கவனிக்க: இந்த மின்னூலைத் தனிப்பட்ட வாசிப்பு, உசாத்துணைத் தேவைகளுக்கு மட்டுமே பயன்படுத்தலாம். வேறு பயன்பாடுகளுக்கு ஆசிரியரின்/பதிப்புரிமையாளரின் அனுமதி பெறப்பட வேண்டும்.
இது கூகிள் எழுத்துணரியால் தானியக்கமாக உருவாக்கப்பட்ட கோப்பு. இந்த மின்னூல் மெய்ப்புப் பார்க்கப்படவில்லை.
இந்தப் படைப்பின் நூலகப் பக்கத்தினை பார்வையிட பின்வரும் இணைப்புக்குச் செல்லவும்: Race Relations in Sri lanka 1977.08

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1. SOCIO-ECONOM
 
 

|C BACKGROUND
VOLUME 16 NO. 2
AUGUST 1977

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Editorial Board: Tissa Balasuriya o.m.i... Mrs. Bernadeen Silva,
Richard Dias, Douglas de Silva, Shirley Candappa.
Sales & Subscription: Miss Nirmalie Perera.

VOLUME 16 NO. 2 Alogo. AUGUST 1977
INTRODUCTION
August 1977 has been a cruel month for us in Sri Lanka. It has seen the recrudescence of communal violence on a large scale. Tens of thousands have had to flee from their homes for safety in the North or the South. We have seen some of the consequences of the violence unleashed and are shocked by the inhumanity of man to man, woman and child. We find it difficult to understand how any group of persons can inflict such injury and attrocities to other human beings, specially innocent, weak and undefended ones. Persons from some work places are also said to have gone on the rampage.
Sri Lanka is witnessing an escalation of violence in the 1970s. The post-election violence of May 1970 was followed by the youth insurrection of April-May 1971. Subsequent long years of emergency rule gave legal leeway to harsh measures by the forces of law and order. Recently the post-election violence of July 1977 was followed three weeks later by the communal looting, arson and manslaughter of August 1977. Over a 100 persons are reported dead. Refugees are said to number 50,000.
It is important to remember the warning of both Prime Ministers Sirimavo Bandaranaike and Indira Gandhi: “we are sitting on top of a volcano that can erupt at any moment'. The lines of division in our society criss cross There are divisions of class, race, religion, political parties, and age groups. Any of these could erupt into violence. Sometimes several of them converge. In all these situations of disorder a section of society that lives a marginalized existence as an underworld emerges as looters. They can easily be hired for thuggery Or they may find in the situation an opportunity for obtaining quick gains at the expense of defenceless victims. Organized gangs of persons went in hundreds in lorries to loot, burn and do physical harm to others. Their victims included poor farmers, plantation workers and vegetable sellers who live a day to day existence.
The race divisions have come to the fore in Sri Lanka specially during the past few months. The General Elections were fought by the T. U. L. F. (Tamil United Liberation Front) on a basically communal programme. They wanted a mandate to vivisect the country into two separate sovereign States. As the U. N. P. manifesto states the Tamil people's frustration had grown to the point that many were prepared to support such a policy out of

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desperation and a sense of hopelessness concerning the leadership of the major Sinhala political groupings. Politicians too have their share of blame for neglecting issues of race, aggravating divisions and also by neglecting the national aspect of most problems such as of poverty and unemployment.
We must understand the historical background of at least the past 50 years, the economic aspects of race rivalries and frustration, the socio-psychological make up of our peoples, the divisions perpetuated by the educational system and the myths, legends and stereotypes handed down from generation to generation. Personal factors of the temperament and the quality of the leaders of different groups have also a bearing on these problems. There is a vast communication gap between the Sinhala and Tamil communities in Sri Lanka. The extent of the feeling of self righteousness within each group and lack of understanding of the others is both sad and frightening and this is not confined to youth or to the “ignorant masses'.
We can be one nation only with justice and fair play to all. Mere physical power nor even democratic majority rule cannot keep a country together for long if there is grave injustice to one major group or the other. Likewise two separate States are not likely to be more just or more peaceful if we do not face together the issues involved both in the country as a whole or within each community. In any case the price of separation will certainly be far greater than what each side has to bear with at present.
We are convinced that the future of Sri Lanka is in our being united in a just, free and socialist society in which all persons are equal in dignity and rights. We believe this is possible given the resources of nature, civilization and good will that we have in our country.
We are also convinced that this problem cannot be left merely to politicians. All citizens must concern themselves with our future as a nation. The religions too can be a binding force, provided they live their authentic values. The advance of knowledge and human understanding can help contain communalistic trends and build national unity based on a respect for all persons.
In this and subsequent issues of Logos we present some of the background documentation, analyses, political approaches as well as the resources for nation building. We try to present the different points of view within a few limited pages. The next issue has the T. U. L. F. manifesto, analyses of Election results etc. We shall be grateful for comments, contributions and for sending us documents for publication and for our library.
9–9-1977 Tissa Balas uriya, o.m.i.

MINORITY PROBLEMS -- A SOCIO-ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
TSSA BALASURYA o. m.i. (Director, Centre for Society and Religion)
(Text of a talk to the Sri Lanka U. N. Association at the
Sri Lanka Foundation Institute on 1.11.76)
Over the past 1 1/2 years a group of us belonging to different races have been meeting off and on to understand the problems with relation to the races in our country. We have also held a whole day public seminar and published a statement on our agreed views. My views have been formed partly through this on-going dialogue with this group and with many others including the Council for National Unity.
The point of view of the Tamil leadership, specially of the Tamil United Liberation Front (T.U.L.F has been expressed at this seminar and in other publications. It may be summarized as follows:-
1. That the Tamil people have been denied their language rights by the present Constitution which enshrines Sinhala as the Official Language. On the other hand the regulations for the use of the Tamil Language under the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act are deemed to be subordinate legislation. Hence it is argued there is no Constitutional guarantee for the use of Tamil. This creates very troublesome and humiliating situations as when Tamil people receive official correspondence in Sinhala only.
2. The use of Tamil as the language of the Courts in the Northern and Eastern Provinces is dependent on a resolution of the National State Assembly, and are not safeguarded in the Constitution as such.
3. The Tamils have not been given an equality of opportunity in employment in the public service. This has been a traditional avenue of employment for the people of the North where there are few other outlets such as industries. There is also discrimination in promotions due to the official language requirement and

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through administrative devices. Increasingly, there are fewer opportunities for a Tamil to be able to rise to the top positions in the public service.
4. There is discrimination against the Tamils in admission to higher education; standardization on the basis of the language medium is an unfair discrimination. But they are prepared to accept weightage in favour of the less favoured districts. This shuts out the opportunities for the Tamil youth to enter universities. It also prevents Tamils from seeking employment elsewhere in the world. The Tamil youth are restive due to this unemployment caused by such policies.
5. The country's development policies have relatively neglected the North and the East, specially in the setting up of public sector industries. The land colonization policies of successive governments have been an encroachment by Sinhala people into the traditional homeland.
6. The Sinhala leaders have not shared political power with the Tamil leaders. The Sinhala leaders of both the major political parties cannot be trusted as they have broken promises made to the Tamil leaders during the past 20 years.
7. There is now a Sinhala raj that has replaced the British raj. It holds sway over the North. An army of occupation is in the North. Tamil youth are detained without trial.
8. An attempt is being made to interfere with the religious convictions of the people, by luring them away from Hinduism.
The contention is that the Tamil people have now come to the limit of their patience. There is no hope in dialogue with the Sinhala leaders. Hence the only solution is to have a separate sovereign State for the Tamils in the North and the East (with the support of the estate Tamils of Indian origin?) This is after all only a return to the historical position prior to 1815 when the British imperialists brought the whole country under one rule. Prior to that there were two nations in Sri Lanka. "Let us return to that position, peacefully; and we will look after our problems. We are prepared if necessary to take back all the Tamil population in Sri Lanka to our traditional homelands'.
While it is necessary that the rest of the country appreciate the problems of the Tamil, it is useful that the Tamil people understand some of the difficulties of the Sinhala people. Then we
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can try to see how far the problems of the Tamils are really ones shared by the rest of the country also, and how far there is racial discrimination.
At the outset I would like to say that if the Tamil people wish to have the self determination to set up a separate sovereign state as the only feasible means of living with human dignity and justice, then it is for them to press for that right. However they too should consider whether there is sufficient cause for it and whether the consequences are not likely to be worse for all concerned. The majority community has the responsibility to see that the Tamil community is not compelled to seek separation due to its being seriously discriminated against.
Let us now consider some of the problems from the point of view of the Sinhala population.
Unemployment
Unemployment is becoming a rather serious concern among the Tamil people, specially youth. But among the Sinhala people it has been a severe hardship for nearly two decades. In almost all the Sinhala villages there are hordes of unemployed youth, some even above 30 years. This has been so for many years now. Let us consider some of the available statistics. −
According to the Preliminary Report on the Socio-Economic Survey of Ceylon 1969-70 there were 547,700 unemployed in the country. (Table 17). Of these in
Thousands
Zone I 250.7 Colombo, Kalutara, Galle, Matara - 4 Districts of whom 40,000 in age group 25-34 years.
Zone II 33.5 Dry Zone - Hambantota, Moneragala, Amparai, Polonnaruwa, Anuradhapura and Puttalam. N. C. P. - 6 Districts 1,300 in age group 25-34 years.
Zone III 22.9 Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee and Batticaloa. North East - 5 Districts 2,900 in age group 25-34.
Zone IV 238.8 Kandy, Matale, Nuwara Eliya, Badulla, Ratnapura, Kegalle and Kurunegala - C. P., N. W. P., Sab. - 7 Districts - 25,500 in age group 25-34.

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Unemployment is thus mainly a rural problem i.e. 70% of the
total unemployed, or 380,000 out of 546,000 Unemployed in Urban areas 115,000 Unemployed in Estate areas 51,000
In Zone I the 250,000 are largely Sinhala - 89.4% population here is Sinhala.
In Zone IV - 71% of population is Sinhala i.e. 3.5 m. 21% Tamils of Indian origin i.e. 1. m. but these have employment and security, and where some are dislodged now, there is a chance of complaint - a sort of public responsibility for providing employment.
Unemployment is therefore largely a problem of the Sinhala and to a certain extent Moor communities. It is much less a problem for the Ceylon Tamils in the North and the Tamils on the estates. The difference is that the Sinhala people have to bear up their burden as a consequence of the poverty of the country, the exploitation in the system and the unemployment generated by the pattern of development. But when the Tamils in the North are unemployed it presents itself as a problem of racial discrimination. It is not noticed that there were 489,000 out of 546,000 unemployed in the predominantly Sinhala areas. There are perhaps as many Sinhala unemployed youth in the country as there are people in the Jaffna Peninsula. But there is no political lobby to adequately articulate the harrowing distress of the Sinhala youth.
This unemployment is partly due to the long-term discrimination against the Sinhala people specially in the hill country. The British plundered the lands of the villagers and the adjoining forests which would have been the area of natural expansion. The tea and rubber plantations totally marginalized the Kandyan peasantry. Further the same land area has now to bear 1.1 million more people of Indian origin. Agriculture was grossly neglected in public policy. Thus the main price of imperialism had to be paid by the Sinhala peasants and the estate labour both of whom were harshly exploited by British capitalism.
Secondly, the pattern of development in which foreign companies captured the local market for consumer goods and destroyed local skills and enterprises also made for further unemployment in the country. In recent decades Governments have tried to divert more people to the land, setting up new colonization schemes.
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Industrial development too is very recent. What I wish to emphasize is that large scale unemployment is very much a problem of the Sinhala peasantry. They do not have an escape valve through higher education and lucrative foreign employment.
Discrimination in Employment
While language may be a source of discrimination, the Sinhala people are affected by another type of discrimination - due to their differing political parties. In addition to the traditional favouritism or discrimination on the basis of caste, family, sex, there is also the need of the M. P.'s chit. Hence many Sinhala families are disgruntled with this system. Further, the Sinhala youth too have to face a language problem, in that the more lucrative jobs are open to those fluent in English. The village youth suffers much from this type of favouritism. Even the problems of caste discrimination are not peculiar to the North. The caste system too can cause discrimination among the Sinhala people.
Female Unemployment is a further grave problem in the Sinhala areas. Out of a total of 546,000 in the category of unemployed, 213,000 were females. Of these 94,000 were in Zone I and 104,000 in Zone IV i.e. a total of 198,000 and 9,900 females in Zone II. Only 4,800 females were unemployed in Zone III.
It is to be borne in mind that in the Estate sector which is largely in Zone IV 300,000 females are employed and only 11,000 unemployed. In the Estate sector 79% are persons of Indian origin. Therefore the bulk of the 104,500 unemployed females in Zone IV are Sinhala peasant women.
All these figures have of course to make allowance for the limitations of such surveys.
It is this deep seated frustration among the youth, specially those with some education, that led to the insurrection of 1971. This was the most significant expression of public discontent in this country, since the rebellion of 1848. About 70,000 or more youth rose up in armed rebellion and faced the danger of death, because they did not see signs of hope under the present situation. Over 1,200 were officially recorded as killed in the process. Popular estimates place the figure at a higher level. When there is a complaint of discrimination in employment on the basis of race, it is good to remind ourselves that these Sinhala village youth felt they were the people without a way out - peso gas මගක් නැතේ.

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Similarly in relation to imprisonment with trial, 18,000 of the insurgents spent several years in detention before release without trial. This too is not to justify any other detention, but to note that the problem is not merely racial.
Landlessness
The burden of population is also mainly in the Southern half of the country. Zones I & IV had 4.6 m. and 4.9 m. in 1969/70 i.e. 9.5 m. out of a total of 12.29 m. The density of population is much greater in the Sinhala areas than in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.
Availability of agricultural land is
Year No. of Ag. Holdings Acreage No. of Size Population
Operators 946 848,527 2,817,957 m 3.3 6,657,339 1962 1,168,214 3, 25,98 II, 64,74 2.68 I0.443,000 1973 l,646,46 3,887,287 ,623,386 2.36 3,80,000
i. e. 80% of cultivable land
Between 1946 and 1962 - Increase in Ag. Lands 10% but increase in population=56.8%.
Between 1962 and 1973 - =23% but increase in population=26%.
Though there has been an increase in the number of holdings, there has been a steady decline in the size of holdings.
1973: No. of Small Holdings
sless than 1 acre = 767,392 or 47% 1,646,461-31-5 acre=690,908 or 42%
Umore than 50 acres=3,729 or 0.2%- { Kurunegata 22.5%
Colombo 20.1%
in 1946 out of the land-owning families in Kandy 82.1% had less than acre
in Matale 85.3% do in N’Eliya 75.4% do in Badulla 76.9% do
This shows the smallness of size of land holding in the hill country even 30 years ago. This is partly due to the plantations. The land of the Sinhala peasantry has been taken over for the plantations a Tea, Rubber, and Coconut.
f

Density of Population
A study of the density of Population shows how during the past century the growth of the pressure of population has been mainly in the traditional Sinhala areas.
Density of Population per square mi le
District 87 9 1963
Mannar 21 27 63 Vavuniya 10 12 48 Jaffna 246 327 635 Batticaloa 33 55 206 (184 Amparai) Trincomalee 19 38 137 Anuradhapura 16 22 109 (Polonnaruwa ) Chilaw, Puttalam 58 278 263 Badulla (Moneragala) 39 66 528 Ratnapura 74 133 437 Kegalle 164 378 901 Kurunegala 113 166 463 Hambantota 60 109 274 Matara 298 472 1070 Galle 298 446 993 N’Eliya 123 328 839 Matale 83 120 333 Kandy 254 447 1,142 Kalutara 234 448 1,018 Colombo 532 1,023 2,787 All Ceylon 95 162 423
:
Thus the growth of population has been heaviest in Badulla, Ratnapura, Kegalle, Matara, N’Eliya, Kandy, Kalutara, Colombo and Kurunegala districts. Colombo has grown 5 1/2 times, Kandy 4 times, N’Eliya 7 times, Kegalle 5 1/2 times, Badulla 13 times and have a high density.
While we should pay heed to the criticism about Sinhala advances into the traditional homeland of the Tamils it is also worthwhile to remember that over the past few centuries, even prior to 1505, it is the Sinhala areas that have received new comers. Thus the Moors, Malays, Tamils of Indian origin and Ceylon Tamils have all settled down in the Southern half of the country. It is this area that was occupied by the plantations also. Nearly 1.1 million Indian Tamils, 500,000 Moors and Malays and about 400,000-500,000 Ceylon Tamils have made these areas their home. It would seem the Sinhala people have been quite hospitable.

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Ceylon Tamil Population
In view of the T.U.L.F. demand for a separation of Sri Lanka into two sovereign states it is useful to bear in mind the geographical distribution of the racial groups in Sri Lanka.
At the 1971 census there were 1,415,567 Ceylon Tamils or 11.1% of the total population of 12,711,143. Of these -
175,000 were in the Western Province 83,000 Ο Central Province 107,000 Southern Province, N.W.P., N.C.P., Uva and Sabaragamuwa 60,000 9 Amparai District
174,000 s Batticaloa District
67,000 s Trincomalee District
648,000 s Jaffna District
40,000 Mannar District 59,000 Vavuniya District
This means that only 750,000 Ceylon Tamils are in the Northern province. (In Vavuniya the Sinhala population is 115,000). 241,000 Ceylon Tamils are in Batticaloa and Trincomalee districts and 60,000 in Amparai. Thus 365,000 Ceylon Tamils are in the largely Sinhala provinces i.e. over a quarter of the Ceylon Tamil population.
If we take the Tamils of Indian origin too into account, out of a total Tamil population of 2.6 million 800,000 are in the Northern province i.e. less than 1/3; and 338,000 in the Eastern province. Altogether about 1,138,000 are in these two provinces along with about 250,000 Sinhala people. Hence more than half the Ceylon and Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka are out of the North and East.
What has to be taken into account is the immense human dislocation involved in the setting up of separate states. I would loathe to see our Tamil friends leave us or live here as citizens of a foreign country. After all there are 103,000 Ceylon Tamils within the Colombo Municipal limits alone. Even Jaffna Municipality has only 90,800 Ceylon Tamils. Incidentally, Colombo is the biggest city of Tamils in Sri Lankal
The Moors and Malays
The Moors and Malays are evenly distributed in all the provinces
of the country. Out of a total of 9 lakhs of Ceylon Moors, Indian Moors and Malays in 1971:-
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231,000 in Colombo and Kalutara. 221,000 in hill country - Kandy, Matale, Kegalle, Ratnapura,
Badulla, Nuwara Eliya. 45,000 in South — Galle, Matara, Hambantota. 124,000 in Kurunegala, Puttalam, Anuradhapura, Polonnaruwa. 128,000+ in Amparai and Moneragala.
124,000 in Batticaloa, Trincomalee.
38,000 in Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya.
i.e. about 620,000 are in the predominantly Sinhala areas of South, Central, West, N. W. P. and N. C. P., 162,000 in Jaffna and Eastern province and 128,000 in Amparai and Moneragala. Thus only about 18% of the Moors and Malays are in the predominantly Ceylon Tamil areas.
My good friends of the T. U. L. F. should consider the problems of other minorities too. What is going to happen to the Moors and Malays who are so widely dispersed all over Sri Lanka? Are they to be divided in order to satisfy the demand of the T.U.L.F p Naturally they too should have a say in this. They are also among the most disadvantaged in the country, although a few of them are very affluent merchants. The poor Moors and Malays are badly off specially in education. They have the further aspect of being Tamil speaking with Sinhala also. They are divided into the different major political parties - with a foot in all of them and a primacy in none of them.
Nor should it be underestimated that the Moors and Malays are 7.0% of the population while the Ceylon Tamils are 11.1% in the 1971 Census.
The Tamils of Indian Origin
This is another very important minority, exploited first by the British. They were brought to our lands for imperialist-capitalist gain; - kept in semi-slave conditions, hard-worked, under-fed, ill-housed, illiterate. They were deprived of citizenship rights by Independent Sri Lanka. The Sirima-Sastri and Indira-Sirima Pacts have now provided for the repatriation of about half of them to India and the balance to be given Sri Lanka Citizenship They are 1.2 million and their numbers will decrease by 35,000 an year for another 10 years or so. But also there will be the natural increase. About 900,000 of them are concentrated in the hill country, i.e.

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Kandy 290,000 Badulla 206,000 Matale 48,000 Ratnapura 112,000 N’Eliya 234,000
This is the traditional lands of the Kandyan Kingdom. They have lived in peace with the Sinhala population - though without much contact and with certain mutual suspicion. The Sinhala people see them as the occupiers of their homeland and the instruments of imperialism. The Indian Tamils see the Sinhala people as having deprived them of their vote and wanting to send half of them back to India.
There are only 66,000 Tamils of Indian origin in the Jaffna, Vavuniya, Mannar, Trinco and Batticaloa districts. Hence there is little contact between them and the Ceylon Tamils. Nearly 100,000 of the Tamils of Indian origin are in the Colombo and Kalutara districts.
But I think it is important that our friends of the T. U. L. F. realize that the fortunes of the Tamil people of Indian origin in the hill country are now linked to those of the Sinhala population residing there. The challenge is to integrate the villages and the plantations into one cohesive Socio-economic, pluri-cultural, multi-religious whole.
The separate development of “Apartheid' of the colonial system can now be broken down, thanks to the land reform and the process of decentralization. The heart of the rural problem is the integration of these two groups in a meaningful and worthwhile manner. It is here that the races are closely intermingled.
The people of Indian origin who are to remain in Sri Lanka do not seem to want to leave the hill country and the plantations to join some Tamil Sovereign State in the North and East. The suggestion I have heard from very responsible T.U.L.F. leaders that they can take to the North all the estate labour of Indian origin, is I think, preposterous. It is a lack of consideration of human cost involved - not to mention the economic aspects. While we can appreciate the sympathetic intentions of a welcome to the Tamils of Indian origin to the North, it is not really a practical issue. Not all the waters of the Mahaveli sent Northwards nor even the oil of Pesalai can easily help absorb such a vast human deplacement. On the other hand it is not conceivable that there could be pockets of sovereignty within the Kandyan
area.S.
O

Of course, if the majority community is so unwise as to exasperate the minorities, then for the sake of living with dignity such things may be opted for. But the Kandyan Sinhala peasants have been far from harmful to the Indian labourers; nor have their Tamil friends in the North been so considerate to them in the past. Both the Indian worker and the Sinhala peasant have been and are the sad victims of a long term imperialist and capitalist exploitation. Their common radical liberation by a total reorganization of our society on truly socialist lines should be our urgent concern.
Burghers
The Burghers are another minority of 44,000 persons of whom 31,000 are in the Colombo district and 3,000 in Kandy. They are resolving their language problem by learning the national languages while many others are migrating to other parts of the World.
SOME COMMENTS
From the data mentioned earlier it will be seen that some of the grievances which the Ceylon Tamils have are also experienced by the other racial groups in this country: e.g. unemployment, landlessness and civil rights.
Fundamentally there is no clash of interests between the majority of the Sinhala and Ceylon Tamil people in the villages and even in industries. The Sinhala and Tamil peasants hardly meet each other; and they are the bulk of the population. In industry and commerce too the conflict is not so much at the level of the Working class.
Mr. Godfrey Gunatillake showed, in a study presented at a Seminar organized last April by a group of us, that the overall policy of the successive governments of this country since Independence has not been discriminating against the masses of the people on a racial basis. He took various criteria or socioeconomic indicators such as the structure of income distribution, the per capital levels of income, the standard of living of the different income groups, the incidence of unemployment, the levels of literacy and educational attainment, the distribution of educational, health and other welfare services, income transfers effected through the government budget and contribution to revenue and national income. His conclusion is that though there are some differences in the distribution of benefits to the different communities, these tend to balance off. But the
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general pattern confirms the conclusion that the spread of economic benefits and the improvement of living conditions do not reveal significant disparities among communities' ..." One sees in operation a socio-economic system which has pursued goals of distribution and welfare in a pluralistic society in a manner which has benefitted all communities.'
There are disadvantages experienced by different groups: the Tamils of Indian origin suffer from Statelessness or being second class citizens, the Sinhala masses face grave unemployment, the Moors and Malays have long suffered from educational backwardness, the Ceylon Tamils have a lack of opportunity of development within their home areas and the Burghers are in a quandry as to their future. It cannot be claimed that any racial group is thus in a distinct advantage in the socio-economic situation, even though the Sinhala people have a political advantage.
However there is a pressure for jobs at the level of the elite in the professions such as Doctors, Engineers, Scientists and Accountants. The entry into the Government administrative and clerical services is also subject to serious competition among the educated youth. There is a feeling of racial discrimination in promotion within these services. It is presently felt much by the Tamils, but the Sinhala public servants also refer to a proportionately high percentage of Tamils in several Departments of the public service. This competition is acutely felt at the point of admission to the University campuses. Standardization according to language media has hurt the Tamil youth who feel they are discriminated against because of their race. A more deserving Tamil student is said to be kept out while a Sinhala or Moor student with a lower record is admitted to the university. The Tamil youth feel blocked out from advancement under this regime. They have no hope of achieving their desires and are deeply frustrated. A point on which there is widespread discontent among the Tamils is concerning the use of the Tamil language. At the day to day level they feel insulted and humiliated when they receive a letter from a State agency in Sinhala only. Not only are they very inconvenienced, but also hurt in their self-respect as Tamils. At the legal level, the position given to Tamil in the Constitution of 1972 is not satisfactory. It had made the relative position of Tamil worse than prior to it. While the Sinhala Only Act is enshrined in the new Constitution, the regulations under the Tamil Special Provisions Act are regarded as subordinate legislation. The language of the Courts in the North and East is left to the discretion of the Minister of Justice. The Tamil people have also specific grievances about the process of opening areas for colonization, and about certain instances of disadvantages of a religious nature.
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Finally there is competition at the level of the political elite. The Tamil political leadership sees itself as systematically eliminated from the exercise of real power ever since 1931, and specially after 1956,
Approaches to Solutions
Thus there are some issues which the Tamil people as a whole feel specially in the North, and there are others which affect mainly their elite. There is a serious lack of communication among the different communities, specially the Sinhala and Tamil people. They live in separate compartments. The educational policy of the country had furthered this communication gap. This is particularly among the educated youth at the pre-university stage. The political sensitivity on this issue has led to a certain absence of public discussion that could throw light on it. Unfortunately English remains the main medium of communication between the two races at the level of the elite and of the clerical employees.
Secondly, the political party system too is not so helpful towards a solution of the issue. The leadership in each racial group tends to think in terms of gaining advantages through an accentuation of the rights of its group. Communalism is to a certain extent fanned by interested politicians in the different races. In a certain sense here the extremes seem to meet in a common selfinterest in building their own racial constituencies. This is not to neglect the existence of underlying causes, but to note the consequences of political campaigns.
We have to admit that today the racial issues are coming to a head in our country. While I have tried to show the difficulties of carrying out two sovereign states on racial lines in Sri Lanka, I wish to emphasize that national unity can be preserved only on the basis of justice and fair play to all. Whatever may have been our past as one or two nations, we have in our generation to face the issue of national unity. This can be consolidated only by a give-and-take on all sides.
Race is an important reality that is fraught with immense emotional appeal. People sacrifice much for their rights as a race, a linguistic or religious group. The majority community should have the magnanimity to understand the desires, fears, frustrations and humiliations of the minorities. The Sinhala people too have their preoccupations about their language, religion and culture. But now 20 years after 1956, they need not be so worried about the future of Sinhala. They should get rid of a certain sense of insecurity that makes them unwilling to accept the language rights of the Tamils. After all the Sinhala culture too will develop when the Tamil culture itself is vibrant and creative. Sinhala as
13

Page 10
a language need not lose if the Tamil people can transact official business in Tamil.
This is a challenge to the leaders of the majority community. The policy of S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike was two pronged. “Sinhala only with a reasonable use of Tamil'. The 'Sinhala only' has been emphasized, but it should be relatively tempered with the provision of the “reasonable use of Tamil'. The time seems now rife for this latter task. The very humanity of the Sinhala people will flourish in accepting and respecting the humanity of others. In this connection the present National State Assembly should try to remedy the situation by a suitable constitutional amendment ensuring the position of Tamil, prior to its own dissolution. It would be a pity if the National State Assembly should leave a quarrelsome legacy to posterity. This Parliament can easily muster the majority required to amend the Constitution of its own making.
In this connection the present Prime Minister can render another signal service to our country. She has been able to bring 86 heads of States together under her leadership. She met the problem of Statelessness of the Tamils of Indian origin through the Sirima - Sastri and Indira - Sirima pacts. She offered to mediate between China and India during their war. She has sufficient national stature today if she will endeavour to give a speedy solution to this issue in consultation with the other political parties. This is a crucial challenge to statesmanship today.
The minority leaders too should understand the problems of the other communities in the country. They have to be shown comprehension that goes beyond the confines of their own community. It is the majority that has suffered the most in the past few centuries and been at the receiving end of the blows of imperialism and capitalism. The Tamil leaders should endeavour to have a concern for the wider national issues, for without that they may not understand even the deeper issues that affect the masses within their own community. The minority communities have "to ask themselves how much of the present conflict is an economic issue felt mainly by the elite, and how much is it one of race. Is the class issue of the common exploitation of the workers and peasants by the local elite and foreign agencies not more important? How far is the Tamil elite really fighting only its own elitist battle under a racial banner? It is by a consensus of the leaders that a united nation can be built and maintained. The minority leaders should also take a realistic view of the price of separation; is the cost worth the benefits? A national all-party solution should be sought for these issues. They must be taken out of the arena of party conflict and faced as national issues.
14

Socialist Solutions
While we stress the importance of resolving the problems of language and fairplay in administration and educational opportunities, it is important to realize that the fundamental issues of the country can only be met by deeper solutions of a socialistic nature. Thus the problem of unemployment is not merely one of giving more jobs for Tamils, Sinhalese or Moors; it is one of creating many more jobs for all. There must be a plan for increasing employment through a self-reliant, labour-intensive agricultural and industrial growth. The village and the estate need to be integrated as a socio-economic whole to provide for the large population in the hill country and plantation areas. This is an aspect of liberation of the village through a Socialistic re-organization.
In education, the real solution is not in having a 50 or 100 more Tamil students in the University but in changing the whole content, methods and relationships in education. We need to evolve an educational system that serves the masses of the population. The workers and peasants must have an equal opportunity of access to education and culture. This is a much profounder problem, than the distribution of a few places among the elite. The gaps between village and city, manual and intellectual work, masses and elite need to be bridged by a total overhaul of the educational system, economic structure and a cultural revolution. The brain drain must be halted. For now, far too many Doctors, Engineers, Scientists and Accountants leave this country after studying at the expense of the masses of our people. Those who thus leave are perhaps more than those who fail to get admission to the university due to standardization. A group of us have already recommended that while Sinhala be the official language, Sinhala and Tamil be recognized as national languages. Concerning the medium of instruction, I would like to support the growing consensus in favour of education in the mother tongue, Sinhala and Tamil as the second language and English as a third language. It is important that everyone in this country be able to communicate with the people here; while English is studied as a World language. This is not too much of a burden to youth. It will bear ample fruit in the future generations.
The decentralization of the administration is another means of ensuring a greater degree of people's participation in decision making. The steps so far taken such as the decentralization of the budget, the setting up of District Development Councils, Janatha Committees, Multi-purpose Cooperative Societies etc. can be taken further to establish a more genuinely decentralised form
15

Page 11
of government. Those who exercise power in an area should be chosen by the people of the area and be responsible to them and not only to the central government. This should be a solution that is devised to meet the needs of the whole country. The regional Council proposals of Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike and the District Council plan of Mr. Dudley Senanayake failed partly as they were devised as merely concessions to the Tamils. Today the time is ripe for an advance towards an islandwide decentralization as a basis of the re-organisation of the economy and polity under an overall plan of socialism.
These are a few of the tasks that face us today. It is a historical challenge to our peoples to build one nation if we so desire. National unity has to come from not merely constitutions and legal concessions but the free consensus of the people. We must be wise enough to acknowledge each others rights. It would be a pity if the folly of either side should jeopardize the common future of all. However unity is worth while only if it is with justice and a respect of the dignity of all, We can all grow in facing this task as a free people and help build a multi-racial, multi-lingual, multi-religious nation based on the common acceptance of the human dignity of all.
While this is a special responsibility of the political leaders, we the common people of the country can do much by building understanding among the races. The religious groups, the trade unions and press can help immensely in finding reasonable solutions to these urgent issues.
It is a sad reality of our political scene that the Left political parties which rejected linguistic and religious chauvinism and made a radical option for social revolution did not have a sufficient perception of the religion and culture of the Sinhala and Tamil people. Hence they were unable to communicate effectively to the masses their socio-economic option. On the other hand, the Sinhala and Tamil political groups that responded to the pressures of language and religion did not have an adequately clear social option in favour of the underprivileged masses. What the future seems to need is a leadership that is wise enough to understand and respect the claims of the different racial, linguistic and religious groups and yet transcends them in a more radical commitment to the integral liberation of the socially underprivileged classes of all communities. If the present leaders of all parties can come together to resolve the problems of race on a national basis it is a very great contribution they can make to the future of Sri Lanka.
16

SOME SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF COMMUNAL PROBLEMS
(based on a talk given at the Girl Guides' Headquarters, Colombo, on 4th February 1976)
GODFREY GUNATILLEKE
(Director, Marga Institute, Colombo, Sri Lanka)
In this brief presentation my main objective is to draw attention to some of the important socio-economic aspects of the minority problem in Sri Lanka. Here one could begin by making the safe generalisation that the roots of communal conflict in a multiracial society almost invariably lie in the competition for scarce resources and scarce economic opportunities. Very often this competition is either aggravated or mitigated, depending on the degree of scarcity and the level of poverty prevailing in that society. Most developing societies which have been subjected to colonial rule have experienced mounting communal tension and outbreaks of communal conflict immediately after the transfer of power from the imperial rulers to the national elites. The historical reasons for these developments have been fairly obvious. As a part of their strategy of government, foreign rulers have normally favoured the minorities living in the countries which they ruled and have provided them with better opportunities to reach positions of power and privilege in these countries. They adapted their policies to suit the different cirumstances of different colonial territories. In some of the African countries we saw how the foreign rulers encouraged migrant communities to enter and obtain a virtual monopoly of certain sectors of the economy in which local skills and entrepreneurial capacity were deficient. The social and economic inequalities that these situations engendered naturally surfaced when the overlordship of the imperial rulers came to an end. With the assumption of political power, the majority inevitably moved to redress the social and economic balance which they felt had been tilted in favour of the minorities and various immigrant groups during the period of imperial rule. We in Sri Lanka have also witnessed similar processes at work in our society, whatever the rights and wrongs of the various positions taken up by the different communities might be.
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Page 12
Socio-Economic tndicators
Without entering into endless controversy regarding past and present structures of discrimination as they affect the different communities, it would be useful to examine on a broader front how the socio-economic system in Sri Lanka has functioned in relation to the different communities and what overall impact they have had on the socio-economic status of these communities. It would be possible to answer this question in terms of various Socio-economic indicators that are generally accepted as measurements of the well-being and economic advancement of a community taken as a whole. These indicators would include the structures of income distribution and the per capita income levels and standards of living of different income groups; incidence of unemployment; levels of literacy and educational attainment; distribution of educational, health and other welfare services; income transfers effected through the government budget; and contributions to revenue and national income. One could think of various other indicators, but these that have been enumerated would be sufficient for us to make a broad appraisal of the relative socio-economic positions of the different communities in the country. These indicators however would reveal only the average conditions in these communities. The average conditions by themselves would not help us to uncover some of the underlying causes of the prevailing communal tensions. To obtain a clearer understanding of the situation it is necessary to examine the problems at two levels. First, one would have to examine the socio-economic conditions of the broad masses - the poor majority - in each of these communities. Such an analysis would help us to determine whether the existing socio-economic system works and operates in a manner which is exploitative of any particular community as a whole - whether the system has structures of discrimination which are reflected in serious differences in average standards of living, average per capita incomes, levels of educational attainment, life expectancy and so on. This is still only one aspect of the communal problem. From the average levels we need to go further and examine the situation as it affects the elites of these communities, for it is the relative positions of the elites which would be crucial to an understanding of the relationships between communities and the underlying causes of communal antagonisms and conflicts.
Per-Capita income Levels
Let us first take the most straightforward indicator - the per capita income levels. We have a ready source for this information in the consumer finance survey conducted by the Central
18

Bank in 1973. The information given in the survey in Tables
67 and 69 are combined in Table I on page 20. If we
exclude the category of 'others' which would represent small
groups such as migrant groups which do not include the whole gradation of income that is to be found in a large community, we find that the highest two-month median income is enjoyed by the Moors and Malays at RS. 470. Next in order are the low-country Sinhalese with Rs. 425. The Ceylon Tamils come third followed
by the Kandyan Sinhalese. The lowest incomes are received by
the Indian Tamils. Their incomes are half the average. The
figures that are presented in the tables show the incomes earned by income - receivers for an average two - month period. They
do not give us the average income per head. The actual economic position of a household cannot be gauged from the average income
per income receiver. The employed may receive high incomes in
a community but the levels of unemployed may be high, and the size of household may be large. We need to get an indicator which
takes care of the rate of activity and incidence of unemployment in the community. We need to ascertain the size of a household
and the number of income-receivers per household. The income received per head would therefore be a more reliable indicator of
the level of living. Before we go to examine the average incomes per head, it would be useful to highlight some of the other features that emerge from a comparison of the median incomes per income-receiver. A comparison of the 1963 and 1973 data indi
cates that with the exception of the Indian Tamils the income disparities between the communities have been reduced during the
period ending 1973. Again, if we exclude the Indian Tamils there are only marginal disparities in the incomes received by the incomereceivers of the other communities. During the ten-year period the greatest improvement has occurred among the Kandyan Sinhalese whose incomes in 1963 were significantly below the incomes of the low-country Sinhalese, the Indian Tamils, and the Moors and Malays.
19

Page 13
1ABLE
Median income For Two Months For 1963 And 1973 By Community Groups
COMMUNITY Median Median Median Income Expressed Income Income As An Average Per Head
For For (Rs...) 1963(Rs. 1973(Rs.)
Urban Rural Estate
Kandyan Sinhalese 164 376 133 80 86 Low-Country
Sinhalese 199. 425 137 102 94. Ceylon Tamils 198 385 106 90 78 | Indian Tamils 18 180 108 89 83 Moors and Malays 259 470 93 101 73 Others 467 633 169 201 47 All Communities 165 360 m
Source Survey of Sri Lanka's Consumer Finances 1973. Central
Bank of Ceylon.
If one takes the profile of income as reflected in the incomes per income receiver, one feature stands out sharply. The average incomes of the Indian Tamil income-receivers are significantly below the average incomes of the other communities. On a superficial interpretation of the data one would be inclined to come to the conclusion that the socio-economic system operates in a way which results in discrimination against the Indian Tamil community and in the exploitation of their labour. The data on median incomes of income-receivers would however need to be subjected to deeper scrutiny before we come to any firm conclusions. First, it has to be recognised that the large majority of the Indian migrant community fall into the occupational category of agricultural labour. While the majority of incomes in this commumity will bunch up in the low income category, the other indigenous communities whose workforce enters all sectors of the economy and who also contain the propertied classes will show a higher average income per income-receiver. The more relevant comparison in the case of the Indian Tamils would be the incomes of comparable groups of other communities, for example the rural peasantry. We could come to this comparison later. These comparisons however should not obscure some of the glaring inequalities which emerge when we compare the socio-economic position of the Indian Tamil community as a whole with the other communities in the country. It is hardly necessary to stress the fact that the
20

data reveal the plight of a community which is denied any Social or economic mobility and has little opportunity for integration with the economy outside the plantation. Their position in the country is such that they are captive to a rigid socio-economic structure in which they and the majority of their children can only look forward to a certain type of occupation and continue at a certain socio-economic level. The opportunity for upward social mobility that was made available to the low-income groups of other communities through the complex processes of social change that were set in motion after independence was not within the reach of the Indian Tamil community.
When this has been said we can examine the levels of living of the various communities in terms of the average income per head. The best method of comparison would be to take the Sectoral income data shown in the table and compare the incomes of the communities in terms of the incomes in the sector which contains the majority of the population of that community. In the case of the Kandyan Sinhalese, the low-country Sinhalese and the Ceylon Tamils, the rural income-receivers are in the preponderant majority. In the case of Moors and Malays. while the rural income-receivers are in the majority, about 40% of the receivers are in the urban sector. In the case of the Indian Tamils, the majority of income-receivers are in the estate sector. The analysis of income data in terms of income per head provides a picture which considerably modifies the impression one receives in regard to the situation of the Indian Tamil community from the data on income receivers. The average income per head in the Indian Tamil community is still marginally higher than the average rural income for the Kandyan Sinhalese - Rs. 83 per Indian Tamil for two months as against Rs. 80 per Kandyan Sinhalese for two months. The few Indian Tamil income earners in the rural Sector and the Small urban Indian Tamil community get a higher average per head than the Ceylon Tamil urban community or the urban community of the Moors and Malays. This improvement in the position of the Indian Tamil community when examined in terms of income per head is partly due to the fact that the number of income-receivers per household in the Indian Tamil community in the estate sector would be larger than that of rural households among the Sinhalese or the Moors and Malays. This is of course due to the relatively high rates of participation of the females in the plantation workforce.
It might be argued that the income of the Indian Tamil household in the estate sector is obtained through a more intensive labour input of a number of household members and that eventually the return to labour in the estate sector and to the Indian Tamil community is lower than in any other sector. If this were so one
21

Page 14
could further conclude that this is an index of the exploitation of the community as a whole. There is howener little evidence to support such a conclusion. The labour conditions in the rural farm household, the contribution of family labour to the farm and various other factors would have to be compared at a much greater level of detail before we can come to any firm conclusion. Another factor that might be borne in mind in comparing the income levels of the rural Kandyan peasant with the Indian estate worker is that out of a marginally lower per capita income the Kandyan peasant receives one-third of this income in kind whereas the Indian Tamil receives 80% of his income as money income. The data on average income per head as given in the consumer finance survey indicate that the highest income levels are enjoyed by the low-country Sinhalese who receive the highest income per head in all three sectors - urban, rural and estate. The differences however between the low - country Sinhalese and the other communities are relatively low. In the rural sector the income per head among the low - country Sinhalese is Rs. 102 compared to Rs. 101 of the Moors and Malays, Rs. 90 among the Ceylon Tamils and Rs. 80 among the Kandyan Sinhalese. Acording to the consumer finance data, per capita incomes in the urban sector are lowest among the Moors and Malays. This is significant considering the fact that the share of urban income-receivers among the Moors and Malays is higher than in any other community. Another point worthy of note is that in the Ceylon Tamil community nearly 30% of the income-receivers were in the urban sector. The average incomes in the urban sector being higher, the average income per head for the community as a whole would be pushed upwards. When one examines the total picture in regard to the income levels of the various communities on the basis of average income per head, the facts certainly point to a socio-economic system and a pattern of development which has shared the benefits of growth equitably and prevented sharp disparities of income as between communities.
Educational Attainment
We could next examine the levels of educational attainment among the different communities. Table II on page 23 contains data on the level of participation in the educational system for the primary, secondary and the higher stages of education. In the case of primary education, the proportion of children in the education system was not significantly different for the various communities. While the Ceylon Tamils and the Indian Tamils had increased the proportion between 1963 and 1973, there was a drop in the Kandyan Sinhalese and the low-country Sinhalese with a marginal rise in the case of Moors and Malays. When it
22

comes to the secondary stage, only a very small proportion of the school - age population among the Indian Tamils is retained in the system. Therefore wide disparity exists in the educational attainments between the Indian Tamil community and the other communities. In the case of all other communities significant progress was made in the secondary level of education and higher proportions of the relevant age group were retained within the system. In the case of higher education there has been a drop for all communities, the sharpest drop being among the Ceylon Tamils. At the primary and secondary stage, with the exception of the Indian Tamil community, the access to educational facilities and the spread of education does not reflect any wide disparities. The slowest rate of progress at the secondary level is among the Ceylon Tamil community. Here too there are major disparites between the different regions such as Batticaloa Jaffna and Mannar. According to available data the educational indicators for the Jaffna district are the most advanced among all communities. The average for the Ceylon Tamil community as a whole is a result of the relatively low level of educational attainment and participation in the school system among other sections of the Ceylon Tamil community, The indicators for Jaffna are compared with a few other districts in the country in Table III (A), (B), (C) and (D) on pages 25-28.
TABLE Education Classified by Community 1963 & 1973
COMMUNITY Primary Secondary Passed GCE Higher 1963-1973 1963-1973 “်မ်ိဳး973 1963-197%
Kandyan
Sinhalese 41.7-38.2 16.9-23.0 2.3-4.7 0,7-0,5 Low-Country
Sinhalese 39.3-35.8 24.5-29.9 4-3-7.4 1.3-1.0 Ceylon Tamils 38.9-41.3 18.4-20.8 4.2-3.8 2.2-0.6 Indian Tamils, 31.8-42.1 6.6- 5.6 0.6-0.8 0.1-- Moors and
Malays 39.1-39.6 15.3-19.6 2.8-3.5 0.4-0.4 ಟ್ಠers 20.3-20.6 37.7-46.5 5.9-12.3 4.4-3.2 A
Communities 39.2-37.9 19.6-23.9 3.4-5.3 1.10.7
Source: Survey of Sri Lanka's Consumer Finances. Central Bank
of Ceylon.
23

Page 15
Unemployment
Another revealing indicator would be the incidence of unemploy ment in the different communities. Table IV given on page 28, which is a reproduction of Table 38 in the consumer finance survey, sets out the position. The highest rates of unemployment as a percentage of the population in the community occurred Among the Malays - 11.2% - and the low - country Sinhalese10 6%. If we exclude the small groups classified under “other the Kandyan Sinhalese followed third with 7%, the Indian Tamils with 6.3%. Unemployment among the Ceylon Tamils and the Moors was lowest at 5.4% and5.3%. The ranking is slightly different when one computes the rate of unemployment as a percentage of the workforce. The lowest rate of unemployment is among the Indian Tamil community, with the Ceylon Tamil community following. The highest rates of unemployment are again among the Malays - 43% - and low-country Sinhalese - 30%. It is important to interpret this set of figures in relation to the grievances that had been frequently voiced by the minorities on the question of employment opportunities. It would appear that the burden of unemployment is highest among the low-country Sinhalese community and the small Malay community. When the fact that the Kandyan Sinhalese community has the third highest rate of unemployment is taken into account, it would be seen that the distribution of employment opportunities and the generation of employment does not reveal a pattern which is discriminatory against the minorities. On the contrary, the unemployed as a proportion of the population and as a proportion of the workforce is significantly higher in the majority community with the exception of the small community of Malays. But at the same time it has to be stated that the high burden of unemployment both among the low-country Sinhalese and the Malays goes with a per capita income level and average incomes of income - receivers which are the highest in the country.
24

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Page 16
TABLE III (B)
Number Of Government Schools Per 2 Mile Radius
Administration Number Sq. Miles No. of Rank
Districts of per Schools per
Schools District 12.57 Sα.
per (Approx) Miles (i. e. 2
District mille radius)
Colombo 1,122 808.25 17.44 1 Kalutara 453 623.75 9.05 4. Jaffna 574 998.63 7.16 7 Mannar 100 964.00 1.25 18 Vavuniya 171 1466.75 .38 17 Batticaloa 138 1016.63 1.63 14 Trincomalee 221 1048.00 2.63 12 Anuradhapura 502 2808.63 2.13 13 Moneragala 155 2785.31 0.62 20 Kegalle 599 642.00 11.69 2
Source: Department of Census and Statistics Statistical Abstract
of Ceylon, 1969.
*These figures were obtained by considering all 22 districts.

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Page 17
TABLE III (D)
Teacher Pupil Ratios - 97
Ratios of 'O' and 'A' level arts and science students to total number of arts and science graduate teachers
respectively Ratio Arts Ratio Science
Colombo 25.3 74.3 Kalutara 35.9 118.2 Jaffna 21.0 24.2 Mannar 39.4 28.2 Vavuniya 29.3 51.4 Batticaloa 30.4 56.4 Trincomalee 26.9 33.1 Anuradhapura 21.7 157.0 Moneragala 17.7 -----
Kegalle 36.3 2014
Source: Ministry of Education School Census- 1971
TABLE IV
Unemployment By Community - All Island
Community As a % of Popu- As a % of Work
lation in the Force in the
Community Community
Group Group
1963 1973 1963 1973 Kandyan Sinhalese 3.6 7.0 12.7 23.0 Low Country Sinhalese 5.4 10.6 17.5 30.0 Ceylon Tamils 3.5 5.3 1.6 17.7 Indian Tamils 3.7 6.3 6.7 123 Moors 4.0 5.4 14.9 21.3 Malays 0.7 11.2 2.8 43.5 Burghers 5.9 6.3 21.9 21.2 Others 9.1 ܒܚ re- 28.6 All Races 4.4 8. 13.8 24.0
Source: Survey of Sri Lanka's Consumer Finances: 1973
Central Bank of Ceylon.
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Levels of Living
Another indicator would be the distribution of amenities and equipment among the various communities. The consumer finance survey does not give this data in terms of the communities. But the classification according to the sectors - urban, rural and estate - and according to the Zones, each covering a group of districts, enables us to obtain some rough idea of the levels of living among the communities as indicated in the possession of basic facilities and amenities, Vide Table V given on page 33. In zones 2, 3 and 4 which cover the predominantly rural areas containing both the Sinhala and the Tamil populations, the percentage of households in possession of sewing machines, radios, kerosene cookers, refrigerators, do not vary significantly. Zone 2 which includes Hambantota, Moneragala, Amparai, Polonnaruwa, Anuradhapura and Puttalam has 2.2% of the households served with electricity, 25.4% possessing sewing machines, 22.5% with radios, 2.5% with kerosene cookers and 3% with refrigerators. These figures could be compared with Zone 3 which includes the Tamil districts. The differences it would be noted are marginal. The use of electricity in the Ceylon Tamil zone is higher. The same applies to kerosene cookers. Zone 4 which includes Kandy, Matale, Nuwara Eliya, Badulla. Ratnapura, Kegalle and Kurunegala, also contains a similar pattern. As against Zones 2,3 and 4, zones 1 and 2 represent the heavily urbanised sector of the country. The percentage of households possessing the various consumer durables is significantly higher. These zones cover the low-country Sinhalese areas. When we examine the situation in terms of the urban, rural and estate sectors, we observe that the estate sector in which the large majority of the Indian Tamil community lives has the smallest percentage of households in possession of consumer durables such as sewing machines, radios, kerosene cookers and so on. As against this, the basic facilities for housing such as pipe-borne water, electricity and sanitation in the estate sector compare quite favourably with the position in the rural sector. The data that we have analysed so far provide different combinations of elements making up the total socioeconomic situation and level of living in the different communities. One set of factors is frequently offset by another. High per capita income levels go with a high incidence of unemployment. Households poor in consumer durables enjoy certain basic amenities not available to the same extent in some of the other communities. This diverse combination of different elements that go to make up the standard of living in different communities underscores the difficulty of making straightforward comparisons between communities. But the general pattern confirms the conclusion that the spread of economic benefits and the improvement of living conditions do not reveal significant disparities among communities.
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Allocation of Budgetary Resources
An important area which one can examine for differential treat ment of communities is the allocation of resources through the government budget. A large part of the government budget is devoted to social welfare expenditure which includes free medical service, free education and subsidised food. An analysis of the budgetary allocations over the years supports the broad conclusion that these services have reached all citizens regardless of community and without discrimination. The only community which did not benefit equally from these services was the Indian Tamil community in the plantation sector. In the case of other communities, the equity in the distribution of government services and capital investment for the provision of these services is clearly evident in the distribution of hospitals and hospital beds, the distribution of classrooms and the availability of classroom space, the cadre of medical personnel in relation to the population in the different regions, the pupil - teacher ratios and so on. On all these items it could be said that the allocation of government expenditures has taken adequate account of the needs of the various communities distributed in the different parts of the country. The distribution of investments in the rest of the government capital budget would need more detailed analysis to demonstrate how they have benefited the different communities in the country. At a first glance however it can be said that there has been a spread of investments which have included all regions. This can be clearly demonstrated in the case of transportation and power - the network of roads, the allocations for maintenance and the extension of the national power grid to serve all parts of the country. Investments in the irrigation system have been heaviest in the dry zone where both the potentiality and the need were greatest.
Contributions to the National Economy
One other criterion which could be applied is the national economic contribution made by each community. This could be examined in terms of the contribution to national output, to government revenue and to the balance of payments. Measured in terms of national income, the per capita contribution is highest in the case of the low-country Sinhalese. This is of course reflected in the fact that per capita incomes are highest in this commun ity. The per capita contribution however is not significantly different for the different communities. There has been the popular impression that the contribution to the national income of the Indian Tamil community in the plantation sector is much higher than that of other communities and that the surplus in
30

this sector helps to boost the standards of living of the other communities, resulting thereby in an iniquitous process of exploitation of the Indian plantation labour by the rest of society.
It is necessary to place these arguments in perspective as they could give us a somewhat exaggerated view of the various elements in the prevailing situation. First, the total contribution of the agricultural sector to the gross domestic product is in the region of 33%. If services are excluded and only the material output in national income is taken into account, then the contribution of agriculture to material output is in the region of 60%. The contribution of tea to material output is approximately 11%. The tea sector is not manned exclusively by the Indian plantation labour. The low grown tea plantations draw on the labour available in the Sinhala community. Therefore the contribution of the Indian plantation workforce to the material output in the tea sector is a part, although a major part, of the contribution which tea makes to the national income. The figures that have been given here should be adjusted for the manufacturing component in tea which takes place in the plantation itself. Again, the gross foreign exchange earnings from tea which is about 50% of total merchandise exports is not an adequate measurement of the contribution. The Tea plantation sector is almost entirely dependent on the intermediates such as fertiliser, agro-chemicals, equipment and so on, as well as the consumption needs of the working population on supplies from outside the plantation Sector. Most of these inputs have a high foreign content, including food. Therefore the net foreign exchange contribution from the tea sector is subatantially less than the foreign exchange income earned from the exports of tea.
It is necessary to emphasise these facts as the concern for the exploitation of the Indian Tamil community needs to be appropriately balanced between the dramatised version of a large community parasitically dependent on a small intensely exploited community on the one hand, and the somewhat chauvinist version of a foreign sector in the economy which links our society to structures of international trade, reinforces our external dependence, and has been detrimental to the long-term national interest, on the other. We need also to look at the other popular argument regarding the contribution of the tea sector to the government revenues. There is the impression that large surpluses are generated in the tea sector and these are siphoned in the form of taxes and export duties to finance government programmes for the rest of the community, and that by this means the surplus in the tea sector is employed to transfer resources to other sectors of lower productivity. It is quite correct that the surpluses
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of the productive sectors in the low income sectors through vari by the government. The tea sec tribution to this programme. sector could be exaggerated out example, the direct contributi form of export duty and the total revenue. Out of this too ne the tea industry in the form improvement of the tea industry tion was larger.
If we take the Ceylon Tamil con national economy in a wide rang Important industries such as cem food in Batticaloa and Mannar, port substitution programme in onions, chillies and other item bution. These facts also underscC of the Ceylon Tamil communi the country. The import substit resulted in a significant expansio) the Ceylon Tamil regions and the port substitution programme ir benefits to the Ceylon Tamil develop a high-income smallhold vided a model of labour-intens of the country. In regard to th Tamil community to governmei out that many of the important ec Tamil community are not in th such as, for example, the plantatio) Their activities have been largely has to some extent been protected through taxes on professional inc significance. It is likely therefor government budget the revenue an of the Ceylon Tamil commuity resu to the community. These commen nature and do not attempt to p1 They can only draw attention to activity in the community and its in the case of other communities Malays makes its contribution in a service sectors ranging from agricul which has considerably gained in gem trade. What is important to e. dence of the various communities.
32

xonomy were transferred to the us welfare programmes initiated or did make an important conBut here again the role of the tea of all proportion. In 1975, for in made by the tea sector in the tea tax was less than 8% of the arly 17% was ploughed back into of subsidies for replanting and
In the past years the contribu
munity, its contribution to the ; of activities is quite significant. nt and salt, the output of staple he vital contribution to the imsubsidiary foodstuffs such as S, all add up to a major contrire the economic interdependence ty and the other communities in ution programme in food has h of economic exchanges between rest of the country. The imfood has brought substantial community and enabled them to ing agriculture which has proive efficient farming to the rest le contribution of the Ceylon nt revenue, it has to be pointed 'onomic activities of the Ceylon e high revenue-yielding sectors sector, industry and commerce. in domestic, agriculture which from taxation. Its contribution omes would however be of some that in the transactions of the expenditure account in respect lts in a net transfer of resources is however are of a very general ovide any quantitative estimate. the broad pattern of economic evenue-yielding potential. As the community of Moors and large number of productive and ure and livestock to the activity mportance in recent times - the nphasise here is the interdepenEach community provides a

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critical input into the national economy and is at the same time critically dependent on thc cconomic inputs of the other communities.
The Elite Groups
The somewhat generalised analysis which has been provided in the foregoing account was intended to give an idea of the comparative socio-cconomic situation of the broad mass of the people in the different communities. I think one would be justified in coming to the conclusion that when one examines the levels of living of the majority of the population in these different communities, one sees in operation a socio-economic system which has pursued goals of distribution and welfare in a pluralistic society in a manner which has benefited all communities. This is yet only one part of the communal situation. If it was the entirety, then we should have no problem of communal tension and conflict. But the fact is that the problem of national unity has today assumed grave proportions and causes serious concern to all those who are committed to the future development of Sri Lanka as a united Society. For the root causes of communal conflict one has to look not at the relative positions of the poor majorities in these communities. One has to look at the problems of the elites. The main source of the communal conflict is in the fierce competition for elite positions in our society, This competition is exacerbated further owing to the fact that it takes place in a situation in which economic growth is slow and the growth of those sectors which generate demand for professional and other services at a high level of educational attainment proceeds at a very faltering pace. In this context the protest will be naturally spearheaded by that segment of the minority community which had geared itself economically and socially to supply the manpower for the modern sector of the economy ranging from junior administrative and clerical activities to the higher professions - the Ceylon Tamil community in and originating from the Jaffna peninsula. We are faced here with a situation in which a highly resourceful intelligent minority had developed a long tradition of exporting its skills abroad as well as to other parts of the country. It was the response of a community meeting the challenge of a habitat which was relatively poor in its natural resource base. The processes of social and political change that occurred within the country in the fifties and the sixties effectively debarred this community from entering those sectors of activity which it had traditionally organised itself to enter. It is of course true that these developments have affected only the upper 5% of the community who had the aptitude and the opportunity to proceed to levels in the educational system which equipped them to enter elite positions in the
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country. But the fact that it affects only this small fraction does not make the problem less acute. A community in which there was a fair degree of upward social mobility which suddenly finds that the opportunities for entering elite positions have been Suddenly removed or have severely diminished would naturally react very strongly to the change.
It is true that in the case of Sri Lanka's society as a whole, free education had engendered expectations for upward social mobility which were inevitably frustrated and which resulted in social tensions which even now threaten the entire system. The problem of the educated Ceylon Tamil community has to be first seen in this general context. Creating the conditions for freer access to elite positions in the rest of the country cannot solve the major problem of employmet and productive economic activity. For the mass of the educated youth, the main characteristics of the problem are fundamentally the same for all communities. The break through can occur only through a rapid expansion of the economy which is also supported by a change in the structure of job expectations and the absorption of the young workforce in highly productive income yielding activities other than those to which the traditional expectations had been geared. When all this has been acknowledged, still within this general context the problem of the elites in the minority communities, particularly the Ceylon Tamil community, is a special one. National policies have tended to create conditions which the minorities see as a special set of disabilities and a discriminatory structure which handicaps them in the competition for the elite positions.
An Analysis of Possible Solutions
The Marxist approach to this problem would suggest that what is required is a radical change in the structures of power in our society which changes the class relations across the communities, and that this is eventually the solution to the communal problem. But the particular problems of the minority elites with the accompanying hardship cannot be subsumed in this type of structural solution. Given the present structure of communal relationships, even solutions of a structural character could result in communalistic distortions. The approach to the change in class relations can assume different forms which assimilate communalistic elements. This was manifested to some extent in the ideological orientation of the 1971 insurrection. Then there is the fundamental question of the political elites of the minorities. An integral part of this whole process of competition for elite positions is the wider issue of sharing the decision-making power at
36

the national level in a manner which is equitable to all communis ties. This involves the role of the political leadership of the minority communities in the decision-making apparatus of the national political system.
The path to national unity lies in the solution of these key problems affecting the elites of the minority communities including the political elites. It lies in a just and equitable distribution of decision-making power within our society as a whole. It can be said that a fairly sound base for the solution of these problems already exists in the socio-economic situation in which the majority of each of these communities, that is the poor and lowincome majority lives. The main features of this situation and its positive elements have already been outlined. The broad analysis revealed a large non-competitive and complementary area in which the various communities can engage in a positive and productive exchange which leads to co-ordinated national development. What is now required is a purposeful and imaginative effort to solve the problem in the more restricted competitive 21.168 .
First, it seems to me that the most positive result could be achien ved through a strategy of decentralised development. This is a part of the development strategy in the Five Year Plan. It is based on a development effort in which small rural communities will participate more actively in the creation of employment opportunities and the intensive use of resources available in the rural sector. It goes with a decentralisation of the government budget and structures of administration where greater autonomy and decision-making power will be exercised at the regional, divisional and village levels. If this pattern of development is appropriately translated to machinery of government which is decentralised and which provides greater scope for self-management by districts, divisions and village communities, many of the contentious problems as between the minority communities and the majority community would be solved. >
The more substantive tasks of economic development and economic decision-making would devolve on the district levels and the levels below them. These policies which have been adopted by government could be employed very effectively to deal with the communal problem and transform the prevailing situation with its communalistic frictions into a participatory development process. Such a process would also concentrate on removing the disparities and inequalities within the communities which is in fact the more urgent socio-economic task. The wide regional disparities among different areas inhabited by the Ceylon Tamil community, the unequal
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distribution of resources and income within the majority community as between the urbanised coastal regions and the rural hinterland, and the pockets of poverty in the Muslim community should be the main targets of the efforts of each community-efforts which are being diverted into a competition among elites. In regard to the Indian Tamil community, the land reform and nationalisation of estates provides an excellent opportunity for its integration into Sri Lanka's society and economy.
Over and above these changes that would be required is a structure which allows for a just distribution of power at the centre and a sharing of the elite positions in the modern sector. This would require constructive adjustments in a number of fields. There are various negotiating positions from which one could start. Those spokesmen from the majority community who argue that they have been victims in the past of processes which denied them fair access to the positions of leadership and elite roles in society advocate measures which give weightage to the majority on what is almost a principle of proportionality. This would imply some quota system for the centralised services and the professional sectors, leaving the opportunities in the districts and regions to the communities living there. At the other end there would be the demand for conditions which ensure complete equality of opportunity for the minority communities.
This demand is integrally linked to the language issue and the manner in which it affects the educational system, the access to higher education and to elite positions in the metropolitan centre of the country. While the language issue is a fundamental political issue concerning the ethnic and cultural identity of the majority community, its social and economic consequences for the elites in the minorities provide the explosive element in the present situation. As far as the elites are concerned, they see the discrimination which is implicit in the language problem and the way in which it operates in the educational system as going even beyond the principle of proportionality. It is not difficult to find a position between the two positions which have been set out above which is capable of reconciling the objectives and needs of the various communities. One could think of an acceptable framework in which one moves from some form of proportionality to complete equality of opportunity over a phased period wherein some of the basic imbalances in which various communities compete could be progressively redressed and the need for any form of proportionality together with the present disadvantages built through the language situations altogether disappear. (In fact, with a steadily growing economy the problem of competition in a market in which opportunities are scarce will be converted into a problem of scarcity of skills and manpower at
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all levels). Such a solution would require various progressive adjustments in the prevailing system of education. It Would need adjustments in policies governing admission to higher educational institutions and recruitment to government services and so on. It would call for a policy which enables the Tamil community to be administered in their language, gives the Tamil language its due place in the regions in which the community predominates, works out a reasonable formula in which it receives recognition as an official language in the centre, and which eventually promotes bilingual and trilingual proficiency among the elites of the different communities. In the short term, a freer and more liberal scheme of exporting skilled personnel which would in some concrete form benefit the country might also help to lessen the tensions. The educational system today, both in terms of the outputs from the secondary school system as well as the capacity for expansion of teaching facilities, could supply an output at the higher educational levels much in excess of the country's present capacity to absorb that output. Within a well-conceived scheme it is possible for the country to take advantage of the situation.
At the political centre of course there is the much less tractable problem of sharing political power at the highest executive level. A decentralised pattern of development would provide the clues for readjustments in the centres of executive power. One could think for example of ministries which deal with regional affairs. Districts of the Ceylon Tamil community for example could be grouped under one ministry of regional affairs which gives an opportunity to the leaders of that community to direct and co-ordinate the activities which concern it. The representation of the communities in the council of ministers could be on an agreed basis. New mechanisms could be created which provide the leaders of the minority communities with an equitable share in the highest decision - making processes. All these elements including an agreed timetable for achieving the objectives could be elaborated and defined within a charter for national unity to which all communities subscribe. The present positions on the part of all communities appear to have hardened to the point where negotiations on the critical issues are an extremely difficult task. The non-political groups in each of the communities could perform a very constructive role by engaging in a dialogue across the communities, examining different negotiating positions, and working out alternative possibilities that could be considered by the political leadership of each community
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SRI LANKA - THE PEOPLE - NATION - CITIZENSHIP
BY A SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT (Oct. 1976)
identity of Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka has defined territorial limits. It has had for centuries a definite name. It is a viable economic unit. It has a system of communications connecting all parts of the country. It has for over one and a half centuries a uniform system of administration. Throughout that period, its inhabitants have lived under the same criminal law and have followed the same laws relating to civil and criminal court procedure. Except for personal laws of limited scope like Kandyan Law, Muslim Law and the Thesawalamai, there is a common unwritten law, namely the RomanDutch Law. The general statute law is applicable to all inhabir tants alike. Its inhabitants are free to live and earn their living anywhere they please within its territory.
Sense of Community, the Basis of Nation
For the above reasons, and for other reasons as well, there is among the inhabitants of Sri Lanka a sense of community and the accompanying consciousness that they belong to Sri Lanka and are therefore fellow-countrymen. This is basic reality.
This sense of community is the fundamental basis of our political society which we may properly call the People of Sri Lanka or the Nation. National unity means the wholeness and strength of this sense of community in our country.
The basic idea of our political society can be distorted by the use of words with unclear meanings. This danger can be avoided if the basic idea of community is kept in mind, no matter what other words are used to denote it. For instance, the English word nation is normally used as meaning the People of Sri Lanka. The word nation, unfortunately, can have different meanings. Derivatives of the word, even to a greater degree, are suggestive of different concepts. The Sinhala word “Jathiya' and its derivative “Jathika' also suffer from the same lack of clarity. In all probability, in the course of common usage the word “jathiya”
40

will before long be ordinarily understood as meaning the political society we call the People of Sri Lanka. For the sake of clearness, the word nation and its derivatives will be used in this book only in this sense, as indeed, it is used in the Republican Constitution. The word '8562s' is used in the Constitution to denote a racial group.
Subjective Nature of Nation
A sense of community is essentially subjective. A group of people cannot be called a community unless the persons as a group generally feel a sense of community. It is true, as we have seen, that common experience, living together and the sharing of economic and other interests tend to produce this sense of community. Nevertheless, it remains subjective. In other words, a nation is a nation when the people comprising it feel they are a nation. There is no guarantee, however, that once a people have come together and have begun to feel they are a nation, they will continue to feel that way. The sense of community can be destroyed.
Supreme Duty to Foster Sense of Community
Over and above all other duties, there is the supreme duty that the people of Sri Lanka owe to themselves: the duty to do all that is reasonably possible to avoid whatever tends to weaken their sense of community. This duty is in reality the duty of selfpreservation. If the sense of community is lost, the political society based on it will perish, and the integrity of Sri Lanka itself will be in jeopardy.
Unity in Diversity
The sense of community on which our political society or nation depends is a reality, despite the fact that there are in our country many racial, cultural and religious groups, each of which is held together by its own proper sense of community. There is, in other words, a unity in diversity. Persons who belong to these diverse communities are also at the same time members of the larger community, i.e. the political society we call the People of Sri Lanka or the nation. Federalism does not in essence run counter to the idea of nationhood. On the contrary, it can provide a way of safe-guarding the sense of community under certain circumstances.
Fanciful Homogeneity
In theory, it would be true to say that a country with a single
language, a single ethnic origin, a single religion and a single culture would be free from the stresses and strains that we find in
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multiracial and multi-religions political societies all over the world. In reality, however, there, is hardly a country in which such homogeniety exists. There are still some people in our country, fortunately very few, who indulge in dreams of such fanciful unity. With each passing decade, such dreamers have become fewer and less significant. It must, however, be noted that such men are both foolish and dangerous: foolish because homogeneity in language or culture or religion can never be enforced or even be artificially induced. Dangerous, because their misguided zeal sometimes prompt them to advocate policies having the effect of weakening the essential sense of community in our country.
Special Source of Danger
The question of language presents very difficult problems, and compounded as it is with race, it is, fraught with potential danger to our sense of community. For this reason, it will receive special attention later on.
For the moment, enough has been said to make the point that it is the duty of our political society, as well as of every member of it, to do all that is reasonably possible to strengthen the sense of community holding our people together as one nation. The point is so important that we must return to it from time to time. Some practical discussion of “reasonably possible' is also called for.
The Republican Constitution
As might be expected, the Constitution does not expressly refer to a sense of community or to a political society. Nonetheless, their existence is the tacit basis of our Constitution. If one were to ask why it does not refer to these two realities, the reply surely would be that their existence goes without saying, because they are self-evident fundamental realities. It might also quite rightly be said that the political Society of Sri Lanka has been indirectly referred to, in words, 'People of Sri Lanka' and the "Nation', expressly referred to, mean the same thing. In this connexion, the opening words of the historic resolution, unanimously passed by the representatives of all political parties at Navarangahala Hall, for establishing the Constituent Assembly, are of vital importance: “We the People of Sri Lanka being resolved in the exercise of our freedom and independence of the nation to give to ourselves a Constitution...'
Citizenship and Sense of Community
We now proceed to examine the connection between the people of Sri Lanka and its citizens. It is true to say that, by and large,
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inhabitants who belong to our political society, as we have described it, are citizens and those who do not so belong to that community are not citizens. This is the legal position resulting from laws relating to citizenship, kept alive by the Constitution. The Constitution itself does not define citizenship, although it gives to citizens the exclusive right to vote at elections to the National State Assembly and at local government elections. The two principal Laws thus kept alive are the Citizenship Act of 1948, and the Act for the Registration of Indian and Pakistani Residents of 1949.
Citizenship Act of 1948
The Citizenship Act of 1948 is the fundamental piece of legislation on the subject. One of its basic provisions followed a principle agreed upon in 1947 at a Commonwealth Conference.
The principle is the recognition of the need to avoid double nationality or citizenship. Accordingly, the Citizenship Act gives effect to this principle. No person who is a citizen of any other country can acquire citizenship of our country unless he renounces his earlier citizenship. Also, a citizen of Sri Lanka loses that status if by a voluntary act he acquires the citizenship of any other country. It is relevant to observe that India and Pakistan have given effect to the same principle in their citizenship laws.
Of immediate interest to us is the way in which citizenship under the provisions of this Act fall into line with the basic idea that the People of Sri Lanka are inhabitants who share a sense of community and the accompanying consciousness that they belong to Sri Lanka and are therefore fellow-countrymen.
The Citizenship Act does not use phrases like “sense of community' and “political society'. Understandably so, because a sense of community, though real, is of a subjective nature and cannot easily be defined by provisions of law. The Act therefore provides objective qualifications or tests which secure the same thing.
Citizenship by Descent
Thus, all inhabitants who belong to old established communities of our country like the Sinhalese, the Ceylon Tamils, the Ceylon Moors, the Ceylon Malays and Burghers became citizens of Ceylon by descent.
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Citizens by Registration
The test applicable to inhabitants who were not members of these old Ceylonese communities was a sufficlently long connection by birth, which could reasonably ensure that they were likely to share the sense of community together with citizens by descent. The test was as follows: " "...was the person born in Ceylon, and further, was his father, and if not his father, his grandfather born in Ceylon'? The reasonableness of such a test was one of the points argued when the validity of the Citizenship Act came up for decision by the Privy Council in Kodakan Pillai and Mudanayake (1953) 54 New Law Report 433. The view of Privy Council was expressed in these words: “It is as the Supreme Court observed a perfectly natural and legitimate function of the legislature of a country to determine the composition of its nationals...... The migratory habits of the Indian Tamils (see paragraphs 123 and 203 Soulbury Report) are facts, which in their Lordships' opinion are directly relevant to the question of their suitability as citizens of Ceylon and have nothing to do with them as a community'. The test for citizenship by registration was doubtless devised with the Indian plantation workers in mind - when these workers started coming to Sri Lanka, they had a clear migratory character - The test was a practical one to ensure that only those who had ceased to have this migratory character would receive Ceylon citizenship.
Distinguished Citizens
The Act of 1948 had a provision of comparatively minor importance whereunder the Government was permitted to confer the status of citizen on residents who could be regarded as having rendered distinguished public service or as being eminent in the professional, commercial, industrial or agricultural life of the country. Persons acquiring citizenship in this way were so few that, even assuming that they did not, feel they belonged to Sri Lanka, they could hardly affect the sense of community on which our political society is based.
Indian and Pakistani Residents Registration Act - 1949
The next important piece of legislation is the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act of 1949. This Act provided for the registration, as citizens of Ceylon, residents of Indian and Pakistani origin who had failed to qualify under the Citizenship Act, but who had uninterrupted residence in Ceylon since 1936, if they were unmarried, or since 1939 if they were married. They also had to satisfy the registering authority that they had certain other qualifications, of which the ones relevant for our purpose
44

are, firstly, that there was no inherent difficulty in their living according to the laws of Ceylon and secondly, that they understood that by acccpting Ceylon Citizenship they renounced their original citizenship and thus became, for all purposes, subject to the laws of Ceylon. The qualifications, though less stringent than the test in the Citizenship Act, provided a certain minimum assurance that those who succeeded in acquiring citizenship had made their home in Ceylon. In other words, such citizens too can reasonably be regarded as members of the political society we call the People of Sri Lanka.
Special Consideration due to Registered Citizens
Although new citizens registered under these provisions of law are legally deemed to have severed all political connections with India or Pakistan (as the case may be), it would be unrealistic to expect that all feelings and sentiments they must have had towards their countries of origin ceased at once when they acquired Ceylon Citizenship. It would be unreasonable and even harsh to condemn them for vestiges of their old loyalties. It would be just and also prudent to show understanding and what is possible to win there complete loyalty.
Sirimavo-Shastri Pact
A vitally important human and political problem arose out of the fact that about a million persons of Indian origin failed to obtain registration as citizens under the provisions of the two Acts we have just seen. By far the greatest proportion of these Indians are estate workers. India does not normally treat Indian emigrants and their descendents as persons continuing to enjoy rights of Indian citizenship. This is quite understandable. British plan-. tation companies had in the past engaged hundreds of thousands of Indian workers as indented labour to work in many countries throughout the world, including Ceylon, West Indies, Guyana, East Africa, South Africa and Malaya. From a practical as well as a legal point of view it was not reasonably possible for India
to accept general responsibility for such emigrants. It is well to remember that our laws too clearly prevent our continuing to accept, as citizens, emigrants who had been away from Sri Lanka for generations even if they had not acquired citizenship of any other country.
A vast number of Indian estate workers who failed to acquire Sri Lanka citizenship had also lost indian citizenship, with the result that they are now stateless. They have no political rights and do not have protection under international law as citizens either
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of Sri Lanka or of India. A situation such as this is socially and politically dangerous, apart from being fraught with injustice.
Happily, Indian statesmen have given special consideration to the problem of Indian emigrants in Sri Lanka; and as a result an agreement was reached whereunder India, on her part, agreed to take back a specified number of Indian emigrants while Sri Lanka, on her part, agreed to grant citizenship to Indian workers who remained behind. It is a pity, that financial difficulties and lack of co-operation from plantation companies prevented expeditious implementation of the Sirimavo-Shastri Pact, as the agreement is called. Provision of money for its implementation must clearly receive high priority because a quick solution of the Indian worker problem is vital for the preservation of national unity and stability.
A Dilemma
Even if repatriation under the Pact proceeds satisfactorily, about half a million Tamil estate workers will remain behind. Absorbing them into the political Society of Sri Lanka will be no easy task. The problem presents a dilemma. A large proportion of these workers still regard India as their mother country and are unlikely for some time to come, to share a sense of community with the Sinhalese villagers who live in the same areas.
On the other hand, their exclusion, for a considerable period, from our political society will give rise to political complications growing out of resentment; this will make their ultimate acceptance of Sri Lanka as their real home much more difficult.
There are divisive forces, operating within our political society, and it would be foolish to ignore the risk of these forces spreading disaffection among the new citizens. A concerted policy for receiving these workers and winning them over to our political society must receive the highest priority. There are, indeed, risks involved, but there is no choice. To postpone is to double the risk.
The problem cannot be solved just by giving the Tamil workers Sri Lanka citizenship. A host of Social problems, including education and employment must be solved. It is true that once these workers become citizens in large numbers, political pressure that can be applied through the vote will ultimately lead to the solution of these social problems. But before they are solved in this way, much injustice, hardship and bittterness would in the meantime have ensued. Political pressures operating through the
46

frahchise are also likely to bring about politically unhealthy alignments with sections of our political Society among whom resentments have already given rise to tendencies inimical to national unity.
Tamil Estate Workers and Trade Unions
The problems of these workers and the problems of the Kandyan peasantry are inter-connected. The resettlement of Kandyan peasants on lands taken over from foreign estate companies has gone some way towards alleviating their economic plight. On the other hand, the break up of estates has resulted in serious unemployment among Indian workers. It is too much to expect that political parties will agree not to make the Tamil worker problem a party issue; yet there is no problem in Sri Lanka that calls for more urgent co-operation between them. The only hope lies in 'our trade union movement. If the trade union movement, as a whole, rising above the politics of the parties to which individual unions are affiliated, exert pressure to neutralise the inherent vote-catching motives that operate in a pluralist democracy, the situation can be saved. Future generations will judge trade unionism by its efforts to secure this political result. One could say the same thing about political parties that profess, in a special way, duty to support the working class.
1. You are Prime Minister not only of the
Buddhists, but of all countrymen.
2. You must hold the scales evenly among
Buddhists, Hindus, Christians and Muslims.
3. Religion and Language should be treated
equally.
4. You should do everything to correct the situ
ation that had hitherto prevailed.
Maha Nayake of the Asgiriya Chapter to the Prime Minister,
Hon. J. R. Jayawardene,
August 1977.
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Page 28
A LEFT APPROACH TO THE MINORITY PROBLEM
V. KARALARASNGHAM
(Attorney-at-Law)
(Talk given to the Sri Lanka U. N. Association at the Sri Lanka Institute. Noy. 1976).
The first thing to be noted about the minority or national prob-, lem is that it is not something peculiar to Ceylon, Not only other developing countries, but even the developed nations which long ago had accomplished their bourgeois democratic revolutions and therefore had resolved these questions are today faced with similar problems. I need but refer to the agitation of the Basque people of France and Spain, of the Scots and Welsh of the United Kingdom to illustrate the point that even the countries of Western Europe face this problem. Contrary to what the Sinhala and Tamil chauvinists say, the problem in Ceylon is due neither to the communalism of the Sinhala people nor to the unreasonableness of Tamil demands.
Uneven economic development is a general law of capitalism and this unevenness is not confined only to the relationship between the imperialist metropolis and the colonial backyard. Within the imperialist country itself this relationship is reproduced. That is to say, the “town and country' relationship which is so characteristic of capitalism is extended to the country as a whole, and therefore Scotland and Wales in the U. K., the Basque country in France, Catalonia in Spain are the rural areas in relation to the industrial centres of England, the Paris and Marseilles industrial regions, and the financial centre of Madrid.
In the developing countries, the problem is further aggravated. In the conditions of underdevelopment, stagnation and above all the pre-capitalist heritage which weighs down heavily on these societies, the lever of state power is a powerful aid to the dominant group in the “rat race' and this dominance is based on the discrimination of ethnic, caste, religious, or linguistic minority groups. In some countries of the Third World such discrimination is open as in Pakistan which proclaims itself the “Islamic Republic', while in others, it is masked, despite lipservice to democracy, secularism and even Socialism.
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Tamil Frustration
What is unique about Ceylon is not the existence of a national problem but the fact that the minorities are politically defenceless in the face of increasing pressure on them - a defencelessness brought about by their own barren politics. I do not propose to deal with the politics of minority communalism except to state that minority communalism which is the credo of the Federal Party can never be the answer to the communalism or chauvinism of the majority community, What I am concerned in this talk is to show that the majority people, the Sinhala people, cannot continue much longer to adopt an attitude of indifference to the aspirations of the Tamil people, that in fact these interests coincide in terms of the anti-imperialist struggle, the only worthwhile goal in the contemporary world.
The pressure on the Tamil speaking people, in particular those in the North, has increased. It is unnecessary to list the specific grievances which agitate the Tamils but suffice it to say that a sense of utter alienation has overwhelmed them. The gulf between them and the State power which has a wholly Sinhala chauvinist character about it, is ever widening. And the Sinhala character of the State power in the Jaffna district takes on the form of a 'foreign' army of occupation in those parts. The growing alienation and frustration is reflected in the fact that the government's own active supporters among the Tamils, not the 28 Sri variety of Mr. Kumarasuriar, but those Tamils seriously committed to the anti-imperialist movement in our country, have recently met to formulate these grievances. You have but to read this document to realise how basic are these demands, that their recognition by the State involves no great concessions, and that these demands are so elementary that the cultured among you will be surprised to hear that a part of our people are denied these fundamental rights. The present policy which denies these rights naturally creates alternative moods of pessimism and despair, which in their turn are the breeding grounds of reaction.
A Peril to Sinhala People too
Why do I say that the Tamil mood of pessimism and desperation, alienation and frustration is a peril to the Sinhala people as well? Precisely because the Sinhala speaking people are the overwhelming majority, the anti-imperialist movement in our country is predominantly Sinhala and this anti-imperialist movement cannot permit the people living in a part of the country to be used by imperialist reaction, without jeopardising the interests of the struggle against imperialism itself. When a people are driven to
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these alternating moods, they become, consciously or unconsciously, the tools of foreign imperialist interests. . Who can deny that the rabid chauvinism of an earlier generation of Arab nationalists contributed not a little to driving all the Jews into the arms, of Zionism, and therefore, of American imperialism? I am not here referring to the role of the Federal Party which is the heir and successor to the imperialist tradition in Jaffna politics. But the position today is that the mass support which the anti-imperialist movement enjoyed in Jaffna - admittedly a minority support - is being eroded and the anti-imperialist movement's own supporters among the Tamil people are compelled to ask the government to abandon its present discriminatory policies against the Tamils.
The predominantly Sinhala anti-imperialist movement in Ceylon must seek to strengthen its allies in Jaffna and among the Tamil people generally and this can be done only on a political basis. Sinhala chauvinist elements that press on the government seek an administrative-police solution and they fan all the old fears.
Dialogue Needed
This move of Sinhala reaction must be met and the anti-imperialist movement must demand of the government that it enter into a meaning full dialogue on the basis of the legitimate grievances of these people with the elected representatives of the Tamil people, and not foist on them dubious leaders of the government's choice. By taking a frank and honest position in relation to the legitimate demands of the Tamil people, the government would thereby drive a wedge between the reactionary leadership of the Tamil speaking people and the popular masses supporting them.
The genuine problems before the Tamil speaking people have been formulated by the government's own supporters, namely, Messrs E. R. S. R. Coomaraswamy and V. Kanapathipillai among others, they must not only be adopted by the anti-imperialist movement but it must give expression to these demands. Only by so doing will the anti-imperialist movement ensure that it has a mass base in the Tamil speaking areas of Ceylon, however small a base, however inadequate it may be in terms of Parliamentary representation. But such a mass base is essential, if for no other reason, at least to combat at the mass level, the reactionary politics of the presently accredited leaders of the Tamil speaking people. It is stressing the obvious to say that these politics are reactionary to the core.
Behind the TULF leaders are the reactionary forces of world imperialism. Of course as yet they are keeping a respectable distance from the TULF leadership, although the perspicacious
50

would be able to detect a link between the politics of the leadership of the TULF and the politics of world imperialist reaction. I will not say more than that for the present. Every anti-imperialist fighter among the Sinhala and Tamil people knows that as far as our country is concerned that struggle, namely, the struggle against imperialism is by no means over; if anything, we, the people of South Asia are just begining to move into the centre of that arena. Let me come to the heart of the matter.
An Opportunity for Imperialism
After the decisive and crushing defeat of American imperialism in Viet Nam, the United States which it the leader of world imperialism is without a sizeable base in this part of the world. India under Indira Gandhi is not only ruled out as a base of America in the Indian Ocean but this country is linked by treaty with the Soviet Union and is therefore the object of American imperialist designs in the Indian Ocean area. Bangla Desh, even after the anti-Mujibur coup, is too unstable, while America's official ally, Pakistan, cannot afford to open her borders to America, lest the whole Arab Middle East explodes. No government in Ceylon will dare permit an imperialist outpost in the foreseeable future, however much her rulers may desire such an arrangement. But America's long term interest desperately cries out for a base in the Indian Ocean. Mrs. Indira Gandhi must be contained today, but tomorrow, the Indian Socialist revolution must be throttled by direct military intervention. The prospect of that revolution is the nightmare of American imperialism, and today's forward planning of imperialism and the Pentagon is centred on how best to achieve that unavoidable task. You will ask: is not Diego Garcia adequate? The answer is simply no. Diego Garcia being an atoll off the coast of Africa is only a glorified aircraft carrier, good for today's job of patrolling the Indian Ocean, but logistically and otherwise useless for the purpose of mounting a military operation to smother a developing socialist revolution on the continent of India. This is where the projected new state of ''Yarl Desh' will come useful to American imperialism. And America is not un mindful of this agitation and this demand. On the one hand at present it is dutifully sympathetic, and on the other, through its Sinhala chauvinist agents on the other side, it persuades the employment of police methods and administrative fiats to put down the agitation of the legitimate demands of the Tamil speaking people, thereby opening the way to genuine mass support for the reactionary demand of separatism.
American imperialism's aim is to carve out an Israel out of Ceylon, in order that such a creation will subserve its imperialist
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interests. In the Middle East, an Israel was necded as a bastion against the Arab anti-imperialist movement, in South Asia she needs an Israel to crush the impending communist revolution in the Indian sub-continent. When the moment comes, American arms will find their way in a regular flow to activists among the champions of the separate state. Before you could say Jack Robinson that State may not only be a reality but the American marines invited to defend the 'independence' of the new Statel This is no piece of fantasy.
The growth of separatist tendencies among the Tamils with all its
attendent dangers to the anti imperialist movement must awaken
it to a realisation of the urgent need for a correct policy to the
legitimate demands of the Tamil speaking peoples, that this
movement must find a solution acceptable to progressive sections of Tamil opinion, and that it must truly unify the nation and not merely one section of it. For too long socialists among the Sinhala people have fought shy of the Tamil problem but this
ostrich policy cannot continue if we are to stand up to world
imperialism.
Mr. J. R. Jayawardene Stresses Human Rights
“My Government is dedicated to the elimination of all forms of discrimination. In this task, the redress of the grievances of all ethnic, religious and caste groups will receive my Government's urgent attention.
To this end, an all-party conference will shortly be summoned to consider the problems of the non-Sinhala speaking people and its decisions will be incorporated in the proposed constitution.
来 兴 来源
"I reiterate the belief of my Government that fundamental freedoms are pre-requisites for the total emancipation of the people
''The full enjoyment of the freedom, thus guaranteed can only be realised by the economically emancipated'.
An excerpt from the Prime Minister, Mr. J.R. Jayawardene's Message to the World Peace Through Law Centre Conference - Manila, August 1977.
52

NATIONAL UNITY
BADDEGAMA WIMALAWANSA ANUNAYAKE THEIRO
(Background Paper submitted to the Seminar held at the Girl Guides' Headquarters, Colombo, 4th Feb. 1976.
I would like to submit the following to the discussion on National Unity. I hope it will receive your consideration. The questions that arise in the country should receive the attention of all those who are interested in the progress of the country. The Buddhists of Sri Lanka have never done any injustice to anyone. It is the tradition of the Sinhala Buddhists to receive even strangers very cordially. This is a fact admitted by the majority in the world. If that is how the Buddhists treat foreigners, can there be any misgivings about their treatment of the other communities in the country?
At present there are in this country a number of communities including the Sinhalese, the Tamils, the Muslims, the Malays and the Burghers. The Buddhists expect the goodwill and co-operation of them all. Unity among these communities existed even in the days of the Sinhala kings. If there were wars, they were only against the Dravidian invaders from South India. That Sinhala - Tamil unity existed even during the British occupation of Lanka is shown by the fact that the Sinhala Buddhists accepted the leadership of Tamil leaders like Ponnambalam
Ramanathan. All this indicates that so far there has been no Sinhala-Tamil enmity or a plan to suppress the Tamil people. However, it is a fact that, due to political reasons or lust for power. there are in this country a handful who work against the Sinhalese. Yet, except for the political disruption carried on by the Federal Party which is considered a Catholic organization even by the Hindus, I do not think that there is any clash among the communities in this country.
It is well known that when the Soulbury Commission came, some political leaders from the North clamoured for rights on a fiftyfifty basis. However, the Soulbury Commission did not accede to it. Those who rejected that demand of the Tamils were not Sinhala-Buddhists, but intelligent European politicians. Thereafter, the Federal Party has been continuing the fifty-fifty
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struggle to this day. In certain respects this struggle has been not for 50-50 but for 30-70. The language question is an example. The demand was that both Sinhala and Tamil should be the Official Languages in seven provinces and that Tamil only should be the Official Language in the Northern and Eastern provinces. What an unjust demand is this? Will it be justified if a five-year old son cries for the same amount of food, clothing and money that a twenty-year old son gets? Can there be a father who grants such a request? While it is demanded that Tamils should be settled in all parts of the country, the demand is also made that no Sinhalese should be settled in the Northern and Eastern provinces. Is this a reasonable demand? Is it a justifiable demand? An analysis of each question will show that it is the Sinhalese who are deprived of reasonable rights. That this is no exaggeration or a falsehood can be proved by statistics. According to the 1971 Census the Sinhala population is 9,146,700. The Sri Lanka Tamil population is 1,415,600 only. The Sri Lanka Muslim population is a little more than 800,000. Thus the Sinhalese are 73% of the total. Now let us turn our attention to the members that entered the University in the Sinhala and Tamil media:
1966 - 1970 Faculty Tam i Medium Sinhala Medium
Medical 464 410 Engineering 346 3:36 Architecture 09 03 Veterinary 52 21 Agricultural 52 6S Dental 39 53 Pharmaceutical 79
What are the privileges enjoyed in the field of education by 73% of the population? If an equitable distribution is made in proportion to the population, the Sinhalese should get 81% of the places while the Tamils should get 12% and the Muslims 7%. It will be quite reasonable if population ratios are followed in the field of education, public service, administration affairs, employment etc. This system operates in multiracial countries. The Bhumiputra system in Malaysia and the ratio system in Pakistan are two instances.
I think it is the ratio system that should be supported and accepted by all citizens who eschew chauvinism and seek national harmony based on justice. Do not the Tamils comprise the majority among the high officials in the Public Service? Are not the Governor of the Central Bank, the Auditor General, the
54

Chairman of the Mahaweli Development Board, all the leading officers in the Irrigation Department, Tamils? Twelve of the fifteen officers in the Development Planning Section are Tamils. Although I have the statistics relating to all of them, I do not intend submitting them here. What will be the situation that arises if factual information is made available to the Sinhala public? In many places including the Western Province it is the non - Sinhalese who have more than 50% of the accomodation in the housing schemes. Among them the Tamils predominate yet there is no housing scheme for public servants Serving in Jaffna. They are not even allowed to live in rented houses. What is the situation in places like Wellawatte, Bambalapitiya and Cinnamon Gardens? Who is it who suffers . injustice if these matters are examined in detail? The Tamils and the Burghers were given special facilities and privileges in the public service during the British times on the assumption that the Sinhalese were trouble-makers. Although the Tamils want this situation to continue it is a very unreasonable request. For the people to live in harmony these injustices should be removed. One more word about education: Let us consider the number of schools where there are University Entrance Science classes. In the city of Colombo with a population of 1,709,000, there are 32 such schools In the Jaffna town which has a population of 492,000 only, the number of such schools is 33. The Sinhala Buddhists have not so far fought against these injustices. Such injustices are not confined to one or two instances. In the circumstances I think it will be desirable if a balanced discussion is held with equal members for each side participating. Before the law, God or the Buddha, no one can say that an injustice has been done by the Buddhists. I am sending this letter in order to see that, at this discussion, justice is done to the cause of the Sinhala Buddhists and it is shown that no harm comes from the Buddhists to the minorities.
“But there is hope. Men and women from all walks of life have begun to affirm themselves in favour of communal harmony. Leaders of all religions have apppealed for peace & justice for all. The common humanity in us all is leading persons and groups of every political or religious persuasion to cooperate in safeguauding life. Promoting understanding.'
Tissa Balasuriya - "Our Crisis of National Unity'
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Page 32
THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY IN SRI LANKA & RACE RELATIONS
SHIRLEY CANDAPPA (Staff Centre for Society and Religion)
In an interview with Mr. S. A. RASCHID & Dr. M. C. M. KALEEL April 1977
In Lanka's deteriorating race relations it is important to understand that the Muslim community, unlike the Sinhalese or the Tamils, is not a racial group. It is a religious group made up of different races, the common link being the Islamic brotherhood.
Originally traders, Muslims during the time of the Sinhalese kings were treated as honoured guests of the country.
By royal command they could claim a living allowance from the people marry anyone other than those from the royal family. They were given land for cultivation and for houses, were permitted to build mosques, and have their own burial grounds. Muslims never, either through their behaviour or their demeanour gave the impression of having intentions of conquering the country and therefore had these privileges extended to them. As such the Muslims have been able to live peaceably with the Sinhalese. Muslims in the time of the Sinhalese kings were made to feel part of the nation,
In an interview with two leading Muslim citizens Mr. S. M. A. Raschid and Dr. M. C. M. Kaleel I was able to gather the following data on Sinhalese - Muslim relations. Mr Raschid said the Muslims have always lived in peace with the Sinhalese and there was never any racial tension between the two groups.
The riots of 1915 were not directed against the local Muslims, but against some Muslim traders from India. That was proved by the fact he said that resident Muslims shops etc. were not burnt down or damaged, instead Muslims were protected by the Sinhalese people. A case in point was that his (Mr. Raschid's) mother gave birth to her first child at that time in the home of a Sinhalese neighbour. The houses and property of local Muslims were protected by the Sinhalese people.
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Today however, the position of the Muslims has changed. They do not feel part of the nation. The reason for it according to both Mr. Raschid and Dr. Kaleel is not racial but a consequence of economic factors.
Delimitation of Electorates
Muslims feel they are being discriminated against in a number of fields. For instance, the new delimitation laws, they feel, sound the death knell of Muslim representation in the country. The Moors especially, felt that by arbitrarily increasing the numerical norm of citizens per electorate, the previous government sought deliberately to reduce Muslim representation in the legislature.
On the other hand some other members of the Muslim community do not blame the previous government entirely because a Muslim was a member of the Commission,
A result of this, was that certain areas where Muslims are in the majority were demarcated in a manner as to prevent Muslims from being adequately represented.
Muslims also felt that certain recommendations of the Soulbury Commission with reference to minority representation had been ignored by the Commission, to the detriment of Muslim interests in urban arcas where they are a majority.
Education
Education was another field where Muslims were at a great disadvantage. Muslims form around 7% of the population but not even 2% of the students in the University or other institution of higher cducation are Muslims. The main reason is that under the present educational system Muslims cannot compete favourably with the Tamil-speaking or Sinhala-speaking students however good they may be in English.
Muslim doctors, lawyers and engineers are comparatively few. However during the past decade there has been a slight improvement of the lot of Muslims in education.
Trade
The comparative lack of educational opportunity made it difficult for Muslims to find gainful employment. This was especially so because the Moor community was composed mainly of traders who were not interested in furthering their education.
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It is in the sphere of trade, however, that Muslims feel discrimination really, takes place. As mentioned earlier, trade has been their principal means of earning a living and they have been for generations in the import, export and retail business.
Nearly 80% of the Moors are traders and the entry of the state into this sphere has led to mass unemployment among the members of this community.
The problem would have eased somewhat if the state had absorbed the displaced Moors in the new structures that were set up. These Moors who were displaced could not find alternative employment, for being traders it was not necessary for them to acquire other skills. It is felt that state policy on trade was a deliberate move to wrest it from the Moors and give it to Sinhalese businessmen.
State support to a big-time Sinhalese businessman who has opened trade centres in different parts of the city of Colombo tends to affect the small time Muslim businessman and boutiquekeeper.
Possi BLE SOLUTIONS
I. Separate State
Since the community feels discriminated against what could be the possible solutions to its problems? What of the idea of a separate state which the Tamils are demanding in the Northern and Eastern provinces. What does the Muslim community feel about it as a solution to its problems?
Both Mr. Raschid and Dr. Kaleel were aghast at the idea. Muslims, they said dreaded even thinking of such a day. Should it come the Muslims would become a mini-minority within a minority. A divided country would, they felt, create major problems for the Muslim population.
Muslims and Tamils have nothing in common, be it culture. outlook on life or religion. Although the language of the Muslims is Tamil, each group speaks a different dialect.
Moreover, they said that unlike the Muslims, Tamils always had expansionist ideas. Consequently, Muslims felt that in the event of a separate state coming into being there was a strong possiblity that they would be much worse off than at present,
S8

To the Muslims the solution to the problems of the country and the people lay not in separation or division of the country but in integration. Thinking on narrow sectarian lines of race, religion or caste, would be to their disadavntage.
Il Simple Living
Whilst both Mr. Raschid and Dr. Kaleel agreed that the solution to the racial problem of the country are largely economic their own approach to the solutions differed. .
Mr. Raschid considered simple living essential. A minority he said, could not continue to live off the backs of the majority (90%). Living standards if necessary. must be lowered even if it meant that everyone would be poor at a given stage. It was only when a common poverty was shared that people would stop making scapegoats of race, religion and caste.
Dr. Kaleel on the other hand, disagreed with the idea of shared poverty and taking from the haves for redistribution among the haves nots. Government, he said, did not have the funds necessary to maintain the going concerns of private individuals and companies. Government policy should rather be geared towards creation of new avenues of employment, thereby dynamising the industrial sector and the economy of the country.
Neither of the proposed solutions alone will end the racial problem or help build a nation. A nation cannot be built on a religious or racial background alone. Weightage or favoured treatment of any one community, specially in a rural Society like ours immediately alienates a large section of the people. If our aim is to build a nation we must join hands irrespective of race and religion and consider ourself as one nation and one people. The present policy of a favoured position for Sinhala and Buddhism will have to be abondoned and we should learn from the examples of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. If not, we too will in the near future suffer similiar consequences.
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THE UNKNOWN COMMUNITY - THE ARUNOIDARS
SUMMARISED BY Mr. P. A. W. PERERA (Centre Staff) From an article by S. M. KRISHNAN, in Attha. Ilth October 1974
A considerable section of our population, comprising about two lakhs, spend their lives amidst a thousand and one problems and hardly any one takes any interest in their conditions of life. This section of the population is employed as minor employees in the local government institutions of our villages, towns and municipalities and contribute their efforts to maintain the health services at maximum efficiency. They are engaged in Sweeping roads, conserving latrines and such menial labour, and are known as 'Arundidiars'. They live sub-human lives in the humblest of habitations.
These persons, unlike the plantation workers were not brought by the colonial powers for capitalistic purposes, but came on their own to seek a new home in Sri Lanka because of caste discrimination in their homeland in South India.
It is a pity that no one has taken the trouble to explain their culture, language and living conditions though most of them now speak Tamil, their original language was Telegu-a dialectal form of Telegu prevalent in South India about 600 years ago.
They had to abandon the use of Telegu and learn either Tamil or Sinhala because there were no Telegu schools in Sri Lanka. But because of the problems connected with their living conditions, financial difficulties and caste - discrimination their children have practically no education whatsoever.
The seriousness of this problem may be guaged from the fact that this section of the population of 200,000 has so far not produced a single graduate, and only a single teacher. A few in the public sector occupy minor subordinate jobs.
Though all communities that live in Sri Lanka have the previllage of having their representative in the state asembly, these people
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do not have so much as a Justice of the Peace in their community. Thus, they find no one who could make representations on their behalf on the difficulties they encounter in their day to day life.
W Some of the customs they have are reminiscent of ancient patriarchal life. When there is any social problem amongst them they never resort to legal remedy or outside intervention. Anyone who does so is ostracised. An elder in the community acts as mediator and the aggrieved abide by his decision.
Recently these has been a social and political awakening among the youth and the workers of this community. They are aware that they can obtain social improvement only through political involvement. They have therefore formed the Sri Lanka Progressive Arundidiar Sangam' in order to obtain their political, social and economic improvement. Mr. S. M. Krishnan, a former Secretary of the Sangam has expressed the view that if the 200,000 health labourers are banded together, it will not be a difficult matter to win their social and trade union rights. He further states that whilst they have, at no time, acknowledged the leadership of Aziz, Thondaman or the (Federal Party) TULF they were neither rightist oriented. From the very first decade of this century, they have followed leftist policies.
'The pursuit of the doctrine of hate is not good for . anyone. Hate may or may not injure the person against whom it is directed, but it does definitely injure the person who hates. The Buddhists who get worked up over real or imaginary wrong doings of others are injuring themselves first. They are also creating an oppressive atmosphere which is not conducive to any spiritual growth. A person with even a little sensitiveness can feel this oppressive atmosphere in Sri Lanka today.
If Buddhism is love and compassion, who in this world can touch it, let alone destroy it? But if Buddhism is . merely an empty shell devoid of the essence of love, the earlier it disappears the better it is for the world.'
Dr. E. W. Adikaram - "And the Doctrine of Hate'
-الفسـسـعاً
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SOME RELEVANT DOCUMENTS
INTRODUCTION
As free peoples, the different races in this country have to work out a modus vivendi a way of living together in harmony. During the past 30 years various efforts have been made to resolve this issue. From 1948 - 1955 the problems were more or less dormant due to the Superiority of English and the English educated elite in the country.
After the General Elections of 1956 the issues became acute due to rise of Sinhala consciousness of the need to safeguard and promote Sinhala as the Official language. (cf Official language Act of 1956) Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike tried to allay the fears of the Tamils through a guarantee of the 'Reasonable Use of Tamil”, The Bandaranaike - Chelvanayagam Pact (B-C Pact) of July 1957 agreed on the basis of a solution specially in terms of Regional Councils and land colonization policy. This pact was torn up by Mr. Bandaranaike in April 1958 due to militant Sinhala political pressure. The federal party resolved to launch a non-violent direct action campaign, but before it could get way there was the communal holocaust of May 1958. Emergency rule prevailed from then to May 1959.
There were two General Elections in 1960. The Federal party helped to defeat the minority government of Mr. Dudley Senanayake in March 1960, as he did not agree to their demands. In July 1960 the SLFP Government got a clean majority in parliament and decided to go it alone without F. P. support. It was during the National Government led by Mr. Dudley Senanayake that further steps were taken rcgarding the Tamil Language special provisions. The Dudley Senanayake - Chelvanayagam Pact of March 1965 again promised setting-up of District Councils and the resolution of the language and colonization problems. The District Councils Bill was given up in July 1968 by Dudley Senanayake again due to Sinhala political pressure. But the other provisions of the pact were respected.
With the May 1970 General Elections, Mrs. Sirimavo Bandara
naike became Prime Minister with a two third majority in Parliament, A new Republican Constitution was promulgated.
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The minority safeguards of sec. 29 of the Soulbury Constitution were not in this constitution. The Tamil members in exasperation walkedout of the constituent assembly in July 1971. The F.P. and the Tamil Congress (T.C.) joined to form the Tamil United Front (TUF) in May 1976, 20 years after 1956 the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) adopted a resolution in favour of an independent Tamil Ealam for the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka. The TULF consisted of the F. P., T. C. and the Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC) of plantation workers led by Mr. Thondaman. The C. W. C. however had reservations on a separate State.
July 1977 General Elections were fought by the TULF to obtain a mandate for Ealam. The UNP under Mr. J. R. Jayawardane won a 4/5th majority in parliament. The UNP Manifesto promised to be just and fair to the Tamils. Meanwhile the communal holocaust of August 1977 has further agggravated the
SSS
We hope the publication of these relevant documents (in this issue and later) will help understand the aspirations and fears of both the majority and the minorityes.
Editor.
(A) OFFICIAL LANGUAGE ACT NO. 33
OF 956
An act to prescribe the Sinhala language as the one official language of Ceylon and to enable certain transitory provisions to be made (July 7th. 1956)
1. his act may be citcd as the official language Act No. 33 1956.
2. The Sinhala language shall be the one official language of Ceylon.
Provided that where the Minister considers it impracticable to commence the use of only the Sinhala language, for any official purpose immediately on the coming into force of this act, the language or languages hitherto used for that purpose may be continued to be so used until the necessary change if effected as early
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as possible before the expiry of the 31st. day of December 1960 and, if such change cannot be effected by administrative order, regulations may be made under this act to effect such change.
3. (I) The Ministers may make regulations in respect of all matters for which regulations are authorised by this act to be made and generally for the purpose of giving effects to the principles and provisions of this act.
(II) No regulation made under sub-sections (1) shall have effect until it is approved by the Senate and the House of Representatives and notificaiion of such approval if published in the gazette.
(B) s. W. R. D. BANDARANAIKE, Prime Minister REASoNABLE USE oF TAMIL
(Statement in Parliament from Sri Lanka Weekly Information sheet - Information Dept. Vol. 1. No. 1. Ist May 1957)
The Prime Minister outlined in the House of Representatives
last week the Government's proposals for the reasonable use of Tamil:
These proposals are:
1. The right of every Tamil to be educated in his own language
up to the summit of the educational system.
2.
Tamils should be entitled to sit for public service Examinations in Tamil, with provisions being made for them to acquire proficiency in Sinhalese in a stipulated period after recruitment.
3. Tamils should be given the right to correspond with the
Government and receive replies in Tamil.
4. Local authorities in Tamil areas should be given the power to transact business with the Central Government in Tamil.
The following is the Prime Minister's statement:-
''The House and the Country know that it has always been the policy of the Government Party that, although the circumstances of the situation were such that the Sinhalese language had to be
64

declared the official language of this Country, there was no intention in fact to cause any undue hardship or injustice to those whose language is other than Sinhalese in the implementation of that Act.
“I wish also to point out that the Government Party prior to the elections in their manifesto gave the assurance that while it was their intention to make Sinhalese the official language of the country, reasonable use of Tamil too will be given. We had to wait till we saw what were the precise forms in which this recognition of the Tamil language could be given effect to.
“I am in a position, on behalf of the Government, to make a statement in general terms - of course. The details will have to be worked out and discussed and Members of the House and others will be given the opportunity of expressing their views in due course. There are certain matters that are already being done, for instance taking effective steps to see that this reasonable use is given its proper place. Administratively already certain things are being done. For instance, in the realm of education it was always the position of the Government that they did not ban education in the medium of the Tamil language, naturally, will have the right to go up to the very summit of education in that medium.
'The House and public will also remember that in a discussion we had with the University authorities, it was decided that the Tamil medium should also be used in examinations, that is, so far as those facilities are concerned where Swabasha is used, that the Tamil medium should also be adopted. It is the policy of the Government that position should be preserved.
“Flowing from that position, there is the question of the Public Service. For the present, the practice the Government is following is that those educated in a medium other than Sinhalese should be permitted to sit for examinations in the medium in which they have been taught with only the proviso that once they are appointed as probationers they will naturally be required to obtain that knowledge of the official language which may be considered necessary for the carrying out of their official duties before the probationary period eventuates in permanent employment.
'It may be that after some years the better course for those who sit for these examinations would be to take some easy paper at those examinations showing some knowledge of the official language rather than wait till they are appointed as probationers to acquire that knowledge. That is a matter that will receive the consideration of the Government.
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"The other question is that of correspondence and transaction of business. That also flows from the position that the Tamil language is recognised as the medium of instruction. Those who are educated in that language will have the opportunity of addressing letters, getting replies and so on in the same language. I am not going into details. I am merely expressing certain general lines on which the Government will work out a scheme.
''The fourth question is in regard to local authorities, Regional Councils and so on. The work of these bodies fall into two categories, namely proceedings at their meetings and the transaction of general business. Proceedings at meetings will be governed by the Standing Orders and Regulations in the same way as proceedings in this House are governed by our Standing Orders. With regard to the work of the local authority vis-a-vis the Central Government, we feel that at least in certain areas in the Northern and Eastern Provinces the local authority should have the option of doing the official part of their work in Tamil if they so wish.
These are the four main heads, and of course there are subsidiary matters that will arise. It is the view of the Government that a scheme in that way should be worked out.
“In other words, the policy that the Government intends to follow
is that while accepting Sinhalese as the official language, citizens who do not know Sinhalese should not suffer inconvenience,
embarassment or any trouble as a result of that.
“Some of my Hon. Friends opposite who hold an extreme point of view will think differently. There are extremists on both sides. We cannot decide these issues on grounds of extremism whether it be on this side of the House or on that side. We have to take a rational, reasonable attitude in these matters. Of course, Sinhalese has been declared the official language of the Country. The Government now proposed to take these steps and everybody will have an opportunity to make suggestions.
“I have only given the broad outline of what we intend doing'.
(C) THE BANDARANAIKE - CHELVANAYAKAM
PACT JULY 26, 1957
Text of Joint Statements by Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, Prime Minister and the Representatives of the Federal Party. (House of Representatives, Parliamentary Debates (Hanzard) Vol. 30, cols. 1309-1311.
Statement on the general principles of the Agreement.
66

“Representatives of the Federal Party have had a series of discussions with the Prime Minister in an effort to resolve the differences of opinion that had been growing and creating tension.
"At an early stage of these conversations it became evident that it was not possible for the Prime Minister to accede to some of the demands of the Federal Party.
The Prime Minister stated that from the view of the Government he was not in a position to discuss the setting up of a federal constitution or regional autonomy or any step which would abrogate the Official Language Act. The question then arose whether it was possible to explore the possibility of an adjustment without the Federal Party abandoning or surrendering any of its fundamental principles and objectives.
At this stage the Prime Minister suggested an examination of the Government's draft Regional Councils Bill to see whether provision could be made under it to meet reasonably some of the matters in this regard which the Federal Party had in view.
“The agreements so reached are embodied in a separate document. မျိုးနှီ'ို the language issue the Federal Party reiterated its stand for parity, but in view of the position of the Prime Minister in this matter they came to an agreement by way of an adjustment. They pointed out that it was important for them that there should be a recognition of Tamil as a national language and that the administrative work in the Northern and Eastern Provinces should be done in Tamil.
was not possible fo, in to take any step which would abrogate
“The Primc ဖြိုးမျိုီနှီ that as mentioned by him earlier it the Official LanguagAct.
Use of Tamil
“After discussions it was agreed that the proposed legislation should contain recognition of Tamil as the language of a national minority of Ceylon, and that the four points mentioned by the Prime Minister should include provision that, without infringing on the position of the Official Language Act, the language of administration in the Northern and Eastern Provinces should bc Tamil and that any necessary provision be made for the non-Tamil speaking minorities in the Northern and Eastern Provinccs.
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“Regarding the question of Ceylon citizenship for people of Indian descent and revision of the Citizenship Act, the representatives of the Federal Party put forward their views to the Prime Minister and pressed for an early settlement.
''The Prime Minister indicated that this problem would receive early consideration.
"'In view of these conclusions the Federal Party stated that they were withdrawing their proposed satyagraha'.
Joint Statement by the Prime Minister and Representatives of the Federal Party on Regional Councils.
(A) Regional areas to be defined in the Bill itself by embodying them in a schedule thereto.
(B) “That the Northern Province is to form one Regional area whilst the Eastern Province is to be divided into two or more Regional areas.
(C) "Provision is to be made in the Bill to enable two or more regions to amalgamate even beyond provincial limits; and for one region to divide itself subject to ratification by Parliament. Further provision is to be made in the Bill for two or more regions to collaborate for specific purposes of common interest.
Direct Elections
(D) “Provision is to be made for direct election of regional councillors. Provision is to be made for a delimitation Commission or Commissions for carving out electorates. The question of M. P.'s representing districts falling within regional areas to be eligible to function as chairmen is to be considered. The question of Government Agents being Regional Commissioners is to be considered. The question of supervisory functions over larger towns, strategic towns and municipalities is to be looked into.
Special Powers
(E) “Parliament is to delegate powers and to specify them in the Act. It was agreed that Regional Councils should have powers over specified subjects including agriculture, co-operatives, lands and land development, colonization, education, health, industries and fisheries, housing and social services, electricity, water schemes and roads. Requisite definition of powers will be made in the Bill
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Colonisation Schemes
(F) "It was agreed that in the matter of Colonisation Schemes the powers of the Regional Councils shall include the powers to select allottees to whom lands within their area of authority shall be alienated and also power to select personnel to be employed for work on such schemes. The position regarding the area at present administered by the Gal Oya Board in this matter requires consideration.
Taxation, Borrowing
(G). The powers in regard to the Regional Councils vested in the Minister of Local Government in the draft Bill to be revised with a view to vesting control in Parliament wherever necessary.
(H) “The Central Government will provide block grants to the Regional Councils. The principles on which the grants will be computed will be gone into. The Regional Councils shall have powers of taxation and borrowing.'
This pact whose implementation may have gone a long way to resolve Sinhala/Tamil problems was eventually abrogated unilaterally by Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike in April 1958 due to political pressure.
(D) TAMIL LANGUAGE (SPECIAL PROVISION)
ACT 28 OF 1958
Regulations made under the Tamil Language (Special Provision) Act 28 of 1958 and published in Government Gazette 14653
of2., 3, 66.
1. Without prejudice to the operation of the Official Language Act 33 of 1956, which declared the Sinhala Language to be the one official language of Ceylon, the Tamil Language shall be used.
2. (a) In the Northern and Eastern provinces for the transaction of all Government and public business and the maintenance
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of public records whether such business is conducted in or by a department or institution of the Government, a public Corporation or a Statutory Institution, and
(b) for all correspondence between persons other than officials in their official capacity, educated through the medium of the Tamil Language, and any official in his official capacity or between any local authority in the Northern and Eastern provinces which conducts its business in the Tamil Language, and any official in his official capacity.
3. To give effect to the principles and provisions of the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act, and those Regulations, all Ordinances, and Acts, all Orders, Proclamations, Rules, By-laws, Regulations, Notifications, made or issued under any written law, the Government Gazette and all other official publications and circulars, and forms issued by Government, Corporations, Statutory Institutions shall be published in Tamil.
The above regulations were published in 1966, 8 years after the I958 Act but never implemented.
COMMENTS
The Government was of the opinion that these Regulations have no legal validity, being ultravires of the Act (See below excerpts from the speeches in the Constitutional Assembly, by the Hon’ble Felix Dias Bandaranaike, Minister of Public Administration and Justice, and by Hon’ble Dr. Colvin R. de Silva, Minister for Constitutionai Affairs.
1. The Hon. Felix Dias Bandaranaike, Minister of Public Administration and Justice:-
'... . . . . . . I think you have no right to vindicate, because I believe those regulations are ultra vires the main Act... . .
Vol. I No. 28, Column 2107 of 25. 6.71.
2. The Hon. Dr. Colvin R. de Silva, Minister for Constitutional Affairs:-
“That is the view of this Government, as was the view we held and which we continue to hold, these regulations are ultra vires
70

the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act and that therefore this Government was not applying these regulations in the admi nistration.
Vol. 2, No. 6, Column 334 of 9.5. 1972.
That is the position of this Government, officially stated.
No regulations of legal force and validity have yet been made.
(E) SENANAYAKEICHELVANAYAGAM PACT –
MARCH 965
Agreement
Mr. Dudley Senanayake and Mr. S.J. V. Chelvanayagam met on the 24th day of March 1965 and discussed matters relating to some problems over which the Tamil-speaking people were concerncod, and Mr. Senanayake agreed that action on the following lines would be taken by him to ensure a stable Government:-
1. Action will be taken early under the Tamil Language Special Provisions Act to make provision for the Tamil language to be the language of administration and of record in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Mr. Senanayake also explained that it was the policy of his Party that a Tamil-speaking person should be entitled to transact business in Tamil throughout the island.
2. Mr. Senanayake stated that it was the policy of his Party to amend the language of the Courts Act to Provide for legal proceedings in the Northern and Eastern Provinces to be conducted and recordcd in Tamil.
3. Action will be taken to establish District Councils in Ceylon vested with powers over subjects to be mutually agreed upon between the two leaders. It was agreed however that the Government should have power under the law to give directions to such Councils in thc national interest.
4. The Land Development Ordinance will be amended to provide that Citizens of Ccylon be entitled to the allotment of land under
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the Ordinance. Mr. Senanayake further agreed that in the granting of land under Colonisation Schemes the following priorities to be observed in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.
(a) Land in the Northern and Eastern Provinces should in the first instance be granted to landless persons in the District;
(b) Secondly to Tamil-speaking persons resident in the
Northern and Eastern Provinces, AND
(c) Thirdly to other citizens of Ceylon preference being given to Tamil citizens resident in the rest of the island.
Sgd. - Dudley Senanayake, 24/3/65 Sgd. - S. J. V. Chelvanayagam 24/3/65
District Councils mentioned in this pact were not set up as Mr. Dudley Senanayake could not muster adequate political support for this.
(F) EXTRACTS FROM SPEECHES ON THE STATUS OF TAM L. LANGUAGE VIS A VIS SINHALA MADE BY
(1) Rt. Hon. D. S. Senanayake, Prime Minister
(2) Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike before he promised
the country Sinhala only in 24 hours.
(3) By leaders of political parties who subsequently changed their policy when they became Cabinet Ministers,
(1) The Rt. Hon’ble D. S. Senanayake: The essential task is to build up a nation, and build up a nation not with one language but with two.
72

(2) Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike: Vol. I. No. 30 Column 2374, - 'I do not see that there would be any harm at all in recognising the Tamil Language also as an official language. It is necessary to bring about that amity, that confidence among the various communities, which we are all striving to achieve within reasonable limits. Therefore, on the second point, I have no personal objection to both these languages being considered official languages; nor do I see any particular harm or danger or real difficulty arising from it'.
do Vol. 1, No. 30 Column 2375.
* “If it is the desire of the Tamils that Tamil also should be given equal status with Sinhalese, I do not think we should bar it from attaining that position. This House I am sure will vote with me that English should be deposed from its position as the official language and Sinhalese and Tamil, the ancient languages of the people, should be made the official languages of Lanka'.
He also said:
“What then is the object of having Sinhalese alone as the official language? If the object is that it is rather awkward to have more than one official language, I should like to point out that other countries are putting up with more than two official languages and are carrying on reasonably satisfactorily.'
(3) Dr. N. M. Perera: Vol. I, No. 30, Column 2376. ''The Lanka Sama Samaja Party’s demand for Sinhalese and Tamil as the State Languages, it should be made clear at the outset, flows from a very real concern for the interests of the people who speak these languages.'
'We have been for Swabasha, that is, for Sinhalese and Tamil, ever since we started in 1935. That was one of our items in our first programme issued by the Lanka Sama Samaja Party, that the administration of the country should be in Sinhalese and Tamil.'
“Our Party has taken up a consistent attitude ever since our Party was launched. We have never faltered or wavered from that position because we felt that, that was the correct line to take. That position we still adhere to however unpopular that action might be'.
(4) Mr. Leslie Goonewardene: Vol. I, No. 30, Col. 2377. “Finally, I would state that in this matter we stand, naturally,
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for the elevation of Sinhalese to a State Language. There is no question or doubt about that. But we oppose the injustice done to the Tamil-speaking people by this Bill. We feel that just as the Sinhalese people should have the right to be ruled in the Sinhalese language and conduct their business with the Government in the Sinhalese language, so also the Tamils should have the right to conduct their business with the State in the Tamil language and to be ruled in the Tamil language.' - Official Report 8th June, 1956; Vol. 24, Col. 1107.
(5) Mr. Pieter Keuneman: Vol. I, No. 30, Col. 2377. “I am a Communist and I am proud to be a Communist...... It (Communist Party) opposes oppression in whatever form it It is because of this fundamental basis of our political philosophy that we of the Communist Party oppose this Bill with all our strength. We believe that all nationals of this country have a natural and unfettered right to use their language, to govern themselves in their language, to build and develop their languages and culture. This is a right which in the case of any one linguistic group is neither more nor less than in the case of other linguistic groups. No person or linguistic group should, because of his or its language, be placed in a position inferior or superior, in the exercise and enjoyment of the rights and obligations of citizenship, to another person or language group.' (Official Report, 11th June, 1956, Vol. 24, Col. 1189-90)
“All I am suggesting is that, in the basically Sinnalese-speaking areas, let the Courts and the Government administration be conducted in the Sinhalese language; in the basically Tamil-speaking areas, let these be conducted in the Tamil language, and, of course, in order to assert the right that any citizen of this country, wherever he may be in a unified country, can have the right to deal with Government and the Courts in his own language, let there be a system of interpretation so that interspersed minorities living in one or other of these linguistic territories will be able to communicate with the Government and receive replies, in their own language.' - Official Report, 14th June, 1956: Vol. 24 Col. 1691.
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RACE RELATION:
i. socio-Econo
Con
Introduction
Minority Problems, A SocioEconomic Perspective
Some Socio-Econ. Aspects of Communal Problems 7
Sri Lanka -- the People - Nation - Citizenship 4.(
A Left Approach to the Minority Problem 48 National Unity 53
The Muslim Community An Interview 56
Unknown Community - Arundidiars 6C
Official Language Act 1956 63
Bandaranaike - Reasonable
Use of Tamil 64
The Bandaranaike-Chelva. nayagam Pact July 1957 66
Tamii Language (Special Provision) Act of 1958 69
Senanayake - Chelvanayagam Pact 1965 7
Extracts on Status of Tamil Language vis-a-vis Sinhala 72
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