Page 1
Vol. 13 No. 10 September 15, 1990 Price Rs. 7.5
M/7ínutes of the rmee 12.8.87 by the Cabi
His freelaneyed.
His Excellency Affairept Sri A Homih"
Hon. Gam in i Dis
Minister of Lands & Maha Welli Devel
Horn. Llaith Athu Minister of Wation
Hon. Montague , Minister of Public
Minister of
Kw. Of
H. VOh er of Transp
Hon. Gamin i Jay Minister of Agricu & Research
Hon. M. S. Ama Minister of Trade
Mr. R. W. Jayew Security Consultan
Mr. M. A. G. Pe Secretary to the C
Mr. D. S. Attyga Secretary, Ministry
- ܙܡ General Cyrill Ra
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

DAN
N
Registered at the GPO, Sri Lanka, OD/79/NEWS/90
'ing held on et Sub Committee
R. Jayewardene
J. R. Jayewardene
'remadasa ihulaith mudali
Ssana yake & Land Development ортетt
lathmudali
endis Industries
amed ሆï
asuriya tura/ Development
asiri
Shipping
rdene
『á binet
le Of Defence
atunga

Page 2
.國劇). 潮
Nozī滅娜》|
鞑
tSVOU
 

Page 3
TRENDS
`AM IMVALID CON" |
Parliament is now an invalid coin and the AFC (AII Party Conference) has taken its place, Mr Dinesh Gunawardene, leader of the MEP (Mahajana Eksath Peramuna) said in parliaTelt.
Laws were being discussed and drafted at the APC; important decisions regarding the country were being taken there while what was said in parliament was not taken SeriOusly, the MP said during an adjournment debate of the increase in fuel prices, bus and train fares.
CAS MO TRADE
Chief Opposition Whip Richard Pathirana told parliament that a bill was being introduced by the government to hand ower all Casinos in Sri Lanka ТО a Singaporeап casiпо
Operator named Joe Sirm.
He said that a pro-UNP monk was associated bit 器 MP declined to name
TTT,
WARM WINDS
A Daily Wews leader talked of fruitful and cordial talks between Sri Lanka's Deputy High Commissioner and Tamil Nadu's
Chief Minister, in Madras.
Warm Winds from Tamil
Nadu, the Government's flagship said.
This was mainly due,
the editorial said, to pres
sures building up in Tamil
Na du politics. The LTTE Was doomed to defeat and when Tamil Nadu helps the end can be faster, the Daily News concluded.
ABRIEF
Oppositior in the we of
forming an 'u t0 protest the é. living. ThirtySLFP, MEFP ant after Colomb. Jinada sa Niya bagan it unex Wing his saat ta Carpeteri flor : Con Septembe Speaker Garnir journed parliant Contin LIGd to
ignoring his or to their seats.
Arm Cong thosi the for were Bandara må ike Nanayakkara: ( der Sirimäwo Bä not present in t
Eli, Kaut Armi l Moore ssir the House that before 1977 Strongly when beëri i ri Creased Tais ad by five C LEå der of the C Jayewardвпе а Tādas 1m e 1 t ir1 l a Ebu | |lo{ 3 ta' 5 SE15:ä til,
The present g il Crased bus fa oil pri Ces Wareg r said.
GUAR
"O 13 Mo 10 S.
Price R
PLublished fD
Lanka Guardian Pi
No. 246, UT
R החם|םC)
Editor: Mervy
Telphons:

LY. . .
MPs squatted he House perJawasay" (fast) cala ting Cost of Ou T. MIPS of the USA joined in District MP hapala (SLFP) Ectedly by leasit on the red f the chamber, r 7, Deputy i Fonseka adent when they shout slogans lers to get back
חס Squatting : Messrs Aura and Wasudawa pposition Leandarana i ke Was he House.
ar a District MP 1g he reminded the opposition had protested oil prices had ånd bus fares ents; the the |pposition J. R. d MFP FR. PTDme to parlia:k cart to Cre
ower Tlent had res ever before
e. A 17-party opposition delegation led by Opposition Leader Sirimawa Bandaranai ke met President Premada S3 to bring to his notice "the Serious plight the people in the North and the East find themselves" in. While recognising that hardship wäs in evita ble in the midst of War, Mrs Bandaranaike said that it was everybody's duty to filminimise such hardship particularly when children were a substantial part of those affected. Tens of thousands of people Wera reduced to the life of refugees in their own country living under the most deplorable conditions in various Camps.
The numbers killed and maimed among the security services were a frightening tragedy. "We are in no way trying to undermine their walia. It efforts to defend the territorial integrity and sovereignty of our country. We extend our full support to them. We are equal y Concerned about the Casualties among the non-Coimbatant civilians.
"When the opposition parties issued a statement drawing the attantion of the gowernment to the The Ed to avoid any indiscriminate aerial bombing the State Minister conCerned is reported to have res. ponded by issu ing instructions
Faised, the MP to the services to the same
Effect.
D N COMITEMNITS
News Background 3
aptamber 15, 1990 Lettors
The Region
g, 7.5D Comintern and newer Development 12 Liberalisation - 2 14 | 53 ac DJ Lutscher FBwisited 16
rtnightly by
Lublishing Co. Ltd.
I ion Placg,
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Comprehending Socialism's Crisis 19 Remembéring Tamara Deutscher 21 J. W.P. (2) 23.
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Page 4
"We are not in any way å sking the Gower ment to Stop the war against the LTTE, The SS fäSC ist terrorists häVB to be eliminated. We extend Our support to put an end to this ITIE 13 Աt: ,
''The Stata et i SSed by our party Earlier has also mentioned the need for appropriate action to stop harassment, abduction and killing of persons in the other parts of the Country Which Still Continues. Stopping this too is än essential part of restoring peace and normalcy through the country', MS B dārā ik 5id,
State Minister for Defe TICE Ranјап Wijeratne told the delegation that there was no indis Crimina te bombing artid that the food shortages in the Jaffna peninsula were mainly dL tta LTTE ''TB Bgatior Thust apprecia te that Cour service personnel too hawe the same concern for human life that you profess, Their objective is to serve the country by winning the war against the LTTE", he said.
He vas glad to lote, he Said, that Mrs. Barı dararla ike herself agreed that these fascist terrorists had to be eliminated and that they all extended their support to the government to poLIt an end to that Inenace. The Thinister BISC Said that the government was sբanding almost Rs. 30 million per day to provide food and other Essen tills to the large number 5 of people affected by the War. There Were over 600 Welfare Centres, and the number of displaced persons Was Close to 900,000, the Tinister said.
O In the absence of a civil administration Tiger laws are beinig en forced in the Jaff må peniпsшla. The Tigers are imposing fines and also holding about 4,000 people in detention Camps of their own, according to a defence ministry comГпштigШе.
"The LTTE has prohibited people fгопп пnoviпg froпп опе
village to anot obtaining a pe If a person is dro Luld with O L
person is fim If the fine is person is seп
a term in a L communique s
At a corn eting in Mad leader Padman: colleagues gui gedly by LTT Na du Congres hapa di Raman there was so ming th Ea LTT
39 o George Fe Railway Minis är or "|ndi problems and Delhi. that a the Gowerle lite in for Tati.
ted Liberation (ULFA) had f Inilitants in K jab and with l
וח שחWiטGr youth Was a economic pr failure of poli these problem said. He adw | Sition Wher Would be t of the peopli to the idea Gädhi.
General C Defence Sec weekly news polica and sa had be ki || || East since Ji dition, 352 po ser WiCes perşi sig.
a Bar Asso Desmond Fe National sessions that to lawyers He cited the Wedrako On W ita rests of t person who ducted by pË a Sènior pol

her without first armit from them. detected mowing it a permit, that ed Rs 1 OOOO. not paid that tam: sed to Sarwa TE prison", the Haid.
The oration m3ras, for EPRLF a bhar and t WWE WF3 ngd down alleE agents, Tamil 5(I) leader Wazurthi said that hope of refor
raids, India's ter, Old a Semia mationalism:
cha || enges", in s a rilenber of it he had defithat tha Jili
Front Of A55 artin Orged liks With ishmir and PunTamil in SurgentS. i li tancy among
result of acute 3]|er11 S rnd tFE3 ticians to ta Ck3 ls, the minister oitiated digites its di - Ea de welopment he responsibility 5, and i return s of Mahatma
: yrlil Ramaturnı ga, :retary, told a briefing that 585 CLI rity personne || ad in the NorthLungo 11. li adCEm Em 3 m. 106 Dniel Were mis -
Cliatic Presidet rnando said at Law ConferenČe
death threats had flot endad. Case of Mr Batty ho Watched thig he mother of a was al legedly abrSons including lice officer and
whose body was found on the day subsequent to the abduction. The government had provided Mr Weerakoor With bodyguard 5, both policeme, who too häd received dath threat 5.
Pragidert For Eliādāsa, ha säild, had shown the highest regard for the judiciary, for neither the President or his government had aver sought to interfere with the judiciary or embarrass it. The attitude of the present gover the It, he said, Was it sharp Contrast to the lack of respect shown by the previous Executive for the judiciary,
The judiciary's independence and security of tenure had been interfered with in 1978. Seven judges of the Supreme Court Fināld beer Termo Ved With - out am y reas com being given, Judges who were not in fawour with the ruling party Were harassed by the appointment of unconstitutional select COTT1 TitteBS.
The disregard for the judiciary was vBry ewidant wher a police officer in an important fundamental rights a C:tion. the Pawi di Hand Case, against whom there was a strong judicial finding by the Supreme Court, was promoted in Tedia tely after the judgment was delivered, the Bar Association President said,
In an editorial tribute to tE at Mr N 3 Wille SEITETEkoom WP7é Sard Said: "He was Chief Justice when judges' homes care under attack by political thugs. It was a sign of things that were to follow. Chigf Justica Samarakoon spoke out fearlessy for the defect and the idependence of the judiciary as well as the individual which will long be remembered beCause at this tirme to fiıda person who could utter a whimper of protest in the higher e che lors of power Was mot easy".
(Continu Bd On puge 20)

Page 5
TARGET : JAFFNA
LONG, COST VAVAR AAHEA
Mervyn de Silva
ike a blip suddenly going |L the radar screen, the word "Fort' dropped out of the front pages. Its conspicuous absence was felt soon after the "Tigers' launch cod a frontal assault on the Mullaitivu army camp. Official reports put the number of soldiers dead at 8, and wounded at more than forty. 37 "Tigers' were reported killed.
It was of course a diversionary move. The "Tigers' had used frog men and 'sea mines' to blast the causeways to Jaffna, the access route from the islands in the south of the city. Repairs and sniper fire made the Army's advance painfully slow, especially since Johnny's "battas' that carpeted the causeways Were blowing off the legs of the approaching columns, inspite of advance parties clearing the route off the home-made II lines.
The army's time-table was "Wrecked : Eld Tim edi: at tıcı Li () II]] SWitched to MullaitiWL where the confrontation was both direct
and fierce. And so the word "Fort" disappeared a together from the front pages, teaching
both the press and a real diag public quite accustoned to the Ways Of Linconve Titional Warfare, En un ple: sant but salutar y les son.
The LTTE also carried in its new "offensive line' on the Muslims in the east. Killings Eind attacks on mosques II nake it plain that the LTTE's plan IĞ CO- 0pt a falit section of the Tamil-speaking Muslim Illinority in the East (a crucially impor. tant in third of the provincial pāpulation) has failed CT, met with very little success. The new "hard line' is a warning to the Muslims that those who afe NOT with us, are AGAINST us". No neutrals' in this War in the east.
The army for the 'hild Operations co indicates. The indeed the ill the sels c till in large part til too. To and plant the w Coll lid be a tre boosti Ing wict covering effect peninsula will difficult :: Indi bu
DIPLOMATIC
In il cor Inplex, the diplomatic as the purely m exodus is the E nadu Chief Mi demand Delhi tion... Henge involved in Tep Spreal di civilian indiscrimate : Filcilt, tw () II. Illel titled in thi by Opposition Bandaranalike, parties, includ Muslim organis UNP's anger ט 3"Lון שווIנE0W&r I Wii.5, 30 to 5 for the DMK's and grist to t mill of the lobby in Delhi
Fortunately the domestic poli especially the Coalition crisis Dewi Lil's depa: Thir, where ii + LOIllo, Illust 5:11 ther changes (ra iny ideas of i than strictly di TCt be serious The Gu 1F crisi OW èT 150,OC)O Int Delhi busy.

LY D . . .
however Witt - Jaffna - als the de-name 'Fort
! bestiged fort is mediate target in the operation is Il TC5C11t: Օբtrarelieve the Fort Sri Lankan flag men dous moralebry, though reiwe control of the be exceedingly loody, and costly.
GAIN
Illany-sided war, is ils : Il portant ilitary. A refugee X cu se that Tiimi ||- inister needs to 3 l'Irgent il telthe sensivities rts about wideÇä Sualties and i eriäl bombardatters explicitly e 5 til te III e It is sled Leader, Mrs. and fiftee other ing T:1 m1iI HInd El Lions. Thus, the CO, Ild the mba TIT assiment It ly, El T1 I Ilulit. Il glli in Madra 5 he propagandist "interventionist”
for Sri Lanka, itical problems ifter Inath of the
cil used by Mr. Titill T è ild KashWar, if it is Lt. before the weains and snow)- TWeltic. Other plomatic, could ily en tertained, ş, 84 ild Fair lifting iians, also kept
Til the la test has sulI'11o Ted
L) elli Tämilla du chief Illinister to Delhi for talks on Sri Lanka. Interestingly, two
טאירווח
the
matters have been placed on the agenda - the Tamil refugees and the strains on the Madra s administration and accompanying social problems along with the growing suspicion that the LTTE has established direct links with the separa List militants in ASSAM. While previous reports pointed to contacts between the LTTE and the Sikh rebels in Pubjab, Indian Intelligence agencies See Ilı to have more evi dence of the Jaffna-Assam connection.
CONSENS US-BUILDING
One of the more interesting Cl-)Insequences of the 1 military situation in the North and the Opposition's expression of "concern Was a face-to-face between the Opposition Leader, Mrs. Bandaranaike and President Prema dasa. Mrs. Bandaranaike, the SLFP and some of its allies have been boycotting the APC. A direct outcome of the encounter was an agreenent t consider * "ht III liitriä issues' jointly, A small Opposition committee will liaise with the Government on this issue. An inspection tour of the North, and East, by such a committee was CIL of the decisis) Ils. Mr. Anura Bandara naike who was criticised by a spokesman of one of the smaller parties in the SLFP-led alliance, issued a strongly worded statement in which he said that a joint delegation to SA ARC countries did not mean collaboration with the UNP but a common cffort to place Sri Lanka views before political leaders in the neighbouring states, all fellow menbers of the regional organisatio I.
(Cadfrired Jr. page 5)

Page 6
LALTH ON THE VWA . . . and allied matters
in the Suriday Island of Sept. 2, Mr. Lalith Athulath muda li was reported by Romesh Fer
Illud i II a. Il exclLiSiWe interview as saying that he (Lalith) 'feels that President Jayewar
dene relied too much on the
Indians and neglected the expansion of the Sli Lanka forces after the Peace Accord
of July 1987 was signed.
The same article cc) Iltained the following pol. Il :
F : The Commandes los L s C) many this time at Mutur beCHL se their Eli T 5 LIPPI Cort was withdrawn, I am told the
helicopters had to be diverted for peace-times duties'.
On Sunday Sept 9, the sa ille paper carried a letter from the f3 TIL er National Sec Lu Tity, 110 W Minister of Education, which said (lat these sla telents Were w T U Ingly at tributed to hii T1. The letter also said "Since these statements halwe not been ma de by Tinc a Inti do not reFlect my views accurately, sha | | be mbliged if you W olLIld CCT Tect thell"
BOMBS ONLY ANSWER
In the first report to appear in the daily press of a speech by Mr. Athulathmudali (BOMBS ONLY ANSWER TO LTTE BUN KERS: LALITH), the Minister of Education Said:
*There is no way to destroy bunkers a Thund JaffDil Fort without bombing. We use bombing when there is no alternaltive. If we do Tot use Hir su poport, we will not be able to rescue even the wounded. India was against bombing, but When the IPKF came here, they Were compelled to boTTnb LTTE posi - tij us',
So said the Minister of Education and Higher Educiltion, La Lith Athulatih muda li,
when he address at Awis sa Well, the people to hi tributions to the fence Filnd
recipients, in organisations."
He said: "I happy We T centributions, t) set it up in l DUSטיme tיWas St Certili Il chillingt place in politic Leader of Opp () legates from 19 Illet the Presid good thing to I dent. But why ing the Prcsid c1 there is Inc3, foi () or do they was the Te'''
CCIIII lehting dellands, Mr. observed, "" 5. 1005. Il C} t Willit in this fight TEE SLF P W I bombing. The break and dest kers, without portנן ווut air Sנt the Woulded. when there is Indial Was ag The IPKITF tol: I need ilir su ppt) realised the In. bombing in the til LTTE.'"
Explaining hi
ment was dra fight, hic said: fight. There i
I have Incot Spi til Ty soluti III, fight. Out
sincerely want. did his best ti fully. But the a military wicto The LTTE do: democra Lic Solli afe Ical fils ci:

AR
ed a large rally
organised by ld Ower COIli "Hit Ili Leby Jana sa Wiya lividuals and
El Il Lhe
extremely 115י_וT"שוון ון וו this ful Ti, 985 till Ellere ition tC it them. S h:1ye take Il s, today. The isition with depolitical parties | L:11t: It is a leet the Presiare they meetit. Is it becil 115t d in the North ut food dropp Ccl
on the SLFP Athula thin udali = g TIls thc SLFP the Air Force in the North. tks LS t ii) St IM * c is inco Wiiy tt) roy LTTE bun5 (himbing. With: We Cln't TESClito We use bombing Io alternative. ainst bombing. ght it didi Tot Tt, but later they ed and started tir fight against
the governgged into the - We Fly e ti) s no alter T.H. Live. okcn cof a Tlilihu L. WE WC to PT cysident Ill St :d peace ind he | 501ve it pea CeTigers wanted ry for themselves. 3. It Wil IL 4 I 1 W tion because they its and that is
W
NEWMYS BACKGRO U MID
why they assassinated the Tamil leaders. The LTTE holds the record of brutally murdering aders of all Tamil political parties. This is not War against Tamil people, but a fight against the LTTE.
He said: "We are not frigh
tened of Tigers. I know MT. Ranjan Wijeratne is not frighend of them. I am not frightened of them. I saw W they were running for their is at the Wadamaratchchi operation''
The Minister of Plantation Industries and the Minister of State for Defence, Ranjan Wijeratne, said: “Owing to the correct policies of the UNP the people have kept us in power since 1977.
I - At those elections ou T. President gave certain pro Illi5es some of which have been fullfied. We released terrorists to give them a second chance, The President invited the NP for discussions, but they did not respond. The LTTE was invited but they did not agree to lay dowTi arms.
You know the destruction caused by the JWP and We håll to fight them and wipe them ut. The LTTE had said that the IPKF men were plunders and rapists and they had ag Teed with the President to drive he PKIF out. No W. We lo chasing and attacking the LTTE. They are I uning'
Referring to Mrs. Bandarnaike meeting the President, he said: "Mrs. Banda ratnaike is asking us not to attack from
the air. This SLFP which has no policy, but a bond of family bandism, is tIyi Ing t0 prop up the LTTE. We will destroy the LTTE. We will not allow anyone to interfere with our
internal affairs'.

Page 7
Thondaman calls for ne
*1A, RASI
Mr. S. ThoII da Iman, Sri Lankas Minister for Riu Tall Industrics and President of the Ceylon Workers Congress, met Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M. Karu nanidhi and told him that all those who were genuinely concerned about the plight of the war-torn Tamils of the island and who had influence With the LTTE should take the initiative to bring about cessation of hostilities between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Government.
MT. Tho Indal Ilman told news II le 1 that neither the Sri Lanka Gower III11ent Ihor the LTTE Could be expected to tilke the initiative to stop the fighting since it had brokem out after the failure of yearlong In cgotiations, The i Initia tiwe had to come from others.
He said in this connection that he had already taken up the matter with Sri Lankin President R. Prema dasa. He told the President that though the Govern Innent per - ceived the current conflicL is a fight against the Tigers, the LTTE could not bc isolated from the people through military means. The President, he said, appreciated this, but he had to think of the Sinhala opinion since it was the LTTE which had started the current conflict. Moreover, even the armed forces would not take kindly to any unilateral move for a cease-fire, he said,
REFUGEES
He said since nearly one lakh refugees had poured into Tamil Nadu and the people and leaders
cof the State weite concert mcd about the plight of the island TaT i 15, tElle i Ilitiatiwic häid to
come from Tamil Nadu. He said MT. KHTullnidhi tOld him thlt the State Government had already urged the Government of India to i Titilte a cea Se-fie,
Mr. Thon daman, however, disliked any Indian intervention. He said India had failed to
disa IIIl the T tioning the IPF "Es, Thrif to be s Cor Led collit Lällikal (Gover LTTE. He, hot pressure could LTTE LO)). Teitl T1 ti |
A Skci albot lities in the MT. Ths Ild:lIll guess is as Hic, however, civili:L1 casuali table which a to fight a f challenging its Thonda IIlilI sai nearly one la been ble to India showed kall forces We: civili: 15.
He said so Wert L. Ilf
SL TE; C'yi where in the Csi Il te Til Illis Were Littliche But if the fig it might spill
TEl .
About the
accord, he s accord Which Tamils a provit recognition of language which gle, peaceful a not bring a bol Sri Linka I ( als 3 discussing parties provisit. like merger of the north, the the Status of all-party meet
Would discuss Week,
Mr. Thondl
PTC5'ide Tıt Prt 17 up at the Indi סוון תנmmissitנtם

MEVVS BACKG RO U MID
w Indian moves
gers despite StaF there for two Te, the issue had betwee I thic Sri ninent aid the wever, said moral le brought on the to the negotiating
ClSlllconflict, " " yazılır ."שון 1 וון
civilia ÇLI I TE Ilit all said: good as
said incidental ties were ille WiGower Illent had orce Which was authority, Mr. ld the fact that kh people had CI 5s Oy ET to that Lhe Sri Laire not going after
far the killings to the Inorth El Tnd lians living elseisland, including of Indian origins, i by thic conflict. hting continued,
over to other
Indo-Sri La Tıka aid it was the
brought to the 1 cial council and Tamil as official years of strugind violent, could it. He said the Owenient Was with various ils of the accord the east with referendu III and Musli II 1S. A. In ing in Colombo these la ter this
man also said adasa would take —Sri Lanka joint cting the ques
tion of granting Sri Lankan citizenship to one lakh estate Ta mills holding Indian passports.
{ / Perce, Yr Hercwri)
LONG,
(Čarı firstHead fra page 3)
But the continuing contro
versy over the "political settlement / military solution’’’ issue and the likely consequences of the present army offensive still elude the national cor bi-partisan Consensus the President se eks. There seems to be a growing realisatin ho Weve that a con - sensus on " "humanitarian issues?" at least is a necessary prelude to isolating the LTTE and convincing both Indian and world opinion that this is NOT a Sill hilla-Tani civil War. The Iced for such an effort is even Timore urge 1 L T C I W, what with the 'triple shock of the Gulf crisis - loss of migrant remittances, larger than tourist income or money from garment exports, the Iraqi tea market, and the petrol price hike. Apart from these severe blows, the government is spending 25-30 million rupees a day on over 900,000 "displayed persons' (Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese)
herded in some 600 refugee
Cal Tıps.
While 'humanitäTian assis
tance' may be forthcoming,
economic aid is certain to drop next year, as a direct Tesult not merely of Western spending on the War' against Iraq, but the greater diversion of resources to Eastern Europe and the USSR.

Page 8
MI EVVS BACKGROUMID
ACADEMICS APPEA
We are deeply concerned and greatly distressed gence of war between the Liberation Tigers of Tami and the scurity forces of the Sri Lankan Government and the East of Sri Lanka. We un equivocal y condemn Ճf human rights and international conventions of war both parties to the conflict. We strongly urge the LLLLLL LLLLHHLLLLS LLL LLL S L LLLLL LHH tLtLLL KLCL LLLLLLL Yt LLLLLL LLL LLLL S SLLmamLCLSLSLLS HH SLLL LlltLLHL LLLLLL GLtLLLC S S custody.
LLLL L L LLLLL S LLLLCLLLCLH CH S LLL HHHHH S LHHLS SLLuGLC KLL LCCLLSLLL CCLLLLLLL LLLLLL CCCL0LLSS LLL0LLCkS HLLL LLLLaCL S a severe setback to the possibility of a negotiated set ethnic conflict and prevents the restoration of peace : the entic country.
Since its resumption in early Juric, the war has LLLLLL LLLLLLa HLLL LLLLLLLLH LL La LLLLLL GLLL LLLL LLLLLL try, Thousands of Sri Lankans ha Y : b gen ki|Ted; m || warth af properry has begn de troyed; hundreds of t LtLStLtLLt LtttLK LLLCLCLLLLC LLLLCaCCCS Ktaa LaLtttLL HtLL S by both the LTTE and the Go Yerm ment,
C LCHaHHOtH L S HH0LLL CLLLLLCLLL LLLL LLLLLLL tlıa peoples of Sri Lankı and their political Leaders LLLLSSSLLaaaLLL KLLLLLLLLSS LLtllLLL LSL LLLLLLLlLlS HHHLLLS LLLLLL LLHHLLLLLLL LLLL LaL S LLLLLLLH LLL LLL LLLLLC
SS SSS LL CLLL S CCLLL S LL S La HHHLLLLLLL LCLLLLLCLLLH S North and the East and ve call on al parties to re:
ingress to participate in the palitical process.
LLLLLLLLS LLLLL LHH LLLK LLLLLLLL L LL LLLLtt LLLL LLLL S S LLL LLLLL LLLL LLLCCLLLmLG L CLaS LLLLLL GLHH the people of the North and the East. This would : KKLLLLLLL S LLL LLLLaL LLLLLaaLLLL aHH LaLL GLLLLLLS
LLLS CL LC CLOOH LLLHH HH L S CHL LLLLL S L LL SL youth who have been arbitrarily arrested, and the L L HLHHLLLLHHLHHH LHt tHL HH CCHL LLLLLLY LLLLtHtLHHL S GLLLLL LLL of ostilities.
LLLLLL L LLLLLK LLLLLL L LLLLL SS LLLLLLLHMutLtS LLL LLLL CmGLLLLLLLLttt aaLLL LLa LaGCLLLLL LL H LLLLLLHHLLLL LK LaK Laa CLCLGGLHHLCHH LL LLL LLLLt aLa aLLa LLLL HH ltCaLaLLa aLm L LaL LHHLL Ltmt L L K LLHHLHHL pro tio 35,
LL tC LCCLL LL S LLCCLCS LLK KLOLL LLLL CLLLtLCLLLHHltLL LLLLLL S SLLLLS L LLLLLutLLLLLLL LLLLeeLLLLLS LS LLLLLLS LLLLLLK LLLLL of power granted to the Provincial Councils under th
HtaaS CCCLLLLLL CLLLLC LL LLLLLLCLSLLLLLLLL LCLGLL
1: East.
We ca || om the Government to Trip cal the sixth aLLL CLLLLLCLLLLLLLLH tCL LLat GLLLLLLCHa LLLLL S LL S LLLHLGHLLLL LLLLLL LLLL LLtHlHLKLLS S LL S LLLLLLLaL HHCCCLHLLCCSS S LLLLL LLLLLS golwe an cligc tgd Provincial CoLuntil,
We urge the Sri Lankan Government to begin II LL LLLL L LLL LLLLLL HLaL CHtmLLLLLLLS S S LCOmmLLLLS S S LLLLLLLHHH LLLLLL SLLLLLLaLC L CC ELLL LLLLHL LL L LLLLL HH LLL LLLL CLLLLS
The disput.cd claims to traditional homelands in KLLLLLLL LLLL ElOOaLL LLL LLLLLL LHLH L LLLL tLtL LLLL aLLLLLLL We therefore urge all Tamil political organisations to this Issue through di SC Lissior E with the represen La Liwes and Sinha la communities in the Eastern Province. Suci LL CCLLL LL LLLLLLLaaHL L LLL LLL SLLaLLLOKL S LL L LLLLL LLLLLS LLLLLS S SLLLLLLLCLKS K SLLS LLLLHHM LLLLLL LL LCCt LaLCLL S communities or Arty other solution that is acceptable
LLLLLL LS SLL S L S L aS TLLLL LLL LLGLLL LLLL SLLLL SK S LLLLL LL HHLSL LLCLLLLL LLL LaL L LLLLLL HLL aLLlLLLLLL LLtmLLL aLLLLLtLLt a third party, such as the SA ARC (South Asian Assoc mal Cooperation) or the UN (United Nations), ta me of transition to provincial rule in the North and thi ov cree fresh elections, )CJחfiוחleri Jגאוו וח

L
by the resur| Eelam (LTTE) | LFL LA FANTE HI all violations cc TT i Ltd by LTTE and the Id the de : ITLICIf || E. Hi 5 : il
rist the Tamil 15 1L .ץ וחני חבHutc lement of the ind stability to
Ca, Lused Wide 5 = of the calinII-In es rupésis ouslds of Sri eign imprisoned
task faced by in overcoming history of unt- IIIII tit. Thitse p:āci to the is firl their Wi
cease hostilities lles and fue to lso enable the
lease all Tarni TTE ET || 5
ČI TITTET ETT EL
in gre55 LC - il Cırganisit için,
El artir il
of the political
to fully implethe devolution eta 13 ith a frien dthe North and
ar fi di T : E t | CCLIII i Bi || || i "y" eft" | T. E disi
I og til Lirsris With al autonomy and
th : Eastern pro2 vidence algne. agree to resolve of lı T-1 Luclrı h a resolution it in and Northby the different to all partin.
dispel the fears tions by inviting :iation of Regiolia të th: process e East and to foಿಕೆ)
LETTERs
SWRD AND S M HALA
The only part of Mr. S. Pathiravitane's apologia for SWRD that seems to reguire 1 reply from ine relates to bis comments on my Story ballt SWRTO "5 TE11ärk: to Robert Gunawarden:l in Parilmet, I Wel eelber that my journalist colleagues in the press gallery that dily interpreted the remark (and the te in which it wal 5 inade) exactly as I did, MOTechwer, in Illy lobby COLI II i In the next II1, Trining in the 'Daily News'' I reported the episode and cominented Il it to 11 luch the sa Ille effeCt th1:1 t T didi in the L(G recently. So als), I believe, did al well-k. I will Staff Illeber of the “Lanka dipa' at that time who was Llso ill thc poTes 5 gille: I"y' El ind Whose! shcked reaction is still fresh in my mind. Perhaps these reports had something to do With the L II јSE I Of the remark from Hansard. But wh;it is most Televa. It is that nobody at the title complained - either in print T W C in conversation - that we had misinterpreted the Prime Minister's words. Mr. Pathiravitanc's speculations, thirty years after the event, when he hadn't been theric to hel T the Telark il the first place, are Worth less.
Reggie Siriwardena Dehiwela.
Д. S. M. O. M. JOE
S. Pathiravitane's attempt to Tefute Reggie Siri war dena (L. G. 1 Sep.) fails abjectly. He does not even try to explain a Way R. S's portrayall of SWRL) as postu ring, hulilor less and wali II. NOT does he touch on the episode RS relates of SWRD ordering the police not to interfere with the thugs who were attacking the satyagrahis Il Gille Face Grcel. He does deal with the story

Page 9
Signed
Pref. Ben Edict R. Anderson Dr, K, Arumսggnathan Frof. Athusa ÄrtyFgsse Prof. Walentine Daniel Pros. 5. P. De Asyls Prof. Sartha De Yarajar Prof. Sherley Feldman Prof. Carlo Forze Mr. Hemia For seka Prof. Surendra Gambir FrČs. Wijay Gambhir Prof. Апл Саld Mr. Qadri firrig Prof. Florence McCarthy
Prof. Briđim Pfaffenberger Dr. Chris Rodrigo СпГп Fraf. Lukshima mam Sodha rai tri drin Carw Prof. G. R. de Silya Prof. S. I, Tamեiցի
McJssachusetts
We urge the LTTE to re. El pation of other Tami I and tions in the North and the East, and also by di E3 under the mediation of a acceptable third party, c of power from the centre to the
proca Le by notobE slim Baltical arganiza
Provinces is compl
We firmly believe that there cannot be a mili the ethnic conflict and hope that all parties concern themsel Y es ta negotiated political agreement.
Corne liverrity, Ithaca, Ne Cornel Urij versity, Ithaca, Ng Corriel University, Ithaca, Ne -University of Michigan, Ann
University of Colorida, Bourder Harvard University, Carnbridge, ருே பரiversity, the R WIDER, Helsinki,Finland Har Yard University, ட்ராridge, riversity of Pennsylvania, Phird ni Yersity af Perry sylvania, Philagde Coate University, Hamilton, N. Cl'urbi University, New York,
oriel University, Iraca, New' ' Prof. Gandriath Obeyesekere Princeton Ug versity, Princeton, M riversity of Wirging, Charlotts,
el University, Ithaca, New Y idson College, Davidson. Nor Rawdoir College, Brunswick, Main Harvard Univèrsity, Cambridge, WM
The Cralitian făr. Ethnic Equality and Democracy in Sri Lan,
(Lesters Cofirinued
of SWRD sneering at Robert Gunawardena's poor English and claims that SWRD was a "gentleman' for seeing to it that the sneer was not printed in Hansard. Quite apart from the fact that today most people do not use the word "gentleman' regarding it as a Wictorian archaism, it seems to me that a more accura te word Would be 'pol troon". He did not want a permanent record of his pettiness. SP has not made the slight.cst delt om RS's ca 5c,
M3 ving on to Tarzie Wittachi SP purports to impugn his veracity (SP's word). Now, when you question a man's Weracity you are not saying he is mistaken, you are not saying he is Wrong you are saying that he is lying. SP calls upon Manor to prove his allegation. What does Manor say? He says that three separa te persons Robert Kearney, Tarzie Wittachi and A. Jeyaratnam Wilson each in his own style
Si Elid that after
Lic. I1 Lf the erne da. Ta naike virtu ted to the GC ges OI) to say: who saw SWRD first reports t violence had sp said that he
shaken but he 띠 Wered his con never lost it
This is present SP as a comple of the statemen different Witnesse handed over his the GG. If M
Face A dra, S芭W 汽 Hgs s) This Ca μg/ή По то WWakef

LICEing the Partitian 5. fri the eletTig therseys rict the transfer sted.
tary 3 til Lutin Ed Will dedicate
rkם"ז אין
'የ ሽùrk
York
Hrbor, Michigan
'. Čolorado
Massachusetts
'r
its arrier setts 'Aphi, Pennsylvania fhir, Pgri ri sylvania Eff York
Ney York fork Jew Jersey |ę, Wirginia
■ th Carolina E
755 af Elst
ka, cimbridge,
the declaragency " "Bim1 lly abdicaMHIsr ''Witnesses Iceive the ha. Li serious read. . . have Was deeply Lickly TecPDS LI IT et H rld thereafter. ed to us by le refutation by three S tillät SWR)
PQ W ET5 til | IlioT Ila IIled
the Witnesses he refers to or mention cd where it is that what they said is recorded for reference SP is not prepared to reveal such data to us.
What is cven more remarkable is that the statement that SWRD ''Quickly recowered his composure" which is presented to us as resuting TW's account is to be follind in the latter's own descriptil of the e vents, The emcrgency Was declared on 27 May and before the Government Parliam cintary Group meeting on 3 June the was ilı cortırılmalıd of his selfassurance again'". (Emerg,(82 .y "58, pטון ט
Agli In, in Ma nor's referCT1 ce tc) **II unit:T« LIS interviews with Journalists, military command Crs and politicians' none of the se is identified and no published source is In entioned where Manor's state left can be verified. It is 0 Illy in one instance (the reference to SWRD's electi. Il manifesto) that Manor quotes an actual publish cd reference. He says: 'See Mahaja na Eksath PeraпШпа, Prakashanaya" (ColoIn bol956), "Since the reader is not likely to be able Lo lay his hands on this docuTrent MalnoT could have quotled the actual words in the Prakashana ya he Tellies om. He dies"!
If SP calls a main a liar he should prove it. What he has produced is not proof but a shabby snow job hardly worthy of a leading in urnalist such as he is.
Leonard Thiru na wa karas LI
Colombo- 4
AMP MADONNA "шглеd Up їn s/eер, you suck.
алт таy be. Оr hungers urge ? II and fair, my child, this war
rights voices and half moon
pared you live, blundering surge.
t in the Window and the trees f /u/ me with their croon ul the Dead and refugees.
L. Kar Lunati lake

Page 10
LLLLLLLL0LLLLLLLLGLLGL LLLLLL L00YLLLGLK LLL0LLL
Problems of taking over
(Full Report of Cabinet Sub-Committee Meet
His Excellency the President J. R. Jayewardene wanted General Ranatu nga J0C, to explain to the Cabinet in detail why his request made in February last to take over the Jaffna town could not be car
tied out; difficultias faced in taking over Vadamarachchi willage, when the Indian Army
can be asked to be moved out; the problems that We could face in the future; and whether Indian troops are helpful or not.
General RåIna tunga said that the main problem in taking over the Jaffna town was the in aldequacy of troops. He required 4 infantry battalions. There was no problem in taking over the Jaffna town bill could not hit the ground for long. He required about 4000 troops on the
ground, If not conce they occiu pied there would hlave been III tar a ticks fril 11 wer
the su Tr3. LI TI di Ing areas. To maintain a ground force M. S. R. : Te Tequired. Things had to be brought from the Palaly Airport. To have a supply route from Palaly it was absolutely essential to have the necessary equipment and strength. To efsect this, 2 more battalions would have been necessary, Like iTI HT1 y other placc, te Tritorists have the option to shoot from anywhere and from any place Where they like, un like a conventional a TT11y. We would hawe had to have a number of camps in the supply line and they would have been opcined to da DgCT if attacks from terrorists in the surrounding areas. Terrorists knew every inch of the El Tea and We did not know from where they would fire or send mortar attacks. Even the places We Occupied, throughout the dily we were un de T fire, like LaLLLL S LLLLL S LLLLLL GCHLS SLLLL LL the Jaffna town was to keep On hitting the terrorists as much as we could unlike the places like Batticalloa, Trinco and Mullaitivu. During our time we did 2 major operations. We cleared the places but did not occupy, Secondly we also had
- R
to get the copeople of the circulis til Inces capture Jaffna have been Ei casualtics in th alıd fırıly 3ı sı; Jaffna would h; In the Wall:LT tion, Imany buil halwe beel bi ihb terorists. ne touched al blitt house collapsed died on the si several places Jaffili (W. F. Health knows hospital was b. a sit u. a. tiq 1T1 likworth going int because the p We could hawe la L1 di Copera til. stages terrorist aircraft and : refused to fly Vēl ti vās supply line could General RELI1 the de t:1115 ()f El tiom by the h the Ilf; PI
Lihat in the Will ation he had we ties. This was itself. Any Wily
lugh the operat a large number had occupied Lemples etc. W a single bomb had omly 3 t This Was a gre tid mit di ca though there gations. He li talions (ccupy
Holl... Pri II : LC: klCH W 117 WW I led betweel T Geler;ıl Rili at Sri La InkaL AT the were with: fTeil uIlder 511 title we cap" they got 4 We Hon. Ministe curity read ווt) WTון שl T: וון סfT explained thic

* jaffna
ing 12/8/87)
peration of the T'cil. Til the se if we welt to town thcre would large number of Lo civili: Il sector all pirtion of the
WC cc in left. 11r: ch chi operatlings and liւյլIsts ly trapped by the 5 dier Welt ind ni ilind the Whole . Til hii ili äTil Inc Ot. There were |ke til i 3 il the HET. Mi Iis LeT of that e yell the oby trapped. In 2 this it was it the Jaff1 til W III la ce Was STThall. gained only on During the last 5 shot down a In Efter that pilots in that area. the position, the I have been Cut off, atunga explained the whole operelp of a Map of is Lil Il He slidl la mara ch chi opertry serious casualon the first day they went throIII. There WeTe if terrorists who laces like ko Wils, We did not hawe era i Craft. We a sport aircraft. : drawback. We pet bombing alyere lots of Illest 3 infantry bating ground.
Milli5, te wa Tited Pribblika TaT traw elaffilii and India. 11 nga said that the my did not have 1 to keep this veilla Ice. Every tured 2 Weapons aբոI15, I of Nation:ll Seut a pa Tagraph ld magazine which situation in this
MEWS BACKGROUND
Island in detail. He said that the High CCIII missioner of India Mr. Dixit told Hill. It to tcnulc Jaffa lest TT dia Will hawe tC i Interwe Inc. There is no guarELItee that India will it intersere 11 the future. He 5aid that yw c yw i 11 hil. We to have a Thea, Ilingful defence programme for the whole country. Do not think La te trible i 5 gover, We will have to strengthen Our Loops position, Defence expenditure LLLLaa LLL aaK LHH LLLS LLL LLaaS Hon. Ganini Tayasuriya, Minister of Agriculture Development said that whatever defence line we hawe, we cannot fight Indial, H. Prie Minister Wated to know when they would filish handing over of fiTe lIIls. (General Atty galle, Secreta Ty Defence said that this Wis stilewhat slow. They are concerned Lbieb Li L the safety of Prabhat kara l. BLIt le said that hic Walls quite confidc Int that they will 5 LI Trendicir a good number of a TT1s but not 100%.
H. Prie Miliste sai that T:mills llawe El l CD t fs L1 spicio T and as such We must improve our rapport With the In and Win their confidelce. Prabolika, Tallin is actually a genius. He further said jokingly that, he should be given the military command of the whole of Sri Lanka because the he Will hawe 10 ne to fight with, amidst laughter, He said that Tamils should be treated like equills and Will Lluci T confidelicę.
Hol. Minister of Public Ad11 i Tistration Wanted til krl Li W the total strength of är mis su ITendered by the terrorists, Gen. Attygalle said that the total strength was supposed to be 3060) änd so fa T 38 li hawe been surrendered by the LTTE,
Hon. Pri Ile Minister said that the Te iš Already El Ill i llegatic) Il that women are raped by the Indian troops. He said that we Illust develop some sort of co fidc Illice a Tid trust With thc terrorists and send out the TIdia trüps,
H. Millise Nationil Security said that India was Il Crist sic T5 itiwe about the Jaffna town. If c could increls & the military strength he could hawe

Page 11
military dominance in the Jaffna town, but even in 1986 we did not have the adequate forces.
Hon. Minister of Lands said that We must express our Willingness to have Tamils as brothers, cxpress common less. He Said that hic read the whole speech of Prabhaka Tan distributed in India. It was a tira de against the Sinha lese. They callled Sinhalesc devils. They appeal to thc India army to continue their presence here. The Indian troops are getting on well with thc Sri Lanka solidiers. LTTE has said that what they did was a stab in their back. We must have a security o Tiented statci. We must hawe the manpower to obtain inforIliation. The enemy is within us; We must have sophisticated Weapons now that the Indians are con our sidC. He stressed that the LTTE is not going to join hands with the Government. Hon. Minister of Home AFfairs (Mr. Devanayagam) said that according to the information he got, terrorists in the Batticalo a district arc Tu ni ing riot. Prabhakaran had appointcd his political army. Most of these terrorists are uscid to mur - der and Inayhen and they can
not easily embrace the notmal law abiding civilian life. We must open Police Stations
in those districts a new and post hon est me In to millaitain la W and order. Our security is the Indian army temporarily. They have come on our request. They are not going to remain here for ever. We must get rid of those hallucinations. After the accord cwerything good has happened. It is an executive act by our Government and an executive act by the Indian Gowe T1 meilt. This ca. Il Tot be cha llenged in a Court of Law,
Hon. Montague Jayewickra Ina, Minister of Public Administratio In sajd tha L we can h al wc trust in the Indian Prime Minister. The accord is the greatest achievement. He agreed fully with Hon. Minister of Ho The Affairs. He said that we must fortify our armed forces and equip them With sophisticated weapons.
Hon. Minister of Transport said that they are all with the
President. His President can Indian army sh General Atty we can have t till we arrange He TcfcTTječi LO) ments in the S Minister of combing out o be carried lit
arms Tr the
CORRESP
Indian Ta.
Just because charcobal is als not cquite CI But Boyd Alm do just that i the Indian Ta Aug. 1, 1990). that the Federa 1948 Citizenshi 1949 PäF11a. Il c1 A II enciments A issue in the 19 tion and the gave him (Chel his party a sew an exaggeration
The FP Wor seats it contes electico T. C. WaT in the Kopay S. R. Rajavaroth to in the TTI tuency. It also : lative total of its candidates. the Tamil Cor Pon na Ibala rin , 7 seats it cont cumulative tota for its candid ill the total votes did not receive bing', consideri it was a newly tical party con ellcction foT fi the exception (). and Wannia sing ting MPs), the
if the FP foi t new faces to t Consider thc : 23–year old Ami tcsting a parlia the first time : who lost the W not to a Tail Illinee, but to :

Excellency thc ecide when thc ould go. galle said that he Indian Army
th: Teferendul. the unruly clcյնth. about said that erations should to obtail all the willages.
O/WHOEYWCE
Tmii
| row is black and black, One canW to charcoal. 'ida purports to In his letter om mil issue ( LG, His contents Il Party Illa de the Act and the tary Elections ict o'äl election 52 gcneral elccvoters of Jaffna vanayakam) and ere drubbing' is
of facts.
two of the 7 Led in the 1952 nia singham won clcctorate ind Ayam Was a vicCCI11: le e costilecci Wed a cum LI - 45,331 votes for In comparison, gress of G. G. von four of the sted and got a of 64,512 Wotes e5. III ter I L1 s. of polled, the FP i "5ęWcrę drubng the fact that established poliesting a general "st Lime. With " Chelwa na ya kam han (then sitother nominees his election were e Tail voters. l se of a young thailingam, conInentary seat for s a FIP nomince, iddukoddai seat, l Congress nomuch respected
issue in the
Hon. Minister of Education wanted to know how quickly the Police Stations can start functioning in the North, Law and order must be maintained in the North and South and get all Police Stations to function in these places. Hon. Minister of National Security said that Police is functioning in the North and East at the millent.
952 Election
victcran independent candidate Weerasingham. One should also note that in the south, the newlyfor Incd SLFP a150 Contested the 1952 cl cortion for the first time and only 9 of its nominees were lucky to be elected,
Though Almeda's statement that S. Natesan belonging to the UNP defeated Chiclvanayakam with a large majority is correct, the implication that the loss of Chelwallaya kam was mainly due to the fact that he supported the cause of Indian Tamils is mot å convincing one. As Prof. A. J. Wilson has noted in his book, The Break-Up of Sri Lanka (1988), I. D. S. Weerawardena explained Chelwahayaka Ill's defeat i I. 1952 on two counts: the allegation that highcaste Tamils might dominate the lower castes in the event of federalisını ald the fact that the federal Issue has not been explicitly expounded, so that federalism was often confused with secession or separate statehood' (p. 102). Chelwanayakarn's support to the Indian Tamil issue was not a prominent factor in his defeat for representing the Kankesanthurai seat in 1952.
AL best 011e can in fer that the majority of the Ceylon Tamils were in different to the plight of the India Il Tamils in the 1952 election. But it is inaccura te to state that they “coverwhelmingly supported the legislations' of 1948-1949 concerning th e° ITıdi:11 Tami1s.
Sachi Sri Kantha
Pailadelphia, USA

Page 12
For a deeper and Wid
across the division of Ther
A Buddhist
by Mara
inclu
Living One
The Marriage of W
15 kHEIG Fl FCE
is there Room for C
Anatta and
R3
Divine Revelation
by Peter
The Author a Pali Scholar Society shows that the usual g BuddhiSn based om a Small 1L again and again (While hundre not substantiated by the texts
the Wealth of Suttas which lie
RS
Published by George Allen
I75fffe Of Tra
Awailable at 36 Flower Road, Col C from the Publishers, F

ser View of Buddhism
awada and Mahayana read
: Spectrum
o Pais
Iding
3'S Karma
isdom and Method
em Of Evil ?
Grace in Buddhism 2
other eS Says
450
in Pali Buddhism
Masefied
and translator for the Pali Text generalisations about Theravada mber of quotations that appear lds of others are neglected) are but are often contradicted by between those usually cited.
1200
& L//7 Wf7 a/7ď Tľ7e Sri La 7 ka
dona Studies
imbo 7 or by Mail Order (post free) '. O. Box 1204, Colombo

Page 13
THE REGIOW
India and Pakistan back off
David Housego finds the prospect of war
World issues dominate
Wola diplomats, Ilervous for much of this year that the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir could spill over into war, have long pencil cd in September and October as the months when the risk of conflict would be the greatest.
As seen from Pakistan, the fear has been that India would
use the two months after the In ons () on to launch a ground attack aimed at humilia ting Pakistan so that Kashmiris
could no longer look to it for .TIנpp Lנ51
During the rainy season a ground strike runs the risk of a mour being bogged down.
On the Indian side, there has been equal apprehension that Pakistan would seek in the two months before snow closes the passes in Kashmir to infiltrate Inore of the between 5,000 armed Inilitants believed to be Waiting on the other side of the border as well as further Weapons and ammunition.
Though both countries still have large forces deployed close to the border - and recent talks between the two foreign secretaries to reduce tensions came to nought - war fears are none the less considerably less than couple of months ago. Mr Muchkund Dubey, the Indian Foreign Secretary, a senior civil servant, said in an interview this Week: "Our assessment of their intentions (is that) we feel they also do not want a war
He did not rule out the risk Of border clashes in Kashmir triggering a larger war. But he thought it unlikely.
Similar language is used by Mr Tanwir Ahmad, who has just stepped down as Pakistan's Forcign Secretary. He said after his talks in Delhi earlier this month that both Mr Inder Gujral, the Indian Foreign Minister,
and Mr W. P. Minister, had g g0 rical as suTan T1 01 0Il the Indi Dubey confirms
Mr Tahir AI to take thcSe i: V:lle Whilc Stei I eXchanges acros pärt Of Irene wed Kim Pakis till o w isse,
Several factor buted to reduci conflict in thic ci though few rule The Tost import is less nervous th ag C3 L1 it thic Moslem separati could result in the valley from Tisk OF a n IId strike against illways the great Staces Where could slip from
In Delhi, th diplomats and the in frontatic militants and the forces show's Tho up — With proba bers of para milit: by insurgents a a few months a
Bitterness agai forces after inci HC Lise-t (3-house Well-documented lity his probabl; Will. But the th Lisias Tum” of tht the insurgency
The Seco Ild Ta Pakis la. In HTnd III1 with political probles that w; El les 5 probabl Pakista ni militar wiltive political is pre-occupied MS Belizir Bhu POWEI - a proci

from Kashmir conflict receding as domestic and other
Singh, the Prime iven hill cateČe:S thit yw HIT ““ vyras a II agenda. Mr the sc 5 ta' Lemments.
nad was inclined 33 l'ITEL. Il Ce5 :lt face ig recent artillery is the border as
India. In pressure
: r the Kiislı II. IT
5 have conting fears of a
Illing months
it out entirely. It is that Indil i Il a FC W II o It His inSurgency by sts in Kashmir the secession of the Lil Illin m... THlian retaliatory Pakistan was "e:St. i T1 circu LI1— lia felt Kashmir
its grasp,
Italysis of |fficials is that in between the : Indian security
Sign if letting lbly the InumL ry forces killed Tg.T thil. Il -- it was է: Լ}.
inst the Indian os sant curfews, searches, and
Ciscs of brutay deepened as "To mantic elearly days of as disappeared.
to F is that both dia are so beset 1 Tid economic a T hals become : Option. The y ind Conserestablish ment with blocking tt's return to C55 they hope
will be consolidated by elections
(ct bēr 24
In India Mr Singh is facing the prospect of early elections amid threats of the break-up of his coalition and widespread
rioting against his job reserVation programme.
In both countries, the Gulf
Crisis has added payments and economic problems to an extent that war would add a ruinous burden.
The third factor is that the Indian military build-up on the western frontier is not enough for 1 India to launch the overwhelming strike that could be the only rational Indian objective. In particular, India has inadequate forces in Rajasthan to cut Pakistan's communications links with Karachi - which is the sector where Pakistan is In Öst vulnerable.
to balance of
Last, the Gulf crisis itself is a deterrent to a south Asian War. Mr Dubey thinks it a negative factor for India in that it could encourage the US to increase military supplies to Pakistan and to be more 'indulgent' to Pakistani objectives. But equally the US involvement in the Gulf puts a restraining hand on any Pakistani escalation of the Kashmir issue.
As for Pakistan, Mr Tanwir Ahmad thinks that India would Llot be 50 "cynical and opportill Distic' as to launch an attack against Pakistan while the World is absorbed in rolling back President Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. In this context II dial and Pakista LTC minimising the two recent border clashes in Kashmir that involved heavier exchanges of artillery than any seen on the line of control for 18 years.
(Capri riri Led dar page II 3)
11

Page 14
LL0LGGLGLL S LLLLLLLE00LLLL SYELLGLGLLGLLLLSL
Comintern and Uneven
Dayan Jayatil leka
I think that Comintern was for Edo (I med Ht The LiITS Of its founding in 1919, for two reasons. The first as Set out by FeTIlando LLLtLLL HH LL S0K LLL tttLLLLLLL SG00S try of the Comintern, is that the phenomenon of uneven development is such that there was no possibility of co-ordinating the global revolutionary pro = ject from a si Ingle headquarters. But the other Tealis011 is to do with time. There I believe that Fritz Barke mill Was Correct when as early as 1938 he said that The German revoluit 101 had already passed its zenith in 1918, when the Civil interm was founded il 1919. S I believe that the high tide of revolution in Germany had already passed in 1918, In that sense the founding of the Com inter Il cal Ille to late for the rescle of the Gerlal Revolution, and the subsequent evolution (fate") of that organiation was revitable. This is Borkenau's argument.
We see this repeated again iI 1967, while 1 L11 de T the leide Tship of Fidel Castro The Organizati con of Latin Americal II Solidarity" (OLAS) was started in order to try to co-ordinate the revolutionary guerrilla efforts being made in Latin America. By that time already the high tide of the Latin American Revolution had already passed, in 65/66.
I think Lha L it would It be en tirely correct to sayas Comrade Hector Abhayawardiana did, that Lenin shared the total Eurocen – tris II of most of his colleagues in the Bolshevik party and the European Communist Move Incint. say this firstly because of his perspicacity one the National question. As further evidence, I draw your attention to the title of cinc of his ess:Lys "Adwanced Asia; Backward Europe. In it, Lenin points out that in Asia unlike in Europe the bourgeoisie still sides with the natic). LLL S L LLLLLLLLHS S LLLL S S LL0La
12
h: iDVerts the
of . Il "Adw: 1:5: * Balckward Asi: with the fi Tullu ward Europe', Hardly evidence
TJ vya Tids, the Le Ili II Wils lindi himself called " ' cation of (our) On 50cialis ill.'" :15 tilt. Teslյlt t)
the European |111 LCTillise, SC essay "On Co.
instance, after th this Intil of cation in OLI I c Scillis Ill.
Following thi til 11 i 11 til C list that th; c. 55 lle revolution) in: thic flict thält and China coi whelming pro population of
So I thi Ilk shifted fill stra tegy of Wo. wards the eld In 1Co Inger Lhu; revolution Was on the Euro But LUI för till That Lenin died it the build Llp cred the close: Uf his wiews, iII, (LH1 e la Ing Ut copia Tn.
Now with C. in El Way go radical II Clific; Lutlook in S.) spoke of.
| tHı|[ık the
1ity in the Bo was; least ELIT. to be Stail.
becca Lus: cof thi his own exper the Cauca, L1825Bolshevik lead exile in Europ

Development
LTiditi 1ll wiew d Europe' and
in tl cri Illes ւ լIt latio of "BackAl vice A,5ia. of Euro cel Liris III,
el of his life ergoing what he El TF1 dical Til difiemtir: Öutlook I Sic this also | LEle failure Of
cvolutio L i his II filished — opera Lico In", for 1e NEP, you hayc : * radicial ilin ĝi fiIltire outlook on
s was a recogniyear of his life
(of the World ly be decided India, Persia
1lined in C Werortion of the the globe.
that Lenin läs til e Eurice Illric rld Tew Colution ti :) -- of his life. He ght that the World dependent Thainly pean revolution, icly for humanity 1 that y cair, and {if Nazisi:Trı II cildst approximation those of BukharNEP) somewhat
Gorba chlew we are ing back to the ation in out whole Cialism that Licili Tı
leading personallshevik party, who centric, happened
That was perhaps 2 specificities of it ince Working in ill like the other ון 1 טrט"יו סוler's Wh e. His DWI) for
II La tio also ma de him fali T moTe sensitive to thic pluen om en on of National Revolutions and nationalism. Which is why when the whole Bolshevik leadership and the Comintern leadership werc focussing on Europe, Stalin made the significant point that the (GET II la Tc w Colu till was a poteltiality and not a fact. The other leaders seemed to take it as a fact. He also said "We call In not base J LI Tselves om potemtialities and possibilities". I think this is significa Tit.
I think that the disis LTL) tills Red Army march on Poland in 1920 points out in un mistakable terns the importance of Inationalism, particularly nationalism with a religious element, Which is why I all appalled til at Sri Lalkı licftists i Te s C) insistent on the necessity and the possibility of the SLA to march on Jaffna and solve the problem of the LTTE militarily. These Marxists should remember that even the Soviet state led by Lenin, the Red Army formed by Trotsky and the columns headcd by Tukhachevsky couldn't march onto Warsaw, i e beat Polish nationalism. I don't think the Cominter realized it, but 1920 was really a watershed in olur understalding of classes and nationalism. It also helps us understand the subsequent shipwreck of the global revolutionary project on the shoals of nationalis II. Pollind 1920 was the first defeat in that sense. By the Way, I think a comparative study of Pilsudksi and Prabhakara, I would also be an interesting exercise.
LLGLLLLL LLLL SLLL S HCLGGLaTL Ka SS LLELLL LLLLCLLLGTHLS LLH SCLLtLlGGCTOCGGHLS LTT the Easterri Blac al reír irriper" organised by the Parkers = Perself fristikule, in honour of the laste Dr. N'ei' for (Ffrain i'r sir ghe.
Speakers friender Herror Aigal'ard-Tria, Dr. Berry GrifiqFrteragersart, I Dr. IrrrrAra sirr Li jirrage, rarTel P. E. PP'. Gula sekera.

Page 15
Collide Hector mentioned Tan Malaka, thic Indonesia. In ComII unist and also M. N. Roy. I believe that certainly Tan Malika and also Sultan Glaiyev qught to be eassessed a lid rehabilitited like Bukharin or als people press for the rehabilitation of Trotsky. Certainly the full history of the World Co III unist MoveIThent has to be reassessed with new emphasis given to the formulations of people like Tan Malaka, But thcn again while M. N. Roy was very insistent on the class struggle iisp. cct of the Indian revolution and held that the Indian bourgeoisie had exhausted its progressive role, it was Lenin who, striking a cautionary note, said that the bourgeoisie still had a role to play. So I really don't think that I will agree entirely with the notion of Lenin being as ELITocentric and as insensitive to the national dimension as were the oth cI leaders of the World ComImunist Movcment at that time.
I think we Illust be cautious before We draw the conclusion that the problem was thc impossibility of the construction of socialism in One country. This may prove to be so but I think that the facts lead to other conclusions, as well.
In the first place I think that neither Lenin Or Luxemburg (who Conrade Hcctor seems to uphold as the superior alternative to the former's outlook) properly understood the specificities of the State and social formation in Western Europe or rather, gave due weight to those specificities.
I think it was only after Gramsci that this was understood. It was only after Gramsci that the whole question of the distinct and different stategy of the revolution in Europe was put on the agenda as a Whole new problematique. But I think that Lenin and Luxemburg in their distinct ways had not fully transcended the specificities of their own praxis. Lenin was morc correct than Luxemburg in his insistence of the moment
of organization a Organizational the vanguard in juncture. I thin berg, though a tionary, had no jLIncture (il teri determination of So Leni Il was, put it that w; revolutionary, bl. nobody attempte ceptualizing of Inatu Te of the S society of the s i Ill Weste TI ELLI
I think this obstacle. 11. W question of wor IL1-1lt WS (WETCI
I think that W ing thc various World connul such as the Sil Because i f' IC ments in the Cl 1953 period, the KTL15h chlew as di Molotow -- Kagai and the 20th C. CPSH which it the CPSU leade lision, I beliewe
World socialist World socialist hawc erw o lwedd = } alternative and
t(3 iI 11 perialisTm. for socialis II w., very bright.
And this fratr pened again and after the victor mCSG revolution a decisive defe:
lism, we witn and the fratrici We'll the Call
Thanese and La El Inici Wietnames F 1975-80 - 11 טWe revolutions too Il T4, Tial In revoIII particular form because the cris Communist M. that in many World, the anti Were not hegem ideology. Still Was On the de the retreat. B.

d the Co 15 cibus Inter Welti. Il CF a specific conthat Luxe Ilgreat revoluIlotill of conis if the wer contradictions). If you want to y, the greater t. LIntil Gr:1T18 Ci di a deep conwhat the real ill aid of civil ci: 1 fort I Ili tion, pt:. was the main las Indt reilly a king class Invetralized party.
Fe Tc y werksplits in the ist il. Wement lo-Soviet split. for the develop°SU in the post accession of stinct from the
10 witçlı gr) Llo ingress of the 1 fact brought
Tship into colthat a parallel systein and larket Would a economic counter Weight The prospects Lull hawe beĘT
s
icidal 5 tri fe hapagain. In 1975 of the Wietnahad inflicted it on imperiaessed the split dä | CCJIl flict betbdii 15, Wiettills, Chinese : parties. BetEl mul TibeT of k place. Tի է: in took the
that it did is in the World
յ": rill: 11t Ille
parts of the -systemic forces Olised by left for all, the US fensive and on
it then again in
1982 til:
self-decapitation
of
the Salvador can revolution (the assasination of Ana Maria and
the suicide of Carpio)
ca. It
the isolation of Nicaragua and enabled the US to go on
global offensive.
So I think this
13
That
the
[1e
question so much of socialism
being i 11 possible
Te COI lllT ll ITW ,
t
but that
build
in
Sub
jective and ideological factors, I must add though, that I think that the Sino-Soviet split is in some kind of sense sourced in
the
phenomenon
of Lil m
development and therefore
Un even development resulted in the clifferent needs and interests of the
a material basis.
Cill m t:8: Swiet
1Sts חנוודן וmם ט communists.
a Tid Bլ է
for all I believe that is
subjective logy)
differencc5
Hill
WI고 has
Լ11t: still Il:5€
(policy/strategy/ideo. that
red
the balance of global forces so as to thwart or abort the world revolutionary project.
Iпdia. . .
Cartin Lied fra T page || ' )
the clashes
Mr Dubey
5 Էլ:5 15 a local Il Cill Thter II
which
Pakistan was seeking an advantage over border posts and prowiding covering fire to militants crossing into India. But if war
seems less
likely,
relations
between India and Pakistan remain worse than they have been
for years.
Talks this
month foundered
on the two sides' sharply differing priorities over Kashmir. Pakistan wants an Indian troops redep
loyment a Lld
Indian forces of hill man
principles in
observa Ice by rights Kashmir. India
wants an end to Pakistini inter
ference before agreeing
troop redeployment.
Bo Libh sides insurgency Will
a larger conflict cast its shadow.
טייט E11נb
t:}
that
ргоус а drawn-out affair. While it lasts, the threat of it developing into
is
bölu Tlıd
:111y
the long
t
13

Page 16
LIBERALISATIOM — 2
Economics and politica
Mick Moore
T point of departure is the political system of the 1960s and early 1970s which Was marked, ir ter alia, by the following characteristics: a high degree of electoral competitiveness and constitutionality; the focus of political competition on access to the fruits of controlling a stalc which was a major employer, a relatively pervasive regulator of private cco T1 Cornic activity, the recipient of a large financial surplus extracted from the plantation sector, and a major distributor of material welfare; very high levels of mass political collsciousness clectoral participation and membership a IId quasi-political organizations; the implicit dependence of the political order on a relatively high degree of legitimacy (i.e. afirmative acquiescence) in the minds of the Iniss of the population, and the corresponding low degree of dependence on, or capacity for, organized coercion; the continuous legitiTiation of the system in terms of the government's obligations, alıd successes, in IImeeting mı ass welfare necds and, les 5 explicitly and consistently, in Teviving El Sillalesc Bulldlist symbolic, moral and political order; the high level of politicization of public administration and the public realm generally: a relatively large if declining role for ascribed "notable' status in Organizing : n.d structuring political competition at local level; political party machines which, in terms of resources, continuity, institutionalization, and au LOnonly in Telation to local society, could only be termed "halfdeveloped"; the continlling do Illinance in the leadership of all major political parties of Scions of Sri Länkas relativ cly welldeveloped, self conscious and Westernized capitalist class; a large public sector workforce which lacked most of the features of a distinct 'state class", l.c.
of political :
material privileg solidarity and 3. lation to the (the political capitalist class, e. wery low deg Tce ČD of "state' fr) II relatively high lation of the dC process from ex tici: 1 influi en C25.
As c3 plained concer is With sicins of politic:
period 1977 - ) tion; repressio Wi 1 !cInı Ce, M{1 T"e
mela -- Iinilitairi
it List achieve political decay of state 1re not deilt '
Paplica Cefiri place at W0 power Within t E15 e 1 in C hia Inds, (of a Telati of cabinet II'nin officials, who III long-established wealthy familie Lemselves been IIIIrı ent To T Ima versely, the po i file MP has b The overwhelmi majority enjoye Inight noTITally give backbench lewer Hige against mentary leaders UN P’5; backbe beem extTćTmel Prlja. The It, Ll, poor attenders. great dical of electoratics. In
Thij 5, IIT: tiation within Parliamentary the product of described a bow. magnitude Cof in 1970 and mag Ilification under the

decay
e al ni inter [mail utonomy in resocial categories leadership, the itc.); a relatively f differ citiation 'society'; and a legree of insumestic political ternal geo-poli
in Section II, Cour Lil Tele di memal decay in the 1983: centralizaTn; and eth Ilic recent phenozation, generao wiolence to | goals, and the : institutions - with hiere.
Ilization has taken levels, Firstly, le ruling party entrated in the vely small group is ters and party Lostly belong to prominent and s, lind who have politically prony years. Conwer of rank and een very limited. ng Parliamentary d by the UNP be expected to MPs additional their own Parli lhip. Instead the |ch MPs have quiescent in i Indiced at hic T They spend a ti me in their local business.
Ilarked differehe rinks of the JNP is in part factors already Beca 11 se of the electoral swings 1977 - ill the if their effects estminister-style
electoral system - in the latter year the UNP had only a small nucleus of experienced MPs. Equally, J. R. Jayewardena's party reforms had yielded a large crop of new young MPs from Tclatively obscure backgrounds who were socially and politically un confident on thc national stage a Indor especially interested in the affairs of their own electorates. There they functioned mainly as progresschasers for public projects, and the big expansion of public investment gave most so Irlething to keep them busy.
In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the new 1978 cons
titution exacerbated this intraparty inequality. Generally "Gaullist' in inspiration and content, the new constitution greatly strengthened the hand of the national party Corga Ini7ation (Ior the Parliamentary party) vis-a-vis the MP. The party leadership now had the
power to expel from Parliament (by virtue of expelling him or her from the party) any MP originally elected on the party ticket. The party could nominate a replacement. And a proportional representation systerm Was introduced for the succeeding Parliamentary general electio Ils.
A second, related, but ultimately more significant process of centralization his been the concentration of power over the executive, the ruling party and På Tilia III1 ent in the hands of J. R. Jaye war de na and a small number of Telatives, senior politicians, party officials and public servants - the line between these categories has beconc very blurred - on whom he cho coses to devolve rcsponsibility. The 1978 constitution, elevating Jayewardena to the position of Executive President, has played a major role. His position of personal political dominance has, however, bec in

Page 17
Eichieved in part because of the way he has chosen to use Presidential power. Already in firl control of the party In achinery, he has manipulated elections (see below) to retain a parliamentary majority llrge enough to permit the constitutiÚ11 t{} be a me11 ded 1t will -
à pUWer which hä5 been 115ed liberally. The President has chosen to concentrate a great
deal of power in his own hands, Eind to Teve It liny si Illil Lr concentration in the hands of hisimmediate Irlinisterial subordin Eltes lind potential successors. He has at any moment typically himself held between three and five ministerial portfolios, geneTally giving de facto Illinisterial
power to confida Intes holding the Secretary's post. Si Imilarly, some of the Ilost important
public corporations, notably Air La Ilk:L and the (Greater Colomba Economic CommissioI (responsible foT creating and Irina naging the export-processing zone) have been directly responsible to the President, The Prime Minister has in practice exercised no Indre pOW Er than any Other senior Illinister - indeed, less Lhan sortie — and Was ch05 en ft OIT Outside thic ch: TITcd circle of the established elite. Ministerial power has in general been diffused by the gradual expansion in the number of Ininistries. By 1984 there were forty-three, including four concerned with the three plantation crops (cil, rubber and coconut), a Ill thTce cach for surface transport and for health services.
The increasing use of state power to repress lega and deriacratic political opposition has been widely documented in various international reports. W|1|- the illestion of the treatinent of the Sinhalese opposition becil me increat singly enta Ingled with the pursuit of the nearcivil waT bct Wee In the ar Illed forces and Tamil Illilitant groups in the period 1984 - 1987, the two issues were originally to a large degree separate. The list of repressive. In easures against the Sinhalesc opposition was already long when the ethnic
conflict bocca 11C It began to gro" 1980. Til ære flre to this repressi simple use of against Opponen is the Inanipul: the cinsi LiLLI til fic Flint II la surcs quoted under t include: the Luis against peaceful Strikes in 1980) on Buddhist associated with ( ) 5 tcıta. Li 3 Lus Tè "Y; til In cof a pol conspicuously , rights of a lea figure after a tration; attempt High Court juic cill decisil i ms | go wern IIle Ilit; thi associated With UNP t W tills for the ] melit Council widespread ph against Sinha parties at the cluding in E might also inc the attacks (l 1983, for a pri played by thu nized in adwa: associated Wii 5cilior Mi I 1 istic El clo se relati Prcs icle Ilt, Le Ta mills, thic IT
Titi W5, TCS: members of especially thos (Ciclic IEC. Mi publicly-proIIli: rarely attacked previous · Pri Iin BLT da. Ta laike, her civic right vel te di froIII Presilci til el 1982. The SL! weakened by ilprisonment on charges t persued. Havi tion by relativ, in the sense 1 largely free wished and 1 generally Cor the i gCower Illic:

El clute il 1983. w rapidly around two main a spects m. () Ille is the physical violence ts, and the other tion of law and The Timore signiwhich could be le first hel di Ing 2 of party thugs public sector ; physical attacks priests closely the SLFP; the ward by promo|ce ofiiÇer Who Piolated the civil ding Opposition Joltical dem 15Es to itilidalt: lges whose judihad angered the Iggery in Jaffna : an attempt by il the 1981 elecDistrict Developaid Tübu title': 'Find
hysical Violence ese opposition Incil TeWET T
y-elections. One lude in this list Ta. Il ils in July Illilet Ice Wils gs clearly orgaice and closely h at le:1st c) I1e r believed to hai ve 3nship with the :awi Ing aside the Cre brutal tre tIwed for Ordin Elry the Opposition, e living outside ddle class El Ind ment people weTc physically. The te Minister, Mrs. was deprived of s and thus precon testing the 5ctica I15 in October FP campaign was the i Trest :inci of her son-in-law rטrיטון r Eטיין h Hit Ing won that elece s'y falli T mica. This — lät water's WCT: to Wote als they that Wotes yw CTC, rectly counted - nt theIn retıi Incdi
the capacity to a II hend the Constitution at will by extending for a further six years the 1 ific of the PL Ilia I Ille It iii whichl it collanded a massive Ilaiority. This decision - formally Liself a Constitutional a: The Ildmcnt — was walidated in Decem lber 1982 in a Tefered L1 III il which ilti Imidlaltico I aliud fraliud were widely used by the UNP.
The important point in relatil to et strig fessor is that the problem became ever more acute. There were widespread "civilian' attack5 OL TEL Limi 15 i mith after
the UNP was elected to power in 1977. Such attacks were repeated on a smaller scale, and against both Muslims and Ta mills; in the period before the 'holocaust' of July 1983.
That in turn Wils stimulated by the first large-scale killing of military personnel by the ewer more active Tamil separatist guerillas. Since the late 1970s the armed forces and police had been acting like all occupying force in the Tamil a reas.
WI. Linkages Between
Economics and Politics
How might these dimensions of political decay be the product of economic liberalization
From the very still ulating debate o Il Lil til Allıerica authoritarianism (Section 1) I have borrowed the rather broad Ilotill that the elective functioning of certain types of economic system might requi Te TestTic LicTns on the extet årld Tatu Te of the political participation of the ma55 of citizenz, and, therefore, en courage sot The for III of Ellithoritaria Inis [1]. Ilin Section WII T Luse my Tea, dli Tg of the La tin Americ millerial to test five specific prepositions about how
political authoritarianis Ill in Sri Lanka (i.e. both centralization and repression in Illy
sub-categories of political decay) could reflect the requirements of the process of economic liberalization. There appears to be. Taithe T litt| c cČITI 1ectic I1.
The basic chronology of events in Sri Lanka - the fact that most aspects of political decay
(Confirшed ол раge 2.1)
15

Page 18
saac Deutscher Revisit
Reggie Siriwardena
in many thinking peoplc of
my generation who Couldn't accept either of the Tiwill Carth = doxies of the cold wa T - Stalinism or anti-Communism - the Writing and thought of Isaac Deutscher exerted a profound influence. He was, to my mind. the outstanding interpreter of Soviet history as Well as the
most penet Ta ting commentator on Soviet affairs during the last two decades of his life.
My own intellectual debt to ill is considerable. From the time of the publication of his political biography of Stalin in 949 until his death in 1967, I read nearly every onc of his books as they came out and reviewed some of them. In the fiftics I arranged for the publication of his periodical articles on the middle page of the "Ceylon Daily News", and in 1952 I hadi the privilege of a long afternoon's conversation with him at his home in Coulsdon. Nearly a quarter of a century has passed since Deutscher's death. How well do his analyses and his historical prognostications stand up in the light of these two decades and a half - and particularly in the context the enormous changes that have shaken the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe at the end of that period? To attempt answers to that question is the task of this paper.
I should like first to indicate by a single example thic wide gulf that separated Deutscher's thinking from that of most professional Wester Sovietolo. gists of that time. When Stalin was dying - the Wire services ha di just flashed the report of his stroke - Deutscher WTC te El Th
attice for the “Manchest ET Guardian' which appeared on the day of his death. The
historical sweep of the article would in any case have been striking for a piece that must have been written in a few hours, but what made it cven
1.
more remarkable prognosis. For his articlc ''The Inisi 1: The S Conning Crisis". indicate the dil analysis by allo' graph:
"Let Ille sll Ill of thic crisis While Lenih Wall bed the revoluti to w:Tilis. El II i Llt C drawing into it: While Stalii is death the ScJwie to be sick with and the Tew Colu broken out of it: It is impossib how this CTiSiS solved. Probabl startling develc be expected in "Stalil is dead - lis'' - the Cr from Moscow i months, Tegar dll that Stalinism h: ewen before SI:
To apprecial such a per 5 pic C time, () İlk 111 1151 ı both Wester Il S affairs and col it was taken f Stali l'8 dic: L'h nothing in the the system WO' orthodox th co II Soviet scicly was that of state", which b ICTUlithic, Slál to change - at forces. (This was importa II, lied that if S TisIll W5, li it had to be side.) This W. of the Soviet CCIIIC I to El C gists like Ken Brzezinski o I1 to wulgar lTi. propagandist, : Chamber 5 L Tid

ed
Was Deutsche T's Deutscher titled
end of St:ıliWiet Union's
I shall try to ection of its ting () ne par El
up the elements looming ahead. s on his deathon was evolving cracy and withs national shell. Wrestling With t people seem the autocracy, |tion has long s national shell. le to prophes y is going to be y no rapid or pments should thic Llei T future. – long live Stali
y will resound In the next few ess of the fact
ls been half-dead ilin has dicid."
e how Linli's La tive was at that ecall that among chills of Soviet i-war ideologues, 3r gra1 n ted that Would change Soviet Unio 1; ild go on. The :tical II lodiel of that was current thc 'totalit: Tian definitio) [1 Wäs c, and imper vious least by internal ast qualification because it impI wiet totalitar ilbic. O werthir o wl lone from outS the paradigm stal te that was |demic Sovietoloa Ti, Fai In sodi, and he One hånd ind
now forgotten ich 15 Whittaker James Burnha m
Against them, to argue then Sowie 50 ciety, even after the rigid mould imposed on it by Stalin, was a living and evolving society, possessing its own dynamics and its potentialities of change. Or - as he put it in an essay im 1956 — "Yes, the Sc} yiet linive Tse does Illovci.”
With other non-Stalinists of the left Deutscher had his disagreements, too. They indeed did accept that the Stalinist state was ephemeral, but they - many of them following Trotsky's analyses - looked to a political revolution by the Soviet masses to overthrow it, Against them Deutscher argued that in a society that had for so long become un accustomed to political self-mobilisation, the initiative for change had to come f'Torin bowe — in other words, from a section of the ruling group itself. He wouldn't assert that the democratic regeneration of Soviet society could no essarily be completed without revolutionary interwention by the people, but he wasn't prepared to rule out the possibility of its consummation by continuo us reform either. The era of KhIT Lushchev windicat cd Deutscher's opinion that reform had become an in escapable necessity from the standpoint of the Soviet rulers themselves, and though the clock was again set back by Khrusch che v's fall, Deutscher remained confident that the tide of refoIII would retu TI, A Te W IIlonths before he died, Deutscher said, delivering the George Macaulay Trewelyan lcctures titled The Unfinished,
on the oth cr. Deutscher was and later that
Revolution
"Soviet society cannot recocile it self much longer Lo remaining a mere object of history and being dependent on the whils of autocrats I the arbitrary decisions of oligarchies. It needs to regain the sense of
being its co w ni Imaster. It needs to obtain control o weer its governments and to transform
the State, which has long tower cd above society, into an instru

Page 19
Ilment of the latio III’s dem - cratically expressed will and interest. It iceds, in the first
instance, to re-establish freedom of expression and association." If DeLi L5 cher blad liwell iIlitc) the era of glasnost and perestroika, he would certainly have fund in these developments a confirmation of his expectations.
Deutschcr's funda Ilı eritally optillistic wic w cof the Sowiet fu till Te would have been impossible if his analysis of the Stalin era hadn't also been significantly different from that of cither Western anti-communists or of In any left-wing anti-Stalinists, Deutscher had been through the school (of El Inti-Stalinis II1 as a II ember of a Polish Trotskyist group before the war, and he shared lone of thic Stalinist Imyths and dogmas. But when he wrote his biography of Stalin, he rejected the analogy which it was so fashionable to make at that time between Stalin and Hitler as tyrants whose Iccord is one of absolute worthlessless and futility'. In spite of his consciousness of the gigantic human cost of the Stalin erä, Deutscher recognised ills () thL achievement made possible by it. III tille article Writtel alt til: Li Ille of Stalin’s deith t) which1 I have already offered, there occurs this observation:
“The core: T Stalin’s històric achievement consists in this, that he found Russia working with Wooden ploughs and is leaving her equipped with atomic piles.
NOT w:15 this, 15 Deutscher was at pains to stress, merely El In economic or teclı Il cological tTHIS; FOT T1 till; Russia's econmic Advance would hawe beel impossible without sending a wybı ole l Eitin te schijll . Il Til the biography of Stalin there is a remarkable passage which occurs immediately After Deutscher has described the crippling regiIn entation of artists, writers and other intellectuals by Stalin, He goes tյո:
"However, the cultural significance of Stail i ThisTim ca in Thit it be judged merely by the Way it ravaged letters and arts. It is Hic contradiction Tl betwee Ill Stål
| in's constructiw Irultti'ye influe:Ili be kept in mind. mercilessly flatt tual life of Ll he als C. ClTT. ellements of Ci w:ast mass of L1 nity. Under hi culture | Crist de in breadth. Th perhaps be wen extensive spread in Russia will a new phase of 10p me mt. H phH Hot het gener:1 bäck With Telic ba Tous intics () era, It Will Said that Stal peculiarly adapt of a ruler hi educated, who The Frf Eriks, In issuing from1 til of their : Ill Tch dila Tkessi.”
We may sal insight all the tively today
inte 11 lectual fe Giorhacht:w year his hope of a looking back the bol Tb1 Tc3 LIS Stillinist er 1".
Deutscher's was I h 15 T Swiet society, ILiling է: Լինբ,
Hic i Interia, fr. criti tral is fritt Deutscher expe tI:lIlsforillä tioll css': tial lly to W. the original st programme of L lution. Let m thic Conclı ding the "Malcheste clic w Titel is *N revolu Li ev et Illa de re: turned Burb Teil OlIIlced it5 r tage. The pe C Ution 11:1 il of Stalj Tism, opp Tessive a sp But there is in that they Wil Id fective Bolshevik Rey

te and his des - :es that should While he was en ing the spirie intelligentsia, ied... the basic Willisition to a civilised him als rulle Ri Issiä 5th but gained e prediction Inay tured that this of CivilisatioIl be followed by intensive dewese from which tis) I will look f upon the barf the Stalinist then perhaps be in's style was led to the tasks Tlself Illot well had to dragoon d a bureaucracy |ıc: Yılızlı iks, Out ic powerty and
Dellscher's more appreciawhen the great rment of the s has confirmed new generation with relief upon a litics of the
te
strength, then, ecognition that ā eve its could generate rces for dello11t i 11. But What :ted was that that would be di Tected ir ds. El rect LITı to Ciall : ind political Hic October Rewoe quote part of palı Tagraph from Guardian" artiStalin was dying: i nary Illation hals peace with re15 T Stuarts and evolutionary heriples of the Soviet due time slike OT rath1cr the cts of Stalinis II. reas Con to suppose
ever genuinely y Tell Tice the
lution.“
It is note Worthy that in this passage Deutscher, hawing looked forward to the shaking off of Stalinism by the Soviet people, adds the qualification, or rather the oppressive aspects of Stalinism', This is because for him the legacy of Stalinism consis tcd not only of the one-party state, the dictatorship, leader worship and police terror: it included also planned economy, public ownership of industry and collectivisation of the land. Whatever the distortions of these by the Stalinist political SllLllIT, Deutscher considered them to be a continuation of the Bolshevik Revolution which the Soviet people would not want to Tէ:Il 11:1||1:E.
Deutscher, in other words, was a classical Marxist, and he was Confident that the future regeneration of the Soviet Union would take the for farcturil to classical Marxism. There is an explicit statement of this belief almost on the last page of his massive and brilliant biography of Trotsky, where he cnvisages the future rehabilitation of Trotsky in the Soviet :1חס 1 וUI
"When it does colle, it will be more than a long-overdue act of justice towards the me mory of a great m:Ln. By this act the workers' state will althounce that it has at last reached maturity, broken its bureaucratic shackles, and Tcembraced the classical Marxism that had been banished with Trotsky."
Trotsky's formal rehabilitation has not yet come, but one may doubt whether, if it were to take place next month or next year, it would signify a re-embracing of clasical Marxis In. The Gorbachev ruling group has progressively moved away from Stalinisı, but this Same momentum has in several respects carried it far from classical Marxis II, cven While it was affirming its fid
elity to it. The doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat has been silently buried, the
cfficacy of central planning is questioned and the superiority of the market mechanis Ill affirmed, the concept of the deci
17

Page 20
sive struggle between two con tending World systems has been replaced by that of international co-operation between them, and the priority of class interests is continually denied on the basis of universal human values', This has all taken place Within the ruling group itself. Outside it, a fat more thoroughgoing critique of classical Marxismindeed, often a rejection of Marxism in all its forms - is going On 1 mong thể reforming
intelligentsia. And such information as is available about the broad trends of thinking
among the Soviet people - for instance, from the new institutions of opinion polls - scem5 to indicate that if there Wert a free and open election in the Soviet Union today, last year's experience of Eastern Europe would be repeated and the
Communist Party defeated. Let mc recall Deutscher's Words at the time of Stalin's death:
“The Te is no reas). Til to slipp CSC that (i.e. the Soviet peoplc) will ever genuinely and effectively renounce the Bolshevik Revolution. Today it is perfectly possible to envisage that, given the opportunity, they Imay dico just thalt.
The Eastern European revolution of 1989 offers an interesting occasion to compare Deutsher's his tor ical a In a lysis With subsequent developments. In his biography of Stalin he draws a parallel between Napoleo III’s and Stalin's historical roles in relation to the countries they conquered in Europe:
"Napoleon, the tam ct of Jacobinism at home, carried the revolution into foreign lands, to Italy, to the Rhineland, and to Poland, where he abolished serfdom, completely or in part, and where his Code destroyed many of the feudal privileges, Malgre lui-hierre, he executed parts of the political testa ment of Jacobinis II. . . It is mainly in Napoleon's impact upon the länds Deighbouring Francc that the analogy is found for the impact of Stalinism and central
Europe. The chief elements of both historical situations are similar: the social ordet of eastern Europe was as little
8
T ט"וירול
capable of Survil feudal Corde T i T1 in Napoleon's d: lutionary forces the anach I (This Il to remove it; the revolution merg ment at ICC retrograde, whicl fried the struct Returning to 1950 in his essal tions", Deutscher “I do mot be Werdict of history syste of s: telli respect be more s becil (In the BCI
Today, in the the Soviet satell has reason to de coll clusion. Sta Tevolutionisc Ea conquest his til more ephemic Tal co TT esponding e true that the of the French ried by Napolt the conqu cred li
back by trium after 1815. T popular nation
to French dom tedly contribute sal of the pTC) that Napoleon the conquered toration of the and aristocracic military defeat the victory of 1 ance. New crith { Tewolul til W:lis - cal sciāle — 21 S The new popli 1830 all 1848 be inspired by the legend of t ution. More", images of N. survived in til former cm pire oppressor, and libera tor, Jell calls in a foto iTwo Revoluti. "I was broug one of Nap countries, whit day the Napol so strongly school boy, I
Napole) nearly every F

vall as was the the Rhli Telâl idi ays; the revoarrayed a gali Elst were too weak in conquest and : I - IT10 Weiprogressive and Ft 5 t t TEISiure of society. ;his subject in y Two Revolu
said: Lice that the O Il the Stali Ilist tes will in this jewerc than it has apartist system." - aftermith of i te regimics, Onc ubt Deutscher's is attempt to stern Europe by ir ned out to be than Napoleon's indeavour. It is social Eld War Ce5 Revolution, Cilfon's armies 10 ands, were rolled 1phant Teaction to this process alist opposition ination undÜubBut the TowergTessive chal nges had brought to Ilds — the TCSold monarchies is - required the : , F France alını d he Grand Alliless, the counter- On the historihort-lived phase. ilar risings - in continued to the example al Indi le French Re"0- 'ET, two colli El TV apoleon himself lic lands of his one of the the other, of the tscher himself Tetitle to his essay,
15: ht up in Poland oleon's 5 at cl lite ere ewe il Trily eonic legend was Elive that, 3 's it wept bitter tears "5 downfall, Els Polish child did."
But if the return of the old order after Waterloo Was ensured by the military victory of the Grand Alliance, aided by nationalist forces within the former French Empire, the Eastern European revolution of 1989 - or counter-revolution, if you want to call it that - Was not brought about by American intervention or the military efect of the Swiet Union. It was the peoples of Eastern Europe themselves who rosc to topple the Stalinist regimes. There Deut5cher's analogy seems to me to break down. And in rejecting Soviet domination the peoples of Eastern Europe have evidently repudiated the Russian Revolution LČ 0: Marx and Lenin have been cast into the historical dust bin as much as Stalin. The optimistic Marxist may argue that this swing to the right in Eastern Europe will be historically as shortlived as the post-Waterloo counterrevolution was, and that sociallism will return in due course in Eastern Europe. I would certainly agree that the enthusiasm for the free mai Tkct Imay not survive the economic rigours of rising prices and unemployment, and that a people accusto med to subsidised social scrvices will not Willingly for ego the II,
But whatever the political and economic structures that Tmay emcrgc in Central and
Eastern Europe from the present period of transition, it is reasönably certain that at least in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, it will bear Il Teseilblance to the one-party state and the centralised economy of the pre-1989 model. (Eastern Germany will soon no longer have an independent destiny of its own.) It is only in the more backward region of the Tor Ile T Sy" i et empire - in Romania and Bulgaria - that the old stricetures retain som 1cthing of their tenacity, though covered over with a veneer of reform... I would the reforco al Tigl1e that Stalin's enterprise of 'revolution by conquest' has been much less enduring in its hislorical legacy than Napoleon's.
(To be continued)

Page 21
What went wrong 2 Comprehending Socialism
Tisaranee Gunasekera
ot Since the second con
gress of the RSDLP which ended in the division of the party iıti) Bolshe wik Salıd Me Inshic'wiks, has any party congress been of such significance, of such crlcial importance to the survival of the party of Lenin, as the recent congress.
The Congress took place in a climate of pessimism and defection. Socialism is supposed to be on the retreat and therefore on the defensive on all fronts. There col Illot be a better time thus to look a new at the past, to try and understand what went Wrong. If We are to overcome the current impasse and advance, wc hawe to halwe — als Licinin slidt often - Clarity above all else".
In Das Capital while talking about a future "free association of producers' (as the eventual goal of socialism) Marx also points out that this will need a certain “IIlaterial foundation”. The creation of this laterial Foundation will be the result of a period of long and tormented historical development - in other Words, a period of "primitive socialist accumulation'. (as Preobrazhenskyu was to term it later).
MaTx expected the first Socialist revolution to take place in the industrialised capitalist countries of the West. Therefore when he talked about the need to go through a period of "long and tormented historical development to create the material foundation' for thic future free association of producers" hic obviously had in mind the industrialised West: that even with this relatively high level of development these
societies would have a long Way to go to reach the stage Marx referred to as a "free
association of producers'.
Contrary to tions the first tion took place 1:55 indl Istril lize ugh Monopoly more prevalent in most other tries, Russia less advanced i rialization and The Tefo Te RL155i. challenge - to f plete tasks of primitive capit tion by achie of industrialisit ment attained the capitalist W through the per socialist acclim ll the material higher stage of
*Whält do e5
practical ter II1s? this dual chal necessary for Ru o LIgh " : nh u1u51: al primitive :hl! I LI would contain both capitalist au These special cir sitated a great State and the command-admini (with evel a ce coercion). The that State soci: sia) Was necess (early) stage O
We are fant characteristics primitive accl I Capitalist We certain paralle and tille initial socialis II” — Lihi policies ('encl. Of Britilirl tü. scale agricultur collectivization Russia being c cause the Sovi of primitive a mot pu Telly ca tained characte

's Crisis
Marx's cxpecta" Socjalist Tewolu" in backward, d Russia. ThoCapitalis II was i Il Russia thaП Weste TT cu In
Was relatively in both inclustdevelopment. Fil faced a duHil
llfill the incomher "period of a list accumulaing the levels ion and developby the rest of West and te go iod of primitivc lil til Le creac bil 55" for til:
50cillis II.
this imply in " I think that lenge made it Issia to go thrly long period of II1 Li lation պիiըl lil Tacteristics of Il socialist forms. CLI 15 tAl tess II e Cesår rolle for the creatin of a Strative Systell rtain amount of cf3 Tc TI believe I.lisrm (:1 lä1 Riu1sEl Ty at a certain f this process.
iliТ with the if the period of lulation in the St. There :1Tc s between this phase of state
el circle Ille L sure movement") build a large
and the forced in the O's in In 5 Ich. Blit be
it Union's stage iCLI Imlilation was itä list blit CO1listics of socialism
as well, (which were dominant in certain a reas) it was more humane and socially just and the Tefo T: TOT a dvalled that the period of primitive accumulation in the W5 teTIl contri e 5, There was less exploitation (for example - no massive exploitation f chid libli ko il Briti or slave labour like in the U.S.); there was no mass unemploy
ment, it was more egalitaria n and socially just; the erdication of hunger, unemploy
Illent, powerty and other social ills were also important objectives, There were notable adva Ilces i 1 :LT els like II 134SS literacy and education, health, living standards etc. Unlike in the capitalist West where industrialisation took place at the expense of the majority of the poor and the dispossessed, With profit as the only motive, in the Soviet Union there was a conscious attempt to uplift the living standards of the poor. The eradication of poverty etc. was as important an objective as industrillisation or growth. The Soviet Union, under this first phase of het primitive accumulation, experienced more rapid economic, social and cultural growth and development thin did the capitalist countries during their period of primitive capitä| 1CCLIII lu la LiO 11. Il fact the Soviet Union experienced a faster economic growth than the relatively more developed capitalist countries of the West. (This was specially noteworthy in the crisis ridden 1930s). Therefore in the early stages of its period of primitive accumula Lion socialis II (or rather State socialism) advanced more rapidly than capitalism - so Imlich. 5) that it looked as if the founders of Marxism had been completely windicated and the ultimate death of capitalism was only a II atter of time.
Today, less than half al century later, the opposite seem to have taken place. Capitalism Seern triumphant and socialism is at best on the defensive, Socialism might mot be dicad; it might still have a future. But that's no longer a certainity - only a possibility.
19

Page 22
What went wrong?
Even after the massive destruction of the Second World War, the Sowiet Union ma Taged to make a comeback Il di to rebuild her economy. I think the reason for this dcbacle was an event which took place in
the sixties, an event which transformed the world - the technological revolution. The
upward trend in the economic growth of the Soviet Unign ended in the Sixties and the Soviet economy entered a period of stagnation (from which it is still trying to recto WCr),
Thc mistake was, I think, to equate State Monopoly Socialism to Socialism per se and to regard this as the only form of socialist economic organisation possible - as something that should always last. We seen to have forgotten that capitalism, for instance, went through massive changes in its evolution from the days of mercantalism to what it is today, Merca. Iltalism l8 WC know gave way to laissez-faire (did mercanta list policies also create the necessary base for economic liberalism, I Wonder). The Capitalism of today is radi
cally different from the capialism of Marx's days. The Private Monopoly Capitalism Carnagie-Rockfeller phase, (where a handful capitalists owned enterprises
and earned profits and exploited the Workers wh) earled :
meagre wage) has given way to the share J. W ning SystemWill le Public quote d C0Ill
panies (which issue shares that can be bought and/or sold in
the stock exchange) becoming dominant, the clear line of demarcatill between OWI ers,
managers and workers vanished. Public companies existed prior to this, but they mainly deal in government securitics and shares in railway companies), Political factors played a major role in this evolution. T: introduction of unversal franichise, the demand by workers and managers to be allowed to buy shares in the enterprises they worked for, Anti trust laws, Factory Acts, laws permitting tra de unions etc. Played
O
It WELS :45
a major role it of transformatic no exaggeratior capitalism took posed by the i b L1 1st II W CITT TIL
In der Welt 31 TE I don't think stand this. L'en Tialism the hig capitalism in grapple with thi were taking pl capitalism at t for most of lil point in this W the need to be changes taking talism (as Leni I grapple with th, to understand [O LT Lheories: til ctics, Il CT WA talism is going
ces 5 0F evol litic: a once for : rcm:lins 111cha
rock of Gibralt salient point exactly the IJI lism has Teacht (didn't Lenin
highest" stage will Illot ewlwt lism tills CT1 e its evolutional therefore capit is not II lich d capitalism of century. This forced another dogllas - that is the Only fUl possible ilind rnı even. In in lite ch firl is a bett iT t.|:
BREFLY. .
( Сопtiпш Baghdad and other A: sed food fic: stranded in Foreign Mini Gujral told 1 The planes could also ital back, Baghd situation had proportions E following th tgrdiction 0 by naval shi sing po WBF

1 this process 1. It would be to say that
the challenge Tigeoning sociaseriously and til Inørphosis. we fully underin Wrotic “Impehest stage of an attempt to 2 changes that act in World hat time. But is the Salient Ork was met her a Ware of the place in capi1 dici) a Llid to Ose changes and their relewa Ice i, str:lt egies öT s it that capithrough a pгоIII, that it's Tot
ill thing that nged like the T. For Lills tille was something posilic. Capita!d its final stage talk about the
") and therefore : further; capito the end of y Pto Cess – 50 alism of today ifferent from the the early 20th assu IIlption TeinOf Our fall voll rite State socialism m of socialis In :cessary and that ange: from this lyal of socialism. e end of history
d from page ( ) had told India iam nations to their nationals Kuwait, Indian ter Inder KurTar e Lok Sabha. bringing food their nationals d had said. The assumed serious ld had worsened threaten Ed infood supplies s of the blockathe minister
has come for us. We Marxists who should have been the harbinger of change became the cnemies of change instead.
This I think was the original sin". We forgot the basics of our own theory - that a system becomes obsolete when its relations of production act as fetters to the further development of forces of production; that this necessitate the replace
In cnt of this system with a more advanced system. We Were waiting like Job for
capitalism to become obsolete. We cilid mot realizic the enormity of the changes taking place in World capitalis II and thic implications of these changes. We did not s ce that capitalis 1 Was evolving, remowing the fetters to the further development of the forces of production. We did not realise that it was we, with ou T fixation om State Socialism, Who werc standing in the way of the further development of the forces of production in Ollr own societies. We have becomc the enemy of change; We hawe be come Dinosaurs.
I think the breaking point că Ille With the birth of the technological revolution in the sixties, The technological revolution resulted in a massive leap in the growth of the forces of production. The best proof of the capacity of capitalism to evolve, change and advance is the fict that the technological revolution was a child of Capitalism, of the Capitalist West.
(To be continued)
said.
India has accused Western powers of Unfairness in enforcing sanctions against Irap and has urged these powers to permit food and medica|| aid to be sent to the te TIS of thousands stranded in the Gulf,
Meanwhile, tנשח United States of America has wowed that the ra Will bag no Compromise in its stand against Iraq.

Page 23
Remembering Tamara Deutsc
Deutscher, who died recently, was one of those devoted and self-effacing Wives w H1) hawe subordinated their intellectu31 til ents to the Service of their husbands' creativity. As Isaac Deutcher's research assistään L, scribe, editor al Indi virtual collaborator, she contributed immensely to his literary Hnd historical àchieve IT ent in his great biographics of Still in and Trotsky and his other studies of Soviet politics. Yet her role in the writing of these works is preserved for posterity only in the acknowledgments made by her husband - generolls, but
apparently no more than the plain truth. What he said in the preface to his political
biography of Stalin could probably have been said of all his important books - that her "critical sell se h5 contributed to the shaping of every paragraph Of it.
Though Tatlılara, like her husband, was Polish by birth, they Inct for the first time only in wartime England, Deutscher had cmigrated a few months before the outbreak of the war (thus cs capi Ing the tragic falte of his father, who perished in the gaschambers of Auschwitz), and had become a corporal in the Polish forces in England after te fall Fle. St lad arrived from France together with members of the Polish at Illy, and Wils the Secretary of the Polish Jurnalist5" A55 cilti II. Daniel Singer in his reminiscences of Deutsch cr Tccalls, The hands me Tamara looked rather ill of and one of his fellows 01 lewe wa Ted him with mid
dle-class wisdom not tic) was te his time: she won't look di win below the Frank of Colome1.
The Wise dW is er Coll lid It have been a worse prophet." Thus began the life-long partnership. Slle Wils with Deutscher in EllTope as al correspondent in the latter stages of the War, with hii in in AI merica during his researches in the Trotsky Archiwes at Harvard and on his later lecture tours, and always at his
side making no typing, Teilding the manuscripts and articles rig tragically prem Rolle il 1957.
It was after death that Ta prçiminence as iT het C W II Tig many articles is "New Left
il cing the 11th writings which by Politics Ali she prepared 5:ye Till CF til: scripts of her hl the brilliant opt wils llll that w projected Len *Le min's Childh
TAILT II) elut with Sri La Ilık: fact that Lyn owyk were neigh sof the DELltsch (there is Lin ac the preface to Revoluti II" of reading the Illa Qver, Deutsche trigued by the skyi 5. Il III Sri LI LI I TE as a "peculiar Пember hill i ex plana Lion wil hirn in LUIlder
| || LI TIL country. Shea ewelts were b LI first I WP IS 11 was diceply tro" pect of a confr the UF gover y (Luth, After i d"} I1 ::i [1d the Ii these fe: Ts, sht. ming the ! Ce ( Lyn Llude o "Fytyk m (Int WC Te ills i agitated for it hu I 11a In Tights i
Jinlike hic T. ] DCLESchelly cd see the calisilt siderable degret fjr · dc milio Crati5ä lJIni()In. BL1 t sh

Te
tes, transcribing, an di criticising of his books ght down to his ature di cilth in
het husband's lar cale int a political writer ht, contributiոք to journals such Review" and pro10 logy of Le Thin's she titled Not Il e' Me:LT1While for publication Temaining TalliIs bandi — notably ning chapter that as writte Ti f his in biography —
id'.
schler's first link | Carme fl'OIT thc and Edith Ludbours and friends er 5 ilt One Time knowledgment in The Ulfillished Lyn’s help in Inuscript). MoreIt läd beel i Ilstrength of TrotL: L1 kl. 11 d. Te fers Prophet Outcast' exception' (I resking II le for an le Il I Called Cl 1 in 1952). Early ara Visited this TT ved at the tille ilding up to the rectin, ind she ubled by the prosinti: tion bet We'e Il שוt1 thון t Hחeוןזון י 1er Tet Lu Til t} L Collaterialisatil of : helped in forylon Collittice' Il Ric Tic TÖllmembers) which hic protection of In Sri LankH
1 u sbaikll, Tali mal ITL | long c11ough to ti)I – to : C.J Il2 - of his hopes tim in the Swiet it hIslf Was
like him - a classical Marxist, and it is possible that the present shape of things in her native Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe may not have been altogether agreeable to her.
R. S.
Economic . . .
(ட்ரrird frச நாஜி சி) manifested themselves fully only
after the commencement of cconomic liberalization (see Section W) - implies that it
may be more fruitful to explore a different pattern of causation: to sec if political decay was more a result of economic liberalization tha. In a Terellisite for it. Hypotheses of this na ture can be placed in two main categories: those which specify a direct impact of liberalization on the polity (Section W III); - and those which see this impact as mediated by the effect of liberalization C1 Sciety (Section IX). The latter kind cof arguIlıcı Lis, which El re the Inc. 5, 11 Cost commonly advanced within Sri Lanka, a re the IL1 ost complex. With onc limited exception I find them unproven and generally not very plausible, albeit very difficult Lo cither prowc or disprove. The hypotheses explain cd in Section W III are also not casily tcsted Cor stric Ingly supported. There is, however, some appeal in the argument that the large foreign aid inflow 13 sociated With liber Hization – rather than eco In comic liberaliZliti itself il tille. Il ÖTe fra T1111 T dict TiiiTc 5 else of thält term — did alt leist cinc Chu Tige HIld Ilu Tturę 50 Te HLIthoritaill tendencies.
It is ewid It that the Illethod of testing hypothesis is extre inely onformal. The argument relies heavily on general I notions of plausibility. This is not to deny the gravity of the proble IIns involved in Speculating Con historical counter-factuals. There simply scerns little point in agonizing over the inevitable,
Next: Economic System
Requirements

Page 24
We make I
7.30 p.r
 
 

MillionaireS
for the
y Saturday n. On TN
'edible multi-millions

Page 25
J. V . P. : (2)
Pre - Election Tactics
Bruce Matthews
At the sa Ille til Te, the JWP ma de use of its pote Titial el cctCYr ail adwaint:lige - by Tew italising the main political parties with the possibilities of cooperatio II CT as Illuc:] ei of alliance. I TI this regard, although President Jaya war de Inc IevcT wave Ted in his contempt for the WP. Other UNP figures (notably then Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa)
Went out of their way not to la y any blanco on the JVP, for the increasing incidents of
terrorism. This remarkble acquicscIlce Was II10-re tha. In matcheid by the actions of the DemoCratic People's Alliance, a temporary and short-lived federation of seven parties headed by Mrs Sirimawa Bandara naike to contest the presidential election. Overtures to the JWP, and cwell offers of cabinet ministries, gave the JWP both credibility and time to organize a major assault against the clicction. As one critic from the left-wing Lanka Samal Sama ja Party put it, the JWP (and the DIW) were free to continue their terrorist activities because responsible political par
tics failed to create public Opinion against such actions, These parties were competing
With each other to win the supPÇOFt El T1 i Collaboratio Il of these forces'. Concurrently, at least sole of these IWP activists infiltrated the UNP and Sri Lanka Freedom party to escape detection and wreak havoc, posing als party workers. (For example, a chief SLFP organize for Kalutara Was discovered to be l JWP operative only days before the polls.) It should, however, be Inted that not all thic violence associated with Lhe two elections was due to the JWP. In te TIn 11 party power struggles, political Wendettas and criminal actions un related to the JWP, contributed to the daily toll of assassaination and general mayhem. Most killings were unsolved and even
uninvestigated III ) Iinth peri Cid, † the parlia II nellt 15 February. I witing scenario, Lilo ElecLUTALE. wote in the pres and 63.6 per ce mentary electi |i LeT. Thus Lhe J 1st in their bi presidential ele succeeded, the alıd Tider w Colul ted, and a 5 authoritarian ru eHsier to challe It could ther Lihat the JWP I defeat in Dece had exposed security force stakes of the N tation. Those a less disrupti parliamentary e arly 1989. It bilb lc tlat Tills associated With tary elections ' Led by the JW political parties 5 ccd5 T disi 1 .5:St טקurת וw Iר)
The - 52 cild
concerns the C JWP, where strong est, and
is. The questi C is extremely c. Inuch lı als chal 1 sicc the WP of 1971, most
eçCI1 o Illic call:S reillain-notabl verty, un cmpl social and ec. ländles 5 mcss, wi alienation from ten found b dishonest and these must be
factors, such a wat in the: In C

for al enti Te five inding only after ary clections of Despite this unin55.3 per cent of tur 11 ed Out til idential clection, It for the parlia111 tv i months WP only narrowly id to destroy the ction. Had they breakdown of law d hawc accelėriaiiubsequent shaky le Would have been nge and Over com C. fore be argued let With a strills imber 1988. They hemselwe:s to the 5 in the high well be confrnwho were left kept el profile for the lection of Februis therefore prot of the killings the parlia menwere not perpet TalP, but by other intent on 5 o Wing usion for their
part of this essay onstituency of the its influence is what its idcology in cof JWP support Implex. Although nged in Sri Lanka -led insurrectil of the social and 25 of that tr; Lilla y widespread pcby ment, lack of nonic Inobility, |lage isolation and a political sysy many to be opportunistic. To added sewe Tail Llew s the 5ccessionist Tth. l. Il cast, a Tid
the negative effects of the UNP's "open economy'. The JWP has been able to monopolize much of the economic and political discontent Illent, LII dermining the traditic Tä 1 left-of-celt Te SLFP and the left-wing LJ nited Socialist Alliance leadership in these matters. Economic issues H I - doubtless the central reas CT1, why many a Te open to JWP participatio 1. As in 1971, 5 oo i In 1989, 20 per cent of the work force in Sri Lanka is unemployed. Seventy per cent of those un employed are youths between the ages of 15 to 20 years. Unemployment is particularly severe in the North Central Province, til: Stop Luthe Tin Probirince i ld thı : TellLively remote Uva Province. In the South, where unčmployment ranges as high as 40 per cent in Tangalia (Wijeweera's honetown”), and where 75 per cent of an entire district like Hamban total subsists on foodsta lps, local s III all industries (such as glass, ink, Wire, paper and sawdust products) have been all but eliminated. There, agriculture has mot benefited from Egitt ble T, the failel Lunu gam villārā projest 0r the Inc w Maha weli s cheme. In Uwa, there is both powerty and landlessness among pica sants, who live side-by-side with largc international agrobusines ses holding thusands of acre5 under longterm cases. The result of this is the Failure of māIny lWcountry Sinhala Buddhists in the rural areas to participate in the open economy and, by extension, in the democratic political life of the country. One observer has noted that the aliematico II, felt by the Tamils in the 1970s and 1980s resulted in their 'youth taking up arms against the state. Today, politics has come full circle. It is the heartland of (19th century Sinhala patriots) Anagarika Dharmapala and Munida sa Cunaratunga which is acutely disturbed'.
2표

Page 26
But it is not only in the rural south where economic conditions invite VIP participatioll. Generally Sri Lanka is still burde med With such a Tach Tolism1s as the system of political patric)- nage in finding state employTulent (un estimated 50 per cent of the formal' job Illil. Ikel). This is recognized to be dalingcrous and outdated, but remarkably it remains unchanged.
There are many other reasons why people are attracted to the J WP apart from economic dis5:atisfaction, III, p. Crtantly, class distinctions base di on Weath and status Will be envicci (T 5 corned by the un diero pri Wilcoged. Like Wise, s III C JWP fro 11 lower c:1ste5 iT1 e'Wi ta, bly re5eInt the sti – gina of their birth and fate, and thus relish the prospect of a narchy leading to a total rearrange II ent of Sciety. Others, whose lives lre dulled by lack of opportunity, seek excitement. They are hero-worshippers who regard Wije Weera and his deputies as Robin Hood or Fidel Cast To figures. And there are those who see in the JWP's inte 155c: Hat Ted of Indi: il cha Ice
to express pride in their Sinhala Buddhist Culture, (It iş of interest to il te thit the
JWP is Wirtually non-existent in the Sihal El Christial coilstal region north of Colombo.) Si Ich extre ILlis III || 35 beer i Tıpted in th1: Buddhis [ 10 131 stic Tider, especially ELITÖIng 11 Conks attending university (bhikkus constitute 24 per cent of the arts en Toll 11 e Tit FCW, LI po frCITI * 8.8 per cent in 1982), Their involvement in JWP has greatly concerned the ecclcsiastical hieTarcy, who claim they have no authority over monks who live outside their temples. In addition, C. A. Chandra prema LSL S tttLLtLHHL D S S LHH HHHS LLLL S SLLL a S S La LaL has consistently rested within a middle-layer of Sinhala nonpoor in the contryside', which he also calls the 'small collmodity producing Illarket-gardenig yeoman Ty’. This is, Chlindraprema argues, a 'social stra
LuII. Iotorious for its small proprietor mentality, ideological narro Wress and CT scTV:-
24
ti5 m. Their Çor Çılır cd tico 10 Tlic ables Lihle Il t} i
logical heritage tl I r m U LI LI to be protagonists. I all of these f: is something Te am increasingly element. Nily bank robbie Ty, 6 tage and murde for both the the JWP. Thics brought togethel ficult it is to zed profile of : The JWP holds le y els of Scict. sio I l s t i L11 L youth, and for
If TEASCII, 5,
It may be a cohere It ideol) disparate clemt: together. Ther doctrinäll substa ho we've I. The outlock has a so-called "Five undergirded the tion (viz On thi sis, indic pendell sion, the leftist the path to re six years after was Proscribed its ng inbers y There they con rigorous educati based on Wije revolutio II: Ty included a pur t 7 MarxisIII, ideas c) li lil m, b' a “philosophical their own. Fu Iewly-elected
1977 lifted JWP ideology . cally. lin its tio Ils of thic rejected armed text:Tal-elcct. Til Ieflectici a ki parliamenta Tian different Trim the Trotskyist maja Party ant coIlmu Iist part Peking) of the But clearly its to Inonopolize

mparatively favposition enLn bibe the ide Iof the land and its most ar det tertwined With lctors, hÖ Wewer, latively Ile W – strong criminal of the acts of rxtortion, SabiI have pay offs Inderworld and several fact. Ts show llu y difgive a generalia JWP supporter. appeal for all y, from profesimployed rural L Wide range
Is stil Illed thit a gy holds these Its of the WP - i5 Tit mich | 11.CC tÇ g0 Ç011, basis of the WP
lways been the Lectures that 97 in surrec
2 economic criCe, India. Il expan. Tiflı bır e: The [ :ını d volution'). For 1971, the JWP lind many of were in prison. dicted their Will Onill pro gr El Im IIne, Weera's original Il Dit i 15. This ported adherence but Wijeweera's be said to have 1 foundation of TitleT, whic: In the JNP gove TI) ment the proscripticom, changed dramatipolicy declaratime, the JWP cwali Lu Licom and stTuggles”. It Indi düf * Trii lit: Tıt ismin' , m ot Iliuch that adopted by Lanka Sana Sathe traditional ies (Moscow and 1950s and 1960s, aim was also the leeft. It show
ed i virillet dislike Of il competing left-wi Ing parties. As a critic of the ti me te Ilia Tkecil, “the JTWP" s 5:ectari: L1 i 5 T1 . . . emanated from a sort of political ego-centrism which isolated it not only from the broad left but also from the working Class.
Betweel 1977-83, difficences of ideological opinion in the leadership of the JWP widened. These were apparent at some of their open rallies and party meetings and in the party's then official paper, Niyari iya (Wanguard'). This was especi
ally so with regard to the “national' or “ethnico question, in other words with the JWP's
attitude towards the indigenous Ceylon Tamils and the plantatio-sector Indian Tamils. Sile, like the JWP General Secretary
Lionel Bopage, took a fairly conciliatory or "centris to position with regard to Tamil claims and grievances. Others regarded the gathering Tamil
Secessionist struggle als periphcTal to the Illin scio-eço IIImic problems facing the country. Up to this point, the JWP Tever directly Challenged the ruling UNP, and remained Sile I'll []. Tỉ ISSlles it was 11 micle:II about, such as the ethnic question. In a serius niscalculäti), hi Wever, the goverment proscribed the JWP and other radical leftist organiza - Lics, claiming the WCT the perpetrators of the July 1983 ethnic disturb: Inc.'s, Once again, the JWP went underground, *But", als Chandra prema obseryes, a n 'i tıp orta Tıt change tock place within the JWP during the first four or five lonths of its pro scriptio L1. The habiLually opportunistic and impatient leadership of the JWP, and Wijeweera in particular, had scen the CII QITI 110 us PCI WCT Of Sinhala Tacial Chauvinis II for the mobilization of the other wis C a pathletic Illassics”. Thus at this point, an unconpromising attitude towards both Indian and Ceylon Tainil aspirations became the most distinctive hall Ilark of the Ilew JWP political platform.

Page 27
سية
Why there's so in this rustict
There is la Lighter and light lia Titler arritungst these rural dansels who are bugy sorting Out trabacco leafirl is ban. It is one of the hurrieds of such
Earns spread out in the mid and upcountry LLLLaLlltLu GHLLC gHHLCL Luu LLLLLL LLL LLLLHHLHLLS fall, dilight if season.
Here, with careful II. rturing. lobacca groys as a LLLLLLLEE EELL LC HHHLLLL LLL LLL LLtaaaa0 LLLLL LL gikl... to the wallue of JŲ: Rs, 250 rrtill: JT or more: ani Illy, fu erhap: 143, Liral folk,
 

s ENRICHINGRURAL LIFESTYLE
und oflaughter obacco barn.
Tobacco is the industry that brings employment to th142 3:2C[Ind highe2st rıLurIıber Cof pe(pl2, Arid th&*5g prople are the Lobacco barri owners, the tobacco aLLLLaLLLLLC LL LLLLaLL gLLLHu LHHLLLLLLL LLL LLLeTS aHH a alLL
and in the barris.
For illerii, the lobacco leaf means meaningful work, 1 citfitable life Iid secure futur. A good enough reason for laughter,
Ceylon Tobacco Co. Ltd.
Sharing and caring for our land and her people.

Page 28
PRAJA MWA YA MWI
Bank of Ceylon has pioneer
Scheme linking the formal se
A Praja Maya Miyama T. O. He lends money (provide
his community using Ba
O He works round the clo
O. He is well known in his
without colateral as deci
O He decides on the repay
O Finance is easily obtaina
are made on mutually a
Bank of Ceylon Praja M
is a step in the right c
BANK O
Bankers t
 

(AMAA SCHEME
d in the Praja Waya Wiyamaka
cfor with the informal sector.
【分
s credit) to the members of
nk finance.
community and lends with or
ided by him.
ment period.
ble from him and repayments
greed terms.
laya Wiyamaka Scheme
irection.
F CEYLON
the Wation.