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Articles

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THE ORIGIN OF THE TAMIL VANNI CHIEFTAINCIES OF CEYLON

K. Indrapala

After the drift of Sinhalese political power to the south-western parts of Ceylon and the emergence of the Jaffna kingdom in the northernmost region of the island (which processes took place in the middle third of the thirteenth century), the only political authorities in the major part of the ancient Rājaraṭṭha about whom we hear from our sources are those chieftains often loosely referred to as the Vanni or Vanniyar. The area that came under their rule has also been referred to as the Vanni.

The extent of the Vanni lands has varied from time to time. In the Sinhalese chronicles of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the depopulated jungle area that separated the Sinhalese kingdom from the Tamil kingdom of Jaffna is commonly referred to as the Vanni. In the chronicles of Jaffna this name is mainly used to describe the chieftaincies of northern Ceylon. In the chronicles of the Eastern Province, the chieftaincies of the Batticaloa region also receive the appellation of the Vanni. In the period of Dutch and British rule, by the Vanni region was meant the present Vavuniya District and some parts of the Polonnaruwa District. In this study the name Tamil Vanni is used to the chieftaincies of the Mannar, Vavuniya, Batticaloa, Trincomalee and Polonnaruwa districts.

The archaeology and history of the Vanni is still an unexplored field, although the jungles of that region are fast vanishing in the face of government-sponsored colonisation schemes. Very little information on the Vanni is available in our literary sources and only a few inscriptions of the Vanni chiefs have come to light.[1] Much of our knowledge is confined to a few writings of

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[1] The only two known Tamil lithic records referring to Vanniyar chieftains have been published - K. Indrapala, *'Kilakkilaṅkai Cācanaṅkaḷ'*, *Cintanai* (Tamil) II, Nos. 2&3, July - Oct. 1968 (Peradeniya). pp. 35 - 40, An unpublished Tamil copper plate grant of Kayilāya Vanniyan and other Vanniyar chiefs, dated śaka 1644 (A. D. 1722) is in the possession of Mr. S. Sivakolunthu of Kalliyankadu (Jaffna). There is also a copper plate grant in Sinhalese, dated śaka 1469 (A. D. 1547), referring to one Navaratna Vanniyā of Luṇuviia - S. Casie Chetty, *Ceylon Gazetteer* (Colombo 1834), pp. 190-191.

some British civil servants who evinced a keen interest in the archaeology and history of this region. Among these, the writings of H. Parker and J. P. Lewis deserve special mention.[1] In 1941 Wilhelm Geiger published an interesting article on the Vanni based almost entirely on the Pali chronicle *Cūlavaṃsa*.[2] In recent years was published another work which is sadly lacking in scientific analysis.[3] There is much difference of opinion among all these writers on the problem of the origin of the Vanni or Vanniyar.

The Term Vanni

Who were the Vannis who emerged into the limelight in the thirteenth century amidst the confusion that followed the fall of Polonnaruva? This is a question which is not easy of solution with the evidence at our disposal. The derivation of the name itself presents much difficulty. Senarat Paranavitana has the following to say about the Vanni:

> The government of the districts away from the capital was carried on by a class of chieftains referred to as *Vanni* who sometimes defied the authority of the ruler at the capital. The people who lived in the ancient Rājaraṭṭha, which in our period (thirteenth to the fifteenth century) was being steadily encroached by forests, were under chieftains called *vanni*, some of whom were of Tamil race and who transferred their allegiance to the Sinhalese king, or the ruler in Jaffna, as the exigencies of the changing political situation dictated. . . . The word *vanni* is generally derived from Skt. or P. *vana*, 'forest', and is taken to have been borne by these chieftains because they ruled tracts of territory mostly in forest. The number of *vanni* and their territories is sometimes given as eighteen, and sometimes as three hundred and sixty-four. Two classes of *vannis* are also mentioned, namely *maha-vanni* 'great *vannis*' and *siri-vanni*, 'smaller

[1] Henry Parker, 'Irrigation in the Northern Province', *Papers Laid Before the Legislative Council of Ceylon*, No. XI, 1886, pp. 105 - 116; J, P. Lewis, *Manual of the Vanni Districts* (Colombo 1895) and 'The Archaeology of the Vanni', *Journal of the Ceylon Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*,(*JCBRAS*)XIII, No. 45, 1894, pp, 151 - 178; Anonymous, 'Historical Sketch of the Vanni', *The Monthly Literary Register and Notes and Queries for Ceylon* (*MLR & NQC*), I, No. 1, Jan. 1893, pp. 1 - 7; Feb. 1893, pp. 25–30.

[2] Wilhelm Geiger, '*Die Vannis*', *Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, II, Heft 4 (Munchen), Juni 1941, pp. 3–11.

[3] C. S. Navaratnam, *Vanni and the Vanniyars*, (Jaffna 1960).

vanni'. Perhaps the eighteen were the *maha-vanni* and the three hundred and sixty-four the *siri-vanni*.[1]

According to this, the Vanni were only a class of chieftains who derived their name from *vana* because of the nature of the tracts that came under their authority. While agreeing with this derivation of the name, Geiger has a different opinion to express on the identity of the Vanni:

> Der Name der Vannis (mod. Sgh. *vanniyā*, Pali *vanni* oder *vañña*) ist in seiner Bildung nicht vollig klar, aber es ist kaum zu bezweifeln, dass er mit *vana* "Wald" zusammenhangt. Wir konnen ihn passend mit "Waldleute" oder "Waldsiedler" wiedergeben. . . . . Weiterhin istes sehr bemerkenswert, dass das Wort *vanni* oder *vañña* niemals allein vorkommt, sondern immer in Verbindungen wie *vanni-rajāno* und dergleichen, an 3 Stellen (83. 10; 97. 52; 90. 33) uberdies mit dem Zusatz *sīhaḷa*. Es ergabe aber ein schiefes Bild, wollte man das mit "Vannikonige" ubersetzen und nur auf die Anfuhrer und Hauptlinge der Vannis beziehen. Nein, es war das Name der Gesamtheit, Das Wort *rājan* hat in Ceylon eine allgemeinere Bedeutung angenommen, die dem Sk. *ksatriya* entspricht. Die *vannirajāno* beanspruchen also, ein adeliger Clan zu sein, genau so wie der in Vesāli herrschende Adelsclan der Licchavi in singhalesischen Quellen (vgl. z. B. Saddharmaratnāvaliya, ed. D. B. Jayatilaka, p. 298) als *licchavi rajjuruvō*, wtl. "Licchavikonige" bezeichnet wird. Wenn sich aber die Vannis druchlich selber *sīhaḷa* nennen, so stellen sie sich damit als Arier in bewussten Gegensatz zu den Damiḷas (Sk. *draviḍa*) wie zu den Vaddas. Wir sehen also, dass schon in 13 Jahrhundert die Vannis obenso, wie dies ihre heutigen Nachfahren tun, den Anspruch auf arische Abkunft und vornehme Kaste erhoben, und dass von dem Chronisten der zu Anfang des 14 Jahrhunderts sein Werk Verfasste, also als Zeitgenesse gelten darf, dieser Anspruch offenbar als durchaus berechtigt anerkannt wurde.[2]

We shall presently see that while Geiger is partly right in applying the name Vanni to a whole community or caste rather than to a group of chieftains, he is wrong in claiming that they were all Sinhalese

[1] Senarat Paranavitana, 'Civilisation of the Period: Economic, Political and Social Conditions', ed. H. C. Ray, *University of Ceylon History of Ceylon* (*UCHC*) (Colombo 1960), I, ii, pp. 736–737.

[2] Geiger, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

and consequently of Aryan descent. But before we come to that let us consider the various derivations that have been suggested for the name Vanni. Emerson Tennent mentions two possible derivations, namely 'one significant of the forest (*vanam*) which it (the Vanni region) covers to a great extent, the other of the intense heat that characterises the region' (*vanni* = fire ?).[1] Some have tried to derive it from the Tamil *val*, 'hard', denoting the hardness of the soil.[2] Still others have suggested a derivation from Baniyā or merchant.[3] These are all fanciful derivations based on the similarity of their sounds with that of *vanni*. The derivation from *vana* is plausible but appears to be unusual. The Pali form *vañña* does not seem to have been derived from *vana*. No tradition has been preserved in Ceylon regarding the derivation or origin of this name but in South India, where too we hear of the Vanni in the same period, there are certain traditions concerning their origin which throw some light on our problem.

The Tamil work *Cilai-elupatu*, probably composed in the period of the Vijayanagar empire (14th - 16th century) though ascribed to Kampaṉ who lived in the twelfth century, is a panegyric on the Vaṉṉiyar.[4] According to this work, the Vaṉṉiyar belonged to the Agni-kula and were descended from a certain Sambhu-muni. This association with the Agni-kula (fire-family or-caste), in S. Gnanapragasar's opinion, is a theory born of the similarity between *vahni* (fire) and *vanni*.[5] In fact, there is a legend among the Vaisiyar caste of North Arcot (Tamilnadu State) which illustrates the derivation of their name from *vahni*. H. F. Cox has recorded this legend in the following manner:

> In the olden times two giants named Vatapi and Mahi worshipped Brahma with such devotion that they obtained from him immunity from death from every cause save fire, which element they had carelessly omitted to include in their enumeration. Protected thus they harried the country, and Vatapi went to the length of swallowing Vayu, the god of the winds, while Mahi devoured the sun. The earth was therefore enveloped in perpetual darkness and stillness, a condition of affairs which

[1] Emerson Tennent, *Ceylon*, II, 4 th edition (London 1860), p. 508.
[2] J P. Lewis, 'The Archaeology of the Vanni', p. 151 note.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Quoted in S. Gnanapragsar, *Yālppāṇa-vaipava-vimarcanam* (Accuveli 1928), p. 40.
[5] Ibid.

> struck terror into the minds of the *devatas* and led them to appeal to Brahma. He, recollecting the omission made by the giants, directed his supplicants to desire the *rishi* Jambava Mahamuni to perform a *yagam* or sacrifice by fire. The order having been obeyed, armed horsemen sprung from the flames, who undertook twelve expeditions against Vatapi and Mahi, whom they first destroyed and afterwards released Vayu and the sun from their bodies. Their leader then assumed the government of the country under the name of Rudra Vanniya Maharaja, who had five sons, the ancestors of the Vanniya caste.[1]

This is one of the many Vātāpi legends current in South India and has no special historical significance. It seems to preserve some memory of the origin of the Vanniyar as a warrior caste. But its importance lies in the fact that it is meant to illustrate their origin from fire and the derivation of their name from *vahni*.[2] Thus we find in the literature and tradition of South India the origin of the Vanniyar being associated with fire or the Agni-kula. The derivation of their name from *vahni*, therefore, seems to be plausible but is not very convincing. As Gnanapragasar has suggested, this association may represent a later attempt to derive the name from *vahni*[3]. Even if we allow the association with the Agni-kula as plausible, it is difficult to explain why their name was derived from a rarer word like *vahni* instead of the more common *agni*.

Vanni being a caste name in modern India, the early occupation of the Vanniyar may provide a clue to the origin of the name, for almost all caste names are based on the occupations followed by the different castes. The modern Vanniyar caste of South India follows the profession of cultivation like the Vellāḷar. This was their occupation in the last century, too.[4] The Vanniyar of the Vijayanagar period, too, seem to have been engaged in the same occupation, for they appear in the inscriptions of that time as tenants of Brāhmaṇa and Veḷḷāḷa landlords and paid a special

[1] H. F. Cox, *A Manual of North Arcot*, I, Revised by H. A. Stuart (Madras, 1895), p. 236.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Gnanapragasar, op. cit., p. 40.

[4] Cox, op. cit., p. 236.

tax called the *vanniya-vari.*[1] But there were other Vanniyar whose occupation does not appear to have been so peaceful a pursuit as agriculture. These Vanniyar seem to have been a source of constant trouble to some of the Vijayanagar rulers and to some of the local princes. Sāḷuva Tirumala (A. D. 1450), for instance, enjoyed the title of *'Pakaitta Vanniyar Kula Kāla'* (the Destroyer of the Vanniyar Kula which antagonized him).[2] Similar titles ('Destroyer of the Vainnyar of the Eighteen Districts' and 'Destroyer of the Pride of the Vanniyar') were borne by a number of Setupati princes (who ruled over the Ramnad region of Tamilnadu) in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[3] The subjugation of the Vanniyar of the Eighteen Districts is also attributed to other princes in the fifteenth century.[4] These Vanniyar were obviously not peaceful cultivators but were given to martial pursuits. And these are the Vanniyar who are mentioned in the contemporary literary works. The *Cilai-elupatu*, for instance, praises their skill in the art of archery and gives the bow as their emblem.[5] The *Kallāṭam*, another Tamil work, refers to them as *nār-paṭai-vanniyar* (the Vanniyar of the Four-fold Army) which is probably an allusion to their employment as warriors in the four-fold army of the state.[6]

As we go further back in time, we find that the Vanniyar were warriors rather than cultivators and that Vanni chieftains enjoyed the status of feudal lords. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries several Vanni chiefs were in the service of the Cōḷa and Pāṇḍya kings and were in the enjoyment of land-grants and grandiose titles. Many of them are mentioned in the epigraphs of the time of Rājādhirāja II (1163–1179), Kulōttuṅga III (1178–1216) and Māra-

[1] *Annual Report on Epigraphy* (*ARE*) *for 1913* (Madras), Inscriptions Nos. 223 of 1912, 30 and 34 of 1913.

[2] T. N. Subramaniam, *South Indian Temple Inscriptions* (Madras 1952), (*SITI*) II, Inscription Nos. 549, 550, 551, pp. 555, 547 & 548.

[3] James Burgess, *Tamil and Sanskrit Inscriptions*, (Archaeological Survey of South India, Vol. IV), tr. S. M. Natesa Sastri (Madras 1886), Nos. 5, 6, 7, 10, 13, 17 & 27 of the Setupati grants, pp. 71-120.

[4] Ibid., Nos. 10 and 11 of the Madras Museum grants, pp. 149, 151.

[5] Gnanapragasar, op. cit., p. 40.

[6] *Kallātam*, ed. P. V. Comacuntaranar, (Madras 1962.) v. 37, p. 302, In this Tamil work the Vanniyar are said to have been created as a result of a miraculous conversion of twelve boars into human beings. Some take this to indicate their origin as subordinates uuder the Cālukyas whose emblem was the boar. *Cf.*, Gnanapragasar, op. cit., p. 41.

varman Kulaśekhara Pāṇḍya (1268–1308). Most of them bear the title of Vanniya-mā-devan or Vanniya-perumāḷ or Vanniyar-nāyan (Lord of the Vanniyar).[1] Prominent among them is one Vanniya-nāyan Cārrukkuṭātān who figures in as many as fifteen records of the time of Rājādhirāja II. He is described in these as a Malaiyamān chief, with the fulsome epithets Malaiyamān Iṟaiyūrān Periya Uṭaiyān Cārrukkuṭātān Vanniyanāyan Rājarāja Cētiyarājan.[2] A contemporary Ceylonese work, the *Upāsaka-janālaṅkāra*, also refers to a Vanni feudatory of the Pāṇḍya ruler (*Paṇḍu bhūmaṇḍale yo'bhū vaññо sāmanta bhūmipo*).[3] As in the case of some princes of the Vijayanagar period, certain rulers of the thirteenth century also seem to have faced the opposition of the Vanniyar, for we find that an army chief of Rājarāja III rejoiced in the title of *Vanniya-vēṭṭakkāran* (*Vanniya vēṭṭaikkāran* – He who hunted down the Vanniyar).[4] There is also evidence to show that a fighting unit of the Perumpaṭai (lit. the Big Army, a regiment of the medieval period) was recruited from the Vanniya-vaṭṭam (lit. the Vanniya Circle).[5]

It is in the eleventh century that we come across the earliest references to the term *vanni* in the South Indian inscriptions. Records of Rājendra I (1012–1044) refer to a certain Vanniya Reva who was an army chief of the Cāḷukyas.[6] But perhaps the earliest occurrence of the term *vanni* is in the inscription No. 556 of 1919 which appears to belong to the time of Rājarāja I (985-1014).[7] The term that occurs in this inscription is *vanniya-parru*, (lit. Vanniya holding), which is comparable with such terms as *paṭai-parru*

[1] *ARE for 1903*, Nos. 546 & 558 of 1902 from Tiruvannamali (South Arcot), dated A. D. 1191 and 1205 respectively, refer to a chief of Paṅkala-nāṭu named Kūttāṭuntevan Prithvigaṅgan Vanniyamātevan Alakiyacolan. *ARE for 1936/37*, No, 214 of 1936/37, also from South Arcot, refers to a Vanniyapperumāḷ. It is dated A. D. 1277. *ARE for 1934/35*, Nos. 126, 136, 143 to 149, 154 to 159, and 171 as well as *ARE for 1937/38*, No. 381 of 1937/38 refer to Vanniyar-nāyan. All these are from South Arcot.

[2] *ARE for 1934/35*, Nos. mentionod in fn. 1.

[3] *Upāsakajanālaṅkāra*, ed. Moratota Dhammakkhanda Thera, revised by Kosgoda Pannasekhara Thera (Weligama 1914), p. 157.

[4] Subramaniam, *SITI*, II, Inscription No. 709, p. 665.

[5] Ibid., Inscription No. 706, p. 662.

[6] *SII*, III, No. 29, l. 10, p. 59; *SII*, VIII, No. 1, p. 1.

[7] *ARE for 1920*, No. 556 of 1919. In this inscription there is a reference to one Pottappiccolan. Presumably he is the same as the Pottappiccolan who figures in other records of the time of Rājarāja I (K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, *The Coḷas*, p. 505) and it is on this basis that our surmise rests.

(lit. army holding) occurring in the Cōḻa epigraphs. After an analysis of the occurrences of this term in the South Indian inscriptions, T. N. Subramaniam explains it as referring to 'lands held under military tenure' or 'lands in the enjoyment of soldiers'.[1] Since there is another term *paṭai-parru*, referring to holdings of soldiers who were different from the Vanniyar of the *vanniya-parru*, it appears that the latter referred to only the holdings of the Vanniya soldiers.[2]

On the basis of the above evidence in the South Indian sources, we are in a position to draw the following conclusions. In the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the Vanniyar were associated with martial pursuits rather than with agriculture. Some of their chiefs were in the service of kings and enjoyed a status similar to that of other feudal officials of that time. But there were occasions when the Vanniyar constituted a source of trouble to the supreme rulers and it was considered to be an achievement to suppress them. In the period after the thirteenth century, the Vanniyar continued to be a martial community and were noted for their skill in archery. They also continued to give trouble to certain supreme rulers as well as to some local princes and to suppress them was still considered to be a great achievement. There were also some Vanniyar who had taken to agriculture.

As far as we can trace, therefore, the Vanniyar were a community associated with fighting. Gradually they must have begun to lead a settled life and taken to agriculture. Traditions relating to the later Vijayanagar period refer to them as a 'forest race, a tribe of low cultivators', who built forts and 'paid tribute to the sovereigns of Andhra, Carnata and Dravida (Tamil) countries'.[3] They may have lived originally in the forest tracts. If their name has any connection with their original habitat, then it may be derived from Skt. *vanya* (='wild, savage or existing in the forest').[4] *Vanya* becomes *vanniya* in Tamil (cf., Skt. *puṇya*=Tamil *puṇṇiya*) and takes the suffix *-r* (ர்) as a personal plural noun. The Pali from *vañña*

[1] Subramaniam, *SITI*, III, p. LXXXVII.

[2] T. Desikachari, *Inscriptions (Texts) of the Pudukottah State*, (Pudukottah 1929) No. 285.

[3] William Taylor, *Examination and Analysis of the Mackenzie Manuscripts*, (Madras 1838) p. 78.

[4] M. Monier-Williams, *Sanskrit English Dictionary*, p. 919.

also suits this derivation. As the name is not of Tamil derivation, it is possible that this community or tribe originated in the Telugu or Kannaḍa areas, where Sanskrit caste names are not uncommon. Indeed the Vanniyar caste is still found in the North Arcot district which borders on the Telugu regions.

'Vanni' in Ceylon

We are inclined to think that the name Vanni originated in India and not in Ceylon. In the first place, it occurs in the South Indian sources earlier than in the Ceylonese records. Secondly, it is unlikely that a Sinhalese caste with the name Vanni migrated to South India or that the term *vanni* was introduced from Ceylon to designate a community in South India. But the converse is possible. Further, the absence in the island of traditions concerning the origins of the Vanni and the prevalence of such traditions in South India may also point in the same direction. Finally, the Tamil chronicles of Ceylon refer to the migration of the Vanniyar from the Tamil country to Ceylon. It seems, therefore, not justifiable to say that the name was applied to a class of chieftains or a group of Sinhalese in Ceylon because they were living in the forest regions, unless such a name was given following the Indian practice.

It is difficult to trace how this name came to be applied to Sinhalese chieftains, too. One possibility is that the term *vanni* became current for chieftains in the abandoned regions of Rājaraṭṭha and in the forest tracts elsewhere after Vanni chiefs from South India established themselves in the northern parts of Ceylon. Another possibility is that the term was introduced into the island before the migration of the South Indian Vanni chiefs, in the same manner as South Indian administrative terms came to be introduced[1]. *Vanni*, however, was not used in South India as an administrative term and the Vanni chiefs there were not heads of administrative units. It is possible that in the period of Cōḷa occupation (993 - 1070) or afterwards Vanni soldiers were brought to the island and given land-grants for their services in the same manner as the South Indian Vēḷaikkāra troops were employed here and given land-grants[2]. In this way the name Vanni could have been introduced into the

[1] *Cf.*, *Melātsi*, *muttettu*, *meykāppar*, etc.

[2] S. Paranavitana, 'The Polonnaruva Inscription of Vijayabāhu I', *EI*, XVIII, p. 337.

island at a date earlier than the thirteenth century, when we get the earliest references to it in the Ceylonese works. But in the eleventh or the twelfth century the semi-independent Vanni chieftaincies could not have come into existence in the Rājaraṭṭha even if they had emerged elsewhere. For, as we shall see later, such chieftaincies could have risen only when there was a slackening of central control, and such a slackening did not take place in the Rājaraṭṭha till after the end of the twelfth century.

In Ceylon the earliest work in which the name Vanni occurs is the *Pūjāvaliya*, written in the third quarter of the thirteenth century. This is also the only work of the thirteenth century referring to the Vanni chiefs of Ceylon. In the account of Māgha's occupation of the Rājaraṭṭha (A. D. 1215) this work refers to the Mahavanni areas and the chiefs of those regions who lived in fear of Māgha.[1] The Mahavanni was obviously a part of the area that felt the impact of Māgha's rule. There is no evidence to say that Māgha's rule extended beyond the Rājaraṭṭha and some parts of the Rohaṇa (the present Batticaloa District). The *Pūjāvaliya* reference would, therefore, mean that by about the third quarter of the thirteenth century the *vanni* had come into use in Ceylon to designate the minor chieftaincies in those areas of the Rājaraṭṭha and other provinces where the authority of the Sinhalese king was not felt any more. Further, it would also imply that the division into Mahavanni and Sirivanni had already been effected by that time. Although this may appear doubtful, it could be argued that it is not impossible.

There are a number of references to the Vanni in the *Cūlavaṃsa* and the *Pūjāvaliya*. The period to which these relate is what may be called the post-Polonnaruva period (after A. D. 1215). Geiger is, however, of the opinion that there is a notice in the *Cūlavaṃsa* regarding the Vannis of the twelfth century, although they are not mentioned by that name there.

> Es hat Vanni ohne Zweifel auch schon im 12. Jahrhundert gegeben, denn auch in der Beschreibung der Zustande, wie sie durch die damaligen Burgerkriege geworden waren, findet sich Mhvs. 61. 62 die Notiz: Leute von vornehmer Abkunft (*Kulīna*)

[1] *Pv.*, p. 109.

hielten sich, hier und dort an geeigneten Platzen (*phasutthanesu*) verstreut, verborgen und nahmen ihren Wohnsitz daselbst''.[1]

The strophe in the *Cūlavaṃsa* referred to by Geiger is as follows:

In the same way people of good family, scattered here and there, kept themselves hidden in places which seemed good to them and made their abode there.[2]

Geiger's claim that these 'people of good family' (*kulīna*) were Vannis is based on his assumption that the Vannis were Sinhalese of noble descent who sought refuge in the forest regions in times of distress and later came to be called Vannis, signifying 'jungle settlers' (Waldsiedler). But this interpretation, as we shall see presently, is unacceptable. Paranavitana, too, feels that the Vanni chiefs appear to have been in Ceylon 'from early days' (earlier than the thirteenth century).[3] This opinion is basedon certain statements in the *Nikāya-saṅgrahaya* and the *Eḷu-attanagaḷu-vaṃsa*. The latter work alludes to certain Sirivannis in the Attanagaḷu region who disregarded the authority of Mugalan who was ruling at Anurādhapura.[4] This monarch may be any one of the three Mugalans who ruled between the fifth and the seventh century. The source of our information is a work of the post-Polonnaruva period and, therefore, the reference to Vannis in the period before the eighth century does not seem to be authentic. Paranavitana himself has cast doubt on the validity of this reference by saying that 'we cannot be certain that the author of this text was not attributing to the past conditions which were normal in his day'.[5] The *Nikāya-saṅgrahaya* has a similar reference to the Vannis. According to this work, Parākramabāhu I conquered three hundred and sixty-four Vanni territories.[6] This is, however, not mentioned in the earlier work *Cūlavaṃsa* in which the life and achievements of that monarch are dealt with in great detail. Though at first sight these statements in the later works may appear to be inauthentic, they are not actually so. This could be explained easily if we find out the exact use of the term *vanni* in our medieval Sinhalese and

[1] Geiger, op. cit., p. 8.

[2] *Cv.*, 61: 62.

[3] Paranavitana, op. cit., p. 738.

[4] *Eḷu-Attanagaluvaṃsa*, ed. P. Aryaratna, (Colombo 1932), p. 41.

[5] Paranavitana, op. cit., p. 737.

[6] *Nikāya-Saṅgrahaya*, ed. D. P. R. Samaranayaka (Colombo 1960), p. 20.

Pali sources.[1] In these sources, *vanni* is applied to chieftaincies and chiefs in the Rājaraṭṭha and in other forest tracts. While in the Sinhalese sources *vanni* occurs alone to mean either a chieftaincy or a chief[2], in the *Cūlavaṃsa* it occurs in compounds, namely *vanni-rājattam*[3], *vanni-rāja*[4], *vanni-rājāno*[5], *vanni-mahīpāla*[6], *maha-vañña-rājañña*[7], (variant: *maha-vanya-rājañña*) and *vanni-rājūhi*[8], (all of which stand for 'Vanni kings). Perhaps the only exception is the occurrence in the personal name Vanni Bhuvanekabāhu, but here, too, it could be taken to be in the same adjectival form as in the above compounds, that is, it is used here as a qualifying noun[9]. Geiger's contention that the whole compound *vanni-rājāno* refers to a noble clan (adeliger Clan) of the Sinhalese in the same way as *Lichchavi-rajjuruvo* stood for the Lichchavi clan is not convincing. We are inclined to take these compounds to mean 'kings of the Vanni'. Geiger's argument that the word *vanni* never occurs alone but always in a compound is based purely on the *Cūlavaṃsa*. Paranavitana's view that the *vannis* were a class of chieftains is right in so far as the Sinhalese and Pali sources are concerned. In these sources the term is used to denote chiefs and chieftaincies in the areas that did not come under the direct rule of the Sinhalese king. When the authors of the *Eḷu-attanagaḷu-vaṃsa* and the *Nikāya-saṅgrahaya* referred to *vanni* chieftaincies of earlier centuries, they were only using a term that had come to be applied to such chieftaincies in the thirteenth century and later. These references need not be taken to imply the presence of a clan of people called Vannis in those early times. When Geiger referred to the Vannis as a noble clan of the Sinhalese who took refuge in the jungles in the time of Māgha, he was only referring to those Sinhalese who set themselves up as minor chiefs in the abandoned areas of the Rājaraṭṭha which came to be known as the Vanni. He was basing his statement solely on the *Cūlavaṃsa* and

[1] *Cf.*, *Pv.*, p. 109: *Rājāvaliya*, ed. B. Gunasekara (Colombo 1953) pp. 44, 65, & 66; *Nikāya-saṅgrahaya*, p. 20; *Giṟāsandesaya*, ed. T. Sugathapala (Alutgama 1924), v. 128.

[2] *Cv.*, 81: 11.

[3] Ibid., 83: 10.

[4] Ibid., 87: 26, 52.

[5] Ibid., 88: 87.

[6] Ibid., 88: 88.

[7] Ibid., 89: 51.

[8] Ibid., 90: 105.

[9] *Cf.*, Tamil *kuruvanni* in Inscription No. 8 of 1936/37, *ARE* for 1937.

was not taking into account the evidence of the Tamil sources regarding the Vanniyar of Ceylon. He is wrong, as we shall see, in calling the modern Vanni caste of the Northern and North-central Provinces as descendants of the Sinhalese *vanni-rājāno* of the post-Polonnaruva period.

In the Sinhalese and Pali works of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, therefore, the name Vanni has been applied to the chiefs and chieftaincies of the Rājaraṭṭha and other forest tracts. As Paranavitana has pointed out, there seem to have been two classes of Vannis, namely the Maha-vanni and the Siri-vanni. In some works the number of Vanni chieftaincies is given as eighteen and in some others as three hundred and sixty-four.[1] These could hardly be taken seriously. Eighteen is a conventional number often met with in Indian literature. In fact, some Sanskrit works refer to the existence of eighteen forest kingdoms (āṭavika-rājya).[2] Since the Vanni chieftaincies were also forest kinglets, the Sinhalese authors may have referred to them as eighteen in number, following the Indian practice. In South India, too, there are references to the Vaṉṉiyar of the eighteen *kōṭṭam* (districts).[3] It is possible that traditionally it was considered that there were eighteen Vanni chieftaincies. In the Tamil chronicles of Ceylon, however, the number of such chieftaincies in the island is given as seven.[4] Probably these were the major Tamil chieftaincies that were feudatory to the Jaffna kingdom.

The Tamil Vanni

Although the Sinhalese and Pali chronicles do not refer to the Tamil Vanni chieftaincies, the references to 'Sinhalese Vanni kings' (*Sihale Vanni-rāja* in the *Cūlavaṃsa* and to 'Sinhalese Maha Vannis' (*Siṃhala maha-vannin)* in the Pūjavaliya imply that there were also Vannis who were not Sinhalese.[5] It is from the Tamil sources and the later European works that we get much information about the Tamil Vanni chieftaincies. As in the Sinhalese sources, the name

[1] S. Paranavitana, op. cit., p. 737

[2] D. C. Sircar (ed.), *Select Inscriptions Bearing on Indian History and Civilization*, I (Calcutta 1942), pp. 257, 375.

[3] Burgess, op. cit., p. 120.

[4] *Yvm.*, p. 38. *cf.*, *Elūril Atappar* (the Aṭappar of the Seven Villages) in the Kaṅkuveli Tamil inscription of a Vanni chieftain of Trincomalee, K. Indrapala, '*Kilakkilaṅkai Cacanaṅkal*' op. cit., p. 36.

[5] *Cv.*, 83: 10; *Pv.*, p. 116,

Vanni is applied in the Tamil chronicles to the chieftaincies of northern and eastern Ceylon. But the name Vanniyar is applied to a caste of South Indian Tamils whose leaders were the chiefs of the Vanni districts. These Tamil sources preserve traditions relating to the migration of this caste to Ceylon.

In the present day, with the opening up of several colonisa- schemes in the Vanni, the Vanniyar caste has almost become integrated into the Sinhalese and Tamil population. But in the nineteenth century when the Vanni was being opened up for the first time the Vanniyar formed a distinct caste and followed their age - old occupation of hunting and occasional cultivation. Not all the people of the Vanni areas belonged to the Vanniyar caste. In fact only a small percentage of the people of the Vanni were Vanniyar. The following observation of S. Fowler is worthy of note in this context.

> These people are the Wanniahs and are entirely dependent on hunting and occasional *chena* cultivation. They have no money and cannot buy land. These Wanniahs are a distinct caste, of which these men are the only representatives in the province. (There are five or six villages in the North-Central Province, I believe). They still use the primitive bow and arrow and are well acquainted with the most remote jungles through which they wander in search of honey and game. There are some peculiarities in their dialect, which with their mode of life, suggest relationship with the Veddah, but they altogether repudiate the idea[1].

The Vanniyar of the nineteenth century were divided into two different communal groups. Those who lived in the Vavuniya district were Tamil - speakers while those in the Nuvarakalaviya district were mainly Sinhalese-speakers. There is reason to believe that these Sinhalese-speaking Vannis were in fact descended from Tamil Vanniyar who had become assimilated to the Sinhalese population after the Nuvarakalaviya district was re-colonised by the Sinhalese. It was traditionally believed by these people that they were descendants of Tamils. A. Brodie, basing his account on certain traditions preserved among them, wrote in 1856:

[1] S. Fowler, *Diary of 3rd May 1887*, quoted in the *MLR & NQC*, II, No. 5, May 1894, p. 98.

> There is one (caste) here not general over the Island and which is superior to that which is elsewhere considered the highest. I mean the Wanni caste. These persons are descendants of certain Tamils who came over from the continent in the time of Raja Sen, who granted to each extensive tracts of land[1].

There were other aspects of their life which revealed their close affinity to the Tamils. Another of the nineteenth-century writers makes the following observation on these Sinhalese of the Vanni region:

> They have adopted the Tamil system of personal names, thus a man has his father's name prefixed to his own and does not take his name from the village or family he belongs to or the land he owns, as is the common Sinhalese custom elsewhere. Many of their names, too, are Tamil in a Sinhalese shape. The older generation have taken to wearing earrings, but this practice has been discouraged by the present Sinhalese headman. The Sinhalese villagers have as much faith in the Hindu god Pillaiyar as have the Tamil villagers whose favourite god he is. . . As regards dress the Sinhalese keep generally to their own customs, but they often wear the Jaffna cloth (*chayaveddi*) and fasten the handkerchief on their heads after the Tamil manner.[2]

The foregoing observations of nineteenth-century writers reveal certain facts about the so-called Sinhalese Vanniyas. In the first place, we find that they were a caste distinct from the Sinhalese. Secondly, traces of Tamil descent could be found in their traditions, customs and manners. Thirdly, they considered themselves to be superior to all other castes of the Vanni. This feeling was evidently due to the fact that they were at one time the ruling caste in the Vanni. In the light of these considerations it is difficult to accept the view of Geiger that the Vannis were a degenerate group of Sinhalese. It appears that the Sinhalese Vanniyas who lived as a separate caste in the North-Central Province were descendants of the Tamil Vanniyar who gained authority in that part of the island after the decline of Polonnaruva. But the name Vanni or Vanniya was also used in the post-Polonnaruva period to refer to

[1] A. Brodie, 'Topographical and Statistical Account of the District of Nuwara-kalawiya', *JCBRAS*, III, 1856, p. 150.

[2] Anonymous, 'The Vanni', *MLR & NQC*, II, No. 5, May 1894, pp. 98–99.

the chieftains of the Vanni regions who may or may not have been of the Vanniya caste. A copper plate of Bhuvanekabāhu VII (dated A. D. 1547) refers to a Mukkuva (a South Indian caste) chieftain of the Puttalam region with the title Vanniyā[1]. The *Maṭṭakkaḷappu-mānmiyam* (*Mm*), a late Tamil chronicle of the Batticaloa district, refers to other Vanni chiefs of the Mukkuva caste[2]. It appears, therefore, that the Vanni chiefs were not always members of the Vanniya or Vaṉṉiyar caste. The South Indian Vaṉṉiyar, who, as we shall see presently, established chieftaincies in the Trincomalee region some time after the twelfth century, were probably the first Vanni chiefs of the island. Later, it appears, similar chiefs, both Sinhalese and Tamil, and their chieftaincies in other parts of the island were also given the appellation of the Vanni.

Tamil Tradition

Traditions relating to the migration of the Vaṉṉiyar from South India are preserved in a number of Tamil chronicles. In the *Yālppāṇa-vaipava-mālai* (*Yvm*) and the *Koṇēcar-Kalveṭṭu* (*Kk*) this migration is connected with a personage named Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ. In the *Mm* it is connected with Māgha (Mākoṉ) while in the *Vaiyāpāṭal* (*Vp*) a Paṇḍya princess is associated with this migration.

Of these, the tradition connected with Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ is the strongest. This personage and his activities are also referred to in the *Taksiṇa-kailāca-purāṇam* (*Tkp*), *Tirikoṇācala-purāṇam* (*Tp*) and in a sixteenth century Tamil inscription, though he is not associated with the Vaṉṉiyar in these sources[3].

In the Tamil sources Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ is described as a Saiva prince from the Cōḷa country who came to Ceylon on a pilgrimage, tarried at Trincomalee for some time, effected repairs to the ruined temple of Koṇēśvaram and created the chieftaincy of Trincomalee. The *Kk* and the *Tp* are both chronicles of the Koṇēśvaram temple and therefore embody the same tradition. The account of Kuḷakkoṭṭaṉ in these two works may be summarised in the following manner. The prince Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ, after renovating the Kōṇēśvaram temple,

[1] Casie Chetty, op. cit., p. 190.

[2] *Mattakkaḷappu-mānmiyam*, ed. F. X. C Nataraja, (Colombo 1962) p. 95.

[3] *Taksiṇa-kailāca-purāṇam*, ed. P. P. Vaittiyalinka Tecikar, (Pt. Pedro 1916); *Tirikoṇācala-puraṇam*, ed. A. Canmukarattina Aiyar, (Jaffna 1909); H. W. Codrington, 'The Inscription at Fort Frederick, Trincomalee', *JCBRAS*, XXX, No· 80, p. 448.

decided to invite some families from South India and entrust them with the task of maintaining the different services in the temple. According to the *Kk*, Kualkkōṭṭaṉ went in person to invite the families while the *Tp* states that he sent his ministers. In response to this invitation thirty families of the Vaḷava caste went from Maruṅkūr. They were assigned the duties of *tāṉattār* (temple executive) and were settled in Trincomalee. Twenty familes went from Kārai (Kāraikkāl). They were conferred the title of *Paṇṭārattār* (lit. treasury officials) and were assigned various duties. Paḷḷaveḷi, in the Trincomalee district, was granted to them for settlement. A nobleman of the Kārāḷar caste was invited from Tirunelvēli and conferred the title of *mutanmai* (chief). He was assigned duties concerning the conduct of festivals and was granted the villages of Kaṭṭukkuḷattūr and Nilāveḷi. A minstrel from Kāñci was assigned the duty of singing hymns at the temple and was settled at Campūr in the Koṭṭiyār division of the Trincomalee District. The prose section of the *Kk* adds that five *ācāriyar* (master craftsmen) were invited from the Cōḷa country and were settled in Trincomalee. When all these people were assigned different duties and settled in and around Trincomalee, a nobleman from Madurai was invited and appointed as their ruler. He is given the title of *vannipam* (Vanni chief) in the *Kk* but not in the *Tp*.

In the *Yvm* this account has been greatly modified. According to this chronicle of Jaffna, the prince Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ, after having completed the renovation of the temple, granted fields and estates in seven districts to the temple. He then invited and settled Vaṉṉiyar in those districts and entrusted them with the task of cultivating the temple lands. After the death of Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ, a further band of fifty-nine Vaṉṉiyar came from the Pāṇḍya country and settled in these districts. Since the revenue from these districts went to the Kōṇeśvaram temple and not to the king of Kandy (to whom these districts apparently belonged), the latter neglected the affairs of these districts. The affairs of these districts were managed by several petty chieftains. Eventually the Vaṉṉiyar got together and selected seven of their chiefs to be the rulers of the seven districts.

The identity of Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ has not been easy to establish. The *Tkp* calls him Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ *alias* Cōḷakaṅkaṉ (Coḷagaṅga) and his father's name is given as Maṉu Cōḷaṉ[1].

[1] *Tkp., Pāyiram*, v. 8; p. 67, v. 8.

The *Tp* refers to him as the son of Vararāmatēvar, also a Cōḷakaṅkaṉ, from the Cōḷa country.[1] The *Kk* agrees with this statement but does not refer to Vararāmatēvar as a Cōḷakaṅkaṉ.[2] The *Yvm* follows the *Tkp* and refers to Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ's father as Maṉu-nīti-kaṇṭa Coḷaṉ.[3] The *Tp*, too, mentions the latter but only as one of the famous ancestors of Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ.[4] Maṉu-nīti-kaṇṭa Cōḷaṉ is a mythical ruler reputed for his benevolence and compassion who finds a place in the legendary genealogy of the Cōḷas.[5] It is hard to explain how he came to be associated with Kulakkōṭṭaṉ. As far as we know no Cōḷa ruler by the name of Vararāmatēvar ever existed. The Cōḷa descent attributed to Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ in the Tamil sources appears to be rather unreliable. Even the name Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ does not seem to have been the real name of this personage. It means 'He of Tanks and Temples' and is very probably a sobriquet he earned after his tank-building activities. As Paranavitana is inclined to believe, Cōḷakaṅkaṉ may have been the real surname of this prince. While the *Tkp*, the oldest of the above Tamil sources, calls him Cōḷakaṅkaṉ, the *Tp* calls his father Coḷakaṅkaṉ. Cōḷakaṅkaṉ also seems to have been the family name of this prince, as it was in the case of the Eastern Gaṇgas (Coḷagaṅga or Coḍagaṅga) of South India. We are, therefore, inclined to accept the view that the family name of this prince was Cōḷakaṅkaṉ.

The identification of this Cōḷakaṅkaṉ is no easy matter, for this name was used not only by the Eastern Gaṅgas but also by several princes and feudatories in the Cōḷa, Pāṇḍya and Karṇāṭa countries in the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Moreover, our sources reveal that a number of Indian princes of this name had been in Ceylon in those centuries. As a result we are up against several possibilities. This prince may have been (a) Coḷagaṅga-kumāra who lived in the court of Gajabāhu II[6], (b) or Coḍagaṅga who invaded Ceylon and captured power in 1196[7], or (c) Coḍagaṅga of the Trincomalee Sanskrit inscription who landed in

[1] *Tp.*, p. 94, v. 53.
[2] *Koṉecar-kalvettu*, ed. A. Canmukarattina Aiyar, appended to the *Tkp.*, (Jaffna 1909) p. 1.
[3] *Yāḻppāṇa-vaipava-mālai*, ed. K. Capanatan (Colombo 1953), p. 8.
[4] *Tp.*, p. 94.
[5] *EI*, XV, p. 46.
[6] *Cv.*, 70:238.
[7] Ibid., 80:29.

Ceylon in 1223,[1] or (d) Coḷagaṅgadeva who invaded Ceylon sometime before 1284,[2] or (e) any other prince not mentioned in the *Cūlavaṃsa* or inscriptions.

To consider the first possibility, we find that Coḷagaṅgakumāra was a prince who lived in the court of Gajabāhu II around 1153. No details about this prince are available. The only evidence which may be used in support of the identification of Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ with Coḷagaṅgakumāra is to be found in the Tamil chronicles. In the *Tkp*,*Tp* and *Kk*, Gajabāhu and Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ are closely associated with the Kōṇeśvaram temple.[3] The *Maṭṭakkaḷappu-māṉmiyam*(*Mm*),a chronicle of the Batticaloa district, in which Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ is called Makācēṉaṉ (Mahāsena) states that this prince married a Kaliṅga princess who was an adopted daughter of a certain Ceylonese ruler named Gajabāhu.[4] But the story of this Kaliṅga princess is given in such a legendary form that it is difficult to attach much importance to it. It is not possible to identify Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ with Coḷagaṅgakumāra on the basis of this unreliable evidence.

The Kaliṅga prince Coḍagaṅga who seized power in 1196 is said to have been a nephew of Niśśaṅkamalla.[5] It is not stated in our sources whether he invaded the island in 1196 or whether he came to Ceylon some time before that date and captured power in 1196. If 1196 is the year in which he arrived here, it is unlikely that he is the same prince who effected repairs to the Kōṇēśvaram temple and settled Vaṉṉiyars in the Trincomalee region, for he was ousted from the throne within a year and it is hard to think that under very insecure conditions he would have undertaken the task of repairing temples and settling people from South India. Moreover, if he were a nephew of Niśśaṅkamalla and aspired to the kingship of the island, he may have been a Buddhist and not a Saiva. On the other hand, it is possible that this Coḍagaṅga, like Māgha who also was a Kaliṅga prince, was a non-Buddhist. The late Sinhalese chronicle *Rājāvaliya* disagrees with the other chronicles and states that this Coḍagaṇga was an army chief who seized the throne on behalf of Queen Lilāvatī and, having enthroned her,

[1] S. Paranavitana, 'A Fragmentary Sanskrit Inscription from Trincomalee', *EZ*, V, p. 173.
[2] *Cv.*, 90:32.
[3] *Tkp.*, 7:88 ff.; *Tp.*, p. 170 ff.; *Kk.*, p. 20.
[4] *Mm.*. p. 28.
[5] *Cv.*, 80:29.

administered the kingdom for three years.[1] This is interesting in view of the fact that the Tamil chronicles *Yvm*, *Tp*, *Mm* and *Kk* mention that a queen was wielding power at the Sinhalese capital when Kulakōṭṭan was renovating the temple at Trincomalee.[2] However, the available evidence is insufficient to indentify Kulakkōṭṭan with this Coḍagaṅga.

The Sanskrit inscription from Trincomalee, discovered among the ruins of the Kōṇēśvaram temple, refers to a personage named Coḍagaṅga who came to Ceylon in 1223.[3] Paranavitana has identified this person with Kulakkōṭṭan. The inscription is fragmentary and is engraved on a part of a stone door jamb. Among the decipherable words on the stone is the name Gokarṇa (Pali, Gokaṇṇa), the ancient name of Trincomalee and the root from which the name of the temple is derived (Skt. Gokarṇeśvara). Since the epigraph is inscribed on a part of a building, Paranavitana feels that it 'may reasonably be assumed to have recorded the building of the monument of which it formed a part'.[4] He therefore argues that 'it is very unlikely that there were two Coḍagaṅgas who both came from a foreign country, landed at Trincomalee and busied themselves effecting improvements to the Saiva shrine there'.[5] He adds further that the date of Coḍagaṅga's arrival being 1223, it 'agrees with the statement in the *Yvm* that this prince had dealings with chieftains known as Vanniyars, for it is only from the thirteenth century that Vanniyars or Vannis are mentioned in the contemporary writings'.[6] Paranavitana is also of the opinion that this Coḍagaṅga was an Eastern Gaṅga prince. There is, however, no evidence for such an assumption. But there is no evidence to the contrary either. Gokarṇeśvara was the favourite deity of the Eastern Gaṅgas.[7] The fact that a Coḍagaṅga from outside the island interested himself in the affairs of the Gokarṇeśvara temple in Ceylon may indicate that he was an Eastern Gaṅga. Probably Paranavitana is right in identifying him as an Eastern Gaṅga prince. Paranavitana's arguments for the identification of this Coḍagaṅga with Kulakkōṭṭan seem quite tenable. But let us consider the other possibilities, too, before we arrive at a satisfactory conclusion.

[1] *Rājāvaliya*, ed. B. Gunasekara, (Colombo 1953), p. 43.
[2] *Yvm.*, p. 8; *Tp.*, p. 119; *Mm.*, p. 32; *Kk.*, p. 32.
[3] S. Paranavitana, 'A Fragmentary Sanskrit Inscription . . . ', p. 173.
[4] S. Paranavitana, 'The Arya Kingdom of North Ceylon', *JCBRAS* (NS), VII, p. 179.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid., p. 80.
[7] *EI*, IV, p. 192.

The *Cūlavaṃsa* has a reference to another Coḷagaṅgadeva who is stated to have invaded Ceylon some time before 1284. From the manner in which this event is introduced in the chronicle it does not appear to have been a major invasion. It is said that Bhuvanekabāhu I 'drove back all the Damiḷa forces, like Kāliṅgarāyara, Coḷagaṅgadeva and the rest who had landed from the opposite coast'.[1] Apparently these enemies had led punitive raids which were not of much significance and in time Bhuvanekabāhu got rid of them. The nature of the expedition of Kulakkōṭṭaṉ also seems to have been similar, according to the Tamil sources which state that he had an army with him but did not effect any conquest.[2] But there is one difficulty in identifying Coḷagaṅgadeva with Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ. The former was in Ceylon not long before 1284, the year of Bhuvanekabāhu's death. If we are to accept the testimony of the Tamil sources that Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ introduced Vaṉṉiyar into the island, the latter must have come to Ceylon before the third quarter of the thirteenth century, when we first hear of the Vannis in the Ceylonese sources.[3] It could be argued, however, that Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ only introduced a further band of Vaṉṉiyar into the island or that the Coḷagaṅgadeva mentioned in the *Cūlavaṃsa* landed in the island probably much earlier than the reign of Bhuvanekabāhu but was driven away only in that reign. This would mean that the possibility of identifying Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ with Coḷagaṅgadeva cannot be ruled out.

It is also possible that Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ was different from any of the four princes taken into consideration so far. He may have been a Cōḷa, Eastern Gaṅga or Western Gaṅga prince or a South Indian feudatory ruler whose visit to the island is not recorded in the Sinhalese and Pali sources. The *Yvm*, *Tkp*, *Tp*, *Kk* and the *Mu-m* maintain that Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ was a Cōḷa prince.[4] The last mentioned work gives Cūrya Kulōttuṅka (Skt. Sūrya Kulottuṅga) as one of the titles of the father of Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ. Of the three Cōḷa rulers named Kulottuṅga, only the first of that name (1070-1120) is known to have had a son named Coḷagaṅga (or Coḍagaṅga).[5] He was viceroy at Vēṅgī from 1084 to 1089 but vanished into

[1] *Cv.*, 90:32.

[2] *Cf. Yvm.*, p. 10.

[3] *Cf., Pv.*, p. 109.

[4] *Yvm* , p. 8; *Tkp.*, 7:23; *Tp.*, p. 88. v. 4; *Kk.*, p. 1; *Munnesvara-mānmiyam* (*Mu-m*), (no ed.) (Colombo 1961), p. 8.

[5] K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, *The Coḷas*, (Madras 1955), p. 319.

obscurity after that. Was he the prince who came to Trincomalee and tarried there? We know that his step-sister, Cuttamalli, lived in Ceylon, having married a prince of the Pāṇḍya faction.[1] In the absence of any definite evidence, it is not possible to identify Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ as the son of Kulottuṅga I. Further, it must be noted that there were also other Cōḷa princes named Coḍagaṅga.[2]

Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ may have even belonged to a feudatory dynasty of South India. There were several Cōḷa-Pāṇḍya feudatories named Cōḷagaṅga. One of them figures in about five inscriptions dated in the regnal years of Rājarāja III and Kulottuṅga III, between 1210 and 1222.[3] Another is mentioned in a number of records of the time of Rājarāja III.[4] Certain other Coḷagaṅgas are known from Pāṇḍya inscriptions,[5] The *Upāsaka-janālaṅkāra* refers to a Pāṇḍya feudatory named Coḷagaṅga who was himself a *vaññ*a (Vaṉṉiyaṉ).[6] This may mean that some of the Vaṉṉiyar chiefs were themselves known as Colagaṅga and Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ may have been one such chief who, after establishing himself in the eastern part of Ceylon, settled there some of his kinsmen or Vaṉṉiya subjects. All these are matters of speculation and in the absence of any real evidence no certain conclusions can be drawn.

In the *Mm* the creation of the Vanni chieftaincies of the Batticaloa district is attributed to Māgha (who is referred to as Mākoṉ in this chronicle). It is stated that this Kāliṅga ruler chose the best among the Paṭaiyāṭci (military caste) from Kāḷikaṭṭam (unidentified) and brought them to Ceylon as commanders of his army and later made them the *vannipam* (Vanni rulers) of Batticaloa. The assignment of duties to the various castes of Batticaloa is also attributed to this ruler.[7] The renovation of the Trincomalee temple and the repair of tanks belonging to this temple are, however, attributed to another personality called Makācēṉaṉ (Mahāsena) who is identifiable with the Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ of the *Tkp*, *Tp*, *Kk* and the *Yvm*. There is undoubtedly a confusion of traditions relating to Kulakkōṭṭaṉ with those of the earlier and better known tank-builder

[1] S. Paranavitana, 'Two Tamil Inscriptions from Budumuttāva', *EZ*, III, p. 310.
[2] *Epigraphia Carnatica*, IX, Tamil Section (Mysore), p. 17.
[3] *ARE for 1913*, Inscriptions Nos. 535, 549, 556, 557 & 559 of 1912.
[4] *ARE for 1908*, Nos. 202 & 205 of 1908; *ARE for 1926*, No. 194 of 1926.
[5] *Cf*, *ARE for 1921*, No. 140 of 1921; *ARE for 1922*, No. 203 of 1922; *ARE for 1915*, Nos. 409, 410 & 413 of 1914.
[6] *Upāsaka-janālaṅkāra*, p. 157.
[7] *Mm*, p. 104 ff,

Mahāsena (274-301). Although Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ seems to have taken an interest only in the repair of some of the major irrigation works in his principality, Tamil tradition has credited him with the building of those tanks. Not only does the *Mm* refer to him as Makācēṉaṉ but it also describes him as a Vaitulliya Caivaṉ (Skt. - Vaitulya Saiva),[1] an obvious confusion with Mahāsena who, according to the *Mahāvaṃsa*, was a Vaitulya Buddhist.[2] Similarly, while Mahāsena is recorded to have destroyed Brahmanical temples in Trincomalee, Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ is stated to have destroyed Buddhist structures in the same place.[3]

It is also interesting to note that in the *Mm* the account of Māgha is very similar to that of Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ in the Trincomalee chronicles. Firstly, Māgha is described as an ardent Saiva who was intolerant of Buddhism and even of the Vaiṣṇava faith.[4] Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ, too, is stated to have been a very devoted Saiva although there is nothing in the Trincomalee chronicles to indicate that he was a bigot. It is in the *Mm*, where he is called Makācēṉaṉ that he is said to have destroyed Buddhist temples in Trincomalee. Secondly, Māgha is associated with the building of the Tirukkōvil temple and its tanks and with the invitation of priests to perform service in that temple.[5] Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ, as we have seen, is credited with the renovation of the Kōṇeśvaram temple and with the building of tanks. Thirdly, Māgha is stated to have assigned various duties for the different castes of Batticaloa. This account is remarkably similar to the assignment of duties by Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ to the various castes he invited from South India for the performance of services at the Kōṇeṣvaram temple. Finally, while Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ is said to have created the chieftaincy of Trincomalee, the foundation of chieftaincies in the Batticaloa, Trincomalee, Mannar and Jaffna districts is attributed to Māgha.

In the *Vp* and its gloss, the *Vaiyā*, a different version of the origin of the Tamil Vanni chieftaincies is given. The confused account in these works may be summed up in the following manner. When Vararācacinṅkaṉ (Skt. - Vararājasiṅha), a son of Ukkiraciṅkaṉ (Skt. - Ugrasiṅha) and king of a part of Ceylon, married a princess from the Pāṇḍya country, she brought with her a retinue of sixty

[1] Ibid., p. 33.
[2] *Mahāvaṃsa*, ed. W. Geiger, tr. W. Geiger & M. H. Bode (Colombo 1950), 36:111.
[3] Ibid., 37:41; *Mm.*, p. 34.
[4] *Mm.*, pp. 53, 70.
[5] Ibid., p. 77.

Vaṉṉiyar. One of them stayed behind at the capital of the kingdom and the rest were asked to take over the chiefships of the Aṭaṅkāparṟu region, which corresponds roughly to the present Vavuniya District and the northern part of the Trincomalee District. These Vaṉṉiyar then invited from South India a number of people belonging to the eighteen castes and settled them in different parts of the Aṭaṅkāparṟu as well as in the peninsula of Jaffna. Madurai and Maruṅkūr in South India were among the places from which immigrants came to settle in the Aṭaṅkāparṟu. After this follows a long and confused list of places in the Vanni districts where various castes and prominent personalities went and settled. Among these places are Trincomalee, Verukal, Tampalakāmam, Tiriyāy and Kaṭṭukkuḷam, which are in the Trincomalee District. The Vaṉṉiyar are mentioned among those castes which settled in these regions.[1] It is interesting to note that the *Vp* mentions 'Pūpāla Vaṉṉimai (the Vanni Chief Pūpāla), Kōpālaṉ and others among the people who settled in Tiriyāy and Kaṭṭukkuḷam.[2] The name of the Vanni chief of Trincomalee appointed by Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ is given in the *Kk* and the *Tp* as Pūpālaṉ, who appears to be the same as the Pūpāla Vaṉṉimai of the *Vp*. A comparison of the traditions embodied in the *Kk* and the *Tp* with those in the *Vp* shows that a section of the latter was based on the chronicles of Trincomalee.

The *Vp* does not mention Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ in connection with the origin of the Vanni chieftaincies but one could clearly see in this chronicle a confusion of the traditions relating to Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ with those about Ukkiraciṅkaṉ, who does not appear to have been a historical personality. Ukkiraciṅkaṉ's association with Jaffna is in some ways similar to Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ's association with Trincomalee. The story of Ukkiraciṅkaṉ, as it appears in the Tamil chronicles, is basically a different version of the Vijaya legend.[3] Sinhalese traditions as well as some South Indian legendary material have gone into the creation of this story which forms the starting point of the history of the Jaffna kingdom in the chronicles of Jaffna. Traditions of the Rohaṇa kingdom, which once included parts of the present Trincomalee District, also appear to have helped the growth

[1] *Vaiyāpāṭal*, ed. J. W. Arutpirakacam (Jaffna 1921), vv. 29–81; *Vaiyā*, ed. S. Gnanapragasar (Jaffna 1921), p. 26 ff.

[2] *Vp.*, v. 73.

[3] K. Indrapala, *'Yālppāṇa Irācciyattin Torram parriya Cila Palaiya Karuttukkal'*, *Cintanai*, III, No. 2, July 1970, p. 93 ff.; K Indrapala, *Dravidian Settlements in Ceylon and the Beginnings of the Kingdom of Jaffna*, (Thesis submitted for the Ph. D. degree of the University of London, 1966), pp. 406-414.

of the story of Ukkiraciṅkaṉ. The confusion of many of these traditions seems to have been the result of a belated attempt on the part of the later Tamil chroniclers to reconcile the different floating traditions in the Tamil regions and to give these a historical sequence. In the story of Ukkiraciṅkaṉ, for instance, we see an attempt to reconcile the stories of Vijaya, Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ and possibly a third personality associated with the kingdom of Jaffna. In this story one could see the characters Siṅha and Siṅhabāhu of the Vijaya legend in the personalities named Ukkiraciṅkaṉ and Vararāca-ciṅkaṉ respectively Vararācaciṅkaṉ combines the characters of Siṅhabāhu and Vijaya. The matrimonial mission sent by him to the Pāṇḍya court and the arrival of the Pāṇḍya princess with a large retinue, as mentioned in the *Vp*, are both based on the Vijaya legend. The coming of the Vaṉṉiyar and the invitation of the different castes from places like Maruṅkūr in South India, their settlement in parts of the Trincomalee District and the arrival of the chief called Pūpāla Vaṉṉimai are clearly based on the story of Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ.

Thus we see that a number of unreliable traditions have got enmeshed in the story of the Vanni chieftaincies as narrated in the Tamil chronicles. It is very difficult to extract from these anything more than a bare sequence of events. Compared with the chronicles of Jaffna, those of Trincomalee and Batticaloa are less confused. Of the later chronicles, that of Batticaloa, namely the *Mm*, is certainly more reliable. It is the only Tamil chronicle which contains a number of episodes from the history of the Sinhalese before the thirteenth century, many of which tally with the accounts in the *Mahāvaṃsa* and the *Cūlavaṃsa*. Further, the *Mm* is the only Tamil chronicle which mentions Māgha by name and deals with his activities in a manner that compares favourably with the Sinhalese accounts. The miraculous and legendary elements which mar the accounts in the chronicles of Trincomalee and Jaffna are found to a lesser extent in the Batticaloa chronicle. These qualities do not, however, entitle the account of the *Mm* to be wholly accepted. By a comparison of this and other Tamil accounts with those of the Sinhalese and Pali chronicles we may be able to arrive at some of the basic facts and to leave aside the dubious details that have to be treated with some amount of scepticism.

The traditions in the Tamil chronicles refer to a time when invaders and settlers from South India, including the Vaṉṉiyar,

occupied parts of the present Northern and Eastern Provinces and set up chieftaincies there. These were undoubtedly the chieftaincies which later came to be known as the Vanni. There were a few prominent leaders, one of whom was Māgha, who were responsible for the creation of the chieftaincies in the Trincomalee and Batticaloa districts. During this period Buddhist establishments suffered and Hindu institutions flourished. Some of the leaders or chieftains also undertook the restoration of some of the major irrigation works.

It is only in the light of the more reliable evidence of the Sinhalese and Pali chronicles that these Tamil traditions could be understood. Even to work out a chronological framework for these traditions one has to depend on the Sinhalese and Pali sources. For, with the exception of the *Mm*, which associates Māgha with the origin of the Vanni chieftaincy of Batticaloa, the Tamil traditions do not provide any definite evidence as to the date of the events reflected by them. For a number of reasons, however, it is not possible to date these events to a period before the eleventh century. In the first place, as explained earlier, it is only in the eleventh century that we get the earliest references to the Vaṉṉiyar in the inscriptions of South India. Secondly, the semi-independent Vanni chieftaincies of the Rājaraṭṭha could have risen only when the central authority at Anuradhapura or Polonnaruva had collapsed. Although there was such a collapse of central power at Anuradhapura in the tenth century, the conquest of the Rājaraṭṭha by the Imperial Cōḷas in A. D. 993 and the establishment of a powerful capital at Polonnaruva could not have created the circumstances necessary for the rise and continued existence of the Vanni chieftaincies in such areas like the Vavuniya and Trincomalee districts which are so close to Polonnaruva. As long as Polonnaruva was able to wield its authority at least in the Rājaraṭṭha, the Vavuniya and Trincomalee regions must have remained integral parts of the Sinhalese kingdom. These regions must have broken away to become semi-independent chieftaincies only with the collapse of central authority at Polonnaruva. The rise of the Vanni chieftaincies of the Tamil country also appears to have taken place under similar circumstances. It is only in the reigns of Rājādhirāja II (1163-1179) and Kulottuṅga III (1178-1216), when the central authority of the Cōḷa state showed signs of decline, that we get the earliest references to Vanni chieftains wielding authority in such regions as the South Arcot District,

which were far removed from the Cōḷa capital.[1] In Ceylon Polonnaruva was in a position to control the whole of the Rājaraṭṭha in the eleventh and twelfth centuries and the decline of central authority may be said to have set in immediately after Niaśśaṅkamalla's death (A. D. 1196). Thirdly, the Sinhalese and Pali chronicles as well as the inscriptions of the eleventh and twelfth centuries clearly indicate that the regions like the Trincomalee District, where, according to the Tamil chronicles, one of the earliest Vanni chieftaincies was established, were under the rule of Polonnaruva kings. Inscriptions of Vijayabāhu I (1055–1110), Gajabāhu II (1132–1153) and Niśśaṅkamalla (1187–1196) have been discovered at Kantalai, Velagama (Periyakulam) and Allai in the Trincomalee District.[2] Niśśaṅkamalla's Allai plates, which record a land-grant of this ruler in Kanakkara-vatta, in the Mā-pisambi Koṭasara District (Sinh. Koṭasara = Pali Koṭṭhasāra = Tamil Koṭṭiyāram – a region in the Trincomalee District), clearly suggest that the authority of Polonnaruva had not declined in the Trincomalee District as late as the end of the twelfth century.[3] Niśśaṅkamalla was the last of the powerful rulers of Polonnaruva and it is difficult to assume that the Vanni chieftaincy of Trincomalee had come into existence in his reign or in that of his more powerful predecessor Parākramabāhu I (1153–1186).

The Sinhalese and Pali chronicles leave us in no doubt that the events which followed the death of Niśśaṅkamalla, especially the invasion of Māgha (A. D. 1215), created the conditions under which the authority of Polonnaruva finally collapsed, leading to the rise of several regional authorities in many parts of the

[1] A few Vanni chieftains (*Vanniyanāyans*) of the time of Rājādhirāja II and Kulottuṅga III are mentioned in a number of inscriptions (see fn. 2, p. 114), Almost all these inscriptions are from South Arcot and are later than 1168. In one of these a *vanniyanācci* (feminine form of *vanniyanāyan*) is referred to as a *Veḷaikkāri*. This may mean that the terms *vanniyanayān* and *veḷaikkāran* (masculine form of *veḷaikkari*) are synonymous and that the Veḷaikkāra forces of the Cola period were later known as Vanniyar. But it may not be preferable to rush to this conclusion on this single evidence. (122 of 1934/35B).

[2] S. Paranavitana, A Tamil Inscription from Palamottai', *EZ*, IV, pp. 191–196; C. W. Nicholas, 'The Reign of Vijayabahu I',*UCHC*, I, ii, p. 435; K. D. Swaminathan, 'An Inscription of Gajabahu II', *The Ceylon Historical Journal*, X, Nos. 1-4, (Colombo) p 47; *SII*, IV, Inscription No. 1397; D. M. be Z. Wickramasinghe, 'Kantalay Stone Seat Inscription', *EZ*, II, p. 289; P. E. E. Fernando, A Royal charter on Copper Plate', *The Ceylon Daily News*, (Colombo) 20, Sept. 1968, p. 12.

[3] P. E. E. Fernando, op. cit.

Rājaraṭṭha.[1] There was a renewal of foreign invasions almost immediately after the death of Niśśaṅkamalla. Within the short span of twenty years beginning from 1196 there were at least eight invasions of the island, most of which were led or inspired by the Cōḷas.[2] This quick series of invasions culminated in the onslaught of Māgha, which resulted in the occupation of several parts of the Rājaraṭṭha by Tamil and Keraḷa soldiers and in the dislodgement of many Sinhalese from that area. Under the rule of Māgha Buddhist institutions were destroyed and what is called a 'false faith' was propagated.[3] 'Villages and fields, houses and gardens' were 'delivered up to the Keraḷas'.[4] Tamil warriors were 'settled here and there in the country'.[5] Even in the Māyāraṭṭha there were 'Damiḷa warriors who dwelt as they pleased in the single villages and houses'.[6] The forces of Māgha and his associate Jayabāhu set up fortifications in several places in the Rājaraṭṭha. These included Polonnaruva, Koṭṭhasāra (Koṭṭiyāram), Gaṅgātaḷāka (Kantaḷāy), Kākālaya (Kokkiḷāy), Kavuḍāvuḷu (Kaṭṭukuḷam Pattu), Padī (Padaviya), Kurundī (Kuruntaṉūr in Karikaṭṭumūlai South) and Goṇa district (Trincomalee).[7]

A comparison of this account with that of the Tamil sources shows certain basic similarities. Both refer to the arrival of South Indian forces in the Rājaraṭṭha, the destruction or neglect of Buddhist establishments, the propagation of a non-Buddhist faith and the settlement of South Indians in many parts of the Rājaraṭṭha. If the many fortifications set up by Māgha and Jayabāhu can be taken as centres of local authority, then we may even add that the two accounts refer to the rise of regional authorities. These fortifications were doubtless in the hands of mercenary leaders who probably became chieftains of those regions. Most of these fortifications were in the areas which later became the Tamil Vanni districts. Many of the places mentioned in the

[1] For a detailed account of these events, see A. Liyanagamage, *The Decline of Polonnaruva and the Rise of Dambadeniya* (Colombo 1968), p. 56 ff.
[2] Ibid.
[3] *Cv.*, 80:75.
[4] Ibid., 80:76
[5] Ibid., 83:12
[6] Ibid., 81:14
[7] *Cv.*, 83:15-17. *Pv.*, p. 116; *Nikayasaṅgrahaya*, p. 23. For the identification of these place-names, see C. W. Nicholas, 'Historical Topography of Ancient and Medieval Ceylon', *JCBRAS*, (NS), VI, 1959, pp. 45, 46, 81, 84, & 86. Kākālaya is sometimes identified with Kavuḍāvuḷu.

Vaiyā and the *Vp* as those where Vaṉṉiyar chieftains established South Indian settlements are referred to as the places where Māgha's Kerala and Tamil soldiers had established fortifications. Muḷḷiyavaḷai, Kaṇukkēṇi, Taṉikkal, Varrāppaḷai and Karuvāṭṭukkēṇi are places in the area described as the kurundī region. Kiḻakkumalai and Noccimōṭṭai are in the Padī region. Tiriyāy and Kaṭṭukkuḷam Pattu are in the Kākālaya-Kauḍāvuḷu regions. Tiru-kōṇamalai, Verukal, Tampalakāmam and Koṭṭiyāram are in the Goṇa-Koṭṭhasāra regions. These regions form a major part of the Vanni districts where, according to the *Yvm* too, Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ settled Vaṉṉiyar. If we discount the details provided by the *Vaiyā* and the *Vp*, we may not be wrong in concluding that the account in these Tamil sources also refer to the occupation of the Vanni districts by South Indian soldiers and chieftains in the time of Māgha. The Vaṉṉiyar and Mukkuva leaders appear to have become the chieftains of these new settlements. Presumably they were appointed by Māgha and his associates. Probably Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ and possibly Pūpāla Vaṉṉiyaṉ were among these associates. We know from the Sinhalese sources that Jayabāhu was definitely one of them.

To sum up the evidence so far discussed, we have in the first place references in the Pali and Sinhalese chronicles to the Vanni chiefs and chieftaincies of the thirteenth century. There is no evidence to suggest that there were such chiefs or chieftaincies in the Rājaraṭṭha before the fall of Polonnaruva. Next we have the evidence of the Tamil chronicles of Ceylon regarding the origin and rise of the Tamil Vanni chieftaincies. Although the accounts in these Tamil chronicles, except that of the *Mm*, do not provide any chronological data regarding the first Tamil Vanni chieftaincies, a comparison of these accounts with those of the Sinhalese and Pali chronicles clearly suggests that the former relate to the thirteenth century. The evidence of the literary and inscriptional sources also shows that the areas where Tamil Vanni chieftains rose to power were under the rule of the Polonnaruva kings till the end of the twelfth century. As one would expect, the fall of Polonnaruva and the consequent breakdown of central authority seem to have led to the establishment of regional power by South Indian military chiefs who were in the employ of Māgha and his associates. These military chiefs were in all probability the Vanni chiefs mentioned in the Tamil sources. The Vaṉṉiyar were a military caste of South India whose leaders created their own chieftaincies with the decline of the Cōḻa empire. It appears that Vaṉṉiyar soldiers were brought to Ceylon as mercenaries at the end of the twelfth

century and in the first quarter of the thirteenth by South Indian invaders and other aspirants to the Sinhalese throne. Prominent among these invaders was Māgha. Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ, who is regarded in the Tamil legends as the founder of the Vanni chieftaincy of Trincomalee, appears to have been a personality closely associated with Māgha. It is difficult to assume that his activities took place at a time earlier than the first quarter of the thirteenth century, either in the reign of Niśśaṅkamalla or in that of Parākramabāhu I. Māgha, too, was probably responsible for the creation of some of the Vanni chieftaincies, especially that of the Batticaloa district. With the confused and limited evidence at our disposal the origin of the Tamil Vanni chieftaincies of Ceylon cannot be held to date from a period earlier than the first quarter of the thirteenth century.

The diacritical marks used in this article for the transliteration of Tamil names are those adopted in the Madras Tamil Lexicon. But owing to the non-availability of certain types, a correct transliteration of all Tamil names was rendered difficult.

SCHOPENHAUER — A LINK BETWEEN THE BUDDHA AND FREUD ?

M. W. Padmasiri de Silva

> "We have unwittingly steered our course into the harbour of Schopenhauer's philosophy". *Sigmund Freud.*
>
> "Schopenhauer was influenced by Buddhism and by the Upanishads". *Carl Jung.*

While working on a comparative study of the theory of motivation in Freud and the Buddha, the intriguing figure of Schopenhauer left an uncanny impression in our minds.[1] Schopenhauer remarks that there is "close agreement" between his doctrine and Buddhism.[2] Freud says that Schopenhauer's concept of the unconscious "Will" is the equivalent of his theory of instincts, and thus considers the philosopher as a forerunner of psycho-analytic theory.[3] While it is possible to accept the claim that Indian thought influenced the philosopher Schopenhauer, the direct influence of Schopenhauer on Freud is a more intricate issue, especially, when Freud remarks that he read Schopenhauer very late in his life. But the resemblance of some of his ideas to the thought of Schopenhauer certainly did embarrass Freud and he makes a number of attempts to clarify this issue.

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[1] M. W. P. de Silva, "An Analysis of Some Psychological Concepts in Early Buddhism and Freud," (University of Hawaii: 1956). Unpublished M. A. Thesis, p. 5. Also see, M. W. P. de Silva," A study of Motivational Theory in Early Buddhism With Special Reference to the Psychology of Freud," (University of Hawaii: 1967). Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation.

[2] Arthur Schopenhauer, *World As Will and Idea*, 3 vols., trans, R. B. Haldane, and John Kemp, (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1909)-Hereafter cited as *W. W. I.*, Vol. 2, p. 371.
Bhikkhu Ñānajivako has examined the similarities between the philosophy of Schopenhauer and Buddhism and demonstrates quite clearly the influence of Buddhism on Schopenhauer; See Bhikkhu Ñānajivako, *Schopenhauer and Buddhism*, (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1970).

[3] Sigmund Freud, *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, 24 Vols. translated from the German under the general editorship of James Strachey-Hereafter cited as *S. E.*, (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-analysis, 1953-.), Vol. 14, pp. 143-44.

The closeness of the thought of Schopenhauer to some aspects of Buddhism and the Freudian echoes of Schopenhauer seem to suggest to us the possibility of a deeper basis for the resemblance in motivational theory between Freud and the Buddha. It is the aim of this paper to suggest possible lines of inquiry and invite discussion rather than give a conclusive analysis of the problem.

I

The Nature of Instincts: Buddhism, Schopenhauer and Freud.

In the field of scientific psychology, Freud was the first to accept the supremacy of emotions over the intellect or of affection over cognition.[1] This is something that Freud shared with Schopenhauer. According to Freud, these affective processes are nourished by deep-seated instincts and the nature of these instincts is not clearly known by the individual. This again is an idea common to Freud and Schopenhauer.[2] In fact, the comparative study of concepts of Schopenhauer, Freud and the Buddha that is attempted in this paper will be basically limited to the theory of instincts.[3]

Buddhism		Schopenhauer		Freud	
Taṅhā	Kāma-taṅhā	Will to live	Sexuality	The Id	Libido
	Bhava-taṅhā		Self-preservation		Ego Instinct
	Vibhava-taṅhā		Suicide		Death Instinct

Freud

Regarding the nature of instincts according to Freud, there were two stages in the development of the Freudian theory. First, Freud posited two basic instincts - the sexual instinct (libido) and the ego instinct. As the word hunger is used in ordinary language to represent the aims of self-preservation, so the word libido is used by Freud to indicate the presence of sexual longing in man. "The popular view distinguishes between hunger and love, as being the representatives of the instincts which aim respectively at the preservation of the individual and at the reproduction of the species. We accept this very evident distinction, so that in psycho-analysis

1 See, Philip Rieff, *Freud: The Mind of the Moralist*, (N. York: Doubleday Anchor Book, 1961), p. 54.

2 Patrick Gardiner, *Schopenhauer*, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 1963), p. 176.

3 The Chart summarizes the basic points of resemblance only with reference to the nature of instincts. As this paper is basically focussed on this problem, other possible subjects for comparative examination (e. g. the nature of religion) will not be discussed here.

too we make a distinction between the self-preservative or ego-instincts on the one hand and the sexual instincts on the other. The force by which the sexual instinct is represented in the mind we call 'libido'-sexual desire-and we regard it as something analogous to hunger, the will to power, and so on, where the ego-instincts are concerned."[1] Freud, however, used the term sexuality in a broad sense: it has many manifestations besides the simple connection with the genitals. Freud extended its meaning in two directions-on the one hand, to cover all bodily pleasures and on the other hand, to cover psychological aspects like the feelings of affection and tenderness.

In the second stage, Freud postulates two contrasting drives-the Eros and the death instinct (referred to by some as Thanatos).[2] While the Eros combines the sexual and the ego instincts, the death instinct conceptualizes Freud's claim that in man there is an innate destructiveness or a proneness to aggression, basically directed against the self (as in suicide) or deflected outwards (when inflicting injury on others, killing and destruction of objects).[3]

The base on which this theory of instincts rests is the notion of the Unconscious. Freud describes three layers of the mind-the Conscious, pre-conscious and the Unconscious. The conscious level consists of the processes which come within the normal awareness of a person, at a given time. The Pre-conscious consists of memories that could be recalled with little effort. The Unconscious contains ideas, memories and images which are not accessible to the conscious mind under ordinary conditions. Thus special techniques have to be used to break through the mechanism of repression. Freud considered the Unconscious as the area of repressed memories. Later, he realized that the Unconscious was not only the area of repressed memories, but was the receptacle of deep instinctual desires, which try to find expression in socially acceptable ways. He accepted that even a part of the ego was unconscious. Freud described this obscure and inaccessible part of the personality as the id. The little that has been learnt about it is based on the study of dreams and the formation of neurotic symptoms. We can come nearer to the id with the aid of analogies and call it a "chaos, a cauldron full of seething excitations".[4] The id consists

[1] *S. E.* Vol. 17, p. 137.
[2] Ernest Jones, *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud*, 3 vols. (N. York: Basic Books, 1963), Vol. 3, p. 273.
[3] Ibid.
[4] *S. E.* Vol. 22, p. 73.

of a mass of impulses irrational and primitive, and is thus referred to as "the resevoir of instincts". Again with the help of the metaphor of the iceberg, Freud has indicated his view of the mind -the visible conscious portion is extremely minute, compared with the more extensive submerged depth of consciousness.

The Freudian concept of a truly dynamic Unconscious as depicted by the concept of the id, certainly puts him in line with the thought of Schopenhauer. It is this aspect of Freudian thought which attracted the attention of Heinz Hartmann: "The concept of truly dynamic unconscious processes has a quite different ancestry; it is, in German philosophy, found in the works of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, and in certain romantic philosophers before them. But about this ancestry comparatively little is known, or rather little is known about the degree to which, the ways in which, this thinking might have left an imprint on Freud's work."[1]

Buddhism

The resemblance between the roots of motivation according to Freud and Buddhism has been dealt in greater detail elsewhere.[2] Thus, here, we need only summarize the basic points relevant to the subject under discussion.

In the Early Buddhist psychology, the springs of human action are traced to six roots, which fall into two classes, moral and immoral. Of these, the immoral roots are greed (lobha), hatred (dosa) and delusion (moha) while the moral roots are their opposites, charity, compassionate love and wisdom. Greed has two manifestations, viz. in the form of Kāma-taṇhā (craving for sensuous gratification) and bhava-taṇhā (craving for self-preservation). Hatred manifests itself in varied types of aggression and ultimately issues forth as vibhava-taṇhā (craving for annihilation). Delusion is the primary root of evil that prevents man from seeing the true nature of things.

The concept of kāma-taṇhā is similar to the Freudian concept of libido, bhava-taṇhā is similar to the Freudian notion of ego instincts and vibhava-taṇhā may be compared with the death instinct.

[1] Heinz Hartmann, *Essays On Ego Psychology*, (London: Hogarth Press, 1964), p. 274.

[2] M. W. P. de Silva, "An Analysis of Some Psychological Concepts in Early Buddhism and Freud," (University of Hawaii: 1966). Unpublished M.A. Thesis.

Kāma as sense desire generally refers to the enjoyment of the five senses. But in a more specific and in a more narrow sense, kāma refers to sexual enjoyment as for instance in the precept concerning evil conduct with regard to sexual behaviour (kāmesu micchācāra). In fact, the word "methuna" is used to refer to sexual enjoyment in a specific way, the words 'methunasmin chanda', for instance refer to desires in sexual gratification. But the term kāma is used in a very broad manner and sexual pleasure may be one aspect of it. Thus the term kāma-taṇhā comes very close to Freud's pleasure principle. The Buddha quite explicitly says that it is men's nature to seek what is pleasurable and avoid that which is painful.

Kāma has two aspects: kāma as object (vatthu kāma) and kama as desire (kilesa-kāma). This distinction is found in the Mahā-Niddesa, but it is related to a distinction already made in the older suttas, pañca kāmaguna and kāma rāga. Kilesa kāma may be called subjective seusuality while vatthu-kāma may be called objective sensuality.[1] Pañca kāmaguna refers to the five types of pleasure objects obtained by the eye, ear, nose, tongue and body. Kāma-rāga refers to the desires and passions of a sensual nature. The term "pañcakāma gunika-rāga" refers to the fact that in beings there is a deep-seated proclivity for the enjoyment of the five senses.

In the final analysis, it is not the existences of sense-organs or the impact of sense-impressions that is emphasized, but the persistence of desire and lust. The eye is not the bond of objects, nor are the objects, the bond of eye, but desire and lust that arise owing to these two. Freud too makes a distinction between erotic instincts and object andconsiders the instincts as more important.

According to the Buddha, unless there is the persistence of clinging (upādāna), excitation of the sense-organs is not sufficient to rouse the individual to activity. Clinging emerges with craving as a condition. But clinging as such works on a far deeper current and once a person clings to pleasure giving objects, some latent tendencies (anusays) have already been excited and stimulated. Fixation on pleasure giving objects always feed on the undercurrents of anusayas. In fact, all three aspects of craving mentioned above, are related to the anusayas. The anusaya of sensuous craving

[1] Nyanatiloka Thero, *Buddhist Dictionary*, (Colombo: Frewin and Co; Ltd, 1956), p.68.

(kāmarāga) is the basis for the craving for sensuous gratification and the anusaya of anger (patigha) provides a base for the craving for annihilation. The lurking tendency to cling to existence is the bhava-rāga anusaya and it is related to the craving for self-preservation.

Both Freud and Schopenhauer recognize the dominating role of sexuality but Schopenhauer felt that the love of life was a more basic drive.

Bhava-taṇhā

Bhava-taṇhā arises with a false conception of personality, based on the dogma of personal immortality (sassata-diṭṭhi). This is the belief in an ego entity existing independently of those physical and mental processes that constitute life. This entity is assumed to exist as a permanent, ever existing thing, continuing after death. This wrong view is referred to as diṭṭhi. However, the ego is not merely an intellectual construction. It is fed by deeper affective processes like the desire for self-preservation, self-display etc.

The roots of this ego-illusion are very deep. It rests on a primitive and archaic ego-illusion, which has been functioning through countless births. It lies in the personality in the form of a dormant proclivity, described in the suttas as bhava-rāga anusaya and bhava āsava.

Another manifestation of the ego is self-conceit (māna). Self-conceit takes three forms. It takes the form of a superiority (seyya māna), equality with another (sadisa māna) or inferiority to another (hīna māna). If a person has attained fame and glory, he could suffer from an inflated sense of vanity. On the other hand, one who is beset with defeat and disappointement will suffer from a depraved ego. This analysis of ego injury and ego elation have their parallels in Freud. The Freudian concept of Secondary narcissism and the Adlerian concept of inferiority complex may be compared with the Buddhist concept of māna. In general, it could be said that both Freud and Buddhism make a clear distinction between the desire for sense gratification and the desire for self-preservation.

Regarding the origin of the ego, Freud makes an interesting comment that the ego is first and foremost a "body - ego". This is similar to the Buddhist analysis of the origin of personality

beliefs (atta diṭṭhi) in relation to corporeality. It is said that the majority who are not skilled in the doctrine regard body as the self. Freud also says that the ego as an organization of mental life is derived from the primal structure of the id. This is somewhat like the relationship of the ego illusion to bhava-āsava. Thus the similarity between the ego instincts in Freud and bhava - taṇhā in Buddhism appear to have a deeper basis.

Vibhava-taṇhā

The word "vibhava" as used in Pāli literature, has two meanings: 1. Power, wealth, prosperity. 2. Non-existence, cessation of life and annihilation. There seem to be two meanings of vibhava-taṇhā which may be connected with these two meanings of the word vibhava.

1 The love of the present life or craving for success and power in the present life based on the belief that there is no future state. The ego will be annihilated at death, so make the best of the present life.

2 The desire for self-annihilation accompanying the belief that there is a self-entity that is annihilated at death. This springs not from a desire for success in the present life, but from loathing, disgust of the body and aggression. This leads to suicide and self-inflicted tortures to do away with the body. While the earlier expression of vibhava-taṇhā is to some extent related to sensuality the latter form basically issues form the root hate (dosa).

Logically both positions are possible. It is possible for a care free pleasure lover to hold on to the position that death is the end of life. It is also possible for a man full of worry and anxieties to wish for the end of life even by committing suicide. The later position is a more complex and interesting situation. Even Freud for instance says, that, so immense is the ego's self-love that we cannot conceive how the ego can consent to its own destruction. It took sometime, for him, to accept that there is a basic aggressive aspect in the personality of man tht makes the concept of a death wish meaningful. Schopenhauer, while accepting the warlike and the aggressive aspect of man seems to consider suicide as merely another subtle expression of the will to live.

There is a crucial passage in the Majjhima Nikāya that gives a definite sense to the second meaning of the word vibhava.[1] Here, the terms- uccheda, vināsa and vibhava are used as synonymns and thus vibhava clearly means destruction. Though the individual attempts to get rid of the "essential being" by destroying it, he paradoxically displays a tremendous pre-occupation with the self. There is a display of undue anxiety and fear regarding one's own body (sakkāyabhaya) and the loathing of ones body (sakkāyaparijegucchā). Thus one keeps running and circling around ones body. This is compared to a dog running and circling round a post to which it is tied. Thus those who take to suicide as an escape from intolerable conflicts are too subject to an ego illusion, namely the annihilationist view.

According to the Buddhist theory, the thirst for annihilation expresses itself in the annihilation of the painful objects as well as one's own body. The Freudian theory is the inverse of this- the death instinct is originally directed against the self, as a death seeking urge and only secondarily deflected against the outer world. Though there is an important difference in this respect, both Freud and Buddhism recognize hatred as a dominant source of human motivation. In a later phase of Freudian theory we get the concept of Eros. Eros which combines the sexual instinct and the ego instinct is similar to the Buddhist concept of rāga. Rāga has two manifestations-kāma-rāga (sensual passion) and bhava-rāga (the lust for life). Some aspects of the death instinct may yet be compared with the concept of vibhava taṇhā. However, in his later theory. the dual instincts of Eros and the death instinct go beyond the limited confines of their psychological and clinical dimensions and assume as Jones says "something of a transcendental significance". They are represented as the forces of unification and seperation. This metaphysical flavour is hard to find in the Buddhist theory.

The concept of unconscious motivation in Buddhism has been examined in detail, elsewhere [2] Here, it should suffice to mention the relevant concepts in Buddhist psychology that help us to

[1] M. 232-233

[2] M. W. P. de Silve, "A Study of Motivational Theory in Early Budddhism With Special Reference to the Psychology of Freud, "(University of Hawaii: 1967). Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation.

grasp the nature of unconscious motivation. Many scholars attempt to explain unconscious motivation in terms of concepts like the bhavaṅga and ālayavijñāna. But these concepts really do not belong to the nikāyas of early Buddhism.

The concept of anusayas (latent tendencies), asampajāna mano-sankhārā (dispositions of the mind of which we are not aware), viññānasota (the stream of consciousness) and āsava (influxes) help us to understand the basis of unconscious motives.

We have already referred to the fact that the three aspects of craving have a deeper source in the under-currents of the anusayas. The concept of sankhārā refer to certain conative tendencies having both a conscious and an unconscious aspect. The āsava concept is close to the Freudian notion of the id.

Schopenhauer

Regarding the nature of man, Schopenhauer says that, "Willing and striving is its whole being, which may be very well compared to an unquenchable thirst."[1] The Buddhist concept of taṇhā could also be rendered as an unquenchable thirst. According to Schopenhauer, "... the basis of all willing is need, deficiency, and thus pain. Consequently, the nature of brutes and man is subject to pain originally and through its very being. If, on the other hand, it lacks objects of desire, because it is at once deprived of them by a too easy satisfaction, a terrible void and ennui comes over it."[2] Thus man is tossed to and fro between the states of pain and satiety.[3]

This resemblance betweeen Schopenhauer and Buddhsim regarding the nature of willing has its echo in Freud. According to Philip Reiff's interpretation of the Freudian concept of instinct, "Instinct is to him just that element which makes any response inadequate. The failure of response can be traced not merely to societal rigidities,.. but further back – to the ambivalent structure of instinct itself, which continually prepares the ground for conflicts."[4] Reiff says, "Far from being a residual idea left over from

[1] *W. W. I.*, Vol. 1, p. 402.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Thomas Mann, *Schopenhauer*, (London Living Thoughts Library, 1939), p. 10.
[4] Philip Rieff, *Freud: The Mind of the Moralist* (N. York: Doubleday Anchor Book, 1961), p. 32

his biological training, as the neo-Freudians have maintained, Freud's theory of instinct is the basis for his insignt into the painful snare of contradiction in which nature and culture, individual and society, are forever fixed."[1]

Having examined the nature of will in general, it is now necessary to examine its more specific manifestations. First, it must be mentioned that for Schopenhauer "egoism" (principium individuationis) is the basic mode in which the will manifests itself.[2] Schopenhauer examining the source of egoism says that "...every one desires everything for himself to possess, or at least to control, everything, and whatever opposes it would like to destroy."[3] This practical aspect of egoism is related to what he describes as "theoretical egoism." There is only one point from which the world can be seen and this is the position that a person occupies physically.[4] The individual is the supporter of the knowing subject and the knowing subject is the supporter of the world.[5] The will is objectified or is given expression through this basic mode of egoism. "... every individual, though vanishing altogether and diminished to nothing in the boundless world, yet makes itself the centre of the world, has regard for its own existence and well -being before everything else; indeed from the natural standpoint, is ready to sacrifice everything else for this-is ready to annihilate the world in order to maintain its own self, this drop in the ocean, a little longer. This disposition is *egoism*, which is essential to everything in nature."[6]

The instinct of self-preservation is of course the most natural expression of the will. But Schopenhauer says that the sexual instinct is equally dominant and that, "next to the love of life, it shows itself the strongest and most powerful of motives."[7] He also refers to sexuality as the "focus of the will."[8] Schopenhauer's description of the role of the sexual impulse seems to anticipate some of the Freudian reflections on the subject. "...it is really the invisible central point of all action and conduct, and peeps out every where

[1] Ibid., 35.
[2] Patrick Gardiner, *Schopenhauer*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1963), p. 266.
[3] *W. W. I.*, Vol. I, p. 427.
[4] Patrick Gardiner, *Schopenhauer*, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1963), p. 264.
[5] *W. W. I.*, Vol. I, p. 428.
[6] Ibid.
[7] *W. W. I.*, Vol. 3, p. 339.
[8] Ibid., p. 380.

in spite of all veils thrown over it. It is the cause of war and the end of peace, the basis of what is serious, and the aim of the jest, the inexhaustible source, of wit, the key to all allusions, and the meaning of all mysterious hints..."[1] To Schopenhauer, Sexuality "appears as a malevolent demon that strives to pervert, confuse, and overthrow everything."[2] In general, Schopenhauer gives a metaphysical picture of the universe and man; it is an expression of the will as manifested in the love of life and the impulse of sexuality. "The parts of the body must, therefore, completely correspond to the principal desires through which the will manifests itself; they must be the visible expression of these desires. Teeth, throat, and bowels are objectified hunger., the organs of generation are objectified sexual desire; the grasping hand, the hurrying feet correspond to the more indirect desires of the will which they express."[3]

Regarding aggression, Schopenhauer discusses it mostly as the product of the conflict of individuals. The terrible side of this aggression caused by the conflict of individuals is seen in the lives of great tyrants and miscreants and in world-desolating wars. Its absurd side appears in self-conceit and vanity. The warlike nature of man so ably described by Hobbes is best seen when men are released from the bonds of law and order. This is only surpassed in actual wickedness, "which seeks, quite disinterestedly, the hurt and suffering of others, without any advantage to itself."[4] What Schopenhauer describes as wickednees is somewhat similar to the sadistic element in man described by Freud; some derive a kind of gratification by inflicting pain on others.

Regarding suicide, Schopenhauer says that it is merely another expression of the assertion of the will rather than a denial of it. "The suicide wills life, and is only dissatisfied with the conditions under which it has presented itself to him."[5] Also, suicide is a vain and foolish act, as the will to live is not changed by it. The will to live remains unaffected by suicide, "as the rainbow endures however fast the drops which support it for the moment may change."[6] Schopenhauer concludes by saying that the "will

1 Ibid., p. 313.
2 Ibid. p. 339.
3 *W. W I* , Vol. I. p. 141.
4 Ibid., p. 429.
5 Ibid., p. 515.
6 Ibid.

to live appears just as much in suicide (Siva) as in the satisfaction of self-preservation (Vishnu) and in the sensual pleasure of procreation (Brahma)".[1]

Schopenhauer also has a notion of an obscure depth of the mind which unknowingly influences the consciousness.[2] The distinctly conscious thoughts are merely the surface while the indistinct and obscure thoughts, feelings intermingled with eisposition of the will belong to the depth.[3] "Consciousness is the mere surface of our mind, of which, as of the earth, we do not know the inside, but only the crust."[4] Gardiner remarks that this statement resembles Freud's celebrated analogy of the mind as an iceberg. "In any event, analogies certainly exist between the ways in which Schopenhauer frequently characterizes the will–e. g. as 'blind incessant impulse', 'endless striving' and as 'indestructible' – and many of the terms Freud was wont to employ when talking about the nature of the unconscious".[5]

II

Having outlined the nature of instincts according to Freud Buddhism and Schopenhauer, we now raise the question of mutual influence. Regarding the relationship of Freud and Buddhism, we have already summed up the points of similarity; there is no problem of influence to examine, excepting the possible link through Schopenhauer. We also do not hope to examine the influence of Buddhism on Schopenhauer. In fact, Bhikkhu Ñānojīvako has done an excellent job in examining this question and of bringing out some significant parallels between Schopenhauer and Buddhism.[6] Our main problem in the second part of this paper is to determine the relationship between Freud and Schopenhauer against the background of Buddhist influence on Schopenhauer.

Freud On Schopenhauer

What does Freud himself say rigarding his relationship to the thought of Schopenhauer? In a number or references to

[1] Ibid.
[2] *W. W. I.*, Vol. 2, p. 328.
[3] Ibid., p. 327.
[4] Ibid., 328.
[5] Patrick Gardiner, *Schopenhauer*, (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1963), pp. 176–177.
[6] Bhikkhu Ñānajīvako, *Schopenhauer and Buddhism*. (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1970).

Schopenhauer's philosophy, Freud mentions the similarities between his theories and some of the basic ideas of Schopenhauer. But yet he does not accept the contention that Schopenhauer influenced his psycho-analytic theories; on the contrary Freud says that he read Schopenhauer very late in his life.[1] Even if Freud read Schopenhauer very late in his life it is possible that the thought of Schopenhauer was a part of the intellectual climate of the time. This hypothesis is supported by L. L. Whyte in his, *Unconscious Before Freud*: "He may have been unconsciously influenced in his general attitude by Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Dostoevsky-even if he personally read little of these writers in his early years, they were being widely read in Vienna in the last two decades of the century.[2]"

There are many references to Schopenhauer in Freud's works, out of which we have selected a few. The theory of repression, the nature of unconscious processes, sexuality and the death instinct are the main topics where Freud finds certain parallels between himself and Schopenhauer.

"The theory of repression quite certainly came to me independently of any other source; I know of no outside impression which might have suggested it to me, and for a long time I imagined it to be entirely original, until Otto Rank (1911 a) showed us a passage in Schopenhauer's *World as Will and Idea*... What he says there about the struggle against accepting a distressing piece of reality coincides with my concept of repression so completely that once again I owe the chance of making a discovery to my not being well-read.[3]" Freud concludes by saying that he is prepared, "to forgo all claims to priority in the many instance in which laborious psychoanalytic investigation can merely confirm the truths which the philosopher recognized by intuition.[4]" Here, Freud claims that the concept of repression was suggested by the clinical data that he examined and that it was not due to his reading of Schopenhauer. In this context it appears that we have to accept Freud at his word. It is reasonable to claim that the concept of

[1] *S. E.* Vol 20, pp. 59–60. Freud says that Nietzche is another philosopher whose ideas had some resemblance to his psychology; precisely for this reason, Freud claims that he refrained from reading Nietzsche.

[2] L. L. Whyte, *The Unconscious Before Freud*, (N. York: Doubleday Anchor Book, 1962), p. 157.

[3] *S. E.* Vol. 14, p. 15.

[4] Ibid., p. 16.

"repression" was suggested by the clinical material he examined. Freud's claim to a new discovery lies in transforming the cathartic procedure into a complete system of psycho-analysis, and the new factors that were added to the cathartic procedure were—the theory of repression and resistance, infantile sexuality and dream interpretation.

While giving Freud due credit for these specific contributions, it seems that regarding the more general concepts like the Unconscious, indirect influence of Schopenhauer on Freud is possible. This claim can be supported by some of Freud's own statements.

In a paper entitled, *A Difficulty In Psycho-analysis* (1917), Freud says that the pride of man suffered three blows; The first is the cosmological, where Copernicus pointed out that the earth was not the center of the universe, the second is the biological, where Darwin blew up the myth of a radical difference between man and animals and the third is the psychological, where Freud pointed out that man is not the master of his own mind. Refering to his own contribution, Freud cites two significant factors-"that the life of our sexual instincts cannot be wholly tamed, and that mental processes are in themselves unconscious and only reach the ego and come under its control through incomplete and untrustworthy perceptions."[1] He says that these two ideas together represent the third blow to man's pride. And he concedes to Schopenhauer the anticipation of these two profound ideas.

"It was not psycho-analysis, however, let us hasten to add, which first took this step. There are famous philosophers who may be cited as forerunners - above all the great thinker Schopenhauer, whose unconscious 'Will' is equivalent to the mental instincts of psycho-analysis. It was this same thinker, moreover, who in *words of unforgettable impressiveness* admonished mankind of the importance, still so greatly under-estimated by it, of its sexual craving."[2] He concludes by saying that there is, however, a difference; while the philosopher asserts this on an abstract basis, he demonstrates the same through his techniques to every individual personally.

In his *Autobiographical Study* (1925), however, he says that the assertion regarding the dominance of emotions, importance of

[1] *S. E.* Vol. 17, pp. 143-144.

[2] Ibid., emphasis mine.

sexuality and the mechanism of repression – are not to be traced to his acquaintance with Schopenhauer's philosophy.[1]

The only concept that we have not mentioned so far is the death instinct. This is a concept that finds definite expression, in his *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* published in 1920. By the year 1925, in his *Autobiographical study*, he made the statement that he read Shopenhauer very late in his life. In his *A Difficulty in Psychoanalysis*, 1917 Freud has already referred to "words of unforgettable impressiveness" of Schopenhauer, implying that he had read Schopenhauer. Thus it is certain that by the time he published his *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, he had closely read Schopenhauer. This is strengthened by the fact that he makes a specific reference to Schopenhauer's work, in this book.[2] If so, did Schopenhauer influence Freud's concept of the death instinct? Freud of course says, "we have unwittingly steered our course into the harbour of Schopenhauer's philosophy. For him death is the 'true result and to that extent the purpose of life', while the sexual instinct is the embodiment of the will to live."[3] As early as 1913, Freud refers in his *Totem and Taboo*, to Schopenhauer's preoccupation with the problem of death. The concept of death instinct is considered one of the most speculative aspects of Freud. It is at this point that Freud makes the reference to the "Nirvana Principle"[4], inviting Reiff's comment that there is "Something Oriental in the Freudian Ethic."[5]

As Freud refers to the "nirvana principle" as an aspect of the death instinct, the concept of death instinct needs careful analysis. The concept of nirvāna has a key place in Schopenhauer; it is also the ultimate ideal of the Buddhist. Ernest Jones points out that Freud was influenced by Fechner who in turn was influenced by Buddhism. Regarding the nirvana principle Jones says, "Dorer has plausibly suggested that it, derives from the quietistic teaching of Buddhism which is known to have greatly influenced Fechner."[6]

[1] *S.E.* Vol. 20, p. 59.

[2] *S.E.* Vol. 18, p. 50; also cf. p. 101.

[3] Ibid., pp. 49-50.

[4] Ibid., p. 56.

[5] Philip Rieff, *Freud: The Mind of the Moralist*, (N. York: Doubleday Anchor Book, 1961), p. 376.

[6] Ernest Jones, *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud*, (N. York; Basic Books, 1963), Vol. 3, p, 270.

Thus in the case of the nirvana principle, Freud had some contact with Buddhism, via an indirect route—Fechner and Schopenhauer. Yet nirvāna is not an expression of the death instinct according to the Buddhist. Freud says that the "*pleasure* principle represents the demands of the libido" and "The *Nirvana* principle expresses the trend of the death instinct."[1] It is Vibhava taṇhā rather than nirvāna that can be compared with the death instinct of Freud.

However, as Flugel has shown, there are six strands of meaning that come under the Freudian concept of the death instinct.[2] (1) The universal tendency of living things to suffer dissolution and die. (2) The tendency to achieve and maintain equilibrium in the inorganic and organic world. (3) The tendency to reduce or abolish tension. (4) The repitition compulsion and the restoration of earlier states. (5) Source of aggression. Aims at annihilation of self, re-directed outwards as hostility to others. (6) Death instinct as contrasted with life instinct; former integrating and uniting and the latter separating and disintegrating.

Of these, (5) can be compared with Vibhava taṇhā. The difference is that the death instinct is originally directed against the self, whereas the Buddhist consider that aggression is usually directed outwards, and only later directed against oneself. However, both systems consider hatred and aggression as a primary base of motivation. It is in fact in his later works like the *Civilization and its Discontents*, that Freud turned his attention to the outward expression of the death instinct—aggressiveness and destructiveness.[3] Schopenhauer also lays emphasis on the conflict between individuals, and the warlike nature of men set free from the bonds of law.

(1) can be compared with the Buddhist doctrine of annicca, Schopenhauer too refers to the endless change and dissolution in things. (3) may be compared to the concept of craving in Buddhism and Schopenhauer. (2) is similar to (3) while (3) refers to the physiological and psychological aspects of desire, (2) refers to a more general pattern in the universe, both in the organic and inorganic world. However, it may be confusing to equate this principle of equilibrium with the nirvāna of the Buddhist. The

[1] *S.E.* Vol. 19, p. 160.

[2] J. C Flugal, *Studies in Feeling and Desire*, (London: Duckworth & Co., 1955), pp. 96-97.

[3] *S.E.* Vol 19, pp. 157-158, n. 2.

concept of equilibrium can conceptualize some aspects of nirvāna, a state free from tension and conflict. On the other hand, as an expression of the death instinct it can be very misleading. Nirvāna cannot be described as an inorganic state of rest or a state of pure quiescence. Nirvāna has been described in positive terms like the concepts of perfect health, knowledge, insight etc. It is the culmination of one's spiritual growth and not merely the annihilation of instincts. Schopenhauer emphasized the negative aspects like the denial of the will and thus perhaps indirectly contributed to strengthen the view that nirvāna is annihilation. The concept of repetition compulsion (4) has a parallel in the Buddhist concept of sankhāra, translated as karmic formation, conative dispositions etc. Schopenhauer's concept of will too contains the idea of repetition as an aspect of its meaning. Regarding (6) Schopenhauer expresses a similar idea: "generation and death are essentially correlatives, which reciprocally neutralize and annual each other."[1] An exact correlative of this idea is not found in Buddhism. In general, it could be said that the concept of death instinct with all its diverse strands of meaning, refers to some puzzling aspects of man's experience. And in this, Freud is attempting to state the nature of a dilemma than present a straightforward solution. Not only has he steered his course into the harbour of Schopenhauer's philosophy, but at this point his thinking appears to be nourished by a drop of alien blood (via the route of Fechner and Schopenhauer).

Apart from Freud, Jung is another psycho-analyst who refers to the philosophy of Schopenhauer in most of his works. He has made a study of both Schopenhauer and Buddhist thought and quite clearly says that Schopenhauer was influenced by Buddhism.[2] Though Jung differed from both Schopenhauer and Buddhism regarding certain facts, he certainly attempts to use Schopenhauer as a bridge between Buddhism and his version of psycho-analysis. An interesting example cited by him is the common etymological root of the Latin libido and Sanskrit lobha. In fact, lobha (greed) along with dosa (hatred) and moha (delusion) are the three roots of motivation according to the Buddha.

Inspite of the somewhat obscure and speculative thinking that Jung often displays, he has struck an interesting line of thought

[1] *W. W. I.* Vol. I, p. 355.

[2] Carl Jung, *Collected Works*, ed. R. Read, M. Fordham, G. Adler, Trans. R. F. C. Hull, Vol. II, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), p. 481.

by working his ideas through Schopenhauer, back to Indian thought. All this seem to suggest that behind "...the philosophic climate he (Freud) shared with figures like Schopenhauer and Nietzsche"[1], there are haunting shadows of Indian thought.

Tentative Conclusions

(1) Freud did not knowingly make use of Schopenhauer's ideas as hypotheses for organizing his clinical data. This is specially true of some of his specific and limited concepts like repression, oedipus complex, infantile sexuality, transference etc.

(2) But regarding the more general concepts like the Unconscious, libido and death instinct, the possibility of indirect influence cannot be denied. There were others who read Schopenhauer and his ideas belong to the intellectual climate of the time.

(3) At some point in his life he did read Schopenhauer closely. In his paper, *A Difficulty in Psycho-analysis* (1917), he refers to Schopenhauer's "words of unforgettable impressiveness". In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920) Freud makes specific references to Schopenhauer's work.

(4) Taking into account, both indirect influence and some kind of direct influence (after he read Schopenhauer), we could do no better than sum up in the words of R. S. Peters who says of Freud: "Schopenhauer peered wanly through some of his constructs".[2]

(5) The close agreement between Buddhism and Schopenhauer is evident; some degree of influence of Buddhist and Upanishadic thought on Schopenhauer can be established.

(6) Thus it appears that in the philosophy of Schopenhauer may be present, a link between Buddhism and Freud.

[1] Hellen Walker, Puner, *Freud,* (London: Grey Walls Press, 1949), p. 162. The word 'Freud' within parenthesis has been inserted by the author.

[2] R. S. Peters, ed. *Brett's History of Psychology,* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1962), p. 717.

SCHOOLS OF BUDDHISM IN EARLY CEYLON

D. J. Kalupahana

The concensus of opinion, both ancient and modern, is that the Sthaviravāda (generally known as the Theriya-nikāya) is preserved in Ceylon in its pristine purity. The three nikāyas in Ceylon led by the three monasteries, Mahāvihāra, Abhayagiri and Jetavana, in spite of their differences are considered to belong to the Theriya group. The two groups associated with the monasteries, Abhayagiri and Jetavana, came to be known as Dhammaruci and Sāgaliya nikāyas respectively.

History of the Schisms

The accounts of the schisms that led to the founding of separate nikāyas agree fairly well.[1] Based on these accounts the history of the schisms may be stated as follows:

Soon after his restoration, Vaṭṭagāmaṇi Abhaya built the Abhayagiri Vihāra on the site of the Titthārāma, a monastery of the Niganṭhas. This vihāra was given to his benefactor, the Thera Mahā-Tissa. It happened that the Thera Mahā-Tissa who had accepted the gift of the Abhayagiri Vihāra, but actually lived elsewhere, was credited by general repute with living in domestic intercourse. The monks of Mahā-Vihāra assembled together and interdicted him. One of the Thera's pupils, who was present, obstructed them, and the tribunal of monks, adjudging the obstructor guilty of misconduct, expelled him from the order. He, therefore, broke away from the Mahā-Vihāra fraternity and lived at Abhayagiri Vihāra. A group of monks belonging to the Vajjiputtaka Nikāya arrived in Ceylon during this time, headed by a teacher called Dhammaruci. Finding no favour with the Mahā-Vihāra, they joined the Abhayagiri fraternity which welcomed them and soon accepted also their teachings. Thenceforward, this group came to be known as Dhammaruci Nikāya.

During the time of Vohāraka Tissa, the monks of the Abhayagiri of the Dhammaruci sect adopted the Vaitulya-Piṭaka which

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[1] *The Nikāya Saṃgrahawa*, (abbr. *NS*), tr. C. M. Fernando, revised and edited by W. F. Gunawardhana, (Colombo, 1908), pp. 11 ff.; *Mahāvaṃsa*, (abbr. *Mv*), ed. W. Geiger, (London, 1908), ch. 33.

"certain infidel Brâhmans called Vaitulyas who had assumed the garb of monks for the purpose of destroying the religion, had composed in the time of Dharmâsoka Mahârâja, and proclaimed it as the preaching of the Buddha. Thereupon the priests of the Theriya Nikâya, having compared it with the authentic text, rejected the Vaitulya doctrines as being opposed to religion."

The controversy between the two fraternities, Mahâ-Vihâra and Abhayagiri, over the acceptance of the Vaitulya-vâda by the latter, produced such bitterness that it demanded a royal inquiry. The king appointed one of his ministers, named Kapila, who reported that the Vaitulya-vâda was opposed to the strict teaching of the Buddha. Thereupon the king burnt all the Vaitulyan books and disgraced the monks of the Abhayagiri.

During the reign of Goṭhâbhaya the Vaitulyan heresy raised its head again and once more the scene of trouble was the Abhayagiri Vihâra. It was during this time that a Thera named Ussiliya-Tissa, recalling the disgrace which befell Abhayagiri monks during Vohâraka-Tissa's reign, refused to be associated with the new enterprise. Unable to dissuade the monks of Abhayagiri from accepting Vaitulya-vâda, he left Abhayagiri and with a few followers went over to the Dakkhiṇagiri vihâra. There they put themselves under the leadership of a Mahâ-Thera named Sâgala and were thenceforth known as the Sâgaliyas.

Once again the reigning monarch assembled the monks of the five chief monasteries which constituted the orthodox Sangha in Ceylon— the Mahâ-Vihâra, Thûparâma, Vessagiri Vihâra, Issarasamaṇârâma and the Cetiya Vihâra—and they then accepted that the Vaitulyans were heretical in their views. Thus for the second time the books of the Vaitulya-vâda were collected and burnt.

This, in brief, is the account of the schisms which produced the three main nikâyas in Ceylon. One very important fact that emerges from the above description is that whatever differences there were between the Mahâvihâravâsins on the one hand, and the Dhammarucians and the Sâgaliyas on the other, the Mahâvihâravâsins tolerated the latter except when attempts were made to introduce Vaitulya-vâda which they immediately opposed.

The Theory of Four Principal Schools (Câtur-Mahâ-Nikâya)

It is to be anticipated that the separate existence of the three nikâyas, until their unification under a common leadership

in the twelfth century would certainly have led to the emergence of differences of opinion. Unfortunately, no attempt has been made to find out these differences in their teachings, if there were any, and to determine the nature of their traditions in relation to the various schools of Buddhism in India. This lack of interest on the part of the scholars may be an outcome of the belief that, since all the works belonging to the Abhayagiri were destroyed by the kings on the instigation of the Mahāvihāravāsins, source material for such an inquiry is also wanting. Therefore, the attempts to study the teachings of the various schools prevalent in Ceylon during early and mediaeval times were primarily based on extremely thin and scanty evidence found in the Chronicles, epigraphical records as well as travel records of some of the Buddhist pilgrims. These refer to the existence of the Mahāsāṅghikas and the Mahīśāsakas, in addition to the Theriya Nikāya.[1] Apart from the Mahāsāṅghikas, and the Mahīśāsakas,

[1] There appears to be only one reference to the existence of Mahāsāṅghika bhikkhus in Ceylon, and as has been pointed out by Heinz Bechert (see, Wilhelm Geiger, *Culture of Ceylon in Mediaeval Times*, ed. Heinz Bechert, Wiesbaden, 1960, p. 208, n. 1) and as may be evident from the information provided in this article, the authenticity of this reference is rather doubtful. But a few references to the views of the Mahāsāṅghikas are to be found in the sub-commentaries (e. g. *Abhidhammatthavikāsinī* abbr. *AbhvT* by Sumaṅgala, ed. A. P. Buddhadatta, Colombo, 1961, p. 46). It is natural that the author-monks of Ceylon were aware of the doctrines of the different schools that existed in India, especially when there was close contact between Ceylon and India. But this need not be construed to mean that all such schools existed in Ceylon.

The *NS* (pp. 9-10) also mentions the fact that Vājiriya-vāda was introduced to Ceylon together with Vaitulya-vāda. Vājiriya-vāda is generally considered to be a reference to Vajrayāna (see Eliot, C., *Hinduism and Buddhism*, London, 1954, vol. iii, p. 40). But the texts associated with this school, according to the *NS*, are the *Ratnakūta Sūtras* The *Ratnakūta Sūtras* do not belong to the Vajrayāna school. For example, the *Kāsyapa-parivarta*, included in the category of *Ratnakūta Sūtras*, represents an earlier phase of Mādhyamika thought. The *Ratnakūta Sūtras* are even older than the *Mādhyamikavrtti* for we find Candrakīrti quoting passages from this class of literature (see pp. 45, 47, 156, 157, 248, 249, 336, 339, 358).

Even the *Vajracchedikā Prajñāpārmitā* represents Mādhyamika rather than Vajrayāna thought. Therefore, Vājiriya-vāda would most probably be a reference to the Mādhyamika school (*vajra* or 'diamond' symbolizing the 'logic' of the Mādhyamika school.) Later on this kind of logic is even attributed to the Buddha, see, for example, *Mahābodhivamsa*, p. 84, where the Buddha is considered as one endowed with the splendour of the great diamond-like knowledge *mahāvajirañāṇādiguṇasamannāgato*). It is also interesting to note that, according to the *NS*, they were the Andhaka heretics who composed the "Ratnakūṭa Sūtras" and other scientific works (p. 9), thus associating them with a region in India where Nāgārjuna, the great Mādhyamika logician, started his career.

there are no specific references to any of the other nikāyas, either Mahāyāna or Hīnayāna. In a recent paper, R. H. L. H. Gunawardhana has made an attempt to show that "the main nikāyas of Indian Buddhism were, in fact, represented in Ceylon in the ninth century".[1] His argument pivots round the reference to the "four principal nikāyas" *(cātur-mahā-nikāya)* in what he calls the Abhayagiri inscription. Here, unfortunately, the four nikāyas are not mentioned by their names. The lack of any historical evidence to determine what exactly these four nikāyas were, has led the author to look for similar groups elsewhere. He found valuable light thrown on this problem by a statement of I-tsing who visited India in the seventh century. The statement refers to the prevalence of the four nikāyas "throughout the five divisions of India, as well as of the Southern Seas" "In Magadha," I-tsing says, "the doctrines of the four nikāyas are generally in practice, yet the Sarvāstivāda nikāya flourishes most... In the eastern frontier countries, the four nikāyas are found side by side."[2] Then I-tsing goes on to enumerate the four nikāyas as the Āryamūlasarvāstivāda, Āryamahāsāṅghika, Āryasthaviranikāya and Āryasammitīyanikāya. Gunawardhana quotes several other sources which refer to groups of four nikāyas. But in these , the four nikāyas consist of Mahāsāṅghika, Sarvāstivāda, Sthaviravāda and Sammitīya. But these lists are slightly different from that given by I-tsing. I-tsing's reference is to the Mūlasarvāstivāda and not to the Sarvāstivāda. It is generally believed that Mūlasarvāstivāda is different from Sarvāstivāda.[3] Therefore, one may not be justified in assuming that the four schools, Sarvāstivāda, Mahāsāṅghika, Sthavira and Sammitīya nikāyas were accepted as the four principal nikāyas in all the regions where Buddhism flourished and at all times. For example, Fa-hsien knew of the list of eighteen sects[4] but he mentions by name only three, Mahāsāṅghika, Sabbatthivāda and Mahīsāsaka. These together with the Sammitīyas and the Sthaviravādins were the most important in Asoka's time. Hodgson has

[1] "Buddhist Nikāyas in Mediaeval Ceylon", in *The Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies*, vol. ix, pp. 55-66.

[2] I-tsing, *A Record of the Buddhist Religion*, tr. J. Takakusu, (Oxford, 1896), pp. 8-9.

[3] Mūlasarvāstivāda is considered to be a sub-sect of Sarvāstivāda, see Geiger, *Mv.* (translation), p. 285.

[4] See Rhys Davids, T. W., "The Sects of the Buddhists", in *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, (abbr. *JRAS*), 1891, pp. 409 ff.

given us a somewhat extended summary of four later schools in Nepal, none of which are referred to in any list. These are

(i) the Svābhāvikī,
(ii) the Aiśvarikā
(iii) the Karmikā and
(iv) the Yātnikā[1]

Rhys Davids opines that they are all probably Mahāyānist.[2] Lastly we come across a different list of four schools in Sāyana Mādhava's Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha.[3] They are

(i) the Vaibhāṣika,
(ii) the Sautrāntika,
(iii) the Mādhyamika and
(iv) the Yogācāra.

Of these, the first two are considered to be Hīnayāna schools and last two Mahāyāna. Although the reference to these four schools are in a fourteenth century work, yet they were much older schools.

Our main purpose in referring to these different lists is to show that like the group of eighteen schools (which vary according to different lists[4]), the group of four nikāyas 'should not be taken as implying only four specific nikāyas. Due to the significance of the number four[5], we find sometimes the eighteen schools reduced to four depending on the time and place. Sometimes where five schools were found, one which may not be so significant as the others, may have been dropped to make the number four. Or else, where there were only three main nikāyas, another which was not very widely studied, may have been added to bring the total upto four. Of these two methods, the latter seems to be true in the case of the reference to the four principal nikāyas in the Abhayagiri inscription.

If so, how are we to determine which four schools were prevalent in the island during the period in which the Abhayagiri

[1] *Asiatic Researches*, vol. xvi (1828), pp. 424 ff. quoted by Rhys Davids, op. cit. *JRAS* (1891), pp. 241–2.
[2] loc. cit.
[3] ed. V. S. Abhyankar, (Poona, 1924), ch. iii.
[4] See *Points of Controversy*, (tr. of *Kathāvatthu*), by S.Z. Aung and C. A. F. Rhys Davids, (London, 1915), pp. xxxiv ff.; Geiger, *Mv.* (translation), p. 277.
[5] Cp. categories in Buddhism such as cattāri ariyasaccāni, cattāro puggalā, cattāro sammappadhānā, cattāri mahābhūtāni, etc.

inscription came to be inscribed, that is to say, about the seventh century? To maintain that this is impossible because the Vaitulya-Piṭaka was burnt and destroyed several times is to beg the question. It may be true that the Vaitulya-Piṭaka introduced to Ceylon during the earlier period was destroyed and that extreme forms of Mahāyāna were not tolerated by the orthodoxy. This same fact should militate against including any Mahāyāna school under the category of "four principal nikāyas". But there certainly are schools which, though coming under the broad category of Hīnayāna, had greater leanings towards Mahāyāna. Such schools may have had the good fortune of escaping the wrath of orthodoxy.

The fact that the Vaitulya-vādins were always persecuted and that their literature was burnt shows that, as far as Ceylon was concerned, Mahāyāna was not one of the "four principal nikāyas" studied here during the early and medieaval period. Consequently, the burning of their literature should not be made an argument against the possibility of determining what the four principal nikāyas prevalent in Ceylon were. The more sensible method of finding out which of the schools were widely prevalent in Ceylon would be to examine the literary works and see whether they represent any particular school or schools of thought.

Referring to the situation in India, the Ceylon chronicles say that the first schism in the Buddhist Sangha took place after the Second Council held at Vesāli.[1] The two schools which arose as a result of this schism, namely, the Sthaviravāda and the Mahāsāṅghika, differed very little from each other with regard to the main teachings, except for the fact that the latter emphasised the docetic tendencies already dormant in the Sutta Piṭaka and attempted to popularize the teachings of the Buddha. While the Sthaviravādins insisted on the primacy of the historical Buddha, the Mahāsāṅghikas emphasised the conception of transcendental Buddha. These differences widened in the course of time, and the Mahāsāṅghika ideas gave rise to the belief in the eternal body of the Buddha, the Dharmakāya. Thus, when we come to the time of the *Kathāvatthu* we find the Mahāsāṅghikas and the Sthaviravādins interpreting the early sūtras differently, as for example, the statement of the Buddha in the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*, that a Tathāgata is able by

[1] *Dīpavaṃsa*, (abbr. *Dpv*), ed. B. C. Law, in *The Ceylon Historical Journal*, (Colombo, 1958), 5.30 ff.; *Mv.* 5-3 ff.

the power of *iddhi* to prolong his life-span.[1] But during the earlier period there was not much difference between these two schools.

The major doctrinal differences among the various groups of the Sangha arose with the development of the Abhidharma. As pointed out elsewhere,[2] the Abhidharma analysis created many philosophical problems and divergent views came to be expressed by the Buddhist philosophers. The result was the emergence of many sects, traditionally believed to be eighteen in number and the Asokan era witnessed the diatribes among these different groups. The *Kathāvatthu* ("Points of Controversy") represents the Sthaviravāda presentation of the problems and their own refutation of other views. Some of the major schools whose doctrines were refuted in the *Kathāvatthu* were the Sarvāstivāda, Puggalavāda (=Sammitīya) and Mahāsāṅghika which, together with Sthaviravāda constituted the group of four principal nikāyas (cāturmahānikāya) referred to above.

Sthaviravāda Tradition in Ceylon

Some time after the Third Council, the Sthaviravāda tradition, together with the Pali Tipiṭaka, was introduced to Ceylon. This Sthaviravāda (Pali, Theravāda) tradition, enjoying generous royal patronage, continued to develop and take firm roots in the island. The Sthaviravāda so introduced was opposed not only to the schools such as the Mahāsāṅghika with definite bias towards Mahāyāna, but also to the Sarvāstivāda and the Sammitīya, as is evident from the Kathāvatthu. But unfortunately as a result of Buddhaghosa's literary activities and the subsequent disappearance of the earlier commentaries written in Sinhalese, we are not in a position to find out the lines on which the Sthaviravāda doctrines developed in Ceylon from the time they were introduced to the island by Mahinda until the time of Buddhaghosa.

The contribution of the Sinhalese to the enrichment of the Sthaviravāda tradition as embodied in the Pali Abhidhamma Piṭaka, including the famous Kathāvatthu, would certainly have

[1] Jaini, P. S., "Buddha's Prolongation of life", in the *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, (abbr. *BSOAS*), (London, 1958), vol. xxi, pp. 546 ff.

[2] Kalupahana, D. J., "Aspects of the Buddhist theory of the external world and the emergence of the philosophical schools in Buddhism", in *The Ceylon Journal of the Humanities*, (Peradeniya, 1970), vol. i, pp. 93 ff.

been represented in the Sinhalese commentaries which developed in Ceylon in relative isolation except for the occasional inroads of Vaitulya-vāda. Therefore, we may presume that the genuine Sthaviravāda was preserved in these Sinhalese commentaries. These Sinhalese commentaries which grew around the Pali Tipiṭaka and developed for nearly eight centuries are irretrievably lost. These were replaced by the more systematic commentaries of Buddhaghosa, generally believed to preserve in its pristine purity the Sthaviravāda introduced by Mahinda. But a careful analysis of the works of Buddhaghosa as well as some of the incidents connected with his stay in Ceylon would throw much doubt on the validity of this assumption.

The Syncretic Sthaviravāda – Buddhaghosa and Dhammapāla

The *Mahāvaṃsa* describes Buddhaghosa as a "Brahman youth, born in the neighbourhood of the Great Bodhi-tree, accomplished in arts and sciences, one who had mastered the Vedas, was well versed in knowledge, skilled in all disputes, himself a schismatic wanderer over Jambudīpa assuming the character of a disputant."[1] He is also credited with having written a text called the '*Ñāṇodaya*' and also a chapter called '*Atthasālinī*' on the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*. Such a person certainly would not have missed the opportunity of studying all the Buddhist traditions as well as their literature available during his time in India. By his time the teachings of many of the principal schools of Buddhism had come to be crystallized. Therefore, we are justified in assuming that when Buddhaghosa came to Ceylon he had a thorough knowledge of the teachings of the different schools of Buddhism prevalent in India.

We mentioned that the Sinhalese commentarial tradition was a product of at least eight centuries of development. But this commentarial literature is believed to have been systematised and translated into Pali by one individual, namely, Buddhaghosa. It is, therefore, difficult to believe that the Sthaviravāda tradition represented in his commentaries could escape the personal touch of the commentator. The vast knowledge he has already acquired before he came to Ceylon would certainly have influenced his thinkingand coloured his interpretation of the Sthaviravāda doctrines.

[1] *Mv.* 37. 215-6.

In this connection, the statement of the *Mahāvaṃsa* that the Mahāvihāra monks decided to test his ability and credentials seems to be rather significant because it shows that there was an element of suspicion in the minds of the Mahāvihāravāsins about the way in which he would interpret the teachings of their school. One may therefore not be far wrong in assuming that the Theras who, according to Buddhaghosa, invited him to write the commentaries, were actually the monks who were keeping a vigilant eye over the manner in which he interpreted the teachings.

In the absence of the Sinhalese commentaries, what reasonable criteria are we going to adopt in determining what the genuine Sthaviravāda was and what were the new ideas introduced by Buddhaghosa? The safest method would be to consider some of the major theories criticised in the *Kathāvatthu* and see to what extent these very same views are reflected in Buddhaghosa's works. This method has its own limitations in that some of the theories which we come across in Buddhaghosa's commentaries are those of later schools such as the Vijñānavāda which were not fully developed at the time the *Kathāvatthu* came to be written. But in the absence of the Sinhalese commentaries, there seems to be no other course open to us.

Reading through the commentaries of Buddhaghosa, it is possible to pick out some theories which a genuine Sthaviravādin may be reluctant to accept. There are two important theories not found in the Sthaviravāda Abhidharma tradition, but which appear for the first time in the commentaries of Buddhaghosa. One is the theory of atoms (*paramāṇu*) and the other, the theory of moments (*khaṇa*).

The analysing of man and his experience of the external world in terms of the aggregates (*khandha*), bases (*āyatana*) and elements (*dhātu*) was a common feature of early Buddhism as well as of all the schools of Abhidharma. But influenced by the Vaiśeṣikas, this was converted to a theory of atoms by the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas. Along with the acceptance of the theory of atoms, there emerged several philosophical problems. How could the atoms, considered to be suprasensible and bereft of any magnitude and colour, form the perceptible world with its dimensions and colour? To solve this the Sarvāstivādins put forward the

theory of primary (*dravya*) and aggregate (*saṅghāta*) atoms (*paramāṇu*).[1] A theory bearing very close resemblance to this is seen to emerge from some of the comments made by Buddhaghosa. In a passage in the *Visuddhimagga*, Buddhaghosa points out that the bodily constituents such as head-hair, bodily-hair, etc. should be understood by way of groups (*kalāpa*). What in common parlance is called head-hair is only a collection of eight material elements (*aṭṭhadhammakalāpamatta*).[2] In another passage, the matter that enters into the composition of the body is explained by way of particles (*cuṇṇa*). "In this body the *paṭhavi-dhātu* taken as reduced to fine dust and pounded to the size of paramāṇu might amount to an average dona-measure full, and that is held together by the *āpo-dhātu* measuring half as much."[3] Here the Sarvāstivāda conceptions of primary atoms (*dravya-parāmāṇu*) and aggregate atoms (*saṅghāta paramāṇu*) are found in germinal form. As may be pointed out later, it was left to the later scholiasts to lay bare the full implications of these theories.

Further, the Sarvāstivādins, again under the influence of the Vaiśeṣika "dravyavāda", accepted two different aspects of phenomena: substance or 'own nature' (*svabhāva*) and 'characteristics' (*laksaṇa*)[4]. The former explains the continuity of phenomena, the latter perceptibility. 'Substance' or 'own nature' (*svabhāva*), which explains the continuity of phenomena, had to be considered as unchanging and eternal; thus their existence (*astitva*) during the three periods of time, past, present and future. This was the very same theory which came to be vehemently criticised in the *Kathāvatthu*.[5] It was so prominent a Sarvāstivāda theory that Buddhaghosa possibly could not introduce it into the Sthaviravāda tradition. But certain ideas associated with this theory of 'substance' (*svabhāva*) are to be noticed in the writings of Buddhaghosa. For example, the definition of dhamma as that "which bears its own nature" (*attano sabhāvaṃ dhārentīti dhammā*)[6]

1 *L'Abhidharmokasa de Vasubandhu*, (abbr. *Kosa*), tr. L. de la Vallee Poussin, (Paris, 1923), i. 144.
2 *Visuddhimagga*, (abbr. *Vism*), ed. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, (London, 1920-1), p. 364.
3 ibid., p. 365.
4 *Abhidharmakosa*, (abbr. *Ak*) ed. R. Samskrityāyana, (Benares, 1955), v. 26; *Abhidharmadīpa* with *Vibhāsāprabhā-vrtti*, (abbr. *Adv*) ed. P. S. Jaini, (Patna, 1959), pp. 259–60; *Tattvasamgraha* with *panjikā*, ed. E. Krishnamacharya, (Baroda, 1926) (Gaekwad Oriental Series, 30), vol. i, pp. 504-5.
5 ed. Arnold C. Taylor, (abbr. *Kv*), (London, 1894‘ 1897), i. 115 ff.
6 *Atthasālinī*, (abbr. *DhsA*), ed. E. Muller, (London, 1897), p. 39.

represents an unconscious acceptance of the Sarvāstivāda theory and as may be pointed out later, a school opposed to the Sarvāstivāda tradition in Ceylon sounded a warning against the acceptance of such a theory of 'own nature' (*svabhāva*).

Moreover, as a result of the acceptance of the theory of 'substance' (*svabhāva*), the Sarvāstivādins had to modify the theory of causality which was presented in the early Buddhist texts. They admitted a distinction between 'cause' (*hetu*) and 'condition' (*pratyaya*), corresponding to the distinction between the primary cause and secondary condition as postulated in commonsense realism. This is because the 'cause' (*hetu*) and the 'effect' (*phala*) are invariably related or connected by their 'own nature' (*svabhāva*) and that other contributory conditions are not of such significance. Such a distinction was not made either in early Buddhism as embodied in the Nikāyas or in Sthaviravāda Buddhism as represented in the Pali Abhidhamma.[1] In fact, the *Sphuṭārthābhidharmakosa-vyākhyā* refers to these different views.[2] But in the *Visuddhimagga*, Buddhaghosa seems to emphasise this distinction thereby almost accepting the Sarvāstivāda standpoint. He maintains: "When it (i. e., a being) is born thus, its causes (*hetu*) are the four things, namely, ignorance, craving, clinging and karma; since it is they that bring about its birth. Nutriment is its condition (*paccaya*), because it is this that consolidates it"[3]

With regard to the theory of moments (*kṣaṇa*) too, Buddhaghosa's view seems to resemble the Sarvāstivāda conception. It is true that in his works we do not come across a fully developed theory of moments, as we find in the later Abhidhamma manuals.[4] Yet he accepts three moments, nascent (*uppāda*), static (*ṭhiti*) and cessant (*bhaṅga*)[5]. There was a rather long-drawn controversy

[1] See Kalupahana, D. J., *A critical analysis of the early Buddhist theory of causality as embodied in the Pali Nikāyas and the Chinese Agamas*, Ph. D. Thesis, University of London, 1967, pp. 120-142, (unpublished).

[2] (abbr. *Sakv*), ed. U. Wogihara, (Tokyo, 1932, 1936), pp. 188, 703.

[3] *Vism.* pp. 598-9 Tass' evaṃ nibbattamānassa avijjā, taṇhā, upādānaṃ kamman ti ime cattāro dhammā nibbatakatttā hetu; āhāro upatthambhakattā paccayo ti...

[4] See Saratchandra, *Buddhist Psychology of Perception* (Colombo, 1958), p. 44.

[5] *Sammohavinodanī*, (abbr. *VbhA*), ed. A. P. Buddhadatta, (London, 1923), p. 7; *Vism.* pp. 292, 473.

among the different schools with regard to this problem. The controversy centred round the statement in the early Buddhist texts which runs thus: "Bhikkhus, there are these three characteristics of the conditioned: of conditioned things genesis (*uppāda*) is apparent, the passing away (*vaya*) is apparent, change in what exists (*ṭhitassa aññathatta*) is apparent."[1] The phrase *ṭhitassa aññathatta* in the above passage refers only to the nature of a conditioned thing from the time of its arising upto the time of its cessation; in other words, it only implies the process of decay (*jarā*), and does not imply anything static. Buddhaghosa, while paraphrasing it by decay (*jarā*),[2] goes on to accept a static moment. The Sarvāstivādins accepted four characteristics: nascence (*jāti*), decay (*jarā*), duration (*sthiti*) and impermanence (*anityatā*).[3] *Thitassa aññathatta* which was only one of the three characteristics according to the suttas was given as two: *sthiti* and *anityatā*. The recognition of the static moment was one of the main features of the Sarvāstivāda theory and as may be pointed out later, the Sautrāntikas denied this static moment. The fact that the theory of moments was new to both the sūtra as well as the commentarial traditions preserved at the Mahā-Vihāra in Ceylon is amply illustrated by a statement of Buddhaghosa in the *Atthasālinī* He says: "Herein the continued present (*santati-paccuppanna*) finds mention in the commentaries; the enduring present (*addhā-paccuppanna*) in the Sūtras. Here some say that 'The thought existing in the momentary present (*khaṇa-paccuppannaṃ*) becomes the object of telepathic insight (*cetopariya-ñaṇa*)' ".[4] Thus, those who upheld the theory of moments (*khaṇa*) are referred to as "some" (*keci*), thereby implying that it did not belong to the commentarial tradition available at Mahāvihāra. Moreover, the examples quoted by Buddhaghosa to illustrate the rapidity with which the moments

[1] *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, (abbr. *A*) ed. R. Morris and E. Hardy, (London, 1885–), i. 152, Tīṇ' imāni bhikkhave saṅkhatassa saṅkhatalakkhanāni. Katamāni tīṇi? Uppādo pannāyati vayo pannyati ṭhitassa annathattaṃ pannāyati

[2] *Manorathapūraṇī*, (abbr' *AA*), ed. N. Welleser and H. Kopp, (London, 1924–56), ii. 252, Thitassa annathattam nāma jarā.... Tesu uppādakkhane uppādo, ṭhitakkhane jarā bhedakkhane vayo.

[3] *Kosa*. ii. 222; Sumangala (*AbhvT* pp. 304-5) says that the ācariyas, Jotipāla and Dhammapāla, while disagreeing with Ānanda, accept both *thiti* and *jarā*.

[4] *DhsA*. p. 421, Santati-paccuppannaṃ c'ettha aṭṭhakathāsu āgatam, addhā-paccuppannaṃ sutte. Tattha keci khana-paccuppannaṃ cittam cetopariyanānassa ārammanaṃ hotīti vadanti.

succeed one another are examples rather popular in the texts belonging to the Sarvāstivāda school.[1]

Thus we see that a number of the Sarvāstivāda theories are to be found, some of them implicitly, in the works of Buddhaghosa. On the whole, the realism that is characteristic of Sarvāstivāda is a dominant feature of Buddhaghosa's writings.

But we do not propose that Buddhaghosa was a full-fledged Sarvāstivādin. In fact, there are many instances where Buddhaghosa seems to have favoured, or even accepted some of the theories put forward by schools such as Mādhyamika and Yogācāra. The *Visuddhimagga* as well as the Abhidhamma commentaries make use of the theory of "subliminal consciousness" (*bhavaṅga-viññāṇa* or *bhavaṅga-citta*).[2] Whether this theory was part and parcel of the Sthaviravāda tradition in Ceylon before Buddhaghosa is a question which may not be satisfactorily answered, because, as we have pointed out earlier, the source material necessary for deciding this question is irretrievably lost. But we know that a similar theory, namely, the theory of *ālaya-vijñāna* was very popular with the Yogācārins from a very early date.

Apart from this, a very specific example of Buddhaghosa's knowledge of the Yogācāra texts and the influence this exerted on his interpretation of the Sthaviravāda tradition is to be found in the *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*. A careful examination of the *Paṭṭhāna* of the Theravāda Abhidhamma Piṭaka would reveal the fact that their conception of a causal relation is rather narrow or limited. Among the list of twenty four causal relations enumerated here, not one represents a positively obstructing cause. The *vigata-paccaya* and the *natthi-paccaya* are obstructing causes only in a negative sense. This is because the Theravādins defined a cause (*pratyaya*) as a 'supporting phenomenon' (*upakārako dhammo*), not as one that obstructs the arising of another phenomenon. In his own definition of 'cause' (*pratyaya*), Buddhaghosa remains faithful to the Theravāda tradition. But his knowledge of the non-Theravāda literature was so extensive that without any provocation he introduces a type of causal relation which was not contemplated in the Theravāda tradition. In the *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*, Buddhaghosa

[1] See *Vism.* pp. 458 ff.

[2] Cp. *Sāratthappakāsinī*, ed. F. L. Woodward, (London, 1929–37), ii. 99 and *Sakv.* p. 33.

refers to nine ways in which ignorance (*avijjā*) is causally related to the dispositions (*saṅkhārā*), one of which is by way of obstruction (*paḷibodha*).[1] We have not been able to trace such a definition in the Theravāda Abhidhamma. But in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, Asanga refers to various ways in which the "root-cause" (*hetu-pratyaya*) could be recognised and one of them is by way of "opposition" or "obstruction" (*paripantha*).[2] The example given is that of the acquisition of defiling tendencies (*klesa*) which leads to the perpetuation of the flow of defilements and the resulting "obstruction" to the attainment of emancipation. Here the defilements function as obstructing causes and the function of the 'cause' (*pratyaya*) is identical with that referred to by Buddhaghosa in the *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī* as *paḷibodha*. Moreover, an 'obstructing cause' (*virodhi-kāraṇa*) is frequently referred to in the Yogācāra texts.[3]

Before we conclude the examination of Buddhaghosa's works, we may mention another school which seems to have exerted much influence on his interpretation of the Sthaviravāda texts. This is the Mādhyamika school. It is true that the Mādhyamika conception of *sūnyatā* had its origin in the early sūtras. In fact, the Mādhyamikas themselves quote many sūtras in support of their theory of *sūnyatā*.[4] But really it is Nāgārjuna who, while criticising the Ābhidharmika tradition, *emphasised* the use of *sūnyatā* as an equivalent for 'dependent origination' (*pratītya-samutpāda*) and also as an equivalent not only of the nature of the phenomenal world but also for Nibbāna and the Absolute. This emphasis emerges very clearly from the works of Buddhaghosa.[5]

[1] *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*, (abbr. *DA*), ed. T. W. Rhys Davids, J. E. Carpenter and W. Stede, (London, 1876-1932), i. 101.

[2] *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, ed. Pralhad Pradhan, (Sāntiniketan, 1950), p. 28.

[3] Ibid. p. 29; *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang. tr. L. de la Vallee Poussin, (Paris, 1921), p. 459.

[4] Cp. for example, *Mādhyamakavrttih*, ed. L. de la Vallee Poussin, (St. Petersbourg, 1903), p. 41 and *Samyutta Nikāya*, ed. M. Leon Feer, (London, 1890). iii. 142. Also *s. v. Mādhyamakavrttih*, pp. 525-629.

[5] See Karunaratna,, W.S., "Sūnyatā in Tneravāda Buddhism", in *The Adyar Library Bulletin*, (Adyar, 1959), vol. xxiii, pp. 1 ff. Here the author attempts to show that śūnyatā was not an innovation of Nāgārjuna but part and parcel of Theravāda Buddhism. Yet most of the sources considered by the author as representing the Theravāda tradition are from the commentaries of Buddhaghosa, a fact which, on the other hand, proves our contention that Buddhaghosa was also influenced by the Mādhyamika school of thought.

The conclusion to which all this would lead us is that Buddhaghosa's commentaries hardly depict the pure Sthaviravāda tradition. On the contrary, while preserving a good part of the Sthavira tradition, Buddhaghosa has incorporated into his works the central tenets of many of the divergent schools of Buddhism, ye with a strong bias towards Sarvāstivāda realism. Thus it is a more complex form of Sthaviravāda that we find in Buddhaghosa's works and this was the school which had its centre at Mahavihāra in Anurādhapura for many years afterwards.

Of Buddhaghosa's successors, Dhammapāla seems to have been rather faithful to the views put forward by the great exegetist. Since most of Dhammapāla's commentaries were on texts which dealt with predominantly religious ideas rather than philosophical concepts, his works throw very little light on the problems referred to earlier. On the whole he seems to have advocated a kind of realism which Buddhaghosa himself favoured. In his commentary on the *Netti*, Dhammapāla, like Buddhaghosa, directly associates himself with the theory of causality which recognised a distinction between a 'primary cause' and a 'secondary condition'.[1]

The Sarvāstivāda Tradition in Ceylon

Buddhadatta who wrote the *Abhidhammāvatāra* and who was a senior contemporary of Buddhaghosa seems to have favoured the kind of realism advocated by the Sarvāstivādins, more than Buddhaghosa did. While Buddhaghosa followed the more traditional way of expounding reality in terms of the *skandha-āyatana-dhātu* classification, Buddhadatta's analysis appears to be rather unorthodox in that he adopts the fourfold division of mind (*citta*), mental properties (*cetasika*), matter (*rūpa*) and *nibbāna*.[2] Realism is more pronounced in his works than in the works of Buddhaghosa. The consideration of mind (*citta*) and matter (*rūpa*) as separate realities (*paramattha*) points to this.[3] This method of expounding reality in terms of the four categories was not much popular in the North Indian Abhidharma tradition. Since Buddhadatta came

[1] *Nettippakaraṇa*, ed. F. Hardy, (London, 1902), p. 78.

[2] *Abhidhammāvatāra*, ed. A. P. Buddhadatta, (Colombo, 1954), p. 1.

[3] See *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*, (abbr. *Abhs*) ed. T. W. Rhys Davids, (in *Journal of the Pali Text Society*, London, 1884), p. 1.

from Uragapura in South India, this probably may have been a tradition prevalent in that part of India. The realist trend is also clearly set out in Buddhadatta's *Rūpārūpavibhāga* ("Analysis of material and immaterial phenomena").[1]

The next author of repute who appears to have continued the realist tradition in Ceylon was Anuruddha who lived at the beginning of the twelfth century. A careful study of his works would show that he was more faithful to the system of exposition adopted by Buddhadatta, as for example, in emphasising the fourfold division of reality introduced by Buddhadatta. In his *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*, considered as the manual *par excellence* both in Ceylon and Burma, he spells out very clearly some of the theories which were found in a rather unsystematic form in the works of Buddhaghosa. The Sarvāstivāda theory of paramāṇu, which was found in implicit form in the *Visuddhimagga*, is presented very explicitly here. The term *kalāpa* came to be used in a technical sense, corresponding to the *saṅghāta-paramāṇu* of the Vaibhāṣikas, to mean the smallest unit of matter, which is a collection (*piṇḍa*) of material elements (=*paramāṇu* or *dravya-paramāṇu*).[2] As for the theory of moments (*khaṇa*), he accepts the threefold division into nascent (*uppāda*) static (*thiti*) and cessant (*bhaṅga*) moments and goes on to describe in detail how the attunement of mental vibrations with the vibrations of matter gives rise to perception.[3] The *Nāmarūpa-pariccheda*[4] is still another example of his adherence to the philosophy of realism.

Sāriputta who lived during the reign of Parākramabāhu the Great (1165 A. D.) turns out to be a very important figure in our attempt to determine the schools of thought connected with the three main Vihāras in Ceylon. Although Sāriputta belonged to the Polonnaruwa period, yet he represents a tradition which was started by Buddhadatta during the Anurādhapura period.

Sāriputta's *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha-sannaya*, while conforming to the realist tradition embodied in Anuruddha's manual, also gives the different views held by some other teachers regarding certain

[1] ed. A. P. Buddhadatta, in *Buddhadatta's Manuals*, I, 1915 (pp. 149–159).
[2] See Karunadasa, Y., *Buddhist Analysis of Matter*, (Colombo, 1967), pp. 144–5.
[3] *Abhs.* pp. 16–7.
[4] ed. A. P. Buddhadatta, (Colombo, 1954.)

philosophical problems connected with the theory of moments (*khaṇa*). Accepting the traditional view that a phenomenon has three moments, i.e. nascent (*uppāda*), static (*ṭhiti*) and cessant (*bhaṅga*), which resembles the Sarvāstivāda standpoint, Sāriputta refers to another theory which denies the static moment (*ṭhitikkhaṇa*) and later goes on to reject it.[1] He does not refer to the name of the author or of the school advocating this theory, but merely says that it was held by some teacher (*samahara ācariya kenek*).

What is of historical significance is that Sāriputta became the head of a large school at Jetavana in Polonnaruva. He is one of the most illustrious teachers who lived during this time and came to be known as Sāgaramati, "like unto the ocean in wisdom".[2] He was also one of the prominent members of Parākramabhāhu's convocation and we are told that the king built for him "a mansion of great splendour containing many halls and chambers", attached to the Great Jetavana Vihāra at Polonnaruva.[3] The connection between the Jetavana in Anurādhapura and the Jetavana at Polonnaruva, though not established historically, seems to be rather significant when we consider the continuity of the tradition started by Buddhadatta.

Of the authors who owed allegiance to the realist tradition, the last and by far the most important for our study, is Sumangala who was one of the pupils of the great teacher Sāriputta, referred to above. The most outstanding among his works are the *Abhidhammatthavikāsinī*, a sub-commentary (*ṭīkā*) on Buddhadatta's *Abhidhammāvatāra* and the *Abhidhammatthavibhāvinī*,[4] a sub-commentary on Anuruddha's *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*. In these two texts, the Sarvāstivāda realism is spelled out in no unmistakable terms.

One of the most important problems connected with the theory of moments *(ksaṇa)* on which the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas disputed with each other is the recognition of the

[1] *Abhidharmārthasaṅgraha-purāṇa-sannaya*, ed. W. Somaloka Tissa, (Colombo, 1960), pp. 101-2.

[2] *Saddhammasaṅgaha*, p. 62; Malalasekera, G. P., *Pali Literature of Ceylon*, (Colombo, 1958 reprint), p. 197.

[3] *Mv.* 78.31 ff.

[4] (abbr. *AbhsT*), ed. D. Pannāsara and P. Wimaladhamma (Colombo, 1933) (Vidyoday Ṭīka Publication, vol. i).

static moment (*sthiti-kṣaṇa*, P. *ṭhitikkhaṇa*).[1] In both works mentioned above, Sumangala makes a persistent attempt to justify the acceptance of the static moment. Every now and then, he refers to the opponent's view which denies the static moment and devotes much space to its refutation. It is of immense significance to note that in one place in the *Abhidhammatthavikāsinī*, Sumangala openly states that it was Ānanda (who wrote the *Mūla-ṭīkā*) who denied the theory of a static moment (*ṭhitikkhaṇa*).[2]

We pointed out earlier that Buddhaghosa's definition of dhamma as "that which bears its own nature" (*attano sabhāvaṃ dhārentīti dhammā*) brought him very much closer to the Sarvāstivāda teachings. It was pointed out that the Sarvāstivāda was, on the other hand, influenced by the dravya-vāda of theVaiśeṣikas. The Vaiśeṣika categories of *dravya* and *sāmānya* seems to have moulded the Sarvāstivāda conception of dharma to such an extent that the latter defined dharma in terms of 'individual' (or one's own) and 'general' characteristics (*svasāmānyalakṣaṇadhāranāt dharmaḥ*).[3] Sumangala goes further than his predecessors in adopting the Sarvāstivāda standpoint when he defines dhamma in identical terms—*sabhāvasāmaññalakkhaṇaṃ dhāretīti dhammā*.[4]

Thus the Sarvāstivāda tradition in Ceylon, initiated by Buddhadatta and favoured by Buddhaghosa, reaches its climax with the works of Sumangala. The fact that Sumangala was following the footsteps of his predecessors in the matter of presenting the Sarvāstivāda tradition is attested by his frequent calls to adopt the interpretations of the commentators.[5]

The Sautrāntika Tradition in Ceylon

Apart from these two traditions—the syncretic Sthaviravāda represented by Buddhaghosa and Dhammapāla, and the Sarvāstivāda

[1] For the Sarvāstivāda view, see *Adv.* pp. 104–5; Sautrāntika views are found at *Abhidharmakosa-bhāsya* (abbr. *Akb*), ed. Pralhad Pradhan, ii. 46 ed. (quoted by Jaini, *Adv.* p. 105 n.)

[2] p. 304; cp. *AbhsT.* pp. 77, 117–8.

[3] *Sakv.* p. 12.

[4] *AbhvT.* p. 11.

[5] *AbhsT.* p. 78, where Sumangala agrees with the view expressed in the *atthakathā* regarding the problem of *thitikkhaṇa*. See also pp. 81,87,98–100.

tradition represented by Buddhadatta, Anuruddha, Sāriputta and Sumangala—we come across another very important tradition of which the sole representative seems to be Ānanda of *Abhidhamma-mūlaṭīkā* fame. The *Abhidhamma-mūlaṭīkā* (a sub-commentary on Buddhaghosa's commentaries on the Abhidhamma Piṭaka)[1] composed by Ānanda, a native of South India, presents us with a tradition completely different from the two traditions discussed above. This is borne out very clearly by the fact that on the one hand, while commenting on the commentaries of Buddhaghosa, Ānanda occasionally disagrees with the commentator,[2] and on the other hand, Sumangala, the representative of the Sarvāstivāda tradition in Ceylon, while agreeing with the commentarial tradition,[3] openly disagrees with the views expressed by Ānanda.[4] In the *Vikāsinī* as well as in the *Vibhāvinī*, Sumangala several times refers to Ānanda by name[5] and sometimes as the Ṭīkākāra.[6]

Leaving out many of the minor problems on which these traditions differed from one another, we propose to consider two of the main issues on which they expressed divergent views. In fact, these were two of the main issues on which the two traditions, Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika, came to be divided. The first is the conception of dhamma and the other, the theory of moments (*khaṇa*).

We have already pointed out how because of Buddhaghosa's leanings towards Sarvāstivāda, he used the term *sabhāva* (own nature) in his definition of dhamma. Then we found that Sumangala went a step further when he defined dhamma as "that which bears 'individual' (*sabhāva*) and 'general' (*sāmaññā*) characteristics", thereby adopting the dichotomy which the Sarvāstivādins themselves upheld. But Ānanda who wrote the sub-commentary on Buddhaghosa's *Atthasālinī* and who even preceded Anuruddha, while adopting Buddhaghosa's definition of dhamma as "that which bears

[1] Part I, (Dhammasaṅgaṇī-ṭīkā) (abbvr. *DhsT*), ed. D. Pannāsara and P. Wimaladhamma, (Colombo, 1938), (Vidyodaya Ṭīkā Publication, vol. ii). The complete text is being edited for the Pali Text Society (London) by the present author.

[2] *DhsT* pp. 98-99; also pp. 140 ff.

[3] See note 5, p. 176.

[4] *AbhvT* pp. 153, 197, 301 304-5; *AbhsT* pp. 81, 104, 118.

[5] *AbhvT* pp. 153, 207, 216, 237, 254, 278, 289, 301, 302, 304, 306, 388; *AbhvT* pp 81, 108, 118.

[6] *AbhvT* p. 197; *AbhsT* p. 104.

its own nature", immediately sounded a warning against any wrong implications that this definition may carry. Having raised a question regarding this definition of dhamma, he says: "There is no dhamma over and above the nature of bearing" (*na ca dhāriyamānasabhāvā aññ̃o dhammo nāma atthi*).[1] Taking the example of 'forming (*ruppana*) as a characteristic or nature (*sabhāva*) of 'form' (*rūpa*), Ānanda maintains that there is no 'form' (*rūpa,*) etc., apart from 'forming', etc. or earth (*paṭhavi*), etc., apart from 'hardness' (*kakkhalatā*), etc.[2] Here is a definite denial of a 'substance' (*svabhāva*) over and above the perceptible characteristics. Ānanda's determination to sound this warning seems to have sprung from the fear that the generally accepted definition of dhamma as "that which bears its own nature", may be misconstrued to mean that there is a 'substance'.[3] Furthermore, the Sarvāstivāda theory that substance (*svabhāva*) exists during the three periods of time: past, present and future, appears to have been rejected by Ānanda.[4] This represents the standpoint of the Sautrāntikas, who adopted a phenomenalistic view of reality.

The other issue involves the conception of time, divided into three moments (*khaṇa*): nascent (*uppāda*) static (*ṭhiti*) and cessant (*bhaṅga*). As pointed out earlier, Sāriputta, in his *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha-sannaya* refers to a dissentient view which holds that there is no static moment (*ṭhitikkhaṇa*). But Sumaṅgala, while giving the same description and details as given by Sāriputta pointedly refers to the theory as being held by Ānanda.[5] He even quotes a passage from Ananda's Mūla-ṭīkā wherein Ānanda refers to the Aṅguttara discourse[6] describing the three characteristics of

[1] *DhsT* p. 21, The printed text seems to be wrong when it gives *na ca dhāriyamānasabhāvā aññ̃o dhammo nāma n' atthi*, because the doube negation *na...n'atthi* is not found in the example quoted in illustration and also because all the manuscripts so far consulted, as also the Burmese edition, read *atthi* ins tead of *n' atthi*.

[2] ibid. pp. 21-22, Na hi ruppanādīhi anne rūpādayo kakkhalādīhi ca anne paṭhavi-ādayo dhammā vijjanti.

[3] For according to the *Sakv* p. 362, *svabhāva* is equivalent to *ātman* (svabhāvata ity ātmatah).

[4] *Dhs*T p. 46.

[5] *AbhvT* p. 304, Ānandācariyo pana cittassa ṭhitikkhanam eva n' atthi bhaṅgakkhane rūp'uppādo n'atthīti catusamuṭṭhānikāni pi rūpāni cittassa uppādakkhane yeva hontīti āha.

[6] *A* i. 152.

phenomena, to wit, arising (*uppāda*), ceasing (*vaya*) and change (*ṭhitassa aññathatta*) and argues that this sūtra passage does not imply a static moment. This too was one of the central tenets of the Sautrāntikas, for they held that a dharma disappears as soon as it appears without any spatial movement.[1] This theory attributed to Ānanda by Sumangala, is in turn attributed by Ānanda to the Abhayagirivāsins, Ānanda himself accepting it.[2] This statement of Ānanda is of great historical importance in that it helps us to connect the Sautrāntika tradition with the Abhayagiri.

On the basis of the foregoing discussion it may be possible to delineate the three main traditions prevalent in Ceylon during the Anurādhapura and Polonnaruva periods in the following manner:

School	Representatives
(1) Syncretic Sthaviravāda	– (i) Buddhaghosa (ii) Dhammapāla.
(2) Sarvāstivāda	– (i) Buddhadatta (ii) Anuruddha (iii) Sāriputta (iv) Sumaṅgala.
(3) Sautrāntika	– (i) Ānanda.

The Three Main Centres of Buddhism

Having demarcated the three main traditions which seem to have dominated the Buddhist movement in Ceylon from the time of Buddhaghosa upto the end of the twelfth century, it would be necessary to attempt to place these traditions in relation to the three main centres of Buddhism in Ceylon, namely, Mahā-Vihāra, Abhayagiri and Jetavana. One important fact that we have to keep in mind at this stage is that some of the Buddhist luminaries mentioned above, namely, Anuruddha, Sāriputta and Sumaṅgala lived at a time when the political capital and along with it, the centres of Buddhist learning, had shifted from Anurādhapura to Polonnaruva. But this problem need not deter us from going

[1] *Sakv* p. 33, Ksanikānāṃ nāsti desāntaragamanaṃ yatraivotpattih tatraiva vināsah.
See also *Akb* ii. 46 ab (*Adv* p. 105, n. 2).

[2] *DhsT* p. 140, Kecīti Abhayagirivāsino ti vadanti. Te pana cittassa ṭhitikkhanaṃ na icchanti,...

ahead with the proposed investigation because the school of thought represented by these three teachers is only a continuation of the tradition initiated during the earlier period.

Mahāvihāra

There is no great problem in placing the school represented by Buddhaghosa and Dhammapāla. As mentioned earlier, they were connected with the Mahā-Vihāra which is generally accredited as having preserved the genuine form of Sthaviravāda. Our analysis showed that, although the Mahā-Vihāra would have preserved the original Sthaviravāda tradition, yet after Buddhaghosa's literary activities and the subsequent disappearance of the original Sinhalese commentaries, the pure Sthaviravāda tradition came to be mixed up with various other schools of thought such as Sarvāstivāda, Mādhyamika and Yogācāra to such an extent that it has become extremely difficult to sift and sort out the main teachings of Sthaviravāda. Many new concepts came to be introduced by Buddhaghosa and we are not in a position to lay bare the tradition that would have been preserved in the Sinhalese commentaries which Buddhaghosa consulted in compiling his commentaries.

Abhayagiri

The nikāya which had to endure a great deal of persecution and attack from the Mahā-Vihāra was the Abhayagiri. It was here that the Vaitulya-vāda appeared on several occasions. Vaitulya-vāda is no doubt another term for Mahāyāna, rather a derogatory term used by the Hīnayānists to designate Mahāyāna, in the same way as the Mahāyānists used the term Hīnayāna. It is rather doubtful whether this school was allowed to thrive on Ceylonese soil. The conservatism with which the newly found doctrine, namely, the Sthaviravāda introduced to the island by Mahinda, was protected and cherished, stood in the way of extreme forms of the religion such as the Mahāyāna developing and flourishing here. A school such as the Mahāsāṅghika was said to have existed in Ceylon.[1] It is also argued that the Mahāsāṅghika teachings as represented in the works like Mahāvastu are not very much different from the ideas embodied in Pali canon. In fact, the Mahāsāṅghikas were

[1] See *AbhvT.* p. 46.

once included in the list of Hīnayāna schools.[1] But it may be pointed out that the Mahāsāṅghika school of the Christian era or even after the Third Council was far more developed than the Mahāsāṅghika school which ceded from the main Sthaviravāda after the Second Council held at Vesāli. While the latter may have contained the seeds of Mahāyāna, the former was certainly a more developed tradition that turned out to be the great rival of Sthaviravāda. The persistent attempt to introduce the Vaitulya-vāda and along with it, the Vaitulya Piṭaka, failed and we hear of the Vaitulya books being 'sacrificed to the god of fire' every time it came to be introduced.

What then was it that survived at Abhayagiri? It has been observed that although Abhayagiri was an individual force in the history of the Ceylon Sangha, little information is available as to the doctrinal differences, if any, on which Abhayagiri seems to have deviated from the Mahā-Vihāra tradition.[2] Gunawardhana referring to the Abhayagiri inscription observes that "Most probably, it was the monks of the Abhayagiri monastery who represented the Sthaviravādins in this context."[3] But a careful study of the *Abhidhamma-mūlaṭīkā* of Ānanda would, as pointed out earlier, change this situation. Our analysis revealed the fact that the *Abhidhamma-mūlaṭīkā* represents the doctrinal standpoint of the Sautrāntika school of Buddhism. We have pointed out that two important passages, one in the *Abhidhammatthavikāsinī* of Sumangala and the other in the *Abhidhamma-mūlaṭīkā* of Ānanda, set out very clearly the connection between the Sautrāntika school and Abhayagiri. In the former, the Sautrāntika theory of moments (*khaṇa*) is attributed to Ānanda, the author of the *Mūlaṭīkā*, while in the latter Ānanda himself attributes it to the Abhayagirivāsins. In the literary circles of medieaval Ceylon, Ānanda seems to have been well respected. In the later medieaval Buddhist texts, Ānanda is very often referred to as holding different views on problems under discussion.[4] Even though they were not inclined to agree with Ānanda's views, he was always addressed to respectfully as ācariya (the teacher).[5]

[1] Rhys Davids, op. cit. p. 411, Table I.
[2] Devendra, D. T., "Abhayagiri", in *Encyclopaedia, of Buddhism*. Volume of Specimen Articles, ed. G. P. Malalasekera, (Colombo, 1957), p. 2.
[3] op. cit. p. 63.
[4] See note[2], p. 177.
[5] ibid.

It is also of interest to note that occasionally Ānanda disagreed with Buddhaghosa on whose commentaries he was writing the sub-commentary.[1]

If we are to hold that it was the Sautrāntika tradition which was dominant at Abhayagiri, then we have to solve three important problems. Firstly, what is the connection between the Sautrāntika school and that which came to be known as Vaitulya-vāda, which, according to the Chronicles, was favoured by the Abhayagiri fraternity? Secondly, why did the Mahā-Vihāra tolerate the Sautrāntika and allowed it to thrive, but not Vaitulya-vāda? Thirdly, what is the relationship between the Sautrāntikas and Dhammaruci?

The *Abhidharmadīpa*, a Sanskrit work expounding the genuine Vaibhāṣika (Sarvāstivāda) standpoint, comes to our rescue in answering the first question. The *Abhidharmakosa*, written by Vasubandhu, was considered to be a work embodying the doctrines of the Sarvāstivāda school. But author himself belonged to the Sautrāntika school. This being so, the Sarvāstivādins found that the Sarvāstivāda standpoint was not well represented in the *Abhidharmakosa* and that it had a bias towards the Sautrāntika ideas. Thus came to be written the *Abhidharmadīpa* setting out the more orthodox Sarvāstivāda doctrines. The *Abhidharmadīpa* and its commentary, the *Vibhāsāprabhāvrtti* are supposed to have been written in imitation of the *Abhidharmakosa* and its *Bhāsya*.[2]

In the *Vibhāsāprabhāvrtti*, there are many hostile references to the Kośakāra (without mentioning the name of Vasubandhu) criticizing his Sautrāntika views and at times accusing him of entering the portals of Mahāyāna Buddhism.[3] The editor of the text, Dr. P. S. Jaini, has convincingly pointed out the significance of these statements.[4] Of these several statements, one that is of great relevance to our problem is the statement of the Sautrāntika view regarding the

[1] See *Vibhaṅga-mūlatikā*, (Burmese ed. 1960), p. 6, where Ānanda avoids discussing the reference to the three moments at *VbhA* (p. 7). See also p. 191, where commenting on *thitikkhana* he actually denies it.

[2] Jaini, P. S., "On the theory of two Vasubandhus", *BSOAS* vol. xxi, 1958, p.50

[3] Jaini has noted seventeen references.

[4] ibid. See also "Buddha's prolongation of life", by the same author, *BSOAS* vol. xxi, pp. 546 ff.

Budha's ability to prolong his life-span. It runs thus: 'For surely, if the Lord, by the powers of meditation could, at will, produce a new living personality or could cast a new life-span independent of karma, then indeed, the Buddha would be turned into a Nārayana. Moreover, he would never attain parinirvāna, such is his compassion for worldly beings. Therefore, this view deserves no consideration, as the Kośakāra (that is, Vasubandhu who was a Sautrāntika when he wrote the *Abhidharmakosa*) is here following the *Vaitulika-sāstra*.''[1] This statement, as pointed out by Jaini,[2] anticipates the development of the *avatāravāda* in Mahāyāna Buddhism and reasserts the orthodox theory of the human Buddha accepted by the Pali commentators as well as the Sarvāstivādins. The *Kathāvatthu* attributes this belief to the Mahāsāṅghikas, the representatives of Mahāyāna.[3] Moreover, the *Vaitulika-sāstra* clearly refers to the Mahāyāna scriptures. Asaṅga, in his *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, identifies *vaitulya* with *vaipulya* and explains the latter as a reference to the *Bodhisattva-Piṭaka*.[4] Thus, *Vaitulika-sāstra* is no other than the *Bodhisattva-Piṭaka*, i. e. the Mahāyāna scriptures. *Vaitulika-sāstra* is no doubt the *Vaitulya-Piṭaka* referred to in the Pali chronicles. Moreover, since the Sautrāntikas had greater leanings towards Mahāyāna, they would have shared many common views with the Mahāyāna schools such as the Mahāsāṅghikas. Thus we find the Abhayagirivāsins (who were Sautrāntikas) agreeing with the Mahāsāṅghikas on some minor problems such as what constitutes the dasapuññakiriyavatthu.[5]

The next problem that has to be solved is: Why did the Mahāvihāravāsins tolerate the Sautrāntikas but not the Vaitulya-vādins? According to the *Vibhāsāprabhāvrtti*, a Vaitulya represents the extreme form of Mahāyāna. The Vaitulika not only emphasised

[1] *Adv* p. 101, Yadi Bhagavān samādhibalena svecchayāpūrvaṃ sattvaṃ... utpādayet svātmano vā jīvitam ankāsiptaṃ prāk-karmabhir yogabalen'kāsipet, tato Buddho Bhagavān Nārāyanī-krtah syāt, āpūrvasattvanirmānāt. Sa ca kārunikatvān naiva parinirvāyāt... tasmād Vaitullaka-sāstra-pravesa-dvāram ārabdhaṃ tena bhadantenty adhyupeksyam etat.

[2] *BSOAS* vol. xxi, p. 551.

[3] *Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa-Atthakathā*, printed in *The Journal of the Pali Text Society*, 1889, p. 131, on *Kathāvatthu*, ed. Arnold C. Taylor, (London,1894-7), pp. 456 f.

[4] p. 79.

[5] *AbhvT* p. 46, Mahāsaṅghikā pana Abhayagirivāsino ca diṭṭhujjukammaṃ visuṃ punnakiriyabhāvena na ganhanti.

the transcendence of Buddha to the neglect of the historical personality, but also presented a theory of *ayoga-sūnyatā* according to which nothing exists. This latter view was condemned as annihilationism (*vainā̄sika*) by those who upheld a realist standpoint.[1] It was identical with the *nihsvabhāvavāda* propounded by the Mādhyamikas as well as by the Yogācārins,[2] the two main schools of Mahāyāna which were opposed to the Hīnayāna tradition. This seems to be the reason why the Mahāvihāravāsins, with the assistance of the royalty, suppressed the Vaitulya-vāda which found favour with the Abhayagirivāsins.

But the Sautrāntika school was only a door-way (*Vaitulika-sāstra-pravesa-dvāra*), not in itself a form of Mahāyāna. This is amply illustrated by the fact that Vasubandhu started as a Sautrāntika and ended as a Mahāyānist.[3] It is also important to note that although the Sautrāntika school was considered as a door-way to Mahāyāna or Vaitulya-vāda, yet it was generally considered a Hīnayāna school. Thus the Sautrāntika school had the double advantage of being acceptable to those who had leanings towards Mahāyāna (as for example, the Abhayagirivāsins) as well as those who belonged to the Hīnayāna tradition (like the Mahāvihāravāsins). Such a school may not have been considered as dengerous as Vaitulya-vāda by the Mahāvihāra-vāsins or by any other group with a bias for realism. This explains the attitude of teachers like, Anuruddha, Sāriputta and Sumangala towards the most important representative of Sautrāntika thought in Ceylon, namely, Ānanda. These teachers, while referring to Ānanda in a rather respectful manner as *ācariya*, yet disagreed with most of the views put forward by him.

If, on the basis of the foregoing evidence, we propose the thesis that Abhayagiri was the Sautrāntika school of Buddhism in Ceylon, then it is necessary to find out whether the earliest school founded

[1] *Adv* p. 258, Yah khalv esa prathamo vādī Sarvāstivādākhyāh, esa khalu ... sadvādī, tad anye vādino Dārstāntika-Vaitulika-Paudgalikāh na yuktyāgamābhidhāyinah tarkābhimāninas te, mithyāvāditvād ete Lokāyatika-Vainā̄sika-Nagnāṭapakse prakseptavyāh.

[2] ibid. p. 276, Vaitulikāh kalpayanti;

Yat pratītyasmutpannaṃ
tat svabhāvān na vidyate.

See also *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (p. 84), Yad uktaṃ Vaitulye nihsvabhāvāh sarvadharmā iti ...

[3] See Jaini, *BSOAS* vol. xxi, pp. 48 ff.

at Abhayagiri, namely, the Dhammaruci, had any connection with the Sautrāntikas. According to the chronicles, the Thera Dhammaruci who came and settled down at Abhayagiri, once Abhayagiri came to be separated from Mahā-Vihāra belonged to the group of monks called the Vajjiputtaka. The Vajjiputtakas seem to be the same as the Vātsiputriyas,[1] who in many ways were related to the Sautrāntikas[2]. The name Dhammaruci itself is already open to different interpretations: one deriving the name from the supposed founder (i. e. in the chronicles), another indicating the nature of the ideas held by the seceders, i. e., those who delight in the Dhamma or who cause the Dhamma to shine.[3] We know that the Sautrāntikas were so-called because they considered the sūtras as the most authoritative texts (sūtrapramāṇika), as opposed to those who accepted the authority on the later śāstras (*śāstrapramāṇikā*).[4] This implies that at that time in India a distinction was made between the sūtras and the śāstras. But in Ceylon, the Sthaviravādins were generally reputed to be emphasising the vinaya (discipline).[5] The Sthaviravāda Buddhism in Ceylon claimed its descent from Upāli[6], the greatest *vinayadhara* among the disciples of the Buddha.[7] Mahinda too, the founder of this school in Ceylon, insisted on the reciting of the vinaya by a Ceylonese bhikkhu as it was only then, he maintained, that the sāsana would take root in Ceylon.[8] "Mahinda's Buddhism was a religion predominantly of practice."[9] But just before the first schism resulting in the establishment of the Abhayagiri as a separate fraternity, we find a controversy among the monks in Ceylon as to whether 'learning' (*pariyatti*) was the root of the sāsana or whether it was 'practice' (*paṭipatti*).[10] After arguments had been adduced on both sides the 'preachers of the doctrine' (*dhammakathikas*) gained victory over those who

[1] See *Points of Controversy*, p. xlii.

[2] Vasumitra, *Origin and Doctrines of Early Indian Buddhist Schools*, tr. J, Mazuda (in *Asia Majort*, vol. ii, 1925), pp. 53 ff. 66 ff.

[3] Bareau, A., *Les sectes bouddhiques du petit vehicule*, (Saigon, 1955), p. 242.

[4] *Sakv.* p. 11, Kah Sauntrātikārthah. Ye sūtrapramānikā na sāstrapramānikāh te Sautrāntikāh.

[5] *Samantapāsādikā*, (abbr. *VinA*), ed. J. Takakusu and M. Nagai, (London, 1924), i. 13.

[6] ibid, i. 62:

[7] *A* i. 25.

[8] *VinA.* i, 102; See Adikāram, E. W., *Early History of Buddhism in Ceylon* (Colombo, 1953 Second Impression), p. 56.

[9] Adikaram, op. cit. p. 78.

[10] *AA* i, 92-3, Pariyatti nu kho sāsanassa mūlaṃ udāhu, paṭipatti.

advocated the observance of the ascetic practices (*paṃsukūlikas*). In short, the Sutta defeated the Vinaya.[1] The victory of Suttanta over Vinaya would have been to the advantage of the Sautrāntikas who found favour with the Abhayagirivāsins—themselves not much interested in following the vinaya rules as is evident from the accusations levelled against Mahā-Tissa by the monks of the Mahā-Vihāra. In this context, it is of great interest to note that the Dhammarucians, established at Abhayagiri, rejected the Parivāra section of the Vinaya which according to the orthodox tradition, had been recited by the Buddha.[2] "The Abhayagiri monks seem to have kept up contact with various Buddhist sects and new movements in India, from which they derived inspiration and strength. They were liberal in their views and always welcomed new ideas from abroad and tried to be progressive."[3] This was the Sthavira school of Mahāyānists which was known to Hsuan Tsang.[4] Thus locating the Sautrāntika school at Abhayagiri seems to provide a more plausible explanation of the separation of the two communities without either of them becoming heretical in the doctrine. The teachings of the Abhayagiri fraternity was considered to be heretical by the Mahāvihāravāsins only when the former accepted the extreme form of Mahāyāna, i.e. Vaitulya-vāda. It was because of the close connection between the Sautrāntika school and Mahāyāna that the Vaitulya-vāda was welcomed by the sangha living at Abhayagiri.

As is evident from the *Abhidhamma-mūlaṭīkā*, the Sautrāntika school was one of the principal schools studied in Ceylon. There is also sufficient evidence to show that the Sautrāntika school was a power to reckon with in South India.[5] Ānanda, the author of the *Abhidhamma-mūlaṭīkā* was himself a South Indian[6] and probably this South Indian tradition continued to revitalize the Sautrāntika tradition introduced to Ceylon earlier.

[1] ibid.

[2] *Vamsatthappakāsini*, ed. G. P. Malalasekera, (London, 1935), pp. 175-6.

[3] Rahula, W., *History of Buddhism in Ceylon*, (Colombo, 1956), p. 85.

[4] Hiuen Tsiang, *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, tr. Samuel Beal, London, ii. p. 247.

[5] For Sautrāntika views as presented in *Sivajñānasiddhiyār*, a polemical treatise in Tamil an Saiva philosophy composed by Arunandi Sivacaryor, see *Journal of Vekantesvara Oriental Institute*, Tirupathi, vol. i, part 2, pp. 176-191.

[6] See Malalasekera, op. cit. p. 112.

Jetavana

We are now left with the other important centre of Buddhism during the Anurādhapura period, namely, Jetavana. The founding of the Vihāra as well as the manner in which the Sāgaliyas came to be established at this centre was mentioned earlier. Sāgala (Sialkot) is a city in North-Western India close to Kashmir, where the Sarvastivāda school flourished during the time of King Kanishka. According to the chronicles, it was a monk named Sāgala who came and established the Sāgaliya sect at Jetavana. It is usual for a monk hailing from a certain locality to be called by the name of that locality. This connection is significant. If the monk received his name from the locality from which he came, then the Sāgaliyas could possibly have been Sarvāstivādins.

One important statement in Buddhaghosa's *Atthasālinī* may afford a clue to the problem of identifying the Sarvāstivādins with the Jetavaniyas. This statement, referred to earlier, implies that the 'continued present' (*santati-paccuppanna*) finds mention in the Commentaries; that the 'enduring present' (*addhā-paccuppanna*) finds mention in the Sūtras; but that the 'momentary present' (*khaṇa-paccuppanna*) was held by some not associated with either sūtra tradition or the commentarial tradition associated with the Mahā-Vihāra. Two of the most important schools which accepted the theory of moments (*khaṇa*) were the Sautrāntikas and the Sarvāstivādins. As has been pointed out earlier, the Sautrāntika theory differed from that of the Sarvāstivādins in that the former denied the static (*sthiti*) moment. Now, Buddhaghosa's reference is to the Sautrāntika theory: denying the static moment, and Ānanda, while commenting on the statement of Buddhaghosa, identifies this theory withthat of the Abhayagirivāsins (see p. 181 note [1]). Was there, then, any school in Ceylon which accepted the Sarvāstivāda theory which recognised the static moment (*sthiti-kṣaṇa* or *thitikkhaṇa*)? This, as pointed out earlier, was one of the major controversies that dominated speculation during the Polonnaruwa period. The greatest literary figures of the Polonnaruwa period, Anuruddha, Sāriputta and Sumaṅgala, all made attempts to justify the Sarvāstivāda standpoint and all of them were associated with Jetavana in Polonnaruwa. Was this Sarvastivāda doctrine introduced to Ceylon for the first time during the Polonnaruwa period or was it a continuation of a tradition which existed in Ceylon during the Anurādhapura period? As is evident from Buddhaghosa's statement,

the original Mahā-Vihāra tradition did not subscribe to this doctrine; neither did the Abhayagirivāsins. Thus there is a strong possibility that it was accepted by the Jetavaniyas of the Anuradhapura period.

It was pointed that the pre-Buddhaghosa Mahā-Vihāra tradition may have preserved the pure Sthaviravāda doctrines. The Mahāvihāravāsins, being rather conservative, were reluctant to accept most of the new doctrines which came to be introduced into Ceylon, and these were generally welcomed by the Abhayagirivāsins who constituted the first major opposition to Mahā-Vihāra. The monks who settled down at Jetavana (in Anuradhapura) and subsequently formed the Sāgaliya sect were part of a group occupying Abhayagiri. When the Abhayagirivāsins favouring Sautrāntika ideas welcomed Vaitulya-vāda for the second time, a group of monks left Abhayagiri and settled down at Jetavana. It was only after the arrival of the monk named Sāgala that the Jetavaniyas come to be recognised as a distinct sect — i. e. the Sāgaliyas. This, therefore, seems to be the point at which the Sarvāstivāda came to be introduced into Ceylon.

We have pointed out that the Sarvāstivāda teaching dominated philosopical speculation during the Polonnaruwa period. Why was it that the centre of Buddhism during this period came to be called Jetavana, not Mahā-Vihāra or Abhayagiri? The most plausible explanation of this would be that the Sarvāstivāda tradition which was accepted by the Jetavaniyas of the Anuradhapura period came to be established with greater vigour and enthusiasm at the Jetavana in Polonnaruwa.

Last of the "Four Principal Nikāyas"

If we accept the tentative position that the three schools, the syncretic Sthaviravāda, the Sautrāntika and the Sarvāstivāda, were associated with the three centres of Buddhist learning, the Mahā-Vihāra, the Abhayagiri and the Jetavana respectively, what is the other important nikāya which makes up the four principal nikāyas (*cātur-mahā-nikāya*) referred to in the Abhayagiri inscription?

Gunawardhana considers the Mahāsāṅghikas as one of the "four principal nikāyas" in Ceylon.[1] He refers to a statement in

[1] op. cit. p. 66.

the *Cullavaṃsa* which says that King Sena I donated a monastery called Vīraṅkurārāma to the Mahāsāṅghika monks and those of the Theriya school.[1] We have pointed out that the Mahāsāṅghika teachings were not much different from Vaitulya-vāda and were therefore, not much tolerated in Ceylon. There certainly are references to the different views put forward by the Mahāsāṅghikas, but that does not imply that they should be considered as one of the "four principal nikāyas" as far as Ceylon was concerned. It is interesting to note that Heinz Bechert who brought out a posthumous edition of Geiger's *Culture of Ceylon in Mediaeval Times* has proposed an emendation to the verse in the Cullavaṃsa.[2] The emendation he proposes is that the phrase *mahāsāṅghika-bhikkhūnaṃ* should be read as *mahīsāsaka-bhikkhūnaṃ*. Gunawardhana argues against this, but his argument is based only on the fact that none of the manuscripts consulted for three different editions of the *Cullavaṃsa* give this reading. It is not very difficult for a scribe to mistake *mahāsāṅghika* for *mahīsāsākā*, especially when the Pali verson was found as *mahimsāsaka*.[3] Once such a mistake is committed, it tends to be perpetuated.[4] Bechert seems to be correct when he suggested this reading, for not only does Fa-hsien refer to the prevalence of the Mahīśāsakas in Ceylon, but even the *Jātakaṭṭhakathā* is believed to be a version of the Mahīśāsaka sect. Moreover, as Gunawardhana himself points out, the *Nikāya-saṃgraha* makes no mention of the Mahāsāṅghikas and their corporate existence with the Theravādins.[5] Furthermore, according to Vasumitra's treatise, of the two groups of Mahīśāsakas, there was one which had very close affinities with the Sarvāstivādins.[6] Thus this group of Mahīśāsakas may not have had much difficulty in living with the Sthaviravādins, both being Hīnayāna schools. But it is doubtful whether the monks of Ceylon who violently opposed the introduction of the Vaitulya-vāda would have tolerated the Mahāsānghikas. Therefore, in determining what the four principal nikāyas prevalent in Ceylon were, it seems better to consider the Mahīśāsakas rather than the Mahāsāṅghikas.

[1] ibid. p. 55.
[2] Geiger, *Culture of Ceylon in Mediaeval Times*, p. 208, n. 1.
[3] *Mv* 5. 6, 8.
[4] See, for example, *DhsT* where *yugandhara* is defined as *sita* - (some manuscripts, *sida-*) *pabbatesv eko* (printed text p. 6, corrects to *kulupabbatesv eko*) in all the manuscripts so far collated, when the correct form should read *sattapabbatesv eko*.
[5] op. cit. p. 57.
[6] Vasumitra, op. cit. pp. 62–3.

Another school suggested by Gunawardhana as one of the four principal nikāyas in Ceylon is the Sammitīyas.[1] Although the Sammitīyas were a prominent nikāya in India, there are no references whatsoever which point to the existence of the Sammitīyas as a principal school in Ceylon.

Considering all these facts, it may be safe to assume that the four principal nikāyas referred to in the Abhayagiri inscription are the Sthaviravādins, the Sautrāntikas, the Sarvāstivādins and the Mahīšāsakas, all of these schools coming under the broad category of Hīnayāna. This may explain why Parākramabāhu did not have much difficulty in unifying the divergent groups and uniting them under one leadership. Of these four, the Sthaviravadins (or more correctly, the Syncretic Sthaviravāda) were associated with the Mahā-Vihāra, the Sautrāntikas with the Abhayagiri and the Sarvāstivādins and the Mahīšāsakas with Jetavana.

1 op. cit. p. 66.

SOPHOCLES AND SOPHROSYNE

C. W. Amerasinghe

The most controversial of the three Greek tragedians has always been Sophocles. There has been disagreement over the interpretation of his plays individually as well as about the interpretation of his general philosophy of life. Amongst the points in dispute has been the question of what Sophocles regards as the ideal of human excellence. Webster, for instance, believes that Sophocles was committed to the ideal of *sophrosyne* (safe-mindedness).

"Sophocles" he says "regards the virtue of *sophrosyne* as second only to piety".[1]

He calls it the aristocratic ideal[2]. Webster's view has, I believe, been shared by the majority of classical scholars.

Whitman, on the other hand, cannot agree that "the heroic figures of his tragedies were created out of the straw of *hybris* in order to be knocked down as an object lesson in *sophrosyne*."[3]

Corresponding to their difference of opinion on this point are their diametrically opposed views on the Sophoclean chorus. To Webster the chorus is apparently the voice of Sophocles.[4] To Whitman the chorus is not the voice of Sophocles.[5] Webster's views on *sophrosyne* are connected with his view of the chorus, because it is the chorus who will normally be found in Sophocles to be commending the ideal of *sophrosyne*. And it is true, as Webster says, that "his chief characters are not remarkable for it"[6] His chief characters, lacking this quality, usually come to a tragic end. It is also true that a figure like that of Odysseus in the *Ajax* is an admirable incarnation of this human, and humane, ideal of '*sophrosyne*', with all its implications of self-knowledge, knowledge of one's limitations, recognition of the rights and limitations of others, prudence etc. And yet, Odysseus, in that play, acknowledges the excellence of Ajax. He cannot allow Agamemnon to dishonour him by refusing him burial. He considers him the best of all of them who came to Troy. To dishonour

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[1] Webster, *An Introduction to Sophocles*, 65 (Oxford 1936).
[2] *op. cit.* 39.
[3] Whitman, *Sophocles* 16 (Cambridge, Mass: 1961).
[4] cf Webster, *An Introduction to Sophocles*, 18-19 and 80-2.
[5] cf Whitman, *Sophocles*, 31-2.
[6] Webster, *An Introduction to Sophocles*, 65.

him would be both to deny justice and to violate the laws of the gods.[1] It might perhaps be thought that the violation of the divine law here consisted merely in the refusal to bury a human being – a thing which the Greeks normally regarded as a sin – but Sophocles leaves no room for doubt that the sin lies in refusing to honour a good man, by his specific statement that

"It is not right to harm a good man when he is dead even if it is true that you hate him".

Now Ajax is one of those figures who was not conspicuous for *sophrosyne*. Yet, if the man of ideal excellence is made to acknowledge and honour excellence in Ajax, may we not rightly hold that Sophocles too saw excellence in him? If that is so there can then be forms of excellence that are without *sophrosyne*. One of the clearest examples of such excellence is Antigone who was anything but 'safe-minded'. Yet, in the event, though she goes to her death, she is proved to be right, while Creon and the chorus (who counselled *sophrosyne*) have to admit that they were wrong. The truth of the matter may very well be then that Sophocles himself was divided in mind as between the two ideals of excellence. One of them, *sophrosyne*, we might consider as excellence at the purely human level; the other, heroic excellence, we might regard as excellence at an other than human level which, as we shall presently see, could be above the human level. The presence of *sophrosyne* makes those who possess this virtue eminently fit for survival in society. Thus Ismene survives Antigone, and Odysseus in the *Ajax* not only survives Ajax but is even able (somewhat ironically) to secure for Ajax recognition of his dues. This form of excellence one might consider a limited form of *arete* — the form best suited for the average man who does well to aim at the golden mean. It is not without significance that *sophrosyne* is the virtue that Plato, in the *Republic*, concedes to his third estate. Now the Sophoclean hero is never an ordinary man. He possesses certain qualities of excellence which lift him above the ordinary. In particular he refuses to allow any considerations of human weakness to deter him from pursuing the course which he regards as consistent with his conception of duty and nobility. The certainty of death will not deter Antigone

[1] *Ajax*, vv. 1332-45.

from burying Polyneices. Ajax prefers death to living in disgrace. In fact he dies because he will not accept the limitations that naturally accompany the human condition. This is the point of that wonderful soliloquy in which he reflects upon Time and the mutability of life.[1] This speech has been a point of major dispute amongst scholars Many regard it as a revocation of Ajax's original intention to commit suicide and an act of submission to the Atreidae. But they are then hard put to it to explain the act of suicide which follows almost immediately after. Whitman would seem to provide the more acceptable interpretation – namely that the speech is not an expression of his yielding to the Atreidae but an ironical rejection of Time and change.[2] Time is a symbol of human limitation. To live means to accept the changes which Time brings with it, to see winter follow summer, dishonour follow honour; it means learning to yield to inferior men like the Atreidae because they happen to be in positions of authority. Such a life is impossible for the hero. Since, then, this is the stuff of life, Ajax will have none of it – he will opt out of Time. His rejection of Time and his suicide are ultimately an expression of a desire to transcend the limitations of the human condition towards the permanent, the infinite, the immortal. This aspiration is a characteristic of the heroic ideal of *arete* which Sophocles took over from Homer. This, and not *sophrosyne*, as held by Webster, was the truly aristocratic ideal. *Sophrosyne* with its willingness to take into account the limits to one's own power and the rights of others, to accept the vicissitudes of Time, and to come to terms with all these things, is ideally the democratic form of *arete* It is essentially the virtue that makes life in community possible. People like Odysseus in the *Ajax* and Ismene in the *Antigone* possess this virtue. These are people one can live with. People like Ajax and Antigone are uncomfortable to live with. Their standards are so exacting and they make so little allowance for our human weaknesses. It will be noted that the Sophoclean hero is invariably an isolated figure, because he is an individualist. I would like to suggest that Sophocles found himself confronted with a problem – the problem of how to reconcile the aristocratic ideal of heroic virtue with the democratic way of life which demands the exercise of *sophrosyne.* Sophocles was living in a democracy,

[1] *Ajax*, 646 ff.
[2] Whitman, *Sophocles*, 74.

in an age in which the heroic ideal was a thing of the past. It is possible that there were some values in that lost ideal whose loss he regretted. However that may be, I think one may at least show that Sophocles was objective enough in his attitude to see in each of these ideals the possibilities for both good and evil.

It is possible to show that *sophrosyne* is not always an admirable quality in Sophocles. It is undoubtedly admirable in the case of Odysseus in the *Ajax*. There it is an expression of moral strength. It calls for moral strength to honour a man's excellence even when one hates him. But *sophrosyne* can also be an expression of moral weakness. It is so in the case of Ismene in the *Antigone*. She was aware of it herself, and ashamed of it. Why else should she, under interrogation by Creon want to identify herself with Antigone's defiance of Creon's edict, when in fact she refused to join her in the act of burying her brother Polyneices? Antigone's violent rejection of Ismene's pathetic attempt to join her marks the distance that separates the 'heroic' spirit from the 'safe-minded' one. *Sophrosyne* then is not always and of necessity right. In fact Sophocles has subtle ways of bringing home to us the possibility that it may sometimes be mean. Take the case of the sentry in the *Antigone*. An eminently safe-minded person, after his first appearance before Creon he departs thanking the gods that he has been saved, and determined never to return again. His motives are basically the same as Ismene's. To catch the criminal is beyond his powers, therefore he'll vanish and save his skin. What Ismene tells Antigone, in justifying her refusal to help her, would apply just as well to the sentry, "to act beyond one's power is not sensible."[1]

Of course Sophocles does not condemn him; in fact he seems to be rather amused by him. The poor man, after all, has nothing but his life to save; so who can blame him? Ismene's case was different. She had birth and breeding, as Antigone pointedly tells her.[2]

Perhaps a clearer example of ignoble froms of '*sophrosyne*' is the case of Odysseus in the *Philoctetes*. Here is prudence in

[1] *Antigone*, 67–8
[2] *Antigone*, 37–8

real politics. Philoctetes must be taken to Troy if the Greeks are to be victorious Since he cannot be taken by force he must be taken by guile. So Odysseus urges Neoptolemus to lie in a good cause[1]. Though the word *sophrosyne* is not specifically used, the whole tenor of the argument indicates that Odysseus is pointing out the prudence of not attempting to overcome Philoctetes by force since he is stronger, armed as he is with poisoned arrows. He appeals to Neoptolemus in the name of nobility, addressing him as "son of a noble father", and bribing him with the hope of winning two rewards – of 'being called both wise and good (noble)". The association of wisdom here with goodness (nobility) makes it quite clear that Sophocles does not want wisdom here to be equated with mere cleverness which could be villainy. Wisdom as the kind of right thinking in practical matters which is also good would have to be equated with *sophrosyne.* In a subsequent scene between the two, when Neoptolemus has decided to return the bow to Philoctetes, Sophocles uses the word *sophos* again; he also uses the word *sophrosyne* and plays on both of them with telling irony.[2] To Odysseus's charge that both his words and his actions are unwise, Neoptolemus retorts that "justice is better than wisdom". When Odysseus uses the word 'wisdom' he obviously means 'prudence'. Neoptolemus in his reply quite clearly dismisses as villainy the kind of wisdom Odysseus refers to. The neatest piece of irony occurs at the end of that exchange. When Odysseus unable to persuade Neoptolemus, draws his sword against him and Neoptolemus promptly draws his own, Odysseus, prudent man, has second thoughts and merely threatens to denounce him to the army; whereupon Neoptolemus congratulates him on his '*sophrosyne*'. In the context the word has an ugly ring about it. We may conclude then that Sophocles keeps an open mind about *sophrosyne* – it can be good, it can be bad, depending on the context.

In the case of heroic excellence Sophocles had to face a slightly different problem. The qualities of superhuman endurance and courage which are displayed by the heroes, though 'imprudent', are always admirable. Yet they are accompanied by qualities of harshness and intransigence which sometimes render the heroic figures almost inhuman. In fact I would suggest that the incompatibility between the heroic and the humane values was a problem

[1] *Philoctetes*, 96-119
[2] *Philoctetes*, 1240-60

which constantly engaged the attention of Sophocles. I would even go so far as to suggest that this may well be the key to the understanding of some of his plays, in particular the *Ajax* and the *Trachiniae*.

These two plays share a common structural peculiarity: each falls into two apparently distinct parts. In the *Ajax* we have first the events leading up to the death of Ajax, and then the argument over the burial of Ajax. In the *Trachiniae* we have the events leading up to the death of Deianeira followed by the picture of the dying agony of Heracles. Scholars have disagreed violently over the explanation of this oddity. On the one hand we have critics who find in this evidence of artistic disability on the part of the playwright[1], on the other, we have a variety of explanations seeking to establish the connection between the two parts. The charge of artistic incompetence hardly deserves consideration. Three out of the seven surviving plays of Sophocles follow this pattern – the third is the *Antigone*. Under the circumstances it would be a reasonable supposition to make that the structure might have something to do with the meaning. Much more disturbing are some of the explanations given by those who acknowledge the artistic competence of Sophocles. It is, for example, disturbing to find an otherwise excellent critic like Kitto saying of the *Ajax* that "the end is rather the triumph of Odysseus than the rehabilitation of Ajax"[2]

This would surely make the play a play about Odysseus primarily, as Kitto virtually admits when he says that

"the keystone is the importance of Odysseus".

It is a little difficult to understand why, if that is so. Ajax should be a more prominent figure than Odysseus[3], and why the title should carry the name of Ajax. I would suggest that the division of the play into two parts is an image of the incompatibility between the heroic virtues of Ajax and the humane values of Odysseus. This incompatibility is already brought out in the prologue. Ajax is

[1] Waldock, *Sophocles the Dramatist*, ed. 2. Chapter 5 in toto, especially 58–9 (Cambridge 1966)
[2] Kitto, *Greek Tragedy*, 122 (London 1939)
[3] Kitto admits this.

presented as one of the those primitive heroes whose code is to hate their enemies and to go all out to do them harm. Odysseus is the man of refined conscience who will not gloat over the misfortunes even of an enemy. In fact one might note a greater affinity betwen Athena and Ajax than there is between Ajax and Odysseus. Athena is bent on destroying her enemy Ajax, even as Ajax is bent on destroying his. Athena gloats over the humiliation of Ajax even as Ajax is shown gloating over the humiliation of what he believes to be his enemy Odysseus. There is the same kind of absoluteness about the attitude of Ajax as there is in the attitude of Athena. It is precisely this quality of absoluteness that differentiates the hero from the ordinary human being – which makes him therefore a-human, if not positively inhuman. In this particular scene Ajax is inhuman. Yet he is closer to the divinity. If we do not call Athena inhuman, though her attitude is the same, that is because the word has no relevance to divine beings – they are just not human. The tragedy of the heroic individual is that, while in spirit he has affinities with the divine, he is held in bondage to the human flesh, to human obligations and human values. In the resulting conflict between the two sets of values, he unhesitatingly rejects the human. So Ajax in this play rejects the bonds in which his human condition holds him. Faced with disgrace he will not live. Though Tecmessa has human claims on him he refuses to be moved by them. The harshness of his rejection and the pathos of Tecmessa's plight are heightened by the deliberate reminiscence of the Hector–Andromache scene in the Iliad which the scene in Sophocles evokes.[1] The values which Ajax rejects are the values of normal civilised human living. In the end he makes a total rejection of the human condition by ending his life. We might note that, almost as if to affirm the validity of the primitive code by which he lived, he will let his enemy's sword kill him. That "enemy must kill enemy" is for him essentially right.

In the first half of the play, then, Sophocles shows us an Ajax who is outside the pale of humanity. But being outside humanity is not the same thing as being sub-human. This is indicated throughout the play. Already there was a hint of it in the parallelism between Ajax and Athena which I have mentioned.

[1] Bowra, *Sophoclean Tragedy* ed. 2, 21 (Oxford 1945)

Further indications are the high esteem in which Ajax is held by Tecmessa and by his sailors. These hints are developed into a certainty in the second half of the play. First there is the expression of Teucer's feeling for Ajax. More convincing is the revelation of the difference between the greatness of Ajax and the meanness of the Atreidae. The Atreidae are, by convention, also members of the same heroic caste. Yet their behaviour is totally unheroic. Both of them enter blustering threats against Teucer, both enjoy reminding him of his slavish lineage; they show no appreciation of his loyalty to his brother and his courage in standing up for him, and, as Teucer reminds us, they show no gratitude for all that Ajax has done for the Greeks. The most damning statement of all is that made by Menelaus[1],

"though we could not control him alive we'll certainly control him dead".

Could any boast be less heroic? They are presented as vulgar bullies. Ajax was infinitely superior to them. His superiority is finally affirmed by Odysseus's acknowledgement of his greatness and vindication of his cause. There is a certain irony in the fact that the hero who rejected the conditions of ordinary civilised human living finally owed the decency of burial to the humanity of the man whom he most hated. The irony of the situation itself hints at the incompatibility between the two ideals. But on this point Sophocles does more than hint. He points it clearly by Teucer's polite but firm refusal (in spite of his gratitude to Odysseus) to allow Odysseus to participate in the funeral obsequies because

"I hesitate to let you touch his grave lest I do something hateful to the dead".

Rejecting Odysseus's offer of help, Teucer invites all those who were friends of "this excellent man" to join in burying him. Ajax, the excellent, will be offended by the services of Odysseus the humane. Even in death there is no reconciliation between the heroic and the humane. Since Teucer is acting on behalf of Ajax it is virtually Ajax who rejects the civilised gesture. Once again,

[1] *Ajax*, 1067-8

as in Homer's *Odyssey* the ghost of Ajax has turned its back upon Odysseus. Sophocles has put his own interpretation on that scene.

The antipathy between the heroic and the humane ideals is even more strikingly presented in the *Trachiniae*. The two principal figures, Deianeira and Heracles, represent two diametrically opposed values, Deianeira, decent civilised living and Heracles, heroic excellence. Heracles is an even more primitive version of the hero than Ajax. He belongs to a remoter past and represents sheer brute strength and masculine vigour. He is also undomesticated. He has a wife, but no home – a point made by Deianeira with her statement that

"we begot children, but he sees them as little as a farmer sees some out of the way field of his – only when he sows and when he reaps"[1]

Domesticity is a symbol of civilisation. Heracles is uncivilised. He is also inordinate in his passions; he has sacked a city to abduct a princess. And yet, we are reminded in the same breath, almost, that he is "the splendid son of Zeus and Alcmena". Deianeira also tells us that no man has loved more women than Heracles. Who, after all, can glut the appetite of a god? In Heracles we have a strange combination of virtue of a sort, power almost akin to the power of the gods, and, from any normal human point of view, wildness. As against Heracles, the totally masculine, is set Deianeira, the totally feminine; against the wild man, the refined woman; against the almost god the completely human. Deianeira is feminine in her weakness and her fears, refined in her domesticity and above all in her sympathy with the captive women sent by Heracles, especially with the princess Iole. But she is also completely human in her jealousy when she discovers that Iole is Heracles's mistress, and in her decision to try to win back her husband's love by a charm. In many respects Deianeira resembles the Odysseus of the *Ajax*. Like him she is aware of the mutability of things human,

"And yet, if we see clearly, there is cause to fear that today's success may be tomorow's failure"[2].

[1] *Trachiniae*, 31 ff.
[2] *Trachiniae*, 297-7.

This is the basis of her sympathy with the captive women. Awareness of this fact is a characteristic of *sophrosyne*, the civilised virtue, which she shares with Odysseus. But in one significant respect she differs from Odysseus. She failed in prudence when she used upon Heracles a weapon given her by his enemy. Jealousy clouded her judgement and destroyed her morally. Physical self destruction follows naturally from the discovery of her failure. Sophocles brings out with tragic irony the nature of her blindness in the very language she uses when she contemplates the deed,

"Yet, as I said, it is not well for a woman of sense to cherish anger. But I will tell you, friends, what means I have of relief. I have a gift given me of old by an ancient monster..."[1]

In one and the same breath, in the name of good sense, she rejects anger, but uses the gift of a 'monster'. The contradiction between the two is pointed. The civilised woman is driven by her very desire to cherish civilised values to use uncivilised means to tame the uncivilised hero. After the event, too late, she recognises her rashness,

"Why should the dying monster, who died because of me, show goodwill towards me?"[2].

Deianeira dies and passes out of sight with only a little over half the play done. The rest of the play consists of the agony and death of Heracles after he has worn the poisoned robe. This scene is a baffling one. Heracles commissions his son, Hyllus, to do him two favours – both of them repugnant to human sensibility – that Hyllus should set fire to his body, still alive, with his own hands, and that Hyllus should marry his mistress Iole. Hyllus's vehement protests leave no room for doubt that he finds them repugnant. Yet he is blackmailed into performing them, though some concession is made to him on the first point. What is one to make of this?

Some strange excuses have been made for Heracles's conduct. Bowra, for instance, says, in connection with the first request that though

[1] *Trachiniae*, 552–6.
[2] *Trachiniae*, 707–8.

"Heracles, concerned with his own end, does not stop to consider what Hyllus will feel about it, when he knows, he yields. He is remote and imperious, not absolutely brutal".[1]

One might just let that pass – though one might be pardoned for wondering whether one would, however concerned one was with one's own end, forget that to ask a son to burn his father alive is hardly the thing to do. Heracles was careful to make his son swear an oath that he would carry out his commands before he specified them. The inference is clear. On the second request Bowra finds that Sophocles

"shows an unexpected trait of tenderness and justice in Heracles. The great hero still loves Iole for whom he has done so much and for whom, in a sense, he dies ... His words seem to show his love for the girl:

'You know the maiden, child of Eurytus?'

Hyllus must marry her because he can be trusted to care for her. Moreover this is also an act of justice".[2]

It is difficult to see what there is so much that Heracles has done for Iole, and how, even in a sense, he can be dying for her. He has certainly killed Iole's father and sacked her city. It was done to gratify his lust, not 'for her'. As for dying he died because of her, which is not the same thing as dying 'for her'. Finally I fail to see where he finds an indication of love for the girl in the single line he has quoted in proof of it. Anyway Heracles has made the reason for his request clear; no one but his son must take her since she has been his mistress! This is not love for Iole but selfishness – a divine form of selfishness, if you like, since she has evidently been consecrated.

Kitto has a better approach. He sees the end as "essentially a presentation of Heracles" whom he describes as being "entirely self centred, ruthless to enemies, acquisitive, possibly affectionate but entirely selfish towards his family, unfeeling to his wife, transient with other women, and a very great man".[3] In effect this is another

[1] Bowra, *Sophoclean Tragedy*, 142.
[2] ibid.
[3] Kitto, *Greek Tragedy*, 293-4.

way of saying that Heracles is an extreme specimen of the heroic type. Kitto however does not tell us what purpose is served by the presentation of Heracles at the end of the play In fact he considers that this scene destroys the formal unity of the play because he can see no connection between it and the first part.[1] I would suggest that the connection lies in the idea of the utter incompatibility between the humane values represented by Deianeira and the heroic values represented by Heracles. The dichotomy in structure is an image of the idea. Heracles and Deianeira are united in a bond of marriage but never once meet in the play It is a union which is no union. The one attempt made by Deianeira to make of it a true and lasting union succeeds in destroying both of them.

The *Electra* provides another example of Sophocles's awareness of this conflict between two sets of values. In this play the conflict is fought out in the mind of a single individual – Electra. On the one hand, Electra is identifiable as belonging to the heroic type. Nobility prevents her from putting up with the wrongs inflicted on her in her father's house. She is contrasted with the sister Chrysothemis whose policy is to bow before the storm for safety's sake, even though she admits that Electra is in the right. Chrysothemis represents *sophrosyne*, Electra heroic rashness. However, Electra being a woman, her heroism, when the play begins, can only find expression in the nursing of her grief and resentment while she awaits the arrival of her brother to save her and the house. On the other hand, Electra also has some of the characteristics of the humane type. This emerges in the beautiful scene of Electra's mourning for Orestes when she believes that he is dead, and in the even more beautiful scene of joy when she recognises Orestes. Sophocles dwells at some length on these scenes. He must have had some purpose in doing so. I suggest that the purpose was to bring out one side of Electra's character – her total femininity. The purpose of that is to prepare the ground for the conflict in her between her two natures. This conflict is presented in two scenes. The first is in dialogue with the chorus when she apologises for nursing her resentment.[2] That speech ends with the significant cry

[1] ibid.

[2] *Electra*, 254

"Surrounded by evil as I am, I am *driven* to do evil.[1]"

This is the only play in which a heroic figure apologises for his or her 'heroic' conduct. The second occurs in the course of the argument with Clytaemnestra, where after her outburst against her, Electra apologises again for her violence. In both cases she is 'ashamed', and in this case she adds

"Your hatred and your actions *drive* me to act so in spite of myself. Vile conduct is taught by vile example."

But the conflict exists only in the first half of the play. As the action progresses the demands of heroism supersede the demands of humanity. The change occurs at the point where Electra is convinced that Orestes is dead. Then she decides to perform the act of vengeance herself. Since Chrysothemis refuses to join her she will even do it single-handed. In the scene between the two *sophrosyne* and heroic daring are specifically opposed to each other. Chrysothemis, remembering their weakness as women, is for caution; Electra is for following the dictates of nobility and justice even though Chrysothemis warns her that "justice is sometimes dangerous". Thus the way is prepared for the final transmutation of Electra's nature which Sophocles reveals in the murder scene. Here is no longer the tender, loving, sister or the apologetic heroine, but a bloodthirsty fury. What other impression can one get of an Electra who, when she hears Clytaemnestra's first cry as she is struck down, calls out to her brother,

"Strike her, strike again"?

All feelings of human compunction and of shame have been extinguished. The act of venfgeance, though executed in the flesh by Orestes, is in spirit the act of Electra. The 'heroic' in Electra has killed the humane. That is the tragedy of the *Electra*.

There is then justification for believing that the conflict between heroic virtue and the humane values associated with civilised life in society (represented usually by *sophrosyne*) forms an important part of Sophocles's thinking. In plays like the *Ajax*, *Trachiniae*, and *Electra* he sees no reconciliation between humane values and the type of heroic virtue represented by the Homeric and pre-Homeric heroes. But Sophocles created his own image of a hero in whom he showed the terms in which the reconciliation

[1] *Electra*, 309

could be effected. That hero was Oedipus as he is presented in the two plays that bear his name. The foundation for the image had already been laid in the *Oedipus Tyrannus*. The edifice is completed in the *Oedipus at Colonus*. Sophocles was evidently fascinated by the legend of Oedipus. The main details of that story he found in the myth But the personality of Oedipus, as he emerges in the two plays, is the creation of Sophocles In this creation he presents a figure who combines ideally the heroic and the humane values.

In the *Oedipus Tyrannus* Oedipus is the good citizen and the good ruler. As good citizen he identifies himself totally with the well-being of his people. As good ruler he takes it for granted that it is his responsibility to save his people from the troubles which afflict them The people in their turn look to him as spontaneously as he assumes his responsibility. In the pursuit of his task he shows the singleness of purpose and fortitude that are characteristic of the hero. He will let nothing deter him from his task. The very intensity of his dedication makes him misjudge the prophet Teiresias. Here is a man who knows what will save the city and yet will not speak. He therefore accuses him of treachery. In that scene, impelled by heroic dedication to his task, he transgresses against *sophrosyne*, taunting the prophet with his blindness and exulting in his own perspicacity. It was he, after all, who solved the riddle of the sphinx while the prophet was dumb. But, in spite of his rashness, Sophocles sees to it that he does not transgress entirely the limits of humanity. Thus, he consents, as a favour to Jocasta and the chorus, to spare the life of Creon whom he believes to be conspiring against him. He spares him even though he is sure that it will mean his death or exile.[1] He is heroic in his yielding to the demands of humanity, though, from his point of view, his action will be lacking in *sophrosyne*. The humanity shown by him here is consistent with the picture of him given in the opening scene, where he shows his deep concern for the priests who sit in supplication before him, addressing them as his "children, tender nurselings of ancient Cadmus".

His true heroism is finally shown when he stands on the edge of the discovery that he is the son and the murderer of Laius.

[1] *Oedipus Tyrannus*, 669–70

In the interview with the shepherd there comes a point when he knows what is about to come out and yet moves irresistibly forward, compelling the shepherd to utter the terrible words which he has already heard in his heart[1]. He has been harsh, inhumanly so, in this scene with the shepherd. But the reason for his harshness is the same as the reason for his anger against Teiresias. And if he does not spare the shepherd, he does not spare himself.

There can be no doubt that Oedipus belongs to the type that one would call 'heroic'. But he is not the primitive, Homeric version of that type, like Ajax or Heracles. He is a more civilised version. It is significant that, unlike them, he is set within a framework of domestic and civic life. He is also unlike them in his utter selflessness. The most significant difference, however between him and the earlier types is his readiness to accept the mutability of the human condition. The first indication of this is given in his reply to Jocasta's plea to him not to pursue the quest for his parentage;

"Have no fear. Even should I be proved a slave thrice-born, you will not be proved base."[2]

He is ready to face the possibility of being a slave by birth. To cap this comes his comment after Jocasta's departure,

"She has a woman's pride. Perhaps she is ashamed of my low birth. But I call myself the child of fortune, giver of good, and I shall not be shamed. She is my mother. My sisters are the Seasons; they cause my growth and my decline. Being what I am I would not wish to be any other and shirk the knowledge of my birth."[3]

Time, we saw, was the symbol of mutability and finitude. Its use here is therefore significant. Other heroes, like Ajax, rebelled against the limitations inherent in man's subjection to Time. Oedipus welcomes it with open arms. This acceptance is in itself an act of heroism by which Oedipus transcends the 'heroic'. The seal is set, as it were, on this acceptance by his act of self-blinding. Other heroes, like Ajax, would in similar circumstances kill themselves. By this act they find a way out of a situation

[1] *Oedipus Tyrannus*, 1169–70
[2] *Oedipus Tyrannus*, 1062
[3] *Oedipus Tyrannus*, 1078–85

that they find unbearable. The situation in which Oedipus finds himself is more horrible than any situation in which any hero was involved. Yet Oedipus does not seek the normal, 'heroic' way out of misery and disgrace. By blinding himself he places upon himself the sign of his true condition – his utter blindness and his total dependence on other agents both human and divine. This is the true meaning of his act. All the other reasons given by Oedipus to the chorus are his fumbling attempts to rationalise an action which was performed by instinct rather than by reason. His first thought must surely have been of death. Thus, the messenger tells us that he ran round calling for a sword – for what purpose except to kill himself? But then, suddenly, he sees the brooch on Jocasta's dead body, and instantly snatches at it. This action in fact might be said to mark Oedipus's triumph over Destiny. Since he was destined to be blind, he will face his destiny blind. By doing so he disarms Destiny. It might be compared to the gesture of turning the other cheek.

The logical sequel to this triumph of Oedipus is his deification. If Oedipus has transcended the heroic, he has also transcended the human. For a man who has transcended both the human and the heroic what is left but divinity? The *Oedipus at Colonus* shows us this final stage in his evolution. His opening words in that play remind us significantly that he both recognises his littleness as man and possesses the new kind of heroism which accepts and even welcomes that condition.

"Who will welcome the wanderer Oedipus, today, with the barest of hospitality? I ask but little and am content with less than little. Pain, Time, my companion long since, and nobility these three have taught me to be content."[1]

Actually the word I translate as 'to be content' means more than that in the Greek. *Stergein* means 'to love'. It is a word used of the love of parents for children, of brothers and sisters for one another, and of friends. And what is it that Oedipus 'loves' here? What else but his condition of littleness and misery, which ceases to be misery when you take it to your bosom? We remember that in the earlier play he embraced the Seasons as his sisters The reference to nobility in his opening words recalls the heroic background. Here then is the new hero, fully man in his littleness and vulnerability, yet also fully hero in the

[1] *Oedipus Coloneus*, 3–8

spirit in which he endures, or rather, embraces his condition. Later in the play we hear him speaking of Time to Theseus,

"Dear son of Aigeus, only the gods never age or die. All things else all-powerful Time confounds. Vigour dies in the earth and in the flesh. Faith dies out and falsehood blooms and the spirit never remains the same, whether amongst friends or as between city and city."[1]

The substance of what he says is the same as what Ajax said in his play. But the spirit is so different. Here Oedipus, speaking from the heights of the wisdom he has achieved, instructs Theseus to prepare him for what will come. The tone is one of serene acceptance and assurance. These things which he accepts with serene confidence, regarding them as friends, are the very things which the heroes of old regarded as their enemies. Their code was to hate their enemies. Oedipus has transcended that concept.

From that point onward we have his progression towards divinity. Throughout the play there is a growing awareness in himself and in others that he is more than man. He began by overcoming the hostility of the men of Colonus; passionately he vindicated his innocence of guilt in the past. Now, with the aid of Theseus, a kindred spirit, who instinctively recognises his quality, he overcomes his enemies Creon and Polyneices. He prophesies and pronounces curses with the authoritative voice of a god. In the scene with Polyneices the harshness of Oedipus towards his son is, at first sight, disconcerting, because it seems inhuman. The humane attitude is pointedly brought to our notice by Antigone's pleas on behalf of Polyneices[2]. But, on reflection, his harshness is consistent with the concepts both of the hero and of the divinity. The hero is uncompromising, while between god and evil there can be no reconciliation. The ways of Polyneices have been evil in the past, as shown by Oedipus[3], while his purpose now is also evil. The latter point is made in the parting scene between Antigone and Polyneices. Antigone begs him to disband his army and not wage war upon his native city. But Polyneices will fight because he cannot bear to be thought

[1] *Oedipus Coloneus*, 607-13
[2] *Oedipus Coloneus*, 1181 ff.
[3] *Oedipus Coloneus*, 1354 ff.

a coward and to be mocked by his younger brother - the old kind of heroism again.

What is asserted in this part of the play is Oedipus's moral integrity. The scene is also the last of the trials to which Oedipus, in his human condition, is exposed. The play has provided us with a succession of three trials. In the first of them he triumphs over the prejudice of ordinary well-meaning men and refines their notion of piety. In the other two he triumphs over the evil machinations of men who seek to use him for their own evil ends. Appropriately the struggle against evil is the last of his trials on earth. Immediately after that Oedipus hears the call from heaven and walks, unaided, towards his encounter with infinity. Oedipus becomes a god. But even as god, Sophocles has, through him refined the concept of divinity. There is a sharp contrast between the arrogant selfishness of Heracles in the *Trachiniae* whose divinity required that none but his son should marry his mistress, and the patient, long suffering Oedipus who, as man,was content with less than little, and, as god, will bring blessings on those who recognised his worth. Oedipus is god-man-hero spelled out by Sophocles in new terms.

This play was written by Sophocles on the eve of his death. It is something like his final testament to his beloved city. Incidentally he has also paid her the tribute of being the one city able to recognise the face of true human excellence.

NOTE: We regret that, due to a shortage of printing paper, two articles which were to have been included in the present Number have had to be held over for publication in Volume Two Number One. The articles are — "John Donne — an Unmetaphysical Perspective" *by Derek de Silva* and "The History of Ceylon, 1505 — 1658. A historiographical and bibliographical survey" *by C. R. de Silva and D. de Silva.*

Editor

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