Page 1
EXCLUSIVE E KAR MARX LANKA
Vol. 13 No. 1 May 1, 1990 Price Rs. 7.50
54 infantry - vo Division.
PKF ORDER
PKF: DIS0RDE
K. SUBRAMANYAM
JAMES PRNGLE F
MERVYN
ROMESH NENON S
Dayan Jaya tilleke 04 Paul Gaspersz on
ak H. L. D. Mahindapala
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

t
ON EUROPE TODAY O
- Martin Jacques
OF EALs
PUNYAPRIYA DASGUPTA
EEMA GUHA
* Shelagh Gunawardena

Page 2
A selected list of
Sri Lanka Mosaic - Environment, ma
and change HWC S/C
Seasonality and Health: A Study of
environment Of ill-health in five by Godfrey Guna tilleke, P. D. A. Fernando, Eardley Fernando
A Colonial Administrative System in
by Dr. B. S. Wijeweera
Sepala Elkarnayake and Ex Post, Facto Hijacking Cof International Aircraf Sri Lanka Domestic Law incorpo |Internati Oha | La W by David S. Awerbuck
The Pilgrim Kamanita - A Legendary
by Karl Gjell erup
StOrie:S from the Maha wamsa
by Luciem de Zo'y sa
Stories from the Cu lawam sa and oth
Tales by Lucien de Zo y sa
Conservation Farming - Systems. Tet
Tools (For small farmers in the by Ray Wijewardene & Parakrama
Marga
61 || sipat hama Colombo 5,

Marga Publications
n, continuity
the socio-economic
|OCEtions
Perera, Joel
Transition
) Legislation:
T8 t C5
* FROTha Ce
er Historica
: nidues and Humid Tropics) . WW ai dy antha
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1 OOO 185. OC)
6.OO 16O.OO
4.OO 90. OC)
17.50 225 OC)
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Publications
Ma Watha Sri Lanka.

Page 3
TRENDS
TENDER SPOT
All tenders awarded in future will be published, the Government has announced. The name of the successful tenderer, the local agent and the amount, will all be disclosed Cabinet spokesman Ranjan Wijeratne told the media at his Weekly news brief
ing.
A string of recently aw arded tenders were dis closed at the briefing.
FOOD FIRST
An ART survey has re| vealed that Sri Lankans spend more than half their total household expenses on food; while there has also been a decline in the level of food consumption due to an increase in pri
C 65.
The highest proportion of food expenditure is on rice. And urban dwellers spend more on bread than the rural sector does.
ATTENTION YOUTH
Political parties attending the All Party Conference decided by Consensus that local government election laws should be changed to allow adequate youth and ethnic representation. Youth is to be defined as tOS e in the age grOLU) 18-35. They also decided that the cut off point of 12 per cent (in Wotes re ceived by a political party) should be removed.
BRIEF
EVERGENC
President F repealed sewer regulations in Cl quisition of pro and personal ban om politica als 0 ) een rem O. of the police lating to public Continu tt) a po
A Gowere said that it W of the Gower the Emerg Bn Cy Soon as pissib Security ope suspected Sub been haltad, : appeal to thos: Surrender to as Surrender COTIT mittee of no Ti recognised par appointed,
SAARC S
India's For In der Kumăr Gİ Er tat India v with any decis SAARC yël Le
Pakistan (the
person), Mald Lanka. 'It is
SOrt Out this go by Whate, they arrive at" të Foreign në |ings at a rool a five star
LAREA
W. 13 No. 1
Pric B R
PHished f
Lanka Guardin P
No. 246,
COTE
Edilor: Neru Telephon

, Y. . .
Y RELAXED
or Erha da sa has al ErT1ցrgEncy uding the reperty, Wehicles services. The teetings has ved; provisions Ordina II Ce re= : meetings will .lyב t Communique was the desire ment to lift altogether as |E. rations against versiwes ha WE along with a 3 in hiding to "Independent litt 33". A CCIlegs from all ties has been
UMWT
eign Minister ujra | told Reutwould go altung iom about the arrivad ät by Current chairiwas and Sri for (them) to mattar; we will If I COISET 5 LIJS
he said, tionals gambF top Casino in
Werò ha u led a Way and locked up by the police in a SUddam SWO op. Ninety-eight people were in the net, including foreign Women and other hotel guests,
A II bout five foraig Women were released on police bail, after questioning. Those detaim ad Were belia W3Cd to E) E Thai nationals; found without wisas, police Said.
Pice Claint :50 häd no walid licence to operate,
and was also illegally eploying foreign women. The Tlatte is do WW before the Courts.
WOO MISHME
A moonshine distillery has been found in a luxury Colombo residence, formerly CCcupied by a Western diplomat, It is the largest and the most sophisticated of the illicit liquor factories discovered to date, producing 10,000 bottles of fake arrack per day. A | arge stock of forged labels was also found,
TAX DODGERS
g The state loses Rs. 15 billion by tax evasion and a further Rs. 1.2 billion in
accumulated un paid taxes 9Wery year, a media Conference Wäs told. "It i5 TC) TE POTOfitable for people to delay tax payments and in West that money and later pay the low penalties levied by the department', the CommissionerGeneral of land Revenue,
olombo hotel Mr. T. Ratasundaram said.
CONTENTS DAN News Background 3.
IPKF Pui Out and the May 1, 1990 Return of the Tigers
Conflict — A Socia | DmC: TH til: is 7.5 Perspective 21 Marx liter wie 25 rtnightly by The Changes in Europe 'Lublishing Co.Ltd. and the Third World 27
Political Biography 3.
піоп Plat:в, .2 = םנ
"yn de Silwria c. 547.584
Printed by Ananda Press E2/5, Sri Ratnajothi Sara Wamam Littlu Mawatha, Colomb). 13.
Telephong; 435975

Page 4
Letter Ethnic
was flabbergasted with the conclusion of Izeth HusSain's thesis that "the Tamil Nadu and Sri Lankan Tamils # Te distinct ethnic groups" (LG. March 15). According to the Encyclopedia Americara (1989, Vol. 10), ethnic groups a Te “distinguished by common cultural and frequently racial characLcristics. They also hawe a sẽn se of group identity and the larger culture within which they live recognizes them as a distinct aggregation'.
Ashely Montagus 1964 definition cof an cthnic group states that, 'it represents The of a number of populations, comprising the single species Horio sapiens, which individually maintain their differences, physical and cultural, by means of is olating mechanisms such as geographic and social barriers. These differences will vary as the power of the geographic and social barriers acting upon the original genetic differences varies'. (Current Anthropology,
Vol. 5, p. 317)
identity of
Tamils
In this cort Nadlı and Sri belong to th (Dravidian) g speak tl e sa II it is ridicul that they are groups’. Tam and Malayala the Kerala sti legitimatic d groups, since it belonging to vidia II race) the Tamils a due to geograp developed their
Hussalin is Telati Ing to th MGR to the conflict (LG, ignorantly wr Tamil Nadu go ever raised in the fighting, prospcct that Prabakhara Il T till Ted T kille pical T to distLII least, while led a protest in Feb. 1988, ganized a fast II arch from M yaiku mari in N
No call up charde within city limit5 " Wehicle ac
"...Receipts issued on request ' Company credit ava Ca|| 5D1BD2 501 503 or
Another Aitken Spence
2
 
 

eXL, bith Tallil Lanka Il Tallis !!! - Si mc racia! Tups : Find thıcy Le language. So, K L L S ĦI ELS ET "distinct ethnic il Nadu Tamils In speakers in Le CT Indial. Te istinct ethnic he latter (though the GFL IIIe Drilsep: rated from millenium ago, hic bol Tric T5 till I (?:wn language, Els i Il crTor. |e response of IPKF – LTTE March II). He ites hall the }'er 11111ent hf.) wCI Protest over and twen the MG R's protege night be capd did not apbi hii II il the ""Karu IllIlidhi de IL1 CbInstration as well as orand a protest [adras to KanMarch 1988"".
Since he died con Dec. 24, 1987, MGR should hawe arisen from the grave to counter Ka, Tumanı idhi's demon strational politicking. Further Iuno Te, in Feb. 1988, Tamil Nadu was under President's rule and til Ct under MG Ross contral. Contrary to what has been WTitten by Hussain, MGR was in close contact with LTTE cadre, until he died, Salamat Ali wrote in the Far Easter Ecoloric Review (Feb. 4, 1988) that until MGR's death, the LTTE's speed boats used to shuttle between Tamil Nadu and Jaffna's northern coast with impunity almost every night'. Following MGR's death, J. R. Jayewardene cockily predicted the demise of LTTE. The Tirre (Jan. II. 1988) reported that, "he (Jayewardene) is confident that the 35,000 Indian troops will soon finish" the Tigers, Well we know noW, that was another prediction of JRJ which went WTC) Tg.
Sachi Sri Kanthi
Philadelphia U.S.A.
Jr (JOro (ET)
:ess fr o rT i elected ; tämys,
|a Elf.
501 504
: Ser VI Ce

Page 5
IPKF quits but diplomacy cont
Mervyn de Silva
cautiful Kash Illir is worth
fighting for, said Mahatma Gandhi i In a histori. I lessage to the nation in 1947. Though thic aesthetic principle has been rarely invoked to justify the use of foTce, K. SubTäma Ilya m, the former Director of the Indian Institute of Defence Studies and
Analyses, does rely on the "ap
ostle of non-violence' to defend the military interwention in Sri Lanka. (See Subra many am: the IPKF Expedition was the Right Choice) While thic authority cited, the Mahatmi, is unipeachable, it is I suspect the example, Kashmir, the Writer has so shrewdly chosen, which геally clinches the argu пепt – LLLLLL LLLLLJ L LLLL HaaLLLH HLLLLLS LSLLLLS Init, the first intervention of the new independent State of India, is right now the focus Of Ilitional alte Illin a Ild alxiety. -
The Indian Foreign Minister, MT, I. K. Gujral, has announced that there will no more Indian military interwentions any Where for any reason. Mr. Subra manya. In rejects that, and I believe he is right, when he War Ins:
""Let Luis II t - TLIsh to the C01clusion that this is the last of our foreign interventions. Let us hope and pray that it should be so though one doubts whether the aLHLL S LLCS S CHLL S SHHH SS L LLLLa Sri Lankan ibro gli and India would not be involved again nt all. By all means let us decide that we shall think i Lilly til Illes in Tuiti te before Seiding CALIT firces into a foreign country even at their invitation
Sulbart II13 mylił II is a reallist. In his contribution to 'India and its Neighbours', he accepts, perhaps welcomes all too readily, that "coercive diplomacy has
low corne to d tilläl i Tell til: “coercive diplo has practised W lating success
wards. (Thc II a CCIW ential was a military als U a majar Nel TLI-Mel II bhai diplomacy exception to thi Bhutan, Nepal, Pakistan (Bangl - all are exam lo Imacy” which instrul Ille Tit 5 :lv:Lil State, particula Lihat Hills :: ; owed lihat it is I 11 i Illa Ilit p (3 wyer, ETits i Tyclude frie à55orted forms
OImltic, e CCLCI overtly military Inted that Ilt ways been use ta' im, the Lleighb un equill Imilitar W Els persu Lidcd datted line, H supervision of Hind Sikki mı y'; into the India ties and "Acc ised The Tetrar. accretico II of p) { vitati * h S 1 Welt 10In',
C) e la 5 HC close look at t:ition". This päris betwethe Maldives. buy the "plot.-P. theory (that is, Maheswaran's Il ies to stage a dives, Litt) a 11 Ebwy y0 11 to i Iwi Le help). I regard illusti Täiti II of til I1. No se i

coercive
inues
011 i 11:1 te interlias". It is this nacy' that India ith such sciiti-ןrט 1947 וחטIT ldia-China War, clish of a rills, defeat that was setback for the indi-Chi Ili blao indi i Ilútable a "coercive rule). Goa, Sikkim, El desh) Sri Lankai ples of this "dipemployed all the ble to a nationrly to a State () naturally endthe region's doThese is trullndly persuasion, of pressure, diplic, բllysical and ... I should be military has ald H gainst Pakis8) ur that is least ily, while Bhutan t) sign on the ccepting ITiian foreign policy ls inciporated =Triggi - הן נון חLJ נן ords' halve legalis of victory, the 3 weet, while ""i legitimisel "i II te T
wever to take a the Le IIII loi Ilyiin Wites a collSri Lanka and Since I til et lotel ConspiracyR. A. W. using 1:1 H 11:1"- coup in the MalPresident GayIndian milit Hry it as a perfect benign interven
Sri Llik:Ł.
MAIN MISSION
On Sri La Inka, the inter" Wention-by-invitation is fila WedbeCluse the Invitation Wils 1 blitallt use of coerci w c diplomacy, Thc in wita, tio In card, printed in India, was air-dropped along with the food parcels and the mcdical supplies by Indian military aircraft, a fra grant in wasico I) of Sri Lankall airspace. The card i WS, e Inclosed i II : " “TetLIITTIto-sender' envelope on which was written R. Gandhi, Delhi, India. President R's respo I se therefore was not of his own frce will. An invitation at guilt point is no invitation,
Ewell that Would nyt have proved a major problem for Delhi policy-makers and Indian opinion IF the Illilitary interwention fulfilled its Illain mission. What was that? It was forminer High Commission er Mani Dixit, a key figure in the preAccord drama, who defined it as a necessary projection of Indian powyer" to dem constrate to Incighbolu Ts tha t they TThu1st T1 ot pertT1it their foreign policies to Linderline Indian security interests. That was the primary objective. The Other was to control El Ind contain the Tamil secessiliat LHHKKaa aS SL SL S LLLLL LL S LLLLLLaaa aaaL Tousic passic). Ils ill Til ImilmädlI. the original a rena of past-independence linguistic nationalist agitation in India. In Past åges, a Trgu cd Dixit, it was not from the In corth = thic Hirila layias Were S LLLHHLLLLLLL LLLLLLL S LLLLL LLL0LLLLLLK foreign forces had entered India. but from the sea, the India II Ocean. (This was also the source of the Illim ob 5555 JIl | lblut Trincomalec and foreign naval
presence in this area),

Page 6
In that Sense, the India II i IlTerest. In the Sri Lanka. In Tail 11 com II unity, its grievances, its politics and I'll codes of struggle, was ALSO a national security CCTC er 1. Sri Lalkan Tamil Separatism, especially its a TIned wanguard, represented a threat Lc nitional ch c5io II, a di inger to the India) polity. Indira Ganhi'5 Fears in Short were Ii different fra Ill Leonid Brezhney's apprehensions about the Islamic resurgence in Iran ind a fullIle Italist fall-out which Would foment Teligious disconteilt and
TewL. Il the Sowie UniCIl's Mosell periphery. (Recent spread of violence in Azer
baijan is a tribute to his foresight although the Muslim factor may not have been the only Teason for full-sc:: le Soviet inter vention in Afghanistan).
INDIAN SECURITY
In al II y case, the mail Ill:10 tiWiitional factor in the cercive diplo Incy that led logically tö physical i Il ter wentio il Was India II security, It Tallilspirātils a! Tı d "Tanını il salfety and security". Mrs. Il diri (Galdhli i Instruccid R.A.W. to train the Tigers' and equip them so that Delhi could coerce Sri Lanka to grant Delhi's foreign policy - demandis, alıd cırıcede deyil Lition - Hind Tegional auto II'ı ony tçı the Tamils, The latter exercisc would bring
ܬܐ .
political Te Wards satisfy the basic the Tilli1 coln Il fuse tensions allowing Delhi refugees.
Indian diplomac: skilled to give pr TElIIli liiLISe T:1 Elli strategic interest gthened its moral international Co IT mr possible exceptio aid 34 Tılıb Tic LTı ll { CHı il alı, thıc IIndi: (not inter wention Id) u riced. It Wals and appreciated West, and the S of col Tsic thile N
Mrs. GaInd hi's allow R. A. W. Lf:1ỉ groups was alst priorities, espec became clear th: Were increl singl of thic LTTE, pe start a bloody | Malhattaya’s expl interview with th fore ring trut: - independent". TI had to remain li din policy. T tg () '''independen picked by the I. cirilla Ilder, What why the LTTE 5idct Prell di
For Richardin remembrance
I would like to said To my dear dead friend, A Wreath of red roses
Since thaw Cannot now En Circle his bro W Deep beneath
Red
On a luminous stage,
To rast gantly on his grawa,
roses for r Emernbran CB Of times past, when life was but a play Of splendid soaring moments
the enfolding earth.
Which gave forth tremors, intimations (t seemed then) of .immortality.

for thic LTTE, aspirations Of unity, and deil Tamilin adlu, o repatriate the
was sufficiently Die to the t t the 5ic Lt. 5 tTel
position in the unity. With the in of Pakistan, ed but critical HLטוח שעיiנt"יון 1 הן ) was not de
understood" by both the civiet bloc, and Il lignedl -bloc,
reali ess to I til CT militant an index of ially when it ut these groups ficruce rivälls rfectly. Tehdy to rat Tici di
 yw:LIT. allation in his is WTCT EET :- - Wa Nye Tie to he armed groups
plia Vint tools of le LTTE Was t", - the Word TTE's military in he explained tuТTed to Presa Most Sri
Lankans have forgotten that Prabhalika Tan began to talk about "India's geo-political interests' prevailing Over “Tamil aspirations' after the Indians failed to persuade the LTTE to lay down arm5. Prabhakaram had then read the fine print of the "Exchange of Letters' that accompanied the the Gandhi-JR Peace Accord" and understood Indian prioritics.
How does a nation, paricularly a 'regional superpower', project its authority over neighbours' The simple answer is that is must successfully impose its Will, in Sri Lanka's case, on the Jayawardene regime that
signed the pact and its successors, : n.d on the Tamil militants, Delhi failed to do
both Far from imposing its will,
Delhi found Mr. Jayawardena's successor virtually ordering the IPKF out. Rajiv, the co-author
of the Pact, resisted. But President Prema dasa did not back down or yield,
In fact, he stuck to the letter
and spirit of the Accord. The IPKF is here at the will and leasure of the Sri Lankan President whose orders it must follo W. That wils JR's understanding.
India also failed to get the
LTTE to do its bidding. While many of the anti-LTTE groups
(Cr r ஒ: தி)
But the the spian's fire, The poet's searching song,
defect those fata|| The bullets of a faceless cowardly attack Mada in tha darkness HB for B dawn. A assä sisiration so un mēri tad That angels Weep And the sea, in anger, Deli wered up the dead,
Could rlot
NO TOrg will that lithg for IT and questing spirit move gracefully To play his part in our theatre in-the-round. He lightly sped his brief passage From our tradisiert rewels To assure a role he newer sought Upon a nation's stage, A martyr's death, a hero's image,
Shellagh GO OnewVardele
blows:
Melbourma, Australia.

Page 7
LAWDMINE WAR (Part 3)
Hameed on the high
he JWP leadership has been deciliated, JWP's back broken as a lilitary organisation. The IPKIF didn't lose a single soldier to the JWP but its presence in Sri Lankan soil gave the deshal pre Illi a tre II1 en dous biciclist. has left the island after 32 попth5. President Prema dasa who finally gawe the Armed Forces the "green light to go for the JWP while simultilicously negotiating the IPKF's pullout timetable with a far more understanding W. P. Singh government, can claim two extraordinary WicLOries.
The til i War" i Sri La Ilka's Several, multi-faceted political-Illilitary conflicts, is also the coldest — thic Eela T1 Jr Tigcr war. The LTTE is talking to the President hawi Ing agreed to a cessation of hostilities with the Sri Lanka Army - a diplomatic move than a military triumph; half a victory in what is also a high-risk, probably very dangerous venture,
Judging each element in a tangled situation correctly, the LTTE leadership has played the game with exceptional skill, For
well coyer a decade, al In eiti Te Tamil generation has fought, died or lived in the jungle.
A Id that mea Tis that the awer - age Jaffna family has gone from war to war, knowing little peace, enjoying no physical or economic security. So much Sơ, th[]tl
sands of familics hawe found refuge somewhere, legally or i lle gally.
Few communities have survived such hardships for so long a period. Since every Tamil is not a militant, Il cor ewery youth a "Tiger' the pressure for peace, or at least a respite from endless wat T 5, Illust be extremely strong. The LTTE must know that; must surely feel that. It is a glucrrilla ar lly. And much more than regular armies, the guerrilla cannot alienate the people. The fish cannot drain the water in which it survived and swam quite freely. The people of the peninsula, the
Tamil heartlılık LTTE, as the its bitter cost.
The people . the "Tiger' nce But not at any
Delhi's Game
Working the c to say, the LT ed a converge I however Le Tıp Cor; President and its pullout. By Cire e i TNA, ad EPRLE-ENDLF dia Il policy-Ilmal! Lingly, c{IT1pelle re-- think t:ictic5
Litude to CCl Sri Lanka ATII the Tiger Hig understood wh: his ilI viity | dics Tibed as "II EPRLF-EN I OLF. "cilts f This 5 caled the c c, however tc LTTE-UNP.
The CWF, t the IC5L, were bct L. Laid wated and Illuch And the the pull-out.
In war, Tegul tional, the dici down of weap וא tוןeוון טוון שth dwn arms di surrcinder, if th OT l{15e T. NOT handing Over Tisi i5 - I LI An essential p lution exercise security' of th provincial polic what powers' gra tel into 5 TLC tLTE: AT ent of Police area cominand: vise police si El TF Cill Tie:5. Wii weapon? And LTTE's heavy illery pieccs, v police forces,

wire
l, stood by the
TIPKF TIL
:Tave for peace, d5, a breat Eller.
pTICe,
Il tridictio 1S 5) TE quickly SpotCe of inte Tests, alry, between the F - the IPKF's ati Ing a so-callby 1 sing the as proxies, Inke T5 had, 11 Im Wit: Te LTTE t
The LTTE" IIlbo sind to the y changed Once 1 Cab Iim ma I d lhalidi ıt M1 hattaya il with the LG had dia's game". The had becCIIle the IIl gia's R.A. W. working allianImporary, of the
C ENDLF and levou Ted by the
fLT 13T e Illo Litougher "Tigers'. IPKF began the
| T | CI TA' 1 - ision in laying Ils is Of course f truth. To lay Y:5 IIIL II :: Il il eTie is I10 Wil Iller des it ITle:AI) ALL Weapons. Il usuall situll tion. art of the dewis "Safety : Tı d Le Tal IIiiiils li, e., a
force. But with HW is it illeHı: Sri La Ilka 1
aDInil slı1 perirntend(a former LTTE ar") would super:atic Is tha L hawe th what type of
Whal of the weapons, the artwhich armies, not Liced
NEWS BACKGROUND
In the ed, it is a question of trust. The LTTE, and is ced all Tamil parties, do not trust Colombo, this or any other adIlililist Titi II.
(Cred Tr Page it)
IPKF quits. . .
I CρηΓίΤίει ται μια με 4 bocca Ille Ellies and i gents of the IPKF, the LTTE took in the India. In ari Iny, which som found that it hi d a lieilated the Tall II lil people who had greeted it as aLLLL S aEEtaaS LC LtttLL S LH LLL ground as well as in the sphere of Indo-Sri La Inkam relatius, D chi's policy has collapsed. It wä15 left For Pri Ilic Minist: T W. P. Singh it recognise this flict :: Ill TC-II. Cg3 tilte i ti IICs table for a final pullout. In the T W J Tids, a honou Table exit, having lost 1,200 lives, with 3000 wounded. Nobody has so far given a Teliable figure on the billions spent.
Wille Te dic5 that leave Sri Lanka, the government and the Tal I Imil militants, the “Tigers' II 1st CTL cial lly.
Embittered Indian policy-makers of the Rajiv era will like nothing better than to see the LTTE and the Sri Lanka army resume their war, With Sinhala opinion in the South ta Trining violently against the Pre Illadas a government. The only question is whether the Te’ll be deliberal te attenipts to seek the vicarious pleasures that a Prema dasa regime under pressure or seige, may offer, Indian intervention may be over but interference may continue. Much of what could happen will depend on the Colombo-LTTE relationship and how the Tigers' behave. 1947 (KASHMIR) to 1987 (Peace Accord) is four decades of coercive diplomacy', including intervention, conducted with a COIs LuI11 ITlate Skill that Imä de the use of force justifiable, even benign and Incoral. That singular a chievement of Indian diplomacy collapsed in the Jaffna and the Wanni jungles.

Page 8
PKF PULLO And the retur
The IPKF expedition not in
K. Subrahmanyam
NEW ELEH
he Indian Peace-keeping
Force (IPKF) is coming back home and we in India are glad to have our force back, Many, especially al Thong the ar med forces, compla in that the politicians, our media and academia have not been fair to the role the men of the IPKF played losing over 1,100 promising young lives. How many of us I e member today how our Illen who came back from Congo (now Zaire) and Bangladesh were received ? We do not even celebrate the day when we helped to liberate the eighth most populous nation in the worldBagn ladesh. The spirit has been Karri II y'e ya Adhikara s fe, Ma Pafashi Kathacharia (Duty is your obligation and not the fruits thereof) and Yaga Karnasty Katstriari (Skill in performance is Yoga) - is proclaimed in the Bagard Gita The apolitical arried forces of India can take this in their stride and count it as one more task assigned by the Ilation fulfilled.
Looking back on the last 32 lonths, was the task of the Indian armed forces in vain Sur cly they did not go for conquest or in pursuit of any imperial aim. They went to ensure that Sri Lanka's unity and integrity were preserved, the Tamil minority was Illot crushed and that the latter got their legitimate rights within a limited Sri Lanka. All these broad objectives have been fullfilled. There was a risk of democracy in Sri Lanka being extinguished, of the Tamil resista nce being eli Tilinated and of the Illajority riding roughshod over the minority. These risks
have been a weer the present. foreign Illinist ledged that but Of the IPKF Tigers of Talli Willd. It haw
Inference tābt TPRXF tHETe , smooth presider men talry electie) Lastly but for th Lankan security have tackled tht Pera muna (JWP)
jpular Lil}ט טTh short and hence pression that wh in Sri Li:Linka yw LISLI I End Hili The western India's new reg and many of thise sentiment the Indian armi in Kata nga in : the unity of C.
1971 we assist Bahini in the Bangladesh. In
quelled the mer in the Maldives. the other two we free operations. India has earn gratitude of Bang They were oper; in Our interest international pea The artiled forc. ried tout the tals them by a dem .tון ים וח
The Tndian art instrumentality State. If after there has not devolution of Tamil provinces LTTE's 5th Id

UT
h of the Tigers
W2
cd, at least for Thnic Sri Lanka ||1 : I has acknowfor the presence Lihat Liberation 1 Eclaim (LTTE) : come to the ... But for the uld have been по tial and parlia1s in Sri Linka. c IPKF, the Sri forces could not : Jii Ialta Wiltılı kiti effectively.
emory is usually L1 cre is an inat the IPKF did as something un
nC) precedence. Press talks of ional power role ur people echo 로, 1m 1960-62 2d forces fought Africa to ensure
ngo (Zaire). In Lled the Mukti liberation of
1988 our forces cenary rebellion Except the last Te not casualtyIt is not as if cd the lasting ldesh and Zaire. titions necessary and those of ce a indi stability. es of Indial ca Tiks assigned to do Cratic gove TI -
1eci forces are Fl. Il of a democratic their sacrifices
been adequate powers to the i and if the * Eela III" i 5 311||
ambiguous those are not the failures of the IPKF but of the politicians in both Sri Lanka and India. Whether the withdrawal of the IPKF at this stage is justified, whether there is going to be peace in Sri Lanka and devolution of powers to the Tamils or whether there will be a regression to the earlier unhappy situation it is not possible to forecast at this Stage.
ALLEGED EXCESSES
As many as 6,000 civilians (nostly Tamils) were estimated to have been killed in the crossfire between the IPKF and the LTTE. Amnesty linternational has issued a report drawing attention to alleged excesses. No wa IT or war-like opcration cam ever be und ertake In On the basis of the standards of Amnesty International. This is not a criticism of Amnesty Internationa but a sober reflection that when a state decides to use force, even in a just War (Dharma Yuddha) collateral da Image and death of innocent people cannot Bbe a Woidcd. Th, cre foTe in the concept of a just War (whether Hindu, Christian or Islamic) there is also the underlying aspect of proportionality in the use of force. Considering the civilian casualtics all of which can It be blamed on the IPKF (the LTTE was responsible for the major portion) and the IPKF men killed in action it is clear to any irnpartial observer that the IPKF did not use dispor portiona te force and had exercised extraordinary restraint. That is not to say there were no excesses at all but given the Ina turc al Ind size of the Copcration such occurrences are, though not justified inevitable.

Page 9
The Only Way excesses could have been totally avoided and Our OWI casualties prevented was not to use force at all. Eminently desirable though the objective may be, we a Te not living in a world where use of violence by the state f both interial and international | Situation 5 ca. Il bc ruled out. The apostle of non
violence, Mahat Ina Gandhi approved of the use of force in Kashillit. For India in 1987 the
alternatives were (i). Lo kcep a 1o of while the Tamil resistice was decimated by the Sri Lankan army, (ii) to allow Sri Lanka to slide into military dictatorship, (iii) to lict Sri Lankan unity be scattered initiating a chain reaction of His scrtion of various sub-nationalist identities, or (iv) C) AC ! As it did. The choice, though In Lidical was the least unsatisfactory alternative. Consider
i Ing thic stake i was not disprop
The test of the IIocratic alled of sobriety and Ill Ocratic govern it is totally wict, is forced into a
1959 LO act in sit lilti as the one post The decision to : : , ITT" [Ct. ) [1: : :i Il IPKF is in the independent Ind Օք :tյլITSը : mլII Were CIllIILLe. assessile 11t, CO. telligence Opera matic-operation Iullber of other wc do Imot halw апаlysing our П ing from them.
old Tigers in new
Coodbye to all that. Thic last 350 Indian soldiers of the 50,000 sent to keep the peace in Sri Lanka left for hơ me to Il March 24th, It was al mela Incholy departure from the north-castern port of Trincommillee. The India. Ils hawe l'OSL 1, 155 men in Sri La Inka, Ilıcast of the Ill killed by the Tail Tiger guerrillas they had cUIIle to the country in 1987 to subdıHe. Few of the Indialı 5 felt inclined to accept the quily side invitation of a Sri Lankai cabinet minister: he said they should return eventually, but as tourists.
The Indians beat thic Tigers, driving the II from their Stronghold in Jaffna into the jungle. The Indian Commander said this Week that his Illel had disarmed the Tigers three times. But political feeling in Sri Lanka changed after the Indians arrived. The governIn ent be calle tired of defending what many Sri Lanka Ins regarded as an army of occupation. When the Tigers offered peace talks on the condition that the Indians left, the government accepted,
Talks have
been going between the
Tigers ald
the
skins
IllcIltfoTחtr'ינg Thc Tigers ha
end to their 1 have formed a the People’s Fr eration Tigers - tio 15. Tille fiTS pected to be f Eastern Provici present council the protection is probably fin its Ilembers hal for their lives Tigers hawe en11 hideo LI L5.
The Tigers' say they will CÖIl trÖ 1 Of th; then negotiate its powers to sh () II Jf the iT a separate State Their fighters v iIlito a provinci they will not : their weapons.
For now, the the north-east zing degree of twee for Iller Lankan army are working si security operat See :Il CEL Tv C-11 P between the ult: of President R.

Wilcd the cost Irtionate.
:: Ill Tale of a deforce or the sense bala lice of al dement is not When rious T when it war als India was
but when it hals H5וון וח טT (Hilיt 5ון ב :d by Sri Länka. act by itself was d the role of the bar:5 t t Taditi ÜTI COf ils il TITied foTCe5. liber of milj:5 t ke 5 1 in intelligence 1 r llimition of in| Lions, in diplo5 Interface and i reas, III Indiä e a traditi Cf istakes and le a TilThat did not hap
pen in the wake of the 1962, 1965 and 1971 operations. One hopes HL least this time the Te will be a learning process. -
We hawe haid a lot of Les Li) I1ing, self-doubts and hand-Wringing on the IPKF operation. All tlıat s hr Ws We are al 5 gober, bill: Ilced, pluralistic and democratic nation-H Ild We Flight to be proud of that. Bu t let LI 5 In Öt Tu1sh1 t ) the conclusion that this is the läst of our foreign interventions. Let us hope and pray that it should be so though onc doubts whether the Curtain has come do Win I): In the Sri Lankan imbr glit) and India would not be involved again at all. By all means let us decide that we shall think many times i Il future befo Te sentling our forces into il foreign country Loven at their invitation,
nearly a year. we dc clared an 7 yacar war and litical party - ont of thc Lib- to CCT LE:5 cl ccLi electio il i 5 cxa new Northal Council. The set up under of the Indians, ished. Many of we fled, fearing
In o W that the erged from their
political leaders win overwhelming ! collu II cil Kılıd ilin exteligio II of
Something just CL1r Te1L 11 T1 Of of Tamil Eela II. v jll be c4. Ilye Titel all police force; lawe to surrendict
re is peace in and an amaco-operation be
foes. The Sri and the Tigers de by 5ide in ions, Some fore
of the country :tive licta torship апаšinghe Prema
da sa in the Sinhalese South and the Tigers' warlord, MT Welupillai Prabhakaran, in the
Tamil-do Illinated north and cast, This they believe, would pro
vide a lasting solution to the ethnic problem within a unitaTy Sri Lanka.
Others disagree. The Tigers' main aim in talking to the go Wcrnm cnlt has becil IC3 persua de it to gct rid of their Indian tormentars. As the presSLIT IS Eee Telice yed, there are signs that the guer
rillas are preparing for a new war against the government. Fresh underground bunkers and military hospitals arc b cing constructed in the jungles. There is 1 new Tecruit Iment drive and heavy taxation of the local Tamil population to pay for the Tigers' re-arma Ilcht.
The Tigers are cocky about seeing off the Indians, ånd the Sri Lakan arily ha 5 bico Inc a Trogant after defeati Ing the anti-govern Illent JWP guerrillas in the south. It might take conly to The Ilhassacre of Silbh:lle se oT T:a rılıil Willagers to spark off
a conflict again. This time Indians will not be there to Fort out the пa c5 3. SU Ime in
the ruling party feel that telling them to göı may prö’ye tö have been MT Premadasa's biggest Inistilke.
{The Erata rris )
ד

Page 10
IPKF returns unsung an
S. Murari
A. long last, the Indian PeaceKeeping Force is back home after waging a futile war for two years to restoric peace in Sri Lanka. It is now easy to be harsh on the Indian army but it was a War without frontiers, without clear battle-lines or a well-defined goal.
It is easy to praise the Libration Tigers of Tamil Eelam as a force which has gone through fire and come out un scathed. Politicians like Mr. M. Karunanidhi can well salute the LTTE ls Valiant force which has withstood the fourth largest army in the World. But the story has Timore tha in one dimension toit.
The involvement of the IPKF in a costly misadventure that left 1,200 of its personnel dead and over 2,000 wounded is only Onc aspect. If India has lost the battle, who is to blame pli
ticians, diplomat s or the soldiers? And what has the LTTE gained in getting the Indians
out it an Enormous cost to itSelf and the people it seeks to
represent which it could not halve machieved through diplomacy?
When the Indian soldiers landed in Jaffna to a warm wellColle on July 30, 1987, a day ster Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and President J. R. Jy:- Wardene signed the so-called peace pact, they were led to believe that they had come to protect the poor, oppressed Tamils from the Sinhalese forces. But with the Sri Lankan forces confined to the barracks
and the Tamil groups fighting #1 TT10llg themselves, thc IPKF"s role as a protector became bl'UTTc{1.
The IPKF soon had no precise idea about its role. It came
als a buffer force to protect the Tamils from the Sri Lankan security forces but was projected Els a II ET II ly that had COIL c t ) disarm the Tamil militants and
Telieve thic Sri for deployment tackle the Ja Peramu na probl
But the ar II not the issue. CDTIIIliSSiOler hı: after August 17 LTTE. Clai II el in all its weap cent of the firl ground. What at thit ti me v', agreed to pay LTTE to buy and that the T ally used the firs Out in August to in Singapore. Walls clinched : Mr. Rajiv Gar supremo W. P. the policy-ma a Ware that the Cor mar the ac
The LTTE W Il dia Tef’LI 3 cd t the sole repre: Tills. Wt looking up to protection, the lilled. May Te s r. Were allowed arms and pitch the IPKF. TE cipally the Ecla lutionary Liber Tallil Eelal II. IL 5 til al Id thc Del Critic L were initially w with the LTTE leave it to the their repres cinta 1
Blt the LTTE to allow this WẽTt t{}{1 $C:ìTed them. The f turi cd tih ciT wra indulging in r and revenge kil
| 13 tead cof c initial euphor bridges with IPKF assum cd were with the L.

d un honoured
Lankan forces
in thic south to
latha Wimukthi Ը. I11,
i surrender was The Indian High ld gone con record 1987, when the hat it had turned ns, that 70 per is had come overWas not known is that India had Rs. 50 lakh to the
its compliance igers had eventut instalment paid buy more arms The money deal it the level of Lidhli Did LTTE irabhakaran. So kers were well LTTE could lake cord.
as sullen because 0 TC cognise it als sentatives of the the Tamil people the IPKF for LTTE felt 51 dewhen its rivals I come back With camps, alongside :Sc groups, prinIm People's Revoation Front, thc iberation OrganiEelam National iberation Front filli Ing to co-exist and eventually people to choosc lives,
was not prepared and the people to speak up for rustra tcd groups th on the people, obbery, extortion lings. Lshing in on the ia and building the people, the that the people TTE EL Indii r clicd on
the other groups to gather inteligence about the Tigers. In the process, not only was the IPKF but also the oth cri groups - alienated from the peoplc.
By September, it was evident that the LTTE was itching for a confrontation. The massacre of 70 Tembers of Tival Tali| groups in Batticaloa on Septem13 was a clear signal to the IPKF. A week earlier, Kalmunai had been rocked by clashes between the Tigers and muslims following the murder of the assistant government agent of Mutur, a Mu51im. The IPKF Was lothe to interfecTe on both thc occaSion S.
Two days after the Batticaloa Illas Sal Cre, LTTE L cader Thileepan went on a fast in Jaffna. to press five demands, including an end to colonisation in the east, expeditious rclcase of political prisoners and dismantling of Sri Lankan army camps.
The IPKF officers can be pardon cd for not understanding the emo Live na turc of the colonis al
tion issue. But South Block and the Indian High Commission chose to ridicule. Thileepan's
fast as a move to divert attention from the Batticaloa massacre, instead of explaining the
the action taken on the five demands,
For instance, there should
have been no problem in releasing political prisoners who had been picked up at random and had been languishing in jail for years. Colombo did grant amnesty to the militants after they made a show of surrendering arms. But the myth was exploded after the Baltical Coa - massacre and Colombo started going slow o Il releasing prisconers, linking it to surrender of all weapons by the LTTE.
Thilecpan's fast and his eventual death should hawe made it c car to New Delhi that the LTTE would stop at nothing to

Page 11
achieve its goal. The LTTE had to do something dramatic to re-establish its hold over the people and drive a wedge between them and the IPKF - and Thileepan had to die, for this.
The LTTE organised the fast in f’TJ Int of the Na 1 lur Kamda swamy temple to give it a religious touch. And it whipped up anti-India hysteria by organising hartals and demonstrations against the IPKF. However the IPKF refused to be provoked. Even Sri Lankan policemen were dragged out of a station and assault c.d by Ill ob5.
Yet, when Thile epan dicd on September 26, not a stone was thrown, for the LTTE's negotiations with Indian High ConmissioneIT J.N. Dixit were at a delicate stage. Three days later came the agreement between LTTE's deputy leader Ajit Mathiah and High Commission official Hardip Puri under which the Tigers were given seven out of 12 seats in the interim administrative council. Curiously, Ille Of the five demands for which Thileepan died found a place in the agreement.
The LTTE submitted 15. It lies for the seven seats, including three for the post of Chief AdIllinistrator and the final choice was left to President Jaya Wardane. Mr. Jayawardane vetoed the na nne of Mr. K. Pathmanbha II, the assistant government agent of Trincomalee who was released only in September after being in detention for 45 Illonths under the emergency regulations,
Mr. Dixit would not accept Mr. K5 i Ana India II will was perceived to be anti-India I. So the choice eventually fell on Jaffna Municipal Commissioner C.W. K. Sivaganam. When the Tigers insisted on Mr. Path Ilanabhain, Mr. Siwaganam declined to accept the post. Mr. Dixit, who had ill-concealed contempt for the Tigers, was angry over their going back on the Written agreement and MT. Jaya Wardalne conveniently made use of the impasse to drop the entire proposa 1 to have an interim
di Iministration.
A few days men, including der Kumarappa Inale e com Iman were captured Lankam nawal 1 Pilt Pedr. T perfect.
While alloul to part with air du malai public chief Pi Ibhlık that from then the responsibili protect the Tai å test cåse Wiht; including two c Ill Weapons exce gun were taken Lankä III authori held i Il a II i Il Pallally while hec WEIt TI A L ','; decide whether take Il to Colo II
The last pers was Mr. Mathi: A hCLIT lateT S mfltidos ster ITie bid to forcibly plane to Col Tigers bit the s Lules. Twelve { Kuma Tappal ai Tid Hours befo Te top IPKF of telephoned a Lāka Goverī hill that the ci be disastrolls i Allowed til dl "The H10110ur mUTc importar of a few i II iter fee.'"
The Tigers dictable li Ines. Soldiers held LTTE, WycTe bi their bodies Jaffna bus stan Co We T 1 OC) S III sacredi i Ill Balt conialee, leadi of 40.000 Sinh; pura. Colomb hal: : Teäs.
President Imptly withdr declared Mr. W:Lited man, Lankan force in the north

teT , " 17 LTTE affinal com Tina In
and Trincoer Pulendran, by a tiпy Sті atrol boat off 1e setting was
'ing his decision T15 at the Sumeeting, LTTE ran had said con il would be y cof India to 1ils. Hcre Was Te l7 guerillas, 2 mm:ndcrs, With pta sub-machine in by the Sri ics. They were duction cell at tic consultations L Tiolls llc wels to they should be 1 b J.
on to see the II th. On October 5. Sri Lankan co IIId t hic Cell i a put the Ill Oil a lombo and the ir cyanide Capf them, including Pullendra II, died, this happened, a Ficial frantically key figure in Sri In ent and warned Insequences would f the Tigers weTe |c. He was tald, if the latio Il j5 t than the lives dividuals. Don't
reacted oil preSewcIn Sri Lanka. Il prisoner by the utally killed and dumped at the |. Simultaneously, illese Were malsical Ja ald TTiflıng to the exodus |ese to Anıl Tadhaand Other Sin
ayawarda ne proW the amnesty, Pir: bhakari I a deployed the Sri in Sinhall àTeas ind east ånd Gr
-
dered the IPKF to disarm the Tigers. Even so, the IPKF began slowly, starting in the east with the other groups. On October 9, the offices of two pro-LTTE newspapers, Muras oli and Eelaпита и, were damaged in explosions. An hour or so later, the LTTE reacted by blasting a CRPF vehicle, killing four personnel. Thus began the war that Leither the IPKF IN UT the Ta Illils Wanted.
The IPKF hild had three Imonths to prepare for this eventuality. Yet it found itself caught on the Wrong foot. It underestimated the LTTE's military potential; it was denied air cower. Il short, a colWentional army was suddenly pressed in
to ser wicc to fight a II urban guerilla war in which the Tigers were pastmasters. What was appalling was the total failure of the intelligence, leading to the failure of the coinmando operation at the Jaffna
University complex aimed at capturing Mr. Pirabhakaran.
The commandos were HiТ lifted from Gwalior barely 24 hours before the operation. Even before the helicopter, carrying then took off from Palaly, the Tigers were waiting in ambush at the university cellplex and Mr. PiTabhaka Tan Had left the scene. In the battle, 28 collInandos and 40 civilians were killed while the LTTE SI Teledi Illinimal losses.
It is Said in defence of lle IPKF that it had to fight with
o Inc hal Id tied behind its back and that the Tigers used civilia Ils als human shields. But
even that one hand was enough Lo terrorise civili 1115, The Tamils had not seen such heavy shelling as during the battle for Jaffna even during the peak of Operation Liberation launched by the Sri Lankan forces the previous sum
mer. The entire peninsula Was without electricity and water froll October 9 to 22 when
the Tigers decided to abandon their seat of power.
The 12-day war wrought havoc. The Tigers had wanted precis cly that. Their strategy

Page 12
Was to put up stiff resistance
in heavily populated a reas, Cause maxillum civilia El casualties and then abandon the
territory to launch a guerilla offensive from a new base. They did it in Wadamaratchi during Operation Liberation. They repeated it at Chawakacheri duri Ing Operation Pawan.
It Was the battle for Jaffna. which created a permanent gulf between the IPKF and the peo
ple who would otherwise mot have supported the Tigers all the way. The climax was the
Illassac Tc Ulf IOC) ci Willia T15 at the Jaffna general hospital on October 22, Deepavali day. Among the victims were doctors, nurses, other hospital staff and
patients.
The Tigers were nowhere near
the scene when the Indian
El Tm Y SEOTTI) ed in to the hospi
tal. The Intervous soldiers opened fire at the slightest novement OT sound. The IPKF initially denied thc massacre and later came up with the specious cxcuse that the attack Cainc lp at dilsk when there was no
electricity and visibility was pooT. But the killings continued the whole night, and
even the next day II orning, a
doctor walking into the hospital was shot dead.
It was this massacre more than the indiscriminate shelling which turned the people of Jaffna totally against the IPKF. In effect, the Tigers had
Won thic first round.
Yet, the battle for Jaffna did deal a psychological blow on the Tigers. By the end of November Mr. Pirabhakaran was sending frantic messages to Mr. Gandhi and the then Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, Mr. M. G. Rama chandran, pleading for a cease fire and un conditional talks. It was then that India made the biggest blunder - insisting that the Tigers accept the accord and lay down arms and allowing the IPKF to overTeach itself.
By March 1988, the IPKF had virtually pushed the Tigers to the jungles and was firmly in control of the entire north and east. This was achieved through
I
El satural ted, pr 10thlig II i T: a III y could de point of title hawe been en Over ground ilirable se Ller B LIL LOC ILLE: All W" U Tk. I at CICS5-purpos even while the the LTTE, E Analysis Wing tiations with nakumai alias i Il Märch II between Kittu had reached a the till ks col LTTE Fictivist
importa Int Ki Litlu to NMr. shot dead in the
From Octobe 1988, though L LTTE leaders deported to Jafi the Tigers wol With the IPKF [C) C COI T1 til Maldi And the Driwi. hagam Innoved M to prevent thei By early 198: apparent that be Colle India's question should to get thic troops of face. But I with the Tills i Sion of everythii No attempt wi a Tamil provin P0W e T's Corin pai enjoyed by Indi Gandhi had prol El mendilent ant C) Lucil Acts : 31. Il di tillic Sri La Ill had completed . provinces by J. India ignored from all Tamil ding the Tamil tion Front, on thic devolution. I When election province could II any further, III 10-day cleasefire - in September 198 ted on the sam - acceptance of And 5 litrender of a

Gellçe. The Te Was a conventional At least at that the Tigers should ouraged to come ld Teach an honcnt with Indiä. y agencies were ey Were W orking s. For instance, (KPF was fighting Research and yas holding negoSaclä5iwam KrishKittu in Madras, 38, negotiations and the RAW crucial stage. But :ı psed after a11 who was carrying The S5 age Fנח נו"ן ?ir:i bhahkar:LI1 Wa, s Wawlu Iniyal junglise. 1987 to August he Madras-based an di cad Tcs were na by the RAW, Inded in battles were allowed to *ls for treatment. la Mill Il retra Kazadras High Court r deportation, 8. It had became Sri Lil Ilka had Wietnall and the hawe been how out without loss dia was obscissed issue to the cxclung else.
S maldic t0 CTeate ce and get it the Table t(}, those an Statics als Mr. miscd. The 13th 1 the Provinciall had been passed kan GowcTnment :cctions to other c 1988. But representations groups, incluJlited Liberainadequacies in häckage. 5 to the Tinil it be postponed
India offered a to the LTTE 38. But it insis
e preconditions the agreement ms — Tir talks.
The Tigers had by then recovered lost ground and were in no
lood to negotiate.
The IPKF played a dubious role in the conduct of the ecctions. With the Eelam Rewlutionary students" (Organisation, the People's Libcration Organisation of Tallil Eelam and thc TULF boycotting elections in response to a call by the LTTE, thic IPKF managed to bring about an understanding betWeen the ENDLF and thic EPRLF to share thic Seats i Ti Luc Llorth Without a contest. The Tigers attempted to prevent this by setting up independents to file nominations. The IPKF then imposed an unOfficial curfew in the Jaffna Kachcheri area and detained all those who had Rs. 250/- the a mount requircd for filling nomination The electiCJI 1, 5, WeTe finally held only in the east. They were so managed that not a single Sinhala national party could get in.
The EPRLF administration could have gained some legitimacy if it had concentrated on winning more powers from Colombo with Indian help rather than trying to consolidate its position through forced conscriptions, revenge killings and other strong-arm methods. And the IncW Government of Mr. Rana singhe Premadasa, which came to power on the mandate of getting the IPKF out, would rather deal with the LTTE. Thc IIloilet the LTTE and Colombo started talking, India should have Withdrawn gracefully from the scene. But the Rajiv Gandhi regime Walted the Indian soldiers to stay on and fight for devolution even after
Mr. Premadasa servcd a quit notice on the il.
The total withdrawal of the
IPKF has only served to underline the fact that India's Sri Lanka policy, especially under the previous Government, has been a total failure at almost all levels. And there is no denying that the IPKF top brass to contributed to the mess though the officers in the field Were all along aware of what the ground realities were.
- DEr Heral

Page 13
Home is the Soldier
Seema Guha
hat went wrong with the Indian a TT1ly that pe Cople’s perceptions changed so drastically in less than three years? The troops landed in Sri Lanka in a blaze of publicity as the Saviors of the Tamils, the good guys as opposed to the bad, epitomised by the Sinhala a TIlly, The glory was short lived, and the fourth largest army in the Wil las Itured loe ispirited, much of its shine having wurn ofl, and its reputation às a fighting force sadly tarnished,
Now that the last Indian soldier has finally left, it is time to take a long hard look ät why this happelled, was it the fault of the army, the politicials. I the bureaucrats? Did the government of India have a clicar cut perception On Sri Länka, or did it just I cact to cvents triggercd off by the Liberation Tigers or Colombo. The fact is that the policy planners il Ne vıy T) elli fı il ged] [ ]] (ölk beyond the immediate future, they could not forcs ce that III e day they might have to take on the LTTE.
Yet, was i II i III e diately clear to all journalists who were in Jaffna just after the Indo-Sri La Inka, accord of 1987, that the Liberation Tigers as well as the ordinary civilian wanted the Indian a Tmy to do a Bangladesh here. LTTE leaders like Mahatya, Thileepan (who went on fast and finally died) and Yoga ratnam
Yogi, all felt that the Indian ar Iny should liberate the Tamils, fight the Sri Lankan forces, create a In independent Eelam and leave, considering that this was what the Tamil people really wanted, it would have
been fait to anticipate an evenLa S LLLaL a S S aaLL HC KLL H S SLa K S LLLLLL and the Tigers, as Delhi was pledged to uphold the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka.
General Harkirat Singh and his men came into Sri Lanka totally unpre parcd for action, It was almost like a picnic for
the army, The War come, Lhe adula 1 citizens and the Wills in Eid Illinistr; with the rapport t the LTTE, had t bristling With . Sri Lank: Il CCLII butt of cruel is held at bay by a Many of the se 1 Palaly felt that fight it would Sri LELI kail Early that it would tha Il 72 hours ti island state. M cucd the LT fiulittered frol III.
LTTE AT di Cut Cof each they shared mea ČLT I ll I WTC 1 on guided tours
Enhancing the is ty' image Wa: ol II army Went to spгee, buying Wide 55 ette Te C. Iles, three-imfiVe-siX-Seven el these goodies we India by IAF the TFı dilär if (CLI
While the III hawing a ball, thi the prevailing he sed that it will a title would C Wuld hive to cr their cull Tricht crior I can clearly re. Yogi's remark wardene will . Indian troops fight against us'
Meanwhile G Singh gave the l to take ELI1 IAI shout ä vidiu f gic плilitary i Tim Port - Id the IIndia Ils However, tle gathered little ewcIl Con li hic t the fighting fin force was clue

11th of the Wellin of ordinary fact that there ative machine Ty they shared with 1 Indian a TIlly fidence. Its terpart was the kes for being group of boys. lior Officers in if they had to be against the They boasted ke the Il le 55 :) take Over the eanwhile they E, Tiger flags lia In a Tiny jeep 5 IPKF were in others camps, ls together and taken by them
of Jaffna.
Telaxed ""LLUITthe fact that a wild shopping up televisions, orders, two-inincs and foursc, Wise, all :re se n. back to planes, beyond Is Loi This rules.
dia 1 a Imy Wils - LTTE, despite i T1ey III1 oon, Teali – Ildin"t 1:5 t, and Ille when they "dass si Words with lies, the Indians. call Yoga ratnam "President Jayeinsure that the will eventually
eleTill HaTikirit LTTE permission helicopter to Ill of all strateIls t:1 || altiQI)8 il Palaly, where yere en cam ped.
IPKF itself intelligence, 11t errain, so when ally began the ess. Not Only
did it hawe Illo Teal idea of the strength of the militants, they didn't even know the lay of the land. The LTTE's preparedness Was Somethi Ing else. They had meant business right from the start. They had observed the Indian a Tmy at close range, and knew how it functioned. Whe Il the moment arrived, the Tigers vere t'armcl' to the tooth.
The crux of the problem was that right from day one the Indian army was over confident. When J7 LTTE men, including two of their top leaders PulendIra In and Kull ma rappa, commit tcd suicide, and the Tigers, repudiating the Indo-Sri Lanka accord, Went on a rampage, killing ewery Sinhalese in sight in Jaffna and attacking sinhala settlers in Jaffna and at Lacking Sinhala settlers in Trincormålee. SO (In after this crisis Brigadier Fermandez of the IPKF declared with bravado, The Tigers do not know Who thcy are taking On. The Indian army is not the Sri Lankan force. We will OW Cr
un them in a day T t Wica",
The Brigadier found out Soon enough how he and his collelgues underestimated the LTTE's ten: city Hind fighting primile. The Tigers were excellent, they had a modern communication system, and a network of underground channels that were impervious to aerial bombing, More important, they had mastered minc technology illmost to the point of an art, and used it extensively, especially in the first days of the war. The Indial troops statione di in the Dutch fort in Jlflla were unable to move out as thic Tigers had seeded the area with a circle of explosive death.
Il took three weeks for thc Indian arily to take Jaffna town, and many more before they could actually establish control. What had seemed like a Walk-over, soon i tur ned int a nightmare for an army unused to fighting in the thick of built up areas. As the Indian column lumbered along with its heavy ma chinery, its armoured personel carriers, il consta Tit dread of the faceless sniper behind
11

Page 14
the concrete wall. The enemy Would fire and slip away through back alleys and, for thcm, well-known Willage roads, caving the Indians to fire at random, leaving the Tigers unscathed.
In the first two days of Operation Pa Wan, the Indian casualties were Linconscionably high, 13 officers were killed will Timore than 20 ja Wans lost their lives.
Then the military slEilegists in Palaly decided on the flashy Illove of air dropping jawans near the LTTE headquarters opposite the Jaffna university. EWery one of these 30 baie men was shot dead by the Tigers
Who, long before the operation began, had ensured that I ΗΤΙΤ 11 plating of guards
would make their headquarters impenetrable. The IPKF generails, had visited the Tiger office in numcrable times before and they should have known this instead of dropping their men to certain death. Such foolhar
diness could not continue. Delhi had also gone into Pil TOXY"m 5 Over the Fak on
account of time taken by the
IPKF to capture Jaffna. As resul General Har kirat Singh was su Thinmoned to Delhi and
kept cooling his heels there for Over ten days. General A. S. Kalakat took over, and has been in charge evet since.
3. : --
EWe Intill:ally the IPKF did take Control of all towns and Illa jor Villages in the north and east. Despite the fact that, in the Pas y el T, it was hard hit, the LTTE gave the IPKF a run for its money. The Indians YTE fighting an elusive eleIlly, in alien territory, with a hostile population that had clammed into a n un communicative mood. The Tigers mingled with the civilians and hit out when least expected, notching up instant successes, both military and in
ter Ills of morale. The IPKF, used to conventional Warfare, tock too much Lime to adjust
to the guerrilla tactics of the TTEtumbered along, bogged down by heavy Weapons," mov
12
ing in highly
proclaiming its Lill to see, TE Other and car histicated arms grՕլIբ5 and I11t silen Ely a circos5 : they knew like halds. The el s) wi tal for Lhi Wils always the iT1g O In the . sidi
While batti posed more pr army had pres' ti Cill task befor more forIndahl HlsE , Saddleci w tration of the COI) guering a Which was incl. plaD1, eInslITiIng Temained propart of the II And it showed. trse thיוו tT5 political state clasilci.
All the gooi earned through civilians was i which house-to Were conducte WCT e Set Lup F1. Il travelling by p were subject to ;Il LI Imili חטftט From the militi the army had it. W 15 15th II civilians would 1g1T15t 5uch “ c) Il fusio II was the faillIe sif at the primary Iity of our jay spcik ir un Many a tiпnc, ] HäTyányi Jawan tiC) T11ake h1irmse| English, which II not sounded EAE) I thir context been anusing; CỞ T15ẽ till:11çë's W't
On the other lly in Jaffna pe D popl lation was side of the LT
tered them in t concealed their the II.

Visible columns,
intentions for e LTTE, on thic ied light, sopoperated in small Ved swiftly and he jungles which the back of their : IncIt of surprise, is type warfare, irs, always misse of the Indians.
ng the LTTE oblems than the Imcd. The poliTc it Was ievēI c, The army was ith the adminisIn CT th— est. The men’s minds | ded in the action that the Taillis Indian, was not PKF's training.
T) lākie lātc military and gies too often
will the IPKF working for the mmediately lost 1-house searches i, road blocks d all passengers ublic conveyance through - and El ting — scrutiny. 1 Ty point of view o do this, but atural that the be up in arms 1af Tal55 11ent''... Thic con fou Ended by com Ilmu Inicatio II level: the majoWELI15 could not lerstand Tamil. came across a trying his best f understood in 1C) Tc ofte In thal iket Hindi. Il it may have but here the :re di sastrou15.
hand, especialinsula, the local clearly on the TE. They shell heir homes and WeapoIls for
After a successful LTTE operation, when Indian soldiers were killed, the entire village hild to pay for the loyalty of a few sympathisers. Excesses were coll mitted, houses, Were searched and young men arrested but it would be unfair to say, as many Sri Lankan army
offieers and LTTE supporters claimul, that the Indians massi cred in Inocent civilians. This
was generally never donc willfully. Sitting in an Indian camp in Nela vali last year,
Father Peter, a staunch Tiger supporter, explained the set up: "The IPKF is worse than the Sri Lankan al Irmy, Thc Sri Lainkans would kill all thosc they
arrested, but Indian beat and malim the TT which is much Worse, I asked him if he
would hawe dal red to sit in a Sri Lankan Army Camp and criticise their army, in front of the officer as he was doing now in front of the Indians. He was frank enough to admit he wouldn't have the guts. In fact he added that in the pre-accord days, he would ha vc made certain that he went 10 where near an SLA camp.
The army, it is clear, Illade a large number of mis Lakes, thic tactics used to combat the Tigers should hawe been modi - fied and altered to suit the special conditions in Sri Lanka, The army failed in this mainly because it is so steeped in the bureaucratic strait-jacket that it has little adaptability. But why blame only the army? They can hardly be held Tesponsible if Delhi thrust upon it a quasi-political role for Which it was in no Way equipped. One can't hold the gun to the army for the lack of forcthought, for the government's failure to perceive the full implications of India plunging head long into direct intervention in Sri Lanka.
Above all there was lack of coordination between the three agencies embroiled in Sri Lanka - the ministry of defence, that of external alTairs and the intelligence wing (RAW), Wery often the internal bickerings of

Page 15
the three led to their men working at cross purposes. For instance in Batticaloa, in 1988, which RAW was holding talks with the Tiger representatives of the area, the är my geot wind of the Tigers being in the vicinity of the church, and went to search the place. The LTTE guards outside threw a hand grenade to alert the parlcycrs inside, giving them just enough time to get away. Thus a major embarassment — and casualties - were avoided by a
lair's breadth.
Still, at the end of it all, the army ca. In get s El tisfactico. Il from the fact that, ultimately, it was the relentless Pressure that they had kept up on the Tigers, which forced them to seize the opportunity of direct negotiations with Sri Lankan government. Unwittingly the IPKF had helped temporarily to bridge the gap between the Tamils and Sinhalese - in their comnln hältred Of the PKF both protagonists understood that they belonged on the Silme side. A 5, Fälthet Pius Padmalraja, a Parish priest of Trinconnalee church put it: "We Tamils huwe Tealized that we cannot rely on India. We Will have to solve ou T probleIns with the Sri Lankan governinct. The arrivil of the alie fог се па је шs геalize this."
One of the last tasks perforIncid by the Indian jawans beforc thcy left Jaffna was to b Li illi a small Tile Timorial to thic dead. As Ilmany as 1,500 men Wcre killed il Sri La Ilka, al IIother 4,000 were injured and will be handicapped for life. Iш Sri Lanka, the Tamils, MusliIns and Sinhalese äre all happy to see the last of the army, in India there is general indifference about the IPKF and its three-year-long struggle. The forces has come home quietly to lick its woulds, to nurse bitterness in silence. The ques
tion cvery one of its Illen
might ask - aloud (I to hillself, what was all this in aid of? As at the em di of Tim Cost wars, there is no satisfactory
IS WAT
-- Te Tffffa57 frafa
Sri Lanka
James Prin
dark-eyed
plaited he assault rifle he nide capsules 5 her neck. Tar low thcm if
Te not a fraid Eclaim," she sa the Tamil con rate homeland. ing Sri Lanka pression. We ställe with Collt F1
No one coul cerity. After E ger "la dies,” a by male soldic ration Tigers army, died in Lankan troops peace-keeping ans left STi Li after suffering an unsuccessful år 11 the Often Si Ime hawe . Wiet IllIIl.
But instead in which the would have TE who cape Tät: forces, and between th: W find the Sir Sri Link:LT AT peace reigns i Ilith a ni C15 tative : h {2pes easing of the
Once called cause of thic being it enger fall Ters, Sri Lal dependence fi in 1948, as bloodshed. been wracked by a cycle of year the conf deaths, by co I15 e T väl tiwe than in Chini
Last August thic ad Illi TiistiTE Rana singhe Pr out to collap slaught by th, Si Illes CJELI

a; Hope in an uneasy calm
gle
Tamil girl with it and AK-47 Id ut the cyalhe wore around mil Tigers sWalcaptured. "We to die for Tamil id, Teferri Ing to :ept of a sepaWe are fightm militaгу орwant a separate iny interference."
d doubt het sin11, 27 Tamil Tiis they are called trs in thic Libeof Til II i 1 Eela Ill blittle with Sri and the Indial force. The IndiIk lst mith 1,155 dead in 1 attempt to disfa, 1ati Cll TigeT5. alled it III dia's
Cf i blodbath ruthless Tigers | len om Tamils 2d with Indian renewed fighting ell-arned Tigers halese-dominated “ппy, dп шп сегtніп in the Tiger-ruled L. The Te are te IlToT; at least LT1
mayhem.
* "Serendip” befeeling of wellidered along seanika a chiewed in"I thic British Ceylon, without However, it has in recent years violeIItc, Last lict ca Isc di 12,000 the govern IL1 ent’s estimatc – InÜre l or Romania.
it see IIled that tion of president e Illa da sa was albse before al OIl2. cxtT-ITie left ist tha Williukthi Perä
muna, or People's Liberation Front. But the JVP Imade the mista ke of killing families of soldiers and police. The security forces responded in kind, and by December they had climinated the JWP leadership.
Driving in the south in recent days, I saw the grisly remains of several dozen bodies of JWP suspects lying by the roadside where they had been left by security forces, It has been horrible, but it has worked, a Western diploThat said, 'Six months ago, no one could have believed that the sit Litical Would hal Wc become as relatively normal as
it is now. In that sense, you
could say the end iustified
Lhe Illeans."
Huma In rights organizations,
such as Amnesty International have been appalled at the car nEl C. Death squads, formed from elements of the armed forces and bodyguards of senior politicians, are said to be responsiblic for some of the killings.
In February, Richard de Zoysa, a journalist interested in human rights, was taken from his mother's home at night by Illen in uniforn. Since his death, five other local journalists have fled the country,
The Sri Lanka. In Bar Associal
tion call cd foi al II e Id to all abductions by military and para - military units. In the past In oth the Ill IIber of slich killings does appear to have abated.
After coming to power in 1989, President Prema da sa called on India to withdraw its forces. It is in the north of the Country that his policics have had Inost success so far, although the Tigers refuse to disarm as they promised to do once the Indians left. At least negotiations between the govern Illent ind the Til mil militants are LI I der way.
Y Carfiried Ciri P&Fe II)

Page 16
Defending the
Punya priya Dasgupta
S; of those duty bound not to see even the egregious
follies of the Governillent have fallen back on metaphysics. They can find nothing I'm Corc
helpful in their explanation of What the in appropriately—designated India Il Peace Keeping Force achieved in Sri Lanka.
General Y. N. Sharina, Chief of Army Staff, had to say shahash La Lhe Officer5 F1Ild IIl CIl thei homecoming. The formality of issuing an Order of the Day had to bic gone through on the completion of "deinduction' of the expcditionary force. But the GcIneral seemed a little uncertain about what to say,
Fuzzy Words
He decided to View the outco[The of theiT actions *" i In its entire perspective to appreciate the ambiance of democratic order that yoııı have brought about, to start the process of return to normalcy in Sri Lanka."
A military Order of the Day With such fuzzy Words does not ring loud and clear. It could not hal we - bcc in otherwise because General Sharma had no solid achievement of his army to be proud of this time, Hic tried to cover up his embarrassment. He said: " “In an un conventional conflict of the nature that you have experienced, it is always difficult to identify or quantify the gains in material terms.'
This linc of reals on ing has been taken to its extreme by Mr. K. Subrahma Ilyam, who after retirement from the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, remains the most prominent and prolific expositor of India's defc.nce doctrine. III a newspaper article con the day the last contigent of Indian troops sailed back from Sri Lanka, Mr. Subrahmanyam cited the famous linc from thic Bhagawad Gita — Karman’evadikara ste fra faleshu kadachana ("The right is to work
|
Only, never to Of") - as the : Indian Army's ther in the Co desh or in Sri
Mr. SLIIb Tal hill had in mind armed forces borders. He d the wars with tan (except to: Mahatma Gand the Luse of for
1948). Never the pretation of the despatch
La Inka maly, in
hanced popular harata, thanks
create difficulti in our military El Tilled forces co ding Hindustan terfils of Colg tangible achicve
All the other to play in for II the troops back not find the The scientists-N for Defence, D1 Ina, du tifully h disembarking in thy earners of t est gratitude bLI TCT11āTking that not been entir nature. Why s tary be deployc tary purposes'
The explanati Lt - (Gen A. K. C of the India. A Command, for bility to defeat
replays the ex thc Naga Hills The säme llamcı
ing With one ha the back, confr who was sitting the roadside or firing a gun i unfamiliar, in ho:
A third school foT LH1 e IPKF

indefensible
the fruits there. spirit behind the operations, wheTiga) 0T i T1 Bangla
Länka.
1nyam, of couThe, the role of our Illy out of Ir ill not mention China, and Pakissay Once that hi had approved te in Kash I11 it in tless, his interhic idea behind 3f forces to Sri 5 pite of the enity of the Marato Door da Tshan, es for instructors academies. The Wery Wherec, inci LI, are trained in Tete til sks ind
S.
5. Who had roles la lly Well coming home also did script felicitous, linister of State , Raja Ramanla il cd the men Madras, as worhe nation's deepcould not help their duties had cly military in hould the militil for non-mili
ons offered by that terjee, Chief 4 Tilly's Southern the IPKF's illthe LTTE Wcre :15 es hel Td in
il the Fifties. its about fightIn di tied behind }nting someone g peaceably by I e Ill (Illent arid In the next and spitable terrain.
| claims success in the whole.
The argument is that the RajivJayewardene agreement was intended to facilitate interaction between the Sri Lankan Tamils and the Sri Lanka Government to settle the problems between . וון טוLI
Negotiations
According to this view, the LTTE had refused to do it earlier but as a result of the IPKF's operations, had now started negotiating with Colombo. But why then did Mr. Rajiv Gandhi refuse to pull the IPKF out of Sri Lanka last July? President Prema da sa had written to Mr. Gandhi in June about the cessation of hostilities by the LTTE against the Sri Lankan Government and agreement to settle all problems through a process of negotiations and asked for withdrawal of the IPKF.
The Rajiv Gandhi government hild solemnly and publicly accepted the position that the Indian Forces were in Sri Lanka at the i 1 wita, tion of the Island-State's President and would be brought
back "the day he does not Want the In any more'". Yet when President Pre mada sa re
questical with di Tawal of the IPKF Mr. Gandhi began temporising - Or, in effect, refused. It is un believable that Mr. Gandhi's foreign policy advisers did not tell him that failure to act in Sri Lanka according to the wishes of the head of the Sri Lankal State, would a mount to what President Premada sa called 'a Wiolation of the perenptory Ilorms of international law." If they did not, they were not doing their duty. Possibly they did and Mr. Gandhi thought there was no harm in his acting like a bully.
RJ's Tactics
President Jayewardene had malouvred Mr. Gandhi into fighting the Sinhala establishment's War against the Tamils and re

Page 17
lieving and airlifting Sri Lan
kan tre op 5 for i Lampaign against the JWP in the south of the island. The boast of the 'old fix beforc the media, about his making the referee, that is India, take his place in the CCIII bat with Lille LTTE, might have made Mr. Gandhi
look foolish. But by refusing LL0 S LLLLLLLHHL S aL LLSLLLL S aLLLLLL SLLLLLLL withdrawal of the IPKF, the inexperienced Prime Minister compounded one sin With : n
Other.
The Indian withdrawal forI Sri Lanka HfteT MIT, GäIdhi's
exit from power, was, out watdly, not so humiliating as the A II leiric: Il 5 cramble out of WietT1arm1. There Were T1 ) sceTh eS reliniscent of helicopters flying out the last lucky escapees from
the US Embassy roof-top in Saigon. The Sri Lankan Foreign Minister was present in
Trinconalee harbour to say a few ki ıd words ilin ıı ell Ty of the 1,500 (by his count) Indian soldiers, who had lost their lives in his country. But the less created by the Linthinking — and sonline also in wisible - policymakers in New Delhi has not been cleared by the withdrawal - call it by the euphemistic term 'deinduction” if you like. It has Spread as fait as Malkangir, in the Dandakaranya region of faraway Orissa.
How many Sri Lankan Tamils have left their held to seek safety in India after the failure of the Indian interwention in Sri Lan käl and h0 W many mðrc will Collit II () i II e knows. A new refugee problem has been created by the Sri Lankan policy of the Rajiv Gandhi Goverment. Even in the best of times Indial can Tot ficcd, clothic and house its own people. Now it will Flyve s ČITc Td3 Te t'i llock after aid, if the worst fears Come true, face a Ilew lä W ä Ild order problem. Some of the Tefugees Imay hawe arms with the II.
The SC-callel IIl diam Peacekeeping Force succeeded neither in disarming the LTTE mor im ensuring protection of its leaders
agai Inst Colombi their liquidation elt campaign to Dima de al Ilocke T claim to pel Ce La Inka. At 11,3 t the one yearcclchratioIls of Ja birth, did any New I) clui Cor. periphely care t warning that "“fic: for Ce de i te 11l t prolong conflic cucc the II all in support of 1 even of a pu Tcly stiffels rathct resistacc.
The IPKF c that it was Il in a fогеј Еп la
At best, it W force Lhe ill–L Jayewardene ac
tlı roat:5 (if title Tigers. In a Dy Was not a pat
Lessons
In der Malh
is III e XIH! Lihat this CC to help. Sri Lal cTLuciating eith II sending 50,000 there hild beg and has cinded Much (if the ci Mir Rajiw Garı d lytes, who reall policy un Lil wid,
India rushed of Jaffna and 5 colla lete i Il llı thinking throug i Intendi Ing to C go We TILIThe Int Wils Iliss in its d LTTE, then a powerful and riwal Tarın il gr. lls, New Del til a few, days Jayewardenc, ac the Indial Pea

b's designs for The subscqLLcrush the LTTE y of the Indiam —keeping in Sri ime, even during long centenary wahâIll Nehrll's Ile in Official is intellectu äl o remenu Her his rСЕ НПti C u ItСТ– o exacerbate and :tig sraithe is tháin di military action aw enforcellent, policing nature, la Il vetcOITles
ould not claim forcing the law Id.
as attempting to to Iceived Rajiv:cord down the rcsisting Ta ITnil case, thic LTTE ty to the agree
ment, The IPKF’s wal II i Ing on the LTTE lacked cven the slightest moral excuse. Therefore, the expending of the lives of at least 1,155 Indian soldiers and in juries to 2.984 more, toLally lacks justificatio Ti.
Hatred Earned
At the cost of this sacrifice India his ca Tned the ha tred of the Sinhalas and the Illi, jority of the Tamils and laid its military capability open to ridicule, The Sri Länkan Tamils hal Wc been split with at least a few thousand immediately becoming India's 1iability on India. Il soil
At the end of his : Tguilents to prove that the Indian expedition to Sri Lanka had not all bcem i Ti Wain, MT. Subrahmanyam too could not but Coller a sage advice: "By all means, let us decide that we shall think many times in future before sending our forces into il foreign country, even at their invitition."
; of Sri
|Ot"a
geritic I t0 Say untry's venture nka solve its ex1ic - probleIum by II-1 diam troops un with a ba Ing with a whimper, "iticis II filling :: t li l Lld hi is : Ċily ma de Sri Lanka December 2, is
into the jungles wamps of Tristic and without sh what it was lo. The Rajiv. i particularly reealings with the S I70 W the T1 () st lominant of the ups, which was i’s fall w rollTitic III
after the Rajiv - cord Lilder which ce Keeping Force
Lanka
(IPKF) was despatched to the island republic.
Clearly, Mr Rajiv Gandhi and his advisers leither Inis read the LTTE's intentios or had in un realistic notion of their capacity to Take it fall in line. In any case, it was odd that instead of being a guarantor of am El greement between the Sri Lankan government El Ind the LTTE, the two parties to the disput c, India signed an accord with the Jaye war dene government, leaving the LTTE free to wash its hands of the Whole thing,
Ironic Change
No WOIlder the chickens st: TLed ca Ining home to roost even before the iTık öTı the agreement was dry. Til Inext to II, o time, there was an ironic change in the IPKF's role. It had glne as a protector of the Tal mills
15

Page 18
in general and the LTTE in particular: it now found it neccessary to turn it.5 gu Ils on the recalcitant LTTE. This time the army obviously overestimaled its ability to tame the Tigers. It thought it could do so within weeks, if not days. Bll L is 3O-111th bitter War. With the LTTE retailed largely inconclusive. This should hal Vc bcc in forestell because the critics L Was betwee T1 a regula T är my Lip Craiting out side its national frontiers and a highly motivated guerilla Force, secure in its inaccessible hide-outs.
Today, the LTTE is even more dů minut thur im 1987, The EPRLF, which New Delhi had tried to build up als a coluInterwailing force, has fizzled out not-With ständing its control ÖVer the In orth-eastern provincial colul ilcil, gained though an election LLLLLS S S LLLLL S LLLLS CC HHHLHHLSLSLHLaLLL because of the LTTE's boycott.
On its paTt the IPKF has sacrifice di no fewer than l, 150 lives for the sake of preserving
Sri Lankan unity. But it is Linlikely tČð get Illi Elly thank5 eithe T i 1 Sri Lailka Ort e vel this Collit Ty.
A mong Sri Lanka's Sinhald majority the 1987 accord a Tid the IPKF we Te ncwer popular,
President Jayeward cine's OWI) attitude towards them was at best 111hivalent. But ås i signal LOTy to the accord and because of hi5 mai Iny insecuritics, hic could not resile from it, not that he did not try to settle with the LTTE 'behind India's back. However, un til 15 late as MayJune 1988, when I acco IL1 pa nied
the then defence minister, Mr, K. C. Paint, to Colombo, there were many Sinhala opinion
makers candid enough to admit that though the presence of the IPKF hurt" their 'self-respect'', they would not be able to cope with their problems if the IPKF was suddenly withdraw I.
This situation began to chilmge slowly, as the IPKF's Inission was prolonged, and dramatically after the succession to MT Jayewardene by president Pгепафasa, who had, as prime minister, relentlessly opposed thic Indo
f
Sri
St.
Sinhala Opinic
Mr Pirc IIa disa, in galvanising S against the IPF m{iki Tìg C'{1 TT1 TT10l II dia. With the i Il te T1 a tiÕlilil, e: Asian, feelings “inter Welti II" successfully to minds of Mr. numerous critics rest is history need Tecolul II till g.
Llirik, 3 CC
וטwil , חם זיHow F done, it would fair to overlook twe 5 ile C f L hic ints merit speci
First, to use pression, the bic bull Tor the 1998 IPKF. S. Lil have been ill THle Sri La 1 kali T could It live Whill the Indi to bring to hele
In fatt, il cii Tilt, thält i Ti Lח טייWh Hit it W halilis of the I might mot have "','" til MIT PTET Of course, Inc. Silch. El 5 ettli le ached it that between the LT Länkan är med f place or that Пth Felim OI i Eeläimi cofie Any of these yet occur bec Premiai: evid he can cuts Illar Teverse might w
The see tid b If the IT dia ni La I1 ka is 10 le concerns prima itself. By July ings in Tallil plight of Lank si i Inflamed I New Delhi's pi ccrtainly have explosion and 5 Coulthern stätte.

:ord ft) [1] the
list 10 time i Thala pilion KF and III dia. cause against LTTE, rousing specially South against Indian and ppctling the hearts and Rajiv Gandhi's Il | Illil. Tilc [ ] ["::it T. i,
1 all is said all be grossly un
: the other, pɔsicoin, Two pc
al at telti Cil.
an Americilin CXit to in line is that accord Id the kit wild it ine piece today, | security forces
decima ted Llo se iain air my failed
ke ca. Il ble II de the absence of through at the PKF, the LTTE agreed to parley dasa. There is, guarantee that In L would be Te:: | blodshed "TE Ind the Sri orces would take there would be lt lé:15t a Titlito the orth. tragedies could lu5& While Mr. ently thinks that t L le LTTF, the well happen.
en efici 1 fall l-ÜLIL
Wel ELIT e il SST SS important aindi Fily this country 1987, the feelNadi owe the an Tillis Were hat i maç til 71 it would almost caused a major upheaval in the
It may seen heartless to say so but the fact remains that events during the last two and a half years, especially the LTTE's in transigence Hindi El Trog ance, in both Sri Lanka and Talil Nadu, has seen to it that renewed slaughter in Sri Lanka's Il orth-east, whetler by thic Lal Ilka. It alled forces () is a result of intra-Taniill wiolence, would not makic mål. Il y pe C plc in Tamil Nadu lose their sleep
It should also be noted that the withdrawal of the last IPKF contingent has coincided With Colombo's decision I to shut down the Isreai interest section in the A Im eric:II1 eIı1 bassy i n STi Lanka. Evidently, even behind the si Ima okcs crecil of Co Werblow 1 anti-Indial In Thctoric, thė Te is greater respect for India Il se IIsitivities in Colomb 0 than I might have been thought possible.
Against this backdrop, whit äTc the les so Is this Colintry Call TW TT-3 III its ST i Lillk: :x- perience? In the first place, while it is imperative that India should be extremely careful about accepting responsibilities beyond its shores, disappointment II Sri La Ilkä Illu St Ilot meam abdication of resp 11 Sibilities from which India just Cal TNTit it tSca բt.
It is amazing that Mr. In der Gujral's statement some Weeks ag), that India. Would not intervicine militarily "anywhere under a my circu Tista inces'', has ew okcdi very little comment. Utmost callution in interve Elling ewen in areas of vital concern to this country is of course called for, BLI LI LI TILL Le Collit Indial. Il iTt'CTW CI1tion althogether, regardless of conscquences to Indian security or supreme interests, is just not
Is this country repudiating unilaterally the treaty with Bhutan under which it is obliged to go to Bhutan's help when Bhuta nese Security is threatened? Should New Delhi hawe rejected the distress call of the Maldivics in November 1988 w len president Gayoom was being overthrown by mercenaries? ArcTn’t si Imilar contigencics likely to arist ill future

Page 19
Second Lesson
The second important lesson to learl foll the Sri Liliki Interludie is h0 W I10 L LO IIlake policy on sensitive issues. There is In Cothi Ing te show that any systematic and longterm study of the Talil situation in Lal. ka's Iorth-east or of the inteltil Ils of the LTTE WES ewer Illade. Worse, policy on Sri Lanka became a Inonopoly of a few in the PMO. The foreign
officc was left il the cold. () RAW, 1 hic age
intellige Ilce, WE duly large role: low cd to Inc. which sh Could : its cúis liticsin. Coi II. wccn. Jafna, Cl. Delhi vcrc slo 1 time, RAW, thi sty of exterial high commissic fırtıcti, qırıcıl 3ıt cT;
Return of
Ramesh Menon
he early morning sul glowed in the sky as the last batch of over 2,000 IPKF jawan5 in Trincomalee tied up theit bags and boarded the troop-catrier INS Magar con March 24. As the ship flanked by Indian Navy frigates began its jou. They to the faire Well Strai[15 0F allld lang sy Tie played by the STi Lankan armed forces, a cotroversial chapter in Indian diplomacy came to in end.
"We came as a proud force and are leaving as a proud Force”" slid IPKF C0 I1 Illa Ilder Lt-General A. S. Kakat as lhe joined his tro Caps un board, But among the Weary Indian javans, the predUInir1:111t seT|- timent was of relicf as they bid good-bye to the island, where for over two years they had been engaged in a gruelling bush war with LTTE militants. In the process theyd see 1,155 of their contactics ki II ed and 2,984 w Coll Inded.
And for their efforts, they'd invited flik from both Indian disse Inters and Sri Lanka. Il politiciil 15, Defence Minister Ralin Wirille, in fact, had th Te: teled th;il is the IPKI did not le:ı ve Qoll its ) 'wId, the Sri Lankan Air Tiny w Couldi hawe to evict it. Latc., he tried to Illa ke a Erlends, going so far ais to say that he was grateful to the IPKF for responding to
the
his country's ca banquet in hon the poshi Taj S CCCImb c. 115 rat ne apologise lsptTSi3I15: טtIl the IPKIF fillt pulsions”.
Now wit El til Sri Lanka, the ing rout a prili the eth mit is President Rail iisa. On Ma da sil offer cd || integrity and LII and TT lill. Til
ha 5 expresse di the peace in list, th: gr) LIT
dic: Le:S the Wi
Following the Te LTTE :: c) Introll illi the east. Sindbags behind by the man med by the posts have be strategic point: guarded offices and its politi People's Front Tigers (PFLT) Nissalını alınd wans, filled wit weari Ing their uniforms, move CCIE la lee, Wawu IT and Kili Ichich

out practically in the other hand. 1cy for external 1$ given arı 11 n = : il Was ĉe Weil aldie in affairs Il ver llaw been | 11 unications bcLIn his and New W. Most of thc : artırılıy, the Timinifairs and lhe у П П Columbo oss purposes with
Tigers
ll. At a private IT If IPKF | illud Tal hotel i II fortnight, Wijed profusely for Hile hild clist (C) In Sr political com
IPKF It us of Worktical Solution tC. 5ue rests With asinghe PreinaTch 25, Prellarayers for the ity of Sri La Tikal 1 ough Wijera tine the hope that the island will Id situatic T1 i 11
St.
= IPKF pull-out, Tdres have taken Il Carth Ll the :lidi b lil Ikers left IPKF are being Tigers; checkeIn 5 et lupo El L 5 ind HeavilyCT te LTTE cal wing, the Of Liberation hawe sprung up, Pajero pick-up h a Tilled cadres newly designed : a Tould Triniya, Point Pedro
.
One a Ilother.
Moreover, New Delhi illowed Madras to ITILIch le e Willy i 1 lillising with the LTTE and other groups of Lankan Tamils. The la te Mr. M. G. Ramal chandaran used this for his political and personal advantage to the detriIll of Ilational interest. Mr. Karu Ina nidhi's recent parleys with Lanka. In Tamil groups in Madras, not New Delhi, caused further elle til ST i Lill kall With Collt producing illny other result.
As ligg Tessive-lÇok i Ing cadres patrol the areas, the police and the Sri Lankan Army stand by, not wanting a confrontation. l Il Ka Likes Flinth lura i iIn the la flfna peninsula, the police say they are under explicit orders of the LTTE to police only certain places, Says Kailash, 2, 3, LTTE CorganiscT: "The police have to take the LTTE's
permission if they want to
move around in the Odducud
it ill.
Flag and posters of the
LTTE ald the PFLT dominate the areas and it seems as if no other political party exists. Restaurants and street-crile TS play the group's patriotic songs and speech es pri:Lising n.1 a rtyrs and explaining why and how they fought the cause of the Tal Iilils all these years, Area leaders of the LT TE h0 ld dur
bars on local problems and even preside over peoples CO LIITL5.
Clutching a wireless set LTTE political leader Ruchen, 30, arbitrates on people's Woes,
Incidentally, over the past few
weeks nearly 500 people have expressed their regret to Rueben for their previous links
With other. Til 111il militant groups like the EPRLF and the ENDLF.
With II ost Ililitants help Пg
ing to these gir coups hawi Ing fied to India and other places
7

Page 20
in fear of the Tigers, the peo
ple are convinced that it is the LTTE that will rule thic roost. And the Tigers are busy
recruiting new cadres. Among th cm is 13-year-old Dincsh, With a cyan die capsulė slung aT und his neck. In Jaffna, it is a comITon sight to see uniformed girls belonging to the LTTE travelling (i) 1 tWWII) - Wohl, Cell [5 through the town, toting AK 47s, magazines and grenades.
And there are no signs that the Tigers had for the past two and a half years waged a
bitter battle with one of the largest armies in the world. While the IPKF claims the
LTTE lost 2,000 personnel in the opcrations, thic Tigers maintain only 683 died.
Now, moves are a foot by the LTTE to secure more arms. In the war-ravaged coastal town of Wellwettit hurai in Jaffna district, the Sea Tigers, the LTTE's
naval unit, had scist off a mechanised boat to Nagapatti Tim i Ti Tamil Nadiul to collect arms. Also, the LTTE
has been unearthing arms hidden by other groups beføre they fled the country. The idea is to be in a commanding position in case they return, LTTE's commander Mahathaya, however, thinks the chances are reIn ote as even the people are screaming for their blood for indulging in large-scale Ioогіпg.
The contrast with the earlier days, when EPRLF, PLOTE and TELO had a commanding presence in the island, is stark. Today, the empty offices of these groups presents a pitiable sight. In some places, the LTTE has taken charge of the offices. Says Sid thadhan, leader of PLOTE: “There is going to be serious trouble now. No group will be allowed to exist.'
The Tigers have Categorically ruled out surrender of weapons, saying that the security of the North Eastern Province depends On their retaining arms. LTTE ideologue Anton Bala singham's statement that it was not feasible to surrender arms without
S.
ensuring securit and the cist,
mockery of W. that he was goi L:1T k:1 : gUnles:
But following elevation to thi political party, test the provi promised by Pi is a disti II cL cha Ewell the taxes T. Is W. Cl Hie PFLT TOT I ple". Tigers car tid) Ted On high trucks carrying of security per: phant Pais 5 lin. peni T1 stila with island is full 1: hersוחשוון טTh 5h00 s al Id est collect taxes, the lates bank blusi:55 me all
STiL:1T1k:1T1 T:IIT1 the UK, the L the Gulf.
Says Balasingh Cáin Llot a fford : the LTTE. IL record of illma any further as rupt the flow The Sri Linkin nt Coitain lis Way is to take to Imaking peac
Though the է y el Ll PTE II el I El Ild the L'I up hopes of p illusions of il Political obse LTTE is just reorganise itself пеw legitimacy : lot -box. It’s 5 til
fir II itself i 3 sentative of the and the dellan
As Col. In ba wi the de Inland, il tı of frightening I
StELI
Asks Sal Tm Tam MP, pessimistica
be peace sole bi mut tu, Who

y of the II orth has III a de a ijera tine’s stand Ing to II lake Sri 5 CoլIntry.
g the LTTE's stature of El Which Will C0Ili liti:Il electioIIs CD1:1 dl SA, there Inge in approach. levied by them i donations to serving the peo1 ble seen posiWay 5, stopping
goods. Instead Illel, the Eleking the Jaffna the rest of the of LTTE Inc. lso go around
blishilcīts
equipped with bala Inces of top professionals. lowing in from ils il Australia, JS, France Ill
al III : **Sri La Ilkä I 13 ther Wallir yw i LHill :: I1 Ihet hy its In Tights Stained it. Inight interif foreign aid. A TT1 y als o camSi the best a new approach
Wit Is."
1011 eymoon bet1a da sa GovernTE has thro) wedi 1eace, few Have lasting long. Wers 5 ally thc Llyi Ing time to and acquire a through the balEl tegy is to alfthe real Te preTa Tmil people id for at in Eelam. 11 hot agree to armed struggle Toporti 0Ils Will
binuLLu, EPRLF lly: " " Will there
day?"' + Tamaba. Il donci his
mansio II in Battical of after it was looted day after day for a whole week by LTTE cadres, has launched a virulent attack against the LTTE in Parliament. Accusing the group of piling arms for an ar med combat and selling the dream of an independent country, he has released a list of items being taxed by the LTTE and said the people had to be a silent witness to such extortion is the Goyer IIIlle I11 was toch wicck to act,
Meanwhile, the focus of the LTTE VET the LSL Te Wa Weeks has becil on organising the PFLT. Daily Ileetings-addressed by the leaders like Mahathaya and Yogiratnam Yogi, PFLT general secretary - are drawing eager crowds. The leaders do not di rcctly talk of Eelam, but the spirit of an in
dependent land is present in the speech c5.
Last frt night, pel Kasi Anından drew applause at a PFLT meeting in Wayuniya
when he said that any foreigher could capture his land, but
could not rule over it. They could defeat the peoplc, but could not destroy then. At Killi Ilchichi, Mulli tiyu, Batti
Calcia, Pullu malai, Waka Ta and KELIlmu nai, Yogi Tawcd that India had sig in cd an accord not to protect the life and property of Tails, but to secure its gt:(J-p Clitic{1} interests, T THTThis WTë Tëmilde Lf 1(W over the past four decades they have been discriminated against in job, education and other areas. The stress is clearly on the Tanil identity and territoTill integrity – the platform. In which the LTTE hopes to ride to power.
The EPRLF provincial governII. It in Trico Imalee - which had the blessings of the IPKF - Surprised everyone on March whic In thic Wara da raja Perlu Imalled NOTth East Provincial Collcil cc) Instituted itself i Il to the national state assembly of Frce and Sovereign Democratic Republic of Eela II) – a step short of actually declaring a scpara te State.
(Cary firstre cara page 23)

Page 21
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Page 22
፲፰፻፰ The philosophy
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with a heart 00 houses to be 82 and now Wards a arget. invites s to offer
"eryone.

Page 23
CONFLCT - A Social
Dayan Jayatil leka
" ...... Fror7I the starldoir of the basic ideas of Marxisriri, the iviTerests of 50 cial de l'eloporrera dare higher thar the infereris oy The дrolefагідн."
W. I. Lenin Collected Works
When I was informed of the title of this seminar, I thought to myself, 40 odd years after British Colonialism and we haven't lost olur penchant for British understatement. We use the term 'Social Lin rest' in a situation which is characterised by What the London Economist calls the World's deadliest War. In fact. We have two wars, two civil Wars raging in this country rende Ting us fit for the description by Professor Ralph Bultjens as probably the most Willent society on the face of the earth today, I think we should take El close lok at thic types of conflict. I prefer the term “conflict' to unrest'' because that is precisely what it is - a cluster of very violent antagonis Is and conflicts. We must i temize the Lype 5 of conflicts that we find in this tiny IC 311 pact is lil El di CT ou Ts. Because if We dio not look at and differentiate between the types of conflict we would be still stuck in the same old grove of talking about capitalism, dependent capitalism, "the economic system produced un rest and so on and So forth - the old thinking, which I think deser wes to be located in some kind of airconditioned museum these days.
What we have here is the concentration of almost every single type of conflict that you could find in any state. You have inter-state and intra-state conflicts, that is conflicts located within the state and conflicts between this state and another. Obviously I refer to India. Then you hawe various subdivisions Within these two broad catcgories of 'inter' and 'intra and 'intra"-state conflicts. Taking
Excerts Unrest and 1 sored by til (OPA.)
Th 3 oth Prof. Kingsl and M. Mi Studies. Of
the easiest, the flicts between
Il dia Col the
halwe the contT: 5i 15–ve TY Seri oli di July 29th Le Celtri CC lombo lid the Indii, The Il of the resistance Liberation Tige
a II against thi
Keeping Forces two types of
In il-L 11 kl. Il Tel When we spel Conflict We h:1 the 5 o wereignity
kin State froII the IPKF, we
to territorial int Lankan State p the 5ccessi Trist Cyp T Lu Sisältilist ENDLF seriollsly We la to state power
system. By tlı I10t Mi eitil till systen (in tert: relations) but t system which is
er, fait more p: capitalist syste tlrcat that WH think, is still Jam: tlh. Wimuk
Thus, Sri La past has witne: tr til) Il of of Çiflicts a II which lost so called hird w a te lot to be bination. If yol

Democratic Perspective
from la presentation at the Seminaron "Socia| he Youth - Solutions and Perspectives" spon he Organisation of Professional
ar speakers were Gamini ey De Silva, Dr.
Hh a fa I.
ASSOC:ia tidos
Dissa na yake M. P., Wickramabah LI Kárunaratne
intra 5 tate Cl
The Writer is Director, Conflict the Institute of Policy Studies.
pines, för instance there is a
Sri LiLinka and one hand you dictions, the temColls tÇ I 15 i 1s äT| 1989 ELy:: weTiment of CoGovernment of CYLI Tsey CLI have war waged by the 5 of Tamil Eele Indian Peace i. Sc} Th CTE: Te :) I fi Wifi tl i I a tins :15 it Were, .k Çif intri) 5'titt We the LEl Telt. In of the Sri Lanthe presence of hH. We the threat egrity of the Sri Osed variously by Tigers and the EPRLF a in El lly and IT1 Cost we had the threat itself :ılıd to the e "system' I do y the capitalist Ils Of ECOL10ITic the democratic sol Llething broadIs of our Ilid tha. Il thit Ill. This is the is posed and 1 posed by the hlii Ptera. IIluna.
Ilıka in the Tecell ssed the conce 1number of types id's contradictions :it:tics in the so OTill aire for LLIIlbeset by, in conI take the Philip.
very strong anti systemic insurgency waged by the NPA and the secessionist i Ilısu Irgency Waged by the Moro movenent. But there is no serious threat to national Sowereignity als is posed by recent state of IndoLankan relations. Societies like Peru, hawe very powerfull interIlal, insurgencies, but do not have the other two types of threats, of secessionism and the threat to national independence, I think we must grasp the specificity of the Sri Lankan Crisis - namely, that We have been so unfortunate or We have behaved in such a way as to make ourselves the cockpit of all these various types of conflict and tension that any political system can be threatened by,
Now I Ilus sy that I ilm not at all satisfied With the received wisdom, and the standard in cırı ta tioIns " of I 110st of us in the opposition, that it is the socio-economic model plursued by the United National Party since 1977 that is responsible for the type of conflict LLLLLL S LLLL LS S LSL S HLLSS LC S S LLL LLa0S sing. I am not satisfied by that. I say this with what I believe are fairly firm anti UNP crede Intials as som cb0dy, perhaps the only person in this auditorium who has been chargċd on 14 counts under the UNP regime-14 counts under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, including conspiracy to overthrow the Static through violence. Now I say that I am not satisfied
21

Page 24
with this standard explanation Illot because I a 11 mot a Inti-systellic, but becallse it d'Oès 110t explain to Ile the kind of violence, the type of conflict that We hawe bee Il victims of im the геcent past. If it were primarily Cor Ilmainly thic socio-c conomic system that was responsible for the JVP violencic, then I would want to know why it was that the Janatlla Willi u kthi Per mu na And the DJW rcs ortcd to Violence first of all against the parties of the Left in mid 86 when thcy participated in the Political Parties Conference (PPC) for some kind of political solution to thic ethnic war. That was the first manifestation of ared violence. The first use of Ict hall violcIcc, the first assassination by the JWP was of : very poor student Daya Pathirana, a radical leftist, not a member of the old left or the traditional left, a leader of the Independent Students Union, a Wery militani anti-UNPer, a young southern student who was abducted and his throat cut on Dece II ber 15th of 1983. Now I Want to know, why the first targets of lethal violence at the hands of the JWP were preisely those of the Left. Now this does not un can that the JWP was primarily anti-left er was not motivated by anti-systemic in pulses. What I a II saying is that it brings the no closer to the truth to say that, you had this bad system, capitalist, UN P, authoritaria Tl etc. HTid it bred the JWP, for these Te:15 ans à Ind dille to those cha Tacteristics,
And I do not agree that the JWP can be seen as a part of the petty bourgeois youth rebelli C). In Which was cilde Llic in the Third World in the post-war period. Because in Inost of those countries—particularly i In Latin W T1 e Tical, but als i I LE1: Philippines-the guerrilla Inovellents aTe IL orally and ethically far Superior to the system that they
try to over throw. If you take the recent offensive by the FMLN in San Salvador you
Will find their treatment of the Civilia, 1 population to have been exemplary. It is the State that
22
Tesorte di ti le Tii ai 15 Le civili: Salvador. You
the Salvid Till
la tēTally declar ceasesi Te exterild Illas to the Ney,
Nyoy if We do the difference belli Il in Sri rebellions, We stand why our found. Because w cric Clewll t. to, ra. In parallel rilla IIc wellents us would not difficultics in III Certainly I Illy have had the k. moral, ethical
live in the ci Becall Lusic tieni IT are anti-system been with, or is sympathetic to
Blut here Il SII willian populati sionals, the
people, the pi working peopl trapped by two OIle the State the anti-Slate must Be Said ti of the anti-S bccn WCT5 : ethical, civilis point of wiew Stätc. Thc SLga Tot like it, within a certai L) TILLI LT1 CCD1 get freign aid investment. 1he strained to El huIll:111 Tighlls the West, by Some shred of This is why w have OPA Im this is why w to talk here. the case with type of anti-sy. which I would Il el II of bar prefer, of Sri L
Nid yw llunless why the respo capitalist deve development iii

Ill bombings agL 11 : reis i I1 SA 1 Will fillid tät FMLN hal 5 unied an 11 day ing from Christ
YFT,
i mot Linderstand bet Weel the TeLinka Hпd thuse Will Tidt undercrisis is so proIf IT Tebelli Üli , were " similar to, such gllerthen many of h:1ye hold Sich aking our choice, self would not ind of political, problems that I 1rre Il situati On. 1ä my cof us who lic w build hawe upp Cortive of, UT , the guerrillas. i Lanka, the cion, the profes
Tiddle class La cor people, the le, h:1wש - tוושט נ HT med vil nguHTds. and the other forces. And it IFוהזזוtilla bell H 11:ו El te forces has fr CII a II Coral, ia tik 13äl, cult L1 rall tläп Illit Uf the te, though it Imay hals to Opocrate In systein. It has 10 Illy, it has to , it has to get refore it is cocertain degrec by consciousness ill hic I1cc to HıHy: the Rule of Law. fel y Were able: [[ ] e Cting5 list yttl T,
c äre still å ble But thilt is 10t this partic Lil: T
ste mic. Im Livement,
term the phic noEl rism or if y Colli ankan Polpotism.
we Lur der Sta Ill d nse to dependent lopment or under1 Sri Laikal was
what is lost Wrong With
that in Latin America and the Philippines. We Will Il öt LI Elder's La Ild What is Wrong With our Society. Ald, if wwe do lot , L11 de Ista Indi
11 society, we will not be able to redress those wrongs. So, I think that when you go beyond the cold expla Ila tory I til Codel of capitalist system vs. anti-system yılı will understand that thc type
differe It fırılı
of educational policies, the type of culture and political cultLII Te that we hawe had his been responsible for the type
of exterminism that has chara Cterised oli T Conflict over the last few years.
SANS ENGLISH
I Will not go in to the pro - bichs related to education because they have bec11 dealt with by Professor Kingsley de Silva and others on this platform Il di I Halwe also writte. In about it recently in thic Sturday, Observer. But let The just pose one Ür two Julestion 5. Imagine what y Coll would bic, what cach of us would be if we did not
know English. What we are, What We have el Tilt, Whit We Flave becOIlle What We have achieved - in agine what We
would have bee I like had Welt
beer able to read and speak in English; if we did not have the access to knowledge, to
1 iterature that we hawe hadi becluse Of
ou I knowledge of this internitional läl. T1 g lL13age. Once you imagine that, then
you will understand where these kids are coming from. Go One step further. In agile what the Christial T1 clergy would hawe been like if over the centuries they did not in fact know La Lin and Greek. Wc know that the Christi: Il c1crgy has the benefit of it certain kind of El 5 choll'5lic Ciliciation. Earlier they knew Greek and Latin and now the other international la Igll Elges, therefore they have
been Hble to ElbSOrb War 101JS developments in philosophy, iI science, 1I1 literature, - if only to climb at the Ill in
some cases. But if you take our Buddhist clergy, with some exceptions they are devoid of

Page 25
that access to knowledge. Therefore they are devoid of that knowledge. Thus they have the same mindset perhaps of the Catholic clergy during the Spanish Inquisition. I all not "CITI SLI Te of that. So, for them, what they've been taught is real. The myths are real. Dutlugemu nu and Elara are their conteInpora Ties. This whole thing about Sri Lankā, this mythics ed histry is real to them. Because they do not k I now any difference. So, if you take a Inonolingual youth. pl115 this Tactor Lf the Blddhist clergy then you will undie Ts ta 11d why thıc bäcklish t) the Tamil insurgency took the for that it did. These two insurgencies have been feeding C e On the Cher,
I ask myself why is it that the Moro secessionist struggle in the Philippines did not generate the kind of majoritarian backlash that it did in Sri Lanka in July
1983. I ask my struggle did not civilians the wa gle did from
fact from Ikokili for the Tamil II and the Sinhala terrinus. This i Sinhillese, had : tյr thnLight we
State, with ეf "5ნ.
T. E.g.
Return of..
FIfFIEEE
Indii, Was qui in clear terms ill support of : stite in any affir led its fai of Sri Lall kä dil 10t want already mis un
The Analysis of Pre-Co in Asia in the Wr
Dr. R. A. L. H.
Professor Peraderтїy:
Article in Reprint Serie
WTi
Social Scientis
1296A, Nawala
ԸՃ|Ճ|
or for said,

Self why the Moro
larget Philippino y the ta Inil strug
An Luradha pura in i onwards, Because lilitants, the State . People Were co15 beca Lise ve, the apt II Ted' the State had captured the he transformation
ζονΙτίrIIιεί,
{!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!#18}
ick til) a nii 13 u lice Lihat it was, Llo a separate Tal IInil
the troubled island. Meanwhile, Perumal and his council members vanished. That India had backed Perumal at one time is today scor ned by Sri Lanka.
The future of the surf-washed pictures que island continues to hang like a question mark. The ethnic trouble in the island Imay b c lunder wraps at the Imo II ent, but the peace
lowing Sri Lanka is apprehensive that the powder-keg will explode any time, ''The time
has com: for every Tamil family to give off one of their sons to the LTTE,' says retired government officer W. Siva linga, 58, of Trinc connale e whose son Rawi, 28, has abandoned his medical studies to be with the LTTE to fight for the respect of Tamils'
The time bomb, he says, con獸 "R", tinu es to tick. Wery few in Clearly Ää the north and the east Would tip Hidd to disbelieve him. Herstood roc i Iau - :f Try
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Page 26
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Page 27
WWEM W TAWWWWWWG AFOARLWIMMY
Marx interview
Martin Jacques
herc was a knock on the
door. "Come in,” I called. It was the nilo II ent for which I had been waiting. He was slightly shorter than I had expected but no less imposing, with long hair, now mainly grey, and a bcard. His complexion was rather darker than I imagined. Of course, I thought: "The old Moor.' I offered him a seat, thanking him for Inaking time for the interview. He shrugged his shoulders, looked at the tape recorder with so Inc puzzlement, and waited for me to begin :
“Mr. Marx yol 14'rofe in the Cornnitrist Manifesto, or the eve of the I845 revoluriori, tha: “A specirë is harrit ing Europe, the spectre of communisri.' The spectre hauriting Europe now looks more like capira
FI."
I began to cxplain what had happened in 1989, but hic interrupted with some i II) patien Ce. "I know, I know. I have been following events, I don't sleep while an in the Reading Room. Of course, I thought, seat G7. As he seemed Well up with the news I hastily revised my interview,
If What do you think of 1989. Is it the end of corpiiri Sri ?"
“Fascinating. A remarkable year. In soille respects it is like 1848. An irresistable popular ntrie5נורט rlt in sö IIlalIlyטIIlטייmo all at the sa file time. Blit this time the revolutions will probably survive. They are revolutions for democracy. I think 1989 is the eld of 1917. It is the eld of the era of the Russian RewolutiCT. I all afraid it has failed."
"I 'as taker (EIR. E." is 'ilFingresis foje rison] so nin tuch of 11'hoat', affert all, was dorze ir his rere, "" 3 f, " I respor deed, "' fra FF YWie la se 18ó05 ya yourself"looked to Rusia as the rost likely carididate for rey III fiori.”
The Yriter is Editor, Marxism Today)
I also writic a Russian Revolu the signal to il p ution in the We: would complem. (preface to a new Of the Coryl F1 F1 lor nearly happened most a revoluti. I European countr immediately afte Wat, Tot leis! clist. But it And then Russia a country with a tariat and no d tio ) 1. It WELS a TE authoritarian reg exactly what hap! visaged socialis emancipation, and the ower whil But in Tact iL b sit c, It Wall s S mame of the pe h:Inds of a small
Brr it was dori "" ,"tנץtTrח "זוז טין זזת
“ “So, what," El i5 m. bicca Inc la 1: ti 15- This Wals it lookiel a gbe was that it bec; It became the C other schools, li Second 1пtcTпаt into ou ter darkn municiaticdi. As Marxism, Which the West, bcca ciated with thc wardness, with
isil Was estal cracy. That wa
! Il'I5 5 !! rprises FESF, E3 Ver, philosopher first cond, in spire of . girl we int Highliġi pshed Fir frficie FF5f fiske For Fe ' r ii'i do re i7 ľ Fiere 14 čl," či "I ľTči is ir. 'If irr
**II l5tre 55 history and the sociallism, w ga

with Engels that |tion might "give Tletaria. In Tewait, so that both ilt each other' Russian edition Manifesto). That . There was al1. Il a mlı liber of ies in the years the First World Germany, of was not to be. was on its own, very small prolecm) ciTatic trildi2cipe for a cruel ime. And that 15 pencd. We enF () 15ח חטL ון 1 וון self-management alming majority. came thic oppoocialis II in the bple, but in the
minority.'
e l'ith your ideas,
e replied "Marxy different tradiOne, ind at first r. The problem L Ille ffig Marxism. ficial line. All ke those of the ional, were cast, CS5, WTC CXC COITa ct) In 58 գլIence had grown up in cindelibly as soEast wit. El backcspotis Dtı. Socia - ged from demos a tragedy.'
by Marx's frankPerhaps he was a "rid a partisar sehas it says or his afe Cerrietery, I r; 'But surely you responsibility for Four Harrie, surely женf authoritariaλιμι αρκ. "
On Lle laws of inevitability of e credece to a
certain sclf-righteousn css, an clitism, the idea that the end justified the meaning. But you can't seriously hold Ine Stalin, for God's silkc',
““ BEI dide 'r your ca i'r Flyle of debate and poleratic set a rather blad exaři ple to your follorers ? I. vas Friarked by a degree of intolerance Iphich was Imitated by many, including Leniri."
Marx lookcd annoyed. Gesticulating wigorously, he said: 'It was the culture of my time, especially in the refugee circles in London. Anyway, I can't be blii med for the behavio LIr of others wholl new crilet.'
** Irif your writinig yw'r sir y sociatlisri as the inevitable consequence of capitalist. If you said it a thousand finie F. You wrote with extraordinary insight abour capitalismi, such thar today many people who would never dream of calling ther71 selve F Marxīsts are ir ierīced by vor ides. You wrote Hitch about revolutions, particularly 1848 and the Paris Coiminturie. And yet you wrote preLLLLSLLLS LLL LLLLLS S S LallLLLSLLLLHHLSLGH the Bolsheviks took power, they inherited little riore ha d ha ri piece of Paper'.
"I suppose we assumed that when the moment arrived, it would be relatively clear what ccd cd to b c dome, We weTe guilty, I guess, of a certain utopianism. It would be all right on the night. The Other Teason was that it lewer secim cd like thic main priority. It al Ways lay somewhcrc in the fu turc. Understanding capitalism was always more important than dreaming about socialism."
*OK, ther, let's talk about capitalism. Kou made va predictions. First, capital would become increasirgly concer fra tead, flar se pri var e Patre of its appropriation l’ould becorre 771 ore (I Fall Friare 777 rife, Sr. Arad secord, the industrial proletariat would grow to represent the vast тајority of the родиІarfол, алtї thereby be core the cer Iral agency
25

Page 28
of a ney Society, socialisri. Noy The laf terjist hasrı't happerred: The industrial prolétariat Is Ploilo corfr" ir ag rapidly. A "If the i Tyrkirig popularson, sar fror beconsing niore f{r77 (geros, las ir Wract groi'r frcreasingly her erageous.'
" "Let's b c c ! ea T about the history first. After I faded from the scene, the indus trial proletariat continued to grow with great speed right across Europe. This was true un til afteT 1945. It was only in the 1950s that the industrial working class began to decline as a proportion of the workföITCC. MC Telci ve T, it had be colle stel dily mo Te o Tgal mised, I Te class-conscious, just as we had e Invisaged."
"Your account is valid for Europe, if r of So Fitch else 'ere - the U.S. for example,'
"True. But we didn't get the US right more generally. Anyway, that aside, l accept that since the 1950s or thereabouts, the prediction about the growing prepon dera n cc of thc industrial proleta riat began to come List lick. It is now clica T that the growth of the prolctrit Was the characteristic of a specific era rather than a permanent tre Tid. Now it is in dccline. By the end of the century, it will co III prise less than 20 per cent of the Working population in this country."
"Exactly. Which neans rhat Viri ile for sa period you 14'ere right about the cer rrality of the working class as ar agency of charge, har era is over. The Working class is ir declive. Your his foric agency of socialism is o riore."
"I agrce. This was our greatest mistake, For a period we got it right. In fact we got it right for SCI11: 70 years or so after I bowed out. That was no mean achievement. But no longer, history has e Yen caught up with Cold Marx. What is more, I fear it means our concept of socialism needs rethinking. What does socialism mea In Without its central agency ?
I guess it's back to the drawing board.
gait, I lists strick by Marx's Willingness to look facts in the face, e veri l'her they strick at the"fordat fors of his thought. I said as r77 Tachi
2
to hiri, (Irid he re. sava Irste rrosta: L ľa Idrij II "}" čJI J 71 a har e verij'tirIg"). sorre thriciar.
partiaT Ta I lit f le r porded erithusia sti mild surprise that couldn't ford b.
He contin Lled: discussed one of Lions. It seems t was T e Tim Tkal bly : ever the tendi dece11tralisatic)', mics, there has be concentration of at the great glo Furthermd Te, I that capitalis III W ary system. I new it had exhaus Lei though I admit e" sed by its vitality |litlf of the 20LH է:
'It is illy turn tings to you.' ' cal It exist Wii revolutionising til production, and tions of produc thic thic while ciety. Constal of production, Ll turb): Ticc bf :ill s ever lasting uncer tion distinguish epoch from alle fixed, fist-frozc1 TleiT tTåi II of : II able prejudices a SWe Fi Way . . . ; III litiltis into air.' A Tid I WTC te thi before my work Ildt i bad descri de ca de !"
"Tere 7. d Fils rk{Thly (7 CCI, roi fit Hir of Capital rriore Isari Tryorie erced how people day. At the 5 (1. cro'r p lefel y lly rider city to adapt, to rising standard of didn't really Ilirik referra, of the corri Flore Liffré frał
vere Frifirig.
Marx le:Iled himes elf anothe palused for a II

Finded file of his le corrir l'HIl y dirh|- ust hпwe dobro It was life for I recJlle sie 'Ts ad line. He rescap, expressing ra l-'gig Fil FT For for "fri farge.
"We have only my two predico Ile the Other ciclu Titel. Will. LIl cics to Will Tids within compa:EI1 #111 EI1, Il T111 1111: capital. Look ball coil panies. always insisted 15 a revolu Einer suggested that d it 5 potential, vel I am surpriin thc second c mtl Ty.
LC) qui te my WriThe bourgeoisie thout constalty he inst Tuilents of thereby the Telati dönı, Elnd with Telai CIls of SCrevolutionising ninterrupted lisCicial c (bilditi (IS, tilin ty : Ind agit:- the bourgeois arlier ones. All Telitics, with :ielt Lld Weile:T- ind opinions, are | tillН je 50 lid Not bad, el "? til 1848, y el || on Capital. That's til of the last
Luhr yai were re2 7 hout the dy'r ATїrн. Јтdeed, yoы,
else, ha ve ir flWilfrisk fra ir fa: firie, though, you stinia red its capatirfrigo fari , ĉar e Wero si Virg. More, 1'0E. : if i'as Caps ble of "irrig scorrier frig ser | Ét 14's Hoher l'oz.
forward, poured :r glass of winc, some 11t, :! I'd th L11
began: "'Certainly I underestimated the capacity of the work. i Ing class, by collcctive orgalinisiltiil, to CC) un terlict the te ITdency for its in income to 5 tagIlia te OT de cline, Th:Lt is cleair. But I slightly contest the second point. Already, Well before l took II ny leave, Imass i Indepe I1delt socialist parties, generally describing themselves as Mars xist, were taking root, and were II naki Ing sic II he headway in terms of Tefo Trin. Engels and I both recognised the funda Ilmeiltal importance of u niwersal suffrage. A Te you familia T with Engels’ introduction to III y Class Struggles i France, which he wrote in 1895. He argued thält u Tiwersal suffrage had reI)- dered obsolete the insurrectionalry methods of 1848 and the Polis; Colm III e FullTther, het: suggested that the state itself could be Tef’Ille il frČIll Withi.""
"'Neverf hele is, the refor777s ThéTr have begrI sichie ved in IVestern Europe surely go well Be'arid your Wildesir dre. I'r 25. I'r rhe. Il arfer years of your life, you certa irly cire o recugis e le value of piece real refore, indeed you sa ky ir 5 7 se best Pope & f f har LGLLGS L Y LKKL S TTtCCHS S S G S a Ebelief har far sorre po ir ! There 1ναι εί με Ι. Γενα μίία, Ι. Για αίτηg. back ayı it no:11, 11'dirld you be sy'Pripra l'efic f 0 0 77 e of your fallo)- LGuLLSLG LGtLLmlLGGHL SLTGTCT LrLLS Steiri, Who becare a powerful advücare of gradualismı, of Seeing the process of reforei as rather F77 care irri Farra vir Warī file Z." ir P72 E goal, the revorriori"
Marx, scemicidi LI 5, li rc hi w tlb respondi, Hic passed his hand through his beard, then said:
"In retrospect, I think I was right until the failure of the revolutions in Western Europe in the early 20s, That marked the end of the possibility of Tewolutiū im ih the al dwa, Inceki Capitalist countries. The best op
tion then was the path of reform. The parties of the Second Internatic Tal, like the
Ger II na in Social Democrats, probabi bly offered the best longle IIl 10 del
(Cα ηττη, Εί αΗ Ρας 43)

Page 29
The changes in Europe
Paul Caspersz
Europe there was no one – states man or political AT1alyst OT pe Tson-in-the-street — who correctly foresaw the challges, still less the breath - taking speed at which they have been taking place. In onc or two places — stralingely not i Il many TC — the events of 1089 Hawe
been compared with the revo1 LI til i France il 1789. Thc bringing down of the Bcrlin
wall I would the Il be thic sicci. In di centenary celebration of the StOFIlling of the Bas Lille. *But the a nalogy must be exit mincd further. The collapse of the Berlin wi|| 15 às lill thc victory of free enterprise capitalism as the fall of thic Bas
tille was the victory of thic
people,
Poland started the current
process. If so, Polish Pope
John Paul Is - perhaps the most internationally political of all the Popes since the Reformation - mily have an important place in the current and future history of Europe and of the world. Froin Poland ther c was t Whichון שנחשDing H II10Wין טSt סח some analysts say really began With Nikita Khrushchev: Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, the So Wiet U [10] Ili itself clai Loured for change. As one writes, Lith. Li a nia Elias Volci foT independCince, FL Ilıd Estonia aını il Latvia a Te bound to follow if Lithuania succeeds (or even if it does not). And the winds of change which were driven a Way from Beijingos Tia nain mem Squia Te last June ha vc reached the Asian Communist state of Mongolia,
Betwecin Wicsterli ğlıd Easter Tı Europe one can now expect cooperation to develop in many fields. But when Will the further steps forward be taken from cooperation to federation A1 di Lumil? The CLITT et calls in East Germany for the reunification of the two Gerlanies
f'The Territer fis Direcriar of the Tworkers Gard Feafarif "s'" srsť fra fe, Kardy)
- despite the t:auses all thus, Nazi Germany are only the Calls that I lay {ın extensi ürı in the Europea the cu El tries a and for Lle fuT Illilitary links b ties of West Europe, Gill Italy's dynamic ter, expressed the spirit of th Europe When h now finds itsel of world. Ei ffilir are becoming I consciously or the choice is tik) In a Ind disint The Europe SuIIIIInit hield : Deccmber last the idea of a for Ricconstruct lopm1cnt to hel of Eastern a ni While the idl: enthusiastic sup sent, only Pre: of France, wh the idea of as C3 LI T1 tries of E: tral Europe, w Way to Teiter.L. tion to give FrcIlch external graiifilm Fes to th { Mitterälld llad ing territories but he certainly the countries a
Pacific.
It Wis at :
HäI Ward Orl 5
General Georg
Il Cluce te i i try Programı'
Silply the Though half o: Carl he withiu S
power reflisti i Ellropea. In col Int cepted the offe of dellars Were the Plan thoug Only a bolt ha Was actually

and the Third World
nightmares it Who I member if the 1935 1 trild of future be expected for COf The Libership In Corn in unity to f Eastern Europe the ract of cwell EtWWeI LI :: CLI lrn And Eastern 1i e Michelis. TOT cign minisWith accuracy e energing new e said: ''Europe at the centre 5 because people Tr 1 CT CC :LW: Tse, LLConsciously, that bct W ccm integraegration.' it in Community it Strasbourg in year supported European Bank til hmd Devicp the economics Central Europe. El received the port of all president Mitter and ile :i 55t:Iı LiTng to sistance to the List: TF1 and Cenent out of his e his de terli Dathe priority in 15sistance pro: Slith maybe French - speakTainly in II ind did Ilot exclude f Asia and the
1 CO. Il ference in
JLI le 1947 that : Mirth all inElit (Ypern Recolater called Warshall Plan, f Europe which talin's orbit of the aid, sixteen ries gladly ac
r. 3) Illil liards
available under h in the event lf this a 110unt disbursted Sice
the countries of Eastern Europe
did not - could not - apply
fħir li l
Today there is already seri
U LIS talk of al Illo the T. MaTshall
Plan for the newly emancipated countries of Eastern Europe lin November 1989, speaking to the American Congress, Lech Walesa explicitly asked for such a Plan for Poland. Not only thc USA is in 1947 but also West Germany and Japan are today waiting to be a sked, West Germany, for instance, has already expressed its eager Willingness to modernize East Germany's teleco Inmunication system. And Japan is cager to
scCLIrc markets both for its capital and for its goods in Eastern Europe and thus tic
the East firmly to itself.
The European Economic ComImi LInity has al ready sent food and c mergency aid to Poland With 70 million. This will be followed by a further £20 million of such aid. This year the EEC will provide £210 million for aid projects in Hungary and Poland for the purposes of agriculture, training and environmental protection. Britain has promised "know-how' funds Worth nearly É100 Illillion ower the next five years to private entre preincurs in Poland and Hungary. Douglas Hurd, Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, said recently that, all told, the funds made available by Britain to Poland alone could reach (250 million by, 1991. Western Europ can countrics and Western financial institutions will also provide the countries of Eastern Europe with assistance for debt rescheduling. As an example of what might happen elsewhere too, the EEC has recommended that Hungary which wa15 negotia ting with the IMF should receive an a dilist ment lCall of USIO 1 Ö00 millico.
One can also expect the ideas that have been put forward for I10Iletary union in Western Europe to be develop cd so as
27

Page 30
to include the countries of freed' Europe. The gover nments represented in the EEC, co III1m itteed to acco) Tı0 Tiflic H IId monetary union, will probably find that the practical outcome of this collitent will be the setting up of a Central Bank of Europe, maybe on the model of thc GeTIlla Il Bundesbank which is independent of politicians meddling or of the Netherland Bank which is less in dependent than the Bundesbank. If the Central Bank of Europe is set up, it will not take long for the Barık to ad IIlit the contries of Eastern Lind Central Europe into its membership.
What will be the likely relations between Western Europe and the coln Intries of the Third World? First, less time not to speak of interest and concern, fo I thic colult Tjes Of the Soll th, Second, less financial assistan cc. III, the process of Ima Tshalling aid for Eastern and Central Europe, the call of Francois Guillaume, French Minister of Agriculture, in 1987 for a Marshall Plan for the Third World im Hy well go il to cold storage.
In 1987 in his encyclical letter, The Social Concerns of the Church, Pope John Paul deplored the superpower rivalry betweel the West Hind E:ı 5 termi Europe as de tri mental to the developing nations of the Third World, in so far at it divetted western resources to military expenditure rather than to the needs of the poorer countries. Today the coining together of the West and Eastern Europe may work again to the detriment of the Third World, The Third World nevel Wins!
Once the market economy develops, official and private capital from the West will withOut (10 Libt flow int (). E:15. Le TIl Europe rather than to the Third Word on the well-known capit:1 list economic principle that capital follows the best investment opportunities and looks for Lille best cc) 1S1 IlmeT" Illa Tkets, Easter II and Cental Europe may Well repeat the type of economic recovery which the
28
West itself II 1940s and early influx of MT t:I. Il and CentT: 1990s may take make the journ than Western 1950s because it the Sa Ime Tead tTllu Çıllı re :As the earlier period. will Tio 1ւյլIbt Western Europe bchind its Eas Only when that will Europe () timic for thic Ti
Thatcherite Br in three directi political and ei the United S Europe with W In any historical cultura, 1 a IId eth third among co tlin'5 concerns World. The Te Europe will this order of El Labou T gove able to do ver the priority list
Barber B. C.) if the World World Developi 1989 already w; loping countrics cline in foreig II II.1eans that cou to Tely primari
CSL. TCS ty II eTT", The Teil Europe oInly sh; warning and point.
Indeed, What the contrary, we to the Third W been generous. set in the early GNP — of whic official develop a Ind the balanci | Tlent : In di co III1I. should be set as developing cou Tally not been Scoln di T1:1Vĩ:111 c Netherlands, in filled the targe i Is Inceds ti) be: the OPEC coll

de in the late 1950s after the all Aicil. El sEurope in the a long time to ly to ICCovery Europe in the does not hawe -for-use infrasWest had in the But the journey be made, for will be readily Ierin neighb3 LIT. process 15 Over nce again hayo
irid World.
Lin itself looks ! Ils: first, t0 its :CICli Illet, Lics: ext, l. lich it has st , քcographical, lic links o Tilly ntemporary Brij5 tille Third ccTL changes in only strengthe II priorities and Tulent Imay be y little to alter
nable, President
Bank, in the ment Report of lred the devethat the de| capital inflows Intries will hawe ly on domestic Finance in Westcent changes in arpen Conable's gives it greater
wer the lyth to :stern Foreign aid World llas never The UN target, 70s, that 1% of th 0.7% would be memt å si sistance - private investmercial lcn, di Ing = ide as aid to the El Lries ha 5 génemet. Only the ountries and the some years, fullt, together with
specially noted, tries of the Illid
dle East which werc, at the tile of the Brandt Report, contributing nearly 3% of their GNP per annum as assistance to the Third World. The point, at present, however, is not that foreign aid has bicen unge Illerous in the past, but that it may be even less forth coming after the current changes in Europe,
Yet, the greatest resource for development in the Third World is not foreign aid, but its own peoples. Everything possible -- socially, economically, cultura l
lly — should therefoTc be do ne to harness the in nate energies and cI thusiasm of the people
in order to develop the countries of the Third World.
Such har Tessing has most u Ilfortunately not taken place for a variety of reasons in most contries of the Third World which pra claimed their independence from the colonial powers in the immediate postwar period, High hopes were murtlired the i that the Whole people would march forward to progress behind hon est and enlightened leaders. Many of these hopes have turned out to be blit sad illusions.
For the har ncs sing of the people to the task of national development, the national Inicidle class has a role to play but at the cost of losing its WIl identity as it immerses itself in the mass struggle. But While it exists in itself, and for itself, it should always bear in mind the bitter comment made on it by Frantz Fanon, himself a Tember of the class:
Because it is bereft of ideas, biccause it lives to itself and cuts its el T o TT from the people, Liller= mined by its hereditary incapacity to think in terms of all the problerms of the Il: Lion, the nationalmiddle class will havet nothing betKL aa SLLLS S SLLLH LLLLL S LLLL S LC LCLl Tolc of mAh;ger for Western enterprise, and it will in practic set up its country as the brothel of Europe.
Whether this is, pTophiccy Cor only warning the middle class c le Third World Will itself have to decide.

Page 31
If the countries of the Third World take courage into their own hands and realizic that now itleast they should scek to cha T t their own future COLI Tse, thcy Inity indeed the Ilselves give strength to, and find an ally in, those forces in the new Europe which realize the possibilities of building a new form of society for a new Europe and for the While World.
Only superficially may the currcnt cha inges i Ti Europe - bc coil - sidcrcd to be al Illassive wote for western capitalist forms of society. These observers noted that what the East Germans Snatched with the greatestavidity from West German shops when they broke through the Berlin wall were not thic books of Solzhenitsyn or even the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of the young Marx but pop- and por 10-video cas = Sct tcs and the other prizes of decadent western capitalism. As someone said, the new temples to liberty will be McdoIlalds's and Kentucky Fried Chicken! But is it not also possible that thcrc will be at least more serious minority in Europe who will sce in the recent changes only a new and thoroughly unexpected opportunity to seck to build for Europe and for the Thı irad World : Tın (Corc human society'? If so, the changes in Europic represent yet another chance for humanity,
Mrs Thatcher said on Radio 4 in Britain on 18 February that it our real dividend is the failure of the Communist system". Contrarily, the real dividend has been opportunity to reflect deeply on the merits and den crits of both the socialist and the capitalist systems of society, The former might then seen to be not evil in itself but only in its so shameful abuses, while the latter is not only evil in its elf but is als 0 self-defeating and self-destrictive. What the I will take the place of the communist regimes that held despotic sway in so Imany countries? Western-type capitalisIn, enthroning consumcrism and the money-god". Religious fundamentalism, devoid
of the conce TI ice". Another title = from the Literized LechII. de void of gen A III lixturc of a it i possible that Imay spring to ut the past not Europe but als
Czesław Milo bel Prize-Winn : sees it as a pr
iividlI:ll:
The failure - created the Ille: Ilot for the rej ... Will relili of responsibility inst thic Inclin of the individul: ly of a whate. torical memory son al resposibi to the Solida Tit. and the Ina tik Baltic states, t Czechoslovakia, EITT 110 i Lie:S Been it tenora to an ordinary Ei mill: C015 LL11ers, of ICW for tion, cof a no Wision.
Speaking m years ago at th ,mics הון ואשT Fט mQvement in C ning to raise Hsia o-Tung Fe |em Til ther in en 15ion:
If in advanting of technological West ha chi thält is, III. ii lite - the problem be simpler, ... that the pric in China shot trilist: Lion but should in if šJçial stru with the inheri indi integratio! is to perish, v WIi soluti0n , f of experience y Cal TS.
It is a prob the East, but not only for bilt also fot t Tillir WT1|| the While of 21st century than in the ce drawing to its

for social justictatorship, this 'ight? Á cornplogical society, 11Ine Bhum:1 nisIIı? these? Or is
something new
Jf the rLIİmıs of OIlly in Easter
in Western
'z፡ th c 198[] Nùr for literaturc, bill of the in
Marx's vision has I for TTL HET Wisibl :ction of all visions 15 day is thic idea which works aga. ss ind indifference living in the bel. Together with histhe belle in perlity has contributed y 110 yerlent ini Pol3 al Trots in the le Civic Foru Il in I hope that the CILIË Ties ha 5 -- Tot ry phase, in passage society of earners but rather the birth []f humām inteFäcn-utopian Style of
re than forty c London School when the Maoist hina was begin
טso Illuch liop i saw the probits societal dim
to the præsent stage I development, the ved å leYW Ordergrated social systern
in the Fras would It is therefore clear 55 of social change ld not be a nucre Of Weste: T1 . CLI ILI Te bly i reorganization ture in conforinity ed spirit of harrony ... Unless China C: HE WE LO fill Llr On Our inheritinice over thousa Tids of
'''in'יי t Onlyס נm I: 'for' the East: Eastern Europe, le Wh0|e Of L1And, solving it, le World in the fill be happier
tury that is now
close.
Marx . . .
'ரேried நிர்ரா நா:t)
"So, do you see your legacy in terrisof the Soviet Unior or, for e:ahıple, Siyeden?"
Both are part of the legacy. But now it is clear that the first has Tun its course, has failed. On the other hand, the socia, I deII1 ") cr:Ltic tra1 ditioIn TcImains full of historical Tunning." Marx pulled his pocket Watch from the left land fob Jf his w His Licial II. "IIIllust be o II my way,” he said. 'I have to IThe et someone alt Maitland Park Road.." ("His former horne).
'Briefly ther, one or two final points. Where does a this leave. Marxir at the end of the IeIIIrl'
Let's bic clear, I Dever subscribed to Marxis ill. Reienber what I said: "All I know is I'm lot a Marxist.' But I cannot deny now that there is El MTxist tTalliti Col. It see 11s tb Time th:4t the . II1e:11ning of 1989 is that the umbilical cord that linked Marxism to 1917 is now broken. Marxism finally becomes pluralistic, it becomics Ma. Txismns. At the s a II1e ʼ tiI11c it loses its exclusive less. It takes its place alongside other traditions in a position of equality rather than predominance. After more than a century, that's how it should bc."
"But what is left?"
'I think We hävc answercd In lich of this already. I would only add that capitalism is alive and Well, and so, thcTcfore is inequality and injustice. It is all around us.'
" " Do you ha ve 777" regrets albair your life?'
''Why should I? To quote HāIL 11 c: 'Sure, he, that mare us with such large discourse,
* Looking before and after, gawe us not “That capability
:ind god like reason,
• "To = fulls L in Luis un used. . ."
I looked up and he had goi1c. 1 rubbed my eyes, Was this a drea III, or the exclusive to end all exclusives? .
2)

Page 32
CORRESPOWIDEWICE
THE DR REPORT
The Report of the Indian Defence Review Research Tea In you carry in your issue of April 1 is an eye-opener. But for the Babu-English (e. g. "A navy which can boast of (sic) two aircraft carricris' and 'Peace in qui time (sic)" etc.) one would imagine it was written by a pack of Wictorian jinբots in Palmerston's heyday. It is indeed ironical that just as today the Worst type of neoNazism is practised by the Zionist leaders of Israel, the WOrst type of Victorian imperialism is emulated by the Indians. The kind of arrogant guff that is contained in the Report is, one must presume, what guides and informs the govern Ilment of India in its foreign -- Tela Licins. It is a frightening thought.
In a World in which the geo-5 trategic" importance of sealänës is a Ti i relevancy the IR team claims to perceive seriOls dangeT IU India's inte estis from Colombo : nd TrinConlee should they fall into the hands of some Illy's Lerius and un nam ed inimica nava PC Welt"! The truth is this is just an excuse für India to flex it muscles at its close neighEl Colli T5. The World knows that CVely threat to peace in this neck of the Woods in the last 40 years has originated in India ind has been motivated by the Indian lust for hegemony.
The illegal Hyderabad and Nehril, the rape of Goa, the Pakistan wars Bhutan. Sikkim, Nepal and the clownish բa Tiբրլ: invasion of Sri L. El Inka, al I åre ex al III plcs of Indian aggression, Nehru's 1961 mishap, when (claiming legitimaey from the illegal McMahon Line) he trie di conclusions with China Hind was given a sound beating was
Ciclul pati II of Kashmir by
what hastened his death not long after and fuelled his daughter's determination to
build India's military strength
30
to fantastic pr 5 he did which ruthlessly at ti lecting 700 m ill-norished, dis erty-strick cnl hu to this day rel Wretchcs III thi
The Tc is la ever to this cutfrom any of It the it is the
The hypotheti the Report of ensued had the Pact 1otbccIl gi ly be the work feet are firmly air. They art World of their Tesembling earl la Tid but i El E14b skin ned English Blimp type.
W. S. Naipa during the Chin di ilms passed il Real || Act just W arti Illi - Briti i I One called it C Britai. El Indi h) Britaifi, they di public parks w բurpose but to sa Liable Indian
it a Liles I
Il the identi Which Le Briti: Llp the i Image od (HII . In preposse: blicst) the IDIR ja Wall the rugg fił Til tryima II which the best I i I1 L1e: paragraphs later Iיי וחיTCין EIVETi fi simply the best Till anywhere i
It is remark: a wans - the be in thc world-fa. they were sent dó but instead numerable rapes dreds of ince

oportions. This leheartedly and le cost of negillion illiterate, iease-ridden, powman beings who lain the polorest s carth.
threat whatsTale Super-power its neighbours, Other way about.
call gce Iario in what night have
IId -- Sri Lätkä igned Illust sur cof people whose pola Inted in midl: ווg iחliWi :
W1 - L. World W = Wictorian Engited by brownTie II of the Col.
Lil Telä te5 lovi IC 5e War the IIIDefence of the as was done in and how everyhora jlils t as in W, juist als in Ig lenches. In hich served 110 It the Ilneed for open
Eitil III: III leis in ih used till är
Tommy Atkins 5 sing thug, it Report calls the e di pel sant imis still one of World.” A fel y the ja W:lins a Te in: They are fighting maten լի է WլյrlLi".
ble thit Lillesse st fighting Illateilled to do what to Sri Lanka to
comitted illTIL Tidered Hill IIIt mel, Wille
and children, burnt down People's homes, robbed people of their household belongings and Were, in turn, killed of in their thousands by PrabhakaTäI5 me.
The Report ends (horrors) by thanking God for sending the Indians 'a combat-laboratory (Sri Lanka) and calls upon India to "make the most of it while 'it' (what? Sri Lanka?) lasts.
Heaven preserve us from these unbalanced little men and their paranoid delusions.
W. PeTeTa Colby 3,
Hamleted on ... . .
s Corrinfres frort лагел)
To the In, the Tamil problem, is a history of betrayal; of pledges IIIade and broken of agreements signed and sealed and torn up - both UNP II di SLFP. Thus, a legacy of distust.
history of the
UTN til, this distrust is progressi vely era 5 ed n i firm accord Will be reached. This is Mr. Hameed's job, as top negotiator.
There is another, not seasily discerni bole or defini ble factor. If any incident, in the North-east, creates a highly chairged situation in the South, the talks will break dC) W III. Mo Te. The stability of the Premadasa reginne - IN 1 Hy be threatened. What turn will events take then? It is this in calculable that the LTTE II list include in its cactitions. Hameed's high-wire diplomacy has radically altered the calculus of risks. For the rest, it's the old story - land-mines all along the path to pe: ce: north-east council polls, 6th Amendment, T1cr gcT, refcremdul II etc.
M. de S.

Page 33
Political Biography: The Role of P
Reggie Siriwardena
THE EXPEDIENT UTOPIAN: Bandaranai ke and by James Manor (Cambridge University Press, 1989
pp. 327-1-bibliography and index).
Colitical biography is a genre
that requires its practitioner to make up his mind about the role of Personality in the historical process. It is possible for a historian to regard individual leaders as merely epiphen come Illa of classes or other social forces, but nobody holding such a view is likely to
take to the writing of biography. Not that the biographer need as su T1 e that it is great men who lake history, and
James Manor explicitly disavows such a view. But We are entitled to expect that we Inay de rive from a biography an understanding of what the individual personality of the Iman, his strength or his weaknesses, co Intributed to the chuirse of
WILS,
J: Ilcs Mil or's book ODI Balla Tanaike belongs strictly to the category of political biography, since it doesn't deal with its subject's personal life CXCCpt in 50 f:LI is iL is Telewant to bis political role. Thus Manor tells us little or nothing abolit Bandara naike's Telatio I15 With his sisters, or with his wife and childre II, because tliese don't enter into his political story. But the biography does present in considerable detail the circulistances of Balda Itänaike's childhood and youth before he entered the political a Tena, That is because Mallo T believes that the personality and ch: Ticter Structure for Ilied the In
had a good deal to do with his conduct in public life in latter yeELTS, FrðIT BIL Iudara na
ike’s own autobiographical accounts, the fa Ilily papers and the feminiscences of his associa Les Maino T has been Biblic to build up a convincing portrait of the boy and the young man.
- LL LTCTGGL HCLGGGGGmG T LH LLLHL LLTLLLGGGHL
It is Well kill AriI:ike's filth Dias Bildlili Malhal Muda liy; early years of
Ç531 sider: t the gentle Illel". His from the Obe
who were also : super-elite at t halese society'. 11 til 15 bet voyee Il er ilt the tiITF mon CiIIle iI LO mutually hos til El Tan Like Ilot hier own family husbald's but gärdled herself educted thail 'Lady Bandara hesitation,' wr po uring scorin
101 e vel befo II ten in coarse ti cle of these during Banda Tal. I - Sonic where b. and el cwcinth y c had to law th Fate at Haral gol her two small it after the young up alone with SHW his Il othel client inter Wills. out the fict th; 5 cylcre 5 hock + "You Ing Solom 'spent much of state of Ilei, T is cLL Off fTOT Su: relationships." T all the greater b ilised that his even IIlix With clite familie 5. was taught by the age of six when he was Thomas', Sir SC that he should school hostel Stone's bungalo"

ersonality
Ceylon
Will that Balder, Sir Solomon 1:like, Was the lr, who in the the ce Iltury Wils first Silh:11.5 : 3 Ill Coller Cälill: yesek ere fa Inily ano ng “the small he apex of SinH) Weyer, T. flther and IT1Cththe you ing SoloLlic World y cre e, Lady BandDIlly considcrci superior to hcr With justicc rcas being better her husband. Inlike had little itg5 MālLT, in upon Sir Soloʻc gLI csts :LI1d (3 fcris. The OltLIHT rels was that lake's childhood :tween his eighth HTS – hiĩ5 TT1[htht:T 1: HICC strål esta together with aughters. ThereSolomon grew his father, and only it infreManor brings lt this break yas for the boy. }I), he writes, his youth in a 5 till:4 til, largely Sta i med, irltimatc Ille islation wis ecause the father Sori should Tot childre II of the Young Soltimo 11 British tuto s Lill teen, and then, ad littled to St. lomon arranged stily Tot i I thic Jllt. In Wilrden
Bandara naike's childhood upringing left hill with both a fear of his father's domineering authority and an anger and Tescntment against it; yet he c) Luldn’t Cscipe the pa terhal iIfillerice. Whit SiT Sol II still imped in his son was the conviction that he was excepti ”Lillil Lill ilirked ut froIII birth for a great destily. While still a schoolboy he wrote, "I was brought up with the idea Of greatness and superiority to 3 the T5 $1 ITT; 11 Inding title Llund i mi'n bLlcd with the notion of my greatIn 55 to cline.' However ewel more revealing than this state11e Int by th. In adolescent is the extraordinary passage he was able to write as adult in his 'thirties on the same subject.
(To be continued)
Sri Lanka. . .
(Corttiled sai Page I3) Part of the reason is that both the Sinhalese, who form the majority of the 17 million population, and the minority Tamils are Sick of the War that has left parts of Jaffna in ruins and maimed thousands of people. The Tigers know this, and have to bow to the peace senti nin cont, A. majo Tity of the country's Tamils live outside the Til Ilils's northern heartland 1 md are fairly well integrated into the Sinhalese population.
Mr. Pte madasa has pledged to remove discrimination against Tamils and made some politiCal concessions. Tiger officials say they can do busines 5 with hill. “ I don’t think the Te is in Over Whel Thing desire among Tamils for a separate state," a Sri Lanka. In academic said. 'What Imay emerge in the end is some kind of federal system." A T1 independent Eelam would 110t be a chiewed "" but it wi11 be approximated.'
Of course, the country's trials нге Far from over. The government mus Teit in Lhe death Squads and address the combustible grievances that spawned the JWP, including lack of employIn ent for Sri Lanka's educated youth and a system of political patrollage based on favoritism.
(Ir ferrariarca Herala Tribre)
31

Page 34
The Great Renunciation
Look at har . . . 1 look at TTY wife, Fast asleep, with one arm Looped over my son, Dead to this and all other worlds,
Farewell sleepers, farewell Old ties held me down Like my wife's arm across my son. Mine en emies irt: Those of my mine OWI household. Farewell, sleepers, farewell must always keep awake.
The known is always a dead-end, The known is like the bed left. The unknown has no place to rest And drives you to explore A that's difficult To acknowledge or ignore.
must go now and tip-toe out Of this Palace CEI hear The snoring of my retinue Trumpeting their last fanfare,
Farewell sleepers, farewell | must always keep a Wake.
睦、
Easy Easy I My favourite champ Go easy Don't Snost. Can't you ke EP Your clippety-clop down I Don't clarlց Your hooves, you colt | You'll Wake The whole Palace up I Keep to the grass, That's it my boy. Fine Keep to the grass, Out of the gates. That's it. Easy Here we gol Go, my champ, go I go for your if And mine too Run, champ, run. The moon is brighter Thãm the PalaC# light5.
LG IN NEW
A tougher brand of city politics is t convoys are changing the face of genteel C
The talk of the city was captured re of the Independent newspaper, THE 15LAN promises an "adequate supply of textiles fi
to cover our moral makedness."
After several quotes from an inter
NYK TIMES report Continues:
The cries of outrage and fury in th shock effect of Richard's death, "Wrote M LANKA GUARDIAN, a journal of Politic*
occassionally contributed."
32

Sparks of dying night-fires Sport briefly And burn out in the Wind. Caravans, hawking wa ress, Charging high prices, Hawe Camped by the ways ide, Tired tra Wellers are staring At stars to find their way The noise of politics and campaigns Bringing questionable conquests Left my people pining, again 8 again, For the promisd land they never gained. My father's kingdom caged him. He will sit in one place, For some time, throwing orders Ald call it a throne.
feel the power of liberty As I ride into the Centre of gravity That draws me away to empty This self - the unreal entity. After the parting, After tha initia | break This journey is easy. Anyway, whät right have il to ruda OVer Other mErl When I can't rule myself
In the morning When they find that I've gone The Court will go wild And the gossip will go round town . . . And all the King's blood Raging in his royal skull Will yell : "Oh, that Princa 1 My Son . . . . . Stubborn Prince ! What does he know A Prince without power Has the future of a swimmer Without limbs in a river."
– H. L. D. Mahindapala Melbourne
YORK TIMES
king hold. Private security squads in armed lombo.
ently in one small cartoon on the front page D. In it, a man is reading a headline that r the new year." He adds, "But not enough
iew with Dr. Manorani Saravanamuttu, the
national newspaper's suggest the therapeutic RWYN DE SILVA, editor of the left-wing and social opinion in which Mr. de Zoysa

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Page 36
Over a quarte
Century ago
We chartered
To inculcate
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Fura / masses
Our efforts h
Since today
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All commercia
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3 COLS3
the banking
Off
ave paid dividends
Ve a CCOUnit
sf Savings
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together
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the Millions
ir First Objective