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The Nadesan case
Co-operation among
small nations
Godfrey Gunatieke
Which way for the left 2
K. P. Siva
Sino-US relations
Harry Harding
Suicide notes B Jayantha Somasunderam
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Economic Front
The LINP war. Ang Inadya and It w III probably win the argurimer t. With the TULF over Potty but the despatches from the ecoraría front are far from cheerful, Ever the "Sunday Observer' which led with the Story on bearer bonds spoke of'galloping inflation". Arnd fri the Wat room Where the miristers rect each week, the temperature of the ongoing discus5 for is often as uncomfortable to Sorre Tieribers as the feat outside to the Ordinary citizen. Crice specific items are discussed and decisions taker, the debate gets hot and sharp over soaring prices, public experdit Lure, and gaping defici IS.
imported inflation
Weteran Politiciaris II ke President JR, Seasoned in the hard school of the parliamentary oppositiori, are Shrewd enough to know that It is the UNP's performance or this front (fiving costs jobs) which will prove decisive in 1983/4.
The Central Bank, an institution rI ever given to pessimism, at Jeast in print, has reported that inflation in 1979 was 20%, compared to 15% in 1978. The most popular estimate for | 980 is 30%.
Propaganda argues that much of this is imported inflation. (Did that OPEC petition gut la 5 t in the post II ke Prof. A. J. Wisson's copy of the "devolution report".) As the UNP knows only too wes', propaganda is no final answer. When the J. F. Wailed about the "world market', the UNP Sineer Cid drid romped fore in a Eulick cart.
DiemTā
M5 the UMP approaches the midway III grk in its six year term |t faces a basic dilemma. It a bandoned the old "'s eige e coromy'-(state-regulated and inwardlooking) Card put its faith in ciri "opera economy". But op en tio Whigt? By strengthen ing our links * ti ti 5-dīn Ēd ir economy it hoped to develop the COLI'm try Card increase o Lur economic
Independence. 7 (1150 rt1eant deepe defice om a cris economy, partic badly hit by
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The ореп есо d I'll the exte exposing at E ESSET tř7 wurder af
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Big business ahead of gover Sewart || 5 trij de 5 bureaucracy an fills the ELs thing but prais : ecarority but started to grunt Cornplants cert rg] té: and the ti Črčdľť. Argther Virtual bar om guard intees to f Wıldt he ducs ii r public b J t II: Efe: Petal is t. pectation that foreign exchang I tradL ed 50o people think. I cion is well-fou to ask whether Cr: Lup to Old ing in voices etc (Úa,7ľÍrIľ Frť
GÜAR
Wol. 3 No. 3 June
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Letters News backgre The 'lă desar
Foreign news

his strategy has nfrig our depenis-ridden global Lilarly the US,
r::55ian. The extile quotas Was | g.
it my is oper tg rnal բrassures, very ԱԼII" pility.
;ain
ls often one Step timent policy and (Way from the d its rules." In og 5rier fløj 5 fag: for the open ecently he has Je. His current "é (3) tfie barik Thanced cost of grievs race is the aca Banks giving oreign creditors. rt task about 5. We’ll kri o Wyn i'n fie corn Tign exTČ5ťť i o 15 0 2 may be re7 Eir than some 5 Left a suspiinded, it is time the big boys tricks i.e., odd? I ri sfort, tfie
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Population programmes
| don't wish to take issue with Mr. Caspersz's fairly oldfashio red wice wys com the relation - ship between population and development (Guardian-May 1), except to point out that some of the most socially advanced Countrics of the third world (for instance China and Cuba, as well as Sri Lanka) also hawe the most compte hensive Populatiori progrå mThes. Sciclăl change has Indeed occurred or a wist scale in any of these countries, yet population policies-usually aimed at slower growth are Sti|| || Teeded.
I should correct one or two points of fict in Mr. Caspersz'
article, however, THE UN FFA Population Needs Mission to which he refers wisited Sri
Lanka at the request of the Government and its membership was approved in advance by all concerned. Their recoredations concerning contraceptives and sterilization (which formed a small part of the whole) were inade in response to two facts which any observer of the Sri Lankan scene w|| confirm-first
Assam
Which way for the Left? 3
Small nations &
Co-operation 6
Nicaragua 9 TULF and Devolution
Suicide rotes 2É
Pritci by Araldi Fr:35 825, Wolfendhal Street, Culing .
Telephone: 35975

Page 4
that there is a strong demand among the people the ITselves in all parts of the country for these services and second that. the demand is as yet unsatisfied
Far from "forcignors" (one of the më mbars of the team was Sri Lankan and agreed with all |ts fin d'ings) making "brash Inroads on the most intimate sectors of people's lives" the Population Needs Mission merely expressed the needs and des res of the people themselves. Perhaps Mr. Caspersz should leave his ivory tower and wisit a village T two? He could take år example from the Needs Mission and Wisit sixteen districts of Sri Lanka. In eighteen days-a delightful but exhausting tripand he might then also change his views about the "perks' of ir Lermational traw el.
Alex Marsha II United Nations Fund for Population Activities - Coordinator.
May Day musings May Day in countries where the Working Class
5. I t ||
power s 曰1 demonstrations . and solidarity c and the setting of achievement. in the City of its festive air a but it 3 i mi I i Cainc ab 5 en t n c r w AS
Tuch in 20 dad so has been for t| five years a tend the showmansh mood and to
"C 5 L 10-t-U5 Working Class. started during SLFP-L33 P-CP
continued with by the present If the emphasis gathering large knows how bes the emphasis is C and well timed of length emb Grand pass, then
how best to d politically organ play challenging
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occasion for if the strength if tha Worker 5 of new goals May Day 1980, Colombo wor: s is customary, iy was largely In Lydance the lidarity. There he last four or ency to overplay ip and festive underplay the demands of the This tendency the days of the and is being mas tery skill ruling party. is on merely crowds, UMP t to do it. If in a well enacted demonstration racing babes to the JWP kri, w 5 O it. If it is a ised power disEh 2 rLu |(2r5, it
is the SLFP, LSSP and MEP Corthbirn e that has reta Fried the art. If it is a pure s III ple: attempt to rouse class fer Wour regardless of real-politik, then the JATUC has done sole work.
But all take together, one sees a large volume of spectators shifting from one spot to another, the confused population sceptcal and står gaz ling.
There was music in one spot, drama in Another, 5 u5 pen se alsc where and stunts at another
place. The total fare was thoroughly satisfying to the shifting shoals of stargazers
constantly fed and brought up on silvers creen fare.
What, after that? Was the Te sol i darity? There was Tutual mud-throwing in the colourful slogans. Leaving the UNP show, the other three demonstrations were carping at one another. That seemed to hawe a keer er edge than the economic hardships of the people or the
(Č' Tľi Tľrei! Prr Jr. Fť '; )
iiiiiiiiii sífelltis fಣೂಟ *y will:8 that it isn't Fists Laii

Page 5
Left projections : for May Day 98
ext Year's May Day will Nači three major political formations and a polarization of the Left movement as well
as the broader anti-UNP Opposition into two main camps. This was the view of
most independent political observers and Was based on a reading of the sub-surface te ndancies, tensions and cross-currents discernible this year. The UNP, the SLFP and the WP are expected to constitute the three 'corners of a quintessentially triangular political contest in the national arena. The TULF though it is the third largest political force in the island after the UNP and SLFP (placing the JWP in fourth place) is left temporarily out of the reckoning, owing to the specificity of its political programme and constitutency,
The ant-UNP opposition sentiment can be expected to group itself around two main poles of attraction, i.e., the SLFP and the JWP, both being extremely hostile
towards each other. The SLFP's silence and the LSSP"5 m Lited protestations not withstanding
the SLFP-LSSP-MEP trio is the
mass mind not an action bloc, but a reformed "Samagi Peramuna' i... e. a politlical alliance
for 1983 and beyond. The entire left movement and the organised working class, as represented in the JTUAC, is expected to be the site of a new polarization with fresh sections of the Left being drawn, albeit in varying degrees, into the SLFP orbit. The Maoist Tnovement, both pro and antiDeng, will fa || victi IT shortly to the SLFP's spell and the Nawa Sama Samaja Party (NSLP) will very probably follow in its wake, according to many independent observers of left politics. G. I. D. Dharmasekera who fared very creditably at the las General Elctions is said to be seeking
Archaic or Ortical for III unionist politic pressures are could drive mı JWP Left tow; by next May
SLFP nomination 83. Addressing of Gamini Y: T. Benedict Nandasiri Gu|| lunch in door g China Maoists Dharmasekera Ca UNP political unions and ma5: come Logether i The JWP tard C. 'sectarian' he alli of foreign policy. that the pro-C the SLFP favour; "anti-hegemcny.
(i. e. anti-Soviet in the country. hawe close con" SLFP's "Sirimaoist group'.
Thg five Par
Janatha Peram tuo be|| 2 wers o Thought' is expec scom on the que: with the SLFP, t fiwe is an un luck left moʻʼwement "PETITLU " Yiya 5 partici på mit in t union TAC de year. It's leadi San mugathasan the Front's T. U receptive to the united May Day to sittiwe to Wari -UNP May D parties and tra by next year. paper “Desha is the Peramur further and st creation of a sir

a forecast
all higuous theIulations, tr: de S di elect: 1 factTH wllIch 1Lll of the Ilonards the SLFP Dıy.
for Kalutara in If the company apa, CP (ML)'s and the PDP's neratne, a preat hering of proon May Day, illed for all antiér tities, trade i Organisations to n a Solid phalanx. PSL were beling aged, for reasons It is well known China Left views i bly as the leading anti-superpower" ) political force These sections acts with the s" of the Dina kara
ty bloc, Nawa U Thai, comprising * "Mao Tse Tung ed to disintegrato tion of relations hus proving that W 1 LIT1 bert for the :he se days. This but a reluctant 10 CPSL. Ied |7 mo and rally this g personality N. whose CTUF is arm) had been LSSP's call for a He has pledged S making an anti y of political e Unions a reality he leading Maoist "im ukthi" w Hich a's official organ angly urges the gle anti-imperi
alist, anti-UNP National United Front of the broadest Proportions. The paper, which carries spicy commentaries on the WP and CSPL, in addition to biting Criticism of the UNP, is howeve relatively non-committal on the SLFP. The occasional anti-SLFP Comm en 15 are muted and couched in moderate language.
A constituent member of the Maoist 5 party bloc, the Nava Prajatha nthrawadi Pakshaya? (NPP), which its lef is a splinter from the SLFP breakaway PDP, has lost its most prominent leader *M. P. A. M. Jina da sa to the SLFP. Mr. Jina dasa's ex constituent 5 have urged him to rejoin the SLFP while they themselves have also launched a signature Campaign
urging the party to readmit Mr. Jina dasa,
The PDP's other Promir Ent Personality was Mr. Nanda. ElaWala, who stayed with the PDP during the PDP NPP 5 Plit. Ης, however, did not feel at all comfortable with his PDP comrades, since they are, for the most Part, Sinophillic, Maoists (eg. Han guranketa's ex MMC Wimiải Wijeyekoon, an excellent organizer and Yapa's former "segundo"). Mr. El avala has, in the recent Past, shifted his foreign policy stance to арго -USSR One, so much so that een the independent (anti-Deng ) Maoist NPP could not accomodate hlm, Fropelled by 3 trong electoral pressures, Mr. Ella wala announced
his decision, at a recent PDF
meeting, to return to the SLFP
fold.
The PDP's Tennyson Ediri
sooriya who had stayed politica||ly dormant for a while, is now working with Kumar Fupa singhe (the former 'court jester, according to Rohana Wijeweera) in the newly formed Democratic committee. Though the latter has gained a shred of respectability in left circles owing to his present

Page 6
anti-Sirima stance neither Mr. Rupa Singhe nor Mr. Ediri sooriya are thought to be divorced from SLFP politics and electoral аппbitions.
Thus both the PDP and the NPP, which, it is noteworthy to recall, constituted the bulk of the old "an awegaya" tendency, are expected to return to the mother party's warm embrace (if not re - en te the Y&T, b from wheri çe they ema nated), ending four years of prodigal existence. Meanwhile, the Independent Maoist oriented personality Mahinda Wijeysekera is also said to be seeking SLFP rolination for 1983.
If all these take place, the Maoist 5 party bloc-Nawa Janatha Peramu na-will quite simply disintegrate, because two of the 5 Constituent members will not go along, preferring to hawe as little to do with the SLFP as possible. These are the JWP breakaway Janatha Sanga maya and the Nawa Lanka Communist Party (NLCP). The Janacha Sangamaya is as hostic to the SLFP as It is to the UNP and has recently concluded, at its congress, that the present stage of the Lankan revolution is socialist. (Unlike the JWP and other Trotskyists they base themselves on Lenin, Stalin and Mao and recognise the validity of the New Democratic revolution in a colonial context when the imperialist, rather than the local, bourgeoisie wields state power). Though they discern certa in difficerem ÇE: 5 and distinciaors Eetween the UNP and SLFP these
are not considered qualitative or
strategic. Thus, the Janatha Sanga maya, unlike other Maoists, places the SLFP, together with the UNP, in the carp of the class enerny.
The Nawa Lanka Communist
Party (NLCP) presents a curiously cord radictory picture. On the one hand its foreign policy posture is significantly different from that of its partners in the five party
front. While its partners are sharply critical of China's foreign policy the NLCP's Ariyawansa
Guna sekers visited China recently in his capacity of chief atganiser of the Samas tha Lanka Gowi
Sam melanaya, and with Chinese lea wansa, Ananda K Fernando grace
-China Friendship. development is
unconnected with H1 NLCP H 5 TE against its partne (NJP), Mr. N. Sant st accuses of b22 bureaucrat. Sham bitterly opposed t
policy and the Theory'. One mi that all this
NLICP Wy a 5 relati i'w towards the SLF party's chief the Kalyananda Thir: hls Lory of pro-SL together with The worked closely wi group for a brie
e'We the N Secretary, K. A. old Maoist milit
pected for his spirit, reviles the tai| behind the SL
May Day Issue "Jana Shakth a leaflet baar'5 th
thinking. Therefc NLCP has mot d clearly from thi the Janatha Sang likely to take a
a kiri to the Sic Maoist parties an from tailing behir
Maoists apart, Tampoе"s RMP NSSP Though M. the Trotskys, Marxist Party (RI Er rest olandg|'5 as is well knowr and his politics de terT i 1 ed in tf by trade union syndicalism) cons ready his rivals : as Samarakkody's Balasuriya's RCL,
JWP (which adh TanT poe-ized Tro that his close
SLITUF's Alawi M. him into the out tle: S LFIP-LP - M Tampo es unusua|| on May Day did tha | ie to these

had discussionsdership (Arlyau Tara, T. B. C. the Sri Lanka Association.) This probably not the attacks that cently launched T i the Tot 1 u gath a 5an whom a trade union
is of course o China's foreign "Thra World
ght have thought eant that the 2ly woll disposed
P. | d d CF 2 retician, lawyer i fi agama has a FP politics and ja Gunewardena, th the Jana we gaya f period. How|CP's Gererā
Wimalapala, an ant highly res
dedication and o se oloists who FP. The NLCP's
of their
բaբԸr s well as its e StarTp of his ire, though the 21 cited itself L SLFF ä5 f125
amaya, they are militant position i Luth East Asia d thereby des ist ld the SLFP.
What of Mr. and Wa su devas r. Tampole heads Revolutionary MP) affiliated to U. Sec, his base,
1 is the CMU, are therefore he last instance
ist (Economlsm/ iderations. Alin the Left such RWP, Kg orth || and of Curse the eres to a detskyism) predict Cø f1 tacts with cular a will draw ter periphery of EP orbit. Mr. y subdued speech nothing to give predictions,
At first glance, Wasudeva's NSSP does not seem likely to succumb to the SLFP's con tripe tal pull. It must be remembed how Wor, that alliances with the SLFP result logically from the given party's understanding of the class character of the SLFP, and the NSSP's characterization of the SLFP has from the early Wama Sama Sämaja days (1972 onwards) been vague and wared. The NSSP's founder ard theoretiam Dr. Wickremaba hu Karunaratne defines the SLFP as a bourgeois party, but qualifies It with such objectives as "liberal
reformist" and "Populist, SocialDemocratic". The significance of this is that the NSSP's "mother
party' Mr. Ted Grant's 'Militant" tendency In Brita in a 5 well as its West European affiliates pursue the tactic of 'deep entry' wis-a- wis Britain's Labour Party and the CCM LİTEN”, Sofia | Democratic parties eg. Spain, Wickrema bahu"s critics reject the parallel emphatically, pointing out that the SLFP is not a party that rests on the trade unions articulating the interests of the T.U. bureaucracy which constitutes a labu aristocracy. This after all is what European Social Democracy is all about. The CPSL's radical theoreticians trained at Moscow's Party School now point out that the liberal-reformist-populist' phase of the SLFP lasted through the | 950's into the mid 96O's but has exhausted itself and since the | 970's become wirtually identIcal to the UNP. The SLFP, says the CPSL currently is the alterna te party of the bourgeoisie; the substitute for the UMP. The JWP, Janatha Sangamaya, RWP, RCL and the Marxist Youth Front (Malla wa rachchi), and th(: CPSL thus hold essentially similar wiews of the SLFP, which incidentally atë shared by a minority tendency within the NSSP is clf identified with the Eri||än L. malLhematician Dr. Nalin de Silva. Incidentally this dissident group in addition to being strongly anti-SLFP, takes a principled position of the National (Tamil) Question; a position that is much less equivocal and more Ti|itant than the official party line. All these political parties and groups point out that
the NSSP's ambiguous definition

Page 7
of the SLFP could very well result in the formation of a "bloc' with the the latter party. It will be recalled that a NSSP representative Dr. Sumana siri Liyanage shared a platforn with Sirima Bandaranalke at a Hyde Park rally (chaired by Fr. Tissa Balasuriya) to protest against the new Constitution.
The JWP for instance, heaps scorn on the NSSP idea that it is both possible and permissible to em ter Into unita d action with the SLFP against the UNP government. How to protest the UNP's anti-democratic practices and harsh economic policies in the company of an SLFP which when In office did much the sama thing and which will repeat its performance given half the chance? This Is the WP's pertinent query. The point is not to join one bourgeois party to combat another, but rather to oppose both bourgeois parties and do away with the capitalist system which sustains these parties, states the JWP, CPSIL, RCL, RWP etc, in opposition to the Wickrema bahu line of argumentation.
If the NSSP, the Maoists and Mr. Tampoe join, in one way or alather, the SLFP-LSSP-MEP bloc by next May Day then the CPSL will be isolated. Will it be able to stand its ground and proceed patiently with the task of building the avante-guard party of the working class? Will it display imaginativeness and flexibility in permitting 'bloc-entries' and "fusions' thereby internalizing the better elements of the radical left? Will it be capable of making adroit Interventions and splits in those parties which may tail behind the SLFP Will the CPSL prove capable of drawing the anti-UNP, anti-SLFP (i. e. anticapitalist) but non sectarian (i. e. non JWP) radical left into a single front or will the TrotskyStalin and Sino-Soviet differences prove insurmountable obstacles to this task? Conversely will the old tra de Lun ion bureaucrats and the young careerists in the Students Union (CNSU) combine to defeat the radicals of the Education Bureau and Youth League Federation, thereby re-imposing a "rightopportunist' soft-line. In this event will the party split as in 1972?
CPSL :
*6=-he CPSL solf-critic pect, while the Party (NSSP) is drawn into the near future." T expressed by Pe scientist Laksiri 5 sing the May of the (Trotskyis Workers Party from the leading daily "Aththa, guage weekly "F CPSL's th ( Report, he point party had pre: but three sub wers ions of the furthermore cat, contained ambig The page one le "Aththa', publis closing Stages ol gress, quoted Secretary K. P. S that the CPSL any front, allian any bourgeois Pia Report however decisicorn to em te
I r the short r | stands to be ch the Left's (comi the SLFP 5ince his rivals. This JWP 5 role a5 in transigently 5 El til e C. Fu dynamic "Left-O be the Third politics. On th Wije weera migh ultra setta rial. I l iš to disrupt as party "action-b RMP-NSSP-JWP), Ani | Moonesing he sought to Sirima-wards bloc had remair it had been ri the Galle affair (perhaps with f SLFP would no well as it dit, And Mr. Wijew too well awar osed to his r a SLFP— "Left" b it fare 5 Well in

: Three
5 much waumited is T is Tather" susNawa Samasamaja very likely to be SLFP obit in thig his was the wiew radeniya political Fernando addreDay "in door ra||y" t) Revolutionary (RWP). Quoting g Sinhala left-wing the English larorward and the longress Political ed out that the ; en led not como tly differentiated self-criticism and :h version itsa || f Lou 5 formulations. :ad Story in tha ned during the the th Conhe rew General ilwa as promising vil flever grter -e or bloc: With rty. The Political states that the a United Front
In Mr. Wijeweera lef beneficiary of 1g) tilt towards it will discredit will reinforce the the fou 5 of li-SLFP |eft ictioning 品安 i position," i will Force of Lankan other hind. Mr. still regret the that led him October"5 fiwc oc" (LSSP-CPSLthus pro viding 2 the opportunity drag the LSSP f the five party cd intact or if Constituted after mirus LF LSSP ash inclusions) the halwe få tid a 5 this May Day. era a can only bo of the threat Surgent party by E particularly if
83-84.
(-)- 6/rლი/რ’-1. "°"“
Versions 2
with the SLFP in correct in that given context and under those conditions. since the hegemony was that of the bourgeoisie. This interpretation, said Mr. Fernando was conditional and equivocal and avoided the more fundamental issue of an alliance with the bourgeoisie. The 'Forward" version was the most watered-down one he added.
1953 was i 1.
The CPSL has yet to explain the theoretical sources of the political error committed from
1968 onwards. In point of fact, the 1968 decisions were the logical product of the theory of an united front with the 'progressive national bourgeoisie". The CPSL's current "left turn' has a precedent in that party's policies of the late 1940's under the leadership of Harry Abeygure wardena, who was following the Zhadrov-Rana dive line." This phase was short-lived and culminated with Harry's ouster. Similarly, the CPSL's present leftphase would very probably be transitory, since the self-criticism
contains enough a venues for a renewed "right turn" should the party feel itself isolated or if
Soviet foreign policy needs require it. In any case. Concluded speaker Fernando, the CPSL || th Congress' position on the National (Tamil) Question, Where it pays lip service to the recognition of the right of self-determination but follows the petty bourgeois SinhalaBuddhist prejudices of the JWP in denouncing the so-called "division of the country', reveals that the CPSL is not prepared to break through the parameters of the bourgeois state.
Incidentally, identical criticisms of The CPSL"5 педу |ime were contaimed in a sim booket on Sale at the De matago da rally of the Revolutionary Communist League (RCL) which is the local affiliate of Gerry Healy and Michael Banda's Trorsky ist group In London. Though it was publicly articulated by these two Trotskyist sources, this critical appreciation of the CPSL's Ith Congress seems to be 5 hl. Ted Co In Certain (2x3n | eo warh by non or anti-Trotskyist Sections
of the radical left ■,

Page 8
THE NADESAN. C.
WE publicised, even in the government controlled press, 5. Banda anaike's Statemen E. fore the presidential commission and its Possible consequences hawe become the No. topic of political discussion in the country. It has also attracted much attention a broad and the ric'w familiar "Gard Fhian parallel" Is bound to get är other airing. Interest abroad in Mrs. Bandard rake's critical decision and her political future was doubtless intensified by the coincidence of Tito"; fuera here the SLFPo leader was given top billing-in
the front row of World leaders,
right next to Soviet party chief
Brezhney.
But a mother cas, 2 h 5 drawn
even ke er er inter national Attentiar), if only in the narrower circle of lawyers, academics and organisations devoted to the study and defence of democratic rights, particularly the freedom of expression.
While Lord Hoosan, representing the International Commission of Jurists was present throughout the proceedings, other organisations and many Bar councils have also showed the ke enest inta rest in the outcome. Lawyers from abroad, (including one from South Africa!) offered their ser wice 5 free. But Mr. Nades an once a Senator and a Bar Council chairman was content to rely on local lawyers.
"A government can always learn more from the criticism of its opponents than from the eulogy of its supporters. To stifle that criticism is-at least ultimately-to prepare its own destruction," Serior Counsel H. L. de Siwa for S. Nadesan, Q.C. told the Supreme Court quoting Harold Laski at the hoaring into the Parliamentary (Powers and Privileges) Act case heard before a bench of five judges.
The judges are: Justice G.T.
Samara wick rema, Justice W. T. Thamøth C. rām, Justice là "-1 - |

Page 9
US - CHINA Sino - in the
by Dr. Harry Harding
US
merican policy towards the
People's Republic of China has largely dropped out of the headlines Since mor Thalization was ach le ved little more than a year ago. Once it became clear that Taiwan was not about to collapse because of the changes, Public debate over U.S.- China policy largely came to an end.
To be sure, there was a flurry of discussion of the desirability of a stronger military and security relationship between the United States and China at the time of defense secretary Harold Brown's visit to Beijing in January, 1980. But, other issues, particularly Iran and Afghanistan, have pushed the China issue somewhat into the background,
In part, this is healthy, for it reflects the fact that relations between the United States and China have been developing relativey Smooth y since normalization. It is also somewhat dangerous, however, for it is equally true that a number of important question 5 Tetmain Lun reso lw 2 d... The United States needs, for example, to reach an agreement on controlling textil 25 IT ports from China, to conclude martime and aviation agreements with Beijing, to decide whether to grant official aid and tariff
Jr. Irry Irrig is is sociate Professor y/o Poirical Seriernice a I Stuford Liversity'IdCoordiria for of the East Asia Program
7 " '' e PPV) dra 14. A'i/sarı sınıf gorrial for al Centre for sclırlar Y, Fashington, D. C. The a hora
is at a bridgerieir of an article writer by Dr. Harding for the National Security Affairs Institute of the U.S. National Defence Liversity. r"
- (Cortes y USICA)
relati
1980s
preference to Chi Thisne whethe is to ad wanced tech na But resolving the
ans Wering a question: What relationship does wish to create
980's
One of the
aspects of Sintsinca December series of steps bila teral agreeme riðri ha 5 been f The adoption of tions art of Mar, the new relation United States and on o SIIgh 5 ted. K O Den ing of embas. חס חםti ק חווWWasf
year. The establi consulates in Sa Houston, the ope
Orise, Shanghai, the w rema irning lJ. S, fo and the tert|1|ma defence treaty
January 1, 1980.
In addition, hov. rican relations rapid dévelopme dimensions ower months. First.
Ormaliza io ha from the diploma economic ream,
Two agreemer ha'we played a cruc ing e Conomic noi 5 沮f AErtic mem May 1979, on h CU est for Of blo frozen assets dari if War.
Second is the si year trade agreem providing not on I red-nation (MFN.

ions
ra, and to de::DE:T- Telax cott|3, o logy to Beijing. : Se issues depends merci fundamental kind of long-term the United States with China in the
mort important *merican relation5 98 has been the
by which the in C1 riali5aIly im De Tiented
the Taiwan relach || 979, defining ship between the Taiwan, has been ther 5 include the sie 5 in Beijing and March I of that ših ment of Chinese ni Franci; o and !rn Ing of A Tr|c; dו חa ון rdחCa ח withdrawal of the rco5 from Taiwan, tirth of the U.S. with Taipei on
ve Wer. Sino-Amg11v E fx De fig nog 2nt along other
the last sixteen
the process of s been exteri de d itic sphere to the
1 ts Tri particular :ial role in promotmalization. One t, formalized in W to resolve the Icked clains and 1g from the Kore -
gring of a threement in July 1979, y for most-favou| status for Chima,
FOREIGN
but also for protection of American patents, trademarks, and copyrights; prevention of the disruption of American markets by Chinese exports; establish Tent of arbitration procedure5 and trade promotion mechanisms; and the expedition of Wis a formalities for Chinese and American businessmen.
A second aspect of U.S.-China relations over the past year has bëën to consolidate normalisation by Creat Ing a cor Tiplex network of relationships connecting both the governments ånd the se cieties of both Countries. Not only hawe the second-ranking leaders of each Country -- Deng Xiaoping and Walter Mondale - wisited the other, but there have also been visits. La China by almost every American cabinet officer and by the officials of a number of independent federal agencies, and return visits by a number af Chinese wicepremiers and government ministers, The U.S. goal is to forge links with as many parts of the Chine se bureaucracy as possible, in order to strengthen the Sino-American relationship by increasing the number of Chinese officials who have a direct stake iri it,
And of Course, thare has been a host of connections forged betwes n private American firms and organisations and their Chinesa counterparts. Indeed, it is now difficult for the major American natio Tial exchange organisations even to keep track of the exchanges organised and a drTinistered by others; a number of public and private universi ries have established till:5 with TCS Carch im Sicut CS är id Lriversits es in China and 3re exchanging students and scholars.
All this has led to a great quantitā tive increase ir almost every dimension of the Sino-Allerican relationship.


Page 10
A third as P. CCL of Sin Č-American relations ower the past ye år has been the clear willingness of the U. S. government to extend official aid to China's civilian economic development. This has involvEd official agreements between th: two governments, by which the United State 5 ha 5 offred the assistance of virtually every federal department to the economic and 5 cientific T1 odernization of Chlmä.
Fourth, the military and security relationship between China and the United States has developed much more rapidly since normalisation than Titost obserwers would hawe predicted when normalization of relations was established. It is true, of course that Sino-American relations hawe had an important security component from the very beginning.
|E 5 al 5o tra that the Carter administration had, everi before defensa secretary Harold Brown's visit to China in January taken several steps which sig mallad a ContInued American interest in China's securpokuk but is was du ring that wis it that the military and security relationship between China and United States took a "Leap forward'. Originally, the visit had been describe das a way of beginning arms control discussions with the Chinese, and of introducing Beijing's leaders to president Carter's principal national Secury advisers. However, as a response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan In December, the wist Look ona different tone. The Secretary informed the Chin ese that the United States was now ready to move "from passive to Thore active forms of Security cooperation" with Beijing, and that this would include "complementary" and "parallel" actions "in the field of defense as well as diplomacy."
Secretary Brown also conveyed the administration's Willingness to sell advanced, dual-purpose techrology to China om a case-by-case basis, Specifically, he announced that the United States would sell ho Chinese a la rid5at 5atellite ground station. Although the UniLed States would ensure that the då ta sent to the ground station did not have military applicatids, the station's equipment - including
BA
he Sri Lanka
Ltee has deci In the Moscow Lanka is Tost
any medals at this of sporting fes decision Howe've leading non-aligr teamed up wit World nations | blud geomed intoji dubious boycott
Wheng weer the and liberal opini raised the 155 LIE odious racist fascist regime called for the Africa in the Ywestern politicia shouted back t slogan “keep po same is true of Air appeals against
But there is of a politically r campaign than t anti-Scwiet Politi presidential poli The new cold war part of the presi TFL15 Wal-| 1f0"T tors know th between Mr. C Dr. Bregezirisk
computers and tā could hawe militār sala Was describe ment officials as policy, under W. would be willir purpose technolo as long as there as suran. 25 that
only for civilian
About two wee Browmi lëf. Chir administration an loos ening of ex Beijing. A penta ėrice di Clared States would По". equipment to C had military use, equipment, early
NEXT : Am 8.“

GAME
Olympic Commided to participate Olympics, Sri un likely to WII) most competitive ti walls. By this r, Sri Lanka ā led Country has h many Third In refusing to be ining Mr. Carter's campaign.
black nations ar is tha YW E5 t of a partheid, the idoctrine of the in Protoria, and aoycott of South field of sport, ls and the IT edia "12 samt im Cr" | LIS |tics out'. The * ab and Palestinian
ionist Israel.
o plainer example notivated boycott his. It is both ics by the US and ics by Mr. Carter. - is ar u in mista kable dential ball-gama. led US commen talat the di 5 pute yrus Wance and
surfaced during
эing equipп1епt — y use. The lands at d by state departpart of a new hich Washington ng to sell dualgy to the Chinese We're reasonable it would be used
purpo5 eտ,
ks after secretary a, however, the nounced a further port controls to gon press conferthat the United 'w be willing Io sol|| hina that clearly including trucks, warning radar.
ica’s fourt options
and
Cheque5 ai 1 di money Orders Lobe
the Winter Olympic Ga5 ביוח in Lake Placid. Wile it is now known, was deeply
upset when he was compelled to adopt a public posture which was not only in defensible but also did damage to the deten te which h c had so pains takingly attempted to strengthen. I LI also did damage La his reputation as a distinguished diplomat and to his moral prestige as a man of good sense,
Current diplomatic pressures the Propagan da campaign moLunted by the US, wis-a-wis tha
Soviet Union and Iran are part of a piece. In the case of Iran the purpose is to punish that
country in every possible manner for the "crima” of breaking the US stranglehold on the Iranian economy and for ending nearly 20 years of US domination. the ca 5 e of the Sowiet Unio rn the riotivation is fore complex. But one of its many features Is the effort to weaken relatio 15 betweer the socialist camp and the Third World whose common aim is to transform the present USdominated global economy into a more equitable system,
— LANKA GUARDAN
SSC'' F'7 TIJ FT FÅ Fe'i (Inclusive of postage)
made out in Lycur of
Опе уear Sig rhom th5 Local RS. 95- Rs... 50.
Asia Rs. 300- Rs. 50/-
USS O. US $ 10.
O. É 5. Foreign Rs. 450- Rs, 300
USS 3D US $ 20
5 a
Lik (Lardin Publishing ), ld.
The Commercial Manager. Lanka Guardian Publishing Co. Ltd. Nr. 88, N. I. M. Abdul Ciller Roald
Reclamation Road) Colombi I,


Page 11
SPECIAL REPORT
qSqSqSqSqSqSqSSTSLJSJSqTqSqTSqSSqTq TqSqSqq qqSqASAeASASLSAS SSASSASSASSASASAS SAAASeA SeASAeAASLL
ASSAM
by Gai | Omwedt
in India's strategic northeast region and most te Čently Congoing agitation in its biggest state, Assam, is providing a serious chal lenge. La Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's drive to consolida to her power in the country,
The Assamese-speaking original in habita fit 5 of A5 sama hawe been Increasingly confronting the center In the demand to prevent "foreigners' (mainly Bengali-speaking migrants from Bangladesh) from
claiming citizen status, jobs and land. The movement which had been simmering with sporadic Outbursts for de Cade,5 took Am
explosive turn with the demand to postpone parliamentary elections and rem w : the närmes af foreigners from electoral rolls; it has continued since with peaceful strikes and Satyagrahas, attempts to blockade oil production, and occasional chlLwinist and brutal attacks against Bengali-speakers as well as Communist activists who hawe been identified with the Bengalis.
In turn, repression of the snoye. Tnent ha 5 included police rarTnpages and rapes of women, curfews, arrests of activists and firing and killing of demonstrators. But Indira Gandhi has mcat with the movements' student loaders and the stä, te, cleärly concermed about its ability to control the region, is a tempting to take a more Sophisticated response.
Though leadership of the Assam movement is currently in the hands of students and with a right wing tendency, at the same time rebellions of tribal nationali ties in the same region hawe been taking a left and increasingly solarxist-Leninist direction, Unlike the Assamese, who by and large still consider themselves to be Indians and Hindus, the se nationaltities feel little identification with Indians and are increasingly calling for independence.
The Naga libg Which has been struggle ever declared their o one day before recently se en th pro-Chinese lead the Burmese c across the border ir Mizoramm to currently been uneasy central c almost equally o and neither I money poured nor the preser thOLIsards of In tro the Situ Ad o WW || Ma the 5e col dest cent a new rewolt ha the leadership forces, the pro Liberation Army, Revolutionary Pai (PREPAK). The mainly rural ba: Çen ters on Urbai are carrying on and both are i strong חבtl-Hiז Brahmanical tribo: lism among t Kangleich as, the of Manipur.
In Tripura, it tribals and Bang |TCW CC 15 Ci CILI CC a state) has widi adjoining Megh organization, the Implementation C has begun to gi Kha5i and Garo against the influx
These II owest northeast at pre goals and varying ideologists rangin and pure bourg to Marxis Th-Leer I r are occuring in : been historically the ca fi rol of next to Burma and tribal natio Іоп5 It is all armies and liber; to turbulent Ban its own "tribal Chittagong Hi || to the mā55 iwe which has long

r" til T1 W STërit, ne of ar ned since the Nagas Wm independence the Indians, has e emergence of a ership linked with Om munist party . The Insurgency the south has brought under ontrol, but it is ld and determined hic development to these states 1:2 of te 15 of dian troops can A tion for long. nipur which links Iers of insurgency, is grown up under of two Marxist -Peking Peoples' and the Peoples' "ty of Kangle ipak
first group is sed, the second youth, but both
armed struggle det i figd wyth a 1 du and anti– | cultural rew iwa
he Meigs cr
main nationality
ension between all-speakers (who majority in the 2nd, while in a laya E'' Peoples Demands' onvention (PDC), ow among the People, agitating of Iontribals.
1空门工引 i the 5 ent hawe warious leaderships with g from Gandhism eo is nationalism nism. Yazt they in area that has
al Tost outsid central powers, where Comunist mal forces hawe d independent ated zones, next gladesh which has roblem" in the Tracts, and next Bengali region e em a certer of
Co Tl Tmunist Influence. The Te is an increasing effort to coordinate organization and Towerinents, and together they are posing the most serious challenge to the Indian state today.
Yet outside forces, most especially the US and USSR, hawe beer trying to influence developments in the region, and because of the gulf that has a risen between the Assamese and other groups and the dolinant left forces in the region (especially the CPI (M) because of its identification with Bengalis and failure to support nationality de Thands), Indira Gandhi is likely to be able to Taintain control for the present. In fact the Assam CS2 and och er north eastern movements pose a challenge IC in diam Communists as well — a challenge to take a clear position of leadership on the nationality I55LI 2,
Behind the Assam Crisis
What are the roots of the Assam Crisis
Basically they lie in the multinational character of India and in the uneven development caused by continuing Imperialist exploitation.
The whole northeast of India has been culturally and ethnically a
transition zone between India and southeast Asia as well as a mountainous area whose tribal
rationalities as the Nagas and Mizos were newer really a part of the In diari cultural-Social Structure or ruled by Hindu kings. In contrast, the in habitants of the Brahmaputra valley adopted Hinduism and developed Assames e, an Indo-European language, but this process occurred relatively recently, in the 16th-7th centuries. The A55 am 25 e, at a relatively lower level of feudal society, still practicing some types of shifting cultivation and with many tribal rennants in their culture and Society, were consequently much less numerous than the neighbouring Bengals inhabiting the rich plains
and deltas of the Ganges and Brahmaputra riwers.
But it was colonial rule that
transfred these diferencs ina often wident contradictions. The Bengal region was thg first conque red and most exploited; terri ble
9


Page 12
famines resulting from imperialist Plunder in the || 8th century ki|lled millions of people, millions more died of malaria and other diseases resulting from Imperialist "development" efforts after late 19th century, and an exploitative and feudal land structure left food production stagnant while population grew.
The result was an imperialistinduced "pressure on the land" that pushed increasing numbers of ಕಿಞ್ಞಣ್ಣೆ peasants (mainly Muslims) to move into neighboring Assamese and even tribal areas in search for land. At the same tima, British tea planter's grabbed upland in the Assamese hills and imported debt-bonded tribals from central India as plantation labourers, while Punjabi and Mawari merchants moved into Assam and Bengalispeaking middle classes moved in with British encouragement to dominate ducation, the professions and the bureaucracy in Assam.
After independence, the biggest Bengali-Tajority district became a part of East Pakistan and for the first time the Assamese people were in a majority in a state of their own with SCT e chance for democratic Advance. Bu Uridgf th: new bourgeois Indian state and Continuing imperialist unle Wen dew82lopment, it remained a backward region even while it came to supply Illuch of India's oil as well as tea and other exports.
And after independence the Bengali influx bega fi again, this time with Hindu refugees from East Pakistan, an influx which has beLLLLLaL LLLLLaL LaLLa LLLLL LGLLLLL LL LLLL Laae Bangladesh war. There have been consistant movements and agitations in Assam, including demands for "full autonomy' in 1975 leaving only defense and foreign affairs in
the hards of the Indian central government a demand similar to what Mujib Rahman had earlier
må de im Bångladesh In the recent explosion the demand is simple: that 950-5 to taker as the 'cutoff year": al II immigrants before this (including Bengali-speaking Muslim peasants) would be accepted as ful In diam and A55 am CSC: citizer 5, BLE Subsequent immigrants (Tost of whom constitutionally are foreigners) must be identified as foreigaers, their namics struck from the eac
O
to rał rol|5, and | for their Welfare by the Indian stat tha AS sa mese. (II that populacion ( is exactly the sar whole; it only populated" in Bengali areas).
The A55 annes e f ally one of beings and economically
of indige nous Assame tituted only ab Assam itself. Ar 5 milliol were B. 2 million immigra cf whom haye '''assa, mized", I. č0 du5 in the Brahma | 400.000 Bengalis which is now maj addition, there ar. galis across the desh and 50 milio state in India, w constitute 70%, a of Tripura stal 550,000 in 97. that tha: || 98 cens Assame so to bo minority in their c
Con Tunists and
From the poln na tional existenci point of wicw legality, the Assa sonable demand. the northeast situ been complicated. de the Muslim as the main spo Bengali Muslim Pe their slogan "lard e the right to havé in Assart. The Ec gress Party, help policy of giving re. rights to different
nalitis, bic: Cam C: of the Assam 252, pation in the
struggle against always combined Tartain the “|In tried to prevent Certain are 15, ie maintain the Ass: rights as "sons of t
The accepta rice terization of Irldia : state and of nati

the responsibility
should Be takem e and not mainly should be noted density in A55 a Tı ne, as in India as a appears "lightly Contra 5 t to the
ea" is qui ita litorwarnped culturally by Bengalis. In 1,630,000 people, se-speakers cons}LIt: 4,350,000 ir| other estimated Ingalis (including nt Muslim, ITnany been relatively ),000 Bengali Hinputra walley, and in Cachar district. jority Bengali. In a 80 milio Berborder in Banglan in West Bengal hile Bengalis na w f the population le, (which was It is expected Lus Will Tc2 weā| the own more of a
St.
the Northeast
t of their own 2 and fra T1 the of Constituti cora | mese hay 2 a reaBut politically ation has always Before indepenLeagua emerged ke 5 millim for the as a sits, taking as to the land less', a land anywhere urgeois-led Coned by Gandhi's presentatior and ling is tic natiothe main leader Here particianti-imperialist the British was with attempts to e system' which immigration into With efforts to irnese identity or Ha soi!."
of the chariis a multinational ional rights to
self-determination apparently never helped the Communists tc. take any concrete position regarding the Assam issue. Before inda pendence the then-united CPI more Or less fell in to a chas m botwaer the Muslim League and the ConEress Party, trying to voice both slogans - "land to the landless" and Assamese national rights - at Lhe Fame time. With a base mainly among Bengali and other immigrant workers and the Bengali middle classes, it could never take a clear stand or gain much
of a basa a mong the Assame se themselves,
Today this failure has led to
a severe contradiction, after the CPI (M) which is still the largest ÇÇmmun İ5t force, Emerged as leaders of Left. Front governments in Bengal and Tripura in tho |977 elections. But they hawe become largely identified with Bengalispeakers in Assam, and Tripura has now become the main example of a Bengali numerical domination feared by the Assamese and tribal Tioritie 5. The Assam Ticowe III et has included attacks and beatings of Communist cadres, and the
CPI and CPI(M) hawe responded by characterizing the movement as a chauvinist one. Articles in
respectable Marxist journals sometimes hawe an almost colorial tinge, characterizing the Assamese as an "easygoing", "lazy", "backward" people in contrast to hard working i Ti Tigrants who are said to hawe "" developed' the region, and tending to attribute the whole agitation to CIA and RSS (Hindu reactionary) influence.
In fact the two big communist parties hawe newer given consistent support to nationality demands in the region. The CPI which em - phasizes central power, has always characterized the Naga and Mizo movements as "separatist", "antiIndia' movements in which the hated Maoists are said to be joining
with the CIA in an attempt to dismember India. The CPI(M) describes. In dia a 5 multimaticama |
and gives great emphasis to national rights - but has remained absolutely and opportunistically silent even on the heavy repres19r exer ted in Nagaland and M|Zoram. Cadres Whan 35 ked Will often Say, "but we are si Tıply


Page 13
not strong enough to Challenge the state or this issue. Wait." In fact, the CPI(M)'s multinational policy has been reduced to asking for more financial powers and Inore autonomy for the states, which is used to consolidate their West Bengal and Kerala base and attempts to form alliances with bourgeois-regional governments in other states, but which has Completely failed to pose them as a leader in a revolutionary Working class policy for the northeast region.
The Max å lites hawe also been divided on the northeast issue, though there is intense debate
on the nationality issue in MarxistLeninist ranks though they have been bolder than others in speaking out for the rights to selfdetermination of the Mag 35 and Mizos, their effort has been a weak one on the Whole and they have not built enough base to make their varying civil liberties and democratic rights organizations into genuine mas 5 political organ|- Zators.
And regarding the recent Assam
Towerment, they have been ambivalent. The main Bengali and north India-based groups have taken a position close to that of the CPI(M), more or less och coing the claim that än India-wid social revolution is the only way to save the unemployment and |ånd problems of the A55 ame5 2. But some south India Naxalite groups, who have been much more sensitiwe to the nationality l$5ug than the northermers one (such group apparently argues that the main contradiction in India is now between the different nationalities and the center) have supported the Assam and other mowerTerts, And recently dissident Marxist-Leninists in Assart itself hy e formed är A55 a T (communist Party and havo been taking part in efforts to coordinate insurgency throughout the northeast,
As a consequence of the stuttering af d e yen a fi tagonis Lic || eft response to the ir problems, the AS Sam Ese Tower Therint and some of the tribal movement:5 ha we been as much anti-communist as opposed to the Indian bourgeois state. And in spite of its solid base in West Bengal and Kerala shown
in the 1980 parlia the Communists
Indian masses is m' by the CPI and C th(!). I'm 5 Chw (25 Llun ab oppositional (licet nary) political lo in the region a
Indira's Drive |
It is alrTiost Congress(I) will State elections held in mine 5. ta | May; and thereb the dominant pa state and natio ewerywhera cxc Bengal and the as prime minister of Consolidation
of any effort t national politica one of her earli dissolution of th oppositional stat February.
Opposition eff the heavy ha
failed beca L5 t had done the s. its central victo divisions in the
reached a Tost
Clons. The Jana three sections fol though one ha: itself with Jagjiv raded and unit the Congress (Ur Janata Party (wł old RSS-Jana Så Bihari Waypayee
going its own other Jamata Pär gress (_) and
engaging in all with the Coir We||. BLJt fe W | much attertior) wres the Congre to have a solid w; the Lick Cha | af hl, we som basis and agricultural The TT 5 Lates. in India, but masses (including di sidents) look as the only f Solving their prc. And in dira go. date her person the state burg (some of the g

Tentary elections, (which for the Iainly represerted PI (M1) are showing le to give any alone revolutioadership in India 1d à5 à Wyholo.
for POW
certa in that the win the upcoming scha duled to be 25 år the en cd cf y will emerge as rty at both the a lewe arost opt in Kerala, northeia, St. Indira has put this kind of power ahead o really form a | ргоgгагm, and est acts was the
E. I CII-CITIT LITIS L. e assemblies In
orts ta protest m derd di 55 ollution he Janata Party 1T1 g in 19FF : FEérbry, and because opposition hawe la Lugha blic Proporta Party split into lowing its defeat, i now dissolved - בוhון u 5" וחRa וחהץ purned entry into s ). The Bharatiya 1ich is ir fact the ngh um der Atul 5, leadership) is way, while the (y and the CanLok Di ATË ia me discussions m|Jnis L forces as in India are paying to these minoeu. 55 () is expected :tory even though d Sver the left a T101 g pel Saints labourg r5 in Sorne Turri oil Çontinues at present the even the Assam to Indira Gandhi orce capable of blems.
ntinue 5 to Consolia power within aucracy as well rest acts were
new appointments in the bureaucracy and police, especially in Delhi) and in the Congress(I) itself. There old Congress bosses, those who had in the past local power bases and those who joined the Congress(I) only before the elections both to bring their own bases into the party and to
mali rn ta in their hold hawe found themselves increasingly taking a back seat to the 'new men",
the younger "loyalists" who stayed with the Congrass () through 1977 and 1978, an utterly ruth. less and pragmatic crowd characterized only by their loyalty to 'Sanjay and Madame''. They are now just about numerically dominant in the parliament and in the party as a whole and they will tend to be pro-American and open to multinational en try but not out of any ideological conviction, they if" է: preparad swing to Russian aid or to any
political direction that "Sanjay
and Madame' command.
In fact this is a further
authoritarian consolidation in the
Congress(), ower riding almost all of the forces in the past who had constituted rich peasant and kulak interested in the old Congress party in the form cof the power of "local bosses". The party is becoming an Increasingly tight machine geared to the needs of the bourgeois State as a whole,
ready to discipline even the bourgeois opposition (including land lords and kulaks) in these
interests, capable of both massive repression of mass movements as well as Inowing to coopt them. And this is all being done in a context that clearly poses Sanjay Gandhi as the heir to the prime ministership.
The left and democratic forces (including an increasingly strong dal it movement and emerging women's groups) have been able to do little to oppos 2 this process. Yet massive discontent and skepticism remain in India, and the turmoil in the geographically sensitive northeast, in spite of its current uncertain direction, in spite of clear activity by CIA and KGB and countless other forces, continues to have a relentless thrust and a revolutionary potential.


Page 14
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Page 15
SYMPOSIUM
Which
'ay for
K. P. Silva, General Secretary,
וזur symposiurס In
"Which Way for we published Question and Answer
inte
almost every Marxist group in this countr
now invited the three major
parties-LSSP,
JWP to participate in this discussion.
Q: On October 2nd last (1979), five leading lest including your own, Carlie together publicly and announced that they had agreed upon a progrg Time of united action. Now this agreement is no more. What was the role played by the CPSL in this drawing
year partes
together and what, in your Issessment, Werg fig frdifl Call Fes for the breakup of the newfound
Liri i ty?
A: It is II accordance with the political line adopted by the Xth Congress of our Party held in March'73, of broäder ing and strengthen ing the unity of left forces, to resist the attacks of UNP government of the standards of living of the people and on trade union and democratic rights of the Working class and other working people, that we actively supported a nove by the JVP seeking united action of the five left parties to oppose the so-called Prevention of Terrorism Act. Later the Essential Public Services Act was also included. We cor tributed to that five party unity by surmounting the obstacle created by the refusal of the LSSP to work with the breakaway party led by Wasudeva Nanayakkara which called itself the "LSSP (new leadership)", We worked actively to Persuade both sida. S to come to a compromise on the basis of changing the name of the Farty led by W. Nanayakkara to "Nawa Sana Samaja Party' (NSSP).
Later this Te’w found unity broke up as a result of both the JWP and the LSSP retreating from that position. It turned out that which was
JWP's unity move, a departure from their "go it. alone" policy, was not quite
popular within that party-find soon afterwards they began to extricate
the Tselves from COTimitment. T of Podi Athula for th 5 Galle b: that they were an alliance wit Galle by-electior JWP id the LS end to the five October, 97.
Q: WM 2011 yw fi i le L'inited Left Fr itself I (r. Cate
SSP-CPSL-PDP 1777), fra 5 asso were the citru split?
A: Our Party Electora|| || iam: | m || 9 WW on th { Electio Marif. el2 ticis, it wa: parties to stren on the basis of programme in t For the achie political unity, it to work cut a апd El tics Union unity, th left unity and Hi, ''' e 'wer rath ; closer om the som what drifte abwe-meritione basis of both short-term goal Xth Congress o We place el greate thening broad ly including tak to the SFP, ard of unity and c of left political The LSSP on dr“ fL = L-Ward: the Ilair stra: joint activities party level. Th the Galle by-ele
 
 

the
CPSL
the Left" rviews with r. We hawe CPSL and
their original ha LSSP's choice as its candidate -election showed mot i fawr" of the WP. The helped both the SP to put a final party unity of
the LSSP-CPSL Qnt, (whsch wIs d version of the front formed in cụma ubart. What reasons for this
entered into an with the LSSP asis of a common :Sto. After the the äiT of tot F1 gthen this alliance I common political he new situation. vement of such : became necessary Common strategy concern ing trade e broaden Ing of towards the SLFP. + r than coming Se Tlatters, We !d apart om the i is 5ues. Om Lh2
long-term and ls defined by the four Party in 1978, : r s tress on Strengtrade Inio 1 uni│e union 5 affiliated on the achievement loser cooperation parties and groups. the other hand ; a policy where i was placed on with the SLFP at Ceir behaviour at :tions, which Was
Left
detrimental to the continuance of the five party unity, and their recent proposal to have a joint May Day Rally with the SLFP
show this trend.
However, our Party has always recognised and still recognises the need to work together with the LSSP as a Left Party,
Q: There is an all legation that the JWP and your party restricted participati Om in the campaign of united actions to the 5 parties, on the basis of foreign policy positions, is this correct? Since there was na programmatic front entered into by the five parties, why were other Jeft groups (Chiefy Maoist) rict in corporated in to the auctor campaign? Surely such a bragd bci sing would have prevented dny single party gining a disproportionate weight wit fi i r the 'bloc' which permitted it to put a brake on Left unity according to its whims and forces?
A: The Invitation in Tid 1979 to five left parties to discuss about joint action was an independent initiative of the WP. Our Party actively supported this Thoy e Since w 2 considered thig getting together of these five parties would be a big step forward. OJr Party works for broad left unity and united action of all left and democritic forces based on such left unity
Q: What are - the prospects and preconditions (both objective and subjective) for the restoration and expansion of left unity? What are the concrete proposass you put forward grid the transitional Intermediary stages you em visage as necessary for the achievement of this goal?
A: All left parties and groups hawe differences in the a 55 esiment of socio-economic developments of our country and different viewpoints about the path of struggle. These differences which
Հl T Ը 1 reflection of the conflict of proletarian is and petty-bourgeois
attitudes, obstruct left unity.
3


Page 16
Our experience, during the last two years, has convinced us that left unity on the basis of a common political Programme cannot be ach lewed in a hurry. It depends chiefly on the development of the independent political role of the working class.
particularly
The intermediary stage, during which the se differences could be narrowed down, will be a period of united action against common enemies and around issues that we can agree upon at any time, on questions affecting the working class, the peasantry and other oppressed sections of the population
and the development of united mass struggles both at trade union and political party levels.
The aggravation of the general crisis of world capitalism and its serious repercussions on the bourgeois society in our country is an objective factor which serves the cohesion of left forces.
Q. Much interest has been evoked in Left circles, by your party's self criticism. Could you
sketch out its main points for us and also tell us why this selfcriticism has not been made public?
A: The Communist Party follow5 the Lennist method of criticism and self-criticism to improve party's work by correcting mistakes and by learning from past mistakes,
In the recent past self-critically reviewed its work during the period since the formation of the SLFP-LSSP-CPSL United Front in 1968, and particularly our work during the period of our participation in the United Front Coalition Government. Our criticist and self-criticism dealt with both inner-party matters, which are confined to the party, and on matters of policy which are of public interest, Our self-crit|cal review of past political policies are contained in documents of the Xth (1978) and XIth (1980) Congresses of our Party. These are public documents. Some of these self-critical assessments have also been voiced by our speakers at public meetings,
our Party
4.
The gist of o Critical review c it Was Correct formed a Unite SLFP and the L UNP governme general elections. we think that i forces prevailing was a mistake | the coalition go the balance of for ble to the wo inside and outside We could not st government's pol effects of many חט tחeוrTוYGrrםE of the population di 55:atisfaction. association with di Tn in is had the the ma 55 es had its imago.
Q: What is t assessment of the tial of the Sri Party (SLFP)? W position om the v questions of the and the stage : Why has the Pg of explicity C| present stage of 'socialist'?
A: The SLFP exhausted its ant I say "historical SLFP, (and for t the UNP) may cffecting some within the neogoo is framework of an anti-impei Basically, there between UNP an But the SLFP wi imperialist and nat collaborated wit Therefore, there Imperialist sectio that party, which over by the left,
It is our pos only an anti-im led by the work can now complet tasks, which are certain anti-capital We consider th: Clons the te Is in between the con anti-imperialist

lur thorough selfif the past is that in 1968 to haye Front with the SSP to defeat the rt at the SWO
But In retrospect, In the balance of
at har time, it to have entered yernment. Wher Ce5 Wā5 Unfa WOLUra"kling class both 2 the government. ifficiently influence icles. The adverse
policies of that
Warlo U5 sections caused widespread As a result our
that government Confidence which
in our Party and
e (PSL" is current : rose and poter|- Lanka Freedom hat 15 your present "exed frter related national bourgeois If the re ya Jutior? ty stopped short haracterising the the revolution gs
has historically i-Imperialist role. y' because the hat Tatter, ewen
be capable of PTC g te 55 iw acts colonialist bour
and which are illis C character. is no difference
d SLFP policies. 1ich has an anti– ionalist past has հ left forces. d T{: CE Ttml T} +F1 tjis still following 5 hould be won
tion that it is 34 tillist ällianco ng class, which ! anti-imperialist Il tertwined with ist Lasks as wel|. is out cordi -
i di viding wa|| pleton of the "ew Colution and
the commencement of the socialist revolution. However, it is true that we have not characterised the present stage of the revolu
tion explicitly as "socialist" for the following reasons:-
(a) Despite the leading role
that the working class will have to play in the current stage of the revolution, we envisage transitional stages in social transformation, in an under-developed capitalist country like ours, in building a socialist economy.
(b) The Strongest ene Iny people have to face in the present era of transition from capitalism to socialism on a world scale is imperialism, headed by American Imperialism. This global aspect will certainly draw in wide nonproletarian sections of our country into the struggle first against Imperialism, and who will finally turn against capitalism as a whole, as Les in pointed out. Or revolution then will be a continous one going over from antiimperialist to the socialist stage.
Q: There is a school that the imperatives of electoral Polics will eventually force the CPS into a realignment with the SIFF, despite yor present anti SLFP stand. A muting of the antiSovietism of SLFP foreign policy as seeks to imitate Indira Gandhi a superficial leadership change which rmied ns little in class terris Soviet foreign policy perceptions Concerning Sri Lanka and South Asian region or quite Simply, the proximity of general elections-these are factors, which, according to some analysts, will drive the uses Sentially parliamentarist CPSL back into the arms of the SLFP. What is your reply?
of op Infor?
A. Our Party has declared our general Political Fine in the new situation since the break Lp of the SLFP, LSSP, CPSL United Front both at IXth and xth Congresses quite clearly. We
cannot help it if any one entertains doubts.
CPSL's new
Q: The line conCrning the SLFP and the stage of the revolution has been crit. sized by Maoists as "neo-Trotskyist' and inspired by those sections with in the CPS leadership who


Page 17
came over from the LSSP. Another motivation, according to these Maoists, was the attempt of the CPSL to accormodate and approximate the WP's positions. What were the reas factors (internal and ex terria I) which pro vided the sourcĈ5 of inspiration (theoretically and politically) for the new general orientation? Did the thinking of any particular segment of the World Corm runist move Tert, or the examples of any specific rewolu tíordry leaderships provide inspirational impulses for the new militancy?
A: Our political line is worked out by application of MarxistLenin Ist revolutionary theory to prevailing local conditions taking In to account experience from our own revolutionary practice and the experiences of fraternal parties, particularly of those working conditions similar to ошrs. In view of the Maoist ling of collaboration with imperialism
and local reactionary forces we are not surprised when they slander our policies as adventL f|St.
Q: Your party gave considerable profil/flerc g to the Star Centerary, even surprising the Maoists, according to some commentators. Some Interpret this as a rearguard action by the Stalinist old leadership against the neo Trotskyists with in the party, while others take the contrary view that it is an ideological corollary of your new "hard'
political line. Still others think that it was a purely Soviet phenomenon which you had na
choice but to reflect, despite your friendly relations with the esser tially Trotskyist members of the erstwhile 5 party bloc. Yet another view is that it was a riposte to the LSSP and for the WP. What is the reality?
A: Our celebration of the Stalin Centena ay is in consistancy with the common international a 55essment of the role of Sta|| | consolida ting the socialist system in the USSR, and defending it from its external enemies and from interna enem les such as the group led by Trotsky. Communists, while criticising and denouncing certain serious mistakes committed by Stalin, pay due tribute to his historic positive role.
Q: Your part tilted to Wards t foreign policy cor is the state of tionship with t| you characterize theoretical positi dit which ports de Tarcate itself f
A: Thore is assumption that "tilted' toward: of common attit tional issus W. work in cooper: forces both o | Intertratia || || ES
It is well kno certain differenc parties, just as both local and in
Q: What are LSSP's present pi, With special refe
merit of the SLF
A: We Woul; comment publicly policies of the that you clarify directly from th
Q: Your positi (Tamil) Quest for East seems to hic as sar apart f. Ta mill youth as i militant Sinhald Your respected W. Portnam barri CPSL's refusa || tc itself to the caus de terminatson, W with y ir t. La II y no ťfi e TJ JT7 is Treas, the PSL wych Errefir 5 5 třor II liberator 5 O vër, l's 5 J COLI : ja on the T1 iss
A: We refer do curTil ent col || na titoria | mino Titi the XIth Сопgrc: which will be pr wide circulation,
Q: How would yo present conjunctur, T, Q W E3 intű (1 lit: UNP regime at Tre the tasks of Cornjuri ct LI re?
(ப்ராய்: )

y is Said to have he WP, owing to siderations. What yo Lur present rclc - e WP? How do
the ideologicalJins of the JWP and
des the PSL rom these positions?
no truth In any
our Party has the WP, because udes on internaWe endeavour ta til With || || gs. m nation är id
山은 .
Wyn, that we hawe es. With other left With thic JWP, Carn :er F1 lational issue5.
your views on the scies and practice,
ГЕГ СЕ to its t15st. 35
not like to on the present
SSP. It is best these points LSSF.
|ם חטthe NutI ויום חם fm the North Gard is set the CPSL In the Titant It was framm tfie youth in 1971. party organizer q Lift over the clearly commit te of Tami || 5elf 1Ich Jeaves you 5. Lobo rt bi se irn Why is it that prides itself an idarity with natruggles the world L5 y conservative تمتع
уош to our he question of (25 adopted by is of our party inted shortly for
I characterise the £ as the country decade, with a It is What
the Left in this
Péré }
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Page 18
SOUTH ASIA (I)
Small nations : Co-operation 2
by Godfrey Gunatilleke
he project on Cooperation
among small rations in Asia in the context of the changing Asian Political Economy, was expected to examine the problems encountered by two groups of Sinal nations in Asia - one group in South Asia near and around India, and the other group in the South-East Asian region with China as the growing centre of political and economic power. In this region. In both situations the small countries were perceived als al gro Luping around two gcorno. m les of gigantic proportions, both possessing massive potential for accumulation of economic, political and technological strength. Two papers were prepared on the problems of the two groups of countries. These papers provided an ower wiew of the situation in each region.
Tho consultations examined the presentations that had been made In the papers and explored several themes which were not fully covered in the SC Presentations. The papers had adopted different approaches to the treatment of the subject. In the case of South Asia, the paper examined the problems in relation Lo the configuration of power in the South
region 田岛,廷 Whole With India at the centre. It analysed the nature of relationships that
were growing between the small countries of the South Asian region and India and thereafter examined the prospects for alternative patterns of regional cooperation,
The paper on South-East Asia analysed some of the conceptual issues relating to balance-of-power strategies and the factors which drowo smal | nations to 'policies of strategic checks and balances involving support for non-hegeponic politics." It de allt with some
of the main Poli economic feature: të fised the rea Srial countries i. A5 iam region and of the Precondit regional cooperati Sultations it was CYYC pa per 5 woul borated on the indicated at the Participants were that the project loped further i ntc in Ywhich institu : from small nation: including the des, Could meet La c of Smail nations Perspective, analy ships with the maj and examine how could participate processes of global in order to bring equitable distribut che international
With the emerg ple's Republic of C the two rTmajor centr political and econoi both is South Asi Asia hawe to be the changing config which would for in the papers an at the meeting atts tify some of the which will goverr Ships between the and the two big
region. Underlyir W3.5 a formative fr which projected
Pattern af relatio of which the rel; Asia and South-E, be evaluated. This 2 CE2 WY45 certiwgal
COf1cepts which hat goals and objec Non-Aligned Mowg

How
ical, cultural and which charac:ionshlps among the South-East Identified som a ons for genuine Yn. At the comagreed that the ! be further elaIles which Were meeting. The also of the view could be deveI a second phase as and scholars in other regions 'eloped countries, 15 i dar the toe within a global se their relationor powar centres | 5 ma || lations effectively in decision-making about a Thore ion of power in system.
ence of the Peohina and India as es of growth the Tic relationships in and South-East viewed within uration of power w. The analysis d the discussions :mpted to idenmajor factors the relationsmall nations powers in the g the analysis amic of reference the desirable is and in terms itions in South ast Asia could frame of referfrom the basi: e shaped the :tives of the ment as it ewol
much
This pa per li : 14 h 2 2 1 prepare dil lby (Guilfrey (GLu Iı:i tilleke, Direct i Ir, Nyf:ırR: Institute, as in report to ti e Interna [ion:al Foundla Liu En for L): 72 lup nin cent Alternatives un the Project on “Crop cri tiu Li : In cong & In: ll Eli: tions in Asia in the context of the changing Asialı puli tical ecündırılıy” yılı ith wa 5 sponsored by the Foundation. The report is hased On the presentations in the paper's Lind the discussions uit 1he meeting hield in Marg: in 5titute. Hu Yeyer, the Author Eccepts full responsibility for the Yiews expressed in the report as well as the emphisis giver tu specific issues. "l'he paper on South Asial wat 5 prepH red by N.M. M. I. Hussein, Director of Asia Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sri Lanka, and the palı per on Sir II tilh-East Asia Will 5 c)-I LI thicored by Ridt bl f S. I) li ikli, EI luel Esguerra, Goh: 10 M. Jurado, Felipe is. Niiral nila, and Francisco NerLien Fo, Jr.
wed during the last two decades, as well as the Declaration of the New ternational Economic Order. Qn the Ona hand these concepts emphasize certain political proconditions for an eqnitable world order Which includes the absence of colonialism, imperialism, neoimperialism and all for T15 of damination of one nation by another.
The international order which is envisaged is one which promotes and safeguards the sovereignty and equality of nations and is based on principles of non-intervention and the absence of political formations which concentrate power in a single nation or a group of
nations. It could be said that es Santially such an order is nonh egg nomic in character. Cn the other hand, the definition of international goas has focus ed con the economic order and stres 52d the need to alter the existing
asymmetrical pattern of economic relations between developed and de weloping countries. These chan - ges imply a new international di wision of about in which the


Page 19
exchange among nations is increa singly carried out on a basis of equality. The reduction of asymmetry and and inequality requires a structure of trade which is radically different from the colonial Structures based on the exchange of primary commodities from economically weak nations, with rThanufactured products from ecorasmi Çally powerful nations. The present project on small nations examines whether the prevailing conditions may terid to te produce both the political as well as the e como Thic configuraticorns of the prevailing international economic system which is characterised by une qual relationships. The Study therefore was expected to examine the preconditions for patterns of relationships which are in accord with the principles accepted in the Non-Aligned Movement and in the Declaration of the New International Economic Order.
Te discussions highlighted significant differences in the two situations in South Asia and South-East Asia boih in regard to the political as well as the economic trends and developments. These differences are manifested in seweral important a reas. First, in the South Asian situation the politics of the region as well as the relationships a Toring the countries in the region did not feel the fu impact of Cold-war diplomacy. In the case of SouthEast Asia, super-power diplomacy and the East-We: E conflict dominated the postwar development of the region. These deep conflicts and sharp confrontations between the big powers fundamentally influenced and shaped the policies and responses of the small nations in South–East Asia. It produced a more clearly identifiable community of political interests in a group of South-East A5 iam rations which resulted in the collectivo arrangements for their security. In the case of South Asla, the re was no major escalation of coldwar politics in the region. It could even be said that the at:5emcg đf cl:5{: IT, teractic: m am Qng countries of the region or movemont tçwär d5 alliam Cø5 (111 d coalitions might be partly attributable to the Wory fact-that the super powers did not complete
strongly to asser in the region and
or groups of Con into their orbit.
(Of course til various interpre attitude of the to the rale o South Asia regi ions at the IT attempt XT facets of coldrelation to the Sic which may hawe the situation, E that the major the relationship Asian region we region and gr political inheritar partition of India tha independence When this is sa tid that t F and north-Easter Indian sub-contir a politically so which the ex influence of t particularly the Chinä and the tin Ling problems South-East Asia Wietnam 31 d Car systems and th hawa aris en in with the other Powers hawe bei in the politics ( South-East Asia.
At tha list agreed that thi further analyse ; international pow region from the of the 5 mall I policies for Tara; relationships wir In the case of the countries in cluding both the Initions as well The Eers of . Movement and share a commc regard to the in in the world a them. Pākista remained Outsids Movement till were exceptions, time Pakistar degree of ideolo to Lig von

"t their presence to draw countries trics more closely
ere hawe been tations of thë :wo super powers f ||rı d| 3 || I the on. The discussleeting did not line the warlous
war strategy in Luth Asian region contributed to ut it was agreed "Corc 25 determinling is in the South fe internal to the * Lut of th 1ce folia wing on and subsequently 2 of Bangladesh" Id, it has to be in north-western 'n frostier 5 of the 12 m. did beca The ih, i DIY 2 TrE i tension of the he big powers, Soviet Union, J.S., posed conlin the Case of the emergence of mbodia as Socialist ig Conflicts that heir relationships major Socialist come a new factor of 5T11|| alia 15 in
55 of 15 it was 2 studies should 3 find elaborate the ver conflicts in the por L 3.f view ations and their ing their external h in this context. So Luth Asia, al|| the region, ingroup of 's Tall" as India, are he Non-Aligned to that extent om id:ology in 1ajor power blocs d relations with and rail which : the Non-Aligned the last Summit but for a long ad shown a faint gical commitment iględ Moyę Tient
and sought membership within it, The membership of South Asian nations in the Non-Aligned Move11 e It hai Cirtainly contributed ta the containment of cold-war conflicts within the region.
In the discussion of the role of
51 all nati C15 i South Asiai ard South-East Asia, thira was the underlying assumption that the
countries contiguo LS and clo5e to the two big powers were relatively small and the refore had comparable problem 5 pertain ing to the relationships of small rations with
the dominant big powers in the region. In this context one option op en to Such Countries was ta :33 perate a m) ng the T155|wes in ord Lr to CrelLe A structure of counterwalling power which could manage the small-big power relationships. The definition of 'small" however is a relative
one. Both Pakistan and Bangladosh hawe populations in excess of 70 Tilliam. In demographic terms they would be regarded as large countries with populations bigger than those of West Germany and J.K. The fact however is that im Talation to l m dia both ini grns of population and national output, they are approximately 19th.
In the South Asian region we hawe two i T10 de rately a large cum tri :S -- Bangladesh and Pakis
tam — follow C: d by much s finaller Countries - Burma, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Afghanistan. When we
come to Iran the pattern alters in an interesting way. Though demographically Small, Iran ha 5 a E TOSS, dom 25 til Predict Yyhich || 5 nearly half of the gross domestic product of India. Im South–East Asia the pattern in terms of size is not wery dissimilar. Again tha group of countries outside China can all be regarded as relatively small, There is of course Indonesia which by itself in terms of population, territorial spread and Tego Urce 20 dowment h:15 tha potential to develop into a major economic power, but in relation to China it is still less than 7th in terms of population and å much snaler fraction of China's gross domestic product. In the situation that has been described, what are che factor5 that provide the motivation and the community of interests to create stronger
|W


Page 20
ties of cooperation among the small nations in these two groups? It could be argued that the current economic trends may tend to produce à pattern of relationships in each of these regions in which the econo Tic exchange and the linkages between a big power and the next major power in the region might grow significantly faster than the linkages between the big powers and the region as a Whole. In such a scenario the important axis in South Asia Would be Iran and India, ånd, provided the political constraints ara o Y er com e. in South-East Asia it would be China and Indonesia, This pattern of relations of course Would bę diffgrgr1 from th: model in which small nations act together to evolve a more equitable pattern of relations with the big powers. As stated earlier, the underlying concepts in that model are those which have emerged from the Declaration of the New
aaLHHLLLLLLL LlLlLlHHHHLLLLS LLLLLLL
the Principles of Non-Alignment.
The group Ing nations offers a which conceptual could emerge. the strength ol large economies throw the Ir wel the 5 miller Cour a more equitable the region as a CQur 542 raj525 : which are inter of STal matos and to the pat which they evolve Given the d Iwer is furthar con different stages reached by the in the region, concertning relat s Tall nations an of a more compl Carl be as su Tie i all countries ou powers - India grau Ped tagethe a blinding cont
in their Tatlo powers.
Next: Powe
Rise in Third World de
by Bhaij Khlindaria
GENEWA
HE FOREIGN debt of develop
|ng countries which do not export oil will reach $440bn in |98|| , up from an estimated S384 bin this year and S329bn last year.
The current account deficit of
such countries will reach nearly SWObi in 1981, a rise from an estimated $63 bri this year and $4 Ibn last year.
These forecasts Were måde in a report by the UN Conference con Trade and Development (UNCTAD) whose decision taking board met here to review problems plaguing economic relations betweer rich and poor countries
The Board, In its meetings highlighted the dramatic deterioration in prospects for the economic development of poorer nations as a direct result of the economic stagnation and recession still dogging the Western indistrial nations and Japan.
8
According to : prepared for the the Purchas ing p -exporting deve wil i Increase t F than I per cent drops in their ex tions suffering ec
The poor expt Thean that such
tries Will man: imports by only cent a year in
compared with : in 1978 and 9
The world's 3 wi|| ach lewe e rate of only 2 year, which coul cent next year they manage to g aid to sustain levels and their ment plans are drought or fami

of the ASEAN fra The Work within ly such a pattern In such a pattern f the moderately such as Indonesia ght together with tries in achiewing a balance with In Whole. This of number of Issues nal to the group taken together ter of relations among themselves, sity in size which pl |cated by the of development different countries the problems ionships between d big nations arte ex character tham d in a model in itside the major and China - are r as small, with unity of interests ns with the big
er" C Ee I tT5
bt seen
a keynote report board meeting QWEr Jf nQn-Oil loping Countrics 1|s year by less because of sharp 3 Corts to richer maonomic slowdown.
rt earnings also developing coun
ge to increase o about 4,5 por 1980 and 98
about ? per comt 79.
0 Poor est mations Cononic growth .6 per cent this lid rise to 3,4 per pro Wided that |et enough foreign
current import economic develop
not scuttled by Tl Ը
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Page 21
NCARAGUA (II)
In the Sandinist
by A Special Correspondent
hile it is very true that WE exists an asymmetry between the bourgeois-laden g0 wern T1 Cental structures adiwa 1Ced non-capitalist COET|'' apparatus of the new state, we must recall the famous phrase "all Political power flows from the barrel of a gun." And in the new Nicaragua the gun is grasped firmly in the Sandinista fist.
Having said this, the focus of our attention must now be shifted to other levels. The armed Sandin ist movement does not exist in a vacuum or hover in mid air, Earlier in our series we have described the FSLN as a Vanguard organisation adopting a mass line, organically linked with
the mass movement and the leading factor in the creation of mass organisations. Now, in victory as in struggle, the FSLN
is indissolubly connected with and rests Lipon the masses. It is the the FSLN which has won, in and through the struggle, the position of hegemony in the popular consciousness. Commander Tomas Borge, Veteran Sandinista, leader of the Pro tracted Peoples War' tendency and presently Minister of the Interior drew attention in his "Newsweek' interview late last year. (1979) to the important fact that the Nicaraguan revolution had given rise to more advanced mass organisations than had the Cuban revolution at the time of its triumph in 1959. Indeed we may note that the final insurrection in Mlicaragua had a much greater intensity than the Rebel Army's final thrust 01 La Hayima,
The degree of
organization of
11 E T1 t [T M||r; higher than was 26th movement. power flows f of a gun and th firmly in the
The 立点 F陀יי | | the Communist I. fra 7 terrical greer ir. and peasan is ay (We Wheroīe array cip a ffori cyf' (G Which is carryi de terrrired stri, inperialism of th | The Capriffir I IPO) all working (fr) F7S 7 rud a le e of a countrie, Gerreral Sardino
- Excerpt frc Edopted by thi Congress meet Quoted in the nal Internation: dençe (INPRECC
then the arm is that of the n While the 'bod Prises the popula of Nicaragua. T wel I say that If
tradiction with dominated gover becomes an antag
is the Sandinist in all probability Primary aspect of tion. Such a co
have to be res QWerthrow, di 5man
Purging the sphe ment and thereby ting the bourg coi:

a fist
Consciousness and the mass Toweguia is probably that of the July If all political rom the barrel e gun is grasped Sandinista fist,
Pr'' (Tori gress of ιε η α Γιάντα τεη, η g5 ( he workers Wĩr"tỉragua, and 2 viational errar2ηeral Sα η αίτιο, 'g Dr. T brape Ε. Είες αεταίνης τήε e Liri i red Starës, Viserrariari II ras Class organisa7 firé Prosera 5 ... a support |
in the resolution 2 &th Cormintern
In oscow B Commintern Jour| Press Correspan. RR) Sept. 1st 98.
behind the fist
na 55 m o woment, y' itself com. r Social sectors herefore we may the latent conthe bourgeois nmental sectors Cristic one, it forces that will, emerge as the the contradictradiction will icol ved by the tling or merely ares of governfirmly relegafractions to a
Position of subalternity in Power bloc. The Peoples cracles of the post-war Provide examples of such transtional situations. On the other hand, the Way in which che PCP, MFA and the radical left were out manoeuvred by Social Democracy and imperialism in Portugal furnish in negative example and rem ind us that the victory of the socialist option is not inevi. table in transitional periods, and that restorationism is within the realm of logical possibility. Yet In Nicaragua, the politico-military weight of the Sandinistas, together with the social weight of the mass organisations render t extremely difficult for the bourgeois Sectors to wrest and retain, for any prolonged period, the hegemony that the FSLN won Euח In hand during the period of armed struggle against the Somoza dictatorship.
W DemoPeriod
Here an objection may be raised, Invoking on its behalf the spectre of Algeria where the army itself assumed a Bonapartist role and then Proceeded to reverse the gains of the revolution and build UP dependent capitalism. Is it not probable that the FSLN's National Directorate would itself
Play an essentially similar role However, the answer is that despite slight and Superficial
similarities, the FSLN's forces are qualitatively different from the Algerian army of Huo ari Boume
dienne. Ruth First explains to L5 in "The Batre of a Gun" that the Algerian regular агпny
Was a non-combatant one based in Tunisia and kept physically
9


Page 22
Separate from the "Wilayas"- the Guerilla command groups which were the real forces engaged in the armed struggle, by the *Curice lince of fortification 5 built by the French along the border. The Wilayas themselves had been militarily weakened by the defeat sustain cd in the long Battle of Algiers, which paradoxically had politically weakened the French. With the Evian agreement negotiated by the new Gaulist regime, 3 groups contended for power and influence within the nationalist movement: namEly, the bourgeois reform ist politicans, Boumedienne's regular army, and the guerilla command groups. The first two groups based in the exterior (Tunisia) united to crush the power of the Wilayas, who were already weak Tilitarily having borne the brunt of the struggle. Then in 1963, the regular army ousted the Politicians (reformists and radicals) and seized power in a coup d'etat.
In Nicaragua though the te may be a distinction between the forces that operated from inside the Costa Rica m border a rid the detachments that spearheaded the Lurban insurrections, there is no cleavage as existed in Algeria between a non-combatant regular army and a combatant guerilla force. The Sandinista army headed by its National Directorate of Field Connanders, is a revolutionary army of the people, for Ted, transformed and tempered in a way of the people.
Finally let us, shift our attention from the political instance to the ideological instance, for Gramsci and 1ao haye, in theiro separa te ways, emphasilized the ideological hegemony of the proletariat, the decisiwe importance of the correct (proletarian) line,
It is of no Ilean importance that portraits of General Sandino are present in every Corner of Free Nicaragua, because the Ideology of the FSLN revolutionaries and the dominant ideology (as opposed to bourgeois reformism) of the Nicaraguan revolution is Sandinismo. This is no empty symbol or concessionary, gesture
by immaculate Marxists-Leninists
O
to "backward' po To the contrary, in the heart of te volutionary. powerful expressic alism of revolutic It is also infused social contert
itself on the
masses and led precisely at a t go2ois reform ism to imperialism. future was egal operativist. TH 5tric test Sense S said to correspor position of the i t i 5 stupidly zarr it, as Trotskyists bourgeois nation: scientific prolet Indeed, the task |a55. I tres 5
interests, and with internation a Duam), of synthe and the revol Khac Wien), is o strategic problem: Irist5 in the color and dependent (r tries. Fidel Cast the traditions c years of struggle giants like "fax|r Marc | and "the Antonic facco
tTaditio of reb ism-Leninism.
The CLAS Ge which proclaim principles of f guide the revolut of Latin America" in its second th Revolution in Lat deepest historica liberation Tower pean colonialis century. The epi peoples of Arnieri class battles that carried out again earlier decades, source of historic the Latin Americ Toetent."
Sandimismo mu understood as national-popular inst imperialism a a5 well as a net

pular sentiments. * Sandirio Liwea5"! ewery Nicā raguan āmid | rm | sm is a in of ant l-Imperinary na tlo nalism. with an egalitar lan 5irice I bö3ı Sed Worker-pela sant their struggle ima when bourhad capitulated |ts wis lor of the itarian and coough in the 1rdirls m may be id to the class betty-bourgeoisie, "ogant to dismiss do as a pettyalism opposed to
arian socialism.
cf "identifying
With national ational Interests | interests" (Le sizing "tradition Ution''' (Nguyen ne of the key
for Marxist-Lenial, ser | colon I al neocolonial) coun"o carried forward if "aris Fhi Lundred " dom imated by To Gomez, Hose Bronze TI tarm" and fused this lion with Marx
eral Declaration ad that "the “İarxİ5 m-Lenin ism ionary movement also proclaimed,
esis, that "'the in America has roots in the
ent against Euroof the 9th c struggle of the ca and the great our People hawe st perialist in constitutes the cal inspiration for can revolutionary
st therefore be a wehicle for mobilization againd the oligarchy, :3ary ti
Marxist State
Nicaragua Pio IV appears ro be y'ell cor te 14'e yo to fiecarring sa pro-Cuban Marxist state, senior U.S. 20’icials said here.
PVM i fe House, Strafe Depart| ment and Pentagon officials said | irl (I series cf recevr frt ferviews | the Carter administration had last hope that the Central Arnericar call fry could he encouraged U 71 ft) da Frödera fe der Placrific corse - Οι ιείIE: Pashing for I, 5 μriειαν,
- Reproduced in "Ceylon Daily News' Monday April 28th 1980.
socialist project significant enough this was the position held by the Cornintern in its "Third Period when it is alleged to hawe ignored the importance of nationalism. At its 6th Congress in July 1928, the Comintern unanimously approved a resolution affirming its strong support for General Sandino's war of national | iberation against J. S. imperialis T and urged that all the affiliates of the Corn intern, e specially those in the ATerica's should support Sandino by all possible means. In accordance with this, Chinese CoTTunist Party and the Left Kuomintang na Ted an arried de Lachment after Sandino!
Of course, the contemporary Sandim İsta mo'w cment a 5 it was reconstituted in 1962 by Carlos Fonseka Amador, (whose renegade brother is the Trotskyist Fausto Amador) is not simply a revoluttionary rationalist Ո՞լ էին է:Fll El I, Writing in "Tricontinental" magazine (the Hawa na based organ of OSPA AAL) in 1969, Carlos Fonseka identified the sources of inspiration of the FSLN (apart from Sandi no) and stated that they base themselves on "the teachings
of °arx, Lerlin, Fidel, Cha ard Ho Chi Minh.' It is this ideological strand that the FSLN will
hawe to refine, clarify and Strengthen in their new stage of development, Lenin tells us that the petty bourgeoisie cannot be a stable ruling class, but can only be, in the final analysis, a stepping stone either for the


Page 23
dictatorship of the bourgeoisie or the dictatorship of the proletariat. This is true in the ideological theoretical realm too.
Anti imperialist revolutionary rationalism, though an important, Indeed inevitable stage, is still only a transitional stage, a 'stopping stone'. The reformistic liberal bourgeois le and the social de Tocrats will seck to Wawe the banner of Sandinism against Socialism, against Communism, since the three specific features of the
Cuban revolution wiz the ambiguous position of the United States, the ambiguous (latterly,
supportive) position fractions of the domestic bourgeoisie and the supportive position of the surrounding bourgeois states, are present in Nicaragua, there will be efforts to replay the Cuban scenario differently this time. If these efforts are to be foiled, Sandinismo will
hawl to "Commi gically (to use Amilcar Cabral) as a Scientific ideology of th this process, cler will be negated be re-affirmed higher stage c spiral contal ned enriched synthe: moving forwa Prcletarian Soc revolutionary, imperialism of preserved.
The fact that Che Guevara c that of General Nicaragua is a advanced clames år e conscious col taken this taspoint out the of Jose Pope Fi
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within a new, is. It is only by “d to scientific |alism that the rationalist anti
Sandin is no be
the portrait of ften accompanies Sandino In Free symbol that the its of the FSLN and hawe under&. Cha Luscid to nega tl we ex a rTnple gueres who led a
successful nationalist revolution in Costa Rica in 1948, became President and ther negated the
peoples aspirations by selling out to US interests representing the great monopolies-which wanted an "honourable' popular government with a 'good' reputation. The FSLN will take care to avoid these "pitfalls of a purely national consciousness' (Warned on another continent by Fanon) and Nicaragua will probably provide a real example of a viable synthesis of indirect representative democratic institutions and organs of direct popular democracy as argued for by Rosa Luxemburg.
Indeed we may confidently expect that the New Nicaragua will be a free, independent, democratic and socialist Nicaragua, where the working masses are the collective masters and makers of their own destiny. (Concluded)
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Page 24
DEVOLUTION (2)
qTTSTSTTSSTTSTSSTSSqSqSqTAAAASSSSSSSSSqASAAAeAMAAAAAeAAAeASAMeASAMAAS
Planning at dist
by Neelan Tiruchelvam
ho Executive Committee Would
be the political executive at the district level which is collectively responsible and answerable to the people for the Implementation of the development plan. Functional responsibilities may be distributed bewoon in diwidual members of the Executive who may within these spheres provide political direction
and supervision to the District Administration. Tha District AdTimistration would hawe two
categories of serwants and officers, Firstly, servants and employees appointed by the Council and subject to its control. This category would include officers required within a district and who would form part of an administrative and technical pool which would primarily service the needs of each district. Secondly, other officers who may be posted to such Councils by the Government and whose services may be secured by the Council for the di s charge of its functions and responsibilities. There would need to be a District Secretary, to be the bureaucratic head of the district administration, subject to the direction of the political executive and accountable to the Development Council. The implementation of the plan would be through the instrumentality of the District administration. Each district may also explore the potential of involving the private sector and other non-governmential organisations in the execution of developmental projects,
The other basic to the
which is scheme envisaged Here is that of the district development plan. The preliminary work relating to such a plan, including technical feasibility and detailed financial estimates of projects would have to be initiated by the Executive Committee. The Flan may be In respect of any of the subjegus to be devolved on Development Councils. It is an imperative
сопсерt
22.
requirement of reference that the (a) agriculture an use and settlem husbandry, (d) { small and medium (f) fisheries, (g) r (h) housing, (f) (k) cultural affair. tien, (mi) agricul (n) social services Services. (vide the White Paper of irrigation Wor an intra-district district level em bo considered.
The draft pla formulated by
Committee will the Development would be require wote Lupon | t. responsibility fo annual district . would be wested
ment Counci | include the prop the financing of ture whether by wing or grant.
so formulated
would need to Once the plan approved the ( Executive Commit responsibility for tion in respect as are referred Plan. The Deve should also hawe formulating 在1 importance to
respect of subje àfore zäid ||St.
should hawe the ferring such de' to such Council.
As regards the ture of Develop significant Comp financial needs through grants There has been

rict level
the terms of
subjects include, d food, (b) land ent, (c) animal co-operatives (e) scale industries, ural development, health services, ; (1) Toninor. Irrgatural marketing, and (a) agrarian paragraph 12 of ). The addition ks which are of
character, and loyment need to
rl which is so the Executive de presented to Council which d to debate and The statutory r preparing an development plan in the DevelopThe plan would Q5 als relating to annual expendirevenue, borraA plan which is by the Council be 'approved." has been so ouncil and the tee would assume the ad Tini5traof such matters to irii the sa I d lopment Council 3 the power of y scheme քնf the cis Lric. Im Es coutsid the The Gow criment power of transelopment scheme
2 financial strucIm Ent Councils, a orient of ther would be mot fr the cette. concern that the
present system of financial al locatil ons as represented by the decentralized budget does not adequately take note of the varying
financial needs, developmental potential and Implementation capacity of different districts. Undeveloped electorates with population dispersed over an entire districct hawe hitherto be en de nied the special consideration that they require. There is accordingly the need for an Independent Grants Commission
to evolve objective criteria for Tesource al location based of Arta
stage of development potential for raising revenue and expenditure needs, Օm a Possible approach would be for such a
Commission to develop a formulabased system of grants which is operative for a period of years. Such a system could facilitate stability and predictability in the financial arrangements of districts without depriving the scheme of the flexibility which may be called for by major calamities and un forese en contingencies, Stable financial arrangement could further enhance the capacity of Development Councils to make long term projections with regard to development priorities. A Grants CoTimission would further II in iTlise the intrusion of political Considerations and other subjective factors in to decision Taking on resource allocations.
Direct grants would need to be supplemented by additional re
sources. The capacity of Development Councils to mobilise such resources would no doubt wary.
The Secretary to of Finance and Planning has drawn attention to a few Supplementary taxes and charges on activities within a district which may be levied by Development Councils. (wide memorandum dated October 12th, 1979.) He further added that there is, "no objection to Development Councils underta
the Ministry


Page 25
king commercially viable developlet projects financed by Commercial Banks or a DevelopInent Bank". He has further pointed to the possibilities of Development Councils borrowing from the market through debentures, bonds and stocks provided such Councils have the capacity for repayment. In our view there is scope for imposing levies on economic activities within a district, without adding to the fiscal burden of ordinary people. In addition there is need to examin e the possibilities of revenue sharing schemes or the assignment of sources of revenue to such Development Councils. We may also note that the Government has recognized that Development Councils could expedite the integrated development plans for districts financed by the World Bank and other international organizations. (Wide paragraph 4 of the letter dated |3th November, 1979 from the Secretary to the President). Such projects are now in operation in Kuru negala, Matara and Hamba ntota; and similar support for other districts is under negotiation.
We need to refer to the Government's decision to West Development Councils with local
government functions relating to rural areas. In this respect the Development Council would become the legal successor of all existing Town Councils and Willage Councils and would be responsible for the local government functions which were within their jurisdiction. We note that this policy decision recognised that existing local authorities in view of their limited owers and financial resources E. little capacity to transform the quality of life of the people for whom they were responsible. The aggregation of rural focal bodies at the district level will facilitate greater rationalisation of revenue collection and expenditure on local government services. The institutional void at the village level may, however be filled by the creation of an institution which could make direct representatic ns to the Development Councils on matters whics concern a village or a cluster of villages.
The magnitude which should be a resolution of t crises facing 5 calls for concertig political executive, tration and loc. The innovations recommended pro' for the integratic which hawe work for many deca changes, howev become meanings. result in an imp quality of life in If this experimen the new structur to be sustained E abiding commitme of power and re the people in re. which intimately Ci
We summarise tions as follows:-
(1) The Develop
be a corpor subordinate l: subject to t Pāriment, hawe statutor lewy taxes a and in west its
(2) The Councils of a Membe
in a district nurnber of m at a General purpose of St. elected Chair at the Dew The District be a member but whenever messages or Council. The IC 55Ј ПТ 1 1 co-ordinating Centre in re. not forming
(3) The grants,
and loans rec Councils to E District Day
The political
district level
tiwe Committ be collective the Council three or fol Council app
(4)

of the affort directed towards he development 2veral districts, d action by the district adminisal government, hac have been vide a framework n of institutions
ed In Isolation des, Structural r, imaginative | only if they
"ovement in the all its elements.
t is to succeed es would need ly a deep and
nt to the sharing sponsibility with spect of problems oncern a district.
our recommenda
ment Council to ate body with
awmaking powers he approval of
The Council to y authority to ind raise loans . טוחסCחi ;
hall be composed rts of Parliament
and a specified e Tibers, elected
Election for the ch Councils. An man to preside ipment Council. Minister will not
of the Council appropriate send
address the District Minister he agency and
function of the pect of activities art of the plan.
evenue, charges avered by such e credited to a 2lopment Fund.
executive at the to be the Execu. 2e which would responsible to
and consist of members of the inted by the
CONSO LEXPO
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T'phone : 25 67/8 2698 3
23


Page 26
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
District Minister and the Chairman. The District Minister will be the head and the
Chair Illar ex-officio member.
The functions of the Council to include, (a) the formulation of the district plan, (b) the of the
development imple Tentation district development plan, (c) the co-ordination and evaluation of district development activities and (d) the expenditure of funds wested in the District Dewelopment Fund.
The functions of the Executive Committee to include -
(d) the formulation of a draft district development plan;
(b) the implementation of the district development plan and the supervision of the
district administration: and
(c) any other powers which may be delegated by the
Development Council.
The subjects to be devolved on such Councils to include the subjects referred to in paragraph 2 of the White Paper. This means that the Council may formulate a district development plan in of such subjects,
respect Once the plan is 'approved" the Council will assume respon 5 ibility for the administration in respect of such matters as are referred to in the plan. The Council пау for Tulate any development scheme in respect of a subject outside the list and request the government to transfer such a scheme to the Council.
also
An independent Grants Commission to be empowered to make firmåciā| ā|| cca tiems to such Councils, and to 25 blish a formula based system of gran CIS,
(9) Development
become the to all Town
Willage Counc district and local governme. respect of th
within a distri
De Welopment expedite the of integrated d ΠΕ ΠΙ project: international ag
(10)
(II) The District Ac
consist of -
(a) officers and
inted by
(b) such othe пmay be p Councils E. Gowen mer SEFE-5 T
by such C
Which way fo
((Carlo iri ideo fraj f.
A: A5 | hawe me the present stage tiom is one in wh cl555 and the left to gåd the : against Imperial is socialism. In tack should keep the at perspective in mi behawe accordingly.
The development pendent role of class, cf the unit tra de LInion; as W |gft for Ces at polit through developm struggles should ti Qv gro Qur in wQlygm ary contradictions between groups. C bourgeoisie. We c way propose that HS iridifféreft ta among bourgeois should stri we or t exploit Such contr favour without je strategic tasks oi class and the loft.

Councils T է: egal successor Councils and ils within a o issu The the 1t fur-tions in e rural areas
it.
Co Luis10:ilg t Implementation listrict develop5 funded by gencles.
| || || 5 til to
52 T'WAT 5: арроhe Council;
officers who
osted to such y the Central it or whose hay be utilised .il5ם וזנוס
. . .
t, Pige :)
tioned earlier, of the te Yoluich the working
should strive at1cal struggle im and for
:ling tasks, we bowe long-term nd act and
of the idethe working of organised vell as unity of lical party ovel, nent of mass A k, 2 Proca der C2 ents in temporand struggles if the national iо поl in any the left should contradictions group ing 5. We he contrary to à diction5 in Our opar dising the the working
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Page 28
Suicide notes :
last farewell
by Jayantha Somas underarm
tatistics tell us that Tore SE ki || themselves than end Lup being killed by others, In the UK for men, homicide is the cause of 0.8 deaths per 100,000 while suicide is the cause of II.4, deaths. Men however arc more prone to suicide than women. Further, it was found that suicide rates fell during war time, Confirm Ing Freud's theory that during national conflicts the collec
tive aggressive ness of people ate
di Tected towards 효
епепу.
Sigmund Freud had already
Identified two basic Instincts in mankind-Lowe and Destruction, In suicide the two instincts would appear to be blurred by parallax. Oscar Wilde who said that "To love one self is the beginning of a life long romance," was also the one who wrote "yet each
man kills the thing he lowes....
the brave man with a sword.'"
A study was recently conducted among 79 graduate students at the University of Illinois. The sample who averaged 24 years, had 43 who were planning suicide, 2 who were entertaining suicidal thoughts and 15 who had attempted suicide. The study which was reported in Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica classifies their motives in to four. The first were lonely due to the breakup of a relationship. The second had health problems. The third experienced failure. And
ra" the fourth wanted to hurt others.
Ore finds an
motives in the :
this wife left by
"I took the mot go on. I W He left been playing ab, an. If myוחסW up, it will be t cowri ho Te. Ewer as a child my fa W|th Warren. “ it. I swore no ri tО ПЕ. I am fur but the Te is wrong with me, my father, I sai playing around ז 5"That .חaוחסW him into it. I didn't like it, somebody else : what I asked. No except him. Wi nothing. I can't | can't liwe om copa. did ne Thyself, just to It's blacktail doesn't Succeed. .... there won' chance, I will II;
TE : ''
At the other ls what Emile Du classified as altri culture damned coward - they w to jail for an uns But in the af
Ru55 iam Rewoluti a group of PC themselves in to the situation

The
amalgam of these suicide note that քիimd
because could anted Jim back. eek ago. He has out with another marriage breaks he 5am (2 as rTny since releber ther played about ty mother took han would do that ious and it hurts also something Jim || 5 not || ke d just now he was
With another not true. I pushed told him if he
he could look for ind he did. I got )w I want nothing thout him life is face my Thother; my own, 1 сап”t It want to kill get him back, know, but if it ... the next time t be a second ake damn sure."
end of the scale rkheim in Suicide uistic suicide. Our the suicide a 'i|| Even send hlrn uccessful attempt. termath of the in there energed hets who killed heroic opposition in their country.
Boris Pasternak who wrote about them says that "To start with what is Tost important: wwe
have no conception of the Inner
torture which precedes suicide. People who are physically tortuted on the Tack keep los ing consciousness, their suffering is so great that its un endurable in Lansity shorters the end. But a man who is thus at the mercy of the executioner is not annihilated when he faints from pain, for he is present at his own end, his past belongs to him, his memories are his and, if he chooses, he can make use of them, they can help him before his death.
"But a man who decides to cornmit Sulclde puts a full stop to h15 being, he turns his back om his past, he declares himself a bankrupt and his The Tori e5 to be un real. They can no longer help to save him, he has put himself beyond their reach. The continuity of his Inner life is broken, his personality Is at an end. And perhaps what finally makes him ki || himself is not the firmness of his resolve but the unbearable quality of this anguish which belongs to no one, of this suffering in the absence of the sufferer, of this waiting which is empty because life has stopped and can no longer fil|| it.
"It seems to me that Mayakovsky shot himself out of pride, because he condemned something in himself, or close to him, to which his self-respect could not submit. That Yesen in hanged himself without having properly thought out


Page 29
the consequences of his act, still saying in his in most heart; "Who k fic) Wys? Perhaps this isn't yg t the end. Nothing is yet decided'. That Maria Tsvetayeva had always held her work Between herself and the reality of daily life; and when she found this luxury beyond her means, which she felt that for her son's sako she must, for a time, give up her passionate absorption in poetry and look round her soberly, she saw chaos. No longer screened by art, fixed, un familiar molicarle SS, and not knowing where to run for terror, she hid in death, putting her head into the rose as sh might hawe hidden her head under her pilow. It seems to me that Paolo Yashwili was utterly confused, spell bound by the Shigaly owshchina of 1937 as by witchcraft; and that he watched his daughter as she slept at night and imagining himself unworthy to look at her, went out in the morning to his friends" hic use and b | 5 god his had with grapeshot from his doublebarrelled gun. And it seemed to me that Fadeyev, still with that a polagetic simile which had so Te - how stayed with him through all the crafty ins and outs of politics, told himselfe just before he pulled the trigger: "Well, now it's over. go odbye, Sasha.
"What is certain is that they all suffered beyond description, to the point where suffering has become a mari ta | &i:kn: S. Ard, as We bow homage to their gifts and to their bright memory, we should bow compassionately before their suffering."
The last farewell of suicides has now been subjected to statistical analysis, Bjerg Kresten has done this in Essays in selfdestruction. He says that ån analysis of suicide notes reveals that 8 percent had frustrated des Ire, This was personal in same causes: "I'm too lonely." "I don't hay C a frim d." Som 2 causas were responses to others: "I hope nobody hurts you like you have mic,' 'I hawg Ecgn treated like a dog." "I can never stop loving you so I shall take this way out."
Kresten says that Cent of the Tit Les
in- 59 per the dominant
fca t Lure is irritorat all mixed up.' " like this.' Closely are the 17 perce dislike of themsel" a sharn ånd a fi the only decent Six percent believ expected to da what you wante. p||ls for you." " Satisfigd.'
In at least 7 p. re wiewed thers is Better future acr "I am going to "I hope one day ir heawer ''
In 6 percent oft the W |ctirm bu eçxr 'You drove a h:1'wg k.i ||gd II1g:. ""
And finally the the aggressive, pi come o LL clearly We||: "I hope you breath on your mi hope each time y try you will hawe Ciri e who is ther
Trends . . .
(ĊT FI FirTrell li
large inflows of leaking QL, que
Palestine
| The SLFP pre: steady provocativ LMP si bout ||sra, th It, kno Wr) LIN have formed a
the government Israel to oper i Colombo, Refus || |}|ိုး၊ the UNP In the trencf.
It is not any | Qi. It is a Sigri world-wide succe stre Day meetir Wys addressed from Dr. M. C. representatives a Sa id are observe Pelsestfrie is 50 s the JWP cor descɛ to the 5τΠιε μ SIFPI''

| strain: "| am сап't go оп related to them nt who show es : ""1" we been ilure.' This is thing to do.' ed they were this: "'This is .." "I took the hope you are
er cent of those the hope of a oss the grave: meet my Dad." we will meet
he su I tid notes Il es accusat Ory: to this.' 'You
4 percent where Initive element in the la st fare| hawe my last nd fore wer.'" '"'|
"CLI p155 em.
memories of
"t}r?i Hage I )
capital may be ity.
55 millntdin 5 ti e fire on the e t csars IP sy'n pa; this ers lobby to push
into allowing ts embros sy in og to be prostays pati ently
a question of of the PLO's 55 that the Paleng in Colombo
by everybody
M. Klee to f the ultra-left. r : ''The ca II of trọng that even rded to come atform as the
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Page 30
letters . . .
(Co Triri u ed frare page )
fa || Lires of the gowt. When such a devil dance was going om in the three-cornered mu dslinging competition, it was no Wonder the rulers were cooly Squatting on Galle Face regaling themselves with tales of sculptors and swinging to the beat of Hindi Music! Has the May Day become a day of entertainment In Sri Lanka?
Gone are the days when capitalists were frightened of the display of militant solidarity of the Working Class and took Protective leasures to shield their showrooms. Gone are the days when slogans were resolves and challenges; promises and proclamations. Today's slogans are ritualistic. The May Day should not become another ritualistic per ahera, with more spectators than participants. In the per ahera we used to count the elephants, what do we count In the May Day processions? We should ba a ble to count on the processionists and their proclamations.
Hatton R. R. Siwalingam
“Uthumaneni”
With reference to Uyangoda's glowling tribute to Gamini Fonseka and the fi | * UTHUMANENI' | quote from George Orwell:
"The fact is that this busing 55 about the mora li superlority of the poor is one of the deadlest forms of cscapism the ruling class have evolved. You may ba downtrodden and swindled, but in the eye of God, you are superior to your oppressors and by means of films and magazines, you can enjoy a fantasy existence In which you constantly triumph ower the people who defeat you in real. iife. In any from of art desgried to appeal to larga number Cyf people, it is an ismost um head-of thing for a rich filian to get the better of a E. man... FilmTl magnātes, press ords and the like a mass quito a lot of their wealth by pointing out that Yealth is wicked.
"The formula "good-poor-man defeats bad - rich man' is simply a subtler Wersion of "pie-in-thesky'... 1 I is a Sub li rTmati fi elf the Cla55 5 Ι. Γιggle."
What is the so portrayed in the rude be hawlio Lur constable? The pt of a lawyer? W injustice that wo poss sible for Bat to expropriate ht bour'5 ||ard? Wh justice of a syste force a women wait. . for her betr his sister in Ilar he could marry F a film that prese in justices as "given while presenting problems as pur. ones and ones w an "individual' so
Colombo
Anamac
Although the C by it's editorial madu wa by-electic to lull the gover stato of complace bo we || for the to realize that n the total wote T5 : do not seem to the gigantic develc of the govern mer
To be exact th ca 5 t for the UN Wotes Tore than h
polled (36,782) at . Parhadura W.
Mass nt
W. K. Wijeratine Panadura to anniversary numb refers to the "Wacuu has bee the field of masscountry, during th
Suffice it, for out, that, the in many count
dubbed "yellow' cheap-sensational after a dubious pop of intellectual as forms of journalis
May your we Cortin Lie, to m; least to some glaring deficienci —redia!
Kandy F. Bert
B

lal injustice |
f The of a police erile tantu This hät of the ld make it y Mahattaya poor neighL of the InIn that would to wait...and thed to give riage before er? What of its all these ' in a society, raal soc|al ly 'personal' Hich de Thandi Li tion?
S. Kotte goda |uWa
DN of 9.5 80 on the AnaIn result tries Tert to a ncy, it would gowc Triment early half of At Anamā dwl be endorsing opment efforts 1. e 18,552 wotes P is just 16 alf of the total Aramaduwa.
K. Wijeratina ||
|edia
, writing from Your second r, of May 1st act, that, a filled' in media, in this ose two years.
me to point bopular press,
İe 5 is C2 werı
beca uso of 5 T1, han kering ularity and lack well as other :ic honesty. rthy journal ke good, at 2xtent, these :S | ur Ta55
| Rana singhe
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Page 31
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