing together its responsibilities for these matters into a dedicated Department of Equality.
These improvements will build on existing protections in Westminster legislation in respect of the judiciary, the System of justice and policing.
Comparable Steps by the Irish Government
9.
The Irish Government will also take steps to further strengthen the protection of human rights in its jurisdiction. The Government will, taking account of the work of the All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution and the Report of the Constitution Review Group, bring forward measures to strengthen and underpin the constitutional protection of human rights. These proposals will draw on the European Convention on Human Rights and other international legal instruments in the field of human rights and the question of the incorporation of the ECHR will be further

Appendix A 119
examined in this context. The measures brought forward would ensure at least an equivalent level of protection of human rights as will pertain in Northern Ireland. In addition, the Irish Government will:
establish a Human Rights Commission with a mandate and remit equivalent to that within Northern Ireland;
proceed with arrangements as quickly as possible to ratify the Council of Europe Framework Convention on National Minorities (already ratified by the UK);
implement enhanced employment equality legislation;
introduce equal status legislation; and
continue to take further active steps to demonstrate
its respect for the different traditions in the island of Ireland.
A Joint Committee
10.
It is envisaged that there would be a joint committee of representatives of the two Human Rights Commissions, North and South, as a forum for consideration of human rights issues in the island of Ireland. The joint committee will consider, among other matters, the possibility of establishing a charter, open to signature by all democratic political parties, reflecting and endorsing agreed measures for the protection of the fundamental rights of everyone living in the island of Ireland.

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Reconciliation and Victims of Violence
11.
2.
13.
The participants believe that it is essential to acknowledge and address the suffering of the victims of violence as a necessary element of reconciliation. They look forward to the results of the work of the Northern
Ireland Victims Commission.
It is recognised that victims have a right to remember as well as to contribute to a changed society. The achievement of a peaceful and just society would be the true memorial to the victims of violence. The participants particularly recognise that young people from areas affected by the troubles face particular difficulties and will support the development of special community-based initiatives based on international best practice. The provision of services that are supportive and sensitive to the needs of victims will also be a critical element and that support will need to be channelled through both statutory and communitybased voluntary organisations facilitating locally-based selfhelp and support networks. This will require the allocation of Sufficient resources, including statutory funding as necessary, to meet the needs of victims and to provide for community-based Support programmes.
The participants recognise and value the work being done by many organisations to develop reconciliation and mutual understanding and respect between and within communities and traditions, in Northern Ireland and between North and South, and they see such work as having a vital role in consolidating peace and political agreement. Accordingly, they pledge their continuing support to such organisations and will positively examine the case for enhanced financial assistance for the work of reconciliation. An essential

Appendix A 121
aspect of the reconciliation process is the promotion of a culture of tolerance at every level of society, including initiatives to facilitate and encourage integrated education and mixed housing.
Economic, Social and Cultural Issues
1. Pending the devolution of powers to a new Northern Ireland Assembly, the British Government will pursue broad policies for sustained economic growth and stability in Northern Ireland and for promoting social inclusion, including in particular community development and the advancement of women in public life.
2. Subject to the public consultation currently under way, the British Government will make rapid progress with:
(i) a new regional development strategy for Northern Ireland, for consideration in due course by the Assembly, tackling the problems of a divided Society and social cohesion in urban, rural and border areas, protecting and enhancing the environment, producing new approaches to transport issues, strengthening the physical infrastructure of the region, developing the advantages and resources of rural areas and rejuvenating major urban centres;
(ii) a new economic development strategy for Northern Ireland for consideration in due course by the Assembly which would provide for short and medium term economic planning linked as appropriate to the regional development strategy; and

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(iii) measures on employment equality included in the recent White Paper ("Partnership for Equality") and covering the extension and strengthening of anti-discrimination legislation, a review of the national security aspects of the present fair employment legislation at the earliest possible time, a new more focused Targeting Social Need initiative and a range of measures aimed at combating un employment and progressively eliminating the differential in unemployment rates between the two communities by targeting objective need.
All participants recognise the importance of respect, understanding and tolerance in relation to linguistic diversity, including in Northern Ireland, the Irish language, Ulster-Scots and the languages of the various ethnic communities, all of which are part of the cultural wealth of the island of Ireland.
In the context of active consideration currently being given to the UK signing the Council of Europe Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, the British Government will in particular in relation to the Irish language, where appropriate and where people so desire it:
take resolute action to promote the language;
facilitate and encourage the use of the language in speech and writing in public and private life where there is appropriate demand;
seek to remove, where possible, restrictions which would discourage or work against the maintenance or development of the language;

Appendix A 123
make provision for liaising with the Irish language community, representing their views to public authorities and investigating complaints;
place a statutory duty on the Department of Education to encourage and facilitate Irish medium education in line with current provision for integrated education;
explore urgently with the relevant British authorities, and in co-operation with the Irish broadcasting authorities, the scope for achieving more widespread availability of Teilifis na Gaeilige in Northern Ireland.
seek more effective ways to encourage and provide financial support for Irish language film and television production in Northern Ireland; and
encourage the parties to secure agreement that this commitment will be sustained by new Assembly in a way which takes account of the desires and sensitivities of the community.
5. All participants acknowledge the sensitivity of the use of symbols and emblems for public purposes, and the need in particular in creating the new institutions to ensure that such symbols and emblems are used in a manner which promotes mutual respect rather than division. Arrangements will be made to monitor this issue and consider what action might be required.
DECOMMISSIONING
1. Participants recall their agreement in the Procedural Motion adopted on 24 September 1997 "that the resolution of the

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decommissioning issue is an indispensable part of the process of negotiation", and also recall the provisions of paragraph 25 of Strand 1 above.
They note the progress made by the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning and the Governments in developing schemes which can represent a w orkable basis for achie ving the decommissioning of illegally-held arms in the possession of paramilitary groups.
All participants accordingly reaffirm their commitment to the total disarmament of all para military organisations. They also confirm their intention to continue to work constructively and in good faith with the Independent Commission, and to use any influence they may have to achieve the decommissioning of all para military arms within two years following endorsement in referendums North and South of the agreement and in the context of the implementation of the overall settlement.
.The Independent Commission will monitor, review and verify progress on decommissioning of illegal arms, and will report to both Governments at regular intervals.
Both Governments will take all necessary steps to facilitate the decommissioning process to include bringing the relevant schemes into force by the end of June.
SECURITY
The participants note that the development of a peaceful environment on the basis of this agreement can and should mean a normalisation of Security arrangements and practices.

Appendix A 125
2. The British Government will make progress towards the objective of as early a return as possible to normal security arrangements in Northern Ireland, consistent with the level of threat and with a published overall strategy, dealing with:
(i) the reduction of the numbers and role of the Armed Forces deployed in Northern Ireland to levels compatible with a normal peaceful society;
(ii) the removal of security installations;
(iii) the removal of emergency powers in Northern
Ireland; and
(iv) other measures appropriate to and compatible with
a normal peaceful society
3. The Secretary of State will consult regularly on progress, and the response to any continuing paramilitary activity, with the Irish Government and the political parties, as appropriate.
4. The British Government will continue its consultation on firearms regulation and control on the basis of the document published on 2 April 1998.
5. The Irish Government will initiate a wide-ranging review of the Offences Against the State Acts 1939-85 with a view to both reform and dispensing with those elements no longer required as circumstances permit.
POLICING AND JUSTICE
1. The participants recognise the full and equal legitimacy and worth of the identities, senses of allegiance and

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ethos of all sections of the community in Northern Ireland. They consider that this opportunity should inform and underpin the development of a police service representative in terms of the make-up of the community as a whole and which, in a peaceful environment, should be routinely unarmed.
The participants believe it essential that policing structures and arrangements are such that the police service is professional, effective and efficient fair and impartial, free from partisan political control; accountable, both under the law for its actions and to the community it serves; representative of the society it polices, and operates within a coherent and cooperative criminal justice system, which conforms with human rights norms. The participants also believe that those structures and arrangements must be capable of maintaining law and order including responding effectively to crime and to any terrorist threat and to public order problems. A police service which cannot do so will fail to win public confidence and acceptance. They believe that any such structures and arrangements should be capable of delivering a policing service, in constructive and inclusive partnerships with the community at all levels, and with the maximum delegation of authority and responsibility, consistent with the foregoing principles. These arrangements should be based on principles of protection of human rights and professional integrity and should be unambiguously accepted and actively supported by the entire community.
An independent Commission will be established to make recommendations for future policing arrangements in Northern Ireland including means of encouraging Widespread community Support for these arrangements

Appendix A 127
within the agreed framework of principles reflected in the paragraphs above and in accordance with the terms of reference at Annex A. The Commission will be broadly representative with expert and international representation among its membership and will be asked to consult widely and to report no later than Summer 1999.
The participants believe that the aims of the criminal
justice system are to:
deliver a fair and impartial system of justice to the community;
be responsive to the community's concerns, and encouraging community involvement where appropriate;
have the confidence of all parts of the community; and
deliver justice efficiently and effectively.
There will be a parallel wide-ranging review of criminal justice (other than policing and those aspects of the system relating to the emergency legislation) to be carried out by the British Government through a mechanism with an independent element, in consultation with the political parties and others. The review will commence as soon as possible, will include wide consultation, and a report will be made to the Secretary of State no la ter than Autumn 1999. Terms of Reference are attached at Annex B.
Implementation of the recommendations arising from both reviews will be discussed with the political parties and with the Irish Government.

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7. The participants also note that the British Government remains ready in principle, with the broad support of the political parties, and after consultation, as appropriate, with the Irish Government, in the context of ongoing implementation of the rele vant recommendations, to devolve responsibility for policing and justice issues.
ANNEX A
Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland
Terms of Reference
Taking account of the principles on policing as set out in the agreement, the Commission will inquire into policing in Northern Ireland and, on the basis of its findings, bring forward proposals for future policing structures and arrangements, including means of encouraging widespread community support for those arrangements.
Its proposals on policing should be designed to ensure that policing arrangements, including composition, recruitment, training, culture, ethos and symbols, are such that in a new approach Northern Ireland has a police service that can enjoy widespread support from and is seen as an integral part of the community as a whole.
Its proposals should include recommendations covering any issues such as re-training, job placement and educational and professional development required in the transition to policing in a peaceful society.

Appendix A 129
Its proposals should also be designed to ensure that:
the police service is structured, managed and resourced so that it can be effective in discharging its full range of functions (including proposals on any necessary arrangements for the transition to policing in a normal peaceful Society);
the police service is delivered in constructive and inclusive partnerships with the community at all levels with the maximum de legation of authority and responsibility; the legislative and constitutional framework required the impartial discharge of policing functions and conforms with internationally accepted norms in relation to policing standards;
the police operate within a clear framework of accountability to the law and the community they Serve, SO:
they are constrained by, accountable to and act only within the law;
their powers and procedures, like the law they enforce, are clearly established and publicly available;
there are open accessible and independent means of investigating and adjudicating upon complaints against the police;
there are clearly established arrangements enabling local people, and their political representatives, to articulate their views and concerns about policing and to establish publicly

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policing priorities and influence policing policies, subject to safeguards to ensure police impartiality and freedom from partisan political control;
there are arrangements for accountability and for the effective, efficient and economic use of resources in achieving policing objectives;
there are means to ensure independent professional scrutiny and inspection of the police service to ensure that proper professional standards are maintained;
the scope for structured co-operation with the Garda Siochana and other police forces is addressed; and
the management of public order events which can impose exceptional demands on policing resources is also addressed.
The Commission should focus on policing issues, but if it identifies other aspects of the criminal justice system relevant to its work on policing, including the role of the police in prosecution, then it should draw the attention of the Government to those matters.
The Commission should consult widely, including with nongovernmental expert organisations, and through such focus groups as they consider it appropriate to establish.
The Government proposes to establish the Commission as soon as possible, with the aim of it starting work as soon as possible and publishing its final report by Summer 1999.

Appendix A 31
ANNEX B
Review of the Criminal Justice System
Terms of Reference
Taking account of the aims of the criminal justice system as set out in the Agreement, the review will address the structure, management and resourcing of publicly funded elements of the criminal justice system and will bring forward proposals for future criminal justice arrangements (other than policing and those aspects of the system relating to emergency legislation, which the Government is considering separately) covering such issues as:
the arrangements for making appointments to the judiciary and magistracy and safeguards for protecting their independence;
the arrangements for the organisation and Supervision of the prosecution process, and for safeguarding its independence;
measures to improve the responsiveness and accountability of, and any lay participation in the criminal justice system;
mechanisms for addressing law reform;
the scope for structured co-operation between the criminal justice agencies on both parts of the island; and
the structure and organisation of criminal justice functions that might be devolved to an Assembly,

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including the possibility of establishing a Department of Justice, while safeguarding the essential independence of many of the key functions in this area.
The Government proposes to commence the review as soon as possible, consulting with the political parties and others, including non-governmental expert organisations. The review will be completed by Autumn 1999.
PRISONERS
1. Both Governments will put in place mechanisms to provide for an accelerated programme for the release of prisoners, including transferred prisoners, convicted of scheduled offences in Northern Ireland or, in the case of those sentenced outside Northern Ireland, similar offences (referred to hereafter as qualifying prisoners). Any such arrangements will protect the rights of individual prisoners under national and international law.
2. Prisoners affiliated to organisations which have not established or are not maintaining a complete and une quivocal cease-fire will not benefit from the arrangements. The situation in this regard will be kept under review.
3. Both Governments will complete a review process within a fixed time frame and set prospective release dates for all qualifying prisoners. The review process would provide for the advance of the release dates of qualifying prisoners while allowing account to be taken of the seriousness of the offences for which the person was convicted and the need to protect the community. In

Appendix A 133
addition, the intention would be that should the circumstances allow it, any qualifying prisoners who remained in custody two years after the commencement of the scheme would be released at that point.
The Governments will seek to enact the appropriate legislation to give effect to these arrangements by the end of June 1998.
The Governments continue to recognise the importance of measures to facilitate the reintegration of prisoners into the community by providing support both prior to and after release, including assistance directed towards availing of employment opportunities, retraining and/or re-skilling, and further education.
VALIDATION, IMPLEMENTATION AND REVIEW
Validation and Implementation
1.
The two Governments will as soon as possible sign a new British-Irish Agreement replacing the 1985 AngloIrish Agreement, embodying understandings on constitutional issues and affirming their solemn commitment to support and, where appropriate, implement the agreement reached by the participants in the negotiations which shall be annexed to the British-Irish Agreement.
Each Government will organise a referendum on 22 May 1998. Subject to Parliamentary approval, a consultative referendum in Northern Ireland, organised under the terms of the Northern Ireland (Entry to

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Negotiations, etc.) Act 1996, will address the question: "Do you support the agreement reached in the multiparty talks on Northern Ireland and set out in Command Paper 3883?". The Irish Government will introduce and support in the Oireachtas a Bill to amend the Constitution as described in paragraph 2 of the section "Constitutional Issues" and in Annex B, as follows: (a) to amend Articles 2 and 3 as described in paragraph 8.1 in Annex B above and (b) to amend Article 29 to permit the Government to ratify the new British-Irish Agreement. On passage by the Oireachtas, the Bill will be put to referendum.
If majorities of those voting in each of the referendums support this agreement, the Governments will then introduce and support, in their respective Parliaments, such legislation as may be necessary to give effect to all aspects of this agreement, and will take whatever ancillary steps as may be required including the holding of elections on 25 June, subject to parliamentary approval, to the Assembly, which would meet initially in a "shadow" mode. The establishment of the North-South Ministerial Council, implementation bodies, the British-Irish Council and the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference and the assumption by the Assembly of its legislative and executive powers will take place at the same time on the entry into force of the British-Irish Agreement.
In the interim, aspects of the implementation of the multiparty agreement will be reviewed at meetings of those parties relevant in the particular case (taking into account, once Assembly elections have been held, the results of those elections), under the chairmanship of the British Government or the two Governments, as may be

Appendix A 135
appropriate; and representatives of the two Governments and all relevant parties may meet under independent chairmanship to review implementation of the agreement as a whole.
Review procedures following implementation
5.
Each institution may, at any time, review any problems that may arise in its operation and, where no other institution is affected, take remedial action in consultation as necessary with the relevant Government or Governments. It will be for each institution to determine its own procedures for review.
If there are difficulties in the operation of a particular institution, which have implications for another institution, they may review their operations separately and jointly and agree on remedial action to be taken under their respective authorities.
If difficulties arise which require remedial action across the range of institutions, or otherwise require amendment of the British-Irish Agreement or relevant legislation, the process of review will fall to the two Governments in consultation with the parties in the Assembly. Each Government will be responsible for action in its own
jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding the above, each institution will publish an annual report on its operations. In addition, the two Governments and the parties in the Assembly will convene a conference 4 years after the agreement comes into effect, to review and report on its operation.

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AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN RELAND AND THE GOVERNMENT OFIRELAND
The British and Irish Governments:
Welcoming the strong commitment to the Agreement reached on 10th April 1998 by themselves and other participants in the multi-party talks and set out in Annex 1 to this Agreement (hereinafter "the Multi-Party Agreement");
Considering that the Multi-Party Agreement offers an opportunity for a new beginning in relationships within Northern Ireland, within the island of Ireland and between the peoples of these islands;
Wishing to develop still further the unique relationship between their peoples and the close cooperation between their countries as friendly neighbours and as partners in the European Union. Reaffirming their total commitment to the principles of democracy and non-violence which have been fundamental to the multi-party talks;
Reaffirming their commitment to the principles of partnership, equality and mutual respect and to the protection of civil, political,
social, economic and cultural rights in their respective jurisdictions;
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
The Two Governments:
(i) recognise the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland

(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
Appendix A 137
with regard to its status, whether they prefer to continue to support the Union with Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland;
recognise that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively and without external impediment, to exercise their right of self determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish, accepting that this right must be achieved and exercised with and subject to the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland;
acknowledge that while a substantial section of the people in Northern Ireland share the legitimate wish of a majority of the people of the island of Ireland for a united Ireland, the present wish of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, freely exercised and legitimate, is to maintain the Union and accordingly, that Northern Ireland's status as part of the United Kingdom reflects and relies upon that wish; and that it would be wrong to make any change in the status of Northern Ireland save with the consent of a majority of its people;
affirm that, if in the future, the people of the island of Ireland exercise their right of self determination on the basis set out in sections (i) and (ii) above to bring about a united Ireland, it will be a binding obligation on both
Governments to introduce and support in their respective
Parliaments legislation to give effect that wish;
affirm that whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, the power of the sovereign government with jurisdiction there shall be exercised with rigorous impartiality on behalf of all the

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(vi)
Reimagining Sri Lanka: Northern Ireland Insights
people in the diversity of their identities and traditions and shall be founded on the principles of full respect for, and equality of, civil, political, social and cultural rights, of freedom from discrimination for all citizens and of parity of esteem and of just and equal treatment for the identity, ethos and aspirations of both communities;
recognise the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or both, as they may so choose, and accordingly confirm that their right to hold both British and Irish citizenship is accepted by both Governments and would not be affected by any future change in the status of Northern Ireland.
Article 2
The two Governments affirm their solemn commitment to support, and where appropriate implement, the provisions of the MultiParty Agreement. In particular there shall be established in accordance with the provisions of the Multi-Party Agreement immediately on the entry into force of this Agreement, the following institutions:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
a North/South Ministerial Council;
the implementation bodies referred to in paragraph 9(ii) of the section entitled "Strand Two" of the Multi-Party
Agreement;
a British-Irish Council;
a British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference.

(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)
Appendix A 139
Article 3
This Agreement shall replace the Agreement between the British and Irish Governments done at Hillsborough on 15th November 1985 which shall cease to have effect on entry into force of this Agreement.
The Intergovernmental Conference established by Article 2 of the aforementioned Agreement done on 15th November 1985 shall cease to exist on entry into force of this Agreement.
Article 4
It shall be a requirement for entry into force of this Agreement that:
(a) British legislation shall have been enacted for the purpose of implementing the provisions of Annex A to the section entitled "Constitutional Issues" of the Multi-Party Agreement;
(b) the amendments to the Constitution of Ireland set out in Annex B to the section entitled "Constitutional Issues" of the Multi-Party Agreement shall have been approved by Referendum;
(c) such legislation shall have been enacted as may be required to establish the institutions referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement.
Each Government shall notify the other in writing of the completion, so far as it is concerned, of the requirements for entry into force of this Agreement. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the receipt of the later of the two notifications.

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(3) Immediately on entry into force of this Agreement, the Irish Government shall ensure that the amendments to the Constitution of Ireland set out in Annex B to the section entitled "Constitutional Issues" of the Multi-Party agreement take effect.
In witness thereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto by the respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.
Done in two originals at Belfast on the 10th day of April 1998.
For the Government For the Government of the United Kingdom of of Ireland Great Britain and Northern
Annex 1
The Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Talks
Annex 2
Declaration on the Provisions of Paragraph (vi) of Article 1 In Relationship of Citizenship
The British and Irish Governments declare that it is their joint understanding that the term "the people of Northern Ireland" in paragraph (vi) of Article 1 of this Agreement means, for the purposes of giving effect to this provision, all persons born in Northern Ireland and having, at the time of their birth, at least one parent who is a British citizen, an Irish citizen or is otherwise entitled to reside in Northern Ireland without any restriction on their period of residence.

Appendix B
1. The Ministers' Draft Constitution of 1944
(Sessional Paper XIV of 1944)
7. Parliament may make laws for the peace, order and
good government of Ceylon.
8. In the exercise of its power under Article 7 Parliament
shall not make any law
(a) to prohibit or restrict the free exercise of any
religion; or
(b) to make persons of any community or religion liable to disabilities or restrictions to which persons of other communities or religions are not made available; or
(c) to confer on persons of any community or religion any privileges or advantages which are not conferred on persons of other communities or religions; or h−
(d) to alter the constitution of any religious body except with the approval of the governing authority of that religious body.
2. The Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council, 1946
29(1) Subject to the provisions of this Order, Parliament shall have power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Island.

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(2) No such law shall
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
prohibit or restrict the free exercise of any religion; or
make persons or any community or religion liable to disabilities or restrictions to which persons of other communities or religions are not made liable; ΟΥ
confer on persons of any community or religion any privilege or advantage which is not conferred on persons of other communities or religions; or
alter the constitution of any religious body except with the consent of the governing authority of that body;
Provided that, in any case where a religious body is incorporated by law, no such alterations shall be made except at the request of the governing authority of that body.
(3) Any law made in contravention of subsection (2) of this section shall, to the extent of such contravention, be void.
(4) In the exercise of its powers under this section, Parliament may amend or repeal any of the provisions of this Order, or of any other Order of His Majesty in Council in its application to the Island;
Provided that no Bill for the amendment or repeal of any of the provisions of this Order shall be presented for the Royal

Appendix B 143
Assent unless it has endorsed on it a certificate under the hand of the Speaker that the number of votes cast in favour thereof in the House of Representatives amounted to not less than two-thirds of the whole number of members of the House (including those not present).
Every certificate of the Speaker under this subsection shall be conclusive for all purposes and shall not be questioned in any court of law.

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Appendix C
Sinhala and Tamil as Official Languages
1. In the State Council (The Donoughmore Constitution)
(1) Mr.G.K.W. Perera - State Council Member for Matara -
Moved motion of 5th July 1932
This Council resolves -
(1) that no person shall in future be appointed into the Civil or Clerical Service who fails to reach a high standard in Sinhalese or Tamil;
(2) that no officer in the Civil or Clerical Service shall receive promotion until and unless he showed proficiency in Sinhalese or Tamil
(3) that no person shall be appointed as Police Magistrate to preside in the higher Criminal Courts unless he proved his ability to conduct and record proceedings in Sinhalese and Tamil
(4) that lawyers be permitted to conduct criminal trials in
Sinhalese and Tamil
-Hansard State Council, 5th July 1932 page 1641. (The Council was dissolved and the motion lapsed).
(2) Mr.J.R. Jayewardene - State Council Member for Kelaniya
Moved motion of 22nd June 1943

Appendix C 145
That with the object of making Sinhalese the official language of Ceylon within a reasonable number of years this Council is of opinion -
(a) that Sinhalese should be made the medium of instruction
in all schools;
(b) that Sinhalese should be made a compulsory subject in
all public examinations;
(c) that legislation should be introduced to permit the business
of the State Council to be conducted in Sinhalese also;
(d) that a Commission should be appointed to choose for translation and to translate important books of other languages into Sinhalese;
(e) that a Commission should be appointed to report on all steps that need to be taken to effect the translation from English into Sinhalese.
(Hansard, State Council, 22nd June 1943, page 1024).
(3) Mr.V.Nalliah - State Council Member for Trincomalee
Batticaloa moved an amendment to the above to make Sinhala and Tamil the Official Languages of the country.
(Hansard, State Council, 24th May page 759).
Mr.Nalliah's motion was passed by two-thirds majority with Mr.J.R.Jayewardene supporting and Mr.S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike abstaining

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2. The Official Language Act, No.33 of 1956 (Soulbury
Constitution)
An Act to prescribe the Sinhala Language as the One Official Language of Ceylon and to enable certain transitory provisions to be made. (Date of Assent: July 7, 1956)
Be it enacted by the Queens Most Excellent Majesty by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and the House of Representatives of Ceylon in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:
Short Title
1. This Act may be cited as the Official Language Act, No.33 of 1956. Sinhala Language to be the one official language.
2. The Sinhala language shall be the one official language of
Ceylon:
Provided that where the Minister considers it impracticable to commence the use of only the Sinhala language for any official purpose immediately on the coming into force of this Act, the language or languages hitherto used for that purpose may be continued to be so used until the necessary change is effected as early as possible before the expiry of the thirty-first of December, 1960, and, if such change cannot be effected by administrative order, regulations may be made under this Act to effect such changes. -
Regulations
3. (1) The Minister may make regulations in respect of all matters for which regulations are authorised by this Act to be made

Appendix C 147
and generally for the purpose of giving effect to the principles and provisions of this Act.
(2) No regulation made under sub-section (1) shall have effect until it is approved by the Senate and the House of Representatives and notification of such approval is published in the Gazette.
3. Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act No 28 of 1958 (Soulbury Constitution) (Date of Assent: September 4, 1958)
An Act to make provision for the use of the Tamil Language and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.
Whereas the Sinhala language has been declared by the Official Language Act, No.33 of 1956, to be the one official language of Ceylon:
And whereas it is expedient to make provision for the use of the Tamil language without conflicting with the provisions of the aforesaid Act:
Be it enacted by the Queens Most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and the House of
Representatives of Ceylon in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:
Short Title
1. This act may be cited as the Tamil Language (Special
Provisions) Act, No.28 of 1958.
Tamil language as a medium of instruction.
2. (1) A Tamil pupil in a Government school or an Assisted school shall be entitled to be instructed through the medium of the

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(2)
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Tamil language in accordance with such regulations under the Education Ordinance, No.31 of 1939, relating to the medium of instruction as are in force or may hereafter be brought into force. -
When the Sinhala language is made a medium of instruction in the University of Ceylon, the Tamil language shall, in accordance with the provisions of the University Ordinance, No.20 of 1942, and of the Statutes, Acts and Regulations made thereunder, be made a medium of instruction in such University for students who prior to their admission to such University, have been educated through the medium of the Tamil Language.
Tamil Language as a medium of examination for admission to the Public Service.
(а)
(b)
A person educated through the medium of the Tamil language shall be entitled to be examined through such medium at any examination for the admission of persons to the Public Service, subject to the condition that he shall, according as regulations made under this act on that behalf may require,
have a sufficient knowledge of the official language of Ceylon, or
acquire such knowledge within a specified time after admission to the Public Service:
Provided that, when the Government is satisfied that there are sufficient facilities for the teaching of the Sinhala language in schools in which the Tamil language is a medium of instruction and that the annulment of clause (b) of the preceding provisions of this section will not cause undue hardship, provision may be made by regulation, made under this Act that such clause shall cease to be in force.

Appendix C 149
Use of the Tamil language for correspondence
4.
Correspondence between persons, other than officials in their official capacity, educated through the medium of the Tamil language and any official in his official capacity or between any local authority in the Northern or Eastern Province and any official in his official capacity may, as prescribed, be in the Tamil language.
Use of the Tamil language for prescribed administrative purposes in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.
5.
In the Northern and Eastern Provinces the Tamil language may be used for prescribed administrative purposes, in addition to the purposes for which that language may be used in accordance with the other provisions of this Act, without prejudice to the use of the official language of Ceylon in respect of those prescribed administrative purposes.
Regulations
6.(1)
(2)
The Minister may make regulations to give effect to the principles and provisions of this Act.
No regulation made under sub-section (1) shall have effect until it is approved by the Senate and the House of Representatives and notification of such approval is published in the Gazette.
This Act to be subject to measures adopted or to be adopted under the proviso to section 2 of Act No.33 of 1956.
7.
This Act shall have effect subject to such measures as may have been or may be adopted under the proviso to section 2 of the Official Language Act, No.33 of 1956, during the period ending on the thirty-first day of December, 1960.

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Interpretation
8.
8. (1)
(2)
In this Act unless the context otherwise requires "Assisted School" and "Government School" shall have the same meaning as in the Education Ordinance, No.31 of 1939; "local authority" means any Municipal Council, Urban Council, Town Council or Village Committee; "official" means the Governor General, or any Minister, Parliamentary Secretary or officer or the Public Service; and "prescribed" means prescribed by regulation made under this Act.
Constitution of Sri Lanka (1972) - Chapter III (Srimavo Bandaranaike Constitution) (Adopted and enacted by the Constituent Assembly on the 22nd day of May 1972)
Language
Official Language
The official Language of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala as provided by the Official Language Act, No. 33 of 1956
The use of the Tamil language shall be in accordance with the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act, No. 28 of 1958.
Any regulation for the use of the Tamil language made under the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act, No. 28 of 1958. and in force immediately before the commencement of the Constitution shall not in any manner be interpreted as being a provision of the Constitution but shall be deemed to be subordinate legislation continuing in force as existing law under the provisions of section 12.

9. (1)
(2)
10.(1)
(2)
(3)
11.(1)
Appendix C 151
Language of Legislation
All laws shall be enacted or made in Sinhala.
There shall be a Tamil translation of every law so enacted or made.
All written laws, including subordinate legislation in force immediately prior to the commencement of the Constitution, shall be published in the Gazette in Sinhala and in Tamil translation as expeditiously as possible under the authority of the Minister in charge of the subject of Justice.
The laws as published shall be laid before the National State Assembly at the meeting next following the date of such publication.
Unless the National State Assembly otherwise provides, the law published in Sinhala under the provisions of subsection (1), shall, as from the date of such publication, be deemed to be the law and supersede the corresponding law in English
Language of the Courts
The language of the courts and tribunals empowered by law to administer justice and of courts, tribunals and other institutions established under the Industrial Disputes Act and of Conciliation Boards established under the Conciliation Boards Act, No. 10 of 1958, shall be Sinhala throughout Sri Lanka and accordingly their records, including pleadings, proceedings, judgements, orders and records of an judicial and ministerial acts, shall be in Sinhala:

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Provided that the National State Assembly may, by or under its law, provide otherwise in the case of institutions exercising original jurisdiction in the Northern and Eastern Provinces and also of the courts, tribunals and other institutions established under the Industrial Disputes Act and of Conciliation Boards established under the Conciliation Boards Act No 10 of 1958 in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.
(2) The Provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall apply to any institution which under any future law shall have a jurisdiction or function corresponding or substantially similar to the jurisdiction or function of any institution referred to in that subsection.
(3) In the Northern and Eastern Provinces and in proceedings before Quazis under the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act, parties, applicants and persons legally entitled to represent such parties or applicants before any court, tribunal or other institution referred to in subsection (1) or subsection (2) of this section may -
(a) submit their pleadings, applications, motions and
petitions in Tamil; and (b) participate in the proceedings in Tamil.
In all such cases a Sinhala translation shall be caused to be made by such court, tribunal or other institution referred to in subsection (1) or subsection (2) of this section for the purposes of the record.
(4) Every party, applicant, judge, juryman or member of a tribunal not conversant with the language used in a court, tribunal or other institution referred to in subsection (1) or subsection (2) of this section, shall have the right to interpretation, and to translation into Sinhala or Tamil provided by the State to

Appendix C 153
enable him to understand and participate in the proceedings before the court, tribunal or other institution referred to in subsection (1) or subsection (2) of this section.
Such person shall also have the right to obtain, in Sinhala or Tamil, any such part of the record as he may entitled to obtain according to law.
(5)
(6)
18.
19.
A person legally entitled to represent a party or an applicant may participate in the proceedings in any court, tribunal or other institution referred to in Subsection (1) or subsection (2) of this section, in Sinhala or Tamil, and shall be entitled for that purpose, to interpretation, in Sinhala or Tamil provided by the State.
Subject to the provisions contained in the preceding sub sections of this section, the Minister in charge of the subject of Justice may, with the concurrence of the Cabinet of Ministers, issue Orders, Directions and Instructions permitting the use of a language other than Sinhala or Tamil by a judge or other state officer administering justice or by a pleader appearing before a court, tribunal or other institution referred to in subsection (1) or subsection (2) of this section. Every judge and other state officer administering justice shall be bound to implement the Orders, Directions and Instructions issued under this subsection.
The Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka-1977 (J.R.Jayewardene
Constitution)
Language
The Official Language of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala The National Languages of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala and
Tamil.

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20. A Member of Parliament or a member of a local authority shall be, entitled to perform his duties and discharge his functions in Parliament or in such local authority in either of the National Languages.
21 (1) A person shall be entitled to be educated through the
medium of either of the National Languages:
Provided that the provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to an institution of higher education where the medium of instruction is a language other than a National Language.
(2) Where one National Language is a medium of instruction for or in any course, department or faculty of any University directly or indirectly financed by the State, the other National Language shall also be made a medium of instruction for or in such course, department or faculty for students, who prior to their admission to such University, were educated through the medium of such other National Language:
Provided that compliance with the preceding provisions of this paragraph shall not be obligatory if such other National Language is the medium of instruction for or in any like course, department or faculty either at any other campus or branch of such University or of any other like University.
(3) In this Article "University" includes any institution of higher
education.
22 (1) The Official Language shall be the language of administration throughout Sri Lanka -

Appendix C 155
Provided that the Tamil Language shall also be used as the language of administration for the maintenance of public records and the transaction of all business by public institutions in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.
(3)
(4)
(2) A person other than an official acting in his official
capacity, shall be entitled
(a) to receive communications from and to communicate and transact business with, any official in his official capacity, in either of the National Languages
(b) if the law recognises his right to inspect or to obtain copies of or extracts from any official register, record, publication or other document, to obtain a copy of, or an extract from such register, record, publication or other document or a translation thereof, as the case may be, in either of the National Languages; and
(c) where a document is expected by an official for the purpose of being issued to him to obtain such document or translation thereof in either of the national languages.
A local authority in the Northern or Eastern Province which conducts its business in either of the National Languages shall be entitled to receive communications from and to communicate and, transact business with any official in his official capacity, in such National Language.
All Orders, Proclamations, Rules, By-laws, Regulations and Notifications made or issued under any written law, the Gazette, and all other official documents including circulars and forms issued or used by any public institution or local authority, shall be published in both National Languages.

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(5)
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A person shall be entitled to be examined through the medium of either of the National Languages at any examination for the admission of persons to the Public Service, Judicial Service, Local Government Service, a public corporation or statutory institution, subject to the condition that he may be required to acquire a sufficient knowledge of the Official Language within a reasonable time after admission to any such service, public corporation or statutory institution where such knowledge is reasonably necessary for the discharge of his duties:
Provided that a person may be required to have a sufficient knowledge of the Official Language as a condition for admission to any such Service, public corporation or statutory institution
where recrui knowl
(6)
23.(1)
no function of the office or employment for which he is ted can be discharged otherwise than with a sufficient edge of the Official Language.
In this Article -
"official" means the President, any Minister, Deputy Minister, or any officer of a public institution or local authority; and public institution " means a department or institution of the Government,a public corporation or a statutory institution.
All laws and subordinate legislation shall be enacted or, made, and published. in both National Languages together with a translation in the English Language. In the event of any inconsistency between any two texts, the text in the Official Language shall prevail.
(2) All laws and subordinate legislation in force
immediately prior to the commencement of the

(3)
24. (1)
Appendix C 157
Constitution, shall be published in the Gazette in both National Languages as expeditiously as possible.
The law published in Sinhala under the provisions of paragraph (2) of this Article, shall, as from the date of such publication, be deemed to be the law and supersede the corresponding law in English.
The Official Language shall be the language of the courts throughout Sri Lanka and accordingly their records and proceedings shall be in the Official Language:
Provided that the language of the courts exercising original jurisdiction in the Northern and Eastern Provinces shall also be Tamil and their records and proceedings be in the Tamil Language. In the event of an appeal from any such court, records in both National Languages shall be prepared for the use of the court hearing such appeal:
Provided further that
(a) the Minister in charge of the subject of Justice may with the concurrence of the Cabinet of Ministers, direct that the record of any such court shall also he maintained and proceedings conducted in the Official Language; and
(b) the record of any particular proceeding in such court shall also be maintained in the Official Language if so required by the judge of Such court, or by any party or applicant or any person legally entitled to represent such party or applicant in such proceeding where such judge, party, applicant or person is not conversant with the Tamil Language.

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(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
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Any party or applicant or any person legally entitled to represent such party or applicant may initiate proceedings, and submit to court pleadings and other documents, and participate in the proceedings in court, in either of the National Languages.
Any judge, juror, party or applicant or any person legally entitled to represent such party or applicant, who is not conversant with the language used in a court, shall be entitled to interpretation and to translation into the appropriate National Language, provided by the State, to enable him to understand and participate in the proceedings before such court, and shall also be entitled to obtain in either of the National Languages, any such part of the record or a translation thereof, as the case may be, as he may be entitled to obtain according to law.
The Minister in charge of the subject of Justice may, with the concurrence of the Cabinet of Ministers, issue directions permitting the use of a language other than a National Language or in relation to the records and proceedings in any court for all purposes or for such purposes as may be specified therein, Every judge shall be bound to implement such directions.
In this Article - "court" means any court or tribunal created and established for the administration of justice including the adjudication and settlement of industrial and other disputes, or any other tribunal or institution exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions or any tribunal or institution created and established for the conciliation and settlement of disputes; "judge" includes, the President, Chairman, presiding officer and member of any court; and

Appendix C 159
"record" includes pleadings, judgements, orders and other judicial and ministerial acts.
25. The State shall provide adequate facilities for the use of the
languages provided for in this chapter
6. Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution (J. R. Jayewardene Constitution) (Certified on 17th December, 1988)
An Act to amend the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
Be it enacted by the Parliament of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka as follows:
1. This Act may be cited as the Sixteenth Amendment to the
Constitution.
2. Article 20 of the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution) is hereby amended as follows
(1) by the substitution, for the words "or a member of a local authority ", of the words "ora member of Provincial Council or a local authority"; and
(2) by the substitution, for the words "or in such local authority", of the words "or in such Provincial Council or local authority".
3. Articles 22 and 23 of the Constitution are hereby repealed
and the following Articles substituted therefor:-
22. (1) Sinhala and Tamil shall be the languages of administration throughout Sri Lanka and Sinhala shall be the language of

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administration and be used for the maintenance of public records and the transaction of all business by public institutions of all the provinces of Sri Lanka other than the Northern and Eastern Provinces where Tamil shall be so used:
Provided that the President may, having regard to the proportion which the Sinhala or Tamil linguistic minority population in any unit comprising a division of an Assistant Government Agent, bears to the total population of that area, direct that both Sinhala and Tamil or a language other than the language used as the language of administration in the province in which such area may be situate be used as the language of administration for such area.
(2) In any area where Sinhala is used as the language of administration a person other than an official acting in his official capacity, shall be entitled
(a) to receive communications from and to communicate and transact business with, any official in his official capacity, in either Tamil or English;
(b) if the law recognises his right to inspect or to obtain copies of or extracts from any Official register, record, publication or other document, to obtain a copy of, or an extract from such register, record, publication or document, or a translation thereof, as the case may be, in either Tamil or English;
(c) where a document is executed by any official for the purpose of being issued to him, to obtain such document or a translation thereof in either Tamil or English.
(3) In any area where Tamil is used as the language of administration, a person other than an official acting in his official capacity shall be entitled to exercise the rights and

(4)
(5)
Appendix C 161
to obtain the services, referred to in sub- paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph (2) of this Article, in Sinhala or English.
A Provincial Council or a local authority which conducts its business in Sinhala shall be entitled to receive communications from, and to communicate and transact business with, any official in his official capacity. in Sinhala, and a Provincial Council or a local authority which conducts its business in Tamil shall be entitled to receive communications from and to communicate and transact business with, any official in his official capacity, in Tamil.
Provided, however, that a Provincial Council, local authority, public institution or any official receiving communications from or transacting business with any other Provincial Council, local authority, public institution or an official functioning in an area in which a different language is used as the language of administration shall he entitled to receive communications from, and communicate and transact business in English.
A person shall be entitled to be examined through the medium of either Sinhala or Tamil or a language of his choice at any examination for the admission of persons to the Public Service, Judicial Service, provincial public service, Local Government Service or any public institution, subject to the condition that he may be required to acquire a sufficient knowledge of Tamil or Sinhala, as the case may be, within a reasonable time after admission to such service or public institution where such knowledge is reasonably necessary for the discharge of his duties:
Provided that a person may be required to have a sufficient knowledge of Sinhala or Tamil, as a condition for admission to any such service or public institution where no function

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of the office or employment for which he is recruited can be discharged otherwise than with a sufficient knowledge.
In this Article
"Official" means President, Minister, Deputy Minister, Governor, Chief Minister or Minister of the Board of Ministers of a province, or any officer of a public institution, local authority or provincial council; and
"Public institution" means a department or institution of the Government, a public corporation or statutory institution.
23.(1) All laws and subordinate legislation shall be enacted or
(2)
(3)
made and published in together with a translation thereof in English.
Provided that Parliament shall, at the stage of enactment of any law determine which text shall prevail in the event of any inconsistency between texts
Provided further that in respect of all other written laws the text in which such written laws were enacted or adopted or made, shall prevail in the event of any inconsistency between such texts.
All Orders, Proclamations, rules, by-laws, regulations and notifications made or issued under any written law other than by a Provincial Council or a local authority, and the Gazette shall be published in Sinhala and Tamil together with a translation thereof in English.
All Orders, Proclamations, rules, by-laws, regulations and notifications made or issued under any written law by any Provincial Council or local authority, and all documents. including circulars and forms issued or used

(4)
Appendix C 163
by such body or any public institution shall be published in the language used in the administration in the respective areas in which they function, together with a translation thereof in English.
All laws and subordinate legislation in force immediately prior to the commencement of the Constitution, shall be published in the Gazette in the Sinhala and Tamil languages as expeditiously as possible.
Article 24 of the Constitution is hereby amended as follows:
(1)by the repeal of paragraph (1) of that Article, and the substitution of the following paragraphs therefor:-
"(1) Sinhala and Tamil shall be the languages of the courts throughout Sri Lanka and Sinhala shall be used as the language of the court situated in all the areas of Sri Lanka except those in any area where Tamil is the language of administration. The record and proceedings shall be in the language of the court. In the event of an appeal from any court records shall also be prepared in the language of the court hearing the appeal, if the language of Such court is other than the language used by the court from which the appeal is preferred:
Provided that the Minister in charge of the subject of Justice may, with the concurrence of the Cabinet of Ministers direct that the record of any court shall also be maintained and the proceedings conducted in a language other than the language of the court";
(2) in paragraph (2) of that Article by the substitution for the words "in either of the National Languages", of the words "in either Sinhala or Tamil";

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(3) in paragraph (3) of that Article
(a) by the substitution, for the words "the appropriate National
Language" of the words "Sinhala or Tamil", and
(b) by the substitution, for the words "either of the National
Languages", of the words "such language";
(4) in paragraph (4) of that Article by the substitution for the words "the use of a language other than a National Language", of the words "the use of English".
(5) The following Article is hereby inserted immediately after Article 25, and shall have effect as Article 25A of the Constitution --
"25A. In the event of any inconsistency between the provisions of any law and the provisions of this Chapter, the provisions of this Chapter shall prevail."
Government Proposals for Constitutional Reforms (Chandrika Bandaran aike Kumara tunge Package) (Issued October 1997)
Language (Chapter IV)
Official Language
32.
The official languages of the Republic shall be Sinhala and Tamil
National Languages
33.
The national languages of the Republic shall be Sinhala, Tamil and English

Appendix C 165
Use of languages in Parliament &c.
34.
A Member of Parliament or a Member of a Regional Council or a member of a local authority shall be entitled to perform the duties and discharge the functions of such Member in Parliament or in such Regional Council or local authority in any of the national languages.
Languages of administration
35.
(1) Sinhala and Tamil shall be the languages of administration throughout the Republic.
(2) Sinhala shall be the language used for the maintenance of public records by national and regional public institutions and local authorities in the Capital Territory and all the Regions other than the Regions specified in Parts C and D of the First Schedule for which Regional Councils are established, wherein Tamil shall be used.
(3) Sinhala and Tamil shall be used as the languages for the maintenance of public records by national and regional public institutions or local authorities in any area comprising a division of a Divisional Secretary where the Sinhala or Tamil linguistic minority, as the case may be, in Such area exceeds one eighth of the total population of that area.
(4) In any area where Sinhala is used as a language for the maintenance of public records, a person shall be entitled --
(a) to receive communication from and to communicate and transact business with any official in his or her official capacity, in either Tamil or English and to receive a response to such communication from such official or the language in which the person communicated;

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(b) if the law recognizes the person's right to inspect or to
obtain copies of or extracts from any official register, record, publication or other document, to obtain a copy of, or an extract from, such register, record, publication or other document, or a translation thereof, as the case may be, in either Tamil or English.
(c) where a document is executed by an official for the
purpose of being issued to the person, to obtain such document or a translation thereof, in either Tamil or English.
(d) to give information as regards any birth, death or marriage
or with regard to the commission of an offence to a police or peace officer in either Tamil or English.
Rights in Tamil speaking areas
36.
In any area where Tamil is used as a language for the maintenance of public records, a person shall be entitled to exercise the rights and to obtain the services referred to in Sub-paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d) of paragraph (4) of Article 35 in Sinhala or English.
Rights of Regional Administration &c.
37.
(1) Subject to paragraph (2) of this Article, a Regional Administration or local authority which maintains its public records in Sinhala shall be entitled to receive communications from and to communicate and transact business with any official, in his or official capacity, in
Sinhala, and a Regional Administration or a local authority
with maintains its public records in Tamil shall be entitled to receive communications from and to communicate and transact business with, any official in his or her official capacity, in Tamil.

Appendix C 167
(2) A Regional Administration, local authority or public institution or any official functioning in an area in which one of the national languages is used for the maintenance of public records shall be entitled to receive communications from and to communicate and transact business in English with any other Regional Administration, local authority or public institution or any official functioning in an area in which a different national language is used for the maintenance of public records.
Language of examinations for admission to Services of the State &c.
38.
(1) A person shall be entitled to be examined through the medium of either Sinhala or Tamil or English at any examination for the admission of persons to any national or regional service or any public institution, subject to the condition that the person may be required to acquire a sufficient knowledge of Tamil or Sinhala, as the case may
be, within a reasonable time after admission to such service
or public institution where such knowledge is reasonably necessary for the discharge of duties of the person.
(2) A person may be required to have a sufficient knowledge of Sinhala or Tamil or English as condition for admission to any service or public institution where no function of the office or employment referred to in paragraph (1) of this Article for which the person is recruited can be discharged otherwise than with a sufficient knowledge of such language.
Language of legislation
39.
(1) All Acts of Parliament, Statutes of Regional Councils and subordinate legislation shall be enacted or made in Sinhala, Tamil and English.

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(2) In the event of any inconsistency between any two such texts of any Act, Statute or provision of subordinate legislation, each such text shall be regarded as equally authoritative unless the authority enacting or making such written law shall otherwise provide.
Publication of written laws in force in Sinhala and Tamil
40. All written law in force at the commencement of the Constitution save those enacted or made in Sinhala and Tamil, shall be published in the Gazette in Sinhala and Tamil as expeditiously as possible.
Language of Courts
41. Sinhala and Tamil shall be the languages of the courts
throughout the Republic.
Language of record and proceedings in Courts
42. (1) Subject to paragraph (3) of this Article, Sinhala shall be used as the language of the record and proceedings in the courts situated in all the areas of the Republic except in the Regions specified in Parts C and D of the First Schedule for which Regional Councils are established, wherein Tamil shall be used.
(2) In the event of any appeal from any court, the record shall also be prepared in the language of the court hearing the appeal, if the language of such court is other than the language used by the court from which the appeal is preferred.
(3) The Minister of the Cabinet of Ministers in charge of the subject of Justice may, with the concurrence of the Cabinet of Ministers, direct that the record of any court shall

Appendix C 169
also be maintained and the proceedings conducted in a national language other than the language of the court.
Initiating proceedings in Courts
43.
Any party or applicant or any person legally entitled to represent such party or applicant may initiate proceedings and submit to court pleadings and other documents, and participate in the proceedings in court, in Sinhala, Tamil or English. ..
Providing interpretations and translations in proceedings
44.
Any judge, juror, party or applicant or any person legally entitled to represent such party or applicant who is not conversant with the language of the court shall be entitled to be provided by the State with interpretation and to translation into Sinhala, Tamil or English, to enable the judge, juror party or applicant or other person to understand and participate in the proceedings before such court, and in the case of a party, applicant or person, shall also be entitled to obtain in such language any such part of the record or a translation thereof, as the case my be, as the party, applicant or other person, may be entitled to obtain according to law.
Permitting the use of English
45.
(1) The Minister of the Cabinet of Ministers in charge of the subject of Justice may, with the concurrence of the Cabinet of Ministers, issue directions permitting the use of English in or in relation to the records and proceedings in any court for all purposes or for such purposes as may be specified therein and every judge shall be bound to implement such directions.
(2) A judge may at the request of the parties to any proceedings use English in relation to the records and

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proceedings where the use of such language would facilitate, in the opinion of the judge, the expeditious conclusion of such proceedings.
Medium of instruction
46. A person shall be entitled to be educated through the medium of either Sinhala or Tamil and if facilities are available, through the medium of English.
Language of instruction in Universities
47. A person shall be entitled to be instructed in any course, department or faculty of any University in any national language of the person's choice if instruction in such language at such University is reasonably practicable.
Use of one national language where medium of instruction is another national language
48. (1) Subject to paragraph (2) of this Article, where one national language is a medium of instruction for or in any course, department or faculty of any University directly or indirectly financed by the State, the other national languages shall also be made media of instruction for or in such course, department or faculty for students who prior to their admission to such University, were educated through the medium of such other national language.
(2) Compliance with the preceding paragraph of this Article shall not be obligatory if such other relevant national languages are the media of instruction for or in any like course, department or faculty either at any other campus or branch of such University or of any other like University.

Appendix C 171
Facilities for the use of languages
49. The State shall provide adequate facilities for the use of the
languages provided for in this Chapter.
This Chapter to prevail in the event of inconsistency
50. In the event of any inconsistency between the provisions of any law and the provisions of this Chapter, the provisions of this Chapter shall prevail.
Interpretation
51. In this Chapter
"Court" means any court or tribunal created, ordained and established for the administration of justice including the adjudication and settlement of industrial and other disputes or any other tribunal or institution exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions or any tribunal or institution created, ordained and established for the conciliation and settlement of disputes;
"Judge" includes the President, Chairman, presiding officer and a member of any court;
"Official" means the President, any Minister of the Cabinet or Ministers, Deputy Minister, Governor, Chief Minister or a Minister of the Board of Ministers of a Region, or any officer of a public institution, local authority or Regional Administration;
"public institution" means a department or institution of the State, a public corporation or a statutory institution;
"Record" includes pleadings, judgments, orders and other judicial and ministerial acts; and

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"University" includes any institution of higher education.
8. An Act to Establish the Official Languages Commission. (Date of Assent 27. 3.1991) (Selected sections)
1. This Act may be cited as the Official Languages Commission Act, No. 18 of 1991 and shall come into operation in respect of all or any of its provisions on such date or dates as the Minister may appoint by Order published in the Gazette.
Part
Establishment of the Official Languages Commission
2. There shall be established on Official Languages Commission (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission" which shall consist of the persons who are for the time being members of the Commission under subsection (1) of section 5.
5. (1) The Commission shall consist of six members to be appointed by the President, one of whom shall be nominated by the President to be the Chairman of the Commission (hereinafter referred to as the "Chairman".
(2) The Commissioner of the Official Language Department, shall be the Secretary to the Commission.
6. The general objects of the Commission shall be
(a) to recommend principles of policy, relating to the use of the Official Languages, and to monitor and supervise compliance with the provisions contained in Chapter IV of the Constitution;

Appendix C 173
(b) to take all such actions and measures as are necessary to ensure the use of the languages referred to in Article 18 of the Constitution (hereinafter referred to as "the relevant languages") in accordance with the spirit and intent of Chapter IV of the Constitution;
(c) to promote the appreciation of the Official Languages and the acceptance, maintenance, and continuance of their status, equality and right of use;
(d) to conduct investigations, both on its own initiative, and in response to any complaints received, and to take remedial action as provided for, by the provisions of this Act.
The Commission shall have the power to--
(a) initiate reviews of any regulations, directives, or administrative practices, which affect, or may affect, the status or use of any of the relevant languages;
(b) issue or commission such studies or policy papers on the status or use of the relevant languages as it may deem necessary or desirable;
(c) undertake such public educational activities, including, sponsoring or initiating publications or other media presentations, on the status or use of the relevant languages as it may consider desirable;
(d) acquire, by way of purchase or otherwise, and to hold, take or give on lease or hire, mortgage, pledge, sell or otherwise dispose of, any movable or immovable property; and
(e) do all such other things as are necessary for, or incidental to, the attainment of the objects of the Commission or

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necessary for or incidental to, the exercise of any powers of the Commission.
(1) The Commission may, from time to time, appoint such Committees as may be necessary to assist the Commission in the performance of its duties consisting of such number of members as may be determined by the Commission, provided that the Chairman of any such Committee shall be a member of the Commission. -
(2) The Commission may delegate to a Committee appointed under subsection (1) such of its powers (other than the power conferred on it by this subsection) as it may deem fit, but may notwithstanding such delegation, exercise any such power.
Part II
Investigation of Complaints by the Commission
18.
Subject to provisions contained in this Act, the Commission shall investigate every complaint submitted to it, arising from any act done omitted to be done in the administration of the affairs of any public institution, relating to the status and use of any of the relevant languages and in particular, where such complaint discloses that.--
(a) the status of an official language is not, or was not being recognised; or
(b) a right to the use, or a duty to use, any of the relevant languages in the manner set out in Articles 20 to 24 (both inclusive) of the Constitution, is or was not, being recognised or complied with; or

19.
20.
Appendix C 175
(c) any provision of any Act of Parliament or any regulation, rule, order, notification or by-law made thereunder, relating to the status or use of any of the relevant languages or any directive given by a public institution or any administrative practice thereof, in compliance with Chapter IV of the Constitution, is not, or was not being, complied with; or
(d) the objectives and intent of Chapter IV of the Constitution, is, or was not being, respected or complied with.
(1) The Commission in the exercise of its discretion, may refuse to investigate or cease to investigate any complaint if it is satisfied that.--
(a) the subject-matter of the complaint is trivial,
(b) the complaint is frivolous or vexatious, or it is not made in good faith;
(c) the subject matter of the complaint does not, for any reason fall within its powers; or
(d) the initiation of an investigation, or its continuation would for any reason, be necessary.
(2) In the event that the Commission decides to refuse to
investigate or to cease investigating any complaint, the Commission shall within fourteen days of the making of
such decision inform the complainant of the decision and
provide a written copy of the reasons therefor.
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, the Commission may determine the procedures to be followed in carrying out any investigation under this Act.

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21.
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(2) A complaint may be made to the Commission by any person or groups of person, who may be directly affected by the act or omission to which the complaint related or who may be parties acting bona fide in bringing to the attention of the Commission, an actor omission which in his or their opinion, requires investigation by the Commission.
(3) The complaint shall be treated as a confidential communication and the investigation shall endeavour to protect the privacy of the individuals concerned.
(4) Before investigating a complaint under this Act, the Commission shall notify the head of the public institution to which the complaint related of its intention to conduct such an investigation and the Commission shall not divulge to any person, the identity of the complainant, unless the Commission has the complainant's prior consent therefor.
(5) The Commission may delegate the conduct of an investigation of an individual complaint, to the Secretary to the Commission.
In relation to the conduct of an investigation or review under this Act, the Commission shall have the power to--
(a) summon witnesses and compel the production of all documents that it may deem necessary;
(b) administer oaths, and compel witnesses to give oral or written evidence under oath;
(c) receive, accept and consider any other form of information or evidence, as the Commission may in its discretion see fit regardless of the evidentiary value of such information or evidence in a court of law;

22.
23.
Appendix C 177
(d) conduct such investigations in the premises of any public institution as it may deem fit.
(1) In the conduct of an investigation or review or study under this Act, the Commission shall not be required to hold any hearings, and no individual or public institution shall be entitled to be heard as a matter of right.
(2) If, during the course of any investigation or review the
Commission finds that sufficient grounds exist to make a report or recommendation which may adversely reflect upon, or adversely affect, any individual or public institution, the Commission shall, before completing the investigation, take all reasonable measures as may be necessary to afford such individual and institution an opportunity to respond effectively to any comments on, and criticisms of, such individual or public institution.
(1) If after carrying out an investigation under this Act, the Commission is of the opinion that.--
(a) the act or omission which was the subject matter of an investigation should be referred to the public institution concerned for consideration and action; or
(b) any directive of a public institution should be reconsidered or any practice that leads or is likely to lead to a contravention of Chapter IV of the Constitution, should be altered or discontinued; or
(c) any other action should be taken,
the Commission shall report that opinion and the reasons thereforto the head of such public institution.

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24.
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(2) If after carrying out an investigation under this Act the Commission is satisfied that the complaint is not made out it shall report that opinion, and the reasons therefor, to the complainant.
(3) The Commission shall make its report within sixty days of the making of the complaint, and if the investigation cannot be concluded for reasons beyond the control of the Commission, the Commission shall file an interim report within sixty days outlining the reasons for the delay.
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (3) the final report shall be available within one hundred and twenty days of the making of the complaint, and the Commission shall make available forthwith, a copy of such report to the complainant.
(5) The Commission may in the report to be filed under subsection (3), make such recommendations as the Commission thinks fit, and direct the head of the public institution concerned to notify the Commission within a specified time of the action; or any that the institution proposes to take, it give effect to those recommendations.
(1) Where any person has made a complaint to the Commission under this Act and the Commission has -
(a) not informed him of the results of the investigation within one hundred and twenty days of the making of the complaint; ΟΥ
(b) informed him of its decision to refuse to investigate, or ceasing to investigate, under subjection (2) of section 19; or
(c) informed him, under subsection (2) of section 23 that the complaint is not made out to the satisfaction of the Commission,

25.
26.
Appendix C 179
he may apply to the Supreme Court within thirty days of the expiry of the period referred to in paragraph (a) or after the receipt of the communication referred to in paragraphs (b) or (c), as the case may be, for relief or redress under section 27.
(2) Every such application shall be made by petition in writing addressed to the Supreme Court, in accordance with such rules as may be in force, praying for relief or redress. Such petition may be proceeded with only with leave to proceed first had and obtained from the Supreme Court.
(I) Where a person has made a complaint to the Commission under this Act and the Commission has in a report made recommendations under subsection (5) of section 23 in relation to such complaint and the head of the public institution concerned has not given effect to such recommendations within a period of ninety days on receipt by him of such report, then such person or the Commissioner of the Official Languages Department, after informing the Attorney-General in writing, may apply within ninety days of the expiry of the period within which the recommendations were required to be given effect to, for a direction under section 27, to the High Court established under Article 154P of the Constitution for the Province in which the person making the complaint resides.
(2) Every such application shall be made by petition in writing addressed to such High Court and shall be heard
and determined in accordance with the procedure laid
down in Chapter XXIV of the Civil Procedure Code.
The Supreme Court, on the application of the AttorneyGeneral or the Commission, may, where the public interest so requires, direct any High Court established for a Province to transfer to the Supreme Court, any application

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27.
28.
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which has been made to such High Court under this Act and which is pending before it. The application shall, upon such direction, be transferred to the Supreme Court which shall thereupon hear and determine such application.
Where in proceedings instituted --
(a) in the Supreme Court under section 24 or 26, the Supreme Court determines that a public institution has failed to comply with Chapter IV of the Constitution or the provisions of any law implementing the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution, the Supreme Court may grant such relief or make such directions as it considers just and equitable or appropriate in all the circumstances of the case; or
(b) in the High Court under section 25 and the High Court determines that the head of a public institution has not given effect to the recommendations of the Commission, the High Court shall direct the implementation of the recommendations contained in the report of the Commission.
(1) Where a public officer who is required in the performance of his official duties to transact business relating to such duties, or to receive or make any communication, issue any copy or extract from any register, record, publication or other document, in any particular relevant language, willfully fails or neglects to transact such business, receive or make such communication, or issue such copy or extracts in such relevant language, shall be guilty of an offence and shall on conviction after summary trial before a Magistrate be liable to a fine not exceeding one thousand rupees or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or to both such fine and imprisonment.
(2) No prosecution under subsection (1) shall be instituted except with the prior sanction of the Attorney-General.

Appendix D
The Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact
July 26, 1957
Text of Joint Statements by Prime Minister and Representatives of the Federal Party
Part Al-Statement of the general principles of the Agreement between the Prime Minister and the Federal
Party
Representatives of the Federal Party had a series of discussions with the Prime Minister in an effort to resolve the differences of opinion that had been growing and creating tension.
At an early stage of these conversations it became evident that it was not possible for the Prime Minister to accede to some of the demands of the Federal Party,
The Prime Minister stated that,from the point of view of the Government, he was not in a position to discuss the setting up of a Federal Constitution, or regional autonomy or take any step that would abrogate the Official Language Act.
The question then arose whether it was possible to explore the possibility of an adjustment without the Federal Party abandoning or surrendering any of its fundamental principles or objectives.

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At this stage the Prime Minister suggested an examination of the government's Draft Regional Council Bill to see whether provision could be made under it to meet, reasonably, some of the matters in this regard which the Federal Party had in view.
The agreements so reached are embodied in a separate document.
Regarding the language issue, the Federal Party reiterated its stand for parity but in view of the position of the Prime Minister in this matter they came to an agreement by way of adjustment.They pointed out that it was important for them that there should be a recognition of Tamil as a national language and that the administration of the Northern and the Eastern Provinces should be done in Tamil.
The Prime Minister stated that as mentioned by him earlier it was not possible for him to take any steps that would abrogate the Official Language Act.
After discussion it was agreed that the proposed legislation should contain recognition of Tamil as the language of the national minority of Ceylon and that the four points mentioned by the Prime Minister should include provision that, without infringing on the position of the Official Language as such,thelanguage of administration of the Northern and Eastern Provinces be Tamil, and that any necessary provision be made for the non-Tamil speaking minorities in the Northern and Eastern Provinces,
Regarding the question of Ceylon citizenship for the people of Indian descent and the revision of the Citizenship Act, the representatives of the Federal Party put forward their views to the Prime Minister and pressed for an early settlement.

Appendix D 183
The Prime Minister indicated that the problem could
receive early consideration.
In view of these conclusions the Federal Party stated
that they were withdrawing their proposed satyagraha.
Part B-Joint Statement by the Prime Minister and Representatives of the Federal Party on Regional Councils
1.
Regional areas to be defined in the bill itself by embodying them in a Schedule thereto.
That the Northern Province is to form a regional area whilst the Eastern Province is to be divided into two or more regional areas.
Provision is to be made in the Bill to enable two or more regions to amalgamate even beyond provincial limit; and for one region to divide itself subject to ratification by Parliament. Further provision is to be made in the Bill for two or more regions to collaborate for specific purposes of common interests.
Provision is to be made for direct election of regional councillors. Provision is to be made for a Delimitation Commission or Commissions for carving out electorates. The question of MPs representing districts falling within regional areas to be eligible to function as chairman is to be considered.The question ef Government Agents being Regional Commissioners is to be considered.The question of supervisory functions over larger towns, strategic towns and municipalities is to be looked into.

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Parliament is to delegate powers and to specify them in the Act. It was agreed that Regional Councils should have powers over specified subjects including agriculture, cooperatives, lands and land development, colonization, education, health, industries, fisheries, housing, social servicess, electricity, water schemes and roads.
Requisite definition of powers will be made in the Bill.
6.
It was agreed that in the matter of colonisation schemes the powers of the Regional Councils shall include the power to select allottees to whom lands within their area of authority shall be alienated and also power to select personnel to be employed for work on such schemes. The position regarding the area at present administered by the Gal Oya Board in this matter requires consideration.
The powers in regard to the Regional Council- vested in the Minister of Local Government in the draft bill- to be revised with a view to vesting control in Parliament wherever necessary.
The Central government will provide block grants to the Regional Councils.The principles on which the grants will be computed will be gone into.The Regional Councils shall have powers of taxation and borrowing.

Appendix E
Federal Party Resolutions - 28th July 1957
At the 5th (special) National Convention of the Federal Party held on 28 July 1957 at Batticaloa
Resolution No.
(1)
(2)
(3)
"The special session of the National Convention of the Illankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi assembled at the Town Hall Batticaloa on the 28th of July 1957 having considered the agreement reached between the representatives of the Federal Party on the one hand and the Prime Minister on the other and having reviewed the report of the negotiations submitted to it by its representatives reiterate its unalterable determination to achieve
An Autonomous Tamil linguistic state or states within the framework of a Federal Union of Ceylon,
Parity of status for the Tamil language with Sinhalese throughout Ceylon and,
The revision and reorientation of the present unnatural and undemocratic citizenship laws of Ceylon to ensure the recognition of the right of every Tamil speaking individual who has made Ceylon his home to full citizenship,
"This convention having regard to the fact that by the agreement inter alia"

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(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
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state-aided Sinhalese colonisation of the Northern and Eastern provinces will be effectively stopped forthwith,
that the Tamil language is given official recognition as the language of a National Minority,
that Tamil shall be the language of administration of the Northern and Eastern provinces,
that the right of every Tamil speaking person in every part of the country to transact all affairs with government in Tamil and to educate and nurture his children in the Tamil language and culture is secured,
and further in consideration of the large measure of regional self government granted to the people under the proposed Regional Councils Act.
"Resolves to accept the agreement as an interim adjustment and hereby ratifies the deciion to withdraw the Satyagraha which was scheduled to commence on the 20th August 1957.
"This convention further calls upon the Government to implement expeditiously the terms of the agreement reached between the Prime Minister and the Federal Party expeditiously (sic) in good faith and in the spirit in which it was entered into."
Resolution No. 2
This special session of the National Convention of the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi calls upon the Tamil speaking people who are struggling for the attainment of full

Appendix E 87
freedom and self respect solemnly to resolve to work for the regeneration and unification of the Tamil speaking people by undertaking immediate action for the removal of all forms of social inequalities and injustices, in particular that of untouchability which still exists among a section fo the people and towards this end to organize a campaign of self purification if necessary by Ahimsa and Satyagraha for the achievement of this goal without which the Tamil speaking Nation in Ceylon cannot and never will realise its fundamental object of attaining Political and Cultural freedom for the Tamil speaking people of Ceylon by the establishment of a Tamil linguistic state or states within the frame work of the Federal Union of Ceylon.

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Appendix IF
A statement containing the minimum demands, submitted to the Leaders of the U.N.P. and S.L.F.P. on 30.3.1960 by Mr. S.J.W.Chelvanayakam on behalf of the Federal Party when both parties failed to get on absolute majority in Parliament after the 1960 March General Election and sought the support of the Federal Party to form a Government
The results of the General Election have demonstrated emphatically that the Tamil speaking peoples of Ceylon have endorsed in overwhelming numbers their acceptance of the policy and objectives of my Party, which can be briefly stated as follows:
(l) The replacement of the present unitary Constitution by a Federal Constitution which recognises the autonomy of the Tamil-speaking areas.
(2) The restoration of the Tamil language to its rightful place enjoying parity with Sinhala as an official language of the country.
(3) The granting of Citizenship rights to Tamil persons of
Indian origin who are settled in Ceylon.
(4) The cessation of planned colonisation of the traditionally
Tamil areas with Sinhalese people.
However, since we have been asked for an indication of the minimum points on which agreement can be effected between ourselves with a view to my Parliamentary Group supporting

Appendix IF 189
your party to form the Government we are setting down briefly four points which I think should be acceptable, but by my making these suggestions we should not be understood to be Surrendering or abandoning any of our fundamentalobjectives.
Acceptance of the matters on which agreement is
effected between ourselves should be indicated by reference in the Throne Speech and thereafter implemented by legislative action which should be completed within a period of three months.
(1)
(2)
Granting of regional autonomy for the Northern and Eastern Provinces by the creation of one regional body for the Northern Province and one or more regional bodies for the Eastern Province with the right of these bodies to amalgamate. Powers to be delegated or conferred on such regional bodies for specific subjects including agriculture, co-operatives, land and land development, land alienation and colonisation, irrigation, education, health, industries and fisheries, housing and social services, electricity, water schemes and roads.
Pending the establishment of the regional bodies stateaided colonization referred to above is to be suspended.
Tamil to be recognized statutorily and administratively as the national language of the Tamil speaking peoples in Ceylon. Ta mil is to be made the language of administration and of the Courts of law in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, necessary provision, however, to be made for the non-Tamil speaking minorities in these areas. The right of the Tamil speaking peoples throughout Ceylon to be educated in the Tamil language in all stages up to and including the University and the right of entry into the public services by competitive examinations in

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(3)
(4)
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Tamil to be statutorily recognised. Every Tamil person should be entitled in law to transact business and correspondence with the Government in all parts of Ceylon in Tamil. All legislation, Gazette notifications, Governmental publications, notices and forms should be in Tamil also.
The Ceylon Citizenship Act Nol. 18 of 1948 to be amended by deleting the words "before the appointed day" in Section 4(1) of the Act and deleting of section 5 (1) of the act and by making such consequential amendments as may be necessary.
Till such time as the question of Citizenship and the Franchise for the Estate Tamil population is settled representation in Parliament for these people to be provided by way of nomination to 4 out of the 6 appointed seats in Parliament and that a convention be created whereby the persons nominated will be the nominees of the political body which represents that population, namely the Ceylon Indian Congress.
Details and other points not covered by the foregoing paragraphs will be settled by negotiation between the Government and the party.

Appendix G
Dudley Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact
(24.3.1965)
(An agreement reached between Mr Dudley Senanayake -on behalf of the UNP-and Mr S.J. V.Chelvanayakam-on behalf of the Federal Party.)
Mr Dudley Senanayake and Mr S.J.V.Chelvanayakam met on the 24-3-1965 and discussed matters relating to some problems over which the Tamil-speaking people were concerned, and Mr. Senanayake agreed that action on the following lines would be taken by him to ensure a stable government:
(1)
(2)
(3)
Action will be taken early under the Tamil Language Special Provisions Act to make provision of the Tamil Language of administration and of record in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.
Mr Senanayake also explained that it was the policy of his Party that a Tamil speaking person should be entitled to transact business in Tamil throughout the island.
Mr Senanayake stated that it was the policy of his party to amend the Language of Courts Act to provide for legal proceedings in the Northern and Eastern Provinces to be conducted and recorded in Tamil.
Action will be taken to establish District Councils in Ceylon vested with powers over subjects to be mutually agreed upon between the two leaders. It was agreed, however, that the

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Government should have power under the law to give directions to such Councils under the national interest.
(4) The Land Development Ordinance will be amended to provide that citizens of Ceylon be entitled to the allotment of land under the Ordinance.
Mr Senanayake further agreed that in the granting of land under colonization schemes the following priorities be observed in the Northern and Eastern provinces.
(a) Land in the Northern and Eastern provinces should in the first instance be granted to landless persons in the district.
(b) Secondly, to Tamil-speaking persons resident in the
Northern and Eastern provinces.
(c) Thirdly, to other citizens in Ceylon,preference being given
to Tamil citizens in the rest of the Island.
Sgd. Dudley Senanayake 24. 3.. 65
Sgd. S.J.V.Chelvanayakam 24. 3.. 65
(This agreement was never released officially. It was however published in the Sri Lanka press.)

Appendix H
Buddhism as Official Religion
1. 1972 Constitution - Chapter II Sect. 6
"The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall be the duty of the state to protect and foster Buddhism while assuring to all religions the rights granted by Section 18 (II) (d)".
2, 1978 Constitution - Chapter II Sect. 9
"The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall be the duty of the state to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana while assuring to all religions the rights granted by Article 10 and 14(I)(e)".
3. October 1997- Government proposals for
Constitutional Reforms - Chapter II Section 7
(1) "The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly, it shall be the duty of the State to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana while giving adequate protection to all religions and guaranteeing to every person the rights and freedoms granted by paragraph (1) and (3) of Articles 15
(2) The State shall, where necessary, consult the Supreme Council recognised by the Minister of the Cabinet of Ministers in charge of the subject of Buddha Sasana, in measures taken in the protection and fostering of the : Buddha Sasana"

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Appendix I
Vaddukoddai Resolution
Resolution passed at a Convention of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) held at Pannakam, Vaddukoddai 14 May 1976
“Whereas throughout the centuries from the dawn of history the Sinhalese and Tamil nations have divided between them the possession of Ceylon, the Sinhalese inhabiting the interior of the country in its southern and western parts from the river Walave to that of Chilaw and the Tamils possessing the northern and eastern districts.
And whereas the Tamil kingdom was overthrown in war and
conquered by the Portuguese in 1619 and from them by the
Dutch and the British in turn, independent of the Sinhalese
Kingdoms. And whereas the British Colonialists who ruled
the territories of the Sinhalese and Tamil kingdoms separately
joined under compulsion the territories of the Tamil to the
territories of the Sinhalese kingdoms for purposes of administrative convenience on the recommendation of the
Colebrooke Commission in 1833.
And whereas Tamil leaders were in the forefront of the Freedom Movement to rid Ceylon of colonial bondage which ultimately led to the grant of independence to Ceylon in 1948.
And whereas the foregoing facts of history were completely overlooked and power was transferred to the Sinhalese nation over the entire country on the basis of a numerical majority,

Appendix I 195
thereby reducing the Tamil nation to the position of a subject
people;
And whereas successive Sinhalese Governments since Independence have always encouraged and fostered the aggressive nationalism of the Sinhalese people and have used their political power to the detriment of the Tamils by -
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
Depriving one half of the Tamil people of their citizenship and franchise rights, thereby reducing Tamil representation in Parliament;
Making serious inroads into the territories of the former Tamil kingdom by a system of planned and state-aided Sinhalese colonization and large-scale regularization of recently encouraged Sinhalese encroachments calculated to make the Tamils a minority in their own homeland;
Making Sinhala the only official language throughout Ceylon thereby placing the stamp of inferiority on the Tamils and the Tamil language;
Giving the foremost place to Buddhism under the Republic Constitution thereby reducing the Hindus, Christians and Muslims to second-class status in this country;
Denying to the Tamils equality of opportunity in the spheres of employment, education, land alienation and economic life in general, and starving Tamil areas of large-scale industries and development schemes, thereby seriously endangering their very existence in Ceylon;

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(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
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Systematically cutting them off from the main-stream of Tamil culture in South India while denying them opportunities of developing their language and culture in Ceylon, thereby working inexorably toward the cultural genocide of the Tamils;
Permitting and unleashing communal violence and inti midation against Tamil - speaking people as happened in Amparai and Colombo in 1956, all over the country in 1958, Army reign of terror in the Northern and Eastern Provinces in 1961, police violence at the International Tamil Research Conference in 1974 resulting in the death of nine persons in Jaffna, police and communal violence against Tamil-speaking Muslims at Puttalam and various other parts of Ceylon in 1976-all these calculated to instil terror in the minds of the Tamilspeaking people, thereby breaking their spirit and the will to resist the injustices heaped on them; .
By terrorising, torturing and imprisoning Tamil youths without trial for long periods on the flimsiest of grounds;
Capping it all, by imposing on the Tamil Nation a constitution drafted under conditions of emergency without opportunities for free discussion by a Constituent Assembly elected on the basis of the Soulbury Constitution distorted by the Citizenship laws resulting in weight age in representation to the Sinhalese majority thereby depriving the Tamils of even the remnants of safeguards they had under the earlier constitution.

Appendix I 197
And whereas all attempts by the various Tamil political parties to win their rights by co-operating with the governments, by parliamentary and extra parliamentary agitations, by entering into pacts and understandings, with successive Prime Ministers in order to achieve the bare minimum of political rights consistent with the self-respect of the Tamil people have proved to be futile;
And whereas the efforts of the All Ceylon Tamil Congress to ensure non-domination of the minorities by the majority by the adopting of a scheme of balanced representation in a Unitary Constitution have failed and even the meagre safeguards provided in Article 29 of the Soulbury Constitution against discriminatory legislation have been removed by the Republican Constitution.
And whereas the proposals submitted to the Constituent . Assembly by the Ilankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi for maintaining the unity of the country while preserving the integrity of the Tamil people by the establishment of an autonomous Tamil State within the framework of a Federal Republic of Ceylon were summarily and totally rejected without even the courtesy of a consideration of its merits, and
Whereas the amendments to the Basic Resolutions intended to ensure the minimum of safeguards of the Tamil people, moved on the basis of the 9 point demands formulated at the Conference of all Tamil political parties on 7th February 1971 and by individual parties and Tamil Members of Parliament, including those now with the Government party, were rejected by the Government and the Constituent Assembly, and
Whereas even amendments to the draft proposals relating to language, religion and fundamental rights, including those calculated to ensure that at least the provision of the Tamil

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Language (Special Provision) Act be included in the Constitution, were defeated resulting in the boycotting of the Constituent Assembly by a large majority of Tamil M.Ps, and
Whereas the Tamil United Liberation Front, after rejecting the Republican Constitution adopted on 22nd May 1972 put a 6-point demand to the Prime Minister and the Government on 25th June 1972 and gave three months time within which the Government was called upon to take meaningful steps to amend the Constitution so as to meet the aspirations of the Tamil nation on the basis of the 6-point demands and informed the Government that if it failed to do so the Tamil United Liberation Front would launch a non-violent direct action against the Government in order to win freedom and the rights of the Tamil nation on the basis of the rights of selfdetermination, and
Whereas the last attempt by the Tamil United Liberation Front to win constitutional recognition of the rights of the Tamil Nation without jeopardizing the unity of the country, was callously ignored by the Prime Minister and the Government, and
Whereas the opportunity provided by the T.U.L.F. leader to vindicate the Government's contention that their constitution had the backing of the Tamil people, by resigning from his membership of the National State Assembly and creating a by-election, was deliberately put off for over two years in utter disregard of the democratic rights of the Tamil voters of Kankesanturai, and
Whereas in the by-election held on the 6th February 1975 the voters of Kankesanturai by a preponderant majority not

Appendix I 199
only rejected the Republican Constitution imposed on them by the Sinhalese Government but also gave a mandate to Mr. S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, Q.C. and through him to the Tamil United Liberation Front for the restoration and reconstitution of the free, sovereign, secular, socialist state of Tamil Eelam.
The first National Convention of the Tamil United Liberation Front Meeting at Pannakam on the 14th day of May 1976 hereby declares that the Tamils of Ceylon, by virtue of their great language, their religions, their separate culture and heritage, their history of independent existence as a separate state over a distinct territory for several centuries until they were conquered by the armed might of the European invaders and, above all by their will to exist as a separate entity ruling themselves in their own territory, are a nation distinct and apart from the Sinhalese and this Convention announces to the world that the Republican Constitution of 1972 has made the Tamils a slave nation ruled by the new colonial masters, the Sinhalese, who are using the power they have wrongly usurped to deprive the Tamil nation of its territory, language, citizenship, economic life, opportunities of employment and education, thereby depriving all the attributes of nationhood of the Tamil people.
And therefore, while taking note of the reservations in relation to its commitment to the setting up of a separate state of Tamil Eelam expressed by the Ceylon Workers' Congress as a trade union of the plantation workers, the majority of whom live and work outside the northern and eaStern area S.
This Convention resolves that the restoration and reconstitution of the free sovereign, secular socialist state of TAMIL EELAM based on the right of self determination

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inherent to every nation, has become inevitable in order to safeguard the very existence of the Tamil Nation in this country.
This Convention further declares -
(a) that the State of TAMIL EELAM shall consist of the people of the Northern and Eastern Provinces and shall also ensure full and equal rights of citizenship of the State of TAMIL EELAM to all Tamill-speaking people living in any part of Ceylon and to TAMILS of EELAM origin living in any part of the world who may opt for citizenship of TAMIL EELAM;
(b) that the constitution of TAMIL EELAM shall be based on the principle of decentralization so as to ensure the non-domination of any religion or territorial community of TAMIL EELAM by any other section;
(c) that in the State of Tamil EELAM, caste shall be abolished and the observance of the pernicious practice of untouchability or inequality of any type based on birth shall be totally eradicated and its observance in any form punished by law;
(d) that TAMIL EELAM shall be a secular state giving equal protection and assistance to all religions to which the people of the state may belong;
(e) that Tamil shall be the language of the State but the rights of Sinhalese-speaking minorities. in TAMIL EELAM to education and transaction of business in their language shall be protected on a reciprocal basis with the Tamilspeaking minorities in the Sinhala State;

Appendix I 20
(f) that TAMIL EELAM shall be a Socialist State wherein the exploitation of man by man shall be forbidden, the dignity of labour shall be recognized, the means of production and distribution shall be subject to public ownership and control while permitting private enterprise in these branches within limits prescribed by law, economic development shall be on the basis of socialist planning and there shall be a ceiling on the total wealth that any individual or family may acquire.
This convention directs the Action Committee of the TAMIL UNITED LIBERATION FRONT to formulate a plan of action and launch without undue delay the struggle for winning the sovereignty and freedom of the Tamil Nation.
And this Convention calls upon the Tamil Nation in general and the Tamil youth in particular to come forward to throw themselves fully into the sacred fight for freedom and to flinch not till the goal of a sovereign socialist State of EELAM is reached.”

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Appendix J
Annexure C
In terms of paragraph six of President's statement of December 1st, 1983, the following proposals which have emerged as a result of discussions in Colombo and New Delbi are appended for consideration by the All-Party Conference. These proposals are in the context of united and integrity of SriLanka and will form the basis for formulating the Agenda of the All-Party Conference.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
The District Development Councils in a Province be permitted to combine into one or more Regional Councils if they agree by decisions of the councils and approved by Referendum in that district.
In the case of District Councils of Northern and Eastern Provinces, respectively, as they are functioning due to the resignation of the majority of members, their union within each province to be accepted.
Each Region will have a Regional Council if so desired. The convention will be established that the leader of the party which commands a majority in the Regional Council would be formally appointed by the President as the Chief Minister of the Region.The Chief Minister will constitute a Committee of Ministers of the Region.
The President and the Parliament will continue to have overall responsibility for all subjects not transferred to the Region and generally for all other matters relating

(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Appendix J 203
to maintenance of sovereignty, integrity, unity, and security and progress and development of the Republic as a whole.
The legislative power of the region would be vested in the Regional Councils which would be empowered to enact laws and exercise executive powers in relation thereto on certain specified listed subjects including the maintenance of Internal Law and Order in the Region, the administration of justice, social and economic development, cultural matters and land policy. The list of subjects to be allocated to the Regions will be worked out in detail.
The Regional Councils will have powers to levy taxes, cess of fees and to mobilize resources through loans, the proceeds of which will be credited to a Consolidated Fund set up for that particular Region to which also will be credited grants, allocations or subventions made by the Republic.Financial resources will be apportioned to the Region on the recommendations of the representative Finance Commission appointed from time to time.
Provisions will be made to constitute High Courts in each region. The Supreme Court to Sri Lanka will exercise appellate and constitutional jurisdiction.
Each Region will have a Regional Service constituting
(a) officers and public servants of the Region and (b) such other officers and public servants who may be seconded to the Region. Each Region will have a Regional Public Service Commission for recruitment and for exercising disciplinary powers relating to the members of the Regional Service.

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204
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12
(13)
(14)
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The armed forces of Sri Lanka will reflect the national ethnic composition. In the Northern and Eastern Provinces the police force for internal security will also reflect the ethnic composition of these Regions.
A Port Authority under the Central Government will be set up for administering the Trincomalee Port and Harbour. The area that will come under the Port Authority as well as the powers to be assigned to it will he further discussed.
A national policy on land settlement and the basis on which the government will undertake land colonization will have to be worked out. All settlement schemes will be based on ethnic proportion so as not alter the demographic balance subject to agreements being reached on major projects.
The constitution and other laws dealing with the official language Sinhala and the national language Tamil be accepted and implemented as well as similar laws dealing with National Flag and Anthem.
The Conference should appoint a committee to work out constitutional and legal changes that may be necessary to implement the se decisions. The Government will provide its secretariat and necessary legal offices.
The consensus of opinion of the All-Party Conference will itself be considered by the United National Party Executive Committee and presumably by the executive body of the other parties as well before being placed before Parliament for legislative action.

Appendix K
Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement
July 29, 1987
The Prime Minister of the Republic of India, His Excellency Mr. Rajiv Gandhi and the President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, His Excellency Mr.J.R. Jayewardene having met at Colombo on 29 July 1987.
Attaching utmost importance to nurturing, intensifying
and strengthening the traditional friendship of India and Sri Lanka and acknowledging the imperative need of resolving the ethnic problem of Sri Lanka, and the consequent violence, and for the safety, well-being and prosperity of people belonging to all communities in Sri Lanka.
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
Having this day entered into the following Agreement to fulfil this objective.
desiring to preserve the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka;
acknowledging that Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic and a multi- lingual plural society consisting, inter alia, of Sinhalese,Tamils, Muslims (Moors), and Burghers;
recognising that each ethnic group has a distinct cultural and linguistic identity which has to be carefully nurtured;
also recognising that the Northern and the Eastern Provinces have been areas of historical habitation of

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2O6
1.5
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.3
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Sri Lankan Tamil speaking peoples, who have at all times hitherto lived together in this territory with other ethnic groups;
conscious of the necessity of strengthening the forces contributing to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, and preserving its character as a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious plural Society, in which all citizens can live in equality, safety and harmony, and prosper and fulfil their aspirations;
Resolve that:
Since the Government of Sri Lanka proposes to permit adjoining Provinces to join to form one administrative unit and also by a Referendum to separate as may be permitted to the Northern and Eastern Provinces as outlined below:
During the period, which shall be considered an interim period (i.e.) from the date of the elections to the Provincial Council, as specified in para 2.8 to the date of the Referendum as specified in para 2.3, the Northern and Eastern Provinces as now constituted, will form one administrative unit, having one elected Provincial Council. Such a unit will have one Governor, one Chief Minister and one Board of Ministers.
There will be a Referendum on or before 31 Decernber 1988 to enable the people of the Eastern Province to decide whether:
(A) The Eastern Province should remain linked with the
Northern Province as one administrative unit and continue to be governed together with the Northern Province as specified in para 2.2, or

2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
2.8
2.9
Appendix K 207
(B) The Eastern Province should constitute a separate
administrative unit having its own distinct Provincial Council with a separate Governor, Chief Minister and Board of Ministers.
The President may, at his discretion, decide to postpone such a Referendum.
All persons who have been displaced due to ethnic violence, or other reasons, will have right to vote in such a Referendum. Necessary conditions to enable them to return to areas from where they were displaced will be created.
The Referendum, when held, will be monitored by a committee headed by the Chief Justice. a member appointed by the President, nominated by the Government of Sri Lanka, and a member appointed by the President, nominated by the representatives of the Tarmil speaking people of the Eastern Province.
A simple majority will be sufficient to determine the result of the Referendum.
Meetings and other forms of propaganda, permissible within the laws of the country, will be allowed before the Referendum.
Elections to Provincial Councils will be held within the next three months, in any event before 31 December 1987. Indian observers will be invited for elections to the Provincial Council of the North and East.
The emergency will be lifted in the Eastern and Northern Provinces by 15 August 1987. A cessation of hostilities will come into effect all over the Island within 48 hours

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2.10
2.11
2.12
2.13
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of the signing of this Agreement. All arms presently held by militant groups will be surrendered in accordance with an agreed procedure to authorities to be designated by the Government of Sri Lanka. Consequent to the cessation of hostilities and the Surrender of arms by militant groups, the army and other security personnel will be confined to barracks in camps as on 25 May 1987. The process of surrendering of arms and confining the security personnel moving back to barracks shall be completed within 72 hours of cessation of hostilities coming into effect.
The Government of Sri Lanka will utilise for the purpose of law enforcement and maintenance of security in the Northern and Eastern Provinces the same organisations and mechanisms of Government as are used in the rest of the country.
The President of Sri Lanka will grant a general amnesty to political and other prisoners now held in custody under the Prevention of Terrorism Act and other emergency laws, and to combatants, as well as to those persons accused, charged and/ or convicted under these laws. The Government of Sri Lanka will make special efforts to rehabilitate militant youth with a view to bringing them back to the mainstream of national life. India will co-operate in the process.
The Government of Sri Lanka will accept and abide by the above provisions and expect all others to do likewise.
If the framework for the resolutions is accepted, the government of Sri Lanka will implement the relevant proposals forth with.

2.14
2.15
2.16
Appendix K 209
The Government of India will underwrite and guarantee the resolutions, and co-operate in the implementation of these proposals.
These proposals are conditional to an acceptance of proposals negotiated from 4.5. 1986 to 19. 12.1986. Residual matters not finalised during the above negotiations shall be resolved between India and Sri Lanka within a period of six weeks of signing this Agreement. These proposals are also conditional to the Government of India co-operating directly with the Government of Sri Lanka in their implementation.
These proposals are also conditional to the Government of India taking the following actions if any military group operating in Sri Lanka does not accept this framework of proposals for a settlement, namely:
(A) India will take all necessary steps to ensure that
Indian territory is not used for activities prejudicial to the unity, integrity and security of Sri Lanka.
(B) The Indian Navy/Coast Guard will co-operate with
the Sri Lanka Navy in preventing Tamil militant activities from affecting Sri Lanka.
(C) In the event that the Government of Sri Lanka
requests the Government of India to afford military assistance to implement the se propos als the Government of India will co-operate by giving to the Government of Sri Lanka such military assistance as and when requested.
(D) The Government of India will expedite repatriation
from Sri Lanka of Indian citizens to India who are

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resident there concurrently with the repatriation of Sri Lankan refugees from Tamil Nadu.
(E) The Governments of India and Sri Lanka will co
2.17
2.18
3.0
operate in ensuring the physical security and safety of all communities inhabiting the Northern and Eastern Provinces.
The Government of Sri Lanka shall ensure free, full and fair participation of voters from all communities in the Northern and Eastern Provinces in electoral processes en visaged in this Agreement. The Government of India will extend full co-operation to the Government of Sri Lanka in this regard.
The official language of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala,Tamil and English will also be official languages.
This Agreement and the annexure thereto shall come into force upon signature.
In witness whereof we have set our hands and seals hereunto. Done in Colombo, Sri Lanka, on this the twenty-ninth day of July of the year one thousand nine hundred and eighty-seven, in duplicate, both texts being equally authentic.
Rajiv Gandhi Prime Minister of the Republic of India
Junius Richard Jayewardene President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka

Appendix K 21
Annexure to the Agreement
1. His Excellency the Prime Ministerof India and His Excellency the President of Sri Lanka agree that the Referendum mentioned in paragraph 2 and its sub-paragraphs of the Agreement will be observed by a representative of the Election Commission of India to be invited by His Excellency the President of Sri Lanka.
2. Similarly, both Heads of Government agree that the elections to the Provincial Council mentioned in paragraph 2.8 of the Agreement will be observed by a representative of the Government of India to be invited by the President of Sri Lanka. 3. His Excellency the President of Sri Lanka agrees that the Home Guards would be disbanded and all paramilitary personnel will be withdrawn from the Eastern and Northern Provinces with a view to creating conditions conducive to fair elections to the Council.
The President, in his discretion, shall absorb such paramilitary forces, which came into being due to ethnic violence into the regular security forces of Sri Lanka.
4. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Sri Lanka agree that the Tamil militants shall surrender their arms to authorities agreed upon to be designated by the President of Sri Lanka. The surrender shall take place in the presence of one senior representative each of the Sri Lanka Red Cross and the Indian Red Cross.
5. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Sri Lanka agree that a joint Indo-Sri Lankan observer group consisting of qualified representatives of the Government of India and the Government of Sri Lanka would monitor the cessation of hostilities from 31 July 1987.

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6. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Sri Lanka also agree that in terms of paragraph 2.14 and paragraph 2.16(C) of the agreement an Indian Peace Keeping contingent may be invited by the President of Sri Lanka to guarantee and enforce the cessation of hostilities, if so required.
Prime Minister of India New Delhi 29 July 1987
Excellency,
Conscious of the friendship between our two countries stretching over two millenia and more, and recognising the importance of nurturing this traditional friendship, it is imperative that both Sri Lanka and India reaffirm the decision not to allow our respective territories to be used for activities prejudicial to each other's unity, territorial integrity and security.
In this spirit, you had, during the course of our discussions, agreed to meet some of India's concerns as follows:
(i) Your Excellency and myself will reach an early understanding about the relevance and employment of foreign military and intelligence personnel with a view to ensuring that such presences will not prejudice IndoSri Lankan relations.
(ii) Trincomalee or any other ports in Sri Lanka will not be made available for military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India's interests.

(iii)
(iv)
Appendix K 23
The work of restoring and operating the Trincornalee oil tank farm will be undertaken as a joint venture between India and Sri Lanka.
Sri Lanka's agreement with foreign broadcasting organisations will be reviewed to ensure that any facilities set up by them in Sri Lanka are used solely as public broadcasting facilities and not for any military or intelligence purposes.
In the same spirit, India will:
(i)
(ii)
Deport all Sri Lankan citizens who are found to he engaging in terrorist activities or advocating separatism or secessionism.
Provide training facilities and military supplies for Sri Lankan security forces.
India and Sri Lanka have agreed to set up a joint consultative mechanism to continuously review matters of common concern in the light of the objectives stated in para 1 and specifically to monitor the implementation of other matters contained in this letter.
Kindly confirm, Excellency, that the above correctly
sets out the agreement reached between us. Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.
Yours sincerely, (Rajiv Gandhi)
His Excellency Mr. J.R. Jayewardene

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President of Sri Lanka 29 July 1987
Excellency,
Please refer to your letter dated the 29th of July 1987, which reads as follows:
Excellency,
1. Conscious of the friendship between our two countries stretching over two millennia and more, and recognizing the importance of nurturing this traditional friendship, it is imperative that both Sri Lanka and India reaffirm the decision not to allow our respective territories to be used for activities prejudicial to each other's unity, territorial integrity and Security.
2. In this spirit, you had, during the course of our discussions, agreed to meet some of India's concerns as follows:
(i) Your Excellency and myself will reach an early understanding about the relevance and employment of foreign military and intelligence personnel with a view to ensuring that such presences will not prejudice IndoSri Lankan relations.
(ii) Trincomalee or any other ports in Sri Lanka will not be made available for military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India's interests.
(iii) The work of restoring and operating Trincomalee oil farm will be undertaken as a joint venture between India and Sri Lanka.

Appendix K 25
(iv) Sri Lanka's agreements with foreign broadcasting organisations will be reviewed to ensure that any facilities set up by them in Sri Lanka are used solely as public broadcasting facilities and not for any military or intelligence purposes.
3. In the same spirit, India will:
(i) Deport all Sri Lankan citizens who are found to be engaging in terrorist activities or advocating separatism or secessionism.
(ii) Provide training facilities and military supplies for
Sri Lankan security forces.
4. India and Sri Lanka have agreed to set up a joint consultative mechanism to continuously review matters of common concern in the light of the objectives stated in para 1 and specifically to monitor the implementation of other matters contained in this letter.
5. Kindly confirm, Excellency, that the above correctly sets out the agreement reached between us.
Please accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.
Yours sincerely, (Rajiv Gandhi) His Excellency Mr.J. R. Jayewardene
President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Colombo.

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This is to confirm that the above correctly sets out the understanding reached between us. Please accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.
(J. R. Jayewardene)
President

Appendix L.
Interim Report
Parliamentary Select Committee 1992
Mangala Moonesinghe Report
Your Committee was constituted following the unanimous adoption by Parliament on 9th August 1991 of the following motion moved by Mr Mangala Moonesinghe M.P. and seconded by Mr Stanley Tillekeratne M.P.
"That this Parliament is of opinion that a Select Committee of Parliament be appointed
(a) to arrive at a political solution to the question involving the devolution of power to the Northern and Eastern Provinces;
(b) to prevent -
(i) the disintegration of the nation;
(ii) the killings of innocent civilians, members of the
Armed Forces and the Youths fighting for a cause;
(iii) the increased militarization of the culture of violence
in our country; and
(c) to achieve peace and political stability and utilize the reduced defence expenditure for rapid economic growth and national development.

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That the Committee shall -
(a) have the power to fix its quorum;
(b) have the power to summon any person to appear before it, to require any person to produce any document or record, to procure and receive all such evidence, written or oral, as the Committee may think it necessary for the fullest consideration of the matters referred to above, and
(c) have the power to report from time to time and to sit
notwithstanding any adjournment of Parliament".
While moving the motion Mr Moonesinghe M.P. proposed an amendment to delete the word "national" which appeared in the notice between the words "the" and "question" in paragraph (a). The House agreed to the amendment.
Hon. Speaker thereafter appointed a committee of 45 Members representing all parties in Parliament under the Chairmanship of Mr Mangala Moonesinghe M.P. This is the largest Select Committee in the history of the Parliament of Sri Lanka.
At its first meeting held on 20th November 1991 the committee fixed its quorum at fourteen.
The Committee has held 43 meetings to date.
Your Committee at its meeting on 20th November 1991, decided to call for written representations from the public on matters relating to its Order of Reference. This decision was advertised in the press and given publicity through radio and television in Sinhala, Tamil and English. The closing date

Appendix L 29
for such representations was fixed for 16th December 1991. Your Committee subsequently decided that representations received up to 10th January 1992 would be considered. Your Committee received 253 memoranda.
Memoranda were received from Members of Parliament, political parties, other organizations and individuals. Where clarification of the submissions was found to be necessary, the Committee examined the Members of Parliament, representatives of political and other organizations and individuals, (vide Appendix II).
The Head of the International Committee of the Red Cross Delegation in Sri Lanka, Mr. Pierre Wettach, in March 1992, confirmed in writing to the Chairman that he had met two members of the LTTE viz. Mr G.Mahendrarajah (Mahattaya) and Mr Balasingham who had informed him that a delegation from the Select Committee would be welcome in Jaffna. Your Committee informed Mr Wetach that any representation from the LTFE would be welcome and that they wished this to be conveyed to the LTTE. However, the Committee notes with regret that there has been no response whatsoever from the LTTE in this regard up to date.
Proposals and Evidence.
The following issues emerged for consideration:
(a) whether the temporarily merged Northern and Eastern
Provinces should continue to be one unit with special
arrangements made to safeguard the interests of the Muslims:
(b) whether the Northern and Eastern Provinces should be separated and that each should be an independent unit of devolution;

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whether the temporary North-East merger should continue except for the Sinhala populated areas to be excised and annexed to the neighbouring Provinces; and
whether the unit of devolution should be the District. As your Committee continued its deliberations, it became clear that misunderstanding and mistrust prevailed on issues pertaining to colonization of lands, law and order and delays in implementation of legislation relating to devolution.The Committee decided that public servants who had access to information and specialized knowledge of the subiect should be summoned to give evidence.
Public Officers were examined on the following subjects:
Colonization
The Land Commissioner, the Secretary, Ministry of Lands, Irrigation and Mahaweli Development and the Director, Planning in the Maha weli Development Authority were Summoned to give evidence and produce documents pertaining to relevant data on land settlement in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Their evidence related to land settlement in those Provinces since independence in 1948 together with an ethnic classification of those settled in the colonization schemes (vide Appendix II).
Law and Order
The Inspector-General of Police gave evidence on the relevant aspects of law and order. He explained that there Were provisions in the Constitution under the 13th Amendment to establish a National Police Service and Provincial Police Services. (Vide Appendix HI).

Appendix L 221
Finance
Members of the Finance Commission outlined the principles upon which financial disbursements are made to Provincial Councils for capital outlays and recurrent expenditure. The Secretary, Ministry of Finance indicated to the Committee that the objective of the Commission was to encourage the Provincial Councils to expand their revenue base and take an initiative in revenue collection in order to be financially viable.
Your Committee also summoned the Director, External Resources who held the view that it would be useful to allow the Chief Ministers to take preliminary steps to procure foreign loans and aid to develop their respective Provinces provided that the Central Government also participated in the negotiations. (vide Appendix IV).
It was apparent from the evidence of these public servants that the devolution contemplated in the legislation relating to Provincial Councils had not been fully implemented.
Your Committee is unanimous that there should be a greater devolution of power and that such devolution should be put into effect within a specified time. Your Committee was also of the view that not only should more power be devolved in conventional subjects such as health and transport, but also in matters such as foreign aid and foreign concessionary loans and that the Chief Executive of a Province must be encouraged to take the initiative in negotiating external financial assistance to develop the Province provided that the Central Government also participated in the negotiations.
In the course of the deliberations on the conflicting issues a Concept Paper was tabled embodying a compromise which

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provided for two separate councils and an Apex Assembly consisting of Members of the two Councils to plan common policies and coordinate programmes. The Paper presented a flexible framework for discussion.
The Paper was rejected by Members of the Committee belonging to the Ceylon Workers Congress and the Tamil United Liberation Front.
Subsequently an Option paper was tabled incorporating the salient features contained in
(a) The Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact
(b) The Dudley Senanayake-Chelvanayagam Pact
(c) The Manifesto of the Democratic Peoples' Alliance
(d) The Memorandum of the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (c) The Memorandum of Mr S.L.Gunaseskera, M.P.
(f) The Memorandum of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress
(g) The Concept Paper, and
(h) The "Four Point Formula' of the Tamil United Liberatio
Front
Your Committee in order to expand the area of devolved subjects, examined closely, the papers presented by the Ceylon Workers Congress and the Four Point Formula of the Tamil United Liberation Front.
Your Committee agreed that the subjects in List III (Concurrent List) of the Ninth Schedule to the Thirteenth

Appendix L 223
Amendment to the Constitution should be minimised or even that the list should be dispensed with.
Mr K. Srinivasan, M.P. for the Jaffna District subsequently presented a proposal on 11 th November 1992, entitled "A Realistic Solution to the National Crisis". A majority of members of Your Committee on 11th December 1992, agreed to adopt Item 2 in that proposal namely that "the Northern and the Eastern Provinces shall each be treated as a distinct unit of devolution". The Members representing the Ceylon Workers' Congress and the Tamil United Liberation Front did not agree.
Item 1 of the proposal states -
"The Unitary nature of the Sri Lankan Constitution be converted into a federal one"
"Provided however that subject to the undertaking by the Parties to the Select Committee that they shall not canvass and/or participate, the question whether Sri Lanka should have a Federal Constitution or not may be put to the determination of the people of Sri Lanka through the democratic mechanism of a referendum".
While not accepting this item in its entirety, the majority of Your Committee agreed that the devolution of functions may be on lines similar to those found in the Indian Constitution.
The member of Your Committee representing the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna did not agree to Item 1 of the Srinivasam Proposal.

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Matters agreed upon by a majority of the members
On 1 Ith December 1992, Members of Your Committee representing the United National Party, Sri Lanka Freedom Party, Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, the Communist Party, Lanka Sama Samaja Party as well as the independent members, Mr K. Srinivasan, Member for Jaffna District and Mr Basheer Seguda wood, Member for Batticaloa District, reached agreement;
(a) on the establishment of two separate units of administration
for the Northern and the Eastern Provinces;
(b) to adopt a scheme of devolution on lines similar to those
obtaining in the Indian Constitution; and
(c) to devolve more subjects that are in List 111 (Concurrent
List) or to dispense with the List.

Appendix M
Speech of Mr. V. Prabhakaran on National Heroes Day - 27.11.98
While the whole world has radically transformed and moving on the path of peace, progress and harmony and preparing itself to embrace the new millennium Sri Lanka is still caught up in a turbulent conflict. The Tamil national question continues to torment the Island as a burning issue fuelled by war and violence. Why is it that the Tamil ethnic conflict, with a prolonged history of more than half-a-century, continues to be an insurmountable problem while the world is undergoing change, resolving tensions and conflicts?
The Tamil people are demanding none other than their inalienable rights. Therefore, political justice is on their side. What are we demanding? What are we struggling for?
We aspire to live peacefully with freedom and dignity, without the interference of anyone, in our own soil, in our Motherland where we are born and bred; in our own historical homeland which belongs to us. We too, are human beings. We constitute ourselves as a human society possessing the basic rights of human beings. We are a national formation with a distinct language, culture and history. We, therefore, demand that we should be recognized as a community of people, as a social formation with distinct characteristics. We have the right to determine our political status. On the basis of the right, we aspire to choose freely a political model suited to us to govern ourselves.
This is what our people are demanding and fighting for. The Sinhala nation has been denying this just and civilized

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demand. It is precisely for this reason that the Sinhala state has been oppressing and suppressing our people. Successive Sri Lanka Governments have neither integrated or assimilated our people within the unitary system nor allowed our people the right to secede. Instead, they have always attempted to repress and subjugate our people. It is for this reason we have been compelled to fight a political struggle for the last fifty years. Though the forms of our struggle have changed in accordance with the historical compulsions, we continue to fight for political rights, for our right to live in freedom. Now the Tamil struggle has expanded and escalated into a war between two nations.
It is none other than the anti-Tamil attitude of SinhalaBuddhist chauvinism that has turned Sri Lanka into a blazing cauldron of violence. The Tamil national question arose as historical product of this racist oppression.
The world has changed with the passage of time. Similarly the politics of the world also has changed. But the politics of the Sinhala nation has not changed. It is unfortunate that the Sinhala politicians have not realized this fact. Fantasies that arose from ancient mythology have grown and developed into hegemonic ideas which exert tremendous impact on the Sinhala political and intellectual world. As a consequence the Sinhala nation lacks the ability to comprehend objectively the very basis as well as the rationale behind the Tamil issue and to deal with the problem humanly.
Over the years our people have been shedding tears of blood under the oppressive grip of Sinhala chauvinism. We are deeply saddened by the fact that their long standing suffering has not yet touched the conscience of the world community. Apart from this apathetic attitude shown by the international community towards the problems of our people, the massive financial and military assistance provided to Sri Lanka by foreign countries has also exacerbated their tragic plight. The assistance provided by foreign countries has also encouraged the rigid, irreconcilable and bellicose attitude of

Appendix M 7ר ר
the Sinhala chauvinists. The world community has always fought for the cause of the oppressed and it has always raised its voice of protest or intervened whenever there have been incidents of human rights violations, crimes against humanity or repression of minority nations in any part of the world. But we are dismayed to note that the international community is observing a muted silence over the colossal tragedy faced by the Eelam Tamils. Encouraged by the economic aid, military assistance, political, moral and diplomatic backing gained from international countries, Sinhala chauvinists have been adopting a genocidal policy against the Tamils with single-minded ruthlessness and arrogance.
We are aware of the fact that the international community is misguided by the sophisticated misinformation campaign carried out by Sri Lanka. It is unfortunate that the world community has uncritically assimilated the preposterous theories advanced by the Sri Lankan state (i.e. war for peace) to legitimise its military campaign against the Tamils. Nevertheless, facts about the plight of the Tamils have also found their way to the international arena. Atrocities and injustices committed against the Tamil people for the last several decades have been well documented and submitted to international forums. International human rights organisations have expressed serious concern that the state oppression against the Tamil has reached genocidal proportions. It is well known internationally that more than sixty thousand innocent Tamil civilians have been brutally done to death over the years by the terror and violence unleashed by the racist state in the Tamil homeland. Further more, more than eight hundred thousand Tamils, who fled the country and sought refuge all over the world, bear testimony as living witness to the barbaric nature of the Sinhala state oppression. The world is aware of all these facts. Yet, we are surprised and deeply saddened to note that this monumental human tragedy has not yet aroused the concern of world community.

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We are well aware that in the present world order every country pursues its own national and commercial interests. Yet, the civilised world has always given primacy to the universal values of human rights and freedoms. What dismays us is that the countries which lead the civilised world are reluctant to raise their voices against the uncivilised forms of oppression unleashed against the Tamils. Nevertheless, we have not lost hope. One day the truths that are buried deeply in the mass graves of Tamil Eelam will emerge from slumber and reveal the true face of Sinhala chauvinism. Only then the tragic story of our people will touch the heart of the world. Until such time, Eelam Tamils living all over the world should continue their campaign relentlessly about the tragic existential conditions of our people in the Tamil homeland with the objective of arousing the conscience of humanity.
So far, not a single voice of rationality is heard from the Sinhala nationals against the war. None so far has made a plea to put an end to the war and resolve the problem by peaceful means. From politicians to the monks, from intellectuals to the journalists, every one calls for the intensifications of the war. The Sinhala nation wants to continue the war to subjugate the Tamil nation.
Sri Lanka is a Buddhist country, a nation that follows the teachings of the Compassionate One who preached the noble ideals of love, truth and enlightenment. We are surprised as to how the evil of racism and militarism has raised its ugly head in a Buddhist society that thrived on the philosophy of dharma?. Today the war has expanded and escalated into a fullfledged conflagration in which armed forces of the two nations are confronting each other. The Sinhala nation is engaged in war of aggression to occupy Tamils land and to subjugate the Tamil people. We are fighting to protect our people and liberate our soil from alien aggression. The Sinhala nation is engaged in a war of injustice where as we are engaged in a liberation struggle in which justice is on our side.

Appendix M 229
Chandrika's government, which has reached the peak in oppressing the Tamils is determined to escalate and continue the war. Her government is bent on prosecuting the war through the military campaign have demoralised the army, brought massive destruction of life and property and shattered the economy of the country.
Chandrika's military project has crumbled and failed to achieve any of its strategic objectives. The fundamental objective of the war is to defeat and destroy the Liberation Tigers. But the LTTE has not been defeated but rather has grown immensely in strength acquiring wider experience in the art of modern warfare and turned out to be an invincible force. The Wanni battles caused a serious of debacles and massive casualties to the Sinhala armed forces. The Jayasikuru battles, which was undertaken with the grand design to open the road to Jaffna, has prolonged for more than a year and half and reached an impasse with the fall of Killinochchi.
Chandrika's political project of establishing Sinhala state administration in the occupied Jaffna peninsula with the help of the Tamil quislings is also being shattered. We cannot allow the Sinhala aggressive army to occupy even an inch of our homeland nor will we permit Sinhala state administrative functions in the occupied Tamil lands. We are shedding blood and fighting a deadly struggle with the primary objective of liberating our motherland which is the very foundation of the national existence and economic life of our people. Therefore we cannot permit the foot print of the Sinhala aggressors to remain embedded on our Sacred soil.
We do not believe that Chandrika, who has become the author of the most blood strained chapter in the history of oppression of the Tamils, will bring peace to the country by resolving the Tamil national issue by peaceful means. She is a firm believer in a military solution and lives in an illusion that political conflicts can be solved by military means. She is also a prisoner of the Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinistic ideology. One

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cannot therefore expect a leadership dominated by such thinking to be humane and compassionate enough to do justice to the Tamils.
We have not closed the doors for peace. We are open to the civilised method of resolving conflicts through rational dialogue. Since the Sinhala leadership lacks the political will and sincerity to resolve the problem we favour third party mediation for political negotiations. But we are not prepared to accept any pre-conditions for political dialogue. We want the political negotiations to be held in an atmosphere of peace and normalcy, free from the conditions of war, military aggression and economic blockades. We are not stipulating any pre-conditions for peace talks. We are suggesting the creation of a climate of peace and goodwill to hold peace talks, a congenial environment in which our people must be free from the heavy burden of suffering imposed on them. We hold the view that political negotiations cannot be free, fair and just if the Government utilises the military aggression on our soil and the restrictions imposed on the economic life of our people as political pressures. We are prepared to engage in initial talks to discuss the removal of Such pressures and to work out a basic frame work for political negotiations.
Our people are facing unbearable suffering in the form of death, destruction, displacement, hunger and starvation. They live as prisoners in their own homeland, facing daily, various forms of military atrocities. Our people want their dayto-day urgent problems resolved immediately. They cannot wait over an indefinite time until the peace talks resume and the ethnic conflict is discussed, resolved and the solution implemented. They want the war to come to an end and the occupation army that torments them to withdraw and their urgent existential problems addressed immediately. Is Chandrika's Government prepared to take a bold step to deal with the immediate essential problems of our people and resume

Appendix M 231
political negotiations in a congenial climate of peace and goodwill?. If not, the possibility for peace and a peaceful negotiated political settlement to the ethnic conflict will become remOte.
We do not anticipate that the hawkish and racist attitude of Sinhala chauvinism will undergo fundamental transformation. If such change does not take place Sinhala chauvinism will bear the responsibility for creating the concrete historical conditions for the birth of independent Tamil state.

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Appendix N
N. Ram Interviews President Kumaratunga (Frontline Jan 1 1999)
N.Ram (NR): It has been four years since you became President of Sri Lanka. What do you perceive to be the most significant achievement of your Government over these four years?
President Chandrika Kumaratunga (CK): Well, do you want only one significant achievement or would you be satisfied with a few?
NR: With a few.
CK: I think the most significant achievement of our rule is that after nearly two decades we have proved that even under great pressure, the Government in Sri Lanka can be democratic. For two decades people were made to believe that because there was an ongoing conflict and a civil war, governments couldn'?t help but be undemocratic and that they had to use a lot of terror at the state level to govern. Our greater achievement is that we have proved that under all these pressures, the Government can continue to respect democracy and govern efficiently. The other great achievement is that, for the first time, the Sri Lankan Government has consciously and honestly accepted that Sri Lanka does not need to be a unitary state. It can be united, can be one country, but it can have substantial devolution of power in order to satisfy the minorities in the country.
For both these achievements, especially for the second, we have had consciously to do a lot of political work, canvassing and campaigning convince the Sinhala majority, especially about

Appendix N 233
the political solution offered as a solution to the minorities' problem. And we have been able to do even that successfully in Sri Lanka. We were sincere enough not only to promulgate this or to announce it and try to make it law, but also to go to the people constantly - village to village, area by area - convincing them. We had a huge programme, the Sudu Nelum movement, the White Lotus movement. Have you heard of that?
NIR: YeS.
CK: These are the sea-changes we have been able to make. There were also smaller achievements such as - and I feel that it is also a very important one - the third achievement, the anticorruption drive that we started. I won?t say we have been able to wipe out corruption but we have certainly, at the top level, managed to ensure that all big Government development projects are not decided on criteria based on corruption. We have also been able to tighten systems and procedures and bring in new systems and procedures to plug loopholes to the maximum extent possible.
Breaking with two traps
NR: In a sense, the tragic part of the history of independent Sri Lanka - there have been many achievements, but the tragic part can be summed up in these phrases: the Sinhala Only trap and, in reaction to it and retaliation against it, the Eelam trap.
CK: (Nods in firm agreement.)
NR: You, President, won a tremendous mandate on the promise and programme of breaking with this history. How would you judge
your project four years from the time it was launched?
CK: I was personally convinced that both traps are wrong for the country. Being a student of politics, I had studied the issue

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very closely and discussed it at length with friends who were interested and involved in the subject and who had suffered because of it. I was convinced beyond any doubt that we have to get out of both these traps...I was so convinced, but my party wasn't convinced at all - they were caught in the same trap. They thought that one shouldn't even talk about these issues at election time They thought as all the Sinhala-based parties thought, including the Marxist parties.But I was so convinced of what the people thought because I had gone to the villages for twenty years before I became Prime Minister or President. I talked with them for hours. My style of politics was hands-on. I had talked about this ethnic issue especially during my (Sri Lanka) Mahajana Party days and I was convinced that the people would respond. I took the bull by the horns, and especially in the second of the four elections we had within eighteen months in 1994, the Southern Provincial Council election - the South is supposed to be very chauvinistic and panSinhala - I tried this hesitantly at a couple of meetings and had a lot of response. And then went on and on. I was told, "Be careful, don't talk about the issue during this election," and we won a resounding victory there.
I was justified that time: and I was so happy that what I thought about the people's thinking was right. And therefore I got the courage. And we go on. We have had the courage right through. We still tell people. "This is what is right." I still believe that the majority of the people are with us. But the longer this goes on, the more tired the people will get - and less enthusiastic about possible political solutions.
Understanding the LTTE
NR: You have had to take two tracks: military operations and a willingness to go for political negotiations to find a solution within

Appendix N 235
- I take it that the only stipulation is that it must be within -- the framework of a united Sri Lanka. What happened? How do you look at the experience vis-a-vis the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam)? What did you actually expect along the political track?
CK: Do you mean when we started discussions with them?
NR: Yes. You had a cease-fire and you had this tremendous mandate.
CK: I had studied enough about the LTTE to know that they were not just going to jump into a peace agreement - and even less So Mr. (V.) Prabakaran, the leader. I saw him as a ruthless leader of a very rare type. I would classify him with Adolf Hitler and a few others.But I thought that a leader cannot be alone, especially a guerilla leader. I explained this to my people, my Cabinet Ministers and so on, when we started going for talks with them. I thought that a guerilla leader has especially to depend on his people. I believed that all his supporters, his cadres, were not as obsessed (with the armed struggle for Eelam) as he was.
We saw there was huge enthusiasm amongst the Tamil people when we came, amongst the people in Jaffna who were being ruled by Prabakaran. I wasn't just guessing -- I was banking on the people's will which we had seen. I also realised that there must be a lot of young cadres who were with Prabakaran and the LTTE who also wanted peace -- who also, for once, had some faith in a 'Sinhala' leader.
You know the euphoria there was in Jaffna soon after I won. I was banking on that popularity for his people, the ordinary citizens plus the LTTE cadres, to prevail upon Prabakaran and pressurise him to come to some kind of agreement outside of the war. But obviously, Prabakaran was stronger there than his people or his cadres Secondly, I really banked on the people's power.

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Never before had the people of the North openly showed approbation of a 'Sinhala leader like that.
NR: Yes.
"A last attempt at humanism'
CK: This is where Prabakaran had to continuously tell his people a lot of lies, in their publications and in their various media activities, against me. This was all to convince them about why he broke the talks. They told a lot of lies because, the people wouldn't otherwise have accepted it.
My other thought was this. Just because you think somebody is impossible, that?s not a good enough reason politically to say "Oh, I'm not going to talk to them." You have to keep trying. If the Israelis and the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organisation) could get together, if the Irish and the British could get together, we couldn't see why we shouldn't. So it was one last attempt -- as far as I was concerned, it was a last attempt at humanism. Everybody had attempted in a very professional way to talk to Prabakaran and it had not worked. The Sri Lanka Government and the Indian Government put a lot of effort into it.
So I thought: at least let us show the man that there are governments in Sri Lanka that are capable of being human and of understanding the Tamil people's problems. And that is what I was attempting to do. That was the first stage, to break the ice, to build bridges (all of which were broken and blasted) between the two sides, the sides being the LTTE and the Sri Lanka Government. The Sri Lankan Government and the Tamil people was no problem, I knew, as long as we were sincere.
That is why I sent the first team; the team was briefed, saying "this will be the first stage." For the next stage it would be a more professional, political kind of team that would go -- if they agreed to begin to talk about political solutions. The first team was just to find out - a recce-ing trip - and also building bridges and friendship.

Appendix N 237
Prabakaran-Chandrika Correspondence, 1994-95
I have the series of - 42 - letters which I am going to publish very soon. The ones that he and I exchanged, 42 or 43.
NR: Will you give us copies?
CK: Certainly, certainly. I will give you autographed copies as you were one of the people responsible for our meeting the LTTE (in Chennai) long ago.
NR: Yes, when your husband Vijaya (Kumaratunga) and you came to Chennai in 1986.
CK: Yes. So right from the beginning, after we started talking with them - we came in on the 19th of August (1994), I wrote to him before the 31st of August, talks began somewhere in October, and two months later I wrote to him saying the political proposals were in hand: "Would you like to give dates to discuss this?" As far as I was concerned, the delegation that was going was going for the purpose I mentioned and also to persuade him to give dates to us to begin talking. Talking about beginning the political talks. But he never -- he refused to -- he just did not touch on that. So we couldn't go on to the second phase of getting more professional about the discussions.
Even the LTTE has taken up the UNP's (United National Party's) criticism that we were not professional enough, that I didn't send a professional enough team. Well, I sent my Secretary, that's important enough. The LTTE says I made a joke of the talks. The Secretary to the President is the highest public servant in the country. He was a very senior lawyer in the country. He is the President's Secretary and everybody knows that he has my confidence; I thought it was the perfect person. He?s a charming person, his PR is good and then I sent a group of other people -

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including one Tamil person -- to talk, and as and when it was required we sent Army people and Navy people depending on what had to be discussed, right through that process.
NR: Were these only talks about negotiations?
CK: It was partly that, It didn't begin like that. It was as I said, mainly building bridges. And then talk about negotiations. What they used it for was to get as much as they could out of us materially to gain time with the cease-fire to build up militarily to start the
War.
The LTTE model of political behaviour
NR: There is a deja vu about this. Since the anti-Tamil pogrom of 1983, the LTTE has apparently shown no willingness to talk substance or propose an alternative to their Eelam. The only time they spelt out anything was at Thimpu in 1985: the right to selfdetermination and the three other "cardinal principles," they pitched it at a very high and abstract level. Even India failed to get anything where the LTTE could be pinned down to say, "This will be a reasonable alternative to Eelam." federalism or whatever. It's the TULF (Tamil United Liberation Front) that did this, the LTTE didn't do it. There is nothing on record that suggests and this is a question - that the LTTE is willing to propose, or be serious about negotiating, any alternative short of Eelam. Or could it be different?
CK: No, we have no indication at all that they will change... for the moment.
NR: I read Prabakaran's address on Heroes' Day where basically, he says: we are willing to go for peace talks - he uses the words "peace talks" for talks that might lead to negotiations and "political negotiations" for what might lead to a solution. For peace talks, he says we are not putting down any conditions but the atmosphere

Appendix N 239
should be conducive. Keading it, it appears that you must make
concessions on the control of Jaffna (they call it "occupation"), the "economic blockade" and so on. He says the LTTE is ready to participate in peace talks with international, third party mediation -- because we have no faith in the "Sinhala leadership," he explains. This comes in response to what you have said. You have reiterated your willingness to go for a political settlement. What would be your response to that?
CK: As I said, we have always, from the moment the LTTE without any rhyme or reason broke the talks, had the same position. It has not changed. We are willing to talk because I do not like to settle this by war. We are not a military type of government. We'd much prefer to settle this politically and are consistent about that. And at this stage, we will be willing to discuss, as I have always said to various people. We don't want mediation, we are willing to take third party facilitation...foreign. We have many offers, so we can choose.
NR: Would that be a good offices role?
Time frame and framework of future talks
CK: Something like that, yes. And we would want discussions without very many conditions, except the one that there should be, as I have said, a limited time frame that we should decide upon at the beginning of the talks. If not, the LTTE will do what they have always done - that is, drag on and on and on until they build themselves up again militarily and then start attacking again. So we want to have a fairly tight schedule and, if the talks are not finished by then, we say bye-bye to the talks. Apart from that, we are not asking for very many more conditions.
There is, of course, one more. We have said that the unity of the State is not negotiable.

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Unity, not unitary
NR: Not unitary, but unity...
CK: Yes, unity - not unitary. Quite different.
NR: You're emphasising this. Now, may I have a brief assessment of the military experience? It seems to have had its ups and downs. The Sri Lankan state was able to regain possession of Jaffna, repeating what the IPKF (Indian Peace-Keeping Force) did in 1987. That seemed to be an impressive military achievement. There have been other gains and progress in your attempt to open the Main Land Route (MLR). But there have been setbacks as well, like Kilinochchi. And today we read that the Deputy Defence Minister and the three Service Chiefs had a narrow escape. Are these part of the game or...
CK: Part of whose game?
NR: The game of war. The question is about the military balance since the peace process broke down in 1995. I asked your political opponents this question: would you say the LTTE is weaker, stronger or about the same? Some people say they are stronger. Many other assessments say that there have been net gains for the Sri Lankan State and that the LTTE has been weakened or checked. You, President, would know the most about this.
"The LTTE is much Weaker'
CK: Let me tell you very honestly that the LTTE is much weaker than it was when we took over from the UNP government. In 1994, the LTTE was absolutely ruling the entire Northern Province, other than in tiny Army camps here and there, where the Army had just locked themselves up inside and were not even moving

Appendix N 24l
out. When the Palali people had to go out to collect their water, they had to ring up the LTTE and ask permission and go and collect the water. We had seen this happening continually. It was completely under their sway.
We have taken the whole of Jaffna Peninsula and we have taken parts of Mannar. We have now taken the entire road -- there are only two main roads from the South to the North; we have taken the one that goes west towards Mannar. We have taken two thirds of the one that goes straight up to Jaffna. To Killinochchi and beyond.
They have lost a lot of cadres and so are physically much weaker. They are also politically much weaker, because they have lost their people. Eighty-five per cent of the Tamil people who live in the Northern Province are now living in Governmentcontrolled areas. And these people are helping us, as I'm sure your Frontline people would have gone to Jaffna and reported to you. They say, "We are much happier now than under the Tigers" - though, of course, things are not yet back to normal in Jaffna.
Once again thanks to the Tigers. They won't allow development work to go on properly. They have started blasting. guns here and there. So we have to go very slowly. They keep threatening people, their people have killed two Mayors of Jaffna. We had just started the work nicely after the local government elections. They keep harassing the normalisation process but we go on - slower than we would if the LTTE was not harassing us, sabotaging the development work we are trying to do for the Jaffna people. And they have told foreign journalists, "Please don't let the LTTE come back again. We prefer to be under the Army than to have the LTTE here."
Forcing children into war
I think that is a huge victory for the Government and a big defeat
for the LTTE politically. They are finding it difficult to get cadres. They have recently been - you would have heard that also - taking

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them forcibly from their parents. And the parents were protesting. Some of the children who had been taken have run away.
NR: Could you tell us something about the experience of these children? At what age do they start?
CK: We have children they have taken at the age of eleven. And they send them to battle. They trin them for about a year. They don't let them see their parents. Earlier they used to pay the parents two thousand rupees, now they pay three thousand.
NR: Including girls?
CK: Including girls. We have two little girls with us (we have lots of girls now, I'm talking of the first two we've had). They came in a group to attack one of the Army camps in the North and the attack was repelled. But quite a few of the girls - Sea Tigers - who came were arrested. And the Sea Tiger leader, what's her name, Akila, who trained...
NR: .... who is an accused in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case, A-3.
The death of Akila the Tigress
CK: Exactly. She was the leader. She was the one who trained the women, who used to train them - she's now dead. Akila trained the woman Dhanu, who assassinated Rajiv Gandhi, and Akila also came for this attack. They were arrested by the Navy; some of them ran away, some were killed, these two girls were arrested. Akila was older and she ordered all the girls there to swallow their cyanide capsules, which some of them did. These two girls did not: they pretended to bite on the capsules but threw them away. Akila thought they had also bitten ontheir capsules. She bit on her cyanide capsule and she died.

Appendix N 243
NR: Is that right?
CK: Yes, she died about two-and-a-half years ago. And these two girls were caught together with Akila. She died in that incident. And the two girls were there. I got them moved down to Colombo. They were then thirteen and fifteen; they had been taken at the ages of eleven and thirteen. On their way back from school, the two girls had been grabbed, forcibly, in Jaffna (then the LTTE was still in Jaffna) and taken to some camp, also within the Jaffna Peninsula, and trained.
In three years they had been allowed to go and see their parents only once and they were accompanied by LTTE cadres in case they ran away. And they said, "We don't like this. We don't like to be here." We asked them what they wanted. They said, "All we want is to be sent abroad somewhere, because if we live there (in Jaffna), we will be killed by the LTTE. And we want to continue our studies." Those girls are still with us. We, in fact, interviewed them within the first one week; they talk only Tamil. We have the whole cassette. That was sent all over the world.
The LTTE is very annoyed about this and they have been asking us for these two girls back, saying they would give us ten, then twenty, then it became forty of our arrestees - "if you give these two girls back." They are very keen on having them back. It's very bad publicity.
Now we have loads of them, dozens of children in the recent six months. Some of them have run away and come to the Army camps for protection; others were taken (prisoner) by us after attacks.
Desertions
NR: So they speak of Army desertions, but not LTTE desertions.
CK: Exactly.

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NR: Now about the Army itself, the morale of your Army and the phenomenon of desertion that has been reported. Are you very concerned about it? There was even talk that some kind of conscription or draft might be introduced.conscription or draft might be introduced.
CK: (Smiles.) Well, there is about five to eight percent desertion. That's not very high, given the intensity of the military conflict that is going on. But then when we give them amnesties, a lot of them come back again and we keep giving amnesty all the time.
"The war has to end"
What I'm worried about is not desertion so much as the whole war itself. It has to end. It's terrible, the idea of young boys dying; Some times I go to funerals of people I know, from families I know. It's terrible.
NR: Do they know what they are fighting for? Is that clear?
CK: They know, they know. And after we took over, they also know that they are not fighting the Tamil people. I made some very clear speeches on this. I suppose you saw those speeches?
NR: Yes... they were reported.
CK: I said that it is a battle for peace. That it is not a war against Tamil people. That it is only a war against those who are enemies
of peace, the LTTE.
NR: Prabakaran, in fact, in his recent speech refers to some of these phrases.
CK: Really?

Appendix N 245
NR: Yes, he has quoted them.
CK: And he is criticising me for them.
LTTE characterisation of Chandrika
NR: He sees you as the most brutal, he calls you "the protagonist of..." You really want to know precisely how he characterises you?
CK: Yes. They depict me in the most terrible ways. They had some booklet where they had me, you know, like a Dracula, with these two teeth sticking out. Have you seen that?
NR: No.
CK: It's terrible. They have taken one of those very popular photographs of mine where I'm smiling broadly and they have drawn - you can do that in the computer - two pointed teeth coming out of my mouth like this, with blood pouring down the teeth.
NR: This is the translation from the Tamil original, not the thing they put out in English (there are some differences): "We do not believe that Chandrika, who figures as the protagonist of the most blood-stained chapter in the fifty year history of racial oppression in Sri Lanka, will, having established peace in the land, solve the Tamil national question in a peaceful way."
CK: Where did he make this speech?
NR: It's Prabakaran's Heroes? Day speech.
CK: This time?
NR: Yes, this year (on November 27, 1998).

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CK: But then why does he want...
NR: I suppose this also means that the military campaign is hurting.
CK: But why then, in the same speech, does he want discussions with us? He doesn't know what he wants. If he has lost faith in Chandrika, then why is be...
NR: I don't want to make any trouble for your plans...
CK: (Laughs.)
NR: for your peace amoves May be this is rhetoric. Your original, and now reiterated, project of finding a non-chauvinistic solution to this longstanding ethnic question, which may be considered Sri Lanka's principal national question perhaps...
Prospects of a political settlement
CK: It is.
NR:...has been the boldest attempt by any government to respond to Sri Lankan Tamil aspirations. I have this assessment from people who are objective, Tamil moderates in particular. There was the high point of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact of July 1957; I think the political package that came with the Indo-Sri Lanka Agrement of July 1987 was substantially a step forward; but everyone is agreed that your Government's constitutional proposals represent something beyond what your father (Prime Minister S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike) attempted - and it was thwarted - and waht the Indian engagement attempted. What previous governments had inhibitions about -- that is, going beyond the unitary framework - you clearly went beyond. And you have made it clear that you are committed very much to this. What do you

Appendix N 247
think is a reasonable time frame for this attempt? Prabakaran may be very intransigent, but surely there are the Tamil people, other political parties, moderates...
CK: Well, if the UNP agrees to at least discuss constructively and then finally come to a consensual agreement with us and make this law, I think Prabakaran's intransigence is not important. If we can bring in legally the solutions that we have proposed -- long-lasting solutions to the problem -- the Tamil people (as I sometimes rhetorically say, for I believe something like that will happen), the few Tamil people who are left with Prabakaran will turn against him.
But we have to prove this to the Tamil people. For once the Tamil people know that in fifty years of Independence, here is a 'Sinhala' leadership that is sincere in wanting to live with them in peace while giving them all their rights. They know that in their heart of hearts and they say so. But we have still not been able to constructively give them what we have wanted to.
Obstacles: Constitution and electoral system
We have started all the processes but we have not been able to conclude them satisfactorily simply because of this bizarre Constitution of the UNP, which they themselves amended sixteen times in nine years. It is a fraudulent Constitution, as I say, which stipulates that even to change a dot or a comma in the Constitution, you need a two thirds majority
And onthe other hand, you have a very, very bizarre electorl system - one does not exist and has not existed anywhere else in the world -- that this Constitution brought in. They have ensured that no party will ever make two thirds in Parliament. If you look at it in terms of India?s electoral system (the first-past-the-post system), our party won 80 per cent - not two thirds but eight tenths--of the seats in Parliament in the '94 parliamentary elections.

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But when it is translated into figures according to the way votes are counted under this Constitution, we have only one vote more in Parliament.
The UNP's historical responsibililty
So it is the UNP's responsibility. They started this war. They made it worse. They brought in a Constitution which will not allow a political-constitutional solution of the problem. So it is their boundern duty to vote with us. We have said we do not expect you to accept this lock, stock and barrel. Come, let's discuss. But for three, four long years, they have shown intransigence and have been lying through their teeth - you can quote me like that. That is the only problem. I think that if we can make this law, the Tamil people, the few who are left with Prabakaran, will turn against him. That will be the end of Prabakaran's intransigence.
"UNP games' and a key linkage
NR: You will still tgry to engage the UNP in an attempt to find bipartisan agreement on the constitutional proposals?
CK: We are still trying but they are still playing their usual games Now they are having secret meetings with the LTTE. The CID investigated an incident in whichthe UNP's MP. Dr.Jayalath Jayawardena, got into the vehicle of an NGO and went into the Wanni jungles and met with (Anton) Balalsingham (Political Adviser to the LTTE) and Tamilchelvan (a senior LTTE leader). And strangely now, you find Prabakaran saying something and one week later the UNP's leader says the same thing
NR: Another question, linked but somewhat different: the executive presidency. You made a promise to abolish the executive presidency and there are proposals for change, but it is linked

Appendix N 249
iwth the resolution of this principal national question. Would that be right?
CK: Yes. That is also part of the constitutional proposals. Some amendment has to be made in the form of the new Constitution. It is part of the new Constitution that we are proposisng.
NR: The UNP doesn't like this.linkage.
CK: We are not going to just give them everything they want without their giving us anything! I say, "Okay, you agree to the resolution of the ethnic problem," which they started, which they made worse, "We will agree to the abolition of the executive presidency." Don't you think that's fair?
NR: Yes, I think there should be that link. May I also ask you about your thinking on the sequence of elections ahead, because there is a lot of speculation in the press and in the political arena about which election will come first, the parliamentary or presidential...
CK: We haven't actually decided. Actually, I haven't decided. So we will have whatever we think we can win. That is obviously our goal.
NR: Within the Constitution.
CK: Within the Constitution. We will certainly have the elections in time. But now the question is whether you are having them early or not.
NR: And which election first? The presidential...
CK: (Laughs.) That is what everybody is speculating about. I shall leave you in suspense on that one.

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NR: And would you like to say anything on the non-binding referendum? It was mentioned in the press taht if the UNP did not cooperate, you would perhaps resort to that technique to put, I suppose, moral pressure...
A business initiative for peace
CK: All that may be part of the process I was telling you about. If the UNP doesn't respond.
I just want to make one other point: the business community of Sri Lanka has done its bit (the private sector umbrella effort under the chairmanship of businessman Lalith Kothalawala to bring together the ruling People's Alliance, the UNP and others for an interaction on, inter alia, the ethnic question). I thought that was a very good effort, because for the first time, civil society was getting involved. They are really sick and tired of this deadlocka deadlock not from our side, but from their side. And I thought it was a jolly good idea, especially givent he fact that all the big people in the business communitya re very close to the UNP.
The Government was very supportive. We said we would participate and let the UNP also come. Mr. Ranil Wickremasinghe (the UNP leader) is being totally disho9nest ont his issue, utterly and completely dishonest. First, he was looking for any excuse not to participate. He said he was not coming because G.L.Peiris (Minister of Justice, Constitutional Affairs, Ethnic Affairs and National Integration, and Deputy Minsiter of Finance) was coming. I do not know what he has against G.L.Peiris. I was surprised, because he was very friendly with G.L.Peiris, he has come here many times with him to discuss devolution matters and all that. And all of a sidden, he said because he was there...he was just picking quarrels for nothing. At which point I said, "Okay, I don't know what quarrel he has with him, let's not waste our time. If he doesn't like G.L.'s face, I will lead the delegation. I will come to the BMICH (Bandaranaike Memorial International Conference Hall)." He said, "Oh, even if she is coming, I am not coming." That was the first thing, a shocking thing.

Appendix N 25
Then, secondly, he now has written ... finally he said we will nominate our delegation, let the Governmnet nominate their delegation. I nominated three people, a very good list of people, not all of them pliicians. The UNP kept delaying. Apparently this group had rung up Mr. Wickremasinghe and he had sent some absolutely stupid letters, which is just playing ducks and drakes with the whole thing, saying things that had not happened.
Telling the Chairman of this initiative that when they discussed the matter, Mr. Wickremasinghe had said he would discuss with the Government only if the LTTE was also there. He said that in the letter but the business people say, "We never talked of the LTTE." How can they bring the LTTE? They have neither the power nor the sbility to do that.
Their main point was to get the UNP and the Government together. Because they were devastated that the two sides were just not succeeding in getting together. You know, facilitate the getting together of the UNP and the SLFP (Sri Lanka Freedom Party), because they knew people from both sides at a personal level. He says, "You know I told you that you should get the LTTE. So what is happening, is the LTTE 2" He is just being very dishonest about the whole thing. That means this will not happen either.
India and Sri Lanka
NR: You will visit India later this month and there have been preparations for the conclusion of a Free Trade Agreement, which will be a major development. Other subjects will be covered. You have always been seen as a friend of India and during you Presidency bilateral relations have been very good, according to the press. But how do you, as a leader, see the engagement of India in this business, the plus and minus points? Some of us would say that India is morally obliged, given the inputs it made earlier,

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to help Sri Lanka and your Government to find a solution in better way perhaps than have been on offer. How do you see that?
CK: Well, I would tend to agree with you, I think India does have a moral obligation, given the fact that they were also partly responsible for the commencement of the war. Not India, but the Indian government of that time. But we have had a lot of moral support from Indian Governments and, perhaps excepting one or two instances, not much more than that.
Significance of FreeTrade Agreement
NR: I see. How do you see this Free Trade Agreement and why is it so important? You seem to have personally spent a lot of time on bringing this forward and taken a lot of interest in the details. It would be very significant?
CK: It would be. For the Sri Lankan economy, it would be very significant. India stands to lose very little by giving us these concessions, but we stand to gain a lot.
The role of non-LTTE Tamil parties
NR: Your impression of the other, the non-LTTE Tamil parties, both the democratic TULF and the militants who seem to have
entered in some way the democratic stream. Do they amount to much?
CR: (Smiles).
NR: Are they working with you?
CK: They are working with us, they are very supportive of political
solutions we have offered. They have, of course, been critical of some of the clauses and we have done some discussion with them,

Appendix N 253
as we have tried to engage the UNP. We have, of course, done this consistently.
NR: So they have been more positive than the UNP.
CK: Much more positive than the UNP. All the minority parties and, as you know, every single one of the minority parties in Parliament is either in the Government coalition or supporting us in Parliament. I would say that as a whole all these parties are trying their level best, but the LTTE systematically decimated the Tamil leadership of this country. Systematically. So how they can call themselves liberators of the Tamil people. I don't know. They have killed off some of the best of the best Tamil leaders. Political leaders, intellectuals, professionals - anybody who opposed the LTTE's violence and terror has been killked off.
I think that it is a very big tragedy for the Tamil people today that they do not have a sufficient number of strong democratic leaders. Those who are there are now ageing. There are a few young people but it is not enough.
The LTTE and South Africa
NR: One of the complaints in Prabakaran?s latest Heroes' Day address is that the international community is apathetic and insentive to history and to the sufferings of the Sri Lankan Tamils. He pays tribute to international sensitivity to other human rights issues, "but not to us." This is a clear complaint, several paragraphs are devoted to this plaintive complaint.
Against this background, we have published in Frontline (December 4 and 18, 1998) a two-part article by Rohan Gunaratna on the LTTE in South Africa. This has also been covered in the press in Sri Lanka. First, the organisation had a base in South India - Tamil Nadu in particular - and once that was over, after 1987, it shifted to South Africa. It has worked to establish links with the Tamils there, the descendants of former indentured Tamil labourers who form a substantial section of the South African

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population. The LTTE seems to have made some contacts with ANC (African National Congress) leaders or at least individuals. Gunaratna's investigative article speaks of training camps in South Africa, some procurement and so on. It is also reported that your Foreign Minsiter has taken this up and you yourself have expressed concern. Could you tell us something about this? Is there truth to these replorts?
CK: Well, it is true that we are concerned about the South African Government's probable -- whether it is the Government or the ANC, I don't know -- links with the LTTE. The LTTE has successfully pulled the wool over their eyes by pretending to be liberators. And the ANC, I suppose, having had a history of liberation, was sympathetic. But we are now striving to explain to them the nature of the LTTE, its behavioural patterns and the dangers which lurk for anyubody who supports the LTTE. They must not forget that the LTTE systematically kills off all those who support it
But it is only the South African Government -- all the other governments that at one time, because of the UNP's wrong and idiotic policy towards the ethnic question, all those western governments and others who supported the LTTE or sympathised with the LTTE have now completely veered from that policy. Because they accept that this Government has an intelligent, humane and correct policy towards the problem.
Prabakaran and the Rajiv Gandhi assassination
NR: There is another complication, it seems, legally Prabakaran is Accused No. 1 in the Rajiv assassination case. This is not some dubious trial, but very professionally done. And Pottu Amman is Accused No.2 and Akila, if it is the same one (you referred to as dead), is Accused No.3. So here is the leader of a movement who

Appendix N 255
is wanted in your neighbouring state. I suppose he has not surfaced and therefore, it is not up to the Sri Lankan Government, which can't reach him. Do you think that at the moment it is an academic question or a real question: that is, that talks are possible for a negotiated settlement and the leader (of the movement) is the prime wanted in a major criminal case? Have you thought about this?
CK: Well, I suppose this is an issue that comes up with many guerilla leaders, but that doesn't, that shouldn't, prevent a government from talking with them - if a solution is possible.
An appeal to all Sri Lankans
NR: Any concluding thoughts on how Sri Lankans, the ruling coalition and alliance, the Oppositioin, Tamil parties,the people of your country should respond to this challenge? What would be your appeal as head of state and government? What do you expect them to do over the next few years?
CK: Well, I have been consistently saying this. We expect them - both sides - to move away from the traps that you were mentioning earlier: Sinhalese from the Sinhala Only trap and the Tamil people from the Eelam trap. And I believe they have already moved away, so there is nothing much to appeal to on that score.
Of course, there will always be the extremists but we don't have to take notice of them. If history took notice of the extremist minorities, the human race could never have moved forward. I believe that a majority of all people of this country want peace. That is what we want them to continue to want - and support us in seeing through these measures.
We cannot wait for ever, jelled in a situation where the UNP has fixed the Consitution, fixed the war, and refuses to make

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it change. We refuse to be jelled to that situation and be frozen there.
We will very soon have to take decisions that may not completely be in keeping with the present Constitution - but will not be anti-constitutional or anti-democratic. My request, my appeal to the people of Sri Lanka is to support us politically on that issue.
NR: Thank you very much, President.

Appendix O
The Governmentis stuck on every front
Interview with Ranil Wickremasinghe (Leader of the Opposition) (Frontline 1.1.1999)
Forty-nine year old Ranil Wickremasinghe is the active, experienced and hardworking leader of Sri Lanka's chief Opposition party, the United National Party (UNP), which is often described as the largest party in the political system. He has held different Ministerial portfolios during the prolonged phase of UNP rule lasting for a decade-and-a-half from 1977. He was also, briefly during a transitional period, Prime Minister of Sri Lanka.
He is expected to be President Chandrika Kumaratunga's
main rival in the next presidential election, which is due in the year 2000, and is also getting ready to wage an aggressive campaign in the proximate parliamentary election. During the past many months, he has been busy organising and re-energising his party. N.Ram interviewed Ranil Wickremasinghe at his Colombo office on December 7 to gain an idea of the UNP's perspective on the political situation, the military conflict in the North, dealing with the LTTE, and bilateral relations with India.
N.Ram (NR): Mr. Wickremasinghe, could you give us an assessment of the overall situation? First, the military situation relating to the ethnic question, and then your reading of the political initiative that is aimed at finding a solution.
Ranil Wickremasinghe (RW): The overall verdict would be that the Government is stuck on every front. They launched

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this military campaign called Operation Jaya Sikurui to defeat the LTTE. It has not worked. It has failed. The objective was to capture Killinochchi Killinochchi is now in the hands of the LTTE. It's been one of the costliest campaigns in military history and certainly the longest ongoing military campaign from the Second World War, after the siege of Leningrad. But what has finally happened is that there has been setback after setback.
With the Army being stretched, the Government really cannot make any progress. Neither can they give up any of the areas that have been captured but not consolidated elsewhere. Politically, it will be a setback for the Government.
A failed strategy
The whole strategy was based on defeating the LTTE militarily and then marginalising them politically through the package. As a result, the package cannot be brought forward. The LTTE is quite active. The package has also run into a lot of opposition in the South. With a majority against the present set of proposals.The Government has no way out.
We believe that (the strategy of) concentrating all the economic resources and winning the war in one year has also failed. The economy is coming apart. We are feeling pressure from three sources. We have had problems in three areas. Firstly, the Government has not been able to manage the economy and has lost investor confidence. Secondly, the fact that resources have been drained off for the war has limited the ability of the private sector to expand. It has also come increasingly under pressure. Thirdly, we are not prepared for the Asian crisis that is affecting our exports.
This has really brought the Government to a grinding halt. They have got to decide where they go from here.

Appendix O 259
Reading Prabakaran's Heroes' Day speech
NR: The LTTE leader Prabakaran's recent address on Heroes' Day received wide publicity. What do you think it reflects?
RW: It is significant in the sense that it is different from the earlier speeches. It seems to have been addressed more to a Southern audience than to a Northern audience. It talks of finding a solution within Sri Lanka as one single country. It also holds out the threat that if you all fail to do so, then the LTTE cannot be blamed for pushing the agenda for an independent Tamil state.
For the first time, Prabakaran has recognised, stated that Sri Lanka is a Buddhist country. It is sending a signal that they want to have talks, they are looking for a political solution. In a way, he has also taken the political initiative away from the Government. From May last year, when the Government initiated the bipartisan exchange of letters to enable the Government to talk to the LTTE, until now, the initiative would have been with the Government. But Prabakaran has taken the political initiative away from the Government - as much as he has taken the military initiative away. It is a position from which, if the Government does not respond, it will affect them adversely, both internally and internationally.
Learning from the 1994-95 experience
NR: Thus far Prabakaran has not shown any willingness to talk about substance. Basically, he talks about what needs to be done before meaningful negotiations can be held. You think that could change?
RW: Well, when you go for talks, all that depends on the ability of the Government to set an agenda which could lead to some fruitful results. Otherwise, the talks become inconclusive. On the last occasion, they sent a very inexperienced team to talk

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with the LTTE. The LTTE team at least had experience: SOe of the members of the LTTE team were those who had discussions with the Sri Lanka Government and the Indian Government earlier. But on the Sri Lanka Government Side, most of them had no experience in any type of negotiations. This, I think, was a fundamental flaw.
Secondly, Prabakaran gave notice of the fact that he was withdrawing from the talks. President Kumaratunga did not follow up on that. Neither were the armed forces informed of the fact that the talks might break down, in which case they would have been prepared. In fact, it was handled very amateurishly on the last occasion. It depends on whether they have the ability to learn from their past mistakes. So far President Kumaratunga has shown she will not learn from past mistakes.
"The LTTE is stronger"
NR: Since the talks collapsed in 95, we have had a sustained period of military operations. Would you say the LTTE is weaker or stronger than it was at that point, or more or less in the same position strategically?
RW: I would say the LTTE is stronger. They have now developed the ability to fight a conventional war, at a divisional level. They did not have that earlier. They were indulging in guerilla warfare. Even the attack on Pooneryn was not successful, because they could not deploy their units at battalion formation. It is not so now. Their victories at Mullaithivu and Killinochchi are major victories by any standard. Because this enabled the LTTE to be recognised as the most powerful guerilla force in the world. This is due to the fact that we over-stretched ourselves and we allowed the
LTTE to concentrate their resources in a smaller area where we turned the military strategy the other way around

Appendix O
In the last phase of the UNP, we had the LTTE in three areas. They had to administer Jaffna Peninsula. They had to defend the jungles in the Wanni. And they also had to carry on their activities in the Eastern Province. While the Government focussed on the Eastern Province. Now it's the other way around. We are stretched into all parts of Sri Lanka and the main LTTE force is in Mullaithivu.
Costly political interference
NR: Has there been political direction for the military operations? Or would you say political interference? How do you see the role of political leadership in this?
NR: There has been political interference in the military operations. Anuruddha Ratwatte (Deputy Defence Minister and Power and Energy Minister) has taken over the conduct of military operations. The professional officers who spoke out their minds have been sent out of the Army or transferred. These are the officers who produced results earlier.
The policy of sacrificing soldiers to make territorial gains has not worked. It has been having a backlash within the armed forces. It is not only on the ground. In the last three years, the LTTE has demonstrated its ability to control the sea route between Trincomalee and Kankesanthurai. Now they have even brought in a few aircraft - for the first time. They have built up an armoured column and artillery from equipment captured from the Sri Lankan Army. This show the extent of political interference. The total losses, the death toll for the Army over the past four years is 11,500 - while in the previous period stretching from 1983 to 1994, it was in the region of 6,000 or 7,000.

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Desertions
NR: And this phenomenon of desertion everyone is talking about: are you concerned about that?
RW: It is a matter of concern People are deserting the Army, no one is joining the Army. Every day our strength is being reduced.
NR: There is some talk of conscription in the future, if this continues.
RW: Conscription will not work. It is politically unpopular. The Government will not press ahead with it. There was some idea being floated by the Defence Ministry, but the President abandoned it because she realised it was very unpopular.
The UNP and devolution
NR: Finally, on this devolution package; could you give us an update on your party's assessment of what is on offer and also what needs to be done?
RW: The present devolution package will not find acceptance in Sri Lanka because many major parties and groups are opposed to it. From the South itself many or most of the political parties; from the North, the LTTE. We have to work out a new package.
Devolution is necessary but I would say the basis of political settlement is a state that is based on democracy, the rule of law, human dignity as well as the Supremacy of the Constitution. On that count, the equal treatment of all Sri Lankan citizens, the acceptance of the different cultural and linguistic traditions. As far as the UNP is concerned, within an indivisible Sri Lanka, we could go forward in devolving power to a large extent. Not merely to the Provinces but also

Appendix O 263
to the local authorities. This is what we have been working on, talking about.
UNP prospects
NR: May I have your reading of the political situation on the ground? You are now in a phase of building up your party. The UNP has been the leading party in the system, when we look at the track record; but you suffered big reverses and there was also a period of disarray. As party leader, how do you see it on the ground in different parts of the country?
RW: The party organisation is getting into shape. A lot of new people are coming in. For the first time, after about ten years, the youth and women's wings have been reorganised. Professional sections have been brought into the party. A lot of enthusiasm, a lot of grassroots re-organisation has gone on, including what is called the cluster system where we cluster two polling booths and have one person supervising it.
At the present moment, we have about 16,000 party branches in different parts of the country outside the Northern Province. And that's a tremen dous task that has been undertaken by the UNP. I am quite confident and hopeful that the UNP will be the single largest party in the next election and will have an overall majority in Parliament.
India, Sri Lanka and free trade
NR: And finally on bilateral relations with India. President Kumaratunga will be visiting India later this month, in the last week of December, and perhaps the highlight of the visit will be the conclusion of a Free Trade Agreement between the two countries. In the SAARC framework, the various member states are supposed to be moving towards free trade, but bilateral progress could come on a faster track. What is your
thinking on this?

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RW: We have always been for close economic relations with India and we finally have to become one market. We have identified the sectors where we are strong, where we are weak and work it on a basis so that the stronger sectors are opened out initially and the other sectors are strengthened and you can look at the other options. We have been pushing this for the last few years both in Government and in Opposition.
I think the major achievement of the SAARC Heads of Government meeting in Colombo was Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee's offer of a fast track negotiation with other SAARC member states. We are sorry that the Sri Lanka Government and others did not utilise the SAARC Heads of Government meeting to press ahead with this and to get it clarified. Nevertheless, they followed it up subsequently. There will still be certain issues to be worked out like...
NR: ... the Rules of Origin stipulation (that is, the stipulated domestic value added ratio used for Rules of Origin purposes)...
Towards a single South Asian market
RW: ... Rules of Origin and some of the other non-tariff barriers. Free trade is a sensitive issue in any country, in the domestic political scene. Therefore it must be handled in a way that ensure that there are no major political issues on either side, as far as India and Sri Lanka are concerned. But in the long term, a single market is something that we have to work for. And we welcome every move, every step that moves us closer to that.
NR: You are thinking of a time frame of...
RW: I would look at a decade plus. A decade should be a target, some may take longer. That's in what the WTO (World Trade Organisation) lays down: a decade is the maximum, but then it can be sector by sector. So once you identify some of the sectors as late-comers, this can be done.

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