Page 1
Exclusive: GAIL OMVEDT
LANKA
JR’s
SURG|
STRIK|
- Mer
ass
Vikramabahu Karunar: G. G. Ponnambalam
a ❤
e Chintaka replies 9 Presidency, Parlia 0 Role of the Oppo
Deng on Mao, (
 
 

- TURN4OIL IN INDIA
A"rs ○andhi
o. 10 October 1, 1980 Price Rs. 3/50
E
vyn de Silva
"I shall return' 7
on DDCs
to Shantha de Awis
ment and PR
sition
4 and Capitalism

Page 2
r
Ano Specialise from People'
Sa Deposit
Protect your valuable jew People's Bank SAFE DEPOSI The People's Bank offers locker units in three differents staff for prompt individual atte This unit is situated at the floor of the People's Bank, He Rent a Safe Deposit Locke valuables really safe.
Contact:
The Manager, People's Bank. Headquarters Branch,
Sir Chittampalam Gardiner N ColorT1bo 2.
HEAD OFFIC
يوسينيات ووحدات -
7ية" - - - - - - .
High
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

ther 2d Service
the S Bank
fe Lockers
'ellery, documents, etc., in a T LOCKER.
you separate safe deposit sizes and with specialised .חסtiח?
fully air-conditioned second ad Office.
r and keep yout
Ma Watha,
PLE’S BANK
2E COLOMBO 2. TEL: 27841–9
ل

Page 3
TULF's RETURN
"Any friention of District CounCls, language or Tamils, and all you get from the SLFP is kneejerk reaction "said a prominent LSSP'er visibly dejected. He was cornmenting on the SLFP's 'senseless opposition' to the Developmert Councils On the grounds that it would divide the country.
Ag he pointed a Lit, the MEas Lire can BC crítics sed for other ref75a 15 but the SLFP's hostility Smacks of raciglisrm.
Dissociating himself from the party position, Mr. An Lura Banda] - rarna i ke did precisely tfit when he spoke on t fie DDC's dit (7 recent 5 efninur. Yet official stund
re Tuins ural tered. I'r wlew of this the regtor13 between the TULF which was moving close
to the post May Day 5-party bloc, grid the SLFP cooled considerably in August.
But the TULF is now prepared to invite the leaders of SLFP, LSSP etc. to Jaffna where Mr. Amrthal rigam wiI presi de Over a mass meeting. Will Mrs. B. go
GASEOUS
'''Whate wer /h (TpperI c:d to tfhd { OPEC petition?" guffawed an ex-Minister at a serminar recently and unlike Pontious Pilate, paused long enough for his own aris Wer. "As I those stirring speeches, the million signatures, the broadcasts and newspaper articles, those breast-beating editorials and Sheik-beating commenta ries and cartoons. . . . what a waste of energy.. "
While the politician and the pro-government publicists do Se em to have guzzeled their own gas", this is little comfort to the Citizer Who Lunderstands the realties of Interratoria e con Qmics and is not bamboozled by puer le propagar) da St Lurts.
The Finance Minister, for example, is now in Washington for the IMF-IBRD annual get together. Sri Lanka has drawn
30 mil Fior SDR5 aut ofits 1980 quota of 90 millian SDRs. Since negotiations between the government and an IMF Tirision bray cd In Conclusive, Sri Lanka did not
draw the balance With the budge shape, Mr. de can now get M. this &C) Ti ir
0 3DR5
EL Le MF ] Te Wy crisi 5. || not to gra7int obs the PLO - 1 de the Arab oi! pro. Saudi Arabia diri the IJ (ter had de T1 and by plac ort Jours to 1
SOUTH
DI ALC
How united
National Party?
WEEKEND did together the C shes, the disrns Wice-Chair man (c. dnd the protraci "two-decade old
r1 I ster Jrid I wc fluential persợric. bouring electors were frientioned
were 7 i Lu ( 1 for dissembing,
The i rony, as urder fried, was In the US Trg Li case for aid In the West, th pating in the sog Le bLit here st dLiel Wige crack: În a leftwing Weekend*5 JSF mentary aspirati i EE || 1 || B. G. UNP High Comn to preside over dialogue if the United Nata become bazaar
ALTTLE
''As far 7 s te J. R. Jayewarde. no fore totator
Take d bow, M specker is norie: drden (Idwarate occasion of just In 5 hart, FDB.
The di 5. sssr op 17 erat (C) Jiri Cil.
(Torfiri Farid

) ja SDR5. t taking final Me | hirik 5 fic: F approva l for drid a further next year.
tself is facing t has decided i erwer StJË LIS, t) mand made by ducers, led by Kuwd it. Msid backed up their rig an embargo WMF.
SOUTH |GUE
Is the United The enterprising
neatly pieced )e wiri u wara lsal of the ADM party s talwort) ted war between
riya:/s", II Milry rich and Irility fταιη η eightes. No dires
but the C|Le5 l'Îth || tte Cid re
Fe WWEER END
that both were 'rig Sri Lanka's Idrid i'r wes (Teriť. - ey dire porti cinorth-south dia.'s 7 south-south 3.d a casurfirisst 3aper. But the de about par faons and party iggest that the land will have a mot fi er sort of : 'unity' of the
Party is not to ξα 55 P.
BIT OF....
:ndencies go, Mr. ne is probably jJ 1 tr) | url..."
F. Presiderit, the
Other ffild!) the : (r) 7 f, FTTILIS a litt se bit of T
is about Dewes; the venue, the
(F೫ Pope #}
Whither Now?
We are grateful for the cow. erage given in the L. G. as it keeps those of us who are living abroad informed of the actual situation in our country.
The recent Striko, the attitude of the government towards it, and the action taken against the strikers were given good coverage in the foreign and local me wis media here.
This came at a time when world attention has been focuSS ed on the Wor5ening e conomlc: r"é2Ce 55ior1 and ne W5 a. boLut strikes in many countries was reaching the headlines. The attitude of the governments in Polland (Communist). Britain (Capitalist), South Africa (Fascist) and Zimbabwe (Socialist) were in marked contrast to Sri Lanka.
Naturally the UNP's handling of the situation came in for
(சொriled r page :)
LANKA
GUARDIAN
Wol, 3 No. 10 October 1, 1980 Fricc350
Published fortnightly by Lanka Guardian Publishing Co. Ltd. First Floor, 88, N. H. N. Abdul Ciller Road,
Re:la 14 tion Rii:Lld) ('&limbo II,
Editor : Meirw yn de Silway Tcl choc: 29.
CONTENTS
LeL LET3 News Background Foreign News 7 L]evelopTIT CIE COLIIIcils 1. Parlianent and Presidency 15 Chintika relies 3 Sclı olar hıçqırığılır:
Priated by Arial Indal Press 825, Wolfendhal Street, Colombo 3.
Telephone: 35975

Page 4
- - Trends , , , Letters , , ,
Centre, where the most serioLIS much comment, a cxchanges a re en li wened by the it difficult to ha good humoured retort, the bom as to the politic riot and the bar. And, ds Mr. country.
Ariura Bandarana ke discovered From about t at the same place on the same str Ike was calle| subject 50ITT : Tice little | FQnje 5 also been арpare! (L. G. Sept. 15). empts to censor |
Arira did not take the SLFP Something un prei leadership line on the DDCs. which brought There was no at tempt to di wide of World Wat ||
the country, no indefensible conce- After 50 years 55iors to the Turris. the franchise, Wf
FDB disc attacked the measure from here? as representing a centralisation Kenya. Anil of power. More than a little bit UNF
of totali tari ar īsT? Who was he
to protest? Well, if there was Mid - Ter no totali ta riam Isrm Im fact In I 770- Reading Mr. A 77, it was not for want of try. self-assessment c Ing. Unlike today when the UNP performanco (L has 56ths in the NSA, parliament one begins to wo In his timie fhad a strong oppg-- | the main thing sition (the UNP, the TULF and Oxford was rhet sa ter the LSSP) and outside the for example, the f House, there was always the ntly answerable Centre, the Civil Rights Move- ponderously pose
tendencies' ir check. years the UNP
ment etc to keep those da ngero Luis one deny that in
Mosaic Luxury
O BOARD ROOMS ge RECEPTIONS
EXTERIOR WALLS e BATHS
PANTRIES SWMMING
O LINNG OF POOLS
STAIRWAYS
Mosaic tile walls de floors are easy to lay o 72 . . . Simple & lo yw cost to main tair Give you!" OLD building sole Mosaic luxury and see it corne to life - Don't miss it in
your NEW building.

ld we found dle inquiries I status of our
he time the
there hawe tly crude attriwa to airmail, ed ented, and ack memories
of exercising ere do we go
Armerasekara '5
Report hullath muda li's f the UMP'S . G. August) nder whether he learnt at oric. Consider, Collowing is listaquestion ho so
s: "Can any the last three
created
more jobs than any other government would hawe created if cliected to office?" (Answer: Yes, because it is perfectly easy to conceive of a government which would hawe been better than the UNP government). The report is replete with statements such as the following ha wing a nimbLIS of apparant profundity about thern.
(l) "The energy of man is now being productively channeed''. Which Tar T. Athua thTudali is thinking of Is not clear. Is he thinking of Plato's Uniwersal Man of the biological species Man or of the Common Man in Ratmalana? Anyhow the claim that "the energy of man is being productively channeled" after the present government was elected to office
is impossibly hard to square with reality, One should like to know whether this discovery came to Mr. Athulath
muda li in a flash of rei welatior or whether he pieced it together bit by bit,
{Corrian 2 era f for Pange 2.7)
AT A NON – INFLATIONARY
PRICE
The ever growing World of Mosaics has a new reach today . . . To keep price with his we have developed ne 11 Fich rustic Mosaic Tile glazes that give an instant rare rich luxury Io walls in
SEE THE FULL RANGE at the Show Rooms, Kollu pitiya, LL0LLLS SS0KLLLE SLLLS SYLLL LLYSYGLLLLL
as CEYLON CERAMICS
33; CORPORATION
69ó, Galle Road, Colombo 3.

Page 5
JR's surgical str
by Mervyn de Silva
efeated at the polls, Mrs.
Gandhi retained leadership of her party and fought all her battles outside the Lok Sabha to make a triumphal come-back to the premiership after a surprisingly brief break in her parliamentary career.
Trug balia wers who feel that a karmic destiny accounts for the strong Impression of inter wower political fortunes, argue that the circle of fate is now complete. The Indira-Sirima analogy, they claim, with a quick glance at the respective horoscopes, has run its to Լյ5 է: ,
True-blue SLFP'ers however are ever Thore confident that this is .st ar other turn of the wheel of fortune. Evidently it is a sentiment shared by Mrs. B, herself: “If they want to make a martyr of me, they arc Welcome to do so....Let's Wait and sco, what happens. . . . and who'll be deprived of what . . ." Not only an abSolute confidence in the future, but a defiance laced with a thinly disguised threat.
Shades of the Bhuttos and Mrs. Gandhi; observers of sub-continentil trends inter y ėlė.
Certainly, Indira (and Indira, of course) casts a long Shadow over Sri Lankan affairs. This is a commonplace of the island's politics. But the resultant interplay of light-and-shade creates visual effects which even the most
sharp-eyed analyst can find decoptively tricky.
Just as UNP supporters and 'neutral' observers wondered why the government, ha Yīng appointed the Special Commission, was taking so long, pro-SLFP groups had started to believe that international opinion, diplomatic pressure and internal UNP differences, aggravated by the government's plummeting popularity, would save the day for Mrs. B. --
Delayed Action
If it had to E hawe been don many a UNP'er, speare. In the fir a potty регпапы lost his civic rig be à Steady lo 55 gro Wing Public E, IE, LI LI M' clectoral oppone
If the step nr was Inevi Lake, popularity prowi congenial climate dramatic mowcs.
Cf course, Sri | boys do mot se turbed by repor and enthusiastic in the South an derisive propaga Opposition pres atter denge at UK is a riorral "Tim" Es the
iri
Only last we clung to the hic ing internal conf| South / South di: get Strategies Ph ra 525 were u: of the new a Would mean a per mem of thi 5 di
A majority c again 5 til 5 term ac of this was he front Page stor the fateful C A reliable sourc UNP High Com think of only a
5.E: ".
To this day t ing hope of a a general artine the future,
Hopeful Broke
In the late | out 1979, the hone5t brokors, Special envoys, a

Je dofle, it should 2 quickly, mused
echoing Shake'st two years only erit secretary had ht:5. Would the Te of credibility, and
in difference ors. most formidable
|1I:
Dw contemplated the UNP's peak ed the TOS
2 for drastic and
Kotha " 5 back-room 2 Ti to be too dists of well-attended
Copposition railles d Uva nor by the indist blasts of the 5 about the poor IP meetings. "This nid - term phenofavoured explana
k sortine S LEP" et 5 pe that "Incunticts" (see TRENDS logue) and 'diverat the top" (both sed at a meeting pposition alliance) "manent postponeecision
if ministers wete [tion? A fairht echo a SUN חard I! y a day before abinet meeting. :e close to the Ta mid Said: " " | :à r1 ine such sympathi
..here is the lingerpardon and / cor | sty Sometime in
r"5
1978 and throughte Yw35 a hos II of
Ti e diators am di Il Conveying, morc
or less, the same message of reassurance and hope. This guessing -game bought time. But for whom? With a Damoclean sword hanging over the leader's head, was the SLFP, the main opposition party, immobilised? If so, the UNP tactics were clever. But if these gains are outweighed by the changes in the political situation and climate of opinion, then the shirewdness of the tactic is open to debate. Ti ming is the essence of ta Ct|5.
What is not open to debate however is the brilliance of the final thrust - the surprise, lightIng mc Y.
If Mrs. B. and the SLFP were kept off balance for nearly 2 years and thus 'immobilised", the proteCtiwe. Ganadh i Connection was *'n eu tralised" in one swift, surgical strike.
Since the President is known to be a keen student of military affairs, an admirer compares his move across the Palk Straits to that of the spectacular canalcrossing of the Egyptians in 1973, and their breach ing of the ''impregnable" Bar Lew Lino.
External Front
But those who hawe followed Mrs. B's own moves since May.
When she withdrew frt in the Commission's proceedings and built up her 'external' front" may think another comparison more apt, Even more spectacular tham Genera i Shazli's crossing of tho Suez was General Sharon's counter-punch - hiting the Egyptians in the rear by crossing the canal in the other direction, encircling the Egyptian 2nd army, and cutting off the supply lines,
Tos sālutāts in Delhi, were lo : as the SLFP Press gle, 2 fill y sugges tcd the Obsequeiош5 outpourings of a suitably chas tened UNP leader, owerraWyed by the Siri Tiia-Indira axis. Nor were those uplifting allusion 5 to Gandhi, Tagore, Mehru and Congress history, the senti
and eulogies

Page 6
Tental journey of a septuage narian,
It was part of the game-plan and it served the pre-determind end,
The report reached the President just before he left for Delhi on September 2. The WEEKEND's Migara who produced one of his characteristically Well-Informed exercises in 'Investigative journalis m-cum-a malysis' (this time, though, with a strong injection of special pleading too) made a point of the fact that most people expected the report to be handed over on the Preside It's return rather than before his departure. But the President, added Migara, did not read the report because of the "time factor' and because he wanted "to go to the conference with an open mind."
Having Inarched out of the courtroom, Mrs. B. went to Belgrade the home of the lengendary Tito and nomalignment. Her next stop was Baghdad, the venue of the 7th non aligned s Lummit. Mrs. B, President Saddam's guest, stayed at 'the palace". Whem a U MIP ista l
Wart sought an interview with Saddam Hussein, it was politly explained, that the ruling Baath
party regarded the SLFP as 'the fraternal party".
And from Baghdad to Delhi,
The System
By virtue of the SLFP's actvism in foreign affairs since 1956, Mrs. B's prestige abroad is a fact that e Wen her most in wetgratg Critic5 11ust Concede. M|GARA men tlo ned the "" ambassador of a big power' who had urged the UNP High Command not to take any punitive action because Mrs. B was a democratic and nor allgned personality. In a comment published last year, the LG reported the welikim o Wyn wie wys o Lh5 question of Prof. Howard Wriggins, then US Ambassador in Colombo His position was that the SLFP represented the only credible democratic alternative to the UNP and her elimination from active politics would do i rrė para ble da Tage to the two-party systein. The author of a stan draad work on Sri Lankan politics, Dr. Wriggins understood only too well that if there
had beim || SWF am e octorate til reç would hawe had .
native.
TՒl | 5 || riը էնf tl | fined to "outside scientists. It is
5 til G of the WEEKEND and reported. In fact, commercator's O despite a somewha to balance "Pro" and an affected : found inspiration CEE for the
the system and,
a nervous appreh SLFF 5än; 'Ir5. B.
This is the co of the two party has eyalved 5İnce LF & SLFF ill || 95 | llum shifts since finds sanction in As The Inh Brent r which ha We Lo b: the interests of st qua. but the gam tant then the pl
Bipartisan Busir
The perpetuatic beyond individua party riwal ries, preocupation of a vestgd interes ation. This wa Luc. true of that busi which grew up shed by an ec. whose principal iT port substituti patronage - i. e. State capitalis II Often this corm. enough to transce tions and persor order to protect 5 to the credit group that des pli
Was a notable it. Cërmed "the i ctor of the UF ion (2d In thi5 LJ as the most arti of this school of
Of course, the ful and argumen supporters point *1rs. B. FDB etc. rules of the gam stifle or strangle

:D af d af 5LFF of UNP rule JEnly a Left alter
nking is not con
s' or political shared even by UNP, as the
ng SUN (Sept 24) the WEEKEND Wn arguments, t aboured effort rmd "''contra'' air of neutrality, in the self-sale preservation of as a corollary, :nsion about à F1
nventional wlew
system which the found ing of and the pendu| 35É, THg wey what is accepted ules of the game respected in ability and status 2 is more imporayers.
s
in of the system l, sectoral or is necessarily a ho 52 who hawe in its pro Serwd be particularly ness community and was mouri2 nomic strategy features were af árid State SLFP sociālism, Or wha Law Er. Jnity is mature ind party affilialal loyalties in the system. It of the SUN to the fact that wictim of what dictatorial thara - tցim Ը', it functNP-SLFP dispute Eula te spokesman
opinion.
more thoughttil ti'y a CF UNFP out that it was who broke the e by trying to Wh åt the 5 late
chose to describe, enough, as legitimate political opposition. Equally interesting is the fact that when the Commission began its work, the State's prosecutors trained their heavy calibre guns on "abuses' and 'excesses' just before and during the 1971 insurrection. It was given the widest publicity at the 5tart, but as time went by, this line of attack was quietly abandoned.
interestingly
Class Analysis
Dr. Colwin R. de Siwa, whom Professor Ernest Mandel once described as one of the finest Marxist pamphleteers in Asia,
offered us a stimulating theoretical insight into the processes at work. His point was that Mrs. B. not satisfied in playing the role of the UNP's alternative, was making the daring bld for “5ole agency". In early 1977, he wrote:
"She is systematising and consoli da ting Capitalist class control of the SLFP; with hors of and the coterie around her, family and all, as the capitalist agency within the SLFP. At home, she seeks to represent and mobilise the support of the new trading, manufacturing af d fi a ficti ering sections of the capitalist class, that is to say
the now capitalists of big and middling business in Sri Lanka, with the Ir more Tobile resour
ces, rather then to build up her links with the formerly powerful capitalists of large landed property now broken by the rationalisation of the plantations, on who the UNP founded itself. Abroad she seeks her allies today in the West, the Ea5tern centre, a mongst the forces of mobile big capiLal, old and new, including espacial ly those most Thodern instruments of net Colonialis III, the Thu lti-nationais. Arld et it bg clear what she seeks to achieve through this process is not just to

Page 7
make herself and the SLFP the alternative to the UNP in the arena of parliamentary politids: she seeks thereby nothing less them to Take the SLFP the so le political agency of the capitalist forces in Sri Lanka displacing and destroying the UNP in the process. The stakes are indecd high; but her ambitions are
no less." (Sirima's BlitzkriegWho Won?)
The thesis still holds good. What has changed (besides, of
course, LSSP thinking) is that JR, mot Mrs, B, is In commard.
J. R. has taken his time, measuring it ca refully. What is more, hic has unders tood the subtle calculus of risks and taken his decision.
In a comment Mr. B has spoken in tones no less martial. In a MacArthur-like response ("I shall return") Mrs. B. has shown her determination to carry on the political battle. (Earlier she had expressed fears that she may be stripped even of her party office.) At least one Sri Kotha intellectual was prompted by this defiant challenge to lean on Shakespeare to give expre55ion to his innermost anxiete5. . ... "We hay e Scotch"d the
Snake, not killed it....'
to the SUN,
m -
LANKA GUARDAN
5/2b5 corpo fioro rufes (Illusive of post lägg)
On year Si This Local RS. 95|- Rs, 50/- Asia Rs. 300- Rs. I50
LUS S 20. US SIO,
). 5. Foreign Rs. 450- Rs. 300
US $ 30 US $ 20
5 A II)
Chick LJ's a direy (Irides to be made out in favour of Linki Guardii n Publishing Co. Ltd.
The Commercial Millager,
Lanka Guardian Publishing Co. Ltd, No. 88, N. H. M. A bli LIl Call:T Road K Rec clarınızı Ligarı R. Qızıl) Colombo 1.
No Isla
he ever tig
of the worl would say, the dependance of mies) as well as th revolution (itself Scientific and te - tion) ha 5 led to ization of politi tionalization Cf 5 is en hanced p7, rad empts to put S global map, first me Tiber of the ri nity and more re as an atte Tipt at keeping with th growth strategy. politics tårn T2 introversion of, if the ruling grc
The soildarity wake of tha Apri| |971 was indication of t The Propagasi da C: expatria, te group | || GFA" TI - - the killing of T Emergency '79 w Ce, There ha5 : 3. Crear of En form ched living co Tam || Plan tatlon
This vā st strated by the c during the Ur recesit tratik dow Lirilor 5. Presider himself acknowle of several Protes tish trade u mler fact, protest aga ment's action 5, ions of support Hawe co Te ftoT Labour Party M. The t, 4 The Tiber Party's National ttee (NEC), the |rish Labour Par Colli | Mt. Brei Andy Bewan, the Labour Party's y Young Sociallists, all powerful trai the TUC sent a ing s Crious Conc of tradC: Ur in hawe also com

und is an island
hter integration d economy (some in Črė asing internå titornal econo - Héa Corm Tn LJ mita, tio rh5 a product of the hnological revoluthe InternationalCos... The internaSri Lanka Politics loxially by the attri Lanka or the y as a prominent on aligned com TLcently (post I977) image building in
I'W COF CITI Thus, Sri Lankam wer acquira the say, Burma, ewen ups so wish.
campaign in the repression of the first real . חסחneחסחhis Ph E ampaign by Tami|| s in the Work of - Tamil rides ånd a mil youth du ring "as further e widerlso been a steady Arion of the wretndition5 of the
workers.
strikingly demonапраgn mounted NP government's on the trade ht. Jayawardena 2dged the recept notes from Bri. ists. In Point of inst the Goweras well as express
for the JTUAC
y as Bחaחח 5ם ו 3mbers of Parlia5 of the Labour
Executive Comm|- Chairman of the ty Administrative dick Halligen, and 2 Secretary of the "o Luth organisation While Brita's de union congress telegram expressorn at the arrest leaders, protests a from Terence
Harry, the General Secretary of the Fire Brigades Unions as well as from the Bakers Food and Allied Workers Unio the National Union of Agricultural and Allied Workers, the National Uni
on of Agricultural and Allied Workers, th 2 Na Elmal Union of Ra || waymen and the Transport
and Generai Workers Union and
the Derbyshire National Miners Աmic n,
This das not come as Tuch
of a suprise, s|nce the Sri Lankan Left has had strong links, historically, with the British Left, and the new generation of Lankan radicals (such as the NSSP) contnues the "great tradition". What is Important howewer Is that the protests are not from some Trotskyist grouplets on the fringe of British policies, but from the increasingly influential left-wing of the Labour Party itself which could very well be in office again.
Another new feature is that protests hawe e manated from the European continent itself, where anti - UNP Propaganda was Previously the exclusive preserve of Tamil groups, This time, the 'offensive' group of the Swedish Social Democratic Party and the "Vorwarts" group of the Dutch Social Democratic Party have expre
ssed their fullest support for the JTUAC struggle.
While a compaign to Defend Trade Union Rights in Sri Lanka (CDTURSL has been formed in
London, by Sri Lankans living in the UK and Плеп bЕг5 of the British Labour (its convenor Bob Labi, is a reiber of the Greater London Labour Party Executive, the protests ha vo s Pilled over and taken com a transatlantic cha Tatter.
Rex de Silva, editor of the SUN newspaper filed a story from New York on a demonstration of approximately 75 PEOple, outside the Sri Lankan mission to the U. N. This demonstration was sponsored, by the Trotskyist international SpAr Tacist tendency (iS th, whose British counterparts demonstrated outside the Ceylon Tea Centre in London on the next day. The SUN published the New York
5

Page 8
story on its front page few days later, went on to display with equal prominence, photographs of that demonstration. The spartacists said that the demonstrations were an expression of international labour solidarity.
The Spartacist paper Worker Wanguard went on to comment:-
"In The After math the reform Ist CP and LSSP as well as their hangers-on like the NSSP will ble me the strike" 5 defeat con the fierce government repression. But that is just a self-serving rationalization. Their Titant rhetoric aside, all these misleaders saw the general strike mainly as a means to forge a political alliance of "'all anti-UNP forces" -a catch word for a new popular front with the bloody Mrs. B, whose popularfront government in 1971 massacred thousands of youth. When the JTUAC was first formed, thin LSSP and CP Literstood that mass har god for the Old Coalition made open association with the SLFP Lum wise, BLI it a bloc. Wiwa 5 made of the trade-Lumio fro rit b'wer the JTUAC's 23 demands, Thus, the JTUAC is a first step toward a new popular-front alliance, It should be recalled how, after the fall of the first popular - front goverri ment. In 1965, the LSSP, CP and SLFP ford ; i. Committee of Trade Union Organizations based on 5 demands that was the precursor to the open electoral popular - front alliance.
"'Already the rotting LSSP has made what its leader Colwin R. de Silva publicly calls" a pact with the devil's grandmother" (guess Who). The LSSP, badly demoralized and in total disarray, crawied into the SLFP's last May Day demo15 tration, Tarch ing at the La il of course, And the LSSP and SLFP held a joint anti-UNP rally in Colombo June 24 with an eye already on the 1983 general ellections. So far, the CP, NSSP and TasTipice have been more ca Luticus.
"Earlier this year the CP felt compelled to make a public "selfcriticism" of its role in the Banda Tamaika coalition. EL I that
and a :
didn't stop the 'encouraglng the SLF in Jure 5 JTUAC the N5SP Wer" th1 3 it has rigver draw aga Inst popular frc to fudge the class the SLFP, dubbing geois and "|ibt: 'social Democratic has no qual mis ab. facto political bloc: such as sharing t form with Mrs B.
the UMP" 5 new co
"The te "5 t corrupted, reptilian do business with ju who ciri further | big bureaucrat on | 5 || Tid, Siffic i t t 1967. Tampo el acce dout to come to
le met with then - tary Robert McN: height of the War of the Wiet and peasants (se Bala Tampace," S Fal|| 1972). Recent the left worder close relations wit bass Alawi Maulan perceptive gadflies Guardian c b Servet May Day speech subdued' on the
"“Th1c RWPʼ5; ro I strike only confir cterization of th tendency as "the o of the old LSSP' the International gue," Spartacist N ter 979-80). For T was urgently néec rall 5 trilko was a h ggle to break the heit i5 e der 5 bourgeois SLFP, Bt "In a 55 leader'" Arc president of th Employees Union, in Sinhala dated J. ewer m critic: the exhorts worker's JTUAC to take Ti Just how is the an anti-capitalist it en braces the of Mrs. E. N Andra di "S leaflet r Ç çf the 'yi tal

talinists from P to participate protest. As for coalition fiasco. In a hard line its it tries
character of it both tourral reformist" '' and the NSSP ut making de
with the SLFP he some platat a rally against
13 ELL Lio.
he thoroughly Tampoe who'll st about anyore his career as a a little, poor re:Call that II sted a CIA han - the U. S., where 'defencig" sere - a mara at the U. S., bloody a mese Worker5 e "The Case of ipartacist No 2| ly, Tampole has ng about his Hi SLFP Limia a. As the quite of the Lanka l, Tampoe's last Was '''Lu'Lusually SLFP.
e in the general Tied ous chais ale Samarakkody rganic left wing ("Toward the Trotskyist Leao. 27 - 28, Wirotskyists, what led in the geneard, sharp struLI r iorns firorTn and frol the It the RW P"|5 radi, acting as o Contral Bank i 55 Ued a gaflgt | y || 3 that di drit SLFP. It simply La fotce the 1ilitär F action. ITUAC to wage Struggle when unior fium ki e 5 Ct surprisingly, n7 k e5 Ib, c rThe I1 t|-. famil question."
3or &lectrical
9onstallations
designed to meet
Jyour exact needs
please cor fact:
LIGHT ENGINEERING ENTERPRISES
(ENGINEERS & CONTRACTORS)
REGI), NL, 9 , 8 ) 5
8th Floor, Paul WI Centre,
Front Street, Colombo II.
Telephone: 36 65 7

Page 9
Dengon Mao,G4 ai
“Thirty ore years aga
Mao Tse-firg a
re volutionary supported by his loyal corrira des proc
republic if Peking. No',
frr:Zosť forr"
J'air".5
TTTLL LLL LLLGSS SLLLLL LLL LTLLGLLLLL LLL LLLLHLLLLLLL shaker cyff the fritheritar ce of his over Moser ing clari LGGH LLGLGGGLGLS LL LLmaLmL LLLLL0S SS LL LLLS
Walker, W/10 covered The reeër.Ir
cas Derg
yra te 2f / We do r77 ir 17 F f role
Natio al People”
ஃப்ரig.
LGLGTCLL LLLL LLLL GGHLHLLtHK LLLLLL T CGLL LLL LLLL LGLGLLLLL LLLLGL LGGGLLLGGLLLL LLLLLL LTLLLLS
Oriana Fallaci: Mr. Deng, you recently wrote that China is at d turning-point which Carl be Cornpared with a secord revolution, In fact, the traveller arriving in Peking today has an almost physical feeling of the charge. No uniforms, no written slogans drid the portraits of Mao Tse-tung dre so rd re: || S7 w only three of them. Will those rare portraits of MiTo rema in or mot?
Deng Xiaoping: Yes, they will
certainly be kept for ever. You 500, in the past por traits of Chairman Mao Were shown in public to such an excess that they looked almost dis respectful, so we remo wed them. But... Lis Lien, Chairman Mao committed mis
takes, it is true. But he also was one of the main founders of the Chinese Communist Party and of the People's Republic of China.
mistakes as we thInk that
In evaluating his well as his merits, his mistakes take a secondary place. The contribution he gawe to the Chinese revolution cannot
be obailliterated an d the Chine ge people w| | | always cheri sh his memory.
Today a II the faults are being bla med on the Gang of Four. That Is, Mao's Widow, Chiang Ching, and the other three who led that CLt Lura || Rewolution. But does this Correspond to historica | truth? have been told that, when are speaks of the Gang of Four, many Lf1-f1 Lse rüsse tfer Hand with the five fingers opened and they angrily
answer: "Yes, yes, fo Lr |
It's imperative for The to Take a clear distinction between the ature of Chairman Mao's lis
Takes ånd the crt by Lim Piao am Four". I TILIS; . rei Chairma Mac C his life La Chima party and the r most critical m. out him at tho Chile 50 Would h more time gropi di Tikre 55.
Unfortunately, of his life he com Particularly, the C mistako. And a m isfortunes wara the Party, tha people ... in the |ife HiTiT * imself a te he had formul: thinking emerge actio 15 and his The i Lun healthiest - his ultra leftist
Well, may be made h im legis pro he had lost cont You see, becau: Contributio to he enjoyed trem among the Chin so he received T much. He thus tionalise the very he had establis * Ich as dem Jorati the mass III. T his shortcomings revolutionaries is ponsibility, I my: behaviour began t
Here is the po Linderstand very leaders of the new

nd capitalism rostic
ripart aired a fiels' for the edir y (Irid all hit Sir Ff'” i'r ffe *king, Tony 3 (m rgress, Βεία ιμ Ίrε i fer y1 Tr irrally"
i T1 es committed d the Gang of mind you that awcted Thost of
and sa werd the evolutior ir the ırı12Ih t. g . . , . With1
very east the ave spert much ng their way in
In the last part li mit Led min ista ke5. ultural Revolutin yחaוזs a resulE r 2 brought upon COLI TI try, the last part of his Mao com tradicted good principles 1.ted. Unhealthy d, both in his style of work, thinking of al II ideas.
the victory had LIdent, or maybe act with reality, ie of his great
the revolution 1 en dous pre5, tige es e pëc Pole and uch praise - too failed to institu
good prinici ples hed for years, ic centra l is rm Farid his was one of , though other hard the resself included. His o be patriachal..
frit, Mr. Deng. I well that your y Chind are living
NEWS
a terri ble dra Tig: reshaping Mga's snyth without destroying it. In other Words, the di lemma of defining what to accept of the past and what to reject. But unless you rewrite history and ELI in the braries, how will you do it? Wasn't Mao's wife the one who led the Gang? Wasn't ft M70 h i rimself who chosē Lin Piala as his successor, just as an emperor proclairs the heir to the throne? Would you cass that drother "TsSti ke"?
I call it a mistake and I put it among the other mistakes.... Of course, choosing his own successor is a feudal practice for a leader. But you must also considor that democratic centralism did not exist any more - that we failed to create a system to Pr evant sich things,
The trial of Lin Pao and the Garing of Four — this wi|| || take place?
Definitely. We are preparing it, and it should take place at the end of the year.
I asked because It Is more than
three years since you cannounced thirt trf.
We'll hold it, I promise yoLI that we'|| hold it. A II this time has been necessary to prepare It: their crimes are so numerous. And we now act in socialist legality.
And the foi L ir are all ye, are they? Child rig Ching is 47 II we ?
She eats very well. She sleeps
- In jail, of course. And this shows that she is alive. They are all alive.
Good? And since they are aliye, they will talk. They will say many things about Mao, What Is their trial ends with a Toral colderration of Mao. megri a verdict very different from the one or which yQL hawe already decided?
promise you that the trial of the Gang of Four wi|| mot besmirch Chairman Mao's memory at all. Of course, it will help to
7

Page 10
demonstrate some of his responsibility, for instance, that he used the Gang of Four, but nothing more. The crimes committed by them are so many and So evident that we do mot need
to implicate Chairmam Mao to prove them.
I'm really s Lurprised, Mr. Deng.
On One hand you accuse him, om the other you defend him. You defend him even when you a CCL se him. Yet twice you were deposed with Mao's approwa.
Not twice, three times. And not with Chairman Mao's approval. (He laughs) Yes, I had three deaths and three resurrections. Do you know the name of Wang Ming, the one who led the Chinese Communist Party and its ultra -leftist faction in 1932 Well, my first fall took place in 1932, thanks to Wang Ming. He accused me of rais Ing the Mao Tse-tung group against him, and knocked
The down.
had to wait three years before being resurrected in 1935, during the Long March, at the Zunyi congress of the party. In fact, at Zuny the ulträ-leftist opportunists of Wang Ming were defeated, Mao's leadership was re-established and I was reinstated in the post of secretary-general.
The second fall the beginning of the Cultural Revolution when I was still secretary-general and a member of the standing committee of the Central Committee as well as vice-premier. Well, this time, too, Chairman Mao tried to protect Ine. Without success, though, because Lin Piao and the Gang of Four hated The too much. Not as much as they hated Liu Shaoci, yet enough to send me to Jiangxi province to do manual work. And when in 1978, Cha Irman Mao called me back to Peking
MGQ or Cho Er-la ?
Cha Irman Mao. Soma beliewe was called back by Premier Chou En-lal, I know, but it was Cha Irman Mao. Chou En-lal was Seriously III at that time and, as the government depended almost exclusively on him, chairman
took place at
8
“|a 3 ||äd mg back In governi premier. He sa were only 30
Terits 70 per cs surrected me wi too, Wils alread Luna ble to me et political bureau. people around h people belonging Four.
As for the th in April 1976, th the death of Chi months before Chairmam Mao. the Gang of Fo and one shouldn' third resurrector
Three tries M. the secret of g resurrected three
No secretl (He At a certain Tort | could be useful took me out of .
But during thos you di fra id of being
Of course. A Cultural Revolutic the Gang of F Turder re. Th becausa e Cha Irmar nie. Ewen when Jiangxi province Work, Chair lar One Watch ing ower
Foreign friend how it was pos Survive a those latio 15, ard II "Because I a Til t} who doesn't easily. I am an know what polft this is not the complete answer, because deep always had faith And I had faith I knew that he
I always heard f) Ut stand you, complained about but he sits fa far as he can“ if I were dead, advice.' "He dog. what I think, he ac

Jack and put me ment as wiceid my mistakes Per Cène, my 2nt, and he reth 30,70. Yet he, y wory Ill and anybody of the He only saw the IIT. That Is the to the Gang of
ird fa||.. it was ree months after ou En-lai and filwg
the death of Then in October It was arrested t marvel at my
Mr. Deng, what's 'ying and being
tres?
| laughs happily.) 1 ent they thought
again and they :Ehe grawe. That's
e purges weren't
kjed?
II through the om, Lil Placo ärid our wanted to
ey didn't do it Mao protected was sent to to do mana | Mao had som g
my security.
is often ask me sible for me to trials and tribuusually answer: he sort of person et di 5 Couraged optimist and | cs i5 like.. "" Bu I. real ans wer, the cauld Survive in my heart I in Chirmär "Ao. in him because knew me.
' that he could that he always you: "He is deaf Γ ταrη Πιε, Τς He rests file is 7 e r m e'v' er a 5ks rnuy S TT" WITrit to k;Tony is his own way."
it's true, though he didn't say those things only about me. Hic always complained about everybody. He protested that they didn't listen to him, they did not consult him, they did not inform him. Well, it wasn't true about the others, it was true about me. And I did that because I did not like his patriarchal behaviour. He acted like a patriarch. He newer wanted to know the ideas of others, no matter how right they might be, He never wanted to h car opinions different from his. Hic roally behaved In an unhealthy feudal way.
It seems to me that the Chiang Ching Story is also a feudal story. Isn't one reason Why nobody dared
to oppose Chiang Ching that she was the wife of Mao?
Well....yes. One of the reasons
was that.
Was Mao so blinded by her, so dominated by her?
Listen, when I say that Chair
man Mao Tha de Tistakes, I also think of tha This take named Chiang Ching. She is a very,
wory e wil woman. She is so ey|| that any evil thing you say about her isn't evil enough and, if you ask me to judge her according to degrees as we do in China, answer that this is impossible ...Chiang Ching is a thousand times a thousand below zero.
Yet Chairman Mao let her usurp power, form her faction, use his na me as her personal bann er for her personal intere SLS, use young ignorant people on which to build her private political base.. Even later when he was separated from her - yes, separated. Didn't you know that for years Chairman Mao and Chiang Ching lived apart? Yet even after the separation he did not interwenc to stop her and to prevent her from using his name.
And to arrest fier, to Irrest the otFier three it was necessary to wait till the death of Mao.
Let's talk ObOLit your opening Lip to the capitalist West. I mean the economic opening you need to realise your Four Modernisations program re. As it will bring foreign (Cofffree Lr Page ro)

Page 11
NDA IN TURMO
by Gail Omvedt
SE mons con rains slashing the fields of India for the last two o months hawe brought arı end to fears of drought and possible famine in the coining year, But they have not been able to douse the fires of inflation or still the popular turmoil aris ing from the ongoing economic and political crisis.
Riots over rising prices of food and other essentials, bloody HinduMuslim clashes, continuing expaSuTes and protests agains t police brutality, and the ongoing antigovernment upsurge in India's strategic northeast region hawe been features of the political scene in the last fc2 YY morth S.
ln dira. Gandhi'5 government is atterTipting to meet these challenges with a combination of repression and concessions. Though she is faced with internal party conflicts that have worsened following the death of Sanjay Gandhi, still Mrs. Gandhi is now. ing ahead to consolidate greater
state power in her hands by calling for constitutional changes to give greater powers to the
parliament in which she controls a two-thirds majority,
Anti-Price Rise Riots
Demonstration 5, märch Eis, 5 trlkE5, road-clo5 ings, bandhs (shut-downs of en tite cities cor regions), riots and deaths in police firing, In short the entire round of Indian protest agitations are on again, this time focusing mainly against inflation, which is now at a rate of nearly 40%, the high est in the country's history.
Heavy price-rises in 1974-75 had preceded the declaration of Emer. gency. Tight controls then had brought inflation rates down
(Gail Oil well, Associate Professo T of Sc::ilcʻgy at the tIJTni" ersity Üs Californil, 1nd the :Lith Jr of si: verial books, his been te: ching; in Indial siEl ce: last year. Recently she visited some of the
troubled States. This ilrticle as written exclusively for the L. G.)
somewhat as w down on nearly protas. The firs Ja mata rule ware favorable, but the prices in 1979 c TE W WYe of Si heralded the end Singh's weak regist slogan of a 'stat Ywas id ertified Iri with the de ha ment. : tuld do : pries — but myw a Te rampaging ' beforte.
What is unique Lirrest - and also the centrality of al levels of rura economy - is th hawe been occuri to "WWI 15 and willa uniwersal Compla among the rural P landlord exploit; money lenders silon (though all but about rising Common respons: compairling today that of twenty ) to speak of pro C: 1 W Conti | Lu. the uniwersal the nat only are ba rmajor crities, bLu are Thatch Ing om ways to shut protest, and riot Qn willage marke ber of cases.
The most wi occurred at the Karnataka state agitation sparke Tiga " | 5 || leading to police in dozens of de;
Police Atrocitie A growing
Tho 'ye merı hilâ3 f on the frequen against women a Qn rapes commit The protest b "" Mathira case"

ell as clampi ng all the resulting t two years of
also relatively return of soaring incided with a cia| tLI rm c|| arh d | of thit Chais an ië. Mrs. Gardh|'s ble government'' the popular mind t such a govern
something about , Qmlnously, thay worse than ever
about the current an indication of the markt at as well as urban
e way eruptions ng even in small ges. The most
in II now heard DO T is mot about tion, debts to or caste oppremay be present)
prices; the Thost : to any question 's situation with fears ago is again
ices; and "how to Survive"? |5 : me. As a result,
indhs occuring in even willagers to national highdown traffig i S hawe occured days in a num
olent explosion end of Junie II When a farriers" d off anti-price nearby districts
firings rgs Lultimg it h5.
s
Indian women's ocused attention ce of actrocities
f'id in particular ted by the police. egan with the which |n yol yed 3
15-year old tribal girl raped by policemen who were its declared innocent by the Supreme Court on the grounds that no marks were found on her body to indi - cate resistance. A storm of protest cent=ring on nation-wide demonstration; -n March 3 su-- ceeded in getting the verdict reversed, but since then hardly a day has gone by without revelations of fresh police atrocities.
The most notorious recent case was in the town of Baghpat in
morthern India where three trawellers were shot dead by local policemen after they had got
into a fi 5 tfight with a pla inclotheTinan, and Naya Tyagi, the wife of one, was grabbed stripped of her clothes dragged through the Strects, boaten brutally with a Police bat om thrust into her wagina, and then raped inside the police station. With the Congress (I) government unwilling to take action, tho centire opposition has been holding continuous agitation
I this and other incidents.
The Indian police have a bad reputation for brutality, and torture and beating of common prisoners (let alone political suspects) in order to obtain confessions is common in many areas. Occasionally an enraged public takes affairs in to its own hands as happened in a small town near Nagpur recently. After a badly beaten accused man collapsed and died in the road after being released from police custody, the
furious crowd which gathered burned down the police station. Two months later the man was
declared innocent-posthumously.
Under public pressure the go wernment is beginn ing to take action to discipline police charged with rape and has tightened up anti-ra pe la Ws to Pro WII de la 5e2wori — year sentence at hard labour. But no Widespread police reforms ser to be in the offing.
Hindu-Muslim Riots
India's independence day celebrations on August 15, which nearly coincided with the Muslim ld festival, were marred by a wave of Hindu-Muslim clashes in
num Crous to WTI S and cities of north and central India. The worst riot, in Moradabad, was
9

Page 12
sparked off when a pig wandered (or was pushed) into a crowd observing id prayers and led to a confrontation of Muslims with the police, with firing on both sides resulting in over 120 dead, The government was quick afterwards to publicize legal and illegal drms caches in th L 1r La lnd to make charges of "conspiracy' by Muslim ExtremIst groups hinting at Pakistani involvement.
In fact there has been a growth of organized religious fundamentalism among both Hindus and Muslims, particularly among petty bourgeois youth now heavily affected by unemployment and the failures of India's "secular socialist democracy." Among the Hindus th, kes the for of movement5 5 Luch as the Hmid Lu. Ek La Am dola TT (Unity Movement) with its slogan of "no class différance 5, no Caste differances, Hindus Unite!" Among Muslims the wa we of funda Tentalist antagonism ha 5 been affected by development5 in Iran and Afgha
tam ("''Neither East mor West,
only Islam").
Where this development may
really become threats to the
Irid I am state Is ir there hays been
national seritime
947 when the 5 by both India and the 5e 58 ritilments
by a funda Tental
group, the Janina severe ripts ha" also. The govers
quick Lo arre St. t a statement of th Ministet, Sheik
'ite Pakis. but only Kashmir de cide their fut equally un nerved
Here again thi of Pakistani inya of the attraction regime of Zia dynamic of KashT present developm could YY2|| bacco
well to Pakistan facing issues of
te TitiT * i - by Baluchis, Sin e as wo || als discot tion of Kashmir controlled by it.
/ EC
EX-STOCK
POH
TUINNELING, M) WATER SUIPPLY, CONSTRUICTION EQUIP
EQUIPMENT & CoNs
7, CANAL ROW
PHONE: 3 2 3 - 23 O 54
COLON
O

Kashmir, where strong separatist is since ta te was claimed Pakistan. Now are being voiced ist “1uslim youth at-e-Tulaba, and ve coccured here ment has been heir leaders, but e Kashmiri Chief Abdullah, that is or Indians' is themselves can lure has almost the government.
are are charges lvement and fears s of the Isla Tı iç Ji-Haq, but the iri mationa lists —if em LS acceleratę – me a threat as
which is already
national self-de!d in various ways his and Pathians li terħi i r the seC"Azad Kashmir')
Deng on . . .
Jr. fire, Jr. age" )
capital to China, isn't it legitimate to suspect that it will provoke a certain growth of private propierty — the dawn of some small-5 ca se capitalism?
Let's start by pointing out that, in the final analysis, the principles of our rational construction are the same as those formulated by Chairman Mao. While taking international a & 5 Istance, we'll mainly rely on our own efforts. That is, no matter how we open to the West, no matter how we use foreign capital, and whatever the proportion of private investment will be this will cower only a small percentage of the Chinese economy. It will in no way affect the socialist public ownership of the means of production. Even the fact that foreigners might build factories in China will play only a subsidiary role.
COf Course, som a deza de nt capitalist influences will be brought into China. We artë aware of this, but I think that is not so te Trible and we är rot af Taid of it. . .
y
هاکسی
SWAPAPILWEARS
ALL
(NING, MARINE,
AGRICU ILTURAL MENT" (O ACCESSORIES
TRUCTION Co.
, P. O. BOX 88
TE O 1
LTD.
TELEX: 2 | 385 GO PAL

Page 13
DDC : Two VIEws
Development Cou
by G. G. Ponna mbalam (Jnr)
(General Secretary Alf Cely on Torrill Congress.)
ny scheme or legislation that will provide for greater economic development of the various areas of this country must be heartily welcomed. But, will the
Development Councils, as envisaged in this Act, which are being set up for the purposes
of accelerating economic development activity in a District through its Executive Committee and its District Minister, achieve its purposes? Are these Councils
so autonomous and independent as to be able to indulge in planning and coordination for economic development of those areas 2 Are the Development Councils local bodies? Do these Councils per mit of decentralisation of administration2 Will these Councils help the Tamil
Speaking people and their tra ditional areas, or is there a possibility that these Councils cari act to their detriment. These are important questions that come up for consideration on an analysiis of the Development Councils Act,
To my mind, the most important and illum inating prowis Ion 5 In the whole Act are contained in Sections & & 34. That the Councils have absolutely no initiative in formulating schemes for development, let alone 'accelerated development", of their districts, that the council is not the focus of development planning || 5 amply shown up by these sections. For, amongst the functions of the Councils is the approval of the annual development plan submitted to it by the Executive Committee (Section I6 () (a). The word 'approval' shows that the drawing up of the annual development plan is the business of somebody outside
the Council and its Committed, as only the implemengation of the plan is by the Committee
('The mairi pe hile had their District 1) e veio Bill Wohlich Wils IIlously in the NS. The TULF : W lile the SI.FP
0 Lt.
Wici Lloyw o ffer have nu been public: nu fri Nawa. Sa III asin the her frt II 11:A tion:illy k no WWII organisation, MI пiпnbill:1п's Ta The second part M1 r., (G. (G. Po II i appear in Our II
(Sections 16 (1)
Section 34 (a) say Tri littee tills to I 15 development pro by the 'appropria person outside t respect of all subjects specified Schedule to the
more, such, pro with other propc be formulated by irh Consultatiori w priate Minister" : what is called the Thent plan which to the Minister c ment, who, theri to L. he Counci | fix (Sections 34 (a) a
Surely, these paid to the arg Councils are able and autonomous ress their minds mont of their di
contrary, the C Committee will respect, somewh stamp. It woulc Counci | Càrn draft scheme in respec not included in
But this must be the approval of bc

ncils Act
litical parties sily Cılı tlı ile nient Councils pas sed Lun: ni
I do r A LI LI st 22. 1 ith the LNP staged a walk
re 5 entel to the km he left ist ja party, and tlıc illes L, Til Iuil political ... (. . (. . . Polimil Congress. Of the : rticle by "Inlılarını Jr, will ext issue)
(b) and 34 (d). 's that the Comider the draft posals prepared te Minister' (a he Council) in 3r any of the in the First Act. What is Josals, together is als that might the Committee ith the 'approTe em bo died in annual developis them sẹ nt f Local Govern
: after, sends it ir its approval nd 38 ().
provisions put Tents that the , as independent 33 dies, to addto the develop; trị cts. Cm thć ouncil and its e acting, in this as a rubber sg om that a a development of any subject the schedule. submitted for th the Minister
of Local Government and the appropriate Minister (Section |é (|) ( e). Even if approyed,
which is purely discretionary, it will be subject to certa in terms and conditions (Section 6 (2)). But if this scheme is one which does not meet with the approval of tha Minis ters or is contrary to the governmental policy, there is no chance of it being approved and the Seherne would the refore have to fall by the Wayside.
Nowhere in the Act does one find the definition of "annual development plan', it would seen that this "plan' is an amalgam of bits and pieces of plans' submitted by various Ministers under whom the subjects in the First Schedule come. Even though there is an impressive list of subjects in the First Schedule, one does mot know whether the an nuai development plan for a District wil embrace many projects concerning the subjects in the First
Schedule or just a few. In this respect there is every chance that some areas might be di 5Criminated aga in5t in that political considerations may distort the choice of projects and resource allocations. Furthermore, nowhere in the Act is there provision for the Councils to indicate as of right their pre
ference to the authorities regarding the schemes or works they wish to have to develop their a reas, Ofcourse, there i5 section 42 which says that it is in the discretion of the Council to approve with amendments or modifications, all or any of the items in the annual development plan or to add any item to t. If there is any form of alteration to the plan 5 en t to th 2 Council by the Minister of Local Government after it has been approved by the Committee, it would seem that it wi|| hawe to

Page 14
be sent again to the authorities for consideration. There is no provision in the Law to say that the authorities will necessarily accept the alterations at that sta .
That hic Mimi; tl: TS w Lu|d ferWard to the Concils Warious national development programmes and projects and allocate funds and expect them to be executed is therefore a Tply shown by Sections 6 and 34. Under this Act, planning and preparation of projects, and the determination
of local and district priorities w|| |ie with the 'appropriate Minister'. It is they who will determine employment oriented projects. The Council will be
impotent in making a 5 ut wey of the resources and de wel op Tent potential of the areas and prepare a plan of development for
the [Es trict. The Comici 15 i re not the centre plece for pian - ning and Project form tilation,
This Act does not give the Councils any form of Polan ning exercise. They cannot initiate capital works of a local nature. This Act will not enable the people to participate in the discussion of policy. The Councils will not be 3 ble to ster thir i'w r. dėstiny or to excrcise their own Will, In Short, It Wyould Sggs that the Councils are devoid of any initiative or power.
If the Councils have no initiatiwe Im dra W Ing Lup de welopment schem Los, how ar 2 these Councils different from the District Coordinating Committees ? These Commit CCS that hawe the Govern
mont Agent as its head, include all Members of Parliament in that District and all local heads of Government Departments. These
Critics Cordināte ārd review the implementation of Government programmes in the District. This being so, is this Law only a ruse to substitute "elected members' for the local heads of departinents? Perhaps, this is the derilocratization the advocates of this Act are seeking, Perhaps this Is What they mean by "pedples partilpation". They want to ensure pressure not merely of members of Parliament but also of the 'elected members' Or, is this Law being brought only
2
to give a constit standing to the rict Political Au rict Minister, as the President to of bhikkhus and hil on the 20th
Does this Act for the Governi sufficer funds, Յզuipment to t Any development to these being aw proportion of the into the Develop in turn depend ot Parliament (Sectio Cabinet (Section 2 by the 'appropria consultation with Local Governmeni (f). Every the lc Colum cili wishes tc. ment the arın plan and for the ThList first w I til the Ministers of ment and Finance (g), 26, 29, and . і5 по apргоva!, : the plan will hav, dømed. Ewen th! d'Utle 5, fea5 and which a Council lewy and which Fund, Wii || in tiu approved by th Local Governmer and confirmed (Section 24). Ewe Cat a lit is a Bank to lodge the Fund will Minis, ter 5 of Lo and Finance (55. monts of monies Will have to be M || 15 ters of Lo and Financo (Sec Minister of Local to stor penditure below public ceremony ( one can inningine the Comici || || 5 money on any w decidos on ! Th31 to be that degre the exercise o regard to expens Ti a fir 1 neial indí the monies pay Who Work for t hawa to be det

utional and legal concept of Distthority or Distwere said by the delegation aymen who met
of August 1980?
make provision ment to give
expertise and F15 E CILIris ?
will be subject ailable. A large : monies going ment Fund wi||
the largesse of ո |8 (2) (e), the 5), the grants te Minister" in the Ministeart of : (Section 8 (2) ans which the 3 raise ta Impledevelopment other purposes he approval of Local Gowarm: (Section 8 (2) 35 (h). If there ; om. Portion of re to be abon 12 rat (25, C31:Xë5
othas chairges has power to augment the rm hawa to be e Ministers of it and Finance by Parliament, in so insignifithe choice of the money of depend on the cal (Gwernment tion 9). In westfram the fund approwed by the al Gowern (Therts tion 20). If the Governer has rriting even exRs. 2000- for a Section 21 (I) (g), to what extent free to spend enture which it To do 25 tot 5E ET e of freedom in F i5rtiri diture. There is зрепdепce. Even able to officers he Council will armined by the
Minister of Local Gowerm ment (Sections 2 () (i) and 35 (b). Indod, it is for this reason that the President says that Municipal Council has the power to spend the money they collect, but the Development Councils do not even have this power What is more, at each meeting of the Council, its Chairman will have to submit a statement of receipts and expenditure for the Previous month which has to be promptly des patched to the Auditor-General. Further", the Counci | has, diligently, to report to the Minister of Local Government at the end of each year about its adIliristration and the state of its financos (Section 49). These prowisions remind The of Societies in schooi5, which, I dare say, WYork with greater freedon and are not treated si ch || cdlike ! The Minister of Local Government has some hold on the Council, again, through the Audi Çor (Section 52 (1)). An amendment in Parliament LCD Section I 8 ( h ) says that into Fund could go any donations or other assistance made generally or for any specified project with the approval of the
sirligter. This II 121115 til 5t indiwiduals or organisatio is are open to donate. This provision will
surely open the flood gates to a lot of corruptions. Sections 45 shows that the Councils will have to spend within the budget even ir the Case of necessity.
This Teans that if in a year a project is found to need more money tham was allotted to it, then Tories wood for other projects will hawe to be utilised for this project. Therefore, there will be no money for those other projects.
Do the Councils have an option to reject the annual development plan if it does not meet with their require Tent? Section 40 seeing to say that, everything said and dome, come What may tha Counci is must finally approve the plan. Does this provision ensure, therefore the independance of the Council
That the Development Councils are only a further extension of the Presidential Executive is barne out by part 12 of the

Page 15
Act which has a specific Chapter on "General Contros". This er Th Phasizes further that the Councils and the Committee are subject to the Presiderit amic! Th. Minister of Local Government and to governmental policies. If the Committee disagrees with the District Minister regarding the implcTentation of governmental Policy, the Committee Is Pirc Imptly "reported" by the District Minister to tha Prc:5 idcnt, who has the power to dissolve the Committee If f, that their differences a roll ir reconcilable (Sectiori 53 (1) and (2). The President can, withcut dissolving the entire cornmittice, dismiss any The Tiber of the CorTn Tlittee for liri competence or mismanagement of the du ties entrusted to him (Section 60 (1)). The President, in answering the delegation of bhikkhus and laymen, has said that the Councils have no power to do anything withLt his consent, which he will exercise through the District Ministet ad the CoTi Tittee. He goes on to say that he can disIn is 5 or change the entire Council, the District Minister or the
Committ && if it do not obey thig
Ths solin 5. Er Tert, ir t LIFF"| di 55 o wa tlh. & . remove the Cl 'elected mamb specified reason Section 61 (I). La der mo circum Mcm hors of P:
moved by the th: Militet" |5 Mombat of FäT| of those matters 61 () (a) to (e). Why this p ment Jf the so filer, L2 Mo doub Local Governme inquiry to be h Judicial Office bo the Council for in Section él (i report is hand Minister has the the Council, i Members (Sect Tears that "elec at the mercy C Local Governmo
MARGA QUARTERLY
Rs. C5. Wolume | No. OÕ Walium 2. No | 4. O) No. 3 . 75 No. 4 , 75
Wolum e 3 No, I 5 . OO
3 No. 2 Special issue.
Sri Lami ka Th|rd World & Uncad y W. 5)
3 No. 3 Special Issue,
Non-Alignment & Third World Solidarity, 7.50 3 No. 4 Special Issue.
Te 7.50
At all leading Booksh
THE PLI THE M
63. Is ipath Colombo Sri Lanka.

hase institutions ! government.
of Local (GwernIs em powered to Council, and to hairman or any ar' for certain 5 m2m II. iam ad im This shows that 15 tacts will the 1rlimet ba Te*Mirn || 5 ter ewe if satisfied that the lia rTnent ls gullty stated in Section
"Lferential trgatembers cf Parliat the Minister of
T5 is eld by a retired efore he dissowes the Tatters stated ). But before the ed to hit, the
power to suspend t5 Chair"|11, cor ion 6 (3). This ted members' arg If th Min |5tor of Int, as is further
bor në out by Section ël (4) which states that if the Chairmal is removed frgir office, hg also censes to be a member of that Colume II. THis shows that eveni if a Coturici | has personis Who are of a differerit political coTiplexion to the Government in power, they are still completely at the mercy of the Minister of Local Gvernment, who tā Fild the 5word of Darmoc! c§ ove To their heads. Section 6 (5) says that where a Council con sus to function, the District Minister shall discharge the functions of the Council and that the Minister only may at any time direct that an action be held to choose Ehe cected members of the Council. The new Council, the refore, will Include all the 'ex officio members" (The Me ITbers of Parliament), which goes to show that the T11 in purpose of this legislation seems to be an endeavour to perpetuate the Prosent parliamentary hegemony. Indeed, it seems as though this Act is a Charter for the Merl berts of Parliment :
Next: Controlled Councils,
JOURNALS IN PR
R
No. No. No. No.
No. No.
Weblume
Wolume
4
4
5 5
No.
5 ops and dat
ication Unit
No.
AARGA INSTITUTE
ana Mawatha,
2 B
교
3
die II is Ye
NT
its. ... 5
ÖÖ 50 5)
... 5
Special Issue
Technology Transfer & Reverse Flow The case of
Sri Lanka) 7 . 50
Special Issue,
Participatory development Dependence (The case of Sri Lanka) 5)
9 . OO

Page 16
District Councils
Councils
by Wikramabahu Karunaratne
he District Development
Council Bill posed a complex problem for the Tamil speaking people. The Government propaganda machinary maintained vehemently that it is a step towards devolution of power, a real step towards bringing the administration to the people and satisfying the aspirations of the Tam|| speaking people. On the other hand when Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinist leaders Tet the President, he was anxious to stress that the power of the President is absolute and the independence and autonomy of D. D. Cs are only on paper. In addition he has agreed to remove any remaining loopholes that may give any
additional powers to these regional councils.
Clearly, as far as the Tamil
peaking People are concerned it is a 'concession' that has come far too late with far too little. In 1958 the Tamil nationalist leaders came to an agre ėmė mit with the awo wed leader of Sinhala-Buddhi Ist populismo, Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandara naiko, Ewen at that time regional autonomy was an integral part of the agreement. At that stage the right of self determination was not raised by any of the Tamil bourgeois leaders. At least it was not the central theme of the carpaign. Still Regional administration with substantial powers, including administrative, police and judicial powers, was included in the agreement. Today, after a lapse of a quarter
Dr. Karuna ratne, a senior lecturer iti Engineering Mail thenati's at the University of Perudenlyu Is General Secretary of the Nara S: 1145) II. Hij: "Arty. He was interdicted for histing black flags on Fehr Lliry 4 1980. as taken it custody in August 8 during the Satyagrah: organised by the ITUAC and is in the Magazine Priscos.
century and the
ment of matic ra among the Tamil : the Tamil leader: to WotC for a r bill which appears sidential council b. a district devel, b.
What surprises stand taken by ti the T. J.F. except the logic Mr, Amirthal Inga T to the TULF C soms to have general scheme of of the administro country. Whe the or not, it will b If we accept | t implementation W the economic dev Tam|| speaking d decide to oppos only further the which our areas to since indepen. (Daily N.
No Argument
Now, if the D imple Tented whe accepts it or benefits of thes tha Tamil s Peaki way. (That is if Taal benefits fror ment council 5. || rסt fחם וחar Eu סח councils which fa anything that th hawe asked for". easily hawe refrai ting and voting participnite in th see what can be these councils. a Trade Union were demanding lett. f I rn creases wage 5 |f this Is donc wiews of the TU need not agree Sti || the Worke 50/ — more and til ject the money.
Ob wiously, the for the DÖD C B

or Presidential
urther de weloplist aspirations speaking people, 5 hawe agreed 'egional council
to be a "prei' rather than 2pment council
some is the 1e leadership of has no logic, of submission. 1 in his spacch en era | Council ši - "this is
dcontra i tior 'ation of the r wa accept It o implemented. and help in its e can work for 'clopment of the is tricts. If we it we would conomic neglect were subject to e 1g.'' aw's 18 August.)
DC Bill will be ther the TULF ot, ther the e are going to іпg people any - there are any these developHowg wer that Is en dors ing the 5e for short of e Tamil leaders The TULF could ned from accepfor the bill, yet 1e elections to done through ke the case of whose members a RS. 300. the government by Rs. 50/- and In spite of the ... then the TU and endorse it. rs wi|| be på id ney wi|| not re
TULF had voted i || Tot because
there was any danger of it getting defeated in the house. No, it was not an act of defense against the racialists and Sinhala chauwlnists whC TT1ay want tQ' with hold even this kind of pseudo to CS, iO. The TULF Fha 5 deliberately and consciously en dorsed and sanctioned a step taken by the UNP. It has done that to strengthen the constitutional bonapartism of J. R. Jayawardena. Wery clearly the TULF is mowing away from the camp of the opposition to a position of tacit support to the present reactionary government. This can only mean a direct sellout of the democratic rights of the Ta Tni | speaking people.
Unasha modly
However the question of DDCs cannot be closed with this criticism of the TUL.F. The DD) Cis have brought foes of the working class into active participation in racialist politics. Warious gangs of Sinha là cha Ulwinists who were only yesterday a part of the lunatic fringe of politics have come into the front pages of the national press. They are going al II out to wi Pe out the DDCs, or any kind of regional council for that matter, from the Tami|| speaking a reas, Apparer Lly, the DDCs as proposed do not give enough democratic powers to the people in the rest of the country while it gives "dangerous
hidden powers' to the Tamil speaking people.
In the near time the position
of the SLFP leadership is dubious to say the least. The reason that they hawe given for Cpposing the bill is that these councils do not hawe enough po W ers to implement a regional development program, while the elimination of WCs and TCs do stroys the participation of rural tribu nes in politics. In addition, they mainta in that not enough time Is given for discussion. However, un der this weil of concern for democratic rights one cannot help observing the defence of Siia la chatuwirism. The Dina karal (Çarıfini el çift page 17

Page 17
PARLIAMENT AND PRESIDENCY - (2)
qTTTLTTLTSTTTSLTSALALSLSLLTAASSLASLSALSLASLSLLASLSLSTSLSLSLSLSLSLSLSLSLSLSLSLSLSLSLSLSLSLSLSLSLS SqqSqSqSqSqSqSqSqLSqeLSqeSqeSeSeSMSTqTSqeM eSeSeeSeSeeASqSqeASASASASeTLTLqMLeLeeSqSqeSeqSeeeeeSeLeeSeeeeSSMSS
PR yes; but wh
by Dr. C. R. de Silva and S. W. R. de A. S
he problem then is to adopt
a lethod of PR which will grmo W e at least s The of the more serious shortcomings enumerated above while preserving a reasonable chance of producing å stable Government. For this purpose we propose three major sets of arterdments to the electoral system in the 1978 Constitution wig:
(1) the adoption of the Jefferson meth Cd Cf PR 215 an à|Lgrilatiye to the Todified Hamilton method in the distribution of seats among parties with in electoral districts;
(2) alterations to the size of
Parliament; and
(3) changes to the list system.
The Jefferson method was na med after Thomas Jefferson who is credited with having first mooted this idea in 1972. It is currently in in use in a number of countries - including Belgium, Finland, Israel Liechtenste In and the Netherlands and it works as follows: First the total vote polled by each party in the electoral district 15 de termind, The first seat is allocated to the party with the highest number of votes. Further seats are allocated to each party by dividing its total vote by the number of seats currently held by that party plus one. Thus, for example, if parties A, B & C were to pol || 7000, 5000 and 3000 votes each in an electoral district Party. A will get the first Seat. The second will be won by Party B because 5000 is greater than 70002 or 3000. The third seat will be gained by Party A and so con inti all seats are filled, The final Party position will be 2 seats
each for Parties A & B and one seat for C.
The Jefferson Tethod besides
being free of the "Alabama Paradox", also supplies two properties which are particularly valuable In the context of Sri Lanka's Politics,
In the first place method does mot 5 maller part les fr ture to the same method adopted i stitut Ian would do still confers so The larger political p; Jeffer 501 11ethod porce Serwing greate Whila Γιατ eopardi of stable governm Jefferson method advantage of pro to coalesce (see T: ew er 1 if it is fol retar a cut-off pc cy to coales ce CLI t-off point to bo ley el them und accepted in the This will help to representation of and minority grc
It has been : magn III de of the |5 LW 2 m Tore Im Particular T1 etho. in en Suring propor sentation. The Er ber of represent; electoral district be the chance o securing a seat. generally in small votes polled by t ES är mort || k || sented. The prowi Constitution whic limit of twenty for a House of contributory facte of small electoral likely that ten of electoral districts will hawg é se a: Ewen in a & mi Party has to obta Per cent of the v cd of a 5 eat arı: is sti || higher fo With felts r mer doubly un fortuna thes e districts au ethnic II in crites

ich method
Samaras inghe
the Jefferson shut out the om the Leglsladegree that the the WB Co. Nevertheless it a dwa ntage on the arties. This the has the Tert of proportionality zing the prospects 2nt. Second, the has the added Widing incentive5 able W). Therefore I necessary to in L this tendenwill permit the fixed at a lower = r the method 978 Cor:t ELLICI). 1 ensure a fairer
smaller partics ծաբ5,
shown that the
electoral district Portant than the of PR adopted tionality of repremaller the numatives from the the esser will f a sппаІІ рагty This means that electoral districts he smaller partiy to ga un re preision in the 1978 :h places a lower electoral districts !?6 is a 5 trong ar to the creation districts. It is the twenty-two Iri Sri Larka kar le 55 each. grmber district a in àL gast. H.7 rotes to be ass LI rd this percentage r those districts nbers. It seems te that some of e those in which i are found iri
sizeable number (e.g. Batticaloa, Nuwara Eliya.)
The solution we suggest is to increase the representation per electoral di 5 trict. Two methods could be suggested. One is to re-constitute electoral districts. The the IT Iš to ir Črte a se the number of Sea CS Em Parlia Tet. Giyen the present distribution of population it is difficult to reconstitLite electoral districts so as to give a minimum of at least á ta 8 members each without making these electoral districts extremely Lu n weil dy. Thus it sciems the only practicable way to avoid having electoral districts with a small number of representatiwes is to rälse the tål number of members in Parliament. It is proposed that the present size of Parliament be raised by 50 per cent. This should ensure that the smallest electoral district will ha Ye about 5 representatives and will be bacter placed to enjoy the benefits of PR. However, if this proposal is accepted three of the largest districts, namely Colombo, Gampaha and Kurt in Egilla wi|| hawe to bg e a ch di Wi ded il to two electora districts each to avoid technical difficultics in the conduct of elections,
In order to overcome the disadvantages of the pres ent Party ist system, one possibility is to adopt the single transferable vote (STW). Under this the voter is expected to indicate his preferance for candi da Les by marking '1' for his first preference, '2' for his second preference and so on. A quota is computed by dividing the total number of valid votes polled either by the number of seats (the Hare Quota) or by the nu Tiber of seats plus one and adding one to the resu!- ting quotient (the Droop Quota). Today, in cui tries such as the Republic of Irelard where the STW 5 in use, the Droop Quota 15 preferred because it assures greater proportionality of representation
5

Page 18
than the Hare Quota. Those cand|- dates who hawe polled a sufficient number of first votes to satisfy the quota are declared elected, (A little reflection should make it clear that the number satisfying the quota on first preference vote 5 cal mew er exceed the rumber of seats available.) If there are surplus votes of candidates Who have already secured a seat, and if there are seats still to be filled, such wates ar transferred to the remaining candidates according to the second preference indicated by the voters. If this still does not raise the wate of any candidate to satisfy the quota,
the cardidate at the botton of the poll is eliminated and his yotes arc tra i 5 fer red to other
uri elected com di di te 5 of the ba5i5 of second preference. This process Continues un ti|| all the remaining Wa Cär Cies arg fi||gd,
Despite the attraction of STW as a method that gives the voter maximum choice in electing his representative serious objections can be raised against adopting STW in Sri Lanka on political groLunds. First, and perhaps the most important from the national point of view, is that STW might encourage W Coting or na tro w sectarian lines -ethnic, caste, and so forth-which
consider an filetto. I such a minority
| 5 per cent of th if the minority W bac for their o w will not be poss candidate to get electoral district
or less without for Waters Lt. The third objecti ong which could UNP and its suppo rence in Sri Lan except where eth are crucial, Wotes generally along Pi gical lines. The
SLFP-LSSP-CP
1960 July Gener compari son with
Election f “Arch is an outstanding Ima. I that LIndi for tha left pa transferred gener and wice versa. Th in effect be a pi tu ticially — sarctic which dc 25 not | ral' allies except p minority party su Workers Congres
Finally, STW mig practical diffcultic): relatively small .
should be discouraged for the The STW also cal sake of national unity. Second indicate their pr STW is likely to be less effective in the preferentia then the present list system in by the 1978 C securing representation for the Presidential Elec ethnic minorities. For example, the scale of the
''L-
"4": r iW:5; t (I MI:rg
Parrier Pof Ple
(r) {2}
A ... 40,000 (40.0) 40.000 (40.0)
B 28, 100 (28.) 28,100 (28.1)
C ... 1400) (14.0) ...
27,000 (27.0)
I) ... 13,000 (13.0)
E ... 4,900 (4.9) .., 4,900 (4.9) 100,000 (100.0) 100,000 (100.0)
(1) Parties C & D contest separately,
(2) Parties C & D contest under common list.

"al district where accounts for, say e Y:ET 5, Eym " TE to Y FF I candidates it Ele for Such a elected in an with six seats so the support side that group. con is a partisan be raised by the rters. Past expeKali suggests that nic considerati
tend to be cast arty and Ideolovoting for the coa | ition 1 In tho "al Electio (in wcting in the of that year) ex år mple. This * STW Wotes Cast rticis would be ally to the SLFP Lu 5, this would, TTT TIL 15 tii ri ed anti - UNP h3. W : Such "Taui erhaps är ethnic :h as the Ceylon
S.
ht give rise to S e Y e in thig Ilectoral district. Is for woters to eferen og 5 Gr as system adopted 15 it to fOF tion 5. Howe wero, exerci se implied
E W
ČT : A Conil prisen
Fj?& Carl F fs för
by the two are entirely different. II. Presidential lections it is unlikely that we would hawe more than a handful of candidates. This will not be so in Parliamentary elections. As pointed out earlier, in order to preserve the advantages of PR it is necessary to have electoral districts electing at least five members if not more.
If twenty-five candidates were to contest, a voter exercising his ful olectoral rights would be
required to number his preferenCūS from ona Lo Lwenty-five. This is a task which may be beyond the ability of a substantial number
of wote T5,
The holding of primary elections is one of the suggestions that is being actively considered in order to remove the power given to the party to determine the list of candidates. In a primary election the electorate could cosnist of either the total number of registered voters or only the paid-up members of the respective parties. In either case a primary election will hawe tha adwarnCage of einabling each party to settle. Its internal differences at the primary stage and to unita behind an accepted party list at the general election, Morcower", e i Ehler alternati we would also have the a dwa ntagg of promoting decentralisation and democratisation of party structures which āt present ar centra - lised and very much subject to the dictates of the party leadership If the full electora te is in Wolved
Jeffer For Mserlige
(r) (g) (r) (2) 8 (44.4 8 (4.4) 8 (44.4) 8 (44.4) 5 (27.8) 5 (27.8) 6 (33.3) 5 (27.8) 3 (13,7) 2 (11.1)
5 (7.8) ... 5 (27.8) 2 (11.1) 2 (11.1)
() - (). (-) O (-) () (-) too.o. 18 (IOO.O) 18 (100,0) 181000)

Page 19
each party will in addition be able to gauge the relative popularity of its individual candidaties, How gewer, there are several objectIons which could be raised against this type of primary. The first is the cost involved. Indeed, in Sri Lanka, It is un likely that any party would be able to fund the organisation of such a primary without State Support. Se cond, even if such a primary were to be adequately funded it would engthen the election process and may cause the average elector to tire of and ose interest in elections Most Important is the third objaction ha E S, if the enti re elegora LC) is in wolwe id in the election of party lists. It is difficult to prevent supporters of one Party being Tanipulated to influence the selection of candidates of an cither party. The smaller politiCal parties are bound to be particularly vulnerable to this kind of manipulation,
This last objection will be remowed if voting for party lists at the primaries is restricted to the members of the respective parties. As the total party membership In Sri Lanka is relatively limited this is bound to be a cheaper method as well. However, this type of primary will be of limiTed L Se in gaug ing the acceptability of candidates. There is also no guarantee that such a limited primary would be more democratic than the Compilation of a list by some alternative cheaper method.
li rn Sio The quarers it has beem suggested that one possible way to reduce the power of the party leadership to determíne the list
of candidates is to permit the Woter to cast his wote or for a list but for an Indiwidual candi
date of his choice. This proposal however, has some major drawbacks. First and fore Thost, it could lead to much in fighting among candidates belonging to the sama party or list because there could
be situations where it is bound to be more rewarding for an individual candidate to devote
In ore time and money to persuading the probable supporters of one's own party to vote for himself and less on persuading voters sympathetic to other parties to switch sides. Secondly, if she voter
is asked to vote f: date, it could up balance of politic cal Parties are in torna di Wi5ior5 of party unity th: sts of such fact Ily b0 taken Int: preparing list o wote 5 are to b2 dual candidates, i a charis matic can to a particular fa ttingly depri'ye ç to the sarine fact
elected by attri of the wates cas to hir Tšelf. Čler
of a fa:i) i w | tlh | mis ing its repres improyed If Luch dates are excluded in favour of med
It is te w|d51 t fi dis cự5% lam that thị solution to the by the present ewer, th eo: ręg di far as reported bound to create lems as they wi pos 5 ibile alternati suggest a system is permitted to w party list as it : Candidate on the Currently in use example, suppose particular party
List
Preferentia wot car didate A.
Preferential wo Candidate B
Preferential wo candidato C
To:
Assume that the ent is 4,000. The E allocated two s A, who ha 5 first we of 5.8 OO will | L. and wi|| get el Ining, 2,400 wotes da te B w 105e to be 2,800 which is number C has pol Win the second Course th i 5 meth antee that party is Weakness of STW. eliminated. Howe certain to be :

Pr just one candiset the irrell al parties, Pc3||ti|- bound to hawe
For the sake particular interions will normaaccount when f candidates, f čast fог |п ili vit is possible that di dato belonging ction could Lwithers belonging ion from getting icting the bulk ... for that factic
ly, the chances п a party max|
Läti Wi
popular candi - fram rath|rhlı tidarı ito c: r"42 1 1 2 5. rom the a bol ve = Te is no persect problems created ist System, Haw25 proposod sa rn the media aro as many prob3 Luld solwe. A5 a "w 2 We W |5h to where the writer Cito et fer for the Stands or fot one ist. the system In Belgium. For the poll for a Was as follows:
5,800
for
(OO)
for
400
ce for
3CO ... 10,000
! electoral quotiarty will thus be āts. Cāndidāte lairn on the list | drwy 3,400 o frig 11 lected. The realWill go to candaal watu wi || fi i'w
less than tha led. Thus C will 5Elt Cygr B, Of od does not guarli fi E hi ting-a major -will be totally ver, it is almost :55 than under
the STW. It will also reasonably protect the chances of minority candidates, especially if they secure nomination high enough on the lists. Indeed, unless voters opt to vote for Individual candidates in sufficiently large number this system may not alter the order of the party list significantly. Thus it will allow the party leadership to retain some degree of control ower the list of cami di date5 while giving the voter a chance to regis
tor his preference for an indiwidual Candida te.
In conclusion three principal
changes that we would like to see effected in the electoral syste T em bodied in the | W8 Costitution are recapitulated as follows:-
(l) The following amendments are proposed with respect to the computation of the quo ta to allocate Seats:
(a) The introduction of the Jefferson methad to computate the quota and at locate seats.
(b) The abolitlon of the practice of giving the party which tops the poll a seat before the quota is computed.
(c) The reduction of the 2.5
Per cent Cut-off point to Say, 8 per cent.
These changes, if accepted, will improve the electoral prospects of the Smaller parties While preserving to some degree the advantages Conferred om the major parties by the preSent syster TI.
(2) The size of the House should be increased by, say, 50 per cent so that the number of members elected by any given electoral district is raised to a to a minimurt CIr five In order to ensure greater proportionnality. (This will also require the number of electoral districts to be raised beyond the maximum of 24 permitted by the present Constitution so that the larger electoral districts could be reduced to a more manageable size.)
(3) Woting for the list alone should be replaced by voting for
either the party list or for an individual candidate on the list.
(Concluded)
|W

Page 20
-- - - - - - - - ii i, iIso o jų − U (0.861's'] = a1a2a}}=) % unuuy ae is:|LIITILII||I||-|||45 "oh!
(ATNO SLIsodaq awāN)sıīsoanaGExĘ
TO Å HOH XY|O/V\ S5).NI/\\/S CIENYHVH-GYHVH YHTIO Å BX|\/\w\ O_L SEVNEHOS || NEĻNILSEAN||wnNNv Haa|,
„LSH’HELNI H/\|_|_C\/\|_L_L\/ \T5) NIS\/E|Y|ONI%ZZ uoỊKəƆ yo >ļueg əų) uouy| oldn
‘’’/\/\ON

'nos uos pupų yao, sɔtsoių ano, əyptu pub
NOTAELO HO X{N\/{
əųą po ɔɔŋjo įsə-leau əųɔ ɔ e uəao II esb
'C130NV\!\!V 38 NVO SLISOd 3q LSNIyov SNyo-1
sussõdəq wɔN uo(086|'G'I ĐA||23]]+)%6–#000's, 's':]|sodĐƠ] unuļu||-|| əəŋou skep , 3e s Lisodaq - _-z)luno-Jo sẽu|wès pɔlɔɛŋuɔɔ 0luno, y s3u||xesKjemplo---- (08'#'I Đa 133 ogā)%uunuuw uøa įsələhu.S_LNTìOO m.Ɔ\7 S5DNIAWS _Zs.|ŽĪ |TT_000'0|||*었: (000'0| '5', 'Isodod luhususki) XIųıuou os qe&tdışɔ jɔyu|| || %9'g|- - - - - ----__ DT:{]s「용의ŪŮŰ"|T:| 5 ||ol | sl | 900"| || 9 等E|연:|ŪŮŰ"|E OOO"OOS : 5또ÛÛÛ'[[JOE JIOOO"OD|| "E준: 5}}| Jos%C)ŌŌŌ"ÕÕI '5}{ ||?? DÙ LI İTİ- - ----|-----5| || LI Ġ|-|||

Page 21
PARLIAMENT
Coalition politics
by Dr. W. A. Wiswa Warnapala
t this stage we need to
diwert our attention to the office of the Leader of the Opposition. The recognition of the office of the Leader of Opposition beca me an i55ue integrally SSC ciated with the statu 5 of the Opposition in the Parliamentary system of Sri Lanka. The lack of homogeneity within the ranks of the Opposition in the first Parliament (1947-52) interfered with the election of a Loader of the Opposition and Speaker Francis Mola mure, who was keen to emulate the parliamentary conventions established at Westminsterremnded the Copposition of the
need to elect a Leader of the Opposition. The failure on the part of the Government to re
cognise officially the Opposition, recording to Francis Molemure, was due to "the inability of the Opposition to elect a leader, The attitude of the Government was that there were three Leaders in the Opposition – the reference was to the existence of three Marxist groups with Lheir respective leaders. The absence of a single party in the Opposition, therefore, demanded the groups within the Opposition to elect a person as the Leader of the Opposition who, according to G. G. Pon nambalam, was the Chief Whip of the Opposition. Dr. N. M. Perera's election as the Leader of the Opposition in June 1950) was considered a Wise Step, and the Gawern Tent im media tely responded with the pledge that it was prepared to provide the Leader of the Opposition with a salary. Though the Leader of the Opposition was elected by the groups in the Opposition, the question arose whether the Leader of the Opposition could speak on behalf of the entire Opposition, He, though the Leader of the Opposition spoke on behalf of the party. There were also occasions when he spoke on be half of the entre CF position.
The Opposition, agreed to work Single group bet that they were Opposition. The Opposition a dop! tudes on the yote d In differer dus subjects. therefore, took conglomera te wF is the Opposition they are seated sition benches'. of the Oppositic statu5 to the Le3 sition who, tho. parties in the not expected to wie wis and policii in the Oppositi of the Oppositic the primary pur: the efficit con 55 of the H. acted in the na 5 ition, ha did 5 yith the mao: 5 jtion. The het E of the Oppositic preg wented the e |Inc. in the scle Certa liri member: sition who bgla: tical Party, wer to accept the Leader of the gard to such selection of spe ation changed ir a result of the tווה גם חeוחוrf טייס בC of official recogr der of the Op about a change the Whip, whic accorded to th Leader of the
Though the ci Opposition dete. of the election the Opposition, party which highest number Opposition, was of the Opposi

in this context, together as a cause of the fact Thembers of the parties in the te d differert attisale issue and It ways on wariThe Opposition, the for IT of "a 1 cole which ir fact 1 merel y because on the OppoThis character » n gawe a different der of the OppoJgh chosen by the Opposition, was represent the as of the parties cf. The Lei det in Ywas cho Seri for lose of facilitating duct of the Elusiou se, Though he me of the Oppoחנsultatitחםם חi ם its of the Oppo: rogenous na Lure rh, for instance, xercise of discipction of speakers. of the Oppo"ged to rio poli2 nat prepared decision of the pposition in rematters as the akers, The situ1956 largely as ätt itu de of the the extension | iti or of the Leaposition brought In the rol of h was originally office of the pposition.
2mposition of the Tirood the rature of the Lei det of the Leader of the ammanded the of 5 αat 5 ΙΓ' τη Γ'
chos cel Leader tion. The LSSP,
Role of Opposition (2)
-----------
which was a be to win 14 seats at ha election, manoeuvred in such a way as to see that its
leader was elected the Leader of the Opposition. Though the other parties in the Opposition could have combined against the LSSP, no such attempt was made. In fact, Dr. Colwin R. de Siwi of the LSSP was unofficially recognised as the Deputy Leader of the Opposition. The most significan change was the attitude of the Opposition to the new Govern
ment and the different parties, which constituted the he Lerogenous group in the Opposition,
adopted different attitudes. This, apart fra T1 indreasing the effectiveIn 255 of the Opposition, created a Faculiar situation in which the LSSP, as the large 5t single party in the Opposition, "developed sufficient self-confidence to regard itself as an alternative to the Government". Study of this attitude by the LSSP needs to be prefaced by a discussion om the nature of the function ing of the main groups in the Opposition. The Sę groups from the wery inception of parliamentary gove sin - ment in the Island, hawe displayed independence in the exercise of their duties as members of the Opposition. Although this attitude was associated with controversial issues, it disturbed both consensus and the effectiveness of the Opposition. The LSSP and the Communist Party extended 'responsive“ cooperation to the Government of 956 while the UNP, FP and the TC adopted a hostile attitude. The passage of the Paddy Lands Bill saw the absence of a United Opposition and the members of the Opposition, as stated by P. Kardia h, a Communist Member of Parliament, felt that "they hawe to wote differently from others in the House'. Explaining further, he said, 'the only thing that they hawe done a 5 Opposition was LO Clec. a. Lader of the Opposition'. Such an expla
nation was necessary to justify the position of the Communist Party vis-a wis the Government.
The Communist Party was accused of sitting in the Opposition and occasionally voting with the
g

Page 22
Government. There was yet another issue on which the Communist Party disagreed with the official position of the Leader of the Opposition. It refused to Support the wote of no-confidence moved by the Leader of the Opposition on the issue of the dissolution of the Colombo Mшпjcipal Council. The reason was that the Communist Party functioned Inside the Opposition in the form of an independent group. Pieter Keureman, explaring its role within the Opposition, said "We do not atted the megtings of the Opposition " mor do we attend the meetings of the Government' and they, in hI5 wiew, werg 1 5.LL of Outsiders. In addition to this kind of atttude adopted by certain groups within the Opposition, there were Individual embers of Parliament who, while remaining within the Opposition, voted with the Government om måjor Is Sues. This in witcd criticism from the Leader of the Opposition but could not be prevented because of the fluid nature of the Oppostor. A bowe all, it was due to the absence of homogeneity.
The development of coalition politics, which lasted for nearly a decade, brought about a change in the parliamentary arena and the emergence of 'a measure of agreement over a fairly wide range of fundamentals' allowed the pariamentary System to develop its own version of the Westminster model. The parties
which for Ined themselves into a coalition in 1964 retained their individual party identity. Prog
rammatic unity was only a parliamentary strategy. The Opposition saw the 1964 Coalition as a mowo in the direction of a dicta torship and this attitude gulded the parliamentary strategles of the Opposition led primarily by the UNP. The political parties which assisted the UNP to cause the f|| of the Coalitior Goyernment became partners in the || 9&5 Coalitic The Govorrimer of 1965, which was a "heterogenous collection' was confronted with an Opposition, which was united In term of its basic perspectives. The Opposition view of the UNP Government of 365 was
O
that it represent the progress tha' made since the
MEP || || 595.
The Colon Pr formed the basis of the United wictory at the of 1970 represen of an alerrià II w The new Opposit sisted of the U and TC (3), conf Coalition, which two-third majorit of || 57 The Tiber three parties in consisted of or they were able funda Them tals. Thi the Opposition t united body, J. ther Leader of expressed a de! cooperation to ti This wiew, thoug nomic considerati tical strategy, i yoked a titis i 5 Ww of the UNP, il hi5 * Parliam racy - the role sition in a De Wel advocated coope the Gowern Irian t 5ition and his wie' by the need to mic stability, was sition partie 5 We groups cor lobbie: which could t: Government” Th multi-party-syste sition Influence d at this conclusi displaying its abi alternative gover the availl ble Parlament to em ful Opposition, Lues and similat utilised for the break-up of the and the subseq. the United Fra o reted a
Parliam grntā|| relating to the respected. Tհը majority, with W tutional Conor changes in the were implemento dubbed as "the

ad a threat to t the people had victory of the
"ogramme of 1968 of the solidarity
Front and Its general Election ted the election
= government. igri, which conNP || 7) FP (I2) on Let the UF commanded a y in a House 5. Though the the Opposition y 33 members, to agree on is perhaps helped function as a R. Jayewardeme, the Opposition. ire to extet he Government. h guided by ecoions and a polimme diately proith in the ranks R. Jayewardene, entary Democof the Oppo|Оріпg Country, ration between and the OppoW, though guided må i ta i T e:oroi that "the Oppofe only pressure i but not forces 1. ke o wert the e defects of a tm-based Cppohim o arrive on. The UNP, lity to for In an Ihrheit used all pportunities in Crge as a powerCorrow etsial isslegislation were purpose. Tho Coalit | O || | rn | 975 Jent collapse of nt in February situation where
ry con Wem tiom sin
Opposition were раг|аппепtary
hich the constihic and sociai period 1970-75
d, came to be tyranny of the
two-third Tajor|ty". Extension of the life of Parliament - the total life of Parliarrier was for a period of seven years - was Considered un democratic, and the Opposition made it an important issue both within and outside Parliament. The attempt to postpone the General Election of 1977 and the move to prevent Merribe f5 of Parlia rT Ent who yountarily resign their seats from recontesting the Same Seat reprosented an attempt to Weaken the parliamentary Opposition. The real erosion. of the powers and opportunities of the parliamentary Opposition took place during the läst phase of the Gowëtimient of the United Front. The Opposition, in the context of the situation consequent to the Railway Strike of December 1976, sought a meeting with the Prime Minister. Failure to grant this request of the official Opposition to meet the Prime Minister to discuss a national issue came to be describad as ar attempt to disregard the role of the OppoSition in Parliam LIt.
Two issues exposed the attitude of the Gowen Tent towards the Opposition. There were two motions of no-confidence pending against the Government. The first was in connection with the Government's conduct in the December-January Strike and the second was in respect of the killing of a University student of the Perudeniya Campus. A parliamentary Strategy was devised to avoid a confrontation with the Cpposition or these is suas ard Parliament was prorogued on 10th February, 1977. The prorogation W35 to rema II i frc. III || || 9th May, 1977, two days before the expiry of the life of the National State AsseTbly. This formula was followed to prevent the Opposition from staging a "parliaTentary dra T13' on the two issues.
Yet another development which interfered with the relationship between the Government and the OPPosition was the defection of a group of Members of Parlament 3 m d the breaka way of the Communist Party from the government. The në xt resignation to follow was that of the Minister of Industries and Scientific Affairs,

Page 23
T. B. Subasinghe. These develop
ments, though it strengthened the Opposition, accelerated the prorogation of Parlament and the Opposition saw the whole
exercise as an attempt to undermine Its role. The prorogation, in effect, Ileant that the Ministers and Members of Parliament, who broke away from the Government, were prevented from making their customary explanations inside the House. All these amply demonstrated the utter disrespect with which the Government treated the Parliamentary Cpposition, The prorogation of Parliament and the subsequent dissolution on 9th May, 1977 created an anomalous situation In terms of parliam en tary com wentions because the country was to be ruled for nearly six months without the function ing of the elected Parliament. This, in the eyes of the Opposition, was undemocratic because it afforded opportunities for the Caretaker Gover FN ment to rule the country without the supervision of an elected Parliament.
Though "the Opposition was regularly ignored or steam-rollered by the Government's majority' - by respective Governments - the need to establish the convention of consulting the Opposition came to be recognised. Recognition of this convention came largely as a result of the repeated requests by members of the Opposition, including those of Dr. N, M Perera as far back as 950 for consultation to take place between the Government and the Opposition on measures of a fundamental nature. A matter affecting the Constitution provoked Dr. Perera to woice his views on the need for consultation and the Gowen
ment responded sta ting that it was prepared to consult the Opposition if it was willing to
be consulted. D. S. Sena nayake, in fact, pledge to establish this convention in respect of consultation with the Opposition, The emergence of the SLFP as an important segment of the Opposition helped in the further recognition of this convention and the Leader of the Opposition was included in the official team which went to India for fiscussions
with that Gover | 954. Mrs. Siri Once claimed tha cussions with th Opposition – Duo — on the Indoand this was there was some ment between t portant question, 1952-60, the i55 to this convertio tance, and the O the Government consult the Oppo relating to the Err DT. N. M. Pere Leader of the O. at Ing his wiew t of the Oppositio kept fully inform ation, said that emergency is con sition d ces not perhaps this a Government whic Opposition to e official cornritte keep the men be sition informed c. the Governmen period of the Government was to establish a sp and it was con 5ic to accommodate of the Oppositio 5e wen member 5 c. the Federal Party provoked the Opposition to wi the Prime Mr. Lihat a special mi ment be summor) pose of inform The matters pel arrar gement of business invited the Opposition, very inception of model, played an
Simca || 9W 14 the such a convent to tho election in wited the atten i sition. Dr. N. M. P that the Leade must make an ef consensus by cons members of the Government exps by stating that t not a homogenet
(Next: Oppo:

n ment in January T1a Bandarānaiks t she had di 5ie Leader of tha dley Senanayake Ceylon problem possible because measure of agreeem on this imIn the period ue of a dhe ring in assumed Impo:- position charged with failure to Sition om Thatters ergency of 1958.
ra, the then position, rei terthat the Leader feeds to be ad of the situ"50 far as this cerned the Oppoexist". It was ttitude of the
:h compelled the itablish an url2 ir cor det to rs of the Oppo. if the actions of t during the emergency. The
later compelled ecial Committee lered an AE tempt the request of 1. The arrest of if Parliament of
so in Lurg |58 lead or of the 'ite a letter to
İster Suggesting 2 et Ing of Par||a- ed for the puring Parliament. "tain ing to the
parliamentary h2 aLter tion of which from thig the We5 EIT) in 5 ter
effective role.
need to establish CT1 T1 relatic Ti of the Speak or Іоп of the Cрроbrera emphasised * Cof the Hau 5e ort to obtain 3 ilting the leading Opposition' The il 1 ed its attitude e Oppsition was U5 g TO UPO,
ition's Decline)
GUARDIAN OF YOUR
HEL
BY ਝਗ, سلسشتهلأششك
AND
இஜ்
AROUND THE
AROUND THE
بیشی
FROM FACTORY FLOOR
TO SELLING DOOR -
WEEKLY CONSOLIDATIONS
SPLIT FULL CHARTER SERVICE
COMPREHENSIVE IMPORTWEXPORT SER WICE
INTERNATIONAL DISTRIBUTION NETWORK
FREETELEX ADWICE
AND HANG ING GARMENTS
ệ
AGEATRеж}-GALA B2) INTERNATIONAL FREIGHT FOR WAF DEFS
F. O. BOX 5 COLOMBO 1 SRI LANKA CABLE: 'AITKENCOLOMEO" TELEX 1142
TELEPHONE 27BB1-3, 32776 (DIRECT)

Page 24
| osəsusunoɔgłIus səəŋJoo's ~ầusųÁJəAȚ
!oueuleus speųLAA
 

&ZI xolo L €I-IIÇzz auoqđələ 1 ! "[ os[c11010C) els erwe W ox{o||sues es uoluțI JIS 'g'||
‘au’aqwÁuə^3 '13'Aeu] u, əlu eu pəļsnu, əųL
XOOO SPUUOULL
SWW
以 | 니년 Hael 實 = No s= 灯 33 s= s F['(E|

Page 25
THE NSSP AND THE
Chintaka replies
Shanta de
hree hundred years of democracy and what have the Swiss produced? The cuckoo clock!" wä5 CTSCT1 WGlees' sär darlic comment in Graham Greene's SS aL LLLL L SS LLLLLL LSLS SLLLLLLK can be asked about Trotskyism. It Was Gramsci (with whose writings Prof. de Alwis has occa5 Ionally displayed a pa 55 ing acqulintance, though not much camprehension) who correctly characterized the "General theory of Permanent Revolution' as "nothing but a generic forecast presented as a dogma (and) which deliolishes itself by not in fact coming true." ("State and Civil Society'). A few decades after Gramsci, Louis A Ithu 5 ser told us in similar wein that Trotsky i SrTn is unworthy of our attention since it has no histrC W CUC rigg to t5 Ted it.
If this is true of Trotskyism, how much truer it is of a representative of that a na chronistic ideology as Prof. de Alwis? I permitted myself a protracted polemic with yet another Trotsyist academic, Dr. Kumar David (Prof. de Alwis' erstwhile comrade in the NSSP) not only because the topic ur der discussion was of considerable import (the National Question) but also because Dr. David showed at least at the outset, a certain wit and literary grace. Prof. de Alwis' literary effort on the other hand is reduced to such a nearhysterical whine that I am reluctant to engage in polemics with him for fear of upsetting the man over nuch. Debray was right in his digression on Trotskyism (which he termed "the ideological construct of an un easy conscience") when he said that a Trotskyist is instantly recognizable by his shrill, grating tone, which in turn mirror's a certa ir attitude to the
world, a certain structuring of experience. We must all give serious thought to the idea
Alwis
that all wicto hithgrto, ha'ye : exception, to liquidate Trousk cause of the
the makey of th In Cessant naggin tCom and cho i that se ers to
minent characte Alwis' verbal in
The Warma te Id til SLFFP
But 10 Tatter. || Conterit of Pro Let us begin, as at the beginnin Alwwis" opěrn Ing principled stand has taken on programmatic blic parties (popular since its incept dency (Vama Sam the LSSP, is or ing features". || probably the Ilir 52lls t5 Trt : dom to Gerowa, long run) in con: man probably bu sale, but the becomics a chas spurious product In the domestic kria'y what Prol doing and wher but those of us With WaTa' lit wity from the ea Carn not help bu good Professor's The fact of the from the wery ir group had no grasp of the na and consequently lata 2 clear positi of its will famous Second before the LSS July 1972 for in

LSSP i
tO
Tio LS rewolutions en fit. Without ncarcera te and/or yists precisely beinfernal riu i sance emselves by their g, in the same Ce of Wocabulary be the most proristic of Prof. de LE"'s Efl tid slo.
idency
Lot LIS examine, the f. de Alwwis" article. Alico was advised g. Consider de 5entence: "The that the NSSP the formation of 2cs with bourgeois * frontism) ewer on as a tiny tema Sаппаjaya) within e of its outstandNow this is very e that the NSSP leagues from Lonand those (in the equential gentley the line wholecredibility gap Th When the same is auctioned off market. I don't f. de Alwi 5 was "e, at the time, who are familiar erature and actrly '70's onwards t chuckle at the ingen uolus claim. a matter is that ception the Wanna clear conceptual tre of the SLFP did not articuon on the question that party. The Resolution put P conference' in stance, failed to
pose the central question concerming the 1964 decision to en ter an alliance with the SLFP. The task of the day, namely, to expose, denounce and break with the SLFP was not even placed on the agen da, It must be remembered that in 1971 people like Oswin Fernando and Reggie Mendis who were later touted as Wama's working class leaders, actually helped organise the "Han sa Regiment" to guard police stations at a time when the armed Forces were butchering youth in their thouan ds.
Furthermore, "Warna" did not take a clear Stand on the Emergency and the Public Security Ordinance then in force, looking upon it as a counter to an alleged fascist threat from a resurgent UNP in 1973/74. Perhaps most glaring of all, there was no clear denunciation of the CC Bill at a time when the Left-wing of the CPSL had broken with the Gowrinment, Incidentally, those CP'ers, even after their reunification, possessed a clearer understanding of the SLFP than did the "Wama" group, which is why after several years of theoretical effort, the CPSL's militants hawe been able to push their party to adopt a
much more correct position on the SLFP, than the is NSSP. (A comparison of the CPSL's Ith
Congress documents and the NSSP's Second Congress dacuments readily bear this out, as would a reading of Jaya til leka Silwa and P. Wimalara tine’s Contributions in thes CP press.) ད།
1. it
Than again nobody heard very muGh Gfi, or í fram, '''Warna" during the 108 day Bank strike which the LSSP, leadership crushed, using the most disgusting and reactionary
actics.
Prof. de Alwis' claim that "Wama' began and developed fighting the
B

Page 26
opportunistic policies of the leaders of the LSSP is revealed for the arrant nonsense it is when we engage in a little "rememberance of things past" and pause to consider "Wama" politics circa 1974. At the time, the profound theoreticians of the Wama group, diagnosed the problem in much the same way as the old leadership: Sirima, poor dear, was in the clutches of the Teactio arties! The "Warna' newssheet made so bold as to identify these beastly cads by name - Felix, Maithri, R. S. Pere a and Michael Siri wa r
dena. The Wama Sama Sarmaja editoria II of December" | 974 CC - tained tha following formulation which may impress the reader with its theoretical rigour and profoundity
""WWHate We r W2 re their shor t
comings (Minister) Hector KobēkādLā d the T. B, tr (T. B, Subasinghe, T. B. Tennekoon and T. B. Illa nga ratne) stood up to the rightist challenge of FelixMathripaia in the Cabinet. They appeared as irreconciliable eneTies of the UNP, ...Therefore the Hectors, the TB's and Jayaratne's must make a decision today. They must make a promise
of the issue of a real socialist programme."
This is but one example of
what Prof. de Alwis a 55 erts as his (party's history of "total opposition to making programmatic concessions of any kind to any bourgeois party!' Wama's analysis (or what passes for one), of the SLFP was, and is not based con objective structural considerations but on personalities and on the fluctuating fortunes of this cor that clique, co terle of cabal. Far from being "born in the struggle against class collaboration', and "hawing as its raison d'etre a consistent struggle for the independent progra Time of the working class Party," Warna's stated project was the formation of "a left leadership with in the United Front.' One had to wait until |lite || 975-"WÉ to her from the Wa må group, a clear denunciation of the 1964 betrayal. It was only In the Wama Sama Santmaja issues of August/September 1975 (End of the stage of Coalition Politics)
교
and Aprif 1976 and our tactics") t of a s tard was crucial question Coaliticom.
A 1977 press re summed up the " history thus:
"From W. E. sought to develop the United FO build a real class to develop strugs | ia ment. We had the leadership.
make the Front class struggle, the leadership, f in which they f in the to a lit subordinating itse bourgeoisie, get within the parliam ting repression."
LSSP Yesus NS
So, by their Warha's criticism dership Was con with the Tanne
latter function coalition. Court was the "Wama'
oping the strugg UF, of making th of class struggle, the Gang of F Ministers (there res cu ing the fair 5 till faire T femal E the wicked clutc. the finanlly of bu dership within t
Prof. de Alwis falsification of c tory not Ywith 5 tam c. Stainst habits s 'what this rei wei NSSP's difference LSSP leadership of a tactical strategic nature, Lions function w the samo pro operate on the terra irı. The Tı that the NSSP activist (not re ture and seeks parlia Tentary agit ta ç'tic to Taxi II i with ir a r alia Inc This explains why

("United Front :hat a samblance taken on the of the 94
: lease (April 6th) Wama tendency's
efore || 972, Wye struggle thro Lugh nt Alliance' to united front. . gle outside pardifferences with We sought to : the arena of while criticising or the manner unctioned with
ion, that is If to the liberal ting Imprisoned
lent, and suppor(My emphasis).
SSP
own admission, of the LSSP leacerned primarily in which the ed with in the erposed to this Project of devele through the a UF the arena of kicking out "our reactionary ! by presumably Siri Tha a n d h(2r" 2 offspring from hes of Satan) and ilding a left leah a coalitiоп.
attempt at the on temporary hisling (these nasty e em contagious), als Is that the s with the old nave always been rather tha a Bath organisaithin essentially blematique; they Same conceptual a in difference is adopts a more !volutionary) p05L0 L 52 éXt:1= ation a 5 a pres5ure Ze its adwartage e With tha SLFP. the "Wama' group
clear stand on
SLFP är break, with the coalition
after 1971 when the Te Was TO
real need to expose the SLFP further from Within the UF since that party had signalled, in the bloodiest fashion, its tra sition ' from reformis IT tO counterevolution. It was a generational conflict and a clash of egos (not intellects), that is to say, a problem of blocked upward
mobility, that was the major Contradiction within tha LSSP. Cred It must be given where credit is due,
and we must appreciate the unmerring accuracy in the choice of momenclatura in the (som etim ës
baffling) process of the metamorphosis of the "Wama' tendency in to the Naya Sama Sarmaja Party. The LSSP being a Social Demociatic party, these revolutionary gentlemen are actually the "Wama'
(Left) version of it. That is to say, they are "Left Social Democrats'. (Trotsky once said som ewhere thet Left Social Democrats can be the more dangerous of the two!) "Nawa Sama Samaja Party' is similarly appropriate, since the NSSP is nothing but a "nawa' (new)
wersion of the old LSSP. This is
why the NSSP will enter the SLFP orbit as well, though the approach route will differ, as Well as the degree of its rapprochement. This is also why a drawing together and eventual reunification
of the LSSP and the NSSP cannot be ruled out altogether, once the dialectics of nature have effected
certain personality changes in the
cald Party,
did not take a
The answer to Prof. de Alwis' plaintive query "why, oh why WoLld a li alliance with the SLIFP come about?' is clear. Any phenome non must be studied in its genesis, development and decay. Firstly the genes is and developIn ent of the NSSP lends itself to the thesis thāt such är all i ac is vell within the realth of possibility. Secondly the NSSP ideologues' literary efforts ranging from "ANT Important Question within the Party' right up to the 2nd Congress documents reveal such an ambiguous and thoroughly confused characterization of the SLFP" 5 cla 55 mature, which i5 little different from the LSSP's 1964 analysis, that the issue of an

Page 27
aliance moves fron the realm of possibility in to that of probability. The NSSP conduct in the Cour50 of the Present strike where it has seen fit to consider the CPSL to be more of an antagonist than the SLFP-LSSP, only serves to bLuttress th i 5 com tan tion. Prof. de Al wis un blush ingly states that the NSSP is "totally opposed to the forming of parliamentarist alliances with any bourgeois party." undertake solemnly to remind him of this in 583, in the pages of this same Journal.
Apart from his potted history of the NSSP, Prof. de Alwis' other argument to "disprove' the possibility of an alliance with the SLFP, is that the party would disi Integrate in Such an ewent, since the party cut its teeth on the 5truggle aga inst coalition politlics, This latter, we hawe Seen, upon closer examination, is false. In any case the possibility of a spilt is no cast-iron guarantee against Right opportunism, as the 1964 "turn" of LSSP has der Tian 5trated. It may also be men Lioned that in contest to the clarity of thought and expression manifested in the pampheteering of the LSSP leaders (such as Colvin, Leslie, Hector and Karalasingham) in their heydey, the theoreticral writings of the NSSP leaders seem positiwely Neanderthal. If the LSSP could deviate sharply to the right despite all the scintilating polemics against class collaborationism and following upon the heels of the formation of the ULF, then it is perfectly feasible for the NSSP, with its ill defined and confused theoretical positions, to do the same, albeit in a different man ner. Beling a quintes Sentially parlamenta rist party, which, d ispite a degree of agitational extraparliament ray activism, is by no stretch of the imagination, wedded to an armed struggle strategy (witness its attitude to the armed actions in the North), the NSSP, we may safely predict, is bound to en ter at least a Parliamentary alliance with the SLFP as elections Lunder the PR syste Ti loom ahead.
SLFP and the LEFT
Prof. de Awis sets forth the NSSP tactic of united actions with the SLFP, a tactic which he says,
accords with th position. Thoug fairly accurate si Lérinist tati-, conveniently ab the context in W to be applied. permissible in 5 Cefnir i c5:
(i) a bloc ' bourgeois le agai Counterre wolution bloc with K Kornilow)
(II) United ac Democratic parti the reactionary Working Class F
(iii) An allianc democracy (or revolutionary de anti-colonial strl
There are no dents for the M a-wis the SLFP, that the SLFP d of the categories This should be exept a political de Alwis' choice na ti ornal bourgeoi: a process of c and has awolved big bourgeoisie. and the SLFP mar, the river same dependern t class. This is actions" em bracl dership can be recourse to Len why the struggle waged against b SLFP. In the pe SLFP'5 g |acticra|| the Left Forces 5 and concentrated thereby inflictin Possible damage an 3|d Maoist should hawe "bea it was in the and is the only the asses with cialist alternativ the current cris Wijew gera (and CPSL) se em to h but Wijeweera's wards other for has, paradoxical

classia: Lennist he makes a In Tlation of this Prof. de Awwis tracts it from hich it was meant This tactic is th a following
with the liberal inst an openly ary threat (the rensky against
los With Social es in the face of offensive United ront)
2 with bourgeois more correctly mocracy) in the
|ggle.
Leninist an teceSSP "tactic' wisg|slice it is cleas oes not fit any mento fined abowe. obvious to anyone Imbecile (Prof. of words). The sie has und ergone ompredo rification In to a dependent Both the UNP epresent, in the fractions of the bourgeois ruling why no "United ng the SLFP leajustified by tha in. This is also today has to be oth JNP and the “lod following the defeat in 1977, 1 could hawe united fire on the SLFP the maximum on it. To Luso saying, the Left. en the dog while rator." This was way to present a clear cut so .
· in the midst of 5. Only Rohana sections of the we realized this, 5ec tarian F5 T1 t) - es of the Left y, worked to the
SLFP's advantage. The NSSP slogan of the 'united actions of all anti-government political parties' inclusive of the SLFP, does not expose the SLFP one whit. To the contrary. It helps the SLFP pose off as an anti-UNP oppositional force, when in class terms it is its substitute: Its twin The NSSP's tactic is one which socks to fend off the wolf at the front door while permitting the tiger to re-enter through the rear window (another Maoist aphoriam of which I am especially fond). Whatever its other (monumental) mis perceptions concerning
the General Strike, the JWP is correct. When it states on the front page of the August 1980
issue of Niyamuwa', that in the course of present strike struggle a united front with the SLFP is in the process of being subtly for Ted.
The NSSP is party to this treacherous process, says the JWP, and thinking is shared,
though not woiced, by tho CPSL's militats as well. Does Prof. de Alwis characterize these organisations as "grou P-5 cules", "sects" or 'one-man parties'. It would be interesting to know,
There has been in the recent past, about the errors allegedly made by the German C. P. during the 'Third Period", errors which are said to
a lot of talk
hawe led to the victory of Fascism. It is said that those who refuse to "call for the
support of the bourgeois opposition parties" (Prof de Alwis' recommendation) are guilty of the same error as the German Communists. This is neither tha time nor place to examin e tho validity of this criticism of the German Communists, but it is important and pertinent to note that the parallel simply does not hold. The German C. P.'s error, if at all, concerned its attitude to che Social Democrat 5, The parallel would be the JWPs refusal to en ter i to united actions with other parties of the Left a (including the LSSP. Such united actions, leading to unity on the basis of a minimum programme and thence to a united Left front presenting the Socialist alternative in the form of a governInental programme, is something
25

Page 28
that must be fought tenaciously.
On the other hand, the JWP (and CPSL radicals) attitude to the SLFP is quite correct and
praiseworthy, bearing no relationship to the German CP's alleged
TULF
There is only one bourgeois
opposition party whose support
it is tactically correct to call
upon in the context of anti-UNP actions, and that is the TULF. This is because the TULF represents in the main, the non-ruling or non-monopoly fractions of the bourgeoisie, unlike the UNP and SLFP, The Leninist attitude to "liberal bourgeois' or "national bourgeois' formations applies, in the con temporary Sri Lanka con
text, only to the TULF. Prof, de Alw is whole argument conCerring united actions' holds true only in this case. Lumping
together as he does, the SLFP and the TULF as "bourgeois opposition parties' Prof. de Alwis fails to draw the fundamental Leninist distinction between the bourgeoisie of an Oppressor nation and the bourgeoisie of an oppressed nation. He thereby fails to understood the progressive aspect of the bourgeois nationalism of an CP Pressed nation. The TULF has now leaned towards the UNP, thereby displaying the classic dual nature and vacillatory character of the national bourgeois (in this Case, middle bourgeois le aspiring to be a national bourgeoisie). It
is extremely difficult to draw them into anti-UNP actions at the Present time. But It is Un thin kable that the SLFP, re
presenting fractions of the ruling dependent bourgeoisie, and being a chauvinist Party to boot, should be drawn into the ranks of anti-UNP struggle. In this period, the only real anti-UNP Option is the Left option and the only
26
anti-lJNP atel Socialist al terma only emerge in a n tl-capitalst s LI
Analysis of the
There are flash humour in Prof. Polemic, and foi be thankful. T is his assertior and neo-Stalini 'simply' define t alternate party c and stop at t engaging in furt good Professor obligingly to pr brief resume of
As I had c earlier, I don't de Will wis was at anyone who was QLL the 970'5 , infor the Pro degree of theor on thg Ilied
| latioma | bourge SLFP, aII cof w outside the ran kyist movement, Stalinist and neoLlon 5 that de Aw refer 5 to, li wa a selli Star organiaation by ing) which first Lly, around || 97 stage of the Sri tion as anticapitals Sed, equally, the and applicability of 'revolution by the case of Chin This un der Stard the charged role bourgeoisie in th Carl text, Was intui Instead of being analysis, empiric rigor CUS conceptu tragically dissipate to be replaced u ledged Mande||te Weiled "ETSİürı Revolution. Moans grou Pings from "Mitipahara' gr CP-ML (the “Nir hâd gathered Lup thread. The di thëse groups resu

| atl We, I5 thէ: iwe. Thcs e can the course of a
Iggle.
SLFF"
s of un intentional de Alwis' deadly Che5e, We must e most a musing that Stalinists groupscules le SLFP a5 "the F the bourgeoisie' at instead of er analysis. The then proceeds esent us with a his own analysis.
Cca si corn to Say know wher. Prof. the time, but around throughyould be abla to f. that a fair izing took place problems of the oisie and the hich took place lks of the Trotsin precisely those Stalinist organiza5 contemptuously 5 the JWP (the ist som i Mai 5 t its own reckonidentified correc'0, the present Lankan rewoluit, while recognihistorical validity of the concept stages' (e.g. in a And Wietnam). ing Con Cerning of the national e neo colonial live and rhebulous. deepened by all study and alization, it was 2d in the jails, n der unick nowinfluence by a of Permanent while, breakaway the CPSL (the cup) and the dhanaya' group)
the conceptual composition of |ted in a fusion
the form of the Lanka Social Studies Circle" (neo-Stalinist group-uscule par excellence) took the process forward, critically assimilating the Insights provided by the development of neo-Marxist analysis in the field of political economy (dependency theory) with the rigorous theoretical tradition of Lenin, Stalin, the Comintern and Cornform. The news sheets, theoretical bulletins and booklets published by these groups in the post 97 period reveal a much more thorough analysis of the SLFP than does the Wanna Sarasa maja' of that period, which was too busy calling for 'Hector and the T. B. trio" mot to mer jarı the "Ellaw allas, Jina da 5 a 5 and Rupasinghes to 'maka a promise
which took
on the issue of a real socialist
programme' and kick out the
"four reactionary Ministers."
Ewen internationally, creatiwe
analysis on the quest fons of the national bourgeoisie and neocolonialism has emanated from people lika Guewara and Lc Duan, Debray and Cabral. (In the realm of political economy, enormous strides hawa been made by Intellectuals such as Baran, Sweezy, Sam ir Amin, Dos Santos, Sunkel, Cardoso Emmanuel and of course A. GFrank.) If Prof. de Alwis is unaware that all the se personalities Share a Common att itu de of hostility and/or bemused contempt towards Trotskyism, then he should
find a platform other than the Lanka Guardian to make a Iudicrous exhibition of himself, flaunting his theoretical Illiteracy.
Finally, apropos Prof. de Alwis Criticism of the location of "meo Stalinist journalists' on 'the fringe of the workers movement". personally think that the primary concern ought to be with what is said rather than fron where it is said, be it from the 'fringe of the workers mowerinent", or from Genewa ort Trie 5 te or for that matter, the Swimming Club! But if Prof. de Alwi 5 wishes to press the point, I am forced to admir self critically, that I cannot approximate the truly internationalist revolutionary praxis of the good professor.

Page 29
District Councils . . .
(ட்பாtirred fr நவழE )
unashamedly carried all the statements of the Sinhala Mahajana Peram Luna. What they cannot do directly due to certain tactical reasons, they seem to be doing
indirectly through the Sinhala
Mahajana Peramuna.
Contain Dissaffection
The position of the TULF is
be con ing still Thore embara 55 ing with the President going out of his way to please various indiwiduals who claim to represent the Interests of Sirhala Buddhists. Hi! seems to hawe agreed that these District Councils are really a camouflage for the dictatorship of the district minister appointed by him–5 elf! However with all these assurances these chauvinistic extremists arte mot gol ng to be satisfied and J. R. will naturally be compelled to remove even the semblence of de volution of power contained in the DDC Bill. Finally it will develop into the institute that it is really intended
to be. It will act as an auxiliary apparatus for containing dissatisfaction among the Tamil
speaking people. Amirthalingam and Sivas ith thamparim will play the role of policennan for the President in aiding and a betting the rig pressive apparatus for hun ting down the radica | Tamil youth, The DDCs will turn out to be a hangman's no ose around the neck of Tamil militancy.
Thus it is the duty of the left parties and working class organisations, to expose the real nature of the DDC frozzi LJ d to the Tam il speaking People while defending the nominal devolution of power indicated in it. This is the first time the concept of regional councils is contained in a bill passed by Parliament. In 1958 the Banda-Chelwa pact went some way towards satisfying the Tamil national democratic movement. At that stage the conflict between the national rovements in Sinhala arid Tamil ä reas, had not gone through the monstrous experiences of 58 and 77. The hegemony of the Sinhala bourgcois over the Taifnill speaking people was not so sharply enforced.
| || th cgg circum the Banda-Ch: considerable st the national
Larika.
Contemptible
However, tE agreement did proving once a mCderm world incapable of arr ingful solution problem. To a sa The can be District Council Dudley-Chelwa P. ta13525 the leef f active defenco chauvinists who devolution of though they their artitude Banda-Chelwa pi Thai r A L. Lide | ach graus and cr
Today the na
lite E. B - Come gargra Carrot be cof regional counc 958 on in 96 Gang rena canna piece cf al How (cwgr, thgrt Un scrupulous cha Stop at moth ing implementation Ti i riu te re media Lhe Left a re di ditionally to de this Teate in e Y
Letters . .
( t αritirrier
(2) 'Our per tham just blrth and we must
The et the chal erns u re thia L. li r threats are be from ouro mem will also not time and that found gains w trievably lost'
Tore this is liko gibberish. a Corfucial ma is in CorrècL L. is no . The à in II. if

stances, naturally, lwl pact was a !p towards solving problem in Sri
e Barda-Chelya not last long, gain that in the the bourgeoisie is iwing at a meanto the national lesser extent the said about the s proposed in the act. In both these ai lo tr la rich a against the Sinhala Were opposising power. In 1958 advocated parity towards thԸ lätt w 15 not clear. İı || 3ğĞ iyyat, tr" (2- interptible.
tional proble in is
Th B wQLrd his Ilous. The DD (s in pared with the
|ls Pгoposed iп É for that matter. be cured by a tiseptic plaster. 2 are gangs of Livinilg t.g. who would
to prevent the
of even this measure. We of ity bound unconfeat the thrust of er y Way possible. O
fro Page )
ple deserve more Work and death create as well as lenge in ordet to las much a 5 past gin ring to tecede hory, our people go backward in
all their rew Could no b c Irre
ounds alarmingly It brings to mind XIm: ""|f language er what is said
what is said is
mot mant, the
what ought to be done
TETIGI 15 unding".
Mr. Atulatih mudali is a politiclan whose self-regard is widely shared. But in the lugubrious role of nortician of the UNP government he is rapidly dewaluing himself. His gift for hyperbole seems to prevent him from perceiving the post-1977 reality which mocks his rhetoric: the ever-incressing cost of living: the Uncontrollable inflation: the meretricio Luis affluence of a small trading class: the precarious position of the national economy: the almost total abandonment of the principle of self reliance in the task of social reconstruction; the un precedented labour and industrial un rest the un plan red de velopmėn. t; the gradual de terioration of the physica | quality of Ife of the mass of ordinary people. W in di Perhaps most disgusting of all the shameless attempt to Luse the 'dham ma' to pro Tote " "th HIl իa".
Carlo Fonseka Colombo.
The July Strikers
| hawe read your article titled "Anatomy of a Strike." In the August 15 issue of Lanka Guardiam".
The strikes did not take place but spread spontantously as your article suggests. They took place in response to a joint strike call on 4th July 1980, which was deliberately made by twelve organisations In the Joint Trade Union Action Committee (JTUAC), within two days of the partially effective
Railway strike. Apart from a partially effective strike in the Government Clerical Service,
and short-lived strikes of manul workers in several stablishments in the private sector in Colombo, the strike call produced no response at all, ar a completely Ineffective resparise in the Public sector, even from the memberships of the organisations that called the S Erika. In that Sector.
27

Page 30
SCHOLAR HONOU
A.E." Inter" est in Scholarship brought him in touch Wylith E. W. Perera, Corne of Sri Lanka's distinguished scholar's- states men of this century. He helped the latter in his critical essay on "The Jury system in Ceylon" published in 1933. The fr|en
shi P la sted till Perera's death. Wher the Contem its of E. W. Perera's personal library
scattered through random sales after his death a substantial por
tion of it pas 5 ed Into Rutnam's hands,
"This hovey er was far fra T
being James Rutnam's most notable acquisition of papers. That honour would go to the packet of two hundred of Horace Walpolo's letters whIch ha bought during
of |lLIIll Ը I ՃԼI5 tra Wels i Europe. The bulk of Walpole's Papers were in the library of Yale University and Wilmarth S. Lewis a trustee of that University was engaged in a systematic search for material to complete their col|- ection. The letters in the hands of James Ratnam Were essential to fill a huge gap in the publication of the collected letters of Walpole which Yale University press was bring ing out |n Some fifty sumptuously produced volumes. When Yale cffered to buy the letters froT hit Jales Ruta II responded by gifting thern to the library of that University because he felt II was the ria ILIral home for those letters. This was ir the Id - 950's,
"By this time Rutnan had published his brief sketch of his life and times of Sri Porralbalam Aru machalam, This short study was a sympathetic but critical assessment of this remarkable IIman's contribution to then life of the country, superior in insight and analysis to the weightier biographical Studies con other members of this distinguished family, produced so far.
"Two recent scholarly essays by him rank among the best works in their fields. I refer to his på pers Com The Polonnar Luwa, Colos 5 Luis (Jaffna 1979) and on Tiré Revd.
교
Vollo. Il thLa LI decided to confe
Crate Elt its Lilien in MIr, ng 75, the ne Welco T1 Cd hy :: Il follo hyd hi i 5 di
LTI : T2 rallicial activis jour:Lillist, busin l.lr, Hu url [ht: Ilirtin if :
with him. We Trdırrı El Iribut: ı Кіпрgъley М. dс. if the Unitersity si 1.
A. G. Fraser end t The first of the er Lical skills den the easy familiar and the facile de theories, is clear by the second. TE decades of inter
gets can be to a reh; set from the c against him by E D. S. Jaya tilake til own way contrib, en ing of official Siri ha les e ir the riots of 95.
"Janes Rutral bing hir Ti self as a He was thinking failure to wIn E nation al legis la [.. hardly hawe begr : סt חגtributicחסם
Letters . . .
(arr Fire '
The Gower tion of a Stat. on 7th July, a arti–Strike mea Emergency, und ted a larger ri 5 tri ke Call of
1af Inter" | Im Whili were called do total disaster sector, and a 5. I he p r iiwa ta : circulars.
Gerneral Sei

RED
i'r Cr 5 ity of ... a ffinia r :n honorary ery first con uIII: T. RILI LII:III] "1": "" : "Yırınly th: 1.5; L! Ydy hi, o 1:1 lly'' stinguished ind As a teich, ind politician, egsih gli : nh d gxo:hi, Ofelic hill ! verybod nid y Tilit ortune tc) Work Bulblish excerpts written by Prof: Sil 1, III: Eller Girls (IIIllis
he Riots of 1915." se despite the nonstrated in it, ity with sources 2 motion of airy |y overs hadowed ere after se veral rupted research as one possibly abilitation of Fraharges leyelled E. W. Ferer ård at he had in his uted to the hardattitudes to the
after rath of the
5 fand of dezerisuccessful fai || Lura. of course of his Election to the ] "Eil, He could 1 think ing of his scholarship."
Ррн! Пайға: л7)
Tent", declara! of Emergency nd its drastic: sures Jn der ths loubtedly inhibi25 Pons e to the 4th July. The h the strikes ormed the II to In the public erious defeat in
actor, in the
P. B. Таппрое :retary, C. M. U.
INVITE US TO
CATER FOR
YOUR PARTY
6
to
6O
Qbir
Õfo
FPAGODA
Catering is our speciality. We cater for any function large or small: Weddings, engagements,
cocktails, luncheons,
dinners.
PAGODA RESTAURANT too
is available for your party.
23O86, 29236.
NR] l
PAGODA
05, Chatham Street, Coornbo I.
Phone:
Cyril Rodrigo Restaurant

Page 31
Stairlin armi gas tl I rlii Iiiiċi power stati bris
h
( := r' :r:11 (115 Hill. It
Hriti $1? ES
TAME:{{i| I - || 1 || I || || up to 525 k".
Electro-heat applications (foundrits)
m Electrical -quirir
Reliable advice, dependable planning and engineering for the generation, distribution and utilization of electrical energy,
 
 
 
 
 

() ; çif all types Large power transformers
| wil Tige & Witch | (*:ar Telf - rtrl à 1l (dätà Systems.
سلالة
:ı t; *() (millifi : Tırni|| 55 Curriplete instala tighп5
for the building materials industry
Represented in Sri Länka to y: Anglo-Asian Company Ltd. Chartered Bank Building a Oueen Street P.O. Box 1034 BROWN BOVER| COOO 1 }
:յ1 15:: - Ա ||

Page 32
Upali. A companyl
The Sunan eternal symbol of USA, Australia, energy and the bright side of Hong Kong, Tha
life is the Upali Group's they are markete emblem and inspiration, It is the star
For centuries the people of that is synonym Sri Lanka, bronzed by its succeSS of the U yyarmth have looked upon the Ventures. │n COu fiery star as a sign of good omen near. In spheres and adorned their flags and varied as the ma crests with its likeness. chocolates 8 Co
The Upali Group's burnished radios and elect sun shines not only in Sri Lanka motor cars, coc but over many lands, Malaysia, Cocoa plantatio Singapore, Britain, where their management ser products are manufactured and distribution.
Head Office: 223 Bloemendhal Road Colombo 13 s
 

blessed by the sun
Japan, reland, That's the Sunshine story of i land, where the Upali Group,yvhose every
:d. product and service is blessed np of quality by the Sun.
OuS With the pali Group s ntries far and 习 as wide and
nufacture of nfectionery, On C equipment, Oa processing, na management, vices and
ri Lanka P. O. Box 172 Telex: 1198 Upali Colombo