Page 1
Exclusive THE MIND OF
Vol. 13 No. 20 February 15, 1991 Price Rs. 7.5
IRAO, MKIWMVAIT
and HISTORY
— Bertram
Bastiampilai
THE LESSER H
BREEDS
- Izeth Hussain
Trotsky’s Moral Myop Trotsky, Mencken an
 
 

/ RABAKARAN - N. Ram
) Registered at the GPO, Sri Lanka OD/06/NEWS/91
Pax America and 'Regional
Influentials' - Mervyn de Silva
Budget' 91, recession and War
|| — Saman Kelegama NimalGunatilake
Dia — Reggie siriwardena
Racialism
— S. Pathiravitana

Page 2


Page 3
Trends
MORE EXPORTS
TO NDAP
India may soon be importing more goods from Sri Lanka, the Trade Ministry said after the Shukla visit. The wisiting Indian Externa
Affairs Minister Mr W. C. Shukla met Trade Minister A. R. Mansoor and discussed this and also the promotion of Indian investment in Sri Lanka.
DEPOTS SHUT DOWN
Six Transport Board depots hawe been closed down and the workers transferred elsewhere, while 44 more depots have been identified for closure. This is "to rationalise services and maximise their efficiency as the peoplisation (privatisation) process gets
under way', the Daisy News said.
The six depots already closed were at Katubedde, Wara - ka pola, Ridiyagama, Narammala, Kala wana and Wallaichena. There were 104 depots before peoplisation began.
Briefly. . .
O Sri Lanka will probably have to ask for more aid from the IMF as the squeeze from
the Gulf Wä felt. Informer that i el Filia El Cid justment fai 450 million 1 for, The que: kild of bittee prĖS Cribed? A the pi II will F lowed before
given. Among ties: a curtai education, IO; sity education.
U der Carlier by the IMF dg preciated, t Was trimmed WETE TETOWE,
The Wär i v a huge d'ent foreign exchar Way of lost tari CĒJS and bo | ports. Also a fares and air Cargo Costs a |GÖ i Öt här fC the regio.
(, The squeе the GLIIf War b are baing swa storm of Surc them: war ri
emerger Cy SLI sification surch nal war risk
emergency mi Charges, rangi 350 tը US h B0
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SDEIAL SGENTIS
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be girls to be Sources say ced structural
cility of USS will be asked stion is, what
s, paill will be nd most likely, awg to be swalthe money is tha possibiliIt is free st likely univer
acco modations the rupee was he bureaucracy and subsidies
West Asia makes
in Sri Lanka'a тge eагпіпgs by Worker remitO CkEd tāä exfected are air travel e CE
ld tourism, and od exports to
ZĖ IS C. Sil: Egan 9 X porterS mped by a sand larges. Among sk sur charges, rchFrgas, di Werlarges, additiopremiums and ddle east Surng from US S 0 per container.
LAEA
GUARDAN
Wol. 13 No. 20 February 15, 1991
PričЕ Н5. 7.5
Published fortnightly by Lanka Guardian Publishing Co.Ltd.
No. 246, Union Placg,
Colomb0 - 2.
Editor: Meirw yn de Silwr a
Telephong; 4.47584
CONTENTS
News Background 3
Understanding Prabhakaran's
L.T.T.E.
GEO. E. His, Background to the
Gulf Will 7
Observations on the
Mě W International Disorder 9
We are Al Racialists
Budget '91 - (2) 13
Trotsky's Morals - (2) 15
Democracy and Development - (3) 18
MISSP Misr 3prB5E3 nı töd 모
Printed by Ananda Press E2/5. Sri Ratnajathi Sarawa na muttu Ma wat ha, Colombo 13. Telephon: 4359.75
5. A
TSʼ ASS(0(CIA1T0N
Road, Narahenpita, 1b 0 5.
nghe's PhD thesis
omic Relations in Countryside'
the
ilable at a Bookshop
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Rs. 450.00 R5, 350.00

Page 4
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Page 5
IMPACT
OF
GULF WAR
Mervyn de Silwa
part from the Middle-East
itself, no other region has felt the impact of the Gulf War more deeply than South Asia; and no other South Asian country has found the cconomic-political burden as oppressive as Sri Lanka.
In India, Mr. Chandra Sekhar's sur Wiwa l as Pri Ille: Mi [hister Was at stake after Mr. Rajiv Gandhi threatened to withdraw Congress support in Parliament. He accu 5ed the PT ile Milli 5 teT of abando ning nonalignment for permitting US ships and aircraft re-fuelling facilities in several Indian ports and airports. The The press accused him of allowing the US to do so secretly.
Accusing him of delivering "a Severe, and dirty, blow' to thc NAM, told a massive rally in Bangalore, Mr. Gandhi reminded hill that the Prime Minister's government was a regille of 24 MP's. Hundreds of Muslims cheered Mr. Gandhi and promised 'to donate blood' to help Iraqi army, and people.
In Bangladesh, a predominantly Moslem country, there have been massive anti-US denos. But the IIlost dramatic turn-about was in Pakistan, Conce a quasi-a lly of US and an important prop of the US regional strategy, particularly diring the Afghan war. Pakistan has had 50% of its US aid cut. That critical development has been paralleled by a dramatic US swing towards India, aid, trade and transfer of technology. Wiolent anti-US demonstrations have swept Pakistan's poor Prime Mimister Nawaz Sharif, who capitalised On the i-Bhutto sentiment a Imong staunch pro-Arab Isla inic Organisations in the Tunup to the polls, tried to deflect In Ounting Islamic passions by LI Indier taking a “ peace mission'' to Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq citc.
All these ci Si CriCLIS E CINCTI i rich Arab world mil:Hirketi 5 il ald döT slice of icon Temitta Ilçes, M. South Asia TS TI Gulf states. N. new source of in —Ile eded ElIls yer ]Iltסlחployנlnerrן
II relation to mestic problems Currency - the Il a ket was viti year 88-89, re topped tourist ir second to tea e the island's lai Iraq comes seco
Not all SII women chicfly, Whell the Wii : have sonicthing 200, (DOC) y cirkers and the Emirates "Card" that the l g ivi T1 g allics used. te on requested re ties in Colombo. were deployed in invitation of K. then, the Unite rity Council ha resolutions urgii to extend all pos the US-led a lies legal-diplomatic
While Pakistan two Isla, Illic stat: c) f mass M LI sliti And Sri Lanka CCC) i TiC5 i 5 t. obtitled a I IMF bilince of pay r Sri Lanka the crunch. Tig Inc. It comproI. actually caving e Til barrass Timelt
evident. An : Stil tat-TLI I DAWL plainly a reply

untries have a C 5 L: kic in the bill; not merely as 1 () is built as a new 1e from migrant 3Tc th a D : Tiillion e working in the 3 t only a Te they a come but a II uch
to the pressing 1roble 111.
Si i Lanka's do--jt:bs and hard Gulf tea-and-job ill. In the peak :Illittances alone C{le and Calle sports. Egypt is ಟ್ಗst tea bully er;
lankan Workers, Telu T1 ed Home ital Tited. We 5 ti|| between 150,000in Saudi Arabia 1. This Wis the JS and its aidwhen Washing-fu elling faciliThe US troops the region On the i Ing Fahd. Since d Nation.5 SecuS. passed several ng all me inbers sible support to i. That was the
level.
ind Bangladesh, :s, hiid think 1 fer Wour, India had to consider India recently facility to meet ments problems. 18 caught in it. The governnıise &i Without
i T. BLI E its is non etheless T[icle || || LH Y NEPVS (11||2) bi tle: S LFTP
BACKGROUND
statement published on 9/2 in thic ISLAND. (See Re-fuelling Debate) To confirm its continucd dedication to NAM, President Premadasa who had earlier urged the Yugoslav President to convene a NAM bureau meeting has scnt his Foreign Minister, Mr. Harold Herat to Belgrade.
In a recent parliamentary debatc, Mr. Ramil Wick rema singhe took a rather bold line and told the western donors that if they want to withdraw aid, they could do so but the goWeTIıITner1t Will not yield to pressure, 'We have other plans' he said. Japan and to a lesser degree, South Korea hawe in fact shown much greater intercst in investment, trade and äid. The ADB chief Wils als Q here, last week. But can these be an adequate substitutic to Western id
One of the government's assumptions of course is that US and West European aid will now start flowing to Eastern Europe, its reconstruction of far greater importance and urgency than South Asia. Yet, can Sri Lanka find alternate Sources of assistance il dequate to its pressing needs
Pakistan played the Islamic Card and quickly built a special relationship with the oil-rich kingdoms - particularly Saudi Arabia. But that very card was played against the regime by Isla IInic fundamentalist groups
who follow Iran, and line lip
with Iraq rather than the pro-US o "regals".
India's importance, both as a was market (a 200 million IIliddle-class belt) and a regional "major", allows it far greater leverage. So India, whether it is In di Ta, Moraji, Raji w or W. P. Singh, need not bow to US pres
(Coriffiττιεί αΗ εκμετε τη

Page 6
WWW APA AFRAILWAMMEWT
Richard de Zoysa killing:
opposition motion calling #־ך for a presidential commission to inquire into the abduction and killing of Richard de Zoysa was defeated in parliaII nent by 120 votes to 71. The ruling UNP voted against it the SLFP, MFP, TULF, SLMC and USA voted for it.
Mr. K. N. Choksy (UNP) said: The dictates of principle and the Tequirements of the duc adherence to the rule of law and the recognition of thc Tole of the courts und cr the Constitution of Sri Lanka are basic latters in a situation such as the present. They all call for this House to dccline and tur Il down this motion. These basic factors have clearly
Ilot considered by the signatories to this Incotion, and demonstrate that this motion
is ill-conceived."
Mr. John ATMnara tunga, Minister of State for Foreign affairs: Several members have spoken in support of thic motion but none of them were convincing and they have failed to estab1ish any justification for appointment of an independent commissio II. I am sorry of the standard of debating. But I must say the Leader of the Opposition was mentioning about clean hands. I think she is the last person in this House who can speak of clean hands,
The offe Ince of murder is What conce TIls the statc. It is an offence Eagainst the state. It
is the duty of the state to make the fullest investigation into the complaint of that
nature. In this instance IIllust say the state through its departments, the Police department and the Judiciary has conducted all investigations and taken every possible step to bring the culprit to the law book. The important matter here is that the Gover III ent has had a full investigation. - (Daily News).
Mrs. Sirima Bandara haike (Leader of the Opposition): This
4
prc Il atter il Telatit of MIT, Richa Ti been raised inte
ICJ, the EEC, Selate är e Him and institution
called for the
an independent inquire into ti have brought fr oil behalf of th Thousands of been murdered m Ost Of thUse ponsible a Te 1 Tegard to th is that göver IIIlıcı i Wolved, Ewe Speaker is su informed MT. Ri mother that hic in the lands forces,
Mr. Chok sy E c01ITi55io 5E appointed; he s Els hääled to i di appoint his ci similar appoint
in relation to
IMPACT OF.
(Cαπτήηγίεr f
sle oil all iss' IIndiaqı (Occia. Tı re Ilifican L security US Ass H ress I its ill Inc.diate e ration first, ki could repair any US relations, i. office. It is ulti of Illutual need.
If PAX AMER shape - and the depend largely COElle Of Lille GL 1: exte del US i sustā iI) Imilita T. globally. IJS g Will have to T props, which He an awk Wardly A identifies as . tills”.
Thus, the Telu II dhi will pose Ina the Sri Lanka go

»be move
јтi to the пштiег de Zoysa has 'I nationally. The The Wimerical no ng the groups is which halwe äppimelt of (It ון (issitוון THם ט his Illu Tider. We orth this milition e entire country, others to hawe Iccentiy but in cases those Ies1 t k n ) W II. Il Čase all know
it forces were the Deputy posed to have
chard de Zoysa's : 50) was safe of the security
Argued that this 1ծ uld Iם וt bg: hould have been so. Why not n טn Whם13Si וון וחב. I.IT1 :I1 t s E1 Tc [11:1 dc Other Ilat ters.
Förr page 3)
Lles, Besides, the: millins a very sigC01 Cer 1 for the It, Rajiv can put lectio Tall considelowing that he di Image to Indo ince he as su Illes In a tely a matter
Il CANA is taking
final shape will In the actual outf War - an overECOnomy cannot y commitments lobal hegemony est (Il regional in Ty Kissinger, in merica phrase, regional influem
"In of s-Rajiv Ganny challic Enges to We TD 1:Dt, Karu
defeated
Obviously you hawe something to hide ad a Te obliged to protect certain people. - (Daily News)
Mr. Nimal Siripala de Silva (SLFP): We are asking for a commission to investigate into this Imitte, lot a coll mission to punish anybody. We suggest the appoinment of a collllission because w e feel that the Police and the Attorney General have not done thcir duty.
IIl fact We halve alskied for the aid Option of Commissibri tall) go into the disappearance of all persons in the last two years. Mrs. Sarawa na Inutu Has said that she identified a person. Now can you make the police the culprits and make the police to makc the investigations. That is why we say that a person over the Il should
be appointed to the investigation.
— (AEW excerpts areo fro"7] Free Dori Fy.
Neli report of the
proceedings.)
עartia/HFHTHrק
manidhi has been ousted, a fairly scrious blow to the LTTE - how scrious depending on the flow of ar:115, fu c1 etc. An electoral victory for the Congress-Jaya|alitha alliance will be more of a blow to the LTTE. But such a victory is even more problematic, In any case, Rajiv-Jayala titha link-1lp after elections at the Centrc and the Tamillnadu periphery Will not mean a joint cffort to isolate the LTTE, The antiLTTE groups have lost thcir credibility. Delhi knows Lihat. The LTTE will be kept alive as an Indian lewer; an LTTE meither too strong to be controlled by R.A.W. or too weak to be an instrument of Delhi's Sri Lankan policy.
The LTTE sees to Elwe a
pretty god idea of what can happen in the near future. That is one reason why it attacked Delhi in the rear - by establishing contacts with anti-Centre rebel movements such as the ULFA in Assam.

Page 7
Understanding Prabaka
N. Ram
Th Ceasefire which was superimposed on Sri Lanka's unending ethnic conflict was by inti. Means a Ila Inis fesitati (), Il Of weakness in the position of the Tigers, as thc crowing by official Si Ilha la cha lulwinism made it ollut to be. It was a shrewdly timed tactical move guided by considcrations of battlefield realism
and the larger interests of the cxtremist cause to which the Liberation Tigers of Tallil
Eeelam stand committed in a remarkably constant, tireless, death-dcfying way. Interestingly, thc ccasefire has not held for alny length of time.
The situation on the ground can be s um med up thus. Politically, the conflict appears in tracttable because the bloody action and tensi. I 15. El Te locked bct ween the poles of Eg, which is Lunatta ina ble give In the geopolitical circumstances, and Irifariri e FF sard dis Crir Pirrior against the Tamils, to which thic Sinhala chauvinists who dominate nationil politics are Weddedi. Millita rily, the ar Imed milita n ts call the shots in the region of ethnic conflict al mid se the terms of War () ir te II porary peace in the pursuit off their necessionist poli
tical objective. The suffering and thic war-weariness of thc affected people do make a
difference to the actics of this
who rcgiard themselwes as liberration fighters. The state seems to have little option in this
situation: its job is to respond, typically with un enlightencd brutality, to Tiger initiatives.
Talk about “liquida ting” the LTTE and harminering down a Illi li ta ry' s col Li tjieb I i I tile North and East is old and virtually useless currency in Sri Lanka politics. From Lalith Athulalihmudali, the original author of the military solution, through the IPKF. which took on the task of Tiger-tailing with one hand tied behind its back, to Rallinja in Wijera tine, the present (se Horsker, a forrier senior eclifor of the FINLL, FF e figure f rhe Prε-1987 Ατταrr: Περαιή, τιμη ...).
Captain of Hic it has been story. The mc bilities ånd goa have attempted LTTE have yiti but it the endi each adversary sa II e bitter 1 : cannot be won CCIlWCF1 Lional Ille "fish' can b the water by a of genocide. The has been shaped recent history o relations, lies a Socio-political a Inlinds of diwr it a lic nated people the barel of th
The Wada II: T els i ve of 1985d) yw Til the Taimis The progressive ple II ent India's bargain conclud Sri Lanka Agri 29, 1987 TIL Cost, against th of this factor. general, who w; friend of the III this is an infor with llis the ri IPKF went afte in October 198 whilt are we di Will tilke ilt lea 51 C(mplish. But orders and we in this latter." why President fill hill self . Sticky Wicket, mint Els of Falk by 31 sh3. Tcd 1 role broke do wI
1990.
Free Tim tille to tion has appeal dialogue only are denocratic." reason ing which 85 phase, led Sri Lankan gav wolwe only the

ran's L.T.T.E.
shrieking hawks, he same basic tivations, capa15 tiք tէlost wէlւն to conquer the cd considerably, of the chapter his learnt the assol, The wHT through any ins the guerrilla e fi Lush cd Co LI t of ly. Il t:1113 Short problem, which by the benighted f Sinhala-Tanil S T 1 Luch in the TIE and in the led, bitter and 3,5 il docs d'OWIl /* բll n.
Ichi military off 3 failed to cow i for this reason, flttempt to im3 part of the ed in the Indorement of July ground, at huge e intractability A scnior Indian as certainly no Lilitants, foreSaw Imal conversation ight before the the Tigers in 7: "Mr. Ram, ing here? Thig ! 30 years to acWe carry out have no choice This is also Premiadas a has 11 i devril cof a äfter teel " brought on tipathy to India's 1 On June 11,
tille, the soll lred obvious: 'a With those who This was the in the 1983he India and "The its to - I 11 dierte TULF
leadership in the negotiations aimed it resolving the ethnic crisis, even as the Indian official side trained, arned and equipped the various Illilitants in a "controlled' way in order to put on-the-ground pressure In the negotiating process. However, the te is no reason today to believe that Such a lethodCology and Collir se Would hawe worked at any stage after July
August 1983, the point of no Teturn in the island nation's ethnic politics. In particular,
the line of building policy on the belief that the LTTE's hegemony is purely a function of its militarism is a false construct. It will simply not do to ignore the politics behind the Il il ital Ill's AK-47 il Ind a 11 the Test of it. What has become abunda ntly clicar over the past half-decade is that any "dialoguc' with anyone other than the LTTE is only of peripheral Valle-given the ground Tealities in a militarised region where the Tigers exercise a genuine End deadly veto.
The idea of conceding such i political hege Tony to Welulpillai Prabakaran's Tigers does stick in the throat of democrats in Sri Lanka als well als in India. But at least after so many illusicons lıa We beeI1 sha, LLCred - including the honourable dream, expressed in the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, of denilitarising the ethnic conflict through India's direct i Il Wollwcmcnt ; in the a Tena— One Illust learn to be objective. As a political force a mọng the Tal Imiils of the North-East of the island, the LTTE cannot be by passed because it is the "boys' (as they are still called, sometimes affectionately, at times chidingly) who are seen as the spearhead of the Tamil struggle for equality, Security and justice – for all the brutalities the Tigers have inflicted on their political opponents, on innocent people and con civil society.

Page 8
But, of cour5C, it is not just the factor of popular sympathy and backing-which the Tigers a Te not g(bing to allow to be tested in any democratic process of "free and fair' competitive elections, if they can help itwhich is important. In military terms, the LTTE is way and ahead the most developed, rcSourceful and powerful of South Asian extremist organisations. Indeed, in the un romanticised professional opinion of a senior general ser wing in thic Indian Army, "the World has rarely seen a fighting force of this type, I10 tivation a Lld calibre. ** He asSigns a central place to the factor of spirit and motivation and rat cs Prabakara Il as a rare kind of Inilitary leader belonging to the genius category. This is without prejudice to the view that the LTTE leadership has a disti Inct Pol Potist streak in its character, methods and, above Hill, disregard for hul Iman life.
What is acknowledged in such Cobjective Els sessment is that as a guerrilla organisation while is also capable of shifting its modc to COIV en Lion Lil Warfare a L. the cost of trencindous civilian losses, the LTTE is un sin kable—at least for the conceivable future.
Prabakaran is reputed to be a man of few words, but his ideas are by no means un sophiisticated, He can be highly articulate (in Tamil) when he chooses to speak out con core is5ucs. Int Wo extended conversations-cine in Madras in Scptember 1986, the other in Jaffna in August 1987-he laid out to me his visio по оf how the struggle would develop and the possible end of the road.
First, Prabakaran saw the militants as liberation fighters, emphasising that it would make no sense to see them in any other terms: "They function as a military wing to protect the people, as the people's sclf-dcfence armed organisations. The state's army functions there as a racist, destructive Inilitary forCe; WC CaTTy OIl as a national people's army for the liberation of the Temil people."
Secondly, there was the touchstonic of spirit and sacrifice:
"We prepared this crisis... W. to de To Instat our fight in ; hardy way. " numbers of fi would not give decisio 1. "" Pri his special coi who stand aloi gle, but nurse ambitions."
Thirdly, on ruthlessness an be frank, Пmili ruthless in triri any II military a jective of victi than the const Il titler's ITC) St II On the at het thentic fighters But can we as a ble in Cour w; of a Tull thless i tainly Cannot,
But 5 terrı idi Iless, the powe volved a big "Those who bi Eind Wield an of power. We this power is inevitably lead That is why w ta Ty organisatic state of discip note that we lessness El gainst Otherwise, we
He underscor sacrifice cxpress capsule which Wear like a mec ' You WoI't fi III IIl[IV:Illel this cyanide w us develop our rapidly... In re olur fighters alı of belief ill til edge: it has i dict CT ilination t lives and our c Čau 5c."
Fourthly, Prab his political ic of 'socialism an El Tg Luing that thi tory did "not luxury of trusti ticians' but pr

the people for were deter Illined C Clir resistance. an all-out, foolWhatever be thic ghters we lost, wc ; in-that was our bakaran rcservei tempt for "those of from the strug
high leadership
the question of i discipline: To tary discipline is sically... Look at ctivity: the obi Ty is valued Illore que luces. Victory in II military affairs: hand wc arc au.
for our people... Tord to be peaceays in the face Enemy? We cer
that's the truth."*
scipline, ruthless:r of the gun inresponsibility: 2. El T a TI I l s a cquirc ECIX tI"ßeDI1ğt I c::A5 luTe believc that if abused, it will to dictatorship. "e keep our miliin in such a strict line. But please :xercise our ruththe ruthless guys. can It will.'
ed the spirit of ed in the cyanide
LTTE fighters la l- cu In- talisman: ind people from in jail... It is hich has helped
Ill ovement very ality, this gives extra lease e cluse, a special 15 tilled in us a C) sacrifice tour Iverything for the
ia karan presented leology in ter Ins id Tamil Eelam", course of his
permit us thic ing Sinhala polioved that "only
Tamil Eela II can be a secure Outcome for us and there can be no alternative.' However, "if an alternative to this' could be demonstrated by anyone, "we will put it before our pcople; ind only if our people approve it can We consider changing IOLIIT stand ewel to al extent."
He rejected thc criticism that his approach was militaristic and insufficiently political, but acknowledged that his own " " natural iIicl i Iha tio [h"" Ilha de Ehi II "lly less cmphasis on words. In serious politics, it won't do to concentrate on talking; you muist gro W through action and then talk Words must be matched and indeed preceded by context."
Prabakaran's ideology was shaped by momentous times and tragic forces in a small, insular developing society. His personal heroes, hic made clear, weTc drawn largely from one side of the Indian freedom struggle-Netaji Subbas Chandra Bose, Bhagat Singh and the revolutionary terrorists of Tamil Nadu. UnSurprisingly, he was drawn to the flawed military genius of Napolean but quite incredibly his admiration extened to the In ethods of Mahatma Gandhi (although in Prabakaran's eyes he could not hold a candle to Subhas).
Most important, Prabakaran sa w himself an the un comproInising custodian of this cause. As the LTTE's Supreme Commander, his suprene moral acCountability was to the ghosts of his comrades as much as to any future. Referring to the framework of the political settlement proposed by the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, he observed t0 Int in Jaffna. that het had to ans Wer the troubling question: "Is it for this that all of then
''
When I pressed him, in Jaffna, to answer the far-out question of what he might do after his dream of Tamil Eelam was achitwcd, he broke his reserve to say he would retire into the
fகொள்வீே ரர நg :)

Page 9
GULF WAR (I)
The geographical and
Bertram Bastiampillai (Proses For, University of Colombo)
JE" bicfore dawn on August 2, 1990 over thirty thousand Iraqi troops crossed the border common to both Iraq and Kuwait and entered neighbouring Kuwait. Within a short time, the capital of Kuwait at the North West end of the Gulf was occupied and a Provisional Council had been installed by Iraq to run Kuwait, Immediately the Arab world was overtaken by a sensc of instability and in the whole world there raged un certainity in the financial centres leading to a leap in the price of oil
six dollars per barrel within forty eight hours.
Most nations of the world
deplored the action of Iraq and then followed up with a call for the imposition of a trade embargo on Iraq as Tetaliation so as to force Iraq out of Kuwait. Trade sanctions seemed incffective and war was declared to push Iraq Out of and liberate Kuwait.
It is interesting to su rwcy in brief the historical background to this dramatic event which has now provoked a deadly war where twenty eight nations secm to be Tanged against the "single aggressor', Iraq.
The castline and Kuwait lie the Gulf. The coastline of Saudi Arabia on the Other hind to o meets the northern Waters of the Gulf. Neither Iraq nor Kuwait however, enjoy any other direct access to the sea except through this common coastline.
The coast of Iraq extends from the mouth of the water way of Shatt al Arab (over which Iraq and Iran had differences up to Kha War Abd Allah. But only the Western Bank of Shatt al Arab lics within thic ter Ti
of Iran, Iraq at the head of
tory of Iraq c point as far : thic i Khayyan further north C banks of the S long to Iraq.
On the othic line of Kuwa. a coastal settle is situat cd nc: Kuwait and Sa entire geograph such that it is tions to crop three states of Saudi Arabia un clica T borders
Moreover, to for two of the to shippi ing an and Kuwait a land locked sta these states p. be considered Consequently, t(b . clai II1 a Tma Seaspace accord visions of the Convention of Sea of 1982, si a claim does I thosc of its co
Now the coal extends to alb and fifty kilom coastline of I twenty five k only are the ci size, especially they are also tio I hate Lo.) the mass of each States, which Moreover, the of Iraq is situ : Kuwait and Iran
of Iraq, while Ta m and Klw to each other.
in the region thus plac cd in they get interc

historical background
t Cndi Ing up to a is the mouth of Canal. However, f this point both hatt al Arab be
hand, thic coastt extends up to lent, Qasr, which i T the bordeT of ı, di Arabia. The Lical lay out is easy for conten
up between the Iraq, Kuwait and over rights over
worsen conditions
states in regard di transport, Iraq re both largely .tes. Yet each of a radoxically can
a coastal state. they are entitled ximum width of iing to the pro
United Nations
the Law of the long as such ot conflict With a stal neighbours.
i tlj Ile of Kuwait ut two hundred e tres whe:Tcas the raq is less than ilo metres. Not yalist lilles s II all in that of Iraq, learly disproporsizes of the lind of these two auses heartburn. Cur wedi coast line ted adjacent to one time enemy the coasts of ait lie opposite These countries f the Gulf are such a way that Innected which
again is conducive to the creation of differences over respective areas and territories.
In addition, territorial claims, rejections and counter claims Compound the contribution that geography and Tesources hawe Ina de to the eruption of conflicts, The de limitation of territorial and maritime boundaries in this part of the Gulf region pose a number of formidable and intrica te problems. Maps and charts demonstrate a deliIleation of boundaries but, uhfortunately, all the boundarics 4Tc Illot de IThat cated and a Te not precisely defined which provides a fertile opportunity for dispute. This un certainity ower bounda rics is certainly one of the factors behind the Gulf War, and it is a factor which baffles easy and satisfactory solution.
Moreover, there are some islands lying off the coast of Kuwait, and under her jurisdiction, such as Warbah, Bubiyan, Awhah, Maskan, Faylaka, Mara
dun Hind another two. These islands though small in size, two to nine metres in length,
not withstanding their physical sizes, yet, because of their jurisdictional status under Kuwait enables Kuwait to claim addtional sea space for exclusive cconomic use thus prompting the envy of neighbours. And ownership disputes over these islands and the question of s overeignty over them have naturally aroused quarrels in the region.
Controversies over the issue of sovereignty are numerous in the Gulf region and furnish ample occasions for disputes. One of the most emotive of such issuc5 canle from the claim made by Iraq to the islands off, and of, Kuwait na naely Warbah
7

Page 10
and Bubiyan lying about fifteen kilometres South of the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr. These is: lands are strategically located commanding the navigational chia II el im Khawr Abd Allah which connects Kha Wr Zubar to the Gulf waters and is hence an important waterWay to countries with restricted access to the sea. Consequently, Iraq demands these lands and Portions of land South of Um Qasr. In fact, during March 1973, a border post near the Iraqi p Ort proved to be a scene of an armed conflict between the guards of Kuwait and the forces of Iraq.
Furthermore, the close proximity of four states Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iran have provided room and opportunity for provoking disputes Over ownership of offshore isles, claims and counter claims to seabed wealth consisting of a Wast amount of hydrocarbons. Additionally, ideological differences provided further reason for tenSion in the region for over two de caldes.
Iraq has land boundaries sepa rating her from Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. It is truly landbou inded, land locked. I Taq Ilınca suures about 434,920 square kilometres in her land surface while Kuwait, which lics sandwiched by Saudi Arabia to the South and by Iraq to the north, comprises a land area of about 17,870 square IL1 e tres. Kuwait's position bounded on two sides by two large foreign Ia tid a Teas is un en wiable in deed. The land boundary colm III to and once shared by Iraq and Kuwait, before occupation and annexation, Ileasured about 190 kilometres while the boundary between K LI wait and SEL, LI di Ara lbia extended to about 160 kiloIl tTGES,
Unfortunately, and also providing a potential for dispute, Kuwait's Westc. I and Ilor the in boundaries with Iraq were defined very waguely. Si Inilarly, even in the Anglo-Turkey ConWetic) In of 1973 the5e b.) L1T1 da Ti:5 were spelt cut in a vague Way,
8
For example, t iSoul Of Safy at that title inte oThe Inile South Southerly palm t There is a lack
ample room f Morcover, il pr border post alone Basrah road was ImaT cate th1e b) Oʻu catio II, that w:43 factory,
Again, on the border between K. Arabia as it w: the Oqair Agree HEIT 1922, 15; il of precision. F the frontic T Saudi Arabi: HT IL1 en cilig from Wadi al Arjun leaving Ar Raja from this poin fra InticIT : C Inti Illu li ne til 1 it joii ånd to add ta is - mmenti J In Of j It selli-circle Article 5 af Ali the Anglo-Tur of 29 July 191 then expected to of thic scicirc a point ending Suth of Riis a Arabia is its el Heyaz, Najd (N. and Azir and sit ILI A tidħil tilli i) : cision and unc cleir cult fГО П El Ties,
There was f lielu zie, of it decided about 5,700 squ left in a regior UITIIIl Guda Wr : Cill fields, were · turally with th oil tensitisis ow It ween Kuwait : were i II: yitable. l0 Wii Ing El dispu the in eu tra | zo Int between Kuväiti The Ellir if K lu Ildividcol h:11 fin Arabia both a El 1 d. t.) i 1. Thl. ratified by the

ilhc description an Wells' Was Tpr cted to mean of thic II lost rec at Safwan
of clarity and 'or diffcrcIces. actice a 5i Igli: : In the Kill Willitset up to dcndary, a dellar: quite unsatis
Cather hlad, the Li Wait Eld Saudi ls evide from TIL OF D: Celllustrated a lack References Were between Naja, id Kuwait coilthe junction of vith the Batin, 'i to Naja. Then 1 nwäTd5 thlL ed in a straight ned latitude 29; c) Il fusi I thçT: Coining it to the referred to ill ther agreement, Lish Agreement 15 טון 11 The .3 follow the side e till it reached In the coast 1 Qaliya, Saudi f coil prised of -jd), a plateau, That tu Tilly their : Inhanced in pre:I tai Iities about -iers and bound
וEI"יש שיור) ווur Lher I Witbll the CW DET l, :111 2 lI [1ti Tig t) ia Te kilomet Tes, | while Te liter the Пti Al Wafi Tih established. Nille discovery of I the 70 he betdi Silli di Arabil
Tliere fra Te, f. || - te in July 1965 2 was partitioned La di Saudi Arabia. uwait shared an crest with Saudi 5 to sovereignty is EagTCe Im (: In t T'ES two states With
in fourteen days; thic northern half was to be administered by Kuwait while thic southern half was bequcathed to Saudi Arabia. The final boundary between the two sectors of the partitioned areas was only preciscly established by a supplcmentary ag TetIllet in December 1969, Ewell though thc revenues from oil and natural resources were shared by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, division of thic Ncu tral Zille did not resolve the disputed ownership of the islands of Maradun and Qa Tuh, which is now reported to have been captured by the anti-Iraq coalitil of til ulti nakti COI hall for Cc5. However, both islands haldi bcc In claimed by Kuwait exclusively
and there had been friction vith Šuldi Abi ve tic issues of policing and taxing
in the islands.
Apart from imprecise bounda Tics, even the histori Cill in tCccidents of states like Kuwait and Iraq gave ample and latent possibilities for differences to crop up. During the mid eighteenth cc Intury a nona di C group from the southern quarter of the Arabian peninsula had IInigrated to present day Kuwait. This region had bcc in rulcd successively by the Mongols, Arab Caliphs and the Ottoman Empire of Turkey; present day Kuwait was always understandably afraid of being overwhelmed by her northern Theighbours — al precil Ti
lis existence indeed
Out of a sense of insecurity, and being afraid of her own neighbours, by a treaty of 1899. Kuwait ceded het external SOvereignty to Britain in return for financial subsidies and defence support, especially against Turkey. In 1914, Britain recognisedi Klu Wait ä5 Ei selfgow eTTıing static but still continued Lc of fer security and protection to the tiny Gulf State,
There special treaty relations continued until the constitutioal hereditary emira Le Was turned into an independent State by an agreement on 19 June 1961. Kuwait set up her own
(Cαπτίπι εί απ Ρηξε 244

Page 11
GULF WAR (2)
Pax Americama
alias
'New International Dis
zeth Hussain
he old international dis
order changes, giving place to the le W. When President Bush declared on the first day of the Gulf War that a new international OT der based on laW was being instituted through the liberation of Kuwait, my mind bogg led. Thic broadcast of that declaration must have caused al sinultan COLI:s boggling om a global scale. The Teason is that for too long the US has been associated with the lawlessness and international disorder, mot order.
Of course in the case of the Gulf War there is a difference
in that the US and its allies have been acting under the auspices of the UN. But the
relevant UN resolution did not enjoin that the high-tech sal Wal
Illust be
gcгу unle: shed on January 15 or shortly after, Obviously it was intended that
alternatives had to be explored, and options exhausted, before the deployment of high-tech, because än avoidablic War is always a crine against humanity. The UN can takic no other position under its charter.
The US refused to consider alternatives, giving the impression that it had made a prior decision to have a go at Iraq and rip it to pieces. As soon as Iraq ag Tced to the Jan. 7 talks, Bush and Baker started bellowing that there was absolutely no question of negotiations, only of getting across the "message' that Iraq had to leave Kuwait or face terrible consequences. The French on the other hand, Inoved at the UN to secu Tc on Iraqi withdra wal in exchange for a Middle-EaSL Pecc. CInferecc. The US and UK would have none of that, because they wcre not going to tolerate a "linkage',
This problcm "linkage' calls T1ents. It is ce Saddam Hussai Kuwait olut of plight of the can also be acc general principl gressor should conditions. But that ill avoidab against hul mani then conditions explored cwc ni i: the aggressor.
C3 L1 Tse, e in what a Te. Should tht mand territory, to be firl and
Sadda II was als| ing full III1 o wes or Peace Confere
which he had t Of the citie in munity for ye Israel and its 1 Meeting that h Elve en Hbled S draw While Sav the same time
taught him the exemplary force with regional til T5, Lhlt 11 com Inu Inity wi against bullying boylu TS - ınd Gulf War was
sidering the te co Insequences al cularly for mis ished countries it is a far gre; humanity than
of Kuwait.
It is seen as Sild dan cannot get his claws the industrial iz So on . But th dirilk theit Oil, nath of the Y showed that th an illusory () it will be argu

order'
of the so-called for some comrtainly true that did not invadc the pity for the Palestinians. It epted as a sound e that the agnot lay down if our premise le war is a crimc ty is accepted, Illust be exlaid down by It depends of the conditions : aggressor dicthe refusal has Categorical. But Xing for Illean1 a Middle-East 1Ըt, so II ething he endorseillent termaltional ccmars except for laster, the US. tyndtil I W011ld Adda II to withing face, but it it would hawe less, one with also for others legemonic ambi. e international 11 stand firm of small neighLinnexation. The avoidable. ConTrible economic one, more partierably impowerlike Sri Lanka, ter cri IInc aga inst the annexation
a War for Oil be allowed to in the jugular of d Countries, and Arabs cannot ald the afterpm Kippur War oil Weapon is e. Nevertheless, i. Saddam is a
Hitler and unless hic is stopped now he will next take the Saludi il-fieldis. Thuc ideal thalt if Saddall had been made to withdraw in exchange for a
Middle-East Peace Conference, he would have pounced on huge territories over which he his no claim Whatever, is an absurd one. It is to suppose that the overwhelming international condemnation of the Kuu walit annexation, and the military might that was Tal nged against him almost instantly, would have no elect on his future behaviour. The comparision with Hilter shows som cthing unbalanced about the Western illage of the Arabs. In 1956 they thought Nasser was another Hilter, even though it should have been obvious that the only similarity between the two was that botlı tlh cir In a Tın c5 cr1 dedil i rı, **er". Some concern about oil, and the Middle-East powerbalance, may be part of the Itivation for the War. The greater part of the motivation could have arisen out of American devotion to Israel. In Iraq. an Arab power had arisen that da Ted to thir catel Is Tac. It hatherefore to be kicked to piecess That was probably the most important reason why the US refused to consider all obvious option for securing an Iraqi withdrawal. A brutally destructive high-tech jugger na ut had to be set going against Iraq for sake of 1srael more than anything else.
The new international disorder is being seen as the Pax America na because the other super-power, the Soviet Union no longer counter-balances the U.S. But can the Americans really impose their Pax on the globe Consequent to the detente, the US might Want to establish its freed oil to use the nuclear option against recalci
9

Page 12
trant or rebellious rascals. Already feelers have been put out by the US and Britain about using the nuclear option against Iraq and most interestingly there have been no outraged international reactions. Should the ground war prove difficult, the US may subject Iraq to a nuclear wracking on
tunc pretext cor another. But donc cannot quite see a Pax Americana based on nuclear
terror, for the reason that even if natives co wer in te Tror the traditions of Western civilization will not allow it. As for land wars, the Americans are not likely to be always enthusiastic about accepting the invitation conveyed in the apocryphal last words of Mai West, "Come down and see Inc some time.""
The Pax America na cannot be based on US military might alOne. The Pax requires economic power. But since 1985 the US has become a net debtor the first time in 71 years, and has been described by Frederich Clai T monte in an article reproduced in a recent issue of the L. G. as a ''blatant mendicant" and al “gargantuan para
site'. Lict us Sri Lankans, who hawe been mc Indicants for so long, pause a while and recog
nize in Presidcnt Bush our mendicant brother. The US has been scolding the Germans and the Japancs e into providing massive funding for the Gulf War, evidently because the billions already provided by the Saudis and other dusky hued Arabs are not enough. If the first great exploit of the Pax Americana, the Gulf War, has to be backed by so much un-American economic power, the Pax can hardly have a properly American character. The new international disorder is more likely to havc a Eurocentric character, and mily Well come to be christened the Pax Eurina.
The new Pax that could be shaping up may have an executive committee consisting of the U. S., Western Europe, the Soviet Union, and Japan, all of them white except for Japan which has long been accorded
O
the status of
by apartheid S. th C Tc w Pax C ded as racist b Som c clarificat Inade before pr
This kind of 1 пmay souпсі а throwback to t fifties and the by the likes of James Baldwin Cleawc T. I hi sy II pathetic to except that I ha Wills Linusual a Words togethe spawned movem Black Muslims and the Rastaf all of them si it was so evid response to w itself racist. It ledged also tha One form of gI that while. Ele ad 11irable Tecor their own racis ill WĊ bcl faT dulging their g
The question I til Elias HTC i II understanding relations. Acco article in TY (London), Wes need an exte hundred years Islam, thereaft Peril, and more fundamenta listn. be Weste Til timxi overwhelmed by bro Wrı, and yel that what the ery against Irak and is that the the inten sic and erican die w cotion
Orle WCTidc.f5 tail Wags the The garris CoIII Cl 1 not be mai for A The Tical II the supposed Zionist lobby explain why the been, u l'able S the even-handed that was am - itthe statesmanshi The explanation

honorary white uth Africa. Will mc to be regay the coloured ions hawe to be cceding further.
alk about racism nach Tonistic, a he e thoss of the sixties shaped Sartre, Fano In, and Eldridge We never been any of then, We admired Baldbility in putting That et hos cInts such as the Black Power, Arians. I found ckening because It that the black hite racism was Illust be acknowracism is first oup mania, and others have an d in combatting Ill, the coloured to frce in inroup malnias.
is whether group 1portant for an of international rding to a recent Ie PWorld Today tellers sce to Timal bogey. A ago it was Pan:er the Yellow : recently Islamic There se em to eties about being hordes of black, low fellows. Is high-tech sawagis really about, explanation for irrational Amto Israel'
why the Israeli
American dog. state of Isra cl T tailled if Ilot unificence, and strength of the cannot possibly
Americans hawe o far to T cst Te i M-East policy portant part of p of Eisenhower, might be that
Israel symbolizes white power over native boys. And that may explain why Israel provo
kes such intense reactions all
over the world. The Gulf War may really be a racist war for Israel. A pointer to that conclusion was provided by thc deadly venom, the dem cn tcd ha tred, behind the Bush-Baker racist insult that the Iraqis were failing to get 'the message'. The idea was that the Iraqis, those Arab natives, a lesser breed, were too dense to understand even a simple message. Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, made a dignified response to the racist insult. He should have quoted D. H. Lawrence who way back in the twenties observed that the Americans are "a dangerous people”. It is possible that the new Pax will come to be seen as Tacist unless its cent Te of gravity shifts from the Atlantic.
If indeed racism has to be reckoned as a factor in international relations, the Virtual demisc of the Non-Aligned moveIllent has to be regretted. Its Illembership has been overwhelTmiTngly Afro--Asian and Caribbean. Technically it has lost its raison d'etre consequent to the super-power detente, but its fundamental principles of true independence and peaceful coexistic Ice Teilnai walid. For quite some time the NAM has look cd moribund, probably because very few Third World countries were actually being dominated by either of the super-powers. For a period, in fact, its only useful function was to ser ve as a travel agency ToT Ibn Batu tal. A T1 e Tetricious dynamism was infused into N A M by the willingness of a Tew, but wociferous members, to serve as agents of the Soviet Union, With the change in super-power parameters the Soviet Union no longe T needs NAM, and wherc there was once a vigorous movement there is now a yawning vacancy. What this means is that the Ina naging committee of the new Pax

Page 13
can with im punity use the UN for its own purposes, which is what has happened in the case of the Gulf Wa.
An obvious desideratum for a wholes one new international order is a Third World input, but is it really feasible just now? The detente, and the serious erosion of the socialist system, prompt a The W categorization of the Third World, not in the political terms of left-Wing and right-wing, or In on-aligned and aligned, but in terms of the criterion of econoInic development. There arc just two broad categories in the Third World, those who are making it :ı. Tıl tılıb 5 see who canlı ToL. JT will Incot. The fico TTT er i Il clude East Asia and South East Asia, and the latter include the chronic cases of South Asia. The miserable perfor II ance of the latter cannot be explained by the inequities of the North-South economic relationship because so many countries have done wcry well dics pitc those inequitics. They are responsible for their own liness. The new Pax may perhaps be able to legitimate itself to so Tine ex tent by judiciously propelling the chronic cases forward. Not, however, if the irra
tionality shown is anything to g.
But this ecljr tion may be tuo a special place h tlhe World of Isl; the Muslim clai seriously that ul "World .bf Is1:ıI Communism an
CO115 ider 10 W Gulf Ille SS is. ] Efter the CCIIII bril li: Il Li Ho Ill.bj CLI sisi Il ca Ilfid the over throw ) Iraqi surrender the day. The { ful the I to cover democracy in I. quent discussi Pete Mansfield both of will Arab w co Tld i Ili cades, Warned ; Tia... Sealc sugg, be II is take t the strength of ) He was probabl cմunt so me fa not be properl. Atlantic corride instance, Shi'is been the religi,
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in the Gulf WaT
by.
10 Tnic categoriz::- facile. Perhaps Las to be given to lm, and perhaps 11 hä5 to be takic II timiltely Only the Will with ställd the West.
very curious the ust a few hours Iconce Ille.IL of the ngs, a BBC disilly anticipated f Saddam and ill in the course of iscussion ranged the prospects for raq. I 1 El subse1 on the same day and Patrick Seale,
l: We knowl the limately for deagainst the eupho:sted that it light () under-estillate Iraqi nationalism, y taking into acctors which may y gras ped in the ors of power. For m hålls historically I of the under
privileged, placing an exceptional value on martyrdom, and predominantly Shia countries like Iraq haye usually been Incore turbulent than the Orthodox Sunni ones like Egypt. The brilliant bombings did not lead to a repetition of the 1967 war. Instead, We have Iraq which fought a nine -year war with Iran and lost ower 500,000 Inen, standing up to born bings the like of which has never been se en before, all looking for Ward to a land-war. Furthermore, Iraq can only expect to lo se becausc, lunlike Wictin aml a Ild Afghanistan, it has no friendly hinterland and no great power support, Saddam is admired by Muslims all over the world, even though they deplore the annexation of Kuwait. Something has been stiri ing in the World of Isla II which callet b c lindersto cod in terms of the silly Western stereotypes criticized by Edward Said and Martin Bernal. There has to be better understanding between the European powers and the World Of Tsar 11 ånd the first requisite for that is that somehow or other the Americans II list be brught to their senses about Israel.
f' Corri riri Fred ċari page 22
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Page 14
We are all racialists,
S. Pathiravitana
Ho to live With Tacialis In? Take a licsson from the Jews, perhaps the most revilled
community on carth, not only right now, but at all times.
The Jews could be put down very plausibly as the most unpleasant race ever heard of. As collholly encountered they lack many of the qualitics that mark the civilised män: courage, dignity, in Corruptibility, ease, confidence. They have vinity without pride, volopt Luciusness without täste, a Ild learning without wisdom. Their fortitude, Such 5 it is, is Wasted upon pueIile objects, and their charity is mainly a for III of display."
Without doubt such a statellent qualifies a man immediately as being a racialist and an anti-Seinite. But the Jews the Il
selves are divided - there are those who think that the Iman who said that, a celebrated
American critic, H. L. Mencken, should not be forgiven his anti-Semitism and there a Te those who think that the Illan was no racialist cor anti-Selimite.
The provocation for these reactions followed the publication of an article in a recent issue of Cominentary by Joseph Epstein called "Mencken on Trial" in which he took Menckcn's side. His defence of Mencken is not what concerns Inc now, but the reactions to his defence are what I find interesting.
A judge of the appeal court in California, Willian A. Newsom, Wrote to say that he had all along thought that Epstein was "a cogent and in cisive literary critic, but only after reading 'Mencken on Trial' that he found him to be "a superlative appellate lawyer'.
But another reader pointed out that Mencken's anti-Semitism cannot be resolved by a simple y es cor no wcrdict, that kind of defence he says "is
12
wholly inappro or historical ar
What is real that most of t t : TS 5 Cell li that human beliefs also hav life, because - wi help them. One judge, has said "in spite of hi entitled to his ces; he did in bcing a saint".
And in the says, "As an o' dox Jew I do forget Mencken's But there are giving Jews who that Mencken different from t flesh, and som generosity towa rance of Jews.
Afficio nad o 5 ( they are swarmi of this journal, story told by a of Trotsky of 5 is said that the tor, Ka, Illal Ata Stalin's propos let Trotsky live of Prinkipo in til
In 1931 T Calught fire and destroyed. Trots| island and Innow mainland livin, called Kadikoy. who is narrati Albert Glotzer, tWC letters fr Trotsky saying ! SOIT) : book.5 t destroyed ones from Max Eastml ky's plight.
Glotzer says Trotsky was em offer because o tions of receivi Comic who II, T

how - as before
|Iiate in literary alysis’.
y in tCresting is ese Jewish Wriaccept the fact prejudices and e place in our ! simply cannot reader, another that Mecken s bigotry... was ersonal prejudi. it lay claim to
a line breath he servant OrthoIncot forgivic or anti-Semitism.' a Te IIn oric for
secm to think
in print was he MeIl ckcn in e recount his rds and tole
of Trotsky, and ing in the pages IIlay find the closc associate The interest. It Turkish dicta
turk, agreed to all in 1929 to in the island
ie Marmara Sca.
rotsky's house his library was y then left the ld across to the in a place There, thic man ng this story, says he saw in McIncken to he was sending replace the having heard an about Trots
hat he realised barassed by thc the implicang books from otsky thought,
was an arch Conservative. Trotsky had then asked Glotzer to draft reply declining the offer and giving as an excuse
that he could get the books
faster from his friends in the
continent close by.
The point of this story,
Glotzer says, is to show that "a true-blue, double-barrelled, dyed-in-the-wool anti-Semite Would never in any way have offered to help a Con II unist leader and Jewish one, to boot'. He thinks that Menckel was moved by "an obvious sense of solidarity with a fellow writer in distress."
Incidentally, Con IIn entary is published by the American Jewish Co III Inittice which also has a policy, as one reader points out, of publishing unpopular opinions. From this same journal II picked up an ethnic joke which I am relating just to dispel the idea in case some peoplc think that communalism is unique to Sri Lanka
where as the truth is it is a universal problem.
One reader nudges Joseph
Epstein on not completing an ethnic joke as hic should hawe. A Greek landlord once told Epstein when he was bargaining over the rent of a house
you should know that it takes six Syrians, four Turks, and two Jews to cheat a Greek."
Epstein should have gone on to say what the Greek landlord understandably ommitted, the reader says, "And it takes two Greeks to cheat an Armenian.'
I suppose you don't have to stop at the Armenian, you are free to name your own favourite among the most unpleasant races of people, as Mencken has done.

Page 15
Part II
Budget '91: Some Macr
Saman Kelegama and Nimal Gunatilleki
et us consider some of the
financial reform5 ännounced in the Budget. These include the scrapping of the tax relief for NSB saving deposits, inposing stamp duties on che ques and credit cards, and invigorating stock market activities by exempting shares in quoted companics from wealth tax. The abolition of NSB deposit tax relief scheme will certainly make the saving environment In ore competitive and allow the commercial banks to compete on equal terms with the NSB. But stamp duty on cheques, credit cards, etc. Will undoubtedly work against cinc Couraging competition and ab Cowe all act as an impediment to bank modernization efforts. The wealth tax exemption will encourage the fast growing actors of of the stock IIlarkct and may cnha Dnce sha Te o W neTship. The real impact of the financial reforms on the supply-side (e.g. more risk taking productive investment) however will depend very much on the accompanying tax reforms to which we turn our attention next.
It must be first noted that thc increase in overall supply in the economy will not be rapid. All tax reforms will take time and will come into effect after some time. In Oreover, Sup
ply responses to tax adjustments Will have a time lag. Further, the effect of changes
in tariffs and excise duties on the emerging Inew entrep Te neurs is not very clear yet. As wellknown, there are many exporters who depend on small-scale producers to provide the required
inputs. Also, new import substitution industries such as Gen-cutting Machinery have
emerged during recent past.
If inflation is not reduced, new private sector investment will take place mostly in quick yielding unproductive projects (to avoid risks) at a time when the public enterprises that are
producing trada bcing dismant This will lead sion of the p.1 the country rl, Also sin are to be und span of a f Tcquire a cons formation to agents so that vestinent sign: At present thi providing infor iId if this again private take place in enterprises and little for produ
The Ted Luci deficit will c. government no cing in flation productive gro\, its general ec. IClt.
Of couT5e, til int per II nit us prictation. But Table 1 it ap Budget deficits
the cui Tent a The causality
could be illor lines: Budget d
—>- IIb Wc Twili luation reduce exports,
== CLITI et a CCI 1. lugh other Timecha duction of tht appears to be where a reduct account deficit
about. The Bl dl'ICCd Sofile IThe duce the cu TT el cit. These will to the 15 bill. of payment sup port taxes con
be further reduc as mentioned, be imposed on
semi-luxury im measures in tur plantation expo so Inc imports re ewer, the ct r

economic implications
les are gradually 'd or privatizcd. to a steady croductiwic basc in uring the short e the tax changes :rta kell Over the w years, it will at:1t Flow (if inarious economic the correct in|S L Te Tecciwed. The chanis Ills of nation arc weak COtill:5 Oce i Ilvestment will quick yiclding contributic very ctive growth.
n of the Budget rtainly help the t only in redu
and achieving wth but als C in I 101 nic III a. I 1 El ge
he identity does a causal interby looking at nears that the have driven up count deficits. most probably g the following eficit--inflation of currency-- increase imports It deficit. ThinisI11s exist, TeBudget deficit ih ne instrument I in the current can be brought iget has in trohInisms to Te - t account defibe in addition in for balance y Ort, First extree-crops will 'd and secondly, kcise duty will any luxury and Corts, and these , will encourage ts and reduIce pectively. Howsult of these
measures would depend on thic ow.es.all i ncentive fir a mic work that will result from the tax and ta Tiff changes in thic context of the prevailing inflation.
Both the current account de
ficits of the balance-of-payments and the Budget deficits have serious implications for
policy formulation. On the positive side both appear to be put into productive use: the Budget deficit to finance capital projects and imports used to generate export earnings in the future, In other words, to increase the total productive in come in line country in the futu Te. Also, a In econominy can continue Tunning Budget and external deficits as long as they can be financed. The loans used for such financing have to be repaid and in this case Sri Lanka has done quite well. The debt service rati Was at a alaming level of nearly 30 per cent during 1987-88 (Table I). But with the completion of a mortization of some of the commercial loans raised in early cighties the ratio reached a satisfactory level of 20 per cent in 1990 and will remain around
that level in 1991.
To understand the negative aspect of twin deficit macro management the case of the US economy is relewint. It has been argued that USA is able to hawe twin deficits bei Callise
of the apparent perception of th" rest of the World that the US economy will remain a haven for international private lapital. Also the defacto World currency is the US dollar, and this too helps to maintain twin deficits without any difficulty. Unfo Titu mately Sri La mka is not blessed with such positive conviction by potential lenders in regard to private capital nor blessed with strong and stable currency. Thus major adverse consequence of the twin deficit macroeconomic management in a small country like
1"

Page 16
hay
Lanka is heavy dependence o external aid.
External aici foT STi Lankas macroeconomic management during the entire post-1977 period has been indispensable. For example, there would have been a Budget deficit of nearly 15 per cent with extremely high inflation in 1991 if there had not becn any external aid. The reliance on aid in turn means that donor conditionalities and
external dictates will halve to be adhered to, thus reducing TTha. T10'11", Tebility f policies
according to the wishes of the domestic policy-makers. For example, the massive concessional loans and grants that Sri Lanka managed to obtain ill 1990) hawc sew cral c) Idiiitiii) Imla lities attached to it. It is relewant to cxamine the questio II at this stage weather this massive cxternal support will continue at a high level in the Inear fulltu Tt.
The overall economic growth for 1991 has been c5ti la ted to be a round 5 per cent — sa Time as the fotecast for 1990. Hz) Wever the prospects for 1991 are not very promising because of the emerging signs of a World recession that can possibly be compounded by the Gulf crisis. Growth rates in most industrial
Countries in 1990 were lower Lihan il 1989 and they are estimated to be even lower iIl 1991. For instance, Teal
GNP growth rate in USA fell from 44 per cent in 1988 to 2.5 per cent in 1989 to 1.1 per cent in 1990 and estimated to fa 11 further 1 o 0,7 per cent in 1991. State officials and ecUIlLIllists in USA and UK already confirmed that their CL. It Ties are now in TCcession. The third quarter figure for Japan have shown a reduction in the year-end (1990) forecast for growth. The recession will push the industrial
countries to adopt more and more protectionist policies - as evidence in the breakdown
in the GATT negotiations. As
a result of these events, Sri Ik vil fili it dificult ti jn crease her exteГ Па 1 markets.
14
This will hawe E pact on ciconom if the growth f
cent for 199) seems most unli level will be 1991.
What will be consequences ճ! Un cmployment W 22 per cent ( appears unlikely the si Hırt-TLIT. Il retirement Schen" to be a plail to 80,000 workers f sector. This Wi sequence of the TestT LILL-1 TITI TC peopliziation pro Who Will Teti Te :ar: 1 3 t. gl.1 :h. T:1 1 1 { private sector. trench Ilent COIS peopllization pri Tetur 11tes from t 100,000) will be the growing at gow crı Timent exp) { public invest Int Ild handl.) Il programme to opportunities, S may also be large scale by progra m me, blu! short-run all th נL CוITור):tם 1: 7 ||ן "יו proportion of t ployment labou 1 country. Unle: sector responds Tefo TIL 15, C mp3 will be slow it and the overal level will Temai
c in the Inc.
What will b. tional i Tıplical Budget? First t
employees will
di till til N. CITÉ Rs. 6000 leading free annual in 36,000 to Rs. . cover a widic sector positions to be a greill the extending C surcharge con i removal of the scheme going
benefit. t.) II (OS 1

In adverse illic growth, Even orcast of 5 per is achieved it kely that this
Inaintained in
the employment f the Budget 2 hich is around or 1.3 million) t lccline in Jild cr the new sנח ט:St טe therן retrench around rom the public be ; c. 1public scctor gramme and the gramme. Those at al. In Carly age ed a job in the Besides the reequent to the Ugra Illine Imilly he Gulf (around adding to the our forcc. The acts the five year 

Page 17
Part II
Trotsky's morals: the
Reggie Siriwardena
"e other passage from the
Diary is civen more pestineal "... I Was thinking over my conversation with Lenin about ill trial for the Tsar. It is possible that besides the time factor ... Lenin had another consideration with regard to the Tsar's family. Under judicial procedures, of course, execution of the family would have been
impossible. The Tsar's family fell victim to that principle which constitutes the axis of
monarchy: dynastic succession."
This passage points to the resonable conclusion that the justifications offered for the killing of the family at Ekaterinburg - that the White armies were advancing and there was danger of a rescue - were secondary considerations which probably only determined the timing of the executions. Trotsky's diary entry suggests that Lenin thought it preserable to shoot the Tsar without a trial because the children could not have been judicially sentenced anyway. Trotsky endorses this logic by referring to the family as having been victi Ins of the monarchic principle of dyn stic succession - a conclusion which shuffles off responsibility for the murder on a social institution and makes it seem an impersonal act.
In the diary the same entry CC Intin Lles:
"No news about Seryozha, and perhaps there won't be any for a long time."
Deutscher plausibly suggested that these two parts of the entry were linked by a continuity of
thought. The implication is that the Bolsheviks werc justified in killing the Tsarist children because they were hcirs to throne. But Seryozha
was not linked by any politic: so Stalin had I secutic him. Dit evidently agre argument.
I shall exa Timi: the validity of let me say firs' sclf-right cousines tion 5 ccm s t (i) its moral myop who in 1935 ju: of the Tsarist not the Trotsk might have bei given for his because of th euphoria of th Bnt now, having experienced the circle of dest withil the Te W0 himself hou Inded the world, havi daughtcr's death ill mediately by his son's fate, he so obtusic Els St killing of those in the interesl: He who had k. Tous violation5 Stalin can yet decision to stal cxecution bech, Could not hav executed. It mill bered that Trots) a public ргопо conformity with doxy might hav tive: he is personal diary, posthumously, a speaking his a lu' mate thoughts expect that afte experienced an cularly in relat of his children, have been tro doubt whether buted by his creating the d

politics of violence
to his father ally dynastic tie, 10 right to perLutsche hiilself :ed with this
he in a 101 ent this logic, but that Trotsky’s 3 il this 3 itillame chilling in ia. The Trotsky tifies the killing royal family is
ty of 1918 who 2n partially formoral blindness
e revolutionary ose early years. in the interim ever Wilcini ilg Luctive Wicile T1Ce lutionary 5tate, by Stalin across ng endured his and torne inted anxiety about : can yet remain ill to justiy the other children of the state. nown the montof legality by TSE: Lemin's ge. El arbitrary IEE tle childré Il e been legd lly s ble TCI I CITYy is not making in cement where political orthe been II]]PCTo" writing 器 published inly ld is therefore hentic and inti.
One would - what he had known, part on to the fate Trotsky would 1bled by some le had contri
Ç0 W1 H C tills tČ) :IT1CIl 5 0f tcTIOT
that were devouring them. But
Admirers of Trotsky hawe pratised the in unbending consistnicy With which hc ma intained his principles, even under pressure. But there is a less admirable side to this virtue. What it Ina nifests is the riigidity of a mind on which experience can make no impact except to fortify him in his preconceptions. He is in fact at appalling example of a man of great intellectual powers incapable of gгоwiпg up іп moral insight or self-knowledge, A capacity for self-criticism Was alien to Trotsky's intellectually arrogant nature. It was not without reason that Lenin in his last letter to the party referred to Trotsky's 'over wee. ning self-confidence".
But was Trotsky entitled to draw a line of distinction bet. ween killi Ing thc children of the Tsar and imprisoning Seryozha? Let us examine this position.
It is Well known that it was part of Stalin's regular practic to visit the sins, or supposed
sins, of the fathers and husbands on the wives and children, even when innocent
of any political activity. During the purges and later the Te was in fact a specific category of people in the prison camps, designated "Members of the Family of a Traitor to the Motherland"; and prisoners in this category were required to identify themslves by this label, when asked. Some of these wives and sons or daughters were themselves executed in course of time; others lived out their prison terns to be released only subject to restrictions like internal exile and limitations on freedom of movement and activity.
5


Page 18
Why did Stalin victimise the
wives and children of individuals who had been purged It wasn't just a matter of
windictive ness or sa dism, as Trotsky seems to have thought. On the contrary, it has to be conceded that Stalin was acting out of motives that were, from his own standpoint, entirely rational. In cxecuting or imprisoning the nearest of kin of those already executed, he was immunising himself and his regime against the possibility of a nucleus of opposition forming a mong those who had the most directly personal Teasons for bitterness. In recent years we have seen in Argentina, or in Jaffna and Batticaloa, how cven normally a-political women who hälve lost their soms or husbands can become activated. Stalin, like the shrewd and farsighted political operator that hic was, left Imo Tom for such a possibility - and, of course, it was not only the Wives and Incothers but als o the sons and daughters of the condemned that he was concerned to eliminate as a threat to the regime,
Wc hwe to tlıat Stalin
recognise then іп percecutiпg the ki sfolk of those who had been condemned was acting Out of a conce I for the Security of the state just as Illuch as Lenin was in excculting the Tsar's family. He too, if called to answer morally, would have said i II, 5, clf-defence, ** The end justifies the means." But what was Stalin's end? It is surely naive to suppose that he was merely concerned with personal power as an end in itself. The Bolsheviks had taken power in the belief that the European Tevolutio II would come to their Aid Flnd rescue them from the impasse of a socialist revolution in a backward country. The European revolution didn't come, and the anomaly of a Marxist party dictatorship in a predominantly peasant country could be perpetuated only by extric IIle Imeä su Tes — and thc result was the Stalinist des potism. Unless we a Te dicalling
16
merely in the
formulas of pa we Imust recogi yould have beli sion to be necessities of
Soviet state inti. nationally hosti un favourable en
The scale of
Was of cours c tha I thit of til and it extende
within thc pa Te pression of t had bee I con fi II outside the på What Was con periods was the EWE text T CIC W justified as a social progress Second World Wi Inst)I1 Ch. LuTc ying ten millic the sake of ch been frightful, "absolutely nect lence of the Se tions was per pre-Stalinist Le minist st: Le : [T] o Te co Impli, Inc with recalcitra the situation also ready to of historical n like to pin historical rect formu la tio Il of
II 1919 ביןr, whורtון טMir a division of during the on was brought charge of acti Sowic 5 til te, M } toוiT וז"ן רוb family, had bit nal soldier i gConte o ve T t ( ) 1917, and rap ränk in thc ever, while command on he found hit the har shly r taken by fe against the who were his repeatedly pro IIleasures, say

lack-and-white isan polemics, sic that Stalin ved his represtified by the reserving the i åIn intèTand internally TI C1lt.
Stalin's violen CC much greater e Lemin y el TS; til digkeite TS ty, where the e II: Tiimist e Til :d to Coppo II e Iltis ty ranks. But man to bith assumptio II thill olence could bic means towards During the War Stalin told li l l thal L destribin pica sants foT lectivisation had Enill it. W:4.3 issary'. No viomassive proporpetrated in the ears, but the ; howed not ill ch tion in dealing 1 t pe:tsa Ints. Whe D1 15 e, a Il W13 use the argument ecessity. I should down from the Id an explicit
this principle.
Philip Kuzmich had commanded the Red A Trily -going Civil War, to trial in a vity against the MiroTow had be (* 1l poor Cossack "יl profé55it; טווcol Tsarit tins, the rewolulitico II i 11 idly risen to high Red Army. HOWentrus Lcd with El the southern front, mself outraged by e pressive measlı TCS low commanders Cossack pel sa TTS, compatriots. He tested against those ring that they were
only driving the Cossacks into the arms of the White Guards. Ultimately, he was charged with indisciplinc and treachery by Trotsky himself, who was 1 ון political charge of the aTIIly, and tried.
At the trial the defence appealed to the fact that Miro, y had been IIloved by honest indignation as a result if the atrocities committed against the peasants. The answer Inade by the prosecution, which II, quot; from part of the official trial record, reproduced in the Soviet journal Ogonyok, is a cltar endorsement of the principle that the end justifies the means, The prosecutor admitted that it was evident from the investigation that the TC had bic cil trocities. But going back to the history of the French Revolution, he recalled l Wen clice - ia, counter-revolutionary pea sant Lebellion which had been crushed with great ferocity by the Jacobin regime under the Convention. The prosecutor went on to say:
. You will see that the armies of the Convention comitted horrible acts, horrible from the point of view of the individual person. But the actions of the Convention's a TT lies HTC understandable only in the light of a class analysis. They have been justified by history because it. was a new progressive class which carried them out. It is the same now.'
Thus terror and even extrem: brutality could be windicated if they were believed to serve tht interests of a progressive class. To complete the irony of this story it must be said that the prosecutor who produced blis argument was the old Bolshevik Smilga. In the Stalin cra Smilga joined the Trotskyist opposition was imprisoned, later capitulated and finally disappeared without trace during the purges of the thirties. Stilin would no doubt have claimed that the violence against him and 15 fell o W -- Oppositionists Wils justified by che same progressive narch, o history to which Smilga had appealed against Mironov.


Page 19
To return to the startingpoint of this paper; for many people in the Sowict Union the fate of the eleven people who died at Ekaterinburg has acquired a representative signifiCance that goes beyond their int Tin sic qualities as individuals: this arbitrary killing was the forerunner of the much more Till The TOLIS exccutions tO COIT1e. I must also state frankly that if I hawe becil moved to reflect Con this is suci, it is because II too have been compelled by our recent bloodstained history to think more seriously than in the past about the ethics of violence, At one time many radicals in Sri Lanka may have considered it a sentimental weakness to raise these issues. Today I hope it is possible to discuss them without laying one self open to such criticisms because we have learnt through experience the human cost that is entailed by
the ruthlessness of power - whether exercised by legally ordained rulers or by extra
legal armed groups.
I should like to draw a distinction, however, between different kinds of political violence. The violence of a Somoza, Marcos or Duvalier is actuated by the simple aims of self-aggrandisement through power and of preservation of the wealth and privilege of themselves and the class to which they belonged. The kind of violence I have been focussing on is different: it is motivated by an indcology which gives it an apparent moral sanctity that is believed in fervently by those Who accept that ideology. Not that I claim that this phenomen on has existed only on the left. On the conta Ty, it has been shared by fascist, by militant nationalist, and by Teligious fundamentalist movements. In spite of the diverse social inteTests these movements represent and their very different philosophies, what they have in common is thic intoxication of ideological passion,
There is a curious and revealing passage in Their Morals and Ours", where, provoked by his critics' reference to the
“Jesuitical In T; sheWiks, Trots. kind of defenc * In so far thei lity is concer "Jesuits were I than other moi priests, on the were superior t ClŠE, I C) Te CC and perspicacic represented a sation strictly rassive: El Id da II 10 en eIl les but In his psycholo of action the “heroic' peri }ı il:Self fTabrın ili as the warrior its shopkeeper Is eilg ( ' Il II i ide;il Other. But it Worthy to look wat TicT with obtuse and slot
Trotsky gjes an llogy "in pl psychological : ween the Bilse' With the social OT ch and L di t parison with th lesiastical hic T:1 This seemingly bute to the ITarxist revolut stra Inge as it appear. For th cation of a ci. to the historic: th:1t :pproxima gi(Jus, and whi Trotsky recog akin' to the fal 11) 5 t milita Ilt | th1 c: WeTy endi c ап d Ours' Tric an clico quent pe the quasi-reli. cation with his Supra-personal clicar:
* I'll these
(Trotsky is refe political CT is es
the "Trotskyist rhyth II of hist di lectics of E. They also learn to a certain de

ility" of thic Bolէy Engages in a E (If the Jesuits, Io pri ctical Imora -
ned," he says, | Ot at all worst k5 or Catholic
contrary, they O the II; in any in sistent, boldier, Lis. The Jesuits
Inilitant orgal nicentrali sed, agggrills lot only als 0 to allies, gy Ill Til ethod Jesuit of the "d distinguished In a Werage priest of a church from We live in ise one in the s altogeth et unllp) 0 1 al filmaticthe cyc of an lful shopkeeper."
Il to draw all Tely for Illal OT sini litudes” betWikis Els contrasted democrats on the 1C Jesuits in coll|e peaceful eccrchy oil the other. linexpected tri
Jesuits from l ionary is not as Inay at first
2re is in the dediIn Winced Marxist Ll goal a spirit Les to the relich produces, als nises, something haticism of the eligious sects. At if Their Miril 15 tsky engages in rotation in which gico Luis indentifi#1 5 H ב וו שטry" Sטtה
force is very
ill lense events I ring to the great
of the century) s' leared the Ty, that Is thic Le class struggle ed, it see Ills, and gree successfully,
how to subordinate their subjective plans and programs to this objective rhyth ill. They learned not to fall into despair over the fact that the laws of history do not depend upon their indiWidual ta stes an dl aTC not subordinat cd to their own moral criteria, . They learned not to become frightened by the Inost powerful enernies if their power is in contradiction to the necds of historical development. They know how to swim against the stream in the deep conviction that the new historic flood will carry then to the other shore. Not all will reach that shore, many will drown. But to participate in this IloveI ment With Copcin eyes and with an intense Will - only this cain give the highest moral satisfaction to a thinking being!'
The Ieligious associations are
evident: not only is history a God-like power from which the individual derives a life
sustaining strength, but the classless Society is "the other shore", and to reach it one has to cross the river beyond which salvation lics. Bunya. In and malny hy II). InWriters might have found thenselves at homic in this language.
Trotsky published this essay just after his other son, Leon Sedow, who was, unlike Sergei, a political activist, had been murde redi in Paris by Stalin’s agents, and he dedicated the essay to his memory. It could Inot have occurred to him, though it remains true, that Sedw's assassins might themselves have been actuat cd by the sal The L1 in qesti. I Ting Convictilin that they Were serving the historic goal which inspired Trotsky. This is appaTent from the else of cle of
these assassins who has been identified - Sergei Efron, the husband of the great Russian
poet, Marina Tsvetaeva.
Efron was the son of parents
who had belonged to the old
Narodna ya Wolly a group which
(Coff fried on page 2)
17


Page 20
PART
Democracy and Devel
Richard II. Hofferbert
(State University of New York)
have chosen deliberately to
examine the impact of policy priorities, as measured by shares of public expenditures, in order to focus on policy maker choice. Absolute o per capita moneta Ty indicators would be excessively subject to the constraints of Imaterial resources. My focus is on the al locative decisions within the broad constrains and resources with which a country
liyTecs. To be: Su Tc, there arc ccrtain Illinilla below which some functions cam mot sin k. Thus, some funds must be set
aside for the basic Imechanisms of government, even if that government does nothing but occupy office space. But beyond those milj mla, the Tecord inlicates a very wide range of variance in allocative commilII. Its.
Socioeconomic Conditions
To differentiate between thic sci(CCC) II o Illic CCI) dit i CTs of the countries in the sample, I shall էյլ: relying mainly 11րոn David Morris" index of the Physical Quality of Life (PQLI) (Morris, 1979). This is a commonly employed II measure of wellbeing in less affluent countrics. It was produced some years ago in Tesponse to the nearly exclusive Teliance önı indicator 5 of
industrialization or GNP to den Lyte lewels rf distortion introduced by such indicators.
First, they were biased as indicators of well-being in that they were insensitive to distributive differences which might i II) pingc negatively on the poorcr segments of the population. Second, they failed to tak c account of non-market factors, such as subsistence economic activities, which would tend to over state poverty.
Thc PQ LI is a compositic, nonIIlonetary indicator incorporating In easures of infant mortality, life expectancy, and literacy rate.
18
Cross-nationally fold to be Ill variety of ways the less well distribution, W associated ild better the Ilore trics.
Obviously, w! ga i 1 of one ower is not generall However, the acco III 110da ting tries, such als Bl. can at til in a PC ahead of what Ill foll their sheer being in contras which attains 5. its level of GNE Froll a policy point, therefore though recorded lle Well, i Indexes butes of wellaffect the nonp (30 Test clemcnt
Hypotheses
The underlyin ing thic hypothic
is an inference policy TOt: i 11 יווד vidual titust i
capacity to prod reliably cnforc reciprocity," as formulated it. One Willing to nal policy skit without throwing That trust coIII of time or sp beyond what Wisible.
Hypothesis :
The greater th to human se thic greater til democracy,
When someo Imiddle western capital city of family and nic

opment
it has been Te Teil ble i Il a for Countries at off eld of the ith GNP and icators fitting affluent coul
hen I = ..85, the the other index y consequential. fact is Worth that sa II e cu 1TILL Costa Rica, Ll substantially ight be expected monetary wellt to a Cameroon, I 1 Luch less thal 1
would predict. amı :ı lytic stan Ilıdthe PQLI, even at the aggregate
important at tribeing likely to litt, if not the
s of a society.
g pгіпciple guid55 the tested
that particular | chimice il diIn the regi Ille's Lice "strong and el niIIIls of 3 Inglehart has That trust Illa kics lose 11 ccasioTnish (r electico T
out the sytsen. es sa Til horizo || 15 ace that Teach is immediately
1C priorily given : Twices policies, le chances for
ne in Nepal's hills geoes to the Kaith II na ndu, his tighbors say he
has "gone to Nepal.' The nearest embodiment of a government is an occasional photograph of the king or the queen. The political system, as an entity beyond the radius of a day's Walk, dQ e5 10t exist in the mind's eve of many "citizens.' Schools, however, are bringing
broader horizons and more distant identificati OE15. Health centers lake children well.
Sanit: Ty Water Systems reducc Illot only intestinal diseases, but the daily drudgery of carrying Walte.
Schools, health posts, and water systems are provided by "Nepal," not, as a rule, by the village, Schools, health posts and water systems do not occur overnight. And their benefits are sometimes along an extended
time scale. As these are perceived as benefits of membership in a larger polity, the
patience and trust essential for democratic citizenship is built.
Hypothesis 2:
The greater the priority given to general govern Ilıcı tand to In altional defense, the lower the chances for democracy,
In most developing countrics, to the extent that there has historically been any govern
ment at all associated with thic current national territory, that government is likely to have
served principally to collect taxes and to conscript youths. Colonial CT impic Tial gover in III e Iltis hawe traditionally been much more engaged in social control than in social service. Releast from the colonial or imperial yoke often leaves these conditions Lin changed. The returns are largely invisible for the resources extTacted from the populace in support of the army, police, CT Eldini 5 trative fu Il cli5, Where visible, they are widely perceived as devices for the en rich ment of official dom by the sweat of the peasantry. Re:5 LITc es co III litted LC) i TitleTIn Tider FLT used to co TitTool and erode traditional loyalties in the name of the artificial "nation." They are used to


Page 21
undermine pre-existing status hierarchies and symbols of order.
Such resources may also be used to prevent disruption from Within or without. But external foes, in particular, are largely un seel until it is to 0 late, which helps cxplain the vigorous cfforts often made to implant in the minds of the citizenry one or anothicir cal ricaturc of a foreign
devil. Without such imagery, why should people willingly sacrifice their meager funds, not to mention their sons?
To the extent that such foreign devils are real, and the territorial integrity of a
country is genuincly at risk of or engaged in violent international conflict, is is nearly una voidable to give high priority
to defense. But the reality of threat in no way reducee the likelihood of a da Tıpening effect on democratization. It
Increly reduces the real choice awali la ble to decision Thaker:TS committed to main täitning national integrity.
Hypothesis 3:
Priority given to economic services is un Tela tcd to the medium run chances for de moсгасу.
Over the long run, roads make it possible to buy and sell at advantages not present in the
isolated village. Irrigation systems increase yield and per capita nutrition. Hydroelectric
power plants provide opportunities for industrialization and the migration of excess rural population. Infra-strucural development of thc type indexed by the figures on economic services, again over the long run, makes it possible for a peoplc to begin the transition from survival toward comfort.
The short Tun effects, how - ever, may be disruptive. Most infra-structural innovations take land from which peasants formerly fed their families. Roads and irrigation often stretch out the income distribution scale. Industrialization absorbs excess population, but it takes the the children out of the village.
If the basic in place to 5 I un dis locatio impact of inv Illic services for democracy is that they thc Tned illum 10 - 15 years.
Findings
The biwari: between expe and subsqucInt are presented
These simple to provide str the three hypo indicators of policy are assi with the dem C: the additive HF illuminating. human services rising impact in It is of m after a couple is quite pronour a dozen years
The setti Ild h ted a negative tionship to def govегппment spe Willile not 5c: cumulative as pact of human the tendency is support of the
Likewise, the of middle range сCOпо Пlic Servi democracy is
Policy Priori
Der713 cracy 1974 1977 1981 1984
* Logged to
cducation, a
Bold-faced

of legitimacy is rvive these short is, the long run Stinct in e Ç00 - may be positive
My hypothesis re irrelewant in "un, defined as
te relationships diture prioritics democracy scorcs ir Tab 1c l.
correlations seem Ing support for theses. All three humall scrvices ciated positively cracy index. But EW scoric is mimost In West Illicit ill has a steadily Jm de Incritizatdest consequence of years, but it iced in its impact down the road,
урође8 is predicdemocracy relaense and general In di Ing priorities. | dramatic nor the positive imservices priority, consistently in hypothesis.
predicted lack
linkage between
2cs priority and :onfi III ed.
Table
The association of HEW priority and democracy is not only the highest, but also shows the clicatest secular trcrld. The most consequential message of this analysis is the pattern of in circased linkage between human serviccs priority and democracy. In 1972, investment in health, education, and welfare ranged 6.2% in Pakistan to 63.7% in Uruguay. The steady rise in correlation coefficients from 1974 (r = . 14) through 1984 ( = .54) is dramatic. But per
haps even more so is the bivariate plot between 1972 human services priority and democгасу іп 1984.
The HEW - democracy connection is one of necessity, but I not sufficiency. The Te are a few countries which give relatively high priority to human services without atta in ing commensuralc democratic development, Ilost notably Chile. However, there are no cases of countries which have attained a relatively high denocracy score by 1984 which did not have a fairly high priority for human services in 1972. Thus, a focus on humän sic Twices appears to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for su5taining democracy in poor countries.
If that statement is true, then policy makers in poorer countries may indeed be able to influence their own political futures. Their choice of political investment strategic5 condition the fate of d clocratic
1.
ties and Democracy in Less Developed Countries:
Lagged Relationships
Policy Priority,
1972.
Percent of Central Goverrirrent Eependiture for -
EW Educ Heal Welf Def* Goyt Econ* E)
08 ... 12 18 =, 15 - 29 O7 33 l 15 31 -.30 -.33 44 26 05 34 -.22 -.45 05 52 34 .18 35 ー.25 ー.32 ー 15
угrect for skew ness of distribution.
(Raw health,
dwelfare percentages total cd and then total logged).
ocfficients > .05 level of significance.
19


Page 22
development. To place a priority On human scrvices Fp: T5 to build the conditions - the trust in strangers, the national identity - which makc democratic praČtices in less developed countrics milio Te likely.
For these assertions to be true, certain competing explanations must, of course, be eliminated. The most obvious, suggested by the general model employed here, is that antecedent sociocconomic circumstances account for the apparent democratizing influence here attributed to human services policy priority. A rather less obvious competing explanation is one of institutional incrementalism, that is, that the countries which are democratic in 1984 Were those most democratic earlier. And, likewise, it is those which Were earlier democratic which gawe high priority to human services policies.
When the effect of Physical Quality of Life (PQLI) and formet democratic dewclopment (Democracy ii) are controlled, however, there is To di minution of the impact of human services priority (HEW), The adjusted R for the three independent variables regressed on De Indocracy increases from .27 (for human services alone) to .34, including the two test variables, However, thic impact is moderately additive, rather than spuri. ous. The standardized regression
coefficients are: PQL = . 15. Democracy = .22, and REW 1 — 42 (B = .07. 15, and 3.3,
respectively). The combined po. licy effect, furthermore, is also additive, with the coefficients for education, health, or Welfare individually all being in the same direction, but sTaller than the indicator which includes their sum (Table 1).
Pakistan (pre-Bhutto), Costa Rica, and Uruguay illustrate conformity to the gen cral human services/democracy relationship, with Chile being the extreme negative outlier. The overthrow of Allende by the Pinochet regime had virtually no effect on the continuation of emphasis
20
on human servi but it imposed the Chile II de
巴拉粤曹,
The fact that conditio T5 (PQ) political practic di Imi nisll the iT ser wiccs policie: ought to be those who ch policies as instr tical chal Inge. It for policy make tries to chose yi Ing sharcs of th tւ ի Լ1Iman Testill f` Te:SColu T.:è C.) 11
The choice t. fense expendit" 15 Socjal te di With tive impact on which Tises àft remails for at li 7 years (Tabli pattern shows
the 47 tille T Sel tionships, i.e., tute for genera
A few exa II the defense p relationship. expenditures ower the rela|| CoS til Ricil 11 generally wher pect thern to defense spender col Lilued to s tion af dem. I Li h1e: Pli Iloj chillet ro ! of its callier () Il ct Ald Si an un usually score, in spite of its budget di
The negativ lation (Table 1 government spe the de mai Cri:1, cy largely disippi
f0ľ P{)|L1 i TC .02.; b = - 06:
None of thi
the process of is itself indep IIם C שiוח טון ר):t& Schl a fidi Il lig in the c: would fly in th research. The

ces expenditures, a long break in mocratic ex pic Ti
Ileither matic rial LI), Ihor formcr 2s (Democracy I) spact of human on democracy encouraging for se to see such uments for poli
see II is possiblic :Ts in poor coun
to allocate Wil Teir public budget rces; largely free stilts,
) e Timphasi ze deures is quickly El 110 dest nega - democratization, cr 3 years, and čast an additional c 1). The same up with respect ... of negative relashares of expendil government.
ples Will illustrate riority/democracy Wiewing defense as discouraging, Lively ong run, ld Pakistal are e o Ille wou di cxble:. Chile, a low
in 1972, however. uffer a retarda:Tai ti zation Llunder gime, irrespective defense commitnga pore, sustains
high democracy of the large share Cvoted to defense.
: simple correbetween general lding priority and
index (r = – 32) LITs, whic in comt Tools introduced (g = -
is to imply that de II (o critization Ident of socio
traints/resources.
| Would be starttent to which it face of previous
relationship bet
ween PQLI (t) and Democracy (t) is, to be sure, strong and positive.
By this measure, the most un usually democratic country in 1984, based on what would hawe been expected by the 1974 PQLI, was Bolivia, and the most u Inex pcctedly Lunde I11 ocratic was Paraguay. Ethiopia and Greece are examples of countries whose democracy scores are Well predicted by their earlier socioeconomic circunstances. The relationship while indicating some resource constraint with common findings of comparative research (suggesting that this sample does not devia te from more general patter Ins), new ertheless shows that, with no more than 30% of the variance in democracy explained by physical resources/conditions,
much is left for Other factors. The chief other factor' in which I hawe: al II i TitleTest i 5
policy priority. Human services, Con the other, Stand Collt as prime candidates, working at odds with each other.
Clearly, policy trade-offs are relevant for democratic development. What is the specific pattern of trade-off"? Is there a clash between guns and butter, for example? Obviously, the larger the per centage of the budgets for any pair of policy areas, the greater the trade-off, by simple mathematics. However, defense is only an average of 13%, education 15%, and health 1.5%, within this set of countries, leaving considerable latitude ac Toss the sic a Teas and between them collectively and the balaIce. On the other hand, if there 15 - WidcIce Of tridc-off between major spending priorities, it may suggest something about the dynamics of policy adjustment and the options open to policy makers, Table 2 presents the bivariate relationships.
The Thost common trade-offs are betwice I Welfare, in the One hand, : Tid defense, erסוral government, and economic services, on the other. This suggests that efforts to expand wel faire services requires combating the


Page 23
twin forces of the civilian and the military bureaucracy - a formidable task that can generally be undertaken only under conditions of relative marginal affluence (as indicated by the correlation of , 54 between PQ LI and % Welfare). The trade-off is guns (defense) and pork (general administration) versus butter (wel fare).
Education and health, con thic other hand, grow somewhat together, and largely independently of competition with any other areas of expenditure. Of these four areas, however, adIminist TH tiwe in westments teld
to be rather heavily resource boll ind, suggesting that before a Clt Ty C: WC t0 Ore
diverse set of policy commitIllents the essential bureaucratic infrastructure has to be in place, The simple correlation in the
early 1980s between n general government shares and PQLI is -, 56. With the other areas of policy priority, PQLI cotrelates:
Economic Services - .45 Defence - .25 Education - .02 Helt .25 Welfare .54
If We are looking for areas of high malleability (that is, where choice is widest) it would SCell to be in the Iclative share given to defense, on the one hand, or to education and health on the other, all three being relatively free of resource constraint, yet balanced between cach other (none attaining statistical significance .05). The poor er the country (in terms of PQLI), the greater the share 5 pent Q 1 economic services, a Lnd the less spent on welfare, at a pretty significant level (.01), Sluggesting less room for Imaneuver than in the other policy areas.
Conclusion
It is always possible that something vital has been left out of the equation. If, for example, Inc's neighbors in the international com Inu Inity are genuimely hostile or if internal ethnic strife is raripant, neither of which аге пеasured in my analyses,
the apparent guns or park be not really Tegal Telless of li
of Tell tiwe w cel
The chal Inces pcorer Countrie in Ticher One: are less Whı erc lity of life is choices sec11 to
Policy choice the Conscious 1. people the potic state for positi wait to basic Such policies c. for the recipro patience which de Inocratic sys State is perceiv boosting citizen slope from sur people begin te and take, the backs; that a democratic dyn
If the se i fc right track, Lh policy choices i CELT 1 Substitute fi mic development
democracy.
This, of cor si Tıple. What
perhaps ignored and folly of I induce defe Ts Are thiere condi ly sti Tinulatic a fic: and health, an cinha. T1cc democi the linking ele nect policies to tutions
FWI Լiwւ:
in the Ilino de 1 pri
Bivri
Defence" Educal til
Hill' W If* ECO in Cilic SE
Logged Bold = Sig. I

"choice" betwee
ersus butter may m 11ch of a choice, mestic conditions l-being.
for democracy in s Are less tha II i. The chances the physical qualo W. But policy Imake a difference. s can bring into :ss of ordinary Litial of a benign We services Tecpersonal needs. : real te the setting City, trust, al Indi undergirds a term. Once the 2d as capable of S up the shallow vival to comfort, 2 accept the give Short-teT selTc e5Sei1tiäl f)T Il mics.
* CICES EL T e o Til the ey suggest that п p00г спшпtгies Dr absolute econdon the road to
Li Tse, is fart too Other factors, only at the peril latina l leaders, 2 expenditures? ions which jointс115 оп education п i Which kewisc racy What are Telts that Cli.emocratic insti
paper, there remain un examined elemen ts. And the thcoretical literature offers additional suggestions which can be examined with available data. For example:
- Is there a relationship betWeen the timing of policy choices and the process of maintaining and enhancing democratic practices (i.e., the element of gradualism implicit in Lipset's analysis)?
Are there balances between patterns of policy change which latch the concept of 'balanced growth' introduced nearly thirty years agið by Lerner?
Will the Tclationships suggested by cross-sectional analysis be confirmed intranationally with longitudinal inquiry
What is the relevance of public enterprise policy, and other economic regulatory patterns, to democratic deve
lopment ?
- Does the gradual turning of the West toward post
måterialism signal trcnids which will provide models of development and developTmct 1 t assista lice that Te fundamentally different from those followed for the past Several decades
The bastic question of this article has been: Do policy choices in less developed coun.
tTic5 affect their chances foT de III) cracy? The answer suggested Telatively primi- by preliminary analyses is: ise Inted in this Quite likely.
Table 2 te Relationships Between Policy Priorities
Eric Hea The PVest- FED P* டுரy
- 25 -.13 --.5l -.05 OO -.30 -. -.ll - .23 Ol .27 20 -.37 -.|() :r ViCes* - 1)
இ ந.05
21


Page 24
Understanding. . .
(Сонгіншғd froтт паge (7) realm of constructive social Work organised on a collectivist basis. Eelam appears at this juncture a pipe-dream, unless it is redefined as a federal goal within the framework of staying within Sri Lanka's sovereignty. But asserting Sri Lankan sovcTeignty through "liquidating' the armed movement for Eelam applicars an equally airy-fairy notion, ils Presidents Jayewardene and PT e Imadas a and also Indiam leildess lia, we learInt at considerable expense. After the IPKF experience, there is no danger of any serious section of political opinion in India Tom Inticising the cause of Eelam and the image of the Sri Lankan Tamil Illilitant. But it won't do to dcIn collise t ble LTTE E Ind its singleminded, gifted leader,
Obserwati Ons . . .
(Carrired fra F1 page VI) Perhaps for Sri Lanka the Inost disheartening aspect of the Gulf WaT is Lha L it has been Teat to destroy a regional hegemony. But iL is tiu Tining out to be a such a mess that it is unlikely that the caders of the Ili ew i Interna, tio Inal disorder will read ily Walt to repeat their perfor Tance elsewhere. IIl other Words, India Will feel ewe freer than befo Te to deal With its neighbours just as it likes. It might seem needlessly ironic on Iny part to write about the ' ' Tmew internatio Tal disorder'' when every international order will in civitably hawe some disorder about it. The concept of order is part of the discourse of power, and it is therefore appropriate for STi La Tika Ils to Luse the Intinomian discourse of the powerless. We can hope to have a better grasp of the brute interEl Llio 1:ll realities the Teby. We have to expect also that the Pax of the future will seek of blood, just like the Paxes of the past. It was the greatest of RoIan histoTians, Tacitus, who i obscrwed of
his compatriots ''They make a
de solation and call it peace.'
Thält seems to be "What the JS | and its allies are trying to do in Iraq. It is a new international
disorder that we are facing,
22
Trotsky’s. . .
(Cantinued f
organised terror the Tsarist regi ber, convinced
Wilks WCTC WT the Whitc: :HTTili into exile. In years he becam supporting the än error and til false to the CIn his family had In the 1930s he a supporter of but als 0 à 5e Cr belalf lil West took part in th Sedo y Ild als } the firic G defected to TT other examples of sophisticated were ready to in the belief th the all the Illic T David Siqueiro: distinguished ters, organiscd armed attack () in Mexico City Mercader him5 tely drove the tsky's skull, W. וIס שfound it in mother should his behalf thic from Stalin's Kremli1.
The Illindset dedicated to ki a funda Ile Itali killing Sal Tha F1 a WPT dedic Wijaya Ku III1 a Ta coln III on the ob: that the High es that of Soci Ellis nation - ahs ol, which seves it | Illiral restraint goal. When the Lle CeI tai Il ties
Te 3 TIL 15ed wit li with Hiller, St. the gas cha mb; execution camp why Cromwell's Purital elders "I besi cech you of Christ, cons Lihat y Ju may 1

(7ו Eקbg ונarר
ist act5
that the Bob15cong, he joined cs and later welt Paris, after II any c convinced that Whites had been 1at he had been wictions in which brought hit in lup. bc.ca Inc not only the Sowict regi Illine ct agent on its ern Europe, and e murdict of Leon (If Ignace Reiss, PU agent who itsky. There are in the period intellectuals who commit InuIder
against
at Stalinism was
od of socialis II: 5, one of thc I lost if Mexican painand led the first 1 Trotsky's refuge ". Perhaps Ra III a. In clf, who ultillaice pick into Tro'ould, not have gruous that have Teceived II Ordic of Lcil hands at the
of a Stalinist Illing Trotsky, of st dedicated to Rushdie, and of :ated to killing 11. Il Liga h: We in Gollutic (CC) [1 Wictig) [1, | end - whether im, God or the 'es the individual rom the ordinary s in pursuing his | clased Illi Til Hill if dogmatic belief
After Octo- |
his
state power, as ili II, IT PEl Pat, 2rs and the Ilass is foil litir W'. Th;it i g relinder to the was so sa lutary: ir1 l the b{) Wels ider it possible be mistaken.'
The Geographical. . .
(Солтiлше{! front page 8) foreign service but obligations to assist militarily continued till May 1968 when Britain decided to terminate the agreement in 1971. The Tuller Was Head of State and the heir apparent was Prime Minister While two other MiniStries; We Te left in the halds of the members of the Enir's family. There were no political parties but a small group of deputies with a radical nationallist platform have challenged the government at elections expected to be held every four years. The rulers have come from the Sabah dynasty since 1756. In a presert day context with the spread of the ideas of democracy, representation and acco. untability the family political
Britis Kl Wait
scit up of Kuwait appears anachronistic, and may disappear.
Iraq on the other hand was Biblical Meseptamia or the land betwee n t W. Ti weTs. Like: KL Wait, Iraq also had been conquered by the Mongols, Arabs and Otto Ilan Turks. Later, it came under a British Imal date under thc League of Nations following World War IIl 1920. Yet British influence exercised through the cooperative and pliant HasheIllite dynasty continued to last even after Iraq gained formal independence on 2 October 1932. It followed a pro-British policy till July 1958 when the Monarchy was overthrown by a Illilitary coup in which King Faisal II and his leading states
Ile died.
Thereafter, this developing country experienced a series of coups, in February 1963, July 1968, and June 1973. To add further to troubles and II Stalbility, the Kurds aided by Iran's military support rebelled intermittently between 1961 and 1975 aga inst the Tu ling Baath Socialists. The Kurds, speaking an Irn d (3—ELIropean la rngluage, ch1erish a disti Il ct Tati(Till consciousless. The establish let of Incidern national froitiers COIIIpelled the Kurds to lock towards differcit cu II tries while cy:: - - serving a Kurdish culture.
(To be continued)


Page 25
A selected list of
Sri Lanka Mosaic — Environment, m
and change HWC S/C
Seasonality and Health: A Study o environment of ill-health in five by Godfrey Gunatileke, P. D. A. Fernando, Eardley Fernando
A Colonial Administrative System in
by Dr. B. S. Wijeweera
Sepala Ekanayake and Ex Post Fact Hijacking of International Aircraf Sri Lanka Domestic Law incorport International Law by David S. Averbuck
The Pilgrim Kamanita - A Legendry
by Karl Gjellerup
Stories from the Mahavamsa
by Lucien de Zo ysa
Stories from the Cula Wamsa and oth
Tales by Lucien da Zoysa
Conservation Farming - Systems, Te
Tools (For small farmers in the by Ray Wijewardene & Parakrama
Marga
61 Isipathana Colombo 5, :

Marga Publications
in, continuity
15.OO 3OO.OO 2.00 26O.OO
the socio-economic locations 10.OO 185.0 Perera, Joel
Transition 6.00 160.00
O Legislation: 4.00 90.00
t
tBS
R0 mal Ce 17.50 225,00
3.50 60.OO
Br Historical 3.00 47.50
chniques and Humid Tropics) .. 750, 120.00 Waidhyantha
Publications
Ma Watha
Sri Lanka.


Page 26
NSSP Misrepresented
A reply
read carefully the article i Llei ** Civilisati) Il a Ind LF: NSSP A reply' in the LG of 15.1.91 written by Tisarance Guna sekera as a rejoinder ta DIT KLunal T David’s earlier article on the NSSP (LG I5.12.90).
What is pitiful about Tisaranee's performance in the article is her total mis represen tation, in particular, that the NSSP has any illusions about the SLFP. The NSSP de it being (not "supposedly' as Tisarance assumes, but wery concretely in fact) as a protest against the class collaborationist politics of the Left and the resulta Int betrayals of mot only the Worki Ing class II11 werine Illt, but also Tallil speaking people. If Tisar an ec contells that the NSSP seeks to e Inter sluch, FL “class collaborati II list Coaliti in politics' presently through the SLFPled alliance, she is apparently being miseducated by soninc wested in Lerestis, tio say the least. For the NSSP has stated categorically in public morc tham conce that the allia Inte it has sought to cnter is only for the purpose of acting as a strong anti-Govt. Action Front under the leadership of Mrs. Bandaranalike.
NATIONAL QUESTION:
On the National Question, the NSSP's position is an open book both in theory and practice. Falsifying is an cas y ga III e a Ind no serious politician Worth his or her name would of should resort to it. It is well-known to anyone in politics that the NSSPI stands un col promisingly for the right of self determinalion of the Tamil Speaking people including their right to secede, if they so wish, while of course advocating the great desirability of unity of all oppressed people and campaigning for the workers, the peasants, students etc. of all communities to over throw and banish the capitalist oppressors of all hues. The NSSP stands firmly by the concept of a hom cland
24
for the Talli in the North & for a Ta II), il rey security. The these positions and internation: In the Eheliya in 1982, for national qucstio The Wholc elg centered around tE1c D1 Pre SileI1 E. , hiITSelf had til plig in tC Cälill C. Nalayakkari im SeçLure his defe: by about 700 what Tisarillee isIn or Sil: Chäuựim i8m?
SINHALA SPEA
After the deaç holocal ulst of Juli PTC-5 i delt J R J at least Once t going to be bo opinions of t tha L he would do w II i In history of a vanquished Comrade Wick written that op Jayewarde na to point that ewe speaking peopl CLIT LITE EL C. et: Tmad men (the claim to protec can only be dcfended by th Tanee is quanti Ing rai la bahli ol Li | WCT dS added which I do Ilot il terest of CoIII 1. TI NSS party, neither nor a Tamil pi fight against op other situations interests of any people. And TISL I a Inee as to tical party she (2) what Left par has a lote salu the national qu NSSP.

speaking people East and also giment for their party fights for at both Tuational 1 All levels. goda by election instance, the In was thic them c. ction Campaign I this; 155 11e. The T R Jayewardena eI1 tCT the c::L r11 — Jill radic Wasudevil **Beli ili 5t" ili it (though only votes). Is this cal lle opportul inLa raci51 CT
KING PEOPILE:
ili est ä Inti Til Illil y 1983, the then aye Wardena said 1:It he was not thered about the Hie Ta II ils, but 110t Want to go ! :45 L'ho | Cade
Siin hala Illati I. Tal Iii a bahu had el lette T L J R
drive hole the
In the Sinhala e, their proud which "these
e UNP Gowt)"" it and safeguard fought for and Le NSSP. TisiaCollide Wickif context with eTe arı d tbı eI c., Ilıilık 1İlerit the 1ra de Wick Taa IIn BluP is a larxist a Sinhala party rty. It has to pressio III a. 1d all iпiпical to the Sectic II of the I want to isk (1) what polibelo II gs to and ty in this country La Ty position con estion than the
J. W. P.
The NSSP ha 5 Coldmed the fascist style murders by the JTWP i 10 11псЕТ täin te TTT15, placing always the Teal and ultimite blame yп the GÜWег пoIIlent for disregarding the Elspirations of the youth with its open economic policies for over 10 years and driving the youth to ext ге псs. At the same time, as El Tc w Colluti Conary party, the NSSP cl Illot fail to de feld e y: the JWP against their being Timur di cred by the Government. That is why, for instance, the NSSP condemned the killing of JWPer Wijeda sa Liya na ratchi
while he was in police custody. Docs Tisa ranee Say that a marxist party should
look the other way or condone such killings
W. ThirLIII av Lukk Arasu Jaffna.
Budget '91: . . .
(Сол тіннғd frұрт! Пдge: I4) such compensatory Wage perks and thus Will be adversely affected by the price increases in fuel and other semi-luxury goods.
To summarize them the government is firmly committed to make the private sector the "engine of growth" in the economy and thereby achieve a growth rate of 5 per cent in 1991. For this purpose the government has embarked up to al Illis 5ive, Tcstructuring programme that includes some stabilizä til Ilıcasures to bring down inflation and adjustment measures to reduce the supply bottlenecks in the economy. To what extent the stabilization measu Te Will bring down inflation in 1991 will very much depend on the Scale of the on ging War in the Northern and Eastern parts of Sri Lanka and the effectiveness of the pe o plization programme. The inflation level would further depend on the changes in the world economic situation resulting from the Gulf ci5i5.


Page 27
ཟ
Why there's so in this rustict
There is laughter and light banter amongst thase ritral la TT15ls, Ļļ, hir aço busy Siarting Cut TibiaCÇça LH LL SH LLLLLLS S L LLLLLHHLH KLL g LLLLLLgs L gaLLll
barris spread uut in the ritid and L-LITEIT, inter mediate 20:12 where the arable land remains falci, iiiiiing this if sista.
CLLLLLKS LLLL LLLL LLLLLLaS LluHCL DD LHLBLBLB Oa C lucrative cash crop and the green leaves turn to TLLLLSSSL al KalLLa L LlaaLL LLS 00La LlLLL LLLLL LGLaL
afinually, fut perhaps 143,0XI TIJIal folk,
 

ENRCHING FRURAL LIFESTYLE
und oflaughter obacco barn.
Tobacco is the industry that rings employment to the second highes: IILITiber of people Art: this: people are the tobaccc. barn owners, the tobacca gryers 3rd thr: whi) . Kirk for them, Cri the lard and in the basis.
Ll LtllleeS LLL LLLLtetHtHCLLL LLL eeLGLGLHLH LLLCLCOHHMLa GHLHLLS
corrille life anda so:Liro futura. A good Erough T2a5', 'or la Lugh! Er,
Ceylon Tobacco Co. Ltd.
Sharing and caring for our lard and her people,


Page 28
We are a different kind of
There are a multitude of Guard
O They who guard the free
They who protect the ba
O They vv ho gag &à e den each of us is entitled as
Each of us is a Guardian to others
dependency in day to day life.
But the difference is oekar (* Jara:
for your future. is a are trustec
money, gaiding yar or Bow to
and you depende Pats tomorrow.
So
For your
PEOP
A Different
 

Guardian to you.
ians during your lifetime.
2 dom of speech & expression.
asic human rights of mankind.
hocratic freedom to which
citizens.
Whe look to us for their
z ras kaip rests on our deep concern
Guardians of your hard-earned
spend and how to save for you
Reach out Today
life-long Guardian
LES BANK
Akind of Guardian for you.