Page 1
O Liberalisation a
LANKA
Vol. 13 No. 11 October 1, 1990 Price Rs. 7.
MOS Israel's D
MARXISM, LENI
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

nd the Latin Model O
- Mick Moore
hA !
即
is
------ */ے
SSAD: ouble Game
- Mervyn de Silva
- John Richardson
- Reggie Siriwardema — Sumanasiri Liyanage – Tisaramee Gunasekera

Page 2
SSSS SSS
A selected list of
Sri Lanka Mosaic — Environment, m
and change HWC S/C
Seasonality and Health : A Study o environment of ill-health in five by Godfrey Gunati leke, P. D. A. Fernando, Eardley Fernando
A Colonia | Administrative System ir
by Dr. B. S. Wijeweera
Sepala Eka na yake and Ex Post Fac" Hijacking of International Aircra Sri Lanka Domestic Law incorpc International Law by Dawid S. Awerbuck
The Pilgrim Kamanita - A Legendar
by Karl Gjellerup
Stories fr0m the Maha wa msa
by Lucien de ZO y sa
Stories from the Cula Vamsa and ot
Tales by Lucien de Zo ysa
Conservation Farming - Systems, Te
Tools (For small farmers in the by Ray Wijewardene & Parakrama
Marga
61 || sipathana Colombo 5,

Marga Publications
tyוuחtiחסC , חH
15.OO 3 OOOO
12. OC 26O. O O
f the socio-economic
|Ocations 1 OOO 185.OO
Perera, Joel
1 Transition 6.OO 16 OOO
to Legislation: 4. OO SO. CO
ft
} rät E 8
y Roma İıca 17.50 225,00
3.5D 60,00
her Historical - - 3.00 47.50
: Chniques and
Humid Tropics) .. 750, 12 O, OO i Wai dy antha
Publications
Ma Watha Sri Lanka,

Page 3
TREWIDS
PETROL - UP AM UP
Transport Minister Wijepala Mendis told a press conference the increases in bus and train fares was necessary to recover losses sustained due to earlier oil price hikes. Petrol has been rationed in the State Sector with a 25% cut in supplies to all departments and Corporations,
EVERGIEMCY GOES OM
Opposition MP Lakshman Jayakody opening the debate in parliament on the extension of the ennergency said that the emergency had been going on for a long time and there was no light at the end of the tunnel; the motion to extend it should be defeated. The SLFP would Wote against it.
NON OFFICIAL
Mr. Anura Bandaranalike said the SLFP had no regrets about participating in parliamentary delegations that visited , SAARC countries to explain the North-east Sit Latio. He Would join such delegations in the future too, he said. The delegations were parliamentary and not offi cial Mr. Baldaranaike said.
BRIEF
S In the ha 1 sis Followig T|j: ST ILT
Options, all t li li li ted, ic-CCT port to the Affairs Subcom and Pacific US Congress by fer, Deputy W tary in the B Eğı ster II Irlid Sk: El Tc dicLiCT f
El Ilg: TLS : " Ç:, Hre already : Two: Tequest
uf payпепIS su i Internati ibrill li Si i Link;}'s d
already one-f. PLITT tårning 5. duction of i cՃ1Ild have st indi etc. III Cornic
Sri La Lika a UN for exem Iraq e çoi no Illi: Was Tefusel wes the III * FW to i E5 cca In Č: while II i II is w; siwe war a Tamil separati
Sri Lanka y lil Il di T1 l-Ars this year and liլT S 111 1991 f thı (bu Sı ild of its iпs in Kuwaii
äÜARDIAN
W. 13 No. 11 October 1, 1)
PTICE RH. TE
Published fortnightly by Lanka Guardian Publishing Co. Ltd.
No. 246, Union Place.
Calambiti - 2.
Edito: Mervyn de "Silva
Telephone: 447E84
Teml in Il the Oil Costs wil
LDMT
News Background SomЕ thoughts on Problems of Social Liberalisation (3) What went Wrong Isaac Deutscher (2
Letters
Politi CT flict
Printed by A
82Y5, Sri Ratnaje
Ma wat ha,
Telephoп

LY.
di currency critlit GլIIF է (111kal Hills thTee hree sile what ding Lo a reHouse Foreigll littee on Asia in Affairs if the Teresti: Schlf...ssis ta Il L. Secrel'e: ll ()f NeāT luth Asia. C.)Ilıc: foreign exchէյլ է r ther weh it low levcis. Illo c bll:1 cc Hipport from thc : Լ) m:InւInity, bլIt eht 5 erwicing is lirth if its exThrec: ils IeIn ports, which :rious political ct, nsequentes.
ppealed to the til frČITI 1 Eilti
sancti) Ts, but Ind Thow obserith heavy cost 5 my at : Li imc iging in experlgainst ruthless 55.
will lose 35 milliTı remit'ta Tice:5
5) Ti || ||ico T1 di lT1 LIIT Initionals work... If oil prices
824-S26 Irange Il in circa 5c by
ET
'll it ilig site i 1.
i: Tri ir 14
1.
(2) 1 23
Չէ:
27
| папа Рrвв Б
th1"Sнтаvапаппшttш է: Ճ|ԼյmԷյն 13, E: A3595
In orc than 20 million dollars this year and 40 million dollars in 1991, also depleting reserves. The loss of the Iraqi te: Imarket will cost Sri Lanka 20 million dollars this year all Inc. Altogether these 5sic 5, Will i La crease Sri L: L1 ka "s current accult deficit by 20 per cent this year alone and by 25 per cent in 1991.
I Ti additi CT1 L : ! I this the Social and conomic costs of the Illiddle cast Workers retur Ining homic to un er Tıployr11:T1 t., E4, Tc: iT1 c::All: Lll:1 ble.
The biggest contraceptive factory in the world is being built is a Free Trade Zone in Sri Lan k:H. EcILI c::A. tiOIn MiInister Lalith Athulath mudali told parliamı cint. The contraceptives a Tc for expei Tt, though Sri Lanka is the twelveth most densely populated coun. try in the World (less than CTC El CTC per per SCOT) — more den sity than in India).
State Minister for Defence Ranjan Wijeratine told journalists at a news conference that he was not interested in stat clients made by Amnesty III Lernational. "I am Il OL i Iltic Tc sted L E O LIL WH1 a L this 1ęIIOrist Organisation Says", the Minister said. AI did not bother to speak about the Kattanikuld y and Era Wu Tias sacres, they were not taking a billinced Wie:W, he said,
O All Indian student set himself on fire at Sir5a 200 kiloIletres northwest of Delhi, the day after three Delhi students tried to burn the Ilselves in protest against plans to reser ve half of government jobs for caste disadvantaged Hindus. Thirty-eight deaths have been reported in clashes with police on this issue.
Fifty Members of ParliaIllet travelled ticket less in a SLTB bus fro Il Nugego da bound for Jayewardenepura to protest the move to 'peoplise" ti Le )ורwשטחi LIT115– port serviccs. Later sic veral MPs complained in parliament that they were attacked by a gang on their way

Page 4
to the House. They were in the bus on theit way to parliament, they said. The Deputy Speaker said that he would call for an inquiry,
9 Opposition Lcl lcr Sirimayo Bandari Intlike cal lcd in parliament for a select committee of parliament to inquire into the police question. ing a Member of Parliament, Mr Mahinda Raja pakse, and taking into custody photographs and documents in his possession at the Kiltunayake Hirport. MT Rajapakse Wils on his way to Geneva to attend a conference. The Opposition Leader said that she was if II led that the photographs and documents related to 'gross violation of hu | Illa 1 Tights that took place i u liliis ců u Il try i Til the recent past".
The Opposition Leader said that this conduct of the police which appeared to have been ratified by the gove TI I The Illt beca, I ii c all tlie more C min fi Lis when one considered the fact that Mr Mahinda RH ja pakse was all elected Member of Parliament Whi had WUTked with dedication for the preGEFW H til af hlm 1:1. Ti Tigh L5. She Said that this un llwful act of the i gC3 Werin me It wil s yet another step in its campaigr1 tri suppress humil in Tight:5 activities al ni |ti Ilidhte human rights activists.
Plantation Industrics Miniser Lild State Ministe for Defence Ra Injian Wijera tin e said in reply that police acted on information that Mr Rajapakse was cal Trying sa "Into fabricited documents and photographs of dead bodies to be produced at it confere ICC on hlı III a. Il Tights in Genev; Mr Kuda hetti, Assistant Superi Il te Tident of Polic, decidei to take action promptly on the i information since publicity to fabricated documents of the type described by the informant would promote feclings of ha tred or con
tempt to War. The It, an act an offence u of the Energei he Illinister 5
O In parlia III Wijeratine - N lä. TäIläike Tefe ment made b. pala Mendis MT S W R Was El vocatik Blut I ILI5t 5; (lit. Till like Wii: ITIII. İşter ilit El C the is sista 1 τΓια το PS, ενεΠ
MTS BELI)car
Mr. Wijerat Will accept y Copportunity fa present probli: thTւյսgll tilt : cTICI 1 E i Ilvit parties to ji SLFP kept aw East problem With Inilitarily W TL5, tcd til: : T LIT citize էլ: V to eլIt tile The President El 5 they too W. 1: Since ånd bilcked t to give the Il after 15 mont thought Ihey OLIT Ty. N, ing theIll :) II complete that
III, parlia Ilu Wijeratine, Mi for II) efeilçe — 5:lid in this I äillegged abduct if Mr. Richa fully support by all right that the culp light to justic not be a llyw frce. While sure the oppo: that the basic Tal justice sho Is it ilt a In altural justic pect or acclusi be in Docent u

ls thc goverLil T1 EIT) Lt t) nder section 33 icy Regulations, Hitl.
i ent: Mr Ria Inja II Mr Aru TH BlIlrted to a statey Minister Wije
El t the la te ) B di Täällike prime minister. ty that Mrs Ban5 ia strong p Tinline Fugh she sought ce of foreign 31 SIT lill Ill Tibet.
a naike - No.
ne — Alright II OlII de'Ilia l. The ir discussi Ing the : ms was granted
APC. The goved all political ill it, but the
'ily. The Northh;5 to be dealt and politically. Le LTTE as they ns. Today they iT CW recks. spoke to the Ill | Te our people. rity of purpose ho. Il t0 tille lit Ciri fidelice. Bu L his of talks they could wipe out OW We are wipt it lid We Will
tit sk.
ent: MI Ranjan illiste T U T Stålte Muchi has bec ltյլ sk: aէյ tյլIL tile iri ili :L [1d IlluriciT od de Zaysa. I the still take hinking people its Ilust be broje. They should eid t) g() : 5cot doing so I am sition will agree telets of Ilatuld be observed. basic Lect of : that Eliny suscd is dcc med to Intil such time
as he is proved guilty of an offence. Therefore, I am of the view that the legal process Will have to be gone through. That is why the Attorney General has directed the Inspector General of Police to utilise all powers at his command to apprehend the culprits and deal with
them stricly in accordance With the la ,
N, 3 far Els my Linderst: n
di Ig goes the judicial process in the Richard de Zoy sa case his not been concluded. What has happened is that at the magis terial inquiry the charges High inst the suspected pers Jins have been dropp: id, In fact the State Counsel had infor med the magistrate that there was no credible material on which the polic officers mentioned by Mrs Sarawana Inut tu could be charged. While all of us in the opposition should sy'n patlı isic with the mother on the killing of her son, it should not follow that anyone should be unfairly in criminated. At the end of the magisterial inquiry it has been concluded that no charges could be fra med against tiny person as there Wils Il Credible material to establish the identity of the person of persons who were Iesponsible for the alleged abduction and subsequent murder.
The suggestion institution other police department should conduct this investigation seems in practical for the Feason that even a commission of inquiry has to depend upon the police officess to conduct the in Westi - gations.
that all than the
The article on the J. W. P. by Bruce Mathaws will be continued in our next issue.

Page 5
L. G. AND ISRAEL ISSUE
The Dual Role
Mossad
Mervyn de Silva
little know I MOSSAD ka sa case officer) decides to defect. MOSSAD, Israel'5 top inLelligence agency, tries to conWill Ce bli mil in Cot t} quit; at leest, not to go public. He refuses and goes in to hidi Ing in Cill I ada, a II di With the help of 34. Ca. Ina - dian journalist, Claire Hoy tells his story. Eight pages of the 361 page book are con Sri Lanka, He handled past of the MOSSAD operation in Sri Lanka, including the training of Talli "Tiger' rebels while the Israeli Intere StG Sectio II i Ill the US Embassy in Colombo was orgaInising training progra Ils for the Sri Lanka ar Lled forces, es pccially the STF, and getting in
wolved in agricultural projects under the Mahaweli project, sending experts to help the
government in various fields.
ISTälel files actio II i T1 : Ne W York court in Toronto pleading that its publication will endanger the lives of other agents. The book is banned. But an appeal by the publishers is upheld, Next day, the book had sold 50,000 copies . . . its first printing. (See INSI DE THE MOSSAD)
Thalif Deen, Lake House's enterprising correspondent in the US, files the story for the SUNDAY O BSERPER. (See: MOSSAD TRAINED TAMILTIGERS IN ISRAEL). The explosion was louder than any LTTE bomb or a Johnny BarraI. In a full, column-length editorial THE SPY SHOCKER, the DAILY NEWS, flagship of the Stateowned Lake House, fires a salvo. It's Tew erberations shatters the Complacency a stolid, incurably in Sular Colombo Establishmen E. (See excerpts) President Premadasil instructs the Solicitor-General to investigate the MOSSAD
defector's ill; TERMS OF RE
Reiders of it
WOWIN' Will gälle 1 "little" Ilagazini top of the st 1984, even bef. Arrived here tij teless Sectic.I. Illike's State IT-I gOver IlITleilt Lf an Israeli pres in 1684 issue De Ilt Llie SLFP ledeT obserwel the government bassy official ||
Tlew5. Im fact, National Scc1 Ti Lälith With llaith a "vague and When MT, Låks MP and for Ile I Of Defelce had Funco Infirmed re tur Il to Sri Lil II 1 is... (In 1970, M ke’s J. F. Hlad Israeli consulati.
Mrs. Bandaranai
*** AS ledeT of lead of the G ord cred the cl raeli Missio II decision which to bringing conflict all to our hole When this Islan te Ied With SO
It calls 1 a ces, regardless and political oppose this : bla tal In t l ttack interests of its people."

of
gations. ERENCE).
{See
MWAKA FLF FRy note that this has been in ry from June Te Lhe Israelis set up the IIMTS. Band:Lrtit warning the the då ingers of ence appeared III her Stateand Opposition that iL as met built a US EIlthat broke the she added, the y Milliste, Mr. muda li had given evasive answer lman Jaya kody, Deputy Minister iTuired about ports' of a rekä CIf the IsraeMITS. BLI Çi:Talaiclosed down the
in Colombo).
kic said:
i Lhe SLFP id Wertl I llclt whichl sire of the Is| dc 110LIII Ce this mily only lead he Arab-Israeli all its violence land at a time di itself is til Tel
IIluch Wille Ice.
ll patriotic forof race, creed affiliations, tc) step which is a On the national Sri Lanka and
On behalf of his party, Dr. Colwin R. de Silva statel:
"The alleged needs of the UNP Government's offensive against the Eela IIlists in the North and East of Sri Lanka do it suf. fice. Lo displace that decision in a Iy Iman ne.
''The L.S.S.P. condemns this act of the Go we Tırtıcı tı : Eld callls Lup) 01 all progrcissiwe forces in Sri Lanka to resist it'
General Wern Walters, forII er deputy head of the CIA and President Reagan's rowing ambassador, was one of the persons who helped stitch the deal whereby the US paid Israel through a special flı Ilıd approved by the US Congress for counter-insurgency and anti-terrorism programs. The US did not wish to get directly involved in Corder Incot to a lielma te India, a Lop priority, like China, COf US forcig in policy. An article (In this cxtraordinary man, Wernon Walters, published in a little known journal put out by ex-CIA men, was reprinted in the LG.
Three other imporant articles
that focus sed attention om al topic
that Wils almost wholly ignored by the 11:4 inst Teilm IIle dia yw e T e: contributions by the Israeli acade Imic, Prof. Beit-Halla himi, Dr. Jill ri Nede Twel Piete Tze, the Oltch Scholar, and Jane Hunter, who specialises on Israeli foreign relatic Is.
The point is that the Israeli issule is more tha In the St. Lliff of "espio mage and Imelodra matic spum yarns. It is a foreign policy question that sourced our relations with India, in the post1977 period, minore particularly in the after math of the 1983 riots

Page 6
ind the entry of Mrs. Gandhi's India as an increasingly importint actor il thic Sri Lankan tragedy. Rights and Wrongs are a Thother mätter. of India Ti power, and the reasons which Delhi adduced to justify its coercive diplomacy are realities. That Sri Lanka has every right, is a sovereign state, to choolse het friends of Sources of ex pcrt Els sistance, is beyond dicbatc. But the consequences are also part of an emerging oppressive reality. The anticipation of these possible probable consequences is the task of the foreign policy maker, and the planners of a nations diplo Inacy.
If Ostrovsky is telling the truth and an Indian SWAT teal was als trlined in Israel 1 hat fact goes to emphasise even more strongly the cyncism of big power Hehlwicour, And II dia is the region's big power, Israel backed by the US, particularly by Congressional Committee Chairman, Stephen Solarz, has worked tirelessly to establish a Tission in Delhi, It now has only a consulate in Bombay, with exasperatingly restricted rights. Israel cannit Tove into any Middle-castern country. South Asia is an important target but it has too many Moslem nations. Sri Lanka would be idcal base for an expanded Israel effort. In Jerusalem, India has always been the forward-planner' priority. If MOSSAD trained the "Tigers' too, infiltration of the separaist Tamil movement which has such intima te links at importa mL 1c wels with Tali mil mad u al Indi South India would be an obvious
l
Speculative theories apart, Delhi did make “security concerns' a major part of its case for '''intervention”. “Your Excellency and myself will reach an early understa Indi Ing ab ollut the relevance and employment of foreign military and intelligence with a view to ensuring that such presences will not prejudice Indo-Sri Lankan relations” (Jayawardena-Gandhi Exchange of Letters, Indo-Sri Lanka Agrecment 29/7/1987.)
4
The projection
person nel
insic
israel trie to its top
In the short
tory of the fiedged officer its vow of sile Ostrovsky, a karsa, or case go public With lust and total for hulian life two Mossad o persuasion, off silence, Ostro" Israel Wert I) ( and New York un precedented against the b But the str:a, teg run a foul of t c. “‘We hawe into a millic) an Israeli offici; collirt in New ba In 1 a s t i w cek. day, the book entire first pr copies.
The book, '' Lion: The Maki of a Mossa di C) St. Mafrir's F certainly sensat charges:
O Since 19 run a top-Secr: tion in the UI unit, code-na. In for above', 24 and 27 wete katsas who ri the Mossad ch business includ City escort ag.
A All a llege 1979 resignatio tions Ambassad beciluse he Wa sympathetic tow Liberation Org tap allegedly versation in v to Illeet Wyt Zehdi Terzi il

NEWS BACKGRoUND
de the Mossad
}s to ban a book embarrassing -зесret agөncy
bult ewemtful hisMossad, no fullhad ever broken ICt. WIlE1 Wictor WFly Wai Ti Mossad officer, tried to 1 is tale of “griced, lack of respect t' in the agency, ficers first Lic ering to buy his sky says. Then :) Lurt. II, TTC Ent , its lawyers won Test raining orders Ok's publishers. Was bold to he First Amend: turned Ostrowsky n:lire.' lanelled 11 after an appeals York lifted the But the next had sold out its inting of 50,000
By Way of Decepng and Unmaking fficer" (3ố 1 pages. "Es, F. S22, 95), is iCon:Ll. Aino Ing the
8 the Mossad his t spying oрета
ited States. The led Al Hebrew imploys between
rans, led by three port directly to ef. The T front t : "C", "Ork псу.
ly engineered the | of United NaAndrew Young c. 15 idered to ards the Palestine nization. A wireicked up a conhich he agreed PLO delegate
the holle of the
KuW:Lit U, N. delegate. The Ku Waiti's Tesidence was supposedly bugged. Israel leaked
news of the meeting, the book says, Callisi Tig Film u probar that eventually forced Young's resig
1 I III) Il
e II 1983, a Mossa distinker'' (informer) ili Beirut reported that radical Shiite Muslims were nutfitting a large Mercedes truck to carry explosives. From its size, the Mossal di coffice T s k Inc. W that there were "only a few logic1 targets' - including the U.S. coil pound. But the Mossad declined to give the Americans a specific wa TTL ing about the truck. American troops got only the usual Totice of imperding attack; 24 Americal servicemic died in the Oct. 23 truck-bombing of their compound. No, We're not there to protect the A 11 e Tica. T15,” C) Til Ille ELis a Il fiticial, ''They're a big country.'
"By Way of Deception' is hEL Tidly the usual i Il firmatika I. But it is not news that foreign intelligence services - even those of allies - operate inside the United States. “Almost every nation in this world spies on LIS,” said a former high-ranking U. S. intelligence officer last Week. Nor it is is any Tcvelation that Israel is Willing to Tisk America Ti lives to divide the United States from Arab countries: in thic infamous Lavon affair of 1954, Israel's agents covertly bombed U.S. and British installations in Egypt in hopes of the Arabs being blamed.
So Why did Israel seek to suppress the book? Prime Minister Yitzak Shamir, a Mossad veteran, offered no explanation. Timing may have been part of the Telson. Mossad was long regarded as the world's best intelligence service, Bu L it 1 a 5 lo St

Page 7
face in recent years. In 1989, for example, the British press learned that Mossad had beel forced to change its European base because it was Li si Ing a single Belgian travel agency, contra Ty to its standard practice. The agency's offices were burgled and computer tra vel records stel. AS : result Mossid covers were compromised.
Second hand
Still, Ostrovsky has a credibility probler of his own. He
says he quit after being unfairly Imade the scapegoat for Israel's bitched 1986 bid to
capture PLO leaders by forcing down a jet flying from Libya to Syria. He says it was his first foreign assignment - just 14 months after he joined the Mossad, according to the Israelis,
His most sensational accounts are secondha Ind – based In classified computer files and ora
histories,” Writes thic coauthor, Canadian journalist Claire Hoy. The book offers no explanation for verbatim quotes from conversati COIs hic could not hawe heard. "I have ill answer to thält," (Ostrowsky told Nei "Sisteek. But he said the Canadian gag order prevented him from discussing how he reconstructed key incidents.
Andrew Young disputes Ostrovsky's account of his firing: he first discussed the PLO meeting during 1 gathering in his home, not over the phone, he told Neil's Heek. But the Israeli leak clearly Was inst Till Iliental ill. his downfall. In any case, said a State Depart II ent official, Ostrovsky's book was "lunch III chätter."
Washington may yawn, but the book stirred a furor in Israel. It wasn't that the Mossad is above criticis Iun. ReceTit debaclės like the expulsion of Mosisåd officers frg IT Britain in 1987 have been roundly debated. The agency Was accused of failing to warn of a potential
tcrrorist attack: Isra cli court up of a Jerusalem L:Titlcize Nãht1111 Lhc MOSSal chi Wils no questior was the genuine New York laws employed by M. 30, 1984, to Mal Ells inted thalt signed "*an absol Com Writing il bou Ces in Lhe agency declined ally co book's contents, t{rauth{1T ()f the history "'Every Said Ostrovsky fine El Ild delica e gering agents; C hic plu t ä inyone :
The book is : grlu Tıt’s-eyc view C}strovsky's first { a three-year ap the art of spying di licy of H I now {O}strovsky is re In listered lit of He plisses a ser I11 Ty tests, a пi Self in the Mid säd ica dämy in day, field officer Tuits in corum Cather til de Craft. chain-smoke and a lock safe for police detec in the door and St. Lorie5 11 der Inte l cal rin ways to h They arc diri Illed Toll tile' - how Kidor - Mossad i T1 the TT ou E choice, a. 22-ca Finish the job the head, they : important, they loping agents. ““the Te Te three foT recruiting | emotion, be it. I logy; and sex. Says, “taught pe artists for the c
The Missill h long on techno Ilumbers. Ostrov Astonishment åt

last year an held the right пеWS paper to Admoni, the Il ef. And there | that Ostrovsky ATticle: IST ell’s it said he was CSS ad fra II I Occ. Tch 9, 1986. IL Ostrowsky had ute prohibition'' | his experienIs Til el 3 filicially Ill I'le ). In the Yossi Mclmiin, Çll Trent MOSS: d Spy a Prince, haid "'Crossed a lin, clo" by enda Instrowsky de Ilies El L. Tisk.
:: LITO Ingest in i [5 of the Mossad land ccount of prenticeship in has the illmeel. It begins as cruited, having he Israeli Navy. ies of prelimisc)) li firds li lillTasha, the MosTel Aviv. By 5 cirill the Teclinications and By night, they SWill coffee in Olse,' waiting :tives to break ttest thici T Cowgir Trogation. They ide documents. in the route to spot a tail. Els sissins - tTä
le. Weapon of
liber automatic with a shot to Are told. Most practice devemindful that Imajor "hooks' people: Imrey; "eWenge or ideoThe course, he ople to be con country."
e de sic Tihcs is logy, lean in 'Sky tells of his Seeing a 100
foot-long, computerized wall lap, in which tiny squares of light can be programmed to illustrate the world wide movemcnts of Is Titel’s cine mies. The Mossad's main computer, he says, contained more tham 1,5 milli0 m names, But he reports that the Mossad has barely 1,200 emploWCCs. Only 30 to 35 of thise are full-fledged katsas, he says. For support, they often turn to a global net W, Crk of thousands of civilian volunteers, called sy'KIYI ir p, whic Teadily offer the use of their banks, hotels, travel agencies and other establishments, ,portsטHc r
Hot Wir
The agency's self-entered Prag 11: Lisil” and duplicity
finally drove him out, Ostrovsky claims. Sri Lankan coImmandos and their Tamil rivals trained in different sides of the same base, with Israel selling arms to both sides. During the height of the Iran-Iraq war, the Mossad tipped both sides to the movements of the others' shipping, the better to keep the war hot."
HOW e Wêr repugnant to the Israelis, such accusations are protected under the U. S. Constitution. Last week's preliminary publishing ban was an aberration. "This is a complete victory for the free press,' said John Lankenau, an attorney re. prese Inting thc publisher. Tille Canadian ban was also likely to fall. Ostrovsky would be arrested if he returned to Israel. And the agency's reach is long: in 1986, the Mossad enticed nuclear scientist Mordechai WaDinu on to a yacht in the Mediterranean and took him to Israel, where he was sentenced to 18 years in prison for revealing state secrets. But after 10 days in hiding, Ostrovsky, 41, went home last weekend to Stil blir bain Ottawa and to his career as a painter and graphic designer. He said he counted on Canadian authorities to pro
tect hill. "I'm here, he said. "I'm going to see what develops.’”
(NeHKF HEFE }
5

Page 8
Mossad Book
One-man Commission to
probe allegations
resident R. Prema dasa appointed a o mẹ Imam ComIllission to inquire into and
report on the allegations concerning Sri Lanka contained in a publication called, 'By Way of Deception: The Making and Un Inking of a Mossa di Officero published abroad.
Thic Cir III missioner Appointel is Mr. S. W. B. Waldugdapitiya, P. C. Solicitor General.
TԷլէ: il LCI
intu
Commissil will alial in Illir L :: Il Tert references mildc in the book that Sri Lankan Security Pers CT1 el as Well 15 11: Th CT s if a Sri Lanka Terrorist Organisation were train cd by the Israeli Intelligence: Age I cy, Mossaid.
More specifically, the Cor Inmission has been called upon to inquire into and report on:
(a) whether any person who has engaged himself in unlawful activity as defined by Section 31 of the PTCWEnt 11.) Il Jf Terroris Ill Act, has received training by the Israeli Intelligence Agency — Mossad.
(b) Whether any Ileinbers of
the Sri LaПkan Security Froces were trained by Mossad, and if so, whic
ther any part of such training was i Tiparted to any person who has engaged himself in unlawful activity as defined by Section 31 Of the Prevention of TIThrist Act:
(c) Whether a ny III ember of the Sri Lanka. In Security Forces welt 3 Tel Aviv, Israel for the purpose of eValuating Tadar equipment for prospective purchase, and if so, whether they were deliberately deceived by being shown equipment inappropriate for the purբ0s e:
(d) whether Mo sible for ca
El Titical of bility repor tion project w cl i Dewe Which was World Ban the lwärd C) IIT: Ct si ta i I 18THE C. klow and thilt f WL:Tc utiljski p L1 T c: Lanka from (d) wheticir al II
hild given Mossad th: Were being ՔգլIIբ me Lit Lankan AI Slic inform ČT false. The Commi: called upon to
It Within IT (I this.
Spy S, The Sunday Some excerpts end of a con book published by a former ag the Israeli into What was sai the agency's training both 5ecurity serwi Tamil Tigers I have made the very importar Coid.
It is no Seac | dent Premad | 5OTTE TOT this
Israeli Interes the American | Colombo, sho and the dipl here be asked created consic piness within E: | office and ni
Its

ssad was responlising the preEl false fic5it for : ConstrucI in the Mahaմրոlent Scheme funded by the k, and securing if a part of the Ticcirillended :li Construction :15 Solcl B0 nah, inds so obtained d to pay for 115 el for Si
Israel:
y Sri Linkäin information to It such finds
Lised to pou Tchase for the Siri Illy, and whether La til 31 was true
5 si Q1 hålls been submit the final period of twin
ѓтосKer
Observer rarn OWe the Weekto versial new
in New York ent of Mossad, ligence agency. id there about do Luble toe of the Lankan Ce5 and the would surely blood of sole it people run
ret that Presiasa's decision, ago, that the t5 Section, in Embassy in uld be closed lomats posted to go home, derable unhapoth the foreign itary establishEr ffuriad W. D. WW
NEWS BACKGROUND
AM NESTY SPECIAL
Mr. Ranjan Wijeratne, State Minister of Defence described Amnesty as a 'terrorist organisation' when asked for his reactions on the latest Amnesty report. Other UNP spokesmen referred to the "favourable commonts" of the U.N.C. H. R. in its recent Geneva meeting.
The report, entitled "Sri Lanka Extrajudicial executions, ''disappe: Tances" and torture, 1987– 1990", said thousands of people hud disappeared or been killed by security forces in the south, Where the government is fighting the left-wing Sinhalese People's Liberatton Front (JWP).
|| the 11th theilst, hundreds more had been killed in what Am Testy Said WFiS Lle latc;t Wave of repression since renewed heavy fighting in June between troops and rebels of the Liberation Tigers of Ta Inil Eelam (LTTE).
In one incident in June, soldiers who had Teglined control C0T the to will of KallTill Illi aftcr Tamil Tigers had left, round cd LIp many young IT1 en, stabbed them to death with bayonets and burned their bodies, the report Silid.
It said the Tigers were also responsible for "Inu Illerous and grave : libus cs”, citi Ing an i Tucident in June when they held hundreds of policemen captive in policc station5 and su IIl Imarily exccutcd In any of the Ill.
But Amnesty said the government should not use this as an "excuse for like brutality that violates basic rights".
AITIl esty said the Sri Lanka. Il security forces had killed in many guises - in uniform, in plainclothes operations attributed to 'vigilantes' and in death squads so Inetimes directly linked to ruling United National Party.
"People have been shot in their homes and in captivity, bodies have been openly dumped con Toadsides, in fields and in Triver 5, ald othe ITS have been blir med II utilatel QT Imo ved to Other areas to avoid identification," the reprot said,

Page 9
FORT : Seige broken a
Muditha Dias (Sunday Observer)
other chief of the coun
tTy's airlined forces in the past had to face such a tense une asy, onero l'15 task as Lt. Gen. Hamilton Wali na singhic, Coill Inander of the Sri La Inka ATmy. No sooner thin the insurgency in the South had been put down, the real war was thrusted upon his soldiers, by What some believe to be the most powerful guerilla force in the World. But the forces under his command have faced this formidable challenge head on and have, last week, registered yet at other major victory in this most painfully prolonged war. Upon his return from the battle front where he visited the liberated Fort of Jaffna, Lt. Gen. Want singhe managed to spare some time te) answer a few ques
ti C1s in an cxclusiwe inter wic w with Mudith Dias.
Q: The liberation of the fort has not just been a relief to the country, but it has brought in a great deal of euphotii in its wake. In certain places there were celebrations with fire crackers. Isn't this too premature, in the sense that will it not lead to a sense of disillusion soon.
A: The main thing is that we got .
Cour people who Werc stuck in there for IIlonths out of that place, That was donc at a sacrificial cost. We lost a lot of men in the process. There were about 100 odd casualties. Getting the In Out of the fort alone was an achievemcit in itself.
Q: It has bec slid that the liberation of the fort was a symbolic Victory, a morale booster and only of marginal strategic significa Ilce. Hy w far was it strålegically important ?
A: We now have all other foot hold to expand Oil, We can use this a Tea for any other operation. So in that sense it is very important.
Q: It is believed that the lost difficult part is just ahead. The
most densely po Jaffna town prop above (North) of likly to result it C:15, 11:Llti (25. How Imini Imise Civilial II
A: We will drop the civili. Ils to points which will attack. Adequate to the people. " possible niıethod li:Hi, In Ç:ı Su illties.
Q: Up to last Was not th cite dowig of one : Wil || Eileir be a cho
A: I can not ca change of Strateg first get across d with ) 11 r I r II) LI r 3COO) Ille tres short, ticular point w directly under fir So things will ha
llt,
Q: You requirc for the air Illy. T in a Sunday new, day Observer.) I i Til this Tecruithe: to go slow on th {
Terrain
A: That was a w IPKF had two Jaffna town area about 6000 peopl be necessary so troy the LTTE o and oth cr areas. destroyed them i by that time the be Will us.
Q: The IPKF I the LTTE cul that it was reas But in spite of t crush the LTTE, that the prese warfa. Te is the ea will get into t le IIns l:lte T () Il – waTfiaTe ?

MEWUS BACKGROUWD
it huge cost
pulated part of er is by the arca it. This area is 1 many civilian do you plan to 1 CE sulis ?
cil fiets asking
go to certain 1 Ilt be u Ilder Warning is given This is the best of avoiding civi
Week air COWeT Iled. After the ircraft St Week : Inge of strategy
טLh ון ר) tח שוח וח y but we haw c to ceper in to Jaffna
We are about
Therc is a parשH 11ן זיו טיול ש-r טH e from 1c LTTE. we to be worked
É5COOC) Illic IIc en his was reported spaper (not Sri PIf ther c is a delay in L will you have * Operations
rong Teport, The brigades in the . That is roughly le. That may not long as We desthe Thaill Tid C) I'm CC. We la We In the mail land, people ought to
Ilanaged to push of the town, so onably peaceful. that thcy couldn't
Don't you feel 1:11ן טון וח ט"ונmt UDI sier Part ind you he serious problike the guerilla
A: Our chaps are better trained for a guerilla warfare now. We are now catching biscs that India läs meewer reach1 cd. Now the basic that was captured by thic STF, the base that was captured in the South that is A II llpa Ta, the m other bases in the Trico area are those areas which the Indians never got clase to.
Q: What are the differences in lhe objectives and methodology adapted by the IPKF and the Sri
L:inkan : " Iliny ?
A: Generally it is the sa Ile. Of course we are more used to the terrain and Our soldiers are defiInitely more motivated. Take a recent incident Eifter the capture of thic fort...most of the soldiers who were injured and brought to the hospital, after getting out of their sedation and recovering after injections and their semiconscious state - they have been screaming the Fort is ours. We will not give it to anyone'. That is the strong motivation and patriotism thic y hawc.
Q: What a Te your comments on the charges - Imade by Annmesty International ?
A : I have . Tio interest in Amnesty lInter Inti Ilal.
Q: What is the measure of support you a Te getting from the Tamil areas you hawe already captured. Are you winning the hearts and minds of the Talil people as you go along How do they cope with the language biTTier
A: We are struggling along, but there is plenty of public relå tid) ns on our part. There was a Woman recently whose leg was blown up. She was taken to our hospital in Palai a midi t Teatcd there. We See that they are well looked after. Of course colunication is a barrier but we manage.
Q: The army was taken una wa Tes recently by the LTTE who were
(Carrir el J.F. page l(P)

Page 10
FORE/GW REPORTS
After the Seige is over
Seema Guha (Times of India)
C)უჭას "უჭ“ by the Gulf crisis, and largely un notic
ed by the rest of the world, fighting in northern Sri Lanka escalated last week, to take on
the diline Insit is of a full scale "WWELT".
As 2000 crack troops of the Sinha and Gajaba Tegiments were air dropped to the islands of Kayts and Mandaitivu, Sri Lankan naval gunboats shelled
rebel positions. While the air force pou Inded fortified Tallil Tigers bunkers in a concentra
ted attack to clear a pais sage to the Jaffna Fort.
When the security forces launched their pre-dawn attack on August 22, the LTTE were taken by surprisc. The assault began simultaneously at three points - Kayts, Mandaitivu and Kankesant urai. The Tigers momentarily floundercd, un certain where the main thrust would be. But they soon realised that the troops were trying to clear a path to the fort.
The government cil slalty figures are comparatively low because of the precautions being taken by ground commanders to pTcseTV e Iman power. Thc Sri Lankan a Tmy realises that a small fighting force cannot afford to expend its manpower. The worst sufferers are the civilians 1iving in Kayts, The continuous bombings, followed by the Strafing with helicopter gun. ships has resulted in un neccessary killing and injury to civilians. The LTTE claims that nearly 300 civilians have been killed since the current operations began. There is however Ilo independent means of verification.
According to the Minister of state for defence Mr Ranjan Wijeratne, the government's orders to the security forces to
S
clear the fort i Jaffna hospital hospital, which mille from the down as it waa crossfire bct wick inside the fort su Trounding it.
said that once Cccici il clea from its bunk
fort, thic hospit; cd to the publi
However, Ll complisions in of the seige : Serialus.
It is first if of prestige. T afford to allow policemen, trap dark walls of Te11a in there in ting supplies t expensive and Ila thing has to Bill t the Illis sity with the LTTE 50 calibre gu In: aircraft. Thc in Fort Ellave 10 el While strategical ed 55-acrc Du│ no importannice, cally very signif has traditionally of power for an rule the north. the Portuguese di Over Ceylon, it and improved by they wrested it British took it and since indepe flag has flown
Tts.
If the LTTE the fort, it wou mediate and se sions in the resi threate ning the of the Prenada: No Sinhala lea to lower the lio

NEWS BACKGROUND
- what next?
tC e la ble tille: Tu Ilctico II. The is about half a urt, was closed caught in the In the garrison ind the militants The Ili isteГ the army slicting the LTTE rs : Tou Tid the | could be open
government's ordering the list Tc II Lich Indre
all a question e army call not 193 soldiers and ped within the he old fort, to definitcly. Geto them is both zardous. Everybe airdropped. Ils aire difficult firing from their at the Telief lcn inside the ectricity either, ly, the starshap;ch sort is of it is symboli"icit, The fon Tt been the seat yone wishing to First built by luring their rule was modified the Dutch After In 1658. The over in 1795, Indence the lic)||1 on its Tam
ad taken over ld have had im
tious repurcus: of the country, very existence
a government. der can afford in flag from the
Fort, signifying an end to the tcrolls hold that Colomb) now h:15 of Jaffna.
Critics of the government and opposition parties would bla me the President for the failure of his Tamil policy, and hold him responsible for giving too many LCince 551 T15 to the LTTE.
Thc army has already been gTumbling a bout the government's earlier policy of appeasing the LTTE, and forcing them
to close down a number of important camps in the north and east, Senior army officers
confided that at one stage when the IPKF was still in Sri Lanka, and the government-LTTE powwo w was on, Colombo was seriously considering handing over the fort to the Tigers at their Tequest. The military vehemently protested and Stopped the politicians from what they believed was a suicidal act,
It is obvious that the army will move into the fort, whether it takes two more days or a week. But a part from giving a much needed boost to the morale of the troops, and a battering to the LTTE ego, little would have changed.
The operations plans at the moment is to strengthen army camps all around the 999 square kilometers of the Jaffna peninsula. The security forces are already well entrenched in Palaly, Kankes enturai, Elephant Pass, Karaiti Wu, Mandaitiwu and Kayts, Once the fort 5: Securcd and they succeed in driving out the Tigers from around the walls of the rail parts, the army will try to gain a stranglehold on thc cadres insi de the peninsula. Navy patrols and the air force would also be called in to plug the escape routes. If the strategy of confining the LTTE to the peninsula succeeds, they will hit
Confinited of age ()

Page 11
Muslims flee villages ir
Gabriella Gamini and Vivek Chaudhary
""My 15-year-old son was shot in the back as he knelt to pray towards Mecca,' says Faizel Majeeth, a shopkeeper in Kattank undy. "I can never forgive the Tamils for what they have dibT1 e. ʼ
Muslims milkc up 35 percent
of the population in the cast and 7 percent of Sri Lainkas population as a wholc. They claim they are being targeted by the Tamil Tigers because they refuse to join the separatists.
Economic jealousy is another cause of crisi) between the two comпштities. The Muslims, Who arc triders and la il downers, have been the most prosperous community in the east. They have relied On Tamils for cheap | ab T.
The Tamil Tigers deny involvement in the Illass killings, claiming it is the Work of government for Tces trying to stir up anti-Tamil feeli Ing. The gove T nment's respons, e has been to create a Muslim hole guard, arming and tr:1ỉThing løữa | y'{ouths. This has added to the violence als armed Muslims hit bäck at
Tamils.
- The Ta Ilils killed Ily wife and child and stole ill my money. They are against lis, but now we are prepa Ted to fight back,' says Mohamed SehITct, A teacher in Era wur. He is am cong 50,000 hom clcss
Muslims in the OWI and lives in a crowded refugee campi set up in a school,
More tha II I OC) Tamil 5 havic been killed in attacks along the est coast al 1 d t h 15 lids hävic fled to Batticaloa. "Many Tamils hawe had their holles destr by cd by MusliIllins and Sri Lankan soldiers working together," says Shantil Kumar, a refugee worker in a camp at a Jesuit college.
While the Army and the gowernment are promising to tackle the Muslim refugee problem and pay compensation to families of massacre wict ills, only the local Roman Catholic church is helping Tamils.
"There is lo supplies, We . the gowler Ilment much for the are receiwing I. priest in Battic
Sri Li mka's is fast reachin portions als Wie diplomats say th people have be ca, LI se of the fi
The gover IIII destroy the Tig
IN DIAN oP
Outlook
hic Sri L.
registerei to Ty iI1 breäki: Jaffna fort by LibcTai, tidarı Ti Eell II on Til three-II on th-lo liet four ca "rapid deploym to give up the tlhe tw 7-Elmi Pili nali CHILIGE W fTt beca Lus; : ! Sniper fire. El across the Jaff Miln dili Li'l E in heavy Leirill C à iT fOTCe bQIIIbe ful per El til katı El Titled fi the 190) - () dil sr:
le trapped the 5e Weeks fT dation by the ing after the ing in the eas Jaffna triumph ille-boster for II led forces. Wrong for Col
that with thi
. The LTTE,
ing heavy loss campaigns, is highly-11, co ti wat guerilla fightc guard action.
tro Cops must, t

| East
Monitor)
enough food (r annot cope, and dccs Incot ca Te Tamils, So We to help," says a lla. refugee problem
· the sa Ine proinals. WesleIn at at least 800,000 in displaced beghting. till has WW clit) els at all costs,
| NION
in Sri
Inka in army has 1 significant VicIng the sicge of Cadres of thc gers of Tamil ursday after l ng effort. Earmpanies of its 1 ent Torce' häld :ir plan to cross -a-half-kilometre ay and reach the f com stalt LTTE entually they got ma lago on from dinghies u nder wer provided by :rs. This successby thic Sri LanOrces has saved ldiers and policeil the fort all on physical liquiIllilitants. Comimpressive showstern region, the 1 is al great morthe Sri Lankan But it will be Oilbo to conclude is the fight is
ewen after sufTeres in the rcccnt left with enough cd and skillful "s; t(» IT1 (plLi, I 1 t Te:a 1"- Thc Sri Lankan herefore, he pre
Lankan Army.
NEWS BACKGROUND
"Our security forces are ready to launch a full-scale operation against the Tigers, ''Defense Minister Ranjan Wijeratine says,
However, in the past three weeks the Army has made scant progress, and the Tigers, despite taking heavy casualties, show II o signs of giving up. "The Tigers hide and shoot at us, and ew cannot stop them,” says a soldier in Pullaveli Army camp. As if to underline his words, just six miles a way, Tamil Tiger fighters openly rode about on push bikes, equipped with AK47s and walkie-talkies more sophisticated than those of the Sri
Lanka
pared to face continuous haras
sment from the Tamil miliL: Ilts. Even ill the Sillila south, where the army had
Wiped out the entirc leadership of the Janatha Wimukthi Peramuna some time algo, political extremism is far fro dead. In fact, it keeps rearing its head overy timc Colombo claims success. This is not surprising. For, political problems cannot be solved by military means.
If the latest victory enables the ad II linistration to ower conne its si cgo imentality a Inti feel confident about resuming the politicall process, Sri Lanka Ilnay well hawe turned the corner. President Raasinghc Preпadasa and LTTE supremo V. Pirabhakaran, who had displayed political maturity in coming together to hasten the with dirawal of the Indian troops from the island, must both seriously ponder over the consequences of continued fighting. While their perceptions may differ, they cannot afford to overlook the fact that the problem before the In is essentially politi
cal, The ground realities may differ from time, but a lasting solution can be found only
through negotiations, not through clash of arms.
(Decca Herald)
9

Page 12
Tigers on . . .
(CFII inted frari page 7)
hiding in Sewerage canals from where they attacked. Does this Illean that the army intelligence is poor in these areas.
A: No. There arc small bunkers and sew erage ca mals in and around the fort. These were there for sometime.
Q: What is the difference between fighting the LTTE and the JWP
A: JWP was a cake walk. There Was no fight really. The army is Ill or motivated low,
Q: What are thic lessons that we have learnt from the Indian expetience ?
A: What we have learnt is that the region can work together for a co T1 Ein T1 purpose and We hawe got on Wery Well as two allies. There is a lot of understanding between the two countries. In fact there are around 150 army personnel undergoing training in India at the moment.
Q: We are said to be running out of arms and many countries are
reluctant to help eg, Australia. Collet
Ace Radio Cab
SS * Computerised meters
* No call up charne wIthin city IImIt5
A: We Hawicis er are in the proces: certain helicopte äTms. Is Allstra them the Tc ire . Il C011 intrics we can We are purchasil helicopters, Y-1. Eircraft Lc. Q: On a personal it fecil like to hav family members Your soil-in-law. A: I like it. My here and my son is
After the . . .
(Ceir fire fra.
out at the fleeing :leTi:11 h 0 1]h:1rd Il copter gllnships. COL1T5 e is els i eT As things stand, 1rth and e St El Stale late. A T1 Ander C. Il fide El prolongel C. decisive victory
Mr Wijeratne le Will be oblic LTTE leadershi repeat performan
Can bE Sumt One to WOL
Wehicle a CC
Receipts issued on request Company credit ava CaII 50 1502 50 1503 or
II ()
éệAset
Another Aitken Spence
 
 
 
 
 

ugh arms. We
of purchasing is etc. but not lia is Teluctant umber of other LITI L2. Il faict g a number of planes, attack
lote, what does a most of your in the army.
So I
son-in-law is
· in Wawu niya.
rн түндre 8)
! cadres through et all heliBut this of said than done. the War in the is heading for top army comd, FIL will be inflict, with no or defeat.'" is confident that to get at the p, and have a ce of his south
ern success, But Army Commanders realise that the JWP and the LTTE are entirely different. The Tigers are a well organised military group who have been tested not only against the Sri Lankan forces but also against
Luc IPKF. The LTTE la Ticore 15 still intact, The Sri Lanka II army may be in a position to
take over the Jaffna peninsula, even the entire northern peninsula, but lacks the manpower to hold it. Time is on the side of the guerrillas and they have nothing to lo se by carrying on for another ten years.
The Tmy hopes to persue thè milita Ints im lo the jungles, where senior officers here claim that the Sri Laikal Forces it reluch better cquipped to fight than the Indians ever Were.
After reaching the fort, there is likely to be a lull in the ar my offensive, The forces are waiting to get their supply of Ine w military hardware including 130 mm guns and Chi These Mig 19 planes. The next phase of serious military action is likely to be in October.
l'aires / Irriär)
Ooster)
ess from selected Stands
lable
501 504

Page 13
Some thoughts on Viole
- The Broader
Rajan Hoole
Introduction
Since 1 all talking about the violence in Sri La Inka (or Ceyl010 als I have km CWI) it) 10 411 international audience, I would like to stress that what We are Witnessing in my country is a Il advanced, Illalignant form of processes We are witnessing all cover the world, TE CCF 11 CS TT 3 Tl) a general huma Il Co Inditio T, with local variations. I read of a In Israeli joke which should apply to all of us we are all optimists, living on borrowed time, shying
away from looking into the deeper aspects of our social and individual psyche, in the
sure confidence that today will be better than to II o Trow. To illustrate what I mean, I Will take an incident closer hole, across Lake Erie. On the fourth of May, 20 years ago, U.S. national guardsmen opened fire at studen tprotestors in the Kent State University campus Wounding 5 and killing 4. The students were protesting against the War in Indo-Chin whichl Preside Ilt Nixon ha di only a few days earlier cxtended covertly into Cambodil,
I found what ex-Senator and presidential comtestan | George Mc Gower said at the 20th an Iliversary observance immeInsely moving and significant, He said + " As matters II w stai Tid, the wır il Wi etimai fılı is lı Tı finished. The killing has stopped but the arrogance that produced it sur wives, al Indi so does the agony, the guilt. We have not yet come to terms with the tragedy of Wietnam and 1lntil we do, America will not be the great Eind good country We
(A falsk girer fir Ffre der free for Přčiče Sridles, McCaster Üniversity', Orı farfa, L TTLLGLLLSLLLS LLLLLLLrLL LL CH llGGGHS kLkCCCLCO TL LLTLaCLCCLCGLSLLHHLLLTT TTT TTTLSS He las le co-alfar y "The Froke Pluras". Dr. Thransgarris (he Jfher af har H'ITF Prir Hriflered Fy Tarrard Pri ilifarrs,
Issues
WäIlt it to be". irc gain s tron Of the | ill:5 froI and peace': "The ness, where sim ::ıT1 di LI"'uth EiTe: Ei
The still delt Kent State, an A III e Tical II is it bol the Wietrial II carry the arger of that episod upper III à st in th that their buddie Were CCIII Scripte HIld killed at t of 18 and 19 it melimi i g. Il di memorial inspir thful feeling co 58 | 75 dä Todi 5 American SCTVice hit. We not read . to the millio 15 who were killed lives were utterly T ln A II merica, 1 g that was cynica The a Inger of : 11 em Ill W III nil 11 generation fact that the will A. Il le Tic: 115 || 1:1ve not to talk abo C). Il as if the what they had Eye. How in c) I Wilsills, a 5 Inises the good and the coilf science, can destructive pow: as so II e thi Ing tr |3 Ok i I1 t"), Thli: of George Mc Il:11t C01 CTI|-
We to C. Hy recesses that li: intractable cult
III which LI TgeITCW, W Ic Ci it way. Everyonic
of the July 198 inst thc: TEL mills of its massivt

hce in Sri Lanka
These words gly reminiscent Il Tolstoy's "War are is no greatlicily, goodness bs Elt“.
pr:}; testors at d 1 mill:Lilly y colling mםTT שt Illy Hg generation still ind the scars What was Lei T | Tlilcis, w:5 s it ind Ilaymates Il LC Wietmanı he tender ages 1 EL "Y" är With Llt eed, a si Tiple ed by their yol111 prises i In pa T"t i II memory of 1 .111etl:| ון Eוון 3 f :lny memorial of Indo-Chinese mlimed CIT wh 15lied belle оVегпnent policy 1 and Illisplaced. sensitiye you Ing 1 fTill 18 Wigstems frill the st III Eijority of si Il ply decided lIt it illud ca Try WCTld Te Ill: Ils imagined it te its occasional i yste T1 that pro
life, happiness T t 5 of IIC der il "]:1 ck 5 a.) Im 11ch
ar, his been left t toחo un pleasilל 5 was the object
Gowern's poig
e allt Ille Iltal We led to this
1re of Wiolence, inspite of the пLinue to Tum
is su rely aware 3 wiolence agawhich because : Iness and the
widespread belief that it had the complicity of the state, beca Ille L Illich publicised iIlLe II alti COILT SIÇä Idäll. This wis followed by it brutal military ca ITupaign agai inst the Ta mills. Inspite of all this I have hadi a nulliber of Sinhalese academic colleagues-personally wery nice people-telling me that the Tamil minority had no problem and that they Were unable to understand why thous: Ilds of Tamil you this had take1m tio arms ! While the country was aflame before Lhe whole world, and people were marvelling at the capacity for violent emotions amongst Sinhalese who were friendly a Ild affa ble at ordinalry til c5, a II e. Il tite L111 ple:15:lnt episode of their history had passed them by. Again, they had simply decided mot to talk fլb DլIt it.
In consequence of the policy of the IInilitary repression pursued against Tamils, the Sri Lankan government was faced with the hul II iliation of hal Willig to admit Indian troops as a peace-keeping force in July 1987. This meant that to the large Ill Iber of Sinhaics who had, perhaps un conscicollsly, come to believe in the ideology Of Simhales co-Buddhist suprcmacy, with Tamils and Indians as their natural enemies, the legitimacy of the government as a cha II pion of that ideology came to be in question. Thus the aathi Willkthi Palling or the JWP, which claimed lo be an authentic champion of this ideology branded the members of the government traitors and challenged the government through rioting, terror and assassima Lib Tis... By the middle of 1989 the JYP hal demonstTa tcd a capacity to p): Talyse large sections of the country at will, including government ministries and hospitals. Up to this timic thic govern Tnent was Serio lill
1.

Page 14
sly concerned about the loyalty of the armed forces. Many believe that the turning of the tide came with the WP death threats to members of fallilies of a Tilled forces personnel. While the JWP advocated a cause that evoked much sy Impathy, its brutality left behind great resentment. The government's OW T COUThter-te Triir Carried (311 t by an increasing number of pil Tal Ilmilitary groups left thioiu sa mids Of Sinhi illese you this dead or 'disappeared'. Most current estimmät es put the number of victims at 30,000 or more,
Many Sinhalese to who the Violence against Tallis had not existed, ca Ille to sympathise with the IWP and were angered by thic state's te Trot which was littering the countryside with CC). Ipses of Sinha lese young — sancti mics several ılımdrech i Il a V7,'Elek, M:LIT y Of them did 1lcot connect this tragedy With the dominant ideology championed by the state which in effect
11:1 die TELIT1 ils alicis illud i F1CT pe Tst 31s. They culti mot see how exempting the armed forces a Tid officers of the state from accountability before the law during the campáig til against T: 1ils, ha di cost the Sinhalese themselves so dearly. Having gone through all this, one hopes that a large number of them Woll lid i Til time make the comnection which light to be the
first step in seeing our way to Wards a solution.
A large in 11 I Liber of T a Inil
professionals from arold the world Whom I met in the early 80's Were confidelL tL wiclence was genetically part of the Sinha les e a midi Lihat the Tallils Were a superior people. This Was an assumption of our ideology in the Inaking. As growing children we were all influenced by it. We found LLLL OO L S LL S LLLLSLLLLLSLS SLLL L S LLKLKS Cres Of H II dired F Sillalese villagers and civilians by Tamil militāts sice 1984. Fev Tails connected this with the increasing brutalisation of the Tail IInilitant movement itself. When news of the brutality of internal elimination campaigns and struggles
for su premacy. W TTiilii Latit II1Լիկ է: ellerging from rationalised as
necessary in th things. The Iise (Liberation Tig Eelam) to a do I was ever hailed Tamil struggle,
wing the Indian paign of Octol e lirimäti Cf C: Indiam Hind alti parties reached portions. With
it of children lence of the WTC Illuch of Tamil ctյաTst:, :) Ile cr) Lil neself th:ı Li TH| violent people.
While many col Writer5 have Over dered and Writt Cause,5 of violen: own Society, Tai begun to face up barely begun to recess gs Of OLIT I and OLIT Social violetice Spring fI that vye "T:1 [11 ils ʻ 35, 5 ikiLIC Lus, care a ing and educati Ten, allowed C in their te: 1s, the Illud Ted 5, FL säIls With a 11710: of public concer se que Tces? Man: that for II o Te th fac t")T5, the: aT1s internal māk: link cd to Our pçı of Eliny ex PTC's sic als o a reflectie) T TT: IT IT of : cademic Free
We peoples i if the World OWI illusions, important diff Wester TI FL til 5 like La Ili kai ai Ili al powerful natior with a capabity Will Oil others, Consequences the yje lenget i Il decades all e, A foreign polic psyche cani con

it hill the Tail III started 985, these yer: terin pora Iny a 11d Il EL LILI IT: - f of the LTTE ers of T:1li
ni Tant positi(II) as L1 Initi Ing the Howe we T. follo1 military calmber 1987, the iwili: Tus by pro-India I Tim il epidemic prithe militarisatand the prevali “tT: itT' ilm so political disd hardly flatter Tilsi il T: Il tot 1
ncer el Sinhalese the years pina hit the c within their hills have hardly th it. We hlil We i 1515 fru III Whit mental make Up fibri: lill tlis "IIII? TH. W i 5 it who trici k such wer the upbringof our childhildren, hardly to be a Timed by id even til CLIit no expression “Tı for the capılıy of us believe a with exterial wer lies i Llr - Lup) which is litics. The lack Il Cf cČilicet is Il of the state expression and edCIll.
1 different på T 15 |jwę with Olli" Billit the TC is; El է:T է: Il L:: bet Ween Am d Co LITT L Tie5 El Silvir. A lik L. J.S. to impose its cal ignore the springing from its psychic for en generations, y guided by this tribu Lc LC wat is
built out corpses and disappeared persons in the Weaker societics of Central America, the Levant (Middle Elst), IndoChina, and even Ceylon, For us in these Wicak Societies history moves much faster and there is no escal p c froIII ou Tselves. We callel texport ill T violence. A corpse at the Ilexit junction, a neighbour, a student Or a colleague disappea Ting er being killed, beatings ånd tortlı T e a Te a part of our living reality. Those with adequate meams have the di Lubious freedom (of becoming refugees. Bu L histo Ty Works in unexpected Ways and the bell is being til lcd for the powerful and com placent Inations, Their export of arms is double cdged. Their own economies are hit in real termis when large sections of the World ecnolly arc spiked by conflict. There is a sense of being be leaguered with a rise il col Llr preilli dicci,
Refugees and the drugs tradic are fast changing the World beyond recognition. We are all being thrown off balance. Causes of Wiolence
This is a topic. With many f;ıce t5 = :ı illi . [] :) Single WTiteT
claims to understand this sill bject completely. Many admirable writings On this subicct 1re available in print coming from writers who å Te mostly SinhalČSe. The collection of pal pers Which appeared in Ethnicity ind Social Change in Sri Lanka, published in 1979 by the Social Scientists Association of Sri Lanka, was a path breaking work in explaining the conflict in Ceylon. Leslie Gunawa Tidene and Gaimanath (Obey sekere bill We written about the origins of Sinhalese–Buddhist ideology and have refreshingly demolished popular myths that have so much influenced Sinhalese pø lí= Lics to the detriment if the Sinhalese themselves. Kufitari Jayawardena has written about how this ideology manifested itself i Il class conflict ca 11 pe = tition and competition foT jobs in a restricted economy under the impact of British colonia1 is mil. See of the Sic Write T5 have been hailed als traitors for

Page 15
their troublic. I will just touch on one aspect that fascinates rne – that Of Tutionalis II. This is again closely linked with the C31 15 iderations mentioned 31 bl o lwc,
U der Llic il flle cc of
Rousseau, nationalist struggles were port Tayed in the imagery of innocence, such as that of
än i flint strLiggling to be bor and breathe the pure air appropriate to its nature. Although this im Eige still captivales the World :L t li: Tige, We Eliaj vivo klow that lationalism is a disease that is self indulgent, inconsiderate and when cI. Hered, even bTutail i 1 d. 5 llicidi, I, A Tecelt tragedy that calight Illy eye was the 5 llici de Cf Stalnis la 1, *3. Zihlmaitis by self-in molation, purportedly for the cause of Lithuani: TI ft cedim. The LithuElnian President Wytautas Landsbergi5 Was Cibligi EC ha il this is "one of the greates sacrifices that could halve been made for Lithuania", The des [Tuctiveness and tragi-comedy inherent in the whole episode is strongly reminiscent of something nearer home. Nationalism thrives on blood sacrifices and martyrs El 1 d 1111 y 50 metimes even conspire to turn li in Willing civilials into statistical figures of martyrs. Fortu mately for al II of us, Sovjet forces in Lithuania have so far been un Willing to provide mai Tty TS in anything like: significant number the danger is always there with any army in the World. When we peer into th e history of El 1 y nationalist movement, we find something dark and disturbing. When during the 2nd World War, the Nazis sought help in the elimination of Jews in occupied territories, including Lithuania, they found many Willing collaborators from amongst the nationalists. Nor did i ILIIIber of church-leaders infected by nationalism come out creditably, The Tice is Tı lyılıbt th:ıt tıcı state of sile Tice Hmid fear the has gripped the Church with a few individual exceptions, in the present state of extensive human rights abuses, Wits bro Light by its earlier CCCIII 10 då till with TaticItali, m. R:, Lher tibi El brez - thing some sa nity into the
syste 11 by candt V10 le 11ce : Ild Sectics of till along with Sinh: in the South a Ia tio Illis II i Il til here is greater standing today, to difficult to : authority.
|t i5 WÖrtlı Dutch, amongst nalist of peop. their church ca III : CLIl With record for p Jewish del || CWS Coccupa til 31.
I think it is Ile's imaginati. suggest that the |CSL 2 T TE LIT a Te encapsulate of two lead Sib lil mm | Il Bil Idi Fra 11 Oxfordi having earned debater, ind er colonial Ceylor man with p I His defiti tely deserte di h di guest of the a political Ilo' young Tamil im red by Maha pendelice ". BLITT I like independent. Ce. feder:11 in of 5 a decide later, a Teml Eirikable c! ill a public Southern Win
Ba dä r: II:iike prepaired to sa for the sa ke o the Sinhalth t. to try to hinde I am determin he 15 til Light il I ever forget' Organ 26 Jan 11:11 thle meeting en 1 MT 5. S. A. 441 i kened MIT. III || CT HIT E S1 ili lege C m him ewery pri to Teach the g This Wi:15, 31 ti scholars had p origin for the

2 L1 Ini Ing sectarian ideologies, large Church well le se nationalis IIl ili With Till
| NTLIFi. "NW"|1|c * IT L1 tull linderit has become
rega i Ill the morall
noting that thic the Clottiles, a ling with Il d Iinh Tichy, a very creditable rotecting their dLiri Ing the Nazi
i mot stretchi Tig 1 to Illich to fites (f Sin halil rationalis Ins di Le istic: .tSחeחו) pאing e Ta na like ret LITT, ed i 1 the 1920'si, distinction is a itered politics in | als a moderatie Cogressive ideas. -D1Eוון סט newer im. In 1929, als Youth Congress, vement of mainly tellectusls inspi(Gilli hi'5, illic, tiliaוןI חt iון שm * decl: Ted that ylon must be a tates, By 1939, there held been 1a Inge. Speaking Ileeting in the of Balapi tiyal, said: I crifice my life ,mu mity ותנf my ct If anybody were progress, ed to see that les som he will (Jaffna Hindu y, 1939). When ded, riile Worlin, beyginawa Tidenal, Ball T31|| alik c t') appealed to the munity to give 55 hil C2 H53.5 til Ce all if freedom." The Whe II 501712 osited an Aryan Sinhalese, and
Sinhalese politics had becomic infected with thic Inti. Il af Aryan racial superiority, then being carried to a tragic climax by Hitler in Europe. In 1956 Bildaranaike swept the polls to become Prille Minister on a collilunal slogan pledging to lake Sinhalese thic scle official language. Ironically, the Til mil opposition to him was led by the Federal Party leader Mr. Chelwanayaki Iih, who demanded a federation of Ceylol. BlindaTämällike vyä, si Indt sila 3 w to realise that he had painted himself into il ccTLE-T where thic II ly TEA titi 1:1- KS SLLLL SSLLL SaaS S LLLLLLLLSS S LLLLLL accept the government i II ColoIn b0 vås brute forge. He duly held til Iks with Chelwa Inayakal III to il on Olli iiffcTcIice's a Tid both signed il på Ct, k ni C) W In as the Bandara nai ke-Chelwil Inaya - kam pact, envisaging limited autonomy for the Tamil proVinces. He was prevented from implementing this pict by his defeated electiil rivals, th: United National Party, Ilow mobilised by future president Jayewardene on the basis of the same ideology of Sinhales: supre Tina cy, calling the p:l ct : sell-olut to the Tallils. DLITilg the 1958 Tacial yi)|ç ilçe that followed, Illany Tamils who knew Bandaranalike personally calle L WEA y With the feeling th:lit le h:1{1 111111 Self becûrîle infected with the frenzy of the richting änd displayed Sentiments, bith Wille L Tid Llycha Title Levyä Til s Talmi15; III 1959 BT1. dara laike was assassinated by a Buddhist moink, as an al leged traitor to the Sinha les e
Cğı il 5 te!
The positive side of Banda
ran like's legacy was largely
overshadowed. Hij government
took the first significant steps in creating an industrial base and placed the country on an a micable footing with India by nuo ving the island from the western camp to become a
leading member of the N.A.M.
Banda. Tänlike als Co set significant precedents in the de Illolitio II of democratic institutis) [15 when he personally interfered (Соттшгін нғd ол Page 15)

Page 16
Problems of Socialist Third World Country:
Russian Debate
Sumanasiri Liyanage
Recent : vcnts in Russi ald Eastern Europe have again posed the old problematic of the possibility of socialist transition in El Country where capitalistic laws of production and distribution a II e Incot fully operative and where as a result, the economy is basically under developed and backward. This essay intends to shed some light on the issue by re-exa II i Elling the dcbates which took place in prc - and post revolitionary Russia.
1. Classical Marxian
Probe Tatic
This is not a classical IlarXian Problematic as Marx has nie Wer addressed this problem in a scientific manner. He was, throughout is entire life, a great enthusiast of the capitalist It Tansfor Illation and its multi-faceted capabilities. In the Coll munist
Manifesto, Marx and Engels W. T. I C
Constal III. Te Wolution ising of produl
cti III, LI II i II te TTLupted list Lirbirice of all social conditions, ever lasting Luncertainty and agita, tion distinguish the bourgeois epoch for all earli: crics, All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of anci. ent and wenerable prej Lidices and Cop III 10113, 4 re: SW et a Way, all Llewformed ones become antiquaited hefore they can ossify. All that is olid mets into Ei, all that is holy is profil ned, and man is at LLLLLL S S LaLHHHHHLLL Hu LaaCse S HKLS S LLLLa šenses, his real Conditions of life liri il hiss relations with hiss kinId. (1969: 110)
They TTCe5 OF "bättre co w III
tlit the capitalism would
El Chile se Walls Td To Tce “the barbarians” intenSely obstinte la trell of forei
gners to capitulate. However,
anticipated
Epir Treff Lys" Eclip Tiflis, Liversity if Perrirferifyrr, Srí Links.
TWIE Firar fharrik Forg/. P. Karrilar GJYr Afr. K. Selvara frigir for their cỏ"##ff (TTTH =#forỉư| help.
as Brenner (1977 bill t t Tall de biased sin in itself of transfor Iliri formations. N: trics in Asia, A America but all East en part of ned, in Marx's pre-capitalist. the Russian Pol Marx to exter. projection dew basis of capital to those coll I til ligt tri Ils for II not to be rila Lei Teply to Za 5 li
Flag i'r greu'r 'i'
Corrse si. E. caps fr fferrefore expr COLITitres of Wes, e FFFFF3F (o'r Sfi
While prepar he contemplated por Theity of ca, til bil L Tid its thic World Ilark Russia to skip tal listic phase , by reorgia Iizing Society on the tive OWI ership.
fr ffy" flere fire y Jefe Ferrer č& Fifa'is f sy'Isfer77 ris: Fraser III . gradual rece frr: #ff, či a Jiĺify Él'offrir l'Flip Hol frir Eri Iiir is ri Affer" , " ' " crearer for the că frr:FF f, ff fra y Erie, tii g . p q b inı t rgf f fĖJIH 'Tre'r i'r ar FF
irig, flfitri", FSF, F2I
T Iloil-ric nation in its t his reply to Za shı33 W Lihat Marx ç: Tefull i Il irtici I8:IlL SC Lilligt Tell til to the bilick WaT di societ

Transition in a
Re-reading the
) correctly points capitalist expanis not capable g pre-capital list it. Only the coulAfrica and Latin Sly the Se ill the * Europe remaiLille, basically III this context, u lists compelled ld his socialist cloped on the istic development ics Where capililtic II appeared "ializing. Til his chı Hic Write:
finally" of his fallisr rr Irrisfa rrriar Farr.) Cssly restrici Fi fej the
terri Europe, Mary's ΙΤΗίπ Τη 3:1, 34 )
iTng this reply, that the conte Illpitalist producdomination of et would enable Over the capiif develop II e It its economy and bE1 SiS 3T c: O| Icc -
HC Inted:
fire: "para fe ffe pf - 5 flғұelopтeгi By The hoff Jr hariarg fra ΥΓτη Γρίθμίτα. Γι πιαν
-|ווחה, ותפים rלrri-Fiוויי T: Ja'a, Inachine-issisted
rra' Frar sira rari filRussida fi Marraf irrifiries. JFIF filip II de flere Fr Terr F Tee ir I ffri preverrr tre Fire fissr FC St. Flfire socii Fr. Jfr sy s ferr Joerff socier y ï, ferrripiiri siis ) fir 15frr:Iiri
1 LISin Cf this :Xplicit ful II in 5 LI Ilich seels, Ldo, was SC Ille what Lula ting a diffeprojection in underdeveloped ies, Moreower,
Engels has qualified it by saying that sluch :: Ilo WeTinct to WaT dis socialism could (ccur if and only if it was assisted by the proletarian r. W ty Lu LiCl in Œe Trilamy.
2. Pre-revolutionary
Russian Debate.
There Were three conceptions of the CCIII ing Russia Ti Tewolu
Lion, Let Inc. present them in brief. The minority of the Social Democratic Party in Russia belter known as the
Mensheviks visualized the coming Russian revolution as bourgeois democratic and ther fore as one which should be led by the Russian bourgeois assisted by the workirs and peasants. The new regimee Would complete the tasks of the bourgeois revolution thus paving the Way for the bourgeois development of economy, polity and society. The majority of the party led by Lenin argued that the Russian bourgeoisie were Inu II letically weak and non-independent Andil the Tefo Te una ble to 31 CC 011 plish the his - toricill Tole played by the bourgeoisie of the West. As a result, the class Ch f proletaria Ins Which was becoming Illinerically strong and concentrated in major cities which were the nerve centres of the Russian Si Coci-political life : Tid the peasantry which had a rich his
tory of rebelliol would take over the leadership of the Conling revolution Ind com
pletic the task of the bourgeois revolutio I. Lenin's formula is Full of contradictions, First, what is the intra-relationship between the proletariat and the peasantry Within the new politicall for Illation"? Seco, Tici, wi 11 the proletariat and peasantry in power adhere to the same CC. Thomic and social programme of the bourgeoisie? Third, if the

Page 17
imperialist chain is severed in a rena had comp its weakest link in Russia and ment to intro if it plays the role of catalyst measures which, in awakening the working class deviated from t in the capitalist West, what gramme. Under Would be its impact on Russian ni5m Which as Tl development? Lenin may have points olut, wa: alLl S K LHCLLLLLC LLLLS S LaaaaLJ S aaLLHHL S LLLL aLLLLLL SLLLLLHH LLL contradictions in his formula ill the banks, but he made no attempt to the transport solwc - thcm. Furth cr morc, he nationalized, C never rulcd out the possibility of production w. of capitalistic development in hands of the sm Russja under thę workers, and artis al Ins Te Illi peasants, government. This as - owned. pect can be Seen in thc igra- (To be c. rian programme of the Bolshe- some thought Wiks and in the distinction made by Lenin between the (Currir réel Jr Prussian and the American With the northal Im Üblic of alig Trial. Il tril 15 for Ill:1 til civil alth Tities to capitalism. The third con lossumed Po" ception of the Russian revolu- Police Was O. tion emerged in an attempt to inter fee well solve these contradictions in a Protestors in G logically, CC) hCTent ||1:1|1|1:T: II front Cof the This was Trotsky's theory of assaulted by Sinh permanent revolution. Trotsky A lateT ILL.Ilife. emphasized that the peasantry process Was the as a class was incapable of Tamil detainee playing an independent role in Prison. In July the historical evolution. There- normal circur fore, it would follow cither the should have be bourgeoisie or the proletariat judicial inquiry in the coming revolution. Hence take place an 1. the regime which would emerge belief of high after the revolution in Russia in these killing: would be a dictatorship of the was not to be proletariat assisted by the pea- The ironic leg: santry. Such a regime will not Who Was Prepai confine its programme to mere the Sinha lese n social reform bit would under in 1971 and T tilke radical Social transfor- in 1989, whe Illnation. Hic also adopted Engels, beilig littered w idea of European revolution housands of All three conceptions of the there was no Russian revolution had one thing them, and th cos in con Illon, nancy the imme- the were the in diate tasks of the revolution by te TrÕIT. Thes Were not socialist, in a very real
of the ideology 3. The debate on the da I'analik c helpe
economic programme of life.
the post-revolutionary J:1y eʼwardeI1e Y
regime. Capture the ide The revolutionary government of Sinhalese s which came to power in Octo- Banda ra naike v ber 1917 began to implement over the destin in its broad out: li ne Lenino's Iha tion for 1 1 : plan for the reorganization of The end of his the national economy. The the Sinha lese W immediate programme of the determination - government was confined to the at the ti T1 e C establish Inent of workers, control in 1948. Apart ower production. However, the II y hal wing bet developments in the political dependent ecc.

elled the governduce a scit of
in all respect, he original prothe WLT CC 11 mulTrotsky correctly s l m outgrowth orical incccssity, big factories and
system were ) inly thic means hich werc in the
all pea sants and ned privately
intinued)
S. . .
{I.j שינו:ק נתם,
functi J ni ing of Shortly after ver il 1956, the rdered lot to peaceful Talli alle Face Green, parliament were La lese ho odlums.
station of this killing of 53 s in Weikaide 1} . U der Stices tle en a th or ough
This did not ist a wide5pTeild .evel complicity
3. The country the sa me again. Licy of El IELT Ted til die for Fition was that 01Emantlyין טrיtו the Country. Wiis 'ith corpses of Sinhales e young law to protect ie: Who Wept for selves overcoille e victims were
st 15, Wictims
t. yy hČhi Ball - d give political
Who Set Out Lo (}logical ground upremacy from was to preside y cof a troubled ears from 1977,
career left the 'il f: less selfthan they had if independence
fiTC3, II, the coul:Ille if I TOT
nomically and
saddled With an explicit Indian w eto in its affairs, more importantly, the democratic machinery was in shambles. The police and the law enforcing authorities had become caricatures of What they were and the results of elections were the object of Widespread skepticism.
The carccr of the Tamil nationalist lcader Mr. A. Arnirthali nga Ill bore several simil: Titics to that of Bandaranaike. Graduating from the University of Ceylon in the late 40's he possessed superior debating skills. Sulcceeding Chelwal Tayakam ti) the leadership of the Tamil United Liberation. Front, his piirty Wall relil Tika ble electoTill si ccc 55 i Il 1977 in the pledge of a chieving a separatic Tamil state. Though the party was formally pledged to nonviolence, speeches by its leaders and its style encouraged violent se Il timents among the young. While publicly milinta ini Ing that the party was working to wa Tids, sepa, Tati) 1, 13thing was do The to mobilise the people or to build up on orgaпisation to work towards SelfTeliam C: Instead, the TULF had secret talks with the government for a compromise, while the government time and again drove home the helpless El In di hul milialting position of the TULF and the Tamils through bouts of repressive violence. The Illi litant Illnow :: Ile It Was in 1980 still in its inception and Was to sill all to challenge the
g0vernment. Many Tamil obServers beco II e convilled that large section of the TULF
leadership was not really collIIlitted tı illi — yiyle ilce allıd WyleTe In it against using the Illilitants the detrict of their electyral rivals. The Lise of the word traitor was significantly introduced in tch Tamil political discourse by the TULF in the early 1970's to describe
their tiwalls in parlia ile Tı tary politics, In May 1983, in the face of a sillall, but rising Taniil Illilitancy, the govern
Incit announced a prop () sal to amend the clergency regulatio Ils to allo W the security forces lo disposic of dead biodies With tյut in quest,
15

Page 18
For The V
In Fashiona
Gents and Ch
Visit
FARLINE
(PVT) I
MO. 1, STAR TO VVER BUILDING
HEAD OFFICE: NO. 36, KYNSEY
COLOWBO 8.
TE|ëx : 2 1 380 FAIRLIN CE
Fix 69 89 2 3
C:1be : "FAR LA D'Y' COLOMBC)
Phone : E 8 5 3.3 7, 5 85 3 3 Ց 6 853 39, 6991 46

tery Latest
ble Ladies,
ildren's Wear
EANA PORUJAMA
AMATTED)
BA, GATALLE R OA D, COLOrVI BO 3,
ROAD,
Factory: 31-33 HOTEL ROAD, MOUNT LAWINA
Phone : 71 – 7 6 8 8 – 4 3 1 1

Page 19
ALWABE.ARALASATWO WW -- 3
Relevance of Latin A
Mick Moore
uilding in particular on the
Latin American debate, one can distinguish five separate but related hypotheses
potentially relevant to Sri Lanka which relat c c conomic libcra, 1 ization to a Tcquire Ilent for a certain kind of political order.
Lo y a Fall order. One can im the first place casily dismiss any notion that when the UNP took power in 1977, Sri Lanka was disorderly in the sense that persons and property were at regular risk from violent, criminal and extra-legal coercion, True that there were Widespread attacks on Tamil properly a month after the 1977 general elections, and that these were repeated again on a smaller Scale 01 5 eVeral occasions before the major eruption in July 1983. But these were not symptomatic of the situation more generally at that time. STi Lanka was in fact a relatively peaceful and law-abiding coultry. Lawlessness was not a significant obstacle or disincentiwic to trakte or econo Imic EccliInulation. It is in the more recent period that lawlessness has become widespread. Depoliticizatio. The next three hypotheses are all variations On ole the IIle: he idea that ally government committed to economic liberalization is likely to meet with such resistance from groups which have wested material interests in statist economic policies that it must in oTie way oT another be come more authoritaria 1 in order tó Overcome this resistance. At an abstract level such arguments appear highly plausible. The actual or anticipated benefits of ecolonic liberalization are relativel y reino te and intan.- gible as far as most people a Te conceT1cd: al more efficie Ft cConcily too row, and, the refore, higher wages/lower prices Timore jobs than would otherwise have been available. By contrast, the benefits of Statist
ចCD T10 mic Te
rity, fo otl : price controls be i Tırılı edit4 ti This, after
theorists argu I mechanisll Lill Ilarkets beco With politicall and burdens: 1 Te forlled to blic policy in the sic tangible long-term detr Selms at least pothesis that
mcasures tend prchid Slp ril til 11 Wherea 5 rallizatio 1 does Zing Tegimn es :1 sured to beco il o Til er to Te de mälds Illa de This general Il
led below it
distinct sets of organized indu the electorate;
De-politicizi irid isir riiiiI I irrere , Cof gove Tımcnt Titte econo Imı be curtailed by Organizcid cc on Tesist through Outside the 'p the formal, co of that term, that the gov. obliged to cur these organize is very much C1 s CCT, Elrio. dity in relati labo Lur in Sri i Tl Tell tip II to
Although we 5e H h ted c) E1 H I small group E. all major pol Lankan capita wholc fall i led al Ct CQ || |cctly el nial era, Whe Products Asso cursor of the Congress, to

merican
Ires – job secubsidies, I et lil etc. — ticind to and til Ingible. 1, let-liberal is the basic tough which free e :encilmbered՝ -imposed controls litical coalitions manipulate pubcorder to Çal, lll T è benefits, to the ment of all. It a plausiblic hystatist econo Illic to elicit widės- 11 di C - econo Illic libemot. LiberaliTe the refore pTiCl3 - me i 11th Critil Tian dulce the political ."לוח הינו נטש טוth תנו otion is exå Illinirelation to three political actors: 3 trial i lite:TC stS; and politicials.
in I. organized its. The capacity
to pursle approic policics T17aY the ability of Ellic interests industrial action, colitical real Tı" im 13. tittltic 11:11 5 218 c
Tila corollä Ty is II ment is then tail the power of interests; this te Läti AmeriIt has stille Williin to organized
Lika, but I l 0 IĘ: organized capital.
Ty strongly repreindividual Cor asis in vir tillåilly itical parties, Sri lists have Lin the to organize and y since the cloIn the Low Country ciatio III, the preCeylon National a large degree
Model
represented the indigenous Capi
tailist class. No capitalists' cabal had to be broken for liberalization to be imple Illen
ed. Indeed the more organized and established gTollps Wer fairly unitedly in favour, and it was mainly the disorganized small businesses which had grown up under tight import and foreign exchange controls which lost out - and they could no resist (see Section VIII below).
As a potentill extra-Parlilmentary obstacle to liberalization, labour is ille interesting than capital. Originally closely led to the Marxist political parties, trades unions began to develop strength in the 1930s and had become a majar political force by the end of the 50s. Anchored in the public sector, they had come into open conflict with every government since Independence. Alth: ough governments could and dili Favour the trades unions associated with the ruling party of the day, they had little control over the trade Ini) m T11 CWC ment as a whole. The linions hiı dl a high degree of autonomy ånd were politically a Tld organizal - tionally highly fragmented.
What could be more milltu Tal than that a government Wishing
to boost private investment should attempt to break the power of a pervasive yet un controllable labour movement?
The major trade union associated with the ruling party, the Jathika Seweka Saga maya (ISS), soon developed a reputation for using brute force against a Inti-governmen L Linions, especially during Strikes. The conditions for registratico T of tTade unions became III, o Te restrictive and the numbers of unions decreased, Unions were banned from the new Export Processing Zone. Above all, a widespread strike in July 1980, c) in Centralted in the public clerical service, was punished with un per
דן

Page 20
cedent cd severity. Forty tholsand cmployce5 were dis missed, and for In any this dismissal was to be permanent. The trade LIllion Illow cment has still in tot recovered from this de feit,
The Te is 10 dollit UNP go weI In Ilment was more Llth Corita Tial II i Il relatin t C) organized labour liI Eny of its predecessors. It is almost als ce: Tta, il that this W. Els largely a product of economic liberallization. The point at is slie, lovy ever, is hic w far this "Ile Cessity' to face up to Organized laboli I can account for the more gcineral authorita Tia Inis im of the regime. There can be no very direct connection with either political centralization co the Tepressi. Il of the dem 7cratic opposition. The gover nITicint's St:l n cie On tri des 11 mi o 115 was broadly supported at all levels ill the ruling party. Many of the direct beneficiaries and executors of the policy were in the lower Talks of the UNP - 111 its OWIl trades 111 lijn affiliates. There was no need to centralize power to tackle this issue. And the main political a ffiliates of the persecutcd trades unions, the Marxist parties, actually suffered less from government repression than did the opposition parties who presented a greater potential electoral threat to the UNP - the SLFP all the Tilli United Liberatic Front (TULF). Finally a Tid most importantly, the amount of force needed to cow organized labour was relatively limited simply because the political power of organized labour was in long-ter. In decline before 1977.
The power of In ovement had peaked in the late 1950s and the 1960s due to an overlap of three favourable sets of circumstances, lin the first place, the founders and closest political allies of organized formal sector labour, the Marxist parties, were still electorally significant and endowed with powerful Parlia IT entary pokesmen. In the second place, the labour movement
that the
the labour
still retained a si tancy and բTծl solidarity which this Marxia T tilte the fact that it tioriately coIIւբ (),5: of Illinority ethn groups who did cumb to thic eth 1 of the majority
lists. In the Lh SLFP government and 1960-f.5 had Tapid ex pil misit. In . mis run by glir cally rights 4Ti di privil. Zed la bour espg public sector. T was, however, i to help undermi mÖveItlent. The unions expanded Inclbership, wh bership Came in c à Tural Simha || est: ground. At the COTs, CiÕLISI CSS EA I Lion the labour calle increasing parochial and interested. T talk of general s the late 19405 (4: before the big LIT1 i II i Ille Tibers. Il sector continued by strikes, but Listics for the which lost cle: underlying trend strike activity ретiod 1956-64 gover II mients. trend was steep tently downwari. remaining 'auth conscious Tess c' the period of t ted Front go" cabinet Illinister xist parties pro of the toughest public sector st
The very fact UNP govern mer powerful trades to LIS Egli T13 the labout I love of hy far the l had disi El tegrate
soon as the power, organiz led the Mar
SLFP-allied) t

ense of IT lil iletarian class derived from lage and from wäs disproporld of Illiclbers ic and castic not easily suchic chil Luvinis II1 Sinhla lese B. IdLird place, the 15 Of 1956-60 stimul lated a f trades, LII, i Qexpanding the :ges of orga milicially in the his later factor In the long Illin 1ę the Elbour null ber of faster that the ile the TernIreasingly from Buddhist backlevels of both ld of organizamovement bely fragmc Inted, narrowly self2 last serious trikes calle in nd early 1950s
expansion of ip. The public to be plagued it is the staprivate sector rly indicate the The peak of Call è il le 1In der SLFP Thereafter the ly : Tı d consisLs. Much of the inic” proletarian "El pora Led durin 1е 1970-77 Uni"Carl II helt, whe 5 from the Mar"ed to be some OPPO II ents of rikes
that the 1977 t had its own union, the JSS, Other sectors of Ille It is evidence lbour movement l by this time. As JNP cane to di labout deserist-allied (and a des unions in
un precedented numbers to join unions sponsored by the UNP. This was the first time that it UNP government had achieved this degree of dollinance in the trades union field. III using this base and other weapons further to weaken organi
7cd labolur, the UNP was taking adwal Intage of a favourable current of history. While its
authoritarian Ireatment of organized labour can validly be be counted as a product of economic liberalization, we cannot claim to have explained' more than a SII all area of the broader can was of authorianis1.
De-politicization 2: the electorare. Sri Lanka has in recent decades been an especially political participation and awareness have been high, and politics a relatively important means of obtaining command over goods and services. It is worth exploring the possibility that this high degree of politicization was an obstacle to economic liberalization. Such a hypothics is is all the Thore intercs - ing when one recalls that the authoritaritarian governments of La Lin America's Southern Cone systematically attempted to "de-politicize' the mass of their citizenry by almost excluding them from political activity of any kind. There has been a wein of similar thinking within the UNP leadership, based largely on a nostalgia for the 'colonial' system in which a relatively autonomous public service recruited from Westernized groups could exercise its own form of raticInality, But any temptations to follow a policy of political denobilization have heel overwhelmed by the UNP's increasingly populist inclinations. As has been mentioned above, the UNP has continued to pay Inajor attention to the material In ou Tishment of its electoral base, and has found new for IIls of mass patronage (government contracts, housing schemes) to replace those which it has felt obliged to eschew in the face of budgetary and Washington pressures (public sector jobs, food subsidies). Attempts

Page 21
at political de Imobilization halwe been directed only at the organizational base of opposition parties. There have been no moves either to propagat e ideologics of general political dici 110
mobilization (a: lat. Chile alrı d Brazil) er til de-link electoral bewicu fr) material c Ward.
Depoliticiza fiori 3: The politicitis. It is quite conceivable that a reforming, liber: lizing government would be Willing
to continue to opera te a patro - Image-based, transactional relationship with (a section of) the electorate, but might at the same time at tempt to alle wiate political pressures on economic policy by partially de-mobilizing sections of its own cadres. This would imply the centralization of political power around the higher ranks of the leadership. Ald just such centrillization has taken place in Sri Lanka around the Executive President (see Section W). The hypothesis that this centralizatico I was imti viited by i lesi Te or need to permit tech IOCTäts rather than politicians a frce hand to formula te and implement "rational' eco Domic policies could be consider cd plbillsible 011 801Tle evidence. Il particular, the President himself assumed direct responsibility for the Greater Colombo Ecco 10 Illic Commissio II, the bly responsible for the establish ment and management of the new export processing zones. The weight of the evidence, however, points in almost the oppositic direction. Air Lanka, a major public corporation, has been directly under the authority of the President. It hals incluirred In assive debts, and an official enquiry revealed enormous profligacy and in discipline Within the top na nagement. As has
been mentioned above, Wested interests in the public sector have so far resisted liberali
zation with a high degree of success. Some of the strongest and most effective resistance has come from the public sectot plantation corporations. Thcy, too, have been under thc diroct authority of the
President. T upon Who II p. cent TEL lized HAWE of taki ing a la orational", or deter II in ed atti Ilo Thy than thei (FC) 'for Friedriff |
fifth hypothesis that in accele capitalist devel especially one foreig T1 i Invest II Led Lip C1 so III e El Ince of long-t tal stability,
capitalists will risk of Lying physical investm ta Til This im II light
Illeans to Ward: stability.
:tyT f1ון 1 וון שוו{_} In ellt in the Sr text is that it close an identi actual motivati
talists who hav tage of Sri La nomic policy abstract concep of the capitalis SECLIT : b) 355 in Westment. of EL Tg lument exte Ilt to Will It especially forei beei Ihle – t e;
Μί ή έι Σα
Hess / | Just south
He had a fa וזFrr CONI EME} Ta/k thing TE FE T.J. E. L'or Peāt O'r Wiki LSfs 5äl,
P00 Has: Eyck frig FÈ Tha ArrT7y C0 F7e fräck Did not , To air

lose politicians OW er 1:15 been : sht: WII no sign liger-ter|11, m_3 Te less politicallytude to the cco. I fellows.
st a lift". () ur
is rather Cobawiolus: train of the Op III e Illt por CCESS, dependent on ent, is predicaIs ea sonable ais slir:Tm1 gCY W e T1 ImenWithout this, In tot take the up capital ill heits, Alth (Titherefore be a i governmental
lW in this arguLank: In c. 1is based on to fication of thic ons of the capi
e til ke L l l dwll TIklis II: W ECE3"rtטוח 1th H זיו t of the needs it system for a for industrial The latter type ignores thlt: ch capital, and gn capital, hais
xpoit Sri Lanka's
economic vulnerability to make adequale profits within the lifetime of one gowler m Ilment through such II nechal Enis ils as textile "quota-hopping (see Section IW), civil engineering co Instructio il constracts, and the Simple chea ting of local business partners. However, leaving that issue aside, the hypothesis that capitalisII needs gover linental stability does at first sight appeii T to be very plausible. Mention has been Il de ab Owe of the disi ilçeltiwes to private investments posed in 1977 by Sri Lanka's history of
electoral seesawing. And UNP politicians have the T1 se lves Inade prominent use of the argument that without a UNP govern Tinent all this foreign
investrale Ilt, aid, and le W-found
prosperity Would take Wing again, all d that, therefore, certain constitutional changes
tending to perpetua te both UNP rulle Lind the security of foreign it west. Its could be justified in the lation's long-run nateTill interest,
The major problem with this hypothesis is that it remains plausible only so long as there is no credible alternative government which would also support capitalism, economic liberalis In and foreign investment.
PEACE TALKS
דחסלr) his brrט 7דול)
eafar of Loch Wess
fr7æssage, ha så id,
Strarח טוזין t/jarם
Raich Mars stå s
5 Gwer wwith i'r 2 KNY Jg ?
er Sorffs Fiis Corrossr77 er 15
gham апа! В/enheim.
EOth our houses,
Effer är WM
Srs äre äss B/S//gsrr15,
far the Corrrrr's raffe.
had to confess, he didn't reach frr:7 or Windsor, o'r ewer? Do Wr7 ing Streer
arry Scotlard Yard' Ebert ārlid rätt fer fard frve Fascist Hess he democratic rocess.
U. Karunatilak9

Page 22
CAN FUNDING
GIVE THE FOL
8 TAX CONC e OWNERSH e LOW INTE
Lease Purc
Contact: Shi
Senior Asst. G. Lease Lease Purchase
MERCANTILE C 55, Janadhip:
Colo
Telephone: 26.611
Or our Managers , REGIONA) 15A H St. Telephone
CITY 14, R. A. Dec Mc1 Maw; Col II
Telephone: 5 OUTSTATION A nu radha pura, Bandara w ela, Gampaha, Negombo, Ratnapu
 

YOUR
OPTION YOU
LOWING
’ESSION
P REST RATES
chase Can
irley Perera 2neral Manager
& Corporate Finance
REDIT LIMITED
athi Mawatha
by 1 9 or Direct 22611 hrough the following L OFFICE: Teet, Kandy, 841)
OFFICE: itha (Duplication Road)
to 5
Ս06:27, 500937
BRANCHES:
Jaffna, Kalu tara, Kuru negala, Matara,
Ta Thailblitte galla.

Page 23
What went wrong? (2)
REFORM FROM TOP
Gunas elkera
HE did the technological revolution impact on thic thcn existing societics? Dit it mcal the end of thic State socialist phase of the stage of primitive accumulation in hıc Swiet Uli JIL? Thic commandl—ad Illi Llistrativ c system was [hic Imalin axis of State 5 ) cial - lism and to d: y several ciconolists :IC 5:lying thill the Comm:und-administrative system bcçame il fettcr (In ciconomic development with the introducctil of the technological Teve) - lution. DU es that Incan that the technological revolution precipitated a contradiction between the fast developing forces of production and the ossified relation of production of state socialism". Did the technological revolution create a si ultico II willich Inecessitatical the evolution of socialist1 to a stage higher than State sticialisIn' I L hi Ilk that this säilure of the existing societics to advance to a higher stage 411 di the resultant deepening of the contradictico II bet w cen the dy llaIllic forces of production and the Static relations of production, led to low productivity a IId econo Illic stagnatio II and eventually to the crisis the Soviet Union finds herself in today.
All thic ilIs plagu ing the Soviet Union are laid today at Stalin's d00 r. But It Wils Ione other the Stalin who first II enticed the possibility of a cco Intradictio II betwee In the foTc cs of production and relations of of production under socialism. Il llis " “ECIJIllic Proble of Socialism' (1950) Stalin wrote that if the party did not ha. Ildle the economic problems correctly and if the objective ecoTıbılic laws of socialism äT: fou tęci, this will lead to a contradiction between the forces of production and existing relations of production resul
Tisarameе
ti Dig ir1 a. cTi warning and a go through tl |
di Lor Ille-Inted 1opII1ı eInt" (M:ar: Soviet leaders in ter Ins Of b is II. Within t statement whic surprised the f i5rm,
As III e Il Politics played the contin Lled e" Capitalis II. I 1 of so called b cracy Were ext in this process of a Tı alıt)1] Illi was a crucial f ple the factors ted the change li5 il fr nl the Monopolies to owning systern for univers: Linion forcedo) ilin, laws factory
IIlanated froll If :: Il l'ultiIl CEIl did not exist Have bee. El exchange of dit e1d Tes Ll L Ili either geclrını qılınıi the WibleILL - erti tion to the S leading to A s crisis. Therefo Cxiste Ilco of civil society at gcais derinocr: ilcas) Wils Ei the continuous the Tc Sulta. It s 1 ta' lisIll .
If Glasnost
h: been intro technological
would hawe so! dictis betwe production and production at C ) LI D1 tries to e y monopoly soci: (State Socialist

sis. But this 1st the need to crioci cof "long historical devek) was ignored. started to talk lilii ing CJII il Tillhе сепtшгу — а. ih would hawe unders of Marx
i Calci Lārlier, а пI ajor role in volution of World ih i Ilk the ideas purgeoisic demoremely important
The existence bus civil society actor. For exalwhich precipitain world Capitastage of private that of the share like the demands franchise, trade
in Inti monopoly laws etc.) ill the civil society. Opus civil society there would not
relatively free 'Til inds ideas and ght ha v c been
C stagnition or ption of opp 35 i - yste II ir bith, it litti Il of total re, I think the L' All II il CLIS nd its "bise” bourcy and liberal çr Luciall fail : Lor in
evolution and urvival of capi
1. PeTestTikal duced with the Tewolu til, thit | yed that CC). In traet Clitiky 15 lf the forces of li helped the se "Ulve frd III state lism to the cally ) phase of the
stage of primitive accumulation, stilte monopoly was necessa Ty. Blut if these societiles evolved into a higher phase (stage of Li dwa nced accumulation?) deIIn onopolisi Ing and decentralisi Ing in the spheres of both politics and economics would hawe: bcc 1 necessary, I'll the ecc.) nomic sphere this would involve the introduction of multiplc forms of ownership (in place of state monopoly ownership) in the form of giving land back to the work eTs etc. , HCCC pt.:El In Ce of trade union rights (the right to form independent trade unions to strike). In other words the state should havc gradually distanced itself from e com Comic activities while cinc C
uraging independent initiative on the pärt (f the people – whether it's in the form of co-operative enterprises worker owned and Ilma ma ged factories. But for nearly 25 years, till the Gorbach evian revolution, these ch:Lng's Were not made. As a result these
changes :1 Te being Iliade today, not as a part of the process of natural and organic revolution of socialism but as reforms imposed from above and as delayed reactions to the current crisis.
Perhaps with the growth of the forces of production, State monopoly socialism should have evolved into a “Socialist liberal Socialism”. Milny Would regard the termitself self contradictory. I think this is bicause most Marxists have forgotten that Marx and Engels i te Cllist Manif:5t talk about a system in which free development of each leads to the frec developmcnt cof all. C. Wright Mills in his famous bok "The Marxists" claims that Marx assimilated his ideals froIl the liber:ll iThtellectual climate of his day - but With a difference. "The moral bases of his criticism of liberal society are the ideals proclaimed by that society itself - taken seriously and ma de Concrete". As a case in point Wright Mills Ime Itions Max's scathing
r Crуғгіншға" сту раge 3.3)
21

Page 24
ΥΟΚΟΙ
MOTORCYC
Make tracks safely, Co with YOKOHAMA Mo
Enjoy carefree, trouble YOKOHAMA.
HIGH PERFORMANC
YOKOHAMA Motorcycle Tyres
<2N Automotiye Products Divisi Sri Lanka StateTradi
119, Wekande Road, Colom
 

DTIMES ROLL.
>LETYRES
mfortably and economically torcycle tyres
free riding with
E
է ն|1
ng (General) Corporation
bo 2. 4GAN 422341—3,432874

Page 25
Part II
Isaac Deutscher
Reggie Siriwardena
hat Wuld Deutscher have
said if he had lived see the Eastern European events of last year. It is always possible, of course, that he may hawe. Il Calified his ideas in the light of the new realities. But if Hic blad remılilled true to his former position, he would hawe had to de scribe these de velopments as "objectively count crricvolutionary, as he did characterise the East Berlin u prising Of 1953. We kI10W El 150 till: 1 afte L ble Hul Illg till Rewolu Licin
F 1956 he wTote:
"One can say that garian people, driven to desperation and to a state of heroic frenzy, tried to wild lle Clock bäck While M05 CC W tried once more with its bayoIets to Te-Wild the communist revolution in Hungary..."
the Hill
What is implied in this positio In is Deutscher's certainty that public ownership and plan
Ined economy — the esse Intial features of the Soviet e CCIIllic for 15 - are the road of
a Ild til at these IIlust not be abandoled beca Lise of the political deformations of Soviet socialism. To questic this position involves not only debati Ing with Deutscher's ghe 1st but also in terrogati Ing the en tire experience of the Russian Revolution. This is to co la Trge a II u Indertaki Ing to a Llte Impt in any thoroughgoing fashion in the latter half of a paper, but shall try at least to thir co w so IIIe light TI LJIL e aspcct of the question. What I want to take up is Deutscher's concept of "revolutio Il fra Imı above”.
the future,
The phrase is not cutscher's own: it comics from the History of the Cammunist Party of the Soviet Union: Short Course, litt Tibull te to Stali hilself. It i5 used the re Lo descTibe Sta|il|''s Collectivisa tipli . 3-f tlı ela IId, though the History, while cha
Tacterising it : "from above, Wi
e Stו e fזוti careful to press lance of pop by Fidding, "wi port from belg. however, appli "Te vol Llti. Il fro:
only to Stalin's Lld Five-Yer | IS w te have sce qu’est of Easter r
Whilt il Te dist ments Cf "revolut
in Deutscher's
tion? We may a Lalyses that in the Swiet
consisting of social trial Ins for Tna to be historical progressive, but carried through the party and I Tole of the II:18 PTOcess 1:1y yai di na te participi CLI tright hostili 1 Clso Of the Il peà sa Intry in Tel tiWisation,
If this is willä 'TLw ()|11 ti{}|1 froIII be eWitte Int LF1 be. In Fb5 lute yiyeci “Te Willik
And "Tewo [Litija II h) Lu L that j Liu LH1: lutionary phen graditi (31 acro: The Te is Ileyer "pure Sp DItalië action: people tions llawe all wil enced by idea: however inchoat lcci iT1 E () :acti1 än di Fictivists, 1 ders may not hı 3) Tg Ft Inis cd politi Eastern Europe Te Wolutions that last year, for towards this po from below'. 'S

15 carried out ith the i Initi:- ate power", is
2 rye tı : 5e1bilar legitimacy th direct supw'. Deutscher. i es the t ciril
In Elbow c' not collectivisation
Pla T15 but also, , ti his co| Еuгоре.
inguishing elleion from above, conceptualisai fer from his he sa W it,
COI text, ፳1 ና El fluidamental tion, concci ved ly necessary and initiated and by the will of ble state. The SCS in such a 'y from suborati. Il to ewen y - as in the ajority of the t.i.) Il to city ||lec
is Illeant by abwe, it will At there call distinction betil fra T1 i Howe" ה"ידול , 1_b 1ח טfr 1 Tilnge of revo - 11 en a the Te is a SS A 52 e Ctrl III. Such a thing as tity in Ilass in such situays becin influ5 ånd slogans, e, and propel11 by agitators hough these lea3A',': ' II? TTJ Cal parties. Thc :::t II de Illicocratic W: Wilssel instä Il Cc teIded le of orcwolution () did Lblic Febru
iry Revolution in Russia: the masses entered into it by their OWIl momentu II, a Ind 11o political pili Tty was in co III mand of the movement, even though | Tig years of political agitation and propaganda would have gone into shaping the consciii) L15 mess of the workers :ind STIldÍer 5 who we 11t Glit inta the 5treet 5 to Werth TW te Tsai, T ist regi Ille. .
What then are we to say of
the () cito be Rewolul til? The decision to take state power through an insurrection was
Inade by the Bolshevik party, and the Organisiationı 4: Tı d slıccessful completion of the in su Trection was effected fundametally by groups di Tected and controlled by the party. (Of culu Tse, il Tillaking that decisio 1 Le lin and the Balsh evik: Hcted in the ko Wledge that their seizu Te of power would receive substantial support from the working class and the 51 die T5 il the tw) capitals, Petrograd and Moscow, Which Were decis iWer for thic fall te of thic Tew (lluti I, III thält estimate they appear to have been right,
H. We Wer, there is Llore to the issue thall that. Between February and October the slogan that all parties on the left (including the Bolsheviks) had pushed was "All power to the Soviets! - that is to the popular organs of Workers', peasants' and soldiers' deputies. It is Well known that on the
cyc of the insurrection there was a division of opinion within the Bolshevik Party
leadership itself on whether the insurrection should forestall the C)Tigr css of Soviets which was about to meet. Waiting for the Congress and taking power in its name would have created pressure for a sharing of power with the other parties represented in the Soviets. Le Din W:AIlted to face the Congress with

Page 26
a fait accompli so as to clear the way for a Bolsh Cwik monopoly of power. (There was, of ccourse, a brief collition with the small group of Left SRs.)
Why did Lenin take this road? It is clear Troll the historical record that what act lated him was above all, the will-of-thewisp of the impending European revolution. In the Tesolution he plit to the crucial Bolshevik Party central committee meeting on the eve of October, the first reason advalced for carrying out the insurjectioF Wils precisely that - "the international position of the Russian revolution (the revolt in the German navy, which is an extreme manifestation of the growth throughout Europe of the world socialist revolution).
Deutscher himself rais es the issue (though he puts it aside as un answeTable) * Whether Lenin and Trotsky would have acted as they did, or whether they would have acted with the same deter Illination, if they had taken a Sober er view of internati CD Thal revoluti CI1 and foreSe en that in thic course of decades their example would not be imitated in any other country." What is clear in any case is that Lenin Wanted to use the Russia. In revolution als a spring-board for European revolutio II, and that perspective ruled out a compromise or a coalition with thic II coderatic parties in the Soviets.
In the October revolution, therefore, there was a significant element of "revolution from above - not only in thic sense that the ill surrection was decided con, organised and directed by a party Vanguard, but in that its funda Incintal ai IT was al In international Tevolution Cl which that Vanguard had set its sights and its hopes. The determination to preserve Russia as the fortress of Socialist revolution until the European working class should rise had as its Inecessa T y con comitant an intransigeance in the face of
24
thic contrary 5 great mass of The revolution fundamentally but the was nation were were willing Bolsheviks as la Ind, but thế aldie the in te T Thi of the Bolshe, to Ilost of . only a few In revolution, the Verdict in the Constitulent Ass free elections 1
ever hild, CC Ili Bolshevik gow The Bolsheviks
of the seats, E 40 per cent. A cal analyst, W kov, has recc] that this distrit should have ma formation of a govern III1 et ut, wil Treflected thuc ; strivings of th haps so, and happened, the might have be worst hic TTCTs o not LC III e Iltion to it. Cl promisc would, been alie In to project of hold beleagu cred foi European prole 1hl: Iresclue.
The October
It Only a 5 Oc imposed by an on a predomi country; it wa: tion brought t ethnically dive a Illo velment b: in the citics () majority regions dimensiCT of til lution has still quately explore tream of writi history the ethi been relegated This is especia Work of left-li Carr, influence by the Marxis treating cthnicit

rivings of the the population. had been Won In two cities, ajority of the 2: S: Tli , They to accept the ing as they given sociallist — let tion:llist — aill:15
iks Were alie |EI1- In 1918, Inths, after the
nation gawe its Electio 15 to the mbly - the first hät Russia had lucted by the I'll Il Il itself. got 24 percent ut the SRs got Soviet politiyacheslav Kostitly commented lution cof seats de possible "thic left democratic 1ich Would have scal democratic e tChile Ts”, Perif this collid llaw c. Sowiet UIıicoIn en spared the f the Civil War, the dictatorill Such a collhowever, have the Bolshevik ing Con il the tre 55 lintil the ta Tiat ca Illine to
Revolution was :i list IrcWolLI tiOL1 urban Wanguard 1 a ntly pea 52a Int als 3 al T & Wolla wast aid "se country by sed principally the Russia IlThis cithinic e Russian rewoIn tot been adeIn the mainsg about Soviet ic aspects have o the margins, ly true of the erals like E. H. 1 as they weTe tradition of and nationa
lity as subordinate to class or only an epiphenomenon of it. Yet the contradiction between the Bolsh cwiks" theoretical allegizlice to the principle of selfdeter Illination and their anxiety to preserve the bulk of the territory of the empire for the revolutionary state was evident fro11 the earliest period of the revolution. This was the beginning of the long process of tralsformation Of : Tegine that claimed to speak for the cntire Soviet people, and indeed for all milliki Tidi, li inti alim instr ulment — as it becaTinc in the Stalin era – of Great Russian di Inilance. The contradicti CoIns between Bolshevik theory and practice surfaced when both the organs of self-rule of the Ukrainian a narchists during the Civil WaT a Ind the Georgian republic set up under Menshevik leadership were crushed by the Red Army. Here 'revolution from above' assumed also thc cha Tacter of the suppression of the i Independent strivings of minority nationalities. The dile Ilıma 5 of the Civil War Were, of course, complex and difficult. On the One hand there were the military compulsions of defeating the Whitc Guards; on the other, there were the varying trends of Tha Lionalist sentiment in the republics which fluctuated bctWeet) the contending camp5; and these were further complicated by the fact that the peasanity were alienated by the rigours Of War comIl'unism. Nobody can clain that there were simplc answers to these problems, but that is all the more reason why the later historial should refrain from seeing the issues in black and
white terms - or shall I say, ill red and White.
Without claiming that there
were illfällible the courses the Bolsheviks folllowed, one may suggest that their choices were limited not only by the objective circumstances but also by certain parLialitics of their owl. Firstly, their thinking was strongly centralist in tendency, and
alternatives to

Page 27
therefore could not easily adapt itself to the aspirations of al L1 to homo 15 m :L Licina list III1 0 Wements; secondly, they did not value Imational self-dictcr miliation for its ow n saket but only as an instrument of sociallist revolution: thirdly, they b clieved in the special mission of their own party as the privileged bearer of historical destiny; and fourthly, they were guided by the supreme objective of international, and not purely Russia. In Te Wolution.
Deutscher cının ot in general be faulted for simplifying the historical issues, but like most Marxist Writers of his time, he does II nderplay the ethnic and nationalist tensions. Within the Russia, 1 revolul til. Their crucial chal Tacter is apparent today in the light of ethnic violence und Claims før secession, and this should lake us re-examine
the cgacy of the past. In the chapter on the Civil War in his biography of Trotsky,
Deutscher des not even mention the nationalist element in the conflicts in the Ukraine. He does indeed pay littention to the occupation of Georgia, but only in terms of the issue of military interwention, disInissing Georgian separatism as 'a convenient pretext' by the Melsheviks. The latter may in deed hawe used it as a political i Istrurilet. BILL Li that Georgian nationalism was a real force is indicated by the fact that nearly seventy years after the incorporation of Geor
gia into the Soviet Union, the Supreme Soviet of that republic has repudiated its validity. It is pertinct to note that Swiet historical scholarship today, with the greater
objectivity that is possible in the new political climate, is beginning to cxplore thesc blank spots" in the history of the Civil War years. The MarchApril 1990 number of the journal “Istoriya SSSR" (History of the Soviet Union) published by the Historical Divisi (f the Academy of Sciences, carries an outline for a projected 5volume work, The Civil War
in Russia. The the following p
National Ill Lional problens. of sclf-deltri ples. The estat Illt. In Hl 5tate i C: 515 it the tiI shcvik Tegime i D4shinaik Tegin ilind the Mul 5: W: Azerbaidjan. nationalist govC Ukille. Th: : centrifugal and ces. The pos Gllari circles o qui estion.
Deutsche T's Mo to the strength nationalis Is Wi U li bini Ċ ) mress I) relation to the lutionary and C It is evident a ception of the mai king for the trilisation (f concentri tin i fel Wert El-L 11 d5. the Stalli di DeutsclicT's al 1 cess is seen pil the ccTipulsions striving to lift bootstraps front of productivity til Irc, and partl sion of the Byz: of thic Ruissiä. Il thcI115 cilves thir (3 l mist dictatorship due recognition I think we sh all other which important. III contil iled El be', erse variety Či languages and ing at widely Of Socil deve yould have tendency to rel fr: The of the T party as a me: 11 Check the CE a rising from th sity. This shou today, when til ril 1 issatio IT LI Tide led to the sulf, ethnicationalis

lItline includes 3. TagTipli:
Tellem ts and millThe question nation of per'lish Tellt ef a. In the Trails cauTil of the MelIl Georgia, the 1 - il - AT II - 11 lia
tist Tegine i Politics if the Tillets in the Struggle betW ccm
centripetal forital of White In the In: tion:il
L Irxist blind mess 1 of separate th in the Sovict ut n Cot C) Tilly i In early post-TewoCivil War years. so in his conmotive forces increasing cempower and its fewer and culminating in ctatorship. II lysis, this proTitly 4,5 dlıç t } of El 57 ciety itself up by its elו:lt ו )1 l; 1 ind mä55 Culy las Elin eXpresIn tile traditions state refracting ugh the Collı III lu - 1. While giving to these factors, uld distinguish W:15. Il 0t le 85 a country which wilderingly diwf Inationalities, cultures, existdiffere mit l: vc15 lopment, there been Illtural on the steelionolithic ruling ins of holding entrifugal trendis at ethnic diverld be very clear le relative libeT (Gorbache: W hill 5 a cing of distinct Ins, often within
the very ranks of the CommuIlist Parties of thc republics. Deutscher cam not b c criticised for having failed to live long enough to see the implications of present-day phicnom cimal for
the whole of Soviet history. But we In List, in asse.55ing the adequacy of his historical
vision, set his progn Osts against the reality of today in this respect too. Deutscher down to the end of his life saw the Fultu Te cof the So vict U JIllinn in terms of democratisation and the struggle against burea Cratism, privilege and the policC state, and this forecast, as far as it went, has been windicated. But it would hardly have entered his head that within a quarter-century of his death the Sovjet Union Would als C} experience strident nationalisms with their contra dictory potentialitics - liberating as Well as retrogressive. It may be said thı:it Deutscher W:15 to o l m1 LIch of a classical Marxist, sharing "the clear bright faith in human reason that Trotsky once affirmed, to have cxpected that seventy years after the October Revlution, scenes like those in Colombo, July 1983 Would be enactical in the streets of Baku and other Soviet cities. The Womb of history turns out to be more fertile in possibilities thain the most acute of the Cists call forcsec.
In the concluding chapter of his biography of Trotsky, Deutscher said that "Trotsky's strength and weakness alike were rooted in classical Marxism'. I think the same judgment may be made of Deutscher himself, The s trength comes out in the fal IIranging sweep of his vision his ability to place men and events in a large-scale tenlporal perspective, and his Tea di ness to subordinatic personal preferences and antipathies to his comprehension of historical forces. The line that Trotsky was accustomed to quote from Spinoza might have served as a motto for Deutscher the historian: It is necessary TOttQ laugh, not to weep, but to
( Салгілнғd on pag'a: 38)
25

Page 28
ത്ത=
LETTERS
Tamara Deutscher I learned with sadness of the death of Tamara Deutscher Tily from reading Reggie Siriwardhane's moving tribute in the L. G. of 15th Sם טLטm - beT. I Well recal II her monthlong visit to Sri Lanka in August 1970 (not cally in 1971 as Reggie has it), and the friendship we struck up when she was our guest in Peradeniya for a few days. Reggie has apparently for. gotten his own article in the Ce)'ları Daily Neiss of August 07. 1970, “Isaac Deutscher: å gTea L historian Termen bered ** Written to coincide with Tamara's arrival on August 02nd. It was a rare pleasure to meet and host the great Inan's widow and scholarly helpmate, a Warm, compassionate, and lively intellectual in her OW in right. Avid for news of the approaching storm in April 1971, we began a correspondence, als het constant refrain to her Ceylon friends was, 'You'll be outflanked on the left'. On either side of the tragic events in April she Wrote two articles. In the first “Letter from Ceylon" We1' Les Repfer Nov-Dec. 1970, she was one of the earliest to draw attention to the impressive strength of the radical JWP movement, and the problems it would pose to the Socialist community in Sri Lanka. In the second. "'Civil war in Ceylon' Rain parts Magazine July 1971, reprinted in Journal of Conterri parary Asia as “ What next in Ceylon?" the same year, she analyzed the political confusion following the suppression of the insurrection, and the da Ingers of greater external influence in the attempt to head off future shock.
I will treasure the copy of her husband's prophetic and optimistic book, just before he died in 1967, The Unfinished Revolution with her inscription: "In Isaac's name, Tamara Deutscher – with gra
titude for Warmth and hospitality, Kandy, 31 August 1970'. She ended one of
het letters in I 11e know whe is 5 till ä5 bel ו1ush , 1um in G when I saw y pictures of C Scape hau Int I. see imis li diretta r. be a ble L T memory will r. and luTIlinous had the privil til k II W HET :
Maha Tigla
Defining E
TE
Well - alth Les tcdi my a bil comprehend ( 600-word letter ly criticised tin if the ET pup), and (LG, Sept. 1) is a christic III i to be baptize an ex-STi Lil I MT. HL1551111': that III Eımı Sufi "persistent hab What is not Lex L". NOT bei I hivo el TIL. W cc 1 the li Illes to Teil di Ing whi: li Iles'. If th hıinı, let blee it suffice for Iny mcInts in what um the MG.R. Tale with Luc .
Casting aside IIU IlscT15 ic: bri. Iny "inability si Tıplc declarati for sake of . wish to recap had transpired
In-going dialog city.
Hussain's hyp Withstanding t
lities of lang and religion, it Ta mill Nadlu
Lanka constitut ethnic groups' and Mar. 15) My criticis II: language and cu teristics shared Ini 1 N:h.dl LI #aTd

971 this: Let her 1 hic garde. In |tiful, glorious,
S as it was u last. The ylio Incisc landc: now it all
Will I ever ice it?'". He
mail beautiful for those who 'ge ()f cc)miTng In person.
H. A. I. G.
thnicity: A ply
Hu55:1in ha di ity to read and based on two 3, which stronghis interprete Till ethnic I have flunkeIt certainly ng experience like this by kan diplomat. i na in gripe is Tering from a it of reading here in (his) Ing a diplomat, to read bet"* in additio II it is in the is habit ırk5 . This should final comHussli II w Tote government's LTTE.
Mr. Hussain's yadside about to undcrstand We sentences', bjectivity, I itu late whät so far in this gue con ethni
Othesis: "Not 1£ Ա ԼիI11111 Լ}Ilt1age, culture he Tamils of and of Sri e two distinct
(ILG, Feb. 1
The CCIII. On Itural cha Tacby the Taof Sri Lanka
-
makes them belonging to the sume ethnic group (LG. May 1). The biomedical evidence does not show any distinct difficirconces Het Weel the Tamils of Tamil Nad Lu and of Sri Lanka (L.G, July 1).
I Wyi11 1et th1e LG Teadcrs to decide who has failed to grasp the "plain meanings of plain words.'. In this dialogue, the problematic words arc: ' ' distinct' and “ethnic group". The conventional diction aty meanings of these two words as well as anthropological evidences
should show my point of view to be correct. If Mr Hussail believes that his interpretation of the meaning (if these words is Welcome to have it. But,
he should provide an acceptable new definition of what he means by “distinct' and ''ethnic group'. Finally, if some folks can still hang on to the belief of flatearth hypothesis, even after 400 years of Galileo, I can cxcuse Mr. Hussain for his ignorance in dismissing the biomedical crit cria foT defining ethnicity as limited in scope. A men.
Sachi Philadelphia U.S.A.
The Intrusive “II” In less than two Dayan Jaya til leka to get 17 "I think's 2 "I don't thinks, 5 I believe's and a plethora of other '1's: 'I say this', 'I draw your attention' "I see this', 'I am appalled', "I will agree", "I must add, ctic. Stalinism i s on the rubbish heap of history, Marxis In-Leninism is at death's door, Lenin's statues are being pulled down all over in the capitals of Eastern Europe, the den igens of the Worker5." paradise are gasping for a breath of free-market ait and all is doubt and confusion. One thing stands like stone: we can still count on Comrade Dayan for a fancy prose style,
Sri Kantha
contrives
Karl Rosa Pitak ottic
PageS -

Page 29
POLITICAL conflict (1)
The Economic
John M. Richardson Jr.
VᎦiᏘi political conflict is endemic in many Third World Nations. It's been costly, A great deal of Illa II power has been allocated to strengthen police, Illilitary and insurgent force:5. Productionı captı city ald infrastructure has beëIn de stroyed. Capital has fled to safer håVens. Talented Tell or women have died or emigrated. Have these costs been fully taken imito acco LI nt '? Häwe these costs generated co III: ensura të benefits' Will terroris II, Tevoluti 01 EL ry. Wiolence CT State sanctioned violence are chos en what costs and benefits are w cighed CE. In the process of weighing the costs and benefits of violence be improved Sa marasinghe and I have proposed a typ Cology of prima Ty, secondary, and tertiary costs of vile:It cal flicts. To Teasure the economic costs the typology will be illustrated With all нрplication to Sri Lanka, focussing on the period '83-'88.
Primary costs are direct costs including the costs of houses, colliercial establishments, fact
Ties, gC WęTIC II lent bլIildings, roads, irrigation systems in di CLH er il fra SLI lucture l'est TC y el by violent conflicts. There is als 0 the Costs of a Immunition and energy, such as petroleum
for example, consumed over and
Prof. Richards Jr.), is ir i'r ferrrrri rrally recgrize' či flyr ffilii er fisfiii particilarly specializing it global LLtttLLTCC S LLLTT SLLLLLLGLLLGLLGLS STLLGeS
GGLL SKTMTLSS LLTLLLLSSSLTTmlLlLHH TTTS Iri férfit forral. A filírű irri: Applied TttLLLHHL S S TTTCLL T S CL S S TkLLLLLlTL LSTHLLLLLLLS SSTT SSSTTCCCK S S S SL0SS LLS LOSSSS S LLL GaGT CuHH CLS S LGLLLLLLLS SLS the Liversity Cerre for Technology Ι.ΠΕ. ΑιήηiπίτιrrΙτία η Πηκ (ι οι Ιάiης firector of Social Science Carper La fra Jry of The fratrica". L'iri'er15fry. He had held te veral re Fearacı poli-Fi irris ir rario fis depariri eFirs including at the MIT. He is rhe frr:Hor of "Parrriers in Developylenir" ("T958).
, g: Ty".
Costs
above the quan normal trlin in En Elm Cc: plu rp o ses ces and opposit third direct C. :Lind i Tjil Irjes slu:
Secundary costs costs of build police aid is preparation for t) violcInt CC) Inf economic resp) II in El Inticipal willen CL als fa
The los foreign in West flight abroad skilled all tr; examples. Fina loss of prod destruction of th destruction of loss of trained loss of investill
The tertiary cos long te Tim imp: nomy resulting
bility and ul vilent CGIT|| C iTıp 1 ct is usıl but they, Illay
longteri F1 quan 1015 in terrils
olut plut etc. F.
Tilctel conflic government to : fully designer
economic plan considerable full El protracted co El Coluntry the joill El Tegic II:ll or actively part t1 բTւ:11|}.
TIL Tēl tiwe af1d I (T1 Wi) 1 er1 rigorously corn situation is not would not ex pe cally Inctivated in cost-benefit decisio Il tot f TatlıcT than surTendering. C cost-benefit än
involving cocri helpful to officials. Devel

in
tity necided for g 21 In«li mE1in te
by security fortion groups. A 5t is li We5 105t Stäined.
include the ing up Illilitary,
Irgent forces in or in response licts. Negative
Il ses LU ville. Il CC ti II of future into this cate5 Of 1:41 al indi 1īt, CFL pital and flight of ained ei re lly there is the Icti II due to c infrastructure, work schedules, Illa mp3 weit and է:Il II:
t, is mainly the Act I the ecofTifll the instilin certainity that t creates. The ally qualitative have important titative implicat
CF i Chile 1 ") r" example i prot may force iլ taba Indon a ca. Telting TETI 1 Cor strategy with lure potential or inflict may deny Opportill nity to economic group icipatic in such
costs of Wilent t option a te nimit pared i Il so III e surprisi Ing. One :ct the ideologiLTTE to engage analysis of the ight the IPKF negotia ting Lor ]n the Otherhard alysis of options cion :: Imight be the government opment program
983 - 1988
mes and project specially those involving foreign do nors are subject to rigorous scrutiny.
The measurement of violent conflict in Sri Lanka
My II leas uirciment of violent political conflict in Sri Lanka is based on the concept of a political conflict event. A political conflict event is a politically significal Tit Coccurrence that falls outside the established
legal procedure of political rights and often involves violence, Usually political conflict cVents express some sort of protics L aga inst the gover Ili mcnt. or the established order of
things ex, assassination of governIment or foreign officials, attacks on or destruction of the symbols of govern T1 e Tit, police stations, post offices, factories, trilins, SLTB buses etc. Politically III o Liwalitekti strike 5, Tots ir demonstrations with political
WerteSi,
The date base his been coilpiled reordering every political conflict event that were reported in Sri Lanka's major newspapers between January 1948 and Dece IIlber 88. More than 6500 events are classified by location, briefly described and scored for level of intensity using a scale developed by Sociologist PitTim Sorokin.
These data suggest that 1983 is a useful demarcation for Illeasuring the costs of violent conflicts. The major qualitative shifts in intensity makes macro economic trends that are attributable to violent conflict ca sier to idcntify, Estimatics of physical destruction, growth in security forces budget and loss of production can be viewedi as opportunity costs that is resources that at least in principole could hawe been al located to an alternative and more beneficial use. Primary costs - This involves destruction of physical infrastructure, extraordinary operating
27

Page 30
costs of forces engaged in conflict and losses due to injury and death. Only the first will be estimateci here. Seco Ild Will be Laken into account als part of the budget for defence and maintenance of public order and safety which refers to expenditure on Police and the legal systel 11. The third-h u Illa D1 costs - Will not be cs in lated. Destruction of physical infrastructure due to the cthnic vicolcnce in July 83 is estimated in the Master pla II of Sri Lankai for the rehabilitation of persons displaced in the disturbances of July 1983. According to the Master plan - 122 factories and 2300 other commercial buildings were destroyed. From other sources we have estinated the number of houses destroyed at about 20,000. (These are conservative figures which includes only those that has been rigorously documented. Tր Il casul Te costs We hawe used average costs of houses and conne Tcial establishments-estiInates developed by Sri Lanka's Ministry of Rehabilitation working in conjunction with the World Bank. Based on these assumptions, total housing losses are estimated at 784. Inillion rupees and industrial structure
losses 169 million rupees. This
is a total 95.3 million rupees
-about 29 Illillion USS.
(Rupee and dollar figures
adjusted to 88 values)
Estimates of physical destruction in the North East for 83 July to 87 July. These were compiled by the Ministry of the Sri Lanka G ()we TimmẽT11 111 C01111ec
tion with the request for reha
bilitation funding from the
world bank,
69,400 houses reported
destroyed
30,000 houses reported damaged
Approximately 11,300 commer. cial business reported da Imaged of which 8000 commercial busiIss reported completely destroyed,
Heavy dest Tuction of irrigation structures, roads and bridges, water supply, transport and power supply systems and buildings reported.
Total rehabilitation , and reconstuction costs 23.5 billion
፶8
rupees (about (Regard as estimatc).
No con paral physical destTL" the turbulent July (Tndo La the end of '88 Tough estima destruction cos ned that a r exists between Wilcnice measu and le Wels of tion. This pro" calculating a destruction cos ble daltal of and violenc period of 1983 period. For til of the Indian ( Jaffna (Octobe We inflated c. tional 40%. assumptions, destruction of the latter peric a 2.7 billion Nört bıl ı l d Eası rupees for the
A primary c about 50 billio 1.4 billic USS conservative oni huge sum for Lankas size: development. perspective, the equivalcnt to til ted cost of a tcd Mahal weli D) gI a. I ll me -- Sri ever developme
REFORM . . . (Сорнттігін ғұ1 fi
attack on Pre: 'a censored hypocrisy, the gi the government OWI Woice. . .
illusio II that it of the people. , on its side f political supe) into indifferenc completely awa of the state'.
perfect descri took place late existing Sociali advocating her individualisII o

72 million USS) Conservative
ble estimates of iction exists for period of '87 nka Accord) to . To provide a te of physical L5 we hawe issulugh correlation intensities if Ted by our scale physical destrucvidie5 L blsis for erage monthly ts using availadestruction cost le Wels for the July - 1987 July 1 2 WC) TIL TIL Dffensive against I/November '87) Sts by I aliB:15 ei oII the Se losses due to infrastructure for 'd are estimated IT LI I Ces for the a Til 9. 2 billiol ՏՃլլth. Cist estimite of 1 r lipees (about } is no doubt a 2. But this is a nation of Sri i Ind ! Cwell Tc) put it in slin is roughly 1 e [ 0 til c5 till - () y ea T. Hicceleraevelopment proLa inkas largest
it project.
of Pಘ್ನಲೆ:1
S Censorship - Tcss leads to e: test of vices. . . hears only its zur Teil ders to the hears the voice The people lls either into Stition or else and so turns froIII the life Surely this is a tion | it » f " Whit under "really 1'. I'm not the rampant What's knowl
as bourgeois liberalism, but a socialism in which the free activity of man' is given full play, by the transferring of political power from the State to the people. I have already mentioned what this would hawe amounted to in the sphere of politics it would mean extending and deepening democratic freed () mı a t :il | ]ewels. Te fallure to make this shift led to the eXceberation of contradictions resulting in a stagnant economy, dissatisfied society :ind polity.
Isaac Deutscher
(Criter for page )
understand. Yet his historical writing is neither bloodless nor in personal, and certainly the Trotsky biography is deeply Per Wilded by the moving sense of the tragedy of a great man at odds with his time and place, enhanced by Deutscher's superb command of a language to which he was not born.
Yet Deutscher's limitations were also those of the classical Marxist. Though he spoke of Trotsky's 'almost irrational belief in the craving of the western Working classes for revolution and in the ir ability to make it, "Deutscher himself neve lost the faith that ultimately the original Marxist Vision Would find its true home in the West. These are his Words at the end of the Trotsky biography:
"The West, in which a Marxism dcbased by Mother Russia into Stalinism inspired disgust and fear, will surely respond in quite a diffferent manner to a Marxism cleansed of barbarbarous accretions; in that Ma IX is II it will have to acknowledge at last its own creattion and its own vision of man's destiny. And so history
113illy COmmc full circle till Hope creates From its own wreck the thing it contemplates."
That final piece of Shelleyan utopianism is appropriate to what scems to me a voice from anoth cr cra — an era whose certainties we may envy, but, illas, cannot sharc.

Page 31
W
Compl
Fr
HER
INTERN
LM|
AFTA, PATA,
A GEWYS AFOFF :
BAKAN
AIRL
No. 6, YORK STREET
COLOMBO

፲፫h
iments
MES
ATIONAL
ITED
ASTA, TAAl
BUL.GARAN
NES
TEL: 25149, 24431, 548235
TLX: 22021. HERIMES CE
FAX: 548,235

Page 32
We are a different kind of
There are a multitude of Guard
O They who guard the fre
They who protect the b,
O They who guard the den each of us is entitled as
Each of us is a Guardian to others
dependency in day to day life.
But the difference is our Guardia
for your future. We are trusted
money, guiding you on how to S
and your dependents tomorrow.
So
For you
PEOP
A Different
 

Guardiam to you.
fans during your lifetime.
>edom of speech & expression.
asic human rights of mankind.
hocratic freedom to which
citizens.
who look to us for their
anship rests on our deep concern
d Guardians of your hard-earned
spend and how to save for you
Reach out Today
life-long Guardian
LES BANK
kind of Guardian for you.