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Brittie Gajarmetrage
Sanmugathasa ali Cooray Brvym de S
jan Philipս

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Indira's long shadow
Right through last week, the major embassies in Colombo as well as representatives of the irn terriation | Tnedio lh I d orne questian uppermost in Tiind – how will Indira Gandhi's victory influence political trends in Sri La rika?
Since pre-independence times Indian politics has had a direct bedring 07 de velopments here but few observers will care to den y the close para l'elism which emerged in the Indira-Srima Years. Indira Gandhi ("Save India, Call Indira") made the C0'er Of Our December Ist jssue which also had as its main local story "Waiting for Mrs. G.', with a picture of Mrs. 3. In di pathetically painful effort to deny this long-established connection “Sunda y Observer" columnist made rome incoherent nolīses about Kachachati Wu birthely ignorant of (or indifferent to) the simple fαζί that it was the UNP's election propaganda which made IndiraSirima, Sanjay-Ariura dentification camplete.
Now from Washington to
Peking, Cairo to Tokyo, Sri Lanka Watchers want to know whether Indira's victory will affect Sirima's political fortL'ITe5.
Not-so o kay Si Iwa
When the court ruled in favour of Daha's election petition, Mr. Albert Silva's problems started. Nomination or no nomination? The answer was "No". But then his luck was fr?, There Was a Ya Caricy at Kanburupitiya. Thanks to our highly advanced constitution he COuld be diri MP once FP) re wit hoL/ t a / I the incQn yerni ance Of a by-election.
Then the trol The police ha ye Kamburupitiya's Supporters, pres the r пеw MP ||
Lake House
While tycoon dend's newspap See the light Rdոjit, the exlaunch a three. on the big comb Weekli es — for , nd u familyם
The secret of the biographers circuits. A loyalists from brought bad ne) HOLIS e mariagem were top execut mino" editor, chief etc.
Man While t| Ebre ayrı g in the moi too. A commer tdh CDN colum BILLI rt, the Carm. is a self-confes: had several ref Lankan communi. at Cambridge. PTT er7 foned VIIC/Elt KT in disah and W.
O CP fra en Ebers
"Saddler" was "South Chind Hong Kong, ind, frust Colombo. Hong Kong jour, pooh-poofed the ment, Bըth the Correspondent al
Lk.
In other inte, ments, the 45 ye ver has gorie ta ' IIa riħa ta' is being The Editor of tři

bles start again. to step in when
citizens (UNP CITTJ bly) Welcome
exodus
Upali WјеwarEr has yet to of day, Cousin NCL boss, will —pronged ០ttack in:5 with hiրիnld Writer, children
Ludience.
D. R." 5 5.Lccess, ha Ye it, was exodus of Ranjit Lake House Y5 to the LKe erit, All of them İ'Y 2S -- 7 ""Dirhe Circulation
1ς Γες τΓαμμΙε
7-native quarter t by Saddler, ηist, οη Τοπy Étridge dom w Pia fed Russian spy, erer ces to Sr | its who studied The names Hed Ke Luneman, i dyalingar, a II
quoted by the Warning Post', ni AFP despatch But another ris) || ASIA WEEK Sudder cornAFP's Corb
ld Asia week's 'USe journalists.
rial develop7 r )/d "Obserblod and the " taken c ver by = Sĩlựmìnn.
Prof. Wilson on Tani ! Consciousness
It is not often that on a finds a Professor of Political Science making a committed contribution on a conte Tiporary political que5 tion of contrower5ial ni tute. As Anthony H. Birch, another Canadian Professor of Political Science, says, "It is not necessary for scholars, as distinct from policy Takers, La commit themselves to a normative position about ethnic loyalties and the resurgence of minority national|st movements," But con the question of the problem of the Tamil national minorities of the country, Prof. Wilson is not just another political scientist, but the son-in-law of the ""father of Tamil Nationalism and the progenitor of Tamil Nationhood', to quote Wilson's own words. Wilson's remarks carry even greater significance, in view of the leading role - the Tam || intelligentsia was so mada
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Page 4
to believe - that he supposedly played in the functions of the Prc5identilā Crimss formu - lating possible solutions to the National question.
Naturally, a ray of hope or a sign of sanguinity would hawe been expected to emana te from
the son-in-law of S. J. W. Chelyanayakarn, in the Jaffna Central College Hall. Nothing
came out, that could make anybçdy hop eful or sanguine about an iTim Irent settlement through Sofile form of decentralisation on lines recommended by the Presidential Collission. In his prize-day address, Wilson has stated what should hawe been conditions precedent to the whole exercise, as necessary conditions for the success or survival of the outcame of the same as exercise. No carteblanche, either, from hirn, TO those Northern MPs in obvious hurry to bury the Eelam hatchet and qualify for Dharmista bliss. But only a grim warning: the present parliamentary leadership would be "swept away in a storm and replaced by an extreme leadership which means business'. if the former conce des to anything that would not be "tangible and substantial in exchange" for the Eelam de mand. What come is te Tıpted to add here is that already concessions hawe been Tåde in the form of sheer inaction by the Tamil political leadership to what has been experienced by the Tamils, particularly, in Jaffna, In the lätter half of | 373. CTB is al5C inclined to say that in deliberately avoiding the task of making any positive recommendations, Wilson has dispelled "the illusion' that he had helped to creä, te in the minds, a teast of the Tamil people, about the possible outcome of a solution from the findings of the Presidertial Commission.
Finally, notwithstanding Wison's manifest standpoint, slant, the inward looking approach, the gloomy-predictive tone and the not tco savo Lury federal flavour, one cannot but agree with Wilson, however much one might
wish that he is he says that "Sir mationalismi hawe It is unlikely
til flŠ CT 2 WC2"
'Economic pal the tensions but by the riots of 9 ad || 37W tillot No call the bli tion practised a people in the pc years since 195 Tamil people til to the Sinhala a tIain in Dheis Lhasa all away, still doubt that T will over be st
Colombo É R.
Tamil A
It is very rel the reproductio delivered by D at the Jaffra C in the Decem bi of the L. G. I sa after following t mics of the oli
Those were to religious pre; La tir 3rd Arab without Tuch Whether it is bot; by the people, matter, by the
Professor Will Tamils had fille of deprivation di Power combina | Gagartmå, Karaw or SIN Fhala, Tamr He 5Lä Les that
Goigama misle: who were a generous. I wo
Ily al these CC whole had bee the elite of th Tam Ils acutely
of it when the the privileges
Government w which was the incole of the ata of their sor at it from tha I would say, t only Tarn Els bu the CCITT UT |ti

wrong, when hala and Tamil Cαrη e to Staγ-- that the two come together,
liatives may ease wou meds Crated 55, 1958, 1961 be easily healed. Eärt discriminalgainst the Tamil st-Sinhala only é. Nor tårn the Irn a blirnd eye rmy of occupamidst. Taka and I would ami│ nationalism illed.'
, T. Nayagam.
wakening
freshing to rc ad n of the speech r. A. J. Wilson entral College Br, 5th is Sue it is refreshing na abstract pole
her writers.
somewhat akin a chings in Pali, |c, I would say, ÇÖ 1.3 f" | | 315 . . ing unders tood or for that priest himself!
son Says that the : | rito al 5 tate Je to the elitist ion based on få ard Wella hi and Msiri.
the Sirhalese ld the Tari is gnanimous and iuld say generaimmunities as a n neglected by ČSe blocs. The bécarthe concious y started losing
they had in hite-collar jobs
main source of middle class strciety. If you look t point of view, hat It was mot t generally all es other than
the mem Eers of the urban bourgeoisie who were English educated and had facilities more thall the Is brotherg.
respectfully say that this was due more or less to the lopsided scaramsc framg'wark af this elitist Power bloc, whose thoughts were "power wise" and mot "country wise'. It was money and business and productiwi ty, They fed the limbs forgot the other parts. The consequences are felt now in our society.
also disagree with the learned Doctor on his opinion that the Muslimi hawe a greater affinity to Tamil culture and the Tamil language than to Sinhala culture and language. I would say apart from preasent day politics, culturally, historically and ethnologically it would be totally incorrect.
Finally I wish to express my appreciation of Dr. Wilson's speech over the other aspects of the Tamil problem. Especially his genuine effort in trying to understand the problem as a true scholar dedicated to finding a solution instead of Taking a flashy, attractive political speech to please his brethren as Thost do now a days.
Sudarma Dhanapala.
Kandy.
Bad habits
Patrick Jayasuriya should, consult Aruni Proops of the
Sunday Observer who will assure him that masturbation is good for him and not a bad habit E 3 || What Is; ? bild H. Eitt i 5 that he should Write fibs about people. I have a Wailed myself of the courtesy of your columns for "intellectual" (if P J will so hawe it) exchanges but not with my 'buddies"; nor can the exchanges fairly be called literary or even 'pseudo-literary" either in content or in style.
Kollшpitiya. Costain de Wos
Tı eter * * TOO Scholastic"" appe, ring in L. G. Wol. 2 No. 17 wn5 yritten hy Mr. R. S. PerinblI11yāg III.

Page 5
Scholars explore and e
iscussion of ethnic or nationalD problems in Sri Lanka. particularly the relationships between the Sinhala and Tamil commnities-has been often charged with great e motional fervour, but seldorm have those issues been looked at in the context of a correct Interpretation and analysis of the country's historical background. The seminar organised by the Social Scientists Association on "Nationality problems in Sri Lanka" held recently was therefore path-breaking and of enormous significance. It was the first time that a group of scholars had gathered together to discuss and analyse the background to the country's ethnic conflicts.
The papers presented at the Seminar fell into two groups: those dealing with the growth of Sinhala and Tamil identity consciousness during the pre-colonial Period and those concernad with the impact of developments during the colonial period.
Deal ing with the peoplIng of Sri Lanka, Dr. Semake Bandaranayake showed how the island had been peopled by various groups of migrants at various times and the resulting amalgam had coalesced into a homogeneous sciety and that this process had been associated with the growth of a centralised state. Challenging the Wijayan and Aryan myths, he pointed out that priority in chronological time could not be construed as conferring any claims to priority by any particular group,
Dr. Susantha Goonatilake, basing his paper on recent archaeological findings and on a reinterpretation of chronicle material demonstrated that Sri Lanka and South India had shared, in the prehistoric period, a common economic structure and techonological base, with settled agriculture dependent on irrigation; however at a certain
stage, this society had adopted a language and religion derived from North India. To him, this
was one of the central contradictions of early Sri Lankan history, He also emphasised the crucial
role that Budd in legitimising til
Ргоfessог Le: traced the growt consciousness. - during the early "Sinhala' had be to the king and this identity had hald from al th and followers. L. those em braced 'Sinhala' had been in order to cer The and loyalty to The whole proce with the growth doms and principā He also demon Il UFThiro U5 Wá F5 Tulers of princip, doms in the islami 5e wes or with th of neighbouring S doms could not arising from et conflicts. They w power between Such kingdoms people of variou and religions. TE Dutugem unu and E sarily to be scen Dutugem unu had other kings ba for salf sufficiently lengo Elara, who i ned man y Sinhal of whose chief g ed a Sinhalese. analysed tha Arya and the way it lous periods, Lup
The Dutugemur was elaborated wegra who dea || riography of this The Dipavamsa, o cle had not e Elara as a Tami|| had spoken in t of his sense of ju Elara as calling or for advice and rep damage to Budd Tha Mahawa msa, 400 A. D. ha d di even though m claims as a just sode is now r)

xplode myths
hism had played he systems of rule.
slie Gunawardena :h of a 'Sinhala' He showed that stages, the word
en applied only Lha kirg group; QWer boen With
e other retaners alter the scope of іп the concept i viden ed, mainly it their adherence the royal family. SS Was 155 ited of feudal king|ties in Sri Lanka. strated that the fought between alties and kingd between them. kings and rulers outh Indian kingbe regarded as inic or religious 'ere struggles for feudal kingdoms, often embracing 5 ethnic groups I e War 5 betw8 C2n :Illara hawe nacesin this light: to CWCOT B. e he found himStrong to chal502 illi Tı ljeş, Ortaa people and one in orals was IndeThis paper also 1 myth, its origin WAS LI 5ed in warito the present.
L-Elara conflicits y Dr. W. I. Siriwith the histoarticular episode. r 2 årliest chron|- en referred to or a Chola and e highest terms tice. It described BLIddhist mor k5 fring inadvertent .tsחEוחuחסוז15t r Written about ferent emphasis: tion ing Elara's kling, the epiignified to epic
POPortions- as war fought to establish Sinhala Buddhist dominane "er a Tam|| Hindu ստurբd r. The Fu Jawa liya, written in twelfth
ty distorts the picture furth or: Elara is here a cra ruler, PPPossing tha Sinhasse and indu Iging in anti Buddhist activities who
Justly killed by a rulersti ing to reestablish the Buddhasa. na n all its glory. Dr. Siriweera made the point that historians of each G poch tend to Froject their own feelings and situations on their interpretation of Pa5 t evan L5 and said that Плапy contemporary historians and Particular text books base their interpretations tha Mahavamsa-Pujawiya tradii.
There was general agreeптeпt that the present chauvinism Among the Sinhalese and Tamils could lot, derive from our historica background; a correct Luh derstanding of our history would deny any legitimacy to claims of SL Periority or chonological priority of Y Particular groups to control or ownership of this island. Concepts such as the Aryan descent of the Sinhala peopla through WiJaya had no historical basis and in fact myths elaborated at subse. quent Periods of history to legitisce the claims of particia lar groups. It was evident that the ca u 5 es of present conflicts must be sought in currect circumstances and that the Sinha la or Tami | histo. le conscioussness which is invoked
to fuel this conflict has been
distorted.
The second session dealt with
the colonial period. Dr. K. Siva
thamby examined the Social formation of the Tamils in Sri Lanka. He discussed the widely-disparate economic structures of the Tamils in Jaffna, in Batticaloa and in Mannar and the WawUniya areas and the Con Sequent difference 5 in their social organisation and legal forms. Despite these differences, he traced the manner in which these different groups had been
3.

Page 6
drawn together and had indeed developed an identifiable Tamilian consciousness as a response to Sinhala chauvinism.
The development of such a Tamilian consciousness during the | 9th and 20th centu ries was the special subject of a paper presented by Dr. K. Kailasapathy. He analysed the various factors that had gone into its fashioning, including the development of the Dravida movement in Scuth India and its Impact
on Tamil-speaking people in Sri Lanka. He also dos cribed the various manifestations of this consciousness in cultural and art forms.
The development of a Tamil
consciousness was strong enough to draw into its fold, even for a short-time, the plantation Tam ||
community. However, the tremendigus &CCrhomic differences had earlier kept them apart and
are doing so now. The special problems that face the plantation Tamils and the development among thern of a consciousness of an identity se parate from other Tam ilspeaking peoples in Sri Lanka was the subject of a paper by Dr. P. Dewa raj. A. Consideration of the contents of this paper appeared to cast strong doubts on the success of present attempts to integrate the plantation and village CC T L Titi 25.
A paper by Dr. Kumari Jaya wardena traced the growth of capitalism in Sri Lanka and showed how the absence of a strong national bourgeois le With anti-imperialist contradictio 15 discorted the nationalist movement which remained inciplent and did not develop into a fully flegdged nationalist struggle that would hawe Lunited all ethnic groups, The paper also demonstrated that the Sinhala petty-bourgeoisie, lacking broad opportunities for economic advancement through trade because of the dominance of British and Indian merchant capital in these areas, were quick to divert their antagonism towards Indian and other local ethnic groups. This attitude was backed by a certain degree of religious and cultural revivalism (financed by the Sinhala
4.
TV and
é é his is no
to post to post office'
Permament Secre out of a queue : the TW licence to obtairn.. The r threaten ing anno dire penalties w wi || Suffer if the their licences. E get them? Afte hours in queu. offices, se wera | | TW sets joined a c
With the II Counter was clos yanished. A ne'
i tSelf in the ho By about 4 p.m.
announced the 5: had run out of for new forms be a
Emerge
he Civil Righ
We cored the rule in Jaffa d Katunayake area, that it is gratify the Public Securi no longer in of part of the isla of affairs, it hop not merely thro year but the wh
Emphasis ing o the emergency ir more drastic tha Security could ju notes that it p
merchants) harkir glories, the Arya the 'Sinhaladipa' a Concepts.
The constitutio of the British these di wisiwe te aspect formed th of Susil Siriward
traced the war constitutional dew British rule wh
strengthen ethnic ha stressed the

"The dangerous woman'
t a case of pillar but SLBC pillar said a former tary as he walked It the SLB C minus he had corne there adio keeps making UTC21215. Of Chr. rhIch TW owners !y do not obtain But where do you it many fruitless 25 at two post hundred owners of lu euse at the SL B.C.
rich break, the ed and the queue W queue formed afteroon sun. the counter clerk ld news that he hs. When would failable? The SLBC
would send for them next dayif transport was available
But lavish self-praise marked the speech of the Minister of State (Information) when he spoke about the mass media in the budget debate, Sri Lanka TW will NOT follow the BBC, the
Indian or any other network but produce its own programmes, he said. Another senior minister expressed contrary thoughts. His grandchild was so glued to the TW that she wanted to be a "Bionic Woman" he complained.
"Soon the government will put on its own show, genuinely Sri Lankan of Course... it will be Called BAYANAKE GEN|. . . . Dangerous Woman' wisecracked an SLFP journalist, adding "of course naturally, it won't be exported to India For domestic consumption, only!"
ncy ends
t5 Mowerment Has end of emergency is trict and the
The CRM says ing to note that iy Ordinance is eration in any
rid. This state 25, will continue ghout the new old decade.
| CE Thore that force was 'far any needs of stify" the CRM ') wided for thig
g back to past myth and to ld 'dhammad ipa'
ial manipulations ulers exploited dencies and this subject matter na's paper. He Ous stages of :lopment during ch tended to differences and underdeveloped
death penalty for even trivial offees, re Producing the sama regulation introduced by the previ
ous government just after the
| FWI || m 5 Lurrection.
The CRM also observed that
despite the end of the emergency two laws which contain many features of Emergency rule are operative throughout the countrythe Prevention of Terrorism Act (valid for 3 years) and the Proscription of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and other similar organisations Law externded in mid-1979 for a further year.
Stilte of nationalist Colonial Sri Lanka. Neil Kurupp in his paper on Communalism and the labour movement referred to the absence of a Proletarian ideology and a strong class-consciousness in the early years of the movement and the tendency of the workers to lapse into communalism during periods of economic crisis. Hè also referred to the failure of the Left parties to overcome the chauvinistic tendencies of the Sinhala bourgeois and Petty-bourgeois classes.
ideology in

Page 7
INDIA Indira's
The Congress (Indra) has almost won a two-thirds majority in the Lok Sabha. What few people expected and many feared has taken place. Overwhelming power has once more been concentrated in the hands of a single political party at the centre without the possibility of any constitutional check on its use and abuse. The Janatha Party and its allies did not have a two-thirds majority in the Lok Sabha and were in a minority in the Rajya Sabha, the upper House. Under Mrs. Gandhi's father, Jawaharlal Nehru, the Congress Party had won a twothirds majority in both Houses in the parliamentary elections of 1952 and (1957. The Indira, wave of 1971 had won hier 350 5eats, a little short of the coveted two-thirds majority. There are certa in to be desertion5 from Janatha, Congress (U) and even the Lok Dal, that will enable her to make it eventually.
The overwhelm Ing nature of the Congress (I) victory has already been hailed as a solution to the political crisis that has been so particularly obvious in India ever since 1975. But the violence of the swing that has taken place is itself a demonstrative indication
of the grawe instability that persists. The 1977 swing to the Janatha Party was only some
what loss violent. It was a reaction to the dictatorship that Indira Gandhi and het Coterie in the Congress Party clamped on the country, even behind the back of her Own Cabinet. Now the reaction against that swing to Janatha has placed even greater dictatorial authority in the Congress (II), without any need to resort to a proclamation of "emergency'. What Takes it more serious is that unlike the Congress organisation that was the ridded with dissensions in 1975, the Congress II) is a new formation, consolidated on the simple principle of total loyalty to its sole leader, Indira
dramat
Gandhi. Any authority can on the scarcely poli her controversial
There is only which Mr 5. Gan provide a solutio cris is in India. I in this journal
| 980, we mentio a new Indira Gal prewlic
of her
Mrs. TriTf Leftist disguise, t the political stag has already anno of her highest P the imposition of It is un necessary for this. Janat Tush caste-list an In the villages of the poor and longed for some nalistic authority. reports depose Party's Rajput le? Sinha, a rrived a t in Bi har esco TCe { his Rajput mafi and Sten guns s trust the police Invariably presen () Governmeat
will make this no longer necess. The election
clear that the Raj. and Thakurs of
let the Janata P. Janata depended
Rajput chieftains Uttar Pradesh an shekar (its Pre Singh (Indira's
 

ic return
by Hector Abhayavardhana
hallenge to her ly emanate from ical direction of
S. One path a long dhi can seek to 1 to the political | C commentary of January 15t, ned that it was dhi, emancipated usly convenient
錢
-l Gandhi hat now Occupies e. The Iron lady unced that one riorities will be "law and order". to barne her a un leashed so communal terror the North that the oppressed reliable paterIndian newspaper :hat the Janatha der, Satyanarain 2 lection meetings by elements of Carrying Bren ince he did not who were also The Congress hat takes office ind of brava do
гу.
"esults make it t5 and Bhumi i hārt 5 Northern India rty down badly. a lot on the it paraded in Bihar, Chandraident), Dinesh former Deputy
Foreign Minister), Satya narain Sinha and others. The indications are that the Jats stood solidly by Charan Singh and his Lok Dal in Haryana, and U.P., though the other "backward classes' the Kurmis, Ahirs, and Koeris appear to have been overcome by their rivalries with the Jats. No reliable figures are as yet available about the intensity and break-up of the polling. Newspaper reports state that polling averaged about 50% in the country. As a whole; that there was less interest in voting among women than in 1977; that polling was higher in the Southern States than in the North, with the exception of about 65%, in West Bengal; and that in U.P. it was as low as 40%, and in Bihar 35-40%. It would not be wrong to in fer from this that large sections of the poor and oppresed did no come to the pols in the North. Not only Brahmins and Banias, but Rajputs and Thakur's and Bhumi hars ralligd to the standard of Mrs. Gandhi. The Harijanas did not have confidence
in Jagj Iwan Ram's ability to do
anything for them through the
Ja mata Party.
It is noteworthy that the
Southern States, with the exception of Kerala, have remained as solidly with Mrs. Gandhi as in 1977. It is plain that they saw no need to revise the suspicion that they had about Janata as a party of the rural rich in the Hindi areas - except to confirm it. The Janata Cabinet had only one Minister, P. Ramachandran of Tail Nadu, from the South in the entire Cabinet; and even he was reduced to doodling on the Cabinet papers before him, while his colleagues dragged out their discussions in a language that he did not understand. With har sophistication and cosmopolitanism, Mrs. Gandhi command5 the confidence of Southerners in a way which no other living North Indian leader can approximate. But this
5

Page 8
only emphasises the sharpness of
the antagonism between North and South in India. Mrs. Gandhi serves as a mediator between
the Hindi and non-Hindi linguistic regions without transcending the antagonism itself. The problem is not merely linguistic, but one of relations between constituent States and between these States and the Centre. This is one of those basic problems that cannot be solved by resort to authoritarian rule.
In Kerala, Mrs. Gandhi's Rightward turn and break with the Communist Party (CPI) has lost het the dominant position She enjoyed in 1977. The CPM-CPI led Left Democratic Front has won a clear majority of the Lok Sabha seats. This is likely to be clarificed fur het at the State Assembly elections to be held on 21st January. But where she has met her Waterloo i5 in West Bengal. The CPM-led United Left Front has, it would seem, made a clear sweep of the Lok Sabha representation at these elections, leaving a mere 3 or 4 seats out of 4 to the Congress (). The importance of this is not merely that the Marxist bloc is likely to be the biggest opposition group in the Lok Sabha, with its implication of the polarisation of forces in the period ahead between Left and Right in the country as a whole, No less significant, is that the Communist Party of India (Marxist), which has dominated politics in West Bengal and administered the State Government since 1977, has retained the confidence of the people and, indeed, enhanced it during the last two years and
nore. The United Left Front Government of West Bengal has a remarkable record which no Government in New Delhi can
Lunderestinate.
The United Left Bengal has carpaigned on an outspoken programme of the redistribution of powers between the Centre and the States. Among its demands are restriction of the power to promulgate an "Energen
Front of West
cy' to the occasion of foreign aggression alone; prevention of misuse of the power to impose
President's Rule om the Statos; a Tendment of the Constituion to
5.
expand the power and guarantee t genuine land reform of poor peasants
labourers. The DM the elections in
alliance with the
cannot be in differ programme, nor w (I) parties in the
State 5 —— or" Ka5Fhrt Con the Eastern bi
Mrs. Gandhi has diate atten tion problems of the e are not new prot record in regard from re-assuring. cant is that her El refrained from approaches to Sol problems, beyonc conspicuous 15 'bosting productior reaction of the Born E to her election W 'W' T-55 Lull i do not reflect any Lihat the crisis c. India dates from rather thafi fram t of an ata rule,
In the realm of however, India has in more self-confid - even before th ment's forma | ass Lu|| |n dira Gandhi's, briel on the situation Afghanistan constit Asian non-alignm: new er bo heard if one strained or directic of tha arhi She has no kind sympathy with the as she has made understands more other representati capitalist class th: of the Sowjet Uni
to the protect interests against design of Americ
The pretence of put up by Sri increasingly expose tion with the new Tent's diplomacy. intrigues with attended with gr. and limited to a s te demonstration out embassy im Colom

's of the States heir autonomy; 15 in the interest and agricultural 1 K, which fought Tamil Nadu i
Congress (), 2nt to such a vill the Congress other Souther | ir Cor the St. Te5 Ordır.
pr on Tnised ir Thrineto the grawe conomy. These illers and her to them is far What is signifiection Manifesta
outlining any ution of these "controlling Uription' and ''. The jubilant ay stock-market ictory and her O Capitālowners " Çomprehension if economy in the mid-sixties he brief episode
foreign affairs, begun to speak ent tones already ge new GowernTiption of office, press comments in arld around Litel a woje of in that could reviously, even e's ears in the ata Gower mmernt. of ideological Soviet Union, clear. But she clearly than any FC2 Cf lle | Indian it the assistice 1 is esse i tial or of India
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Page 9
Afghanistan
Power Game
he western media,
the BBC, have given prominence in the "headquarters" of the Afghan rebels near Peshawar, in Pakistan's North-West frontler. In the past year and more, the western and Pakistani press presisted in calling them "refugees". Detailed and wivid accounts of what's actually going on at Pehawar and other robe" centres on Pakistani territory, clase to the Afghan border, now make it abundantly clear that the hard core of these "refugees' are in fact well-nourished ablebodied men (there are of course thousands of women and children too) who have been given mordern weapons training by "foreign"
tutors. A British correspondent Nick Downey, who spent four months with the rebels inside
Afghanistan reported that they had large sums of money and also enjoyed 'foreign-backing".
| n an article published in LG Oct 1 (reproduced from the British journal 'Race and class") Fred Halliday wrote: "The US ally Pakistan is giving covert support to exiled Afghan groups acting under the ban mer of Illslärm it counterrevolution, a foolish policy since it can only be a matter of time
before Afghan restraint vis-a-vis the Pathar and Baluch Issues im Pakistan wears thin'". The main
reason for which the distinguished
byl AFGHANISTAN)
including great recent Weeks to
Pakistani journal sent to jail for imprisornment b tary tribunal ( both Judge and his report om E over the polici clique" (Gen Zi It is these coy activities the wict while criticising wention, describe foreign powers c in this region", dicers hawe beam speed and enth the US pledged ar 5 arms aid te opinion, across spectrum, stres: Wil || Pakis är tional role of forgetting its a alignment, re-a ace on the su
But if the nal pressures o regime achievec also on account and of Icem barba the A, m1 in 3 dTnir
Several thousa ers hawe been
them the wido, k ki, and three er 5, all hailed a
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Cracking dos (Karma's factic Party Amin Jalile execшted hшпdre lists and to ins tatorship made prime minister the commander SETT
Frightened b ution and the regional base, : the Iranian row, effects on the the US has titi lamic slogan as for Its åt tempt new pro-Soviet gime in Kabul, always a strateg now beer dra into a power
 

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Page 10
  

Page 11
was never an intelligent strategy' either nationally or internationally.
This was grasped, sometimes fitfully, by militants of Latin America, and beginning from the mid 1960's, attempts were made to reach this cherished goal. Columbla's Padre Camilo Torres, for instance, maintained the profoundest personal committinent to the project of revolutionary unity. His one time colleague at the sociology department of Belgium's Cathaic University in Louvain, Fr. Francois Houtart tells us that.
"Camilo was convinced deeply of the necessity of un iting all the Leftist groups in pursuit of clearly defined goals, with agreerTent on corn Ton action. Towards the end of 1964 his plan began to take shape and he contacted more and more people to work out a programme.' Published in March 1965 as a Platform for a Movement for the Unity of the People, "it elicited an un precedented response throughout the country and succeeded for a while in serving as a rally Ing point for a II the Progressive forces of the country". (Church and Revolution' - Francois Houtart and Andre Rousseau)
In Camilo's mind, the United Front would be a vehicle for socialist revolution, not Inerely the waging of limited propaganda campaigns to safeguard, bourgeois democratic rights or oppose specific legislative acts. If a degree of united action is necessary for the defence of bourgeois democracy, how much greater unity is required for the har der task of socialist revolution.
Writing in October 1965 to the Paper "Frente Unido” o Cami said significantly:
"We must explain clearly that
this programme iš oriented towards
the setting up of a socialist state
it is a Platform for liber
atling Columbia from US imperia
lism and creating a socialist state
For Camilo, the socialist revolution was no "wedding to which only a single guest the new Bolshevik party of the revolutionary Proletariat would be eligible to attend. His intention was to
שבח" ב חסוחוזח5u of al radica o CuSS and rati fy th E Opposition from gratic leadership local CP) saba
Still, Camilo F and in his "M Mountains' whi
decision to join ree Weld is a Peoples des Ire f religious or tradi #TCẽ5, without thệ to oppose the ments of any FT1C'Eril 2TL GT cardilii.
This was in Ja month later, February, Padre Was killed in arm
Tour tails of portrait, togeth Commandante G gaunt image o Christ, on the Poor hone. So Grande.
The middle of saw the merger Fabrico Ojeda's F Bravo's FALN, i of the latters ex country's once d again, Шnity came Fabrico Ojeda c after the merger
Those philistint any conception a as "Post-Lenin Mc. take careful not of that pur est La nalist of the cont Commandante Gu sed in the urge of the ELN iss Nancahuazu camp
'(It calls upo People to come a Solid LInited fra tinction as to po Colour; it calls upc who are in a Someth ing and feel the hard conditic Efter i t5 Frank5.'"
Earlier, in Per intellectual and y
Luis de la Pue issued a call for "a single anti-oji

foral convention" gar 15ation 5 to di 5 - 3 draft programme. the old bureauis (notably of the taged this effort. held to his ideal, es Säge from the ch explained his the guerrillas, he to respect "the or unity, without itional party differ* slightest tandency revolutionary elle
other sector, Party, without
пшагу 1966, Опе on the 6th of
Carnilo Torres ed Cor Inbat in the Columbia. His er with that of Le wara, flank the the crucified walls of many a ILh of the Rio
that year (1966) im Wenezuela of LN and Douglas n the after rath
:Pulsion by the Wramic CP. Here ! too late and
lied some weeks
es Who consider f a united front shevism'. should ce of the views Finist internatioe TI POTary period, evara, as expresit proclamation iued from the
in April 1967; — 1 the) Bolivian together, forge bnt without dilitical shade or in those patriots Position to do it ble to withstand Pris of battle, to
U, the brilliant aliant guerri Iero, Il te Uceda had
the creation of garchic and anti
imperialist front' in and for the
struggle. (July 1965).
Latin America's virtuoso of urban guerrilla combat, Carlos
Marghela writing on The organisational Function of Revolution. ary Wiolence" identified the 'shortcomings of the Brazilian revolutionary movement and prospects for the struggle" as follows:-
"The overwhelming defect of the Brazilian revolutionary movement Is the disun ited state of the revolutionary organisations and their disagreement over atitudes and odjectives. Within this disagreement there is an intense struggle for leadership going on. Each organisation is tacitly claiming the leadership of the revolution for itself and this makes it difficult to discover a common denominator among those who are prepared to fight against our common enemy."
Marig hela's writings on the need for unity assume a special relevance and poignancy for us in l979 which is the Oth anniversary of his death and the 5th an niverSary of the Brazilian golpe.
The down of the 1970's found the Uruguyan Left in a state of unity, with a 'broad front' being formed by the Tupamaros, the Sommunist Party (led by Rodney Arisnendi) and the Socialists. This "Frente Amplio" Succeeded in winning 20% of the popular vote at the country's general elections of 1971. In retrospect, Debary correctly locates this as the high point of the "Tupas' existence. The subsequent spiral of revolutionary violence and armed repression drove the Left parties a part, with the CPSocialists taking up their old positions of parliamentarism and the Tupas moving towards sectarian is in and militarism. By 1973, the Tupa 5 had been liquidated as an organisation. In "Revolution on Trial", Debary Correctly identified the Tupas main error of judge
T1:-
"Whereas they thought they were dealing with a representative democracy which, though decrepit and decaying, was still in being, they were in fact confronting a nation militarized and wholly
9

Page 12
controlled by the repression, and
a bourgeoisie that had thrown, overboard all shame, all legality all republican responsibility, to ensure its own su Twiwal. In other
words, the Tupamaros had underestimated the fascist character of the civ|| Power."
The emphasis is Dedray's own and, for our purposes, would serve as a further riposte to local revolutionary leaders who stubbornly refuse to recognise the process of fascistization that has taken place in Latin America and is well underway in other parts of the "peripheral' world. The rejection of "united fronts" is of course, logically linked to, and flows from, this non-recognition of the phenomena of fascism.
"Unity with the Unidad Popular parties and with sectors of the Christian Democratic Party is one of our fundamental objectives in this period and one of the most powerful tools to overthrow the dictatorship. There were important differences between us and the Communist Party and its policies during the United Popular government and still today we hawa differences with them but they are our allies in the struggle against the dictatorship, they are comrades on the same path."
Here too is a fragment from the Declaration of Edgardo Enriquez, member of the Political Commission of the “IR on C-tober 8th | F74,
in memory of Miguel Enriquez:- 'Miguel Enriquez, Segretary of the “||R, has died. fell at his
combat post, at the head of his organisation and in the struggle for the unity of the left forces, for the defeat of the fascist tyranny and for the ideas of socialism.... The Chilean working class is in mourning, a standard bearer of unity, a defen der of
their class interests has died. This standard is not only that of the MLR, it is the Standard
of the Chilean left." (My emphasis)
and unity grasped and
If the danger of fascism the imperative need for
of the |oft i 5 si CD acted upon, then Reaction will not find it an insurmountable
task to bld "adio 5, Companero,
O
ad Ios" to the who tic and workers
What the or what import wa "left unity' in th Nicaraguan rewol. be no mistake ol score: unity w paramount impor Fr. Ernesto Cart most prestigious poets and the Culture of libera
FTHE fir-5 g out is that to there must be irl Other COLIl has been split We were unit more. That spelled the dea" za regime; wit struggle would much longer. the fore lost could be of us ples struggling plete and def darı ce.**
:nחוחGra)
Thus Fr. Ca the experiences can be learned of the Nicara while an a rece na. Clear and should think.
Of course th itself a united f choice of roller the uninitiated Though it applie with a Maoist
|C) 21 Th3155 T10" ma 55 e5 did mot cept perhaps at ges of the cri: structure and cor; dered it necessar the mass mower this sense, a wan rather tha a functioned as St. experience confi revolutions to organisations rat or "rnass' parties the Tasses or latter is a socia she wik construct 5urvive under re either in exist

|le Left, de Tora
W.
f Nicaragua? Of s the factor of le victory of the tion? Let ther
evasion on this as a factor of tange. Listen LO. ena || one of the of Latin American new Minister of ited Nicaragua.
55 on that stands achieve victory unity. While tries the left and split again, ing a more and complete unity th of the SOm Ohout unity the have gопе оп think that is experience that e to other peofor their cominitive indepen
i' Oct 21st 1979)
rdenal, discussing am d || 25 Soms that from the 'victory guan revolution, rt visit to Hawa
unc quivocal, one
e FSLN was; mot ront, though i Is dlature might lead ø thÎm k đth C Twist1. !d Lhe mass lina
erfection. It was emer, since the Join en bloc, exthe terminimali 5 talsis. The FSLN's ganized cadre ren'ily narrower than ment. It was in guard organisation mass party, and Tā FS". r"m15; the r12C2d for" build Wanguard het
than 'open' coextensive with the class. This
| Democratic Men.
which could not pressive coditions ance or coming
into beign in most "Third World' countries. There is however" the other danger, that of 'wanguardism"
or what Debray calls "the metaphysics of the vanguard'. Discussed in parts (ii) and (iii) of this
current series of articles, wanguard. ism implies the construction of an organisation insulated from the masses, impervious to the mass mood, insensitive to the rhythms of the mass now ement. Of course, the revolutionary organisation should not tail behind the masses nor merely be reactive to mass
sentiment, just as its organisational structures should not be coextensive with the mass II owement. What is necessary s the construction of a vanguard revolutionary organisation which will adopt a mass line, a line which is neither behind nor too far ahead of the masses, a line
which systematizes the views and experiences of the masses and inserts this back into the mass consciousness, so it is repossessed by the masses.
It is precisely this, that was a major achievement of Mao and Ho C. Minh, Schallati- sectari - aris would raise the objection that this was Mao's great error, "the substitution of the masses in place of the working class, the adoption of a mass line instead of a class | | me." (certainly Mao made occassional errors in this direction, but in the main, the criticism is invalid during the
period up to 1949.) But the "class line" cannot and must not be counterposed to the 'mass line"
in a period where national in dependance and democracy hawe been sold to imperialism by the local bourgeoisie (Stalin); where the proletariat has therefore to take po 55 es, iom of the twin banners of national independance and democracy thus becoming the 'nation class” (Engels, Stalin, Cabral); where "the nation and socialism are one'
(Le Dua n).
So the Siri diri ista Natioma | Lib2ration Front (FNSL) was a vanguard organisation which did not succumb to the "metaphysics of vanguardism'. It was not itself a mass movement or United front, but rather, a wlinguard organisation which adopted a mass line.

Page 13
International tr an overview
is the decade ended President
Carter was threatening the naval blockade of Iran, once America's strongest ally in a vitally strategic region and a key factor in that post-war alliance system which the US had constructed for the expansion and protection of her global power.
Henry Luce, founder of TIME, LIFE and FORTUNE, and an authentic emblem of native genius, enterprise and dynarnism, had heralded the 20th century as "America's Century."
In his celebrated inaugural address, President Kennedy had spoken not only to his own people
but to the whole world. "Let every nation know whether it wish us well or ill, that we shall
pay any price, bear any burden, nect any hardships, support any friend, oppose any fo e, in order to assure the survival and success of liberty."
An admirably soaring rhetoric pro per to a mer Tora ble occasion but surely a sentiment riot untouched by the un mistakable traces of American self-confidence or arrogance which characterised that decade. For America, between Luca's magnificent dream, Kennedy's
brash magniloquence and the world of the 1980's falls a profoundly disturbing reality-the reality of Wietnam.
Since the di Tn ensions of power are not confined to "pure' politics, if there is such a thing, or to the clash of arms, military victory and defeat, many an analyst would ha 5 ton to introduce an a mendment.
Wietnam and the dolar, they would say.
Wietnam of Course, had much
to do with the pressures on the US economy and the entire USdominated world economy which was further unscttled by the 1973 oil price hike. While that economy
is still striving those shock wa pressures are be overal impact felt in ever which had been wat ta facilit; management of system in which pre-eminence along with dominance. This economic instit IMF, IBRD, GAT seemingly inaffe fora like the UN agencle5.
All these insti UN to UNESCO) under 50’yere 5 t the Kissingers goaded into impatience, would as "the tyranny The unease and from the realisat control ower the which were estal to exercise such challenged by a la nations using strength or collect The challenge i those areas and Western dominan en trenched - UN information and of emphasis to fece acri Ton debates and negg many frustrations ideal example. E a grave mistake institutional pro Within is the pressures outsi pressures const phenomenon of 70's,
Wietnam
In the decad the overwhelmin Wietnam 15 | 105

ends -
PATTERNS ( CONFLICT
by Mervyn de Silva
o Tecoy er ftoT es. We as W. ng released, the the crisis was ingle institution created after the e the smooth an international the US enjoyed ind the West լpan: collect Iwe is as true of |tions like the etc as it is of Itual diplomatic and its specialised
utions from the and WHO
5 Te "ain from what and Moyni hans,
an in temperate like to stigmatise of the majority'. the ire spring on that Western very institutions iished in order control, is being ge host of poor
heir numerical iwe voting power. hnges over all
su es where 5uch has bec in long
IMF, trade, o on. The shift UNCTAD, its pro tracted lations, and its is probably the t it would be o see these as 'ens. The stress anifestation of and those LI | E2 major e world of the
that is
oW importance of able. Besides,
Vietnam exposes if one may extend an expression of Hegel, the Cunning of history caught in an improbable mood for neatness. The Wio tra mese tanks rolled into
Saigon (Ho Chi Minh city) on
April 30th 1975-right in the
Thiddle of the decade.
A day later, Japan's leading
newspaper, the conservative ASAH SHIMBUN noted editorially: "The war in Wietnam has been in every way, a war of national emancipation' The age in which nationalism could be indefinitely suppressed it added was also ower.
A more comprehensive assessment of the long-term and global significance of the victory, was made by Le Duan, First Secretary of the Wietnam Workers" Party, and its leading theoretician. In his victory speech made just two weeks la ter, Le Duan said: Wietnam became the area of the fiercest,
historic confrontation between the most War like, the most stubborn, aggressive imperialism
with the most powerful economic
and military potential on one side, and the forces of national independence, democracy and
socialism of which the Wietnamese people are the shock force in this region on the other.
The victory of Wietnam, therefore, is not only a victory of national
independence and socialism in Wietnam, but has also, a great international significance, and an epoch-making character. It has
upset the global strategy of US imperialism. It has proved that the three revolutionary torrents of our times are on the offensive, repulsing imperialism step by step and overthrowing it part by part. Today, imperialism, even US imperialism, cannot grab a single square inch of any socialist country; neither can it push back thic mowe ment for national independence in the world, nor

Page 14
him der the advance towards socialism of various countries.
Wetra redLad America to a divided nation, in a way that no single issue had done for perhaps a century. The market-gconomies hawe been beseiged by serious economic troubles. Such basically economic adversities hawe produced social and political consequences such as racialism and policy changes on immigration in Britain, new attitudes and practices wis-a -wis the once welcome guest worker' in prosperous West Germany, industrial un rest in France, strike waves, new forms of political violence and chronic governmental instability in Italy, and new material hardships for an increasing nu Tıber of Americans, notably the already under-privileged non-whites.
Stability preserved
Inspite of the seriousness of the economic recession however the basic stability of the socio -political systern has been preserved. The "centre" has held. Centurias of pillage under colonialism, the enduring benefits of the industrial revolution, the bountiful rewards of the new global system of exploitation and extraction of the Third World's resources and its systematic transfer to the TetroPolita in centres hawe cumula tiwely enabled these affluent nations to sustain their living standards,
Even within this broad group of nations however the fact of uneven development is undeniable.
If one takes "the West" then in a wide sweep, the need for differentiation be cor T1 e 5 obyious
enough.
The less developed belong to
the "south" - Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece. The "north-south' öffet in Ehe: "West" find5 1 |ုးဖုံcully telling illustration in taly, the most developed of th CS2 Countric S. Ewam the Tost casual student of Italian affairs is
aware that the traditional division between the industrialised north and the agricultural south (broadly analagous to the situation within a smaller compass in Portugal) is a mass. We Socio-Economic actuality which expressing itself in different forms continuously influences Italy's politics.
! .
Portugal, Spain ycumowe middlehawe been gripp Poulantzas has of dictatorship: established dic been over throw we watched the fitful struggles f legitimacy and de places where det it is proving all
While this 5u the general it trands on the categories of Col demarcated area: noted that th conventional represent thė NATO, with t as the focus of
If the metri despite internal 5 intensity; hawe resilience in cc
all-important q. Cal Tried by et tČ Carl WHeth er th is 3rd if so, whict for assim a Lion Incw, sharpcr ch
Far - reaching
In the te TT "dependincia" sic the more fa r-ri located in the the T1 Wor and Latin Amer" were the impas of "Third Word" and mot h : SL Shah and Sad of F of Jackson and the Chinese, attractive idior these continer "storm centres'
As with the the law of LIFE influences the general crisis as 1. LOT OT l'El.
The crisis in is | mteng Last E compound of internal and interconnected.
In a four-fol the fundament:

Greece and as eastwards, Turkey ed by what Nicos alled the "crisis s". Here long tatorships have n. In the '0's ir striwings and or constitutional mocracy. In some mocracy Prevalled,
too fragile.
mming-up reflects расt of есопопіс
| | tits of terta ir Intries or broadly 5, it should be
S. 55 strategic t Southern tier of h C2 Medi terrarian frenzied W25 term
opolitan centres, tres ses of Warying demonstrated a
ping with the estion which is the 80's hinges crisis will de epen. het the capacity will match the allenge. crisis
inology of the
hool, the deeper. each ing cris is is "perіphегу" і. е. ld or Asia, Africa, ica. When they sioned champions peoples liberation Ipporters of the and the admirers Strauss, "Scoop' largeret-Thatcher, in their own rm, Lised to gall 5 the WoT|d";
affluent countries
wen development form which this sumes within each
the poor World | ccшse t 15 а. multiple conflicts, external and all
d classification of all conflicts which
modern world Socialism, proleoppressed and in tra interest) offers us the
characterise the (imperialism vs tariat ws bourgeoisie, nations ws imperialism -capitalist clashes of Kostas Mawrakis standard Marxist Perspective noting the "connected character' of these conflicts, and how they converge in the three continents. At present, he adds, the third conflict is the most explosive. As the decade passed its mid-way mark, we may say that the stormiest part of this explosive area lay somewhere between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, with the Persian Gulf, for the plainest of strategic reasons, as the eye of the storm,
The area would embrace what we call the Arab-Israeli issue, the conflicts in the Horn of Africa, the oil-rich belt, the revolutio in Iran, the Con tiri Led unrest in Pakis Lan, And the
upheavel in Afghanis tan which has now seen its third government in less than two years with Soviet troops in action against armed anti-government groups.
The e wer-sharpen ing severity of conflict in the Third World and its increasing comparative importance as a factor in world affairs saw a strikingly novel demonstration in Portugal. The costly, exhausting and bruta
wars fought by the Portugues army
against national liberation movements in its African colonies seemed senseless to the young
offi.gr 5. ||If the Wien am war de —humanized the Americam soldier (new films like "The Deer Slayer' are facile attempts at an escape from this odium as well as an easy expiation of lingering guilt) the wat in Africa radicialises the Portuguese officer, the main actor in the revolution" which ended four decades of dictatorship in Lisbon. Here, the conflict in the periphery had a direct impact on and produced a major change in the centre.
In the two previous decades, Britain and France, the two leading colonial powers, by and
large succeeded (there were a few notable ecceptions of course) in effecting in their colonies a peaceful transition to political independence: Such freedom did

Page 15
not mean, as we all recognise now, emancipation or a rupture in the basic relationship between
former colonial possession and mother-country. On the contrary, the external linkages were strengthened as the ex-colony was enmeshed in a new network of economic relationships which
were in turn an integral part of the US-dominated global system. Neo-colonialismi did not en ha rice freedom, autonomy or self-reliance.
It only altered the formal character of the relationship, Though less "political' and less 'visible', it increased the depen
dence of the one, and fortified the dominance of the Other.
Paradoxical
This process of locking the under-developed countries into a tighter global system produced in the WC)'s what strikes om as an interestingly paradoxical effect of internal disturbance, םחt stability. Both in the economic and political spheres, developments at the periphery could dislocate things at the centre, while major changes in one peripheral part could inspire and influence change in some other remote part.
Export platforms and free trade zorlles fuld mea in the clasure of factories in Western Europe, un employment and new protectionism. In Politics, the yery success achieved by the developed market-economies to ensnare the poor nations in a system largely dominated and managed by the West, together with the farranging and variegated Consequences
of the 'communications revolution" in a "shri riiking uniwerse" hawe accelerated the flow of ideas, Fcross oceans, heighte ned the
inspirational influence of example and multiplied the demonstration -effect of events. Consider Iran and Nicaragua, two dramatic events in the final phase of the decade, the downfall of the parvenu Pahlevi dynasty installed By the British and the US, and the overthrow of another fake dупаsty, the Sоппоza5, ап Americam manufacture.
"Genera | Sandino, Cur national hero, Was our Shining symbol. . that is, of our move Tent' a Sandinista commander told me in
Havana last Sep the Cuban rewol. been the exampl Our Ti inds , But' "for the people,
thousands who w the fa || Cf the S hope, strengthen because if the IT be thrown out,
pettу ршppet dict:
It the same yea heroic struggle גaוחt cliחhaקוחtriu nations gained if of thern through "De-Colorisation" from Asia to Afri was Africa's ded brutal war, de C the strength to Algerian burden
'colons" (the F France's large there, and the
could disturb the de Gaulle gave Fr
Portugal, a
power, held on empre" with a ter totally incapable
the transition ta which the major had achig wed. national||5n hâd ni: armed struggle,
In Angola the E: W di 25 i that from di
confrontation bet, On the side of t the LISSR afd t| and finally Cuba the side of th
ti walls were thi MC, butu SՃuth Chinese.
Chou on Africa
How Chinese g advisory teams, a came to fight on as the US an introduces a maj any 255.255 ment C the 70's. The important chang policy hawe been separate article ruber. Therefor iri yite the reade Ch cLI — Er1 —lai"5 wi5 the early sixties

ember.... 'and y haveהוח וIticI 2 at the back of
he went on for hundreds of era lot Wists hah gawe them ed their resolve 1ighty Shah can why not this itor, Somoza . . ?"
that Wietnam's Teachd || CSS K, three African dependence, all armed struggle. " had mowed ica and the 1960's de. After a long, Gaulle could hawg shuffle off the in spite of the ranch settlers), economic stake ÖAS, The OAS stability which "HIl Ըը,
ecrepit colonial to its "African hacious stupidity, of negotiating neo-colonialism imperial powers Anti - colonial option left but
Struggle had a -- direct in wolweIts ide, with a
"ween two "blocs". he MPLA were e socialist camp, soldiers. On i MPLA"5 tygo 2 US, waire's
Africa and the
enerals, military irms and money
the same side South Africa, or theme in to if h: Wor|d in rapid, critically is in Chinese
ex arT1i ed il 3
in this special e I need only r"5 atter tion to it to Africa in , a diplomatic
tour de force. "A continent ripe for revolution" was his werdict, and it was clear that at the time that Peking was the inspirational centre for al|| radica | movements in the Third World. Its strategy seems to be one of outflanking “1O5-ow from the left.
But China's perceptions of the World had gone through Than y cri
tical shifts. From an ally, the USSR had become an ideological dewiationist; then an enemy as hostile as US imperialism; next the main enemy. And this had been paralleled by a Sino-US
Teconci|ation Which a dwa rced to the point where Defence Secretary James Schlesinger could call China a "quasi-ally' of the US.
r his book, "lin Search of Enemies', John Stockwell the head of the US Angola Task Force, giw25 L 5 a detailed account of this joint operation. Germane to this discussion is his explanation of why the US exercise had to
be 'Covert“ operation, in whsch even the US Congress was deceived. After Wietnam, the US
Congress would NOT pass funds for externa interwcntion. Stock
-well clearly demonstrates the Soviet-Cuban involvement was re -active, a response to the US
'covert' operation.
Chou's pithy werdict on Africa was echoed by Fidel Castro more than fifteen years later. In an interview granted to the journal "ASIE-AFRIQUE", he a II ed Africa
"imperialism's weakest link." In non-ideological terms, in the language of orthodox schools
of strategic studies, this is the crisis-area constantly generating crisis-5ituatior15. The area demarcated in this es 5 ay has somewhat Widor contours.
Israel, Rhodesia, (Zimbabwe) Namibia and South Africa (Azania) are the obvious signposts. Here is a region where there is a concentration of multiple conflicts Taking each "issue' not only intersely explosive but involving by its very nature neighbouring states (making the issue a regional conflict) and also the major powers, making the issue instantly or potem tinly a global One.
{{'arrir FFFrd sa FF Pegg 3:

Page 16
Towards
2 eW military order
inte
by Maj. Gen. Anton Mutukumaru
he expectation was that the
1970's would constitute the Decade." the Disarmament eace of basis that the arma Teits race
world-wide, was posing an Lunacceptable threat to international peace and security. The strategy was to speed up the lamentably leisurely pace of the disarmament process, reduce tension and set the pace for a relatively quick and viable peace situation. Subsequent events have shown that progress has been negligible except in the organisational sphere, in which one notes increases, in the membership of the negotiating body and a change towards a rotational tenure of chairmanship.
Pending these developments' the world military situation con
tinued to show signs of turbulence. Space being limited, one can only sketch the outline of
the military situation, concentrating on continental and intercontinen tal aspects. This of Course simplifics the task but one can only hope that, in the process, there will be no unacceptable oversimplification.
im mediate
Predictably, one's thoughts centre round the activities of the Super-powers, the
USA and the USSR. Their military capability has moved with rapidity, from the deployment of conventional arrnaments in the wake of World War II to the use of much more spectacular thermo-nuclear armament which Lheir respective scientific and technological backing, developed largely in the 70's, currently enables them to operate beyond the conventional elements of land, sea and air to ou ter space. This has given them the awesome ability to deny mankind the capacity to survive an ability
The author Ferped a Sri Lanka'\ Arribassadør for Australia da Ted Egyp) { afster is rerirerrier Y Las Arwr y Carri- arlile:rוזו
which they appar the Almighty?
It is not altog that they have of coexistence in
from "deterstence which however, thess of entent
distant from the which a war-w: earnestly desires. also saw the pi the signing of t Strategic Arms fact that there agreement is un of progress, but the um mista kable
what is achieved tion and elimina arms, Perhaps mL
central to this one suspects th: concurrent ingredie the desire to ap powerful and ther desirable partner, for existence by weaker segments community.
It is desirable t Certain 1 2 Weng * Impact oп the p. by the USA in th domestic sphere, ght about a cris leadership without axi ÖfThatic, rat | os:1 viability. In the there was the W Wietnam and Wii then ing of links w corresponding loc with Taiwan. Bot on Arnerican Cred was even speculati USA would hark isolationism charac World War I A In the economic. If the energy crisis O's and the we Arterican dollar. tion of these faci Werken the dome Lional Stance of th

rnational
ntly share with
cher surprising wised Tethods r se, ranging to "de tente" eing the anti
leaves ther state of peace ry World so The seventies og ress made in paties towards imitation. The as been som e leniably a sign there remains conclusion that is the limitation of strategic cual se curity is conclusion, but it these is a nt. One senses pear the morte efore the more in the struggle he poorer and of the world
o take no te of which had an istures adopted e 70'5. [ In the Watergate brou5 in Americal which, it is effort lacks military field, thdrawal from the strength China, the en ing of links had an impact ility and there In whether the back to the !ristic of preerican policy. ld, there was in the early en ing of tha The combinaIts tended to and internaJSA, Indeed,
MILITARY
at one time, the emergence of the image of a less purposeful
entity lacking leadership and the will to maintain her predominant position was threatened and even appeared likely to provide the setting for her European military partners in seeking an independent role in military affairs, with West Germany spearheading the towe on the basis of a renewed policy of German reunification. The Soviet Union has been quick to exploit this situation. Where hither to she might have followed a policy of reacting to situations, she has had in the 70's a policy designed one suspects to challenge the USA and strengthen her own international position. This is evident in her actions in Africa, Asia and America itself apart from the speed with which she has developed a naval capability, without which Soviet planners have concluded that super power
status is distant.
It is against the foregoing background that one undertakes a world survey from West to East. The focus initially is on Latin Arterica, where, true to
tradition, there has been turbulence, but "manageable' turbulence, the scope of which has been the making and un making of dictatorship. There hawe however been two exceptions. The first was the rather bitter controversy ower the control of the Panama Canal from the end of the century which gave rise to some fears of American hegemony till the matter was amicably settled. The second was the confrontation between the USA, the USSR
and Cuba ower the Artnerican claim that a Soviet combat brigade was 5 Lationed in Cuba, against that of the Soviets that their troops had only training responsibilities. Whilst agreeing to disagree, the USA has announced her decisions not to recognise Cuba so long as the
SITUATIO

Page 17
troops remain in Cuba and to station a task force in Cuban waters - a perceptible example of how the Monroe Doctrine works
The military affairs of North America - i.e. of the USA and Canada are bound up with thost of NATO and the Warsaw Pact Countries, who collectively form the bulk of the nuclear world and who have been adjusted to warfare from century to century. The 70's have disclosed an East European superiority in manpower and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, and the West has been making strenuous efforts to redress this by attempting to deploy the neutron bomb and now by the introduction of some 500 medium range nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union is demonstrably opposed to these moves and indeed has offered to reduce its numbers stationed in West Germany, The position is fluid. it also remains potentially dangerous not only because of the effect of what is already involved but also of possible e scalation into a full Scale nuclear W.
Turbulence in Africa, to which one now turns, is characteristic In that it takes the form largely of guerilla Warfare, Objective: - " whether to topple dictators or to settle interstate quarrels - remain constant, as in Latin Ame. rica. Where turbulence involves fore than one state (as in N. E. Africa between Ethiopia and Somalia or in N. W. Africa Dvolving Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania), there Is a new ellement, na Tnelly, the desire of the OAU to try to settle differences, on the basis of "Africa for the
Africans".
The peace in Rhodesia that appears to be in sight will ona fears, be the curtain raiser to the final stage In the bitter conflict, which is raging to ensure
black majority rule in Africa, and which will be fought against the last bastion of White minority rule–South Africa.
One passes next to Asia, where many military complexities arise. in West Asia, the peace which has descended over the Western
front of Israel potentially host may be taken
her Easterm fror Jordan and Ir Conjunction wit the Gulf region has a commodit: later on may ha
may cause the cockpit of w; This explains
dollars which t tries are curror military hardwa subcontinent is, qu'il State. Whi howe weer are til Pakistan Is devi capability, whic believe certain not necessarily poses. The situ East Asia is Wietnam has a tary machiпе of equipment Over“ after th war) and in te Tanpower whic to the might c апd evеп the U.
North East A most difficiu || L. a of the complexit eWits. With to 70's are at the problems, One i tion of relation USA and China the Friendship laբan and Chin: tion of these f: SC as OIL5 Soviet Union, if Oce of 15 Concea Is a Cow intention. Whis tlопs betweeп USSR are satisf have been strain tention of the which Japan clai and in one of y Um on is building plex which can
Japan. This may to a remitas The perceptions
Union and Chin
each of them are dis, the same be he ITmed in. The feels hem mgd in

is offset by the ille action which by Countries on it- notably, Syria, 'aq, working in h the PLO. In oil, which today y Walue and which we a scarcity value, region to be a irring elements. the billions of he oil rich counitly investing in re. The India
today, in a tranit is disquieting le reports that aloping a nuclear 1, if one is to a SSSSrrents, is for peaceful puratlQn in South most disquietIng. powerful miliboth in terms (which was left e US-Witenam rts of trained :h has stood up If Japan, France USA.
sia presents Ehe d most dan gerous ies of Asia. Two ok place in the C2n tre of the is the no maisais between the and the other is Treaty between 2. The Combina
t Пnay prepicture to the the overt inn.
e developments Eft anti-Syst 2CO FICTIC T - Japan and the actory, relations ed ower the reKurilo Islands, ms for herself, which the Soviet a military combe used against conceivably lead ation of Japan. of the Sowjet 1 of threats to ITILIta Lis mutalcause each feels : Soviet Union between NATO
and the possible triangular entente between the USA. China and Japan. China for her part feels
hemmed In by the fact that a massive military buildup with nuclear backing, has developed
along her border with the Soviet Union; that in nawa terms, the powerful Soviet Navy patrols her seaboard and, in diplomatic terms, the Soviet Union has Friendship Treaties with India, Vietnam and Afghanistan. The USSR must view China's modernisation plans with so The anxiety because the accent on industry and agriculture will strengthen her economy and the accent on Science and technology will strengthen her defence capability.
Australia, the last of the world's continents, is in a tranquil backwater. She however has membership of ANZUS and has afforded facilities in a basc in Australia to the USA, designed for control of nuclear units Գperating in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and is therefore in the firing line in the event of World-wide hostities.
There is one final point which is worth y making - namely, the marked imbalance in the military capability of nations. It is interesting to note that, in the political sphere, there is no such imbalance for the purposes of the General Assembly of the UN where a
countries are equal. There is a demonstrable imbalance In the economic sphere which
has led to the clamour for a New International Economic order. Thore is a le 5s demonstra ble imbalance in the military sphere because of the need for Secrecy in disclosing defence spending. But published figures are however eloquent testimony of a grÇ55 imbalance. If all defence expепditure is based on security needs,
there would be no need for CJITT & 1.t. But there is much evidence to conclude that the
motives underlying "defence' expenditure lie, in varying degree, in the spheres of political influence, ideological rivalry, economic pressure commercial gain and sheer power-domination. Here in lies the essence of the matter which, if pursued logically, must lead to the dem and for a New International Military Order.
5

Page 18
Moving away fr
by N. Sanmugathasan
n 1812, Napolean is reported to hawe said with reference to
China, "Let the sleeping giant sleep, For, when it wakes, the word will tremble." The man
who gave this sleeping giant the kiss of life and awakened it was Mao-Tse tung and the Communist Party of China which he led. Debates may continue una bated about the role of Mao in the history of both China and of the world, but nobody can gain Say one fact and that is that he was the creator and founder of Modern China. He and the party, that he headed, led the Chinese people, who constit. Li te one fou Tith of the world's population, to success by means of the world's longest and most protracted reWolution,
It is very often forgotten what a was t population inhabits China. It is more than Europe and Russia put together. Even to imagine
one single Government and administration for this wast poplation is mind-boggling. In fact,
no such thing had ever existed before. It is only after the communists came to power, that a regular direct train ran from Canton to Peking. China was the play-thing of the foreign imperialists and feudal war-lords who carved up their own spheres of influence. It was one of the most backward countries in the world, with millions dying every year due to hunger, starvation, floods irid disease.
Mao and the co changed all this. W of years, the Chin Mao put it, had 5 one di ed of hLinge or preventi ble : irrigation projects el Unemployment bec the pās L. COf CO LJr remained a por a low Standard Col compared to In di Sri Lanka, which gained their indepe earlier than Chi beco Ti ing a model.
This success was metely through lil rā tiris ir f also by galvanising power, which was putting politics in success was also du of self reliance Chiese were for: shchev, in 1950, 50'yi et Ecgri (: İliç, 3ı policy algo bec because of the poi boycott, and di recognition by world. This was
1 Le first t''' Chinese people's
realist Social
Mao also With Lh
classes and class 5. end bu t o li tiri. I 52
historical epoch tol Socialist to cof cultitut te w| L: tion
 

om Mao
TITUT IS ES SCOT1 Within a matter e se people, as tood Lu P. No r or starvation isease. Huge iminated floads. arme a thing of ise, China still country with |aving. BLI I a. Butta or had reputedly indence an year a China was
achie werd mot ld reform and industries but huITham labpur pientiful, by ommand. This e to the policy to which the gd after Khruwithdrew all ssistance, This line necessary icy of economic plomatic nonthe capitalist particula, tly Sc} - decades of power.
ad early that, ist revolution, truggles do not during the long * transiti af fram Tri Liisi. The
Whlich started
FFF"
during the second half of the six ties and lasted ti || th c. first if of the 52 Werties was a
example of how to conduct the class struggle under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It was also af åLTempt to safeguard and strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat, to prevent China from changing colour and going on the same capitalist road as had the Soviet Union, and to preserve China as a base for world revolution. It was also an attempt to create a new Socialist man, one who would be without greed, and selfishness, who would be frce from lust for power and personal glory.
These are all noble aims which philosophers down the ages had tric d to inculcate in men but failed. But, for the fir 5 t. Lima, under changed economic conditions, when private ownership in the means of production had been totally abolished, an attempt was
being made to transform the se age-old aims into reality, But, obviously, it was not an easy
task. Amd. 5 Mao 5 a id, or C. CLI litura revolution Would not be enough.
During the life time of Mao, he had sufficient personal influence and authority (Because of his immence contribution to the leader
ship and success of the Chinese revolution) to push through his revolutionary ideas. Those who
openly opposed thern were struck down during the cultural revolution. Others preferred to remain silent. Most of his opponents had expected Mao to die before Chou El-air who Wa,5 ton exPected to lead the counter revolution-the task now being perfor mc2d by Teng H5ia0— ping 3 rnd which Chcu wcL||d hawe porrformed with greater fines se and subtlety.
But the reverse happened. Chou died earlier and counter revoluLicin first showed its hand in the April 5th events of 1975. Mao
had to get up from his sick bed
iller

Page 19
to denounce Teng who was stripped of all his posts for the second tTe.
But Mao's power and influence was on the wane and he died in September 1976. His death was the signal for counter revolution to re-raise its head. Without the sanction either of the central committee or the political bureau or the standing committee of the political bureau, the four clo5e associates of Mao, including his widow, were jailed by HuaKuc-Feng who claimed the doubtful legitimacy of being nomi
nated by Mao. The party and the nation were faced with a fait accomplice. From this, to
the restoration ping to power, Tiri,
of Teng Hsiao—
W5 te
Teng's restoration was the signal
for the complete reversal of all the revolutionary policies associated with Mao and his four
associates. Almost the entire period of Mao's leadership from 1949 was written off as a bad dream. All the correct werdicts of the cultural
revolution werc repudiated. Monetary in centives, which were condemned as revision ist when introduced by the Soviet Union, were now encouraged. Mao's slogans of "Don't forget class struggle' and "Put politics in
command" were replaced by Teng's slogan "What does it matter, if
the cat is black or white, so long as it catches mice". All the revolutionary reforms in education, which had earned the ad
miraaion of the progressive world, were reversed. The policy of settling students, after their university life, in the out-lying areas, both for the sake of defence and for bridging the gulf between the peasants and the intellectuals, was abandoned. The policy of self reliance in building economy was replaced by reliance on foreign investments and foreign techno
|gy.
Worst of all, under the text of uniting with all forces opposed to Soviet Social im Ferialism whom the present Chinese revisionis leaership described as its main enemy (In contrast to Mao's description of both U. S.
Pre
imperialism an imperialism as C: 1 2 is of CH | China now start inter St.5 y El imperialism and forces, such as Europe and ey Iran.
It must be no begin ning of the SAW, LInder så o China's influence ties with the r including, finally, entry into the But there was principles. Chin ratic relations countries that a ple's Republic c fused to recogn after Nixon's Peking (which, at Nixon's requi ed a repudiatior A finerican attem a F1 d isolate Chin agreemerit rema ir letter for Seyen Hsiao-ping agree earlier Chinese 5
and thus broug
Til CİC Tel Lijg 15 ||
COLJIT troiego.
On the basis
four modernisati. of leaping into as a rodern coul
rGVision ist |äder Sorts and forms Westhets. C
biggest Tarkets foreign industrial men were huick
though their enth have waned sli. Chinese had rewis programme. But
foreign Capatilist and the construct complexes have : hive Lh2If InfluE |ife. A II that is, y culture is nowy b in I (CHilla. Mot room dancing b but ever tipping
hawe re-appeared

d So wiet Social the two main 1 and the world), led identifying its those of U. S. other reactionary Japan, Western
e che Shah of
ted here that the Ilirie të e say enties the widen ing of - and diplomatic est of the world,
its triumphant United Nations. 10 sacrific of a agreed to diploonly with those CICEpted Linė Peta2f China and reise Taiwan. Ewen famous visit to incidentally, WS est and represent1 of a carlier 1 Pts to Cor I i a), the Shanghai ed a virtual dead years tilI Teng d to go back on tands on Taiwan ht about diplobetween the two
of the so-called F15 and the aim he 21st century I try, the Chinës: 5 hip invited a II
of foreign inEl İS; C) e of the
2f the world and sts and businessto respond alLu Sials T 5 Eems to ghtly after the ied their original the I rn wasion of 5 ård to turists ion of nie w HotC| already begun to TC On Chinese Wors in Wester eing introduced only has ba ||-
Core a craze, and prostitution
Price control has been lifted from a large number of articles and this has sent the cost of living rising. According to a reCent lgtter from a lang standing resident in Peking, mutton ribs which used to be sold for Rs. 8.00.
has gone up to Rs. 8.00. One jin of eggs which used to cost Rs. 9.00 today costs Rs.
13.00. A pound of fish has gone up from Rs. 8.00 to Rs. 13.00.
The nineteen seventics have, therefore, seen a dramatic change in the direction in which China
urder
was heading, Mao, as a model for a II revolutionaries to follow. It is the current decade
that saw the death of the founder
and leader of modern Chiria, Mao Tse-tung. It is this death that enabled counter revolution.
under Teng Hsiao-ping, to raise its head and change the direction of China's path, back to the capitilist road. This has led to the reversal of all the revolutionary policies of Mao and the introduction of internal strife and tension and an aggressive foreign policy which caused the impermissable war against Vietnam despite the latter's culpability of its own
aggression against Kampuchea earlje Г.
Just as by its aggression against Czechoslovakia, the Soviet modern revision i 5 LS signalled their de welopment as social-imperialists, so did the Chinese revisionists with their aggression against Vietnam. Mao once said that the only socialist country, other than the Soviet Union, which had the economic base to because a social-imperialist power, was China. His worst fears seem La hawe been realised now. The Socord half of the riietean seventies will go down, in the history of China, as the period of the great leap Backward - to
use an apt phrase of Professor Charles Bettelhein.
|W

Page 20
Britain and
by Rajan Philipupillai
he "Mountbatter murders' and the killing of 18 Soldiers of the British army, for all of which the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) has claimed triumphant
responsibility, have brought a sense
of urgency, if urgency was still required, to the problem of Northern Ireland, perhaps the
gravest problem now confronting the British Gower mm er t.
Barely three weeks before the blasting of Mountbatten's boat, had appeared Novelist Bill Granger's thriller "The November Man", hinged almost on an identical IRA plot to blow up the yacht of a British Lord and Cousin of the Queen while he is sailing in the Irish Sea. The Novelist, a ang time journalist, was understandably disturbed by the eerie parallel, but nevertheless confessed that the plot emanated from his understanding and knowledge of the IRA; it was the next logical thing to follow in the IRA's campaign of armed stuggle. For some time the IRA, like its progeny the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), had been talking of its activities escalating into 'spectaculars": murder of important Britons, no matter where they are, and
attacking important targets (Oil Terminals, Power Stations etc.) in Britain, as a means of forcing the British people to demand their own government to leave Northern Ireland severely alone.
Its communique claiming responsibility for the recent murders gave clearest expression to its resolve to "Ioar out their senti Teltal imperialist heart" for the British government's continued oppression of the Irish people and its torture of the IRA comrades
in the "H-Block" of the Maze prison.
Amidst the near uniwersa |
condemnation of the assassination of Lord Mountbatten and others, the chief actors in the tragic Ulster drama hawe taken up resolute and in transigent positions. If the IRA
8
is determ i mrd to the sentimental ir Lt. General Tir General Cofficer Con the British Army Ireland, is equally
defeat the thugs of the Provisional |NLA". He 15 der Ce, Base or
in "another war", and co-ordinated defeat terrorism". determination are among the Prote Forces: The officia Rev. Ian Paisley Union ist Partyand Inurder gangs'-the Association (UDA) WoLunteert Forcc question is whethi government will yi from the Unionist own army and su! Ireland to the GO and co-ordinated
We might haz: "considered and efforts" may turn General Timothy Luna, CCL5 to med to '); Is m' hawing sprun, in Oman, in the
 

hern Ireland
BEHIND MOUNTBAT
go on "tearing 1 perialist heart", mothy Creasy, imanding (GOC) in North Ern de: ter"T1 |rgd""to and murderers |RA, 3rd of the :xpressed confihis experiences Lihat Colisid Cred efforts could The anger and no le SS 5e were Star E Union ist Unionist Party, 's Democratic their "Rightwing Ulster Defence and the Ulster (UWF). Tհը Er the British eld to pressures fortes and its ject Norther C's "considerad efforts".
ird what the CČ-Td imated гуш Г. Гo be. Lt. Creasy is not Thbatting terror. g into notoriet early and mi
M1 URIDERS
sewa mties", as chief of Sultan's Arried Forces to terrorize and annihilate "the Popular Front for the Libertation of CÓmiam". Fred Halliday in his 'Arabia without Sultans'' "ECOLUTI5 the British
soldiers' modus operandi in Oman." poisoning and blowing up Wells, burning villages, setting crops and food stores or fire, killing herds and cutting off food supplies' etc. As Mary Holland of tha "New Statesman' put it, if the GOC is to be given the green light by the Thatcher government to go ahead with such measures in Northern Ireland, "the entire population of Northern Ireland is in for a interesting time". It would be interesting indeed to see whether a western government would go so far as to inflict such reasures on "its own" people as it did without compunction on, say, the people of West Asia or Wietnam.
While this iš to be 5e en in the future, the past records would belie any contention that British ru | rs would rem der favoured treatment to their Irish subjects. The pages of history, whether ancient or modern, whether before or after partition, of British involveIn ent in Ireland, arc staired with strong measures, harsh bloody and Inhumam atro Cities perpetrated by the British rulers on the Irish people. History seems to be taking its own sweet revenge on the British ruling classes for all their past sins-the early conquer and occupation of Ireland, the plantation of Ulster province with English colonists, the Sustain ed and un reasona ble opposition to Home Rule, the cunning setting up of the Ulster Unionist forces, the financing and fostering of ilegal paramilitary bo dies in Northern Ireland, the partition and the creation of the un democratit Northern Ireland Statelet, and the post partition acts of repression. During the last ten years, from 1969 until the Mountbatten murders, 570 soldiers have been killed and 3429 injured, 127 policemen (of the Royal Ulster

Page 21
Collstabulary) hawe and 3360 injured, hawe boen killed
been killed |407 civilians and 15,394 injured. What is equally alarming is the Im Pact, tangible and Intangible, of the Northern Ireland situation not only on the 900,000 Protestants and the 500,000 Catholics of Northern Ireland, but also on the Southern state of the Republic of Ireland and on Britain itself. One might say that Socialist leader James Connolly's prediction of "a carnival of Teaction'' f Partition was implemented, had indeed Č0 TE tTLI e.
In 1922, at the time of the partition, of Ireland when the Southern Catholic Ireland broke away, few would have had апу fore boding of a further territorial disintegration of Britain.B. today, the nationalist movements of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales present the most powerful challenge to the unitary (capitalist) state in Britain, And the very measures taken by the British governments to Clarıp down rebellion in Ulster, have poisoned the British polity, besides being counterproductive in Ulster itself. The trend towards a strong state' in Britain cannot be gainsaid. Nor can the glaring departures from the norms of the Rule of Law' be obscured. The "Prevention of Terrorism Act', which was Stampeded through the British Parliament in November, 1974, empowers the Home Secretary to deport people without hawing to provide reason or evidence. It has also introduced detention without trial and harrassment of even non-Irish political activists. Suspects are subjected to Beatings and third degree methods, while the torture of prisoners is COTT - place. What is even more ominous is the manifest impact on the British Army, which today, in Northern Ireland, is learn ing the art of intervening in domestic political crises, In Provis ing devooping and mastering new techniques of Crowd contro. irl terrogation and torture, as means of Contain ing a hostile and aroused people "Indulging in subversive (and terrorist activities) against the state' (sic). It seems that the British Army has learnt a great deal, and has acquired immense power and politi
Sal autonomy. Northern F, Catholics, are the experinen Army to-day, Who the ultim Another aspec is that most Ulster, throw hands of the retire ront. T development ce the mass medi Pr':55 and ti broadcasting in their coverages the Northern censored and E picture that c. Ĉ"ĉĤ I IO II of 3 g ran Cour and hy
If it is sti I [ 'strong state' i. already one in the Republic of can boast of a repressive legis har shest antitèr and claims to E Per Terber of organis ing "secu out lawed IRA, There exist Cou to Corwict and YWithout open ewi Besides, the r Provisions Act Emergency POW give the authori detain and Impr out due trial. Aft king the Briti. been deman din 'security concess such as the righ of terrorists ac and the right f, o question susp both of which a conceded by the Dublin. Apart f. limitations (for Army has only
LJ be the sårne Force in Ulster other pre-occupa be expected Eo the 3 || 0 mille lor Dublin governme. Political limitatio
Dublin's compr British governmer origin, manifestly

The people of ind, particularly he guinea-pigs of
of the British ut the question is e victims will b2. of the army's role :-servicernen from hemselves into the ational Front after : other disquieting | Cerns tha tole of - the so called free è state owned titutions, in that of the events in reland are both 'esent a distorted In tributes to the imate of mutual iterical chauvinism.
a trend towards Britain, there is Southern Irelandreland. Dublin longer history of lation, and the orist law in Europe, e spend ing more its population in rity" against the than Britain itself. rts without juries imprison people dence being heard, lotorious Special of 1922 and the ers Act of 1973 ties the scope to is on people withat the Mountbattan sh government has g ewen greater ions' from Dublin, it of hot pursuit ross the border ar RUC personnell lects in the South, re unlikely to be ! govern Tent in "om the physical stance the Irish 3,500 men, said as the British and with its tions, can hardly seat off effectively g border) on the nt, there are also
15.
Cri:5e With thc it is of recent Since 1972, or
to a greater extent since 1975, The compromise itself is, though belated, a consequence flowing from the partition. For the Partition had cut off the most industriaisd part of Ireland, the province of Ulster, and the remaining three provinces of Munster, Leinster and Connacht, which were back.
ward, peasent based, and Catholic dorminated, came to constitute at first the "Irish Free State" and later the Republic of Ireland ("Eire'). Displaying the classic features of underdevelopment, and overwhelmingly inhibited
against staging any kind of revolutionary breakthrough, South
ern Island took the path of dependence on foreign capital, boch British and MNC's, with
the concommittant evolution of an appropriate political system.
During the last twenty years or So, foreign investment has increased enormously, and the Irish Republic has become a full Tember of the
EEC.
Even though Jack Lynch's government co-operated to a
surprising degree-he even sacked two of his ministers in 1972 for alleged IRA involvement-with London, no Irish government can go the whole hog in the campaign against IRA. While partition of | reland hans led to the subserwience of the South to British and foreign capital, the historical opposition to partition cannot be easily rooted out from the Irish political soil. Former Premier Mr. Lynch's own party - Fianna Feil is the politica heir to Eamon de Walera and his Republican movement, who opposed the 1921 Treaty (of partition) and later, in 1937, enacted the Republican Constitution for the whole of Ireland. "Reunification of Ireland is the very fabric of the Fianna Fall party''. Political pressure can still build up in the South, and Lynch may be forced
to suggest reunification as the only remedy, if Mrs. Thatcher continues exacting for greater
"cecurity concessions".
Everyone seems to be groping in the dark for a solution. Arnchair commentators indulge in tautological bombast5, such as the on a George Gale delivered himself of, in a recent issue of the 'Spectator': 'no in mediate alternative to
9

Page 22
direct rule and the pressence of the army, but these cannot constitute a permanent solution, but only a permanent crisis'. The commonest argument against a withdrawal of the British Army from Northern Ireland is that it will be followed by a blood bath. As if to say that the British Army is essentially a neutral force keeping two warring factions away, which ofcourse is now a well exploded Tyth. The early British imperialist Intentions ir occupying the whole or a part of Ireland may no longer be quite sa relevant to-day. The economic atraction of Northern Irland is, very little considering the heavy expenditure that goes into military occupation and running the administration in Ulster. A5 ha 5 been stated already, preservation of the status quo in the South is a definire rea 50m for Corn tin Liced interWern Lion in the North. Right-wing Tories and sections of the British Army fear that IRA wictory will lead to the creation of "a Cuba in the Irish Sea'. But the very machinery that Brita im has set up for maintaining its control over Ulster, has grown to enormous proportions during the last fifty years and it will not be a simple matter to dismantle this repressive machinery. The Army and other right-wing forces in Britain will bring pressure on the government to take "considered and co-ordinated efforts' against the Republicans. The in transigent opposition to any form of British compromise would howgwer, Lmanate frarf the Unionist forces in LJ|5 Ler-tha Fräukenstein mons Ier that has grown under owert and cowert British assistance.
The National Question of Northern Ireland, if one may be permitted to call it so, has strange peculiarities. The Catholics and the Protestants are not different ātraits ard Here the lbene of the customary "two nation' feature. There is no minority secCesionist demand on the part of the Ulster Catholics. Theirs iš a demand fort the incorporation of Both the majority (Protestants in Ulster) and the minority into a larger state (The Republic of Ireland) of the minority's affinity. The struggle of the Catholic minority is a continuation of the
20
Tish national lib which met with in 1921 inwolwin, of Ireland and t the "Irish Free S three of the count ces. The presen struggle is for t direct British Tull and its reunifical of the country. or the Protestan always sided with |İsm against the struggle, at first | iberation i toto reunification. Th Unionist5 is simi the customary supporting imperi forces of lition a what is peculiar Irland situatio", mass base of the the petty-bourge sections of the Such elite-cum-ma tion to their abs Irish State, has by hangowers o and persistent r figld of economig:
In the past, periodic conflict: Protestant descen Century settlers descendants of t Besides, sections a had developed a logy that foun expression in the In the field of C tigri, Protestants independence froi jeopardise their pi ched privellege 5. wide spread both testan t-industriai || chant - elites, as the petty-bourge. sections and the fa For allost a CE context of Belfast's the Protestants more favourably Catholics in reg: employment. The always found em skilled trades, wh are relegated to other menial job: of the unemploye Catholics outnum tan [5, e 'werh th oLu

eration struggle partial success, E the partition he creation of tate' comprising ry's faur provint phase of the he ending of the e over Uster in with the rest The Unionists t majority hawe | Bristh imperiaIrish freedom in opposition to and now against e rol of the | To Lha of colonia (lite alism against the liberation. But is the Norther II again, is the Unionists, a Tong ois and working |ster Protestants. 5s based opposiorption into the 3e en caused both past conflicts wargs im the Competition.
here had been between the dants of the 7th and the Catholic he native Irish, if the Protestants supremacist i dod im5 titutional Orange Order. Conori hic competifar tha E fu m Britain would 35ition of ContrenSuch fears are I among thữ Prchla rid|ord... morwell as among bis and working rm ing population. 2ntury, in the industrialisation, have been far placed ther the ird to securing Protestants have ploy IT ent in the ile the Ca Choic5 I LI T15 killed 3rd . In the ranks d in Ulster, the iber the Pro L5gh the former
constitute less tham one third of the economically active population. Given the ir supramacist ideology and the relatively privileged position in a "ståLCle L" sustaired and protected by the British governTent, the Protestant elites and the masses are naturally driven to be averse towards their being incorporated into a free and unified |rish State – which, Im Lhal wiew Would be the Cem bÖdirment of Catholic hegemonism, and in which they fear, they will be discriminated against and their privileged position Considerably weak ened. Their fears and bigotry, however
In founded, - for 80,000 Ulster Protestants abandoned by the Unionists hawe experienced easy
assim lation in to Southern Ireland, are nevertheless a party of reality.
The violent campaigns of the IRA and other Republican groups would only aggravate the Protestants' fears and bigotry. The Republicans are, on the one hand, actively ostracised by a government of their affinity in Dublin, while on
the other, are pitted against an irrovocably hostile Protestant community which constitutes the majority in Ulster - the Republicans main battle ground.
But the Republican 5 are Lurnda tun ted. They have faith in history, which they clairn, is on their side. After all, it is the "faith of their fathers (though now, not necessarily or only Catholic, but almost a revolutionary faith in the struggle against imperialism and oppression) burning still, inspite of dungeon, fire and sword' '! The post partition struggle for reunification of Ireland has gone through several phases and the struggle is continued on different fronts by different organisations, but with one all consumiug objective. From the political wing of the official IRA, the Sinn Fien (Ourselves Alone) w35 formed as a splinter, the Irish Republican Socialist Party. The |NLA is an offshoot of the latter party. It has Marxist leanings and is said to be maintaining close links with West Asian guerillas and the Basque ETA group. As we remarkgid earlies, thoi is strategy involves "spectacular" acts of violence against the British State. They were responsible for the liquidation of Mr. Airey Neave,

Page 23
the Conservative spokesman on Northern Ireland, at Westminister, and are also alleged to be involved in the murder of the British Ambassader to The Hague. They are numerically much smaller than the Provisional IRA, with whom they have links, but act Independently.
The Provisional IRA, (Provos) broke off from the official IRA. In the early 1970's, when the på rent body became Marxist oriented, and had since then become the largest and the most powerful group. From their beginnings as a badly organised and ineffective street arrny, and almost driven to the brink of defeat in 1978 - as a result of the very "effectivo measures' undertaken by Roy Mason, the Labour Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and his GOC Lt. General Timothy Creasy-, the Prow cos hawe na de a dramatic comeback, emerging stronger than before with almost an impregnable cellular internal structure. Since November 1978, they hawe been concentrating their attacks on "economic targets", British Soldiers and RUC Policemen, fifty of whom hawe been killed this year, compared to last year's figure of thirty one. They have been careful, not Co ha tim or cause death to Innocent civilians. They hawe also developed a highly successful publicfty machine causing international er Tibara 55 ment to the British government. Their endeavours to attract the attention of USA, with 30 million Irish exies and a President CommiLited to human rights, met with Phenomenal succe55, when Lowards the end of låst year, the Washinton Post highlighted the story of 350 prisoners (PROWOS) languishing naked (with only a blanket), in cells papered with their own excreta. It was a cunningly executed publicity stunt which caught the British an thorities Luna'wates. The "increasingly noisy Irish lobby in US", as any irritated Englishman would put it, has also, begun to
make its precence felt. We hear of the US suspending supply of weapons to the Royal Ulster
Constabulary, while Governer Hugh Carey of New York has shown In Eetest in the matter as hawe
also Senator Kenne
Tip O'Nei II.
The IRA's, or
Republicans" bigge
their narrow II;
results in eitist st The only time a championing the Ulster minorities, during the time of Movement in the :
W5 l TLEITEIlL Catholic populat reform within the state, that found Somance in the Sol indirect support o big business inte pressure on the introduce reforts. itself was Non-se Protestants as we it avoided the issu and it was col violence. Two Contributed to th the rapid growth c The post-war free to which, the ball were able to es chay diffidence; and mosphere coming ã cõn Centrated Imw Ea | in the late | 60's, replacing the dustries with new frT5".
The CRM reach Tark wher the Bri suspended the St rn ent in Norther ending more than Liar ist ru|E. T.
of the Storont best summed up by in 5 "Nf Lherr
Study of Decentrali: States" (World Po No 3, Apr|| |975) government could long-range develo It TEta iad Tas tri libérties umlika in of Britain; and ''hothou5 e' atmos traditi torna | hatteds Stormont governme by the power sh; which had the SI London and Dubli business interests, lics and major Unio

: dy and Speaker
Perhaps the st drawback is ass, base which yle of operation. ET 55 TO '' El
Cause of the developed, was the Civil Rights
LLe |960"5, This mainly by of the ion denanding
Northern | Teard sympathetic reJh and had the f the media and rests, who put government to The movement Ctarian, open to II as Catholics; e of reunification mitted to norfactors directly e launching and if the Iowomant: 2ducation, thanks zkwärd Catholi-5 w their customary the liberal atin the wake of ard flow of Capi950's and early "tradtirl in" Outside o Wnod
2d its high water tish go'Wernment Crmont gowernIn Ireland, thus fifty years of le total få i urte government is Norman Furmiss Ireland As Case zation i n Uni Lary litics, Woll xxvii, The Stormont not initiate any met schermes: CLİC 5 0 tiwi|| any other part it furthered a phere in which flourished'. The 2 rit Was Irela : ed 1 til 1 g ExCCLII Liwe, Ipport of both governments, top-rung Cathclists in Northern
Ireland. The new arrangement was described as the greatest attempt ey er to reform the Northern State and was hailed as one that granted far reaching concessious on the question of Irish Unity. These new developments were viewed to be pregnant with great possibilities, but alas, for the Protes an backlash. The bulk of the Protestant people hawe always locked askance at any attempt at reforms, which
Lo them were infringement om Lheir priviliged position, and historically every British inspired attempt at reforms has generated its own gravedigger in the form of violent Protestant backlash. On this occasion when Protestant bigotry lashed
back violently against the civil rights campaign, not merely all attempts at reforms were shelved, but the unprepared Catholics cornmitted to non-violence became the targets of criminal assaults. The British Army was rushed in, to Ilaintain law and order. The British Army has been there ever since, ostensibly as a neutral force, but actually in Support of the Union istis and indulging in acts of counterterrorism against Republican terrorism. The attack on the defer celess Catholic ghettoes and the increasingly Partis an role of the British Army provoked the IRA (now the PROWOS) to re-emerge, convined that their earlier decision (after 1962) to eschew armed politics was a great mistake, The ten years Lihat hawe followed si rice || 969, hawe been a decade of violence, a decade that saw over 2000 kilings and over 20,000 persons suffering injuries, but at the end if it no body seems to be anywhere near any kind of a settlement.
Apart from minor left groupings and dissident sections of the media, who have raised the "Pull out Troops' demand, there is unanimity of views among the major British. Political Parties. The Irish question has never been the opposition's cuidgle to castigate the government
The British bungling of the Irish
question is without parallel, at least from the point of view of the objective results of British
actions, in any other country in the World, grappling with the problem of national minorities, or the "National Question".

Page 24
The
by Bertie Gajameraged ara
he tripartite relationship
between US, USSR and China constitutes one of the major structural aspects of the World balances of forces today. Changes that have been taking place in the World situation in the current decade have been ultimately related to the changing character of the relations between these 3 centres of power. The present character of this relationship, to a considerable degree, has been determined by the new orientation that took place in the global foreign policy strategy of the US still the most dominant single power in the contemporary world.
The basic factor which explains the changing character of the US world policy and thus, its relationship with other major powers particularly the relationships with China and the Soviet Union, is the recognition by the US leadership of the relative decline of US power and influence in the world arena, specifically after Wietnam.
The clue to an understanding of the relations between the Ա8
on the one hand and Peking and Moscow on the other, lie in the way the US approached
the fundamental problem of a global Policy since the late 1960's (about 1968/69).
Henry Kiss inger was the leading
American who attempted to understand the basic problems of the US global policy from a
consistent and articulate point of Yiew, when he served as the SPecial Assistant to Nelson Rock fellor in 1968.
Kissinger clearly ręcognized that the US power has been declining relatively, due to 3 main factors:
I. The advance
towards the
of the status
Sowiet of a st
(The Writer who did his post-graduate 5 rudies da Loirdor dard Sussex Ff'er, Fife is now lecturer in International Ressors er se Peradeniya University).
structure of glo
ranking nuclear by the end threate ned to g of parity wis2. The emerg leading centres o Europe, Japan The traumatic
Wietnan.
Erie
As a result of th Curtistances in the Concluded that thi Пeed to redefine leadership role in The US foreign p. u Pon which tha ich: world Balance of fo to a marked degree sidered as a persisi On the part of ti leadership to pe dOrm i a nt ro Ie : an altered World
Kiss inger as the c of the new US remained within th Problematique of US : He fundamentally
dual foreign policy
Truman had decart 1947. - Namely, c ression' (on the
Communist powers) a "free peoples". Hoy tion to the first
 

bal
power which If the 1950' 5 ve her a Status -wis America. ence of new power - namely ind China. 3. experience of
IW Cir
| world Kissinger
are was the the American the world. tolicy strategy, racter of the rces depended can be corart attempt Te American rpetuate the f America in
Context.
hief strategist oreign policy he traditional foreign policy. accepted the object which.
?ed im March pposing "agpart of the
hd supporting vever, in relapart of the
power
SUPERPOWERS
objective, Kissinger rejected what he called "'un differentiated globalism". That is, the almost automatic tendency obtained in the US foreign policy before 1968, to interwene anywhere in the world against what they thought to be "communist aggression". Instead he suggested the need for the application of US power in a res trained manner, in order to achieve well defined policy objectives.
On the other hand, Kissinger suggested a new approach towards the US relation 5 with the 2. leading communist powers. He said that the stability and order in international relations always depended on the ability of the great powers to establish some from of Lunderstanding among themselves. According to this theoretical proposition Kissinger carine to the conclusion that the US should strive to establish a political understanding or what he called "a conception of international order" with Lhe USSR, particulary in view of the fact that the USSR had an ability to challenge the US anywhere in the world. Kissinger also pointed out very significantly, that the trouble with the American was their inability to think about world politics in a subtle manner, particularly in terms of balance of power. This, in effect amounted Lo a del i berate attempt on the part of Kissinger to reject the predicin Inant tendency in America (i.e. to confront the USSR on the basis of the assumption that there wä5 an Irrecorcilabla conflict between the 2 world power centres), and to replace it by a balance of power policy. This in fact can be considered as the most fundamental Strategic guideline that Kissinger introduced to the practice of American foreign policy.
As far as the USSR is consdered, this implied that the US should now endeavour to establish a global political understanding on the basis of a wide ranging mutual political accomo dation.

Page 25
When China is concerned, this Implied in practice a deliberate attempt on the part of US to exploit the difference between the USSR and China in order to "manage' the US relations with the 2 leading communist power, and definite rejection of the hither to accepted "monolithic character" of the world communist movement. However, largely because of the US involvent in Vietnam, and partly because of the tendencey of SofTie U.S. foreign policy analysists to consider the Sino-Soviet conflict as one centering on some tactical problem of the world communist movement, no attempt whatsoever was made to change the American policy towards China and to accomodate the w|lden ing conflict between the two Communist powers. However, the most fundamental strategic In eaning of America's relations with China in the current decade is the deliberate attempt made by the American leadership to exploit the Sino-Soviet differences for the management of her relations with the two Communist powers.
USSR.
From about the mid-1950's onwards the USSR stood for accomodation with the West, particularly with the US. The down fa || of Khrushchev in 1964 did not result In a noteworthy change in tho policy of "peaceful co-existence' which had been declared in 1956. However, until the end of the 1950's the US did not reciprocate to the USSR initiatives towards the establishment of a general de tente relationship between the East and West. In the meantime, the Western powers proceeded cintly with the Soviet Union to eliminate any possible occurence of a head-on clash between the two sides.
The fact that the US did not endeavour to establish a general detente relationship with the USSR 5 partly due to the inferiority of the Soviet Weapons system, both muclear and conventional vis-a-vis Western military power. There. fore, the Soviet leadership, since the mid 1960's (after Khrushchev's downfall) adopted a policy of developing their weaporis system
to a level whi USSR to achie parity vis-a-vis the USSR de ability to achi, parity and evеп in respect of w Soviet leadershi World policy to E de tente relator political accomo US. This was by 1960's. The Sow following object
(a) Establishm Superpower stat compelling the , this status, (b) T 5 ett emrit om t lem. This meant gf the legitimacy frontiers resultin Sion of the Contini second World e5 tablishmen L of regulated b i ia tera the US.
Accordingly. th Sawet pol a regulated broadened relati USA and the Wes Problems tha S Confronted 5İnce or Wards was tha their domestic ecc. based on heavy
view to fulfilling e: devoting major ; increased producti COn SLIT er dråb point of view of of Soviet defence significace of this for economic rec the Soviet leaders only possible way t agriculture and sig to reduce defence bringing an end
arrills race with the W15 Cra of Fle of Soviet world Pol of the 1970's,
The general dete USSR was in the fir to bring an end confrontation wit seems that the S. like their wester had been firmly need to regulate relationships on t mutual recognition

ch enabled the :W2 al Statu 5 of the US. Once monstrated this eWe a status of Slirpass the US eapons, then the P oriented their establish a general 15 hip or a broad dation with the y the end of the et Policy had the W5.
Lent of Soylet us globally and west to recognise to effect a general e European probthe establishment of the European g from the di wi2nt following the War. (c) The SoThe form of | relationship with
Ie main thrust of icy was to evolwo 1 arma lized and orship with the . Cne of the Chief oviet leadership the mid 1960's t of reorienting nomy, which was industry, with a ɔn Sumer needs by Et2 til to the om and supply of , From the the formulation policy, the main imperative cod Tİstation, ya 5 1 i P belief that tha 0 develop Soviet ht Industry was exponditure by to the strategic US. This then key motivations icy in the decade
inte policy of the st place intended
to the acute h the US. |ը viet leadership, ni Counterparts, or Wilced of the
their bilatera he basis of the of the status
F r One Can argue that this objective was ever present in Sowet world policy since
quo in the West.
the cernd of World War II. " What differs in the current decade however is that the USSR,
unlike in the past, is capable of bringing direct pressure to bear on the Western powers, due largely to her nuclear Weap Ons sy 5 terms and to the phenemonal augmentation of her conventional forces in the eastern half of Europe.
There is another objective of this policy, namely the challenges posed by the Chinese to the Soviet Union in the East. That is so say, since the mid 1960's the immediate attention of the Soviet world policy
had to be devoted to confront problems emanating from two strategic theatres which were in Lima tely connected with the
security of the USSR namely the East and West.
One of the problems which arises in respect of the general Soviet foreign policy strategy in the West is the problem concerning Sowiet objectives in Western Europe. There is no doubt that the Soviet Union has endeavoured and continues to endeavour to establish the legitimacy of the Eastern European borders and to increa 5 e the Sowet trada and technological contacts with Europe through the establish ment of i a general detente relationship with the US and the western European
ΕΕ

Page 26
powers, having accepted that the Western European powers thernselves had taken actions to broaden this economic relationship with the Sowiet Union and har Eastern European allies.
The most noteworthy example of this 'mending" of Western reiations with the East was the policy of Ostpolitik' followed by Willy Brandt. The Western European leaders have expressed a great deal of anxiety to the effect that the Soviet Union would attempt to cause a breakup in the strategic relations between Europe and America with a view to bring Western Europe, the strategically and otherwise most Important region in the world. Into the Soviet orbit ("Finlandization of Europe). This means that the position western Europe is going to occupy in the Soviet world foreign policy strategy remains one of the ke problems in the world balance of forces today.
During the 1960's Khrushchev, in order to establish worldwide acco modation with the West, didn't want to confront the west in the periphery. (Example, Wietnam-when in 1962 Khrushchew proposed a negotiated settlement. During this period the USSR did not want to provide military assistance to the DRVNLF).
After Krushchev however, the new Soviet leadership adopted a Policy of providing material support to countries and movements fighting the West while continuing to avoid the risk of a direct conflict with the USA For instance, the USSR extended Support to North Wietnam but only in the firm of military supplies and similarly when the war broke out in the Middle East in June '67, and again in October 1973, the Soviet and American leaderships consulted each other with a view to avoiding a direct clash. This Policy of exploiting localized issues without risking a direct clash with the West, has been pursued by the Soviet Union in the current decade. This has led to a Soviet presence in areas of theggbe which were traditionally considered to be Western spheres of special interest and has res. ted in the increasing influence of the SSR in the word today.
 
 
 
 

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Page 27
End of the lon,
by Upali Cooray
99 is once the capitalist draws to a
he spectre of
aEain haunting World. As 979 close we are witnessing the Un folding of the most serious crisis the international capitalist system has experienced since 1929. The frenzied scramble for metallic currencies in September and October 1979 which pushed the price of gold as high as S. 437 an ounce indicates not only the de e p-going crisis of the intornati cornal monetary system but also the widespread uncertainties about the scope and extent of the e:C 10 Thic: Te Ce550m that is m, Cwrw setting in. This is the third recession world capitalism has experienced with in the short space of a decade.
The 70's would undoubtedly go down in history as the decade of monetary criscs and recessions;
as the decade which marked the end of the long economic boom, the era of full employ
ment and rising living standards; the decade in which the sleeping giant of the Imperialist countries, its working class, began to wake
up from its long slumber and ffiex its muscles. 量
But above all the 7th decade
of the 20th Century will be remembered as the decade which shattered the myth that capitalism would no longer experience cyclical crisis, that with a little help from John Maynard Keynes, capitalism has now mastered the art of main ta inlng a crisis— free .yחחסחסe C
Synchronisation of economic Crises,
During the long wave of expansion which advanced capitalist countries experienced for nearly
25 years after the 2nd world War, there were no long-lasting Tie a: Isor, I graduate in
ecolonics from Lodoi Liiversity Trd a Barris Ier-a a 1, is a Polirrey Premier of the RevoluTio via ty Marxis"! " party.
COTOTİC CITISES. | economic growth did not threater
LI TE 5 0 0 ward spiral. Fo West German te -67 occurred at Britain, France, were experiencing enabled We 5 : GE the worst effects sión by ar expor at these markets, during the long Crisis of diffect not synchronized.
Begin ning with 1 the tendency ha: nomic downturm all or a signific of Capitalist co Lu|| simultaneously. international rec occurred in 197C the Advanced CaI except West Gerr a short lived "sp. In 97-3 tele imperialist countr -long into the ressio sire them more qof haye Succeeded selves out of the
exce 55 capacity, profits, slowing ments, inflation
Thus the first after the 74-75
followed by a
UNEMPLO)YME
LISA IT
197S 8,2 I MAY
978 5.9 (CTOBER
* IIIէլեյ

g boom
Periods of slower i r1 One Country Eco dra w other dari geraus downr ii rmstance the :CC 55fc1 - Cf || 9Éč a time wher Japan and Italy economic growth armany to avoid of the recesit drive directed In other words bocm, 8 Coromic COLI I tri: We re
the W0's however, ; beri for coand rocession in at number of
Lri: L. ..."
TIL 12 first it חWhite חסE55i |-W | iyolod all
3 italist countries many. And after eculatiwe boo T'' cororics of the es plunged head first generalized 99-33. Sirice these countries in pulling themWicious circle of fa || ing rates of down of in westand recession.
growth in 1977. Although there was a slight recovery in 1978 the symptoms of yet another and more pronounced recession began to appear in some countries
already in 1979.
This deterioration of the international capitalist economy is not caused by "bloody-minded" trade unionists. They are seeking, and not always successfully to ensure that wages do not fall too far behind Prices which are continuously rising. Nor is it the result of the monetary crises. The economic crisis preceded the monetary crisis and in part accelarated its outbreak. No is it caused by Oil Sheiks who are
trying to make sure that their real incomes do not fall due to the inflation in imperialist coun
"ES,
The causes of the present economic crisis are more Profound. The slacking of technological
innovation, excess capacity in key sectors of the economy such as steel, automobiles, petrochemical, synthetic textiles, naval construction and ellectronic5 , and the consequent decline in investments, the growing gap between the capacity of production and buying power, compounded by mountains of indebtedness (families as well
as companies). In Marxist teryear of boom minology it is a periodic crisis recession was capitalism inevitably experiences slow-down in as a result of the growth of
TABLE I
NT IN IMPERIALIST COUNTRIES (IN MILLIONS)
L
BRITAN APAN FRANCE WEST
OTHER (GERMLANY IMPERIALIST COUNTRIES
O. .1 2.4
1. 1. 4."
des AUSTRALIA ? CANADA, NEW ZEALAND)
& BENEFIX COUNTRIES.
5
ECONOMICS

Page 28
Organic composition of capital and the falling rate of profit.
The synchronization of economic Crisis itself is mot an accidental feature. It is the result of economic transformations that occurred in the preceding period of capitalist growth and expansion. Primarily it is due to greater and greater internationalization of production accompanied by increased division of labour among all imperialist countries. This Internationalism of production has occurred through further international concentration of capital-the
rise of multinational firms. These multi-nationals Which Produco surplus value in a number of Countries simultaneously are less amenable to the anti-cyclical measures applied by T1 åttior states.
Rising Unemployment
The re-appearance of unemployment in advanced capitalist countries in the 70's is one important indicator of the deep going character of the present crisis of international capitalism. The era of over-full employment or even full employment is a thing of the past. Unemployment in the imperialist countries which stood
at 10 milion during the recession of 1970-7 rose to 5 million in 1974-75. By the end
of 1978 a period which is officially referred to as the "upturn", registered unemployed had risen to 17 million. Since this figure under-represents the real number of unemployed persons, the actual total of unemployed is now probably more then 20 million.
When the gets
CCT ing recession underway the number of
persons officiall: Lunemployed wo Ti illion and the : exceed 25 milia
Rising un emplo with the austeri arte now being governments of ist Countres II inflation, resultin of real incomes er 05 il of jy i reduction in power. This ir effect of lengthe of the recession.
Inflation to s II
After the gre; the 1930's thig tries sought to a down turns by re sian techniques oo
Since the 70's s Luch inflationary Which in the fi.
after the World to modify the el recessions, has economic growth productilon. Duri international Ca has passed from tion stimulating to stagflation in slumpflation in inflation and prl no W persisting of ou tright red L. tive activity and Linemployment.
The staggering that is obserwab ialist countries | of oil price Cour tries, but more than 3 d
TABLE II
DEBT IN THE UNITED STATES
(Gro 55 National Product
1 20.5
1 Կ5[] 교의. 955 398.
Iէlէ[]) OSO
95 8 .
199 92.1 1974 1,335.()
(In thnusAnd
Public Debt
고
호(g.
3.
3.
8.
Ճին.[]]
26

y registered as uld exceed 20 actual total would
yment combined cy measures that applied by the advanced capital
order to curb g in a reduction
of the masses, g standards and heir purchasing turn has the ning the duration
umpflation
at depression in imperialist coun.void deep cyclical 5or tirng to Keynf deficit financing. the creation of buying power, rst two decades War II helped fects of economic failed to te wiwe 1 and industrial ng the 70's the bitalist economy permanent inflaeconomic upswing O-W and to 1974-75; that is CE2 il TES CS 3 " during a period iction in producof increases in
räte 5 of i flatic e in the imperis not the result likes by OPEC the product of ecades of infla
million dollars)
Private Deht
53.4
ΕΕΕ
3)고.
56f.1
87፲፱, 4
1,247. 2,000)
tionary economic policies by these nations. The massive funds spent on military expenditure(the permanent arms economy) which in 1975 alone accounted for S250 thousand million is one cause. No imperialist government is perpared to reduce the wast amount of funds squandered on military expenditure. But the main cause of inflation un doubtedly is the massive growth of Credit in the private sector-that is bank loans and paper money that financed the economic boom. The imperialist economics 'sai ed
towards expansion on a sea of debts whose cumulative effects necessirily accelerated inflation".
Thus, since the beginning of 1977 the volume of credit in U. S. has risen at annual rate of 4%. In the last quarter of 1978 consumer product rose by 26% mortgages by 24%, and
loans by 22%. However production in 1978 increased by 5.5%
YwFile the wolu The of Tetail sale 5 rose only by 1.5%. Thus an increase in the wolu The of Teta II
sales by 1.5%, required an increase in the volume of credit by |4%, to 20%.
If the flow of credit is se werely controlled or stopped there would be massive overproduction and a ca tastrophic rise in unemployment. This in fact is the dilemma of the ruling classes of imperialist countries. If they try to control inflation by checking off credit and pruning government expenditure, they may plunge headlong into a recession, the depth and the extent of which they cannot predict. If they allow the economy to steam ahead or even rol along, inflation will get stronger and it may become eve mor difficut to Contro
Disintegration of the international monetary system.
The Bretton-Woods agreement in 1944 sought to escape from the di lemma that has Confronted the capitalist economy since World War II: that is either maintainence of Gold standard with more and more catastrohpic crises of overproduction or a bandon ment of the Gold standard and a return towards economic nationalism.

Page 29
protectionism etc. which would be equally disastrous for the international capitalist system. The SHARE solution consisted of basing capit- TOTAL WO alist currencies both on gold and - - - on the dollar, maintaining stable rates of exchange and establishing rules tolerating a degree of 1958 III. I inflation, above all when a crisis
USA
of over-production was impending. 1970 18.5 The priče of goid was fixed åt 1972 16.1 S35 an ounce, 197 17, 고
So long as inflation was mode. '" ד. דן rate and the dollar lost its 1977 purchasing power at a slower 1973. 3rd I,
rate than the currencies of other QLIr Leer Importart il 1 perialist Couri tries, "ா - ட
the systern functioned Sa tisfactorfiy, Tencies, when
as far as the imperialist countries of dollars ex were concerned. No one com- prăpartial tă Plained about the U. S. balance inishing stock of payment deficit then, because U. S. the Bret without such a deficit the Bretton brok C down. I
Woods system could not have Nixon officially functioned. The moment the relationship be inflation of the dollar became gold. The Do I greater than that of other cur- Wertible in ter
OVER A CEN
The GFH has
a R.S. 8,000,000 FURTHER - IM Scheme, which
improve the en SOUTH WING, bathrooms, new conditioners, ne old-styled roofil The North Win
CO operatie beau
s
without a break
YESTERDAY." & TOMORROW
TODA
GALLE FACE HOTEL INTERNATIC
LIPNIH ), SRI L ','; EYLN
 

TABLE
III
OF MAIN IMPERIALIST COUNTRIES (%) in LD EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS
WEST GERMANY
19.4
S
Հt 1,2
2.7
20.5
2Ա,7
Iህ.8
he world's holding am ded out of ail the rapidly dimof gold held by on Woods system in August 15, 1971 un hinged the fixed
tween dollar and a becarne in Conis of Gold, Since
FRANCE U.K. ITALY .JAPAN
8. I.G 7.3 1.5 ETT 1.8 7.2 7 J. 1. ". 3. 3.3 8.8 1.7 1. J." 墨.8 7.1 ld. 0.9 !). 7, 15.1 1. 15.8 7.2 باليا
then the price of an ounce of gold has jumped from $ 35 to S530.
The international monetary system remains in crisis. On the one hand the capitalist central banks have no reliable substitute for the dollar as a reservo currency. Since Nixon unhinged (Corrinued of Page)
NTURY OF SERVICE WITH A SMILE
commenced
.00
| PRCWEMENT
will
tite
with new
air.
W
ng etc. g continues
tifully
S CHARM
S COMFORT
Y
ONAL BUT
Estd.
S NOT the NEWEST NOT the BGGEST NOT the TALEST
But it's the Best
Say the Guests AND THE BEST" S GETTING BETTER
864
NATIONAL
27

Page 30
8
Conjunctions and
communalism
nly connect," wrote the ΟΕ εί. E. F. Førster, Summing up his liberal , philosophy of bringing together those separated by prejudices and animosities. And, of course, the grammatical function of a conju fiction Is to Connect. But a grammatical exercise on conjunctions can nevertheless be a vehicle for reinforcing communal prejudices, as is evident from a test paper in English language set to O-Level students in a big Colombo school recently. One question in it asked candidatos to pick the correct conjunctions to link the clauses and sentences in a passage. If students made the right choice of conjunc
tions, this is how the passage would hawe read:
"When you go to Jaffna for the first time you feel as though you have gone to a completely different country. Every thing
there is sc different from curs. So for a moment you feel a Stranger in your own country. After some time you get accLStomed to it. But unless you know their language you cannot be comfortable there."
April days
R. D. Laing, the rebel against the psychiatric establishment, spent seyeral months in Sri Lankı İn 1971, studying Buddhist medication. One experience from his sojourn is preserved in a conversation with his small son A da TN recorded in his book Convert Sations with Children. Headed "Ceylon-April 1971" the dialogue cреп5:
"Adam (on hearing of fighting,
shooting and killing in Kandy, |4 miles away) I want to go to Kandy and kill people and cut
them up and eat thern for breakfast with a big steel gun and a stiff trigger."
Silik worms and sin
There was another wis i tot in Sri Lanka in the April days whose
the current cort ther a dhartist fo5ter" 5 ilk'Wort Th
W-Td5 WBFC
Wi 5 tcr W315 R2 T1 € French agronomi: | Sri Lank 35 the Go'y TTT TIL before the April Ploded. Dumont by the slaughte that he became ators of the Ce which appealed of human rights
his book P. Abois Chont TI eart || 3 wis it to : suggested that t be developed : diversifying the ri was told that thi In a Buddhist involved boiling their cocoons. Du Tont add 5 a (translated) read:
"Hic Wawr it mok Who kille Bam da ramaike; an speak of the blo 97. Mrs. B: certainly decide account any more
The Sri Larka book (published an acknowledgem Bardaliralnai ke for
LSG Stär C2,
Problem Corne
You are give coins, each cont Al coiris b gar
but in one bag
which) all the c feit. A genuine gra Times, and å mine, You are
scale, which we e. Hוחe Eramחס out, in One and ing, which b; counterfeit coins
 

alled to me by rowersy on whea society should breeding. This
Dumont, the it, who arrived an a dw i ser to only a few days islatil eX was so shocked r and tortures one of the fitiylon Committee for the defence in this country.
ay sanneries aux ecalls that om an Sri Lanka he had he silk industry Is a mea is of ural economy, but 5 was impossible country since it
Silkworms | At this point footnote, which
was a Buddhist H PTiT i MiGr |d We shal soon body repression of Lindaran aike has d not to take of this prejudice."
seçtion of the in 1972) carries et to Chami drikā !am t חסatiוחיוםfחi
r
in ten bags of a ining ten cair 15. the sam2 value, (you aren't told | 5. El T2 ) LTD"- Coin Weighs tem counterfeit coin given a pointer ghs in un Its of ow will you find only one weighag Contains the
IVITI
COMPLIMENTS OF
DISTRIBUTORS
OF
CITIZEN
WRIST WATCHES
& CLOCKS

Page 31
The NSSP and the
Democratic solution to the na ticinal question in any Satisfactory form cannot be achieved within the capitalist framework. All capitalist leaderships have grown beyond the age of radical solution. None of them are really independent of the neo-colonia forces. Imperialist integration of the capitalist international order ha 5 made a real solution within the capitalist system impossible.
Still, the national que 5 tion is one of the democratic questions for which imperialists themselves
have been trying to give halfsolutions. In recent times. The creation of Bangla Desh is one
good example. Many developments on the African continent can be given as examples. In particular the present imperialist policy is to appraise national minorities, as counter to revolutionary influences.
In Sri Lanka (Eelam?) the national question in relation to Tamil speaking people has been aggravated to the degree where Tamils have reached the point of demand
ing separation. However, their bourgeois leadership hawe been putting forward concrete propo
sals for a un i tary state in the past. Banda-Chelva pact in 1958 and Dudley-Chelva pact in 1966 are the two specific instances where these proposals were considered
seriously by the two capitalist parties based on the Sinhala
a SSS. Though separation is posed seriously by the militants, the TULF leadership, even today, is
prepared to discuss a compromise solution and such a solution seems to have a popular appeal. Even after so much of violence and rivalry, this attitude of the Tamil bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie is due to the very complex distri
bution of the Tamil speaking people,
(The author, a ccturer in
Engineering at thic Peradeniya University, is general secretary of the N. S S. P. - Nawa Sama Samaja Pakshaya.)
In relation ou 5 me55, Tamil s be grouped in
(a) Tamils of section in the In land, com Tng dustry, possess a ress. Here the this ha 5 lately o' differences and e
(b) Esrata wo and mid country ted by the est Unions. They are, conscious of the hence tied to T Even the most rig Thonda man has separate deal wit continu ing with
(c) Tamil merch and workers distr the southorn Citi in Colombo. Thi connections with above categories, interest is in th they live. These Lirban in outlook for a unitary sol
(d) Tamil sp (peasants and fish east and north lately they were d towards the TUL the northern T leadership.
In this context sol Li tion to this por terms, will be,
(a) Al discrimi tion, employment tion must end.
(b) A dem. administration of eastern province ower local adminis | tion and land usa established.
(c) The rights the Tamil people their transaction in their language

lational Question
national consciking people can four categories:
he north and a st with Interest e, and small in|tional consciousreponderance of rshadowed astē in class struggle.
:ers of upcountry ho are represente sector Trade though backward. lass interest and J's very strongly, 1 twing TU, leader norte interegt in a the UNP than :he TUL F.
ants, professionals ibuted in most of 2s, predominently sy have roots and either of the but their main e area in which armi, arc nostly and arc e ager to 1.
2aking Muslims irmen) mostly in
west. Though awn increasingly , they distrust umil upperclass
the democratic blem in Concrete
ation in educaand land al loca
*atic regional 2 northern and with powers tion, colonisaetc, must be
id facilite 5 fort carry out all with the state st be assured.
by Wilckramabahu Karu na ratne
(d) A proper share of the national product must be attached for the development of the northern and eastern provincias.
(e) The right of self determination (le, right of secession) must be inscribed in the constitution and full citizenship should be given to all those who consider this as their motherland,
Working class and left organisations, while fighting for the above program, are duty bound to defend (with criticism) all reforms and concessions given by the bourgeois governments. In this aspect failure of the left: mpya ment in 1353 and 96% is evident. Though the stand taken by the Sanasamaja party in 958 was heroic, it also did not corne out clearly in defence of the concessions included in tha BandaChelva pact.
Today JR's government, in order to achieve stability and integration of the internal smarket, is being pressurised by international finance capital to give certain concess lons to the Tamil speaking people. The government while propico5 ing coorparation with the TULF leadership, is busy liquidating the militants ir the Tamil liberation mo we ment. (Tigers etc.). By this the government is seeking to rope in the TULF to work within the limits of constitutional Bonapartism.
Concessions under discussion fall Înto the following categories; (i) University entrance (standardisation), (ii) Employment, (iii) Land and colonization. (iv) Use of the Tamil language, (v) Citizenship rights and other constitutional guaran tees,
Already elimination of mediawise standardization, percentage al location of jobs and district councils hawe been proposed.
ln tense opposition from Sinhala chauvinists can be expected even for these meagre concessions. Already a powerful lobby is pressing for mediawise standardisation and forced colonization. Not only
29

Page 32
30
"Mathru Bhumi" but also the so called progressive intellectuals such as Dr. Colwin Guimara trig hawc ico i The forward to oppose concessions. It Is clear tht government will try to balance Eigtween TULF and these forces, in the mean time Tamil middle classes will be Waiting anxiously for the outcome.
Any talk on the defence of the right of self determination or even rights of Tamils in general has no
mean ing what Soewer unless we come out in defense of these meagre concessions (however
bankrupt they are!) against Sinhala chauvinists. It is by carrying Out the fight against the repression by the bcn apartist state in the north and east and by critical defense of the concessions, that the correct orientation on the national question can be brought into the working C|355 and II 1355 (CW 6. Met.
Naturally what is most important is to take these issues into the working class mainly through the JCTUAC. Working class is now mowing in to action on issues, general in nature. The above demands of the Tam is should be incor pra ted. In addition: the TU mowe Ternt should be mina de a ware of the dangers of chauvinism. It is by taking these issues into the TUJ mowerT ernt and South Con ma55e5 in general that it will be Pos 5 ibile to win the Tamil redical masses from the blind alley of nationalism and isolated terrorism.
Considering the importance of the national question in the field of higher education and in relation to employment, it is necessary to campaign on these issues in the universities, lin the Se campaigns Paigns several mythis should be exploded. (I) Myth of Tamils being a privilleged group in education. employment and property ownership (ii) myth of historical animosity between
Tam Is and Sinha given in the po myth of South to liquidate Sinh: of preparation C race war in Jaffn: of Sinhalese in
End of . . .
( Солтігінғі! -
dallar from ga estimated that exchange reserv actually risen f B1%. An currency national a list On
e Country | the other tet weakness which reflect t petitiveness of , i grm in the Wor inflation in U.
TOT 3 Tl) circulating in th outside USA Convulsion5 like 978 which th the entire ba in solvency,
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"rör Page 7)
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Page 33
Race, class
YCHAMINI DEWANIMINCA TLS not associate me with positions I don't hold and then describe them as 'na iwe". Hawing Surin marised some of my argument5 regarding Buddhism and radicalism, he goes on to say : "But, of course some so-called Marxists confidently expect that the hold of Buddhism on Sri Lanka will dissolve into thin air when the cap Italist contradictions duly mature. If he intends to attribute these wiews to me, 1 must say that | am tro consciou 5 of the immen - se ideological weight exerted by organised religion a5 a buttre55 of the established social order to believe that it will so easily "dissolve into thin air". Still less do hold that "the trade unions (!) will then usher in the new era."
What is really at issue between us is the characterisation of the Sinhala-Buddhist te yiwal which includes such figures as Anagarika Dharr Thapala and S. Mahin da Thero. While conceding that "there are Certa in spurious and un fortunate features of this movement such as chauvinism and racial intolorance, " Yohan Ceyvanları da" firm ds in it "genuine radical elements,' and believes that the one is separable from the other.
I suggest that, on the contrary, the meaning of the co-existence
of "chauvinist' and "radical" elements in the ideology of these figures is that they believed
the T1 5921 w es to be the spokesmen for the oppressed of one race. | contend that in taking this stand, they helped to preserve the funda riigi tal bases of the class structure by strengthening the consciousness of race against class, and by helping to lay the ideological foundations for the oppression of one race by another. It is no accident, surely, that in the racialist campaigns of recent months. Sinhala chauwnists have put up posters with the head of Anagarika Dharma
and revi
pala and his sc the preservation
My second q Yohan Dewanand the word "liber; "Prime Siddhar need for se ekin ration for the op came the wilder and the awakeni of liberation."
Was it the "I oppressed" or th San Sara that BLI Cernd with Buddhism offered āti ir c be tested agains of Buddhism, Sigala-vada Sutt ment... Trg Wor... Li Buddha offers a mary, from which graph:
A good master is one who may
Marx,
Touchs tona's "X Thorltation doc5 basic point | rai Egla 1 ard Marxi Tai self-dato Marxists, and M. Self-deter Th | natior Put it |r) ängth B had not written had been no i. Karl Marx, could hawe writte self-determination challenged by tw. who not only cle ists but argue th tion of the Ma wrong. Hence Surely this is ele
In "State an for example, Le correct Marxist state as against regarded as rewi In doing So, ha qi froT1 klarx and

valism
gans calling for of 'Sinhaa-ness".
| 25tion Cote Tr5 's loose use of tion". He writes: a realised the g a way of liberessed. . . . Then ness experience
1g to the path
| beration of the e liberation from dism was ConThe claim that "a way of libeoppressed" must : the social ethic for which the a is the key docung's Palican, The C0 ľ1W.: T1 IB. Tit SLIPT1|- quote one para
(i. e. employer) be reli ed upom
CoRRESPONDENCE
to show consideration towards his employees by allotting each one work suited to his capacity, by supplying them with good food
and pay, by providing care for them when they are sick, by sharing with them any unusual
delicacies which he receives, and by granting them regular time off from work. In return, employees or servants should show their affection for their naster by being out of bed betimes and not going to bed until he has done so, by baling contented with the fair treatment they receive, by doing their work cheerfully and thoroughly, and by speaking well of their master to others."
The social ethic reflected in this teaching is hardly "radical"; it is paternalistic - one that is designed to soften the contradictions of a class society but not to eliTinate them,
- Reggle Siriwardena.
Lenin and scripture
K" and "Y" argu - not met the sed. I wrote on sm, the right of TF || 7 til and COT on Eelam cor I per se. To r way, if Parx a word or there ndiwidual nā mod r anybody else :n on Ee | am and But I was o correspondents lim to be Marxat my presentarxist position is he quotations. mentary?
d Revolution', in set out the theory of the those whom ha sionist falsifiers. Ioted extensively Engels. Zinc, yiew
and Kamenev, among others, tel
us that when Lenin was hiding in the Gulf of Finland, his constant companion was a blue
notebook where he had gathered and carefully noted down under different headings, quotations from Marx and Engels. And this was on the ewe of the first proletarian revolution in world history. One presumes that Lenin not only knew 'the goals of socialist revolution' (Touchstone) but also how best to ach iewe the Tı.
Much earlier, Lenin made extensive use of quotations from Engels to Combat the arguments
of the “1ach ist school of philasophy, (Materialism and Empirio -criticism).
In debating therefore the correct Marxist position on most
topics, Lenin for one, failed to adopt Touchstone's recommended methodology. In fact, the
3.


Page 34
inum erable theoretical that Lenin entered
other Marxists did resenbla "the theological Eattles between riwal sects of Christians about
of them represents the Chr.""
Polemics into with
which Trug
This Samme wie w of the ince 55 at debate within the Marxist rowe
ment as tire som and 5 terile hair splitting is shared by liberal bourgeois commentators who did not understand, as Lenin did, the need for absolute clarity on questions of theory. Leninism, Bolshevism, in that sense was a product
of such debates, among emigre circles. In a rare display of his own feelings, Lenin wrote to
nessa Armand "Such is my fato. One battle after another against political Stupidity, wulgarity, opportunism etc. It has been that way since 1893".
The great debate in the Bolshevik party after Lenin's death on the Leninist nature or oth erwiss of certain courses of policy were fought on what ona might ca| th a torrain of Leninism, with a|| Comba tants making frequent use of quotations from Lenin. (Stalin "On Opposition").
Another major debate, the SinoSoviet polemics of the 1960's Involving the leading theoreticians of both sides, was in part a "quotation war'.
And speaking of quotations, I confess I know my Lenin much better than my Heine, "Theory is gray my friend; the tree of |ife is ewer green". To Luchstono throws at me this quote from Heine as used by Lenin. If only Touchstone keeps in touch with Lenin's writings, for instance Lenin's first "Letter on Tactics', he would hawe known from the footnotes
that this 'quote' is a line of Mephistopheles in Goethe's
Faust".
— CHINTAKA.
3.
internatio
(Carlfred r
We Haya fir age where Coloni ca | form ha 5 ca. of settler-colo minority of S: LI land which they native land, ho ап d есопогпіс р ing the wast. Ino elementary hum
alone political Independence. F form part of
ideology which mises the State
In Israel, this the forced e wi three rillion F their Florillard, Israel in its p fred āti st doctrine; So other grid of the also fids Sancti called apartheid mara official U (this exclude gra agencies) than : Militarily it is a most powerful i is the Arab Africa y Flich H: i Yster" | 5 ba 5 tion (tha m black Africa) wi duty of guardin A,tI3r ti and
eastward. Israel hawe close f Zionist) links.
WНап Ian Sm Cocked 3 snook ta in did (or Frustrated, Zinn IST in a conti
being steadily : to seek other mE of as Serting its fulfilling the cot for freedom.
In the past di has often opened Struggle. At th battle limes are another line as line of differen various types of "n: between say th

na trends
J7 Page 73)
StarC2 is ir ialism in its classiSed, tha problem nists; a white :ler"g governing
claim is their lding all political ower, a r1 d de nyn-white majority iän rights, leave
fred. Ti ård ace (and religion)
the gow: ttning sustains and legiti
has also led to ction of nearly Palestinia, for
The state of iresent forren, 5 st and expansionLuth Africa, at the demarcated area, om in a doctring |5rael rece Ives S aid per capita ntes from Zionist any other country, lJS ba5tion, the an area which | eartland. South is huge western also a military ost powerful in ith the declara d g the Southern vita | S 2 A-lans and South Africa in ancial (mainly
|lth, with UDI, at Londo, Brcould do) little. babwean nationalent which was e-colonized, had !ars of expression, dignity and the |1||1:յI1 aspiration
2 cade this choice the path to armed s point, when the
! being drawn, appears - the tiation between
tionalist' leaders, e Mugabes and
Nkomos on the one hand, and the Bishop Muzore was and the Revd Sitholes, "black nationalists" in the eyes of the Western world. (Heika has now reported that the good Bishop received sa yeral instalments f 200,000 dollars from the Shah | ) In 72 mother era, independence struggles saw the nationalist pitted against a single, casily recognisable foe, the colonial power. In the post-Colonial age, and in a more CoTı polex world Ww H &rte dofTi estic and external interests are closely irn ter wowem the independence (armed) struggle produces a different pattern of conflicts multiple and diverse,
The OAU, the non aligned and the UN recognise half a dozen liberation fronts. Who supports the Th Who arms their en emies At the 6th surn in it, Jamaica's Prime Minister Michael Manley took up what he said was a Constant criticism gweed at the non-aligned activists by the West. Why do these non aligned nations "lean' towards the socialist bloc while un reservedly attcking the West? Shouldn't "genuine non alignment" mean some sort of neutrality or equi-distance between the blocs? Manley's challenging answer nakes a point of wider import. Support for national || II beration struggles is a fundamental principle of the non aligned movement from its genesis. If only the West were to support these liberation movements, he said, it would be a matter of enormous satisfaction to
everybody. But do they?
Take Polisario. Who helps King Hassan? France, Israel, the US Jordan (at one time) and now Egypt which in Curn receives Chinese arms. Who supports Polisario? Libya, Algeria and the socialist countries, in the main.
The line-up not only reflects the broad alignment of forces at the in Larnational level but also demonstrates how the character of con temporary politics imposes global involvements on a particular conflict even when it is physically confined to a country or area.
Next: and US power
Kissinger


Page 35
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