கவனிக்க: இந்த மின்னூலைத் தனிப்பட்ட வாசிப்பு, உசாத்துணைத் தேவைகளுக்கு மட்டுமே பயன்படுத்தலாம். வேறு பயன்பாடுகளுக்கு ஆசிரியரின்/பதிப்புரிமையாளரின் அனுமதி பெறப்பட வேண்டும்.
இது கூகிள் எழுத்துணரியால் தானியக்கமாக உருவாக்கப்பட்ட கோப்பு. இந்த மின்னூல் மெய்ப்புப் பார்க்கப்படவில்லை.
இந்தப் படைப்பின் நூலகப் பக்கத்தினை பார்வையிட பின்வரும் இணைப்புக்குச் செல்லவும்: Lanka Guardian 1990.02.01

Page 1
)。agó (■
(GOMMMUWALISM
RNEY
Mervyn de Sil
Premadasa won't
Galkattas and Exit
S0UTH ASIA – W0
De
Did Wijeweera lear
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

■ L S LL S S S S S S S L S S 00S00SJK S S S00
rock the boat
J. M. Dixit
t Theory
- Tilak Gunawardhana
— Kumari Jayawardena
Velopment
- Saman Kelegama
in the right lessons P
- S. Leelananda

Page 2
THE PREM
IN SOUT
A massive Port Expansior
Colobo into a modern Con Transhipment Centre qualifyin with the following additional
and Commercial Port Users:
O Bulk-Handling facilities for
O Rebagging and Reprocessi
o A Streamlined Bonding Se
Al7y special require,77grts Coul
Enqu
SRI LANKA POR
19, Church Stret
Colombo,
Telaphona: 2 5 5 5 9

MER PORT
TH ASIA
Project has transformed tainer Handling Port and g for 'Base Port" status facilities to the Industrial
Grain, Fertilizer and Cement.
ng facilities.
!r wice
d be arra Tged for ur reg Last
iries :
இது
RTS AUTHORITY
3t, P. O. Box 595.
Sri Lanka.
TG|8x: 21805 PORTS CE

Page 3
RARE INTERVENTION
Win7 a rara, probab Wy Lyrique,
interwa ntio n iirr Ido rrilastic poo Wifits. Arry Corra rider Halffor 7 Wanasing för issued a 5rafелталt f/at/у сїапуїл9 ап accusão race T. Paraп7елt by Opposїїfол Leaоїer, MWr 5. Bārārā rāk. Tg SFP Iaadar. had said that the Агглеої Forces were fгаfrтїпg a special hit-suad af a Gangтлш//а сагтр. Т/те ľa rg 7ť: Opposition po/ffcfaris.
In a nother interesting deve/оргтегnt, the Army Солт77 ander ard Brigadier Algarma presente to Presidert Prairmadasa 'Fuhunu Handa''' The Wojce (Jf fsé S.L. st Costments, in Sinhala and English, hoW tha 73th Brigade defeared the VWP and berated the South, to restore peace алd derтасгасу,
HRE AND FIRE **/ адpofrтt f/тагт. SQ / сал
remove thërri” said the Pressader expsairing hat sie WiMW desa / with e rrärt är Ta'
incompetent Cabinet Ministers. State Ministers and top offclass the Way a stude it is punished When he Inishe7ā Wes or fails Fir 7 g x arm. Ha was speaking at a ceremony
CJJ77 El Carl Wit, ûf frgo IgXI bg year old L.W. fs + Xf7ected' Kuari Vavy E.
DEAT
لم يكن لم تتهم the Decembar ταa MM ή στα Γ' to the Hous 74 of these as political 5есuyriїу дегsс Pwas, tria Wic. Soyers swe 5.
"W" FOI All rrrrrror 5t ya Waffica W Ci'r Way f : . refer of M tunges S.L M Ser7ara Iye, He Cstår drik 7. Kri ř7 o 7 do r. 7 Järffy CEJ W Wes' SA standing for fFF SLAMMP rearrijali vs Prasil "W" WiW äpply ήταν η Γη ήταν F7F7CĒ. ffĖ LYS: generali secret Siswa Misri FF5FF;
ҮСанriлted
**Psychophants'' (L.G. 15 January: Letters)
When Amaradasa spells 'Sycophants" as in '
With a
You must not think it a Trotskyist Orthografi There's a simple reason for the supererogate
He doesn't know better.
Colombo 4
LAMARA
GUARDAN
Wol. 13 MILJ. 19 February 1, g5,
Pri CO RS. 7.50
Published fortnightly by Lanka Guardian Publishing Co.Ltd. MIO. 246, Union Place, COLTE - 2.
Editor: Mervyn da silva Telephoпв: 547584
Le Onard Thirur
c on
Mew5 Background IPKF in Lanka - (3 Tamil Nadu The IMF Scenari A Furlera In Tringt Left and the Won JWP learning from German Question New Thinking For The Exit. Theory Eock Reig
Printed by A 82.5, Wolfenda
TĘlephor

fy tha distribution Qks. The LBP adr instration get a de Siti WWa 'facia-Wifi'
H TOLL
*5. Tā vā5 ffoaffi i fod W. J. Willi 5WFf7Ce fit Parga 2 7 e 25.
AF TE L'EST ki/Wings”. Теп * Trio) l'Osir ! Figir inms of suspected
R WIJAY
r was caused in ly ārn am r7ourfог/твr Committeg '. Wijaya Kumara'.P. Dr. Ranjih 2 537 foľ ľF7äť MMS. 7յE ratung E. rlow ad fо гу77едї а леw MP (V), the 'V'
the four der of Of Ww Whic/, sf7g St. Tses SLMP
Гог гесоgпѓtion дагty Laff я//f- FA. TIFie SLMMP *ľa ry. Mr. Y. P. d the report as
(??? çe 2
H.
psycho"
' pol" irl frott
thic 'stunt";
ory letter:
hawakara SL
H
E N T S
1. Cuestion" Wietnam ł 8 | 교표 고며 É 1 a Inda PF.85
Street, Colombo 13. IE: 435975
A Contin ment on Mr. T. S. P. Soysa
Mr. T. S. P. Soysa writes: "Don't be fooled. Mr. Siriwarde na is not a|| vacuity and bombast: he does have something to say."
I am tempted to add: "Don't be fooled. Mr. Soysa is all vacuity and bombast. He has nothing to say."
Mr. Siriwardena is a UN Per of the Premadasa variety. Mr. Soysa is, obviously, a UN Per of the JR variety.
Mr. Soysa claims the media know nothing about our democratic system being subverted and elections aborted. Leaving aside Mr. Soysa's title to speak on behalf of the media, he seems to have forgotten the strange things that happened to our democratic system and olur elections during JR's 11year roller-coaster ride. To jog his memory let us mention just a few: the 1981 DDC elections in Jaffna in which the officers appointed by the Commissioner of Elections were replaced by men nominated by a political party, the promotion of arrant cops, the intimidation of Supreme Court Justices by thugs, and the 1982 Referen dum about Which the Commissioner of Elections had some scathing things to say.
For Mr. Soysa's information fire does not lick, it burns. Flames lick, just as do political SyCOphants.
Boyd Almeida
Colombo
-

Page 4
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MNSTRY OF LANDS & L
 

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E way to cook
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ensure minimum heat
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2ds a Timco.
Timber Corporation
Road, Bambalapitiya.
AND DEWELOPMENT

Page 5
What's in a 3
Mervyn de Silva
hic Tc is a tide il the Raffairs cf mcl. . . .
Likcwise in the affairs of Illtions, and the communities that comprise a nation? 1956, 1958, and 1983 were the high tide of anti-Tamil sentime IL.
Are the passions spent? Is communalism dying, in the hearts and minds of the people, if not on the rabble-Toll sing tongues of the demogogues and the politicians? May be it is simply that some symbols of yesterday have lost their evocative power.
The EERENI) had. El 5ma TL headline . . . . FIT's END OF THE ROAD FOR SRI''.
On January 1st, a bloodless, neutral 'dash' ( - ) was introduced to licence plates On Illitor vehicles. It line: It Ind Inore “SRI' Liver which so mIIch blood had been spilt over 30 y el T s Ego in the second major eruption of widespread coilmurial violence. (The 1956 outburst sparked by the FP satyagraha in Colombo to protest against the Sinhala Only Bill was less grues Ille),
What's ill a letter. In the heat of wild passions and mutual hostility, life itself. The explosion ca. Inol be understood
lu Illess it is Set III the hä Ckground of a slow but sure build-up of racial tensions,
h1:lt Icd 3 Ild fe:1I.
In Julle 1956, Prille Minister S.W.R.D. Bandara naike kepit his polls proIInise Élis - MEP leader to introduce the Sinhala Only Bill. It was passed in July. That s Ille Ill Tith, the Federal party passed a resolution in
which it cof basic aim of
LILI I KT.), 11 S state withill a Ceylon'.
LTTE S
HOWEVE I Carly days of Eelam, the LT iterestad in po Wer. Ha vir war with the its might on
the LTTE is showing its skills. Ald in
from were t driv 1 OUt, a has descenda Battica||doa arid say that the erged as a реасе—keeping | PKF.
Yet, the pe Ewen as th Government i
talks with the has reportedly til TNA, (GWETTINĖ T t | keen con bury S Laki
[1dia GO WEàrn the TNA will strength to di the accord,
If the way Sri Löd käid ad T any indication,
litt || 3 :had C:
Р. Jaya

irmcdl tline party's setting 11 p a n T:AI1i1 1ingl1isti: federal union of
TRATEGY
unlike in the the bitt| fC f TE is 10 W I10t proving its fireng survived thB PKF and prowed the battlefield, חם וr kBBfחום ח administrative all the areas e TNA, has been strange calm d. People in Wavuniya now LTTE is estmore effective force than
ace is brittle.
Šr Lā kā 5 Carrying on LTTE, the IPKF
been arming The Preradasa d the LTTE är ing tha Indo:cord while the ment hopes that
gain enough efend itself and
the police in e behawing is
Le TNA, StandS
of survival.
rin in Colom BDO fлtig Totay)
It declared that there was no other alternative path to the cultural freedom and identity of the Tamil-speaking people". The party asked all Tamils to transact business in Tamil or, if necessary, English and to геfuse to "learn or speak Sinhala".
Another, much larger gathering deimla Inded for thosc a reas in which the Tails were ill a majority the widest autonomy and residiary powers consistent With the unity and external security of Ceylon'.
It also de landed an end to "C{n lõ Thisälit}II''' i Il th[ose H I c{18 that were 'traditionally Tamilspeking".
It is in this context that the
introduction of Sri', which Would llawe ich okcid här mi less Other Wise, beca Ile an emotional issue, The simple 'Sri', far more decoralive than ally letter in the English alphabet, was Se en als y et linto the majority Simhalese imposition,
By January 1957, Tamil MP's began to alter the license plates 11 their cars, substituting a letter for the official ri'.
The campaign gathered noIllentuIl in the Ta IIlil HTea5. Whell the CTB scTht H. Llew fleet of buses to the north, Tamils stated to Elr the letter Sri. In retai liation, TallTill näitles were taired in the south. A boycott of Tallil shops and a callpaign Of ha Tras ment was laul Cled. Mea II while Strikes and industrial unrest added fuel to the communal fire. A northbøund trai Tì ca Trying M'P's to

Page 6
the Federal party's annual convention was de railed. Passenge's Were roughed up. In the south Tanil shops were attacked or set ablaze. A government Weekened by divisiwe conflicts and trade union agitation and increasingly nervous as racial passio Il S 5 wept the South cawcd in. An emergeny was declared, effective day-to-day authority passing to Governor General, Sir Oliver Goonetilleka, Four five days of mob rule led to the first long emergency.
"To dwell on the horrors of thos C fou T days in which Turder, rape, arson and mutiliation were commonplaces WTC Le Prof. Lynn Ludowyk It is only to court disbelief.
Ludowyk was lucky. He left Ceylon before the decade was over. Those four days were no pages from Dante. Anyway, it is not the hor Tor, the vicience and the evi 1 so unbcarable to the humanic, and Serisitive Llui do Wyk that is most significant in the light of the next three decades and more. It is the impact of these events on Politics, on communa relations, on political institutions and the structure of the State.
In the post-war pre-independence period, emergency TeքլIlations were used to deal with a GCSU strike. It is the recourse to Emergency' powers by succeesive, popularly elected regimes in independent CeylonSri Lanka that best illustrates the crisis of the State, and the
diverse "threats" that have justified its use which illuminate the crisis of Sri Lankan
society. Extraordinary Law is the armour of the State -a State not armed against an external enemy but its own "subjects.
When the Emergency la sted an un precedented 100 days, the
island's premier daily thought it fit (and rightly so) to Write a 'first leader' on this,
then unusual event. The |- tiÔn soon becaTImc the nori.
4.
** STi * " 5 C story to tell. and perceived th With continal tha. Il industrial l nal challe nges F principal reason Tule. The not was the JWP The insurgency Wä5 indeed 1 m to hlad cthnic 1 did eventually p tary threat from that too of the the India III *airJuly 1987 Peace
After thc Acci State was can I fr threat, the twothreat the is integrity posicci lind the cha | power posed by The later the following the LIII Telenting crac last quarter C particular form expression the which produced Will ni W assum over Whelming qui
The other, immediate is sui stage of the gency. The LTT a political part not only kept i
the Congre desperate lead or Ms. an all-Part CO discu 55
after the
With a
Mr. Kartu for the Ta. out getting
de Volution be a holoc:

ther connected Racial Welce Taits collected problems rather [1 IT-25 L ( XLII. 1:1 V c b c el Elc for emergency able exception t:" ) || 5 || 1971, ill the II E1 illi-War but it roots, though it T3'Woke in I111 li - 1 Collitside, but Inildest kind. Irop before the Accord.
Drd however the Inted by a dual frt will: the Ärld’s teiTTito Till by the LTTE, : Inge to State the JWP rew. 1 t 1 a 3 reca del State's fierce, kdown in the if - 1989. Willa
Of political social forces the JWP revy 1 e TeIT1:iin 3 the esti II of 1990.
eין טיוח - perhaDS 2, is the next 1. Tther El in 5 LITTE H1:s become ty. Yet it ha 5 ts powder dry
RAJW'S MOVE
internal revolt likely to erupt if he 55 to another defeat in the State polis, a Mr. Gandhi has grabbed an idea of AIDMK
Jayalalitha with both hands. y meeting at the national level or in Madras how the Sri Lankan Tamils can be protected
PKF pulls out.
na nidhi, he said, LLLLLS LLL L SLLLLL S LLLLS SS LL
the Sri Lankan government's fulfilled, he added. Otherwise there aust, he Warned,
bu t a Lug III1e[ıted its thanks largely to a It i Ill the ru Il.
Right now, the LTTE has kept demonstrating its neartotal military dominance in the north-east, forcing the EPRLFled combine tI TtI TAL . . . . Retreat where? To the jungles' Is the juli Ingle a safe silnictu: Ty'? Çan its tırmoury be hidden from the Tigers' there? Or does the нгп15 са сIle discovered ОП Та плilInadu soil, the first sign that the ENDLF has decided that
:l. I Mill Cill Ty, TNA-CWF
Only external sanctuary can provisie a safe rea T-base? In 0th et Words, leāTIl : 1550m
from the "Tigers' in the first phase of the Eela IIl struggle.
What degrec of autonomy; that is political power, over what extent of territory, Will
satisfy LTTE aspirations. Its perations in the East suggest that it will lo li fast to the traditional homeland' concept, north and east, and bargai II for a constitutionally guaranteed authority as close as possible tC in III dial. I state. If it is conceded then, there will be no
“Eleml".
Conceded less, it may well decide that a nodus vivendi
with an understanding Colombo Tegine, istatically sound. If not, a new war will begin, its C0Insequences un predictable.
leads
They propose
ust show that he feels Withdraw withpromise on
would

Page 7
HUMAN RIGHTs
ls Amnesty "Terrorist
H:" Rights, եTC)ւ բ8, the BT Association and Well knowl inter II: Li Ihal Corga Ilisations such 5.
A minesty International (it has special status With the UN) and the ICRC were caught up in one of the Impost a Crimonious public leb: Les of Tecerit til Illes. Alcssing a Colombo Correspondents Club, Opposition Leader Mrs. Bandaranaike was reported to have urged the donors to cut ff ai di un le55 the goveTI111 ent's Human Rights record improved. She was promptly branded "unpatriotic" and "disloyal'.
Mrs... Bg4 Indiara Ilaike de mi ed I thii [ she had called for an aid squecze, "If it is alright for the World Bank to use pressure for the withdrawwal of 5 11 biss idlies,
why is it Wrong for it to use the same pressure for halting human rights violations... the
conduct of the govern Illent indicates that it only listens to those who give or lend it money” she Said at a press conference. If the Thatch is her (as Mr. Rajan Wijeratine had claimed) why Was it necessary to continue the Emergency and
SLLLLLLSK SLLLLLLaLaLHHLLL S LLLLLLLESKS SHS il sked.
The fu TiC5 colulter-attack
was led by Mr. Wijera tine, and Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe.
A II ll TheSty Inte:Tlalti. Iällld LLL K S LLL S S LL SLLLaaLLLHHHH S HHHHHHHHLLLLK S La II lain tärgets of the giver Imments onslaught. Am Testy was den Jun ccd als “a terrorist” organiSation, It Was accu5ed of "funding subversives.
An Ilesty, in fact, had circLulated a letter (the LG receiwed one) which said that it funded Bar Associations for legal Work to help victims of Hulla Il rights yi Chilā, tills”.
Mr. Wijeratne then made two points (a) the ICRC had agreed to a government proposal that its representatives should first speak to the victims of the criminals' (subversives) before speaking to "the criminals behind bars', and (b) that
A II. -
WAS ready to a arT:Inge ment, i; Wed to enter g0 WCT III e I, he pared to go Human Rights als WCT all que
The Bill Asst. stated thilt Were "utterly
III foi II ded". It
"The Associal CD 1 de III 15 terra
("/7is Co/t/ аffairs-гтfлс We's 77 the world. г.
Eight lid m, : poo | ls
Si IES heart:
ցTÉՏ5, allies Stti the N Mr. S ma kiri
B PerESt
said the SI interwi tl1ց |E '''Wց : The C 5, 6 ye reea ChilE low
5 as his
e The f COLC ciples" 11t:lլIti UN-as

P2
.ccept the SHme E Would b. alloSri Lank: The
added, was prebefore the UN CCIII1mmission te stis
ciation, in reply,
the allegations
base less and added:-
lion opposes and "ism, To pro"wide
NEWS BACKGROUND
legal rei medies foT alleged wiolations of constitutionally guaranticed human rights is not to slupport terrorism, but () II, the contrary to seek to uphold the Full of law..."
The Association, it added, received assistance from the gover II Tinerts of Canadil and
Australia and from Amnesty for this purpose. It was under no obligation to say how funds are spent.
S-l-G-N-A-L-S
In addressed specia My to
, G. LLLLLLLLS LLLLCLHCGY LCCLLLBL mHH CC HHH LCLCCCC LCCLTT "ews page in your da i/y paper.)
Indian states, with a population of 230 milabout quarter of the Country's total, go to the in the last Week of this morth. Noe of the
are in the South, Many are in
traditional which prime Minister W. P. Singh swept at the recent parliamentary polls.
now Congress-controlled. If ational Front captures power in most of them, ingh Wi || feall much stronger ät g Mr. Gandhi's politica | f Liture quite un Certaim.
Ind, the
assemblies are
kā 5 faili, ad S Mr. rter Moscow party chief
mt:81 aw with a Dutch press team, ader of a newly are not a party but a redibility of a leadership has its
o viet leader's
tars of perestroika, this limit has !d, he added. The people no longer
iwing standards.
ppointed a pro-market reformer Prof. Petrakow
top economic adviser,
iwe permanent The Tibers of the ii | hawe agreed on a ''Set of guideline
" for a Cambodian peace
UN-supEr wis Ed elections and a Sisted interiT administratton.
C à CBasefire,
for Ted Der To Cratie: Froit. IYO''We Britʻ" 3 Si(i. lirits. After
חW BBE"ונאוח
t.) | rd te Meanwhile, Mr. Gorbachew
the more foreign
readership. W. ( highlight
the Hindi power-base of the Conand his ТПр.
the Centre,
Gorbach w Mr. Boris Yeltsin,
Critic, in a Mr. Yeltsi is
powerful
UN Security prin
settleet. These
5

Page 8
"No Politics -
Bar protest
Ti unionists of diverse political bent reached near unanimity iI condemming E govern Ilent decree prohibiting political activity in work places. The prohibition was variously dics Crib icci Lis F' il rico Ilia Im'', “ “ LI IlIccessarily harsh', 'retrograde'. Fill timed” and "stupid and illogical’’.
The decree applies to ca IIlpuses as Well. It scicks to prewent political activity in any
work place or cducational institution änd specifically prohibits postcrs, processions and
Tallies. Alsch, Outsiders entering workplaces or educational institutions will Ilot be allo Wed. A provision that permission for such activity may be 5ought From the hcal of the Workplace or ceilicational institutico Im llas been interpreted by so II ne a 5 possibly leading to discriminaltion in application,
A joint tra de union , front meeting has been convened by the Gowe IIIllet Clerical Service LIljo Il to discuss the 551le. A GCSU spokemian said that im El Iny Workers were against the actiWitics of the Siti Perillilulii
in II. Thimed, shadowy or girlfsation that forced work stoppages) late last year, but had succumbed through fear. TraditiCT1:11 (TH de l'IliOIls {11d flût support the terror tactics of the Peramuna. But with this gowETT I T1 e Tit TT1) "," e now, al lidst al rising cost of living, a very sensitive situation was being Created: "C) 1II fel is that thic Workers may start to voluntarily protest', he said. Another St. Le SeCECT tra de lui leader said that the cffectiveness of these stri Ingent rulcs would depend on how fairly they were El pplied. * * It should not be a case of certain people being :Hill (övr edi: [ do their kild if" political activity only', he said, ändi ai dded that activity in wolw - ing the day to day rights of the common Illan would contiIlle, bal Cor. Tot.
6
Unions
A spokes Ihall ernment trade u di Talcolil | Tle:As L. ally necessary to but the regulati be te 11 porary,
The opp i sitiðI. dirautor of trialde Dhar [1] :L siri SeTn Why, if the sit proving :15 Gow cians cl:Lilled, was curting di d Tall Cd 1 ii T 1 T1 eas LI We will strong
le saici.
Bar AS5 claiti. humil: In Tights El Ferná Пtio ga id these are very Slires'. He dest lätions als **illig)
Il 11 editið Ti Islífi í said: 'w paralysed by sofor a greater These strikes of a chit being puny school bo: guard or thic ac el Sa. La Il Perar Ints) which Werc L. He closul e Ulf Em crgency regul In c. 1st LIII CC The traditional trade unions, qi having nothi Ing strike action, W de T ewen greate gove IIIIIlent poli wes. Thus, the bet wie Wed. W. Het of Energency r strict the acti II recognised trade proven track r c3 T11[11iLI11:I1 t tC) process, is justi
''With the ch alling as nevei [1ן1TL: \ h th: 5וT ?) 1חLI in uscles El Id (d sions. Such acti e CT5 il cel Sct lic Within labolu T T cilations'

for a pro-gowIlio I said that Tes Werc initimailita il pca cc, ons should only
SLFP's co-orunion activity,
a Inayake asked La tiii) Il was iIIilleru The Tit politi
the gover Tı The It saster with such res' Naturally y resist this'',
in president and citiwist Les Lil Idi l, "Assuredly, Tet Togra de III eäCribed the regullcal and stupid". L l cabIlIl Immc mit Tie ork places were
MEVVS BACKGROUMID
::111-d + 'strike-5' |
part of 1989. I crict thic Tles u lit
pissed by y t(’b 2h 52 cLI rity tion (f. 50–Callmillinas” (wär froresponsible for W Tk. lati Ils Were of åt thät tille. left Oriented |litic apart from to do with such e perhapsunr threats than ticians themselllc still his to 1er the extension egulations to re1 of CT gillised, i Lili :) I 5 With a Cord of their the democratic ficki.
st of living spir
before, tide 1d to feix the iT emand conceson should not subversive but the all bit of
places.
India must disengage
ike Gorbaclew pulling out of Afghanistan, the IPKF, now an interloper, should go home, a commental tÇT il the Indiail newspaper The Independent has sali id ... l Inter 1: tillola Il iffa irs chill I I 11mist - Ajit Bhatta cgal rjea LI Tgës India to pull out and admit that the decisio T t.) ET LET W:lis WTC) Ing. The fate of Sri Lanka must be left to the Sri Lankans, whether they fight or make peace With each other, he has said.
The most urgent proble III inherited by Prime Minister W. P. Singh lies abroad, in Sri Lanka. What had Rajiv Gandhi achieved by this costly adventure? Only tile ashles of Indian soldier5 s:Lys Bhat tarjea. The exchangc of letters accompanying the IndoLanka agreement, which pledged that the port of Trin collace would not be available to a power hostile to India, was not such a big deal, says this Coll I m Inis Li, bocalise: Who Wall Is Tril, COIT1 {1 le cos rusted facilities a Tymore
Mohan Rail, another writer in The Independer has expressed similar views. India's Sri Lanka policy has failed and has result c.d in India aliellating both the Sinhalese as well as the Tamils, slys Mohan Ram, a frequent visitor to this coll Intry, and all thor of a book Col the confiçit,
Con tours of the Indian government’s Sri Lanka policy indicate that it considers the previous government's involvement in Sri Lanka a folly. The ending of the involvellent leans the ethnic problem is returned to Sri Lanka; he full tillte of the e hIllic: ISS:lle does not lend itself to political crystal-gazing, says the article.
But, unlike Rajiv Gandhi's gover Ilment, the new gox er III left does not regard the LTTE as unLittl|15|t Worth y; . a ild, IIndia will do well not to obstruct the political processes among the Sri Lanka. Ta Enills, says Mohan Ram.

Page 9
PARLAMENT
Sirima on Tigers, Den
Il parliament, during the debate on the oppositions noconfidence Illotion, Mrs BandEl Talaike, the Opposition Lica, der, a 5 ked the Government Whcther
it was aware that the LTTE was conducti Ing military opcrations against other Tamil
groups in the North and East, had it indicated that the Sri Linkan security forces should keep Out of those areas that the LTTE gain cd control of; Wile:Lhic T t hic LTTE il its negotiations with this GowerI ment had givic in any assurance that it would drop its de mand for an ni independent state of Eela Il in STi Länkil?
Mrs Bandara Illike als I asked the Government what precautions it had taken to guar: Il tee the Safety allıd security of the lives and property of the Sinhala, Tamil arıd Muslim People in the Northern and Easte Til provinces and those living in the periphery of these areas. She also asked the Government whether it was awarc that the LTTE was forcibly occupying the h(IIles and property of resi delts i In the Polico III är LIWA
էll L:1:
The Opposition Leil der said that the Government was trying to k cep itself in power by yi Chilent or E1. Il-violent IIIe: 1s, by hook or by crook, Corruption during 13 years of UNP rule had been un precedented, Daa KaLLS LLLL S S LLLL S aLLLL S LLLLLL various private Illilitia and ter Torist galings were torturing and killing people, In any of these were political killings of the opponents of the Gover nIt.
Unemployment had increased since the present government took over, and would increase fu Tther with rect Tenchment; and the Tell will of subsidies and the i-Fease in prices indicated that the Government had no consideration for the poor. Mrs Bandaranaike said.
The Oppositio that thic Tc Wcr: complaints of Iniscs at villa arrest cd or abdi they had good that many of t bductions häd by powerful pe ority with gow nec tills; ""it is C tilt 30 Ille 0 ||
private purpose',
Mrs. Bandara te T1-Told the Ill sive suspects well all. In cape', I tured and mur away into dete tյTs cւյլյlti Tito 1, by thc governi of in Into cocincc sadors of these living in our n horrified by t III. utiliated bod Lyrics of floatin the Opposition
Mr. A Tura (SLFP - Ganpal that over 35.00 perished in the liated corpses Find floating de a com III sigl placed televisi
MT, Lilith Milliste F. F culture slik thila Eığı d b, e e Th 1 qızı ki of the probler Sub versio 1 hild that did not problems were had survived, i. duty of every lil Tile It t film titucint is talk: Wheth1: IT 511 ch : Clist I hidily or no said.
He Sid Llt a foreign pi w try was à 150 21 n t שthe governm

mocracy
I Lead cI said : almost daily kcy SLFP Orgagc level being LICLel all thät TE235; III to belie We hcsc HTTests OT
been instigated Tissib Ims il :ill thlCTImmentill çÇIII:) Di1 Itilonly kino Wil heil hawe their Imies foi i his
In like said that limber of subver
bumped off բting C C5bei Ing ti
de Tedi cor taken Titi 31. Aid di IlInger be bluffed ment’s pretence bc :: L15C F Elbascountrics were midst and were lic spectacle of lies burning on g down rivers,
Leader said.
Bandaranalike ha District) said persons had violence. MultiOll the Titls WIl rivers were 1t and had reJIı İi alını d cim emı :ı.
Athulathmudali, Food and Agrit the Opposition ng only at parts Tu, the tide of Ilow l'Iled but IT leal Lihat the hver. De 111 CCTacy Tid it was the member of parout if colsIn into custody person is in t, the minister
the presence of er in the coln
grawe problem
had to fice.
MEWS EBACKGROUND
Azlafly
A lit-list of 300 names of security services personnel Was found in the home of the slain JWP military leader Keerthi Wijebahu at Piliyandala. Government officials believe that the personnel on this death list Were to be targeted whenever they went on home leave. They also believe that the JWP military strategist had access to Certain confidential information on security affairs, including some operational directives issued from the Joint Operations Command (JOC).
Among those in detention camps, suspected of involvement in subversive activities, are 45 Buddhist monks, mostly university Students.
O
Rabies killed 183 people since May last year. The deaths resulted from a shortage of anti-rabies Vaccine in hospitals and pharmacies. Only 29 state hospitals in the country are supplied with anti-rabies vaccine, and this too restricted to 80 doses per day. But the requirement at Colombo's Lady Ridgeway Children's Hospital, for instance, is 200 doses daily.

Page 10
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Page 11
IPKF in Lanka (3)
Extremism, the menac
J. N. Dixit
hic Indian a Tmed forces a Te not political but ouT troops hawe created an elwir 01 IThe Illt where these warring groups, if they have any wisdom and vision about their own destiny can get together and evolve a cohesive institutional fra Ille Work før Ta1 Til politics for the future. So this is H10 W. J. Wiew what the IPKIF has been doing and is doing and this mind you in the face of adverse publicity from the Sinhalese Press and constant needling by the LLlaLLaL LLLSKOS SSL aL LaaL CHHHH S trospective, investigative jo u Irina|lis Ill.
I am not jing Distic about the II dia I AT I 11ed forces, but I lliwe had the unique privilege of full ctionally interacting with the Indian AIIlled forces in every was and conflict that we hawe been in wolved in, cxcept the Kashi Ilir war. So, I have a great sense of chronological continuity when I make this assessment, I think, there is every reason for Indians to be very proud, and I am not saying this because I am speaking to this audience: I have said this to ea Tlier au die Ilces too, Illich
Im Te criticil lui die Ilces.
J.R., Premadasa
Lastly, the election in Sri Lanka and what do they augur for us ? Some of it. I have already explained. The revival of de ITocracy after eleven years, is something which Inclut TElizcs extre Illist forces and their capacity to clail that the existing power structure is Il 3 til favour af electi CIS, SI CILIT violence is justified. That rationalc has been destroyed by these three clections. When 1 sily this I do not call the extreis II1 has disappeared. Extremisin of the Sinhalese type led by the JWP LTıd extremis ill of the Tamil type, led by the LTTE continues. But if the tItellds whichil We Hilla We se L ili Ilojtion are sustained, I Will go into det Hill, then the PTOCless Of Til:Lirginalisati ČIl Cf Such extre:Illist föITces, Ithink, Will be accomplished, built it is subject to this being sustiti ned. But what this sustai Illing
means, and Wh what discs that I thc Goyern ITICTit concerned Mr. F
should be rc.sp.)
de mands. We “mot’ indulge in a Limbivil leTitւ ձ Wardelle which policies to wa Tidl: 1977 and right offering Distric giving them m TULF to becil lia ince : nd ecx pc In ent, disclusii of power with India is Jille, 1. to hold Thimp' colling up With have nothing të aspirations. TE wyi 11 13:alıd – MIT Pr. 5qLa Te C T e a Il the Te too. But tia te from a po if that happens. T10 t.
Mr PréIlldä5 all, actually gra power which is in his own laws ingly, without cracy and politi Or interfere it Tamil groups power structure ing aside and as pre-conditic [hile: ils Litutio ili; work through it pirations. We, till:1e to gener; diplomatic pres Tillelt of Sri Tamil aspirati that there is the sal Ille tille signals to Mr P Wi || Dot be de S1 Lilla L we will Te Illing in p57. W is delivering in and the promis. party beforc hc All the Til tCTE Ve sīli tikt that the Si Thale: For the UNIP &ql
SYLLLLLSL SYL LT LCL TGHLL rTT C TCkCLl uCCHK LTT r TLLLLLL TlGLS Y
LSTCHLLLGLH L K LGGLCGlGtL LaO HHHL LTTTG CTLLSLLLL LCLLLGHaS

C62
at they sustain - ncan A5 fa1 15 of Sri La Inka is Prema dasa, I think insive to the Tamil Illust 10t Iepe: t, the Osinsis, the f President layecharacterized his 3 TELIThis bet weten
up to 1986: like Councils and not tյոcy: Լtlling the c : Til elcctorill il11 ing from Parlia1g the devolution PTi mic MinistET COf 985, and agreeing L. talks and then
proposals which 3 do with Tä IIlil at kind of a thing emada sil back to d Would land us We Will I W negosition of strength
But I hope it does
A should, first of int devolution of already stipulated fully, unhesitatletting his bureaucians to pull back he processes. The which :: Te iT] the instead of standImaking demands, ins, should join 1. Tilme work and
to fulfil their asIndia, should conHte political and slite on the gowLinka to see that ons a Te met and pulling back. At
we should scIld Temli 5 that We tablishing him a Tid not cilda Inger his CT as, lang as hic his own PTC) Imises, 25 made by his own came into power. sting aspect which : into account is : sic Witcr läs Woted
El SLFP LE
ாரர்
moderate middle of the road partics and for the existing democratic institutions as defined in the Sri Lankan Constitution of 1978. They have rejected the extremists whether they are leftist or Sinhalese Buddhis L Challwinists, whether it is the WP or some elements of United Socialists Alliance. Sinilarly, the fact that nearly 63% of the Tamil voters voted for Parliamentary and Presidential elections in which they chose candidates other than those belonging to the LTTE, is a rejection of the LTTE's 'all or nothing' approach towards politics. This nuance we should take note of.
While the Sinhlä lese hawe ideologically voted for the middle of the road moderate democratic political forces there has becn a radicalization of Tamil politics. The Tallı ils hawe wted for the Leftof-the-Centre parties: young Tamil groups by rejecting the traditionall TULF, the Old School political leadership of Tamils, totally rejecting TULF. So they have rejected Tadical extremism as well as moderate constitutional forcics a nd they have chosen the Tadical youth to man the power structure who would not 1 ose sight of Tamils aspirations of a populist-leftist orientation. This is an energing trend in Sri Lanka politics, which would affect development.
As far as biliteral rclations go, my assessmen L is that regardless of the pre-election rhetoric President Prema dasa will not rock the boat as long as he feels that we Will not insist on things, but at the same time hic Will expect us to en su Te that Tamil militancy, does lot cross thresh (ld where his stability is threatened. So, it will have to be an extremely delibera te exèrcise in reciprocity, and if we can maintain that balance, I think that our relations can grow slowly, advisably slowly, on positive lines.
Häwi Ing said that 1 mm L1st II Titlerline I am predicating all this on
f Corri i'r 7fed o'r page 7g' y

Page 12
TAMIL NADU
DMK deology
Izzeth Hussain
Tamil
he importance of .
1Iլflլ է II
Nadu as a factor cing Indo-Sri Lankan Telations cannot be doubled. In a talk given in March 1989 to the United Service Institute, Delhi,
the former Indian High Commi ssioner in Sri Lanka. . Dixit, said in explining th
asons for the Indian it crvention in Sri Lanka: y We had to respect the sentinents of the 50 million Tamil םiLi7ו:L1צ
India. They felt that if Y did not rise in Slup Pl Of the Tamil cause in Sri Lanka, we are not standing by Ollf ". Tamils; and if that is so, then in the Tamil psyche, the Tamil Sub-constiձ115 լ 11t: զuestion rose: is there any relevano PT validity of our being Pitt: f a larger Indial political idertity, if our deeply felt sentiment:5 a Te 110t respected ? So,
it was a compulsion. It Wis not a rationalised motivation, ut it was a compulsion which could not be avoided by Ely elected Government in this country. So, that was third reason.'
Dixit is categorical on the point that the Delhi Gover Ilment having to take into account Tamil Nadu sentiments
in reacting to developments im Sri Lanka amounts to no less than a compulsion. However, some important qualifications have to be made if We arc. to
reach a proper understanding of the Tamil Nadu factor in Indo-Sri Lankan relati05. It
is arguable that as the Tal I lllils of Sri Lanka and of Talilnil midu speak the same lagu share a common cultural subFtTALLI 11 are predominently Hindu.they might be regarded as constituting a single ethnic. on this argument, it is Cen conceivable that should the dreams of India's ill-wishes be ruled and anti-Hind sentiment in Tamil Nadul Stato could make an irredentist claim
1)
and De
to the parts of supposedly co T Lankan Tamil '
Buit it w C3 Lilliċi plausible to a TE standing the Ci language, cultur the Tamils of " of Sri Lanka distinct ethnic the geographical Palk Straits, th Followed liflife Tik centu ries, and i
pected therefol ethnic identitle different. For 5
before independ between them c. have been par cant, except f the late Ninet twentieth Celtl not be surprisir will try to b there has been walance Con til Tamil Nadlu Tal Sri Li Tika mil Tal cularly to wa Tids Tallil II ilitai Int:S rations. There Til Ndlı CD 1 Sri Lankan T that cannot be Government irl commitment is stops well sho] a Scparate si even though T. sition partits 1 cal capital Coll militants' ext part of the T: game. All th the fact that reasons, there cultu Tal kiI1 sh people of Tarr Sri Lanka In Taf In tot Siam CSC tW
We have LC} cance of the gawe the Talli only one of t beid nii: Sri Lainkai. It

hi's Concerns
Sri La Dk: that S Titute the Sri *homeland".
| bg für 110 Te use that not Within monalities of 2, and religion, Tamil Nadu and constitute tW0 groups. There is divide of the eir histories hawe It courses for it has to be exTe that their 5 will also be eyer:11 ce[][ILITics ence, interaction | cole:S I COL S CITl ()
ticularly signifior a period in Benth and early ries. It should
ng, as this paper iring Ollt, thält a notable ambihe part of the mills towards the mills more partithe Sri La Ilıkalı HT) d their aspicertainly is a mmitment to the imils, something ignored by any Delhi, but that not total and t cof support for a te of Eclairm, . mil Na, dilu ()ppomay make politiof the Tall IT ist claims 15 Tmil Nadlu po Wer— s follows from *for Historical 5, 1 10 symbiotic p between the 1 Nadu and the lils. They are Ils,'
ote the signififact that Dixit Na du factor as : three reasons interwelltion in was a 'compul
Sion which could Illot be ayoided', in his words, but of course the Te Werc other complu lsi cols, as well, so that the Tallil Nadu factor cannot be Tegarded as the sole de termit Of Indo-Sri Lankan relations. It has to be noted also that the relationship betw cel Tamil Nadu Governments and Delhi is more often than mot come of understan ding and Co-operation, not an adversarial relationship. The cxtent to which Tamil Nadu by itself influences Indo-Sri Lankan relation has to be questioned.
Some complexities and ambi
glitics have to be taken into account in trying to understand the Tamil Nadu factor in Inclo-Sri Lil Tikal im relations. Diferent aspects of the Tamil Näitlu factor hawe to be examined. This paper will situate thic Tamil Niciul factor iI'll the context of India's relations with its neighbours, examine te jl Le Taction of Tall Til Nadlı and Delhi, the interaction of Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka, and Delhi's prioritics in relatio ) In to Sri Lanka, before drawing what appear to be the appropriate conclusion.
INDIA AND NEIGHBO URS
It should be useful to situate Sri Lanka's Tamil problem in the context of the chic factor operating in India's relations with its neighbours. Usually, though not always, a country's relations with its neighbours have far more importance than relations with others. Arguably, relations between neighbours have a specific dynamic of their own if only for the Teason that neighbours are particularly prone to qua Tricl with each other. The neighbours of Ildia have for Lhe most part had unsatisfactory Telations with IIndia, which should not be regarded as altogether surprising. But a contrast is sometimes made With

Page 13
China which for the lost plit has had satisfactory relations With its neighbours. Actually this contrast is 8, 0 Ilie Whält LInfa II fo]T sẽVeT{1l I c{180 T18, []. T1ẽ of which is that India's neighhours led to interact for more with Illdia than China's neighbours. With China, in a process
that can lead to misunderstanding, it ritation, and Overt histili Lly.
Refugees from Tibet flow into Hiina chal Pradesh. Bangladeshis seek greener pastures II Assam. and Chakma rebels flow into Tripura from the Chittagong Hills. The Nepali Indian popli1lliol in Bhuta II hols bge I increasing, and Indian labourers are going into that country. When conditions in Nepill är c: disturbed, Tefugees go to BElla I I UltaT Pradesh. There are appreciable numbers of Indians in Nepal, While ethnic Nepal is constitute the majority in Sikkim. The Nepalis in Darjeeling set up the Gurkha. National Libera Lion Front t struggle for a state Within the II di I LJ i c) I. Palkistall sus – pects the Indian hand behind the um Test among Si Indhis, and in Billich is tail where there was a seriolus separa List rebellion under Bhutto. Il dia suspects the Pääkjs La Ili hai Tild behind the Sikh problem. III dia and its neighbours are involved in each the Ts' affairs to all extet that can mot be duplicated anywhere else in the world. Ald in le way or another, the ethnic factor plays an important Tole in the had kaleidoscope of India's relations With its neigh-uT3נbt
L S S SL00LLLSS LaaYS S LLL LLLLL S SSLLL a S S neighbours tend to interact far more With II eighbouri Ing Indian KLLLS S S LLLLY S Ha S S LaL LL SLLLKLLLLSSS Sri LFI kä ilte Tacts Withil Til Illil
Nadu: Bangladesh with West Bengal, Assam, and Tripura; Nepal with Uttar Pradesh;
Bihar, and West Bengal: Pakistän with Jammu and Kash IIIin Punjab, Haryana and Rajastha, Consequently Delhi is undn. pressure from several Indiera states to sort out latters With neighıb çıır. Ting countries. Alıd it has been argued that therefore
there al tre g'on ('IE Inili: 5 frc:11 in dealing Wit situatic. I'll that Luder Nichiru III dial stilt CS W Congress.
From our poi is nothing 111 Til Lillil Nadu f: Indo-Si Lank situatin a p phili T all over North is a qualitative thit Talli Il Nad important in I with a neighbol cotheT" II1cii ELI1 5 t; sensitivity on til to wall Iris Tal Iiiiil expected if onl that it is the Drawid ill state lation of We" first sic paratist India, t cocok pl Nadli, El Indi Ti i weT the is Sille cc Il tille. Si NHL Fla s beeT gress, the Tull alternating betw K ::: Lill the A, .
ni in fact C lost to regional the T) rall Willii El 5 some importan, whic Tc | tlc cultu ween Aryan N. ciliam Soluth h : " Ç. Seriç'i 115 cäiti) 5 5 ) Theo ft 1111 Te. It s|1 I nderstända ble thinks it prude 3. We Lo St TT Still: - , place in Sri L.
WWE I LISt El 15 th;it the Sillitilt rity known to complex over identity of Tamils and 5) Tills T appears that th If I Indial ColltILI of Nepal, but
ET te S:T E Nepalis in Willi LE: 11 ili;
I u II) IT tee ) the majority Bhutall, but the

11 ci il 5 tTHi [l] [5 - :31 f 1 13:1: L1 3:WT: h nicighbours, l di id i 13 t exist when all the are ruled by the
Int of WicW thcre ılısual in the actor influencing : Tel:itib T1S, :4 ently Teplicated India. Blt tillere
diference III
Ll is filir. Tı CTS: India's relatioIls II LhiL ni i5 El Tilly
ite. A particular 1e part of Delhi Nadu has to be for the reason biggest of the & With · ai p ) plu5) T1 illi, Il The Illow emcIt in
1:ce in T:IImil estivelle55, thCITc
Lf Hillcli 1ls ce 1967. Tamil lost to Coning party there ee I thic D. M.
I. A. D. M. K. congress (II) hills parties in all Lates, a fact of :e iTi il colլIIl try Till divisi 5 b, ctand Drawiwould possibly political implitille in the մլյld be quite th1:1t Dc|Hili nt to be Tespc3 T1 - g Tamil Nadu er willit täikes ılık:1.
III נ
:Տ Է: քլ Tt: : hawe al the
the fact IlaidT11iI1 (brity presumed he Sri Lanka Il minillifi : Tılır: a T1 i 1 = Nadlu. It e ethnic Nepalis mber the Nepal is they after all : people. The Bhutan together in Nepal is outIuk pas who are community in nilimerical dis
proportion in that case is not so great as that between the Sinha lese and the Tamils of Sri Lanka and Tamil Nil, dll. There is also in the cal se of the Sinha lese the historic memory of Tamil in wasions frem Schlith India. It is tu be cxpected tholt the Sinhalese will háve än extraordinary sensitivity over the Tamil Nadu factor in IndoSri Lanka relå ti (Is. The Cèllation of Delhi-Tamil Nadu-Sri Lanka seems to be sui genesis, and is hardly comparable to anything prevailing in the North of India.
TAMIL NAU - LELHI
The centre of gravity in the politics of pre-Independence
India was in the North. It is sing Ilificant that only one I ational-level politician emer
geld from the Drawidian South, the Tamil C. Rajagopilla chari. But a new Tamil political Cc.) Ilciousness hadi evidently been growing in the course of the Thirties, resulting in the formation of the Dravida Kazhagam (III). K.) in 1944 under the leadership of E. W. Rama swamy Naicker. His disciple C. N. Anna durai broke away to for II the Dravida Minnetra Kil7 haga IIl
(D. M. K.) in 1949, and ill the latter half of Seventies M G. Ramachadran broke
away from the D. M. K. LO for II the All Tillia AIT: ID. M. K. (A. I. A. D. M. K).
As ob 5: Tweli erlier th CSI: IWC) parties have alternated in pe) WSr, and something must be said about the socio-cultural factors which could explain their persisting political stTength in Tilmil Nadu. The D. K. a. In di subsequently its offshoots, Were 4 Titi-Brah Illi T1, alti—Sansk Titl, 4. Ilti-Hindi, and posed a seculaTist challenge to religious (I- thodoxy. They represented a caste revolt, though not appa Fently of the really underprivileged castes against the doIllinant position of the BrahHills, Who costituted I. In T: than 2% of the Tamils. The Secularism, which might perhäps ble see is the sul the T El CD u lter-part of Nehru's secula Tism jIl the T Orth, ever leid t 1 :
I

Page 14
virtual excision of part of the Tamil past through an underWallation of the Bakhti literalture of tle TäIIlils El Lud an over
emphlsis on the secular Sangarn literature of 100 BC to to AL) 250. The anti-Hindi position, Which als Will be seel later has tur Illed out to be the Test i T1portal Inti CC0 TT1 pČJIl ent cof D.K. ideology, flowed from pride in the Tamil la Iguage and a concollitant resentment against the Aryan north. This is quite under stil Tidable 15 the Drawidian col tribuLiCIl Lo II dia. I civilization has consistently been linde-valucid both within Tidia :ılıd 3 Lutside. A s Profe 553 Sivilithan by once put it in an inter
view given to a South Indian periodical, “Pages are written on Tagore :and Nasrul Isla IT,
but there is only a passing Teference to Bharati. Readers of Raja Rao's well-known nowel The Serpent and the Rope may remember his curious notion that the further south you go im India, the Higher the form of Hindu spirituality, LI Tn til the acme of spirituality is Teached at the southern Ilost point of India. That was evidently a Drawidian reaction against the A Tya II exaltation of the Gänges and the Hilalayas,
It appears that the ideology of L hic IOMIK and of its offshoots has drawn political strenght from the tap-roots of Ta. III1il COTn scio usness, and perhaps it was inevitable that it should lead to a separa tist Inowell cInt ill Tamil Nadu. Nehru handled it very sensibly, most notably by establishing Tamil Nadu as a linguistic state. Other important measures included the Act for the Prevention of II isult to the National HCICLIT in 1957, after an epide Illic of flag- and constitution - burning iIl Talil Nadu. In 1933. There was the sixteenth a II endment to the Indian Constitution banning the advocacy of secession. However, in the after Illath of the Sino-India II border conflict of 1962. separatis п. са пе Lo be bado ed i Il Tamil Nadu. BLI LI the D.M.K. came to power in 1967, the expression of a con
2
tinu Collsly strong
cal identity and
It might be the formation D.M. K. implied that Tamil con cause “ “ All T1 die sluggests thalt en ing given t.) T: reסוח רווח 15: Nawiu Its of Li wider Furthermore, b. and the A.I.A.D. In the få TT, LI sl tral government and it appeared those two part Illuch different regional party i i T1 pressio T1 wais lied by the aT11 11 Til ITlil Nallı which special to be given in derst; d. Delhi's Llle Ta11 i Nild the 1951 Const was declared til gli age, while 14 la II glages Were d al languages" a The Cristit It II a 15-year grace use of English guage. On Reput Tal I Ilil Nadi: I we weer the issue Whe the D.M. է: Էլ է 11 1957 it il bi ching of Hindi i Agali II in Se Talili Nadu Wic the Te Sullt of a In ent circular a ance of a "Hi apparently was in II to cut us in tյt tes. The first Lle el de Of Ll in Tamil Nadu, kly by the D.M.K and the CCTm 1111 Minister Wil TD cd position of Hin tü : Sri Li Tıkar Imeani Ing that Tal 1 opt for sepal (Gald Hili TcitcTL Cc5 of his moth that Hilli wycolul posed on any s
The agitation it provided a ri

Tamil politii conscio 15 ness.
supposed that of the A.I.A.- a dilution of sciousness, beL" ALII D.M.K. phasis was bemills an di Tamil than componeIndian polity. th the D.M. K. W.K. usually got with the cein the Delhi, the TCF Te thit ties were it from any other Tı II dili, Tığit completely bei-Hindi Futre in 1986, to İmportilince his trying I () 11115 en sitivity to fact T. UI det till tibi, Hildi e official l ll Il-- major II h cilian eclared "nation IIng with Hill di. In Fl.150 all) Wed period for the as a link la Iljlic Day of 1965, nt up in flames of Hindi, all K. ÇELIT e tij polished the teaIl state schools. ptember 198 ,sטt up in Tlamת Central Gover Ilbut the Übscrwdi Weck” which regardled as her Indië. In stato protest Was le Congress (I) followel quici..., A.I.A. D.M. K.
1 lists. W. Stitt that the illdi would Ic:.cl -type si Lilli:Ati II, lil Nai H I w bulld litic 11. Rajiv :ll the issu räni1 er li di Nehrill ld not be illtä E.e.
died do w III, but I11 inder to Delhi
that Tamil Nadu was not just like any other state om the issue of Hindi. It is understanda ble that Dicl hi has to respect Tamil Nadu sentiments, and that includes sen liments about what takes placc in Sri Lanka.
A paper presented at the recerif LS LSLSES ELLLLLLL HH TMYT S T SLLS LLLLkTTTTaCTCE Corres y B. C. I. 5. Triad a Turfio'r.)
Extremism . . .
ί αντίπίγει ή απΙ Πειξε 4
certain positive premises. But we must be prepared for contingencies –JVP pressure on Premadasa. Sinhalese blacklash to the economic pressure, inflation, incapacity of the Tanils to hold together whatever they have achieved 50 fait and the rise ()f
Tamil milithin cy.
So the prospects are of some um certainity. But with thc safcguard now which we did not have im 1983, of a fram c work with in which we can i III plement al coherent policy with diplomatic and defence policies where we call preserve our interests and at the sa Ille time ens LI. Te that We are Ilot accus cd of breaking up of a neibøuring Country.
(Speech concluded)
TRENDS
Carried fry I Fage )
"rifficLWOWS. Пг. 5елага те
said that Chā 7 adriskā daug liter of SLFP /Säger Mrs. Eä Laranaike wafa ratur to Sri Lär käj WP7 77 fado-Fido.
NEV EXODUS
5r ārkā 5 s 2 doctors Fr the two-and-af years the Universifles, and f f e WCMVÝC. Were Wyses' or ) accourt of the l-VWP-spoo risored sa biofāge" Carr på sig a 7. /da/Yy, i fig is lart d's healt F1 Services sau ava a către of 3.350. "THE Hägg ПЕВff is a cadra o 28y5" said a senior Officiaid'. We rigwy frady'? 23:50,

Page 15
1989-92
The MF Scenario
(Excerpts from an official report)
he new Gower Illet that came
into power in early 1989 is confronted with the da un ting task of Tc-establishi Ing pel cc, stabilizing the economy, and resuming the reform process interrupted in 1988. At the top of the GoveTim DeL Los economic agenda is the stabilization of economy without which structural reform cannot proceed. The Gower IIITInt is a wäTe that a quick correction of lacroeconomic imbala Inces would bri Ing about equally quick economic gains but considers that too rapid adjustinents could contribute to political instability. The Gover Ilment thLI 5 beliewes thilt thc stabilization of the economy should be gradual and that the program of structural reforms - the key elements of which a TC public expenditure restructuring and civil service and public enterprise reforms - envisaged in the PFP should, likewise, proceed at a pace consistent with the country's political Sitl'Etion,
The Government's CCIT1 mitment to i more liberal and Copen economy and to the II ediumterill structul Till Tef CITI 15 Juli 11 edi in the first-yeaT PFP is Tot in in question. It was reiterated in the March 1989 budget speech, whileIn the Gover In Ilment a mino LI Il Ced three principles that are to guide the formulation and imple.Thenta tion of policies oWer the T11 edi - Im ter II. The first is that Lihle private sector should have primary responsibility in generating growth. The G7 We TI nTalent On its part will take deliberate steps and formulate policies to improve the business environinent in all sectors of the econdmy :ind remove impediments to private sector initiatives wherecwer they exist (paragraph 29), The second, a corollary of the first, is that the role of the public sector should be reduced and its efficiency increased. This objective requires policy initiEl tiwes Col 4 iul Illbert . of from Lis, the key elements of which are
a reduction of Inent spending the implementati This Tative Recifið TT II d a TicŞ5 tİTLICE LI expenditures (p: à view to ein programs and efficiency of Tell ls ielirts enterprise refor I With a few exclo restricted to selec facturing Ente be 豊Xl Llich wildc T TALI terprises in all e Ç0 l III ly (p) :ATAT third is that 1 will take primal in ensuring tha growth are dist am ong the 1} {}.
designing progra
pose. The JSP to achieve this Gwerine. It is view is the des gr:1 m 15 T1:Ct:5 that it is well the poor est seg1 :ire not left out process (pil. Tagra With these pr it is; evidelt tE st The CF struct Il Lust be ref3 TIL sector. The key reducing the public sector air eConomic and Illa cca. At thc: t are the goals staffing in the restructuring pli. While both thile: great challenge 11 tilt it tacles th te mäki Ing pro Cricial areas. econo Illy is ex from a substant ii. 1990, and fl til of trade El 1
Macroeconomic () of the licer Lair tion, the Gover til at stabilizing while IIlai Iltaini

central gÖVer Il(pa, Tag T :1plı 14), on of the Ad IIli1 (paragraph 17), Iring of public tragraph 20). With ina ting Wasteful improving the a.i ning Ip TOgT a TM1 S. that the public In process which, ptions, hl: di been Ed Public Mi TuTprises (PME5) cilded : ge of public ensectors of the aphs 24-26). The :lle G0 We TT1111e:Int ty responsibility the be Ille fit; if ributed equitably pulation and in ims for that puris a first litte 11t pbjective and the prepared to TCsign of this prosary 10 e 15 ll Te largeted and that Telts of society from the growth .ph 22), inciples in mind, at the cirncrural adjust. Tillic Ellt of the public In easures include size of the ıd improving its financial perforop of this agenda f reducing overcivil ser wice a Tid blic enterprises. se objectives pose is, the Gover Ile highest priority gress in thesc In addition, the lected to beliefit Eia | I:1x ref Ill iT ITh ET ||beraliza
finance.
bjectives. Because i political situaIII ent recognizes ; the economy ng some growth
in per capita consumption will entail serie what lower levels of
investment ower the Imedium term. The key inacroeconomic objectives over the medium
term are: (i) to increase growth from its current 2-3 percent level to 3-4 percent by 1991-92 (ii) to reduce inflation from 12 per cent at present to 7 perccnt by 1992; and (iii) i to Icciu, CE: thc current account deficit of the balance of payments to about 6 percent of GDP by 1992, a liciwc! that would allow a m c d est FCcovery in the level of foreign exchange reserves. While the 5t: objectives may appear lodes 1, they represent a major improvement over the country’s recent macroeconomic performance and seen realistic given the political constraints undcT which the program is to be implemented.
The Stabilization program
At the heart of the stabilization effort is the reduction of the fiscal deficit frill 15
percent of GDP in 1988 to 12 1/2 percent of GDP in 1989, 10 percent in 1990, 9 percent in i991, and 8 percent in 1992. The burden of the fiscal adjustment will fall 01 gCU WCT 11 EM1ET) expenditures, which are to decline from 34 percent of GDP in 1988 to 32 percent in 1990, 30 per cent in 1991, and 29 percent in 1992. In 1989, public expenditures al Te expected to remain high at 34 percent of GDP, because in addition to subsidies, new expenditures are required for the mid-day le. the JSP, and the expanded NFSP. Thus, in the short Tun, incrcases in revenues will hal WC a major role in reducing the public sector deficit. Govern ment Treycinues, at 19. pēTCC 111 of GDP in 1988, are expected to reach 21 percent of GDP in 1989 and to stabilize at that level through 1992. While the increase in revenues in 1989 is due to more normal tallix col
lections and to discretiola TY measures that, have a once-forall effect (e. g., the sale of
foodstocks and taxation of Cell
tral batık profits), new Tevenue
measures will have to be intro(Carif írTried dr. Figge fő)
13

Page 16
A Funeral in Trinco
David Housego reports on a Tiger ambush
5 the last II. d 11 11 troops
Arire to pull out of Sri Lanka over the colling two months, Tamil Tiger guerrillas il re 5et to take cCILIol of the rest of the north and east of the country.
The Libela in Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), as they are callict, already control all six districts from which the lindi ains häive withdra W III. In the seal port of Trincomalee, which is with the Jaffna Peninsula the only place where Indian forces remain, the beleaguered Til milldominated administration is prepa ring to alba Indon the town when the Indians depart.
- We shall go underground', says Mr. K. Padmanabha, the general secretary of the EPRLF (the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Fiority, the main rival to the Tigers which nov heads the north-eist prowincial council.
Trincomalice, one of the world's great natural harbours ind i base for allied fleets in the Seco di Wo Tld War, Teimli Ils much as it was 40 years agoa result of government neglect of the Tamil no Tith, EA [ld more
recently of six years of civil
War.
Bearded, wearing dark green
battledress with a picture of
Lenin pinned to his la pel, MT. Padmanabha was speaking after the funeral of Mr. George Thambirajah, one of his most senior collica gues and thic fou nder of the Tamil National Army (TNA), the alliance of anti-Tiger guerrilla groups that India has cquipped,
Mr. Thanbiraja was killed by the Tigers recently in an almBush that dem Instrited their Tu tillessness in rem1 owing LH1C leaders of other Tamil factions opposed to them.
“It is ln indication of what
i5 L c011 e' Said inth CT EPRLF official, watching the emotional ceremony on the shores of Dutch Bay. Indian
14
officers bearing a few steps i escrit fra II thi of the Il boys auto Illatic Weap
The killing inability of the wide protectic II or Iloderit. Լlբ5 though
ea Tlie T läde the TEl III, ils Who ci
the provincial t, the main point: Withdrawal Woll The lIndia. Il pe: 80,000 strong a IW (WT to
mort till tw ) what they belie brief operation Tigers. They w by the end of Imi Tigly TC)The of achieved, more diers killed a imwoolw imemt hiwi the hostility Til III i 15 al mai the pulation.
As a result ding with Presis Preill:115:1 Teil the Tigers arc in themselves open til orgallise 11 i party, Their ali; the other Tal Illi down theiT TIL are pursuing thro lings-prior to th provincial elect and east which Will With a ha
According til men, they will demands to GweT III el L. PC cilloa, the othe se: port town th Tigers in Jan that they have their ultilitic ning a separat and the partitic
It is because
that the Tigers go for a unilat

W Teal this stöd 1 f) In tt (ħif lil e TNA - many f 1'4 I 15 W LH
15. illustratic the 1Indians to pro
f the חו Till grt)- they liliki security of the -Operatcd with :) լIIIt11 () Ile tյք s ) which their lid dc pe Ind.
acekeeping forcet its pelik but 2C), ()()() — arrivei y el T5 ago for Wedi Would be :
L) di 3:11 the ill finally leave Mitch with settheir objectives th1:H T1 1, ()C)( ) 5; col
yw LH til: ng cairned them of both the Sinhalesc po
if I l II de Istill - lent Rana singhe thed last year, OW establishing lly as th cy Scick official political Ill is to forct | factions to lay S - a goal they ugh Selective kile holding of new 10113 il the T10 Th
they expect to dsome majority. their spokes
then put their hlie S Ti Lal Ika I5 ter5 iT1 B:Atti – r II1511п eastern at fel 1 L O the Li al "y", pro cliiiiil not given up objective — Linea -
e Tal II il state I of the is Lilld.
of this belief
will eventually eral declaration
of independence that many think that it fresh conflict with thic Sri Lanka I arily is inevitable. "Everybody anticipales a con
frontation between the army and the LTTE,' said I Muslim politicia II.
India 1 and Sinhalese ho pes that the Tigers were a spent force because OT the ha Illering they had received from
the Indian troops were seen to hlave I10 51ubst: Tice fľOIT1 the Skill and speed with which the Tigers captured Batticaloa - fondly believed to be a bastion of the EPRLF. The Tigers' authority in the to Wil is low unquestioned. They collect their (Wil taxes - which has made them unpopular - and have told the Sri Lauka police to renai in barracks, even forbidding thern traffic duty. 'We have asked the police not to operate,' says MIT. S. Karika lain, the locul LTTE collalder. If there is any problem, the people cal Il
Ill T t ) , 13
Talks now going on between the ST i Lankal (GC) Werl II e Ilt, the Indians, the LTTE and the other factions focus largely on who will have responsibility for the police and scicurity issues after the Indians withdraw. Th: Tigers would like to have full authority over both police and internal security on the grounds that the Silla les e assure lese for their own people in the stuth.
夔
The Sri Lanka El Government resists such de II lands which would carry the island a step further towards partition. They have a responsibility as well to the Sinhillese fril the easter province - many of then now refugees - who account for a third of its population and look to the Sri Lankan airly to return their land 5 ånd homes When the Indians depart.
The Second Thain issue in the talks is the nature of the admiisträtiCIT thlt will flLW äll Il di: Il With di Will The IIl Te optimistic of the Ta Tils think that there could be power sharing between the Tigers and the
Corre a page 5

Page 17
CORRESPO VIDENCE
The Islim Factor
The reference to the powerfull Islamic RCW) Ltion in IIa) LL 0SL LLLLL LLaLLLLL S SSLLCLL0L LLLLL the Fray', by Mervyn De Silva which highlights, Mr. M. H. M. Ashraff" 5 SLMC is 50 Ille WWEllt II lisleading.
To put the record right kindly permit IIIe the L15e Of your most interesti Ing and i II for Illative jourIlal, the Lanka Guardian.
Thc Islamic Revolution in Trail led by the lalte Imam KhUm cini is in completo accordance with the crunciations of the Holy Quran. Dew lit Muslills the world Wor read the Holy Quran and study the traditions of the Prophe L. Hence, the Isla Illic Rewoluti Il C T I mää Il Khữ TT1ẹi Thỉ W:18 hữu Ind [[], i Ilfiucnice the oppressed and dcprived Muslim II asses the World wer.
The developments in Azerbaijan il Te somewhat belated. Afghanistail, Lebanon, Jordain, West Bank, Gaza, Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria, Nigeria, Egypt, Kashmir, Pakistan El In di c vel Millysia i nd Indonesiai are on the boil and potential arcils of Islamic upheaval. The Western mass-II edia except in Afghanist; I and Lebanon have played down the Islamic resurgence in the other countries for fear that reports of developments Imay He celerate the Islamic revolluti II.
This trend of Islamic resurgence can not be halted by any fi rcc, Commi l I mism, social lis Iim, derinocratic-socialisIIl, capitalism and 311 0th CT **18IIns' häWe 10t liberated the oppressed and the deprived Ilasses.
As regards M. H. M. Ashraff, he has used the rising tide of Islamic resurgence of the oppressed and de prived Muslims of Sri Lanka, especially in the eastern province, to scrive his own ends.
Since the signing of the IndoLanka. Accord in July 1987, he clained tha L thic accord did no L meet the aspirations of the Muslims, adding that the Muslims Were not colsultcd.
He, however, contested Provincial Council election 5 which was a necessary pre-condition of the Indo-Lanka Accord. Worse sti II
he conducted paign for the N Cial concil el in Kalimulai ha logistical sup Indian ar II ny.
This despite India III army for the ki III in Jaffn:1, Wa Kin niya, Ottan chenai and Bill the elections.
Recently it wa Jlent that men Linka Muslim ( inducted to backed Tilli (TNA). Saybhanı Sarıat Cմբies: 1) Ayatollah Leader of
2} Embassy i. if the Is IrHII in
The I. M. F. .
(Сопгѓутtiril "; duced in the I 11:lintain go weri This task has and a Tax Coli rently reviewing to II lääke recom cha Inges by the The objectives the tax base, i. sticity, and red V-1155. T. H. Tevenue objectiv Commission wil ter ITT, Teport reç W 51 LIC T1 ST5 Tated into the particular, the Sures will be sion: (i) replaci turn over tax by La X; (ii) broade: age of the iric clude currently and institutions: ging the unit () individuals to f come tax. purpo Restraining m dit growth-pri Em IIkct-based fi 1. Its - Wile bilizing the eco 1989, the Cen been Inopping redu cing the pri

is election camrth-East provinictions last year ving received all cort s To IIn thic
hic fact that the was responsible g of Muslins li niya. Mutur, a waddail, Wallachticaloa prior to
stated in parliabers of the Sri o Ingress haud been e illegal Indian Nation:Il Army
Kloilei the Islamic Republic
of Iran ind Cultural Section lali inic Republic of Colombo, Sri La InkaL.
Frff Prge 3) 1990 budget to 1II1ent revenues. already begun 1 mission is curthe tax systern mendations for ell of 1990. are to broadel Improve its calice its regressii c ve short-term 'cs in 1990, the l make an incommending reto be incorpo1990 budget. In following mica1 C - Tax Colin mising the busincss i value added
ning the coverlill 1 e t M t ħ ilexe IIlpt persons
and (iii) chanf taxation from a milies for inS25
| conetary and cre
Ilarily through Tham tỉ:1l instruessontial in stanomy. During
tral Bank h35 p liquidity by portion of out
bills it holds. have been considerably. growth of
standi Ing treasury and interest rites allowed to Tise Owe T 1990-92, the total liquidity will be targeted a levels consiste It With the growth, inflation, and balance of pay Inents tilrgets and intere at rates will be adjusted accordingly. In addition, thc Government's external policies in 1989 will be guided by the need to strengthen the competitiveness of Sri Lanka's exports and to maintain reserves at adequatic levels. The Government intcinds to pursue a flexible exchange ratic policy over the medium till.
(To be continued)
A Funeral. . .
f Cση τίπίίεά τση μια με 14)
other factions on the grounds that this is the only way to prevent further blood-letting and to a chieve II laxiilul all tonomy. But Mr. Padmanabha, general secretary of the EPRLF, believes the Tigers are too intolerant to accept a compromise. 'They want to be the sole representative of the Tamil people,' he says. He is thus preparing to return to the jungles from which the Tigers are emerging With as many of his own faction and of other militant groups that he can musterperhaps 1,000-2,000,
He believes that the likely confrontation between the Tigers and the Sri Lankan Gowern Intellt as calci trics to do ITimate the other, and the problems the Tigers will hawe in running the administration will work to his advantage. Without saying as much, he clearly counts on continuing military help from an India reluctant to see either the Tigers or the Sri Lanken army establish a dorminant hold,
The chances thus that the Indian Withdrawal and the reconciliation between the Tigers and President Premada sa could usher in a period of peace and Te construction il the In orth still se em remote. A people weary of conflict face the prospect that it will continue.
(F.T.)
15

Page 18
Some Thoughts on the "Woman Question' in
Kumari Jayawardena
he Left in South Asia,
has been active in nobilizing Women Workers and peasants (as well als W 31 en of the petty-bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie) in mäny activities. These range from independence struggle, tradic u ni Din actions, peasant agitations, student movements, :1 titl housewives' campaigns against higher prices, to party activity at election time. In India, for example, Communistled WOII en played a crucial role in all the historic livements of the twentieth century. These include nationalist agitation (both violent and nonviolent), the 1951 Telega na peasant uprising, strikes such as Lihat if tille Tiilitat Coimbitore Till Workers in 1946, fallic relief Work in Bengal in 194344, a Iltifascist ca III paigns during World War II, and Inany mili
tant class : ctions of recent years. In fact the te Tidency has always been to emphasize
Wo II) en's equal rights of parti
cipation in nationalist and class Struggles, Moreover, politicall leaders halwe always been aware of the importance of WI11 el's in Wolvement for the success of struggles and, of course, for electoral politics.
However, the W II mellos
question of liberati CH — 5
орроSed to Inti II131 and work c5 liberiti II — has bicell 11 erely
subslu meel under “class struggle.” This, it has beel said Will al tonatically liberale Women When it succeeds. II this subordination of wollen's specific interests Illibera Lic. Il to those of class liberation, left movements in South Asia parallel ll too closely the problematic
assumptions : Inc Ille 55Cs of Lillä: mW cm cInts and
Although it to forge allian
del cocTitico" Left has alway: With organizatic Il elbe T5 voyeTe Tills All I groups, although of i Illin porta II, ce Were regarded even atterpts b Left to lite a Were se di Il to lo Ing. In 1947, S fra II the C Trotskyist parti With other 50 ci; for lil a I a li ta Wille's FTI for Wile's social rights. organization 1 gains and reci publicity for i
Obilize worki Ti al year the It hal the two parties dissolution of t beci 1115'e Of CC is iš Lies between West Bengal to CCITIITIl II'll St Par WOFT1e T1 party Il com II list part work i T i organization list in Creaising pri
the two parti in : Split in Organization.
In recent year issues affecting hävc a TiscIl in including the c He Hud Cid C.
FROM PROMISSORY NOTES: WOMEN
TRANSITI OM TO SOCIALISM
ed Sonia Kruk.5, Rayna Rapp and Marilyn
Monthly Review Press, NY 1989

Left and the South Asia
practical Weakiny other left
regines.
frequently tries Ces With otheI Tiga Ilizations, the ; had proble Ills Ins where Party not in control. 15 W 011c III’s raising issues
to søCialists, Eı 5 hostille, arı d y women of the Cross party lines lerated for very ri L:1 Tıka W ÖrmeT1 onlu Thist El Ti es gat together |alist Women to I70IT101,5 United It to Cal T1 paign econo Inic and Although the Thade significa Int gived a lot of LS IT CIgral. Il 15 t) g WOT eI), within e leadership of had forced the he Organization Inflict on other the parties III (, although the ty split in 1964, embers of both ies continued tio single Wiji Then’s til 1971, when ble Ils betwee:II 28 als Tesulted
the wCItle I's
rs, when many women's rights Struth Asia - Xtree cises of
Drdinance (1979)
IM THE
YLIg,
in Pakista II (which includes sto Illing to deith and lashes for adultery), and si (burning woule to death oil their hillsband's funeral pyre), or killing W o Innen for b Tingi Ing i Inadequalite dowry in India - the Left hills failed to come forward to give
leadership to these struggles tlıat have bee II take up by Feminist groups. The relationship today between the Left
a Tid fel Illi Illists i 11 South Asil Telains an Lineasy () nie.
A Glance at History
It is interesti Ing to note that when the Woman Question' cane up in India from the
пiпе се пII септшту опwards, it was discussi ed il te Tills C f Social evils Lo be erädic:ited by legislation. British bureaucrats along with Indian social reforers, nationalists, and Christia. Il missio Illa Tie & Supported the campaigns Against Far, child ma Triage, and the ball on Wil W Temar Tilge, ald proInoted the rights of Women to education, property, and political participation. It was predo Illinantly a ca. Inpaign of Hillia: Tı : Tı de Westle Trı Tile I'll whı Cose aii Wils to liberate, Inoderlize, civilige'' or Christil mize W III)cm, as the case I may be. Neverticless lūcial Wille II Were also i Iwolwedd Int billy Els victi Tills, but als as al gitt CTS, activists, and reformers, often
receiving support frɔm European Women feminists, theosopihılists, a Tı d socialists residi ing
i Il South Asia,
Since the agitation for legal, franchise, proper ty, UT education rights for wormen was part of a package of deIIlocratic de lands, support for such campaigns callic also from the liberal nationalists in India. As the nationalist. In Ovement grew, the leadets sa W, the advantage of drawing the mas5c5 (of woIIle II in to the

Page 19
movement and for this purpose
they urged women to coine out of their homes and into the 5t Tee ts5. Thuis libera ideology on Women's rights coincidcd with the need for mass support. It is this that acco
unts for the enlightened stands Gandhili and NehTLI tipolk ön the subordination of Women.
The Initionalist reforers of course had to be careful; they needed to take from the West to combat the West, but in the process, they wanted to also retain their self-identity in terms of national culture. Chatterjee has suggested that there was a separation of social space into the home (ghar) representing 'the inner-spiritual self, our true identity" and the
world (hahir), representing the external, the domain of the material.
The European power had challenged the non-European peoples and, by Virtue of its superior material culture, had subjugated ther. But it had failed to colonise the inner, essential identity of the Past which ay in its listinctive, and superior, spiritual culture . . . No encroachmelts of the colonizer Illust be allowed in that inner sancturn. In the world, initiation and adaptation to Westerin normals Was a necessity; at hortime, they were tant El Timount to annihilation of one's very identity.
Hcnice, the Westernization of Women had to be very selective - in Bengal the new "respectable woman' could acquire ''the cultural refinements afford. ed by modern education without jeopardizing her place at hole.
Of course one may add that the home represented not only spiritual but also strong material interests and ideological domination, providing the men of all classes with un paid labor and other privileges as Well as unlimited power over the lives of Women. Thus the home was the primary source of Women's oppression and exploitation, which few Illales were (or are) Willing to change.
In India, the opponents of social reform for women were a mix of orthodox Hindu and Muslim conservatives who, iro
nically, include Im Ost militant British colonial exa IIlple Was E der of the ** il the Indiam N. When, in 1908, for sedition a Inc. was a major in the mills which many W. participated. though political socially conser VE ed legislation C affecting wome ranted and obje ference by the local tradition a even joined the Ilaries in the c the Age of Cons Wlich Taised th female Sexual i ten to twelve y
STi La Ilka, Hht Le Tims of fcr11:lle quality of life i century, produce In Linds foi womi reformist males. Ilized' Illen of Were concerned Constitutional Tc male franchise, portunity with the professions service. The class were given cation. With the *accomplishment up with the lat hions. Oppositio cal me: from the Hindu ricWiwalis wLmerl LL be ch discarding West For example, A mapala (1869-19 militant spokesm Buddhist consci industrialization advance but crit tion of Wester fashions by S The glory of chastity, in the household til Ities to her husband,
In South Asia frequently accus internationalist of being inse

sile of the Opponents of ism. Ole such . G. Tilak, lea2xtrcme' group tional Congress. he was tried deported, there 'alve of strikes f Bombay, in onal Workers But Tilak, ally militant, was tive. Hic regard
In social issues Elk, El 1 l 1 W: ITÇiti Cable: il ter
colonial state in Ind custon. He
social reactioampaign agai Inst ent Bill of 1891, e legal age for Ilitcrcourse froIII ԷէլTh:
:ad of India in education and In the nineteenth di Illo | iberal de2n's rights from The ii t Westerthe bourgeoisie with II 11 oderate forms, limited and equal op - Europeans in and government Women of the a limited eduemphasis on s' and keeping 25t Wester.Il fais1 to these rends Buddhist and s who urged aste and doc ile, 2III influences. nāgarika Dha33), the most lan for Sinhala ousness, urged aПti Scientific icized the adopclustoms and inhala Women. roman is in her performance of a ni obedience he insisted.
the Left is "d of being too nd secular and sitive to the
strength of feelings based on national identity and tradition. Without cntering that debate, I would only point out that this is not true of the Wollan Question, where one finds a continuity of traditional values, permeating all strands of current political thinking, including frequcntly, that of the Left.
Moreover, many leftists who were prepared to support the national liberation of all pe co
ples and to struggle for the democratic rights of workers and peasants at home and abroad were not only unwilling, but also reacted with great emotionall fervor against attempts to raise the question of women's liberation. The strongest reasons given for such opposition have always been linked to arguments of Tesista, ncc to forcign domination and ideological control.
However, in colonial titles there were also so II ne radical Thaile reformers who spoke out against w II lern’s subordination, but who tended to be froll the Ilore maverick clements of the political spectrum. They were able to make the con lection bet Wecl caste oppression and women's oppression that existed in a hierarchically organized caste and class society. For example, in Mahara shtra, Jotirlo Phule (1827-90), of low-caste origin, led a struggle against Brahmin hegemony. He opposed child marriage and polygamy, set up schools for girls and "untouchablics," and, in opposing sa ti, speculated on whether a man would become a sata on his wife's funeral pyre; he was an early opponent of sexism in language Critizing Cxpressions such as “all Incin a Te equal,” and in his own Writing, changing this phrase to "each and every woman and man.' Another outstanding example is that of E.W. Ranaswami Naiker (born in 1879 and known popularly as “Periya I, the Great One), the founder in the 1920s
of the Draw jidill III Co wcmcnt against North Indian and Brahmin domination of the
South. Being a great icon clast,
(Сонtillнғd on page 19)
17

Page 20
POWTWCS
J. V. P. Learning from
S. Leelanada
t i & Cleartha LE 1 e WP inte
post-accord periodi modell'ed its tactics on the Wietnamese experience. They identified an external aggressor (India), saw the UNP gover ITTie Tit as a puppet regime of that power (like the Diem regime iII South Wietnam), claimed that cliques (Jayawarden: Dissa nayake-Thonda man) – (Premada Sa-Ra Tjan Wijera tine) were at Work Within these regiIIles, brought it women, students ånd m inks is i frontline" in street battles, emphasised the "patriotic nature of the opposition. w0 oed 'patriotic intellectuals, Fitte III pted to deprive the "puppet regime' of its Tevenue and started killing wil lage levcil officials of the gover Ti ment and ruling pilrty. All these were successfully tried out by the NLF in the Wet Ilamese war.
In retro spect how wert we seco that the JWP leadership has fallen wicti T1 to the: TITEL Iltic Iltion that the Wietnamese struggle was a "guer Tilla war”. This was a view promoted by both romantic radicalls of the West is the official Left, It enhanccd the 'good guy vs bad guy." i 1 Image. In reality however the USSR, Eastern European counL Ties and Chirha fun [] e lcd L TeIn endous military and financial assistance to North Wietnam and NLF. The Liberation struggle could not hawe ca Itinlle! Withcut such backing. While no doubt the NLF had great guerrilla fighters they also had trained soldiers ready for modern set piece battles. The tanks ånd soldiers who swept into Saigon from the Central highlands were parts of a diciplined military machine; not village youth. The }WP had to source of strength. In this they were quite different from the Tamil guerrillas who who could find sanctuary, men and material il South II dia.
I think it was this fatal gap' in JWP's military situation which forced its leadership to threaten armed services person el with reprisals, after appeal to them
1S
to join the JWP They in ceded to of the Army. had done their j nccc cd bätt lehär for the final push was the brutalit. Tatum that fin: army run to offensive.
(a) Though We
phenomenon ideology, it til ei here effort Was II the Buddhi: important su Elle WP, FIT wery well with strategy of the Illonks t FTCI ad c hist Iloinas points of te: the Cathol di Inated Weie hated
Thinks, the . gim e-partic accord, earn celsure of clergy. Ever the UNP pa in the City, point a Cipositio i 1. Temple play 1:r to that Pagoda i II Iīks in maya kes i young Tonk ting Patrioti Ilonks of t left were Il Conkis took Iment Of III L Tid im Clasi Լ:HI11 E է: E Il II է and refuge These Illi! Front organ lished a mag T.Ter- e. "
Monk's Role
S. J. TI if Blidd his in NTL II atte Inti I til: Which lili!

Vietnam
army failed. win over a part JVP i Tregulars ob. Now they -dened troops 1. Ironically it y of this ultiIly swung the
& II i Ill Collit
Will discuss this
lä LeT LITET Sluld be melthat a special ale to organize it clergy as in pport group for stly, this fitted the Wietill mese winning over El P. Tito Inverting Budd
[Tie 5 i Tit. fr. Cl -
3 ista Ice. Just as ic elite which South Vietnam by the Buddhist la ya wa Tidem e Teularly after the ed the univeral the Biddhist 1 (ingl. TF1111, Ironized Temple becline a focal nti-Jayavarcienc A Narah empiita ved a Toole simiof Quon Tri Saigon. Senior olu dig MahaTiti midiä ted by is into supporc Front. Leading he UNP and the killed. Pro-WP over the managelip I lait temples teries which heis of propaganda for WP activists. 5 Tail their will iyation and puba w.inic which Illis - WP viewponit.
In biah in his study ı a ı il spirit cults Thailand draws li social 1 I let works k the Buddhist
neophyte of the village to the prestigious Metropolitain Temples of Bangkok (Canbridge University Press 1970) There is no parallel, still dy in respect of Sinhalil Buddhis II but some in pressionistic data may be considered here. Recruitment to the Sa Ingha today appears to bel Ilainly from children of the poorest strata of the peasantry. Recruitment from the Hristocracy and higher Willag 5 trata are On the declinc, ey e T1 i Til the Siya Ill Nikäilyä which traditin silly critered to those categories. Peasants who could not afford to feed theit child Te II, ils de IT1015trated by Thambiah with Thai data, tended to offer them to the Sangha. The met work has always been the best instruIllent of upward Imobility for poo T r u Tall youth. If they had outstandi Ing pragr (intellectual ability) Sila (ascetic practice), or SI F77 a Wii (III editati II al skills), they would receive recognition first within the Sanghai hi eta Tichy and later be identi - fied as outsti:HIndi Ing perso I lålitics by the whole of Buddhist society. The spread of educatio Tı, Lö TLi Tal El Tears has openedl new wis tas for the young village Ilok, Oil one hand he cain II, 0 W LI, se the educational opening to reach Universitics all establish himself without recourse to traditional criteria of the Sanglia such as subservience to selio III ks. They hawe a charisma of their wil. On the other hand they are introduced to the Secular t Til ditions of the University, particularly its critical stance to w Tds the establish III t. They are also introduced to ill in Lellectual world Willic de 5 Ilot have the: Illi Tal certainties of the Dha TT.IIa. This the young Buddhist Illink becomes the focus If l gulLure shock' wlich predi poses him to radicaLLHHS LLLLL LLLLH S S SaaLLLLLCL0L C

Page 21
(b)
World of moral superiority like his familiar Buddhism. Indeed, they have, umknown to thc Buddhist establish Illet. Cultural MinistTy, Mahabodhi Society, YMBA etc. created a new radical, Buddhist ideology of social commitment which is accepted by a majority of Sinhala youth. This new radical ideology emphasizes the social and cgalitarian functions of Buddhism. (e.g. articles in Viri i vida Magazine; Sinhala newspapers).
INDIAN HEEMONY
The creation f : Patriotic Front Was predicated on the JWP's interpretation of the hege Illonic power of India. Here Wije Weera could claim to be a political prophet si ce this had been one of his five major themes from the time of the founding of the JWP. The reasons for the JVP ittitude in the 5 ixtics call be linked to the USSR-China CC litr 3 wersy, the cultural revolution II Chill : Id the Si13 — In din Conflict of that til The Recent Wisitors to Chila have been told that during the early sewel Lics Chou-e1 Lili was under attack by supporters of thc Gang of Four in the Chinesc Foreign Ministry. On the Eigend: of these anti-Chu
extremists was a critical stance towards the SLFP, particularly the Bandara
I:likes, Who Were known to hawe thic support of the Chou-cn Lai and Chen Yi. It was this left berra Lion" in China which supported the JWP. Once the leftists were routed from the Foreign Ministry, Chou Imade a mends by sending the famous ' who but the Bandla Tanai kes calm we
support' letter in 1971 together With an un precedented offer of a grant
in convertible currency.
In lIly event this wa5 à period when pro-Chinese elements Were conde Inning India, in hegemonism, o related
CSpecially ti dar y disput The Chinese thic even han the USSR which they PTC) — Indiam o
Wijeweета Chiles: Side fishioled lis
CX|[}äl i CBTis Til Chinese poli |977-83 pe
5 CCIT18 tũ hãy the lidii Teä SOT15. Fi: fied the UNP puppet regin India aId si
lot at this (11 ttheir sta I Eel: Ti Ilye
The signing Lällika Accor vided an idei Wije weera. ti T1 e 11 Hi5 India, the W Old Left, ha On a highly vi It also in t Sinhala - orie Class a II TLIT to in West a Credibility in After all. Sri Lankan had for over
arctiiicted 5 Luch:
Tronically, Wijeweera's ic i 31 I1 cc hid Eo El Inti-Indian pr ried 3ut by t 1983. Indian the Tamil gi Il cint illid bee Government lati) In Ht wara 1 This was en ha: Indian intervi internal affairs Wijeweera wat of this propa, lateT Writings բTe-Occupied Lion of a lo talc to the
All these ch El Inti Indiani Frontismı, ant

2 Indii" s bol IIle With China.
als 0 resented | ded attitude of * I this issue, Ok to be a 皿世,
had taken the in this dispute Yiews of Indial
largely based in lics. In the iod the TWP
! soft pedalled issue for two st they identi15, 4 E 1 A 11 e Tical le hostile [0 cond, they had
Stage, worked ce regarding the .Lנן טוו
g of Indo-Sri d however proall opening for For the first halte figures'– est, JNP T di colle together illnerable issue. he cycs of the Il te middle all youth tended great deal of ) Wije weera. was the only politician who [W Conty years El confluence.
the ground for Leological domten prepared by "Cpl gällda ca Tl: UNP froll support for lerrill al InoveIn used by the L) Tete fi: ' psychology, nced by further *Eltio15 i İı tHıt 3 Cof Sri Lanka. i the beneficiary ganda and his show a leader With the ques1g = [[Tri resisIndian Army.
:ltä, C teristics — 511, Patriotic i-elitism, usic
of violence, recruitment Of the clergy etc., were ilwe Within a new nativistic ideo - logy which concides With rise of the influence if the middle class Sinhala youth. In the next issue we Wyli II discuss the encompassing role of this Jarika Chirrfaraja.
Some Thoughts.
fСолгfinited fiон Frge I)
challenging Hindu Orthodoxy and excoriating priests, he code 11 ned the Worship of gods and religious ritual and went even further to denounce TäInil social customs and the en slawement of women. He hi II LI LI : I the revered classic texts "Then, attacked the sacred laws that enforced chas tity, and adVocated 'self-respect ma Triages“ Without clergy or religious ritua 1, with rights of diivorce intl remarriage. His boldest ճllքg:5- tions included the plea for sexual freedom, a new IIIa code for both men and Wծmen, intercaste m Triages, and a women’s strike against reproduction;li he also ca|led for 菲血
us, Strong Il WeltטנQriנaut QI run only by women, because in his view, male presence
would be like halvi Ing Brahmins in the anti-Brahmin Drawidiam Tl10 Wt: m t:Ilt.
However, while Periyar is VeTerited a 5 H founding father of what became a powerful poliLical movement that still domina tes Tamil politics, little is heard of his revolutionary views on Women. These are regarded as an aberration and are seldom referred .
(To be concluded)
19

Page 22
Violence
One is reluctant to enter into dispute with a person of thc power and position of Mr. J. R. Jayewarde Inc.; but when he illsists on making his frequent jack-in-the-box public appearances to come Olut With co IItroversial state IInents, ole is compelled to do so in the interests of accuracy and truth.
At the Savsiripaya Auditorium, oil thic occasion of the bicelltennial of the French Revolution, Mr. Jayewardene said quite unequivocally that he was totally against violence. Yet, it was this sa Ine Mr. Jayewardenc that, during the last presidential election campaign, speakiing at the Sugalhada sa Stadium, said “violcnt cor non-violent methods musi bc. 15 cd to en sure the UNP candidate's victory. This was said in the hearing
of thousands of rcported in th hic the In, in suc changed his a violence?
0Il that sa IIIe Sawsi Tipaya Alu Jayawardene si British came hç our leaders gC signed a Conve British to hand eignty of Sri British sovereign no Wiolence." T of the truth. T here in 1795 much wiol cence prior to the 18 Within a coul the signing ther Rebellium whi crushed with and cruelty.
" No Call up charge withIn city II mits
" Whicle a C
"...Receipts issued on request Company credit awa Ca|| 50 1502 501 503 o
2O
ệAset
Another Aitken Spenc
 
 

people and was e II edia. Has 1 a short time, titude toward5
occasion at the ditorium, Mr. id that "the Te il 1815 a 1 d t together and tion with the ower the 5 overLika to the and there was 1is is a travesty hic British çi:The and there was Lld blood5h1cci 15 COIn Wention, ble of years of e calle the Uwa ch the British great violence Tho'll sa Ilds Cof
CORFESPOWOFMCE
people weTe ghtered. wardele?
Mr. Jayawardene said “We ha ve changcd olur governments ofı various occasions by the free votes of our people, no blood was shed. 'Surely Mr. JayeWarden : call not be serious: Has hic actually forgotten the on-going violence and killings during the 1977 general election, the post-election violence and killings in 1977, the violence and killings during the the Referend II il etc., ctc.?
We are hardly in a position to take El mo Tallistic stad il bout
In ercilessly slauNo violence, Mr. Jaye
the violence and killings duriug the French Revolution which, in any case, happene di
200 years ago.
Piyalı Gam age
Colombo 3
doorstel
CE5s, Fr) Tı Selected 5tärlds
| |ab| ?
է 501 5D4
e Service

Page 23
GERMAN OUESTION:
A Dual Impact
Frank Kurschner-Pekmann
hic dramatic changes in East
Germany within a TeyW wecks, now called the October Revolution 89, were only possible becausic both the Go Wet 1ment and the opposition recognized that only dramatic changes within a short period could prevent the total collapse of the country. Especially the fact that up to 10,000 persons per day (!) went to West Germany left no room for long meditations on a change step by step, And once thc process of change had started it developed its own
dynamics. The fall of party leader Holccker left Indo (othe T leader in an ivory tower. The
Trade union leadership, the regional h cadis of the ad Iministration, thic whole cabinet ... all had to resign. And still the population continued to de Inoistrate for change-and succeeded. People had lost trust in the old political leadership. On banners one could read: "After marching for 40 years through the desert Inobody believes what the old prophets say'. The courage of thc population was based on the insight, that there was only one other possibility and that was to level the country. As it was now possible to take this step when things would get worse it was reasonable to try out first if changes were possible. More and more sectors of the society were affected by fundamental changes and this gave new hopes and new deterIli nalitico Il to the de 110 Th Stral toTS. One success was that the Whole medią system changed ower night. The political leaders are suddenly confronted with journalists who in sist on concrete answers to their questions and who cover the Illectings of the opposition extensively. It may have been a Illixture of desperation and hope for change that convinced the political leadership to open Inc bror de Ill Nowic Tbc T 9th A In di to a Innollince that free and
fait elections W One C.I tWO y. population has distrust politic. the dcInnstrati safeguard the tion. At the Elst (ccTills : Llew frecdot; I'm to til Tm ce:L their r ends again, and and pineapples.
The Communi: of the possibilit next clections, can really hope a certain Tole Wi but evel that W cha Ingcs within " critical debate () party in the las question is, has SIL ÇOL 11 ) ET
ob Wicibus that the type of socialis II practised over th des häs faile present politi Would try to rc system they w (but that this ap II becausic of the T Sibwiet Union to development, Bt of the old social .eחג) "ויוסנז - #1 Tםf has to be a war 40 years of the o style of sociali discredited the sociallis 11 to H that nobody w. interested in soci But presently a East Germany a a new type o socialis II with but with dicloc ficult to assess groups arc, but heard all cr On their banner ''Imagine that t and nobody run Heym, a well k Imam auth o T a ld a critic of the

ill be held in
CELTS tille. The been so used to all leaders that
0 Ils colti Illud To * Octobel ReySa ime time the Te, e Tijoying their visit the West, la Live 5 Fild Tito buy bananas
st party is aware y of losing the What the party for is to play thin a coalition, ould need deep the party and a i 1 the Tale of the it 40 years. The German social liend? It is very
E:15t German 1 that has been C läst four dicicI. Even if the cal leadership ll. In to the old t: 111t:1 stic rl find Tach II hulst fillil C5 ista race Cf the
is sist such : It may be the end lism is a chalce Aß, t i least one
thilt another ld East Gcal im would have whole idea of sluch a degrce LI ld hi We Hoccm alism any more. lot of people in Te struggling for f socialis II: ut bureaucracy acy, It is diflow strong these
their voice is East Germany. § () (äI Täi. 1ere is socialism away Stefan WI1 East Gerfor Illany years d government,
has an even more ambitious vision: "IL is now Iccessary to give up old patterns and to transform the old existing sociEllis II into a new socialist despite all out (negative) expicTic1cc . . . . (CITI I la El I). Il CDCT tic Republic wheric temporary lodgings have to be built to provide Shelter for those who are coming to live in this socialist society.'
IMPACT ON WEST
The West Germal establish
ment is not yet al fraid that its
citizens might move to East
Germany and Say good-bye Lo Western capitalism. But in West Germany the end of the Old East German system opens some new political options. The days hawe gone when all those who raised their wice for ful Indian Ital changes were asked to go to East Germany. The establishIlent hlas lost its elemy on the CLH et side of the borde T. FT KIT1 In W On il Will ha We Lo Tely or its WI achievements with - out hawing the excuse that things are worse on the other side of the border. The changes in East Ger Ilally Ina y have serious consequences for the political system in West Germany. After years of ignoring the respective demands from the peace groups, the gover III ent has now agreed to reduce tic number of 5oldiers alıd to clut thıc texpeIndi ture for The w weapons. It is simply no longer possiblic to convince the population that bil Lions of German mark have to be spent for new arms when obviously no cinemy is around. The arms industry, so far an important political factor, will hawe live: with a decline of the Ilarket (unless they succeed in selling much more arms in other parts of the world). Further-more the dependence of West Germany Con the big brother im Washington is decreasing as protection is no longer needed. Since the HaL aa LLL a S LLLaL S S S LL S LLLLLLLLS governments have had a tremendolls influence in West Gerial politics, especially in preventing any sociallist development. With the decreasing nu Imber of American soldiers in West Germany this in fulle Ilce will di Iminish,
21

Page 24
The progressive groups and paties in West Germany are presently irritated by the development in East Germany. This is especially true for the small comIT1unist party. It has had close links with the East GerIL1 a 11 communists sin cc its inco Tporation. Do the fundamental changes in East Germany aldı the Soviet Union encourage the West German communists to rethink their political concepts?
So far the party is split and it seems that the old party establishment tries to prevent a II. “ “ (Octobcr. Revolution" in its co WIl Tanks. The Green Party is debating the whole East-West isSlle in als controversial termis Els it debates all major political issues and one can not anticipate if the party will come up with El clear strategy, The social Democratic Party is convinced that its politics since the sixtees which was to be open for dialogue and cooperation with the East, it was bearing fruit. But it has bc.cn involved in a dialogue with East Germany's ruling party slightly too long, when the Wind of change had already brought up new political Im We: Info Ills. A5 fäT 15 West Germall politics is concerned, it is not very likely that the socialist groups within the Social Democratic Party will gain anything from the development in the East. The pragmatic group in the party will claim that this is not the right time for a socialist approach in West GeTII): Ily. They will talk of the next election and will hope for coalitions with the liberals. It was Rosa Luxenburg who recognized that a revolution can only be successful on the long run if it is both socialist and democratic. But does a combina - tion of the liInited success of East Germany. With socialism and of West Germany with democracy offer a chance for a
trlely socialist Germany? Unitecl : Tid socialist, that is a dTeallı elif many scrocialists in
GeT ITA Iny but they are a ware of all the stumbling blocks on such a Toad, The Teighbouring coultries are not too eager to be audience of yet another German
22
experiment tha the III in 11 any w; Ca. Il go.We II) 11:Int its remaining i vent à united S as they are all Over a la Lillial It is not very Scillis I L1 I liited ( a political opti
MERCE DES ST
Another poss lIllific::ltỉ011 LI Ilt Star Of McTCelt
The Ilire coI in West Germa Corpo Tate East cinc big mirket investment pos West Germal this appetite do II inance is I i I 1 Eåst (Ger II1 of what has been all difficulties, Germany are I cept ''On Sale' factoric5, Fl El TC WTC of L thit Weigt (C.E. I
HTC TE IL all the Ilist kes
If the per-c the only criter. cess of a socie Ger In: Il society sluccessful. But forget the two loyed people i In the fact of West Geria social Welfire 1980, that ther []f you Tìg drug fact thill L Wes t Te me I dous ecc. If only half o of this globe w rESI11II ԱԱՀ ii Ilti at thie s4 miliet tim bage and poi: ind the Hir HS I h, 13 I'm ail life way 1 possible Con t deep social p! Germany have rise of a righ party, called t They won up WL-5 in the It tions in South,

| could cffect lys. The A 11 ciriWould sec all influence to preocialist Germany ready concerned LIII nited (Germany. likely that a ierIIIa Ily is rcally
AR
ibility is a reder the shining
S.
Servative groups ny hope to inGer Inany into and to gain new sibilities for the t: CT11pā Ilies. But for power and
lot too popular
ny, Being proud achieved despite people in East it Willing to illsigns on all their "the Ilmore they he problems of Tlal Society ald 0 eager to Tepeat
of the West.
apital-income is il for the Sucty, th: Ti the West has been wery 01 e should mot Inillio II un empWest Germany, 111 the number Ins depending on has doubled since e a re the ou 5:1 md5 addicts and the Germany his logical problems. f the population foluld use as much tricTքy, րr ( ) dilciIյք 1é as II1uch as garSC. Thing the water the West Gerilii is Julid 1 ) Inger be
his globc. The robléIT18 in W55t Tesul Led in the
t-Wink political le "republicanso. up to 10% of the :CT t licii cecV ost-icrminy, a
alarming signal in a country where right Wing radials caused a catastrophy half century ago. Furthern ore one cannot forget the role of West Germany in the exploitation of African, Asian and Latin American countries. Few Countries gain more from the chcap raw materials from Third World countries, 'good' investment possibilities (due to low sal-Hries, rino environmental laws etc.), from high interest ratics in loans and froll the trade with regimes like the aparthcil static in South Africal thal II
West Germany does. Should reLi nificatio In II1ea In that mill bric power is concentrated in one country?
INTEGRATION TREND)
As things are, it is likely that two German states will cotinue to exist for the time being With a tendency towards the integratio II (of both Germanics into Ille statci. Neither the USA I10 r the Swiet UniCI will encoLur Eige the Germal 15 to colle together again but the close economic and personal relations plus the location of West Berlin as an island in East Germany will lead to more aid more links between both states. Further more the per-capital-income gap between the states will eith er result in more East Gerrnáns m Living to the West or to more joint efforts to ballance this gap. As neither of the LW governments is interested in more people moving to the West one can foresce that both of them will take steps iI, a direction of closer cooperation that may open the road tc) reunification. Therefore reunification is not the decisive question in Germany nowadays. It
is obvious that it can be achieved in the near future and it is very likely that it will
happen in a slow process over the next years. The decisive question is in which direction the (Germing Wil | Ilve. () Ille option is that this will be a del Crati: Sociallis II. But the traditional and new splits in both the East and the West
s Torfir Eid ar page 2:5)

Page 25
The Writer as Politici;
A. H. Hermann
lclav Havel, who se plays
were banned since 1968, will today become the ninth president of Czechoslavakia. He will be elected by the Federal Assembly in Prague Castle's Walladislav Hall. The Assembly will be chaired by Alexander Dubcek, whose bid ti giv sillis hulal face was crushed in 1968.
The people of Prague will kilow, MT. Ha Wel has bee I 5 W KITI in When 20 rounds are fiTed
from a battery of guns brought this morning to the Plaj II of Liclina. The new president and the 11embers Of The Feder:11 Assembly will then proceed to thc cathcdi Tall for Mass. The peoplc may Well find this recogInition of the Catholic Church 11 Circ still II i Illing thaAll the electi III itself. But the real ga Ine of politics ta kes place tout of the public View, and it would be wrong to believe the change in the power structure is to be as pervasive
and fast as this symbolism
Would suggest.
The Fedcral Assembly will
Interely be complying with an
agre ellent Tcached at a * ''round table' of the Communist Party and the new political organisa
tions which have mushroomed during the past month. The One of a power centre Forried
outside the constitutional organs and consisting of coalition party leaders is another revived Czech tradition from 1918-38, when " + the Fjwe "" — Hic lcalders of the coalition parties - decided all important maitters of State, leaving their cinactment to parlia11 ent and their execution to gWCT1m21t.
The Students' cry · Havel to the castle' was heard first in Prague. The provinces are not so enthusiastic. All they knew about Havel was that the press called him a bourgeois intellectual troublemaker moving in and out of prison, supported by money froll abroad.
Leaving witu this claim of press was justif b) TT 53 year 5 ag of Prague entrepi of his origins,
higher educatio this is an outs tual, His em
laboratory assis brc Wery dici ne his esse Titial p discrimination h his experiences, With laterill III olivä ted li; d. tics.
It is als 0 true h; fra 11 abroad. I his plays in Lo ",Whe Te Y„y er: h is though modest, been suficient. “ preSS Wils also bing him as a moving in and But this could h 1.5 L defa Tlation
li t t ' LI :
Havels play:
important than
perience, The
staged in Prague other of Ellis yw o double-speak of
brutal regime, thi of people who pretending confor L Tid and harmfull
keeping their cũị the Ilselves.
In One of his Writes: "We haw the dan gcr that a ably, our respo split into two re. One human and tical'. In confro pe T5C311 with his b ego, Hawel contin for integration of stated by Franz Find Jal T3Slaw Ha: dier Schweik. first only expos created by the de menklatura - to

MWEMAW THIAWIKIMIAWIG FORIJIM
eration a side, he communist ed, Hawicle Wals, into a family
3. Il cu Tsi. Bic cause he was de Inici but despite
Anding in tellecloyment as a
ant and in a thing to alter !rsonality. The
e suffer gl, inci
provided him for plays and s Side It C Livi
: received money Royalties from Il do 11 and els enly income and
se el til hlave The coll Illinist right in descritrouble laker' out of prison. ardly be taken
even if it were
ELT ITT "T" his prison exGarden Party, in 1964, and ks, expose the a decadent and e schizophrenia ecame used Lo Inity with abspolicies while Il mo Il Sense to
essays Havel . I be aller Lù li most un noticicnsibility might sponsibilitics – the other poliinting the human ureaucratic alter ues the Struggle the Czech spirit Kafkas Triāli Sek's Good SolBut while the ied the tension humanised no
LLC - 1
Tc:cent te Tim - and the second released this tension by laughter, Havel stirred thc oppressed to opposition,
What can one expect from Havel as president? Hic accepted the nomination only for the six Illonths leading to free elections in the II liddle of 1990, and is probably the best Ilan to e Ilısu Te the election Will be free. Beyond that, it is difficult to see if his popularity and influence will survive the present enthusiasm, and the linawoidable difficulties of transition to a multi-party syster and Ilarket economy. At present, he still prefers writing to be a president, and sy5 h e Will stay on in his modest apartment. This he may find impractical, particularly if if he is re-elected next year.
Constitutionally, the Czechoslavak presiden L has no greater power tha In the British Ino na Tch. It depends entirely on the strength of his personality and political skill whether het ca 11 become als influential. Thomas Milsaryk, founder of the independent Czechcos lawak static in 1918, exercis cd enor monus influence by his per
sonality alone. Starting as a village apprentice, he beca nc a university teacher, fighting ca Lises and pTiC) claiming humanitarian ideals. Havel’s ethos is clearly inspired by the same ideals as Masaryk's. Unlike
Masaryk, he was born rich, but thic silwer spoon was wrenched from his mouth. He is small, dresses informally, speaks haltingly and when interviewed, gives, short, Inonosyllabic answers.
When Masaryk was contemplaLive, Hawel Teve als El Termarka ble absence of doubt: there is a great strength in his singleness purpose, his ability to give a 'yes' or 'no' to almost any question. He has shown himself Willing to forgo personal comforts, even going to prison for his opinions.
s Čyrir firTread för page 25)
23

Page 26
THE EXIT THEORY:
Galkattas and Power
Tilak A. Gunawardhana
I dre; it that I addressed the Council of Strategic Studies of Sri Lankai, on invitatio II, as I happened to be the Sri Lankan ambassador in India during the Punjabi and Kashmiri struggles for independence, and as I happened to play a key role in ensuring that India stuck to norms of democratic practice, and allowed a degree of independence for both the Punjabis and Kashmiris. Of (cc) l.I rse DTny airin was full independence from India. for these oppressed peoples.
The history of the Punjabi struggle is a long one. They are the most industrious community in India as against those who come froIIl provinces like Uttar Pradash, or Bengal and who are well represented by Iny friend Mr. Exit who hails from somewhure there. Punjabis al Id Kashi ImiT i 5 de ser w cd their independence to look after their own affairs without being discriminated against by Hindus. At the moment Punjabis, or mainly Sikhs have no place in caste stratified Hindu society. Hindus started caste and class discriIllination, and they still sanction it. Those who rise against jt. Te killed TimeTcilessly, as Witnessed in parts of Bihar recently.
TF Ilot f the Srī Lāka iIlV - sion of Punjab and Kash IIlir, the people in these two provinces Would have continued to be treated like pariahs, or untollchables. The question of Kashmir is a question of a forcible El Texation of H Muslim Illinated region by India when on
their own, they would hawe opted to join Pakistan or even be independent at the time
India was granted independence.
So When I advised the Sri Lankan government to invade both Punjab and Kashmir, we were acting in accordance With (a) olIT greater Sri L:LIika Concept (some say it is a megal
24
omnia Call åttit cern for dem region. If IT di blindly followi self die Structio Il Wish, OT Schizo cannot just wat El ld in OL seid o there and brim, LInder CCIII trol. our good. Thij the well know I which I have Ripple Theory' forced to land Punjab and Kash the India Il Gow a friendly agree eTable ulls to se fied in liber to allow LIS & materials är in Initions, and fighters bct w cen India without t (T15 Flnd imIT1ig Tances. Anywa friendly countri we be subjected ports being ch travel to India. India was a pa Lilika
Any Way we li cified all Indi : Eını lq T of troops in Pl Inis, mostly STI rience in gueril tactics, armed range of Galkata that we develop dependantly, e. borrowed freely and U.S. kilw Severi1 ya Tictie The Gill ka tills; S. and Galkatas tio , « lu To Wall": armel with Gal katas 12O at Bill listic missil
Our Air For ared with th multiple entry We are InO w di nuclear device to 11 range whic Galkätäs M 100

rojection
de) (b) our conracy in this is stupidly and Ig the path of through a death hrenia, then we h the situation It crack troops the situation Primarily for 5 follows from theory of Imine alled Thc Exit Si WC y ETC our troops in Tir after forcing Tnment to sign Tent with us to nd an unspeciif troops, and ferry troops, S. :d aluewen freedom Sri Lanka and he lot Ital clustration encumby between two es why should to olIT passecked when We After Rawa Tial, rt of greater Sri
Linded an un Specounted number Injab and Kashboys with expea warfare and With the lates IS. TI must add ed the Irange inen though we
from Russial how. The Te a Te of Gillkatas. 40, Gailkatas S50
S75. Il dihips are now he long Tange
d the long Irange Gilkitas 2400.
e is uniformly c heat seeking Gal katas 12 O. veloping a small in the 1000 Megais to be called
EXPORT ORDIWE
In aldwic ing the Sri Länka Government to invide lindia and sa ye democracy there, I had another thing in mind, and this idea must Illot be Linderrated, o T ignored. That is, after the Indian iwasi CT we halwe bee Il a blic Lico find a non-traditional export in the form of the Whole range of
Galkatas. We Cam garn suficient foreign exchange to offset all our expensive purchases
abroad in recent times. By our military engagement in Kashmir 1Tıd the Punjab olur production of G: Ika as has increased over thousand fold. What only a small cottage industry in Tangalle, Maltilra, Hambain tota, is now a lighty mass productionoriented technologically viable, export led, capital intensive undertaking with internation financial backing. The Galkatas range is now a major foreign exchange eà Timer surpässing, gaTTllents, genus and tea put together. We export them to all the provinces of India, wherc tribes HTe fighting for their independence fI o IL1 the HiTi di Lu domi Inated Govclient at Delhi. According to the la test customs statistics, our best custo Tiers Tic South Indians in Madras, Nagalanders, Kashmiris and Punjabis. I feel Lihat till: Sri Lal Tikal (GCWET III e Ilt must give encouragement to all freedoll loving ethnic groups in India to wage War against the cas le ridden central government which is exploiting the peripheral states for its own purposes and that undemocratically.
To come to my theory itself which I have named after my good friend Mr. Exit, I must
stress that it has two sides to it. The first is the principle of i Greater Sri Lатika". We
must ensure, I nearly said by hook or by cromok, all the countrics surrounding Sri Lanka should so adjust their policies to attain the IIlaximum Conformity with Sri LHnkam policies wishes, and desires where het external and intc Trial mit

Page 27
ters : Te concerned, basically in the interests of our stability, but not necessarily that of the surrounding countries. We do Il UL Wänt the DOMIK OF MI5 to i Instigate olli peace lowing Tamils to revolt against our (GaWCT 11 e Tit. If there is Gilch a provocation we will not hesitat e to send our STF boy's to Madras and deal With the situation effectively, democratically, and in a peace-loving Way, using Cllr a rilled might, As a corollary we should act from a position of strength wis å vis Indial or a Il y coth cr columtry Which cares lo d.c Stabilisc olur country or its ecoilomy, In a II y CH se the independence we give to India is Indre then sufficient for thảm. Sixty percent of the population in India is il literate. Among the rural population illiteracy goes up to 80.5%. So what democracy for them? The bulk of the peoplc do mot undcrstand modern concepts like democracy. Wotes arc Wasted on them. Like the Old style feudal landlords, Saheebs, Za II'nin dars, and Sarkar 5, wc should keep the Indians under us till they raise their literacy to at least 50%, which is still Way below Ours which is
T... of the highest in the World. Till Indians reach our stand
ards I feel we should keep our troops there. But there should be fair play.
RAM "ANA"S ID FRELAMI
The other side of the "Exit Ripple Theory' of mine is the Tı:L intenince of a divided India. Wc should encourage caste divisions, encourage inter-tribal Warfare, and the genuine struggles of independence now en
bracing Punjab, Kashmir and Nagaland, Assam also should be supplied with small arms, and their young trained in guerilla tactics in the jungles of Monard gala, Tangalle, Belittle and central Sri Lanka.
We will supply then arms to sluit their degree of competence, and the availability of foreign exchange from any source to cover those purchases. This is a highly secret IImatter which II would not like to discuss with M C եւ today.
Si the task of II dii is two ful sure the integri Sri Lillk:, whicl the litto Tall SLa Lť India, guided Ripple Theory'. all I divisive teld Caste, eth Illic, p I sitic al Id religio" II13:lte aii II 1 1 1 LISL IIlore independen states, kept un control by our Our greater good Was (Illi RayEl Ila he first flew ti Sita, il the f flying machine.
The Writer. .
ή , TiηHεί να,
It is an import Havel's struggle critical oppressi it is 'n at the Sol
lil Itik Ilary brawd "נו נוטש טth 5רן טSWE Call manifesto Wa 1975, preceding bi Ilost and prestori form ofan Open le Gustav Histik. I complicated intell
Hal Wel Star lel l ing it was whic body behave as society were unite it was sliding more dangerous recent history. T Wis the Testul L 3 cal confor Illity, Was Spent on flod ind Consun in 1 diwid tua 15, 105L their identity.
Bllt Ever i II 1' optimistic. Life C for long periods, stopped To Tever. wing of the opp I E hic cld kahit LeT. LI LT. The 1968 TITLE”" hili TC ble : but the hulliliati Wei Would lead

* thile STF il d. (A) To enty of Grc:1ter 1 includes all :s, principally by III y "Exit (B) Encourage lencies in India, "0Winicial linguL1S. (C) Li T 1 1 1 Libe twenty of It but war Ting je de Ilocratic STF Forces for l, and which 's drea when India to bring irst mam-made:
(33 שrrgיץ ווי
La Int fetul re CF
With a hypove Tegime, but rt of post-revo
} which II w try. His politis dated April 8 10 years glaasKal. It is ok Hic Etter to Presid: IL t is couched in lect1lal language.
is letter by say. h made everyIF (Czech swak d, when ill fact into a crisis than any in its is test I" f such superfiwhere energy chasing scarce er goods, and the sense of
975, Häwel was Ian be repressed le said, b) LI L Illot The silent stri*es stil Wroլյld in hic p () W Cr struc
fח LחEוון טנn ** paid for dearly, hil Wici FC]] - to a still grea
ter explosion brought Havel to the castle.
CTe du estion re mains una Il s
yerted. Wi 11 H:ıyıcı :ılıd those who follow his Ieall be ab lc to replace the lopsided economic
structure of Czechoslovak industry with one nore in ha Trinony with the country's resources Will they bc ab lc to terminate Czechoslovakia's counter-prodlictive collmänd ecCoIICoIII lics by freeing market forces and the ski 11ş fını d in w:Intiye Tilless of the people?
The movement unleashed by Havel reminds One of Masaryk's
Castle Group" - which did much for Czech arts in the inter-war period, but left the economy and politics at the
mercy of politicians and bankers. One hopes history will not be repeated.
A Dua II. . .
f(ரirl frரா :
German socialist Tulio wement plus the difficult tisk to eitch El East West cooperation of Soci a lists weaker 15 I this in [Y Wici 11 c [ht and strengthens the illrefldy very strong position of those who use all their political and economic power to make Germany one big capitalist state labeled
is 4 + fTee" " or "* social märket economy'. What is needed in West 11ld in East Germany now is al growing awal Tcl css thal the social and economic system of the West has failed as Illuch as the East GT in El Il system did. There is today a historic change to leārī frim
the 11 is takes of byth Germ1:41, states and to create a new just and democratic society. But Will the Germans take this chince? We will see. Few people liticipated the dramatic changes in the East. Maybe we Will all be surprised by fundamental changes in the West. The in e cd for such changes is obvious both For the children of Marx and of Coca Cola.
25

Page 28
Challenging orthodox development theory
Saman Kelegam a
s is ofte In the case, i collec - A tion of essays a rising from conferences I projects (in this case a U. N. U. project) results in a mixed bag, and this bick is no exception to this common rule. 'T're Chalerige ir South Asia" 15 Hп ambiti aus book. It is a collectic II of 15 e 55:llys which seek to discuss the crisis, ecomic as well as political, that South Asia is fai cing four clc cld cs after the e Ill of the colonial period and which appears to theater 5 Imic if the existing state structure and the very fabTic of it 5 socicty. The editors identify 1) the failure of the approach to economic development adopted in the post-colonial period, 2) thic inability of the highly centralized structure of political power to give effective political representation to all strata in society, and 3) growing pola Tiziation of Society a long cth Inic, religious or linguistic lies and under mining of social Wallie 5 a5 the IThaill il terrelated di Illesið 15 of the SQL thi Asi: T1 crisis. These di Incisions are then placed in the perspective of the potential South Asia in terms of Development Democracy and Regional Cooperation,
The essays depict the thinking of South Asian academics will () are attempting to break out of the co II WeItili Ell i cicll 55 ical fi Ild Marxist paradigms of thought and action '' which are It by the Ilselves sufficient for an understanding of South Asian reality in all its richness and variety" (p. 10). The book is divided into two parts. In the first pa Tt, chapters 1 to 3, Te
ÊX 3,Illine the exi; development a II propo 5c ;in alteI which Lakes pc. growth as the In the same pari discuss country PCIllic devel. Lo highlight th alternative app theme of this pi lopment has bet thuis a new kin new kind of pr: tial for econom in South Asia.
11 the first chi attempts a meth tique of the cili approaches to di proposes a dia lcc; lopment and cre the people. Hicri Subject not thc lopment. Devel Els sinult Hinc Coll 5 "botto In up pr approach which cipatory Action cliphasizes the process of brij creative potenti: in particular th Oppressed at the This new appro; its basic fra In concepts of Sarw dhaya involves tionı altı d conscie (a) aware Thess cri political action in order to pi knowledge in I:lt LTC, i Titi |
Although it micro-level it has much
The Challenge in South Asia, Develop Democracy and Regional Cooperation, by Pon na Wig naraja and Akmal Hu published by SAGE, New Delhi, India as United Nations University, Tokyo, 360 p.
26

Sting concept of ld attempt to "Initive approach ple rather than starting point. l, chapters 4 to 7 experiences in pment in order e Iced for a II Toach. Cetal 1rt is th3 t de We.- under Illined, d of theory and ictice 3āre esse. Ilic dewelopment
apter, Wigma raja 1 Codological ciriTreinto do min al Int evelopment and tic between dieveative energics of : people are the bject of deveорпment is seeп "top down' and CeSS. The Ille w is called PartiResearch (PAR) alt te T. It is : ging about the all of the people, Le poor and the 2 grassroot level. ach which draws eWork froll the odaya aid Altosocial IllibilizaDitization through 2ation, (b) socioand (c) research *Oduce Scientific har II10ny with }eople's grouբs.
is essentially El 2pment strategy il fille Ilce at the
The It Edited IS Sain, Tig
Hga5.
BOOK REVIEW
macro-level. Wignaraja explaims this along the following lines, "If the grassroot organizations were linked across space and sustained each other through exchange of ideas, they could contribute to til e evcin tillal e Energe Il Ce lot JLIST of a new coscious Iness blut El 115w kind f :l ståle SLT1CllITE Within such al 5:tt: SLI'll Cllu TE, decentralization of power and mass participation in economic social decision-making nould become a real possibility' (p. 56). However, Wignaraja admits that 1 + it is dificult for such self-Ticlia Tit process to take place sponta neous ly. ... Catalytic intervent1on Is Il Circ Costen than Tit EL I FCC:ssal. Ty initial imput...' (p. 57). QIl the
whole, the attempt mille by Wignaraja is praiseworthy, but . . . some of these need to
be further clarified in specific environments through further experiments" (p. 58) if PAR is to make a significant impact as an alternative development strategy in the academic World.
In the second chapter, Seth takes up the issuc of catalyzing Ilm alticIIIa tiwe development St Taltegy, and argues that such a strategy would be confined only to international academic clubs and commissions if there isn't a political dimension to it. Seth points out that most of the prevailing alternative development strategies at the grassroot level have failed to Take a major inpact because they are a political and thus hawe beet) subjected to official government policy. It is forgotten that without political process the people cannot be sold any idea even if it may logically further their own good and interest (p.66). Thus, Seth argues that a theory of alternative de wel opIllent should start froll a value premise and spell out its alternative politics. Participalive, selfIlmanaged, dccentralized dem talcratic policy is suggested as the political framework for alternative development. But how t. achieve this is the cricial question. The provision of a few examples, such as the progress of Green Parties in Europe, to explain this 'how' would have

Page 29
been worthwhile. However, Seth's Colt Tiboll tio Il to the bok is idi;- pensable.
Shiva provides an illurninating critique of Illodern science and technology in the third chapter. A useful critique of Rostows stages of growth theory and thc (GTc en Revolution is als } provided. The important of natural resources and ecological balance has bee II e Imphasized and inter alfa, the importance of the Chipko movement in India has been discussed, Shiva's discussion of alternative development straltegies is weak and one wonders whether she is speaking about a romantic return to traditional tcchinology. Thus the discussion leaves us with the "choice of development model' and this becomes clear when she says, " .... Wisdom and times tested experience lies the only hope for growth alternative science that eIlsure SlIrvival inste:ld of th reatening it’’ (p. 87).
From the overall perspective of these thпеe chapters one feels that given the embryonic and dispersed character of these alLernative strategies it would be LInwist, intle td unreasonable, to as su E11 e that the challenges th cy pose Lo Imainstream development theory and practice would be decisive or that thic success of the transformative projects they are engaged in, is assured. For either to happen, a macro theory for transformative political action, which is based On the Values and practice of democracy and which has synthesizing potentials for integrating perspectives and actions of wa Tills issue-based movements in a larget framework of tTal Insforillaltic F1, is Tequired. However, the current global thinking om alternative development falls short of this basic expectation.
In thc: country cal se (chapters 4 to 7). shows that all development strategies that were implemented in India since independence have failed to alleviate poverty. Lakshman ẽXã Till Thes the Sri Lankan experience with special reference to the post-1977 period lld shows the fail Lure "of Stal
studies Sundlaram
biliz? :L tipI ağıl cics (reco III1In IMF/World Bar sustainable grow Het goes On to) post-1977 liber W:15 Slista II ei t dependence on f than by mark important Lre: Ian his left of 'supply-side cxport-lcxi dcvc place. The IM] Balık 355 LI TIL LI cxist il South itely, this is r Illirkct forces : to develop th
Ct5. Hashemi i Ild
on these sup whicil he discus tTial Sector
"Bangladesh la 1 colus capitalist * For most par distinction.. b capital and in (p. 58). His an lici is excellen! "...foreign aid, . il self-sust: i lil cess in Bangl
ited dependence
has created the ill Banglades consultants, co relucrats, t shaf: a comin) As long its th natics the econd of Tcducing aid indeed limited' the post-1977 e foreign lid in Lakshman has is very simi Bangladesh.
Hussaill show of high econcil Pakistan, povert regional dispari payment proble aid dependence to noteworthy
linic structure al Id u Illblic i improve the ec ons of the por the Society and regions of the c 81). Pakistan r a period over t

Adjustinent poliended by th k) to bring about th with cquity. argue how the älized cconomy through massive *oreign aiqli rather et forces. One which LiiksIt is the lick Tägt. Ts' for i 1 lopment to takc F i Lh: Wiki h; L these factors A5ił, LIFOILIIIki, it thıc c::Şci il Tid 11 ole ääre II ble osc supply-side
focuses ply-side factors ses the indusin Bangladesh.
irectly
cked an indigeclass' (p. 157). the Te is little
ętW cel TIETch: Ilt dustrial capital'' Elysis of foreign | where he 5:1ys, far frem creating g i Industriål proEl desh, has crealOil aid... Aid T1čW Tich cl El SE El (indentors, TITEL CLOTS, buraders) Wի () In social milieu... is group domiIlly, the chances dependence is (p. 56) In fact, Xperience with Sri Linki, as lucidly show II, ar to that of
S that in spite lic growth in y, Tlalnutrition, ty, balance-ofms and foreign have increased ewels. The ecois both fragile to significantly ) El C3 I Illic ÇOldtiI Ter scctions Of the backward :ountry" (p. 180nay be entering lhe next decade
whicn it may be faced with grim choice of stagnation in per capita incomes or vc Ty high debt service burdens' (p.185). Although the essay clearly ex. poses what is behind the veil of growth in Pakistan there is less interpretation compared to
the Ilumber of tables that has
been included at the end.
These country studies are
competent, aIld Schme are ex
cellent in certain areas, But at the cnd of the day one is left Wondering whether they have really persuaded us that, with a pinch of political Will, we can make a transition to an legalitarian economic system with si usta inable growth. It is not clear what role these authors El dvocate for the market vis a-vis the state and the country studies are essentially critiques of the existing develop. ment strategics. Further, for some author's economic developme Lins entīrely in domestic factors and their Organizations. In sum, alternative development strategies have not been clearly spelt out. At best. such treatment remains SLI perficial and there is no link to the alternative development strategies outlined in the first three chapters.
Part II of the book is on 'Regime Dynamics and Regional Cooperation'. Regime dynamics include aspects of politics and culture. The former is discussed in chapters 8 to 10 While the latter is discussed in ch El ple:ITS II to 13. The last Wo chapters are on Regional Cooperation. The central heme if this part is that although South Asian history and politics have been marked by violent explosions and communal conflicts there is a civilization consciousness among diverse comIn unities that can constitute a framework within which diverse communities can develop in Creative interaction Witli I1 stable states and different states can come together in regional CCPerEl III.
The first four papers (chapters 8 to 10) in this part by Hussain, Gunasinghe, Sivathamby and Sethi highlight thic crisis
27

Page 30
سية
Why there's so in this rustict
There is laughter and light after artingst these rural dari sels who ate busy sarting out tobacca leaf in a barn. It is one of the hurdreds of such
Earls spread out in the Tid and upcountry LLLLaLltLu LLLLL LHHLCLL LLLL LLLL LLLLL LHHLHLS fallow curing the Jf seasDn.
llcre, with careful II arturing tobacco grows as a LLLLLLLEa EElLLL LLLLCCH HHLLLLL LLL LLL LLtaaE0 LLLLL LL gik. to the value af over Rs, 250 Tillion Ormore 1 milially, Jr. perhilp: 143, XXI Liral folk,
 

ENRCHINGRURAL LIFESTYLE
und oflaughter obacco barn.
Tobacco is the industry that brings employment to the second highest number of people. And these piccole: Fars: the tobacco barri cywilers, the tobacco aLLaaLLLL LLLL LLLLLLL gLLLHu LHHLLLLLLL LLL LLLeTS aHHHH LL LLLL and in the taris.
For their, the Igbacco leaf means meaningful work, - ci infurtable life and a seruri: futuri. A good grough Teason for laughter,
Ceylon Tobacco Co. Ltd.
Sharing and caring for our land and her people.

Page 31
Sri Lanka in the ancient day
for trade and commerce. Its
ensured this.
in the ancient days Sri Lanka
Tambapanni, Taprobane, Palisim
Seren dip, Ceylan, Ceylon etc.
Today our country is at cros record the present political at of the country. Bank of Cey barking history and today wi Praja Naya Niyamaka Scheme
is breaking new ground.
We are part of Sl i Lanka's e
we create history.
BANK Ol
Bankers to
 

Was a Centre
strategic location
was called Raakshashadvipa,
| undu, Tenarsim, Senkiyalo,
S roads. Our journals nd economic history
vlon 50 years ago created
th its new schemes like
and Janasaviya Credit Scheme
conomic history and
F CEYLON
the Vation.