Page 1
O Learning from th
曾 龜*廳
LANIKA
WA)
1 TE ARRA
Vol. 13 No. 12 October 15, 1990 Price Rs. 7.50
HIGH COST
OF DEFENCE
- Mervyn de Silva
PRICE OF VIOLENCE
- John Richardson
PITY THE POOR PENSIONER
— Christopher Sabaratnam
 
 
 
 
 
 

/
e Russian Debate O
— Sитатasiri Liyaтage
Registered at the GPO, Sri Lanka, OD/79/NEWS/90
I.B.R.D.'s SEARCH FOR STRATEGY
— Saman Kelegama
OPEN ECONOMY, POLITICAL DECAY - Mick Moore
SCIENTIST
THE VILLAGE
J.V.P.S TRUE BASTON
- Bruce Matthews

Page 2
SVOU
t
 

Knight
rmOVe

Page 3
TGERS IM CITY
Presistent press reports of WITTE Ifffffff 7) COME
as created a lar r artTiger circles in the City and Surfs. Ore are which keeps cropping up is that of S. Karikä ar7, k. 70 yr7 to be the Bafficia strict Chief and the leader of the LTTEs polifica W. W frig sty/ed' tfie Peoples Front of Lifbarā tiña 7 Tigers (PFT), Two others spotted agre 75g r77éef  ́*Kar 7 r7a rIʻ a rJ/' ʼʻSu/a/-
da". After the daring high roof assasination of Sam Tärri EirrjL't MM. P. a / Cti.
wists of Tar / tant groups, poten as targets of the LTTE. hawe beer 7 asked by the /ete/- /fд7елга 5егуѓсв5 to л7afлta fл maximum security in the places ffy frey var 7ť.
C0 PPES COPPED
Two Sufi-inspectors of the C. W. E. Were nated at the Colombo Port by sleuths of the Bribery Corrnissioner's Dept. Thвy were prod'шсвd fЈаfare the Colombo A. D. W.
They are a leg Cltedo a sur
a Wr electrica god. дge:Is Loverg re
TOURST
By the and to I rist i rrij / WE fa'a' 7 f54, OOO. The rivals, a Toшг. ficial said, 20Ú, Ú ÚÚ 77ä fk of 799 C. frg|T) 26{}, {}{70 WWP irnsurger Was gïWer7 GS for the sharp 79.89. T ffa officias Sérious probl' Colonio-Erin 5hortaga Fha7d affer Sewer ' Čo Orryho a 5 a fff 7 fr ffig for r dues. Only afe sched ed T7" | 7952, redd Cť fq f'7 of
уға, г.
LA MERA
GUARDAN
Wol. 13 No. 12 October 15, 1 gg 0
PricЕ Н5. 75
Published fortnightly by
Lanka Guardian Publishing Co. Ltd.
No. 246, Union Placa,
Colotlib - 2.
Editor: Mervyn da Siwa
Talaphong: 447 584
CCMT
Briefly. . . News Background Gulf Crisis Liberalisation (4) TE Ru55i di Deba Injustict in Comբլ
Persions
Celesting Fernand J. W.P. (3) Political Conflict (i. Di:55Brn t World. Developme
Printed by A
82/5, Sri Ratnajc
Mawatha,
Telephon

'&' : fa) 77 WE SI Mof 50 000 frorrJ α ή θα ήημαντέα f3. "WE LWJ SWIS"rida.
ARFIWAL:5
af Vā5ť F7F7F", exCigged 989 figure of FLY F77 E F f f är - sir Ministry of - had passed the , 7 TA' TWEE fargef to Ea adjusted fra 300.000, TWre y fir 7 the Sout', f WiĖ 777 TE GSCOWY drop fri Hrrivals The Chief Call use, 5edia'. WW  1767 er Of Sess Dr d fights. The É ECC) r77 E ac fe arries raised regu lar destinaдеratioла/ sche"3 airffле5 сарвr"Wig Wars äss äga srsť Wolfs fjäris i a 370 fights per
"ENTS
2
7
LC (2) 13 tation of
14
לך
19 2)
2 nt Raport
LITEin di Pres: :) th i Straig Wara LuttL CO 1 13
359
TRENDS +
LETTERS
SWRD AMD SMHALA
Now that Mr. Reggic Siriwarde na says he was the lobby correspondent of the Ceylon Daily News at the LiIL 1e Wile:In SWRL) na :: thosc "shocking” observations im parliament, it makes it still ca sier für me to mkc my point.
Lobby correspondents, as W ę kilow', : Te like i dTaill CT for that Illa Liter fill Critics, mostly reporting their wery own personal impressions of whether the actors were good or bad or whether the plot was thickel ning or Incot.
If I remie II1b er right the plot was thickening about this time for SWRD because Cur det frieds, the MLTxists, found selva la Band: a bit too slippery for their grasp. The man they looked
Lip CT as thicir Ke Ticinsky, the Sacrificial lamb for Lileir October, simply refused to
live up to their expectations. The Te was also great dise Fcha Titilment a T110 ng left-inclined intellectuals like M. S. Wwh1 «) foʼund that BaT1 de Ts Was Ilot delivering the socialism they were looking forward t), fast e In Cough. IT that situation it is not surprising to find lobby correspondents, like forsaken lowers, being“shocked at the things good old Banders Said alını d d idi.
But all this is quite unnecessary. The simple indi pro found truth is that we See What We Walt to sce and hear what We Want to hear simply because we a Te human. Western journalists are doing it all the time when they Teport " backward' Asia to the
civilised" Wes.
Only sai Ints a Te force fTom this limitation, and I doubt whether MT. Si Twardem would want to be considered oc.
S. Pathirtyi tana

Page 4
BRIEFLY. . .
S. An appeal for help from Sri Lankal’s Tallil Tigers Incw engaged in what could be a fight to the finish with govern
Ilment for cics in thic island's North and East, has been tur ned livin sharply by
British Prille Minister Margaret Thatcher.
In a reply to a letter from the LTTE" 5 IL'Ilda Il Secięta rialt Thatcher has reportedly acclused the Tigers of Timur de T, all manner of mayhem and of refusing to negotiate a political settlement. The letter to the British Prille Milister has been signed by Sathasi ya III Krish Ilaku IIla T., known as Kittu in Tiger lore. Mrs Thatcher has said that the British govern Illient is dismaycd by the LTTE's refusal to continut: negotiiitil 15 towards a political settlement and its decision to resulle the fighting. She has also said that Britali II SELW 1 ) over Tiding problem with the requirement to take an oath of al legia Il ce to the unita Ty ST LEI ka sitte.
Meanwhile India's TheW. High Commissioner in Colombo Nagendra Nath Jha said in a Sunday paper interview that the Tigers had now indicated that they were for a united Sri Lanka and should therefore be invited by the Sri Lankan gCow CTI ment for talks. Jha suggested that the extra-parliamentary All Parties Conference (APC) conwened by President Prema dasa w tilld be the ideal FC Tull for talks with the Tigers, but added that in efforts should be spared to woo the two missing links in the APC - the SSL FEP l Le: LITT IE - - |
JCI i II i T.
CIDA, the Canadian International Development Agency, has granted Rs 275 million for a power Ly allewiation prograin in the Matara and Gal
le district 5, feature of this :, Ce:IıtT:1 B:r that people eli from this grat poor, and no be required.
President F it a school ceremony :lt :lar mis alını d dFlığı used by Wariot forces to suppr In tills i midi ke control. They per cent of a free to terroris all liter the those coln trie chil se the ba cit of a lis i5 m, the presi the case of per cent giver : dicts whost compelled the the balance, h
O ATmy COTT Til Hällil to T. W in a press re army action i: the evacuati Fort which hill seige by the purely militar
| агт wait)
My eyes a Only Wigh,
Ars' f'W7a W
Arc Is M

A significant | 5 cheme, Slid ık Telease, is gible for loans T t s El 7 luld be Collitera || Wi||
"Teil1ldásl said
pri 7 c giWing Wiiddl will that gs were being
is ilternati Ciall ess developing IET) ווון כוון שdp Lh first give tell m3 ini dLg it orgali i SFL tills governments of s had to plurlance 90 per to Curb Leer ITdent, said. In drug the ten 1 free spawned dependency In to purchase e said.
1 ma. Il der GeneWana singh c said : I case that thc In liberating L'Indi ng the Jaffna d beern li mill cir Tigers, Wils el decision. The
Fort had no strategic valuc, the release said,
9 SLFP MP Mahinda Rajapaksc has challenged in courtthe police action detaining him at the Katunayake airpart il Tind scizing fra TT1 his possession documents and photographs relating to missing persons. The MP was on his way to attend a human rights mecting in Gencv:l.
g Mr Speaker, M. H. Mihailed said dபார்பg a Malla tra Gandhi birth anniversary speech in Colombo that there should be absolute free do Ill fUT The TT1edia in this country, as was practised in India MT Speaker said that there was greater freedem im Indià; eve the Prime Minister was subject to criticism in that country,
6 Notice was given in Parliam cnt of an Opposition motion calling for a commission of inquiry un de T the Commissions of III quity Act to inquire into the circumstances of the abuction and killing of journalist Richard de Zoysa. The notice was sig med by 2 l MPs headed by Opposition Leader Sirimavo Band: T11 aike.
WA WWWWWG WWW TA' APROBAWE (FOR THE DOVE)
ng, but I know that you will not come so not stray to the harbour Clock any more.
f' has Corme,
ghts of the Ships and the Stars vater full of broken samps.
= U KAR UMATLAHE

Page 5
DEFENCE Go UP AND UP
Mervyn de Silva
For the first time since 1947 the Defence vyote exce cd 5 : 11 Other Wotes Public
Administration and Home Ministries. Hardly a latter of surprise, considering the long "Eela. Il War l', the anti-JWP operations in the South, Td To w "Eelam War 2. The figure of 11.7 billion T LI peres, it should also be noted, Illust be coverted il to dollars for a realistic assessilent of the rise in expenditure it this decade,
Together With the cxpenditure, the military establishment h:5 als U grown and grown. That expansion has been faster than the increase in defence expendiLure, And yet, the a TT ed scrvices cannot be regarded as an important social-political forcc. Though the luribers swell, total strength of the services, even including the Police, is a minor fraction of the population. And since Sri Lanka, unlike a typical Third World country, has El large educated Illiddle cl:L55, the Services cáIlIL1 Illike the day-to-day impact that the military establish Tinent dics in many an educationally backward under-developed nation.
The trend non et heless is clear, and that's what is significant LIl Lima tely.
The Process
As long as the violent con
flicts: remail Lı il Te Solved this; process cannot be halted and reversed.
At the global, superpower level disa Imament follows detente. Low and mid-intensity conflict Will beco 1me the " do ili Ina Inti ili litaTy motif writes Michael T. Klare, CCD-luthor of a bok TNI the subject. While LIC will predominate, Warfare involving
large ind Illed Le Third Wol ing Tisk, he a II which used to
LTI is aid T SIT have been buy: Craft, talks, an i Titlern El tillä l m eleven slich gol tWC in ou reg Pakistail.
Low-intensity will be the di: tional pattern. . In ultiplication an of ethnic, relig economic division yayithin Tirk V Many of these ethnic, cultural, ferences that pre But these schism ded in recent y sions over ideolo cipation and t national wealth - often explosive
By the year World's populat the Third Will
E. Country d
Argenti Inä Carl Libia 5
Chilc ? Egypt Indonesia 3.
Israel
Jordal 3
Morocco 3.
Pakistain C
Philippines 48 STi La Ilıkä 2:
Zimbabwe

ES
ium powers of di will b c al grow - gues. Countries be recipients of all arms-buyers ng modern airil missiles QIl the L Tiket. He lists; In tries, including in -- II dia and
t:011flict h{1WẹWẹT iminant internaThe cause') + 'The di intensification ious and socioIs bet Ween and World countries. fissures reflect and religious dif2 date colonialism. ıs have been Yedrs ti) cv, divigy, political partie distribution of - in complex and onfigurations'.
2000, 80% of the ic"1T1 Wil 1 1 i"We i 11 d (nearly 5 bil
NEWS BACKGROUND
lion of 6.2 billion) and a largc percen lage of this number will be young, urban and unemployed Says Iwan Head, the Cal Ina di: 1 political scientist. The prognosis? Wider and pro tracted disorder and violence. The answer? Usually, and at least tc 11 porarily, Tc pressive colul Interviolcnce, meaning of Course the A mcd forces. Is this the Siti Lanka scenario, for the 1990's"?
With population and youth expectations rising, while export income Wils static or declining, Third World cultics like Sri Lanka Will borrow IIloric and mo Te — first fo II the inte:Tnational agencies which Inay acco illmodate us with "soft | 0än 5, ainsi the Il to other SOLITCes" (commercial banks) at higher interest. The result is the new, growing burden of debt-service,
SIPRI, the Swedish Institute, has given the following table in its latest report, based mainly on World Bank statistics 1988. The situation lay he worse in 1990,
xternal Military Debt-service plus :bt-service cxpenditure military expenditure
36 15.8 39.4
}.7 14.5 5.2
5. 22.) 47,
.8 19.6 34
5.5 13.9 4), 4
3.1 30.9 44
1.2 4.9 85.1
).9 19.5 5(),4
4. 40.1 60.5
.1 5.5 536
4.2 30.7 54.9
5 22.5 46

Page 6
Finally, there is the new institution of MILITARY INC., lot in small countries like Sri Låtlikal, but i Til those Tedi L1 — size, usually army dominated nations like Egypt, Indonesia, South Korea, Nigeria, Philippines etc. ''An under-developed industrial infrastructure beck ons the military, even when it does not have political power. Armies need boots, uniforms, guns, troop carriers. And the defenee budget is often one of the biggest in the economy' Armies support particular private companics, often directly linked to the global arms industry.
These are the first signs of military-industrial complex.
In the po0r er countries, arms plu Tcha ses soon beco fine a lucrative bu5ine SS. A few favoured Çorup: lies or i Individuals becco IIIe the main importers, which trend 100 establishes à lijk best weten a privileged private sector and the military establishment,
The Irlo I e il 11e di te and dangerous threat of course is to the civilian authority. In his speech at the opening ceremony of the Army Hospital and Rehiibilitation Centre, President Prelada sa silid :
Moreo wct the th Tce sic Twice5 and police have developed a strict sense of discipline we all can be proud of. Unfortunately several Tehellion 5 occurred in our country from time to Lime due to political and ethnic reasons.
If the Te had been indiscipline in the services and police it had been due to the activities of a few selected individuals. But in general terms the majority in the armed services and police had always mainlained a very high sense of discipline,
The armed forces and police had always protected the freedoll, independence and sovereignity of the country by being loyal tQ the duly elected government.
4
The Preside Schlir lādi Te
ur security for developed count :And çC III i 1 elded plined force
At i til 1: people of the furious war in are being tail bıcı dies, Ille to
We ecog Sinh LIE NËltig peoples with
Il rial, Thier only if the rig nized and gua! State! Would by El ble gel Lille d [1] el E LO LIH: F: :lcטייו שuld bםw si TC; if the Ni
The prese | 15, 1 guiti ԻՎational grւյլ: lity from the C.
Herce, vyc for the Tres: the present co,
's a slept crisis we Irge recognizcil org
Signat
B. I)։
S. T.
II). .
A. lalt
Isaac

NEWS BACKGROUND
said a foreign and safeguarded the people's cently compared Will and mandate. 'ces to those of
ries in the World He had said our forces had them as a disci- In ewer gone against or spu TinCd which protected the people's will or decisions.
FEDERAL SOLUTION
— ал арpeaІ
whicn there is increasing anxiety and trepidation in long the North and East at the prospect of living in the midst of a which few legally recognized fundamental and human rights 1 tained by both side5, wet, the leadiers of Will rio LL5 Telligil LI 5
voice the aspirations of the people in the Tallil regions,
LLGJ LLLL LLLLL LLHHLCL LLL S LLLLLL aCHCLLLLLLLLL LLLL LL LLLLLL LLLLLLLHH LLLL LLLLaLL LLOLLLLLHHLLLLHH LLLLL CLLLLLCCLL LCCCaaLLLLLLLa LLLLL LLOGH LLLLLL LLLLLLaLS C L GCLLLLL LL LG LLaLLLu LCCHHH LLLLLLa LLLHLLLaSS efore, we have to realise that Linity in one state is practicable HL LL LlH HHmlHLLLG LLLL LLL LLLLLLLHHH LHaLLLHHL aHaH LLLLLL LLLLLLakS ranteed alcquately. Transforming Sri Lankil into a Federal the lost satisfactory leans of achieving this. This will elevolution of power and responsibility from the Central Governiderating Units. We arc happy to inform you that this solution Oried by the Tani speaking people as well as all the political NorthcIn and Eastern provinces.
HH L LLLLSHa LL amOHLLLaLLLLLLLaHHHHLLLLL LL LaL aaL L LLLLLLLLmmLtLLLHCCCS S LL ciently recognize and guarantee the rights of the different Cc LLLLLL aLLLLLLLaHCL C LLCCCa CClLLLaaC L L CaLLLL LLL LLLLCCCHLCLLaS :I tre to the Provinci | COLI I cils.
I would strongly urge you to take all necessary steps to transIt Unitary State of Sri Lanka into a Federal State by amending institution of Sri Lanka suitably.
owards discussing the proposed political solution to the ethnic LtaLLLL LGLLLLLLL LaL LLLLLLCLLL lLLaLLsS LLLa CLLL LLL LLLLLLLLL SLLLTtLLLLLLL LLLL LHHaLaHCL aL LLLLLLKSLSLSS
Designation:
pupillai R.C. Bishop of Jaffna.
Nadirajin Manager, Nallur Temple, JafTria.
ÁrL1Hill:1'Farlar Bishop - Jaffna Diocese of the C.S.I.
Methodist Church - Jalil Circuit.
WiçET Wicar, Christ Church, Jaffnā,

Page 7
How Israel blew up Sa
Former Spy accuses Mossad of murder, de ce
he Silay Tiries (London) published for the first time the full inside story of how Israel stopped Iraq from getting a nuclear bomb, which Saddam Hussein could halve used in the current Gulf crisis,
The :ccot, told it full 0 pages 11—14, shows how agents LHHHH S LL0LLLLSS SS LLLLLSS S S S S 0LaaLLL intelligence service, resorted to HHHHLLLLLLL LLHaL S LGLGGHLLL SKaLLLLLLLLH LLL prevent Saddam from obtaining Illucci secrets crucial to his plans to build the bomb. CodeIla led Sphinx, the operation cu lili Tateci i Til the IsiTai eli ai T Tail on an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, which setback Saddam's Weapons programme by a decade. Although some details of the Coperation hawe cancr gcd, the full story has not bccen told u Пti поW. It has been revealed by it former Mossad agent in a book, By Way of Deception, which the Israeli government claims endangers the lives of its agents. Israel has managed to get the book banned in Cana da; a tempo TEA ry bian in the United States was lifted by the courts recently.
Victor Ostrowsky, tle author, Says Mossad agents lurcd : Il Iraqi nuclear scientist working in Paris into a "honey trap' baited by sex and money. They also Illurdered file (If the Arab World's top nuclear scientists Working for the Iraqis and killed a call-girl whom they feared kle: W LOC III Llich.
While the rest of the World is now probably grateful for the setback to Saddan's nuclear albitions. By Way of Deception also revCa5th at Mossad cingaged in a Worldwide campaign of assassination, bombings, buggings and deception of böth its eneInies and allics in the ruthless pursuit of Israeli interests.
Ostrovsky, who trained as an agent with the service from 1982 to 1985, but was on active service for Only five months, now, Lives in Canada, fearful of being kidnapped by Mossad. He reveals
considerable de thods alimd operat lil Im lil Iiii) w tliet w cio intelligence scrwi
Yitzhlik, Shill prime minister bok : S + ' || 1 iesa view appeared Post, he says: "T Was Write with Everything Wri Lt. DIl bad Will and || Lention of lilurti In. Shimi ir has alsk
Mossaid to pre Teport om how T employ Ostrows pilrliamentary il mittee hils ills () b vestigate the alle, SLIT1, III in the Mos evidence. According to the
Knew about | Hרון (אנL נLC 83י{1 BilliT It Wl :: 41 rimes dilied - billi the Americam S. & KncW thc l' of the Wester rut, including: " the CIA still tc 11 the CIA. S Runs Thore b) Titan Ts, iIl Lii) Idi G HHS H Sec. UI1ited Stiltes kll has 27 agents wh gence in Americ g FC Tiged the Shimon Petc5, ministicT i Il 1985, the illegal tran: jets frem Israel || Brought abo Rabin governm leaking details SECTet US hillik i
Recruited chauffer of Yas of thc Palestile nisation.
D Exposed a p Golda Meir, th prime minister, the Pope in Ron Trailed Ch ti CD squalids in
This siles.

NEWS, BACKGROUND
ddam bomb
ait and dirty tricks
il about the Illei gils of what was Tld’s III last secret,
Լ: Է:
1ir, the Israel i las bril Llied the ''. III a II interIl the WFrisi ser# THıę pylle block e'Wil iL1 telt 1015. * In the Te is based ics, With the i1g Israel."'
e di tie 1:1 di f pare al detailed MISSF1 di Cälille til ky. All I STEL eli intelligence coinel 1 åsked to i Ilgations and Will SEld chief to give
bk, Missādi:
Le TTorist plans in he barra ck5 in
Wmlerica Il II la1 t Tiiltd to Lell
citill of sole 1L 5tages in BeiWilliam Buckley, hief, but did not
tal 2000 colla
Iet Cell in the own is Al which o gather intelli
.
signature of the Israeli prime to rubber-stamp sfer of Skyhawk
Ö Inld ) 1 esiä.
It the fi 1 of the ent in 1977 by of his Wife's .tוIIום של י Els i 1 igent the sic T Arafat, head Liberation Orga
lot to assassinate ë FQT Imer ISTaeli When she wisited
In 1973.
ilean assassinaTetLI TI for Exocet
previous
e Referred to Margaret Thaichcras "the bitch' because its chiefs Were conviIced She Was anti-5 e Ilitic.
The most da. Inaging Tc velations refer to the United States. If the Israelis really did know of plans behind the bombing of the marine bar Talicks atılıd fıilled to notify the America Ins, thicy might hawe preWe Inted one of the worst terrorist acts against any country.
Ostrovsky says Mossad learned through an agent that terrorists Were loading a massive amount of explosivc5 on to a truck. 'Mossad knew that, for size, there were only a few logical targets. One of which Illust be the US compound,' he writes, ''The gene Till attitude ab Collit the Annericans Was: 'Hey, they wanted to Stick their mos e into this Leban on Ihing, let them pay the price.' "
It was decided, according to Ostrovsky, to pass on only a very gen Crill War Ining -- One of 100 Warnings about carbo IIIb attacks that had been circulated in the siX 11onth 5. Mossa di thought that if the barracks was attacked the United States Would move closer to Israel as the only trustworthy ally in the region.
Many of the stories in the book are already known in outline. But what makes this book unique is the detail it contains, including names of agents, training practices, methods of gathering intelligence änd sources in different countries. If trie, there is no doubt that the revelations Will be immensely damaging.
It is difficult to judge the accuracy of the book, o how qualified the author is to Write about the events he covers. Unlike Peter Wright, who wrote Spycatcher, Ostrovsky was a junior figure and must have learned much of the information second hai II d.
Quite how he got access to such secrets remains unclear, given Mossad's reputation for obsessive secrecy, and disseminating information strictly on a need to-know' only.

Page 8
G ULF cRISIs Saddam sets a
mine ul
western military allian
lan Davidson
he crisis in the Gulf sects to be unfolding towards a major tragedy. The chance of wat is high; if so, the costs in terms of human life will be fearful; the prospects of victory a Tc. II, QTc: thall uncertain; L Tid yet the ratchet of events seems to be driving inexorably towards that end.
War is not America's decla Ted policy, of course. But a long US strategic analysts there seems to be an Almost uniwersal a55umption that war is coming because it cannot be avoided. The forces are being built up; they cannot be withdraw I while Saddam Hussein Temains in control of Kuwait; they cannot sit there for long; so they must be used soon after deployment allows, say from mid-October.
It is the prospect of war which is releasing a flood of old US complaints that the allies are failing to pull their weight: but the prospect of war is also, no doubt, the reason why the allics are ha Inging back.
By a remarkable achievement of international solidarity, the United Nations has managed to agree on a static policy of denial, in the embargo. But a War would be a moving process, conducted by the All cricans, at a time and in circumstances which are un certain, and with military and political objectives which may not be defined in advance.
By hassle and persuasion, the US has got the allies to step up their Imilitary contributions to the cil forcement of the ellbargo. But if war breaks out, all bets will be off, and the almost universal consensus behind the UN Security Council Tesolutions will fly apart. In deed there is also a serious potential threat to the general cohesion of the western alliance.
In the past, Americans have tended to argue that the European allies owed them a debt of solidarity, at the very least: in return for the US commitment to the defence of Europe the Europeans should back up,
6
the US which i Weste T1 i Ilitcrc: Nato a Tea. Th. and it is not : is that if the Linco-operative, might go home, In the Ilcw disa Tmament, h Li mliikely [o be a No wester I EL Il en t Wilts th { get out of Euro hand, it is now that, for the fo the Te is II o Inc: military threat tc. beca Lusc, the Wa effectively cease This week, t So wiet Li Ilion February agree their forces in F men each (plu 30,000 for the C:A 115 e it had si taken by events
official target forces is now
100,000, but I
sal, CITOS:ll 1C: L a Illy
II deed, doubt her Nato itself disappearance th Teat, or in w London su Illi year, Nato le declaratory stab ing of westerm trille lnd that under way, it that a steep Cl forces in Europ ALi Crica's milit; al lia mcc., BL Lt debate over the alliance, the di and the Tople of inevitably beco hıca tcd if it we ducted against a wa T i II, the C The debate W be particularly many. Presider a chew Imade an bolic co Ilcessic year which he LI Tlified Germa Iain a full II But the really

lder
was defending 5 outside the unstated threat, lways un stated, Europeans are the Yankees
a of peace and wewer, this is ne-sided debate. ropeln gOvčrn
Americans le. On the Other widely admitted leseeable future, ningful Soviet Western Europe, saw Pact has
to exist. he US 11
scrapped their ment to limil urope to 195,000 is a bonus of * Illericans), be1ply been over. The ne W ll Ilfigure for US Tould 70,000to figures are Tiլ ԼիT է: 5 remain whetcan survive the of the Soviet hat form. At the t earlier this aders made a at the rethinkInilitary docprocess is still scens probable ut in A Therican te would reduce ury role il the the political future of the octrine of Nato, the US, would mic Tluch. Till Öre tre being cornthe backdrop of Gullf. "ւյuld no doubt acute in GerIt Mikhail Gorbimportant Symin earlier this agreed that the ny should reember of Nat0. new fact after
tll t
unification on October 3, is that Germany will become a fully sovereign member of Nato, with a potentially greater in
fu cince ower thic cw ollutical of the al lia Ilcc.
An early test of Ger Llain
at titudcs, will bc the stationing of foreign troops in Germany. The conclusion yesterday of the **2 plus 4' proccss means that the rights of the Second World War Wictors will fall away, and al Ille w basis for foreign trocops will ha we to be fuld. President Fril 1c) 15 MitLiterramid Ells assuled that the new i Gerllan y would not want Frech troops to stay, and has set about pulling the Ill home over the next four years.
In reality, Lhee (Ger Tılan aittitil de is Holder ind morg 135 e. Ttive tha il that. Next Moldly at the bilateral Franco-Ger IIla T1 sum mit in Munich, Chancellor Helmut Kohl is likely to ask President Mitter rand to keep French troops in Germany, but Only oil condition that they are integrated with allied (probably German) forces. One idea would he the fios sna tion of fl, Franco-German corps.
The first implication is the Bon Il Grow e Timmelt ing the mal LI Tal frtill the likely reduction in US forces, and believes th:1 Nito bec y Tle more Of El ELITOpean affair. But a reduced Na to can only hawe a plausible clefence posture if all Tlembers contributc . Il a in equal footing. Therefore, Lihle LiIlle has colle for France to bal Idol its antiquc prete:Insidans to al allut CDnomous defence policy, sepa - Tä te from the Test of the allian cc. In other Words, thic Gert Ilia In Gower Il Tllett is t l I r Iling in France the integrå tiComist logic in the defence field which France Las tur The di so long and so intensely on Bonn, in the ficlids of ecolloIllic and monetary union and political union.
The logic of Euopean gration is likely to powerful, whatever happens, there is no plausible case to imagine that the new Germany will lurch off into dreams if national expansionism. On the other hand, a war in the Gulf
(Corfirilled on page 25)
til L. is drawconclusion
inteTelli

Page 9
LIBERALISA TAOIW - 4
The impact on the poli
Mick Moore
he SLFP was seriously considering an 'opening to foreign capital during the last two years of its Tule in 19701977 (i.e. once it had edged the largest Marxist party, the Lanka. Sama Samaja Party cout of the government in 1975). And since the Tid 1980s, the SLFP las committed itself very firmly to continu ing With the Open econo
mic policy'. There was indeed som cithing of a hiatus in the picriod 1978 to about 1985. The SLFP was badly split. The
party's Presidential candidate in 1982 was the relatively radical (läte) Hector Kobbe kad Llwyl. His campaign was largely run by leftists. But this itself, as Well as the disorganization of the SLFP more generally, was in a large part the result of the political mano e uVrings of Presidet JayeWardena, notably the suspension of the civic Tights of the party lca der, Mrs Bandaranaike, by a Special Presidential Commission in 1978, Mrs Baldara haike, was u 14 ble to co Titest elections CT i IlWolve herself in politics, Wa Tious factions, mainly cented around her children, fought openly.
The Te See. Ils little doubt thilt Il rational strategy for any represcitative of the collective interests of capitall, local and foreign, would have been to IIlaintain the SLFP as an alternative government, and to keep the relatively CC). Il servativ c but aut Hill Crita tiwe Mrs Bandaranaike as party lea
der. The SLFP would the have been used as all alternative Tric Indly gowcTn ment () Il ce the
UNP becam c to o un popular. And that substitution Would almost certainly have been made before no W. Fo'o I" a Co.) In lin LI Ea, tio [1 01 the present road increasingly threaten 5 to precipitate major political cha nges which could not possibly be in capital's, interests. The attempt to disable the SLFP
t",
while laitai of political
isted bee Component of decay describ dificult to see but i Ilirical to capital. Here
relatively ela Which See [[le
of other, deeper SE IIl II. FlLLCI the Evide 11ge til tively simple
UNP has Ele IIlotivated by th ta iIIi its elf i II a) fi
W III. The Dir of Libe the Poli
It is cel T Llı potheses about for the Sri Lank Il for Illic libcraliza convincing in e CJINU, Illic: poli were far from Incci i the large foreig the expansion activitics-they posite. And it Lin Orthodox feat tion policies prowide Some ex pola Illiticions of tical decay, a which rely heav SiOIl and carin Les tcc1. There ! Ille-Ch:1IniSI:15 : [
The first Illic to the poin B:tälls c liberi חEnted iווimple I Imlai 5 siwe i Ifilii W, LIrces through Imany individua sociated with Hlave Tea ped m Inefits, befits a direct produ

tical process
ning in image pluralism has important the "political ed above, It is this as anything I the interests of Els i 1 Other cascs Te theories UNP as the agent forces or interests d le 55 y:|| With än des the relinition that the in a large part e desire to Illa - ice and in clower.
"ect Impact ralization on
ty
Hit 'text-book" hy
the implications in polity of ecotion a Te not very part because the cies themselves *text-book' in na| SC II o Tespects— Il aid inflow and
of public sector Were the very opis precisely these lires of liberalizawhich appear to plausible, partial | aspects of polibeit explanations ily upon il presIt be rigorously Tlay be two causal .kין היוו
han is T) is simple it of crudity. iziti) Til has b ccm the context of a "f foreign resothe public scctor, ls and groups as
the government iljor material be
which are clearly ct of the liberal
economic policy and the associalted good relationship with forcign lid dolors. These beneficiaries include, for example, politicians receiving a percentage on public sector contracts, businessmen Who lı:1 ve built up large enterprises through servicing the big expansion of public investment, and public serwants and MPs who have found valued foreign trips and scholarships available in rela Live: abundance. Becausc Sri Lankal has so I many foreign, :lid donors, all in some degree in direct competition with each other for "viable' projects to fund, and each seeking to purchase the loyalty of local collaborators through, for example, foreign 'study visit and scholarships, benefits hawe accTued to a large proportion of people in the higher and middle teaches of the public bureaucracy. Relative to typical Sri Lankan Living staldards, the rewards from a good connection into this inflow of foreign resources have been Ilore than generous. I suspect that the UNP ha; undermined the demoCratic political system and perpetuated its own rule partly from the elemental desire to remain in clower.
The second mechanism is even less tangible. The Inore authoritarian aspects of the new political order - the centralization of political power and the rcpression of opposition, Sinhalese and Tamil, democratic and revolutionary - in part reflect the fact that the state found that it had a new foreign cconomic and political base which was to Some degree it substitute for its existing base among its own citizens. It is not that Sri Lanka's foreign friends intended 0 Sllop Cort Authoritaria This Tim. Indeed the opposite was the case: compared to most of the poorer Third World, Sri Lanka has been
7

Page 10
able to claim forcign aid by WiTtlle of its denocratic credenLia lig. Nor is it thit case that the UNP neglected its domestic political roots, As we hawe seen above, the government has atte Impted to na u Irish and sustail a popular support base. Yet at the sa Inc time it has succumbed almost i Ilı civitably to the in wari
able corc of trill thı in the Irını axıimını “Hic who pays the piper calls Lhic tune. For the continual
inflow of a great deal of forcign Hid, Elind the resultan relatively good performance of the Initionill e cintomy duri Ing the period We are considering, purchased the UNP sufficient popular acquiescence and support that it was to some degree libet Hitel FTIT TOT 11:4 || CT1st Tilts Ind i Ice II Live 5. It did Ilöt Feel Obligel to Work hard to 1lai II
til in popular support through directly Political means, i. e., by ält tempting to main tai Til some
impression of conce TI with thc Com Enon good, a Ind Some moral claim to governmental power. Matic rial Tesources would bring in the votes when they were needed. One could invite in it tril 15 m altional corporation to produce sugar, thro w large numbers of pealsants Coff their la mids in Monetagala district, undercut the existing business of illegal distillation of sugarcane into alcohol, and get away with it. One could crack the heads and shins of St Tikers a Tid SLFP cadres in the villages and get away with it. The President could a band On the populist style cultiwated by all recent political leaders, adopt an aloof, imperial Ima im Fler, å Ild get a w Fly with it. The UNP government succu Timbed to the temptation provided by the prospect of continued foreign support to clip the Wings of its internal competitors, relying - unwisely as it LLLL0L S L S S LLLL H LHaLLL Sa S C aaaa of growing prosperity to overCOIThe populat qualms about particular policies and about the style of government generally.
IX. The In direct Politica
impact of Liberalization
The Types of argument considered in this section are pot
8
entially comple sparing Illust h:1 Illajor links in The first link ill pact, II ateria tive, of liberaliz, The secondi lil translati Il Cf it
E DIT TOT ' I gories of politi can fortunately Sion within II: by identifying cal 15 H l link:Liges two ma in poi exa Illining kill ho sibilities,
FET the first the in pact of
iza LiCIl QI soc three potential
1. 1 Major cha and SC cial rela with liberalizat generated such Te5:nt II1 ent ll T1CI eri: 1 disorienta" sectif). Ils of the
came intensely or predisposed
and simplistic
IIS
1.2 The cxi tielsii lization alid I the Wisible su capitalism by and the associ: zation With ide considered fo! iIlloral OIT s: have outraged more tradition opposed to cor capitalism and kan (or non-Sil Willies and life
1.3 Most c lization Inight h posed material absolute, on par Tomic categorii
The second I cern the proces: these first Order lated in 10 DH1Of political di fortunately On cc plausible conte

x. The Illst We at least two its causal chain.
dels with the 1 and/or cogniation oni society. iki cch T ceris the his ill pact into If our sub-catecal decay. One keep the discusalia geable limits a few plausible it each of these mits, Tather that II ypothetical pos
order linkage - ecolic liberaiety — the Te are
ç: 1 di daites,
nges in cc) El Cornic tibi 15 i SSC:iilted ion imnight hawe
high levels of ertainity and gention that large : population bepoliticized and to accept extreme
political prog
I of commerciaIlirket Telä til 15, pport given to the government, til Of liber Alils Fltid behälwis L1r reign, Western, criligeous might le adherents of alistic ideologies İımlı tercialis İltı anıl Cor IC3 T-Sri La I1nhalese Buddhist) —stylcs.
incretely, liberaave Wisibly imlosses, relative or Licular Soci-cc.) { = 5ٹل
der linkages conjes through which effect 5 TE LITATSTE H SpectsיI mtט ecay. There are
again only three diers.
2.1 Thic first cord cr cfects Immight genera te such vchentinent political responses from affected groups that thic pre-existing pluralist constitutional framework could no longer cope. The government would then resort to a degree of repression to protect both itself and the political system Ilore generally,
2.2. The Tesel III e Ints geInet.tcd by the first order effects might somehow be partially deflected away from liberalization and from the gover F1 TT1 eint and projected ont o pa Tticular eth Tic groups, thus escalating ethnic tensio II and conflict.
2.3 The previous two processes could be sequentially combined: an escalation of ethnic tension and conflict might oblige the government to resort to repres: sion to protect the political systeri 1.
Depending in particular on how mamy distinct Socic-CCO - nomic groups can be identified as matic rial victi Ils of liberal lization, cven this restricted range of possibilities at each level generates a rather large combined number of hypothetical causal sequences. Rather than specify and examine each in turn, only the more plausible causal sequences will be considered. One can conveniently structure the discussion by starting from each of the three first order effects listed abowc.
Psychological dis turba rice. I dC) not propose to treat further hypothesis 1.1, i.e. that liberalization has had a general disturbing and mobilizing effect at the level of mass political psychology. This is partly because the idea is extremely difficult to test, but mainly becilluse 1 see no evidence to support it. The previous statist economic regime, which brought about major economic reforms, changes in income relatiwities, pTiC5H11Cl - tion of individuals and small groups through political con mections, and serious shortages of basic commodities, Would seem

Page 11
just as likely as liberalization to have generated resentment and uncertainty. No one living in Sri Lanka during that period could plausibly see 1977 as a significant point at which a new economic policy began seriously to disturb a hither to stable Socio-economic system. It would, however, be less than balanced not to draw attention to Guna singhe’s suggestion that after liberalization, Colobo's urban poor became politically disaffected and manipulable because of their Trl Strati OT1 a. t. their inability to grasp the material prosperity to which they had such open visual access con the streets and through the new medium of television.
Violation of value, Hypothesis 1.2 does, ho Wever, have Tore
appeal. Sri Lankan political culture in general, and (the majority) Sinhalese political
culture in particular, have long been characterized by relatively strong adherence to values which have been conspicuously flaunted l'ID der the liberal e conomic regime. The outsider might feel morc com foTtable in distinguishing two sub-sets of "traditional values': a radical-socialistic- populist opposition to capitalism premised on the notion of capitalism as exploitation; and a Sinhalese Buddhist opposition to alien behaviour and life-styles, Whcre the TaII1i1 11i Dno Tities :Te also identified as a lien. An importa Ilt featurc of Sri Lankan politics over the past half century has, however, been the extcIlt to Which the radical and the Sinhalese Buddhist political cultu Te and values have Yof been separated one from another, but have comprised aspects of a relatively integrated and coherent WLrlcl wiew.
The apparent correlates of ecoIl Comic libc Tal ization hawe certainly generated concern and out
Tange a mong “traditionalists". They include: the very notion that the market and economic
necessity should have priority Over welfare, human needs, and governmental responsibility to meet those needs; the apparent
popular Crawing and the assoc. In Oncy; naterial rapid spread of In tion, drug tradi and beach-side
sociated with t fusion to the y dress and 'pop'
material artifak tion. The fact ti apparent correl
zal Lion Were 35 of the rapid gri ist business (un the introduction (in 1978) as per ve is irrelev tical impact. T Illent has certai ally and ideo able. There is as to the real the traditionalist Hult UNP Sen danger that thei stiffer the no backbone of th tion, the SLFP. has historically and vehicle of äli 5t wallues. Til to protect itself. m1cnts made foi sumption contai gical support fo thc free market. for the Ille w c CC purely instrume Iment's Wel flire are reasserted
cTill 5. The UN degree tried, i. coherently or VE to use the Ima associated with the bases for " to create II oral, purely material-i gitimaey for its that it needed largely failed pi millich more gene the relative pau Lima tio Il Tesource able to capitali gimes, especial: rccency denie5 || to be “Illa Lural".
As a matter electoral base o during the first f Tule, to so nie

for foreign goods, iated quest for Ostentation; the arcotic consumping , prostitution Illidity - all asJurism; the dif'olling of Western life styles and Its; and corruplilt Sonic of these ites of liberaliEllich the product 3. Wrth of the tourtil 1983) and of 1 of ticle visiol if libc Tilization ant to their polihe UNP governnly become In orgically vulner50 Ime Cuestion political clout of S, but no doubt Sitivities to the policies would ral and elmı otive e lain opposiFor the SLFP been the product | hese Taditionile UNIP has tried Political state" domestic conin little ideoloT capitilis III and The arguments homic policy are 1 tal, and governTes ponsibilities in traditional P h:15 to some lbeit not very Iy convincingly, terial resources liberalization as Farious attempts as opposed to Instrumenta, leTule. The Tact to di so and rhaps Teflects a all phenomenon: :ity of the legi3 ('Tilyths) avail- טit: Tוון סוIם t & c to those whose hell any claim
of fact, the the UNP did, We years of its egree shift ric
latively away from Sinhalcse Buddhists towards the various minorities, including Tamil in som c arcas. Furth cr Immore, Buddhist priests were prominent among the more vocal critics of the government around the end of 1970s. Assuming that th Cse phenomena were in piirt fuelled by a sense of violation of traditionalist Sinhalese Buddhist values by the policy of cconomic liberalization, one can draw a few rather Weak calus ull links between liberalization and political decay. In the first place, insofar as the traditionalistic value system identi
fied Tamils as being a mo ng the alien groups exploiting Sinhalese Buddhists and corrupting their social system via 'capitalist economic policies, then these policies, helped exacerbate ethnic tension. In the second place it seems likely that the UNP began to take a hard line with
the democratically-elcctc di Tamil Opposition party around 1980 in part to re-assert its own Sinhalese Buddhist credentials. This hard line, epitomized above all by the use of UNP party thugs in local elections in Jaffna in 1981, helped confirm the alienation from the regime of
the elected Tamil political leadership.
I conclude, then, that there
are some substantive links between the ideological impact of economic liberalization and political decay. They are, however relatively remote and weak. They are also high specific to
the Sri Lanka context, above all to the deep entrenchment Within Sillallēsie Iātinālis
ideology of a sense of national
vulnerability to a relatively monolithic set of 'external forces and agents, a category
in which Sri included.
Lanka Tamils are
Malferial loters, There is also some limited Substance in the hypothesis that political decay
is the indirect result of the :1Çtions Cf 5 Çocio-ccomo Illic groups adversely affected by
liberalization. At
C) ur ... 5 econd

Page 12
level, this causal linkage appears to Tun through hypothesis 2.2, i.e., through the projection of Tc5 cilt II e ILS O Il tC ethic Illi Ilorities and the consequent exacerbation of ethnic tensions. There are however, a range of other possiblic links which Tequirc at least a mention. And for that to be possible 3) e cel 5 first to cs. La blish the identity of the loser groups. This is in fact a ratic difficult exci cise, and the conclus10. In telt Htive.
The overall degree of inequality in incorne distribution has almost certainly increased since 1977. There is, however, no evidence that the degree of deterioration was any Worse than in the period 1970-77 und er a statist/socialist Tegime.
(Oile difference is thilt liberii |- 7:1 tion gen crates : sharper popular image of the rich
(With their foreign goods, foreign travel etc.) getting richer while the poor get poorer. The actual p:1 ttern of change il incone relatiwities has, however, becı complex and relatively uIstable. Three numerically significant categories of leysers CHTı be identified.
Firstly, it seems virtually certain that a large number fra III anlong the poor est strata of society are now absolutely woTse off thia II i Il 1978 bec:153 e the value of the food stamp entitlenents which they were the Ti gra Inted in place of subsi dizel fod rations halwe bee II severely eroded by inflation.
Half the population are adversly affected in this way, but many Will have found compensatCom increa Sed inco III e fTOIT) Other
sources. There was no sign of organized opposition from the real losers in the period We arc considering. And this
is L1 Insurprising. The poor est labourers, typically afflicted by Cld age, sickness, large Illumbers of dependants and absence of a ble-bodied IIIElle in COIIIe earners, have very fc w politiCall resol Tce 5.
O
Secondly, a Sector employe School teacher a real decli Many may h; co Isolation in tunities for in tation, especi I Lith in the perception of of corruption. Of status whic to holders of is not a mic na bo COITI ČILS:t til. hawe scell abo' employees hawe զաies cent sinct diccisively brok .1980 וi L וח טונו
Thirdly, a l; WNET 5. and import-substitut Which hWE LI previous regim adversely affe liberalizatio. Filmbers and Tai bumi wa esitcd 70, Weavers who w thrown out of a Le 97. T widely scattered cd, Tulost of til: 1.1 Im II la TTi cd fema? IC III e II i n s It is likely the TILL II ber of f:: cultural Worker by the sa wage ir Import-substitut through the re. TestrictioIls CT1 Wide range of CT Ops. The vi ever, in mos spread, un orga ing a single of the variety volved, e.g. 0Ilions, chillies was mainly fri sula, where th la tio [] Was hea. Oppositio II was ited.
This adverse Jaffna economi food imports tributed in a

ost all public and especially have suffered ill salities, e found solle nhanced opporme supplemenlly if there is lear-universal increased levels But the loss for Illicly accrued Iblic scctor jobs : to any such Ho Wever, als 'We e, public sector been politically El St Tk: Was in by the gover Il
rge number of loyees ofקוeIl ng enterprises
ved Lindet the e have been ited by import
II teiTIL 15 aðf abruptness, the 3 J J Tie by al II CO handl (Ill. ve Tc immedii. Licly חt iנI &1חloyרן הח ט ey WeTe r H. ther | and un organiz.em Be 111= young les Working :lt all workshops. it an ewen la Tiger mers and agris were affected bly, w dealt to i ing Elgriculturc Iowal in 1977 of the import of a subsidiary food tills were, howcases widely lized, EL Tid lackfocus by wirtlle of crops inliga I, potatoes, and pulses. It Im Jaffna, peni Ilfarming popuily affected, that clearly articul
effect in the of liberalized may have conin or way Lo the
gro Wing alielmation from the whole national system of the Jaffna population, the political and cultura 1 coTc of ST i Lanka Tamil society. But, this apart, it is remarkable how little organized political opposition has come from the main groups disadvantaged by the liberal economic policy. Their quicscience is due = to El in Lu II bcr of factors: physical dispersion, lack of organizational focus or capacity, and the existence of alternative economic activities. The only losers whose reactions to liberalization night plausibly help explain political decay were in fact a relatively s III all group of Si Thalesc imdustrial entrepreneurs who did not apparently face quite the s: The obstacles im är Liculating their grievances.
In easily the most thoughtful and fluent attempt to link economic liberalizatio Il to the ethnic conflict, Gull:15ỉTìght: hypothesizes that the key actors were a group of Sinha lese entrepreneurs whose businesses had developed under state patro nage in the previous import-substituting syste II. While so IIe large businesses which had their origins in importsubstitution were sufficiently Well-established to grow and thrive under liberalization, IlotEl bly through malking i InterInational business connections, there were others, Guna singhe suggests, who both failed to make those connections and who found their markets Lindercut either by imports or by locally-made products using newly-imported technology. The key link in the argument is that
thes : struggling businessmen directed their resentments lic) in the mail at the gover TIment which had opened up the economy, but ilt the Tanail busi Tessime II who were well establish cdi in both II naliny Of the larger and now thriving businesses and in the import
export trade. These resentments are believed to hawe exacerbated the general build-up of eth IIic tensions.

Page 13
  

Page 14
party after the assassination of
her Husbald in I959, she had done very little to modernize it or to create a permanent
party Organization and bureaucracy like that of the UNP. The coherence of Mrs Bandara - naikes two goverents of 1960-65 and 1970-77 depended heavily on two factors. One was the support provided by close family members, notably her husband's nephew Felix. Dias Bandara na ike, The Other, especially in 1970-77, was the intellectual and organizational stregth of the two Marxist parties with whom the SLFP was in coalition. Yet both the Marxist parties had been pushed out of the coalition before the 1977 election, in part because of Mrs Bandara naike's inability to disguise her social
(including caste) prejudices, And Felix Dias Bandara nai ke died soon after the clicction,
Mrs Bandaranaike hcld on to the SLFP leadership cycin when
without civic rights. Her clear intention to keep thic party leadership in the family dis
couraged many potential alternative leaders, Indeed, most of President Jayewardena's Lrusted ministers were people whose backgrounds might have made tem SLFPers d the SLFP been a party open to the talents. The splits in the SLFP in large degree hinged around personal differences between Mrs BaTl dara maike, h c r s D1, and
her politically-active daughter Chandlitika, Neither of the latter has shown real leader
ship qualities.
A different SLFP would hawe constituted a much less soft target for the President's sophisticated disabling tactics, provided a III ore credible alter Ilative go We TTN ment, attracted more support of all kinds, and made the kinds of al Luthorita Tia II and repressive measures used more costly a Tid risky for the UNP leadership.
The third element of the answer follows on closely; for a range of mainly contingent reasons Sri Lankan politics became totally dominated by J. R. Jayewardena, Who Was a superb political tactician but Whose oveTriding goal appoca red
to be to preserv his own personal regardless of the Lanka. Jayc Ward himself to be r ently relatively c worthy and distrl
Il di la cking Il ception of—Chr. p. with - the relati political institut under Illined the III] Si Inhallcse Opp C) S ting the IWP, the lese party of the and the way it tlie J TWP EL I d ti bitter encil it's,
similar social dena legalizcd
boosted the JW with SLFP. III this was to Inisf way in which
Ta Tilli l is-s Llc W: 5 were thic results toyed with thit Te1ätively CIns leadership, the
Liberation. Frol cause this suite personal goal: obtain Lheir de the Presidenti: 1982, Hi! Iլ է:WET taken the Tamil at all seriousl. fact that it was a guerilla War.
Lihat tı: TULF
and the armed s assum cd the pol
Tile çel til li: policy derives : Jaya war dena’s Lo Tulle al Te. TI the democratic though not alw
pired by the effectively licen: drive to perp
dimi Thailce. A 1 degenerated int. partly because the II for his ow fill cl to See hi h:ld beC0IThe.
XI. Is Liberi
EKOT era The Ca, L1 sa l ll III Sri Lan liberalization t decay are both and highly co particular featl

e and extend predominance C{05 ES to ST i ena his show I til thless, apparall'Olls, ut Tuststing of others, apparent conerhaps concer II we fragility of iOS. He has a in democratic ition by boosTadical Sinha1971. Insurgency Was repressed, le SLFP We Te despite a very Jase. Jaye warand otherwise P to compete the long rum ire badly, The he dealt with analogous, as Jaye war demaL * elected and &T Wia. Lliw c. Tan 1111 Tani | United it (TULF), beli his im Ilmediate 3 - notably to facto support in elections in 5 e IIl & to haye separa tist issue y, despite the escalating into The result was W Els disc Tc dici eparatist groups itical leadership. Eation of the bove all from ersonal position he repression of Opposition, allys directly insPresident, was led by him in his tua te personal ethnic tensions armed conflict he manipulated in purposes and DW serious they
lization ed?
nkages running a's economic its political
relatively weak htingent on the "ès of thic Sri
mental
Lankan case. Organized labour was treated har shly (Section WII). The Way in which liberalization was supported with foreign aid may also have increased the temptations for the UNP to lock it. self into governmental power and to treat much of its potential electorate in a somewhat cavalier fashion (Section WTII). The cultur Fil phenomenal associated with liberalizzation were u mil welco Il 1 c to Sin hälcs - BIL I didhlist Lr:Lcii LiCIallists. This and the Teactions of Some business The Il w10 Suffered from import competition, orchestrated and exploited by one particular clique within the government, may have helped to exacerbate ethnic tension (Section IX), But if a complete explanation means decorating the whole rom, all We see to hav: hiewed through exploring the impact of liberalization is undcrcCating the woodwork.
What does this case tell us about the broadcr arguments concerning the political correlates of eco Iloo Ilic libera lization out: li ned in Section I? There is certainly some good news for those who favour ecolonic liberalization: there is little evide Ice that it contributed substantially to political decay in this case. BLIt the Te is Solc blad news a 150, For some of the reasons why Sri Lankan economic liberaliza - tion failed to produce political authoritarianism through textbook'. Hadi organized labour (or capital) been more powerful, then it might have attracted (even) more wigorous government attention (Section WII). Had liberalization actually reduced governinvolvellent in economic regulation, and thus curtailed political patronage resources, then the government might have lost the support of its own cadres and thereby been pushed in an authoritaria. Il directic) Il This did not happen because foreign aid kept the Wellspring of patTonage bubbling (Section VII). The general conclusion appears to be that the political implications of economic liberalization will depend both on a range of contextual factors and on the actual content of the economic proceesses which are disguised under the highly interested label of libc Talization'.

Page 15
THE RUSSIAN DEBATE (2)
Third World: Between and Market-mechanism
Sumanasiri Liya nage
in the 70s, and 80s, the living standard of the mas
ses was lowered, The growthratics of labour productivity have sharply dropped. While
production facilities became increasingly obsolescent, technological renovations have become almost absent. In 1960, machines and equipment consisted of 24 per cent of the total exports, but this share dropped to 12 per cent in 1985 (Hasbulatov. 1988: 7). This is the context in which ecc) - nomic restructuring (perestroika and democracy and op en Iness (glas snost) could not be postponed any lUnger.
Implications for the Third World
In this concludi Ing section, I in tend to exami The the implications of what has been stated so far for the economic development of the Third World. The dilemma most of the Third World countries face today is that while the oppressed, persecuted and marginalized social classes and groups are in a position to gain political power owing to the fact that the upper privileged strata of society are not capable of solving the warious economic, social, political, ethnic and cultu Tal problems in a broadly acceptable manner, the socialist program mc of Tcco Instructio II which thicsic classes intend to carry out is not realistic in the present context since the productive forces are not adequately developed and the regime of production is so backward so that concil is socialist planning is impossible. A carcful re-reading of the Russian debate together with a critica understanding of the development processes of countries which were able to over come the proble III of underdevelopment in the postWorld War 2 period (I include in this catcgory countries like South Korea and Taiwan) would
contributc to a practical program
Inc. which can of a just, der civilized society
In conclusic to indentify th which should b gråt Til TIl C.
(1) Referring rary Russian wrote in 1921 th basis for socia therc. He: Ilıca T of production ately developed tions of produ ding to the si production coul What Tecessa Til äbove motion is accepted Teliti socialism and c. Im ent should b{ aspect will be c forth-coming : development: A
is"
OIllitנQ1יַE (2) the Third World the maj Intelli balance between and ex FÒS I 11: As Boris Kagar out (the) mark gua Tintor and d dual interests, automatically s terests (1989). We cal In derive In Russian experie the South Korea
In the present
ket mc chillis II
policy of "IIlak have every wher Catc. Te5 olir ces i nomic develop ne Tated Withil from broad h fered to un p directly as a rest line chalisin. C Balas sal 's co Ilc Newly Industri

Planning
nake the building ocratic, peaceful
a reality.
, it is pertinent main elements : in a such il pro -
to the contempo
situati Ol Leni. Il
at "the conomic lism is not yet S tha L thic for Tces
have not adequso that thic rela
ction corresponcialist mode of ld not emerge. y flows from the that the hither to
onship bct ween :ono Illic develop2 inverted. (This lealt with in Iny 1rticle "Eeolonife Prelde o Sa
development in context requires :c of a proper e. (III: plan ning ırket mechilli5, II, itsky has pointed it ill 5 Wils il efender of indiwibut it can newer -II 1 וו טוון וחנT We C Cב This is the csson ot only from the 1ce but also frLrn Il experience.
context, the Marand the suggested ing prices right : failed to al llo1 favolIT of cCOent, Capital ge
and obtailed ave been transroductive LSCS ilt of Lh L. market in trary to the Isiol Lihlat the lized Countries
(NICs) "provided for automaticity and stability in the incentive system . . . minimized price distortions and relied in market mechan is for efficient resource allocation and rapid economic growth, (1981: 12), most of the NICs have adopted tight discreLion EA ry control ower in west iment and strictly restrictive import policy towards the domestic commodity market (see DattaChaudiuri 1981, Hamilton 1983).
(3) From the above, some conclusions follow regarding the nature of the property system and the extent of nationalization. Excessive nationalization leads mot only to ciconomic inefficiency but also to bureaucratization of the economy. So nationalization should be confined to the sectors where state ownership is Tequired for national plan ning. There is no direct path from nationalization to socialism. The multi-property system has not only to be maintained but also to be encouraged.
(4) The constant drive of capitill for willorization necessitates capital to find investment fields where the marginal rate of profit is equal to or higher than the prevailing average rate of profit, As capital has become distant altıd relatively independent of thic nation state in the post-World War 2 period, Third World countrics are today in a better position to have access to both capital and technology than they were in the pre-war colonial period. Foreign capital and technology and their productive use are imperative in modernizing Third world ecolonies. Industtial pica ce generated through sociall contract together with the prewaiting low wage rate in these countries would be an attraction for foreign investments in productive wen turcs.
Calified in Fig. If

Page 16
INJUSTICE: The Com
christopher S. Sebaratnam
he pension schemes for the THERE! servants introduced by the Šri Lanka Government since 1969 are grossly un realisticand discriminatoly. They constitute a grave social injustice Llder thic Lomnocratic Socialist Republic f
S’Lanka. These a TC the inc quities : Pension on Unconsolidated Salary
on the recommendations of the L. B. De Silva Commission the salaries of public servants, CT consolidated as from 1-10-1969. By the process of consolidation the C. L.A. was merged with the basic salary to form one unit as the substantive salary. Tll Է: rationale behind the consolidaltion was that it was pointless to itemise separately the C. L. A. which had been, for long, supplementary to the basic salary. With the formation of the slubs. El Titiwe salary by consolidation as from 1-10-69. (a) computation of the pension on the basis of the consolidated sa lary and (b) the introductory date of such computation as that of the consolidation emerged, i Inter zilia, as un rebuttable corolaries. Further deliberation or recommendation in this regard was redundant. But through bureaucratic lethargy the computation of the pension on the basis of the corollics "Fls omitted giving rise to protests by the pensioners in response to which he commission stipulated that the computation of pension should be on the consolidated salary. As it was natul Tal and
logical for the commencement ko T
computation of pension on the consolidated sa lafy as from the date cif consolidation the CommisSio 1 did not wa TTant it necessa Ty to make special mention of the effective date of such computation evidently believing that the authorities would use their heads to understand it. But the Government withheld the in e W CC3Im Pill
The writer. I Sri Lirik TFF FFEFT 50 FT&Fr", It's in Auffraffi)
14
tation (of pensi) YEARS enabling to profit on the los meted out to the W110 Tetir. cd :4 fLCI before 1-1-78.
Arbitrary Cut
On further Tep present govern I fixed the del le ll, introductory dat computation. Th loss in pension thcIl could be re. example that e El In tired on I. 12.7 d'atcd salary of received at pe I1Si basic hypothetica 585 p.m. whilst retired one day on the identic: salary of Rs. 815, a pensio Il base chini solidated Sala p.m. The dispal Tem o Corr (quarter of 10 's TITLS - disparity i Ti the II For exa, Tiple, a ca. 55 and Class Cofficer will retir completing the of service for 1יCw וח שווחו אHוןe jנLI of Rs. 8.15/- p. plus the C.L. that was si | it gld com Galiciated Sall cominuted gratui whereas, anothe: tired qualifying in the followi 11t:ritical to ris ol Rs. 8.15/- p. 11. of Rs. 90- and 50/= merged etc. 955 - as retiring # CC mmuled I 19100/- a differen
Degradation
The ab i'w c. 5; L3 || also resulted in of the pensioner: were computed

putation of Pensions
in for NINE the excheq lic sics and Illisericos por pensioners 30.9-69 and
off Date
resentati billi the het arbitrarily 1, 1978 is the : of the new e extent of the Inc Ltd Olut to a list from the Officer Who Ie7 cm in El consoliRs... 815 p.m. om bil sccl (In his Il sa la Ty of Rs. i TI ftlicer whic) iter o 1 1 1 78 L1 cc) Ils oliclitel |– p. m. Teceived i oil the Very Iy of R.s. 815– ity in the pay
nuted gratuity years pensin) – 1c L a 1 On the
nonthly pension. class 1 (special 1 a. II1alga Tima tedi) c 1 ft. requisite period Ht 11רַ)51חטull p 15.Iljited Sall. Ty 1. of his grade A of Rs. 90ded to firi i the ary received a ty of Rs. 11900|- - OfficT which Tcfor full pension ng year on the idated sa lary of plus the C.L.A. | S.L. A. Of R5. i make up Ris. g sa lary received ension of Rs. ce of Rs, 7200Y=!
ed anomay ha di the degradation ; whose pensioIls om the basic
hypothetical sa la ries disգuallfying them from the status f ittesters of signatutes or guara Intors in a generality of instances which required a particular Illinimum retiring salary for such a status. For instance, one of the category of persons empowercd to issue the certificate in the civil pension receipt (form TR & A 128) being gover T1 ment pensioners whose retiring consolidated sa la Ty Was in tot less han R.S. 10.020 - p. El, El go"ernment Persion CT White retired from service oil or before 31.12.7 on a chills slidated Sillary of Rs. 9780- p.a. plus C.L.A. of RS. 1080 || — p. a. aggregati Ing to more than thic said miIIiiIIm llm of Rs. 10020/- p.a. was disqualified from the said status by the failu Te to merge with his consolidated salary the said C.L.A. of Rs. 1080 - p.a. he drew throughout - that to for no financial benefit to the government; whereas, an officer who received the SEl Till: emoluments was clear of such disqualification just because he chanced to retrire a day later, The qualifying salary for such a status had later been raised to Rs. 15000/- p.a. which was beyond the Teach of both catcgories of pensioners referred to. Under the government's dis proportionate pattern of granting In eagre increases to early pen510Iles and 517:Lblic iT1CTe:13 e5 10 recent pensioners regardless of their ranks at retirement the status of pensioners who were highly ranked officers are poohpoohed whilst that of officers who were or are in subordinil te ranks are elevated over the former and in the Ic sult the pensioners who held high rank offices have even to go to pensi) neTs who held subordinate positions to have their signatures at Lested,
Double Standard
Applying double standard the government, under public administration circular No. 1002 pension series No.2) of 28.11.75,

Page 17
TcCoy Ted W. & (). P. Contributions on the consolida Led salary at the usual percen tage als from 1st April, 1975 whilst the pensibilis pensioners Were compulcd con their basic hypothetical salarics. The double standard was short yard-stick for payments by the government to the pensioners and long yard-stick for receipts by the government from the pensioners.
Pretentious Allowance
In the mitter of compens Elting the pensioners who retired fI do I ser iwice rifer 30.9.69 lil d before. I 1.78; for thic logg Cill 15 cld to them through thc complu taltion of their pensions on the basic hypothetical salaries the government introduced a schelle of compensatory allowance on a sliding scale and implemented it from 1.1.82. But the C.A. (a) did not cover the loss in Itspect of the period 1.10.69 to 31, 12.81 and (b) the qual turn of compensation granted frd. Il 1.1.82 was only a negligible fraction of the actual loss calised, For instance in the case hereinbefo Te cited the loss i Il CC ITIlluted gTatility alone Was Rs. 7.200/- while the C.A. of Rs. 30/- p.m. paid to him from 1982 to 1986 amounted to only Ris. 1800 - let alone the loss in the monthly pension. But it was faultily claimed by the Director of Pensions (Daily Neil's report)
that the allowance had been based it i Ill the Fictillall loigis gius - til i ned by having the pension
calculated on the hypothetical b15ic Salary as. El glinst the Consolidated salary. He further Stated that thic al la vya Tice vya 5 being pålid te this category () f pensioners as it was difficult to gö through each i II diwidual case and ha vic the persioT computed on the new consolidated Salary Tecollmended by the salaries Review Col. Inittee on pensions." (Daily Nei's report),
Failure to grasp a timely understanding of the issue was the government's responsibility. So when it belatedly understood the anomaly it was the responsibility of the government to have compensated the actual loss, by
of the said catcgory of
going through case, Or at least loss by sample few cases. The was, therefore,
Lilli Wall Lice.
Anomaly with
The S calci to co III pės: te til
ler ().). É a for the said lo the Ill was also pensioners who 1,1 (), 69 irld WH 31.12.77 and he a gross pensi p. In. and abov PN 3037 bf I ()] 1hey were not co III putation of as those whic Tet Fill befo Te 11. Sio I of Lh cesc W 31.12.177 3ı ild be El gToss - pensio Rs... 1000- p.m. C.L.A.) was an an CT111 ly.
C.A. With he Wid0W5
FT billi li r eccelli L. widows were pa of pension re. de ce:15ed h Lisba payment of the was With held f of Sch persi Teä5 f tei been computed hypothetical sa in thei T liet til
C.A. With effe Tli 3 C.A. a in their pensi
FT 11.87, TE taken five year the bli Tell Criti ilm Clints withhh. hFlwe Llot beëIn
M. A. or F.
MTTed Fills", plaid to the wid. pensi Cancris in s the wholic domes share di by the hi devolvel e Il tire lThe Til the husband. The this a lly will | 1:e f. Willi Ille I tE

each individual the approximate 5 W0 Tked of a se called C.A. H pretentious
nin Anomaly
C.A., designed host who retired d before 1.1.78 ss sustained by Exte I'll cled to the retired before Tetired ;ifter fore 1.1.82 with in of Rs. 1000:: (Circula I No. 82) even though affected by the their pensions | Ted lfter 30.969 78. The exclu"HC Tetired after fore 1.1.82 with Tı ktof less thığını ... (exclusive of El nomaly within
d from
date pensiolers' lid the quantum eived by their nds. BլIt the 5 called C.A. rem the wildca w 5 Illers who, by pensions having on the basic larics, received me the so called .1.82, 1 וון t Trdט: been includici is with cffect is a Thomaly had s to dawn into c leads The :ld prior to 1.1.87
paid to them.
","L1 „:E2: "W"£15 I ) t.
di WS Jf deceas; et pite of the fact tic responsibility Lisband and wife y on the Widow
del is e o her with hold II e Tit of rom such Widows at it was paid
LC their service of Illarit:11 coha
bitation which was the only function that ceased in the family lives con the latters" dt misc. So the II arried all
wance could have been appropriately designated as marital cohabitation allowance and refer Ted to) III short I10t als M.A. but il 5 F. A. The quantu III of Imal Trici allo WOLice With hell FTom such widows are due to them.
Another Cut-off
The amendment to the pension II in lite contained in Gazette notification No. 359 of 19th July, 1985 (pension circular No. PH/3044E dated 19.8.1985 granting a rise in the pension from 66 2/3 percent to a Scale of 70 percent to 90 percent based on the salary and age at retirement to those who retired on and after 1.1.85 was one more enequity piled up on the picnsion ers whic) retired before 1.1. 85, UJ Iri der this revision the qualifying period of service for il 11 pension had been reduced from 35 years to 10 years. The discount of the length of se Twice is opposed to the very Connotation of the Lern pension" which, according to a Stan.- dard English dictionary - say the Oxford Concise, is "periodical pay ment Inade in consideration of pilst ser wice". Does not the term 'past service' encompass Lhe full duration of the service ? Under the scherne Operative for y el T5 upto 1984 length of Service was an III portant factor in the computation of pension. One had to ser ve 35 years to get his maximum pension of 662/3% of his retiring salary. The Liberal change of granting the maximum pension of 70% to 90% of the retiring salary to those who serve a Tlinimum of 10 years is, however, quite Welcome. But, why la di Wi a cut-off date Lo benefit only those who retired on Нnd tifter II 85
Whereas pensioners have to pay the saime pricc for any commodity whether they retire from service before or after any arbitrarily fixed date, cut-off dates that bestow pension benefits to Some and inevitably Work greater ha Tidships on others breed social injustice. The Supreme Court of
15

Page 18
India, whose judgements coinmänd Worldwide respcct has stressed on the impropriety of such cut-off dates in its ruling thus: “Liberaliscd pension schemes apply to ter till pensioners equally and they cannot be divided into groups by a date laid down by pension authority." This ruling should serve as a beacon to enlighten and guide the pension authorities of the Sri Lanka government in the fTrnation of new pension schemes and rectification of past schemes, Hence the libera i5ati CI should apply to all pensioners equally regardless of the dates of their retirements. It is sin ple a rith sletic that wheri () file who served 10 years received 70% to 90% of his retiring salary another who served 30 years should
Ex 70 to 90% of his
rcceive
'' 10 retiring salary.
Cussed Sterling Rates
Thic TF te of cöInversi COI ÓF the pound for Sterling pensioners had been Rs.15/- only which was fixed during the British Colonial Tule While the curret exchange value is a round Rs. 60/-. Only an increase of 50% on the outdated rate of Rs. 5/- raising it to Rs. 2250 had been conceded as from January, 1987. Not to pay these oldest lot of pensioners their pensions at the real current rate of the pound is utter cussedless on the part of the gover III[til e:T 1 t.
Older the Pensioner Greater the inequity
Under circular No. PN3037,875 of 24.6, 1987 pension increases on "New Rewi Sed (C) Slidited Scheme' were granted with effect from 1, 1.87 and paid in October, 87 with are: rs. Whatever the basis might have been, a randon exa II liltill of the increases Te:Weils L chTOlgica biil 5 of later the Tetiring date greater the increase which again is a telling discrimination in general against the older lot of the pensioners, The Il Sta I. Ces of the Ta. Indom examinationaire -
Hr., f'
Mплт "o refirerrier
A. 19 B 1976 C 'S LO 1983 Ε 1984
The pension in with effect froll of such a talle.
Salary Increa Translated to
Salary il crea 5 dically have leve to the pension adhoc allowance due increa 5 c5 h ded. Sala Iic5, i increased periodi the qualitative outputs of cur posts are gret HitleT of those whe) hel tied but to 11 cc Ses il the Cost () : social Tefогп15 11 the sala Ty 5c: ScTwice rer de Tecl post by an office c qual to the sa lil:
Third world.
Ү Сонгiлнrt!
Whilt has beet appear to CInt notions which as in left circles. often argue that ween poor natic south-south dial In ore respectahl the idea of the in Lernational cal: ап а туш ment for 1Il rel Wilken iT1. village communit of “peoples' di “ па је па I culture posed. II Collical of the left app: what similar to t sed and defende

Per FIF of a gיןffff
· W(jr WJ£ሮ 8ü
RS, 024 Rs. 1467 Rs. 1426 Rs... 134 Rs. 1344
creases granted I.L. 88 also tell
Se 5 Ot
PesiO5
is al warded pericoT b centranslated 3. Only so IIle s fill shift of the We been conceIn general, El Te cally not because or quantitative rent holders of tham thẹ. Qutputs d the III a. Il T-" with t ble il Telf living, inflation, 1 l cLC. TH1cT efo) Te e v:lue of the in respect of a in the past is ry scale value of
Peris for als rr : Preirti 'E' து" fié for Л. - 87 Jetcritfrie rare.
Rs. 1075 R | R 5, 1577 R3, 11 [] 7 Rs... 1595 R$ 1û9 12 Rs. 54 Rs. 23) 18 Rs. 57 R - 23) 8
the service rendered in respect of such a post by every officer who succeeds to it. From this it follows that the pension scale value of the services of thc former is equivalent to that of the latter. Hence, in the instance of each salary increase in respect of a post the pensions of those Who retici fo IIl Such a st should be increased on the basis of their retiring salaries hypothetically equated with its current salary On the corresponding scale. This principle is under written in the J. K. Pensioners' Act and followed in most of the can monwealth countries. But why not in Sri Lanka which is a Collino Wealth country adorned with the appelitions "Democratic Socialist Republic'' ?
Τα βε αιτίIIίες)
Түріп pagғғ 13 1
said above mily radict with thic "e im Vogue tČday THISE I The CFL co-operation bet1is (the so-called ogue) provides a le alternative to integration with ital. Sinilarly, the Test OTEltic). Il g of old decaying Lies: il L1 : Ii Ille :velopment' and " has also been ly, these notions a T to be s Illehe wie w5 propoby the extreme
right of the third world countries which stand, i II, the present context, for all archaic, backward and agressive perspective. All these 'day dreams' can be traced in the Writings of the Russian populists whose wiews were ruthlessly conde II led by the Marxists as archaic and Utopian. We have to remember Lil Ways that men a Tid Women can change the circumstances in which they live and Work, but their CCIlstant st Tuggle for chance and the prevailing objective conditions are dialectically interwoven and therefore overdetermined. Any perspective for a Todern, secular and democratic society has to do away With all for Ils Of Obscuräntis Ill and Tust vie W the gJlden ige not as something in the past but its :1Tl attailable goal iF1 future.

Page 19
Gelestime Fernando : A
H. was a brilliant student With an incisive and analytical Inid and was an exhibition Wilner in the University Entrance Examination of 1933. Having obtained his Bachelor's Degree in 1937 hile pro cccddcci to Keble College, Oxford for his B. Li Lt. Degree and his theological studies - which he could not complete at Oxford due to the outbreak of the 2nd World War. However he proceeded to Bishop's College Calcutta where he completed his Theological training in 1941. His Ceylonese contemporaries in Calcutta were Cannon Christopher Rat Illyake, Rey, John Selvara Lna. In and Rev. Patrick Abeywardane. Celestine's record of service after his ordination in 1943 is spelt out elsewhere and one cannot possibly or adequately assess his contribution to the numerous Organisations and committees to which he gave of his time and his Tatu Te Wisdom. But Celestille's major contributions are his work with the Universitics, and the III erous students both Christian and non-Christian whom he influenced. The Ceylon Bible Society which he transformed from a Bookshop where Bibles were sold, to a place where the peace and presence if the Word made flesh abided" (Rev. J. Selva ratnam) and lastly his contributions to the many committees of the Diocese of Colomb) of the Anglican church. Celestine's perspica city and his gift for analysing a problem - was the result of his early discipline as a student and his total commitment to What he believed in. It is best expressed in the words of the great metaphysical poet and divine George Herbert why wrote:
"A man that looks on glass On it may stay his eye But if he pleaseth through it pass And then the Heaven espy"
Celestinc never dwelt on the sılı TTacc — bulut always made alın in depth study of what cver he under took. He was not Content to
See : Illerc refle the sense of self-deceptil I, E the 'eye' could p the sal T1 e 'W':ly of Met:1physicals = al cutely conscio to Illy thit existe gil H. Did the impact of politi actions that it in tian actic Il ;lild the relationship weer the chlu Tı world of today His numerous I 1ll insisted Lin t i T1 diwidual i II a. Il His Illonograph Critics of P, חט n LaTy טmוח C0 Was Wrong in organizations.
Celes tille vya S the inagurati christia. Il T1 ve II: cal College, C First Secretary Priya ni Soysa. E the SCM åt thc ( College of which garajah was the When he was ap sity Chaplain - daily by train Ang tila ni Wher regular Bible st disclı55i 3DS, Hindi Frl" liled student reading
Much has bc. I of Celestine, we and the recognit bot lil i Lil Sri Lill 1 which is eviden list of his ap served for 20 Secretary of til Society and for 2 Chaplain - lind many people.
There were mi litet i 1 i Te hel t0 Ör dia metrijt those that Cee

Tribute
ction - either in Self-aduation I y what the only erceive. Much in the 16th century - Celesti Ille was Lis , f tliet dichlold between Relistate - and the Cal decisions and inged on Christhinking. Also that cxists hctand thc material and sensualism. ublications have he integrity of thc spheres of life. in ''Crises in the wer' was a telling his views on what most christian
responsible for of the student Lent at thic Medilobo and its was Professor Hic ill:50, 7 Tganised cylon Technical Mr. A. C. CalaFirst Secretary. pointed Univerhe used to [[Tawel from Lands lea e he conducted Idy sessions and published 'the Imainly at the public.
1 Writtcl and said :I the last years Il CF ilis ST vice 1 kial a nd abroad, t from the long pointments. He Years als Gener:11 le Ceylon Bible 3 years University
he influenced
liny St. L1 delt 5 Who d views contrary ally opposed to stile 1eld – but
cycn in them one perceived the
carly influence of Celestine's mind and thinking. He stood firIll for Whit ho belis Ved in but
was never dogmatic or bigoted. He would di 5ägree but was alway5 prepared to listen.
Ciclicistine, was ab C) ve all a fath cr-figure to mest of us who mlı h c advis cd, sometimes chal s Liscidi, but always comforted and prayed foT 15 : Till with S. Hi 5 cl ccTI for the individual was pre-eminent and he felt deeply for the problems of every person whom hC el ci ] Li inter Cid — not only for their physical ailments- but more so for the mental, psychological, Eind spiritual problems that they had to face.
Celesti Illes : Ice Til for Chi Tistian commitment in all spheres of life Wils his mission, and to this end he strove right to the e Ind... TJ - 11 Of 15 Who Hill We ko Will Fr. Celestime, he will continue to influence us by his example, his teaching and writings his humility and most of all by his genuine love and concer Il for those around him.
We could say that Celestinc's c) Tıcerin for Eli 5 il fellow Time Till 15 most truly reflected in the Words of that great preacher and divine, Johl I) 311 Ille, when hic w Tate ;
Any Ilan's death diminishes
III,
because I am a part of Mankind.
And therefore he wet send to
know
for Wh0Il (le Be|| t0118. It T0115
for thee',
Fro y flre hōōkler, Frihished by Rey. CetlLkLCL SLCTCCECCMMt ttLLLLHM SYLCLL ί ανηγηiffΕΕ. ΤηΗ εHiτεί μ' δε ΡΗ, μίίτεν Knight.
The Rey, Celes fire Ferrido died он Остаћег 5, fast year.
17

Page 20
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CES: Jaffna, Kalutara, Kuru negala, Matara, Ta Tha Tibutt egal Tma.

Page 21
V. V. P. (3)
Rural Sector:
Bruce Matthews
SE then occasionally diffe
rent ways of expressing traditional JWP ideology hawe been expressed on recorded
tapes from Wije Weera, in party literature, aid in the current JWP “newspapero Rathi La Balai-vega ya
(Red Power"). From time to time, JWP spokespersons (ie SeCOI1d-ir1- C. ) T11 rTh:1 1 l Upatissa
Gatinama yake) or personal c0 Iltacts convey JWP thinking oil certail issues. JWP delaids revealed by other organizations (for example, JWP conditions for participating in the recent aspirations). Presently the confrontation is largely a Illilitary oue. That is mct Lco say that President Prema da sa ha 5 1 10 t made every effort to deal with the JWP om a conciliatory basis. In the past year, there hawe Несп several appeals and "Cčasofires" With full am Ilesty gua Tarticed, and even with the offer of seats to the JWP in parliament. Response to these Covertull res hı:45, usually bee Ill Cleverly delayed and sidestepped by the JWP, Tilising false hopes that a negotiated settlement might be i 111 minent. At the Silme time. Prella da si has introdt1 ced En ambitious economic rehabilitiltion programme for the poor (Jard saviya). His hope is to have each of Sri Lanka's 30,000 villages decide who allong their villages is lost needy, and to provide at least some of the With : relief package designed to break the cycle of destitution and hopelessness. This along with Premadasa's already well-ack OWledged willage “rca Wakening plan (Garoña Urda Wa) based hilousing construction, arc inter esting 1rli creative WS t Ty C come Lo grips with Wide Thing economic disparities Sri Lanka has recently experienced. The view that the economy can bear the full weight of these programmes has yet to be tested. But certainly some initiatives
Best Bul
like this have the government gers :Lindi pels: In this reg: Td, has 50 mg adv JWP Tile 1 a Teach I certail ri Iral po OT, tC) lack of solid gr is Line i f its Ce Not a peasar It is S appeal to the g Sri Lik:1'5 tra Society. A g th:lt: ctl :Illy pti Opport linity for r113ay be 5eer1 2is against JWP än in the depresse
Noetheless, te ITT) Tis min :15:50:3C JWP, all ni Luch in WO || Wed in CJ takes place in For those who
l. JVP Is II 1 Liisl Ilice, cle 35i public transp.) Il 31. El CT s(T). El its sh1 Eidal, W. O}} II10 S T Till T|| 11 increasingly, thi the JWP opera El 1 bei L Tid III մոlniրresent ill til kes Llle entifi SI i Lill: Ti i I III li mill “li ) Time: gall in check. The approximite ly
Illel. Facil Il ca. It CC 11 Sider; adjustment foi Sinhala troops, experience in east was again lated Ceylon T; Further, the JW stilrted to 115 e. I landmiles thil su successful. lit si Tice |98 egies to coit: the JWP live

wark
to be takel if is to keep willaimis do T1 its side, tlıč g) wernment antage over the te I has El In Out1 sectors of the be slure, but its assroots support sit til Weak Thesse 5, it rew Colutionary uch, it does not Teat Ilarity in diti C) Tial : gratian er Il T1 ent st Tategy wides Telief and the TL ITEA | 5ector the best billwark El Tichy, especially
di 5; Collith.
I lost of the ited with the Of the combat in fronting them, the countryside live in Colby, , in scc:15ional Ilg 5litps and it a clay every WETשhow , טי חשוWhש$ 115 larger, : Ild in ret15 { in clլItliTlց, e te il plaim Lations) te in a regular, l, fashi Ol SO Te they that it Ze strength of the led forces, police rds to Cld the 11 e a TE: alt present | 10,000 such perg the JWP has ble psychological In any of the whose previous the Tith L Tid st sitlicially 11 IniseLillil sece: 55 ibilists, P have recently he same powerful it the LTTE has i 15 ed il tle 3. Military stralTı ki, T. Ç.) Tiflr qbilit allowed habitual
lines of holding key garrison positions, patrols, checkpoints and sudden Sweeps through contested areas. To do even this, however, alth Oriti e 5 conced C that the forces are stretched to their utmost. IIn the la Tgest service, the army, recruits receive four months training, and are sett Hit Çince to al L111 it i Il coperation 5. There is little piron w ilsion for the advanced or specilized training considerell desirable for combati Ing the JWP. An un for LILI na te product of the frustratic T1 s involved i II this kind of conflict are the vigilante-style operations by off-duty forces and police staff. These shadow groups have been given warious na mes, like the People's Revolutionary Red A Tinny (they halıve, of c3 LI Tse, Il Cothi Ing t3 dC)
With com Tull Thist-inspired movement and are Tegarded as vigill Inte operations) a Indi
the Black Cats. For the Ill, the Ille Tc5 hilt of JWP i Willy ellet in a suspect (often someone Teleased from i Il te Timelt ble C:llLISE of is lifficient evide Ice for prosecution) can justify murder.
The presence of these occult and silent killers has introduced a further clement of L111certain ty and fear for villagers in conteste di regins, They arc Caught in the Illiddle between powerful 13:11 JWP allithi E7 Titics OI 1 The o The hand (who call ofte in conrol access Lo such vital heeds as electricity and irrigation). and the security forces on the Uther. Mugh alignation is 511re to result fro III the iThe Witable murder of the in 10 cent. This will work to the advantage of the JWP. Oil balance, the Sri Lankan forces and police have been successful ill Tetarding JWP all bitions to collrol the QuntrySIde Weaknesses inט Tecruit The Th Li Tibet lıcı dis a l d i Inı retraining, and an insufficient intelligence service remain, but
19

Page 22
it is to the government's credit that it hit 5 hecil able to build up a relatively professional military and police force in a few short years. And further, these forces remain both loyal til the 5tältc al Id uliw lowed il political affairs.
Up to this point, it has been maintained that a coli bination of economic and social policies as well as Imilitary pressu Te are key components of the gover In1115 Ilt lim to control the JWP. AIl add litilt ina | billit critical listä that has recently received ca Teful attention, and much effort at conciliation on the part of the government, is higher education. The JWP has successfully managed to control access to the six Sinhala universities by closing them down for two. years. This has been rightly describ ed as a nati OT al disastero by the experienced cabinet minister, A. C. S. Напneed, who hals Only Tecently taken over this portfolio. Il all i III portant report, Halleed argues that the inability of the authorities to deal swiftly with student unrest can be traced to a single Timary factor - the abolition of the Stude Assemblies in 1985 without providing an alternative a Trangement for student represeltation. The Teafter, the l'IniverSiti e 5 ha di II C T1 edil IIIl' Ideal With the students. The WP filled this Void quickly. Perhaps as few as ten to twenty per cent of university s Ludents arc presently involved in violence and in Limidation. These activists have been able to seize command of passive and possibly complacent stude II bodies. (Operati Ing through the “Action CoTTiTTittee" skri ya kar ka vīri ya Cor “executive") of the so-called Inter-LJniversity Students Federation (Antar-Wishwidyala Shis ya Balamandalaya), and under the slogan of First the Motherland, then a University Degree (palal'eri ra l'irra, del'e i padiya), the JWP Torced the liversities to close un til tlie govern ITnent mt serties T dīds, This vas a remarkable success for a handful of JWP activists. Althuogh Sri Lankan university Stüdents
2I)
have long expire in M: Tx, is 11 El II Lake-over of the undergraduates resisted by the 5elwcs, Wictimith.5 ficar of reprisals. sity facultics ge ed Hiltof TUDI Wcry poly pai pride in their fearful of JWP facultics gave I stilldelt 5 in thes little suբբOIt struggled til kek In this regard, t itself to hit is ful At cxploit sectors of socie dent uniоп8 ellcatio Ill bo 1989, all five J
Tills were II et ment, and the ul ve ned. But the
Other della Ilds the place of th thält it is, L 3 SiC) Whether the WP edillca Lion Ilhas bo
II CCT1 clusi IT Sui 11 mary, ith: T. Hall the WP lı: ced the Ceylon ist TTLive Im ent : agency of disin
Laikal. Their Ti gence after yea lity was pla
adwal Int: ge of til: of PT e gide It J. || government, E. tent and general four years of were widesprea LIncertainity abou in the Eiffairs of cist about
elections. By si 1987 Ind-Li Ilk: ded the JWP with to ignite basic f ties across 1 br. Sinhalese society Of the TWP Wi: guvernment I Tshill the foT and f’T LISt T: ti. Il y find thell – ani yed and disadv the victims of th and amo ng those

ssed an interest d protest, J.VP idestiny of 20,000 was not strongly students thenof apathy or Further, univerInerally remainthe collapse. di, with limited institutions and reprisals, most o guida Ice to e matters, EL Tıd L0 Lh ČSe Whl0 p classes open. he JWP show ed eptionally skilling vulnerable ty, such as stuand disaffected dies. In May WP-inspired deby the gover Illiversities recCT"e El Te sigls that will shortly take e gold o In cs, EL, Ind 1 In to di etie Tim ime: grip in higher e em broken.
and by Way of is been arged is recently replaTå Inil secessi. Ils the principal tegratio II i II Sri e I'm Tkabble T115 urIt's Of 13W, WisibilIn cd to take te wani Ing years R. Jaya wat de Ine's conomic disco Inexhaustin from collin Ila strife i. There were t Indian Illotives state, and cynithe impending 1cer cha, Ince, the II Accord prowiап оррогtuпity Tears : Tı d lıcı stiliHd spectrum Of
The Tical Elin 3 tao u Inder II i Ille redibility and ces of prejudict: wherever it could png the un emploantaged, a TT1 Cong WווTם וזנשטט נחשון נE L. : who considered
the Ilselves Sinhala patriots. This paper also avers that there have been Ilo important adjustInents in JWP ideology or strategy over the last 20 years. It is further argued that although Sri LEl Ilka's LIIIIed forces are heavily committed in the constant struggle to II) aintain la W and order in il society si easily disturbed by terroris, Ionetheless concilillory overtures to the JWP in economic, political a Llid ed L1 ciltlic"Thail Illitte TS ÇL tin Lle. This shows that the government
has not adopted a policy of ruthless suppression (which probably would lit Wik anyway), and recognizes the need to colliter the JWP D Several front 5. This process will inevitably take time. Even if the programme to reduce
poverty achieves moderate sliccess, longstanding economic ind social problems cannot be eliminated quickly. Militarily, confrontil til 31 : filiTilly extended time scale is likely. Politically, the new parliament, with its vigorous opposition, may in time demonstrate to SCIe of the radica lized that the Te a Te effective non-viole It walys to influence the destiny of the 5-1 :
Meanwhile, the Tale Of Roh E Ila Wijeweera remains a wild card in the prospect of the JWP. Thousa, Inds of young II 1em and Women have died in his Ina IIle,
but remarkably he lives on. Ast bırına tic ald said to be suffering froll angila, recent reports indicate that he inay cv.cn be provided safe conduct
by the government for medical treatment outside the country. Should he quietly be allowed to depart, CT should het die a na tlu Tal death (rather than a I martyr's death), Cine Ca II Conly speculate on whether the Ilove
Time.It He fou Ilded over two decades ago Will continue to uphold its present aims. Wije
Weera's own charis Illiltic coil tribution to the JWP's long-term success has been extraordinary. Withill hill, it call be doubted whether the JWP as presently constituted could continue in a position of strength for very long.

Page 23
POLITICAL CONFLICT (2)
Secondary Costs - some
John M. Richardson
(i) The 1983 national fish catch
of 230 till 3 LI 5a Ilid II letric LC III les has never been equaled. Production slumped by 24% to 175th Isaid metric tiles in 1984. Recovery has been slow. Even in 1988 it was 198 th0115:111d Illetrict011 e5.
Production of rice and other crops in the North and East has also been adversely, affected though not to the same extenL as the fish catch.
(iii) Tourism has been seriously
di mäged by Telcti Üli to Wiet cits. 1978-3 āuall Tourist arrivals was in a average rate of over 25, 8115%, ’82-10%. There were reasons to believe that a 10% Ennill 11:1 leg To With Wä5, 31 I realis) nable expectation for the rest of the decade. However the violence of July '83 and the subsequent events has Teversed the pre 83 trends. The m L-Imber of a rrivals hi Wiċċ fillen steadily ever since in 1988 - a total of 183,000 which was less thall hillf of the 1982 figure.
(iw) Education system — all the
Uпустšities 1п the South HHHL aLLLLL SLLLLLL SLLLHH S 00LS S 00S the Fall of 88 high school and clementary schools stilldents also got involved in political demonstrations and ther Schools Were also cllSed-solic for nearly a year. Closing of Universities meant the supply of newly trained personnel has virtually dried up in the fields of medicine, engineering and other fields requiring a College Degree. University level students with means or the ability to win scholarships hawe left the colul try in la Tge numbers. If the political situation Temains unstable, few of these Students will retutil. University a calci mics specially younger scholars with technical degrees, hawe also emigrated in large numbers. When the current generation
(ν)
(vi) Foreign
of senior prof Lankanı unive to experience in quality whi and a major funds to Tey ET:
Sri Lālk: ’s social Welf bjeceTı :ı Dırıqlı eT NOT: El Elst, e Care and ho have progrt:85 ted since '83. health Cart targets of JW) After mid 88 Wasectolly
105t Electiv plu la r birth C ano ng lower WF T II I suspended du til JWP. TI total lly opp 35 ETO. Of Si Inhi g: 0 cill witclifilis list their shil spending to it a Ind Ili l ital Ty tHı:Te ila 5 bi concer. In a boll the nutrition La Inka’s PooT pri (gross inflow USS Illi
li t l IS: ( ) 22: Tı illi There h:15 be: specially in
wing the J Accord. It wil 5 a furth 1988 sugges Lil Tıktı's ciyi South, which IIlternational se el 5 les:
by foreign i
(vii). Foreign Aid
ntסטט July 77 Sri Lilin käl foreign aid ab nut 50%: deficit a wer: of the GDP and a Bäla I deficit of it

specific examples
essors retire, Sri 'sities are likely a precipitous drop :h will take years
expeilditure of նէ:
highly regarded Te systemli h15 Cas Illty. In the Wel basic health spital facilities tively deterioraIn the South facilities were o StTike cti II. tubectomy and perations, the c and Inost pointrol IT ethods 5י11pטET שוון רוט1n Cor less, totally c t) th Teats forto IT :crt"ו 15:r cht שו ed to birth conlese. Gcllcrally c services have Te CF ilçTe5cc hic police forces ... Consequently 2e in a growing t the lineğı thlığınd
status of Sri
va te investiment ) dropped from (35 ,t 82" רן ון ל. S is 1983 :
T JSS i "Sf. on some recovery til C. FTAW FILLully '87 Peace crestingly there ET TE CO WCT y 11 ting that Sri il waT in the received little publicity was 5 of a problem IT WESSLICHTS,
under the post mic progra Inle h15; III'e lied Il for financing of the budget ging to 14.5% III T - 85 lice of Paynent out 10% of the
GDP. Foreign aid has also ful Indled a s Libs ta Intial i Il crease in capital formation. The Gross domestic capital investment Tatios III ) Te than doubled from about 15% in 1970 - 1977 to 33% in 1980. Roughly 1/3 of this in Westment is very significant ilvestment funded With foreign sa vings. FroIII about "84 tr) July 1987 there was a concerted effort on the part of the international Tamil lobby supported by some international hlı mäTI Tights groups to persuade western do nors to suspend aid to Sri Lanka. In general this did not succeed. However, individual countries adjusted some of their progra T1111 es.
The aid package of 785. Inillion USS negotiated in September 89 for the fiscal year of 1990, is the higest ever made available to STİ Lilik:I. The TC:'s 10 el'l- dence of substantial capital flight from the country. This Tn Hy be probably due to the fact that the external payment deficit not withstanding the government has not imposed any new exchange restrictions on import, travel and outward Icilitlal Inc.'s. In migration however has caused a drain on capital because of the capital that perman cit emigrants are per II hitted to take with the II. There's also the factor of the immigration of traincd manpower - largely Tamils and at les ser number of Sinhalts t.
Concerming the s cc Conda Ty i Il
pact of Sri Lanka's political Collict in the economy – We have developed three growth
scenarios which we have termed optimistic, moderate, pessimistic. The optilistic growth scenario assumes that peaceful conditions Would have produced an alditional 1" in crease in growth from '83-'85 and a continuing
6%, growth rate after. This projection of a growth rate of 6%, for 83 - 85 is consistent
21

Page 24
with most estimates. But this projection fails to take into account the impact of moderately poor harvests of 86 and 88 and the very poor har vest in 87.
The moderate growth scenario takes this po or harvests into El CCOLIInt.
The pessimistic growth scenario assum es only 5% increase - of growth under peaceful conditions and 50% impact of bad harvest in all 3 years.
In estimating the impact of violence on production for 83 - 88 we hawe taken the difference between actual GDP and projected GDP for each scenario, the total cost or the sum of thc differences in the respective projections for each year.
Under the most optimistic assumption of economic growth the cost of violence duc to loss of production may bc as
much as 65 billion rupees - about 2 billion USS.
Under the most pessinistic
assumption of economic growth the cost may be about 29.5 billion ruptcs-about 900 Inillion USS.
In the: Teml i Tid We Will use the On the moderate Which is 51 bij about 1.5 billio II Final secondar diture by India 20 million гupee cost most freq. by the Sri La Indian press : support IPKF ( used this esti Illa readily availabl acquired approx IPKF operated foT bout 157 c. throughout 88.
Total cost 1 ().3 300 illiol USS. The esti Til tel CT the II: Crico e, of the conflic TւIբces.
The addition a expenditure on public order 20.5
Cyst of the II 10.3 billion rupi Total 1 esti Illa" Cost - 818 bil 2.5 billion USS. We shall disc Cists
N. WAITILINGA
70, K. CYRL C. P
DISTRIBUTOR'S OF
COLOM
“HIVER“
HARDWARE MERCHANTS
BARBED WIRE,
WOOD
Office
Sales Department
PhonēS:

er of this paper estimates based growth scenario li). Tupees –
US S.
f cust - exple IlIn the IPKF : s a day is the lently reported Ikan and the Ls required to perations. We Le 15 the IT105L e and widely iIIlation, T
i Sri La Ilıkal lays in 87 and
billion Tupees -
se condary cyst : ono Inic i Timpact I - 51 billiւնը
costs of the defence and
billion rupees.
PKF operations
: ::: -
ed secondary
lio II rupees -
uss two tertiary
(i) The impact of violent conflicts on the viability of the post 77 export oriented liberal economic strategy.
(ii) The impact of violent conflicts on the prospects for regional co-operation involwing Sri Lanka.
The key to political acceptability of the open cconomy programme was its ability to create new jobs and raise the ir1C) mes specially of the lower 82 - 78 1חcume groups, Froחi economic growth averaged IInore than 10%, a year and uneII ployIn ent was low. These positive developinents created a climate of acceptance for more unpopular aspect of the programme Such als privatisation, Price do control and cuts in subsidy, Negative public Teactions to the Worsening in comic distribution that acco II1p a nied economic libeTalisation walls cushioned by a n appreciable Icduction of absolute powerty when the economy slowed down after 83 thic trade off between growth and cquity inherent in cconomic liberalization cal Inc into strong focus.
(Final first alrier I next issue
M & CO., LTD.
ERERA MAWATHA,
BO 1 3.
BRAND GALWAN SED SHEETS
& MANUFACTURERS OF
SCREW5 F. WIRENAILS.
433143-5, 27669, 28.842

Page 25
We make I
Draw ever 7.30 p.m.
for incre
 
 

Millionaires
y Saturday
. On TN
edible multi-milioms
སྤྱི་

Page 26
KAN DAS AMY MEMORIAL
LECTURE
Dissent from paradise isle to he
zeth Hussain
It scens to me that hardly any subject could be more apposite for a memorial lecture on the late: K. KanthH samy than The Walue of Dissent,' for he sto (od pre-cminently for dissent. In formulating the project for thic establish ment
of the Saturday Review, he wrote: " "This is mot intended to be a polemical paper, nor a partisan one. It will be a forum for all opinions so far as they concern Tamil rights and Tace relatio II:s in
this conntry, but yet not prochial in content.' His wanting all opinions to be published clearly shows the value he attached to dissent,
Though I have been given the honour of delivering today's lecture, I did not myself have the honour of knowing Kanthasamy personally. But Teading the moving tributes, and the extracts from his Writings in volume Ai Uri riniel Death prepared by the Kanthasamy Commeration Committee, get the impression of a man who had an extraordinary cominilII ent to the truth. He wanted all opinions to be published, and he was against partisanship and polemics, obviously because he thought it important for people to get at the truth. It appears that he valued dissent because for the truth Was the supreme value. I will argue in the course of this lecture that the value of dissent derives es scintially from the value we place on truth, and that the li Te and death of Kantha samy exemplifies thc integral connection between the tW).
We know from the the Iman ve 3 Te ing 10 day that it is da Ingerous to dissent. In concluding a 1etter to the Editor of Safarday Review in 1982, he wrote: "I know the secret of how to lose friends and ITake enemies a Tid that is, to publish an independent paper.' An independent position, that is to say a position independent of political parties and all groups, the position of dissenting in
Til te of COL111 CTT)Tt
24
ter IIS of what truth, can mak he knew Cof enemics cal II b do not usual full di Telsioni following from usually associa gover Ilmic Ints. can be just as dissent as gove more so. Few history have til era te clisselt that even few tole Tate the their I OTITIS a Iad shibboleth: Wrote this ab cratic Ameria i century: "I kI try in which independence freedom of di Allerica.' A 1. trand Russell paper would p on the Տint) conflict, except paper which h only an elasci it. Society, I ment, can bc | selt. We know in the society i samy lived, ng IT ent, silenced dissent.
We have to why is it that dissent when t it is da Igerous Obviously bec convinced of til ScInt. We have whether lost LH nikal really v question thät h
because our G found it So ci stamp it out.
membered, foT the freedom Cof Sri Lanka was
then destroyed much difficulty was the cons failure to cxll of dissent for Lhen establish
in the public Imi in the West w stricted though

art of darkness
{}Il: 5. Ces 5:15. Il e cinc Ilies, a Indi course that e dan gerous. We ly Tecognize the of the da Inger dissent, for we tc. it (Illy with Actually societies dangerous over TIlm Clts, perhaps gWCTIII tilts in been Willing to , Hind it appears I SCO cieties, c1 questioning of and conventions i. De Tocqueville i cilit the demoIf the nineteenth CW of Il colnhere is so little if mind and real Si Clissio I als in in 1962. Berfound Lo British u blish his article — IT cilia II. border for One Sunday I Wever published lated version of it just govern. intolerent of disthat a group in which Kantha. it the Gowerhi II for his
ask the question, SCHI 11 c, da Te Lor hey know that
for themselves' 1lls :: they a TE: e value of di 5LCD ask f’LITT HET of Lis in Sri älle dissent, a FIS to be asked ŬWCII1Il1!1t5 la "Wet
CitTil I It will be reinstance, that the press in first CI Oded and with օ11t to g Perhaps that lic Ice of a i T1c the Wille COLLIT Selves, a Indi its importance ld. That was done er e dissent, conit might be in
some ways, is really valucid and has become part of the cultural inheritance of the people. In Sri Lainka wc hawe
proclaimed the right to dissent,
and sometimes protested over its denial, but we have not really examined the value of dissent to anything like an adequate extent. It could be of crucial importance for our
fu turc to u Indlertake that examination.
Perhaps the most important point that We have Lo establish is that while dissent is dangerous for one self, the refusal to allow dissent is dan gcrious for the government and society as well. Before we examine the value of dissent, wc must take look at what has actually been happening in societics where little or no dissent has been allowed. It is quite possi
ble that the year 1989, which SaW. the crosion of the conmunist system in the Soviet Union and its virtual collapsc in Europe, Will cone to be seen retrospectively as just as epochal als 1789, the year of the French Revolution. What
is the explanation for so sudden and spectacular a transfor nation, which very few could have foreseen, the result it appears of a raging tidal wave of anti-communis In
Dissatisfaction with economic performance under the commu
nist system is no doubt part of the explanation, but pTObably the less important part of it. In comparison with the
Western economic performance, that of the communist countries is certainly po Cor. But countries such as Czechoslovakia and Hungary attained standards of living that must seem paradisal by the standards of a great many. Third World countries. And furthermore, everyone in the more successful communist countries, perhaps in all of them, has had econo Inic security unlike people even in Western countries. It is arguable that economic dissatisfaction should have led to adaptations of the communist system as expected by the theory of convergence

Page 27
in the 'sixties, according to which the dynamics of the industrial system would make the Wester and communist countries come to Tesemble cach other. But instead of adaptation, or a gradual economic transformation, the Te ha 5 been El sudden colapse of the communist system i || 5: veral Countries. This suggests that the Te Walls Sol Illething much deeper than econoIllic dissatisfaction behind the uphea wals of 1989. We know that the people of the commuist countrie5 want not just drastic economic changes, but
EA T1 Overhaul of the entire system: they want democracy, including the right to dissent, and that seems far more ill
portant than dissa tisfaction ower the economy. A system of
power that is totalitarian in outlook, if 17t always il practice, has been found want11g.
Perhaps the fundamental defect of Marxism is that it does not deal adequately with the problem of power. Marx himsclf might be regarded as hawing had a liberal ideal - fiercely intolerant of dissent though he was personallybecause the communist utopia was one in which everyone would be free. It is arguable that there was no dichotomy as such between Marx and Bakunin, as the quarrel between Marxism and anarchism was really about means and not the end of a frce society. We Inight conclude therefore that what appears to have failed in Eastern Europe is not Marxism but Leninism or MarxistLeninism which made the Inistake of substituting the dictatorship of the party for the dictatorship of the proletariat. But Lenin himself wrote about the "withering away of the state.' The truth is that while comInu nism, of whatever variety, is for freedom as an ideal, the reality was the dictatorship of the party which had bec Inaintained un relentingly for decades, with no signs whatever of "the withering away of the state' and nothing like the freedom available in the West.
The explanati
Ima ly, I believe, failed to address tellect to the pri and that wali 5 b5 tTlle child Of The ghtenment of Certilury, Whilose : lhe ilherited II fically, the p Milrxism is to basically an ec Surely, if the po: Im1ic: Im:1 I 1 Were C4 Wuld be a far ordered place
Llid holl se that i eve l'hilt the proleta Tilt, aind Lihat the dictator: :Acting Els the wall letariat, Would li much difficulty, i. long a period of communist utop rationality of eco prevail. Neither power drive in IT for power that gr and neith cr fore without any co lead to great c Order of Still ill, Coal ICe5 C11. The : 5 hii w 5 thalt tille stal T1 dit ng in the w El hd h 1 1 Filä ine - Orde: un con stra ined p I think, al co II w d: 1 (1stratin ) lis Sent.
I will not, of coul be abl c cx är li I1 cultics where 1 has been allai) wedi will look at the Sri Lanka, but be I Will lakes Inc the fillil L. Te af de majority of the countries. A pr Critisatio Il Hills bis Lal til Americal, disselt to ofte dangerous. In are very few fu democracies, a f might perhaps qui il si-dc II 10 Cratic most part the p Asia are under th torship. The wa Afro-Asian gowe legitimacy in ter I

Coll for the anco
is that Marx Elis II assive inible II of power; !cause he was a European Enlithe cight centh hallow Uptimism ull. More spccirillal error if regard man Els Collic al Illinal. still late of econdirrect the World more rationally rather till I til: it is. Marx beictatorship of thc Leli li bi clic well hip of the party guard of the proeāli vītlu ti Lld lifter lo t o 50ci Ellis II, to the ia, becat 15 ei thc Tl) Illic man yw Could unders to the lan, the appetite ows in thic cating, :sil W that power 15 traints col || Ti Till Ells of thc
Pol Pot, äntl pochal year 1989 basic problem ay of a rational :ring of society is ,w cr: It providesי incing in cig a ti we f the Walle QF
rise in this lecture e a great many ittle or no place for dissent, I leculiar case of fore doing that observations on :Imocracy in the ThliTil World CCCS:S () f der T - :en քtling on in
bLit even there proves to be Afro-Asia there
lly functioning W gove TI nimelts be regarded as , but for the eoples of Afroe boot of dictast majority of :TT1T1 ents Cl:11IT1 Ils of democracy
but, of course, they allow little Or lo disset,
We hawe to ask why there has been Sü ciclo 55 a 1 a fail IT e of die D1 - cracy in Afro-Asia. It might be argued that democracy, a product of Western culture, is a transplant which with ers in Afro-Asia because it is alien to ou traditions of government. I do not find this argument convincing because it is contradicted by the fact that India and Japan hawe had fully functioning democracies for decades. Perhaps there are some things in si come of the: Afro-Asian cultures which make adaptation 5 to democracy Telatively easy. But it is difficult to imagine anything more. Te Thote from democracy than Indian traditions of government, or the royal, aristocratic, martial traditions of government in Japan before McArthur imposed democracy on that country. We hawe to w licT whether AFT - A5 ia pullulates with the so many dicLaters who cilt brook di 5,5:t because of what Inight be regarded as some sort of moral, spiritual, cultural or civilizational
lccalcIn c:.
To be continued
Saddam. . .
(red fr page )
would al most i newitably proWike a deba e Over the tra Ilsa tlantic facet of European secu
rity es pecially in Ger III a Iny,
but also in other European
COLllies.
The question here is not
One of right and Wrong but of politics. Perhaps, if all else fails, the principles at stakes in the Gulf will requirc resort to War, despite the tragic consequences. Perhaps, one day, the logic of integration would II lake it : f casible option for Europe as well. But for the IIonent we only know that a WaT il the Gulf would be deeply damaging for the AtlanLic Illts.
- Frii Trg
25

Page 28
World Development Rep. Global Effort to Confron after a Lost Decade
Saman Kelegama
More
developing
1990.
port for
Te with favourable
than one poverty - this is the latest estima
countries, World Bank's World Developmen
COLld this cut to 825 million by the year
report suggests
conditions towards change, might just succee
billion peop
according t
figu i
a strategy
апd a
his is the first time since
1980 that the World Bank has made poverty the focus of its report. The Bank finds that advances made in developing countries during the last few decades have been more rapid than those made in developed ccountries at a compara ble stage. Despite such progress however poverty in developing countries still remains at a significant level. In 1985, more than one billion people, about one-third of the population in the dev
eloping World, were poor or living in near poverty (see Tablic 1). Mo Te than half of
those classified as poor were considered as 'very poor'. Behind these figures lie grim details, and any comparisons with the developed world are stark, For example, life expectancy in Sub-saharan Africa is 50 years, while in Japan it is 80. Mortality a mong children in South Asia exceeds 170 deaths per thousand peoplc, while in Sweden the figure is fewer than 10.
In 1985 the burden of poverty was spread unevenly whether we
TTE" hi"f"frFr" 75 rI por-graduate sfisderir af Oxford UniverFiry')
26
are consider ing World a S. :l Whit: Within that W
ICCF 1 iti e5 withir As Table 1 show
lf of the W Inillion) lived although this r
for cilly about the developing lin. Of the Asia, 80 per ce Like Wise, if L poor in East A were in Chiri. Asia and Slib around 50 per C laticIn were pi regions and col Wcre: Ofte Il Conce il riu Tall LTC ils lation den sitie! Ga Ingetic platin
The bil Sic II 5ha). Wrth i In the II: in Table 1 till picture of pow the developing IIlary enrollme rate, and life a L Ll in Satisfact II sahara in Africa Asia, and Lal the Caribbean ferent. The pr

prot (1990) :
t Poverty
ile in te for o the
t Re
re be 200O2
that, will
the developing le, t|le countries Tld, or particular such countries. is, in 1985 nearly orld's poor (525 in South Asia tegicom accounted 30 per cent of world's populapoor in South 1 were in India. He 28(). Il illiQIl 5;ia, 75 per cent Til batı Sul til -saharan Africa ent of the popuJo I, and within LIntries, the poo T intrated in places: with high popu
5, such as the
II dial.
ecds indicators
ist three cCluIL1 Ils so give a broad crty structure in cyu Intrics, Piit rate, mortality expectancy Were y levels in Subbut for East in America and the picture is difimary en roll III e Int
ratic was above 90 per cent, the child mortality ratic was below 100 per 1000 births, and life expectancy was above 65 years. How cwer, cauti con is incccssa sy in inter practing thics C Tc3 5y - ggr C:- gate level figures because, for examplc, in Mcxico, life expicctancy for the poorest 10 per ccnt of the population was 20 years less than for the richest 10 pc cent. Thus national and regional averages mask appallingly low basic needs indicaltors for the poorest members of society.
CÓwer thic läst thirty y cars alpproaches to reducing poverty have changed according to whatcwer idcological trend was dolillä Int. In the 195Os Ell 19És economic gTo WIth Was seen as thc primary Incans of reducing poverty. In the 1970s attention shifted to public policy for the direct provision of health, nutritional and cducation services, But during the 1980s the emphasis once again changed in favour of growth, as II any developing countries embarked upIn adjustment packages recoilmended by the IMF and the World BilIllk. Il the 1980's the World Bank argued that in the
short Tun soille of the poor y could los e out fra II e Comic adjustment policies, through
higher li memployment Anci cuts in public spending but that in the long run economic re5trlIcturing would alleviate poverty. The basic assumption behind this a Tgul III e Int was that slupply responses would be rapid and that high growth would trickle down to the poor. Experience during the 1980s has shown, however, that these assumptions cannot be taken for granted for all LDCs. For example, in Malaysia the adjustment progra Inimes that were followed prowed effective in allcwiating pow

Page 29
T:b
Population, Poor, and Basic Needs Indicators
Percentage - Pop. P | East Asia 40.2 25.0
China 2. South Asia 29.7 45.4
I ndia -- 3. Sub-Saharan
Africa 1. 16, 4. Latin All crical
& the Cai Tibbean | 1 2 5. Middle East
& N. Africa
(& Europe) 7.7 5.9
Totall 1 OO 1CO
In Mill
Pор. P. 1AOC) 280 ( 1050 210 ( O2) 525(3 751) 4202
38) 1802
37 () 75
19) 60 (
3360 iss
Notes: (1) pop, = population; W.P. = "very poor'; Enri Mort. = Undcr 5 mortality rate per thousand of below USS370 (1985) purchasing power p. of below USS275 is defined as “very poor'; ( is given between parentheses (the forecast is are implemented): (4) pop, and poor percent owing to data compilation problems.
Sorre :
erty, while in Brazil the restructuring program Ine made the poor worse off ind poverty increased sharply during the eighties. Similarly in Sri Lanka the Gini cocfficient (which measures poverty) increased from 0.49 in 1978/79 to 0.52 in 1981/82, and to 0.58 in 1985/86. On the whole the results of the adjustment packages were not very flw ou rable for the poor in developing countries and therefore the 1980s is considercd as a los decade for the poor.
Although economic restructuring remained the primary goal du Ting the eighties, many policies - both domestic and international - were put into operation to alleviate poverty, particularly in the short run. But these policies failed to produce the desired result of reducing poverty in a large scale Why did they fail? The World Bank argues that this was partly because of massive external shoc
World Development Report, 1990 (Oxford University
ks and World r the eighties. B lost domestic programmes. T that policies suc tion of agricul a reas have thiwa mai cc. Morco credit program in in favour of ri the foT mal sci wage legislatio I rity regulation inished employ to aid the Ba international ai an ineffective reducing povert place don cors h rent motives fo
of which red usually not the More over, som
cluding Haiti,
a Indi Zaire, ha v dependency. T poverty-orientec by aid have fa benefits throug

1
or Developing Countries for the Year 1985
O
".P.
O) 120 5) 8O 5) 300 5), 250
5) 120
50) 40
50) 40 ၇5) 633
Entrol. Misor, LE 96(100) 54 (31) 67 93 (95) 44 (25) 69 74 (88) 15() (98) 56 81 (96) 148 (94) 57
56 (86) 185(136) 5t)
92100) 75 (52) ՃՃ
75 (94) 119 (71) l 84 (οι) 102 (67) 92
il. = Net pri Inary en rollment rates (%); ; LE = Life expectancy (years); (2) Annual income |rity) is defined as poor and an annual income 3) The World Bank's forecasts for the year 2000 valid only if the World Banks' recommendations ages may not tally with the actual figures
Press for the World Bank), pp. 2, 29, and 139.
eçession du ring ut it also bllmes policies and aid he Bank argues 1 as high taxa = ture i II. rLra: 1 ited farm perforwer, subsidized es have operated cher failers. In
'tor, Illinimum
and job secunave led to di Illment, lin regard
lik admits that las ofen beel in St Till Tıl cnnt in . In the first ive many diffe* supplying it id, ing po verty is most important. recipients, inudan, Tanzania, fallen into aid en again, many projects funded led to get any to the poor.
When we turn to future prospects for the alleviation of powerty, we find that the report recommends a new lille af argument for the 1990s - a riccagnition that stimulating economic growth and helping the poor by direct action are not contrary objectives but processes that should go forward hand in hand. Adjustment there must be, but it must hawe a “human face". Further T1 Corc there must be a joint effort by developing countries and international community together, and only by such an overall effort can the problem of poverty be cffectively attacked. The World Bank believes that with right strategy in place, the number of poor could be reduced by 300 million by the year 2000 so that the the developing world's poverty is reduced to 825 million in that year,
What then is this right
strategy? After examining successful poverty era dication in
27

Page 30
some countrics the report recUIIl Ill ends a LWo-pa It Strategy for de wel oping countries to pursue during the nineties: (1) pursuing a pattern of growth that Ilakes productive use of the poor's Inost abundant Te soll Ice: its labol II; (2) provide the poor With a Wide array of social serwices such as pri Inary education, health cafe, and family pla III i Ing. The Teport argues that QIIe of these ellement 5 Without the Other is 10t sufficient. They Illust reinforce
Colle. To the T, For exall ple, BİTEı7 il 3: Tid Pakist H. Tı liqid Tıl chı emphasis on the first strategy
and Deglected the second while Sri Lanka emphasized the second strategy while paying less atteltij I tij the first. As a result these three countries failed to
reduce powerty. On the other ha Tid, the report claimis that Malaysia a Tuld lin dollesia com
bied both a di succeeded in reducing poverty, making at the same time rapid improvement il basic Ineeds indica TS. Theit Success illustrates the effectiveness of the two-pronged strategy -by promoting the productive use of labour a country can provide opportunities for the po cor, and by investing in
health a Ild Education it CaT
equip the por to grasp these
opportunities.
The creation of such op
portunities requires in its turn new policies. Taxation policics
Inust encourage rural development and urban eployment. The poor must have lore
access to land, credit, and public infrastructure and services. The report goes Con to say that projects which involve the poor in design and implementatio a hawe the greatest chance of success, even though they are im Core til Illeconsuming and require organi7ä, tion, The World Bank bellieWes that international effort to reduce the short run adjustment cost in developing countries could materially assist domestic policies in creating nie w opportuInities.
Significantly, the report calls for increased flows of aid from thic international C IT I Tl Il
28
Inity to help developing cou Where countrie CCIIII litted to t powerty. Ofici. Els sist: ce i F1 | Tllilli) I1, bլIt t| Eclieves th:11 WOTld Cal T A 10 per ce D: NATO militi alone could pa of aid. The city Լիլլt լի է: Wլ իր 11strategy would recipients of a Which the Wor Culd Crease billion by the reflects the W. thi Iki Ing that i only when it sound develop However, the hl: We Imı El Fly Pic: Which do Ilot || Bank's strategy leglected. In s Tate level 5, cof directed at groups. Health serve the poor, programmes fo and targeted r gra III Ines are th teTW en tio LH1L ported by the in such circumst
Finally the Some forecasts 2000. The WT
modera te growt) in industrial co growth of 51 p. liping colli trie 1990s. But, as performance wi rcgis. Elst continu cd rapi Sub-Sahil TI A rapid populati record low grow per cent). If advocated by th is followed t poor in East A IM10 Te than 20|| South Asia it million, and in äld the CaTi million, by the Table 1). But poor in the Mi North Africa (&

the poor in in tries, but only S are scriously he reduction of Ell deyclopment 988 was US S 5. he World B: Ilk the developed zhould de) möTL. reductio II i Il y expenditure y for a doubling luntries carrying Bank's two-part be the Imain id i II LIH: 1)) }; |d Bã. Tik helic ực 5 | US S 144 year 2000. This Tld Bank’s Inc w "llid Works well complements a 11 strategy, cillsiltírics, whilt i DI pic Cple but ollo y the World would not be luch cases modeflid Would be ighly vulnerable clinics that , immunization I the children, Lutritional proe sorts of Ilmight be supaid community t! I1:ք է,
report provides for the year Idi Batuk assum cos 1 of 3 per cent untries ind high CT Cent il lewes during the in the 1980s, vary between Asia will see d growth, but rica with its growth would with, rates (10.5 the strategy e World Bank le Illumbct Of sia will fall by 0 1illion, in will fra II by 160 Latin America bbean by 15 year 2000 (see the InLImber of ddle East and ... poor Europe
a In countries) will remain uncha Inged while i Il Sub-sahara In Africa thic number of poor Will increase by 85 million by the year 2000. Unfortunately
the forccasts for the very poor
are not given but favourable forecasts for all developing countrics for primary enrollI Ilment and III cortality ra te for the year 2000 are given (see Table 1.)
Several points should be noted her c. First even if the ambitious targets set out in
the report are achieved, it is S{lb}{: Ti T1g L{} nữ tệ Lill:1[ 825 milli) in pel plc would still be liv - ing in abjcct powerty at the start of the 21st century. Secondly, the forecast for the poor in the y Car 2000 set out in this Teport is 225 million higher tha II the last forecast Ilade for the same year by the World Bank's first World Development Report (WDR) in 1978 (see, WDR, 1978, p. 33). Thirdly, the World Development Report for 1978 esti liited 770 millio to be in poverty in 1975 and by
1985 the Inu Inber of people in poverty had increased to 1125 million — a 46 per cent inCreat se ower 10 years. Given
these facts one has to look at the World Balık's FöTec{15't5 for the year 2000 with extreme caution. In fact, the report itself states: "'Slower growth in the industrial countries, higher interest rates, and a smallerthan-expected rise in the terms Of trl de could combine, :15 in the 1980s, to pose further obstacles to reduction of poverty" (p. 5).
We may give due weight to all these provisos, and yet we cal not deny the need for action to alleviate poverty. In focusing on this topic as the new decadic begins, the World
Bank has given it the prominence it demands; no task should command a higher
priority for the world's policymakers. A workable strategy has been suggested, a possible role envisaged for developed and developing countries alike. What response this challenge will ewoke remais to be secTı.

Page 31
ཟ
Why there's so in this rustict
There is laughter and light banter amongst thase ritral la TT15ls, Ļļ, hir aço busy Siarting Cut TibiaCÇça LH LL SH LLLLLLS S L LLLLLHHLH KLL g LLLLLLgs L gaLLll
barris spread uut in the ritid and L-LITEIT, inter mediate 20:12 where the arable land remains falci, iiiiiing this if sista.
CLLLLLKS LLLL LLLL LLLLLLaS LluHCL DD LHLBLBLB Oa C lucrative cash crop and the green leaves turn to TLLLLSSSL al KalLLa L LlaaLL LLS 00La LlLLL LLLLL LGLaL
afinually, fut perhaps 143,0XI TIJIal folk,
 

ENRCHING FRURAL LIFESTYLE
und oflaughter obacco barn.
Tobacco is the industry that rings employment to the second highes: IILITiber of people Art: this: people are the tobaccc. barn owners, the tobacca gryers 3rd thr: whi) . Kirk for them, Cri the lard and in the basis.
Ll LtllleeS LLL LLLLtetHtHCLLL LLL eeLGLGLHLH LLLCLCOHHMLa GHLHLLS
corrille life anda so:Liro futura. A good Erough T2a5', 'or la Lugh! Er,
Ceylon Tobacco Co. Ltd.
Sharing and caring for our lard and her people,

Page 32
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lowed
ЈО/М
BANK OF
CHILDREN'S SA
Give your child one of the r in life -
Financial security for a stab If you have not, it's time yo
Your savings today is your
BANK OF
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al Security to your OS
Y THE
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u thought about it.
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THE WATIOW