Page 1
O LTTE STRATEGY 4 MWD)
13 No. 7
Vol.
August 1, 1990
Price Rs. 7.50
AFGHANISTAN, C. IDR RESEARG;}H TEAIM
Afghanistan and Sri La
A Compariso The 1970s
HE DECADE OF T
can in retrospect, be called the decade of decisive conventional wars. A number of d sive conventional conflicts o curred in the Third World th saw entire countries fall be for invading/liberating armies. a contemporary Indian writer has pointed out, in 1971 India liberated Bangladesh; in 1978 Tanzania liberated Uganda; in 1979 Vietnam freed Cambodia from the Khmer Rouge; in 1979, the penultimate year of this tumultuous decade, the Soviet Union launched a major thrust to occupy Afghanistan.
The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was a model of ruthless military efficiency that sent shock waves across the globe. Soviet special forces (Spetsnaz) seize Bagram air base near Kabul. The elite 105 (Guards) Airbor me Division flew in to seize the capital. Hafizul Amin's presidential pala attacked and Amin hi killed. Simul Soviet motori ri crossed t
Ο nistan. In fi ау ghanistan was
1970.
f
gaged the USS in a low-cost
the Sinhalas
into which Ind in a web of it
As this deca bloody finale w what appears the final denoue forces have w Afghanista
ship, a supply arms and sanct
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

THE MADRAs FACTOR o
- James Glad - Mervyn de Silva
horld held its breath
P ronly Westerdia reports had long
ouraging a been prescting a bloodbath in tar. In Cambo- Kabul in the wake of the SoviChinese and et withdrawal. Shorn of their
iet protectors, the Surrogate me of Najibullah was expecto come down like a house cards. The world waited til Arously for a bloodbath as the vengeful Mujahideen were now expected to sweep down from the hills and put Najibullah's جة Afghanistan to the torch and wreak terrible vengeance on the perceived quislings. The world waited in vain.
ia got en meshed Kabul, despite all American hopes, was not really a mirror o Saigon. Amazingly lah regime held. The aithful" launched repeated assäält in Jalalabad, in the hope
se
ing a prestigious politi
f
de draws to a e have come
Afghan Army held out resolutely. The uncoordinated Mujahiy nation deen attacks petered out amongst a prolonged bitter, mutual recriminations. ion of another The world was somewhat sura notivated prised. However, to anyone ommitted leader- following the events closely in of basic small Afghanistan the results should uaries in neigh- have come as no surprise.

Page 2
A selected list of
Sri Lanka Mosaic — Enwir comment, m.
and change HWC S/C
Seasonality and Health: A Study o
Elvir (†1 Erst Of ||–S3|t is fiv
by Godfrey Gunati leke, P. D, A. Fernando, Eardley Fernando
A Colonial Administrative System in
by Dr. B. S. Wijeweera
Sepala Ekanayake and Ex Post Fact Hijacking of International Aircrai Sri Lanka Domestic Law incorpo International Law
by Dawid S. Awerb Lick
The Pilgrim Kamanita - A Legendary
by Karl GjellerLIJ
Stries fr the Maa Wamsa
by Lucien de Zoysa
Stories from the Cua Walsa and Ot
Tales by Lucien de Zo'ysa
Conservation Farming - Systems, Te
Tools (For small farmers in the by Ray Wijewardene & Parak rama
Marga
61 || sipathana Colombo 5,

Marga Publications
arl, continuity
15.OO 3OOOO
12.00 250,00
f the socio-economic
C) Casti Ons 1 OOO 185. OO
Perga, Joel
Transition 6.OO 16O.CO
O Legislation: 4.OO SOOO
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· Roma CB 1750 225 CO
3,50) ÉSIO, O O
er Historical 3.OO 47.50
chniques and Humid Tropics) .. W5O. 12 O.OO
Waidyathā
Publications
Må Wat h) Si Lanka.

Page 3
TEIDS
ALLY OUTS
EROS, the LTTE's ally, pulled out its MPs from parliament on July 23, The military offensive and the restriction of supplies of amenities give the impression that there is a War bet Ween tWO nations and it forces our people to feel that they do not belong to this country', they said in a statement. The thirteen MPs represented the Eela war DemoCratic Front, the political wing of EROS.
WIWILL MOT OUT
Four SLFF natiola ist MPs have refused to obey their party leader, Dr Meirw yn de Silwa, Messers So masara Dassa na yake, Kamal Karuna na yake and L.A. B. Perera were asked to resign their seats by Mrs Sirimayo Bandaranaike. SLFP president, and leader of the opposition. They have decided to stay put.
WHOSE POSTERS
Posters put up by enthusiastic Supporters to Welcome back the SLFP's Anura Bandara naike, a member of the parliamen
G FOTITher II ister Rajiv meeting of party i Il II)ch Indian state Ta Jimil Nadu ing witlı Sri Tigers to fin state. In thic is a clear he L)MK HIid t G: Idhi said.
He häid til g0 W CITI 1 TIL 'W' ing (Chief Mi Karunanidhi's it was a pari party Nation governs India
The DMK Til Illil Nd
of the LTTI the South II häid äbed i Ing the cent ägen cies in
their liks, t 1 S:äid i Til å er: on July 26,
ficts about t ment’s protec
Wolrds 1he T to light, the
O Addres 5 juli
of Representa Tittee I III
tary delegation to India, Asia, Indi ] WE 'E tOr o WWII L- Deputy Assis known persons. But the for State fo posters were back on and South As city walls a few hours tsa (C. Schaffe later. Tt'CeTt littck
COMT
GUARDAN
Wol. 13 No, 7 August 1, 19 g)
Pri : RS... "
Published fortnightly by
Lanka Guardian PLublishing Co., Ltd.
NC. 26, Lion Place, Cl T1 - 2.
Editor: Mervyn dé silva Telephong: 117584
News Background
Afghanistän arid
A Cortinparišni Styles
PRO Rapart - 3 NB : Thinking F Correspondence
Printed by A 82/5, Sri Ratnajc MEI W H tha, i TalBբilt-r]

EPL γ
1dian Prine MinGandhi told a lis Congress (I) i that the South
government of Was collaborat
LE. Ika's Tamil III a. separate island. There
Xlls between the he LTTE', Mr
at the federa Els T10L TestT i Ilinister Muthulwell ) DMK because III in the five all Front that
gover II, ITrent of Was Well aware E's activities in I dian state and e Tigers by keepF El government the dark about he Indian Express *ք ():58, published Many startling he state governLive attitude toigers ha di conne
TCP) Cort said.
g the US Hise ti Wes Sub-c01III): Il Rights and Pacific Affairs, lant Secretary I Near Eastern šia. In Affairs TerI said that "the by Ta IInil sep
EMTS
한
Sri Lanka: of Operat iura
23
TIT LI 27
28
da Press thi Sara Wa namuttu .13 נשHוחטlםT 435 5
a ratists on government secur. ity forces is a tragic step backwards in Sri Lanka's road to normalcy'.
"We laud the Sri Lankan government's Offer to regume talks to end the fighting and
cncourage the Tigers to accept it', he said,
e PLO leader Yasser Ara
fall will definitely visit Sri Lanka before the cnd of this yl T, Palestinia I deputy Forcign Minister Abdul Latif Abu Hajlah told newsmen at the Glla da Ti Meridicn hotel in Colombo. He said that the PLO delegation was in Sri Lanka to strengthen ties and dicyclop go od relations folllowing the departure of the Israelis.
O Minister Ranjan WijeTatne show ed Colombo based foreign diplomats pictures of Il 1 a 55 graves to indica. Le ho W Elthless and brutal they have been even before we began to retaliate'. The security forces have had high casual. ties bit the government was Thost Worried about civilians stepping on mines, the Minister siid. Casualty figures released on July 23: Killed army. 173, police 290, nawy 1, air force 4: Wounded - ly 585, police 566, navy 4, air force 13: missing - army 1 1 1, police 352; Total killed 468, missing 463, wound cd 658.
O. Defence Secretary General Cyril Ranatu nga told newsmen at a Weekly press briefing that government բTնքress in the North-East war was "fantastic" and very great'. 'Starting from zero what We have achieved is fantastic. From no preparation what We hawe chieved is Very great. Minister of State for Defence Ranјап Wijeratne agreed with the asSCSS IlleIt. This result was possible because of good leadership, careful planning and efficient execution of plans by the arned forces, the Illinister said.
(CorrirTread or rearr page)

Page 4
Six weeks of government oper; tio [ns had Weakened the LTTE greatly, forcing them to conscript childrel, the [Ili [his LerT said... TWO ) the facto Is thit had Weakened the LTTE were: IPKF operations Willichlad reduced the Il Tber of LTTE trained cadres, and the keeping away of the Other six Tallil groups, the TULF, EROS, PLOT. EPRLF, TELO) : Ild ENDLIF.
These Tamil grups were giving the gover Ti Tient im 3 Tal support, the minister said.
The Bank of Ceylon has linked with Wardley InvestIle In t SCT vices Ltd., il sub Sidiary of the Hong Kong Shanghai Bank group, ti float a US S 30 11 i 11 i Sri Lillkä Fund, for invest The Int i 11 Sri lL: T1 kl.
During the teb: Le Cill the extensin if the State if
Emergency, Op Siri Ilaw o Ball parlit ment tha th ought of w Emergency this cha Luged their el 11 ergency p0 W used to haras: their supporter
About the s North at the Lian:like said agriced that it w It had beel b. mishandling Il CIL
A TLeI Ile I
W3C LLLLITT WEL5 gover II ent: it who filled it ported vast qui fill Col. Tib. bunkers and just allowed i ment : ls) gav
Ace Radio Cab
=r:#FFEتیTHER FEF; += l
* Computerised meter 5
" No call up charge with in City limit5
Can be summoned to yo
" WE:1|CE dCI
"... Receipts issued on request Company Credit dwa Call 501502 50 1503 or
ệAset
nother Aitken Spence
 
 
 
 
 

osition Leader la ranaikc Lold til SLFP) EL oting for the ti IIle but hlad
Ilinds since l'ers Were being and kidnap S.
iLIa tiri ili [lheEl 5t Mrs BanTIL 31 || Wer: ras Very serious. rought about by y the govern
PKT left the tot filled by the Wils the LTTE
They transaltities of steel to build their he government t. The governar. Its to the
LTTF to fight the TNA; they were allowed to build bunkCrs and cocct taxes in these El Tols,
*"I do Illot say that the President and Mr Hallcel Were not sincere, but the LTTE wanted nothing short of the North F. Tid East Frar themselves, Why do you file it it | er:ist Il Di w speak to the other Talli p:lities', the Opposition Leader 5:11 d ...
D. The Sri Lanka Transport Bo:Id has bee dissex, Linder the govern Ilent's prograll of peoplcisa Lion' (privatisation). All its liabilities will be borne by the Treasury. The Board existed for 32 y el Ts, Thirty five more state corporations and 30 other Gower III ent Owned Business Undertakings GOBUs are due to follow in this program of privatisation.
rite
g55 from Gelected ; tam is,
501 504
Service

Page 5
DELHI, D.M.K THE TAM L E
Mervyn de Silwa
he visit of tille Sri Linkin
parliamentary delegation, it in entirely new diplomatic enterprise, helped to spotlight the **Indiam factor" in our national crisis and the Sri Lankan political Establish mcnt’s la tely acquired sensitivity to geo-politics, an elementary but welcome lesson of EELAM WAR I. TH1 e II dia 11 involvement and the actual outcome of 50 days of fighting in the North-East Temain the T105t critically important matters as the war, far from being a neat Surgical operation, drags o T1. And as it does, new f:AtOTS COIl tribute 10 its rapidly increasing complexity. Thc LTTE attack Oil Sinhala settler villages in Madawachchiya is one such contributory element,
Both in content and style, IIIdian foreign policy, particularly Delhi's neighbourhood diplomacy, under the W. P. Singh National Front government, reweals some salient differences from the approach of the Rajiv Gandhi -led Congress approach. There has been a positive effort to ill. prove relations with small neighbours. Nepal is a striking illustration. The imposition of the Indian will through 'coercive diplomacy' is hardly cwident. Physical intervention, benigh cor
otherwise, has becil officially ruled out.
However, the co II position of
the W. P. Singh the coalition of ideologically disparate forces and pressuregroups, makes the inter- IT1 estic fictor in Indo-Sri Lankam relareרווז (נוthe Tami|[ roble r) 15ן רti complex. Besides, the nature of the coalition, there is the more Seisitive c) side Tatio of nimbers or parliamentary stability. The constituent parties possess much greater clout than any 'ally" did in thic Congressmonopolised government of Mr.
adinistration,
Galdhi. Thc re. sis, which led to
1:1. Lic Ins, Wł5:ł Wc trit i II (f. Mr. W nerability. But
mail Illy ildw:lint:Hgc: hill. He is NOT dazzled by po WCr of il gali. He i man of principlic t corruption I. ces from Big Bl foreign, as hic se trated when Galic Ilister. N0Il C () · is political innoc gooder. He is a uevre ani in-fig hic cailc out of proved that.
Tamilladu, wil is an import. It is Le Til stilte. The stronghold is t lakes the DMK, i Il Tal Illi lIllliill, partner, all th its malil, tr: di AJTÓMIK WIS partner of Mr. G when M.G.R. Misti", MG father" til PTb LTTE.
Karunalnidhi
past few months ľole, OT Tathic rc he once held as 1 a list of T:1mille tempt hits gCit tuble With the I Minister Singh, his "boycott'' . to the IPKF Ol SI"iL:Ak:1. E'y,"I Civil Service, tl independent Ind legacy from the sides, the IPKF : Indian army Te which "hillili;it tinues to polu “li world's famil I irth

AND EXODUS
ccint Cabinet Ciria spale of resigTy early demons'. P. Singh's vul
Mr. Singh his i 1 argely per SJ
an office-seeker, ", cor by the glory s regarded as il . He is not open shady influensines 5, local toT
brawcy dellonshli" 5 Finalını ce: Mif this Ileans, he : cnt cor naive dÇ0
mäster af 11an 0 - hting. Thc way hic recent crisis
th its 55 million' tate, a key sollNil til FriðIt” 5 he | ('Yrth. This , the Tilling party ilm Ilfllentill E: ml 3 Te becil 15: Lill Tiva 1 the very important iandhi’s Co Tigress was the Chief R played "God1a karam Hind his
has tried these to slip into that gain a role which :hc IllL};t 111 tiC)11aders. That ithim into deep Сепtте апči PTime The issLics were if the reception its Titl III foll IL TE LE 1 Le e Indian army is ia's Illos L Will Ledi British raj. BeAll thereforge the gards the LTTE el” it and consco II on the largest army'
as so much scum', in the ling of top-bracket army brass'.
Mr. Kurunanidhi has also a ntagonised RAW by accusing it of causing 'friction' between the DMK and the Centre. He has accused RAW (and Mrs. Gandhi, and Rajiv) of establishing training camps for the 'Tigers' in the South.
It should be noted that R.A.W. and the IPKF, despite na ny a fracas, ran the Indian operation in Sri Lanka for two El midi half y ea TS.
The Centre's at Litude th en is not supportive in any way of the Tamil Tigers'. lf anything it is intensely hostile to an LTTE which has launch cd the new War in the midst of serious, prolonged negotiations with the Premadasa government, and this War Secms in deadly earnest - the goal in independent EELAM. With Kashmir, under direct Centre (AT my) rule, a Tid Punjab a run Ining Sorc, Delhi is III no mod to tolerate any form of secessionis II.
How cwcir, Delhi does hawe a serious concern - and here, We see continuity of Indian foreign policy, rather than discontinuity or change. The concern is spelt out in the loose word 'security. The threat-perception' as Indian spokesmen and analysts kecp saying a rises from the possibility probability of Colombo's “inducting outside powers' in the “ “ war” against the separa tist "Tigers'. Delhi knows that no big power, and no extra-regional power, is likely to get involved in the Sri Lankan imbroglio and run the risk of alienating India, tipo important a country to El Intigonise. So, it is only a codeword for a 'power' in the region. And the Te is only ONE p.0Wer which has the resources to assist Sri Lanka in any meaningful Way

Page 6
i.e. militarily. The "power" it has in mind is of course PakisLan, right now locked in a bitter dispute over divided Kashi ImiT , the original conflict that made these
newly independent states mortal Cene || Thies.
In 1971, Mrs. Gandhi's secret tellissaries received Soviet assuEl Ices of help in the event of an India-Pakistan war, and USChinese aid to Pakistan. That Indo-Soviet Treaty is still walid. Yet, Prime Minister Singh decided to visit Moscow to hear Mr. Gorbachev give the self-same assurances publicly, and declare the USSR's unreserved slippo Tt for the Indian position that Kashmir should be discussed on the basis of the Sin la Agreement.
Pakistan is the obsession. And that is vis-a-vis Sri Lanka however adolescent we may find such a view, or suspect that it is mercly a pretext for interference. The rumpus in Delhi, even in the most respectable le Wspapers in India, over the visitto Coll() ninbo cof a "Pakistani warships' carrying Weapons, is a ready illlustration. It was soon found that these were Pakistan Coast guard vessels. They stopp cd in Colombo on the way hom from China. A 3-4 column story With huge headlines soon b. omo a single para in many papers.
LEGITIMATE CONCERN
Besides these 'security concerns' on which the Sri Lankan dellegation was treated to Tilly lectures, there is the Tamil refugee problem, And that IS a legitinate concern. So far, 48,000 Tamil refugees have fled the fighting i 1 the north, according to usually reliable Indian sources. The Indian navy is patrolling India's side of the Palk Straits. Yet the refugee flow continues. Innocent civilian families are leaving their homes and seeking shelter in the Mannar area. The Sri Lankan nawy is simply not equipped to control the situation. Although we are a small island and this exodus was seized by Mrs. Gandhi as a tool" of coercive
Indo-La
The pa
di SC Lussions on which t
a) The need for ac rity in the b) Thai agreetent
Trust Elbe a Work.
c) That which was community Which was
d) Tha parties in r ethnic back
e) That is an ongo already esta
f) That for any clai Sri Lanka.
the Sri all groups i ated the w lndian Pri. i) India Of Sri Lank Hi) indi: of its neig lill ) Indi groups to c The del parties and this policy.
Through Indian polit
delegation Indias conc
i) Conce the conflict casualties
ii) Cont il the Sri security
ііі) Соп the Conflict through the Within the Sri Lanka.

MEVMVS BACKGRO LUMID
nka Parliamentary Consensus
liamentary delegation in the course of their highlighted the following issues and concerns here was a broad consensus: fact that all political parties agreed on the tion to restore law and order and civil autho
North and East of the country,
all political parties in Sri Lanka were in
that the final resolution of the current crisis
political one within the democratic frame
all were agreed that the military option proceeding was not one against the Tamil but against the LTTE as an armed group Committe d to seCe.55i On.
t the public statements made by political 'egard to the present conflict had ensured no lash as had occurred on previous occasions.
the settlement of the ethnic problem, which ing process, must build on the foundations
blished.
Indian 50 iI should not be allowed to be Lised Indestine activity by any armed groups against
Lankan parliamentary delegation also informed t had interacted with, that it greatly appreciery clear statement of policy made by the he Minister. This was to the effect that,
stood by the unity, integrity and sovereignty
a Would not intervene in the internal affairs Tıbours
a would not allow Sri Lankan Tamil guerrilla perate from or maintain bases on Indian soil
egation was gratified to note that all political individuals they met, completely supported
their intense interaction with the major lical parties, the Sri Lankan Parliamentary was able to obtain a clear understanding of erns, These were broadly:
arn at the reported inflow of refugees from into Tamil Nadu and the level of civilian
:ern at the possible involvement of "3rd parties' Lankan conflict which could affect India's
icern and interest in seeing an early end to "and the resolution of the ethnic problem provision of as much devolution as possible framework of the unitary Constitution of

Page 7
diplomacy, expansion of the Sri Lankan na wy has bee In 11eglected. A IIlodest rise in its budget may hawe paid good dividends,
One of IIldi:ʼs best kL10 WI1 commental tors, IT der Malho tir: observed in a Tiles of Iridia article:
By July 1987, the feelings in Tamil Nadu over the plight of Lankan Tamils were so inflailed that inaction on New Delhi's part would almost certainly have caused a major explosion in the southern state . . . it is :A II1 azing that Mr. In der Gujral's staten erit that India would not intervent militarily "anywhere under fin y circunstances has evoked very little comment. Utillost caution in interven ing even in al reas of vital concern to this country is of course called for. But to rule out Indian intervention, altogether regardless of consequence to Indian security, is just not on.'
THE WAR
What so ille i gc cLillo IIs of the II ndian intelligen Lisia rega Tid als LTTE arrogance and ingra titude, proIllotes on the other hand a proColombo attitude and a Wishful thinking that would doubtless please many a Sri Lankan. In the same respected paper, chief
political correspondicTnt A. S. Abraham predicts rather to it) blandly:
tilt was so bloated with a sensc of victory that it over-estimated own strength and underestinated that of Colombo. The result is the immirient collapse Ilot Only Of the LTTE but of the entire decadeslong Tamil struggle. The wheel has cole fu circle'".
Has it " Everything points to bitter fighting in the North-Eilst where the troops have recaptured some police stations and restored government authority in the towns, while the Tigers' enjoy total mobility in the countryside. Its proving a long, painful, and costly war. The LTTE has been taught that it can declare Eelam but cannot gover in it or even protect life and property. Yet as long is it has supplies, the LTTE can continue its guerilla war.
Statem
U.S.
in Sri Lank. winding down insurgency by JWP has tragical rccte:Ilt. W eeks, t. betweel Sri L: II cts and the Lib Til Eel, Linkan gover sume la lks to el encourage the T We have long b rity grievances by peaceful T framework of als
Mr. Chair. Ina I U.S. regional like til highlig Illernt of del c. Democracy his the SubC)Th, ti[1e Linki live C1. of represental Pakistan rejoin months ago; it polity has alre ence Lindcr stre tified recently Soil. T's subcC T of del critic swept the world I 11 3 1 1 ths h:4"W": T c
Pakistan, In, are all faced W Cofronting di IL1 ents: mai itali i Til the face of 5e Int Without LIE democratic wal
stand. The b:
ԼիI1E -
U.K.
Mr Wyn Jon
co un 2, July aske State for Fre: Wealth Affairs partment has I tations to th (a) Sri Lank concerning th of Wiclence in he Will Imake ::
MT. SolinshlII Commissil

ents on
a, the Welco Elle of the bloody the Te volutional y ly given Way, in 3 renewed fighting kan security forcration Tigers of We ald the Sri ment's offer to Tëld the fighting and igers to accept it. elig ved that Ini LOmIIst he Iddressel melns vitlin the overeign Sri Lanka. 1, Lle secon i key bjective I would hւ is encourageratic gover Inlet, a strting base in Int. III dial a Tid ST i joyed forty years :iwe gover In Iuliert. ed their ra. Ilk5 18 s new democritic a dy show I resiliss. Aid, as I tesbescr: Cilli TIlal. Il Ili Lee, the Winds cha Inge that have these last twelve ached Nepal. lia, and Sri Lanka ith the grał w cist lest emocratic gover Inning public Corder often violent di 51dermining the very ues for which thic y lance is a difficult
es i I the CCIII mill: 15 d the Secretii ry of ig 1 a Tid Common, whether his Dema de any Tepi Test: Te Government of a and (b) India e recent escalati).I. Sri Lill käl and if I ETlt: ITET T. y: The British High 1п CalUпН o is i II
NEWS BACKGROUND
Sri Lanka
regular contact with the Sri Lankalı (Government, and we ha WC also made contact with the Indian Government. We are deeply concerned by thic renewed fighting in Sri Lanka and by the suffering and loss of live this is callsing. We are dismayed by the decision of the Tallil Tigers to break off negotiations with the Sri Lankan Government and resume fight1Tig:
E. E. C.
Mr. Mario Sammartino, Charge d' Affaires of Italy as the representative of the current President of the EEC, Italy handed over the attached declaration, states the Foreign Ministry.
The declaration states: "The Twelve wish to express their dcc p concer at the current deterioration of the situation in Sri Länka. They deplore the refusal of the LTTE to continue negotiations and its decision to Te new fighting in the North ind East of thic col IntTy which both causes greit suffering Elmong the civilian ppulation and leads thousands of people to seek refuge in other
TLS
In conformity with President Prema das as appeal for consultation, compromise and consensus, they hope that a peaceful solution will be found to the domestic problems of the island with the object of safeguarding the in dependence, sovereignty, ter Tito Tial integrity and unity of Sri Lanka.
AALIStralia
The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Gareth Evans, today condemned the actions of the Tarihil milita Illt gitt olup, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), im breaking the celseire With the Sti Likin CGC3"Wer T1IIı eI1t,
(Санктіншғd он Парға :1)

Page 8
Armed ethnic conflict reaches or
The final showc
James Clad in Sri Lanka
lunders and terrible cyli
cism hawe pushe di Sri Lanka into yet another outbreak of inter mall är Ted conflict and communal killing the fifth in less thā m a decade. President Rä näsinghe Prema daša has only H few weeks in which to get the upper hand in an increasingly silvage war against the Liberation Tigers of Talli Eclaim (LTTE). If he fails to make quick gains he not only risks ап егоšiоп of political support ät holle àIld abröll but als Ö a m en d tO the promising econo lic revival which began late last year.
The 1:lt est War With the d'OIT1in L. Int Tal Imili sepair El tist group was triggered on II June when LTTE guerillas bega. In the Illas sacre cof hundreds of Sinhalese police. The bloodletting came just three Ionths after the pull-out by New Delhi of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF), inducted in July 1987 to try and achieve
TaII1il :111 t) rı o Ii 1y Withi I1 STi Lanka. With that withdrawal, Hille LTTE Wyas - free Lg elimi
mate its Tiwaals li mili sco Lili solidate its forces.
Hawing a chieved effective co IIIL. Toll of thic TL IT] il - d 1 1 | Dated погLh-east, the Tigers – anticipating an eventual clection in the region — Im CD y cd il gå inst the police in an apparent bid to eInsure that all forces of la w a II d Corder Wcre il their hı:Dd5, The tactic backfired, and gave the army, held in check by PreInadas) while he negotiated with the LTTE, the excuse to respond in what could be the final showdown between the governIIlent and the Illilitants.
In the short term at least, Premadasa has three advantages. First, Weariness prevails in India
over STi Link oil, Ell the Imo Delhi's preoccuբ in Punjab and K the president ha: ing spell from: See altitude to Sri Lanka's cxit ffields.
Finally, the lut to the stup LTTE. Aftc T p lcw War by t reds of police compounded its month by mass Coppi Concent:5 lliwii Madras, the ca. Tamil Nadi Stil tional refuge Tä 15. Its St Tanni I di:4sp () r::ı. World hals The well
Despite these opponents with the president's Party (UNP) is tactics with the included a year C compounded t They claim he self in the WOT: presidency he 1988. Soille se I military leaders (l: 8:ls faith irl being partly res suffering now E the army in or cidge ower the T Cc5 Te esti T3 1lIlder One-third Saldi eTs al lid Salj STi Lillk"S de: military forces.
If the parliai tion parties cor UNP for tes Si Inhalese co Ilimu Imake an issue dasa could be fensive. Current
Crofeji; FAIR EAS REVI EFF")

Licial stage
lown
Li's ethnic turm'e so given New ation with crises ashmir. Secondi, gained a breaththe Wait-andthe War El mong Ernal, lid-giving
|resident to Wes a di cruelty of the recipitating this |utchering hundmlen, the LTTE error the same acring 14 Tamil g in exilc in pital of India's te and the tradifor Sri Laikan anding in the and in the Wider been so low.
useful gains, in and outside United National ay Premadasa's
LTTE - which if negotiations - he War's cost. has landed himst crisis of the assumed in late itor Sri Lankan
regard Prema
Lle LTTE a 5 ponsible for the being incurred by der to regliT an igers, whose forted at slightly
of the 60,000 lors comprising fence and para
mentary opposinpeting with the in the inajority nity successfully of this, Premabut on the dely, however, the
- - - - -
Sri Lanka Freedom Party and most others are subordinating partisan advantage to the war, which the government is trying hard to portray as a conflict bet Ween the State and One te Trorist group, the LTTE.
The first government-LTTE war began in 1983. It ceased in 1987 When India sought to achieve Til Illil autonomy within
Sri Lanka by in terpo sing the IPKF bet Wech the LTTE & Il the Sri Lankan army. Yet when
the Tigers, who had been arm cd and trained by Indian intelligence agencies previously, bccame hostile, the Indians showed themselves woefully short of sufficient force to keep the peace,
The fighting beetween the LTTE and the Indian army ended with the March. Withdrawal, but illmediately afterwards there erupted a piti less war between thc LTTE and different Tamil factions who had supported the 1987 Indo-Sri Link accord. The agreement had promised devolution of power to a northeast provincial council, comprising the merged northern and eastern provinces; Talmil group5 participating in this council, notably the Eelam People's Revolutionairy Liberation Front (EPRLF), collided with the Tigers.
Critics claim Prelladas a turned a blind eye to the LTTE's ruthless power-plays against its Tamil rivals. Meanwhile, the Sri Lankan security forces used the respite given by the presence of the IPKF to destroy by last year a wicleInti Imo weilent of al li en al tedi Sinhalcsc youth groupcd under the Janatha Will Lukthi Pe Taa Iluli 1:1 (JWP, or People's Liberation Front).
These overlapping Wars have often made it extraordinarily difficult to keep the various

Page 9
combatants clearly defined. Other differences turn on caste (among Tamils), on religion (between the Sinha lese Buddhists, Tamil Hindus and the minority Muslims) and om ideology and social class al 5 il the intra-Silhalle se war against the JWP following the 1989 killing of at least 20,000 people.
This hatred has spawned new agents of violence. Shadowy death squads answer to senior politicians. Different branches of the Sri Lankan security serwices now employ terror routincly, an a u ra that hangs heavy on units like the Special Task Force (STF), an elite detachment of police. Some of the most callous LTTE fighters are little more than children, aged 15 or less.
The cu Tel war la 5 the feel
of a showdown. The LTTE, after all has worked for 18 years to achieve an independ
ent state in the Tail-doliated northeast. The origins of that struggle lie in the my copia of Sinhalcise linguistic chauvinism, in implicitly anti-Tamil public-service hiring policies and in dclibcrate Simhalese colonisation of lands in the Tortheast. Thc point of no return was reached after Sinhalese Tamil rioting in 1983.
The sense of Scttling scores also results from the Sri Lankan army's need to avenge past humiliations, som c of which it blames on Premadasa's negotiations with the LTTE. The president genuinely believed that he alone could bring the LTTE, whom he regarded as people of similar populist bent to him - self, to an agreement. Neither he Inor the Tiger leaders hawe Inuch patience for the Englishspeaking educat cd elite. PT eInadasa also thought that LTTE leader W. Prabhaka Tan änd his battle-hardened comrades might slowly be ta med once they beCaTime un disputed administrators of their autonomous northeastern patch within the wider Sri Laikan polity. He also hoped, in the future that this would lead to al Teliab Lc U JNP wote bank in that region.
Pre пadasa d signs of LTTE S0 Tİle, slich ä5 of bunkers rig positions, als fort of Jaffna Էnoլյgh. This rity is crucial Prella di sah"; c. deal with th police in the tangled with t I moved thcIn, keep out of 1 5 ciltling äl mong and fictions.
15 in Jlfna, F :dп inn miпепt I Inspector-gener forced to Orde resist the LTT
Sri Lankan ; diccp breaths evacuate positi äl s CIC: SCT i first government kesant urai, at of the country a I11 ple; reliewin Tison without has become a cise. Officers hard when tee assed them at L. with Premiidas thic LTTE här right to wet mi Still the presid give no cause of the truce, the destruction talks.
Now that pro Yet despite Pr The 55 Elt this be al Ill III beT of i t Elges.
It i5 Iot 19 is simply unab degrees so soo: ing its troops s; ta TCC is de fel Illinimise the w fcct 1 Tali
the Pilki Strit, of a separate
m1:1ir1 S a, s stT(bI1 its Illilitary bra of the LTTE
g Thic LTTE Evc|1 il the C

id not ignore the wat prepa Tations; the constructic Il
it next to arily il thic II Tther
spoke loudly
ցilmble on sinceto understanding
ffort to Teach i:
LTTE. Whic eastern region
he LTTE, 1 e Teorde Ting the il t} the Tigers scorerriwal Tall mill gangs Even when signs, lost shrieked of LTTE attack, the all of police was his II el Ilot to Ε.
事
generals also took When ordered to Cins gelin ed, öften fice, during the I-ILTTE wa T. Kal. Ilthe northern tip , pro vides an exg the Jaffna garthis nearby post wery costly exer
ELISO SWallowed. lage guerillas härTTE checkpoints: a's acquies cence, d delded th litary to Wellents. ential Order held: for a breakdown live no cause for
of the autonomy
cess liet 5 il rulli Iis. cmada säll’s bittertrayal he retains Important a dwa l
83 or 1987. India lc to swivel 18O in after withdrawNW Delhi's lsive, secking to Fars “push” cfIlligration : cross 1пčiia" s dislike Eclam state reg :15 ewe T, while ss Telish the sight eing himmered.
's brutal record. In text of Sri Lai
ka's five internal wars, in which 10 Ollt hills W II är my hlima. Ilrights awards, Prabhakaran has gained a reputation for Tuthlessness.
5 Retaining a conciliatory puse While prosecuti Ing the wa II. Justice Minister A. C. S. Ha II heed, a Muslim, still Works for a truce despite the almost immediate collapse of his earlier ceasefire agreements in June. On the Other hånd Minister af State for Defence Ranjan Wijcratine breathes fire, telling the REVIEW candidly that he aims to kill the LTTE leadership in the way he had helped annihilate the JVP.
D. A hardened military, From 12,000 soldiers in the carly 1980's the Sri Lankan military now has five Lilles that number. Israeli and oth cr advisers have helped to train thctl and they now hawe 11 luch bcttcr w capons. The STF strikes special fear,
The military hopes to retain its garrisons in the northern region and gradually crush the Tigers in the east. Despite the impressin of relentless progress given by the Colombo newspapers, Wijera tinc acknowledges that it will take 'Imonths, not weeks' to put the army back on top. Yet it his made gains, notably the relief of the Kiran artly Cimp near Batticaloa and the destruction of a major LTTE base in Ampara on 10-11 July.
"First we will Teta ke the whole of the eastern province,' Wijeratne said. "We hawe put a brigadier as area commander in each of that province's three districts. We are reopening police stations. Then we will bottle up the penins Lula".
Wijcratne in sist cd he was playing the war transparently. “The foreign press cal come and go anywhere, sce anyone. The ICRC (International Committee for the Red Cross) is free to work. I am fighting the LTTE like I fight any other terrorist group. They are crillinails and we will destroy them.'" The local press reports defeats a5. Well its wictories.

Page 10
Arm5 from Pakistan and, especially, China keep the army Well-cquipped. Armoured personnel carriers, helicopters and Cspcctitilly ho Witzers are II w being bought from Iraq following a visit there at the end of JL1 I1 c by the STi La Tika Ti ai T for Tce chief and the Illilitary's chief of Ordnance, sources Said. AT) i Illicilite Ideel is extra I) y Twa class speedboats fron Israel which are highly valued by the Sri Länkas.
Financing the waT may be feasible if a position of strength is rapidly defined and talks begin again. Parliament accepted Wijera Line's request for Rs 2.5 billion (US$ 62 million). A National Defence Fund is receiving contributions from state corporations, and Other circular devices are being employed. The effect will be to siphon off funds from other sectors,
A longer war will raise the inflationary spect Tc unless the government Tesists the tempta
tion to print new money via central bank credit. During the Weck of 8 July IMF and World Bank teams were visiting Colombo. The draft IMF report worries about the public-sector deficit going above the current 11-12% of GDP mark but a trade-off is likely if, as seems сегtain, Prema da sa Sticks to a structural adjustment programme revised last year. There is no sign that thic aid consortium is Considering withholding as sistance (65% of development spending in Sri Lanka is foreignfinanced),
This backing results from the sense that Premada sa had been sincere in his dealings with the LTTE. Indeed, the LTTE at the time of the IPKF withdrawal had achieved something better than all earlier efforts. They ruled in the north and cast with the passiv c (cven sonunctimes actiwe) acquiescence of Cold II1b). Prema dasa had felt he could deal better with an ethnic adversary speaking with one, authoritative voice. But any lin-- gering hope for a plural, * civilised Tamil polity expired in the three months following the IPKF's
8
dcparture, Anti Conc if the ILT sible spokesmc. that ill-discipl to the 11 Jult ice, and the w: welly I mist immed,
There is I fighting contin tion betw een “guerilas wil Ilire dificult ti STi Lanka 15 wi է: Կլ III (1""E IIIE |lt | history, estimat ment at 100,000 Tul co II IIllIIll| the E:astern . reg bottled up in the south of Tri Tatne accepts been sile "exc by security fori Ilirth wärd Il " is uI1 der wily, which rel Illin5 till the el 5 fer 40,000 people : after ilrmy lin Mill 1 ET isll 1d West of Jaffna.
Reports of ELT Elide to the 1 I ing, however. W tham gỡVernmen for the Slow di fic. Essen tial -LוTטורו חTט1n gQW in the north,
15 fond. Prcmia all to well comparatively
international ri porate if the | evel to be c
c. AI ICRC of food and IT imb for the
Prella disa's is to gain a de advantage for t:11. k: With th II list CCL 5. 'W' till length that Wi would intensify focus to this C ble T5 i Il Si II roads leading Ibo IIIa ke ethnic chill will government is

:) In Balasi Ingha T11, "TE"'s fictw – acces1, has a di Titled il cd cal TCS led
massacrc of pollt is scen as gra
doubt that, as ues, the distinc+ * civili Is"" ilmid [t ט"ים שוות b ECO | draw. Already tnessing the largof refugees in its ed by the governfor III lies. Dredkillings Wrack iom, with Tails Batticall and to ncomalee. Wijethalt there hl. We :esses' in the east ces. AI Werall e II en of Tai Tills to w Tsi Jal Tf13 more peaceful n a Tel Another Lre heading north it5 cl)55 in I
the south
1 economic block"til å Te Imis; 3d - "illence, far more t policy, accounts wn in 1orry tra fsupplics are low -occupied towns TLl L (")L1 t.5;idle th (e:Te da så understands how quickly the
Well-intentitled El Citi Will eygovernment is beng i The CT i ng i fam-arranged convoy cdicinics left Col.July .11 וול) rthיtוI
է:
iIT IL1ediate goal :cisive negotia ting the Ilext round of e LTTE, which ; ilce le C:1. Il I10t ily. A wat the јегаtne envisages * tle COILIIIll:1 onflict. Already. halese script over Il Carth Cort i F1 CCblrank appeals to isin, though the not pandering to
these sentiments. The capital
eillains frce of continual rioting, unlike in 1983. A display of blood and gore under the noses of tourists, who continue to arrivic, would be a disaster.
For all that, the government has ineptly presented much of the evidence in its fav011 fra III this war. The massacre of police at Uppaveli and Kinniya, both lear Trico Eilee, or at Batticall (during which women LTTE Cädte: 55 Te belic word L. have applauded) has not made its way in to il dos sier. Si millarly, the LTTE's Lise if industrial chlorine powder in an 8 June attack con a n army camp El t Ki Tan did in tot prompt the authorities ti have the 20 affected men examined by imparti | b) 5 ET YT5.
With the obvious exception of the JWP suppression, the Tamils have been at the receiving end of every one of Sri Lanka's brutal Wars. The CI Trent colflict, for its sheer destructiveness, may prove the Worst yet. Reliable accounts of hundreds of civilians killed, especially in the deeply unsettled Batticaloa area, now reach foreign elbassies. The in Wellent of refugees; the use of naval and le Tial bil blir diment; the “onecklacing' with flaming tyres and Cather dreadful cal lling cards; the | hea T-stal T va tirn cynic: lly 15ed to propel it refugee exodus - all these point to a prolonged and vicious conflict. Despite the presence of up to 36 ICRC delegates, the minimal standards of hul marit: Tial II will rf: Te, i misnomer perhaps, fail to be observed i both side 5.
Ital 1 hinges on speed. With eyes on the Kashmir crisis and possible war with Pakistan, the Indialns des pe Titely want to a Wajid inter wention. Clumsy LTTE attempts to por tra y a Pakista ni hand in Colomb o’s military coperations elicited å di cilial froIII New Delhi that two Pakistani corvettes, visiting Colombo in mid-July were warships.' New Delhi's prompt reaction was Illeant to head off domestic criticism of “ “gey wer Diment in action"
(I Phage 4 Tץ {frr:treal t הולל")ן

Page 11
Jaffna. Tamils alienate South Ind Worm-out welcome
James Clad in Madras
f political support from India
: highly in calculations by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), them its Tenewed war with the Sri Lankan Inilitary since June could not have been more badly mistimed. At both national and state levels in India the LTTE has reached the bottom of the trough.
is like for " + Jaffla. Til Tills” has slowly grown since the first wave of refugees began irriving In Tamil Nadu, an Indil T1 state of 55 million people, after Sri Lanka's ethnic War erupted in 1983. Those crossing the narrow Palk Strait then could count on a sy III pathetic reception and aid from the state government. There was also a willingness to look the other way at clandestinct Taffic to the Jaffna peninsul:1 a II d Mannar island, using fishing craft
powered by several outboard engi lès.
Y et Within the State Capital
Madras, Sri Lankan Tamils halwe now acquired the reputation of being both snobs and thugs. Residents complain about drug smuggling, brazen show of Weaponry by young LTTE supportcrs driving around in Suzuki jeeps and about a deterioration of law and order. There also is a tendency to bla me high rents and other problems on the emigres.
The for Ilation of the India Il Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) following the July 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan accord put Tamil Nadu's loyalties to the test. The War breaking out soon aftë TW: Tds between the mostly 11(}I Lh Indian IPKF soldiers and the LTTE came do WIl to a choice between sympathy for the nation or bloodfeeling for ki,
Although local jouTnalists and politicians describe it as touchand-go for some months, nation
all loyalties set w Hillccl. Indial
during the IPK 1,155 dead and But when IPKF LTTE FImbollshes rcjoicing in Ta1 the TTh olus ta chi (bi "W", PTabb11 kF TF1 I1 following allor Tamil youth.
NJIlle if tilli i'w all Tamil Nadu f'Tolm playing f the Tamil emig 1.L1 S. EL T : El 1 : a cronyms: the eration Organi Eelam People' Liberation Fril Ee la II National eration Front ( the most proir LTTE — — | b) citt CT Tigers - greatly
The state go Chief Minister IT ) Tilwida ML1 li 1
(DMK) party, with the LTTF power in early
because, his : EHRLE 10TH position coaliti the lationally party and the Multi I let Ta Kaizli:: DMK, Ill W" bcl Prillę Milis LCT Natio Ilil Front in national pol
No Ille k 1.3 W Lankan nation fourth-largest li they number hul Id Ted the L15:41 pressure from Ili dili ordere: drive following ling in Madril5 if the EPRLF Lånd lords 11n e: ch:int for til Td their cha Lice to igre families.

NEWS BACKGROUND
liaክ bዞፀtከዞፀm
Em to have preadiliitted 1353 ES F operation of 2,984 wou inded. soldiers died in the Te Was Il mil Nadu, though El LTTE chief enjoys a cult ng working-class
s has prevented 1 political parties : W. ) LIT ] Lit5 - ELIT 10) [1] : rc groups whose alphabet soup of Tamil Ecl:Lil Libsation (TELC), s Revolutionary it (EPRLF) and
DCIn critic LibENDLF) are only 1iTit:Tit, with the
kIJ W 1 : 3 the
predominant.
ern IlcInt, led by M. Kauaidhi's etra Kazhaglı a II) became friendly after coming to 1989, not least .i des clai III, the bcd with the opin between the ruling Congress A Illinä TOT;widi gham party. The Longs to IIndia II - W. P. Singh's and his a vice licy Illaki Ilg.
is how Illiny Sri als live in this Indian city, but At least several ld. Under heavy N: W II) elhi, Karudi El registration the 14:) Li The kilCf || 4 Cofficials by the LTTE sy about this pie Elerous rivalry saw twict II: Iny cIIl
The killings struck a chord of rệVulsion, especially a mong the Illiddle class. The Wict ills included the party's secretarygeneral K. Padman a bha and two MPs of the Sri Lankan parliaII.
Now Karunanidhi is backing away from his former friends. Following the June killings, seweral det ach ments of police are being trained to use high-powered rifles, But som c analysts beliewe police sympathics lie With the LTTE or, at the very least, doubt their stomach for trying to control its battle-hardered supporters. Still, some tougher police action, follo Wing NCW Delhi's cue, seems inevitable.
The renewed fighting caught Karunanidhi off guard. The chief minister had played the statesma II in February, Welco II i Ing LTTE spokesmen Anton Balasingham, the EPRLF's Padmanabha, TELO) secretary-general A. Selva I11 3Ind ENDLF seCTetary-general Parantha II Rajan to Madras. Yet a month later, Karunanidhi virtually pushed several boat loads of Til mil Tefugees associated with the failed, Indian-imposed Northeastern provincial council in Srī Lāk away from Tamil Nadu. He was also abseilt from a reception in Madras for the retiring IPKF force whose comma Tider, LieutGen. A. S. Kaka L, colld b: Tely disguise his contempt for the chief minister.
Thi5 mixture of Ta IIlil ambivalence ind seniør. I tidlian Ifficial dom's great dislike of the LTTE, I means the Tigers hawe an uphill task to regain whatever Confidence they Illy Çince have enjoyed. Since December, the LTTE has been proclaiming their lly': for India, with Billillsingham on one occasion saying the Indo-Sri Lanka accord
(Сантілшегі от ртаge 3.1)

Page 12
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y with a heart 1,000 houses to be 1982 and now towards a : target, invites us to offer everyone.

Page 13
IDF? PRESEARGHI TEAMMI
Afghanistan and Sri La A Comparison of Opel
The 970s
HE DECADE OF THE 1970s. can in retrospect, be called the decade of decisive conventional Wars. A number of decisive conventional conflicts occurrical in the Third World that 5:W cIntic countries fill before invading/liberating armies. As a contemporary Indian writer has pointed out, in 1971 India liberated Bangladesh; in 1978 Tanzania liberated Uganda; in 1979 Wie:Ilha. Il frecid Cambodil from the Khmer Rouge; in 1979, the penultimate y car of this Lullultuous decade, the Soviet Union launched a major thrust to occupy Afghanistan.
The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was a model of ruhles 5 military eficiency that sent shock Waves across the globe. Soviet special forces (Spetsnaz) scize Bagram air base Tnear Kabul. The elite 105 (Guards) Airbor me Division iety in to seize the capital. Hafizulla Amin's presidential palace was attacked and Arlin himself was killed. Simultaneously five Sowict motorized rifle divisions crossed the border into Afghanista II. In five days all of Afghanistan was under Soviet CCCLII Patin. If this was Ilot total wa T, what wis it? The Wester Il World condemned the Russian invasion, India's call for the evacuation of the foreign PTC's en C c f'T CITY Afgha This tan was muted, Was India at the time aware that she would be forced into a similar situation?
The 1980s
The decade that followed saw
a series of low-intensity conflicts break out in Asia in the Wake of these invasions. The
Allericans were determined to Inlike Afghanista in the Swiet Vietnam by equipping the Mu
g report ffl:ări II II: IIIשנThe ribr)
CLCCCHCLLS rT CLS SSLLLL LLSLLLL LLLLLLL REP EHF)
jahideen with Si ponry through Pakista II, and guerrilla-type W dia itself the their Weste Till E best to ble ed forces in Calib guerrilla war. reversal of Tole gaged the USS in a low-cost conflict through guerrillas. Ia l! intensity conflic soTt c:4, rım e t ) lig —a vici ilus coth I the: Si Thälls a in to which Indi in a web of it
As this decil bloody finale w What appears the final deilole fOICc5 h:lye W Afghanistan an fTO IL1 CaI1b dia infectice that : lyst gan draw i tually impossibl today to cI for military occupat country. Given population, a cc ship, a supply a TIl 15 a Il di sacL1 bմuring states, occupation ca. In unprofitable. Af a point that s seems beyond of even a supe)
However, the Afghanista T con scrutiny. A mo lysis will presen conclusions.
The Success o'
As Liellte Dill Grisillow, the der, led the las out of Afghinist;

inka:
rational Styles
Jphisticated Weaits fronlinc ally encouraging a
Par. In CaInboChinese and Ilies did thicir the Wielics Codia in a bitt CT II. El cliis sic :S the West i el
R. El Ild Vietnam low-intensity
the indigenous 83, another lowL of a differen L. ht i Sri Lätifika lic y cy'e Il di Lhee Tallils ia geot e 11 nimeshed s own creation.
de draws to El ë halve Come to superficially as r1eI1[I. The Sco'Wie L. i til dra will fra II
the Wietill Illes : A II. obvious Iny military a naS thlt it is Wire for any nation e a prolonged i Col Cf Indother a notivated II i Illitted licadercf bil sic 5 Tall Jaries in neighthe cost if such be Inade highly ghanistan proves uch coccupatioI1 he capabilities power.
TCs ults of the flict bel Cls Ser Te detalilei allt räther startling
fNativization
(GeI1 Eri"ä, I BO Ti5 Soviet CillaRussian troops An in February
1989 the world hic ld its breith Western media Tcports had long been predicting a bloodbath in Kabul in the wakc of the Swict withdrawal. Shorn of their Soviet protectors, the Surrogate regime of Najibullah was expected to come down like a holl se of cards. The world Waited timorously for a bloodbath as the vengeful Mujahideen were now expected to sweep down from the hills and put Najibullah's Afghanistan to the torch and wreak terrible vengeance on thic perceived quislings. The World Wiited in vi.
Kabul, despite all American hopes, was not really a mirror image of Saigon. Amazingly Najibullah regime held. The 'faithful" launched repeated issaults on Jalalabad, in the hope of Securing a prestigious polititica 1 objective where the provisional Mujahideen GowcTn ment could be installed. But the Afghan Army held out resolutely. The un coordinated Muja hide em attacks petered () ut a Illongst
bitter, mutual recriminations. The world was somewhat surprised. However, to anyon C
following the events closely in Afghanistan the results should häive come AS TO S LI Tp Tisc.
1983 thic Swicts had bicen following a celteful policy of nativization'. They had increasingly bec in shifting the burden of military commitment on thic Afghan Army. The initial pattern of major operations by Soviet forces had given way to specialized opcrations by the elite Spetsnaz troops. The Afghan Army had six years of probation fighting under the watchful eyes of their pations who stepped in whenever they felt their proteges were in trouble, The Soviets provided training, equipment and effective air co
Si Ice ab Llt
11

Page 14
yer. The Soviets sent in their elite Spetsnaz troops for blooding in this “co Inbait laboratory". These forces undertook unconWCIntional operations and in 1985-86 almost succeeded in preventing the return of the Afghan Mujahidean who had gone for "wintering' in Pakistan. Apparently the Soviets left only when they werc fairly certain that their Afghan proteges could stad o T their cwm feet. Thi5 Was a calculated risk thit has to da te paid off.
Learning their les sons from thc Oltcoinc of the Soviet withdrawill the Wict namics, haw C withdravn fra 111 Cambodia. The Westerm Inedia were rife with reports of the blood-thirsty Khmer Rouge sweeping do W II triumppantly fr. In the Hills and junigles ind putting Phnom Penh to the torch. Nothing of that sÖrt has happcned to date. The Wietnamese had also taken te year i to "Tlativize the cc Ilflict and have now departed confident that their Cambodian SITTogates have fou па their Пmilitary legs.
Nativization is not something 1 E W. The British did it i I I India EWo centuries ago. They conquered and ruled India. With the help of a native Indian Ar Lily that far out numbered the British troops (never more than 50,000-70,000). The failure of the American 5 in Wietnam was thelr failure to cffectively nativize the conflict. Their Wietnamiz.:- tion programmes were seemingly Ilot effective. Their surrogates just could not stand without external support, And no nation, not even a superpower, can provide such external supiport indefinitely. With this as the backdrop let us analyse the Afghan conflict a little more in de til 1.
LOWNTENSITY
CON FLICT: AFGHANISTAN
Strategic Orientation: Defensive or Offensive Thrust?
When the Soviets launched their decisive push into Afgha
I listill in 1979 in particular W ter. In analysts co IF i Syie y, to wa Tids, Pakist Co5 t of Makra I1. it to the Colls al tip II i I TITLIT. WWi5hcd tC) iL1 te: -Iraq conflict divisio Ils i T1 til hindsight it is to assess that was a defensi, a perceived th mic Republics L5ט ויורו 5י הווT years in pacif lim Khilate5. Muslill regill in harmony will iTI I TLT al Id a i Pakista, the CIA beca Tity night Tiare.
The Siets struck. It (T. tensity of t Teactio I - hl. W given them cal Their Afghan hy e Hild its 1 in the end t Initize the halve pálid c. (inclusive of bation) hlas t El
y el T 5, HC Weyť: in Kabul hold be a major
triumph for til
Gorbach cy's
til to 5e ek : designed to cu di Lite the int emoti( 15 to til Shall wi. With gone, the M lse tHeir Täll
Iller Till dissen up w could mak All was dep upon the mili of Najib ullah A successful I T: Time hic lid
acceptable res conflict in Sow
Afghanistan 649,750 squart its peak the
lewer Crossed

hic Wes Leri web Tlili Es tTabl c.d. WcsInjured up visions far IIl-Water thrust
los A Tabia Scal Yet others relitical ed, un stable situIf the Soviets I'ycle i[1 {he ITā Il they had their le right place. In now I eas omable tle Sovyiet til TL3, L te move to block Ie at to their Isli
iIl Central Asiä. had spent forty ying these Mus
A fundamentillist : in Afghanistan, Il te Sli Zellitsi Při MaF General in chestrated by the The El Soviet secul
Luder Brczew insively. The inhe international eve Illust hit We use for thought. policy seems to Ips and downs but lei T decisio I LO oT flict see Tilli Lo T. Nativization Afghal. In Army prokell 10st nie r, if their protege s out it would
politico-military Le Soviets.
subsequen L (leciwithdrawal was it Soviet costs and ersity of Afghal le présence of the the Soviet troops ujahid een would ying cause. Their isions in this sci:e it disintegrate. cTicient H1 Chwe wer tary performance 's native troops. 1ativization prog
the key to an
olution of this
5.
has an area of
: kilometres. At Soviet deployment 115,000 troops.
lin addition there Were 12.000 KGB änd MWD advisers/Coperaltives who trailed the Afghan secret police, the Khad. By itself this force was quite inadequate to tame a major insurgency in this type of terrain. The Soviets had rclicid upon a policy of Tinimal risk based upon
holding the main towns and CCIIII LI Illical til Arte Tics.
Edgar O’Bulla lice estimates
the Mujah in een strength to wary With the Season And Tange frøm 2000 to 90,000. The CIA operatives al Inc claim to hawe sent in over 200.000 weapons. What assisted the Soviets most, how
WET, Wls the L Ti Eball al Id cxtremely divided nature of the Afghan society. Strong tribal El Ini II10 sities 31 Td Tiwalrics wcirc
successfully exploited by the Khad. By and large the Mujahideen armed groups were nothing but the fighting arm of the families and tribes. There äTe over 15 Mujahideen political groups operating in Peshawar. The 8 Shia groups based in Iran a re dra wn primarily from the Haza Ta t Tibes of CcmTal Afghanistan i and include
II:Lilly the Saz-Man-I-Nasr, Sepah–i-Pasadaran and Hizbol| alih groups. The 7 II Air I SLIT1Ti groups in Peshawar include the Hezbi —1slami of GL11Lıb ddiılı Hckmatyar and Professor Burhaun - din Rabbil Ini's Ta ma t-i-Islami. Prominent leaders (besides Hekmatyar and Rabbani) are Mojadidi, Gailani, Mohama dei, Rephall min R. soul Sally Elf And Kahla lisThese numerous factions present the wey picture: of discord and constant squabbling.
The Afghan resistance remained a fractured tribal uprising and failed to graduate into : proper National Resistance movement... Iltis pri IT1a Ty failure lay in its inability to unite the various feuding tribes. The Illist successful Mujahideen leader was Ahamad Shall MasÖlld. a Tadjik leader of the Panjsher Walley. He was highly successful nilitarily and tried to forge
a pan tribal alliance over the four Northern provinces - Bada kisha Ii, Kuu Ilduz, Talk har End

Page 15
Baghlan (as well as Kaisa and Pharwan provinces i Tound Kabu1). Ho WeweT, being ::i. Tadjik his leadership was resented by the Päth HIli IIIb E5 of the SUulihcast. His influence theref. It Te Illi Illed confined to the Hilldukush Ridge and the Soviet border.
As time went by the Soviets and their Afgha. I su TTogates were able to drive a Wedge between the local Mujahideen field commanders operating inside Afghanista T1 and the bickering political leaders ens conced il Pe 5 HAWT.
Ethnically, the Pathan is an indiwidualist. Hic is ba we and fall lätical but dics, 13 L subordinate his freedom to group discipline. His loyalties feudal And tribal in chra: LeT L Tid suid dci w Coltic-faccis Wcrc lich L u Ilcomman in this war. A nu lber of Mujahideen leaders switched sides with their entire following. Their ethnic characteristics llave el sured that While the Mujahideen may do well in the guerrilla phase they will Ill be a El C. Elect the Switch to conventional operations easily.
Foreign Aid
The USA må intained a Clivert arms assistance programme yw Orth
S300 million a year and all Wert huminitäril 11 155istán Le (food and medical supplics)
programme worth S3 - 5 milliCon i Innually, Pakistan, as thc frontline state, provided bases and tT:1ining aT1 d 2:4ll W: :1 pC}I15 supplies were routed through it. In i later stages, Weapons were delivered directly to the Mujahide en als Pakistan was reported to be keeping portions of this largesse' for her own military needs, possibly for use against her arch encry, India. China ils o provided sig Elificant ar IIns and especially in the category of heavier Weapons, for example, anti-aircraft guns like the 12.7-mil Iachine gun, and later the ZPU-1 and -2 (14.5m. In Anti — Aircraft GLInı), 75-Irının RCL guns and the type 63-107 mm multiple rocket launcher system with a range of 8-10 kl. 11. Saudi
Arabia, Egypt a states provided
and a TIIS a idi. IT contiguous front vided bases, samt we Hippornıs adlıd tir: It's aid was di Te towards the Shia
Self Financing Golden Cresce
A permanent f : 1 cwt W four decades ha blishment of Corg empires to fina The Goldc TT j China Was Set covert cpcration and bitter strug LH05 : 1 d. Camb has ended but the persists. Such acquire an autoll tlh: it out lists the supposed tio fina III Crescent came as the source Afghan-Mujahid ilt the well-est of II1arc)- te:TT) ri: today. It is we That the Cỉ till:T the Gold II TTIE out last thic i Afgh
Soviet NMilita! in Afghanista
The Sovyiet II in Afghanista In li by a cal reful con of violence and Tent. Soviet tri went sig Trificant 115,000 mark of th and comprised TIJt crized Tifle di
of a Ili dirbo Tie i IGuards I) and
The Swiets, ill
el LS of Techni 7 a collweti. It als Their occupatio proved cl III terinstead of paci provoked a fie opposition that
the Afghan trib cause. Replacer Amin (who hai effors to clism

Id to the T A Taib both filalcial a n, as the other line state, pro"tuaries, limited Lining facilities. :cted primarily
grOlips.
: The
t
2nduring feature ars in the last s been the estaEl Inized Inarcotics nce such wars. ia Ingle” in Indoup to finance is in the long gle in Wietnam, Codia. That war Golden Triangle drug empires CT1 Colus existēIce Wars they were ce, The Golde into pro Illinence to finance the tsךWii T. It f וו eט ablished pattern ;II in the world 1 on the cards | Crescent, like Ingle, Will long ll W.
ry Strategy
ilitary strategy las been Illarked trol of the level
force commitJop levels I ever ly beyond the e initial invasion
primarily five Visions, element livision (the 105 Spets na z troops.
Ways great exponed Warfare, trie di lution initially. I of Afghanistan -br Coll Ictivic imid 'ying the region CC nationalistic
it first united חרי החוזז טin H C 5: let ("If HäfiZula
made calous |Intle = thic Iri:Ldi
tional tribal structures of Afghan
society) with Barb Tak Karmal. failed to mollify the Afghan people. The stTidency of inter
Ilational Cöİldem That için of the Afghanist an occupation seemed to have surprised the Soviets. Soviet military operations however
persisted and can be divided into two clear stages: Stage Orie (1979–82). After the
successful initial occupation the Soviet forces seemed confused Scattered and apparently unrelated - milita Ty operations Were launched to pacify the population. The Soviets had initially sent in gree II and Intrained troops. A large proporation of the Lil Were frø In the Central Asian Republics. They had been sent possibly to reduce the hostility of the Afghans to the presence of foreign troops. Their combat performa ılce appears tç) have been wanting in terms of professionalism. The mechanized forces were just not attuned to the conduct of counterinsurgency
Operations in a mountainous Setting. Stage Tiv'o ( 1983—89). In this
phase the Soviets launched major and we11-cordinate di tti cks (In the "Markhazes' (the Afghan Mujahideen bases). These often took the for 11 of set-piece aissaults by tanks and mecha Ilized infantry supported by helicopter gunship (MI-24 Hind D) attacks and extensive air Strikes. The Soviets launched a licthodical resources control effort. This resulted in a ruthless campaign of what the Wester Inedia has described as "Desertification' or a “Scorched Earth policy. In Mujahideen-infested areas the Soviets and their Afghan surrogates carried out a systernatic destructio II of agricultural resources to deny logistics support to the guerrillas. This forced the Mujahideen to operate in sin aller groups. Soviet/ Afghan Army operations pushed the Mujahideen and their families from the valley floors to the higher hills. There were reprisal bombings of villages harbouring the Mujahideen. This ruthlessness took a heavy toll and forced III a II y Afghan tribes to sue foT
13

Page 16
peace. Khad and KGB exploited I this and pu Tchaised thic loyal ties of in any tribal groups,
Wery early in this phase the Soviets carried Olt a Te:5se 55Det of their tacti C5 I Tellied the need for skilled infantry for these mountain operations. In Order to minimize their casualties, the Soviets began to shift the burden of set-piece operations con the Afghan Army. They 13 w brought in their elite Spetsnaz troops to launch un conventional operations against the guerrillas. The helicopter gunship was extensively used to counter the speed and elusiveness of the guerrillas Owe T 300 helicopter gunships (mainly MI-24 Hind Ds) were cmployed and these soon became the nemesis of the Mujahideen. Heavy emphasis was placed on closeair support, MIG-2 1. MiG-23 and Su-25 aircraft were extensively employed for bombing, rocket and strafing attacks. There is little or no cover in the Afghan mountains due to lack of vegetation and this greatly facilitated the employment of air power.
Spetsnaz Operations
The Soviets Illide a deliberate policy decision to employ their elite Spetsnaz troops in Afghanista In a mid give the Iim wa luable combat experience. Spets Ilaz troops were used for heliborne Tilids on Afghlin guerrilla camps In addition they were employed in conjunction with Imajor 7 perations by the tanks and ITC Lorized Tife: Lu Duits, They weite helill:11 del on hilltops and ridges to cut off the Mujahideen escape routes Whilc mechanized troops and infantry attacked along the valley floors. Unlike Western Special Forces, the Spets na z do not opperate in 5 mill teams. There äT e IC k.IIC) W II – CSES COf Lhci cmploymeInt in Afghanista I il less then 50-man missions. The standard operating group appears to have been the company. One of the lost successful use of the Spetsnaz was in the Eastern provinces bordering Pakistan in 1985-86. The Spetsnaz covered this area with lic oil wentional night a mbushes a Tid were S ( ) highly successful that they almost
14
prevented the
Mujahideen, w over to Pakist: Winter with thi the combat (I
Ap:4It from
elitist para troc Soviets iII creas burden of figt Afghan Arily,
minimizing the Wils quite palp throughout this
Area. Grid S
"T1 e So Wiec[5 | dat de the Ir hold () LI Tbl. In a reas. " was to establis and political g la til Celtres : sively expand Lu Llywards. A. meter defece W LIt wards S as lation Centre : of the multiple systems supplie Tanks had exte Els static pill Jalli labad, Kan | Jilli lil bild rc:5 had beat en bac de 211 is Saults \, When cit of th We Te li || Illai II airfields Till ch Of the Britis But mal du Ting t War. S. effect ii T-militained Afghan Mujahi El sking for spe criter the Iri Til at W. Tk. IL 5 bill fill g:Luch triaterg What it does g. the Mujahidee gular Warfare prematurc.
In the tra 1 a and Afghan tr shed a collplex Strø ngp[]ints w: and pillboxes, With talks in : strongpoints w extensive Ili nefi а пd AfghaП Lгог
cffort to kecp collı Tunicati að Ti c 11 phasis wat 5
Kabul-Jalālābt

Tetul II of the hic hald çTossed in to spend the eir families, into
.
the Lise of the ps/Spetsnaz, the ingly pushed the lting on to the
The concer for ir own casualtics ble al Ild by i LIS
campaign.
ystem
pegan to consoliIn the major cities The methodology h their military rip on the populind then progrestheir influence concentric peri"as scadily pushed to keep the popu1ut of the Teich : Ick cL E li che kd by Lhc (Chinese. Insively been usei boxes in Kıblı 1, d hi r ll Il Hicri t. olute city defence k several Mujahiwith heavy losses. st garris cities lain cicl Li sing the in the tradition Admin Box.cs i II he Second World iwe has bcc in this
defence ThäL ie :: Il hawe stärted !cial fortars to elds. This may ldozers can casily il El shÖTL time. to prove is that i's switch Lc Tchas been highly
s:1'; alse the Serviet o op 5 ha di establinetwork of fixed ith stone bunkers a I l s Fg7 ris al Cong static rule. These cTe protected by i ells. The Sowict ps made H. special
thei T lilles CF
сурс п. Major placed on the 1 highway. This
was secured by such strongpoints and dominated by effective patrolling and El Inbushes.
Combat Laboratory
The Soviets have used Afghanistan as a combat laboratory for field-testing new weapon systems. The new Soviet Ak-74 (5.45 mm) assault rifle and its shortened Krinov version were field-tested here. It was felt that the 5.45-III bullet was not lethal enough and in some cases Soviet units were re-equipped with the older 7.62-mm Ak-47. The RPK-74 light machine gun AGS-17 Plamya (30-mm grenade launcher), the RPG-18 rocket launcher and the PFM- antipers'0 TT1 el butterfly mines have all been field-tested in AfghaIl SLI.
The Soviets Lused this wat to test their MI-24 helicopter gunships and devise combat tactics for their use in the mountains. This weapon system proved the most effective and was a major source of delloralization for the Mujahideen. The Su-25 close support aircraft was also fieldtested hliere. Some SLIccessfull 11110 WiktioIls Wele the Lise of AT-4 Spigot anti-tank missile by the Spicts na Z against the Mujahideen stone sargars and thic coversion of the BMP-1 into a carrier for the 120-mm morta T. Additional metal plates were added on to tanks and APCs to protect them against MujahiLicen a Inti-Ilank RPG,
The Stinger Impact: Myth or Reality
As stated ea Tlicir, ne of the Thost successful Weapon system of this war was t le titaniumhulled M1-24 helicopter gunship. It was in vulneral ble to the lighter anti-aircraft weapons like the 12.7-mm machine gun available with the Mujahideen. Later the Chiles e suppliecil the 145— mill ZPLJ– and 2 Anti–Aircrift Machine Guns. However, these were wery heavy for carriage by ill nobile guerrilla force. The Mujahideen had fervently been asking for a light anti-aircraft Weapon to negate Soviet air

Page 17
supremacy. The Egyptians supplied the SA-7 Strella missile in 1982. However its IR homing head proved prone to locking on to false sources. It was easily deflected by magnesium flares. Besides, its white plume gawe нway the firer"5 position. Subsequently, the Blow Pipe missile w 15 fielded. Hy wey er this is a Command Line (CLOS) Weapon Find prøved tog sophisticated for the Mujuhideen to operate.
In September 1986 the CIA supplied the top-of-the-line StingCT missle, but with considerable hesitation. Western media reports have hailed it as a war-winning Weapon that negated Soviet ilir
supremacy. The reports however are highly exaggerated. The Stinger is a highly complex
Weapon 5ystem and requires the firer to perform over 17 different functic) Ils before firi Ing. It is a heavy and cumber some load to carry. It was simply too complex for the Mujahideen it did inflict some losses but it was supplied in weTy small l Illu Tıbe T5 to make any decisive iII pact. It was initially introduced in batches of 9 to 2 Weapons only. Each guerrilla leader received a maximum Of 12 lauIlchers. These Were given I mai Tilly to Hekimetyar's Hezbi—Isla Ti Tid to the Khille break-away faction. Professor Rabba ni’s group first claimed to have shot down four helicopters near Jalalabad with this weapon. Tlie Sowjets” standard II measure was ti equip calch aircraft or helicopter with up to 50 magnesi um fla. Tes to divert these hea. Lseeking. It is siles.
The impact of the introduction of the Stinger missile is believed to be highly over rated. The rate of loss of the Soviet aircraft was reportedly manageable. In fact, the Wietnam War has proved that thic anti-aircraft II achine
glu Tl WgLII15. El re still the greatest aircraft kille T5.
Afghanization
A stica dy shift in the blir den of fighting on to the Afghan Army seems to have beell a Tajor Sowie policy decision, As a result, in November 1985
itself, the Afghai Ilhajor assaults a in the Easter the attacks on Murey bases in ανεr 8000 τΓουps 7, 9 and 11 D pated, along wi Brigade and thi Brigade. He libc. Ceded the at Lilic the domina ting h of the escape r. blow was launch APCs supporte These Tebt b. and 22 Novemb Mujahideen adm ind I will Ind A TImy had give milli ta riy capabil
The Mujahide hand see Iled Te Talti I 1 g il s Illall undertaking to cities : Tı d SET : 107-IIl In multipl of Chinese orig decisi I l te with Tista Il Was bastec. tional analysis Army's perform only when they their surrogate' continue the figi military presen 1555 SI 11 T1L 51 Windicated at a
The Mujahide his been ill ill to the third stag Wa T iIn Whichı gu1 Ime Ilce operatic sizes. It läs ir
Ild cilizc filiiled to beci II sistailce Move II the foreign aid a
Future Porte
Fred Halliday article entitled Crisis - Policy West“ (The Trie ust 1989) has sta TiCl is halwe 10 Mujahideen to *clis persed attac prevent the Afg fTOIT1 cc) 11 centrat The point as ha

1 Army launch cd Til gille Trilla basies provices. III :ht Shelinail and N webcr 1986, from the Afghan vivisions particith the 71st Ric : +4tı A Timur cd 3 Tille troops preks and occupied eights and sealed lutes, The Illain led by talks and d by infantry. 1525 fell Ul 19 er 1986 ånd the litted to 42 killed :d. The Afghan In pro cof (of its ities.
cIl the other conciled to opeCT bal 15. El Id to icket litt Licks on Igpoints by the cricket launchers in. The Soviet diral W from Afgha1 upon an opera
of the Afghan ance. They left Telt COElfide It Of 8 clpability to it without Swict cc. This Swiet 15 to lave been
li,
eIus chic f f : il LuTc bility to graduate e frc volutionary e illa, b:inds comIl s i I ll li rgie li milit trained it tribal insurgency and te H Natiti TE RElent despite all Ind assistance,
#rtS
, in his perceptive New Afghanistan Dilem ma for the is of IT dia, 30 Augtled that the AmeW, i'r 15 tructed thc switch back to :ks in order to hail Government ing its forces at bpelled at Jalala
bEldi. True to American form, a technical solution is being 5 ոսght by supplying the Mujahideen With special mortars to attack and crater airfields. The airfields have
been the basis of the Afghan “Admi T-Box" style defences.
The Soviet-Afghan military solution is quite similar to the one tried out by the French in the First Indo-China War. The French were beaten because the Wiet Minh Were able to effect the transition to the the third stage of regular warfare very successfully,
The fractured and split Afghan resistance does not seem capable of such a transition. In June 1989, serious in fighting occured between Hekmetyar's group and Ahmad Shah Masoud's NorthAfghanistian-based Mujahideen. The biggest blow has been the withdrawal of Iran from this war. Iran docs not want to see "American Islam enforced in Afghamistan and is suspicious of Saudi Arabian designs in this region. Islamic funda Innen talism is apparently fili) undering on the shoals of thc Shia–Sunni divide.
AFGHANISTAN AND
SRI LAN KA: COMPARISON OF OPERATIONAL STYLES
India has been fighting tribal insurgencies in her North-eastern states for almost four decades. The Indian Army has been successful in containing and eliminating most of these insurgencies. Political solutions have been arrived at in Tripura and Mizora Il and the Naga and Manipuri insurgents have been pushed out into Burma. The Naga insurgency is racked by tribal splits and may soon wither on the wine. The same may hold true of the Meitei insurgency in ManipuT.
Historical Patience
One Would have thought that four decades of Combatig ilsurgency would have taught us historical patience. In dealing with such situations nation states must learn to think in terms of a long haul to quell the insurgency military and find acceptable
15

Page 18
political solutions to meet the aspirations of the people. The long hill may cover two to three decades. No quick or instant solutions can be expected, The nation static is a lasting entity. Its patience should be inexhaustible. It must play out such problems. The Naga insurgency has taken over three decades to tame. Thic Mizoram and Tripura insurgencies have taken over two decades each. Yet we have sought miraclic solutions in the lowintensity conflict we are waging in Sri La Inkal.
The Eastern and Western Military Schools in India
The F problem has been that India's Eastern Command has become a forgotten army. The glitter has been stolen by the mcchanized warfare exponents of the Western Command facing Pakistan. A number of Indian Artily Chiefs (including Field Marshal Sam Man ekshaw) however have risen from command assignments in the Eastern theatTe... They have a full | grasp of the nature of low-intensity conflict, Possibly a number of Inilitary
ab et rations initially crcpt into India’s Sri Lanka enterprise because the conflict was first
handled by mechanized warfare enthusiasts of the Western' or "Mechanized Warfare School”. Their understanding of this form of war has turned out to be quite limited.
DEFENSIVE THRUST. SRI LANKA
Wiewed strictly in political legitimacy there is no comparison between the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka. However, on the Inilitary plane there are a number of simi. larities which must be noted. The Indian thrust in Sri Lanka (on President Jayewardene's invitation he was no puppet ruler and his political legitimacy is bey011d question) was pri [Imarily a defensive thrust. Its aim was to insulate Southern India from subversion through any hostile footholds developing on the
16
terms of
island of Sri L lppl rently Was hostile power se gic ports of T C010ITibo : Ind f01 cies did It esta in the island harmful to I Possibly, like LF Afghanistan, it ICELC til balisel oneself by one' 5 Ce:Ilias it ig,
IL1 Sri Lanka hu W{18 []. T1 thc CthẹT atin wis täilor CC) y CTt inte IWelt ed reports indic (Gandhi’s ti IIle H t.) Sri Läkain was being freely by turning a Nel doings of M. G state govern IT ent RAW was als in ing and arming tants, it is Tepi arose when the S forces launched assault to wip gulerrilla strongh
Il diil "3 C1 el I either to step up (possibly stific by inducting its cog Ilito), o T t Ty El solutio il alid lalu decisive campa Sri La Tika on e 1987 TIdia had tunity a Tid the Ta The do T1 estic pr would have bee simplicity itsel are our people. Army was decim Waled the Ill. b heed our warning and gave it to th a Wa TiniTng to l a Wish CS LC) klick The Teaction to of food medici sh o Wed that su style operation Y enthusiastically Indian populatic
India's foreig argurd that su would var bc y world at large. External Affairs

anka. The aim 0 £. Il 5 LITE: thill, L I :ured the striterincomalee and cign Coyett agenblish a presence which would be 1 dia's interests. le Soviet II owe in
WES in WCI
on frightening 5 (VI Wt
OWever the shoe foot. Thic situilha de for Indial icon, Un confirmlite that in Mrs 1 is covert support Tall mill guc Trillas given, possibly s(31nʼs eyc }rı I the Railrı Hichığı dramı" si : in Tamil Nadu. Wolved in trainthe Tamil Tilitried. The crisis Ti Lankan armed El deter III i Iled - Out the Tim| Cld in Jaffna.
Options were CRVET 1 Hissista Tiče Till Thil Tc sistance Special forces inI Turkish-Cypriot nch a simple and ign to partition th Illic lines. In both the opportil Tille to do 5. o paganda theme II, the still of F: "The Till 15 The Sri Lanka. In ating them. We ut they did not , so we went in el. Let that be inyone else who India 18 : Tourld." supply dropping 1c etc. Il Till ffilia ch : Grenadawould have been Welcoiled by the TIT
in policy plund its ch an invasion elco led by the The Ministry of
Scens til have
had its way. The crunch came when Dixit, India’s High Commission er in Sri Lanka, pulled off a dramatic diplomatic coup. Hic hectored President Julius Jayewardene into signing an accord on 29 July 1987 in which he invited an Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) to oversee promised Tamil Surender5 in the Northcast, Jayeward cinc did al Theat volte-face, It Inus t rank as a master stroke i In real politik, for it Soon had India fighting the very rebels she had been recently supporting.
The Compromise Solution
The deep inherent contradicti Colls in this stance hawe Tesulted from the cognitive complexity of the world wiew held by the Indian political leadership. India has been keen to project an image of itself as the "Champion of World Peace in the Nehruwian mould. At the same time it has sought to aggressively pursue a course of regional domi Tance in South Asia. The dichotomy between the two stances is difficult to resolve. That is why it eagerly grasped the opportunity proferred by Dixit's diplomatic coup in Coto Tibo. It was the exact comproInise solution that India was looking for - a sop to inflamed public opinion it home and a nother to world public opinion at large.
The Failings of the Light Division Concept
General Krish na swamy Sundarji (then India's Chief of Army Staff) als 0 eagerly grasped this Copp0T til linity. It was a golden chance for him to test his newly created air assault and amphibiolls Warfare capabilities. In an in rcssive operati (I, II di 3 Wiftly flew in its 54 Air Assault Divisi III. Keeping it wie w its limitcd bricf of overseeing thc s Lurrender the division was sent in sa Tas its heavy weapons (minus its är tillery and ar Tmolur clements that is). In essence, thercfore, this rapid induction of a light infantry force cofo Tic to the American Light III fantry DiviSin model.

Page 19
The divisions are primarily a In infantry force. Their weakness ilin artill:Cry a n d a TITığur" is accep) - ted on the premise that the very i Introduction of such US TUT:c5 i II a Third World conflict. It will hawe a slutary impact. The low crall awe of US military might will restrain the local adversary states from employing their superior fire power to attack this light infantry division,
The concept is filwed and has been questioned in the USA itself. The very weakness of this force Inay tempt a local adversary state of the Middle East (sily Syria in Lebanon) to attack it With its a Toured or mechanized forces and deliver il Crippling ble W.
The 54 Air Assault Divisior flown into Sri Lanka was a light infantry force. As We can see in hindsight, its commitment was based upon an inaccurate assessment of the grch und situation. In what can be an object lesson for the Americans, its very lightThess tempted the local military force (the LTTE) to engage it militarily,
Stages of a Guerilla War: The Basic Perceptual Error
What was the ground situation in Jaffna before the Indian Army inter wiced il the et Illic Conflict"! The Tamil guerrilla war had star
ted in earnest after the 1983 ethnic Tidt 5.
According to Mao's classic
theory, each guerilla War II list pass through three distinct stages - the Strategic Defensive, the Stalenate and the Strategic Counter-Offensive. In the first two stages the guerrilla force is formed. It is weak and must play for time to survive and grow. It Lipts hit-El 1 -rlin tacti CS in di tries to wear the security forces down by widely dispersed attacks against soft targets. As it gains strength it starts operating in larger bands Eind engages the security forces themselves in raids ind ambushcs. After many years of this guerrilla mode, it effects the switch to regular warfare to deliver the corp de grace.
This is the third å gLICITrillal wär. a քլI crrilla IIl nW anything from u years to 30 years circuited only if of a neighbour Werles tO dcliver (in Bangladesh lasted only 8. In grace being give Army).
In July 1987 til campaign tippea edits third and LTTE 1:l III in the Jaffna pe engaged in a Teg yw ar With the Sir Forces to defell Of the Sri Lanka ing bumbing|T Sri La Ilıkalı Ali I with a Il et CT, CITT the help of for cies, compell cd THle LTTE Hä its military sup Cith e Tali resi virtu bolb The ground sit Wää Ikut Ill: 3f | In ore or less a tional War. The of the LTTE and medium mit
The force ch Infantry Divisit. its projected r Keeping Force Custodial Forct taken totally fo LTTE. Wild :: ]] lly do w I ETT Tim qır:Il of the 8" i Iltg:Twel til f. still ctured to cil c:15C 5 CE TIL Tid). In Wet Wasted.
The Fracturi the Tami || R
A further I bet Wee1 til: La Inkam Situlati fractlı Ted il IId the resistance cases. The Te Tebel groups (Sı and 8 rebel Ira, 1, Thc Sri L: illas esti Illated

to final stage of
To get to this, "ëII) telt may take pwards of 4 to 5 3. It cal be s HTL
El Tegular army ing stalte interthe so p de grace the guerrilla war I this, the coup de In by the Indian
he Tamil guerrilla Ted to have enterfinal stage. The hed a stronghold Ili Insula and was Llar conventional ri Lankan Armed i it. The ferocity Il allack (includckcting by the * Force) together lic blockade and :ign covert agenIl di: lo intervel e, arlier established 3 Tac m1 a cy o wer the st:1псе дгоups in ath in July 1986. llation therefore OW intensity but regular convenlrma Inent pattern included II10T tars chine guns,
Imposition of 54 in was based oil ble of a Peace - In the li Illes of the in Korea. It was T granted that the Il Coff its; WaT ad ns. The Tilitary tory is that such rces should be ter for a worstInitia || 0 werki || 5
ed Nature of
esistance
lilitary similarity Afghan and Sri
Jins is the deeply divided nature of forces i sin both werc 15 Afghan Inni) in Peshawar groups (Shia) in inkan intelligence that there weTe
over 35 Tamil resistance groups
in Sri Lanka. Most of them newer went beyond pamphletecring and poster campaigns.
The militarily important Tamil groups were six.
Anti-Indian Groups
The LTTE led by Prabhkaran and Mahatya Sri had emerged as the best organized and strongest Tamil military group. It is based in the Northern prowince (Jaffna and Wavuniya areas).
Its ally is the EIROS (Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students) which was basically a student organization formed by a Marxist Tamil cader in London.
The PLOTE (People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam) led by Uma Maheswaran is a break-away faction of the LTTE. Rcfportedly this group took part in the Maldives coup attempt. Recent media reports indicate that its leader Uma Mahles waren hals been killed and the group is thoroughly
lentalized.
Pro-Indian Groups
The EPRLF (Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front) is a pro-Indian group based in the Eastern province. Sociologically it comprises the lowcaste Tamils of the East and is led by Werdaraja Peru mal, presently the Chief Minister of the elected Provincial Council. In July 1986, it had suffered heavily at the hands of the LTTE and had lost 70 of its members killed and almost 500 had then surrendered ("Area of Discord", Striday Magazine, July 1989).
1 ts ally is the ENDLF (Eelall National Democratic Liberation Front) now a junior partner in Le Pinyi Icil (C) Lucil,
Il addition the Te is the TELC) (Tamil Eelam Libcration Organization), possibly the oldest Tamil resistance group in existence. It is said to bc patronized by the DMK leader KaruIlla lidhi.
- 17

Page 20
Mr K. Subrahmanyam, in an article in The Tirres af Iridia (29 July 1989) has highlighted this similarity between the squabbling Afghan Mujahidccn groups and the equally diwide di Tamil resistance. There is however one essential difference. By a brutal process of "natural selection” (a euphemism for elimination of the opposition) the LTTE had clearly emerged as the strongest Tamil militant group. It was this fact which has caused all the complications. Having entered the third Stage of its guerrilla war, the LTTE had possibly gone too far down the Eclam road. It refused to &l CCept the Indo-Sri-Lankan Accord. K. Subrahmanyam has correctly indicated this failure to produce a unified Tamil opposition resistance as the prime failing of the Sri Lanka interVention. He writes,
The lack of a detailed assessment of the compositions of different Tamil resistance groups, or why there were so many groups instead of a single United Front which the TULF was meil it to be. . . From the Way alignments have been shifting in Sri Lanka, it does not look as though there was an indepth assessment on the sociological composition of different groups and their motivation and interrelationship before our armed forces were committed to peacekeeping operations. No did the military leadership of the armed forces seek answers to such questions.
Prabhakaran: The Hafizulla Amin of Sri Lanka?
The LTTE had become a brutal and fascist organization. Lamp post killings, tyre treatment and cyanide capsules had corne to symbolize a killers' cult of surprising viciousness. The key question was that since the LTTE had emerged (by natural selection) as the strongest Tamil group should India (ls the patron of the Tamils) have come to terms with it? Had the LTTE turned completely renegade and unres
IS
pOnsive to I. What were the made India dec Eelam state led karan Mahityain her national was really the aginizing decisi paign. For it prompted the Wolte-face from in surgency to f Surgency.
We are living EWent S tíð Like :: tive and very : Cial weil Of se
ifted sco fir, o never i tā
di Ces 7 tot secil dow Well with ences. Thic Ind Foreign Affairs keeping intern opinio Il favour: Flchlieved blit F Tamilitary and
Til Ille lloc wij || || mestic cost of opinion were ju
The Will to
There is little circles that IIndi superpower. To of the World's nal arried force the-art weapon stems comparabl military powers, lack Illilitary. In la cks the politi ject power whe interests. The political will to that India has Independence w; Plk. WäT of 97 tely the same T politic CJ-II military not been scen a provides ample WOTTy about w Would think of ed Lith Wa TT:in Ledi il Cllir de cisioIl – In trying to ba. The tric with T ambitions we h tot many militat This urgently n.
Fier,

dial interests
factors which de that a Tamil by the PrabhaTi duo was not interests. This nost crucial and yn of this cal Illwas this that radical Indian supporting an |ghting an in
to closc to true perspectitle of the Offirecy has been The si Implic fact this turn about to have gone do mestic atldian Ministry of mission of ational public ble has been it considerable economic cost. tell if the doplacating World istified.
Project Power
doubt in world ia is a regional day she has one most professio's with state-ofand slipport syc with frontline III clia does not Li scle, b) ut she :all will to pro1 it is in her inly example of project power iisplayed since is il the Indo1. Unfortunauthless css and resolwe halwe gain. Sri Lanka proof. Ol hat the World lus has i tTC) diuccomplications making process, lance peaceful egional power ve made foT y compromises. :eds to be rect
For instance, if yw ei had cryn The to the clicar and una mbiguous conclusion that Prabha karan had becomic a “Hafiz, Lulla Amin" our response should have been as ruthless and straightforward as the Soviets'. They carefully bided their time, completed methodical preparations and the stunned the world with a swift and decisive blow. One air assault and five motor rifle divisions were thrown in. Result: Hafizulla Amin's presidential palacc was attacked, Amin himself Was killed and Barbrak Karnal of the rival Parcham faction came riding in on Soviet tanks. All of Afghanistan lay prostrate in five days.
If mcdia reports give thic correct picture, India chosc a compromise solution again; a flexible and graduated approach was adopted: attack on the LTTE TW Station as a warning signal followed by a hasty and illplanned assault the rafter. The "Coercive Diplomacy approach d{hẹs not 5eem to have work cd at all Possibly a neater solutill Wybuildi hawe been to CT11
mencec a highly visible and deliberate build-up of force levels. That by itself would hawe sent more Ine:4 ning
ful warning signals, gained time in a fluid and confusing situation and enabled a Hetter Overall respons c. This however can only be said with the benefit of hindisight. One is mot a wat r c of the quality of intelligence input regarding the strength, armament pattern and motivation of the LTTE but surely external intclligence-gathering agencies such as RAW should have been able to give us this information' Indian military leaders freely admitted in the Incidia that there had been a major intelligence assessment failure.
The Counterinsurgency Phase
The battle for Jaffna became a brutal slog but the Indian Army prevailed as it was bound to. It was simply too big and too powerful for any insurgent outfit to defeat in a regular set-piece battle. This blow L the LTTE regressed the insurgency move

Page 21
ment back from stage three to stage two. The Army now embarked upon a more methodical build-up and brought in its Eastern counterinsurgency experts and divisions. The force levels went up from one to four divisions plus (over 50,000
troops). Like the Soviets, the Indians appear to have made full use of this valuable con
bat laboratory to blood the bulk of their special forces and test most of their new weapon systerns.
The introduction of Eastern expertise, in terms of divisions trained for years in counterinsurgency operations of the Northeast helped greatly in stabilizing operations. From what little has appeared in media reports the Indian Army applied its standard tactics of establishing an area grid of posts to do Illinate the area. It then concent Tated up on classic cordon and search operations to flush out the insurgents. Its methods have been humane and civilized, possibly a little too soft for the stage of thc insurgency encountered. The welvet edge has been added to the iron fist and this humaine elleIn ent has been sustained at considerable cost in lives.
The availability of strong rival Tamil groups inimical to the LTTE in the Eastern province provided better intelligence and ha s possibly led to more successful ground operations ther c. The urban centres of Batticaloa were cleared in major search Operations in March 1988. After being driven out of Jaffna the LTTE seems to have holed up in the dense Wawu niya jun
gles. Wery fierce and major battles have erupted in this grec II hell repeat cdly. This is
classic Vietna. In country where brigades and divisions could just mellt a way. Sociologically the Vani Tamil is the best fighter amongst the Tamil groups. The skill with which the LTTE has switched from urban to junglic warfa Tc is remarkable. To tackle a motivated guerrilla outfit in such a dense tropical jungle would by itself
reguire upward four divisions. I tate a classica Lind annihilatiot the model of t of Chiang Ka Mao's Commu II the Chile se c German Genc himself had In: In all moth oper: al nost destro People's Libera force it to un March. Indian el to have T point that their terin surgency
forced the LTT to its Wayu niya
The Li riba. Il cc tryside in the N tern provinces cleared of mili than two years is by itself El 1 eve Inc Int in the intensity conflit of this hypoth which the India to create the . successful cond elections in the and the install: Tidian EPRLF LTTE"5 failur its junglic lai! proof that the te:dl its uncha upon the count centes and T LTTE to il fc y away from the tres. The lay : understand th: gency canıpaig Uds in tiIThe to Such a II1eals u Ti under two year standing o vatio Artily's infant leaders.
It Was a g Ti gency cal Illp:Aig tragic setting w troops against origin in a The confused which bogged di rations stel 11 Ille flaw - the fail. state to define and permanent

if the to would necessi
cncirclement campaign on e fifth campaign Shek against it guerrillas in yi 1 WW:LT. The | Won Secck ster-minded this tion which had el the infant ion Army and dertake the Long strategists seem3:1 izcdl Kut I this rclcIntle SS COL11operations had E to withdraw jungle redoubt,
Intres and counorther Il a Il di Eashave largely been tants in a less time-fra II le. This 'emarkable achiannals of low:t. The weracity csis Was tested in Army was able tonditions for the Luct of provincial : North and East L tion of Lhc proin power. The : to stir from "s was positive IPKF had asser llc Inged control ryside and urban marginalized the jungle redoubts population cenpublic does not it counteril Surs take long periyield success. : of success in s locs call for a for the Indian yman and his
In counterinsulin fought in a hich set Indian people of Indian orcign country, olitical thinking w In Tamilitary opefrom one basic re of the Indian its national aiTın interests in the
island of Sri Lanka. Selection and maintcinance of Fain” is fa cardinal principle of war. Lack of a clear-cut politico-military ainm leads to a dhoicism, dithering and pure confusion. A peace accord cannot be an end in itself. Despite this the intensive operations launched by - thic Indian Army did help in producing a climate where diplomatic initiatives could be flotlcd. Tile anti-Indial In Tamil groups led by the LTTE were driven into jungle hideouts and a pro-Indian Tamil group was installed in power in the Northern and Eastern provinces,
In purely military terms, India had ensured the energence of a Tamil leadership more a menable to her interests. This Ellarmed both the Sri Lanka no and the LTTE. In yet another volteface the Sinhalas and the LTTE joined hands to demand an ouster of the IPKF in July 1989.
Inı very stark ter uns thic mata rix of Indian options was as follows:
(a) Nativize the conflict, India had success ded in installing a pro-Indian Tamil group in po - wer. This now had to be strengthen cd militarily so that the conflict could bc nati wized. This implied raising an EPRLFENDLF armed force that would prog TcssiWely take ower the burden of fighting thc LTTE. The pertinent point was that this could not be achieved overnight. The Soviets had taken almost nine years to bring the Afghan Army to full fighting potential, so that it could hold its own against the Mujahideen. This implied that India would have to Illaintain her present level of force commitment for at least two to three years more while the EPRLF force found its military legs and completed its period of probation fighting.
(h) Cole to Terris with the LTTE. The pertinent military difference between the Afghan
Sri Lankan scc.narios was that by a brutal process of "natural selection the LTTE had emerged as the most pow crful Tamil Tesistance group. To that extent än
19

Page 22
Indian decision to come to final terms with it by giving it its duc share in the democratic set-up in the North-east would be a most logical One, The Sri Lankan conflict had scen too many Illind-boggling aboutfaccs, U-turns and changes of alignments that one more would make little difference. If the Sri Lankans and the LTTE could sink their differences, why couldn't the Indian leadership also all tct cour5c? Nations hawe no permanent frieIds, only permalicit interests. This Wils ideal but was this still possible? Much blood had been split on both sides and resumption of Such a dialogue Would need a major political initiative from the very top. With the change in political leadership after the elections this has become a very viable and attractive option. It would be relatively much easier for the new II dian administration lo come to crls with the LTTE.
(c) The third, somewhat ext Telin e option, was for the Indials to CC) Time to El clear-clit decision that the LTTE had turned renegade and had to be destroyed militarily whatever the costs. This would have called for the il duction of Illi inin LIII of say two Inore divisions a II d the un restricted employment of offensive ait support to act as a force multiplier to offset the lack of adequate ground troops,
Both options (a) and (c) Would in wolwe IIndia in a long politico-military haemorrhage. However, beyond a particular point it becomes a question of loss of face and such a loss II lay not be palatable to a regional superpower. The point is, having chosen to intervene in a confused and complex situation the Indians could not just get up and go.
The Use of Offensive Air Support
The discussi CJII of the last option leads us to one of the most pertinent military l'essons of this campaig Til against the LTTE. Indian counterinsurgercy lethods were taken from
2O
years of trial in However, the tri there have been They never pro, the first Or at stage of resistan LTTE had alre: the third stage. ' 5 ccil in the ili! Jeffna. Restraint rive air support a dens cly popil a rea is u I defsta 5a le Testra il t | ower the delse W is difficult to co population den much lower and la teral da Image t minimal. The E been depopulate only plausible a air support was jungle terrain it bc le 55 effective. is "less' - it di. ineffective. Of port, though Tes Allied requiren Africa and Elr given in Burma WT|d Wä IF. IL
lC I 5 Tc3 Tce III || || Id W RWN forc: China freely u against the Kham and the Pakist: Baluch guerilla Wastes of Ballic
The Indijan ti pLInches ag:Lim st that Wils qualit rent from its o' rections is diff Stand. Thıc - S contrast freely sive ait power multiplier in A 300 Hill le. proved to be til of the Mujahid Soviet ground WETę employ Whic II, the wa T final stages the SCILI « Imissiles | protcges. Suç military decisi a clear definiti basic politico-It
The military 1 energes is this not corrode it:

her North-east. all insurgencies rather benigin. ressed beyond st the second :c W:TS. TH1 c y graduated to his was clearly jäl battle foT in using offenwhile clearing la led built-up Idable but the eing exercised aWu niya jingles prehend. The ity here was cha Inces of col3 civilians were Tcl colul di laye di anyway, The gument against that in die Inse was likely to The catch Wild es not be colle
nsive air suptricted du e Lo ents in North
ope, walls freely in the Second WAS A ft T’Illeiplier for US es in Wietna IT, sed air power pas in the Tibet mis against the s in the altijd histan,
indency to pull
an i II surgency tively very diffeW1 tTibal isurcult to underviets i Ti sharp employed offenas a key force fghanistan. The Copter gu1 n ships e real nemesis
e II. III addition,
attack aircraft ext:Ti si vely. graduated to its
Soviets gave their Afghan clica I"-heiided Ils COITle fr011
n of the nation's ilitary ai im.
sson thlt clearly if al III Lico II dides C) W II political
will and defines its security interests in clear and unmistakable tcrns, it can a chieve success even in hopcless "Wietnam scenarios'. The Soviets and the Wietnames e hawe done just that in Afghanistan and in Cambodia, India Ineedlessly hamstrung herself by the congnitive complexity of its schizophrenic World wiew. The Il ccd of the hour is cognitive simplicity in our geopolitical perceptions. Let us clearly define our politico-military air) and then refrain from putting un Warranted military restrictions on olirsclves. Clausewitz had said, "War is such a dangerous business that the Thistakes that stcm from kindness are the very worst."
CONCLUSION
The decade of the 1980s has been the decade of low-intensity conflict in Asia. The Afghan at Cambodial Wars and the chilic conflict in Sri Lanka are campaigns that merit close study
and analyses. It is apparent that if a nation state clearly defines its security goals and
is ruthless in their pursuit then it should hawe no difficulty in dealing with such conflicts at le:List in its i III mediatic neighbou T
bid. What is required is a ruthless political resolve that tra 151i les 1 Self in lo cle T-cut
military objectives. Fighting such wars needs historical patience. As Afghanistan and Cambodia amply demonstrate, the miniInull tile-fra. The is a decade. A Illalti con should II, Cot L Tide: Ttake such a politico-military haemorrhage lightly. It should always be its last option. Eve T a conwentional short-duration highintensity campaign is preferable to such a military quagmire. Ho Weyer, is a nation is forced i II to it, it ITILISE Tıbbili 7 c itself psychologically for a maximum effort. This cannot be done by simply pretending that such a war does not exist. That does not diminish its unpopularity.
Soldiers fighting such a callpaign need all the popular Support they ca. Il get to su stain military III orale. If we are not prepared to mobilize this support we should not com mit our

Page 23
troops. Any counterinsurgency campaign undertaken in a foreign country has historically been a politico-military hac morrhage tilt fçW I'll tj] Il 5 til Lc5, hawe 5hp, W LI the capability to bear. The Spanish Ulcer' bled Napoleon white and Wiethin drained Alerica. The recent campaigns in
Afghanistan and Cambodia, how
ever show that given the poli
tical will, such conflicts can be
managed and played out provi
ded they are successfully nativi
Zcd. It Tellili Ils to be SceI) if India ca. In successfully Tati wize the cı Tiflict iTı Sri Lanka,
According to recent media reports, a Citizens' Wolunteer Force has been raised from pro
Indian Tamil groups. However,
the decision to withdraw Indiam troops by this year's end would give it little time to stabilize or find its Tilitary legs. A premat LI Tc withidil Talwa l bf India Il milita Ty suppo Tt could lead to its collapse. The question however is whether the long-term investment of Tilitary effort in the Wrong strategic direction would be justified. India's prime Tilitary threats arc from her North and West. The wastage of scio much militai Tiy effort in the South may prove to be a costly digressich II. It may therefore be much more sensible to accept ground realities and come to ter tills with thc dominal mit Tamil group that has won its spurs in a bloody process of natural selection. The most positive result that the region can hope for is al In 15 si II lillaltic Till of the LTTE into the democratic process in the North-east.
A country's security must be viewed holistically. They cannot be compartmentalized. The scClity threats to India in the Sri Lanka context are evident but do they override the thTCits from Lur West är the long-term threat from the North A comparative analysis of threats
will dictate the force levels We should assign in each. It does appeaf in plurc military
terms that our Southern CInterprise does not merit such largescale and permanent commitment of forces.
til Tel: LS
Statemen
(ζαντίτιμεH
Whatever th the negotiating the LTTE Hlawe 1 this point, it ca. doning peaceful Tayour of a TetLl all dest Tlıcti CTL such Inisery thr in recent years. 5:4id.
"By resorting LTTE 15 Ilot real cha lice of al i T1, Sri Lanka, Lihat tille "Tal Illil o people whose claims to prote Iain losers as t become cal, Lıght |
There were ill that the grotesq acres and repr: up again. Witl deilth of city children, being as propaganda,
* There cal E the conflict whi place. The Al ment urges both Test Ti Tit El Lld logue for the people of Sri Li the ethic Ewä. Is Siliki,
The LTTE tlilitary Carlıp
ri Lik attempt to real separate State, the Inorth El Id La Inka.
Senator Ew: pe cirilly distri liticst rollid if it i time wher a chieved Ilost of a separate only to comple a tins to bring CollToled N0T
The final , ,
(Cariľi Treťľ
ta' sit we Llc Ta Elccusations hi

tS...
Αναμη μαιε ή )
e frustrations of process in which 1) ice: Il eTgaged L 1 Li Lil Il not justify aban| negotiations in rn to the killing
that has caused oughout Sri Lanka "" Selator Ewans
to violence, the only destroyed El return to peace blit it also el sures people - the very rights the LTTE :ct - will be the heir holes again up in the fighting'.
ready clear signs 11e cycle Of Thässisals was starting the consequent 'ilians, including lsed by each side
c - T ) Wille T5 frol ch is now taking Istrilian Go Wer Ilsides to act with reslume their diasake if all the k. Inka, regardless of Origin' Senator
is been Waging a | align liga inst the OWern melt in Elm lise its aim of a called Eclam", in
Inorth cast of Sri
s Salid it was es - 25 sing that this fighting had coinc ı the ITEırılı il 5 hı:Id if their Elis, short state, and Iced cd te the final negotiabout a Tamilheastern Province.
froy|| plage &}
mills, Thc LTTE" 5 lW ċ : CbIlIlIlllI Tall
cdge, given the fence-sitting posture desperately sought by the 7% of Sri Lanka's populatill that is Muslim, Thost of Whom live On the LTTE-contest. Cd cast coast.
There had been, in the April Au Tuddhi Buddhist Ney Year celebrations this year, a hint of
the old Sinhalesc fcstive ness. Fall Illi lies t Tawel lcd til 5HTICS, Illusic filled the villages. Al
though the respite was cruelly obtained at the expense of the JWP and the LTTE's opponents, it had seem ed a gli Immer of peace. Now even this II on ent seems, in retrospect, a mere pause in the slide to more war.
– Fr FET y ferra Ec Tyrir Rae 'fe' hi
Worm-Out. . .
(CαιτίπΙΙεί ή αιτι Ρίτgε 9)
un fortunately led to an armed confrontation between the LTTE and Indian forces but that does Ilot Thearl We are a hostile force."
Karu 11 ani dhi's options are limited. He needs W. P. Singh more than the prime minister needs him; the DMK was the big disappointment in the National Front's electoral performance last November and sent no Tamil Nadu MPs to parliament. Officials in New Delhi remain vigilant for signs of any resurgent Tamil nationa lis Ill of the kind, primarily in linguistic guise, which shook the Indian federation in the 1960s. They have wiewed overt help"by state ill thorities for the LTTE with increasing suspicion since 1987.
None of this guarantees Indian passivity to events in Sri Lanka, Thor does it bestoy Carte blanche on Colombo's security forces. Ho Weyer, New Delhi will Tot order the Indian Navy to "do Sri La Inka's job for it'" by attempting to intercept the LTTE's supply lines. Meanwhile, every day the risk grows of headlinegrabbing refugee flows to the ancient hom cland, an ewent the LTTE dearly hopes for and the Indian Government dreads.
- Far EEGI Ferri Edgaarrrrrrrr: Re Life ii'
21

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Page 25
PRO REPORT - 3
Changing Reali
NeviІІe jayaweera
Towards a multi-ethnic society?
Both in the North as well its in the South, an over Whelming number of our interwie wees, froll all levels of ou I representative sample have told us that Sri Lanka Was ait la 5t éIlle-Iging as a Imulti-ethnic society. Our Illain purpose in this chapter is to cleair the conceptual background as a preparation for examining thic evidence.
1 The concept of a multi
ethnic society
We Tıted First to look at the concept of " "a multi-eth Illic so - ciety' theoretically, if only for the purpose of gaining some sellantic clarity. It is not our intenti onto la LII ch o 1 a 1 extensive the Cretical discussil, or to undertake a coil prehensive sur wey of the field. There is such a volume of scholarly literatul Te on the the Coreticall issu es of Imulti-eth Ilicity globally, as there is of literature oil the issues of ethnicity and ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka that such an undertaking by us Willd be distracting and wasteful.
First, we need to distinguish between thc three related conceptis: "thegemonismo'”, “mationa! identity" and multi-ethnicity".
All thl Tec lawe this in co filIloil. They recognise the objective reality of a given territorial space occupied by more than one ethnic group, over a period of time, where all groups lay claim to that space or
parts of that space, as their homeland. The three concepts Of *hegemolis m', "national
identity' and "multi-ethnicity', represent different Inodalities, whereby these groups relate to each other Within their common territorial space.
Hegemonism
In a hegemolis of the ethnic g by reas con of s Ur econòmic po Cr historical cili Sli IIlts : domini; the society, sub El pp: Tatlus and i ELS L.) crisid: LIt to its do Illi wariant: "if this I Shil's concept Ene” With : [] Til ulti — cultill Til Robert Redfords *"grc:: t traditio tradition" are versi ) 15 of th сопсеpt of Jat is likewise si SI a. It of the 5 mili
National ident The concept entity posits or a stn se of ceilding the in identitics that co CLI ltlllI Tall formati OWerarching iden II|10T e than mere of the particula Ine Ints that const in question. It C0| 15 till:151:SS th IIlous, that can claistil in Ill the allegiances of ethnic groups v it, :ılıdır eye.Tı li { 5 Lubo Idli la Le thici: teress for Hic An example wo sciigo LI sIlles & of bee cal” a 110 Ing the mטS that C קוויHTC 5:Lic we c311 Hı if Allerica. I.) II the wast maji zens who belong Cthnic groups, a societies abroad instal Ilces at war pted Homeland, to") s u bordir1a te t

y
tic Society, Ç)ne roups. Whether perior numbers, wer, or colour, CLI 11 stil Il CCS RASlt ole Withi verting the state ES TCS LIT:c5 SO te and pe Tipeance. ThcTe 31 Te thodel. Edward Of a t " central every major for nation and 's concept of the '' ald "little both different e, hegemonistic ika Chinta naya Ti Lankan wa Ti
ity
of ''Ilational idconsciousness, identity, transdividual ethnic imprise a multiOn. Such an tity is seen as ly an aggregate ethnic compoitute the society is seen as a lat is a Luto IIIby itself lay emotions and the individual which comprise ause them to r individual ingreater good. LIld be the coning an “A Illeriwa Titolus et lil Inic prise the InoUnited States iring World War ority of the citiged to diverse ld whose parent were in soille With their adowere still able heir indiwidual
ethnic loyaltics and emotions and rally to thic call of their new mother country. Episodic experiences of subordinating individual ethnic loyalties to the demands of an overarching national consciousn css ser we to generate and consolidate nationality identity. That is why an external threat is always useful as a catalyst of indiwidual ethnic loyaltics and as a stiImnulus to the cim crgence of a national identity.
II the sense in which We have defined "national identity" here, we recognise its similarity to the 'Incliting-pot' concept of multi-ethnicity. In the melting-pot conccpt, it is only Els and when indiwidual ethnic identities are melted do Wil that il new national identity emerges. The classaic melting pot is of course the United States of America. However, not all multi-cultural formations al Tc
a menable to the II neliting-pot experience. Where the individual ethnic groups have been
in exclusive occupancy of their respectiwc territorial space for hundreds of years, and where they have jealously guarded their space and their culture against penetration by neighbÖuring ethnic groups. the ITı elting-pot phenomenon does not work. A Fire qua Por for the manifestion of the melting-pot experience is the physical intermingling of ethnic groups in space and over time.
Multi-ethnicity
A multi-ethnic society differs from a hegemonistic society on
the One hand and from QIle which boasts of a national identity on the other by tW) basic criteria.
Firstly there is an absence
of dominance by one or other of its constituent groups. Whatcver advantage a particular
23

Page 26
group II light have: Q ve T the others - by Wii Luc Of its numerical superiority, or econoImic power, or colour, or historical circu II stances - there is a Willingness to forego its adWantage and subordinate it to the denands of living in ha Tmony With the other groups.
Attaining such a self-sacrificing, Self-effacing postu Te is easy if all the constituent groLips arc mco Te or les 5 evenly placed, but extremely difficult T l I li ltii mible, i f ii) me of thi: grl 15 ha 5 in Obvil13 in ibliLant adwantage over the Othe T.
Secondly, in a multi-ethnic Society there is also an absence Caif the illel ting-pjt phenomen II. The individual ethnic groups not only reta in their identity, but Seek to e Ilrich a Tid Full |fil themselves. Within their respecLive territoria bol T1 i Tie 5. Tleir participatio II i Ti a wide T Tatic3mill coin 5 ci il:ISIl ess will I II Cot be at the expense of their individull i del Lities, but Tather COTIditional on prior fulfilment.
The truly multi-ethnic society is
Inc in which the i T1 di Widual CÕIltitlucn t. s a Te primary. Its raisor! s d'etre is that it provides the chiro IIIlcIL framework, for cach constituent group to find fulfil Inct consistent with each other's completeness. It is a society which is at once more than an aggregate of its constituents and yet encompasses them without causing a loss of their identities, The best example: We have af such al society is Switzerland.
In the light of theoretical discussion — this was really an attempt at defining terms - We па у tuТП to the evidence, to Sct to what extent Sri Lanka i 5 advancing towards establishing a multi-ethnic society.
2 STi Lanka as a
hegemonistic Society
Throughout II nost of its Tecent history, Sri Lanka has been a hegemnicInistic society. FET most of the time prior to the advent
24
of the British i bala and Talli blad 5ub5isted : sic parate kitu gd) ing the se shi Tt Sinhala kings domini wer tries as well. ti mes the tw )
gTOlip S WT: brought under a ration and expos ence of living Ell the Lugh LIIT der of a foreign ru ring this perio dati ms were li ergence of hegemonism in CeIltilry.
Sinhilla-Bludd owes its origin held perceptic I 3f SII1h :ila. Bu di were being sys giT nalized a Indi : ainst by the ally in favour minority. This voked, by the 1ի է: 19th tt:Tit11 häl-BLlich ist sisted mainly of Sri Liliki's a I d billised ibn C0Ilfr (). Il t:Ltion וLון ary eון יissitוון Si II hil: Budgih be thic colonia responsible fo However, this than merely a E! Ճ115 TË ILISSË also a vehicle
li5. Em ent or 1 gent SinhalaA Tı alliance q' between the B the Icw Sinha class, to whit) TT withi I thic II ceded their so that by th peTidence in 1 Buddhist maj positioned to they considere b0Ta te Progra I Tectic II of his
The attempt were perceived justices invest

In 1815, the Sin
ethnic groups side by side as ms, except dur
periods when extended their the Tamil te IIiDuring British major ethnic foT first tille single administed to the experias one nation, the hege I11 oby | le T. lt was di Luil th ilt ılıc Toll Illid fico T t ble e IIISinhala-Buddhist the mid-20th
hist hegemonism to the stronglyin the minds ld hists that they te IImatical lly mäTdiscriminated agBritish, pTiT 1 cipOf thc Tail perception prolatter half of ry, a strong Sincivil which coof a rediscovery ancient heritage that (of a m ở pe 11 with the westetl 3rprise which the ist perceived to l instrument lost I their decline. Te WiW I WES TOT e: Cult 11 Till or TeliITI C է: - I Was of class aggranhe newly emerBuddhist landed. uickly developed ritish rulers and la-Buddhist ruling | the British Iller 5 ext few decades lower gradually, : title of I nde947, the Sinhalaority was well und ertake what d to be Ft In el alTil Ille for the CTto Tic injustices.
to correct what as historic incd the Si Thāla.
Buddhist majority with in circasingly hegemonistic power over all minoritics, but provoked among the Tamils the perception that they were being incrca singly marginalis ed and deprived of their fundamental rights. With stat e power dccisively in the hands of the Sinhala-Buddhist majority, hegcIlonism now found expression through a growing number of legislative and executive actions which the Tal II, ils fou Ild i Increasingly oppressive and which were eventually to lead to the armed conflicts of the past seventeen years. These conflicts were not confined to the North and Llle East. Progressively, they provoked Indian intervention in the form of a military presence in the North-East and an extreme fascist typic reaction in the for Ill Cliff Llac J.WP-DJ W (Deshapremi Jathika Viyaparaya) uprising froIn Sinhalä-Buddhist youth of the South,
3. One country, two nations
The objective reality now is that Sri Lanka is one country comprised of two nations. The end product of the attempt by the Sinhala-Buddhist majority to correct historic injustices, and the countervailing fight by thc Tamil minority, has becin thic political dis member ment of the country, thc steady decline of its economy and its virtual disintegration as an organized society.
Today, even though the guns
halve fallen Silent and the manifestations of conflict have disappeared, objectively what
We hawe i I STi Elrmed truce. Such a truce, coming as it does after nearly Seventeen years of armed conflict, is indeed to be Welcoined. It has provided the space for both sides to take stock, to go back to the drawing board, to embark upon dialogue and to let rationality prevail over emotion and prejudice,
Lanka is an
It is within this space that we are looking for evidence of a na scent multiethnicity, be it

Page 27
ev er so incipient. We are look
ing for treinds to which solne Inom lentu IL1 may be imparted, for growth points which may
be broadcIncd iTitc) à FL111 et Flow.
Evidence of an emerging multi-ethnic democratic society (MEDS)
1. At the subjective and
existential level
As we said earlier, the Overwhel Illing oral evidence. North and South, from all layers of our sa Imple, is that the Sri Lankan people as a whole hawe learnt the lessons of the past two decades and are now Willing to live together in a Iunity, There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of this almost universally held opinion. But we find it da Inger Cously Tunis leading. The real meaning of what we have been hearing is that almost everyone is war-weary, and near exhaustion. There is hardly a family in the North that his mot lost come of its business, or its dwelling or has not been dispersed all over the World. The causes are Illtiple. The periodic bursts of violence un leashed by Sinhala III obs in the South, the excesses a Tid atrocities of the Sri Lankan services and the IPKF in the North, and not least, the brutal conflicts between riwal Tamil Inilitant groups, and the terrible wounds they have inflicted on their own people, all have contributed to create this fecling of weariness. In the South likewise, the brutal killings of civilians attributed to warious Tami I militant groups, the horrors of the JWP DJW on slaught and the equally horren dous campaign of reprisals launched by the securitywigi la Inte groups, ha ve generated : similar weariness.
These mutual feelings of weariness and self-criticism arc positive gains. There is clearly a di Ilminution on both sides of the self-righteousness, -the sense of infallibility and the overri
ding hubris tE Sinhala-Tamil ring the past and Japan, SC Israel coverte 11 milg into caith: and extracted Wisdom and th sary for rebuil ties, Sri La Ilık; Wise.
However, the cXistetia stati ness are by th great walue. Li they evaporate COInstitute a fo capable of bei Tequiring the political actors their beliefits,
Therefore, th in terwiewees th: il Sri La Tikal mit II ent LO 1 ciety, we accel el ce of L1 exi! which has yet into objective
2. At the ide
The question exist: I til W: to above is be termlig it if I callige; a Tid wheth CT i to a set of cepts and fram of Wallies. Is that the prevail being expressed ter 115"? ATC W giT nings (of ; ideology in Sri
A cathartic
as the Inc. Sri through over t years, dies; 13 ideological tern cial scientists, |() Ll r" Tha 1is t s, th alıca deInı ics alıd a Whole range institutio, Ils; whit society, indeed have to interpri and extract from its ideological proce55 has onl Sri LT1 kl. Tl

at chal Täcte Tized relationships duyears. G crmany luth Korcal and li tleti T Cow Im t TalLa Titic cx pcri en ccs from thctl the Է entrքy I ccesding their sociea should do like
se subjective and is of consciouseT 1 1 se1"Wes (of I 1 ) eft to themselves, quickly. They TIT 1 less 5 Lb5 tal T1 CC, ng Inoulded, but i Intervention of before they yield
Cili Is Of Our At the Te is rii. W : positive COIllmulti-ethnic solot only a 5 evidSt: Titial Wc:1 rIII:55 t } b : LITT 5 lited reality,
ological level
is whether the
I i Illess Wye Tefer i Ing analysed in 5 - a. il d linkagC5,
is being reduced generalised conCd withil a scit t le Te civilc rcc ling Weariness is in ideological seeing thc beIllulti-chnic Lanka?
experi cilçe such Link: Elias be: he past several t trills late it 15 sliddenly. SoWelist d e. Il ass Illedia, politicians, and of people and
comprise civil
the state itself, ct this experience if, ower time, potential. That y just begun in c. fe: T is thit
before it can gain momentum, cv.cnts might again overtake the country.
We hawe obscTwed am Ing seweTal NGOs in Colombo a flurry of activities focusing on the ideological content of the preya iling. mood, Eılıd we ha, we ourselves participated in several discussions with thell. We llawe been greatly heartened to hear o Te title “hardli Ters" from both sides of the North/South divide, express wiewpoints which a Te not only remarkably modeTa te when cc) 11 pared to the pcsitions they had been known to take earlier, but are also ideological in character,
Two such articulations alre: wrth mention ning, one by thc Weneral ble Maidulu Wewe Sobhita and the other by the Wenerable Bclai Lil willi Wilma lira talla, twil Widely known ideologues of Sinhala-Buddhist hegemonism, At a seminar on National Identity', convened by the Marga Institute in January 1990, they both took up the position that what they refer to as Sinhala Buddhist culture is not a static phenomenon frozen at some arbitrary point in history, but that it is a dy ni Illic Sc} - cial process, changing over time and that its survival depends crucially on its capacity to modernize it self. They sa w Inc) alternative to living in a mity, and that this entails a full dimental change in perceptions :: Il di will Lles.
Of course, articulations by il
few leading Buddhist prelates at get in inar g held in Colombo do not add up to a national
ideology. However, in the course of our interviews We gathered that throughout the country, a vast number of pedple EL Tę now thinking along simill T lilles. Si Till I staltele:ItS have been made by several lea. ding Tamil intellectuals as well.
urgent need to provide opportunities in the Widest scale possible, throughOut the coll Il try, for the arti
We see all

Page 28
culation of similar views — opportunities in the for Il of willagic lewel se II i la Ts and workshops, platforms of all sorts, in Sinhala and Tamil – to eilable the Tiew thinking to acquire coherence and a for Illal
ideological content and identity.
Perhaps the greatest single contribution towards the enhanaaL HHHa S LLL SLLLLLLLLH LLL SK multi-cthnic ideology has been PT csident Premada sa’s own uncollivocal and public commitThe It to it.
However, we must not underestimate the constraints upon the eII ergence of a multi-chnic ideology. Such constraints both structural and historiէ:l ! :
Si rI te rrally, the fact that. Si Ilhala Buddhists in fact comprise 70% of the population inevitably Imak css for hegemonis IIn. Expecting them to subordinate this decisive adwantage to the demands of a multi-ethnic ideal is to expect a response such as no other ethnic group similarly pla ccd has ever I hade, a Inywhere else in the World, B it in India, OT Malaysia or II. donesial, a ny ctihn mi-cultural groLlp enjoying that kind of nuIII crical advantage, has generally assumed a hegemonistic posiLicÕT), hairnes sing all the opp CTtunitics provided, through access til 5 talite power, to consolidate its hic gemony. As I cated earlier, the Switzerland model of Inultiethnicity is replicable only under conditions of more or less equal numerical representation.
Another Ilmajor structural factor issue is the proximity of the Indian State of Tamil Nadu, With a population of 60 million
people. Sri Lankas Sinhala Buddhists see the Tallil Nadu pre5'e 11ce as an Overhanging
boulder, dangerously perched over thern and threatening to roll down and crush them.
The Iristorica constr:lint; are party the painful experiences Si Ilha la Buddhists hävie Häi of
being overrun pires several ti tory, partly the having been Illal 150 years of B. their de Sic to
justices correct
These two fa straints upon !
II ulti-ethili: Lanka. The to this objectiv ger Thornism. It to be replaced, for som et hiTng than a priori o Ti1er1[5, "The S Wi|| h:ye [(1 b
çCILI I te Twilili that cail Il Tiflike Workability of Ilism, in the they now find
Such i coluli his II. W lateT teel years of with the Tä mi of which is ni Imilitary terms, I ndia, a Tild its for the foresce devastation of above 111 the permanent dism countTy: these that reality. expediency, an elementary ru 111 51 mill H 13: afford to indu lism iny 10 mg survive, it will com "hlubris cli and develop q for Survival.
friari or mor these facts w mobilised and an "ideology fi.
Today, what IIOSt is a sul TV ther than a m' logy. In fact, the latter, ewe ter II is, is like sterile argume I duce a replay of the past fou might in turn ט1nt ווןisחוtוחge dal manifesti

Jy Drawidian emIlles in their hisir perception of iginalized during ritish rule, and halve th05e in
ttl.
ctors Te 1: iI colhe evolution of ideology in Sri deology natural e reality is he
hegemonism is
here i5 leed
II. OTC GUICTet "... Tığı Talistic argı IIISinhala Ilmajority
e confrcited with g reality - one explicit the un
their hegem - 11ch: "לו ונו Lאש וחנן 3
themselwe 5.
terwailing reality
til i 7 cil, SteveTTimed conflict 5 the Cucile
it yet settled in intervention by Contin ling threat able future, the the economy and likelihood of a emberlet if the ficț5 constitute As il litte of id by the Iloist le 5 0f survival, miljority can Tot lge its hegemET I 1 Td:tr til
hi El We to a bilange its stä Ince, uickly a strategy MC) Tc than any alistic arguments, ill hal We L be developed into
stri',
Sri Lanka needs riwal idcology raLil Li-cthnic ideothe purs uit of in theoretical ly to reactivate 1t Hition and proof the polemics It decades, which prod Sinhala heThe final suiciIl Such als 'We
find presented in dramatic and grim detail by Malinga GunaTaitni i his back For II Sayerreign State. Should that ever happen again, we have to alba. Ildin hope not o milly of ii m LI ltiethnic democratic Society being established, but of preserving the unity and sovereignity of STi Laikal 5 Well,
3. At the structural and
regulatory level
It is at thic structural and regulatory level that Ilost progress has been made towards Teà lizing : Im 11lti– ethnic 5 Liety. These structural and regulatory modifications were not the products of ideology, but the outcome of objective conditions that Stri La Inkall had to confront iT 1987, AS () Ile Cabinet Millister summed it up for us, "Sri Lanka discovered multi-ethnicity only when some Indian Air Force plancs violated Sri Lankan airspace and dropped flod parcels to the belca guered Tigers in Jaffna'.
By mid 1987, the Sri Lankan ATmy had gone over to thc offensive in the Taffni Peninsula and had overrum the strongest Tiger perimeter defence position, Wada määrä chchi. It was Thow poised to advance on Jaffna. At this point India, who had been bicking various Tamil guerrilla groups for years, with money, equipment, trải Iling and space for bal 5 C camps, decided to interwenc openly. The airdrop of food parcels scted as the shot across the bows. At this point, covert talks that had been going on for some months, unofficially, between Jayewardene's emissaries and Rajiv Gandhi's representatives began to bear fruit. The fill olItcome Of thcSe 5ecrct negotiations was the Accord, which 13 jd the foundation fût : SeTic5 f :lme Idment:5 ts thc Sri Lil İlki Cçı 115'titut10 II. Thc5 c Constitutional amendments arc the most tangible expression so far of Sri Lilika's commitInent to a multi-ethnic society.
(To be continued)

Page 29
C. P. and intellectuals: P.
Vladimir Reznichenco, (A
"Nիկ: apathy, IT ist TL15t Çf the Pai Tty, ältid 13 it1 0 Tialis ill are spreading in the intellectual milieu," says the resolution ''On CPSU Policy in Education, Science and Culture,' adopted by the 28th Party Con
gress, held in Mosco w in the first fortnight of July.
That fortnight heard many
wici) ulls and often un just accusitions of intellectuals, especially the press, economic researchers :L nd 5 oci al li scientists... A, Inti — inlleti: sel tilts diāted El pilr L of Congress de legates, with the Iajority Party LInd gCl werd me It Officials cconomic managers and the top militi: Ty. A Ixico LL s t drive il Wedge between intellectuals, in the Inc. hand, and industrial and agricultural Workers, on the Other, they showered the latt cr with effusive compliments,
Under the Severe critici51 which colles on retrograde functionaries from all sides, they did their best to secure the support of un educated people, not too well versed in politics. As living standards slump, they spare no effort to channel the public indignation against Perestroika and the approaching economic switch to Ilarket patterns.
Intel lectuals arc gravely concert ned. No Other 5 oci : il stra tu min was 50 mercilessly persecuted by the totalitarian regime. Many of the best were fra med up, others forced to cInigrate. At home, survivors dragged a misserable, degra di Ig eXistencc, The power 5-th ilt-be tra T11 pled their rights under foot.
Now, intellectuals :ịre a mong thic inst dynamic ind conscictious Perestroika activists, So the Inc ()-Stalinist hal tred could be expected.
The Congress audience booed and calcalled the few intellectuals who got the floor despite all obstacles. Among them were foremost Soviet cultural leaders. Coming straight from the heart and full of justified bitterness,
Inade up of
. P. N. Politic Art
their words, we the atmosphere spoke.
"A Situation Whilt we have impossible in a the dictatorshi
thought FAI i 11 Wicte il free miji drive then Lur
per capita cult HII ILI I LI kopecks a year. si prised to hea stil mբing tind t all clience,' said Killig Lulli III W.
"Not only the mills L repent, th til L1 – i 11ation El Til dra Tik it; Illisery, the lct IW joined in see what's right scs - that our gding to the de is droWing in ignorance'? We culture, the onl tect us frol sa barity."
"As the global LIS, a better 1 man of property argued the writ II at O W. ''The Li Illnists is to Workers and f truth. Now, we appeals for a class still ggle dictatorship, T. the 5ttttiri:111 Ըt is. Il is still a lliw fers of this co the socialist id parties which bi
One of the gr
calle I the la
(Det
T7é Wr to Inst MMO Ard

IVEMW TAHWIWWFWIWG FORWAM17
rting of the ways
Ilyst)
e heard despite in which they
differe Il frin today would be country where strangled free L1rdered C. Con|d5, cor, at best, derground. Our 1 rall al locati01s idiculous three I was Il't least r whistles, foot at calls in this the poet David
Communist Party e Whole nation, which kept silent ef di Lmb Will or Mikhail Ulya
4 *Sh:II c eʼWer | Linder Collir I10 -
civilization is gs, that culture the quagmire of
111 15 to TE25 Clace Oll II y force to provagery and bar
| expcrience tells manager than a can't be found,' er Ching niz Aitask of all colnmakc industrial at Incrs see this once Liga in hear class approach, and proletarian ney tell us that incept of sociale. No One 5ufcept more than c; the Political
ck it.' ea test sensation5 st Congress day
God bless
ilicated to Margaret Thatcher)
days pf the century fade the dec/ining d'acade.
With the announcement that two USSR: People’s Deputies, Gavrill Popov, the famous economist and Moscow Mayor, and Anatoli Sob chak, a top-class lawyer and Mayor of Leningrad, Were leaving the Communist Party "'to promote the formation of a multi-parly system and have mure elbia wroom in the city councils." This step by the two influential community leaders may have an impact on many intellectuals' attitudes to the CPSU.
The situation is extremely inWolved. Not only intellcctuals' opinion of the Communist Party matters now but their opinion of the whole country-suffice it to mention the skyrocketing emigration, Quite recently, it 11ostly concerned Jc wish intellectuals. Now that cxit has become simpler and the coconomic situation goes from bad to worse at lightning speed, brain drain is sur C to involve people of all ethnic backgrounds.
Judging by Mikhail Gorbachev's report, the top echelons are aware of this danger, 'A clever country always holds dear its intellectual and artistic potential. We necd urgent steps to remove the cases if brail drain from our country," he said, If the Communist Party really means to lead the radical effort to streamline Soviet life, it hal s to s ce the wital inccd to attract the best part of the nation to its side-intellectuals, on whom thic country's cultu Tal and moral potential depends. The future of Sowict intellectuals depends on this realisation cwcn less that of the faite of the Party. Its future is at stake.
Britannia
ead of idealism before, 'e and more stuck to farm
' Uncle Sar 77.
Patrick Jayasuriya
27

Page 30
PLANTATION WORKERS
P. Muthulingam writes (LG15 June 1990): 'D. S. Senanayake not only disfranchised the Indian Tamils but decitizenised the Ill.'
He calls this an injustice. If it was an injustice it was, Ile Werthe less, a measure that Was
welcomed by the great majority of Ceylonese including the Ceylon Tamils who overwhelmingly suppoTited the legislation at the yery first general election (1952) Elit Which the Voters hild i chance to express their views on il
The most precise and objective 5tate ment on the iss Ues involved was in the Privy Council judg. ment in the Kodaka II. Pilla i CaseThere We LW Acts - The Citizenship Act No. 18 of 1948 and Lhic Parlia III1 en tary Electi. I 15 Alle III: IL Act No. 4 of 1949. Kodakan Pillai, in Indian Tamil resident in Ceylon, challenged the two Acts as being in contra we tiom of Section - 29 (2) of the Co Isilitik i n.
The matter was finally disposed of in the Privy Council Appeal No. 7 of 1952.
Their Lordships held : (1) that the Acts did not offend against Section 29 (2): (2) that it was perfectly natural and lcgitima te for a colum try to determine the composition of its nationals; (3) that the migratory habits of the Indian Tamils were facts directly relevant to the question of their suitability as citizens of Ceylon; and (4) that there was Thothing itin the legislation preventing Indian Ta II1 ils from attaining citizenship provided they were sufficiently connected with the Island.
The parliallentary voting on the legislation divided, not between Sinhalese and Tamils, but between the right and the left. (N. M. Petera began his parliamentary career in 1936 by Winning the RLu wa n Wella seat beati TIg MTS. A. E. Mola IIllure With the help of the Indian plantation worker's votes.) G. G. Pinnam
balam, the leta Ceylon Tail joined the go September 1948 Election 5 A IIlcI 1949. Clt:1V:1.1:1 Party made th election issue ir e:lècti) T1 äıT1 dl [h1e gawe him and severc dirubbing. los ing to the U. who won With a
These T1 dia 15 Ient roots in distorting the by decidi Ing th in many Kand in effect leavi population Wirtli in Parlia iilent. la LiCl the Kai Tural voter fo had a Voice i affairs.
Ti'n cyn i dîf ef : Dr. Jalle RLS
"We the
clbo). Wel their , at the expense Tamil Wate:TS tl were the first Lllres 11 them T TäIl il : lliance country hegemo which this fail La Ilka Tamils : 50 (actually 4C Inulated by th leaders as a me; low-country Ka Il crit. H. WE WCT portfolio in thi ke clibi Illet dest Llice. Albai Ta Ilti lia In comp: Tanils were dile: civic rights. T of the Federal electi. I 15 W5 en dors eniment of (Lanka Guardia
Dr. C. R. de
: T111 CT Tilmi 15 should || to the vote.....l accepted by the Sinha lese: l. this respect it i ficant that he

der of
Congress 3 nנment tנwerIו voted for the ld ment Act of yagam's Federal e legislation an the 1952 general woters of Jaffna. his pili Tty a Chelwa nayagam N.P's S. Nalesan
large majority.
the All (who
5 with cout per millCeylon, had beell Ilectorial balance e representation yan electorates, ig thc p:TI 11:l I1 e11 t ally unpresented
After the legisIndyan Sinha lese the first tiILe n the country's
jell
Kandy: Ils first way into politics
if the Il dia I le Jaffna T:LIThis to make B WerOT i Kandy II - against "lowny'. It was only cd Llıat the Sri accepted the 50I-60) policy forc II idia T Ta II lil „4 Tı s of co IIıbatiTng ndyan rapprochthe offer of a 2. D. S. Sena mayaToyed this Tal I Illi li doned by their LLTicb[Is i t he II1di EI1 prived of their he complete Tout Party in the '52 a resounding this policy.' I of 15 May
1980)
Silva
list of the India
We been entitled 5 ever been the majority of så der ship And in s perhaps signiIndian go wern.
CORRESPO MADEMCE
ment agreed in the 1960s that the bulk of the II should be regarded as Indians. It also
does not take sufficient account of the problem of illicit immigration of Indian Tamils in the 1950s and 1960s and the fears this raised.'' (The Electoral System 1947-1978: An Overview)
-Boyd Almeida
Lawyers for Human Rights
| find th:1t the Lilnk:1 Gl1:1Tdian has published in its is suc of June 15th 1990, a printed version of a speech delivered by me at a seminar organised by Lawyers for Hill. In all Rights, on the thcne "Does the Lil' Meet the Aspirations of the People'. I regret that I did not have an opportunity to see the printed text. While the article does represent correctly the ideas that I presented at the sic 11 i Illar i Il a talk Im El de without a prepared script, there Hirc I11 Himly errors of both lang L1age and content. Since the Link a Glılar dili:Hi! Tı lı sually presents articles of high quality, I think it dilles both : Tıc and yolur journ:ll injustice to publish a piece with inaccuracies of this nature.
I would like to clarify in particular that I quoted from El dicLull of Jill Sticc (GTätiach in the reported case of Chissel v. Chapman. The dictum itself has been quoted inaccurately. I Would als O like to men tion that I all professor of law at the Open University of Sri Lan
kial, a nd " do not - hold a similar position in the University of Kelaniya,
I hope that you will clarify this to your readers.
Prof. (Mrs) S.W. E. Goonesekere Col. IIlbo.5
NOTE. B. W. EDITOR
P-Ye reace iyer rfie i r"ec"ar"&ReFa! "er",5for! of the speech front the organisers of the Serra ir a r". Profe 5,5 a 7" (Gor) r7E5Ekere ky'a 5 F7 af Ty'a ilali se for ca 77,5 lTrio. He were infore that she was als Ford. We regrer flie errors.

Page 31
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