Page 1
AN ASSESSMENT
qMMMMSAMeMS SAMeSeSeASMSAASASMMeMSLSLALAAMqMqMeSASASASAeASeqMeMLSAeSeASAeAeAeSMM
1. Reggie Siriwardena
2. Nawaz Dawood
3. Kumar David
 

September 1, 1979 Price Rs. 2/50
D
Congress Caravan in Colombo
Film Festivals

Page 2
osəsusunoɔ głosus səəŋJO OZ9 *>(OOO seuOULLSJĮuəqAA -ầusųÁNoaq Joueuleus speųAA

SHIIDHH0, SHETTE WHI
8!? Ixolo L. EI-IIgaz auoqdaļa L "I oqtuosog) eque AewɔɔsɔIII-leae es uoleg IIS 'g';
'oloq^^^ laag 'leneun us au eu pəŋsnu,Đls_L
XIOOO SPUUOULL
SO WWE
Ovoggy BAVIII.
以 ET ĦĦ| 實 『』 ÊHE 3:3 [−] 阳 Eae
sunul divini

Page 3
Trends
Big Brother
Every small country has its own 'big brother'. So close to such big neighbours as India, Bangladesh and Pakistan Sri Lankid FCS reyer beer1 sufficiently conscious of the sensitvities of the Mald wes, Crice C tribute-իցying Sultandte.
The L. F, trod so officiously on Md/d/widn toes that relations bet Weert Sri Larka and the new republic deteriorated steadily - d development
which a smart New Delhi spotted and used to its gdyantage dS Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Male proved.
Flaunting the brand new, somewhat un ir press we, flag of an "Misldn ldentity" (the Shah included) Mrs. Banduranaike's III fated Brzezinski, Mr. Tissa WJeyeratre, tried hard to reposr the damage but it was of no awaf, Inspite of a prime ministerial visit.
Governments ha ve Changed in Color by did Mille. But restjors have not frnproved. India, Pakistan
drid Libya, on the other hand, hawe established their positions strongly.
Though several Colombo-based diplomas went to Male for the National Day, Sri Lanka had no offcid representative at the celebrations. Now the rew President has gone to Libya and from there for the Havand 5um rist. "Noy We don't sook to Our big neighbour, Srí Lanka, for si d'wice when it corties to voting at the UN but alphabetical neighbour In the rexit seat - Malaysia', observed a Maldivian јошгпаІist.
Fascinating facet
Like a good gen, racialism has
many facets. When you hold it to the light ecanomics and commerce shine through brightly. In the land
of gemis, c7, young Buddhist rr:Orlık İs in hospital. According to his friends, he was dragged out of his temple, dissoduled drid r1 Trichied diwr the ra]] d. HFS books Were stryf d baut.
The day before this Incident d meeting was held to protest, Trifong other things against separatism. But what were the mot I yes of the Oster"| - sible sponsors and their patrans' Was it realy against Tam7 separatism or against the Moslem gem boys Two radical groups distributed leaflets and news hects condemning the
raicialism of the
patriots. Cre Wim Likti"" was; JL stock of papers w couple of mudda they appreciated
A bonfire followed
Probably antic between Ra trapur Left groups and til the meeting was pc. young monk, Gini quite prominent Îr those who use ra further their busir
Hydro-crackers
Firm action by 5ef 5eer 15 troi i Tongs Luri Park-Loch Bursting over Sri the most controve 1,500 million rupee
Jopanese, Britis American, Jewisha II In the r urn n i ng staggered the go ovalanche of a leg -allegations of (and worse) that f of the tenders, t, mittee report ett were so much d names of political —dellers, ex-CCS Katha 'experts' quickly soiled. O a ČS man of th
aut af ft Kyff Brianced It Wi cort promise, it is circles, that impre Wyı) 5 na w dete cose and Criti CO deas.
Egypt's isolatie
Mrs. Jeал Sada wisit to Colombig conference on propi to he star if the ha ye been officias SL N. III: Terti she was expected men to gLord || embassy was the til on fr Colombo Egypťani Ambica SS OG the BMs H incide
((Fried

self-styled Sln hala newspaper ''Desha cky, The entre as bошght шp by a ss but flot because the Sĩnhala proses
1's strongly placed 1e powersite Patrots iorly attended. The ra tre Thero, WTS 1 protesting against Ce and religion to ess frterests.
the President JT1ha Ye prevenited a :Freed style scaridal Larik II. st. Cori:Cerris rsal of tenders, the Hydro-Cracker job.
, Frerich, tūsdin, America - they were ... But what really Wern Tient WT5 the for E ard Courter * "ursa ir practice" ollowed the opening he lewd Il Lucitorn torm, WIP reputators Írty liner as the 1s, officials, wheeler
плеп, апе - tiлте 5гі (7nd sa om were 're top bureaucrat, Ie Old School, ca T7e
his own prest ge 's hi is refu 5a ta : 51 d Ir u5re 55 ssed the Big Chief rmined to keep a eye or all big
It has da Teled her for the UNFPA at on She was likely s firw. No reas C15 Jy coffer er but the ned the fact that to ha ve 60 security her. The Egyptian target of demonstraIncidentally, the or who figured in niť In Junie Will Ebe
pH Fಳ್ತಳಿ 3)
Letters
Abrasive Ambassadors
I am a public servant and do not wish to have my name published. However as a reader of your journal thought it would interest you and your readers to know of an incident to which was witness, when I attended a recent diplomatic function. Three or four foreign diplomats (al from non-aligned countries | later found out) were rudely attacking the press of our country for not being "independent'. By the way, your magazine was also attacked bitterly. What really amused ma was that in all those countries which these diplomats represent the newspapers are al|| || 00 Per cent controlled, publishers editors are jailed, newspapers closed down and
(Corrirified or Page 15)
LAMIRA
GUARDAN
wol. 2 No. 9 September 1, 1979
Published by Lanka Guardian Publishing Co., Ltd., First Fluor, 88, N. HI. M. Abdul Cader Roald, (Reclamaticon RÇıld) Colomb. I 1.
Editor: Mervyn da Silva
Telephone: 2 I () [] 9,
CONTENTS
3 - 4 News background 5 - 8 International news
3 - || 0 Labout
| - 5 Perspectives
16 - 7 Regional politics 18 - 19 North - South dialogue
O
22 - 23 Information
Politics
Printed by Ananda Press 825, Wolfertillal Street, Coloribu 13.
Telephone: 35975

Page 4
- -
If you want HIGHEST
INTRES
and HIGHES SECURITY
ON TWO ΥΕΑΕ
FIXED DEPOSITs Then the place to go to i
MERCANTHELE C
The largest and strongest fi
GROSS ASSESTS OWER R5. 116 CAPITAL AND RESERWES OWER PUBLIC DE POSITS OWER RS. 75,
anual naE or l AMOUNT OF DEPOSIT PLUS BONUS PATABLE
Rs. 500 to under Rs. 25,000
Rt. 25,000 to un door Rs. 50,000
Rs. 50,000 to under Rs. 100,000
Rs. 100,000 and above
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

S PER ANNUM
- PAYA BLE MONTHLY
у ON TWOYEAR
DEPOSTS:
REDIT LIMITED
1ance Company in Sri Lanka
MILLION Rs. 7,200,000000,000
stlv “EscÄnn E CREDT LIMITED
re 51-53. Adhipahi Mawatha, Colombo i.
Telepharmi: ESES 1 1 -T5
Fairh Dyffre : MFFhidl i 11, Stanley Budd,
Tilphin ni i MATARA E7 11 Dhurrumpul rhyth, Tilliph i ni: 34
A M LI ĦAD HAPLI FINALI , Hurlinchindri Millwat ħin, Tulipher E34 KAM D': O N I A. Firdany Mou, Tilphini
Lihat in II the Filmpartnt town.

Page 5
News background
Summit and people
T冀 Congressional cannon that rolled from Washington to Colombo a few weeks ago were Ercely the fas Eest guns in the West. It was certainly the fastest ress conference in our crowded Euspa Per history, observed a disEited veteran of the local media, after a dozen US Congressmen, Edgered and battered by some Simple Straightforward questions they could not answer or probably did not understand were hurriedly hustled out of a hotel room by an
Embarrassed corps of Embassy EfE.
They cut and ran", said the SLFP daily 'Dinakara'. (See below) Among those representing the SLFP press, by the way, was a former Deputy Foreign Minister
who was heard to chuckle quietly 35 Congressman Wolff and his Colleagues tried to preach the Principles of non-alignment, the new American version in the home of the 5th summit.
Congre55man Wolff whose belliCity was overshadowed by his Emorance had led the attack on Isn't Cuba aligned? After E. said another sagely, Cuba is E=ring enormous Sowjet a Id. Cice this mean that all those ics which the US is pouring to writicus CCL mitti e5 a 5 "aid" make Die tecipients "aligned'?). Cuba, ===== ehe aggressive Mr. Wolff, having troops in three African c-nitres and killing hundreds of Track toys". (Ex-Ambassador
-15+1 - ܨܝܕܬܐ
the sh
Andy Young sho חם - ionחוקס his revelation).
"It was more t Light Brigade tr Stand' remarke House reporter colleagues, to the the heavy Embas the discussion fri to Boston and E.
Evidently this tax-paid Congr (See Page 5). ptedוחסhave Br ressional carawar Asia-Wards. But pleasures of po antics of these : should blind us to of those who o well-timed wis its,
The target is C. aligned moveme few weeks before the final propag
The Lanka authoritativo cor like Professor A internationally kr non-alignment, h out how the Pro Was launched sor The attack is fr and without. F Thost conspicuousl: has been Yugos reasons for Yug
specious, and inct
(ČJ FTľir Heľ
SF sesses
జ్యోతిరిబాబా මනෂ නියුබාන්‍යාවට පදාර ප්‍රසනවලින් බේරීම ස. මර්ඩ්වජ්‍යෙවෂ්ඨි පෑන
ge is . . . .
F. R.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

owboat
uld be asked for that interesting
the Charge of the an Custer's Last d a young Lake
a 5 ore of 5 fra 15a IF|if f sy escort, turned
( entוחחalig-חסח וחכ
elam.
is the season for essional junkets. The 'boat people'
- ngסy Cחaוח ס5 is to roll along
neither the easy liticians nor the Showboat people
the serious aims "chestrate these
ba and the nonnt. And this, a it, wasוחthe Sum : indist barrage.
Gшardiап апа tributors to it, . W. Singham, an own student of ave been pointing Paganda campaign The Eime last year. "orn both within, rom with in, the y Vocal participant lawia, and the :oslavia's special easingly frenzied
Page; )
India, Indira and
6th Summit
het downfall of Desa I., the
collapse of the shaky Charan Singh coalition and the prospect of a strong showing by Mrs. Gandhi's Congress it the polls have disprited the Anti-Cuba Club, led by Yugoslavia, Egypt, ASEAN and the Francophone group within the OAJ - Governments cinc and go but the nation's foreign policy goes on forever is a maxim that has not always pro WCd true.
India is India and her sheer Weight guarantees great influence Within the TowerTent Those who were fighting to save Egypt's face, curb the next Chairman's powers by new pro Ciadura. I da wicgs, and to restrain criticist of the US and the West were relying heavily on Mr. Desai. As a result, nobody (not in e Ver the US and China) men Llored the Indo - Soye: treaty which Mrs. Gandhi signed. During her time, the question was asked whether that Treaty was not a blot on Indian non - alignment. Delhi therefore had a key role to play a diplomatic gameplan prepared most of all by Yugoslavia. Its nesis can be traced to an interview given many months 코마 by the Yugosla Y A Tabas sidor in New 锚 to David Binder, chef foreign affairs analyst of the NY Times.
Egypt herself lost ground in Colombo When the final declaration clearly denounced the camp David accords and thus went much further than the condemnation of "partial solutions" of the ArabIsraeli issue. When Egypt lost ground, the Egyptian envoys as we all know lost their cool, and had to put in their placc by Sri Lanka WIP's and officials, What will Egypt do at Hal Wäina? Will It be able" to retrieve har position, if nat her prestige? Or, if the Camp David Accords are given the same beating as in Colombo, will Egypt mak some theatrical gesture
Thc tro Lublic with thic anti - Cuba game-plan ( dirty Bretir sk| business" was the phrase used by the Correspondent of a Genewabased Third World news agency) was that it worked on the assumption that Cuba would act tactlessly and annoy the Tajority of members who are not engaged in Warious subtle and subterranean 臀 and strategems. As Mr. a need insists an observing in every discussion. Cuba has acted with great caution and rectitude. While refusing to compromise en Cuba's own stand on various International Issues (it cicles not subscribe to the dubious non-bric doctrine of the Belgrade Baptist Church) it has conducted itself as Chairman-designata With Litmost IT -- Li Luda.

Page 6
NM's death: Turn of th
by Jayantha Somasunderam
eylonese hawe an obsession with death and funerals. Dr. N. M. Perera's death last month confirms this. In a quick tour of the NWP, the Uwa, the Sabaragamuwa and the up country, We saw clear evidence of this. Every Village had its share of white flags, all buses and trains carried posters and in some places, like Avisa Wella, illuminated pandals had come up. in Badulla, by the road, was a larger than life picture of Dr. N. M. Perera, before which flowers had been placed.
Care must be taken not to draw indiscriminate parallels with the past. But the comparison with Dudley Senanayake's funeral and its significance, becomes irresistible.
Dudley Senan ayake's funeral followed three years after Mrs. Bandaranalike's låndslide victory of May 1970. So devastating was her victory that she splintered her gPPosition almost beyond recovery. The UNP was riven with factions and the leaders J. R. Jayewardena and Dudley Senanayake, were at each others' throtats. Slowly discontent and disillusion was growing as the government failed to measure up to the expectations of the electorate. But pedple were too afraid, too disorganised and devoid of an alternative political leadership to express themselves. And then Dudley Senanayake died.
His death served as the occassion for people to identify their siad predicament. His funeral became a passive show of political Solidarity. With it the tide turned.
Two years in office has doused the flames of victory that the UNP has been enjoying. With inflation running at more than twelve percent it can only be a select few who are enjoying the course of events. But for the rest, there has been little coherent political leadership that could mobilise their discontent. The opposition remains dormant, divided and demoralised.
Mourning for Dr. N. M. Perera could not have been restricted to
4.
those who war Woted for him.
that minourned. A Cal Tot be digy significance. Dr. death Could bec Point. It ha 5 de rallying point fc disillusionment y ment. Already he E lear-5 it 5 about his life
circulating ano generator who b:
It neod not
political comrade necessarily reap th adulation. J. R. rode to power in the drama that wa yake's funeral, had the flesh of the inter-party dispu
courts.
In death, as a N. M. Perera ma dangerous to his pi than he was in
"Revolutionary Festivals a Scholarship
DE Cairo haw nity to Leste Recently we were 娜“鹉 fiT – with the special Film Corporation : international festy Sors had tried hal film the official entr Film Festival, argu revolutionary city "revolutionary" fif of judges, howeve animously on anoth Monara", the st Petty clerk's infatu new acquisition - a his married life. Wijaya Dharmasi Stard was asked it
(τα τη μετεί ση

he tide?
-ked for him or It was a nation
ind its mourning oid of political
N. M. Pereras The the turning
finitely become a it discontent and with the governhad been elevated tatus and myths and Work ara ng younger
rely knew him.
follow that his 25. br airs w III he benefits of this laye wardena who the after math of S Dudley Senanabeen a thorn in latter. Ther. :es had ended up
| memory, Dr. y Well be more litical opponents his life time.
culture"
Td
DS
e a special affi:r Peiris films ? :old that Puran - would fly there bless|ngs of our for the coming '3 | TH spon"d to make the y to the Moscow ing that for a You need a բanel םTH .ווח ", decided un2 film 'Dardu f how aס ryב lation with his bicycle - ruins The director ri, we underto send his film
Page )
INVITE US TO CATER FOR
YOUR PARTY
6
ÜC) 60
Of
INOIfe
PAGODA
Catering is our speciality. We cater for any function large or small: weddings engagements, cocktails luncheons, dinners.
PAGODA
RESTAURANT too is available for your party.
Phone: 23086, 29236.
PAGODA
105, Chatham Street, Colombo I.
Cyril Rodrigo Restaurants
Ltd.

Page 7
International news
A US view
Tax - free
by Peter C. Stuart
Washington
he flood of "boat people'
from indo-China has un Corked a steam of "jet people' in the opposite direction: traveling congressmen.
Inspection trips to the crowded Asian refugee areas are supplanting last year's favourite congresisiona travel destination - mainland
China - as a Mecca for touring law Takers.
Three separate Capitol Hill
delegations are conducting "factfinding missions' there during the current monthlong summer recess, hard on the heels of at
east two other congressional refugee trips in recent months. A nine-member delegation
appointed by the Speaker of the
House is tramping through resettlement camps in Thailand, Hong Копg, Indonesia, and Malaysia before going to the country from which most of the refugees have fled; , Vietnam.
The grou P i 5 led by i Rep,
Benjamin S. Rosenthal (D) of New
F.
fact - find
His entourage V to crossing paths contingent of 14 F also exploring the tion in Thailand ; as part of a w pedition to six This mission is hi Lester L. Wolff (C
The refugee prc a third going-ove gress men from WN Republican Joel Democrat Normar are wis iting Carl F Malaysia, and the
The excursions are part of a bu official, tax-paid by lawmakers du shutdown of C the House euph a "district work
The House allon at least seven
Besides the Int | members of Servic55 Committi
Germany,
Wes.
 

ling Congressmen
vi || Come close with a larger House colleagues = refugee situaand Hong Kong, ide-rang ing exASI LİOTS saded by ; 2) of New York.
blem is getting :r by two Con'ashington State, Pritchard and D. Dicks, who 5 in Thailand,
Philippines.
to Indo-China sy Schedulic of foreign travels -ing this August ongress, which emistically calls period".
e is sponsoring overseas trips.
Ho-China vi5 its,
the Aried
e TE Italy,
töring Turkey,
and Belgium to study NATO
requirements and readiness.
Affairs Clamant J. (D) of Wisconsin will lead a delegation of undetermined size later this month to a conference im Wienna.
Committee Za blocki
Foreign chairman
Among recessing Sea to 5 se y en are wis i ting the Soviet Union for taks eted to the
pending strategic arms limitation
treaty.
Three other committaa membar5 also traveling: George McGovern (D) of Sou Lh Dakota in Europe; Edward Zorinsky (D) of Nebraska in Nicaragua, then joining Paul S. Sarbanes (D) of Maryland at a US-Canadian interpaгliamепгагу сопference in aெlgary.
Recess tra wel draws increasing criticism, even with in Congress itself. One of the most-traveled corrittees in previous years - the Senate Armed Services, which spent nearly S100,000 on trips in 1976 - is conspicuously sponsoring none during this recess.

Page 8
NICARAGUA (2)
A critique
by A Special Correspondent
nd so the debate reopens.
The first fundamental characteristic of the Nicaraguan revolution is that it was an armed revolution. Its victory reaffirmed the lesson of Allende's overthrow in 1973 : The problem of state power can be resolved in the last instance only through armed struggle. This fundamental tenet of MarxismLeninism, though confirmed and reconfirmed bloodily by history itself, ha 5 on the one hand been criminally overlooked by reformism, while on the other hand, it has often been misinterpreted by revolutionaries. An armed Contestation for power, is inevitable In the struggle for qualitative social change, and therefore, the path of armed struggle is the only valid strategy for revolution. The famous 'peaceful path' leads to a dead end. In Chile, it led inexorably to the Santiago stadium.
To base oneself strategically on anything other than the 'armed road" is not only illu Sory, but algo Suicida. However a ca Weat, and an important one, is imperative at this point. In his "Guerilla Warfare" Guevara pointed out something that most "Guevarists' forgot mainly in Latin America, but also elsewhere eg. in Sri Lanka. A revolutionary movement should not initiate su 5 taimed at Ted struggle against an elected government which maintain5 constitutional legality and bourgeois democratic freedoms. To embark upon a campaign of armed action in such a context Would Te GL || || thic political isolation of the revolutionaries from the masses, and the military defeat of the former Would be incwitable.
If and when a regime throttles bourgeois democracy, impedes democratic forms of mass protest, makes impossible peaceful sociopolitical change and thus loses its constitutional legitimacy in the eyes of the masses, then, armed struggle
É.
of a
becomes both nec witable. The ima recoganise that th: Is the Sola wil bl. them5elwes orga ni armed struggle. TI tionary movement spearhead without ם חut alםוfjgeWit Rather it become of the people an as such by the pe It5 arr med action repressiwe respons viewed impartially mass which occu point of a de Rather, the te w|| tion becomes the the masses, its a People's Army a People's War. Th place in Nicaragu: controlled Presid the existence of a bly aud an o PP party could not in of an oligarchy'. power.
The FSLN whic 96 and commenci the following ye the several dozen Lihat šprang up or soil in the afterm revolution.
Inspired by the Cuban guerilleros, Latin America to response to the Second Declarati "The duty of ever Is to Take the r FSLN 5LIFaret r |963 bIIt recovere be militarily activ year. The periti another military on the FSLN, but thern recover an gains. Still their Wa5 Un spectacular masterly two-volu Latin American Teh

S
:essary and Inesses themselves 2 military option one and identify cally with the he armed revolu
is mot thc a : a shaft, a lit Explosive charge. s the wanguard d is recognised ople themselves. and the state's ies are no longer " by a popular Pleis a wantage :ached spector. tionary organisaa malled fist of rmy becomes a nd t5 wär, d. is is Whit took t, where tightly 2ntial elections, National Asser05 ton political mask the reality monopoly of
Was for red in darmed Struggle ar, Was one of guerIII a "focos" Latin American ath of the Cuban
victory of the the youth of ok up arms in :larion cal of the on of Hawaiia: у revolutiопагу evolution". The litary defeat in !d sufficiently to e the very next 3d "66-"57 5a W defeat inflicted the 9WO's saw ld make steady military progress
and even the me survey of the volution ("A Cri
tique of Arms", "Revolution on Trial") authored in 1973/74 by that most perspicacious of contenporary Marxist intellectuals, Regis Debray, makes no more than two fleeting references to the Sandinistas.
In December 1974 however,
FSLN commandos attacked a Christmas party thrown at an Ambassador's residence and seized several high ranking government officials whom they subsequently released for large sums of money. This signaled the Sandinista transition to the 'second stage' of guerilla warfare (ie, of nearequilibrium) characterized by increasingly bold attacks on banks, bridges, military patrols, police stations etc. I977/78 saw intensified guerilla action across the forested frontier, while "phase three', that of strategic offensive was inaugurated, as is well known, in 1978.
Several factors concerning the FSLN's military achievement draws the attention of the student of revolutionary politics and revolutionary warfare. The Sandinista's struggle was protracted, low-key and sporadic, killing hundreds of National Guards men ower the үеаг5, but пeveг mршnting the kiid of campaigns that enabled the TuparInaro5, for example, to capture the Imagination of radical youth the world over. And yet, the Sandin Istas hawe prowed infinitely more durable than almost any other Guerilla movement in Latin America, with the possible
exception of the Guatemalan. The serious set-backs suffered in the 1960's did not eliminate thern militarily or do mestica te them politically - the latter being the fate that befell Wenezuela's MAS
Mowmen to a Socialismo-Movement
for socialism) led by Teodoro Petkoff. The Lankan reader for his part may ponder over the
Case of tha J. W. Po which was both defeated militarily and domesticated politically - even those militants who escaped to the jungles and su rwiwed there physically for qui te some time prowing incapable of reforming itself as a

Page 9
guerilla foco which could hawe commenced activity during a repression and economic crisis.
The Sandinista's military campaign is also notable for its departure, or more correctly, variation, from the classic sche The of protracted People's War of both the Cuban and Chinese 'models'. Of course it is not the case that any Latin American guerilla movement ever considered a mechanical imposition of the Cuban, let alone the Chinese patterns, and in this sense there wete no "Todes". Still the FSLN'S strategy is most interesting because of its masterly synthesis of two models of arried struggle which are usually (and incorrectly) considered to be mutually exclusive
and contradictory, I refer to protracted guerilla warfare, the ma in thi cara of which is the
countryside, and armed in surroction in the urban areas. Of course the "model' has always stipulated that a general 5 tri ke and ar med insurrection in the cities would
mark the seizure of power, but only after the countryside had em circled the cities which were
ready to be plucked II ke ratten -ripe fruits. The FSLN campaign however, did not proceed in a gradualistic fashion through all the stages and substages of escalation prescribed in the text book. The FSLN merged rural guerilla warfare and specta CLular Lurban Comma i do operations in a synthesis roughly En visaged in the 60's by Wenezu el lan guerilla leader Douglas Brawd in what he termed the strategy of "Combined Insurrection" (Bravo gave undue Weightage to the potential role of radical military -len and he himself later into Political opportunis II, but all that is another story). Without wailing to completely encircle the cities from the country-side, the FSLN correctly judged the depth and extent of the political crisis, the maturity and mood of the m355 movement, and the overal E3 lance of forces. They escalated
their Tilitary campaign rapidly, moving from Phase I into Phase eles Coping the two phases, attacking the cities, mobilizing
2nd arming the youth, simultaneous cfensives in all parts of the country and thereby detonating explotion. This kind of military flexibility
and indeed creati la Combat is comi and simultaneous maximu FTn polit of course best the TET offelsi Wietnärt.
Опе сап опlу : kind of debate t
tably hawe take Sandinista rank: "strategic synthe
upan. Particularly regard would be e the "Protracted tendency of the FS Borge, presently Interior) and the Force) or "Insurre (led by Daniel Or th: 5 Immor F
The Witmares Provided Lus y illustrations of t standing of a give a precondition for i 1 iti ti"W25 and utilizing military of altering a giw, a given direction conjunctures ነፅ identifies as the Marxist political the exact balance statė of overContradictors in location at a give has also demon 5 grasp of the in dialectical interi ween the politial which has so ofte been misunders to or simply forgotte rTowerTments in Li the past 2 decad has Witnesse da di the development חס the וrם tחeוח armed rewolutio the other. TH occu Tred In diter and time. On guerilla action hi. localised sector isolated from to of the revolutio in Stance, Che's C the Spark, rema from the Tiain i. e. the tin. In
NEXT: Wangu:

ity, where guerilied Wih Ser frontal assault, for ical impact was demonstrated by we of 1968, in
speculate as to the hat m List freyiin place in the 5 before this sis' was agreed interesting in this Ixchanges between People's War' LN (led by Thomas Minister of the "Tercerista" (Third ctionist' tendency tega presently of էuling Junta).
e Marxists hawe with the fin est He correct under: In conjuncture as launch ing military conversely of action as a Tears en conjuncture in
The concept of fhich Althusser key category of science refers to of forces and the determination of
a given spatial 1 time, The FSLN trated a masterly egral linkage and elationship betand the military n and sc tragically od, un der-stres 5ed n by revolutionary If A Tertica... | 25, the continent sjuncture between Cof the mass Tho ye - e hand and the nary struggle on e disjuncture has ision of both space Ce Titair1 CCC:15101 is broken out in a of the country Tain Social force m. in. Boliwia for col LurT rn WH [ch was ned disconnected explosive charge ih 2 "5,
ard role
SINCE 927 WE HELP
BUILD’
THE NATION
N. J. COORAY (BUILDERS) LTD.
303, Barnes Place, COLOMBO 7.
Telephone: 96859

Page 10
IRAN
The 'other face
he mullahs should go back
to their mosques" said an indignant Shah pour Bhaktiar at a Paris press conference recently. As the ill-fated leader of a short -lived civilian regime in the Shah's last days, this fra il figure caught in a political storm he had no hope of surviving may not be the most dispassionate observer of his country's present turbulence. Yet his remark does confirm the validity of a basic judgement made by папу COTT ET1tt05 including this journal, on the 'two faces", progressive and reactionary, of Islamic revivalism.
In recent weeks, the Iranian people, particularly the middleclass and the educated, have seen the luglier, fanatical and obscuratist face of this lowerTent. Music which the Ayatollah Khomeini declared is as bad as opium has been ban med on The Tam radio, and the new puritanism, intense
in its zeal and indiscriminately cruel in punishing "offenders", turns a fierce frown on drink,
sex, certain types of dress, and any public display of emotion by women, including dutiful wives. Flogging is the instant werdict. Meanwhile national groups, Arabs, Kurds, Turkomans are being driven to open rebillion.
A Teheran University Professor to||d NEWSWEEKS "5 Pau|| Marti "Those of us who lived through dictatorships have made up our Tiind 5. . . . . . We si Tıply can't hawe another-islatic or otherwise."
Bhaktir"; rem i de T that Iran existed centuries before Islam may raise fundamental questions about Iran's identity, past and future, but of it. The diate concern are: (a) the conditions of near-anarchy created by the attempt to impose both the backward-looking bigotry as well as the testy dictatorial will of Khomeini and his Qom — based clique, (b) the disaffection and dis Unity it is ca L5 ing across the country, even among Islamic and ecclesiastical circles (c) the effort to legitimise all this through
8
an election" to
Council of Exper of the draft col theocratic state (c. clusion of groups an which played an
the anti-Shah mo" the Insidious atten in the affairs Countries in the "Islamic confedera
As the NY
correspondent has pelled, reported, People's Republical Popular Ayatollah boycotted the ele the National Fron first political forc organised opposit Streets aga inst til N. F. was joined by the Natiana D the Leftwing (Mc the Tudeh party : elections Were so that A. P. report the explicit rules the Interior Minis by Khomeini's ag the ballot papers of thousands of As a result, many didates like the g Central Bank, Mawlawi, and thi Company chairman, Withdrew their n: Ayatollah Khomeir |ared that He stal ratic en e-party 'permit' the ex or two other Pia 'good". The arm a lerted id a rut on all "opponents
The feuds betw tollahs hawe reach that the Arab Ayatollah al-Shuha arrested by Khom Lak er to år "un kno" According to a Christian Science followed an attac sidents on oil pip huge Abadan refin
(ζίνη τη μέει μΗ

a 73-me Tiber is which advise Institution for a 1) the wilful exd political forces WITH
active role in vement and (e) mpts to interfere if neighbouring Tame of a future
tjom". THE Times, whose Since been ex
the Mosem n party of the
Shar-IatrTnad3 ri ctions. So did COMPLIMENTS OF t which was the 2 to carry the tio into the The Shah. The in the boycott emocratic Front, slem) fedayeen, DISTRIBUTORS ind others. The mullah-managed ed on the way laid down by try were flouted eritis who fil Iliad OF
for hundreds literate voters. respected canovernor of the Yohammed Ali 2 Nato la Ci
„ . CITIZEN
Ili has now deci1 ds for a thgostate but will istence of One rties which are y has also been WRIST WATCHES hless crackdown " seems likely.
reen the Ayaed Such a Point & CLOCKS
eligious leader ir Khakam i was éin i 'g smen and wn destination', report in the Monitor, this
k by Arab disClimes mear the cry.
Page )

Page 11
Labour
FTZ, night wor
by Gamini Dissanai ke
or sometime mow, the Gowern
ment has not concealed its desire to employ women at night work. And a few weeks ago, the Department of Labour sent a circular to leading Trade Unions which said A number of Industrial establishments in the
F.T.Z. in Sri Lanka wil warnt wonnen workers to Work in the night contrary to the
provisions of the I.L.O Convention No. 89, which prohibits night work for women in industrial undertakings, ratified by Sri Lanka.
"You are aware that since the convention was adopted, attitudes regarding the prohibition of night work for women have changed and consequently opinions have been expressed that legislation based on the convention is discriminatory against Women in employment.
"It is, therefore, desirable to know the views of organisations of employers and workers for the government to formula te a meaningful course of actio with a view to denouncing convention No. 89. . . ."
In Sri Lanka the following laws prevent women from being engaged in night work:-
(a) Convention No. 89 of the I.L.O. prohibits employers from employing women in factories after 10 p.m.
(b) The Shop and Office Employees Act prevents employers from making women perform overtime work after 6. p.m.
(c) The Employment of Women, Young persons and Children Act prohibits women from being employed in night work.
The intention of the Government, th=refere, is not only to denounce te -- Licin No. 89 but also to
repeal the oth impede women in night work,
Naturally, th rejected the L: proposal and reply the C.M than denounce No. 89, the go denounce those to exploit wo this country at for their enha
During the re strike alt a leat Ltd, the em introduce into Agreement a coi Women on the 3r 10 p.m. and 6 however, that si not contrary to pli or Government rejected by the
A couple of now I.L., O intern for the improven of working life, asked by the Ge to study the phy logical, medical, Implications of n ing to the two James Carpen Cazanian the study are:-
(l) That no m. ic justifוחםחסr ecם for night work, allowed to Outwei
The study acco reduction of nigh ΠΠ ΠiΠη ΙΙ Πη.
(2) That to th doing night wark) disturbance of the at night, when on Te sluggish, can c disorders. The CO T1 moni plate armor swallowing pills during day and sta Only mi ke Titters

( and
r two laws that being employed
c Trade Unions bour Department a characteristic U said Rather the convention vernment should who are seeking The Workers in light in factories, 1ced profit."
cent four om th's ling Textile Mills loyers tried to the Collective dition to employ shift i.e. between a.m provided, t isחymeםJch empl revailing legislation Policy. This was
Workers.
vears ago, undera eוחוחational progra ment of the quality two experts Were neva-based agency siological, psycho
family and social ight work. Accordexperts - Messrs tier and Pierre orglusion 5 of their
atter what teeh nical lcatian minỵ bo føụnd they should not be gh the drawback5.
"d Ingly advocated the Work to the strict
e ower-tired na 55 s Eby
must be added the iting pattern: cating e”5 di göstive prace555
LIguario di 5-3ti ratif:: - Lun wiwit 2 but 1g night workers - of
tog ble to sleep awake at night can
הבה 5 חם" ו"
LO
Extract of I.L.O Convention No: 89.
diffice
WOTNET YWithout distinction 0 age shill not be employed during the night in any public or private in clustrial Lundler alking, li r iii l In' brill clı threof, Other than II undertaking in which only TeII hers of the Sanne fall III ily El rè ETորlny etl.
Iric: 3
This convent i 1 dC) es 10 : pply to:-
(a) Women holding responsible positions of a шапауегigil lIl technical Lh:1r:Lter lnd
Women employees in health yayıf TE STYices y lyho are not ordinarily engaged in Ilian Lal Werk.
(b)
(3) The I.L.O further notes that the dangers inherent in night-work increase with age and length of service,
(4) Working at night and sleeping during the day upsets the natural rhythm. On average, nightshift workers sleep about two hours le 55. Not on y arg the hours of sleep fewer than at night, but they are often of insufficient depth, with the result that the sleeper feels groggy when he/she wa kes up. They are alsa punctuated by awakenings due ta pungs of hunger.
(5) This over tiredness and the difficulties in sleeping associated with it give rise to ner Wous disorders: The
* "night-worker's nou rosis"" || 5 TCCCPgn i 5 ed as the type of neurosis which Tay lead to a nervous breakdown.
(6) Nevertheless, social tradition which force a wo man inta A dual role of employed and housewife is an aggravating factor - especially as women working at night will endeava ur to da their house-work in the morning and sleep only in the afternoon.
(7). On the social side, the most LLLLaLS LLLS S LLSukkLLLS LLLL0LLLLSS SL0 SSS the disruption in the daily life of the family unit caused by night work, which may even scriously upset the mental balance of the workers concerned.
(3) There appears to be no way of organis ing the work that can Countract the harmful effects of night work, at least at the present time, the study concludes.
9

Page 12
– Mr. Bala Tampole, the General Secretary of the powerful C.M.U told this writer about an illuminating study presented by Prof. Erich H. Jacoby, University of Stockholm (who died 3 weeks ago) at the special sessions of the International Union of Food and Allied workers held in June at Geneva. Speaking about our F.T.Z. the Professor had stated that over 70% of the employees were women and out of this 80 -85% were between the ages of 15 and 25. This trend according to Prof. Jacoby was an attempt to promote transnationalization of the United Nations'. Susan George - the author of the classic "How the Other Half Dies "" whom Mr. Tampoe had also met in Genewa told him that "this is tanta mount to the village subsidising the multi-nationals''. She had further stated that this was only a case of "Shifting of employment" and not solving the problem of unemployment. For after about 5 years, these women workers at the FTZ wi|| hawe to return to their village homes as (and with many other problems). She had also noted that the majority of tee FTZ were either unskilled or semiskilled Workers.
Recently, the Trade Unions protested strongly against the minimum wage rates published by the G.C.E.C in respect of F.T.Z. factory employees. The Unions claimed that the G.C.E.C. was in fact, "announcing to the world at large that the labour in Sri Lanka could be exploited for a few dollars".
The published wages per month were (a) Rs. 500- for a skilled worker (b) Rs. 400/- for a semi -skilled worker and (c) Rs. 350for an unskilled Worker. On these scales a skilled worker gets US $ 64 but the foreign investor has to pay only half of that due to devaluation of the Rupee. This also means that at our F.T.Z, a worker is earning even less than || 16th of what his her counterpart is receiving, for instance in Singapore. And to make matters worse, while the average number of hours to be worked per week is over 48, the overtime work is paid for at a very low rate.
10
Two young girls who ran for the factory in the F.T. other day that th 2 hours a day for (out of which compulsory overti earning less tha .th חסוח
The Editor of the does not mind women provided th and meals and trar "That they are li exploitation is si concern us deeply
"Further, we the police are më inquiries regardin, affiliations, trade un about all the won the F.T.Z. We den of police control on
To get back Department's desir ncing' the Conw
and of repealing t laws, the main resu of these legal obs summarised as foll
(1) Tendency te young, un ma industrial or
(2) The possibil
three shifts which hawe present.
(3) The threat o wormen, whic the age limi out of empl
(4) Further hara
ing women burde ned in work place: their homes
(5) Opportunity exploitation loyed in ni;
When I asked Mr whether the Gove tion of employin night work would to factories in the was "By no mean noted that if th de nounces the ILO repeals the exist

from Ratmalana old at a garment Z told me the By had to work six days a week
4 hours were me) but yere in Rs. 500/- a
“Kantha Handa" light work for ey are paid well, 15port provided. able to sexual քmething that
says she.
inderstand that king exhaustive g the political lor conections her Workers in OLUrl Ce this - kirid
Workers."
to the Labour
e for "denouel tion No. 89 he other two Its of a removal acles could be
OW
employ only rried women in ganisations.
ity of working in organisations two shifts at
both men and have exceeded
being thrown
2уппепt.
Smelt of WorkWho arte owerit only in their
but also in
fo sexual f Women empit work.
Bala Tampose 'n ment's imten
We for be restricted F.T.Z. his reply It should be Government onven tión and ng provisions
in the labour laws that prohibit night work for women, the door will be open for foreign and local employers to employ women at night not only in Industrial stablishments that employ men for work in night shifts, but also in other establishments where women cannot be employed at night to do overtime work. This will also open the door to the sexual exploitation of women by unscrupulous employers and the executives besides enabling emploYers, to com Pel women to work in Place of men or together with them on night shifts.
"We are totally opposed' said Mr. Tampoe "to any attempt to de Prive Women in this Country of the protection of the law in relation to employment at night. We have told the Commissioner of Labour that instead of Seeking to equalise the exploitation of human labour at night for private profit, our Union considers that the Government should equalise pay for men and Women, whenever they do the Saile, or comparable work, by law and in practice, in private and public sector as tablishments."
Where black newsmen go to jail
Inhannesburg
Zwelakhe Sisulu, news editor of
the Sunday Post and president of
the Writer's Association of South
Africil (WASA), has just been
sentenced to nine months imprisLIlIILIII
The reason: He refused to testify against another Tip Tt T and WASA nember, Thiami Miklh | TTL El
Meanwhile, somewhere in the labyrinth of South African jails and prisons, Mr. Mkhwanazi himself is entering his third flinth of detention without trial or for Ilal charges.
Mr. Sisulu's sentence, now being appealed, and Mr. Mkhwa. nazi's detention are two more indications that a black news reporter in South Africa holds a high-risk job.

Page 13
Perspectives
N M - A politic
by Reggie Siriwardena
he strains of the funeral
ceremony at Independence Square are coming over the radio as | sit writing this article — a ceremony which comes as a climax to what appeared to be a national consensus of right and left to mourn the departed leader of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party. Yet the bewildering diversity of the tributes paid to N.M. during this Weekas revolutionary and leader of Working-class struggles, as parliamentarian par excellence and constitutional Scholar, a 5 SinhalaBuddhist and defender of the rights of the Tamil-speaking peopleTirrored the dichotomies of the man himself and of the political phenomenon that he represented. It would be too easy and too superficial to say that these dichotomies corresponded with the divergent halves of his political career-early and late. The reality seems to me more complex than that: it is rooted in the very origin and development of the Political movement that he hel Ped to found and to burd.
The historic significance of the foundator of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party in 1935 was that it represented both the first militant anti-imperialist mass movement in Sri Lanka as well as the first attempt to bring a Marxist consciousness to the working class. The first of the se tasks was one which elsewhere- and notably in neighbouring India- had been performed by bourgeois nationalist parties. It was, however, the very Ebsence in Sri Lanka of a bourgeose capable of leading a mass cement against imperialism which Et t-Is role Unfulfi||ed Lin til the | - of the LSSP. But this
- e feature of Sri Lankan c development was also ==ce in the dualistic character - F = LSSP itself.
C. the cine hand, in the aspect which it presented itself to the
people as an political party, -40 Was Marxi organisation no it was a populist the State Count a broadly ant social reformist other hand, will of that party inner group im theory which itself the goal LSSP into a rewi the working clas tion of a classic
To the public was represented above all by t Gunawardena af because they tu into a base for both the colon brown dependa in its second asp little inkling u years, since the the original LSSP into a par
 

all assessment
ublic *器 st neither in its ;Eוחוחgraסrק r In its party agitating in Eil and outside On
open and tha LSSP of
i-imperialist and
platform. On the thin the leadership
the te existed an ued with Marxist nad very early set of converting the olutionary party of s with an organisaLeninig, cha Tate T.
at large the LSSP
in its first aspect wo figures – Philip ld N. M. Peera - rned the legislature a struggle against ial regime and its nts. Of the party lect the public had in til the post-war i tra 15 fora Eiol of loosely-built open ty of selected and
politically educated cadres was consum mated only under conditions of war time illegality with four
of its leaders in jail and its other activists reduced to the condition
of a sect function ing in the underground.
In the inner party leadership
which guided that transformation there was one dominant figurePhilip Gunawardena. His political leadership Was then (and until the factional struggles which split the underground LSSP in 1942) accepted uniwersally by his Com rades in the party and in the leadership with the deference due to his superior experience in the left movement abroad, his profound knowledge of Marxism, and the incisive and penetrating force of his political intellect. It was also Philip who scored the LSSP towards Trotskyism - a development which was intelligible in Sri Lankan condition of the 'thi Tities and "fort les when the formulation of the Comintern of the Popular Front

Page 14
period just did not make sense in the local context.
Since both N. M. and Philip were to travel a long political distance between their beginnings and their ends, it is relevant to ask what in their personal qualities and their cast of mind helped them on this winding road. Both of them were, from the outset, divided figures, but the contradic
tions were of a very different character between the one and the other, Philip, in spite of
the depth of his immersion in the Marxist political tradition, also had a part of his character and outlook which was coloured by the background in which he had been brought up - that of the rural landed gentry. This part of himself was not to emerge strongly un til He had been driven into political isolation in the early "fifties by his inherent Incapactiy to work in a party or an alliance except as unquestioned leader. But in that situation his hitherto submerged ties with his family and class background gained ascendancy and found expression in his compromises with Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist and with the coalition politics first of the S. W. R. D. Bandarana ike and them of the Dudley Senanayake government.
N. M's strengths and weaknesses were of a different kind. His mind had been formed, in an urban, secular and rationalist context, and whatever Public genufertions he may have made later to traditional pieties out of Political expediency, it is qui te Wrong to make out, as some of his biographers in recent weeks hawe done, that those were the motive springs of his thought and action. Where Philip's compromi5os with comunalism in the latter period of his career seemed to 5 pring out of something deeply rooted in his origins, N. M's corresponding shifts went against the natural grain of his thinking N. M's real duality ay in a different direction - his curious Intellectual blend of Marx and Erskine May, of Trotsky and Harold Laski. In his formative years the essential habits of his thought had been shaped by the left-liberal outlook of the LSE, and the later accretions of Marxism and Trotskyism
never really dis these first politi not SUTPrising, t the process of in the direction a lisation and TI theory, N. M. To le tha lot o Wardena but al. Silva Or. Leslie |
Yet the endevolution of the in which N. M. commanding figur his colleagues - a who used to
forti e 5 that N Then tally a social Marxist y eller. the process of N the LSSP itself u formation from a social-democrat party. Here Sr. belatedly took it LSSP and its nationalist bourg failed to laterial thus giving the opportunity to imperialist mass ged in the "fii leadership of Band ing the LSSP fr sole potential all UNP. By the tint naike began to future base of while still pa deference to rewol had in practice field of its actiwi
TEIGT.
Th2 truth 5
formatlon attenir leadership within 'forties had been insufficient depth: the leadership an träined and eduli the top but did the broad rass followers, and w; submerged once 1 caught up in d union and parlia In that shift N. played the leadi particular skills tempera T1ënt mat home in the parl Not only was he to the conventio of the parliament

odged him from al roots. is herefore that in moving the LSSP of Leninist orgotskyist political played a lesser nly Philip Gunao Colwin R. de Goomewardena.
product of the LSSP was a party emerged as the e, overshadowing mong them, some whisper in the M. wa 5 fundademocrat With a Of course, in : M.'s ascendancy, derwent a transi revolutionary to ic parliamentary i Lankan history s revenge on the eadership, The eoisie who had |lse in the 19305, SSP the historic build an antiT1-WE TElt SIT L“- ftias Ludert the aranalike, displacom its role of te Tawe to the ia that Bandarabuild his own bower, the LSSP, ving theoretical lutionary politics, found the main ty in parliament
that the transpted by the the party in the carried out in : it affected only d the politically cated cadres at not really reach of members and is therefore soon he party became ay-to-day trade Then tary activity. M, appropriately ing role, His
and personal da him fully at |amentary arena, deeply wedded n and decorum ary game played
by House of Commons rules (where Philip at heart despised them), but his affable and equable temper (where Philip was volatile and unpredictable) was an asset in the give-and-take of parliamentary exchange, barga ining and compromise, The more the LSSP became involved, therefore, in the shadow-boxing of parliamentary Politics, the more N. M. Strengthened his dominant position in the party itself. But the inevitable result of that process was the coalitions of 1964-65 and 1970-75, in which the LSSP made its farewell to its revolutionary past,
and in which N. M's socialdemocratic philosophy finally and irrevocably triumphed over the residual Marxism of his colleagues.
It is not really surprising, therefore, that N. M's death
should hawe ewoked such a wide -ranging expression of grief and tribute from the most seemingly unexpected quarters, or that Government, State-controlled Press, radio , and film should all hawe joined in paying homage to the dead man as a national hero, But N. M's death comes also at a time when the social and political evolution of Sri Lanka has already, in the General Election of 1977, closed the doors on that era of compromise through parliamentary reformism and accolodation between classes which he incarnated and to the fruition of which he brought his talents. It may not be fanciful to suppose that the national consensus of widely different political elements
which the mourning for N. M's death evoked was also the last regretful salute to the illusions
of a past that has already ended.
recognize change
ROME, The Constitutioni Court has ruled that people who change sex surgically must legally retain their former gender. It rejected a petition by an actor who had undergone surgery so he could "be accepted by society as a person of the opposite sex'
Italy won't sexual- status
The Court said changing sex is
not an in violable constitutional right. and that a person undergoing such surgery "has no possibility of being legally recognized to halve changed sex."

Page 15
End of a
by Nawaz Dawood
(Director of the Banda riffsik Cerre for Herra Bud: Hச சgar eHCLLGtTCL L HH LT S SLCTCCSAS LL L LSLLLSYLS LS weekly.)
T passing away of Dr. N. M. Perera at the age of 74 signifies the end of an era. A brilliant schola T who Da55 ed out of the London School of Economics with a double doctorate, N. M. Perera came back and joined the
Ceylon University as a lecturer in Economics. The traditional calm of a colonial university, then under the sway of that arch-imperialist Professor Marrs, could not possibly tolerate a fiery and dedicated Trotskyite like N. M. Petera. Within a
year, he was literally forced out of the University, into the antiimperialist struggle on the streets. From then on N. M. Perera. Commited himself to the formation of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party and thereafter to its consolidation. Unlike many of his colleagues, N. M. Perera stayed steadfastly with the cause he believed in, right to the very end. In a country where politicians of all hues and colours
leap-frag from party to party, that alone is saying a lot. It is the firmest proof of his grit
In de te Tināti O.
Generations of young men were inspired to delve into the depths of Marxism after listening to N. M. or after reading his Unqualified beracing of the bourgeoisie. I recall cycling to various meetings in Colombo as a schoolboy just to listen to N. M. speak. His easy going -- almost bartering speaking style was in direct contrast to the fiery denunciations of many ther who shared his platform. . . had a way of attracting c - minds and establishing a - with then. Stories cut - simple life-style added the of the man, leave ce is intellectual abilities. Eve ti titterest political enemies wil concede that, had he
fight
taken the ca. other politicians have easily reach electoral ofice
But N. M. op road a nd a simp
Two streams ing went to Sama Samaja Par hand, Cama influenced by thinking in these were N, Wickremasinghe, Wardene and D Silwa. The other by Philip Gunaw got his training Scott - Nearing USA. They car for the LSSP almost immediat difference was 5. Colonial struggle struggle and in Unior Corsicus
The growth anc anti-colonial stru cannot be sepa Suriya Mal Mow paign against Mal: of the workers Spinning and Wt in the Harbo Mooloya, the the Bracegirdle these, in the N. M. It is dif years later, to the nature of th the growth of
Sri Lanka. Wha however, is ch Were il fa
which were laur largest and per dest empire tha ever known.
N. M. Peter Tetailed their Collections a Rajni Palme Jayapra kash Nar: Menom In India Indies perhaps t of West | Indian C. L. R. James, "Black Jacobins'

ing innings
55 C route that took he could led the top of in Sri Lanka. ted for another
le life.
Hf radi-ä| Ehinkform the Lanka ty. On the one hose Who Were
Harold Laski's
gחסוחondon. AM. DIT, S. A. Leslie Gune
"". (C|Wi R. De r group was led rat de na who had Lunder Professor in Wisconsin, ne together to
in I935, and ely a qualitative een in the anti
: the anti-feudal he rise of trade 25s in Sri Lanka.
| development of ggle in our country rated from the ement, the camaria, the struggles in the Wella Watta :aving Mills and ut, incident:5 in 953 Hill at
AffäT. || || fosfor Stod ficult for us 40 understand fully iese e Wents upon socialist ideas in can be said, at the Ge e Yelts bitter struggles ched against the laps the shrewthe World has
and his colleagues international Ing whom were Dutt, Saklatwala, yan and Krishna and in the West | 105 FITUS Trotskyites Dr. author of the - the story of
Tousaint L' Overture, Interestingly C. L. R. James, an exile from his beloved Trinidad even today, like N. M is a lower of cricket. James's book on West Indian Cricket became a World bestseller.
Till the early forties, with the exception of A. E. Goonasinghe's Labour Party, N. M. and the LSSP literally dominated the trade unions. In the early forties the debate in the International Tower ent between Stan and Trotsky had its repercussions here too. N. M. Perera stayed with his original belief in the Trotskyite ideology, particularly on the question of a United Front against imperialism. The LSSP's Connection with Leon Trotsky was firmly established, so much so that Selina Petera (N. M.'s wife) went all the way to the Mexican border to meet the Outcast Prophet, but was turned back due to a messup by her American comrades. Meanwhile Dr. S. A. Wickremasinghe, D. P. Yasodis, Pieter Keun eman, Saranan kara Thero, A. Waidyalingam, C. Karthigesan, M. G. Mendis, W. Ariyaratina, T. Duraisingham, and some others formed the necleus of what was to become the Communist Party. From then on, N. M. was oppo
sed ideologically by the C. P.
Thereafter the working class movement in Sri Lanka was
divided between the Trotskyite section led by N. M. and the international political line of the Corn intern and the Soviet Union. In time, in the sixties, the Communist movement Would also split along the basis of the Sino — Sowiet split. Defections from the LSSP also took place at various stages, but through, out this entire historical period, the leadership of N. M. and his colleagues in the LSSP was never seriously challenged.
3

Page 16
N. M. '5 role as ar abog Parliamentarian began in the thirties after he defeated Adelina Molallure in Ruwanwella and went to Parliament to join Dr. S. A. Wickremasinghe who, by THEn, was representing the Morawaka constituency. In parliament N. M. pressed for and helped to push through many of the Welfare leasures, which we now take for granted and which include laws relating to the welfare of the Working class, Wi Ehin E: Hhe confin1 es i f a boLur-- geois State. Even before C. W. W. Kan mangara, from prison, N. M. had written a booklet in favour of free education. The Statu te book has many pieces of wolfare and progressive legislation, in the passing of which the Hand of N. M. Parga is clearly imprinted. In terms of Electora offica, N. “. In
his 45-year period as politician served as the Mayor of Colombo and also a Minister of Finance in a Coalition Government.
During the last political career, many changes took place in stance of the LSSP on fundamental issues like the United Front, Parliamentary politics and the Language question. These atters resulted in further divisions within the LSSP and debates on the validity of Some of the LSSP's Political attiLudes to certain aspects of the a PPlication of Marxism - Leninism to CLI-I"ETH situations, especially the role of the peasantry, etc. Among these issues, the reasons for tha failute of the LSSP to unite the peasant masses with the working class movement, will surely be in history seen 35 a chik in the Tout of the Trotskyite movement in Sri Lanka. Whatever history's werdict on N. M. Perera's leadership of the working class under the LSSP, his na mé i 5 indelibly written on the pages of the history of the trade union movement of Sri Lanka.
phase of his
|
N M :
by Kumar D;
M., in our C. e is the big important of the and personages of the first three q century. This is I Terit. We hawe T only such persona Dudley, SWRD, and prominent persons period such as th 5 Sir D. E and even Anagari teach is the conte Howayg“, W|15. LF torian of future ger to write the arma We believe that he our judgement. Two us to make this imprint that the s steadfastness of his of Their five decade upon this country, the qualitatively h wing and worki therefore militant the politics with Fa5 · chos en tio ! in ! }a Symb וחmake hi
This ha 5 bleem words. N. M.'s po said, denotes a twi for democracy, tw: The former of C. from the fight Imperialism for nat which the LSSP alone led, to the ste against military co, be dictators in decades. The latte the LSSP's greates as well as its ric Weakness. He under Stand this cal history; he has history.
N.M.'s political fication of the Int two determining e country's politics to five decades-u and Proletarian clas working class has politics as a self-c

in perspective
Hvid
ansidered wiew, gest and most politic || Heiders Sri Lanka during quartets of this lo hasty judgeLIliad o yger mot ges as D. S. and Philip, but also from an earlier וחב:Ball וחב. חתם F בו 3., Goonesinghe ka Dharmapala, xt of his age. he people's hisIe " tio 15 to Tre5 5 of these ties : Will beat Out tקוחסrק 5חסea5ח udgement; the heer length and political career 5 ha 5 had placed and secondly igher, the left ng class and character, of which history am t1 טוחaח his & ol.
said in other litical life it is 5 truggle, one 3, for socialism. use stretches against British ional liberation, and the LSSP had fast struggles Ips and would
TOT It is the site of It ach iewem cits st indefensible
who not understand no sense of
ife is a personiarwining of the ents of this east fourt niversal suffrage is politics. The
interwened in onscious force,
but it has do na so in the context of ån extended and vigorous survival of parliamentary democracy. N.M. is Sri Lanka's greatest parliamentarian; at the same time the LSSP led, (and N.M. symbolises) the political emergence of the working class. There is no paradox here as the sectarian mind might presuppose but only a plain and factual manifestation of the two deg Pest determinants of political reality in this country.
Where then did N. M. slip? We believe that the site of his greatness was also the site of
his weakness. He was too passive a manifestation, too true a mirt Tor,
of his age. A mirror placed on the left hand side of the historicai process of course, but still a mirror. A revolutioaiary Marxist leader lives in a more dialectical
confrontation with history and the proletariat; such were Lenin's acquiescences and confrontations. But N. M. and the LSSP especially after 1964, were prone" to compromise too much.
"Carrying the stamp of one defect
the dram feal
LLLLaa LLLL HaT CLLLLLLLLL LLaaLLL
This cyfyn s:Carth llall.""
The dividing line between revolutionary fiexibility and u nwarran td compromises, initially at least, is a thin line. Once launched however the yeast of compromise leaveneth the Whole bread, transforming the ideology, the practice and the character of a polit|cal movement totally, The urber of movements that hawe taken the first step in the surrender of their revolutionary heritage quoting Lenin's block with Kerensky against Kornilow as their example is legion. Len in however was a union of flexibility with in transigence, quite another thing from compromise
It was the BLP, not the N. M.- Philip group, that took a firm and correct stand in the late 1940's when the plan nation workers were

Page 17
disenfranchised. Again in the 1950's the LSSP compromised on the national question, capitulating to Sinhala chauvinist pressure that it had up to then commendably Withstood. Worst of all however was class Collaborationist politics from 1964 to 1975. Ruinous compromise. Hence the party of Suriyamal, the jail-break, the General Strike and the Hartal was also the party of compromise with bourgeois and Petty-bourgeois nationalism. In a word, the failure of the LSSP Was that when the broad masses, the petty-bourgeois ma,5525, biegan to Interwena massively in politics from about two and a half decades ago, the party failed to solve the central question of working class leadership of that interwention.
Our criticism then is a criticism froT1 h e left It Stands. In Contrast to that other criticism which We hawe heard ofton, wiz: the LSSP did not appreciate Sinhal a Buddhist sentiment, it did not Immerse its elf in the CLultural ethos of Lanka, it did not go to the village etc. etc. This latter critique We reject as both untrue and as a recipe for the obliteration of the Marxist specificity of proletarian revolutionism, We firmly believe that if the LSSP stood firm after 1956 it would have grown rapidly, not shrunk as ill has done. N. M., and the LSSP faltered between these two positions because they were too true a reflection, albeit a reflection from the left, of the unfolding historical process. Their Consciousness did not sufficiently separate itself and stand adequately far ahead of ephemeral immediacy.
This is how we Lunda İstand the
Paradox that has been more simply, but less accurately, described as "N. M., the incongrous
blend of the Trotskyist and Marxist with the Parliamentarian and the Democrat'. But that was the man and no Wonder then that there could have hardly been a working 2 SES HIC FTC in which a Car was rot shed of a sigh escape on the night of August 4th.
NEXT ISSUE-An assessment by Hector Abhayawardene.
Revolutionary
(Сангlлығd
to Cairo by a the S. F. C. b young man thou an insult to the However, the A Pp u lobby suc ing their case w
Incidentally, Bl the Cultura M nominate two y two scholarships cent cultural pat had been direct Ha || Trust which dewa and Wii Amarade wa's narr roved by the di CO - TITO" young had not been n; Sands here expe composer-singer be the obvious a youthful count tiLJ TE || k e outs, опе регson for said a wateran r this journal last
Letters . . .
(Confirlier |
journalists ewen lic, Should DPI er does diplom. crisy? Pointing to lous of the 5 e un
a young Wester me a "even you chaps find him a bit of a blo out papers, inclu zine, hawe not g to him or suppo foreign policy?
Colorn Էյք É
(We are re: "non-bloc' to
blockades but r blockheads glad

fгалт Page 4)
enior official of ut the ingenuous ht it would be verdict of judges.
powerful Puran :eeded in clinchrith Cairo.
lgaria had asked inistry here to Jung musicians for
under the reit. The invitation d to the Tower named Amaractor Ratnayake. e was not appnours as he was but a substitute minated. "Thou!cted the radical Nanda Malini to choice. But alas, ry so rich in culcould only send two scholarships' music director to
week.
- G.D.
ruri Page I)
whipped in publ's "lie" abroad асу пеan hypothe most garrudiplomatic critics, in diplomat told r Foreign Office
abrasive. . . he's ckhead". Perhaps Iding your magativen prominence rted his country's
*Ne Lutra I i5: ".
ady to discuss
tries and evеп efuse to suffer ly - Ed.) Ε
Summit and
(Сот тілшғd forпті Рағғ 3)
pleading were examined by this journal. (Aug. 1). At least it could be said on Belgrade's behalf thet Yugoslavia has not not only been an active, and an enth Lsiastic member but one of the founders of mowerTent that has become a significant force in world politics.
But what were the sources of propagan dist attack from out
side? Fistly, the western media. Even last week, the news agencies were putting out stories which every informed journalist knew was utterly dated. Why? The answer has become as plain as the purpose of the special
performance put on by the Showboat people in Colombo last month. It was to sow discord and dis unity, to divert the attention of the peoples of the non-aligned nations from the basic problems that the summit will hawe to discuss-politics, economics, Information etc., problems which are rooted in western domination.
Secondly, the inspiration came from Washington and Peking, the new axis. Ils Cuba non-aligne d? The same question repeated a thousand times and often thrust into the mouths of pliant propagandists within the non-aligned community. Again the answer is plain enough. In Colombo, over 80 heads of states decided to hold the next summit in Hawana, and only they have the right to adju
dicate on such an issue - not Washington, Moscow, Peking, Paris of Bonn.
Why then this lately acquired passion of Washington and its travellieg salesmen for the "purity" of non-alignment? Is its concern as pure as its sudden solicitude for "black boys' 2
Mao used to say 'turn bad into good'. In a sense, the visiting Congressmen have done the non -alignment and Sri Lankan students of it a signal service. By their clumsy propagand ist over-kill Washington's hand been exposed to our public.
5

Page 18
Regional politics
The arc of revolutions (2)
The counter the
he function of these arguments
is to legitimate a new militancy in US foreign policy; they take on a special force in a period prior to the 1980 presidential election. Carter, assailed by his critics for his weakness at home and for his failure 'to stand up to the Russians abroad, is under pressure to show US muscle somewhere. All these setbacks allegedly indicate this debility. Even the Camp David talks
failed to deliver the promised peace agreement between Egypt and Israel by the end of 1978.
In such a situation it is tempting to disdain the debate posed by the right-wing alarmists; yet rather than denying that there is something to discuss, it might be more effective to pose an alternative argument, replying to each of the three themes already identified. This involves providing not only an analysis of the internal processes in the countries concerned and of US policy there, but also grasping in the much more difficult nettle of what Soviet policy in this region is. The right-wingers base much of their argument on a picture of the Soviet Union as an expansion ist power. Their views are parrotted in a different register by far left exponents of the theory of Soviet 'social-imperialism'. An alternative to the wiews of Soviet foreign policy is an essential Component of any reconstituted, balanced, analysis of the region.
| Instead of conced ing that the new forces in these countries are primarily fostered from outside, it can be shown that in each of the four countrics concerned, the changes of 1978 were primarily due to the evolution of identifiable internal conflicts. The Soviet Union played no instigatory role in these evolutions. If there was an external catalyst, it came in each case from the western countries and their local allies. The unity of the four Countrie 5 is not the refore based om
6
a common fate as
designs, but resul that autonomou processes have aç with the common intere 55 of the reduced in 1978Cø LTTht"ịES exper revolutions - Afgh - while in the tw revolutions had a (South Yemen 1967 a further shift to th or international a rred.
2 The US respon situations has been the right|st crit іпјured inпосепсе, The popular exp ferocity they did p of long years of Sup by the USA. Mor ference, directly a allie S, ha 5 remaine in the radica satio four countries identifiable forms o continue through
3 The Soyiet Un| taken advantage lopments and play role, where the : But this is quite claiming that the S. directed events ol how behaving as power. Soviet m To Tio in terve II tior tries - the facto as "imperialist' by om balance, posit cause for concern Where fewer critics try to locate it, wiz of the political sy produced in these Soviet influence,
The four crisis process of radi
| At the begi the active oppositi seemed to be confi

Fred Halliday
TeS
fictims of Soviet 5 from the fact revolutionary wanced in each,
result that the USA hawe been 9, two of the enced political anistan and Iran o others whera ready triumphed , Ethiopia 1974) e left in internal lignments occu
sibility in these far greater than ics, with their hawe conceded. osions had the recisely because pression backed eover, US interind via US junior a major factor of each of the concerned and f US interference
the region.
on certainly has of these dewaan increasing ituation allows. different from wiet Union has " that it is solean "imperialist' litary and ecoin these couns usually cited left critics - is, YVE The real es at the point of left or right, in the nature tem being reountries under
countries : The alization
1 ning of 1978, Il to the Shah 2d to the urban
middle class and to students, yet by mid-January they had been joined by the religious officials, the mullahs. They in turn mobilised the mass of urban poor in a series of street demonstrations from
February onwards. By September,
the Shah had to impose martial law, and by December, after three
months of strikes, he had been
persuaded to leave the country at least temporarily, by the USA.
This he did on January 6, 1979
and on February 10- a mass u prising swept the rest of his regime away, The causes of this very deep-rooted and rapid popular movement are essentially three:
first, a political revolt against twenty
-five years of monarchical
dictatorship; secondly, a social revolt
against the increasing inequalities
and material problems associated
with the pattern of capitalist development in Iran; thirdly, a nationalist
revolt against the imposition of Western advisers and culture upon
Iran, coupled with Iran's subservience to the USA in regional affairs. The causes of the movement were preeminently internal to ran and the
one source of e wident externa
support was the Ayatollah Khomeini,
the Iranian religious leader whom
the Shah had exiled in 1963. Some
Western commentators tried to
claim there was Soviet influence - either directly or via Libya indirectly. Helms, Robert Moss and
Lord Chalfont have all tried their
hand at this, and US politicians
have talked in vague terms about
Sowiet "interference". Im Iran, But
this is non sense - not least because the opposition in Iran are anti.1stחuוחחחCG
2. The Afghan events have received much less coverage than those in Iran and it has therefore been easier to talk blithely in terms of a Sowiet-supporte d' coup. The coup in question, that of April 27 978, over threw the government of Presidant Mohammad Daud, which had itself come to power through a coup in July 1973. The April revolution installed a new regime headed by President Nur Mohammad Traki, To a II intents and purposes, this new Afghan regime

Page 19
was controlled by the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan, which had grown up out of an up thatסunist Erוחחחסd C חuסdergrחu had been established in 1965.
The PDPA is certainly proMoscow in orientation, and the Afghan army has for the past twenty-odd years been al mostentirely equipped and trained by the Sowie E Union. But does this mean that the Russians instigated the coup? No, Closer examination shows that the causes of the April events were again, predominantly internal, and that the main outside influence was a rightist one, namey from Iran. Daud had initially allied with part of the PDPA (it was split into two fractions from 1967 to 1977) and had promised radical change, such as land reform. But after 1974 and under increasing pressure from Iran, by now playing its counter-revolutionary regional role. Daud abandoned his earlier promises. He broke with the PDPA, reached economic agreements with Iran that were generally felt in Afghanistan to be exploitative, abandoned Afghan support for the Pushtun and Baluchi Peoples in Pakistan, and allowed officials from
SAVAK, Iran's secret police, to work within the Afghan state machine,
Meanwhile the economy of Afghanistan was going from bad to worse, with population rising faster than food output, un employment of over 20 per cent, a million Afghan Ten forced to emigrate to find work, and the foreign debt mounting. Literacy was below 10 per cent and per capita in Come Was S 150 a year. By early 1978 a Iaith betweet Daud and the PDPA va inevitable and When Daud tried to arrest the PDPA leadership in early April, the Party's underground organisation, well entrech in the military but under === Command of a civilian central --ittee member, struck back and seized power on April 27.
5imilar ta E-stan in that virtually no - Fre coverage of the events E = is curred, With the result = -s commentators, from the Er getic Henry Kissinger, can of = Soviet backed coup".
E S+ "Ter"Tn en i5
This presentatior Il South Yemen is coup attempt was a (b) Soviet influenc has been prepon late 1950s, and misleading to place a par With the Ot if | 9W8 marked a t did not; (c) the Yemen came to a because of the imz * that חסut upק Arabia, arı d İrnı dir | C. W 5 th cero fore inspired 'destabili. end Backfired.
|n eššence. wh as follows. So, | Tiployer Ished Cou million people or corer of the A has been in de pe nationali Strevolut 1957. Since 19 ruling National Lit been held by At the secretary-gen Robe Ali, the ass gепегаІ апd pre Yemem. C}wer" the of divergences b emerged. These with economic po! rely on the spontal (Salem Robea Al orthodox centrs procedures (Abd extended to what NLF should be —:1 structured group ethical element (S
5 structure modi: || parties of Easter Fatah Ismail).
These political d I ia from other re in terlaced with pel animosities, but it ted With foreign Arabia began is approaches to Sou to persuade it to E the Soviet Union ; Salem Robea Ali President, Abdul Continue the Clo: Soviet Union. Th ing was brought 2W2, its i Fra Hor Pola rised the co South Yemeni P

of the events absurd: (a) the ...mi dirit —5 Wet on 2; 2 || 5-LIEH Yafra Herant since the it is therefore : South Yemen on het countries as шгпіпg polпt — it events in South head a bowe all reasing pressure Country by Saudi ectly, the USA. a case of USration" that in the
at happened was th. Yelen, an cry of under 2 the south-West rabian Peninsula, rident since the חtriumphedi חסl 9 power in the eration Front had 3 du Fatah ||s Thai | eral, and Salem istant secretarysident of South i years, a number Istwa the two differences began icy - whether to neity of the masses i) or on more e di administrative ul Fatah) — and kind of party the militant flooselybased on a strong Salem Robea Ali) tablished forma d on the ruling in Europe (Abdul
ffer C25-famiWolutions - Were "sonal and regional hey also intersec
relatio 15. Saudi 975 to Take th Yemen trying reak its ties. With and offered aid to in his capacity as
Fatah Wall tid to a ties with the is tentative opento an end by of Africa which nflict within the arty. When the
Russians were expelled from Somalia im Nowcember || 977 they were forced to bring their military equipment to South Yemen, thus acquiring a direct stake in the country which they had previously lacked. Conversely the Saudis, angered by Yemen i resistance, Cut off all aid and began to mass troops along the frontier. And in North Yemen, long a field of conflict between forces sympathetic to g|ther South Yerlerı or 53 udi Arabii, the political situation also became much more acute, with the a 55a 55ination of the Oderat President Ibrahim al-Hamdi by Saudi agents in October 1977. By force of circumstance, South Yemen was therefore pushed much further towards the Soviet Union and this weakened the position of the Presi
dent, Salem Robeå AII.
4. A similar pattern of events can be discerned in Ethiopia, once the conventional Western rhetoric about Soviet and Cuban advances is cast aside. From the end of the Second World War until 1974, Brita. In and the USA were wellentrenched in Ethiopia, backing the archaic and repressive regime of Haile Selassie. Ethiopia, with a population of 33 millions, and a land area of 397,000 square miles, 65 per cent of which can be used for agriculture, was the poorest country in Africa: in 1975 adult literacy was under 10 per cent, per capita income was SOO, and life expectancy at birth was 38 years. Responsibility for the contimulation of this terri ble situation must rest squarely with the Wester countries who financed and maintained the regime and, in particular, the 40,000-strong armed forces.
In February 1974 a popular move. ment, based on urban civilian protest and mutinies in the military, broke the power of the Emperor. He was deposed in September 1974, to be replaced by a military ruling body, the Provisional Military Administrative Council. The PMAC has been in power ever since. Was there any Soviet involvement in the events of 974. No. There was not even a smal || Ethiopian Communist Party and the PMAC's ideology was, at bost, an illdefined
(Солтїпrterї оп Page *f)

Page 20
North - South dialogue (2)
The negotiating proc
his brief account of the
negotiating process as it has ewolved in the Sewenties provide a general idea of the negotiating task in the Eighties for which developing countries would need to prepare themselves. The extent to which the international negotiations in the Eighties lead to concrete a chievements and positiva results would depend primarily on the negotiating strategies which Third World countries adopt and the collective bargaining strength they are able to bring in support of these strategies. But the effort which the developing countries should apply to this task and the resources that they should devote to it would be determined by the value they place on the international negotiating process and on its capacity to deliver positive results. At the same time it could be argued that to some extent the reverse is also valid; the capacity of the negotiating process to deliver would depend on the corn initment which Third World countries make to the process and the seriousness with which they address themselves to this task.
It is often possible to ' detect In Third World countries a strong undercurrent of scepticism and di 5 trust of the international negotiating activity in its entirety. At its crudest, it is expressed in a cynicism which sweeps aside the entire negotiating effort as the product of U. N. bureaucracies resulting in futile exercises. At a more genuine level, many Third World observers concerned with development find it difficult to distinguish the un real from the meaningful in the in terminable sequence of conferences and meetings and the endless flood of dcCuisitation.
There are however two important Categories of critical responses to international economic negotiations. They are based on conceptual approaches which are alternatives to international negotiations. One approach questions the wisdom of
B
relying on a proce: international cons ment, and needs of the conflict developed and dev as a precondition f action. It Tacomi which relie 5 essent forms of action by passed on its : mobilise its co! and counterwailing approach will fi responses In OPE in colective pr producer associat exercise of count which the Third its markets for di exports, or eve in da Eo tedness to system of the dewi he second appro: Thore fundamental ideology of develd considered as Imp tional economic such an approach international econd and the managem relations is perce the effect of developing countr reliant pattern c. A strategy which to international ec
tions Could lent export-oriented gears the system
in developing cou the demand in a it could seek to pr between local
Centres of 02:00m developed counti Promote a pattern which is neglects needs of the po the developing so
The balan
The dis illusion 1 is also the result of in the Sewenties. the frustration inh which is painfully where progress to and action is by

SSS
which requires nsus and agreea te conciliation interests of :loping countries ir any mean ingful ends a strategy ally on un i lateral the Third World wn capacity to
ective strength
power. Such an |d its strategic C-type actions, assure through ions, and the
: rwalling power World has in :veloped country in in its huge the banking sloped countries. ch 5 tems from a critique of the bpment which is | licit in internanegotiations. In the emphasis on mic negotiations int of external lved as having deflecting the y from a selfif development, gives priority ɔnomic negotilasupport to growth which
· of production 1 tries to satisfy ffluent socletie5 est we the link5
a lites and the c power in the ies; it could
of development of the basic or majority in :ieties.
e sheet
"ith negotiations the performance First, there is rent in a process pro tracted and 'ards agreement advances which
are minute and faltering. International economic negotiations are by their very nature slow and time-consuming. This has been as true of the negotiations in GATT as of those in UNCTAD.
The disillusion and impatience With the International economic negotiations have to be wiewed against an assessment of the outcome of the negotiating effort since 1974. The outcome would seem grossly inadequate or moderately successful depending on the standards which a te applied or the expectations which are brought to it. Spokesmen of the developed countries hawe argued that there have been major advances on their side in regard to the fundamental approaches and basic concepts regarding international economic relations and their management, and the concreta results achiewed hawe also been significant. The developing countries, on the other hand, contend that intensive negotiations that have taken place have little to show in the form of positive achievements and no effective international action has been taken in regard to the deteriorating
terms of trade of developing countries, their steeply rising external indebtedness, or the
parsisting disorder of the international monetary system. When a balance she et 15 drawn and a final account is taken of the international economic negotiations that have taken place in the last five years, the debits appear to far outweigh the credit. The Paris Conference on International Economic Cooperation which sought to provide a framework for
international action on a broad front ended in failure. The efforts in the EMF hawe mot been
successful in evolving a new framework to reorder the international monetary and financial systems, and deal with the prevailing di sarray; neither have they been able to manage the Worsening problem of the Imbalances in international payments, and the increasing burden of adjustment which consequently continues to fall on developing countries. The

Page 21
outcome of the GATT negotiations hawe confirmed thic fear of the developing countries that the trading rules established by developed countries after the Second World War will be manipulated by them to their own advantage; no serious effort has been made to grapple with the problem of rising protectionism in developed countries. In UNCTAD wide-ranging negotiations were launched in 1976 in the field of commodities, technology, restrictive business practices, and external indebtedness. The negotiations on individual commodities have had a poor record. With the exception of Sugar, no agreement has yet been negotiated on any new commodity.
As against these debits, the credits have been a few isolated achievements. A billion dollar International Fund has been
established for Agricultural Development. There have been modest increases in IMF quotas, a new allocation of S. D. Rs, the creation of the Trust Fund from the sales of IMF gold reserves, and some improvements and extensions of borrowing facilities-all of which fall far short of meeting the problems of adjustment of deweloping countries. On the external debt, developed contries hawe agreed to limited concessions by agreeing to apply current terms of aid with retroactive effect to development assistance given in the past to "poorer" developing countries. This has resulted in the cancellation of the da bits of selected number of countries. On the individual commodities, an -greement was successfully negoEted on sugar and a firm basis evolved for agreements on rubber End olive oil. The most significant =chievement in the recent period is the agreement on the basic ==-les of the CoT TOTI FLu 1 d. The developing countries however His teen disappointed that the F_i - Falls short of the objectives Essed in the original proposal. The Fi in its present form = e less power and flexibiity to intervene in commodity Treet E.
Unilateral ac' reli;
When the rei against the debit no doubt that negotiating proc Little in the fic: changes in the Int mic system and to developing
as been achie
55 E. Fund for agricult or ewe the Com bear comparison change that was the unilatoral OPEC. BLE L i II; international neg ble Perceived a exclusive or cont chcs, It Would the Third Wo Te 5 tructure the system solely unilateral action
The other ow relating to inter negotiations We of such negotiatic development stri of 77 itself hawe to the attem F countries to li changes in the in to the need for
the socio-Co developing cour has been una criticism of any makes the struc the internation a on issues relating of basic needs of human righ countries. It is for developing c any 5 Luch Conditi turial changes in lewel are 255 cent Moving the ecor between dewe lo Countries in the e quality, improv of trade of de wel reformed more System, Create
TVIII-III BIL M an d in the . Ion, of the internal developing count and strengthen for the purs. strategies,

tion and self
e
dits are weighed 5, there Is 5 ti|| the international ess has yielded rm of significant errationale:Onoconcrete benefits Countries. What ựed 5 Luch as the xternal debt, the ural development tםחוחaם ldחFu חמוח
with the historic
effected through action taken by a teral action and otiation need not 5 two mutually radictory approaEe u Tgalisti, for
rld to plan to world economic :hrough its own
er riding question leוחם חםal Ecחסatiח saw was the place 15 in a self-cliant ategy, The Group reacted strongly its of developed nk. the need for ternational system internal changes omic structures of tries. The group mbiguous in its strategy which tural changes at | lewell conditional to the satisfaction OF thg affirma LIOT its in developing clearly important on tries to oppose onality. The structhe International a for themselves. Iomic relationships ping and developed direction of greater emert. In the term5 oping Countrie5, a a tary and financial the international rhich i 5 CCofn du Ciwe g term supportive
tra 15 formation of :ries. They enlarge the resource base It of self-reliant
This position of keeping the question of international structural change separate from the national strategies in the North-South negotiation does not however dispose of some of the more basic conceptual issues that are raised. These issues are concerned with
the nature of the N.I.E.O. that is being negotiated and its own impact on the Pattern of development at the national level.
Changes at the International level which are primarily concerned with improving the mechanisms for exports from developing countries and facilitating conditions for the
Flow of transnational in Westments may rum counter to national strategies which concen Era te On
rais ing the lewels of mas 5 consumption in the developing countries and strengthening the economic and technological base for their self-reliance. In this sense, the changes that are being negotiated at the international lewel are mot neutral to the proce 55 es and patterns of development within developing countries; they could eithar Create conditlong which ara conducive to self-reliant growth
or could reinforce conditions of dependence.
The leadership which the Third World countries give to the process of structural change at the international level should be
strengthened by a broader understanding of international economic issues within the developing countries themselves, and supported by a growing mass awareness of the se negotiations and involvement in then. It is only through such a political process that the international economic negotiations can acquire a wider national relevance and can emerge as all area of activity which can become part of the political priorities of national leaders. Such a process will also help to define better the priorities in the international negotiating tasks themselves, align
these tasks with the national strategies of development and close the gaps between the international structural changes and the internal changes in developing societies. A political process of this kind may not be
possible in all parts of the Third World. (To be continued)
9

Page 22
| Polítics
Reassessing electoral system (2)
The Law on PF
LOCAL AUTHORITIES ELECTIONS
(SPECIAL PROVISIONS) LAW, No. 24 OF '979
SECTION 25
Every general election of the members of a local authority shallwhere such authority is a Municipal Council or an Urban Council or a Town Council, be held within the period of four months preceding the date on which the term of office of the members who are to be elected is due to commence; or
(b) Where such authority is a Willage Council, be held within the period of five months preceding the date on which the term of office of the members who are to be elected is due to commence."
SECTION 47
Every ballot paper shall be substantially in the form as set out In the Third Schedule, and -
(a) shall contain the names of the recognized political parties contesting the election in Sinhala. Tamil and English, arranged alphabetically in Sinhala in the order of the names of such parties and with the symbol allotted to each such party set out against the name of each such party, and immediately thereafter, if there are any inde. pendent Groups contesting the election, the words. "Independent Group" repeated for each such group and the distinguishing number in the serial order and the symbol alloted to each such gгошp set out against the distinguishing number of such group;
(b) shaII
be capable of being folded up;
(c) shall have a number printed on the back; and
(d) shall have attached a counterfoil with the same numerprinted on the face.
2Ο
SECTION 65 (I)
(a) After the documents refer 64, the returning
The in the in Provided in this si dates to be dec Mayor, Deputy Ma
(b) The return from the statemer of votes given at tion, add up an number of votes recognised Politi independent grou
(c) The candida appear first and se nation paper of political party gToup to whilch thi of votes has bee declared elected officer as Mayor an respectively.
(d) When an e is found to exit E more recognized Q“ LWL Of Trog
OT LWO OT TOT groups and the a shall entitle the c such recognized in de Pendent gro determination of political party grou P to which su: shall be deerned to shall be made by lo presence of the ret Such manner as he
(2) (a) Every r. Cal party and ind polling les 5 than c total Wote 5 polied shall be disqualific ary candidates ele members of the loc
(b) The votes P. qualified parties a E ΓομΡς if any sh: from the total y ot election and the

receipt of the ed to in Section fficer shall de Lornner here in after iction the candiared elected as for and members.
ng officer shall ts of the number each polling stadetermine the given for each cal party and P. tes whose names Eorn d in the nomithe recognized or independent a highest number given shall be by the returning d Deputy Mayor,
'quality of votes ) C'"fE2 E2 LM"Y0 .) T
political parties lependent group5 such parties or ddition of a wote candidates of one political party or Jp elected, the
the recognized or independent h additional wote
hawe been given it drawn in the urning officer in shalII determine.
2 cognized politiependent gгошp ne-eighth of the at the election 2d from having :ted as the other al authority.
olled by the disind independent ill be deducted e5 polled at the number of wores
resulting from such deduction are here i nafter refered to as the "relevant number of Wotes.'
(c) The relevant number of votes shall be divided by the number of members, other than the Mayor, and Deputy Mayor, to be elected at that election for that local authority. The whole number resulting from such division (any balance votes not being taken into account) is here in after referred to as the 'resulting number."
(d) The number of votes polled by each recognized political party and independent group (other than those parties or groups disqualified under paragraph (a) beginning with the party or group which polled the highest number of votes, shall then be divided by the resulting number and the returning officer shall declare as elected from each such party and group in the order in which their names appear in the nomination paper, such number of candidate 5 (excluding the candidates declared elected as Mayor and Deputy Mayor) as is equivalent to the whole number resulting from the division by the resulting number of the votes polled by such party or group The remainder of the votes, if any, after such division, shall be dealt with, if necessary, under paragraph (e).
(e) Where after the declaration of the election of member 5 as provided in paragraph (d) there are one or morte members still to be declared elected on the remain der of the votes referred to in paragraph (d) to the credit of each party of group after the declaration made under that paragraph and the votes polled by any party or group not having any of its candidates declared elected under paragraph (d), the candidate next in the order of priority in the nomination paper of the party or group having the highest of such votes being declared elected the next member and so on Lurn til all the members to be elected are declared elected.
(f) Where an equality of votes is found to exist in the balance number of votes to the credit of one or more parties and groups
{Cơ T#ỉnh Ptỉ' L' Puge = }}

Page 23

sBank
the it with the tOn.
From modest beginings the People's Bank has become the largest growing bank in Sri Lanka with over 230 branches islandwide.
Our total assets have recorded an increase of 33% in 1978.
Our Savings Deposits have accounted for 56% of the total savings deposits of all commercial banks as at the end of 1978.
Our programme for the future involves several new schemes which are designed to help uplift the economy by loan and credit facilities to cultivators, fishermen, industralists, house builders, importers and exporters,
These facts and figures speak so eloquently about our growth and the e- success we have achieved in national
finance, that today we can proudly say that we are in the forefront with the nation. /&ۈچšs
ミ
حج
ミ
禺
the Bank thenation
banks on
T

Page 24
Information
How US decolor
by Chakravarti Raghawan
蠶 ad COTITUICátio
are in reality two sides of the same coin. Còn 2 cam mot exist, without the other. In traditional societies, where information and communication are still basically through word of mouth. In individual conversations, village gatherings or discussions, drama, story-telling and other forms of entertainment, education (of the non school or informal variety), and a hundred and one other different ways, is basically horizontal and to that extent democratic and participatory. It is part of the industrialised society characteristic, where the spread of information has been facilitated by technology, that the entre process is becomining more and rote wertical.
The power to inform and cornmunicate Wests in those who can afford, control and corn in and the means, and this is an increasingly sma|| number, and eWerl When in different hands, is oligopolic in that the interests and motivations of those behind the means are the same. This Werteal information, as a consequent of technology (or un controlled technology), is prevalent in the so-called political democracies, where the means of Production, including information and mass media, are in private hands, and in so-called socialist countries where it is publicly owned.
In both cases, information spreads from the centre to the periphery. from the owner or his agent (or the State and its organs) to the readers who are mere passive receivers.
The demand for cultural freedom and independence, and its reflection in the rejection of the metropolitan country Culture in the ex-colonial countries and peoples, often takes Some extreme forms, including an Đ--à sional chauvinist möde. Elste leadership (among politicians, bureaucrats, journalists and professionals) that is willy-nilly part of the transnational phenomenon,
22
ofte tends to a: the strivings of Pe freedom as obscu atLempts at hom and consumption, production - distri often passes for among these elite and rejection thu. an attempt to go b
The Chievement pendence by color merely the beginni to restructure thei and as a part of it ch life, Ewen after thi political independe volved a continua a chiewe thoir econ; cultural indepenc which political fre: Some of these 5 actions of third Within their own 5g their perceptions dependert World third World has E for a new ethosilt would enable enjoy ic. sociālוחם וחסEC freedoms. Some in hawe see the distribution-consun environmentally r allenating peoples, to perceive the in ethos.
The "free flow
doctrine owes its o of the United St itself from the cul mic domination LF Europe had over th two centuries after and despite its gri strength.
From the second Century, when Eu lished its control Africa and Asia, economic exploitati information and ne

ised
tack and reject oples for cultural antist. The TN ogenising ta Stes and the TN Ution process "modernization' s. Any reaction appears to be ack in time.
of political indeIli al people5 Was ng of their efforts national lives, eir international
attainment of mce, this ha5 İnLuis struggle to Dmic, social and |епсс, Without dom was empty. truggles involve world countries cieties. But as of the interhas grown, the Hegun to - 5 trive arnationally that ment of political
and cultural the North, who TN productionnption process as "uinous and as hawe also begun ed for a new
of information' rigin to the drive ates to liberate tural and ecornoat Britain and e United States, its independence owing economic
half of the 9th rope had estabower much of and began its on, the role of WS as an adjunct
6eVAVS
to the "flag", and later as an aid to commerce was perceived. Aided by the technological underpinning, and financial and political support of the
"flag', European news empires of Reuter 5, Wolff and Hawas were built.
As the US economic giant began to realise its strength and flex its muscles, media men like Cooper of Associated Press of America began to perceive and resent the way Britain, in alliance with the continental interests, was exercis ing influence over US policies and thinking through the flow of information and news to the US, and distorting and mis representing the US to the rest of the World.
The US attempt to decolonise information began through the doctrine of "free flow of information". The role of information in selling goods and services abroad, and in obtaining political and other Influences for the new centre of power in Washington, was clearly foreshadowed in the free flow of information doctrine that was built into the postsecond World War international structures. It was as important a brick in building the current world order as the Bretton Woods structures or the GATT in bringing together the new capitalist empire whose driving force is the transnational phenomenon. The control and manipulation of demand through transnational flows of information, culture and adverti sing became an important element of the total structure.
The US, and specially the Associated Press of America and the United Press of America (later United Press (International) that, between the two world Wars, began this decolonisation campaign in the realm of news, once they had succeeded in overthrowing the Reuter hold and took on the mantle thernselves, became the we herment critics of the decolonisation of information

Page 25
campaign now being waged by the third World, and have sought to label it as Marxist, communist or 2 totalitarian Concept, opposed to democratic Principles and fundamental human freedoms.
事
India, after independence, had refused to align itself in the cold War, and under Jawa Harlal Nehru the Indian people had struck out on the path of nonalignment. The Mest set out to remove the underpinnings of popular support to the government by a campaign of information, and Cfton mis information, about the policies of the West, East, and of other nonaligned countries and their policies. The distorted way the transnational agencies presented to the Indian public even the wiew-poInts of Indian spokes men at International fora on warious issues of the day
brought home to Indian policy makers and the public the importance of information, and de
colonis ing information from Imperial control and manipulation,
Nonalignment in the fifties was a much ridiculed policy amongst the So-called (western-trained and culturally alienated) elites, including journalists of the newly emerging countries (and more so amongst the English language newspaper world of India). The Press Commission's argument and recominendations for decolonising news, and liberalising the two-way flow of news from the American and European communication channels, was carefully worded, with much genuflexion 5 towards the doctrine of "free flow of infort. nation" and the distortions of the concepts of human rights, already introduced by these doctrines. The Press Commission's report was a plea for decolonisation of news, but without a basic understanding of the .nסחneחסhenם TN
鲁 囊
Gradually, by the sixties the nonaligned movement began to gather trength and adherence as a political movement, and its leaders and protagonists increasingly saw the need to foster solidarity among their peoples through better understanding of each other. The perception Erew about the need for cultural and Information exchanges and need for di Tert Flow of Newys and I for Tiation
to each other rath torted images of was currently rec. Western news age its expression in
aligned summit
Although in Ir 1954 the need w cogently argued countries to see E or through their than hostile West much was actual There were many media was domini trained and tota || Ther. Media ch TLJП ОП the basis t a commodity to b The do Tinat dowy du 5 trial barons, W not running it for so to build up infl Politic for their Each of the had TN (conomic str. used the TN pow WF| EI 5 Chann Cl5 t0 TT against domestic to bring about economic democr
Yugoslavia in E the structure oft ownership of the move in the dire to the non aligned native channel of Yugoslaw news from the sixties b It had its own net dents abroad, and Prowide a ser wice rating on some of aligned countrie. i eta 5 t the TTT di and like the wesi Tass, tried to hel Afro-Asian count the local agency, and teleprinters t broadcast on radi
The Service stil a check or a Yugo interpretation of from British, An viewpoints. IL W ethnocentred an had a modern te But it provided a from some of th å reas - of Asia in

1er that the di 5ach that the other eiving through the Incies. This found the Algiers nondeclaration.
1 dia, as early as as perceived and for non aligned ach other directly own eyes rather ern eyes, nothing ly done about it. e 5.5 T e 1155 ated by westerny alienated mediannels were being :hat information is e sold for a profit, "Ter"s Were the ITho when they were profit were doing uence on the body 2Conomic empires. his links with the Ictures. Often they er centres like the d the TN news חt a Campalgחuסו policies that sought the rudients of tacy.
urope, because of he State and the media, was able to tion of providing countries an alterinformation. The agency, Tanjug, Քgun an expansion. Work of corresponwas also trying to abroad. Concentthe leading non5, Tanjug tried to i IES WYS Ser“Yje ern agencies and p the process in the rles by providing the radio receiwers o receive the ne W5 o from Belgrade.
II merely provided slaw wiewpoint or e'yern tS 315 different herican or French as still European d, while socialist, !chnology culture. useful alternative e then embattled d Africa.
However, Tanjug soon discovered that many of the agencies that had been supplied the equipment to receive the Tanjug news free (principally news about Yugoslavia with some foreign reportage from a few key capitals) used the equipment to receive the TN news and often did пot even попitor the Tanjug cast.
Tanjug then conceived a way of hooking these agencies on to the Tanjug transmission through the idea of the pool. It offered to add to its LCOLHH LLCCLHHLLLLLLLS CK LLL LLLLLL LLLaLLLL in Belgrade by any non aligned country news agency. Each country was asked to restrict its daily coverage to two na W5 items of about 5OO Words in all. This process increased the total content of the Tanjug service, and each of the sending agencies would naturally monitor the Tanjug cast (and hopefully use some) to make sure its own news was used. The Tanjug pool concept was no different from the TN newsgathering and distribution machinery in the earlier days, though the pool was much ridiculed both in the East and the Wes.
Even now, the TNs depend upon the local news sources, including the local State-owned agencies in many parts of the world or the State broadcasting organisations, for"news' of what governments tell each other or their peoples. In many areas this monitoring is done by tha BritishAmerican-intelligence network, and the monitored copy is made available to the AP-UP-Reuter and AFP men at key points. Thereafter the TNs rewrite this stuff, putting in their own interpretations, backgrounding (and inevitable distortions in the process) and ladle it out to the rest of the World as "news."
The concept of exchange of news, broadcasts and films, books etc-the whole range of information-amlongst non aligned countries was endorsed by the Lima meeting of
foreign ministers of non aligned countries in 1975, and ultimately resulted after the nonaligned
ministerial meeting in New Delhi and the summit at Srí Lanka (52-h in 1976), in the Present non aligned news pool with several regional relay centres.
(C7 IT fir Tref y T Page =)
23

Page 26
The other . . .
(Cord for "agச8)
Far more alarming however is Iran's hand in the affairs of neighbours. From Baghdad have come strong hints that Iran may have had a hand in the abortive coup in Iraq. An Israeli intelligence digest also spoke of 'Saudi money' and "Egyptian influence' working towards a change in Iraq's un yielding opposition to the Camp David accords.
Sometime ago Pakistan suspected Iranan influence in the Bauch i revolt. An insurgency broke out in Pakistan's western province in the early 1970's. But western correspondents now concentrating
on the "Pakistani bomb' are convinced that Iran and Pakistan, especially after Foreign Affairs
adviser Agha Shah's visit to Teheran, are acting in concert over Afghanistan and that the Afghan rebels hawe train ing ca TPS and facilities in both neighbouring states. In Iran the key coordinator is the Deputy Prime Minister. General Zia who is in a terrible dilemma ove his long Overdue elections may find the Afghan situation a helpful diversion especially when western and Chinese al di will be guaran teed, Since both Iran and Pakistan are new members of the non-aligned movement, their actiwities are being closely watched in Delhi" where analysts wonder whether they w III turn to be what Colon el Gaddafi Identified at the Colombo Summit as "trojan horses'. G
Trends . . .
(Cerror fried fridorovy Flagoe r)
leaving Sri Lanka soon. It is described as a routine transfer:
Investment and democracy
Mr. Hameed was asways a quick -wtted debdter n the House but 2 years chairmarship of the nonaligned Foreign Ministers' conference has certainly Tproved his style to the point that he car now cross s words with even the Tost aggress we of foreign politic05,
On non-alignment Hameed dealt smartly with some Congress for a Inquisitors and then drew blood on foreign capital and democracy. JR's
민부
best di vievement w wn drids de Wi the UF government it htId tց հՃld Investппелt gшагапt the support of a majority. Ah, a skE what happens to when another party it mean, s napped Mfn sister, that di you regard as the for your capitol
The Law on .
(Cürifflotỉ_Tr
Tefe TTC di to. In this hic addition of a w any candidate ol group to be declar this subsection th of the party or grc orie additiora wot to have been give by lot drawn in th returning officer ir he shall determing
(3) For the
section the numbe at any election st be the number counted and shall
votes rejected or N
NEXT : PR by Leitan
How U.S. . .
(Carried a
The nomaligned the connected or exchange of radio t sion material, fil among non aligned best a technical in intra-nonaligned ifolio di : with information nonaligned govern under Mrs Gandhi gency rule was an e ideological and sophy, distorting to justify their d domestic ways. Bu ideology of what F to be known as national Informati the same.
The growth c science and resear show up the deficit Ing flows of Inform

was not merely to ctory but to push
to the point that I ni election. The tes therefore have 1uge parlamentary #d a Сапgressптап,
those gшагалtees is elected? Does back the Foreign citatorship is what only safe guarantee
in Page o)
; subsection and ate would entitla * 5 Luch party or ed elected under e deterination up to which such eshall be deerTed П shall be made epresence of the | such männer as
purpose of this of votes polled |all be deell1=d to of votes actually not include any old."
G. R. Te55ie
rry Page gy
news pool, and ārā nove5 for roadcasts, televims, books, etc.,
countries is at fra-structure for horizontal flow of In mot be confused tself. Some of the Terts-and India 's internal emer. Example-used the conceptual philot in the process wn authoritarian t the concept and iad by now come
the New Interon Order was not
if communication "ch had begun to Incies of the existaltior, where news
as a commodity was reportage of exceptions. A series of exceptions Strung together presented a false picture of existing realities (and thus distorted and influenced other products dependent on information). Communication researchers and some professional communicators began seeing doctrines like freedom of expression, freedom of opinion and freedom of information, and information itself as part of development - development of the human being as an indiwidual and social entity or groups of entities in the global whole. (To be continued)
The counter . . .
(Cortriri fred frost Fage ry)
form of nationalistic "Ethiopian Socialism'. Until early 1977 the PMAC maintained good relations with the USA and although a substantial military agreement with the Soviet Union was signed in December 1976, this was not immediately hanoured by the Russians. Why then did the PMAC strengthen its ties with the Soviet Union in 1977 and 1978. There are four main reasons, First, in February 1977 the USA cut off all military aid to Ethiopia - in protest against the internal policies of the PMAC, in particular with regard to "human, rights". Secondly, in June–July 1977 Ethiopia was invaded by neighboring Somalia at the active instigation of the conservative Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and with at least some direct encouragement from the USA. In this situation Ethiopia cut off from its traditional source of arms had to turn to the USSR and in the face of an all-out Somali attack Cuban troops were sent in to use the equipment that Russia provided. Thirdly, the Saudis and Egyptians were advocating a general policy of turning the Red Sea in to an 'Arab Lake", and were manipulating the Eritrean guerrillas and inci ting the conserwatiye Ethiopian Democratic Union, as well as Somalia, in an attempt to bring down the PMAC.
Fourthly, the Soviet Union gave 5upport to the substantial and radical Social measures taken by the PMAC inside Ethiopia, in
particular the land reform measures of March 1975. NEXT : The US role.

Page 27
سامسوولانیشنامنام\ COLOMEO) k Contrally Incated in ihs City Wilh rapid gress. key shopping, sights Eeing and business venue k. A 3-stor a block with 100 film: arhitectura conceived to maximise the sea view frontage. k. Thn Dughly modern comforts and convenient l Swimming Palel Wlih Sun Tgrats.
. Oriental and Western cuising cater to all ta. k Guest Services include reservation, secretari: and blev facilitius, launder afld valgt service: und frLE haby Ihs. Children und ar 1 weils free when sharing their parents' room,
Convention facilities include Conference Rai with Comple tE and modern audio-visual facili fc 75 LQ 1000 per Gng.
BU. SH MUHAMED MAIAM MДНКА МА Telphine: 2001 TEm Il Tele: O C THE MOST ACCOMMODATING PE
 
 
 
 

括函
砸愈|會
i
丞憎翼
Holiday linn' Colombo P.O. Box 12 02.
DPLE IN THE WORLD.
THA, COLOMBO 3.
able: "

Page 28
}(CUSW SERWICES AND SING
Only SIA offers an exclusive 747B service every Tue to Dubai, Zurich, Frankfurt and Copenhagen; and non-stop - every Thu to Singapore.
in addition, SIA offerS two 707 Superjet services each week to Zurich, Copenhagen and four to Singaporethe biggest choice. Whichever flight you choose, you'll enjoy a standard of inflight service even other rlines talk about.
C003 ZURICHF COPENHAGE
ILOYDS BUILDING, 15A, SIR BARON JAYATILAKE MAWATHA
 
 

TODUBA, RANKFURT,
SINGAPORE,
57/aaaa 4AAMs
- Agreat tedy to fly
COLOMBO 1, TELEPHONE: 24148. 24181,215).