Page 1
O SPECIAL: Maldives :
Vol. 13 No. 8 August 15, 1990 Price Rs. 7.50
CONVERSATIONS ( Zon't 4e a damn fool/26
THE EAS
EELAM STRATEG
The Sri Lanka)
PADMANABA: A RA
 
 
 
 
 

and Youth Activism O
— A. V. Varghese
- Mervyn de Silva Y AND THE EAST
— Amita Shastri n Armed Force
- Bruce Mathews
RE REVOLUTIONARY
— Dayan Jayatilleka
iting for Recognition
— Achin Vanaik
alisation and Pluralism - Mick Moore

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SVOU
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Knight
rmOVe

Page 3
THEMIJS
OIL TIO COST MORE ?
Following the developments in the Middle East, the Ceylon Patro Mauri Corporator WWW Whawe to take a CWC) ser Wook äf ffs petoro/elforti fariřos ff ff is to rear wafe, a CPC official sa iad. Existing stocks WWW Wā5 a fa WW FTOFFS,
"We will never go dry, but дгfce5 гтаy fлсгgase”. a spokes
777 77 SEG fa'.
AD PLEDGED
After briefiring leaders irn Japan, South Korea, Malaysia and Bure of the rera Sffff ir 5 ārkā, Frigf ECGLCLL S SSLLLLYSSSSLLYLLC SS LLL that they had pledged aid to 5 Γ. Ι. Η ΓΙΑξa.
TssiJSE /Eässers 57 s Hésis CWC Of EE - g 7LLLLLLY S S S LLLSLkH S LLLL S SLaL S LLLLL LLLLL SYCL ad eXpressi sa fisf3 Cfio about goverrrrierit policies, fJo MFrste 5-se.
PLACES FOR REFUGE ES
Tami/ WacłL W prowica higher Educatiол суддагtшлities for Sri Lārikā ir refugees. Tfie TW gover f7f77eriť fras instructed eďLrcäť foria / for Sľ fLrťfo 75 fů Seľ as fada 2C) o Waces f7 Y We MMBES Course and 40 in polytechnic and engineering courses.
SLFP STAMOS BY
DEWOLIUTIOll
The SLFP stood by its Corr7ri77 fr777 foi devolution p/edged in tha five-party Dвгrocraffic People's A///агтса Before the 1988 presiderra E MECť F7. MMr. Ar 7 Irā Bārda räfra fiske fl)Vad ā public meet frig a ffer fie returned with the даг/Nаглалtary da/egat/an which Wisited rida.
Myrddiad i Wi.5 7 Cyf fra Ceratives to Sri La rika 7 геѓџgeе5 агrЛvѓлg fл /лd'fа, LO frfra ry fO staterneriks fr7 flye press, an Indian High Corris5 for release fra Colorrild så sol. Hurra faria r) é55 star) Ce Was befлg provided fo refugees fтплтеd'їate/y ол аггїva/ ало! during their stay in Wrida, as had beert dorpe fr7 t/7e past.
TS COL! O way e ferrre francer i ffws, We release sa fad.
μανία ή πη
| Kreeks
P.R.I.O.
Foo Fog Fer forf fra fer i'r Fflorer presere, Ey. Mr.
Jr. f. Ειπλέα η είriιατία, largr": FFFFFFFFF" F ": fra Fife: Ey PFR '' ), Éle FFI fro, Mar l'églio, l'air Îl'é5 froi Fr, M''{{}
Affer. Hy her p, folloï'g +1°CFrpris, . tே Ag, , ! "είδη ήτίίε" τιμήης haye lored, He r. frr: GI "SYEWWE, έμ" σε εστίνι: το Forf,
Глт hé даг, PRľť? reporfs, Pla Terrrfog Sri Lirid h77 BEEr prys fei' ri 5 i riend thrau'r rhis
Países fa i r 'y', for is Jr. PRIC). LPFl'Égrey F Tr וויון אנילז", "ל) r Erldikerט ΑμμΓεriί, τίΗΕ ήί IFIFFFor for orf II politics, he have The JJJ71 erfers. Na festis, Trō elegrar? וייו יו:irhולr" - Horייו 554, Thaili Ferri Is t ffrer Jr re. PRO , flerfirig fø ofre ##ng chụp ##Fo refParis'' '' ''r sak." נולל חוקתה ש"והזדTHarrצטיותו
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W. 13 N.E.
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Lal Guardian
No. 246,
CCIT
Editor: Mer
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REPORT
15'e curruar publish
of the PRIO report
Neil' Fifer
L foi e F r வாசr y : rī Liff", ir
frige fler ''if'lı fira"r officials, represert': r:
ffshoff ffurf firii r Iuilly'' I, Iury I iii, harf planer ig JP, J Fearler's World seiped I resegriff R" f' PR FC) fois frøfir
fyrir sé ef she
He rate First shed rfcurly" fase ciri:ér. Sérfi FrifErfits - lis, Fke have preFrir ferir has begri
of" og fike irs frueRrrrrriar Ripersi righa, Prif rhe! I'ery' a'r tri yw'r "Falayıs of Sri Larıktı. Frre frI celerFri:
είτε απ Ισείει απει
piirilis free Fruch of гругірІтілг*, по profire reached it. i]' - Mr. Ma rreirar Telegrarı farer six fyrirsal írsfirlifreif Hዖረጋዖ'W, 1ኅ'Wi£rI ዜ'¢F H'Érፅ፣ Color Feiffers Flo carraf flir Fesserie FJ FFFFFFF" foi fire sør Ilij Fleur "réterrrel" - E.
BRIEFLY
9 Sri Lanka Muslim Congress Leader M. H. M. Ashroff mactic El public appical to thc nation's Muslims to reImali Il calm indi mot Tc5 Cort to any form of violencc (wc the spätg of killings in the East II PT WICC.
MIT ASHToff said tulit he was also appealing to "all those Muslims who support the government to make it move promptly and meaningfully in the utterly urgent eed for i ediate and adequate security to protect Musli Tıs lives and hı Co. These 'wlı ich were mercilessly Tayaged by the Tigers'. O President Premadasa assured a delegation of Muslim par lia IIle Intaria. Ils, Musli Il party leaders and heads of Muslim national organisations that the government would ensure adequate Security mealsures for Muslim villages with IIIII1 edite efect.
O Mr. Ramjan Wijeratine, Stä Le Minister for Defence told newsmen that he was
not interested any more in Eı deltıilli Elfrized ze il Tound the Jaffna Fort and the hospital as the LTTE was continuing to kill civilians.
Although the government had not dropped the idea he was not willing to discuss a demilitarized Zone, the minister 51 idi.
(Corffried (IFr Fge 24)
|RD) Ay
August 15, 1990
s. T. 50
ortnightly by
PLublishing Co.Ltd.
rior FEC,
hib O — 2.
Yn de Silva
; 4475B4
CONTENTS
Ne'W5 Bq Ck. g r u u 1 d 3. Making ''Eslam" Wiable 4 Conversations with J.R. (3) 齿 Sri Lankan Armad Forces 8
IPKF in the Ouag Tire 1. The Regio 13
K. Pathmaaba 15
Economic Libralization Wersus
Politi: || Puli 5 O
Rehabilitating Trotsky 23
Printe#cd by Ananda Press 825, Sri Ratnajothi Sarawa namutu M3 watha, Colombo 13, Telephon B.: 435375

Page 4
The philosophy S which enabled 15C
completed by
ኳmSነ.. proceeding
3S 1 million house
3.
. ፭፭ል you to join
a roof for
R
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"," كم You and S 竿乡彦、 Together
స్ట్'£్క 3-*
 
 
 

y with a heart 1,000 houses to be 1982 and now towards a : target, invites us to offer everyone.

Page 5
VOLENCE : A Fragmentatic
Mervyn de Silva
he East is red. The East
is 42% Tamil, 33% Muslim, 25%. Sinhalese. While the North may be the Tamil heartland, il hıc " " trildi Li Tiā l lıcılıcları dı "" dır “Eelam" concept has always Hadl a Tin Luch Wicle T territo Tial eilbrace - the North-East ill short, And this despite A III para which is predominantly Sinhala. But then the proponents of "Eelan' would argue that it was “ “ All parali ** before it beca,Illic AT T1 paral, to be i Ill Timediately and fiercely challenged by another School of histo Tills Who Will prove the contrary, that Ampara was originally Sinhala.
The Issue 15 T11 hollcllIld but land, and the land that was a rice bowl, and has once in or become the grec Il fields of the e:1st, tha Iiks to high-cust i Trigaltion projects, largely financed by forcign do nors, directly cor through the massive World Bank sponsored Mahaweli scheme. So, people and land.
And language. There is no logical basis for a North-East merger today than the linguis
tic link betvCEI lie Talli |S H Ild hic MILIslim 5 — thic M115|ims being Tamill-speakers, (MH ny Musli [ In 5 also speak Sinhala but it is NOT their Iain Illide of communication as Sinhala, indisputably is fot the Muslim in the seven SiIlhala-diminated ргоviпces,
Musli T1 s Lipp Cort was in dispen5ı bile, and the fact of cultil ITH| convergence (Tainil) was the main plank of a credible, viable case for a 'north-east region', enjoying Imaximu II auton only Within a united, sovereign Sri Lanka. But as the Tamil II oveIllent was gradually transformed from "federalism' to Felillis II 1”, and from pärliamentary
politics to ext Ictivi Slı, al In di 5 LI fronted by the appa TatlIs, was
ted to ; Tiled st ern province Mu: I the Crossfirc ly and then lil self was it still nomic interest, 1:rנן 11 נןT Cת eטון ט
If the “Est” the East Elsiú Eo battleground.
Simple arithm the province) h the Muslim, the nationwide, con: Ilgth AND ve: . gth lay in th: of parliament: polls. Or the game ) f llll, Elf Lğı TikE Peace AAA dl.111 in the Fili to decide the f pora Tily merge Dancs the Musli position as the cing factor to concessions (i.e er and perk5) : whom. The Till hal c se? Wlı ) ",yi er dici'? Perth tse, L1 : ST11ll cið Tim Lumities än offer more, wit a dwa Italige of at thic Centre,
MUSIM MOB
In any cal se tactical choice, to be Lil mited ir With () ne voice from a positi MLS li rmii Iimobilit assertion of a tity; an identit: Ta I mill-speaking
L Tate' Co III IIll I II

Til-parlia III en tary ch ctivis III, c) IlSt:äteʼg cber Ci'ye steadily convertruggle, the Eastslim was 'caught "", III etaphı oric: l:ET al lly Life: ilke; not just ecElectoral irl'l- 1. identity,
Wals the - issue, CC: Illic the filii Il
letic (a third of as already made smallest group cio 5 of his st: Iness. The strel* ուImbers game Ty CT provincial simplest numbers ter the lmo-Sri ccord, a referenzt after one year Eite of the tem!d NIL h-East. in use his unique decisive, ballextract political ... sharing of powlind, if so, from Il ils of the Sinill give the betEllips the Sinhall:St of the LhTce d t hus likely to h the additional exercisi Ing power (Col C3I1b3.
ILISATION
whate: ver the ..he Muslims have 1 order to speak and negotiate in of strength. ia tida II mea Int the disti TCLive idemy that made the
Muslim a "sepity. There was
o Ine obviolis ageTit of Illicobilisation — religion: Islam the dyIl:- mic force in this "age of identity', certainly from the Iranian Revolution of 1979 i.e. the 80's.
Tamil parliamentaris II had its last dying gasp with the DDC polls, the Presidential election (a large vote for the SLFP's Hector Kobbckaduwe) the Referendum and the July 1983 antiTa Tmil riots in the SouL Lihi, Ilmore organised than spontancells. Eclim Illilitancy takes over from Tämi|| Pal Tilia Tielt Tisil 15 thc TULF leaders, including the Leader of the Opposition, go into exile, politically and physically.
The East, the main battlefield, gets redder, The East is militarised, with all the counterinsurgency "expertise concentrated in the East - Icy State Tlilitia s Luch als the S. T. F. a 5sisted by international expertise. In the run-up to the Accord and the IPKF, (1983-87) the following trends become increasingly evident and assertive: the re-shaping of the Muslim identity with Islam as the instrllI The T t, the adwelt of Illic w political and politic)-milita. Ty forIlmatico Tills, the JIHAD), thic Muslim Congress, morc East-based tha II national, the spTca di of Weapons, and intensified milita Tisa, LiCT, and a more complicX, confusing patter II of alignments, more shadowy than recognisable,
Eliter the IPKF. Its sher weight begins to tell in the North, and the Tigers' flee into the jungles, with the IPKF tra Tsforning it self from peacekeeper to arily of occupation. III a Tullore complex East how - eyer, the IPKF itself hias to adjust itself to a different political-military challenge. The Indians quickly spot the relative
3.

Page 6
all to Iloily of the Muslin factor - a Muslim Brigadier becomes the IPKF's operational head in the East.
MIASSACRES
What then is the background to the gruesome massacres cornmitted by the "Tigers' in the East, North-East, North Ceutral
(l) The IPKF, starting with 6,000, went up to 60,000, backed up by weaponry that we cannot possibly buy. So the IPKF could pursue a “saturation strategy", a military option mot available to the SL Army. Divert and disperse is the LTTE strategy -- divert attention, disperse the SL Army, especially in the present army build-up for a combined assault on Jaffna. A concentrated effort would not be possible if the Army's manpo W er has to be dispersed over El Wici T i Tel
(2) No civilian is any linger immune – civilians for civiTians. Sinhalese, Tamils, Musli films.
(3) Cause panic, provoke incidents that would increase poliLical
pressure on the governThe It,
(4) Create tensions between Sinhalose and Muslims, Muslims and Tamils. Controlling mob violence would mean a
dispersion and dissipation of 31 Tiny-gOW :T 1 Tm en [ rc sources.
(5) Intelligence is a more vital need in low-intensity conflict than in conventional warfare.
The Muslims speak Tamil, and thus can pick up “intelligence' better tham the Sinhalese.
(6) Increase the refugee flow to incite opinion in Tamilnadu, forcing Tamilna du to put presSLITe III Del I.
(7) Civilian casualties would also invite international attention and therefore diplomatic
pressure from quarters that arc
now, basically, sympathetic to
Colomb () than in the pre-1987
''J. R.' period.
(8) Use the beseiged Fort,
With its 250 army-police, host
ages, as a political-diplomatic
lever.
What di 3 we witness - armed
violence, militarisation, com
In unity as victim, all civilians as tal Tgcts — fragmentation.
4
ΤΑΜ Making
Տի
reviously, PE ill th fo L separate lack of a Wiib The North and hero" T " " bac to the 'for', of the islad. See 115 Ľ0 hlavič by the early El Teas OT the I) larly the east impUTtiint pad gions. The si Jaffna region important prod F1 [1d Q.1 T1i) 15. I of developme hid shifted to and by the b 1997) s Trici
1ized a 5, 11 di next Stage of | itiנוט"Whit:h wו
As the lea di tון טון יtקטTק 11u still f Eel SecTeta Ty-geneT A. Amirthaling interview with 1981, the Tami fish, and – giv cie 5 — vääri) LL5 for consumptio Hic 1553;: Titi| tr lick of Illic I nı orthı :ıldı elan 3 = El ni insuperable stä. Leh Od. It : by developing cessing zone which would in West IIls It to rived from ag ting business Til Ilils Were skillel III w b11 Siness agli til et 3 3 1 : Hi. Wrailable Hid in the lew st skilled. It
Amita
(Τις πτήση ές Polifical Sclercé,
I'.

STRATEGY: g “Eelam” viable ?
astri
the greatest weake. Tamil argument State had been its ile eco Tn }TIıic: b:1 se. East were periptkWard' compared ward' southwest This stfall been overcle OS TE T1 Orth and particuhad emerged as dy producing remaill Coller 5, il the had emerged as licers of chillies Indeed, the locus nt in agriculture the Dry Zone, eginning of the Lalee was recogng the key to the industrialization, e export based.
ing Indi most pub
of the separate at the tille, the ill if the TULF.
ilm, El Iglled it an the all tho T il 1 a reas had paddy, ten suitable polisubsidiary crops Il and for trade, I at the I Til ditional in industry in the t Was no longer lurile to III1 der Il could be overcole al in industrial proat Trilco malee, fe a Welles for local capital dicTiclllt L1Te and exisIl trade. The already highly 3 || cintre Ilched in tr:1de, and their apital would be able to develop ate, Their highly educated youth
Associare Professor of
STI, Frrrrs Sre
Would find lucrative employment not only in managing the new industrics but L1st in administering the new state. Foreign Capital, foreign technology, and expatrial te capital from the substa II lial Sri La Lika II Tamil diaspora il the lidwal Inccil industrial countries would help to set up I 1ot. 3 Iniy the indLI stries in the processing zonic but also the advanced in fra structure like telecollinunications and airports that Were required to run a modern state, Most important, the new government would be free to mobilize revenue and cliricct cx") CT1 clit Lur C for the bemefit of the local regio il and its population. Equally important, it would be frce to negotiate with and procure funding from foreign sources as an independelt state,
This, derived from Imaterial conditions, the concept of Eela In had developed until it seculed economically viable to its proponents. The scope of support for the establishment of Eelam, however, Waried Within the region, and the Battica loa district in the EP, which had the Iar - gest concentration of Tamils and had seen the least expenditure of government funds, formed strongholds of support for the separatist cause. Its most a daimant and with client supporters, symbolized by the militants, Were dra Wil from Jaffna lower-middle-class youths, who had the least to lo se il cconomic and politicl terms in a struggle for the proposed state. They also advocated a more "'socialist' equalitarian model for the new state (LTTE 1983 and 1984). Backing then with SCIIle ambivalence Were the Tallil upper and middle classes in the north and east: lawyers landlords, businessmen, and profc5, si Com als who backed the TULF. they had to be pushed by the radical-youth wing to demand

Page 7
a separa tc statc and consist cinly sought to effect a compromise s Cort (of separation — in effect, they SULight to lise the threat as bargaining lever with the central government. Despite their defferenccs, ho Wever, they continued to speak publicly for and be identified with the separatist de III: Indi lind disi Iliri disq.WIl their at 55 ciltill With the Illi | i - tants. A significant seg Illinent of the Tamil lower classes, if Illinority castes, and estate Tails in the NP also supported Eelam il 1977. A 5 il a 11 lati OTalist movements, popular discourse and rhetoric Welded the various groups by emphasizing the discrimination they experienced as Talli 15 : Lld the i "hir" till:Lt would be theirs in a separate State of their OWI),
Tc) a non partisa In but knowledgeable observer, the conception Of Eelam involved Various etc.) Il Comic illud political problems, and it is not being propagated or ill stified here. The lack of El clcar geographical boundary between the proposed states would make the establish ment and defense of a T inter national bieb LI Indry a co Title Titio LIs issil Ice. A T1 Cyther problen was the location of the Tiver heads ånd reservoirs required to supply the ir Tiga ti con needs of the proposed stilte: they would lie Cill It Side the ceI1 tTall hıighla Iıds. The in – termixture of ethnic populations posed another formidable problem. A quarter of the Sri Laikan Tamil population lived in Si Imhilles c aTcas, HT1c the EP had El significa Int population of Sinh:ıl eşşe bı ild Muslims. Thıc testate Tamils were concentrated in the Central highlands and in ColoImb CD - The migration and exchill Tige of populations betwccn the two states, Conce Eelam was formed, would carry a heavy pTicle täg in the ext:Hlimt cnviron - Illent of ethnic hostility and violence. Whether the minority populations that chose to remain in each of the states child atta in justice was another open question, Muslims in in the EP were sympathetic to the dem 2:1 rnd To T greater regional a l I to
Inolly but 1ot acquiring it un: Ty of Ta. Il ils, de assurieces. Abc have proved, t efforts to trans ideology to Teali Il 1 di filt:TEIL AT TIL CICTS: the Tcl : the proponents El Ind th eiT Clippo lese-dominated Colombo); regio and ti e large T il the inter II TH: T:1, TI1i15 1; supp fT ti Indian state of from the gover For Leir at tem greater ill stice for the Ta Tils However, belo II ternati al cCIT sitive to fissip: Within its WIl has consistently of support for ԼITitler tll to I ticcord in 1987, to implement i and posed a n the Ill ist Illilit: ratist groups (t proceSS.
What helds ho we wcir, is tha Eela Illi was il Il Li both the devel. discriTTiTil ti'j Il the = region : Tı dl The develop Inc. demonstrated potential for e and opp CST tunit: i Ill which thit being effected, | 15 til Tell Täilitic state and majo dated in ethni them acutely : would lot be this devel pnel its Cä5 LI alties. declining stake explains their it and their ;i. separatist Coptic perceived poten ment provided Titiation to goal of a sepil

sanguine about der the hegemo:spite the latter's We fill as events he success of Et Ee. Il fTCill ly would depend ld Wide set of itive strengths of of the concept 1 ent (the Sinha
gover III ent at
Ilal geopolitics: play of power a ticial rela, we hed strong
1e neighbtiլIriTiք Tal Iml il Nid LI :: Ild iment (if India pts to achieve and autonomy im ST LE I käl, ging to the inImunity lind senTil LIKE : Tı "" : Tı 15 borders, India stopped short a separa le state. Ido-Sri Lanka India a tempted ust such a policy (Ital threat to int of the sepalhic LTTE) in the
to be noted, the concept of mately rooted in pillent and the expericnced by its population, ilt of the region tic) Tiiliils its In Illic growth "ן שון ון 1:The m ." development was through the s of the unitary Titly ir LI le coms lliC te Timis, Illa de lware that they share holders i Ti it but would be Although their in the system H liell til froIII :ceptance of the III, the Te girl’s tial for developa strong, intense struggle for the Til te state
The other Wisc incxplicable insistence of Tamils on a unification of the NP : LInci EP in any scheme becomics understandble gotice the tipogr:lphy, tricIds, and productive potential of these regions are understood,
in Ler twined als they halve been LI I til TÜ YW Wit I'll the co IIc et Tiltion of power in the unitary ceInter. From the Tzimil point
of view (as articulated primarily by middle-class Jaffna Tamils), much of the EP would hawe to be administic Ted jintly with the NP if ny rcgičnillization of power and status were to b e e cırıb Timbiqcılly "Viable Earı d safe from tampering by the Sinhalese majority. Silchl EL unit would assure a viable conomic space for the continuation of Tamil language and culture and be significant enough to influence the government at Colol bo. Consequently, propos als that offered a de wolution of authority to the Tallils i Il Llle NP blit left its long-term relationship with the EP undecided, as the Indo-Sri Lanka accord did fell short in thc view of core TäIlli T1ilita
ints. Any lasting settle II ent on the issue will hawe to Lake til 15 yic W i T. LO CCCLII Illt,
To return to theoretical Ilatters, although the regio El itself remained agricultural and 'backward" Ti relation to the more i ndustrialized, economically active, and forward' southwest, the cha Tacteristics al Ind dyin al Inics güverming this ''back Ward Tı ess” wсте по 1 опger the same. It was suffused with a quickening pace of change ind development. The situation provided the pote Intial for this region to become a 'forward.' One - in which II e Inters of the forwurd”" elite of ja fill Collid find av en Les for e 11 ployment and mobility commensurate to their potential and aspirations. This detonstrated potential for a * backward' region to become a
" + Twili’’ Ille if freed fr-1 Llifa y corable il sy T1 II het ries in the instituted structure of power forme a critical ele II ent in
thic process of positive counteridentity fornation in the SecesSi Tist Till o','LL TIL,
5

Page 8
Conversations with J.R. D57
D.S., the greate N.M. the ables
IJ.R. talking to the Editor of th
De Sil Wa:
Sir, you just mentioned D.S.", and I noted that your tone changed slightly. . . what was it A remoteness, detachment, awe. . .
J.R: Respect. . . Ut Ill10st respect.
G. But you knew hil masa young man. . . may be as a Minister but still quite a youпg пnaп, and he was the Grand Old Man, wasn't
g
A. Sir Baron was the Grand Old Ma in to Luis . . . 10. Si Semali yake was ou T Leade T . . . Il C. Li esti]] about that. . . but he was al six my field's father, , .
G. Friend's. . . .
A. Dudley's father... that's how I regarded him, though I was, Els you say, picked as a Minister.
Q. How would you rate him, now. . . 2 l mean not about policies or political issues but as a politician, a political leader a national figure... 2
A. , There's Ino doubt in my n1mind con that. . . He is No, 1, the gir catest leader, We had. . , : towering personality, and not merely because of his extraordinary physique. . .
Q. Then what? What special quality made hlm a nan of Such stature in your eyes 2
A. Un cirring instinct. . . what is the problem he would ask, and Conce you explained, he III ay ask a few more questions, and then the clecision Will be matc. ... the answer Will be given. Simple, and Straight. . .
the Thatter of
. yOLI Wer"...
GA., Ewen in Finance. .
A. Yes, as Mi John Exter, who the Central Balık Old Mail befo I d ) Indiċi - It wa niceting with S ELS : Minister, first visit to Lon. matter of specia this CCL Intry, a country ... We Our Sterling Ass and the Dalla T F kept Cur ea Tling a Ind used to trea I IIL HIl 115E beth the dollars . . .
G. And so
A. S. We went tructions. And question . . . To money belo ng ' it belongs to ll """Then get it bac
Q. That was a
A. N. . . well hill, that BT itali ask for time or Tangement. Wh all that, he real saying "Then . . ,"HIth טrיוון טווח
A5, it happen ei serious difficulty trill of LJT Ster| TeSeTVeS.
But D.S. im a. In Uthe T, and fa issue. J. R. and El in :1 Inti-imperia. strick in the Ti, shill establish the Japanese.
There Was a Jil Col Ilbo.

est; t
е L. G.I.
lister of Finance, Was Governer of went to see the T : We WW II1 t tt) s to be Illy first tafford Cripps. . .
it was also my dol to discuss a importance to an independent
were to discuss ets, their future, 'ool, Britain had is in their banks then as theirs. .
the pounds and
to D.S. for inshe asked one wholl does the We replied that s. And he said k', , .
di to explain to may say 'no' or 5)İlıc () the IT a r - en we explained y shı:Cockcli LIs by leave the Coll
l, thcre was no iı getting conlling and Dollar
ressed J.R. on I Illore exciting Dudley who had ist, anti-British decided that they se mi: lin ks With
panes e consul in
J. R. and Dudley saw the Japanese Consul secretly and started discussions on Japanese policy in Asia, and Imost of all a victorious Japan's attitude to British colomies, After the Second clande5time Inc.cting, where the Japanese consul was even Timore cordial, Dudley Tang J.R. and to cut a long story short, informed JR. . . "Trouble. ... the old man wants til se e L5. . ."
And so he did,
D.S. knew all about it, and there was no need for the two 'anti-British conspirators to deny the secret pow-wows. Dudley and JR offered their explanations and justified their talks, arguing that it was bct ter to Tina kc contact with the “winning sidic' in order to advance the cause of Ceylonese independence.
"Don't be damn fools' said D.S. for the second time.' Japan will lewer win the wa T . . . the Americans will soon en Ler the WaT o Ill Britain’s side. The Americans will crush Japan. . ."
Both young men then lamented the inevitable postponement of Ceylon's date with destiny, and dawn of independence.
"'Nilsense" said D.S. "Can't you see What's going on in India ... Britain will have to grant India independence...they can't hold it any more...Once India is granted freedoll, there is no reason to keep Ceylon. . ."
G. So "Key Jr.'', for all his lack of for Thal education and his rough, rustic manners, was gifted with a remarkable lucidity of mind that helped him grasp the

Page 9
essentials what is now called the nitty-gritty. And that's what made him such an extraordinary leader in your view
A. Yes, but something more. Not only was he able to grasp, as you say, the fundamental, the basic and then make up his mind. He was totally c:11 m, Thever excited when faced with a problem. Youl Illust Tealise th:li : leader must not only examine the proble II), analyse the situation, and grasp the essentials, but he must also act. Wind he must act with absolute calm and composure, if he is to be a true leader, giving confidence and courage to others. D.S. could do that. Clear, straight, Teildy to face the consequences.
Q. So what happened 2
A. We did what D. S. asked ls to do. . . We discussed it with Sir Stafford Cripps. He realised that we had made up Our Ilinds. He raised no objections. We had our way. Sad to say, next day Sir Stafford had to go to Switzerland . . . and there hic died , . .
Q. You mean, the shock . . .
A. No, no, monthi Ing to do with
IS IT COLIIT discussils ! ! !
Q. So that was the end of your Japanese Connection5 . . . un til your speech in San Francisco . . .
A. Yes. . . The Japanese consul had told us, Dudley and Ine, that if Japan enters the War. . . LLSS aLLLLLLLaLL LL aH SLLLaSLLL had been posted as Deputy Ambass: i Cr to Afghanista In... .
Q. One thing puzzles me. . . I mean about Dudley and you. . . I would have thought that your education, your social backgro Lind, your values, the books yolu read, the Cricket that you enjoyed so nuch would make you utterly pro-British. ...
A. Both of us, Dudley and I, had the highest regard, the warmest feelings for the finest in English culture, the British politi
ܠ ܒ .
cal systell etc aıti-i Tıpérialist. ilmersed. ... il in the Indial in ment. , , all th, all what they their speeches. .
Q. But what do. . . . I heant anti-British cau.
A. Why, I told pired with the D.S. told us Il fols. . .
A Wat DO besides Dudley a about S. W. R. emerged as the попаHigпппепt, and so on.
A. Like everyb these anti-Bril Wie WS, We did "Will Effort'' .
Copposed it. . , c a Iso I. S. W. the local bodies
to the fund. . t ret LTI ed. He Wa ally about loca iIstrllLti (115 TÜ We the Illea. TIlt | had to pacify Si
hle Look Ely SWR. D.
G. You arte
SWRD was we: him with your h
A. Nothing to was obvious th TI}
Q. But S. W. F a hero to milli chitect of the tion'' . , . My ge bers him in tha indissolubly lin turning point i
A. He was b superb debater.
the classics blit up his Imind, tal I Ct decisi
ITT El, , ,

ELL W e WCT
I Was totally my reading. . . A Ti Ilalist I move:- : great leaders, had written . . .
lid you actually :0 promote your 5e, . . .
il yolu, we cons = Japa Il est until ot to be bloody
ut the others, ind you. . . what D. who finally
spokesman of anti-imperialist,
dy else who held .ish iTI perialist not help the in fact we ollecting money ".R.I), als J Bliske di i tot to contribute len Sir Geoffrey s furious, especibodies getting t t contribute, hat Sir Solomon | Geoffrey before action against
suggesting that k, contrasting ero, D.S. . .
Cant Tal St. . . helt 21, it is ob Wills
R. D. himself Was ions, as the ar* ** 1956. Te WOIIneration rcerThemt Way, his name ked to "56, a In our history.
Tillii I1 t OTEL torr. . . . . Wye || Teld i Il hç ÇOlıldı". IIlıke ke firTil decisills ely. . . a weak
e. You John . . .
haven't Then tioned Sir
A. Not mai de for politics . . . War Il-hearted main. ... Outspoke Il III an... too olutspoken. said anything that calle to his mind. . .
Q. Some said anything that Carme to hi5 mouth . . .
A. May be... but I should not talk too much... you see there was a family feud that had caused bitterness. ... my father's fallily had donc s Colcthing to his father. . . I Would Tather not talk about it. . . the story is well kill Wyl. , A Ill Titler cåse.
Q. And Dudley 2
A. We were like brothers. . . In ore than friends. . . then some evil-minded people, for their own ends, poisoned his mind against Ine. ...I all happy We became friends a galin the year beforČ hic died, ... there was a group that created trouble. . . over the preIlliership. . . all I can say Ilow 3ısı, T - told llimi çıxırlı elli we hecalı ile friends, I shall always regard him H5, a b Tot le T. . .
G. Of the Left leaders, who was the ablest. . . .
A. I knew then all. . . N. M.
Colvin, Pieter, Bernard. . . Philip mot sy well. . . Carl Will Wills Tilly 15 : frije-Igi,..., ... I ke W N. M. from University College days. . .
G. Who was the ablast. . . .
A. N. M. . . Such a cool head. . . But le could I"It ca Ilwi Ice Ille about Marxism, and I couldn't cını "iyli Tıce hıimı either the diffieTelce boc Lliw cel Ma Txislı All Buddhism, Lihat was the issue. I kept tilking Lu.
aLaHL HHH S LLLLLLLHHLLaLC LH S S SLHH dictatorship, on democracy but now the Soviet Union is proving that my way was right. . .
De Silva : Ah, Sinatra-isiT. . . .
7

Page 10
SRI LANKAN A
My information concerning the strength of the Sri Lanka arried forces arid the police Carri F5" | Wrior fri rer","iley frd
tistics on the size of the Speciał Task Force, w ich are rif - 777 de public. MFT ra corder 75 ed a 77 ad sirip sified forrat, the Services cart le placed in
he follo virg persective.
– Bruce Mathew5
Агпу
The Army has 2000 permament force officers and 32 OOC) per IL. In cint other Tanks, With 450 volunteer officers and I1 000 other ranks also curTently in serwice. The infanTy Comprises by far the biggest element. At its core 31e sive infantry line regiments. These a Tc the Sri Lanka Light Infantry (comIll Inly referred to as the Ceylon Light Infantry), the Sinha Regiment, the Gemunu Waltch, the Guja bahu RegiTulent and the Wijaya bahu Regiment. Each regiment has tlı Tec regular battalions änd two volunteer battalions, at 850 m en per battalion (except for the Sinha Regiment, which has three volunteer battalions). There is as well the Commando Regiment of 450 soldiers (trained in tasks such as hostage situations) Eind a Special Forces RegiIllent (550 troops trained for special raids and patrols, not to be confused with the Special Task Force, which operates under police autho
ity). Three other units (the National Auxiliary Force, the Rifle Corps and the
Volunteer Regiment) provide supplementary troops. A Pioneer Corps of two volunteer battalions provides labour for CCI1struction, The standard infantry weapon is the 7.62 IIIIl Chile se T 56 rifle. A few units have the 5.56 mm FN carbine. Each battalion also has a support company
providing mort tII lill-calibre Imla
" po 3. WooT.
The artillery of three regul: 4th, 5{hı, aldı ? 21. Ild 0Ile Wolu Il 6th Regillent) four batteries, The Sta1dård å field gulls and zers (Yugoslavi Til Itta Ts and St. polul 1 der field The : TITOLIT made up of ty ance regiments 3rd), with 700 Warious typics person nel carri wice, like the Tect aldı Buffalı The enginee three 800 mla Field Regimen Regiment and teer Regiment), C}ne Elect Tical Regiment of 1 The service regular units Regiments) and Icer unit (the Ill CI1 each.
The signals prised of two ments (1st and Volunteer regime
teer), Each | TT Cll ,
The T1: .
co II prised of a (operating at
rather the t level). A lined 1000 regular an teer personel
about 30 reg volunteer phys se "I'll Fe;
There is is
Ital Artilled R. trains personne la T a T1 d v Colum te the army, as w Hole Guards
der the superv police). Since

RMED FORCES
E4 T F11d III1edichine gun fire
is comprised II units (the 7th Regiments) teer unit (the Elch lls il Tid 800 IIle II. Irms F1 Te 85 Ilımı 's II Til ho Witan), 4.2 inch me wintage 25 gll ILS, CCIl p}{XIl e:11t j5 y { } ITICÇO 1 Itali SS(the 1st and mcil it each. of armoured e Is El re il 5e TSillaldi, FeT
T5 comprise in units (1st t, 1st Plant the 1st WollllThere is als
Mcchanical 500 c. corps has two (1st and 3rd | 0 ne volin2nd) of 850
Corp 5 is coinregular regi2nd) and one ent (1st WolunII it has 800
:c Corps is bolt 2000 men the depot Tegile tal lical corps of ti 70լ) WtյlլIII(this includes lular and 30 icians) staff lospitals. Well i Na Lic25 cre, which I for the regul2er forces of re|| als for the (which is unisis of the 1983, 5 Ille
20 000 troops have gone through this unit.
The army is further organized into two divisions (one north iad in e South of Matale), each with four brigades. The latter al Tc also in fixed geographical localtions (for example, the 14th Brigade is always at Anuradhapura).
Navy
The nawy has 350 regular officers and 5600 regular other ranks, With 30 volunteler officers and 4 () () yolumıteer other ra miks in ser wicc. Its principal vessels are three surveillance command ships (converted container Wics sels With 60 crew each); six ChiInese gLIIl boats, with a 25 mm ca Ti Indon capable of off-shore support for landi-based operations, a n d crews of 25 catch; 1 5 Israeli "patrol attack" craft with a 20 mm cannon and crews of 10; 16 patrol vessels with a 20 Ilılı can Idol and Crew5 of Six; Lwo 40. metre locally built slow patrol vessels, capable of sustained voyages with crews of 40; two landing craft (LCMs), Only about one quarter of the lawy is at sca. The service has an increasingly heavy security responsibility on land.
Air force
The air force has 583 regular officers (60 of whom are pilots) and 7900 regular other ranks, with 150 volunteer officer 5 : Ind 1000 Volunt cer Oth CT Tanks. It consists of fell I Wings (No 1 Training Wing, Anura dhapura; No 2 Transport Wing, Ratnal ana, No. 3 and No. 4 Helicopter Wings, Kalıtılın ili yake) and 12 bases. Its principal aircraft are nie SIAI Marchetti SF 250 TPs (Which can be used is fighter-bombers); 14 Bell 412 of 212 helicopters (capable of modest 'gunship' capacity):
(Coil fried on re... I page)

Page 11
two Y8 (Chinese) transports (large, long-range carriers); six Y12 transports (Silhaller, limited range planes); and three AWRCD HS 748.s (medium transport planes with limited range). The air force sees itself as entirely a transport and coastal patrol command. It is not cquipped to have a co Tibat role. Like the nawy, the air force is als op iT' volwed in landbased security operations. Police
There are 2700 regular gazetted police officers and 23 100 regular police other Tanks, with 8000 reserve constables in service, These operate out of approximately 330 police stations, Also under police jurisdiction are the Special Task Force (STF), Home Guards and the Citizens Wolunteer Force (CWF). The STF is a para military outfit Well known (or notorious, depending on one's point of view) for its effective role in the Eastern province prior to the Indo-Lankan Accord. It may number about 2000, all Tanks, Second the Home Guards
El Te än al ble : a TI med only and recruited rity needs. good record diligence. strength is 60 1200) before There a Te pla cxtensively ir plantation Sec CWF is Tecir the Eastern ails for a st
As with the teer” scctions so toto the Holme: Gullir d5 ceive no pens years of servi advantage of ISI We Stitt Is can refuse to gerous Cor 11 I1 \,
Finally, it that methods and disse mir ence info Timat stly improved duction of a ligence Bureal 1984. The N separate entity and armed fo mation is fi
Ace Radio Cab
" Computerised meters
Can ble Sumn Thoned to y 0
" No call up charqe within city limits. " Vehicle ac -Receipts issued on request Company credit awa
Ca| 501502 501503 o
Another Aitken Spenc:
 
 

uxillary force, with shotguns, for local secuThey have a f bravery and Their present 10, down from the Accord. ins to use them thic troubled tor. Third, the iting only in province, and rength of 1500.
ther Willinof the forces, reserve police, and CWF Teons, even after ce. The only Wolunt ccT o T is that one taket al da 11ya Inted posting. should be noted of collecting Lating intelligI have nodesince the introNational Intelin December IB stands as a to the police rces. Its info Tyrwarded in de
pendently to the Joint Operations Command (comprised of the Prille Minister, the Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs and the heads of services). The JOC in turn conveys information to a separate Security Council appointed by the President. As such, the Security Council has the potential to be a top-level "think-tank, reaching out to a Wide range of specialists. It could also include such important figures for the well-being of the country as the parliamentary lead cr of the opposition. This situation does not prevail, however, and the Security Council app cars to remain dominated by the political personalities and aims of the governing party
alon.c. Currently, President Ranasinghc PreInada sa has kept the defence portfolio
for himself, and the Defence
Secretary is Foreign Affairs Minister Ramjan Wijcratine, The Ministry of National
Security, so critical in period prior to the 1987. Accord, has now been disbanded.
July 1989 (ROUND TABLE)
LIs tilt idir 5 LEP
cess from selected Stands
| |ab| 2
501 504
2 Service

Page 12
Draw ever 7.30 p.r.
9 for incr
 
 
 

Millionaires
for the
y Saturday n. On TN
edible multi-milions

Page 13
IPKF in the quagmire
(An Indian Defence Review comment)
or quite some ti IIle II cow the F. has b, cel fed with stories, in the main eminating from the USA, argu ing the case for seeing India as an "ascenda Into power in the Tegion. Others, such as the smaller peripheral coluntries of South Asia, includiring the Til dial-baliters in the West, have preferred the word 'bully'. But in either case is implicit a recognition that India. is becoming a dominant factor to be Teck Ted With i So Luth Asia. The latest pronouncement in this respect is that from Ai mbassador-designate to India, Mr Willia Ill Clark, who told the Foreign Relations Committee in Washington on 1 November 1989 that "India has emerged as an e con Tic, political and T1ilitary force" aldı "how we le:ıl withı one another from this point forWard Will have a major impact upon not only our bila teral rclations but on the alignment or World powers". On the same day, Senator Edward Kennedy ans Wering a question immediEitely after a meeting with Indiis A. I 11 bassa da T, TOT Karall Singh, con Capitol Hill, acknowledged that despite the fact that the US itself was gradually warIlling to Wards the Soviet Union, Smc elements, both within Congress and without, continued to
look askance at II di i for its alleged tilt towards Moscow. Those who indicted India om
that score were wie wing the situation from the perspective of a different age. They continued to see things of a period that W13 Io longer there, Senator Kennedy said. "Unfortunately, some of thcm take isolated incidents and distort them,' the Senator pointed out. It was his fir Ill belief 11ät Indi: was today not what it was some years ago. India was now willing, poised and able to play a constructive and legitimate rolle in the region. An increasing number of people in America were becoming aware of the true state of affairs.
Therc 15 Teil that the India II Sri La Ilıka was couraged and II major powers in Yet the mðI'll ka Il impasse is in El regið Il car obligatio I1 to ho skil | New Det tical interpretat Colus that Nic yw I horia of the Ra. Accord had got situation hopele
If Indial i5, il in the region it etc. for cultiv to read politic its neighbouring greater skill. III ficial foreign op to remain disc Lankan issue. E Illessage is cle: military interve
sary the politi Lhat follo 11 o wedi flaved. Emissa
picked from a from between
I) elhi. Neiter in nor Tintil take into acc
calculations, wi tio [1 that if Jay; to anything, all inics were bel
Il CC. Il trast LH particulat its : ticial in and nego Singham), condu With diplo II latic I Illination, flexib sense of oppo tigether" crim Imla I from which Cour pundits could p וטן נתרן ואילוL יזרו sll ՃլIld be do ne. Indian insistence giving up its a rin subsequent effo i 1 til 5 Lublissil, h35, 1 ever dewi ent bid to seek ing Elmid cooperɛ dian Goverile

SOI to believe intervention in unofficially encnidorsed by the cluding the USA. cof the Sri Lanthill dominance "ries Witl i L LI
Inc. up whatever hi has in poliin, IL is obviDelhi in the eupjiv-Jayawardene the Sri Lankan ssly Wrong.
Indeed dominant Will be all the 'Elting all ability all situations in COLII tries with In the main, of inion has chosen Tet ST 3 ut the u II spoken 1. T. G. Witc. In that ntion Was Ile cescal programme it was deeply Ties, seemingly hat, flew to and Climb find Sinhalc5 c opinfeelings were Il 1 L il II di '5 th the implica1Warde I e i greed the others" opCathı II totice,
c LTTE ard, il rincipal theoreLiator Dr Bllacted themselves a polomb, deteri lity and a fine rtunism, which lds respect, and foreign service ick up a point v these things For, despite the In the LTTE said the IPKF's IS F Tce it LTTE policy ed froIII a. patithe understandLtiCIl Of the IIIt. Als Dr. Bala
singham has said, "We haven't closed the doors with the Gower III ent of India. We need India and thic Indiin masses." And yet it is apparcnt that the LTTE will only negotiate from a position of strength, Whether political or military — political in that it intcntis te govern the North-eastern Province, and Illilitary i II that it will not hciii T. of its a rilled cadres laying down their weapons.
India should see this as an invitation to withdraw militarily and to cooperate on the political front in a totally new basis - on a clean slate, as it Were - CTeated
o first by the IPKF withdrawal.
(a ste O'Tld by a cease-fire a mong
all the Tal mill groups,
O third by deploying a police force consisting of Tamils, and
O fourth by the dissolution of the North-east Provincial Co
uncil and the holding of fresh clcctions.
These proposals politely avoid
saying but clearly imply that the 1987. Accord is ICW better bui Tied, and there is no future for India or anyone else in the Sri Lankan context in pretcnding that the EPRLF is not al creature of India's making.
A capacity to extricate itself from political er Tor is surely the hall Tark of any dominant" power. There are the examples of the Withdrawal of the US from Wietrlı altı altıd i mı gore Tecently the Soviet withdrawal Tro II Alghil Llistil in. But as yet there is little inclination I New Delhi to arrive at the right conclusions from its Sri Lanka I experience. Despite pressure from the JWP the Sri Lanka Gower II lent has go mę further al Ing the Toad of estimating the LTTE at its proper Worth than the Indian GowT1 met. Such i Il fact is the fl eXible diplo IIlacy, the Te5ili elce of the LTTE leadership, that it is even prepared for a dialogue With the EPRLF, Thus there is a b : Sis, ho We Wer le bulls, Cr a genuine accord provided India
1.

Page 14
switches from a military to a political role based on a correct reading of Sri Lankan realitics.
Meanwhile the so-called peace coil littee sponsored by the Sri La rika II Gover III ment pe di Ing an expected Indian Withdrawal, consisting of 28 parties, lost of the ared, inclusive of the LTTE, cannot be expected to usher in an era of peace. At Ilbes L i t Car ct s a for LIII.1 f) T an exchange of views and positions on the vexatious problem of devolution of power to the Sri LL k. Til Tills. If I Ildiä persists in propping up the EPRLF and continues attempts to a III1 ii t l 1 d stil lllls withdra wall LI I1 til - TälTilhil seCLI Tit. y is il, chie"Wedi to its owl satisfaction it will Silk fullTth CT il to thic STi Lillkilin quagmiTc thill it hälls illready. It may be more than it bit galling to eat humble pie in accepting Dr Balasingham's formula as the one way of es caping the գլIaբ Tilire, but that is the Icality, the botto 11ine, als är a5 III1 dial is cC ccTincid. It does not help for our foreign ser wicc pundits to kcc 01 ha. Iping about the 1987 Accord being 'very much in force. It breathed its last quite some time ago but New Delhi has yet to summoll up the political courage to accept this as al faif accor7i pli (Surday Mail, 22 October 1989).
Recent Developments
A Ille W di Ille 15 i Il to the et Ellic problem in the North-eastern Province of STi Lillkil is the energeLuce of the Tamil Nationall Army (TNA). A cadre of an estimated 3000 Tamil youths trained in the USE OF EIlill HГП15 and support weapons, the TNA is acting as a de facto security force to prop up thc Provincial Government of Wardaraja Perumal, the EPRILF supremo. There hawe, il Lhis context, becn accusations by Colombo that these illegal and extra-constitutional cadres have hic en t Tliet al Inci armed with the full knowledge il Tıd il 55 istance of New Delhi. Forcign Minister and Minister of State for Defence, Ranjan Wijera tine, accused the IPKF of
con niving in LTai ping an illegal North-east, posi the unity, integ eignty of Sri L: tllis cadre is il ti the LTTE, in W ters determinati trol of the No wice, once the by early 1990.
A 5 h 15 ble : dTywyll of the II of writing, the withdrawn from has begun to c Sive sit Luit II eisteri PT Wilc be clashes bet groups and als T*', 'ig' the ST Forces. In the VEClm "Teltod withdrawal, they exterT T in El ting e in extent, this t tle: JWP TA'
lld Splither Läl käl hälve bec ST i LT1 kl. 1 AWITI cessfully,
The Sce:Illa Ti
be unfolding h: of pushi Ing the regular civil Wa CCI 1 TT 3 Itati Tı bi ilıqlı EPRILF { The sets Sri La Ilıkalı ATT ing hands with casualties which Army has alrea i Tig a short pe dication of the cept probably L1 se of force, complex situatio use of force re Cidle of Tal II ils. 510 W. do WIl GT to IPKF will
The fact W, EPRLF (Gwer T wed all these I support. On ce withdrawn, Mr mal's Goverım: likely to colla apprehension til has had a hill ing and equipp Tcs, further com

ning än di Cq LI i par lly in the ing a threat to rity and soveranka. No doubt : Inded to combat iew of the lat{} Ihi t. ) "W"TE 5 t :) — th-easteTI PIC)- IPKF pulls olut
fel Ted, the withPKF (at the time IPKF has been three districts) Teate in exploin the North e. There live vee Il Tival Talli I in between the Lalkal Air Iled rice to fill the by the IPKF's * See 111 beTL Lin acı Öther. TC) is a dwa ntagellus I thic Central Tegio Ils of Sri in combating the Lled Forces suc
that appears to ls the potential ctյլIntry into a ir. A full-scale et Weel the LTTE a dres, at this likely, with the ily covertly jointhe LTTE. The 1 the Sri Lankan dy suffered dur:riod i Te Hill inir inability, exby the cxcessive to control the II. An excessive Sulting in genothey fear, will Cven plut a stop ": Will.
ever is that the let has sliwi. Il CII this II. IT dia Ilı the support is Wardaraja PeruIt is mai Te than ipse. Colombo's Hati New Delhi ld in the training of TNA cadplicates the issue.
Whatever the military potential of the EPRLF cadres, it is doubtful whether they can take on the LTTE in a prolonged frati
Cidal War. Besides, one II list remember that Lhe Premada Sa (Gover III e It is rmTc i clied to reach an agreement with the
LTTE thill the EPRLF. In such i Sceltı Tio Llı e Clıtımccs Of the EPRLF and its allies scoring a lasting victory in the present Cfrottil le 51. The future much depends on the steps which the Prema das a Gover III ent intends to take - they ELTe I70t inclilled to 1110 W the EPRLF to fortify itself. The question of striki Ing a deal with the LTTE based solely on the convergence of present interests is Ells debilable.
COMMENT
One of the key proclamations of the National FTIt ill its election Imanifest () was that the IPKF would be withdraw I from Sri La Ilka -- Whetller by :end December 1989 or early 1990 is a natter of logistics - but pull out it illust. For too long has the Indial Air Illy been fighting, what could be termed a proxy war, in Sri Lanka. Despite Illny
ha Indicap 5 involving interpretations (3f thic milii Di DL1LI I 11 li se of force, hu Illa Il rights etc., the
Indian soldier, and particularly the infantry Iman, has do ne the country proud. Large numbers of the Ill have laid dowl their lives and many have becil Woll inded and a proportion of these handicapped for life. Many of the I did Plut under StaId * collT cause and why we fight in Sri Lanka'. But fight they did. The IPKF operations brought a measure of peace to the Strifeto TTı Northı — easter Tı PT), 'wiTı Ce : Elıd produced a climate where electio Ds, cxu ili be h] eld. It Was - 3:15 a result of this that the EPRLF Gover III ent of Wardaraja PeruIlal was installed. The retairning p:L Tt of the agTee ment b etweer the two GoveTimeltis Hlas: had to Tide rough weather, as a result of Premadasa replacing Jayawardene in the seat of power in Colombo. Whether the
(C: ?: நாg 1)

Page 15
THE REGION
SITUATION IN THE MALD
A period of big
A. W. Warghese sately in the Maldi wes
O the evening of June 21, a day prior to the Indian
Pritime Ministe T, MT, W. P. Singh's visit to the Maldives at the
el est of Presidict Mallim I Abdul Gayoom, TW Maldives bela Ilı cd a long clip of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi o In the campaign trail in Bihar.
The Maldivians have a soft core T foT MIT. Gandhi will sent Indian soldiers to the rescue of Mr. GayOC II) in the face of the colıp at tempt by Tal II nil mercenarics in November 1988. Twenty months later, political realities at hole have compelled Mr. Gayo on to call Mr. Singh over for a fresh display of solidarity.
BENEFICIAL
The exercise has been in littl:Illy beneficial, in different ways. India rests assured that this small State within its sphere of influence respects its clout. Mr. Gayoom could show his people that he enjoys big brother's unstinted support. However, Ille galwe the galime: :w:ły when, unasked for, he informed the dial Prile Milliste blt the political reforms he wishes to implement. Thereby hangs a t Elle.
Anybody in the capital city of Male will tell you that the Maldives has entered a "period of tTa,Tilsitið T’”. To TT a co IntToolled, conservative, theocentric society to a modern, democratic State sice the Nowe Tibet 1988 coup attenpt. Maldivian intellectuals Helieve that it will also be a period of turmoil' before the fou Tidations of al de il Cratic Maldiviain State a Te TiTTilly laid.
Mr. Gayoom, who has ruled the Republic since 1979, is aware that his decisions will play a key rol c in determiining the
fillt IT e of the C ko wys; thit t inhead El Te limite טוון ר):b Et וו #:BS t Tigidly-C & Introllic: a TieItalist State Cr a del Crati
Mr. Gayool's to the cloice li He hopes that help him Illake BLI Lihlat would tig the peopl openly criticise and I lethodology Mr. Gayool h: steps in this di the Illebels of Parliament) and Forel Preside Council he has debate on the Llic ft II da The Tit: dom of speech
The Mä|dliWi gives the peo free do II of sp
freedo II is rew al Code. Artic al Code glI: Tä
the system who WTittel words
Il ti - Gower I tiller Stiff sentence
of the oute in 1,200-island ar. Mr. Gayoom, C der Article 28, SLIre to abolish pro ve his com concepts of frt and an open S
But Mr. Gayo tTacking CIl p. this full Illa II helt: gthen cd the rai phills undcrg T. in a Republi politics' is a is T1C ruling Cor here. Only i and a personal upon a netwo

[VES
changes
untry. He also he possibilities di — the Maldiw -
LI "," ET DIT di Islamic fundEl dictatorship : State.
diler Illa Telites 1: 1135 LC) 118 ke. the people will the right choice. i Inply his gra Ile the right to the present for Il * Of Gower Timment. 18 takel h'esita IL Tectic) T1. A. EII1) 11g * the Majlis (the in the recently itial Consultative initiated a fierce pros and coIls of Il right to freeEL Tid expression.
än Constitutio II ble the right to e echi. Bult that ked by the Pen8 file Pellinte es CTitics of 'by spoken or or signs arouse it feelings' a Of exile CE1 011: st islands in the chipelago-nation. Ice in exile ulis facing presit ind thus to littlet to the :edom of speech ociety.
II's recent backTITiscs t0 g Tallint Il right has strenliks of an EllinorJund opposition c where party bad yard. There Opposition party Info) TITäll crit CTi e 5 ised politics built k of family ties.
The President this is the lead of one such cot cric rcpresenting the interests of the Eindheri III lagu and Kolige families. There cil. In be no opposition party. So long as Article 38 remains in force even though Mr. Gayo om hals gone on record als saying that he is not opposed to party politics.
Mr. Gayo on has also suggested that the right of freedom of speech Illust result in press freedom aldi Trecently he gallwc: thc green signal for a free press. But he was not happy With the consequences of that decision.
BANNED
In January 1990, ia group of dissidents floated a billionthly called the SaIrIg Lu (the Conch shell). In the islands, the conch is used to sound am alla Tim and to Tally the islanders. The SFg, in its Table: as the Woice of the Lu 13e el opposition, did exactly that. It published a series of exposes of the Illisdeeds of the PresidicInt's brother-in-law (wife's brother), the powerful Minister of Defence, Trade and Industries and Director of the monopoly State Trading Organisation (STO), Mr. Ilyas Ibrahi Iul.
Ewell as the sixth issue of the SangI was poiscd to hit the Ständs, the Government banned it charging its editor and staff with "encouraging certain clements to take the law into their own hands and to engage in un llwful acts which might enda Inger public places and property and result in civilian էliTI11''.
MAJLIS POLLS
At the time of the Sang's closure, its key editorial assistant, Mr. Mohammed , Nashccl, was in Sri Länka. There hic gawe an interview to al Lankan
13

Page 16
paper and wrote a hard hitting
article in The Island criticising the Govern Incit”5 action. Om his return to Malc, his passport was impounded and he was arrested and held without being charged for cight days, for interrogation by the National Security Servicc (NSS). He is now fighting a case foisted by the Gov et 1 Ilment which takes him to task for alleging in his article that the November 1989 polls to the Majlis were rigged. His case may yet become a cause
The Sang also had the last laugh at Mr. Gayoon who, stung by the criticism that his brother-in-law was film e III bezzler, ordered an audit probe into the affairs of the STO. The probe revealed that huge su Ilms had indeed been siphoned off by a top STO official close to Mr. ITbr:älhim1. Mr. Ibr:ahliIm1. Wa5; th eI1 requested to attened a sitting of the probe panel. Mr. Gayoom also asked him to resign als Tride Minister. Mr. Ibrahim immediately caught a chartered Air Maldives flight out of the country. He is understood to be in Gele: Wa Ilo W Where hic has personal for tunc deposited.
Mr. Gayoom whose popularity ha di 5o Ted after the November 1988 coup at tcmpt, is now suspected by the Maldivian public of having arranged Mr. Ibrahim's safe geta way. Hic has not both - ered to dispel the doubts of the people either. So far, no investigation has been ordered into the geta way episode or MT, Ibrahims 155et5, T10 st of which he is understood to have liquidated before his e scape on May 31 this year. With his getalway the spotlight is now be
ing focussed on the Fisheries Minister, Mr. Abbas Ibrahim, brother of Mr. Ilyas Ibrahim,
also accused of corruption and Inepotism.
With the Sarigu banned, another magazine called the Hikku II (Friday) has taken up the cudgels on behalf of the amorpholls opposition. Soon after Mr. Ibhrahim fled, Mr. Gayo or reshuffled his Cabinet portfolios
14
among his Mi saving cxercise issue, the Hui out at the Pre ing, contradict tical' press pe tempts at ht people by resh instead of repl ters who are Opposition sol the next journ: big stick will (bu tSpokcIn Ahr The two other Dhiwch i languag Arif this - are ( sidised and (w bas libra Enill 11 a for Presidentii Mohammed ZELE: pectively,
Corruption, in tary, and wides halwe been the Wian politics a ] hospitable isla
domina
A. V. Warg
he driving
gro Wing o the It in the N youth. And thi ing given the s 60 per cent of pulation compr 24 years of age Gover 111 ent of fresh, bright fai quire T.
The youth ar. in western clot scio Lus, efficient addicted to Coca fills.
Indeed the Fl
tion Tn DVellent has a leadershi age is around
of the youth h ed OVeTSe: 5 – Kingdom, the

isters in a face, II, il Tecelt kru has lashed ide It's "confusTy and hypocrilicy aml his åtodwinking the 1ffling portfolios 1 cing his Minisunder à cloud. rces think that |list te filçe this: e the Hikkri's led Wahid Ali. iewspapers in the e — FIII1p?ter II Kılıqlı overnment subned by Mr. AbInd the Minister | Affairs, Mr. ir Hili issa im re5
1 Oral and Inco Tepread nepotism,
bal Ille of Maldijld the peaceful, 1 ders are most
THE REGION
agitated about it. The first President of the Maldives, Mr. Mohanned Amin, was beaten to death by the islanders for his debauchery and tryrannical lethods. The first President of thc Second Republic, Mr. Ibrahim Nasser, left the country bc fore the islam ders Could mete out justice to him.
LOSING THRUST
Mr. Gayoon, elderly, respected and stil popular With the Islanders, is slowly losing their confidence though with his toleration of corruption and nepotism and the increasing usc of the NSS to ha rass his political adversaries. The situation is such that barring a coup by an ambitious riwal — MIT. Ilyas Ibrahim is Illentioned in this context - the growing opposition In client will see to MT, Gayoom's removal or reform within the next two years.
LDIVES SITUIATION - II
tion movement ted by youth
hese
orce behind the position II lovealdives is the s 15 not surpristarting fact that the nation's poses youth below Walk into any ice and young, ces greet the in
! neatly dressed les, fashion co Ilcourteous and -Cola and Hindi
:dgling opposiin the Maldives whose average 30 years. Most ve been educatin the United SA, Sri Lanka,
Karachi, India and even Moscow. Their exposure to the Wcs te Til democracies and the scientific mode of learning has fired them with ideals perhaps incompatible with traditional Maldivian culture and Islamic values,
The amorphous opposition is largely made up of these educated youth who fear that the nation may become progressively fundamentalist and incapable of keeping pace with the developInents in the Thodern West.
Aware of the albitions of this new, now generation, Mr. Gayoom has been filling key Gowernment posts with its representatives. Eighty per cent of the members on the Presidents Consultative Council are youth. 1t is an open forum. Mr. Ga

Page 17
yoom's difficulty lies in convincing the impetuous youth that change can only be gradual and Tot sudde I1. What the idealistic, impatient youth fo the island need is political maturity.
Mr. Gayo (Im has to act fast if Fle Wil Dits t{) r:1]]aill the COL111try's leader for another decade. Fot the first till: iI i Maldivia Ll history, än Opposition Candidate defeated the powerful Ilyas Ibrahim in his home borough of Male in the Majlis elections läst November. Thc giant—killer was the 37–year-Cld Dr. Wäheed, a charismatic new generation leader with a Ph.D acquired from Stanford University. Dr. Waheed ra. Il a full-fledged political campaign against his opponent successfully. Soon after the polls though, six of his Campaigners Were arraig ned under Ar Licle 38 flIld exiled.
In the close-kinit coII11I nl I Inity of islalders, the Tole a Ind actioI15 of the National Security Serwice, the police-CuII1-imilitary Corganisation handling internal security and defence, are being monitored with some apprehension. There hawe been reports of police hEl rassment, torture and brutality towards suspected dissidents, the extent of which is being probed by a representiti Wc of the United Nation5 Commission of Human Rights,
COMPULSORY DRAFT
There are many youngsters who are also unhappy With the system of compulsory draft by which the cream of the youth are dragged into a life of armed drudgery. Naturally, there are dissidcnts in the NSS who are El Waiting TCForm.
According to Oppositio sourC es, tillere are alt least 1ó III1c Ilbers in the 48-member Majlis who are pro-reform. In the 13member Clbinet ther E 1re à lcast four Minist cis who back the “reformists”. The Copposition is biding its time, Willing to give Mr. Gayo. In a chance to bring in constitutional reforms. They are seeking a sepa ration of powers between the police and the judiciary, for
i 13 tilçe. The II calni palign är e s but are coming o com Tcccntly ab: Licc CollTit 5 Wher Victed ollt of h;
The oppositio i Ing för a clear powers and Tes the President II They also want redrafted to pro er T de 111 øgratig tical structure. Live rules are a refrailled so th: family connect pro Inotions to
Thę Ilucleu5 force in the Mi MT, M111ilIIEd outspokem MP) Sharif (MP frc atoll of Addu), M. Ibrahi Did Abdul Rahman. sees a potenti candidate for th present Attorne A Hırici ZH ki.
The oppositio unhappy with to Stitlu Lior which the II L IIl y i. II notion against NT cin. Il MI ed except by th seeks perilissior sident. “The sy help the Presidit elds to e walc i Mohal III Lleid Näs ince, tlıcre yet get the Majlis the Coup at te II cently after Mr. a Way. All in W
The di 5 Side1t: PTe sidient Iile:T: When he toll W. P. Singh abo to decentralise pk hope that the Mai the body to w authority will bit the true repress people.
Ewell as the Cetrate 5 CIl T:li5 eless ibit such ders insist thält cannot become ;

esults of their l[]w in cøIIling, in. Mr. Gay
polished the po. 'C CYLC WWW 315 CC). I = է Ild,
Pl is : 130 pt 15hdella Tcation of ;ponsibilities of ld his Ministers. the Constitution | wide for a II 10dlegal and poliThe adlinistalso sought to be L' 11 Titldt ions determine high positions,
if the dissident 1jlis consists of Latif (the most
, Mr", Ibra h1iTT In the largest | Dr. Wählecd.
i and Mr. Adam
The Coppositio II a presidential le fll LLITe III the y-General Mr.
1 politicians are le present Contlties Lilit :1 || ԼյW . 110-Ç0 Infidence the President. :lj li 5 be con W en1 - c Speaker who from the Pre'S LIII i 5 billilt to :Int : Iind his friss Lues,’’ says Mr. hcel. For instTc :At teTImpt5 t) CU W el cal TteT bt ELIld I11Ore Te. Ibrahim's getain.
hope that the what he says
Pri mc Mi Ilijster ut his inten tills wer. They also Ijli5 Will becoIIıe: 1ich persons in * 24 cc Yuntäble als til tiyc 5 of the
Ipposition coning public a wa r1 issues, its lea
the Maldics El pilul ra listic 50
ciety in the true sense of the w Cordi. Though there is a clainour for freedom of speech, there is no deilocrat I the islands secking a fundamental right to freedom of religion.
A, BLEND)
The opposition leaders are col Winced thilt slal Il coltais adequalite concepts for the lishering in of an Islamic democratic stalc. Their attempt is to hold back the rising title of Islamic fundamentalism and to graft principles of Western democracy onto an oliga r chic, theoCentric Structurę.
India, it sees, has Tole to play in bringing this experiment to fruition. "If India is truly interested in the Maldivial people as opp aðsed to Mr. Gäyool and the interests he represents, it must exert pressure On the Maldi wil. In GO WerIn I11ent to Imake constitutional cha Inges Within a set of time and ask it to il tTod Luçie ir Ille dialite Tefo Til Theisu Tes like the abolition of Article 38' say extremist oppsitil Ille imbers like MIT. Moha. IlII led Nasheel.
Another top opposition leader, unwilling to be identified, said: * Another Goyer III: IL in the Maldives would be more friendly to India than the one led by Mr. Gayoom who is basically In ore pro-Arab than a friend of India. After all, it was SAARC that brought him closer to India
- and (also) the timely help
Tendered at the time of the
coup."
The opposition leaders are
concerned that the Illowerinent for democratic changes must coincide with Fiction on several fronts. It is widely accepted that the Republic has made good headway under Mr. Gayoom in the sectors of primary education and health. But Inuch remains to be done in terms of higher cducation and broad-spectrum health scrvices.
There is Ellso a great shortage of housing and the fishermen, who constitute 40 per
(CorriηrrΕί αrt Page II)
15

Page 18
K. Pathmanaba: Politic
and Praxis Dayan jayatilleka
Color:a de Pathrmaina ba Was
first of all a revolutionary, He was a revolutionary, a Marxist-Leninist, a nati Cill liberaltil Inist ind a humanitarian socialist. If we were to forget his characteristics we would then also forget his contribu
tion. Path manaba was not just another leader of thc Ta III il National Ino Weile It Cut down
by the LTTE. He was more, and this we should always reIlle Ibe.
Conrade Pathmanaba's political career gocs back to the first years of the decade of the 1970's. He participated in the activities of rising Tamil student and youth fronts, in protest against Tacist policies implime IIIted by the United Front Government of the day. It is this Government, consisting of so called progressives and left parties, that reinforced the foun. da Lion of the Tallil Eela IT demand, the cornerstone of which Was laid by Bandara naike policyof Sinhala only in 1956. Comrade Pathmanaba participated in the carly 70's in the callpaigns of agitation launched El gainst media wise and district Wise standardisation and the discriminatory 1972 Constitution.
His specific contribution to the Tamil Nationalist Movemcit and the Progressive Movement of Sri Lanka as a whole, begins however, in the mid 70's. He Was III : Cof the fou dcTs of the very first socialist oriented or
ganisation within the Tallil National Liberation Movement. This was thal Eela Widu halai Iyakka T1 Cor. Eela Liberation
Organisation founded in 1974/75. This organisaitijo II was for T1cd as a result of the attempts by Pathmanaba and others to give
Ast. Secretary and Meier, Political Free, Sri Triksi. Mfarfara Parry (SLMP).
the Tallijl Nati: El mass base. that group of who were the With the bourg: mentary policie United Friint. stress this fact, pillai Praba kra hes War II reillai political and i of bl o 11 I get 3 is 1111 til much at f
Path Taliba : ted to take the : Näitional LibeT COLI TI try Sids aan di king people. II cm CLIntere di a fi ונאWh Hit W .1ח שl foT Tämi || Eel Workers and pi larly peasantry ring from caste is in answer ti that the politic Path millil bil til: to the Left. T. Eela Widuthala formed as a sc CITgl. Tilisation de cause of Til Illil ration,
Path ima naba
unity of theory
as such the EL tactic of armed He participa tcd the Puloly b which was a ne
in the history
resis Lance. IT
after lath of th; priatio II, PathTT on the Illin, wa tected a I d assi: ple of the area. his love for all so called coln people. He re: people could b: of protection a doll for the N tion struggle. H ientation de epen as a result of

al Philosophy
IIla list Movement HE WAS, Ille of yn 11th militilints fi T5t to breik is and Parlia5 0f the Tallil I think we Illust 5 j Cie bbil Well Ilfı :ı IId Ulığı Milled within the deological arbit TULF politics, *r in the struggle. Lind oth cris attermmessage of Tamil Iltiii) In ii m to the ano ng the Worin doing 50 they I indi: mental probld the struggle m bring to the ea sal Ints, particuTil the 55 : Suffeoppression? It ? this question al philosophy of k. El sharp turn
his is why the i Iyakkam was cil list orieited
dicated the National Libe
believed to the and practice and ) rested to the
expropriations. personally in
ank operation, the first such To the Til Lil
Lihat i III ediäte at ar med ex proa Tahsi who was s sheltered, proited by the peoThis die e pened d respect for the ÜTI. Cor ordinary di liseli that the * :1 ցTeilt source ld even of Wislational Liberais pro people orcd qualitatively this experience.
The Eela Widuthalai Iykkam did not survive the repression II leashed as a result of the Puloly bank operation. As the organisation disintegrated, ComTa de Path IIlalabEl left the Collintry and went to England. He agreed due to the pressure of his family, to recoillence his studies and registered as a student of Accountaincy While in London.
But from the very first day he Teached England he was a II1aT1ifestly Tc5tle55 y c3LI Dng m:1 n. His thoughts Were entirely devoted to the task of getting back to his Illative land als S01 ELS
possible. When in London, all his free time, social contacts and his personal interactions
were devoted to the attempt to Win over friends and acquail til Ilces to the Callise of the national Liberation struggle. It
was while in London that he joincid and in fact helped to for Ill the General Union of
Eelam students – GUES and the EROS. He was ill the first batch Of Tamil Illilitant actiwists to receive training from the Palestinian Liberation Organi sation in Lebanon. His experigen ccŞ - ı l d tlıb ge of Eı is Palestinian people and strong bond of solidarity with the Palestininian struggle. Allost a decade latcr, when he was the head of a fairly strong Liberation Organisation himself, he did his very best to give II) oral material and political Support to the Palestinian fighters. It was during his spell with the Palesti Tills that CJTradic Patlımanaba also die wel Copel al s trong. seInse of solida Tity with the Eritrcan liberation struggle.
COIäd. Plab lade lis journey back in 1978. Before returning to Sri Lanka he spent sometime in India laying a fiTI fou Iudatid for the subsequellt activities of his carga Tisation. His political work in India had been with smugglers

Page 19
a I di socia band it's a di a 15o With the lost hard core Tallil Nadu Ila tið Illa lists. Pathi Ima laba, how - cwer, est: bolished a fiTTil links with the Marxist Leninist Tew") - lution a T y elements in Southe TI IIndia, He le:Tilt Illuch fTOIT) the Il hiT15ělf byl L 115 chlice |
allies is further testimony to his ideological and political cla Tity and his socialist revo
lutionary commitment.
Having set up a GUES conIIittee il Madras under Collrade SLI Tesh, le retL1rled Lo Sri Lanka, working polititically not conly in Jaffna buit : lso in the hill country. Comrade Path maIlaba III1 de Serial Is Tid exte: IlSiwe efforts to Tec Tullit Tal Illil youth from the Plantations and those from the Colo II b) 5 ch, CoCl5 for the ca Luse of Tallil Natio Tall Liberation. In doing so he broke with the narrowly limited, Jaffna ceI1 tTic: chut look Cb F. co ther T:a Im1il National Liberation fighters. Pathanaba also nad a very serious atiempt to establish contacts with Si Ilhalia Tecwbl Lltic) 1Il ries. He imet Inany such and tried to con Wilce them of thc need to support the cause of Tamil se LT detet millä LiðI. Het was not successful in lost cases. However, What is important is that he had departed completely froll any kind of narrow Tamiliationallis 11 Or cha uwi This T1.
From these earliest days in 1978, When we first met in Peradeniya, he was very clear that
the Tamil Nitional Liberation struggle was the first step and stage of an Overall socialist
revolution throughout Sri Lanka. The Tamil struggle itself would make the transition from its Ilational democratic stage and culminate in the setting up of El 5 cilist Tal mil Eell II. Of these two propositions Pathma
naba was wery conwinced and these ideas were ones which he had arrived at independently, His attempt to link up with Sinhala revolutionaries was in c (Insequencic of this strategic visi. Il fhis.
III 198| le broke With the
EROS on the question of the lack of democratic centralist. While that was the issue on which the
Tıptlı Te took pl ing of the EP Colom Tal de Path. Im1: til 7 millise his conception of th Ta t ii) im stri Iggle.
give the struggle list political ed
Els a bl Sie im 1 Gorganisa Lions. was in sistent II
5 et l I p :1 In zi rray ganisations S. Luch Workers and Pe: the Ellil WÜT Front, the Fis Front ind the P tarian Frt. T This Litin S he lat group in a sin CH, lled the Eelair til Frilt. Th.
He was very cle organisation sh t1 tilr:1w Tון H ון ט organisations at political leaders Helice Elis lidh: triad of the p El Lld the Unitel was not dogma his idea of the organisations su u pied im li pop LI trates. I beliew eWolved his own idea of the PFI Habash, of the the India Il Mali. ganisations. As had great respes Stalil, Mao, the particularly for Fidel.
Certainly it i he was lot ib his goals in th obviols that th Structure did Illa way that it was SıçLld El We T t W0 - Siets Of Ted Of reäismi I1 C)T1si subjective listal
E3 till I ETT ITS TeF50||15. Te thio trap of history
Citade Path of us, inherit dicte Tillilled conlik Ç13 til ITC:s. He build a socialis TätiĊI 1 ) Tgälis,

: ce , Lhee ft) lund"RLF permitted naba t operaWI distinctive e Nil Ligo |: 1 LibeHe attempted to : hoth. El 50cia11:ation H5 vell network of Ilass This is why he the need to -ular Orון טf pט | 5 the R11 TIL I sants Front, the ne II 5 Liberial tion 1eries Workers |litai til Pro LeThese mass orgaer attempted to gle popular bloc n. People Libera5 W15 im 1983,
:at that title äT med bl I lil be bi scd Tom the Illass ld be under the lip of the party. Tence to Matyi'5 arty, the Army FTC Tit. BLI it tic Maoism, Els sepa, TELC miss bsequently grolär bloc dcmonsthat he hid | synthesis of the LP of Dr. George Eritricans and of xist Leninist o Ta Marxist, he it and live for * Wietnam e5c and Lih: Chic lcd
s obvious that e to fulfill all is reglrd. It is is organisational t function in the 5 i11 eEaT1 t to a Th dl his was due to SCIS, CO The set sts of a ycidable kes and organiThe other set of Se lle to the
and geography,
11:41 alba, likę: 1 || ted historically litic) is and ciriwas attempting to t Til till || 1 b 5irl: וון וWiThו נןם t1
ethnic and social formation that was cha Tacticrised by conserwatisil and Cossificd Social Strıctures. His a Ltclipt to fight against caste domination and class exploitation, together with his insistence on the need for Women's enancipation. Within the National Liberation struggle, called the EPRLF the elirills hostility of entrenched, privileged social strata within the Tali litti. The result of this was the narrowing of the economic resource base f EPRLF.
When in the after Thath of July 1983 the Ili littlt Ilú We IIl EПt sought refuge in South India and Iliade their base there, the EPRLF was distinguished by its refusalto compromise on its ideological convictions. All the oth cr groups benefitted from the largesse of the Ta IInil Nadu state government. El Id of the T1 Cost nationalistic, ewen cha uwinisttic, political and bourgeois elements in Tarn i 1 Nad 11. Conrade Pilthmanabas stedist refusil t attack Sinhala civilian targets in Colombo or elsewhere did not endear him to bourgeois Tamil nationalists i 1 India Cor the West, who werc bank Talling the the terrorist operations which were undertaken by some Other groups despite their verbal commitment to the principles of Marxism.
The India Fe, Cecil tra 1: GQ Wcr: Ilment, for its part, did not take kindly to the EPRLF's efforts to establish relations With progressive national de rn (I Cratic states, throughout the Third World - such as Syria and Libya. THlus the EPRLF Was L111āb le tc) strengthen itself by soliciting support by those who would have been its natural allies. The OTthodox Marxist parties of India, Wary :1s they Were of th1e TaIInil de miliki ToT; self determinal til, did not support EPRLF as strongly as they probably should have in the Illid 80's,
The cumulative consequence of gil || this was thilt the EPR LIF was militarily far weaker than the more nationalistic, or might I say chauvinistic Tamil Eelilm groups. This of course led cer
7

Page 20
tai Ti Sinha les e Tcy Colutioårics and Marxists to , se ek aliance5 With the larger, more prospe
Tous Tathil Eelam groups, those with a high er profile, at least propagan distically. At that time, particularly with the Damoclean SWOTd of the Prey Inti i Il of TeTTorism Act hanging over their heads, 1st Sinhala leftists ill d Til di Call 5 ch 35 e not to il lly the 11Selyes With the EPRLF i Ill Way Te even contemptuous of this organisation, The bandwagon effect started Illich later, when the going was easy and the gravytrain was rolling.
The Weiklesses of the EPRLF however Werc, is I said, sourced largely in its correct adherence to fundamental principles of M:lIxis III ä Ili Liclinism and revolutionary internationalism. There were weaknesses yhich WCT e luc t Will ble CTT CTS and I innight sily that som c of these were perhaps located in Conrad Path Till I bil 5 style of leadership. Frustrating though these were to some of us at that time, in Ir citrospect I firmly believe that it is far bettet that CCIn Tilde Filth Illin:l- ba had those characteristics than the Oppositie (Iles. I think het himself Wis Ware of this, LlH. Ille1y, tlh:1 t it W::i 5 bet. tcr t. (b. eTT (1T1 the Sii: Of Tätis :W: t) the point of liberalism, than to to er T in the opposite direction.
I fce Lhat L bella Lede 55 of the EPRLF's attempt to develop a powerful military
apparatus was also due to Comradę Pathm:11 ab: "s own Thilosophical conviction that what Was most IIIl portant W:15. El mil 55 struggle, Ilass organisations and a correct politic: 1 orient:1ion. It would hawe been very easy for hill, trailed in Leball by the Palesti nians, tio hall We plu Inged into the "prestige race of launching Inilitary atti ck4 n. Si Iha la targets. But I believe he restrained himself and consciously refrained froIIl sucliming to a militaristic deviation. Perhaps he fores.aw in some way the brutalisa till that was ta set i II, in the Tamil Liberation struggle. Whatever the reas CD, would say that history has windicated
18
Patlı Illalabas I easy path of Il expese of poli
organisation.
We the LT atT:1 (:k III) Á 1111 T
Tid then : gai Ti May 1986 Path EPR LF tank : toT;, () Il both 1 Pilth ILat: we tide. He extel. and solidarity t 115 Wi 5 the CI a hartal in pro of the TELO ca ger S. By doing i 1 Cill TT ed the LIIT P.Talıblığı kil T:II ;ını שיאיו: t hסון 1161 ונrtיו Of this. But a dhe red to prit the right thing injili stice.
THle LTTE'S other Tamil o these organisat choice but to creasingly and say almost tot The EPRLF w Towards the ent last two years, manaba found happy and un far away from envisioned, the his InEK in Indi: be the Marxist Lihat Tics of Hill
I would sa Path manaba's In tot only in LS but Iון טווח טיים the wrong thii desisted from LF LI Tidler Hilis e Igage in the civilizi 15. Ili d killing of its refused to e nga ling as a sou On this last i Wisc so gentle firl.
He upheld t dealth setelce e EPRLF drug trafficking tilit եւ էլ 11 || 11:1Լ struggles are hu Ilan beings

CTL15 a to tak: ilitaris II at the itics Tid mäss
TE lalul Ilched i L5 adhapura in 1985 in the TELO in Ilariabil and thc Very clear posithese cycc:15 jom:5. : rint against the ied full support : tElec TEILC) än il ly grup to hawc test at the killing dres by the TiSo Path na naba dying ha tred of d the tigers. He beidful Ilolcheless he Iciples. He did in the face of
Weakening of all rganisations left its with little be dependent inI might even tally, on India. as no exception. of his life, the Cor; de Pathhi Tself in an lunfa II iliar position, the path he had բatll in which in allies would Le Tinist revoluEl Li CC, LII IntTy.
y that Comrade greatness resides lis positive achiIn OSL certainly in gs he consciously
oing, The EPRleadership did not killing of Sinhala id not engage in Owl II lilitats. It ge in dTug smuggTce of Tevenille. SS Lle, the other
Nabha was very
he idea of the foT lny IIIcmbers who engaged in ... He used to say We do), all trus 3:5ed III live for Lld the ideals
of humainisin. Drug trafficking results in thic destructic II of the liwes of great Illany human beings in other countries. This lakes I sense of the ideals to which We are co IIıI1i t tedi. "ʼ Th1is i T1di - ca Les very clearly the humanis II1 that infused the socialist reWOlutionary commit. In ent of Com
Trade Path Thailaba. Hiis refusall to permit internal killings, at the time when other pseudo sociaiist organisitions in the
TILli|| Ee Ill Mio y el cint W circ maintaining torture chambers and death camps, attests to his fidelity for the cause of dem CNCracy, while his refusal to entertain the idea of killing Sinhala cvilliams is testimony to his ilter la tio ilia 1i5m1.
The fact that Colla de PathIn a Laba was himself deeply illwolved in the attempt to construct a joint revolutionary project of Sinha lese and Tamils and did not sub-contract this task to this or that glib ideologue as did other Tamil libcration organisations is further proof of his deep personal collimitment to the goal of what he Cill led the Lital revolution" in Sri Lankai. It is II. It Only physically that PiIlībā stood Head ånd sh Culders above other leaders of the Tamil LibeTätin Möwe Tent bllt als 1 in his internationalism and humanism. "The New Colution of the world CC). DillI 11unist and Revolutionary MoveIment h5, il dicated Path III: T1:i- ba's own ideological formation and synthesis. Pathmana bil s to od for, believed in and acte di With 3 democratic, hu III a. I he scillis T1, which is an ideal the World MELTxis L. MC We The Int has 10 W CIldorsed as its goal.
III lis h III: Tiis Ill Pa LHIlla Inäba was like Wijaya Kill mål. Ta Ina till Ingl, who was himself profoundly anti-racist internationalist a Tid Litally committed to the idea cof a democratic socialis 11.
Wiewing comrade Pathmanaba in historical perspective is no easy task since there are a great many personal memories and experiences that we have shared in our Odyssey. But that is a much longer story for a different time. I will say that Comrade

Page 21
Path manaba was certainly one of the outstanding Marxists produced by the Tamil nation of this country - the others being Comrades Waidyalingam, Kandiah and Shanmuganathasan — the last whom Comrade
Pathmanaba greatly respected. But I could say that none of thesic the Marxists had the
opportunity ör perhaps the capacity and motivation to unite theory with armed revolutionary
practice. In that sense it would not be inaccurate to say that Comrade Pathına naba Wills the
greatest Marxist-Leninist revolutionary leader produced by the Tamil community. I would even go further. If I am asked who was the greatest revolutionalry Marxist-Leninist leader that we have produced in Sri Lanka, I can not think of anyone but Path Thailabil,
The detailed analytical assessIncit of Conrade Pathmanaba is a task for another forum. But let nine say that understanding Pathmanaba brings is sacc to face with a great many problens of revolutionary strategy and theory of political philosophy and practice - be it the relationship between the political and the military, the party and the united front, the Inaximum and the minimum programme, internationalism and nationalism, socialism and humanism, relations with hourgeois stalc, and the crisis of the World Collmunist Movement, Pathmanaba's practice and thinking involved all of that and Inuch more. Understanding Path Ima naba would shed great light on the history of Tamil liberation struggles, the nature of the Tamil social formation, the history of the Sri Lankan Tewolutionary process, the political processes of South Asia and the trajectories of the revolutionary II lovements of this complex, violent part of the world and the world as a whole,
Pathmanaba has left behind his organisation which has proved its remarkable resilience whenever it was attacked by the
sä5 cist LTTE. organisation be of his close Comrade Suresh But above all left us with his Thever a talker a what he stood for acted upol. Th to gather toget and share olur Pilth Imam alba. A have to follow The Tigers m Conrade Pall n Wijaya Kumara the fuerral of singhe, 'they in rationist, but t the liberation liberation strug Some day when lutionary force the Tamil and munities wage Struggle against imperialism, the this - for surely stage and deter and Pathmalab;
Pithmainaba's cal stature doe but grows with Els We reflect o all crisis of ol.r revolutiona will conclude search cd for a may synthes ciz ideas, his ther ou I own his|| encounter and i Ice counter. A this - SOCIAL TION OR DE
Opposition.
(Corrirrel
cent of the special problen atto||S aire als rising sea-level economic gap b Male, and the also to be bri

He has left his Lind in the hands : Tride il-arms Pricma cha Indra m. Pathmi naba has Xa rinple. He was nd a writer, But , he acted out and :refore we have Le T, Systematize Te Iminiscences of ind above all we his example. ly hawe killed 1lnab:1. But 15 natunge said at Nanda Irla. Mariaay kill the libacy cant kill truggle. For the gle is Eternal.' the peoples revoof the Sinhala, the Muslim coiltheir combined reaction and : World Will know ! at some decisiv c minant of Wijaya
Indral ind ethiis not diminish each passing day the civilizationLur Country and Ty movements. I this, haviпg slogan which c Pathmanabas ry and practice, cric, existential Il dubitable future nd that slogan is ST REWOLUATHI ! Ο
гол Пage 15]
pli lation, hawe s. The Milidivial * threatened by 3. The widening tween the capital, Other islands has ged.
Such problems apa Tt, the Maldivians are set on making a mark in the coin IL1 unity of nations as a progressive, self-sufficient society. They believe that democratic Islam will help them to achieve this status. They seck Indian sympat hy and assista Ilıcc. But Indian hegemony is totally unacceptable.
The Maldivia El people and the growing opposition are seeking fresh assurances from the Indian Government that equality will be the basis of a bilattral relationship - whether or not Mr. Gayo oil remains in power. In short the Maldivians desire genuine non-interference by their country's big neighbour in i Ls interial af få iTs ewen als they set about creating their own political history. Mr. W. P. Singh of course, reiterated that this is the corn erstone of Indi
an policy towards its smaller neighbours. The Maldivian opposition hopes it will remain
so if and when Mr. Gayoom is toppled by the people."
IPKF in. . .
(Corinited front page 12)
Rajiv Gandhi-Jayawardene Accord has Televance at this point of time i Il view of the" new Govern Illent in New Delhi is for both countries to decide. But what should be made quite clear in unambiguous terms is that India can lot and will not stand by and simply watch if any scale of genocide of the Tamils of Sri Lanka is attempted by the Sri Lankan Armed Forces; and secondly, that India cannot but react to any attempts by extra-territorial powers to gain a military foothold in Sri Lanka, inimical to India's interests.
— Freiherr Dgferrarigo: Revře'14'
19

Page 22
SAFFIN LAAWAYA
Economic Liberalization Political Pluralism
Mick Moore (Institute of Development Studies, Un
I. Introduction
s there a positive symbiosis between the liberal economy and the liberal polity". Froll the time the question beca Inc meaningful, mainst Team Western social theory and doctrine has tended to give a positive answer. IL has generally been possible convincingly to argue an intrinsic causal connection between the dispersal of economic (and thus political) power inherent in the competitive market economy and the pluralism which is central to all definitions of the liberal polity. At El "broadbrush' level the histo Ticill ewidence is supportive. There is a strong empirical association between liberal de Inocracy and (successful) capitalist market systems. While Lhere a Te El number of quite plausible arguments indicating soline potential deep and long-term causal connections between capitalism the market econo IT y and political u II freedom, the bala ince of long term historical evidence appears to support orthodoxy.
However, the short term may not simply be the long teTIT writ small. And in the citemporary World our attention is directed less to episodes in the 'natural" expansion of the market economy than to a category of processes which Ilay usefully be viewed its stille What distictive: ecoloric liberalization, where this implies a very conscious and urgent attempt by the state to bring about a rapid expansion of the private over the public economy, of Ilarket over mto T-IT arket rcs Cource al localiticin, and of competitive over hierarchically-determined eco In comic dccisi 01S.
Contemporary evidence on the political correlates of economic liberalization appears ambiguous. IIl 511 e lithe TE () Stati5t-climauthoritarian regimes, notably sociallist Chill äld the Sowjet
20)
Union and ca. Te cellit II O'CS t and political been closely c. ti III e si Ild in ti both proponent Of TefóTIll. Su dictory eviden B TitiTi Sicc PT || 11e Minister Thatchet. Herc economic liber: associated with lization along sios, The Img: dications of til per verse politic economic lib. eוH 0יט ,rשwשw רh t heral capitalist all from the S Litin A Thericii 1970s. In Arge Chile in partic Of economic at least to the involved a III protected in por I10 Ilies to foi in Westment, a ill-hand with II.1eilt; with ov | intellectually-el to depoliticiz institutionalize Lech TocTil Lic: ITILI Ilized tieTiToT ca. agencies again: zenry. It was this period whic Sc5 15 "death Disappeared c0 mm on Wocail filII15 like Missir denocracy to killed tortu Tec sands of politic unionists, in te and journalist arbitrarily-chos
The Ilotion til: struct li Tal Iim these grotesque and (b) attempt list growth on m1o Te li ber:3 1 1 received for Ill:

WYSUS
versity of Sussex)
italist Taiwan, Wards ecolo Illic liberalis II have Illnected both in e perceptions of i and opp olents 11e II li lidly contras iTo IIIט וון סe C: 1979. Linder the ship of Marga Tet Telatively Tadical lization has been political centrasevel di Telst disturbing ine possibility of al CCT Telates CF Talization have, from the per ipcountries, above Čuth CTIl Cone ČT in tէle 1960s and en Lina, BTH 7 il a Tid Lular, a Ine W set policies, liberal extent that they ajor opening of t-substituting ecoreign trade and pelred to go h:Indmilitary governert, JT galinized and aborated projects : Society and military-cumle; and With orgainducted by state it their OWI citithe regimes of h put such phr:- quads' and "The Dies' into the Kul: Ty; generated g; declared liberal be subversive; and a nd exiled thoillAl activists, trades lectualls, students , als well as III care SIN SL15 pccts.
Elt there was sole age between (a)
political regimes to renew capita
the basis of a Concolnic regime, | tlıcretical cla
boration above all in the Work of Guillermo O'Donnell on 'bureaucratic - authoritarianism." From a functionalist stan cc O'Donnell argued an intrinsic connection between authoritarian, repressive, exclusionary regimes and a particular stage of capitalist development: one in wolwing the "deepening' of the capital goods stock aid the Opening up to foreign tra del Id investment. Leaving aside the fundamental objections held by many schola T s to any wa Tiant of functionalist social theory, a null ber of doubts arise about the empirical validity of the O'Donnell thesis. It is to the grcat credit of La til Anmerican studies that the thesis was soon
tested in a consistent and scholarly fashion. It was found sadly wanting. It is part of
Latin America's continu ing tragedy that, despite a period of Widespread democratization in the early 1980s, state terrorism recurs in patterns Which bear no evident relation to gover nments' economic policies.
Since the rejection of the O'Donnell thesis. We have lacked a credible theory which hypothesizes clear structural linkages between authoritarian regimes and attempts to introduce more econo Illic liberalism into Telatively back Ward capitalist countries. Yet suspicions that there are such linkiges Telain Widespread.
Despite the rejection of the O'Donnell thesis, other scholars have convincingly argued that there were clear causal linkages between the processes of political autharitirianism and the econo Illic libcTallisil to which the thesis related. Chl racteristically substituting an empirical, behavioural and contingent app. roach for O'Donnell's emphasis om deep structu Tc, societail function and historical necessity, A. O. Hirschmill has traced salvage authoritaria Disill and faith in market discipline to the deep frustrations of Latin Ameri
ca's bourgeois and military strata after long periods of populist mobilization of the
lower classes, entrenched trade union power, political instability,

Page 23
economic stagnation, arbitrary economic policy, restrictions on ilte Till tiki ) 1 il değcıl 3 DTİC t[TEl 15:Hi. Ctions, hyperinflation, corruption, and damning radical intellectual critiques of class rule. Looking at six lairge La til ATmerical states, Shea han has dem Constrated
a positive correlation in the 1960s between the degree of political repression and the
cxtent of shift to wa Tids marketcriented economic policies.
Other, less ill pressive evidence from other parts of the Third World 15 50metimes L13ed to fuel general suspicions of the political implications of liberalized economic policies: the alleged connection between authorit: ria regios äi 51cessful, capitalist free-Ilarket cco El Comic policies in Taiwa In and SւյլIth Korea, and the public disorder and consequellt political repression that often seems to follow from the acceptance by Third World governmennts of the liberally-oriente d econoInic policies associated with Imajor stabilization and structural adjust III e It loa ins from the InterIna Lional McInetary Fuild i Tid the World Bak. It is ill fact the prevalence of such involuntary economic liberalizations in the Third World since the early 1980s which currently provides the Tlail lotive and reference point för the articulation of dissident doctrines about the per verse relationship between cco Clic libera Lizatio a 1i the type of political regi Ilıc.
I 1977 STi Lanka elected a new gover Innent which began to initiate a process of econdInic liberalization. At that point Sri Lan kill had been in Wested With an image of a country which had failed to live up to its economic growth potential, but hi di Ille ve T'thele SS 11 e Ilwiable record of mass Welfare provision and was one of the few genuine 1 ibi ETL de micrilcies in the Third World. The proponents of economic liberalization (naturally) argued that the consequent Thore rapid material progress would help preserve these social and political achievements in the face of increasing threats at ising from poor económic performance,
History tells a The Te was son political syste II 1 degree of central är en LII1d al Exe Th e go’WcTn Tı1eI1 t democratic op in a harsh fashicom, The li PT lil II: It W; further full sixthrough a refe by force and f h1ä 1 es;2—"Ta. II1il which had long burst into oper major civilia. In Tamils in July violence for p . mimal purpose: spread. By late systein itself disintegrate ir fashiоп: contra I DT th and East was divided be military peacek the TCIllIl: 1115 0 sic paratist gueri south the radi i y cu Llı TL1Cowème I :1T111cc1 COIl flict cic5 L Tid the ruling party, a ing to establis terit Till c: CIL ment was dec sus taliIl cd in p the force of : (but still unir cum-political i rHtlu 5 alıd by ! own cadres. A procics of "Pol Set il1.
A casual a the outlines recent history to establish facie case that cxample of th: sive consequel liberalizati III. variats of th by Sri Lanka I present gover. pose of this those arguitle']; those aspects Te test: Elec. civilia. Il åttack Tim il miInari the warious di tical decay

different story. created : Il CW involving a high lization of power utive President. began to repress position parties and extra-legal fe of the existing cxtended for a year term in 1982
rendulm mål Tred Tud. The: Si Ilet Illic Conflict,
be el simmlering, 1 warfare after wil ble ilçe il gainst 1998 RC5 Tt to litical and CTicame Wide1987 tie 5 liite had begill to an alarming | T. the Til of the country tween in Ildja 1 eeping force and f the Illain Tallinil lla arily; in the 1 Siles WP 1 l "WWa. S i I1 ") pe Ti Wilh State igenCadres of the ind was attempt| some kild of rol. The governply unpopulat and ower in pa Tt by much-expanded eliable) militaryIntelligence appathe airling of its Il ultidi II e Ilsional itical decay" had
cquaintance with of Sri LaTiki"5 sec r115 title գլItite at least a prira this is yet another - politically corroCCS COf ecollic Quite predictably, at case are argued is opposed to the
Iment. The purpa per is to test its, III at least
of the II which For after Illajor 5 in the Sri Lanka. ty in July 1983 imensions of poli3ecame intimately
Il crelated il Wicious circles. The Tamil separatist guerillas obtailled Lill:155es of Tecruits, Illore fina Ilcial, logistic and In oral support from their own coluInity and agencies of the GovernIle of India. The Gover IlIllent of Sri Lanka spent Illuch Ilore Oil defence, a Tilled civilian supporters of the ruling party, and Thurt Lured new I military Limits Whli çlı had SC, IT, Lich liçe Ilçe tçı "de äl with" the Tallils that they rapidly became brutalized. Time and the popular Sinha lese naltionalist reaction against thic goverinent's acquiescence to the
India "invasion of the 10th and the east in August 1987 lei to the Luse of the a TT1 ed
forces against the government's Si Thalese opponents After July 1983 the (ge-) political-cu Illmı il ittify' situation took göTı alı violett dyna Illic of its own which flr Coutweighed any possible causal linkages with economic |iber:llizatioT1.
The focus of this paper is therefore on the period between the election of the new gover Inment (alıd the first. Tıleasılı Tes of economic liberalization) in mid-1977, and II mid-1983. More specifically, we shall be looking for evidence of a ny calus al li inkage betweeT1 cconomic liberalization and (a) the centralization of state power; (b) the rcpTession (of democratic opp Csition; and (c) the sharpening of Sinhalese-Tamil ethnic te 11.5ווי) 5i
The main conclusion is that there appcars to have been Telatively little causal connectionand even less connection of El Systemic (BT genetic Tıaturebetween čCUпо П је 11beralization and any of these three di millsins of "political decay". This conclusion is, however, limited Fındı mı odified by dilemmas as to how we are to Lunde Tistand the content of the term “cco 10
mic liberalization. As a process of privatization, marketization, and creation of coil
petition between economic enterprises, liberalization Seems exolerated. Bilt in Sri Lankan conditions - conditions fairly typical of many developing countries - the process described
T

Page 24
日誓 economic liberalization'
actually involved a large inct increase in thic foreign aid inflow and a corresponding
expansion in the size and salience of the public sector. There are some reasons for suspecting that this set of proccsses played some causal role in encouraging and sustaining authoritarianism. The corollary of these conclusions, Tot arguedi here in detail for lack of space, is that the Imain causes of political decay lie within the Sri Lankan political system itself, and al Te not
to be found within the sphere of economy. III. The Sri Lankan Background Sri Lanka has been to poco T Asia als Costa Rica has been
to Latin America. Each has been almost a model of political pluralism; democratic electoral competition; tiny II military establish II1ent s; effective public adIlli Inistration; relative 5 Çoci co-economic cquality: major Welfare expenditures on health, education and food subsidies; low rates of mortality and illiteracy; and relatively egalitarian and non-coercive patterns of social relations. Both could once have been seen as staging posts om Luc Tad to a sociall de I1cratic utopia.
In 1981 Sri Lanka celebrated a half century of universal suffrage. In each of the six gencal elections between 1956 and 1977 governmental power shifted between two Imajor political parties, each with a relatively distinct clectoral and policy profile, at least in the socio-econo Illic dinnension. The United National Party (UNP) has fairly closely resembled a moderately conservative Western Europe party, ha ving its main base among the more wealthy and generally favouring private enterprise, albeit in a prag natic fashion. The Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), Thore oriented to the po or and thosc of low status, Inore statist in economic policy, and less pro-Western in foreign affairs, can credibly be described as centre-left, For Ilost of its existence it has been in electoral or governmental alliance with one or more of a succession of smaller, parliamentary Marxist parties.
An important societal pillar of the Sri Lankan polity has
22
been the indig grew up in thi a Tound Comme: ist cnterprisc,
professions, an thorough indig State bureauICT around ättenda tish-model plu Colombo and
loombo's Cini ma I r this elite devel and conscious in transcended pa ethnic and Te, With roots in Il regional and
the elite develt of individual
cipation in a occupations: c ist enterprise ( tion ownership) ship, the profes wice and electo was not a natic in the sense in is normally us scious and act imperialism, met tal. Il was, ho national elite Ill che rece, St: and capacity
self-interested
till es to 3 cc significant posi cal leadership,
A major Int Sri LaT kan’s si ccm mseThis LIs hills taxation of thi latively) shrink sector to fill state. An impo of wel Tarcis. In - stitutionalized material resour of the , populat the expansion mily farming s continual alien plots of Crow: läTdless and m through the e i Trigati 01 colo) farmers. Most E. been of the In: community. The gradually fille sparsely popula Dry Zone whic ited the Silla of the south Wes from the Tami along the north CCIE SLS.
Large welfar and the Well-est

Inous elite which
colonial period cial and capitalthe White collar the early and nization of thc cy. Socialized | Ce at a few Bri}lic schools in esidence in CoCon Gardens arca, ped a coherence 'ss which partly ticularistic castle, ional identities. cost ethnic, caste, religious groups, ped on the basis or family parti
Wide range of mmerce, capital"specially plantaurba, 11 landlordsions, public scrall politics. This nal bourgeoisie' which this term ed - i.e. a coniwe opponent cof Topolitan capiwever, al single, arked by relative lf-consciousncss, for coordi Ila tcdi, actic. It con|py almost all tions of politi
terial pillar of icial democratic been the heavy : — la T ge (b 1I t i Teing plantation 1Ce the Welft. Tc rtant component - i.e. Toll title, indistribution of es to the Il 1855 ion - his been if the SimH 1:1 fa"ctor through the :i tio ni of 5 II hall land to thic ore expensively, tablishment of i es ft T s Illll an eficiaries have jority Sinha lese Se Colonies have | the hithert) ed areas Of Llle | formerly se par-Speaking areas of the Island -Speaking areas Til and easter 11
coil little Ilts blished practice
of absorbing thic surplus output of thc higher education system by Cxpanding thc public bureaucracy left little scope for major expenditures on military hardware. Military expenditure has been delightfully minuscule and the armed forces small and Illainly ceremonial. For two decades after the last British bases were closed at the end of the 19505 there I was a tacit but elffective consensus that the international powers would keep their hands off Sri Lanka and that India had a special role as umpire and guardian.
This apparent idyll Was not un marred, Indeccl, it was only
the newly-arrived tourist who wiewed Sri Lanka in anything like idyllic terms. There Were
plans for at least two military coups in the 1960s. In 1971 a poorly-coordinated armed uprising of rural Sinhalese youths under a Marxist-Leninist banmer ca Ille strikingly near success in many areas. Thousands were slaughtered as troops, acting in the na II ne of a government controlled by an SLFP-Marxist coa lition, re-established control. That government tuled under Emergency legislation for T11 ost of its seven-year period of office, and stayed so long in power only by using a new constituli) as a pretext for extending the life of the existing Parliament. Frictions betWeen ethnic communities, espe
cially between Sinhalesc and Tamils, had gradually exacerbited over decades. The most
pitiable victims were the Indian Ta II), ils Who mostly Iman ned the teal estates. Disenfranchised illmediately after Independence and trapped in a stagnant and heavily-taxed sector of the economy, they could do little to protest at or escape their serfdom, The Sti L. Ik TIlis, at Independence well-established in commerce, public service and the professions, had gradually been edged out of their niches as the state was largely Sinhalizhed and the economy partly socialized. Their elected representatives have been powerless in an electoral system which has successively given Pa 1 lia minentary majorities to one of two major Sinhalese-dominated parties. In the early 1970s a handful of Sri Länka Tamil youth began to organize armed resistance.
f Cα ηττηΙεί στη Ρειξε 3.4)

Page 25
IDEOLOGY
Rehabilitating Trotsky:
A chin Wanaik
it has been five years since
Mr Gorbachow came to power. Every IIajor Bolshevik leader who was wrongfully accused and sentenced in the infamous purges and Moscow Trials of the 1930,5 h:15 now been fully Tehii bilitated by the Coll It of his - tory itself bar one — Leon Dawidowich Trotsky! This shameful la cu Illa des grave da Llai gc to thc integrity of Mr Gorbachov's commitment to glasnost and the restoration of truth, It was, after all, the Soviet president himself who said very correctly that if truth cannot b c II esto red to the Lu Indiersta Ili di 11g of the past then there can be Ilo coming to honest terms. With thic present and therefore no Illo yeIT|1elt to al LT 11th Tull full LillTel,
Yet five years on, that simple decret of official rehabilitation of thic singlic In cost i 11 port El Int and greatest of Stalin's foes, indecid thic IIlan whom all historical evidence low confirls beyond doubt was perceived by Lenin himself to be his natural successor, is still missing. The in congruity and dishonesty of this failu Te is all thic sharper because the funda IIncintal Crile with which Stalin charged all thosc leiders who hawe: 1 W been rehabilitated was of Trotskyism or of abcting Trotsky to overthrow the Soviet regime, through crit Tiinal II:n ethods. If they have now been exonerated how un carth is it possible to Tcfuse tu dC, the s Ille to the wery person in whose na Ine they werc wrongfully incarcerated ind seltic Inced?
But, say Mr Gorbachow's supporters both domestic and foreign, Trotsky will eventually be officially rehabilitated. This is almost certainly correct. But this will not do, or should this likelihood be a 1101 wedi tC) assuage thic consciences of those who have hitched their hopes to the waigeon of the Gorbachov reformers. They must not be al
Why
lo, Wcd to y di wett fill what is ti Lion - Why this lay'? Why whe major Bolshevil i Ing B Lukhar in h: litated in the [] i Ing the terrible the si Ingle great El ge 3.115, 105 t C.) deed the first launch the polit. inst Still in has
It is in atte II ställd this “ridd come cuser 1 the limitations :
Trf
and the curre: inct in the US who clail in cialis Til to hawe Le Tills With the Hill and who expres: determination 1 its past, conte II manifestations, 1 cm. Trotsky got there first spe II L. in attack Copposi Ing Stalii as the essential Socialism (give take or two) hic to ter This with skyism now tha: pudiate Stalini H1) I1 (:5t rc-e: Wall.
 

this unjustifiable delay ?
attention a Way le crucial quesu njustifiable dean every other leader includis been rehabia line of rejectStalinist legacy, Lost, meist COUTInsistent and illimajor leader to ical struggle aga
"ן הון
iբting to under|c” that We cal Il i L1 Indersta Ilding of Gorbacho wish
ško
rt reform moveSR. To all those hè name of 50finally come to Tror of Stalinism 5 their new found "O fight against porary and future there is ai proband Trotsky istil ! After die cades on the two for Il a Tid Stalinism embolj ment of or take El misw dCes (ne come Trotsky or Trotit one has to resm? Surely in 1 El Lion of S[ilin
requires a corresponding and equally hones L. Te-evaluation of Trotsky? And the very first step in this Illust be his in Inediate and un qualified Tehabilitation. What holds true for Bukharin must hold true for Trotsky' So why the delay?
One explanation of this is obvious. The rehabilitation of Bukha rin and others, for example, can be uscal to endorse Mr Gorbachow’s present turn especially in the field of ecoT1) Fimic policy. Trotsky çalıot be so used. While he supportcd Leilin's NEP policy, he saw it, is Lie:Illin did, 4s an una voidable compromise forced upon the USSR by weakness, not as El long-term perspective on how to Illwic to Wards a more socialist economy. Sccondly, Trotsky and Trotskyism were not simply a devastating critique of Stalin but of Stalinism which was seen as reflecting the interests of a wholic bureaucratic layer. That is to say, Trotsky's was a critique of Stalinism from the left, of not just Stalin but of burcau CTatic Cliti5 m and blue:Luc Tatic rule as well as of capitalist class rule. As such it has nothing to offer, except indictment, of the present economic pcrspectives of the Gorbachow reformers, let alone the conscrvatives within the bureaucracy,
Furthermore, in its political perspectives, the principal lega tee of Trotskyism, the Fourth International, has always en dors cd a democratic socialis II whose revolutionary eliphasis on more direct foIIIls of democratic IThánda te, control and representation are well in advance of the pluralisms of liberal democracy, let alone the reform perspectives of Mr Gorbachov and supporters.
Follrthly, the in transigent internationalis II of this CLITrent stands als El living repro of of those aspects of Mr Gorbachow's foreign policy (especially in the
23

Page 26
third world) where he has bo jectively abandoned efforts tobstruct the expansion of Wes - e II i Emperillism in the na Ime of peaceful coexistence and sysנון רr:h Litרוlb:11טic cוון שL
Fifthly, Trotsky and Trotskyism lay powerful claim to be the principal inheritor of the Leitlist tTt dit ill. It is Ille thing for MT (Gorbachow to a Ccept that Leninism and Stalilism are incoln patible but how can Trotsky is III als heir to Le IIin is in be accepted without under mining (Gorbach ovis III’s o WIl legitimacy as the Tightful lega tee of the October Revolution? Only at al ti IIle when Sawit II e ITers are prepared to repudiate the validity of the October Revolution itself, i.e. repudiate Leminism it word Els well as deed (al s some are de II) a Ti ding) might they concede the funda Illental continuity of Trotskyism with LC Iminism.
What then can be expected in the Ilear future At so IIle time probably within the next five years. Trotsky as an individual. his historical Tole and carcer will be officially rehabilitat cd. His stature as principal opponent of Stalin, Will be confirm cd. This much cannot be avoided. His Writings should beComic Ilo Te freely available. But, alongside this, there will also be an 'unofficial' message. For so long, Trotsky and Trotsky is II Were considered by the CPSU to be cssentially synonyIlı qolus l ıd both were considered fundamentally objectionable. Now in an ironic twist, a sepEl ration Will be mide between thic two. Trotsky the individual might be conceded enormous stature, but Trotskyism will be prcSCInted ils (a) deviating from Leninism (b) the obverse side in many, if not all, respects of Stalinism, and therefore something to be shunned in the Tcform wing's Current project of establishing a "new, Inore hunane socialism'. In its own way even such an outcome will represent a remarkable tribute to the legacy of the "Old Man', to thc power of his thoughts and ideas and to the dismay these still arouse to the powerful everywhere.
24
BREFLY. . . KŲrıfriLE O In Parlia
isler for Wijeratnic pl LTTE : for the cold of innocent El 5terno PTC dcstroyed.
"They arc do I dat deser shall destroy The Minister Inatter of ui P}}It{i. Il Cẹ: Tili til Lelde [1äike : Ind N leader M. H. Two for E: WAT II): (EDF), a c LTTE yy:: 1c ft T’I Jf| consultations der Welupill: det CTIT1 i The thi of their pari that EDF tic pa ring to fili e The But y el I Was ex RS 53,98 m earliet 51,0) Willa Wick 15ter of El State Minist Planning an told parliam Was Ille t) rise in gove ture due tij th
Iııidday Tm c::
Til et of SLTB emplici said.
O An amt Appгорriatio Se L C EITT 1990 by R: was presente The increase millio 1 13 I
O Sri Lan Kuwait were Ambassadör saidi i I l te Ministry. T to 85,000 Si in Kuwait the Iraqi in O Central Net Wille Kal TL creasingly w educational

di fra T1 page ) m1cn1t, 5 tilte millcfence RE:4Inja n cd ged that "thic 1 als responsible b) Colled Illu TitleT people in the ice Would be
c:Timin:115 änd We to live. We them', he said, " "W:i s . Teply iiig :ä get pill blic illsed by OpposiSi Tilla Banda T:1- Millisli TT C) Tigress
M. A. 5;hT)ff.
II MPs if t. II (I Cr:ltic FT i Ilt cos e ally of the reported to have in a for "urgent '' with their leaLi Billik 11 lil: T t ) e political future ty, ;lm ist reports :tivists were precc the country.
get deficit this lected to rise to טth וחיTrc חס 1111 O) illion, Dr Temä5inghe, Minriוmt H Iשוון וו (rtו "יו ter for Policy i Implementation ent. The increasc cteti טון אשun טth -nt Expend1טוח חr Le War, the School il and the paynsfltion toטompג yces, the minister
I dilent to the in Bill ty increowing limit for i 11,000 Lillion :d in parliament.
is froll RS42,198 Rs. 53, 198 million.
kas virkig in slfc, Sri La Ilkalos L. Sheriffdee. ex to the Foreign lerc were 80,000 i Lankan Working at the title of
TA' ELS I
Bank Governor in a tilleke is inroTried about the Dreadth of today's
academics. He said so at school prize giving. The spectrum and quality of kilowledge isn't there it my morc', he said.
ECOn OniC. . .
(Carrierar page 2:2) There eoil be little doubt that a disappointing national ccc.n)- Inic performance helped structure and exacerbate petterns of political disaffection. Because of very rapid population growth and, worse, almost continuous deterioration in the trills of trade, the economy had tri Tum hard simply to stay still. A continuous growth of national production was in the sic circumsLances. Il Tean a chie Wcinct. But the Tate of cco Ilmic growth was low in relation to other parts of Asia to what many people saw to be the inherent growth potential of the economy, and to the obligation to finance major public Welfare commitments in the face of the drying up the milch cow — the plantation export surplus.
Froll the celd of the 19505 the economy was al most continuously hams trung by inability to finance an adequate level of ill ports. The currecy and import controls which this necessitated formed the springboards from which successive governments, especially those led by the SLFP, launched restrictive, redistributive, and statist initiative in econo Illic policy. This, alone With the increasing politicization of public life generally, gave rise to considerable frustIation, especially a mong Welthie T. I. Il Te Weste Ti7ed groups. The overseas "brain drain' of professional expertise did not stop at the non-Sinha1ese minorities, At the sa me time, there was a steady expansion of the queue of young people seeking the white-collar jobs to which they believed their educational certificates en titled the I1, If Sri Linki Was still in many respects a model, it was not, in terms of econdmic policy, material living standards and certain "bourgeois conceptions of political and administrative Tectitude, qui te the model it hasi been in the 19405
NEXT: Economic Liberalization

Page 27
Why there's sc in this rustict
There is laughter and light bailer artungst these rural darises who ate busy saring aut tobacca leaf in a barn. It is one of the hurdreds of such
Earns spread out in the mid and upcountry LLLLaLlLltL GLLC HLHHLCCL LLLLLu LLLLLL LLL LLLLHHLLS fally during the of seasDn.
llcre, with careful lurturing tobacco grows as a TlLSLCLLEa EaL LLLLLLLCC HHLLLLL LL LLLCLLL LLtttLaaa0 LLLLL La gold... to the value of over Rs. 250 million or more Armii Filly, seu perhaup: 1:43, LÜNÜ FLurral folk,
 

4ga ENRCHINGRURAL LIFESTYLE
und of laughter obacco barn.
Tobacco is the industry that urings employment to the second highest urber of people. Aid these HLHLLCaG KLLL LL LraL LlLLLLLLL LLaHLHHLLLLLLLSS LL LLLLLLLHLLG KLLkLLL aLLLLL LLLLLLL gLLHu LHLLLLLLL LLL LLLLmTS Ht E LLL and in the Earris.
Fif herii, the lobacco leaf means reiningful work, ri t Tifortable life and a securr futur 3. A good encough Teason for laughter,
Ceylon Tobacco Co. Ltd.
Sharing and caring for our land and her people.

Page 28
PRAJA MWAYA MWI
Bank of Ceylon has pioneere
Scheme linking the formal se
A Praja Maya Miyamak
O He lends money (provide
his community using Bal
O H3 works round the clos
O. He is well known in his
without colateral as deci
O He decides on the repay
O Finance is easily obtainal
are made on mutually ag
Bank of Ceylon Praja W
is a step in the right di
BANK OF
Bankers to
 

YAMMAAKYA SEGHEMME
ed in the Praja Waya Wiyamaka
ctor with the informal sector.
ra
s credit) to the members of
nk finance.
community and lends with or
ded by him.
ment period.
ble from him and repayments
reed terms.
aya Wiyamaka Scheme
firection.
ΟΕΥ ΟΝ
the Wation.