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O BUDGET '91: A Close
萎
ܛ ܐ ܠ ܐ ܗ ܠ ܠ ܐ ܬ ܬ ܢ ܘܚܬܵܐ
Vol. 13 No. 19 February 1, 1991 Price Rs. 7.5
KARUNANDHI: Bye for now - S. Murari - Anikendra Nath Sen Trotsky, Lenin and
Violence Reggia Siriwardena The Shukla Visit
- Mervyn de Silva
 
 
 
 

r look — Saman Kelegama
Nimal Gunatilleke
Blood and Sand
- Robert O'N
South Asia in Trouble
- Hamish McDonald
Salamat Ali S. Kamaludin
The barrel of a gun
– Zuhai
LINKAGE AND BLINKAGE

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N0 0UELLES NOW
After the first wave of panic petro queues dropped out of sight in the city. buť mosť motorists continued to drive with their tanks topped up. Few expected the war to be over in a hшrry.
A more serious worry Was Lea. The fra de a5 Wes) as economy watchers ware Counting the cost of a squeeze in the Middle East тагќet, алd of de/ayed de/very elsewhere in case f7e Suez Ca 7a / C/o Sed. Equally Worrisonne Was the /oss of exраѓгѓate eаглілgs from houserraids and other La 7 kar 7 Workers ir 7 Arab sands: these remittances had So r77 eff77 as Ebeg 7 / 77 ora thar the foreign exchange earned from fea exports.
SERVNG THE SMALLEST
In an attempt to take banking to the rura / masses the Bank of Ceylon disbursed Rs 33 milion in 2,400 Joans Spread Over the economically depressed Hambar) tota district, ir 7 the last three months of fast year. A new slogan put out by the bank! ʼʻ VWe are big er) o Lug/) to ser We the Srina West'.
RIGHT TO EDUALITY
The Supremте Сошrt has шphe/d a fundarтелta/ гїghts application by Mг Роппатpa/алт Rагтдf//af, a Superintendent of Customs, chafferiging the appointлталts and prornoffогтs fгт the Customs service on the ethлfс quota principle. The SC has directed that the дetitiолеr Rагтдоf//af Бе солsidered for pгоптоtion withQLIľ ťa king in to consideraEřo 7 t/7e >h77 WC rafio.
The petitforner сог77p/аїлеої that the promotion scherine in the Customs service violated the right to equasity enshrined in the Cons
WfLVO 7.
TAWLL
Wish to di tior to an artici Guard far of D È titled "'Ca Which you hā the ''Warri V Tr
The article i the 'Tarr Wa ber 1, 1990.
A na Pa
Advisory Editorial - Tarif Nation,
ABriefly. . .
JAPAM MC
O Japan ha Lanka a pack million yen (R ÇTed it atıl :ı
of 66, 985 lil 000 million).
for an economi program, inc T1 ent of the GT telecommunica Japan is now No. 1 donor.
GLA RREG|U
The govern the public n any business in the Land F sion (LRC).
has decided
and invalidat
AћRA
W. 13 No. 9
Pridg
Publish
Grdi
No. 245, L
t:L}|ԼյII:
Editor: Mer
Telephor

NATOM
w your attenle in the Lanka cember 1, 1990 erra Initiative" e attributed to es”.
m fact is fr o T
or' of NOWern
rarajasiпgham
Board
ALIStrali,
D. DONOR
s handed Sri aige of 38,353 s 11,429 million) debt relief grant |ion yen (Rs 20,
The credit is hic TestTuctul Ting
lding improveeater Colb () tion network.
unchallenged
R MIG LARITIES
ment has war med
ta' Tr3l T5 CL with land wested Refe TI CCT mis
The government
to investigate 2 all improper
glaring
- highlighted
alienation of LRC land made to private individuals.
An announcement said: "The Government has decided to introduce legislation immediately to invalidate all improper alienation of Land Reform Commission lands made to priwa te individuals with effect from the date the Land Reform law came into operat
"The Gover III ent has been compelled to take this step in view of the alleged fraudulent nature of a large number of saics, transfers, leases, exchanges, etc. of LRC wested lands. Such alleged fraudulent transactions involve instances of under valuation, nepotism and flagrant violation of the LRC law, Government policies and criteria on land alienation'.
This follows the report of a committee appointed by thic President to study alienation of LRC land above ten acres. The coni littee has 51 glaring irregularities.
(Confinterf гэлт гарге 14)
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CMTENTS
News Background 3 The Region
sĞLU If 10 Budget "Ց1 15 Democracy and Development - (2) 19 Trotsky's Morāls 21
Correspondance 24
Printed by Ananda Press 82/5, Sri Ratnajuthi Säravana muttu Mawatha, Colombo 13. Telephon: 4359.75

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Page 6
Asia. It simply could not cornpete with China. "Hence India stands all the more on its rights as the predominant power in its own region of South Asia i.e. the Indian sub-continent and Sri Lanka”.
Un til such time as a success. fully re-structured “non alignment opens new opportunities for Indian diplomacy, it is this South Asian role that will claim Delhi's steady attention and diplomatic efforts, and energies.
The global change in a way has strengthencd India's capacities to under take such an assignment. The US, the superpower that dislikei Indian non alignment in the era of the Cold War, and had always regarded Pakistan as its trusted ally, has downgraded Pakistan, in the new regional Configuration, and upgraded India to the status of "natural' leader in the area. Freed of Cold War antinomies, the region is now seen in a different light in Washington. Therc is no IndoSoviet axis to match the USPakistan alliance. The detente has made such rival quasi-aii. 24. Il Co5 5e 15e les5.
Until the new global order' asSlimes a clearer shape, Delhi must concentrate on its own neigh
bourhood, especially now that Pakistan is stressing its Islamic identity and its west Asia II,
rather than South Asian, orientation.
And right now, Delhi has been compelled to look southWards - its own South, Taminadu, and Sri Lanka, the Tamil conflict in Sri Lanka, Delhi has put the heat on the DMK go wern rin emit, just this side of olusting Mr. Karuna nidhi's DMK Edministration to please its rival Ms. Jaya la litha's AIDMK, the Tamilnadu partner of Mr. Gandhi's Congress. Delhi's picsSure has compelled Mr. Karunanidhi to crack down on the LTTE (and other Sri Lankan Tamil militants) or go through the motions of doing so to impress Colombo of its bona fides. The DMK government has not paralysed the LTTE
4
Operation but made things LTTE i 5 Io 1 do in the state.
So now Delhi Convincingly abo Öf Sri La Ikä's Si Luth II dian - st The Ti II il Tieful exceed 150,000 s Inidhi.
India’s locus sitt CILIX of the Illa Collise the IIdof July 1987, I dasa has not only is al de Eldi letter b
WWOWAW W:
The large-scal civili: lf il clearly reflected Illus flow of Tamil Nadu, o are nearly 240,0 is är increasie
wer the Inul II bel India when thic dier came back. Conti Illes at II of 25,000 - 30, ()
As far as a L Wolvement is ci entic reports of tempts by a Country aid No pe:TCd. Austra between the LTT as Well as talk London-based LT änd the Sri La Ilı sioner, Gen Att th : g3 di Uffice5 foreign office h reported. It is knowledge by Prema da sa gover CLIFEd il III15 fr{ Pakistal besides Libya, Pola Ilıd, I g:05, llawia.
All this nad gCWCTI ment It cali Lanka policy h EL I til thilt it häid its retreat that Way it could COI CeIl 3 t Col I mer foreign min Gujral’s proposa

it has certainly ess easy. The Inger high profile
i can talk more ut the Effal 1-Dlt*
"war" on the lite and beyond. gees il Madras ays Mr. KarLIna
7r2 di — that’s the ter; meaning of STiLIk AccTi President IPTemaargued that it ut has submitted
a Treaty of Peace and Friendship Which makes a less unequal agreement. III a II i Interwie w with the: SUNDAF TIMES, High CommisSioner N, N. JH Sid Delhi holds Sri Lanka to the letter and spirit of the Accord'.
President Prella dasa who was PTile Milliste t e e W18 abroad when the Gandhi-Jayawardena Accord was signed. In El T1 y Caise, many Sri Lankalns, ilc Liding intimate aides of the former President Claim that India failed to fulfil its basic Lunde T - standing i.e. to quell the Tiger' insurgency. The 'Accord' therefore is not binding.
=MV: Prዐf S.
c disruption of
Sri Li Inka is il the co Intirefugees it to f which there 00 today. This if about 150,000 that was in list I PKF S01A Dild the in fl LIx esti IIa. Led rate DO a Illonth. hird country in Oncerned, alth
In ediation at(CoIICoIl Welt Hill TWay have aplia's Dimediation E El Ind Colombo 5 between Lhe TTE leader Kitu kall high coTTimişygalla, through COf the IBTitish at We also beel Alls), c)-II 1 Imom TOW that thc niment has proI 11 || Chiria a di countries like sr: el a Iii Yolu
: the previous sic that its Sri |alid gone awry
gone so far in
there was no Teassert India's Tibo. The ferister, Mr. I. K Il t0 yisit Sri
D. Muni WFites:
Lanka and engage the Premadasa government in a serious dialogue on the Tamil question were also politely turned down because Colombo had nothing to offer.
Ignoring the uncharitable coinIl ents oli Mr Chand Tä Shekha T's assul Tıptico II of office in the Sri Lanka press, Mr Shukla, during his forthco||ning visit may hawe to impress upon the Premadasa Tegic that the interests of New Delhi and Colo Ilıbı ÇÖDıverge on the question of ineeting the LTTE's challenge. The new Indian government has established its bona fides in this respect by forcing thc Tamil Na du gover III helt to act against the LTTE infiltrators in the state. The best way for Colombo to Tcspond would be to reiterate the significance of the July 1987 agreement and the principles of devolution of poWe to the Tallil Worked out th creifi,
Mr Shukla Inay have to urge upon his hosts in Colombo that instead of fiddling with the idea of Im Tiger of the north and cast into one province and playing Muslims against Tamils,
they should expeditiously and sincerely implicilent the devoution package evolved in the
form of the 13th Constitutional amendment in the Sri Lankan parliament Soon after the conclusion of the July 1989 agree
let,

Page 7
Karunanidhi: Sack or na
Anikendra Nath Sen
There seems to be no inmediately apparent Teason for the dismissal of the Tamil Nadu government. It is true that Mr Karunanidhi himself gave his opponents an opening by the lackadaisical manner in which he tackled the depredations of Sri Lankan Tamil I militants — the LTTE in particular - in His State. The Te Were, at (111time, as many a5 31 Camps imparting weapons i traini Ing to militants in Tamil Nadu. Mr Ka Tuna nidhi Ima de his sy Impathies all too clear by denying their existence, and roundly denounced the role playcd by the IPKF j, Sri Lalıkl.
That Mr Kaalidi W15 either un 4 ble ir un Willing to tackle the situation is evident
from numerous complaints made to the the Il Pri Ine Minister, Mr W. P. Singh, by his political allics - the CPI, the CPM and the BJP - last year. But it is by low fairly obvious that the chief minister has turned over a new leaf. As far as one can judge, the training ca. Ilps have disappeared, although the state Congress chief persists in saying that some of them ire still operating. Around 1,200 militants hawe been rounded up and the Tamil Nadu gover IIIlent has expressed its Willingness to consult the Centre about a plan to deport the more intral Dsigent elements amongst the II. There is no longicir any sericolus indication of a major breakdown of authority in the state.
However, Illuch still remains to be do Ille if militancy is to be effectively curbed in the
state. Of late there have been reports of collusion between the LTTE and the ULFA. There is Ilo hard evidence of this a part from the fact that two ULFA activists were arrested while undergoing treatment in a Wellore hospital. But too much Seems to HHW c beci : " T calci ilt) this fact. Assamese suffering
from Serious been routinely lore according ablished by thc ment long a gc: PTille Ministic Stilt CIC It II Slid that six were being run of TULFA Eug Li Nadlu L1 In Lil Tcci an Assanese like a sore thu of large numb e5pecially if hi brandishing a chirge, Ille the la Coked i Ilito. Didhi has poin sibility for cui Ile Its of ULF,
FOD YR F.W.G.W.
LTTE:
- Il CW LI WH5 |
Both the Sri La Fild the "T: Tı il accused eiich Willä til 5 befor decided enough On Janu år y 11t If a du bil 15 tI With the Wilr.
The Tigers s to continue the ce:45efi Te, WhilE right to clefeld Tale of the i d3 e5 lat slit thugh, and it before they are
Why has Pres Premada sä, yht See IIed Ile:T de tuТПed dowT Lh tunity?, Partly shares the deep Tigers felt by politicians, H rebels were to king. El previol Julie, Elfter mi of peace talks.

bt Sack
di så bilities hawe treite il Weito practices estAssam gover I. However, the i llis li test the II atter has training centres for the benefit Wists in Tail 2ntly. Although would stad Coult mb in the Ilidst 3ers of Tamils, le were to be AK-47, the less, needs to be A5 Mr. Krullted, the responrbing the moveA. : Civists rests
NEVMVS BACKG ROLUMI D
squarely with the Centre since Assam is curricntly Lu Ender Presidelt's rule.
Mr Karunanidhi’s political critics hawe obviously Ircialised the folly of persisting with a campaign for his dismissal based almost solely on the charge that he is presiding over a breakdown of the state's authority. They have, therefore, turned their attention to allegations of corruption and economic proFligacy in their bid to topple the government. This has placed Mr. Karunanidhi in the position of the lamb faced by the prowerbial wolf hell-bent upon finding him guilty.
(Tries of India)
DPWOW
Another
pro pcr ceasefire. nkan government Tiger guerrillas ther of many c the government L was enough. h, after ten days "luce, it was on
ay they intend ir part of the ::: Teserwing thc themselves, The njured in по се пt them too well,
may not be long Jack on the prowl.
ident Ranasinghe in the pist hålls sperate for peace, is possible oppor
because e Iow distrust of the most Sri La Ilıkalı e believes the bl: 11e for breaS celsefi Te list e than a year
round
Sri Lanka's generals began to resume thic fight once it became clear that the ceasefire was not sticking. For perhaps the first time, the army really flexed its political muscle. That, it seems, was decisiwe. The a III1 y si :Lys the Tigers är c now wuli 1 erable. They have been weakened by a clampdown on their activitics in the Indian state of Taimi i Nadu, from where they used to get much of their arms and fuel.
The arily has been promising to wipe out the Tigers ''Within six. In this for at least the past five years. It has grown dramatically in size, frQIIn SOIIne 12,000 in 1984 to 60,000 plus today. But it is still fighting against a guerrilla force that most people think can hold col It al T1 Cost indefinitely. The Tigers still corn Tland a good deal of support in the north and cast of the country, which may hawe bocc1 i Increased by the government's policy of bombing suspected guerrilla targets from
Jrrired J Y FFE 33)

Page 8
1990 TTAMIL. NAD U
DMK ups and downs
S. Murari
hen the W.P. Singh Govern
Iment w Els voted cout on NOWember 7, Tallil Nadu Chief Mimister M. Karumanidhi hailed the Prime Minister as a martyr to Mandal and Islandir and said, It is better to die likc a (jungle) cat than live like a rat."
Mr. KarllIllIlich could Tot have chosen a more ill-suited expression for he himself Is Tow in the position of a man who ha 5 caught the tiger by the tail and is trembling like an aspen before a Prime Minister who threates to dismiss him if he does not stop patronising the Tigers.
The year that was revealed the In any faces of Mr. Karunanidhi. If he was restrained in 1989, it was because Mr. Rajiv Gandhi was at the hel III1 at thic Centre. At one stage during that year, Mr. Ka Turhanidhi etjen went to the extent of saying that the Lanka proble II had gone out of his Elands. The Lher Side of Mr. Karunanidhi ca III e out during the 11 months of Mr. W. P. Singh's Tule this year.
Mr. Karunanidhi's pro-LTTE bias was evident in the negotiations : le conducted With all Sri IL-FA Inka Il Tallil groups, at the behest of the W. P. Singh Government, in December last year to explore the possibility of forging än Eigree iment which could palve the way for the smooth return of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force from the island. The EPRLF, which was then ruling the Northeastern province, offered to accoII date the LTTE in the Pro Wicial Council, but Mr. Karunanidhi pressed the Chief Minister, Mr. Waratharaja Perumal to step di Will s tlıat the Colul Incil could be dissolved and fresh elections held.
When Mr. PeruITal resused to oblige, Mr. Karum a Ilidhi turn cd
hostile towards groups, Ill Tol Carpet for the With which ti seized a huge c longing to the E Walasai village i ri. Il district ha 5 Since. This has With the failure get at the Tigers wily through a at Raina nathapu killing a police der, and massac K. Palih mainabhä a -- resilo: Ilti: 1 Fl; May.
A,8 PTiI1e M Shekhar put it, M ting to New Dell Singh was in po
When the OppC CCT In plained in th this year about t filtration of L Tamil Nadu. M. asked. “Why sh Elle Te al Illi liwe il hawe bÇIlle de: Of Tamilil Eela '
The samt NM now sees a Tiger so he wants the ( II thic läst o T IOOC) Tlili La TTLs hi up and detained That only about long to the LTT pTove that the Ti to the Stilte, lic When complain 5cale SImւյբբling other esse: Intials, f til Sri Lälıklı bec: luder, Mr. Kil deli: dit lid the on the Ilavy and u Il Lill Ad III1 i Tal FR with the disclos suspected militar at Sea over a peri

the Ilo D-LTTE led it the ed Tigers. The speed Le State police a che fa IIIl 5 beNDLF at DargaIn Rama nathapunot been equalicd to b: c: Intra sted I of the police to who shot their police checkpost ram in February, mänı anci bystan"ed EPR LIF leadlitir and 15 taithicis g i Il it in Madras in
Iinister Chaldir Madras was dictahi Whe I1 Mr. W. P.
WT.
isition repeatedly Le first quarter of tle increasing in
TTE, Illel it MT. KILTI I lidhi ould they come hiding when they facto IIlo na Tchs
T. Karunainidhi in every bush, Dr centre to believe. c month, nearly ive been roll Ilded in special camps. |00 of the I11 beE, only goes to ers do Il Cit cm L. cording to him. ts about largeof dic5 el and riil Tamil Nadu Il : la L1 der Flici Tull. Ilidhi first In put the blame the coast guard II das cal II le cult lic that owe IOO 1ts, appreheI1dcd od of one lonth
THE REGION
Eind ha. In ded (Wet to the State authorites, la a 11b cc Icleased.
Mr. Cha Indra Shekhar, who has been ble Wing hÖt and Cold ever since he equated the situation in Tamil Nadu with Assam, ha 5 IO w cime do Lut with El Cattegorical assurance that the Centre has () in tention (f. i 11 7 3 sing President's rule in the State. But developments in neighbouring Pondicherry, where the DMKled caliti II (Gover III e It hals fallel following a split in the Janata Dal (S) and the Congress (I) should give Mr. K: Tuna lidhi cause for worry.
The brief reign of the National FI Im t Gower mment, im which the DMK was represented by Mr. Karunanidhi's nephew “MuraSoli" Marath, Saw the Chief Milister Weild the stick in a big way. He slapped a fraud case on TNCC (II) chief K. Rai Illiamuirthi i Il March o I thit ewe of the Congress (I)'s agitation demanding that K. Kilmaraj's name be retained for the Maraimalai Nagar railway station in slub Li bi 1. Madris ... Tii) LIsa Indis of agitators were arrested for picketing railway stations and trains and remanded to 15 days judicial custody.
When the Congress (I) launched an agitation against the GovernIn ent's "cheap liquor' policy a couple if Ionths ago by picketing a Track shops, even old Gandhia Is were picked up and put in jail
The AIADMK split in July after Ms. Jayalalitha expelled Seni T leaders like Mr. S. THILIIl a w Lukka Tšul, MT. K. K. S. S. R. RäTT ach Idra, 1 Tid MT. S. D. Ugan Cha III1 d. The Tebels Taided the party headquarters and the two groups came to blows. The police the moved in and sealed

Page 9
the office. Ms. Jayalalitha was dispossessed of the party headquarters building which found its way into Mr. Thirunavukkarasu's custody. The Suprene Court intervened early this month and appointed Ms. Jayalalitha as the receiver until the disposal of the case relating to the disputed property.
Mr. Karunanidhi, in September, organised a massive rally to felicitate Mr. V. P. Singh for his bold and historic decision' to implement the Mandal Commission report, Yet, when the Pattali Makkal Katchi of the backward Vanniyar community called for a budh in Octobcr to protest against the stay on the Mandal report by the Supreme Court, he upstaged it by calling for another bundh.
On the positive side, Mr. Karunanidhi's good equations with Mr. W. P. Singh brought some benefits to the State. For example, the vexed Cauvery waters dispute with Karnataka has now been referred to a tribunal, Immediately after the National Front assumed office, Mr. Ka Tunal lidhi wis El ble to get the monthly quota of rice released form the Central pool raised to 75,000 tonnes. Towards the end of its term, W. P. Singh Government even cleared thic Rs. 1,300-crore atomatic project. Unfortunately, the Chandra Shckhar Government has decided to review this decision along with other decisions taken by the previous regime after the BJP withdrew its support on October 22.
If Mr. Karunanidhi treated the opposition with contempt during the most part of this y ea T, it was not IncTelly because he had a friend in Mr. W. P: Singh but also because Ms. Jayalalitha could not measure up to him despite her popular support. Ms. Jaya la litha has not been attending assembly since she provoked violence and was at the receiving cind of it in March last year. She has not been in
the public eye for almost the whole of this year.
The dethroning of the Con
gress (II) at the Centre in December last year, the AIADMK's
poor showing in Assembly electic and her road a the same time push her into a hibernation. Af party of the s she visited the ters conce to sig and fic that sh a fiddle When sealcd, she obse a few days in
She cal Ille out ber when MT, u Inweiled a stalt Lu thic city in Octo of party Trien, s Lup lowers poured i pledge their loy la litha. After strength, Ms. treated to Hy as the tumultill Delhi culminimal, tcd the National Fri Now that the d Government see bered, Ms. Jaya in active politic: met the Preside Governor and sub andum on the 1: situation in the as the Pri Ilic min she has not publ her old dc mand the DMK Gower The Congress ( fected by the co the legislature an: Wings led by Mi panar and Mr. K Mr. Moopanar bei Ina n who has ni: for Mr. Karunani left entirely to M. to keep up pressl Govern Imiem t.
Mr. Karunamid Te5ÖTLed to il seri Tleasures like Wa lColin a Tno unting til free supply of e agricultural pum duction in the rice to strengthe that the Sanad IUML has also from the Congr supporting Mr. W Karunanidhi can support of a subs of the Muslims.

the Pondicherry ns in February ccident around all combined to long spel I of ter purging the 0-called Tebels, party headquarIn Ell to the rank ... Wils as fit as the Office was Twrci FL fast foT le T house.
agai in in OctoRajiv Gandhi e of MGR in ber, Thousands port crs and folinto thc city to Illty to Ms. Jayaproving her lyala litha Te"derabad even
Tills e Welts i
in the fall of 1t Gower in I11e Int. Elys of the DMK Il t0 bc. IIIillitha is back 5. She his sin cc it and the State Imitted a memoW and order State as well ister. Strangely, licly reiterated of dismis sing 1 TT CT t II) has been afld War between organisational G. K. MooRamamu Tt hi. ng a low-profile Elır:ıl empathy lhi, it has bocen r. Rama IIllirthi Te OIn the Stätte
hi, meanwhile, es of populist ver af farmers" R$ 500 croe, ectricity to all 35ets, ald ressue price of his base. Now iction of the listanced itself 2SS (I) and is P. Singh, Mr.
Clint O Le 3 Intial Sectio
THE REGION
MK's letter rebuts
PM's charges
MADRAS
Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M. Karulaidi hild 曲 30-minute Inecting with Governor S. S. Barnala at the Raj Bha van and followed it up with a detailed lettet Lo PTime Minister Chandra Shekhar rebut ting point by point the charges he has
In alde regarding the activities
of the LTTE and its links with
LJLFA.
Mr. Karunanidhi believed to
have apprised the Governor of the recent steps taken by his Go We Thref it like thic detein kirol of Over 2000 Sri Lanki. Tamil militants belonging to various groups in special camps, the help extended to the Assam police to nab three ULFA extremists in Willorc last month and the beefing up of the police force deployed along the coast. MT. Karlu na Inidhi’s cttcr to the Prime Minister replies to charges that information passed on to hiIIl had Telched the LTTE in Jaffna and the LTTE had nexus with ULTA, and that arms are freely available in TL Til Nadu.
Mr. Karunanidhi had already dismissed the charge of LTTEULFA tic up as a concoction of the Congress (II) which has been demanding the dismissal of his Government on the alleged ground of break down of law and order.
UNI adds: Unit Il Minister of State for Hole Subhodh Kant Sahay said the activitics of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam were on the Tise in some coasta districts of Tamil Nadu. with the connivance of the Karu nanidhi Government.
Talking to reporters in Nagpur he said that it had been proved beyond doubt that there was a link between the LTTE and ULFA (extric mists of Assam. The Centre took a serious notic of it because of the increased extremist activities in border a reas of the country,
Mr. Sa hay was here on his way back to Delhi from Madras where hie met Tamil Nadu. Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi.
2

Page 10
TN Govt sacking won't
MADRAS Former Union Minister Rail Wills P5 vya said the people Would not tolerate any move to dismiss thic dem Jcratically elected Governillent
iTu Tamil Nadu by a + " ID efector Government” at thic Centre, under pressure from its allies.
Addressing a press conference here, he alleged that a conspiracy was on to dismiss the DMK Government at the behinest
of the Congress (II) and the All-India AITA IOMKI.
Any move to dismiss the
Karunanidhi Government under the pretext of breakdown of law and order in wiew of alleged increase in the activitics of SriLa käT TAI Til Illili til Itt 5 Was u Iljustified as the law and order situation in the State was far better than any other Congress (II)-ruled States, he said.
It will be a mockery of democracy if the duly-elected State Government is dismissed he added.
ALLEGATIONS question, Mr. P Tamil Niliu Go bic accused of trcmists belongi Liberati (3.L. Fro I11 bc.gills: two W:Tc aTTe sted i Il they were underg
Declining to al leged Dexus bi and ULFA, he П10 ye tih diБIli: III]t was not ill W letërið Tal till in but to please tE and AIADMK.
If at all any Illet is to be ground of dete and Jrder, Andh Uttar Pradesh go first be disilliss
Referring to Chandra Slik that "days hawe Centre Wăsi rule
S S.
SBAL SHENTIS
129/6A, Nawala
Color
Mewton Gurnasi "Changing Socio-Ecor Kandyan C
TO EE
Lake Hous
Writa to
Hard CO wer Paper back

THE REG OM
be tolerated: Paswan
S: Rc plying to Gwall sällid the Wern Im Cint Can Ilot aiding the ex= ng to the United ... of Assam - just JLFA 11cmbers tillät State: while going treatment.
collent on the et Weel the LTTE 5:lid the CentTe"5 55 the Give TI - iew of the alleged
llai yw a Ind i order le Congress (I)
State GWCIdis Illissed on the rioratio in liw ra Pradesh and wer TIT ent should :d, he said.
Prime Minist la T's statement բոnc when the
id f’Tabiil Mild TLS,
Mr. Pal SW. Il 5 liid, it Was Ell insult to the Tallis and dies IV. ed C1 de 11 Ila tin.
DUAL POLICY: Charging the present Unio II Government with ruling all the States from the Centre, MT. Pls Will said thlt for the first tille after independence, it was during Mr. W.P. Singh's rule that the federal Structure of the Constitutio Il was honoured and preserved,
Hic i accused the Congress (II) of adopting a dual policy on the Mandal Commissio Il lid the Raml i Jln Taibh o Lli-Balbfi Masjid issues.
He said the National Front, which had sacrificed power at the Centre for secularis-Im and social justice, would continue to fight for the two causcs.
Mr. Paswan later unweiled Lhe statue of Dr. B. S. Ambedkar at the Post and Telegraph Audit Office premises here.
5. A ፲S”
lbo 5.
nghe's PhD thesis homic Relations Sountryside'
ailable at
e Bookshop
the SSA.
FF5. YY). OC) PFS. 35). (OC)
ASSOCIATION
Road, Nara henpita,
in the

Page 11
SOLWAY ASIMA:
Arms Spending: No Me
Group of concer ned citizens of South Asian countrics met in Kathmandu, Nepal, from 10 - 13 December, 1990 under the auspices of the United Nations South Asian Perspective Project to sha. Te thei T C Comice Til Lower the prevailing internal economic and other crises with in their col | Entries and to consider in the context of the great changes 5 Weeping the world, Ways nd meas of en su Ting the well-being and progress of the peoples of the region as a whole.
The Group felt that the dominant strategy of development adopted by South Asian countries in the post-war era is no longer adequate for their needs. In fact the prevailing development patterns are under mining the real, natu Tal a Tid financial Tesources bases, pushing the region deeper into a forcign debt trap. Internally, too, it has failed to cradicate the worst forms of poverty and human deprivation, resulting in the generation of social polarization, ethnic conflicts and youth alienation. EWCT Irising military and other gover Ilmental expenditure have left the countries virtually without any surplus for investment in their development.
The Group is of the view that the flow of real external resources to the region is diminishing and the generally inhospitable international e COICI Illic cliTlate has been further aggravated by the Gulf Crisis, and there is little choice before our countries except to develop collective selfreliance through in tensive regional cooperation. The dangers to the economic and political slability of South Asian countries can be averted only through such cooperation.
The Group S. governmental S currently underW der 5 that its pai slow är di des 14 ciently either tC. ted crises facing LTics al Id the SCL as a while Ort for cooperation, gress of its pelo
At the recent meeting at Mal dence of a Tcco realitics and i presscd in mol tangible forms Lead Crs of the recognized that searth, and totho p11 Tcly cofficial II important rolc moting the SAA lining policy ch mulating Tegion and projects,
At its First M II ll Tidul, this il GROUP FOR S COOPERATION envisaged a progi interactioIl and On South Asia The first phase es will i çudie of:
(a) a concep tillål a South Asili
пnuпity.
a coherent
tailable di:", while milit lf II1 der T1iz rialization, on the Tob hılmalı aid Ces for the
(b)

THE REGON
oney for Development
pports the interAARC process ay. But it consice is pain fully it respond suffithe multifaceindiwidual cClunthı Asia Til Tegin the aspiration
peace and pro.sסpl
SAARC SIIIIIlit c there w:45 - civignition of these test Was EX"e positive and of cooperation. region have A, ca, deI11iC5, TtIs Outside the rocess have at to play iп ртоRC spirit, out10ices and foral program me 5
Meeting in KathNDEPENDENT OUTH ASIAN (IGSAC) has ramme of study, policy dialogue in cooperation. of its activitithe preparation
| fra Ille work foT п Eсопопnic Com
strategy for susrelopinent, which .aiIıirıg [h1e . g:li T1 5 atio m irid i Industis based primarily iliz: tion (of local matctial Tesoura leviation of
poverty. Population Planning, Compulsory Primary Education and Enwirion Ilment ProtCCtion should form an integral part of such a strategy.
(c) a pre-feasibility study on the establishment of a South Asian Fund for Development.
(d) a study of the region's Food System as a whole with a wiew to ensuring that every human being is provided with the minimum nourishinclit necessa Ty for a decent dignified and creativ c life
Il O'''
As its work progresses, the Group will consider enlarging its membership as well as the scope of its activities in support of the SA ARC process.
The Group expresses its thanks to Mr. K. K. Bhargawa, the Sec Tetary General of SAARC foi sharing with it his pers (Il El assessment of the Congoing SAARC process.
The Group had the privilege of calling on the Prime Minister of Nepal, the Right Honou Table Krishna Prashad Bhattarai, It wishes to place on record its deep appreciation of his sharing with the Group his views and for his cn courage Illent and support to the Group's initiative.
A.. EK. II. Mr 5hed Bangladesh
Olga ya Tsering Luar M. Raisigotra Indiց Ahmed Littlef Maldives Hhekн ТПар: Net af Ak IIIşıl HLI%5sıin Pakis,
Ponna Wigna. THj:1 Sri Ları ka

Page 12
GULF AND SOUTH ASIA
Geopolitics worries the Subconti.
Too close for Comfort
By Hamish McDonald in New Delhi, Salamat
three major countries of South Asia - India, Pakistan and Bangladesh - while supporting UN Te solutions oIl Kuwait, halwe shown a distinct a TImbi wallence to the US-led mowes aganist Iraq in recent months. Although all three have con dem ned Iraq's aggression, they have reservations over the post-war course of events in the Middle East.
The Subcontinental stance is a result of mainly domestic compulsions and the economic impact of the Gulf crisis, but there arc als o Imajor questions of the countries' interests-geo
political as well as Islamic-il a regio In adjoining South Asia.
Those oil-deficit Il tills,
heavily dependent on Middle Eastern imports, are already groaning under the burden of higher fuel prices and spiralling domestic inflation. Ewell as their
governments strive to ensure adequate imports from other sources, long lines of panic
buyers have become a common sight at petrol stations in the major cities. If the crisis drags on, supplies will be scarcer and prices higher-posing economic problems that are unlikely to be overcome by increased foreign aid.
For India, the intangibles of the crisis include some galling les sons on its international iTTClcwance — conce it beca Ille clicar late last year that New Delhi could not back the UN tride cmbargo on Iraq and was condemning the invasion of Kuwait nonc to o vehemently, India's shaky minority government has been unable to make its presence felt in the UN Security Council, where its two-year term began this month.
India could have a lot to say. Many opinion leaders are quick
O
to point Crut th a I di double sta iTter WeI tlibsa ir Pa. Il a Illa, contin In lIl ca T-arme di pying the West
Yeti, Indialı { have moved a knee-jck ant They acknowle. betw.ccn US in | Caribbcan and or the French i ignore their ow Lanka and the Iraq's annexatic)
Given the US ble is and the its allies, New fear the emerge cal world polit India is against in the Gulf. concerned aboul even a short () in the way of 1 lity' a senior Amo Ing other | bäck lash couldi monarchies in th after math of th India could fa" order partly th Illilitary rolc if partly through st nal organisation looking to cxpar Illic profile in
Eyet at the
aid, Bangladesh support the
and please W. colors. It ewer at the behest Musli II cultir behalf of Ku A Tabia. Althol wог егз тсturП and Iraq latclas hawe begu T1 e 11 order to replac Riyadh now wicy While all this

left
Ali in Islamabad and S. Kamaluddin in Dhaka
c in consistencies Ilä Tais — the US 1 Grenada and lied aid to a S Tal el Still CCCL|-
Balık 11 di 5 CH 3I1.
officials see to way from any i-Americanism. lge a distinction terwentioIls in the Celi tTall Alıc TicH in Africa-not to m fralys inti Sri
Maldiv cs—and in of a neighbour,
"् ।
-Inic proרנeco I 3 assertive less of Delhi des Tot nce of a Il Artı eriera. However, the War option We are really what a war, Ile, Will Lll cash Ong term instabidiplomat said. hings, an Arab hreaten the ot het Le région. In thc le cuTTCnt crisis, Lu alevy WTld rough a revived or the UN and Tengthened Tegins. India will be ld its own econo
til Gull T.
mercy of external was quick to UN rescolliticos Stern and Gulf | scnt c Illis sa Tics f Riyadh to other ies to lobby Con Wait and Saudi ugh Bangladeshi ed froIIl Kuwait it year, the Saudis ploying others in :c Yellenis-who ws with suspicion. increases the
prospects of further aid, Dhaka fears a prolonged conflict might jcopards e its chances of external ccoloni help.
Dhaka was one of the first Islamic countrics to voluntarily send troops to Saudi Arabia, but its stalled purpose was to defend the country's Islamic holy cities. This was also the stated intent of Pakistani tro (Ips sent to the Gulf.
Pakistan's a Tıbiyalance over taking part in a Galf War also stells from strong domestic sentiment against the presence of non-Muslim troops in the Islamic holy land. This religious view has been reinforced by Iraq's linkage of its invasion of Kuwait to the Israeli pullout from occupied Arab territories and the broader Palestinian question. The Gulf cri5i5 cci Il cided with the suspension of US aid to Islamabad because of Pakistan's Illiclear programme, which has been seen as a U.S. поуe to block the Muslim world's access to gaining nuclear weapons capability. As a result, most Pakistani political |leader5 I have a diw) cated a 12 Luit Tal position on the crisis.
Even middle-of-the-road politicians IIlaintain that by sending troops to the Gulf, Pakistan has lost its traditio Dlal Tolle of Illediator in intra-Muslim disputes. The decision to send troops was made by the army last August during the un certain period of an interin regime. Only a few conservatives support the US position. Further, army chief Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg known to consider Iraq's armed forces as a source of strength to the world's Musli. community, would It wat to sect therill destroyed.
F. E. E. R.

Page 13
BLNKAGE
A. a geopolitical tool, linkage” hals been popular since the 1970s. The word, that is. There's Ilothing II odern about the meaning. It II cans: We'll agricc to discuss that if you'll
agree to talk about this. The concept is as old as conflict itself, which is to say it goes
back to tilles. When mc settled disputes by throwing rocks. That is how young Palestinians address political issues today in Hebron and Gaza. Saddam Hussein, as clever a manipulator as this most cynical of centurics his seen, tried to link Israel's occupation of thic Wcst Bank in til his accupation of Kuwait.
It didn't Work. It was recognised as a ploy. But a parallel drawn by a II u Injust Iman is not thereby unjust. There are great differences between the two allies of occupation and how they came about. But there are also many sillilarities. For instance, in both places foreign soldiers govern local people against their will,
Dr. Henry Kissinger, when he was in charge of U.S. foreign policy, was especially adept at linkage. He invoked it often to ju Tip-start si multit neous negotiations on un related subjects. The emigration of Soviet Jews was linked to improved trade relations with the U. S. With holding the bounties of capitalisII eventually caused the coln II unist system to crullible. This released a flood of Jews to swell the population of Israel And, surely, glad den any heart not made pitiless by ancient Squabbles,
WaT in thic Gulf was legitimised by Security Council Resolution 678 requiring Iraq to get Cut Of Ktu Waiit. Il l957 Re: SILLtion 242 required Israel to withdraw from conquered territory. To be sure, 242 did not mention a date, incWXT II ind a deadline. But 23 years was not what the U. N. Hadi i II i Intl. The 1957 Tescollical did not say Israel could keep the West Bäk and (Gly; if Arab states failed to recognise Israel's right to exist. On many occasions since, the General Assembly has called for "the unconditional
withdrawal of Pa1e:stiTi::T1 :L[1ci tories occupied : ding Jerusalem' that Palestini: theiT II alieni
F.T. those whi to a bring l jilli: need not degen ment weT whe resolution is m al 10ther. Se cuIT Si () IS CATTy T1 . than General As mothing out wei The Colci di Israel, for attack lation of the U. June 7, 1981, t es corted by fiw through Jordal II A Tabian airspac French-built Ill Baghdad's south U.S. Wote yayil
1լIհt is tէլe P։ c 11 durcd for çe kish province, their Wil freed keep in Ilind Kuwait achieve virtue of that cumstance, Is Tiel Was L Iloj * satisfy the Zio h) meland, thoug tern European David's kingdi kind of faith an A Talb scholars mi have. Kill Wiit W buffer between and Jordan and of the al-Saludd If the West pe co II e i It) bein U. N. gave its b Israels Own Cou the state, it w money and dipli ral El teedi its exist of the U.S. hij lished through th you've got it: lin On earth sees its thill the U.S. sure that Ameri irony in Wash opposition to th of diplomacy. Is Culturally enric from Minsk and cíl u Čatit d de Ce Cruclly pers ccl

Israel from the Othe TATäb terrisince 1967, inclu' and demanded 1s be gra Inted ble Tights.”
have the power it peace, all this er:lte into arguther Ole LJ. N. i OTe moral tha II y Council decibre legal weight sembly ones, cild hts a deadline. d once cond cil ing Iraq “in vicoNi, Ch, Tcr. "" (OI he Is Tal celi F- Isis e F-153 in trudeti ial and Saudi e and destroyed a clear Teactor il Ern suburbis. The
tot Eller fjuriteel. :illesti nia Ins” 1 hd Ituries 15 a TLIT - it is II Sllu T o Il lom struggles to that Israel and di nation hood by great shift of cirde colo 1 istil Licom.”' Wedi ti ew Olwe; to Ilist clair11 for a ghi linkage of elsghet tos and Em requires the id per spective that ecessarily cannot El 5 invented as a Hashemite Iraq the new kingdom W 1:1 sty. Tritted Israel to g, if the infant les sing and if the Tage consolidited Ls; Western arms, að macy that gua: Ince. In the case ассо прhe technique of . kaige. Ni na tidlı iclf more lucidly 5 A5ia call be cans already see ing tron’s Tesolute e linkage school rael is now being hed with settleTs Kiew — talent.cdc 1 dalts of Jews, ted in Czarist,
GULF
Stalinist, Nazi and for all we know, Gorbachewian pogroms. They will raise families on lands where "Palestinians not so long ago Watched thicir flocks and te I1ded their fields of barley.
They havc that right. Even a refugee knows in his heart that Possessionis nime points of the la W. But the world concedes to the Jewish state only that portion of Palestine known is Israel, The way the other, occupied, part has y been governed over the past thre lears has not pleased anyone, east of all a large section of the Israeli population. Even had there been no Gulf crisis, postCold War perceptions of justice Would surely soon have focused
on what has been happening in Gaza,
B now the World's notor is running. When Sadda Im Husseil has been deallt with, Egypt and Syria Will call in the chips.
I Will be difficult for FL he Allies' to enter comfortably in to any settlement that does
not address the West Bank. Israel Illust know it Will The Wer hawe its 1948 bordes afirmed unless it retreats to those borders, American5 should expect that many nations will want the U. S. to link its goodwill to progress on human rights as firmly in Jerusalem as it does in Moscow.
The P. L. O. will surely newer get a Inother pen ny fro 11 Saudi Arabia or other Gulf paymasters, Yassir Arafat his backed the Wrong side; hic may not su Twiwic. As the danger from him and Sadda. In evaporates, so too should Israel's in transigence. It has made peace with Egypt. It can II na ke peace with Jordan under another name (starting with P), the Gulf states would be well-disposed to compromise. They would start by recognising Israel. Even peace with Syria would not be impossible in a new postwar climate of concession. There will be, briefly, a window of opportunity
to forge a lasting peace. If it i 5 tot seized Israel Carl be 5l Te the frirld Will Soon
spawn a new P. L., O.
(EDITORIAL, ASIA PEEK)
11

Page 14
GUEF: PERSA IV OR ARA BA / 2
The Rage of Caliban
Zuhail
he flag of the Arab national movement was devised by
a II i English IIn a 1, just Els the flag for the Buddhists' revival was designed by a Il Allerica I, Col Olcott of colul Tse Was That conspiring with the Christians to cause the downfall of the Buddhists when he was designing the flag, but that is the sort of thing Sir Mark Sykes, British diplomat and historians of the East, seemed to have been up to with one of his hands while the other was devising all 'ilblem for Arab unity.
Arab unity is still very far away. But the colours green, black, white and Ted he chose and found today in di Terent combinations in the flags of a variety of Arab states che ered Lhe Arabs quite a bit with their religious and historical associations. The green stands for the Prophet and the first Caliphs.
The Test of the three Colours represent two great dynasties the 0mayyid (white) End the Abassid (black) and the third the Hashemite (red). The last was Lhic Oc to which T. E. Law TeTh. Ce was political tutor. While designing the flag of unity Si T Mark Sykes was alsö, as I said conspiring with two other European powers to undermine the very unity he was setting 11 բ.
Skyes was the partner in that infarnous pagt kilo Wr as the Sykes–Picot Agreement which brought together three imperialistic nations in 1951 the British, the French and the Rlissi: Ils Who Sāt like Wultures to car we up Arbia, that soft under-belly of the dying Ottomal epire, into 'spheres of if lecc'. Thanks to the Bsheviks this plot was soon made known to the world when they published the terms of this da stardly deed. But that did not
thwa Tt the il Russia dropped Bolsheviks calle the conspiratori British deceived a while.
Historia:Ins, h this conspicul Colus chery as a fil British diplomila be y (ou can loc) too, but when den () LI T11 èTht - T1 0 W fore you in the Britials i cobedie time, standing iest power on to W01 der w tutelage and Welt.
Do I hear al somewhere
This Kuwait's
WHıcı tıp ulı Cali
Thu StTok’ds"
Illuch of Il
Water With hi.
teach meth
To IIa Ille th
änd how th
That burn by
and then I
And I sh. O. Wedi
qualities of.
The fresh spr b: TTę plac.
Cursed be I
the cha:A TIL 15
Scuds, Wild,
Jaguars ligh
The Arab Pe.
I used the W and thereby ha ti III e il c{JIl Cern the in competent British imperial which the AIt to Call tElc PeT August 2 lasty

perialistic plot; out because the into power and il skills of the the WTA bis for
o yw cwcir, prais C. act of trealthe exercise of tic skills. May k at it like that, you see the : unrolling beGulf with Iraq it pupil at the 1p to the might:arth you begin
lere Ell thilt
iiplomatic skill
Caliban raging
Illine. . .
Illest first,
time, and made :; wouldst give
T Ties i Il "t; El Ild
a bigger light, e less,
', day find night:
|Çı yedi th ce
thee all the
ing, goil wells, : 111 fertile:
ha I did 5. All
of high tech Wilt
Weasels, Cobrais, t on you!
"sian Gulf
לWטוrd Gulf Tר)". ngs a t Eilc. This 5 the America Ils,
3- CESi) T5, is in the Gulf, :rica. Ils Continue sian - Gulf - Lu Intil * e when the Te
was a surprising and sudden shift to the Arbian Gulf, also kW) as the Persial Gulf".
Williä mm. Sa iTe, that lively commentator who exposes the shifts and nuances of contemporary politics by exa Inithing th 11S f со пtспрогіігу English, recently drew attention to this shift by quoting a letter From a Middle Eastern political expert to an American rādi cīIīlentit).
“ “In your commentary,” Wrote Habib La dijervardi, ln 155 ociate
director of the Centre for Mile E85. L:II Studies I Harvard, 'you said that the
president Would be speaking on
the situation in the Arabian Gulf, also known as the Persian Gulf". I believe that that this is the first time that
any of the networks have referred to the Persial Gulf as the Arabian Gulf".
It may be the first time an American journalist used this term but those we have had to deal with the Arabs cwer since Nasser began to stride the Middle Eastern world have been careful about when to call the Gulf 'Persian" and when to call it 'Arabian'.
None the less, the fact that an Allerican journalist has Weltic to call the Glf Ar:1bia n a Ild has been tilken notice of in in portant circles is a significant event indeed. FoT one thing if you blave grown lip with the Persian Gulf it is quite a problem half way down your
Life to dass di will with the A Tabian Gulf. As difficult in adjustincInt, indeed, as those
who grew up as Ceylonese discovering one day that they had til gill themselves Lanka 15.
Anyway, a change has come to America cycin though it has taken Sadda II. Il dit NasseT to do it. A pily, a coll. I try that pride itself as being the - ac me of civilisation has been unwilling to bend to pleas and sighs, but jumps to it the moment the Words are spelt out from the barrel of a gun.
(Car I ffri r-read or page 1 W)

Page 15
How the West will wi
Robert O'Neil (Oxford University Prosessor of sar F.
W. in the Gulf, if it comes in the next few weeks, will be a major conflict in historical terms. The Americans had higher peak strengths in both Korea and Wietnam, but the magnitude of the forces deployed by presidents Truman and Johnson are comparable to those sent to the Gulf by Bush.
Allied forces in the Gulf, with reinforcements still joining them, total well over 500,000. In Wietnamn the Americans, at their maximum, had 600,000 troops in the field. In Korea, at the most dramatic period 10 months after the War began, the great Chinese Fifth Phase Offensive of April 1951, 700,000 Communist troops drove against 420,000 United Nations Command defenders. For much of the war cof attrition which continued at an all too bloody intensity from November 1951 to July 1953, the UN Colland hic lid the f’T CSI it some 130 miles across the Korea Peninsula, With is divisions in the front line. In the Gulf a front of about 20) II lies is manned by some 1() allied divisions or equivalent forces.
While there are similarities in terms of scale between the Gulf confrontation and the US's two
biggest Wars of the post 1945 period, there are important diffeTCI1 CČŠ.
First, the allics a Te not fighting an enemy which has the support of an inviolable great power across an adjoining frontier. Second, the accuracy and intensity of the available firepower on both sides is far greater that in either Korea or Wietnam, a IId Lhere is Virtually Do cover for ground forces adwancing to attack Cover much of the front. Third, the War, if comes, will be conducted in the heart of one of the World's greatest concentrations of natural resources. Fourth, for all the talk of Wietnam havi Ing been the television war, satellite tech
nology, more p nalistic techniqi, der inter Ila LiCTa televisit will in in around the that no other El Chieved.
A WAT il thi h fish in the with the di Taliti
Il di Wietal does not have waiting to resc Chinese sawed 1950-51,
Salcidil III call
ol friendly ! agilinst the A. In is islated enĘ every side ex Jordail, a IId )T of Jorda T1 stal Tic Will respondi ili fees that Isri threate led in
Sa, dda Im.
It is conceiv could prove a such tur i unlikely, For sice 1945 th: to hawe al maj diplomatically, militarily.
The Iraqis " of resisting fo the onslaught delivered agli were a really the Wehrlicht tւյսld successքլ series of delayi back from pe prepared positi performance in agains to the li that they are
The combat likely to see
lattic of Week is I tot to Sally forces 11 all Ille t II. Th longed seriod def. of Ku

GULF
in the war
issary)
Tofessional jourles El Id the braLl penetration of volve Illass pinglobe in a way conflict hills yet
Le Gillf Will be
pan compared in of the Korean
wars. Saddall a powerful ally lie hill as the Kim Il Sung in
With Cl ogistic backing sericalIns, Siddal mon :Thies ab ollu lid 01 cept for weak i tlic Citler Side ils, Israel Shal miri ke a tiger if he el’s security is
any Way by
Il Cit
able that il rå Inia T1s wild card, but unds is extremely the first title Americains S:te:Tl or enemy isolated economically and
nay prove capable r sew cral wecks which will be ist the T1- If they good army, like in 1944, they ully fight al ble) Cody ng battles, falling pared position to on. But the Iraqi mobile operati (15 Trinians Sliggestis Iit it i Ill this class.
preparations were Will b : awer i al s, not years. This that US and allied be able to return cree will be a pro
of malning the wait, or of attern p
ting to put together the pieces of a shattered Iraq. There may be a sustained, low intensity terror campaign waged by Saddam's supporters against the West. But unlike Korea and Wietna II, there should not be a long period in which Americans and their allies are dying in large scale military opcrations for no apparen change in the Outcome,
Although a Gulf war Would be much shorter than the Korean and Wietnam wars, it stands to surpass them by far in terms of intensity. The Korean War Callught the Aincri calls and their allies unawares and it was nos ll Tintil mid-1951 that they were able to develop their full concentration of air power. The commitment in Wietnam war gradual and much of the enemy's operational and logistic facilities were protected by dense ju ng|lC.
In the Gulf a nighty force has been concentrated, poised to strike a devastating series of blows, and it will not be hard to See where the T1:iin ta Tgiets Ft Te.
The opening phase of a Gnlf war will be a dramatic aerial bomba Tidlinent, probably ne)1 als
pulverising as the air power hawks fortell, but it will look spectacular and allied losses
should be light.
It will still be he cessary to send the ground forces in to Close with and over come the Irilli defenders. We have no idea 15 t.) what their condition Will be. The Iraqi will to fight may disintegrate under the force of the aerial onslitlight, but the diggedness of the Iraqide felice agling t the Iranians suggests that a gold llt fightinרַ טilber Will ccmזווn when the Allied ground attack goes il. Them it Will be the :| lie: 5 Who) lack cover from the accura te wellpons of dug in defenders. The close fighting which follows promisses to be the bloodiest phase of the conflict,
13

Page 16
Contrast to Korea, where the
enemy held a line from coast to CC). Elst, Sadda il cal mot close of all of his 600 mille frontier
with the Saudis. He has a defcn si we li ne " Which Tilun 5 in 1 ::Ind some 200 Illies. It the be
ço, Illes weTy thin, 11 other woTdS his position has an open flank and there is potential for a WaT of Illa Lleuwre which did Illot exist ini Korea.
His other flank, on the Gulf, may be taken by a Iphibious assault. This Inay prove costly to the attackers but the double envelopment strategy opens very interesting possibilities for penet rating the Iraqi rear areas and isolating the grca ter part of its army in its forward defences, General Schwartzkopf, chief of US central command, has an opportunity for carrying through a Napoleonic strategy of holding the Iraqis on the sou the TT1 front while concentrating an intensic allied forces against the enemy rear. If the allied operations are well conducted they stand to be a textbook example of battlefield strategy fur decades.
Bec: LISe the conflict tially about the control of oil and the war will be waged through an oil field, the Te will also be an economic impact. Both: thic Korean and Wietnam wars had powerful effects on the World economy. The comIodities boot of the 1960s transformed the prospects of resource producing countries.
Lyndon Johnson's refusal to pay for the Wietnam warthrough increased tax lion led to severe inflation a weakening of the US position internationally and the cutting of the Great Society programme inside the US.
The Gulf conflict has sent up the price of oil and it may be driven higher in the heat of battle. But unless the Iraqis can find some way of striking at the Saudi oilfields, not enough oil production will be lost through battle to have a dramatic effect on prices. More important econ tornically will be the subsequent impact of the conflict Con general Gulf se eurity.
is essen
14
A waT in the t) hay: el II public opinion. Will not lawc ; burden of his K Tel : id Wiet disapproval of
policy during But he will ifterwards in
Pentagon cxpect achieve a swift päinless victory
Sfa ferfer of
o'r ffe G W W
"Tı : Tıklı
Union joining forces and the i Il the yli ole vi c) Ildell the Bll of the United S1 :aL1d it5 : [1ied fo: Illencement of
Iraq under the til I - of KILI Will lirge that war sh We categorical! LN) Tesolutil ted by the UNO
I this contexo much regret til LIJN () til alw'il || but a settlem and is a result 1:i tion 5 h: Wc - tio quences of the w tible,
It is evident In ental objective totally eTo) ding : CLI lar Lincture. the UNO playin LOthe JSA, can
The TL GSTUT. C] ing class and pei; of those countri this wat ad T a gainst War,
The LGSU al leaders of the tTies t0 til ke IIe rally : Found wi forces with a W"-
rī re
Jayarati Proč

: Gulf promises Iajor impact on Preside It B sı to bear the heavy predecessor in la II that of 1145s administration The WaT itself Surely fase it, tess contrary to :ä til Ins, hi5, foi Tces and relatively
Offeg ALGSAW ' MVar
Cieneral Services With the El Inti wa T peace movements World wehe Ilmently sh Administratit)II lates of America Tces for the coll
the War against IIte text of libet Elit. We stro Ingly ould be stopped. ly state that the
should be execuand not by USA.
, this Union wery le failLIre of the he war and bring int in this crisis, I, the developing
face the conse"El T which is inevi
that the funda:S the UNO i5 And in this partithe possibility of ց :1 հcctitlti fiddle t b: Tuled .
|l upon the workace lowing people es TÖt to Support aise thicit hands
so appeal to the developing couna lingful steps to ith the El Inti wat view Lo stop the
half of the Ta' Service. Ur for,
1 a Maliyago da Perif -- LÓGISLV
Briefly. . .
(Cyfir les fra F7 Page )
DEFITE MIKS
Indian Prime Minister Chandra. Shekhil I told thic Indian parliament that Tamil Na du had become the cheapest place to buy arms like the AK47 and that Punjab Inilitants and Assam ULF separatists were regular cu stimeTs. The Prime Millistic als o Said Lhat there werg definite links between Sri La Inkai's I LTTE and IT ili La Int organisations in India.
ARMS FOR LITTE
SEIZED
Boats laided With arms for the LTTE were seized in the straits of Malacca off Penang by the Malaysian Customs, according to agency reports. The Malaysian High Commission in Colombo which asked the Foreign COffice il Kuala Lampur about it had no further infor Til til II.
POSITWE RESPONSE MEEDED
e Ceylon Workers Congress President S. Thoidanan, who is al Iso MinisteT of Touris II and Rural Industrial DevelopIn ent has told President Prema da sa 1п Н letter: "Gover in III e It Ought to positively respond to any overtures that may be made to open up a dialogue leading towards the even Lual fulfilment ČIf thc aspi Taltions of the Tai Tli 1 people in the Northern and Eastern Provinccs''.
Such an approach, the minister has said, could result in isolating the LTTE which is seeking an armed solution to the problems of the Tamil people in those El II: El: ,

Page 17
Budget '91
Some Macroeconomic
Saman Kelegama and Nimal Gunatillek
he Budget proposals for the
fiscal year 1991 hardly contained any surprises. Wage increases were announced in the face of high inflation before the Budget. Fuel prices were 111 creased als a result of the Gulf crisis reinforcing the already existing inflationary temdencies. These types of price Wage changes before a Budget ha ve been common during the last decade and thus the Budget is no longer watched with anxiety for major announcements by the general public,
Since lately the Budget has as su Ilied great i 11 portance als an instrument of III a croeconomic management. Restructuring the economy is now a key element of policy reform. For example, implementing the changes ad
vocated by the Ricfí is till Citi tliltilīlli: CIn mission, a Commission req changes and cծl hawe to be put the Budget. Furt and develop II i en sector - which red as the eng
- demands lis cits, lW inflāt Or, in short,
stability. The
part of this res raille which it the Tole of th fiscal deficits,
system, and re administratic, Il.
realistic analysi the enti Te polic: rounds the Bud Hılwe to be takt
Table
Internal and External Balance
Fiscal Operations
1978 197ց 1ցE[]
Reg Wearl L. E. 교f. 교 교.1 19. Expenditure 4), 3.9 43. Curret . . . Capital 1교. 14, 1 1.3 Oficit ー13.8 -13.3 -23、1 Foreign Grants 1.5 교, 『 . Foreign Borrowing 7.5 . 5.2 Dorrestic Borrowing 4.7 5. 13.9
Bank Borrowing 4. 1.고 1마.
Inflation (CCP) 12.1 O.S 2.
Extern! TTg de Sector
Cштira III Аг. г. п. шПt =4.5 =11.1 -19.3
Debit Sawi: Riti 1. ) 1.
NEFCFFF"
1990-1994 (P1, 1990). MWigfa.5:
p. 23).
1981 1982 983
18. f. 19. 33, 338 32, 1.9 85 18. 13.8 5, 13. -15.5 - 17. -13.4 3. 3. 교. 5.7 . 5. 고 G. 9. 5.4 4. 3. O.
18, 18 4.
-13.8 -15.4 -12.
1.9 18, 2.
Central Bänk of Sri Lanka, Review of the Economi
aLLLLLL LTLLLLLLLLC CLLCCHHaL S L CCC LLLLSSSA SLLLLCLLLLSESY
For 1990, according to unofficial CCP. in

mplications
E.
Administrative ssion, Taxation Ilid thlę Tariff uire far reaching is cզuently these into action by het i more, growth it of the private is now considegime of growth' Fer Budget defiill, and 5 on, In a CTCCollic 1991 Budget is Ticturing progtempts to reduce e stilte. Teilice TC for Ill the Tax is tructure public Thus for any s of the Budget, y 5 : Lup that surgetEl Ty proposals : I into iccolt.
The Budget for 1991 estimated an expenditure of nearly Ris. 135 billion and a revenue of nearly RS. 75 billi III which would leild to a deficit of nearly Rs. 60 billio 1. As Table 1 shows, total expenditure in 1991 will be the lowest expenditure recorded during the post-1977 period and will allount to 28.5 per cent of GDP. Keeping expenditure at such a low level may appear to be a remarkable achievement. But closer exa Illi nation of disaggregate figures reveals that this is made possible because of reduced capital expenditure (9,0 per cent of GDP als compared with over 10 per cent during 1978-88). This has in turn been III a de possible due to Linspicnt Capital cxpendit Lu Te in the NorthEastern provinces engulfed by the On going War. Thus the govern
(as a percentage of GDP)
14 || 1 f
芷.芷 효. }. 31, 1 34. 3.) 1. C. S. 9 13. - ) -11.7 -1효, 교 고, 1 . 2. . 4.4 5. 2 fir 5. . 1.4 1.7
f 1.5 S.
-42 و ليل= ولاس
17.5 고 1.{I} 25,
1987 988 1989 1990) 1991
空1.4 8,7,置1.6 .. 19
. . . 1.2 28.5 20.1 효0.7 2호.4 22.4 9. O.3 효 8.8 9. Hill. 15.5 - ). -),8 -93 2.4 . 慧.齿 2.) 2,3 호, 意、 予。卓 4.置 5.8 5. 4.5 2. IE 4.5 -1.5 O,
7.7 14.O. 11.5 + 19.7 1.7
-구. -.『 -7. -8. -.
고. 꼬. 고. 19.7 고(T.
W, Warious issues and Public Investment,
-Inflation estimated using the GDP deflator (PI, 1990, Flation WH5 a round 23 par CEnt.
15

Page 18
ment has becn able to maintain the current ex penditu. Te as a share Of GDP close til 20 per cent - the usual level as in previous years — in order to sustain new expenditure progra Ilmes related to poverty a lleviation.
Bulk of the current cKpenditure in 1991 Will be allocated to the Ministry of Finance (for domestic payments such as Wages, salaries, debt epily ments, etc.), Ministry of Defence, and the Ministry in charge of Prowincial Councils; the amounts being Rs. 53 bm., Rs, 11.8 bin., and Rs. 17, 4 ibn Tcspectively. A mung others, Maha weli and Highways wri 11 abs(o, Tibb F85, 5 İbrı... Power alıd Encrgy - Rs. 5 bn., Jana saviya - 4 bm., Education and health - 3.5 bn., Food stan ps - 3.5 bn., and mid-day meals for schools - 1.0 է, ո,
On thic revenue side, as Table I 5i Ows, Teven le a 5 a per CCItage of GDP will remain at 19.6 per cent – very much in line with the Lrend during the Eighties. As Table 2 shows, the composition of the revenue structure has changed markedly during the late eighties in favour of taxes on domestic goods and services compared with the late
total revenue QY cade, and this decline fut ther
export taxes fo gradually going
out. With Teg duties, althoug creased from
29.5 per cent sov cade, they will bsc:115s impOTt reduced in the other ha Tid, exc crease its slä. Te cause of the in cise duties On of both foreign and semi-l Lux LIT though the Tew { has chia Inged, wis-a-vis GDP The Millist:T red to this in t and stilted that mue elasticity h amental Weak Vl5TCII rection speciall penditutes are : It is worth that Tc WCIII le Els GDP is quite h compared with the country ha high level in c growing cxpend
Several Incas
seventjes where high taxes -- Onlı tak cn to enha T the external trade sector do- Budget Reforf ImiTated. Export duties have tax structure declined from 42.9 per cent of portant positic total revenue to 4.7 per cent of measures. The
Table 2
Revenue Composition of the Tax St.
1978/79 Tax on Income 15 Tax on Domestic Goods and Services 교,J
TLIT Tower Täx 1). Excise Tax 14. Taxes on External Trade 59.5 Export Duties 42.) Import Duties 16.6 Taxes on other transactions 2.6
O)
Source: Cantral Bank of Sri Lanka, Review of the Econom
1.

Per the past dcis expected to il 1991 5ice I tree-Crops Eil'c to be phased gard to import in they have in16.6 per cent to er the past dedeclie il 1991 dul tieg have been Budget. On the ise tax Will illsignificantly be1 position of exEl selected list and local luxury y products. Al* nue composition revenue growth 1:15, bee Il slo W. f Finace referhe Budget speech the IW Te Wias been a fundless in (the) Tewhich needs cory when (the exrowing rapidly'. noting however El pcr centage of righ im Sri La Tikal inst LDCs; yet 5 t). In:li Intai Ti a ir der to mcct the
i turc. 5.
LIII es were underice revenue in the ning the in direct occupies an illin amo ng these BTT is t e
"LICtLITE:
1988/89
12.9) 46.2 32.5 3.7 34.2
4. 9.5 5.3
OO
y, Warious issues,
phased out and replaced by a WAT system. This conversion will take time and require careful study before implementation. Mea. While BTT rates that WCTC imposed on goods considered to be luxuries and scIIni-lux'll Ties will be adjusted con the basis of the new excise duties and Pro Wilcial Councils will be allthorized to collect. BTT during the interim period. The proposed changes in customs duty (or rationalization of the tariff structure to maintain four bands belv ti lī iāl tai T: of 50 per cent) will be accolillpanied with the earlier mentioned new excise duty scheme cowering a wide range of goods falling into the Imiddle income basket. Significant I et revenue gains are anticipated from all these policy shifts.
There is large scale tax evaSion in Sri Lanka. This II, Ely be owing to the low taxable incomic in the country. There are only 143,000 tax payers and 97,000 turnover tax payers in the country. Recent estimates show that the state looses an additional revenue a mounting to nearly one per cent of GDP annually by various forms of tax evasions. Recently the Com
Imissioner General Lif In Come Tax said: "It is more profitable for people to delay tax
payments and in west that money and later pay the low penalties levied by the department'. In the Budget some steps were taken to improve the efficiency of tax collection in the country which the authorities expect would result in additional rewenue of Rs. 1 bin. However, it is only one-seventh of income tax revenue expected in 1991. No ley el rastic Inca.5ll T:5 ha Ve been taken to tap some of the black money in the economy which amounts to nearly 20 per cent of GNP. Treasury Deposit Certificates are expected to perfoT Iil this täisk.
The disparity between revenue and expenditure explains the deficit which will till cult to 9.3 per cenr of GDP – a low figure compared with the gencral deficit pattern during thceighties

Page 19
(see Table 1). According to curTent c stimates in current rupcc. terms it will allount to nearly Rs. 60 bn. The Budget envisaged that there would not be any bank borrowing (or money printing). Consequently, the deficit will be financed using foreign aid and grants ann Counti Ing to Rs 35 billi, and non-ball mkb Ċorrowing i mounting to Rs. 25 bill. The non-bank sources will comprise the Employment Provident Fund (EPF), National Savings Bank (NSB), Employment Trust Fund (ETF), Insurance Corporations, and other non-bank public and private institutions. The government will sell treasury bills to these institutions in order to borrow the required sum. In other words, this is called “m opping up excess liquidity" from the public. Long-term borrowing using Government Securities will be ill most nil.
The Sull of Rs. 25 bill, which the government intends to borrow from non-bank sources appears to be realizable because 1991 will be a particularly good year in regard to loan maturity in non-bank sources. Loans amounting to Rs. 37 bin will be maturing in 1991 in the captive sources: NSB (Rs. 14 bn.), EPF (Rs. 7bn.), and others (Rs. 6bn.). But caution is necessary in interpreting these figures because the required sum of Rs. 25bn. is purely based on the estima
ed expenditure and revenue figures. These figures do not IT1ClT, much becau 15e the final out turn of Teven lle and
expenditure can be very different from those presented in the
Budget. For example, in 1988 the reven lc (including grants) which was estimated at Rs. 51
billion turned out to be only Rs. 48 billion while the expenditu. Te Which was estimated at Rs. 73 billion turned out to be Rs, 77 billio II.
The revenue targets have usually been met in most years but in some years they are not Inet owing to fluctuations in the external tradic s cctor. The expenditure targets are difficult to maintain owing to various supplementary estimates (such as defence expenditure). For example, in 1990, 77 supple
mentary estimate in parliam Cint net value Of пеarly one ni current expendi plementary est major role in deficit. If the exceed Rs. 12 Rs. 25 bn) in 1 rowing could example to elu will be useful. diture for 99 mated at 11.8 cxpenditure. W wat in thic N cult to il lagi Ilexpenditure wil a b C we leve 1 whe cent in 1990. T estimates may l rowing and cons tion. Clearly, the NOT the TI CC) mount importanc Budgetary mana
It is will that the deter II tiöll iIl Sri Llr
fined purely to If this was th 1989 when the able to repay system and in borrowing was a inflation sllault: As Ta, b 1e . 1 sho tainly not thi price increases, currency deprec a significant T. ing thic lewel of ower, those: whic faith in the R tions hypothesis tion to the pt deficits, rather Tate o increa 5 ply. In overal) the envisaged Budget may ng bringing down e Tvis ged level (see Table 1).
Under the ci IIost efective inflation is t Budget deficit expenditure, drastically red consumption, takc II to cut-do tion of the pu per cent will r

were presented # t1 n E_1th וזנו כיוון ו 5. 8.2 billion — էի էնք էիս 1990 Ire. Thus supmates play a xacerbating the 2 net estinates n. (Rs. 37 bn,– |91, baik biorake place. An idate this point Defence expenhas been estiie celt Of tt. th the on going orth it is diffithat the defence remail at thc In it was 15 per 1 Lis supple Inen ta riy !a, d to to a li; hr equently to inflahe resol Lition of nflict is of parae for the desired ellent. to Ilote however i na Tit 5 of inflaka are Ilot conbank borrowing. c calise, the in government was to the banking 1990 when bank lmost negligible, i have becil ow. ws, this was cer: case. Import wage increases, ia til, etc. play 3le in de termininflation. Morehave profound ational Expectaattribute inflaevailing Budget than the current in III laney supteTTT & theorefoj Te. strategy in the til b c effective il in FI: [io Il to the of 11.7 per cent
clim stances, the Way to Teduce | cut di ow In the by contracting Ine Way is to Ice conspicuous he steps under7 m i flucl consumplic sector by 25 arginally help in.
this regard. The public sector restructuring and peoplization prograll ille will also help significantly to curtail cxpenditure. The funding of Provincial Coulcils (PCs) may also need some consideration for the purpose of expenditure restraint. In this regard several factors need to be highlighted. PCs have to attract Ilore financial resources from the central government if the functions are properly devolwed. And if this is the case allocating large funds for PCs is justifiable. But what appears to be the case is that the PCs have become a drag 31 the central government owing to overlapping of its functions in several areas with that of the centre. Thus the overlapping expenditure on these councils will have to be drastically reduced. If I lot the king of expenditure that is expected to take placc in 1991 will certainly contribute to in Tlation. This is because bulk of the expenditure will be absorbed by defence and PCs which will not lead to any increase in supply of goods but only to expand demand and thus to increase in inflation.
Set against this is the expected increasc in supply in thic ciconomy from the financial, tax, and tariff reform process. Further more, the Janasaviya programmc is also expected to increase the supply.
The Rage. . .
(rெiாபer for page :)
And another thing. All the pleas of the Arabs and nonArab to America to keep that
Israeli brait under control have fallen all allong on those proverbial deaf cars. Until again, Saddan cleared his throat with a missile or two.
And the the frantic telephoning to Tel Aviv. The astonishing self control of the trigger happy Israeli brat that Bush has biccm a ble to secure won't certainly go unnoticed from the edges of Morocco to the cinds of Cathay. Why couldn't the White House do it all the se days? Must America always have a Saddam to keep pushing it?
7

Page 20
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Page 21
PAART
Democracy and Devel
Richard H. Hofferbert (Srate Urif r of New York)
ultural, material, and interpersonal behavio Tal elements a Te incorporated into the model. Key, ultimately, to the establishTinent of democratic practices is
the evolution = of trust a mong Strangers trust based upon ostrong und reliably enforced
norms of reciprocity . . .
Persons for Whom tradition 11 ethnic or family ties exclude all other points of identification, or persons who see life as a zeroSlu lil St Tluggle fil IT S LI TWiwal, Ca Timot develop such trust and confidence in the processes of democratic bargaining - II Sociopolitical give-and-take.
My central challenge to requisites Illo del is: if it were possible to attain by other IThea. Ils the cond state individual conditions which the model poses as resulting from economic development, would the results for democracy be just as salutry Mir specifically, can policy-IInakers alter the attitudes and behaviors of citizens through the policy process, even
the
though the country is not as rich as it "ought' to be to move along the road toward democracy?
Tallying of political conditions throughout thic world
clearly indicates that (regardless
of the metric used) so ine economically rather Well-Off CCLIII litries halve often. Il di L been
very democratic (e.g., Algeria or Chile) and some pretty poor cultrics are fairly democratic (e.g., India), Economic developmı cint is neither necessary mor sufficient for democracy,
There Illust be some other way to get the trust based upon strong and reliably enforced norths of reciprocity' that Inglehart posits as the key link in the democratic development model, And ther c must be identifiable factors other than economic affluence that account for the endurance of democratic experiments.
Alas, rcccnt
Wide di c1 e a evi ratchet proces dew clopment. efforts in poor broken do WT1. prowide, a : In odel which the performing promising for democratic br
Those who *Social Requis the elements familiar. Legit spread belief in charge belor is the capacity t 0 för Illu läte
With public effective less is telt 10. Whigh hawe their i T with Iliri II LITT effects. I sug
Concepts are wi strong and I 10 Tills of TecipT cal institutions
The broader legitimacy; the and Cor ineffect absorbed with to the democral regime, Condit relatively lousy Costa Rica, or India with W LI Ids to the Strange people in highly legitir and be tolerates ive shring of th H o obcLLET. Ick Com på TH ble con Grccce CT T1 hawe brought a tempÓTä. Tilly to sh1 (b ck—äl.bs OrbiIng Was simply too threat.
Zehn TL ATät ha El 1 d. Lested the de Inocratic decli wal scille least Cof - f() - || 25 col thirty-ycar perio She has begun

opment
history has prodelce that is no s in democratic Wany democratic I countries have Linz and Stepan imple reciprocal uides ättention to c standards most explanation of akdown.
recall Lipset's tes. . . Will ini of this II odc1 macy is the widethat the regime gs there. Efficacy of gover In mmen Ls policies dealing problems. And the rela Liwe cxithose policies tended impact,
negative side gest that these at link trust in eliably enforced ocity" to politi
and deeper the
ImQre in efficacy iWeilt:Ss. Ca II b) c It serious th Tcat lic lature of the
ions can get " in Britai E1, even Israel or
no thTeaten ing body politic. can be elected nate democracies 1 with a collecte shoulders and Dext till:1c." ditions in Chile, irkey, however, halt at least democracy. The value systern 5ha || 3v Tor the
is gone further conditions of ne, with interures, in a set 1 Iltries 0 ver - a d (Aralt, 198+). the process of
exploiting the Statistical potentiall now offered by the lengthening line of experience among LDCs. She examines decline in democratization'' Scorcs and the temporally proximate conditions associated with Such decline. She employs both cross sectional and longitudinal analyses to test tını elaborate model of democratic development and en durance. Consistent with prior cross-sectional work, she finds indeed that democracy is more precarious among the less-well off countries. But, exploiting time series potential of up to 30 years experience among sa mc LDCs, and building on the suggestions of Linz, et. al. . . she finds decline in democracy scores occur under conditions of economic ineffectiveness, most notably in conditions of high maldistribution of inco II1c 4Ti di cof high inflation. Toward a Policy Model of Democratization
Clearly policy and policy makers are not i Televant to the dynamics of democratic stability. Arat draws no specific policy recommendations from her alalysis. The implication is left, however, that fiscal stability, coupled with steady application of redistributive measures would reduce the threat to otherwise tenuous democracies in rather poorly off countries.
Almond and Powell acknowledged the relevince of donestic decisions in their attention to "political investment strategies' (1966, p. 326). They speculated that
different political investment strategies could lead to quite different outcCTI es in terms of
political development. Thus, over twcnty years ago, Almond and Powell identified an aspect of political development which suggests that i gC We:Tn ment’s choice of policy emphasis ca II have a significant effect upon subsequent political developments. As such, this proposition has not been extended not rigorously examined in the existing empirical literature on the correlates of democracy.
Without tile series data on a country-by-country basis, it is unlikely that a Tcaso na ble tcst can
I

Page 22
be conducted on any of several alternative models implied by by prior research and/or speculatio on the role of policy choices in the evolution, Simullation, or maintenance of deLocratic I COCICSSPS.
This model says that sociocco nomic conditions today affect policy choices (political investment strategies"), social tranquillity, future socioeconomic collditions, and future political conditions. Policy choices today, affected somewhat by yesterday's socioeconomic conditions, also condition tomorrow's tranquillity (or the absence of it), morrow's socioeconomic condi:
tions, and, both directly and indirectly, the future political situation. In general, WC would
expect democracy to tike T0,5) and grow better in socially tranquil conditions. But the tree of liberty is watered by the blood of patriots' at least on occasit, (E.g., would the Philippines or South Korea be moving toward democracy at their present rate prior without disruptions, de11-1= strations, etc.?)
The elements of the model to be tested, in a very preliminary fashion, in this paperare thos highlighted in the middle, horizontai lines, i.e., socioeconomic development (T) > Political Investment Strategy (TI)- Democratic Development (T). The role of socioeconomic disruption and of feedback of policy to socioeconomic development at To illust await future time series analyses. Particular attention here is given to the central term, which Will be examined as the Zone of choice available to domestic policy makers. Economists have labored long over the appropriate mix of policies to enhance economic development (e.g., world Bank, 1988). But current develop ment “theory” provides hardly a hint as to mixes of invest: ment strategies which might yield positive results on the political side. Research Design, and
MetasLITement S
The uits of analysis, aT è la randam sample of up to 55 (depen ding upon data availability) le 55 developed countries.The sample
O
is drawn from t tries listed by other than "high porters", industri mics," and "Eas market economie The Inddel har seeds of its (WI tion. And Only hypothesized Pat ned here. For the tested now, h(We sures are needed. discussed in dela only a brief sket sented here. Mc: for the depende mocratic de vel Oil investime I t - Striile: cioeconomic cond borat e ti II E SC! well as examin: of social disrull led for by the is future inquiry.
Democга су Іпі of derinocracy i Zehra Arat, Wh :Sil T11 : Llt II scholars, but II neth Bollen and (Arat, 1984; B 1984) A Tat's ma has been ta ex formerly single title indicators decades, thl 15 el date the indical rigorously tha T scholars.
The Art II. ghted indicator trol of legislati 51:tiye , cffectivi wrises of th: cedure, party competitiveness tal cue I cive nes tors of legisl co IditioIS hävi used iI TeSei TC Her incorporati Tental coerci lowever, is TO is the residual between indice lence and for response. Th y C -- Te 1 response to c. tive bha. Wit.
The democr attributes of formance. Th

he set of counWorld Bank als 1-income toil Exal Tärket e CIOt European nonS.
dly contains the operationalizaa portion of the his will be cxamihypotheses being ver, a few meàMost of the 11 El Te i 1 else while TC, SC) ch will be Presures are needed nt variable, deent, for political EY and for 50itions. More clilries analyses, 3 s till of the clic tions-bolh caldicl -must awalit
ex. The index 5borowed from o has combined categies of several ost I citably KC 1Arthur S. Banks. len, 1980; Banks, jor contribution to ild What Were
cor, at most, t W0
to cover several naling her to vali. Lors mulch T1CTC have previous
iex includes Weis of popular conwe selectio: 11, legi*ness, comıp “titinomi Iıa, tion p r"Colegitimacy, party , and gover ni in e Ils. Banks indicaa Live Eld a Ey been commonly h prior to Atat, s, con of the gove TT1weness variable, Well, This element from a regression s of domestic vioeful governmental ose governm C1115 ist Testrained in imparable disrupget a higher score.
acy indiex dicnotes institutionH ! pere elements seek
deliberately to capture a relati vely narrow liberal' institutional conception of democracy. Not included are indicators of voter turnout and governmental stability. This exclusion is Wellargued by Bollen (1980).
Political investments Strategy, The theoretical gauntlet calling for a systematic investigation of the political consequences of policy choices in newly emегging countries was thrown di Will over twenty years ago by Almond and Powell. In 1966, when they were writing, the set of newly independent countries had not had sufficient time to provide a recotd either to guide refinement of policy perforIllance hypotheses or to support a test of those hypotheses. Twenty years later, however, the first steps toward refinement and test can be undertaken. The data string is beginning to fill, in no small part due to the record-keeping and recording requirements of multi-national aid agencies.
In this article, my main focus is on indicators of fiscal priority that is, the percentage of general (i.e., national plus subnational expenditures on each of six major functional categories (IMF, annual):
- Education, including all cducational programs and SEI W1C LS. - Health, including hospitals, clinics, public health, medicine, related research, etc.;
Welfare, including social security, Welfare services, housing and community amenities, sanitation etc. - General government, in
cluding costs for the ex ecutive, legislature, fiscal affairs, external affairs and aid, public Order and safety. – Economic services, includ
ing aid to industry, agriculture, fuel and cnergy, transport and communi
ction, èt C. - National Defense, including military forces and equip
ment, research trining military aid, civil defense ELC
(To be continued)

Page 23
Trotsky's morals: the
Reggie Siriwardena
Οι th.c night of July 17, 1918 in El cella T of El house in the town of Ekaterinbury in the Soviet Union, eleven people were shot. They were the ex-Tsar Nicholas II, his wife Alexandra Fyodorovna, their children - Alexci, Tatyana, Olga, Anastasia and Maria - and members of their household - a doctor, a Cook, El footman and a maid. Also the princesses' dog.
During the last two years 1 have read at least six articles about th:15 execution in differet Soviet newspapers and magazines that have come my way (probably there are Illany others I haven't seen). What was very striking was that everyone of these articles described the event as a 'Liragedy' or used words to that effect - something that wouldn't have been possible in the years before perestroika.
It has been reported also that the site of the shooting has become something resembling a centre of pilgrimage in the Soviet Union. Why this popular concern about the executton of eleven people seventy years ago in a country where since that time Inillions of people have died arbitrary deaths? I don't think this phenomenon can be explained on the supposition Inercly of so IIne morbid cu tio sity about a sensational event or Soll e surviving Ilionarchist mystique among a section of the Russian people. Confirmation of this fact comes in a sample public opinion poll conducted by the Centre for the Study of Public Opinion in the USSR. Asked whether the execution of the Tsarist Royal Family was justified, 77 per cent of those polled said, No.
It is apparent that democratic opinio Il in the Sco vict U Ilion se es this ewent as significant for a good reason. The shooting was the first recorded event in post-revolutionary history when innocent people were exterminated
for a political ei believes that responsible for "cTimes agains and evel if ac El 5 field of R: could hardly ho and the other L. household guilty the dog.
Why were the kil ed, Fırld wrı () ! to carry out the
To Lle first is an answer w Widely believed, töçok place at during the Civil Wys feared til at
Whilc (Guld Ekaterinburg, w family was liitter would b
Ser We als -- Ti || Coller-Tew litic This was the arg Ilot only the T: but also the c was held by th the decision tha them, if rescued Guards, could b Cf CCL1 Inter-rewol the doctor and Presu Inably a so t eyewitnesses sh Why the dog? Pe lapdog of the therefore incurre
diu II.
I have Tefer Te took the deci specifying who t this lestion th journalists li disagree.
According to it was the pre regional Soviet the shooting responsibility, who offer this eWelts add that at first infrincid
he Tr Inch and only late

politics of violence
1 d. Evel if one he Tsar was What are called
the people', adds the Tsarina Ls plutin etc., one ld the children neinbers of the
Il 5 t t C3 I The Titi CT
se cleven people ook the decision : Litt util II s?
question, thcTe hich has been The shooting El fateful time War, when it if the advancing
Birmies took The Te the royal importisioned, the
released and ying point for тпагу f} Tce:5. I ment for killing T :d Tšiil hildren, for it 1 ose who took even Ille of by the White ecome a symbol ution. Why kill the 5er Wints" hat I lo stile ould Sur WiWe. "rhaps he was a princesses and di revolutionary
to those who šio Ill” with Llt hey were. On it in Westigati Tig Tesearchlers
S TL1 C EL CICL1 I IS si di LIIIl of the which ordered
In their OWI T. Ge WTI LETS version of thc
the local SWict Moscow that been executed, r - Tevealed lihat
the entire family had been wiped ut. IIIC wewer, other researchers tell a different story - that the decision was taken at the centre, primarily by Lenin himself, and that the regional authority only carri ed it Olt.
I:lt LET On e,
I teld til fawout this Version - for two reasons.
that it is highly unlikely that paTty Innen on the spot would hawe Ima de so momentous a decision without orders from the top. Secondly, there is the testimony of Trotsky in his Diary in Exile, 1935, which II
shall cite below. Trotsky clearly states that thic decisio Il Wils fu Indialmentälly Lenins. As we shall see Trotsky doesn't record this in order to denigrate Lenin; on the contrary he holds that Lenin was right and that the execution was justified.
However, the qui estion whether Lenin and his government authoTised the executiin isn't of full da III1 en tal importance becallise they upheld italnyway. I i fict, u E1 til the last few years all accounts of the cxecution officially published in the Soviet Union justified it on thc ground that it was a necessary measure for the protection of the revolutionary state. That the issue has low become controversial is a symptom of the fact that the ethics of revoluti. In are today a matter not only of intellectual debate but also of heartsearching im the Six Wiet LJ ili) ili.
Let us return to Trotsky, whose point of view on this question is particularly interesting because
he both participated in the Bolshevik regime which killed the Tsarist royal family and was later himself executed extra
judicially by Stalin's agent,
In his last years, Trotsky, who was condemning Stalins repressions and purges, was accused by Wictor Serge, Boris Suwarine and others of not h wing a bila II eless record himself. They
21

Page 24
pointed to his own complicity in the Tcpressions of the Leninist era — particularly, to his role in the bloody suppression, which he personally directed, of the Kronstadt revolt of 1921.
In answer the un repentant Trotsky wrote an essay, Their Morals and Ours", which tried to draw a line of distinction between thc actions of Stalin and those of himself and the other Bolsheviks in the Lenin Cra. According to Trotsky, the issue is not whether revolutionary action conforms to some absolute principle of morality, whose validity hic denies, In - Kocstllcr's now el Darkness at Noon, the old revolutionary Rubashov reflects in his prison-cell: 'Politics can be relatively fair in the breathing spaces of history; at its critical turning points there is no other rule possible than the old one, that the end justifies the means." Trotsky holds the same view in his essay, but he adds the proviso: provided the means really lead to the end. In Trotsky's eyes the end - that is, socialism and the liberation of man is given by the historical process itself, but so a Te the means - class struggle and revolutionary violence in its furtherance.
'Permissible end obligatory,' wrote Trotsky, “are those and only those means which impart solidarity end unity to revolutionary workers, which fill them with irreconcilable hostility to oppression. ... which imbue
them with the consciousness of their historic tasks, and raise their courage and spirit of self-sacrifice.""
“Consequently" he Went on, "not all means are permissible." Stalin's instruments of falsifi
cation, terror and extermination of his opponents were to be rejected because they were a means to the perpetuation of the power of a bureaucratic clique, and their baseness was in keeping with the character of this social group.
I shall suggest later in this paper that the issues aren't as Sil plc and Self-evide La5
22
Trotsky tried t first, I must Te Cobse Tiyati 315 qol of the Tsarist
Trotsky mad. tions in this di à time when I been exiled fi Union but also family were un Stalin regime. Zinaida had ce: in Berlin in 19 because shc ha of Swict citiz PICT ma, 1 er tilly cul band and hom learnt that the stayed behind a-political 5 cic Seryozha, as h by the familian the diary), hac In the diary Tri In the excculti royal family o expressions of Scryozha. As h. Els suggested ir of his Trotsky 15 probably Hn chological link tWC) circulista. sky II list have windictiveness I Im llus t ha we, cons sciously, stimul in his mind o other children by the regime himself belong
However, TT the killing of th as Fli. Il appel, se: of guilt. Ther personal guilt records that El from Moscow : the Civil War, a party to the sky doesn't St: intentico II of ex On the citat in the diary h the actic II.
Trotsky men the idea of pt trial had been torical precede been th se of L[}l11 & XWT. Wh sidedly, had E.

L make out, But fer to Trotsky’s Il the execution royal family.
c these obser waiary in 1935 at ot only had hie for thic Swict
membic TG Ulf his der attack by the His daughter immitted suicide 33, partly at least d been deprived enship and was t off from huse. Now Trotsky * Schn Wyh II had the completely ntist, Sergei (or c is referred to di Illil u tiwe i In | bic: LTTE:5 tel. otsky's reflections Il CF the TsäTisL CCLIT i Il between anxiety about ISHL. Deutsch ET the third volune biography, there шпехрressed psybetween these Ces. What TTCS een als Stalin’s agai T1st his son -נT סטנusly GT uTיt:1c ated the surfacing f the fate of those Who Wye Te killed to which he had ed.
itsky didn't recall lle: Tsarist chili Ten II ent of a sense was direct in any casc; he e had been away it the front during
nd He W45 T1Cit : decisio II. Troti te this with a II y culpating himself. ry, he reiterätes is en d'Ursement Of
ins the fact th litting the Tsar on
mooted (the lisints would hawe
Cha Tles I a Ild C, howevet Uileeen accorde di Lille
formalitie 5 of a tria1 bcfo Te being execut cd). Trotsky himself had proposed "an open
court trial' which would partly serve a propagandist purposc in publicising the C na Trinitics of the regime. One wonders whether Trotsky saw himself in thic role of prosecutor: he would ccrtainly hawe given a fila Ilıboyant perfor
In ance. "Lenin replied, records Trotsky in the diary, "to thic effect that it would be wery good if it were feasible. But . . . there might not be enough time . . . No debate took place, Since I did not i T1 sist :) I'll niny
proposal, being absorbed in other work." (Dots in original.)
Trotsky next records his return to Moscow some ti Time liter. "Talking to Swerdlow, I asked in passing: "Oh yes, and where is the Tsar?" "It's all over, the answered, "hic has bee T shot.” And where is the family'' **And the fallily along with him.' * * All of then?' I asked, apparently with a touch of surprise, "All of themi' replied Swerdlow. What about it?' He was waiting to see my Teaction.
I made no reply. "And who made the decision?" I asked. We decided it here. Ilyich
believed that we shouldn't leave thic Whites : liwc - baller LO rally around, especially under the present difficult circumstances . . .' I did not ask any further questions, and considered the latter closed."
There is one clement of this story that necds to be clarified. Sverdlov was evidently doubtful
what Trotsky's Tcaction would be to the news of the execution. I suggest that this un cer
tainty wss due to a fear that Trotsky would react against the cxecution not on huma Ille but con other grounds, We have to remind ourselves how un precedeited this killing was for a Marxist party at the time. Marxists had always condemned violence against individuals, like the assassination of Alexander II by the terrorists of the Narodnaya Volya, not as im moral but as futile. It was part of Marx ist doctrine that One didn't change anything by eliminating

Page 25
individuals; one had to overturn the system by mass revolutionary action. But what Were the principles for a revolutionary party after the seizure of power? It had been accepted that the Tewolutionary state would need tỞ SuppTẽ SS CJuntẽT-TeVolutidnary activity by the dispossessei classes. But how could this extend to the elimination of the royal family and their dependents? In 1918 the execution of thc Tsar, and - at a pinch - of the Tsarina, might have been defended by Marxists as al punitive II leasure; but clearly that could not hawe been said about the killing of the other nine. That may be who Trosky was surprised - motice, "surprised, not shocked - to lea In that the family had been killed together with the Tsar.
Seventeen years later Trotsky could confide to his diary the fact that Leni had ordered the execution. But however expedient Lenin may halve felt the
elimination of the royal family
to be, he could not - in the face of the Marxist tradition of I ejecting arbitrary violence against individuals - have publicly acknowledged his responsibility. That is why, I suggest, the fiction has been circulated of a hasty execution ordered by a local sowiet.
In spite of Trotsky's initial reaction of surprise, he sovercame it, for in the diary the Went on to say:
"Actually, the decision was not only expedicint but necessary. Thic severity of this summary justice showed the world that We Would continue to fight on mercilessly, stopping at nothing. The exccution of the Tsar's family was needed not only in order to frighten, horrify and dishearten the enemy, but also in order to shake up our own ranks, to show them that there was no turning back, that a head lay either complete victory or complete ruin. In the intellectual circles of the Party there probably were misgivings and shakings of heads. But the masses of workers and soldiers had not a minute's doubt. They
Woli ld not havi
Would not havi Other decision. Serd well. The
and feel for an Was characterist high cst deg Tee, great political ll
This passage should disturէ äld miliTers of TT, formed än ima great humanist. in relation to of as the class be just as ruth else - a fact th Out by his rect or in the Ukr; Civil War. In cending referent intellectuals wh misgivings over is fully in ke sneers at Serge dllri I1g the deb C''ëI TEvolution: 1937-38.
(To be c
LTTE . . .
(rெ: f the air. Syr Impalt] the government Illing to fade. fade much mc Tigers' days are
The Wind
Pursuing Pushing pg Beacheа . Tľ7é Wfr) ď
Licher is or Bright feat F/W er a/s Ed 50
Face d'OWF (Who said
Wo Fea w Who saw EarWifer Cor. And the W. Where war | То. Replace | Withosai,
Losť on th

understood and accepted any This Lenin senbility to think with the massics c of him to the specially at the 'ning points ... ." from the diary those naiwc tsky who have c of him as a It shows that hose he thought enemy he could less as anybody it is fully borne rd at Kronstadt ine during the fact, his condese to the party a might have had the executions epi Ing with his and Solwarine a te with the In ry morality in
bintinued)
голт үүсуe 5)
ly for the Tigers, claims, is begin
It will hawe to bre before the ! nu Inbered.
Meanwhile, the government has littlic choice buit to continue fighting. The Tigers demand independence in all but name for a north-eastern state. They want the government to accept their call for Tamil (meaning Tiger) self-determination. They also want it to agree that the northern and eastern provinces are the "traditional homeland' of the Tamils (even though non Tamils make up at least half the population in the east), and to allow a separate Tamil army. "These aren't conditions,' says a senior Tiger leader puzzlingly. "They are basic problems.'
The government has decided it will hence forth talk to the rebels only if they agree to sign a declaratiom that un authorised groups should not use or possess arms. It also wants to negotiate face to face with the Tigers' supreme commander, Welupillai Prabhakaran, who does not make a habit of appearing in public. Thc chances of these conditions being Inet are slim. Some 4,000 civilians may have been ' killed in the past six months, and hundreds of thousands more are refugees insidc their own country. There could be more misery t) CIll.
(ECONOMIST
) Stone,
a I here.
too, an actor of this afternoon fs old pathways on this his ently the soft fluff of grasses white and released for Renewal.
pauses, veers and stirs
Wild buds.
hers flashing while guns pause, p this toppled, scarce crow sleeve ked, but not quite crimson. Another actor
as if n veneration before the Priest, his cause was just).
Mongooses lurk him play his part,
Now the Sun drops, vind scurries to Scatter, * ro /l/s a fhead, fou / sir77 Coke,
these bitter sness, farmi/iar, SCents at toppled form.
U... - KaroL mAtila ke
23

Page 26
CORRESPOWIDEWICEF
Indo-Sri Lankan Economic Coope
Since his taking over recently as High Commissioner for India in Sri Lanka. His Excellency N.N. J ha has, of lite, e Tıphasised lupo ni economic-cooperation betWeen our two countrics, presl Inably also as a means in a chieving broader friendly tics between thc two countries. Mr. Jha's pronouncement must be taken in all seriousness, as hic is reported to be the architect of several Inter-country Economic a Trangements, many of which are reported to be successfully working to the benefit of the countries concerned. The highly successful Indo-Kuwaiti Fund, which was very active until the interruption by the Iraqi invasion, i5 one of the III.
One area in which Mr. Jha has focussed in his several public addresses is the area where he sees potential in both India and Sri La Inka engaging in two-way trade, Without inclui Tri Dug FreignExchange expenditure. This can be done by exploring the possibility of selling into India what
we are constrained in selling elsewhere and items in which, nevertheless, there is a market
in India. Payment of these sales can bc realised by Sri Lankin purchases of vital items for which we would have to pay in hard currency, if these were to be imported from elsewhere.
Perhaps the Coconut Industry, which is in some difficulty now, in Telation to its 2 IInäin Exports wiz: Corc Lut () il ald Desic cated Coconut -- can be a beneficiary if both Sri Lanka and India can put Mr. Jha's proposals into early practice, India produces very little of both items while her requirements of Desiccated Coco Tuts for the Mai Till falicture of Biscuits and Chocolates - c. In sidering its vast 800-cidd Million population — is solle What limitless. India has reason to claim rapid growth of its Middle-class as a consequence of India's growing economic prosperity and it is this class that will be the
24
taTiget-I market f'oI The World itemal
Coconut is in 150-175,000 tons the traditio lill I nut producing Lanka, Phillipii Eil 5t Africia The region - all Cd) | sufficient DWC de III1 d. Malays in the past few ye significant Expo have Tale steld the traditi Illa 1 earlier producer The situlati. Il ti Iii ibr Tilla 1 Weather With the added bi|ities of both Lh ||ז יולי 11 חטthe W DC than require producing countil suffer depressed it would appear the possibility of tons of D/C in welcome by Sr produces 40-500 and can market tDIls With e:15e buyers. From I view they call Quality of Life and particularly Middle class, W. their WIl F expenditure. On ere hat India of the 20th Comp:äny — — A si; fectiomery průd Te: iS C1 for C. c.1111 Oi to Foreign Exc tions imports th educed. The Corporation of ever, ente I thi periodically fo Oil purchases. been io ne of h Mr. Jha's prUpg effect to 1 & co in increased a Lī kā Cli which is prese siel L. OI EII1 1 (Bangladeshi) in

ration
these 2 items. of Desiccated the region of annually : a ııd Desiccated Cococountrics Sri 1e, Camcroons, South Pacific mbined produce Lo IIl cet this iaL and Indoncsia, Bars, have become rters of DC and ly intrusions in L.) markets of thc s named abovc. iday is, under conditions and producing capiles e me W entrat, Int:5 hawe much more d. Consequently, *ies all Over Will prices. As such, I thit exia sin in i ng selling 10-20,000 : India Will be i Lanka, which 00 to 15 anni ally about 20-30,000 to our age-old, ndia's point of m e Ilha Ice the of their people their gro Wi I1g rithout straini Ing Foreign-Exchange enlist Te Tember has I thic for IT century Biscuit a’s largest Co TIucing Company.
5iderable demand 1 im Imidi E1, L) Lie hänge considerlere a Te drastically State Trading India docs, howW OTld I1134 Tkičit I het C0C011 uit Sri Lankä has er regula T. F is als can begiven good potential Ind regular Sri Lt Oil exports, tly al II13st depenIIncertain, single hāIke I, SCIII1[: 1111
expected buoyancy to the Coconut Industry via large exports of both Dcsiccated Coconuts and Coconut Oil to India will inject a badly-needed booster to our ailing Coconut Industry.
Rubber is
yet another item which can play an important ole in this proposed two-way
trade, Sri Lankan's quality and performance is recognised and respected in India, who has been
a regular user of Sri Lankan
Rubber, though in marginal
quan tities.
If India can be pursuaded
suitably we can also re-capture
the market for Sri Lankan Cloyes the Te. Betwee Il 1980-83 the local markct of Cloves
oscillated between Rs. 200-300per kilo when the U. S. Dollar fetched Til Luch less thiä. Il Lil W. The Sri Lankan Clove production sector (Annual production 1,5002,000 tons) can benefit immensely undeT = this Scheille... TEhe reas C) In for India taking Cloves off their OGL. Scheme, which hither to permitted the inflow of 500-1,000
LLHHL S LLLLS LLLLLLOtHaKK S LL S LaK annually, is believed to have politico-economic underting 5
demonstrating the state of health of the relationship between New Delhi Ed Colomb Elt va ricus points of time. -
India can give us badly needed Transport Equipment, Pha TI Tlaceuticals, Chillics, etc. under this scheme of economic cooperation.
Clearly Mr. Jha is cxtending his hand of friendship to over
corne, in the Words of his earlier predecessor the erudite Laik Ll Mehratri, Who
described that ! Ili dialog :: en turies old friendly relationship with Sri Lanka "othere are times when one has to Wage through muddy pools of water.' I do believe Wc Illust extend sur ha II di i response to Mr. Jha in the friendly spirit in which he is attempting to Teach 115.
A. Kan dappah

Page 27

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