Page 1
O MAHATTAYA'S MA
LANKA
vol. 14 No. 4 June 15, 1991 Price Rs. 7.50
THE GLADSTONE
Another ook at thic
Pakistan and American p s priorities, an
Ludowyk, Doric and Bish -
 
 

Y DAY MESSAGE O
Registe, ed at the GPO, Sri Lanka, OD/06/NEWS/91
As a dynasty dies...
SSSSSLSSSSSSiSSSiSSiSSiSSZSMSMiLiLiTiSzYZYLLLSLSLSL
●
DEMOCRACY
W
SURVIVE
— Pran Chapra)
Caretakers, Coalitions,
and Governance
d Ander MM/a/Afrotra
νVIDER PERSPECTIVE
s- лиегиуп се с ма e election results
ressure — Mushahid Hussain
agonising re-appraisal
— Р. Sarayam a mafffair
ор Berkeley - V. P. Vieratie/pij

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The Pivota. Por
Ideally located region's transhi
the world's ima
The hest turn — around till
A streamlined fully-comp.
A Net- work of Colt iner
* A consolidated Rates Str!)
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Attractive rchates for tra i
" Safc handling by skilled
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to cater to the
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is in the Region for all traffic.
Iterised operation.
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RTS AUTHORITY
K 595, Col)Thi bo | , Sri L:11 k. 8(5 PJ) is C. Fix: 54() 65

Page 3
Briefly . . . .
g) Heavy rain and gale forca winds destroyed the homas of about 150,000 people, from Galle to Puttala and up in the hills,
The Meteorology Department forecast a continuation of the rain and strong winds, but with periodic lulls.
3 The 15 years oldboy who is alleged to have killed his army officer father, his mother and his father's batman Was a follower of a demon cult, a psychiatrist told the Mount Lavinia Court. The boy had
a pact with "Manson' (the damon) to offer a blood sacrifice, the doctor said,
On the day of the killings the boy had been listening to "heavy metal music - the music of the demon Cult; ha had been conversing with the demon while listening to the music, the Court was told. The psychia trist said that Diresh Thevanayagam who is al lagad to hawe stabbed and shot to death his father Major-General George The wana - yagam, his mother Sarojani and the batman Nandana,
"was rational and dance of psychiat and was fit to p
O Mr. Lennox-B sacretary at the Bri Office, cancelled
|gd visit to Sri L3|| the government l declared High C. David Gladstone
non grata, Mr. Gl: the island on Jl.
The Sri La ka accused the Britis interfering in rei government elect British Foreign offi said that thera W Lunds for the Expo that an appropriat was being consic calca | latio of M Boyd's visit was resропSeS.
O Representative nasty International in Sri Lanka Eärly informed sources the All team hope first land format ged human rights om the island.
expected to look plight of political and alleged instan ture and "disappe
GUARDAN
No. 4
W| 14 June 15,
PiG REI, 7.50
Published fortnightly by
Lanka Guard inn Publishirig Co.Ltd.
No. 246, Union Place,
Colombo -2.
1991
COMT
News Background
Mahat taya
Gārīdi
The Region
Instability in Sri La
Elections - 1991

has no ewiiç iliness" зad.
yd, under ish Foreign is schedulkā bas
| Colombo |
mmissioner 3 s p) ETS Old dstone left
he B.
government envoy of ent local іопs. The
ce ho Weyer
Grossfire
A farmer, body hard, black and lear as rock Curvēdblade bālantēd un nākad shildr, Lad us from the path, Baked hard as brick, To a patch of tilled CarthSoft under foot, covered with dried leaves. Blade gripped in his sine wy hand, He pitched aside the palm fronds. Dust filled the air.
The angle of his strokes now changed The cleaver, hot from the sun, Swiftly probed the yielding earth. It struck, as Tetal against Wood,
And, with curved tip engaged. The man pausti
Stared at the ground, Expression lass, arid Finci allone.
Thūn, with two das po Erat tugs A tangle of roots and clods Came frag - first ong, than Hnother. How many Tigre ?
are סח JTס - It took long seconds to comprehend
lsion and What Wa sa W. e response Kneeling now, tha farmer Cradled in his ham di ered. The One - much smaller than the rest. |r Lanm0x- BWE a tattirs Of a dress, One of the With pink and yellow flowers,
Thera vas a tangled mess Of bones and flesh f Am- That Cinco ad 5 miled S T TOT And Cried
Wéré du B And laughed. this month. His Taised gyes searthed the Sky
Så id that In mute despair. d to gather The air Was Still. ion On alle-||
Violations E", dra Will : trop Truck
Toka his stare, and, They WWE TE Eyes Still Clutching at the air,
into the He laid the Hopeless fragment back to rest prisoners With thok ġid farewall| ha gft Lus, Ces of tor - Running from that harren place, faces. JOHN McCONNELL 29/9/90
ETS Editor: Mervyn de Sllwn
Taluբhona: 447E84 3.
7
O Printed by Ananda Press
15 82/5, Sri Ratnajothi Sarawa na muttu
ka - (3) לו Ma wat ha, Colombo 13.
20) Telephana։ 435975

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60mpl
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Page 5
Human Rights A Global Conc
Mervyn de Silva
To be engaged in opposing wrong affords, LCCHGGLLLGGLCH0S LLLL S GLLLLS S CHCCCtS LCCLHHLLGLGLLLCCSS LLLLLL
gшага пfea for befлg rig/її”.
W. E. Gladstone (1809-1896) on H.
he hand was the Well-tra
ined hand of the High Commissioner, the self-assured professional, but the voice was the Voice of David Gladstone.
"At times it has been my duty to express my government's concerns about questions of human rights in Sri Lanka. These concerns have always been seen by me and by my government, firmly within a framework of the warm friendship between our Countries" says the final paragraph. Much earlier on, there is this passage:
"In my four years in this country, I have come to have the deep est affection and respect for its people. I have gone out of my Way t0 aC quaint immy Self at first hand with thair Wray of Life and their problems in order to advise my government and do Iny best to develop good relations betwijf een Britain and Sri Lanka. . ."
I think I can claim to have known David Gladstone quite Well, not ust as the British High Commissioner. We hawa had Teg Lullar Conversations over |Urich, just th0 two of LiS, Sormetimes lasting many hours. have oft en consulted him on matters both professional and personal, or a bit of both. And I was glad that he found time for a final Chit-chat the day before he was due to depart. In other circumstances these personal reminiscences would be out of place in this regular
commentary. T both the persor fessional are: C my wiew, to an to understand of L’affaire G as the personi Crucial conside larger context, Testic-political, national. EWer Jimmy Carter Rights' on the policy agenda, both a global as a powerful i U. S. and the al lia | Ce... The s of criticist his ewen Timore freqt H. R. bodies, Internation 31, tł Rights WATCH, ASA, WATCH, etc. and of Col. press. It has quite effective especially in Col Catholic Colimu ern Europa, Lat
lippines etc.
The biggest Third World. Si
al Tost by defin the former CO the Western Crit tly a fierce is by their former and exploiters - ge of collective strikes one as serious study
would probably reactions i ti intelligentsia, a ofte there i5 m

er
TB r fh B)חש a S/E, 7 der
OWER
he truth is that ial and the pro|ulte relevant, in y serious atte Tipt the implications ladstone. Just ality factor is a rE] tion so is the Tot merely dobut the inter5ince PTESİ dent pih:Ed "HLIsläri American foreign it has be Corte LLT1CE 1 5 WE| Instrument of the US-led western elf-same weapon Is baleri Wieded Jently by Wester Otably Amnesty he US. Human Which i C: || LI des WAFFRICA, WATCH I rise the wwEestigarr
also been used by the Pope, Intries with large mities e. g. Eastin America, Phi
target" is the Ce this "World", tion, constitutes 0 Tial territories, Cisti - frequenJStained barrage imperia | Tnas tors produces a ramrespor's ES that predictable. A if the problem identify these rms of regime, people, though Ich overlapping.
BACKGROUND
The increasingly persistent use of "human rights" as a tool of "benign intervention" took most Third World governments by surprise. It Was se en and denounced as arrogant interference in the domestic affairs of sovoreign states. Third World elitos were outraged by the effrontery of old colonial powers whose record of savagery and spoliation Was only too familiar.
The former US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance stated the issues in a fair historical | ErSpective:
The idea that a regime could be held accountable to international standards and to the world for the treatment of its people was regarded largely as an idiosyncrasy of the democratic West, invoked only when it served a western power's interests. A sovereign government, tradition held, could rule its ಙ್ಗಂple or its territory as it saw
it.
Even countries like the United States and Great Britain, which professed to follow higher standards did not seem to believe that those standards applied to treatment of people without white skins. There was no international outcry when the US used harsh methods to subdue opposition forces in the Philippimes or brutally drove native Americans on to reservations. The British could employ the most extrema tactics in repressing mative populations around the globe, and few whites thought the WOTSe of them for that. . . '
COERCI WE DIPLOVACY
The turn of the screw that hurt. Third World countries most was the human rights-economic assistane linkage. Now the inStrument of benigri intervertion became the weapon of coercive diplomacy. Since the US was
3

Page 6
a superpower with an aid program that had a global reach. tha State Dept, had a special H. R. 5g Citij | With | A55. Sco= Cretary of State as its head. Soon Congress got into the act, апа some Congressmen mada quite B name for thers alw es i a 'watch-dog" rol F. Il Cour part of the World, Stephen Solarz is om a Such politicial.
But the use of "human rights' as an instrument of diplomacy has not always been uniform or fair. The US has strategic is it Éir Éists asid these: [:DLIs it Titir E. thar 1 LITTadri ta rial GOT CETS. Thus, the practice of 'double standards'. The current issue of "HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH' States:
""THB and of the Cold War brought as opportunity to introdUCe gro ator Consistan Cy. MQ langer burde ned by superpower geo-political competition, the Bu5 a di Stati ad ar:11ce to make the promotion of human rights the centre-piece of US foreign policy. Unfortuna tely, this opportunity was largely squandgred, as the administration allowed One interest after another, to take precedence over the advancement of human rights. . . . It became al
most inconceivabla that apart from the State Dept's annual world wide report of human
rights, public criticism would be directed towards human rights violations by US allies in the Gulf conflict, be it Egypt for cracking down on Islamists. Morocco for silencing dissent Saudi Arabia, for arr B5ting women demonstrating for the simple licence to drive, or Turkey for displacing Kurdish villagers and Committing systematic torture".
LOW PRIORITY
Sri Lanka has ng Wor boan a high priority in Washington's strategic thinking or forward planning. The Reagan administration maintained warm ties with the Jay awardena regime and gave substantial aid to this country despite the fact that the Leader of the Opposition. twice prime minister was depriwed of her Civic rights by a special trib u II a I a In S Wara li lB ta
4
the Head of S. used the party's jority to changet
system for whi had voted into Presidency. (The
Felix Dias Banda litician described burst of Cando u worthy of Our 5 course the first new judicial gui Nor did the U.S that rätter the protest when pär were replaced by held under Emerg take ower of tha TIMES by a pa dar and dBp Lty President and P Sri Lanka) had S: streets When La
lationalised, har censure of the I.F Wher a Mr. Esmi singha at one post which is Irani's. And AS obviously Watch Thg |BSSOn hE policies of til (economic, forei ter far (T1Org to governments thar The UNP in 19 from thg Stä tist United Frt at tad a free-mark abandom Bt the tivist of the with its rather E America liST1. N. awer its selecti wis a tärget CO UT issue / occasion) ir med itself wiwit policy weapon rights Campaigr in ed and quite West European to mention wery tutions and p Es the POPE.
The combined concerted Camp factive that a
TEdi Lull-size, a pendent. Third N wad i . . . . Lur another source ble. (With the Soviet economy longer exists).

tate, who had ma SSS iwe mähe parliameпlaгу ch the people arl Executive civic rights of ira naike, a po -
irh a l Lur1 LISUal r as a "foemia te E|'''", 'Was of
CaS LI a ty of this | || 0 til 9). , the U.K. or for WBalthחסוחmטC) lia mentary polls " à RBfEr Bld T1 Jency rules. The privately OWed rty whose lealeader (later rima Ministar of itormed the city ke Housta W a 5 "dly earned the P.F.A. Ond Wick rematimo hold the Wםrוw Cu5fסח
A WATCH wist ing. |re is that tha
he government gli affairs) matThajor Western 1 human rights. 77 broke sharply policies of the id SLFP, adopet approach, and non-aligned a CBäddara läikes. -ti חl aםBם חuטחסrו etheless, Whatwe use (vis-a- itry" and specific the US had h a new foreign
The 'lurihar 1 Was Soon joeagerly, by the tטח ,munityוחסם influential in Stiersonages such
pressure and sign Were So afOst Of Sima || T conomically deWorld states ca1 less thara Was of help availacollapse of the , that option no Llr Casa Wor
the 80's, foreign aid had passad the 30–40% mark, as part Of the annual budget. Besides, popшlatioп апd popular expect
ations keep rising, and even the most insensitive regime must finally respond to mass
prass Lura and de marid.
The situation soon makes Way for a mea ting of minds between the 'benign interwentionists" and the local opposition, whether this is the official opposition in a functioning democracy or less formal groups usually described as "" dissidants". The nature of the opposition of course depends often on how "open" or 'closed" the political system is in any given country. MIMORITY FRIGHTS
There is however an almost unalterable Working rule Common to both western governments and NGO's, which infuriates the the majority. An ethnic minority is presimed to be the Wic
tim Unless and Until the con trary is prowed, and that is ofta Tower. The Tajority is
automatically suspected of discrimination and oppression, largely because State power is in its hands.
To the rising gorge of the Sinha la Establish mellt, and the community as a whole, Wastern opinion stood firmly on the side of the Tamils as distinct from the "Tigers", the distinction was not often plainly stated. Neither Western Conscience nor " " liberalism'" however was th169 sole explanation. The credit goes to the Tamil diaspora - from post-56 times. The midddle/ upper-middle class migrants, mamy of them English=educated professionals, adjusted themselwas to their new enWiro tent quickly. Their often better educated offspring mo w Gd in to professions and institutions (B. g., universities) which allowed them to ' infiltra ta' opinion-making groups in those societies. And ewentually, the policy-making pro
Cess. This is trup of almost Every expatria te group in the US, Canada, Europe and Australia
in relation to an ethnic conflict in the land of their birth. Apart from that there is the practical burder of feeding, housing and

Page 7
sheltering hundreds of sands of refugees. Besides, the Toney, their presence becomes B cause of social disturbance.
Not only does Western policy bb1ra y a pro-Tami | bias but it is deepy hostile to what it persistently portrays as majority insensitivity and obduracy. Given such a collective approach, the policy of the present UNP regime, the readiness for negotiations and a political settlement, was preferred to the opposition SLFP's standpoint described as 'confu. sed" "opportunistic' and ' 'shiffy' by the ess critica Western do nors and as "'thinly disguised Tacialism" by tha Test.
PERSONALITY FACTOR
Personality intervenes. The US is the undisputed leader of the Western bloc. It now occupies an even stronger position in the global power structure, though that structure itself is being reshaped. For reasons of history and culture, the US-UK relationship is special. The US does not assert itself in every area of the World in the same manher. Self-assertion is relative to self-interest. It would like Sri Lanka to be a lively stable democracy committed to capitalism Bu t l US irinteress are defined in terms of the island's "noda position" in the Indiam Ocean and its proximity to India, the regional "major", than in territis Of Sri Lanka par se.
The more professional US diposom Hts take thair Gue from RDOSSWelt's advice 'Talk softly, carry a big stick". It little Sri Lanka, the big stick is used only when important US interests are directly involved. There was such a demonstration over the request for re-fueling rights in the runup to the Gulf War. Otherwise, President Bush's representative is a model of Rooseve | tiam rectituda.
In some non-strategic parts of the world, where Britain had been the imperial power, thero is a tendency for the US to allow the more experienced "cousin", Britain, to take the diplomatic initiative, unless US interests are imperilled by some" policy or action of the regime. There is much to be said for this pro
thuս
cedure. But it fisk5 om both sit logies and old be Cau5e friction, S | Össly.
The former is still bearing '" the 'rative' rus firmy guided, fc The former 's SLJSpicio LIS, TE 8C:t acting to the headrastership. dLIct i5 pBrsist Calculated his SI into a percepti grand conspiracy The regime's Opp) Sor craftily a conspiracies are
David Gladst language Wass to mis-inteгргвt Occasion the O SiO5, President not suffer patro gladly, delli wered on the High CC bOtton. David spoke before hit human rights an the Colt-SO SI that all Was ni independence ol The Master (of could see, was up, Cool as e Wi a famous India je ered by studer TBS5Etỉ thā 0 & Said, Ha had juve mile Oxoni: their alcestors from tre g to tro E Wäl for EStG, Ulf E
CSOS EFE Gangas, conteiTI ure of the univer: While the likeabl David Had a to of Arabia - Lord J the patronising Coffend. Again, tak solem Tilly, he to 5tlf to gՃ բuէ: war, and answer ed il terventiori
Taking Ճn t the present W focUSSad On thi dismissed this Sense froT. " a ble people" ir gawe at the Co

as its in-built ies; the psychohavioural habits Oletis ed
Ster thik. S hig the burdën '' and the quietly but ir his own good. Lubject ' remains ing and Cower-reWag Lu Est hint of When Such CCT2nt or evidently Ispicion can turn or of plot and ... With who orients of course. itched plots and
suspected. re's tone and One times open å til. O OTE FA, al). La | 5ESJ.R. who does nising preachers | Six of the best i Timisio 3 r5 bär Gladstone, who 1, had spoken on ddemocracy and ubtly suggested o WWE || With "" tha the judiciary". Ward Place), i Wild but he stod T, to relate what | Orator Who WāS Its Wha Hig Eddford Urio, hladd reminded postis that whe
W Ėrg || E.Ea pring e in the primeing land, his anseated by the plating the natia !, E, Warr11, human E Luch of La Wrece lim, going native, Gladstone could ;ing the 'burden" tok it upon himlic on the Gulf Critics of the US
ritics, in ClLIding rit, Who häd bil i SSL 3, H1 3 dS So mUCI Onor Tally rB ad Son - d lecture he | Tb o Univ. It
was a labout the 'Rule of Law" he
pronounced, in a somewhat pode
strian piece, which he then inflicted on an gwen Thore distinguished audience three days later.
J WP THREAT
World attention shifted shar
ply from North to South with the JWP insurrection, The barbarism of the Desharem in wi
ted an equally brutal reply from the state militia and supportive para-military, state - and - party organised vigilantes who made a chiärming contributio to the English language in the form of a now widely used grammatical construct "'He has been disappeared".
The cate the traumatic shock - Richard de Zoysa. It shook Colombo to its fou dations, The beast had entered the dwelling place of the English-educated a | ite that has governed this country since independence. A famous family name : a young Thail of immense talet a Voice fāti ir Lo SterS fi: ktown to tha TW SCF e em ; il young actor, and journalist, about to |leave on a foreign assignптепt. Like the rest of the media, this little journal had a special local artist's drawing for its cover. It was our way not only of hong uring the dead but expressing our Sense of Outra gü , , . . and dread?
Looking back, ask myself whethigro t 1 : Tři: tio W.) Li di Fha We been as in Stincti wÖ, als Urgent, and um compromising if Richard da Zo y sa was an actor, mB WSCaster and journalist in the Sinha media,
Anyway, Richard de Zoysa, the Mother5 Front Bto represserited a newly eightened a Ware less of ''Human Rights", Politically, however, the significance lay elsewhere - the energence of of a The WW <i-government C= lition, a growing alliance of do mesti: ad for a igm for CGS. WWE:SS it alti-UNP Or WäS it TOr II tiPremadasa 2 May a diplomat from the non-donor community put this quas tion to me. And it is in that question (whatever the an 5wer) that I spotted the outlines of the discussion within the UNP heir archy and an emerging Conspiracy theory.

Page 8
(i) Inflict a defeat or spring a surprise on the UNP at the local polls. A spectacular show is the South (the JWP terrain) in any case is сегtain.
(ii) Establish contact, and make plans for a tactical compact, with the "dissident" groups in to UNP i.e. the old established, English-educated UNP hierarchy),
(iii) B e prepared for the return of Rajiv Gandhi and a forC8 fu alti - Prenada Sa i le from (D) Bi.
(iv) The leading personalities in the "dissident UNP group hawe a CCESS to Rajiv Gandhi,
possible discontent the militar y
(W) Exploit i
if 5 Ebri:Di Lus, in GStablish Therht,
The ECONOMIST exaggerated When it Said that Mrs. Bandaranaike's SLFP was 'electorally ma LIEd", It wasn't But the results in the south confoum
ded the strateg ign or local. third pillar simp the tragic dea Gard hi.
Conspiracy 0 this is dangara our Westernised th a singular aG| ruling class whi redeems its mo in another are ning elite mad of managing int. a tios (the eth separatist War) successful in Class War. Eto'y corrupting) t Marxist Left E fortu na tely bolo class as the de of Sri Lanka's Thus, political frr Wood|arh C Place and Wa the British-spc. a 5 e Efrace di sections into a
THE DAY OF
ftar * the 1987 Peaca Accord, when Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi pola Cad the Indial na - tional interest abov 3 the "rights
of the Tami || nation" as perCBiw8d and advanced by the LTTE, the "Tigers' Liistan Cr:d themsel was from Dalhi, mo wad
:Ser to the DMK Chif Kärunanidhi and Taminädu änd opened a dialogue with the пеwly elected President Premadasa, Tore responsive to the idea of a negotiated political settlement than a grievously Costly, probably un re Warding, military compaign to subdue the LTTE. The terts of the Galdi
Jaye Wyarde la "Accord de Tor5trated to the LTTE leadership that to strategists in Delhi,
under Rajiv or any other Prime
Minister, national security inta restis and state-to-state reala - tions were important to India,
the regional power, than. Delhi's proclaimed concer over Tamil rights, Safety and Security, and regional autonomy. The entry
6
THE T
of a 12, OOO st to swa|| five-fic: Creasingly brutë orth and east, a simple lës SOT Security i tres image of regio'|| would always Cor Carn for thE Tamils and pe cially, impact ( the north and 0 Tamiladu tics in tha t lar dian State,
Ting LTTE r there were lim cisa in exploiti dictions' betw. DE!hi, Delhi är (Karuna nidhi) ar |alitha),
the next decided to "B: Weaker... the
ment, ia || the Sica President publicly declare to talk to thig

iy plaппеrs, foтеOf Course, thE ly collapsed with th of Mr. Rajiv
no Conspiracy, us thinking by | E | ita, Wht iG higwe ment of this Chi to SGOTT E3 Ex tert I LI Ġr tal failure a? If the govere a sorry mass 3r-COm La rellic conflict and it was supremely pre-empting the
Co-opting (and he revolutionary adership, which ged to the sa The aughty defenders
fra il Capitalism, power has moved
| BG tO ROSTB3d rd Place, while nsored exercise
wider and Widef lively dialogue.
MEWUS BACKGROUMO
NOW power has slipped out o. Colombo 7. Football ha s replaced cricket. If the cricket crowd trips to invad? the footbal field and stop that less Blagant, and apparently more Vulgar, plebian Sport, Wisdem may be da Clared perso ir 73 7) r7 grāfa as Pramadasaism margos oasily into A na garaka isrT1-Wijaw) a rais T. SLIC1 reflections of Course drew beyond the Giadstonian frame of reference.
Western do nors will keep using the aid - human rights weapon
in the hope of improving Colombos performanCC. In th9 Grld HDWaver it Wil bе e Colomi C policy and the regi
he's stand on regional autonomy
to the Tamis that Will de CidE the Western choice.
| Such a situation only a
man of Felix Dias Bandara naike's brains and authority Could hawa crafted a strategy for the S.L.F. P. That is why he was the 'foeman" whose civic rights were robbed first.
"GER
rong a TT Y SOUTI ld, and its inIl campaign in the
taught the LTTE : India's lational ts and its safenal peace-keeper iranscend Delhi's
a plight of the rhaps mora Cruif thg "War' in
the Tamil exodus, =liם כן dווה וזם i111נtכ ge southern Il
|listad älso thält its to any exerng 'the contraen Colombo and di Madras DMK 1d Al DMK (Jaya
ohase, the LTTE an" towards the Colombo governmore logically Premadaga had id his readiness "Tigers'. Apart
from that, th Gra Was Mr. Premadasa's determined bid to get the | PKF Out of thë island, artirThrillédiate and even more pressing med for the LTTE. Thig dafaat of the Congress and Rajiv's ex frī 5 Blok offered an obvious opening for the LTTE's new approach., get the IPKF out, re-organise its militia, strengthen its hold on the main base, Jaffna, gliminata (discradited) rivals, repair its supply lil Cas, and ConSolida ta its possition in Tamalnadu, by mowing closer to the DMK, and helping the DMK if ngCassary to magt the challenge of the ADMK Jaya laith a Who, lika MGR., Was pro-Congress. Time was the prima negd. Prabhakara i gail ed that time. When his negotiators in Coimbro, 5 pat mor this disCuSsig the fier points of a politi Cal Sattlem 5 t that WF5 unikely to b Tachod... Cartaimy Tot on the LTTEs mini T1Lumi tgrimm 5. Prg 5 ident Premada 5a FOWever got what he most desired... the PKF Out of Sri Lanka, thus robbing the des haprarT7i – Sup
(Cuлffлшаш сул даруд 9)

Page 9
Mahattaya's May Day
De ar people of Tami || Eelam,
y is May Day, a day of celebration of the workers of the world. We have gathered here on this day to celebrate the first great victory of the working class,
We are Tamils. We are fighting to liberate our nation from occupation and oppression and to live with freedom and dignity. We are a unique people with a distinct language, Culture and history. We wish to live with self-respect in our own land.
One day the flag of this nation will fly brilliantly in our emancipated horneland. As free men and women, we will march together in our liberated land. This is inevitable, since the Sentimant of freedom that grew Very deeply in our hearts has become a formidable force.
For a long time now our nation has been placed with unbearable burdens and our people continu a to face in toler H ble suffering. Our towns and villages are systema tically borTnbed ; our homas are razed to the ground. Bacause of this reckless bombing. ошr people are шпable to go for work and earn their daily living. Our nation is strangled
by an economic blockade and our people are facing immense suffering. Our fishermen are
killed in the sea by the Navy whenever they wenture out for fishing. Our farmers are shot dead when working in their fields.
Fu el and electricity which area wey essential for any work are probhibited. Basic materials that are necessary for agriculture are not
The speaker, the tra'r kri o w'r sys MaharYaya, is the Meader of f'7 G People " Front of Liberation Tigers ( PFLT) Inc dopuy to ths ITTF Suprema, Walupi Mai Prabhakaran.
allowed into pворӀе, нt hoІ Wondered if W. wiwË. Ag 8 inst TT and occupation fierce determina fields and i ti ple waged a de for economic Su
This the st in every sphere Tarmil Eelami st cha lenge. They stad to their aspired to creat a coholic life.
Tha CoolTii. has been impos Sri La 1 ka State us to develop o םiוחטוחםand B G These are the workers of Eela today.
The presence who ha VG gath in largo numb World, wery clea freedom and libe CUF i We5. At t als tells the Tiger5 arв thв : sentative of the Eelam. I do H. who have gatha those who shari SB Titim Ünts, will fact.
Recently tha | Oner for India i lenged the Tig: We should prow that we are the of the Tamil peop. surprising to people who prea cracy are unable tha Hartfelt er орpressёd peoplt
We know we Indian democrac ctoral practices.

Speech
Ur lands. May me and abroad, 2 Would ever Surmilitary aggression We fought with tion. In the paddy 19 S3 a 0 UT POBO - tdmin9d Struggle irwival,
Luggle Con til utd . The people of od up to face determined to own feet. They e a self-sufficient
: blockade that ed On US by the # has er1 Cou Taged ur independence
self-sufficiency.
gains that the T1 ha WB a Chaived
of the workers ared here today ars inforts the ly, that we lowe 3ration more than 12. Sa Theti Te, it World that the authentic repre
people of Tamil pe that those red here today, 3 these strong
Lunderstand this
High Commissi1 Colombo, chalars saying that 3 democratically
representativas ile. It is rath Br ear that these Ich about démo3 Ldrstā Toti Ils of tur
ry Well about y and its elleThe Indian Statց
NEWS BACKGROUND
had also Conducted al "El E - TiOTT
in Lur hofTi e land. This fra Ludu - |et electio reveäled to our people the nature of democracy in India. We wish to place a few questions before the Indian High Commissioner, what method of democratic practice was griployed to bring the present Prime Minister of India to political power? Was it the Tajority vote that installed himto po wer? We also wish to question how the Tamil Nadu Government, which was elected by the majority of the people, was thrown out of power ? Certainly he will not have any answers to those questions.
If the Indian High Commissioner really Wanted to know the strength of the people behind our struggle, he could have made it a point to be with us today. His doubts would have Wanished, if he had see this ultitude of people fired with enthusiasm and ardent love for freedom. They hawe marched here confronting dan ger and death, pre
pared to face any consequen
CES.
We do not want the Indian
Government to interfare either
politically in our national struggle. We would Welcome initiatives that the Indi - an State would take diplomatically taking into consideration the interests of the Tamil people. We are ready to negotiate any settlement that would ensure the national interests, security and welfare of the people of Tamil Eelam.
militarity or
At the begin ing of this year, We created a congenial atmosphere to conduct negotiations for a political settlement and as a g8Sture of goodwill we also observed a cease-fire. The Sri Lankan Stato which faced a military defeat at Jaffna Fort and Mankulam, was not prepared to accePot Our peāCĒ gesture. Tha Sri Lankan State wanted to negoti
ל

Page 10
a te from a position of military hegemony. Thus, the Premadasa Government falsely assumed that it can apply pressure on us from the position of strength. This is unacceptable to us. The International Community should understand the militaristic approach of the Sri Lamkam State, Tha Sri Lankam State is in à dB spBräts need of a huge input of financial assistance to continue the bloody war against the Tamils. The Sri Lankan State which stands at the brink of economic disaster obtains this monetary aid from advanced nations of the world. This financial aid which is obtained under the guise of development of the country, is utilized for the genocide of Our people,
In order to obtain foreign aid thg Sri Lankan State en dBaWOLIrs to impress Upon tho world that it is interested in negotiations and in a peaceful settlement. The Sri Lankan State has always obtained aid by creating a myth about peace. The past experiEn Ce has ta Lught Luis that this
mon BW Will be da Struction of til
At the sa meti believe that it i the Tigers to el talks to gain re. iterational Col right to self-det people. This advance our lit)
Daar People today our broth Har Tarmi Eela vince) arc in a ation having los their propierty . are also people human dignity their own laid villages. Today, Lr der troying C displF, C2C pĖop. camps. This is the people of Ti
Our people a! regardless of Cl away part of T
All casinos raided
| CB sinQS WBrE räidéc, änd all equipment found at these
places were seized and no preferential treatment had been given to anyone, according t0 a press Félease isSugd baү DG (Colombo Ranga) A. S. Se névif5TTE
The text of the pTSSS release:
" " Om 1/6/1991 Colombo City Police, acting under provision of the Emergency Regulations, seized jackpot machines from various locations in the City,
However, therg was information that CGrta in operatorShad hidden
arՃաnt 4,000 մ On 3/6/1991 th
ral of Police Gelera | Public formation rega
that actic Cou
'' Ori irħ, for riħa t lice wisited pr Kinross Awanui and Seizod tha
( 1 ) 60. Nos. (2) 25 Nos. (3) 05 Nos. F (4) 100 Nos
"One persоп
sion thesë arti is being գuas

Utiliz=[j fCT thẽ
e Tails,
me, we strongly is necessary for 1gage in peасе :Ognition of the mm Liity for the Srination of our is rh 8 Cé SSä:1 r''W t0 era tion Struggle.
of Ta,Til Eelar, ers in the Soutm (East Brn por Co
desperata situit thais livelihood
and | ifa. They Who liw (3rd With апd гвspect iп
ard in their o WWT they are living irCLUTTSTE CESG 5S ilea irı refugEe e the plight of all ami || Eelam today.
ra being killed ass of Caste in di Eels, ThH
NEWS BACKGROUND
rights and interosts of Our wor: king people can only be achieved by freeing our homeland. This
is a lesson that we hawa || 0ārned from the long history of oppresssion.
The need of the hour is the freedom of our nation. The motherland needs today young men and women who can fight bravely in the very face of death. Death and suffering are part and parcel of our liberation struggle,
One day our legitima te str Luggle for truth and freedom will be wictorious. A na W Tamil natiOm Will be borr Without the CO tradiction of Class, Caste or Cread, where all men and Women are treated aqua|| y ånd With dignity,
The Tigers will creat a history, Their heroism, their yearning for freedom, their supreme sacrifiCes will enshrine a noble place for the Tamil people in the annals of the history of mankind.
f these mäChinas. a Inspector-Generequested the to provide inding locations so | id ba tak, 31.
iO Clived, PO
emists No. 18 з, Вапnbalapitiүa
fՃllՃwimg:
jackpot machin B5 Casino tables
ROulette Tha Chine 5
. Casino chairs.
in whose possescigs Were found tioned.
City Police following leads in this investigations also wisted premises No. 10212. R. A. de Mal Mawatha, Colombo 3 and recovered components of jackpot inachines and cash Rs. 239, 146 US Do||ars 1 36.00, Deutschl 3 Mk5 51 000, A5 ri D5 20.00, S, Dollars 50.00, Hong Kong Dollars 1000.00 and Sterling Pounds 20.00. Five Thai nationals and two Malaysian nationals including one female, who were in this premises are now being questione d.
"No preferenti altre atment had been given to anyone, All Casinos were raided and all equipment found at thosa places hawe been Soized".

Page 11
Disclose terms
he recently-installed Chair
man of the International Press Institute (IPI) Cushr0W Irani, IS in Colombo on a urgent mission. A suave and outspoken Indian newspeper editor (he is Managing Director of the 'States: mar "of Cal Cutta) MM T. I r - Ti addresing a press conference urged the Sri Lanka government to put out the text of the pro posed Media Commision Bill soon so that there could be a public debate. Delay would mean that the people would have no opportunity to discuss such a wital piece of legislation, he explained.
Mr. Irani said that he had met State Minister for Information A. J. Ranasing he and the Pres - dent's Advisor on International Affairs Bradma Weerakool and urged the same views on them, "| told tham that the ||P| is T1[] busybody or travelling circus trying to advise them on Sr. Lanka's internal affairs but tha' We are extramal y Concernedl about the future of press freedorn in Sri Lanka", he said.
He said that the most disquieting feature of the whole exercise was that no final draft of the Bill was ready. He had been told that the government had not made up its mind still, Further Hé häd be er informied that this Bill had originated from tha A|| Parties Conferen Ce. │t seemed that the government was not taking responsibility for the Bil. Fro what he had beer a ble to gather the Bill сош I d поl be used as an arguThe L fOra liberaiSati ol of the media. "lt appears that the greatest threat to liberalistian of the media is interference by the government, he said.
Mr. Irani said that the freedom of expression was too important an issue to be left to politicians. That was why he was urging as wide a debate as possible. With great humility and seriousness | urge the government to release the terms of this Bill so that
of fled
thпеген сап Бog a He loted that press had bear contesting or final draft haç yat. He added pected to ply Such debate.
Mr. Tali 3 SC Bill seered to the Second Pr in Il dia i 198 dia Press had ted. In fact Mr. a5 ole of thos in the wanguard
This is the 5 hi hES EDEB of IPI which F of 200 dit CTS: worldwide. At General Assel Japan in April the following Lanka.
The Fortieth
Assembly of Press Institute, Editors and pLIl the introduction set up a Mid designed to bri electro i C T1 ed LT1 där statB SL .lם וtחםG
Under the gi for journalists, nomited Com| rely inhibit th na W 3 WSpäpDE ownership patt publications, as Wide variety of r māka thƏ 3x pofE un favourabla to a ha ZadradoLIS OC
The Bil Il is r recommendalior Press Commissic Were 5ucceSS fu | India Press.
The Sri La reeds to be r:

NEWS BACKGROUND
Via Bill - IPI
daba te hê Said, tha Sri Lanka T prevented from it beCa USB ITO di Euè en rel 9 a Sad that Lha | P | Exа г0|ё іП аглу
said that the
bg Tode ||gd Cor “ess Commission 32 Which thG IlSuccessfully resis
Irani is described
Who Had Eb EET Of that reSiStarl Ce.
econd time that alacta di Chair Tan has a membership and publishers
its 40th Annual bly in Kyoto in
the IP adopted 'Esolution on Sri
An Lua || General the International "epresenting 2000 lishers, deplores of legislation to dia Commission ng the print and ja i Sri Larka per vision if not
ise of concer
the government Tnission Wii || SEWEa setting-up of TS, Wēi ke th 3 erns of Existing |d gan ara|| y by a eg Lilatory po Wars, assion of opinions the government it upation.
To deled or the of the Second on in India, which ly resisted by the
Ikan Gowerınert mided that the
press does not create a crisis, it merely reports it. The IP supports the Press in Sri Lanka in its struggle against the Bill and calls upon the government to abandon it a together.
- Island
Tից Day
(Сопtїлued from page 5)
ported ultra-Sinhala-nationalist JWF of its main BrThotional slagan and propaganda WE Hբon. Gandhi's electoral failure and the new W, P. Singh regime was a blessing for both the UNP ad the LTTE,
The war started. The Army
has mot Won but the LTTE has been quite seWerely bor Luised.
The Spaed With which politics moved in India, both at the contre and in Tamilnadu, took the LTTE unawares. A Wak Chandra Sakhar regime totally dependent on the parliamentary backing of Congress was arttwisted into dismissing the DMK ādi 5 trti ir MārāS. While Mr. Gandhi's principal notive was to break Karunandhi's hold On the State-Taching, the dissolution of the Tamiladu assembly was a move that Ms. Jaya la litha, th O COITIgra SS partner, de W0 Lutly desirad. (Jaya |alitha, Sri Lankan readers should mote, has a bandoned har polls campaign in the face of death threats that the Madras police took seriously)
The hunt is ol. It has assuTed global proportions. The heat is also on. Welupilla i Pra
bhakaran Tad y dream of EELAM, a new Tamil Kingdom, a Chola er Impire. It would be na iwe howe Ver to think that his rasponses
to this un paralle led pressure are governed solely by such folie de gra radewr. A || ha
needs right now is a little breathing space. He is ready to talk to Colombo... and even cooperate with Delhi in the Gandhi investigation.

Page 12
| GANDHI KILLING: MOT
s. Venkat Narayan, a former senior edit ToDAY, and now a well known freelance joi lished in many regional papers, including t here, has covered the Tamil Tewolt fOT OWE When asked by the NYK Times Barbara possible LTTE motives he gave two: (a) tl cision to disarm the Tigers', 'holding Prabhakaran virtually a hostage in a Delhi dhi then sent troops against a people who t was a protector. . . the Tamils Wi II never fo for that" (b) Rajiv forced Prabhakaran to
a public surrender
(Jaffna).
the press
with the assassination.
As india Mourns. . . NEW DELHI error and rioting in northern India scarred the somber cremation ceremony of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, assassinated seven years ago, and many in this tumultuous Tia tim expected the same awful scanes to be repeated after Mrs. Gandhi's son, Rajiv, was struck HOWTI.
But the remains of Mr. Gandhi, the former prime minister who was killed in a bomb explosion near Madras
while campaigпing for a retшгп to power, Werë consigned to flames in a sweltering moment of grief that nonetheless occurred in something approximating peace and stability.
Indian spokesman were quick to assert that the nation, the World's most populous democracy, was once again showing its maturity by handling the trauma of assassination without tallapsing.
But the relative calm was als seen as a function of the uncertainty over who murdered Mr. Gandhi, which diffused public
1 Ο
out his gun, he was nothing.
of guns in the heart o Prabhakaran's hero was Clint Rastw
Rajiv hur milia
The NYK Times also notes that "Kitt in London that the LTTE had in
Gап dhі,
LTTE representative in March.
Kittu, a di
SS
äger. Se Curity ployed Гпоге and the at Thosph a faוfן סy tחם וח dhi did not rë his mother did, ""WHET WE killed, everyone Siwe, "" said Dr. pathologist at pital. "People' to the dogs this, а пci evвrү about going Ot. But it looks are Safe."
Sikhs suffered after the ki || ig by two of he guards.
Goweriment suspect that t ki || |ed Mr. Gall of a Tamil sep Sri Länka,
Tamil guerrill dependent sta! haw a long use a base of ol hawe ad is) ni Ot di for his de [1i1 is ter - ti) 58 r 1 i 1987 to hel bellion.

Of NOA urnalist pubthe ISLAND
r, ten year, Crosette for e Indian de
its leader. hotel. Gan - hought India
rgive Gandhi take part in f his to Wr" food. With
te Hill."
L' had told othing to do ded, met an
* for Ces WBre-deSwiftly this time, ere Segmedite StiCt that Mr. Ganise emotions as
heard Rajiv was was apprehenD. S. Dua, a Sikh Hi Me My D) El-Hilli hi(p3 = s reasoning go as at the Its like O "WYS I ET'S It in to tha Street. now lika thing 5
reprisals in 1984 of Mrs. Gandhi f Sikh security
afficials say they he bombing that |dh i Wä5, the Work a ratist group from
as seeking an in
B in Sri Lankā d South India as Jerations. They forgiven Mr. Gaicision as prime d Indian troops lp crush their re
пVES ||
NEWS BACKGROUND
Chandra Shekhar says Tigers killed Rajiv
India's careta kar Prime: Ministar Childra Shekhar häls said there is "definite evidence to link the Tamil Tigers with the suicide bomb attack om for mêr Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi or May 21, the London Observer reported.
The Observer said on June 2 that the tip-off regarding Tiger involvement was given when Palestine Liberation Organisation |gader Yasser Arafat met Chandra Shekhar at Rajiv Gandhi's funeral, according to the London
The WW5p 3 pero,
It is beliewed that Tigers hawa |inks with Arab ExtrBrT1ist gfOLD5 in Lebanon, which "they have carefu II y cultiwa ted" and, according to sources in Delhi at gast 200 Tigers have been trained by Pa|9Stinian Splinter groups.
輛 韋
But Indian Tamils are generally not sympathetic to the goal of a Tami state in Sri Lanka. and Tamils living throughout India dЈ ПОt lawu a distinС ТВligious identity that would single thern out as targets for reprisals. Separatist moveTients hawe) led to bloodshed in the Punjab in the north, in Assam in the northGast dld in the Musirl-dominated northern state of Jammu and Kashir, where army troops are maintaining an uneasy wig ilance against secessionists.
But none of the sa Towella its has stirred quite the anger that was feit among Sikhs after Mrs. Gandhi used army troops to rout Sikh militants from the religion's holiest shrine, the Golden TeIIIple of Amritsar, in JunB of 1984. After the Golden Temple raid. known as "Operation Blue Star." many said har life Was doorned.
This Week, som a Workers i the Congress (I), Party hawe tried to stir passions by blaming the C|ima te of violence on riwal political parties, particularly the parties that speak for Tamil nationalism and militant Hindus. But these criticisms have not discernibly swayed people in the streets. (NYK Times)

Page 13
Bigotry and death, den
Pran Chopra
Ha Assassiation of Räjiw Gandhi, his face blown off, the sku II SIashed, limb Lorn from | imb, must be one more proof, for those Wish ing to believ 3 it, that India Cannot hold together
Luch longer.
The idea is reinforced by the recent rioting during India's most Violent election, which left many scores dead. This was a re-run of what had happened only seven years earlier, when Rajiw's mother, Indira Gandhi, was assassinated is a politicalreligious eruption. Rioters took Over Delhi and killed several thousands, For years I'll dira God n = dhi häd bE Bn thé Only gover Ilment, and none was left when she fell to the bullets Of her Own SBCurity guards.
Reparatedly, as the Indian dramå has Lunfolded since independer Ce, Carl August 15 19:47, fate seems to slip in episodes from the sama ride of Wiolence. The most startling was the assassination of another Gandhi, the Maha trT1a, con Jai Luar y 30 1948. The most gruesome was bloody massacre of the partition riots, when hundreds of thousands were killed within a few weeks, The grim greyness of HinduMuslim riots, between opposing mQES Which ook al ike in their powerty rags and Criminal rage, is a dangar Gwer present behind every disturbance. But often, all too often, it is broken by holocausts with more wivid colour: head-hunting tribes in the northeast bättling tho , India army with their own underground "field marshals' and generals"; the Silvery peace of Kashmir 9nding in the wailing of humdreds of Muslin women clad in black; the flowing beards of Sikh militants at the Golder Temple in Amritsar, now as often seen carrying AK-47 rifles as
akad swords,
The la test tumult in this un fortunate line is also the largest.
Ргд л Сурдагд is forrтлаг editor of The Stafssmari af sridia.
TF1 egʻ 5 affrib [1- (: lt Hindu orthodoxy tect thë mothe rebellious peript 'ungrateful gu Es
Es the MLIG lim:
TFS IT t d x" the highest se
HildL SOcia O System, Wats ti ing rest lessness Castas. The conf th3 |T10S til 8 Cliat ms. The primord loyalties which mm Luch of Torthern TE || Weeks Over : ra ny VII Lung Ped So Wes to death if TE W O WETTI give the lower tective di Scrimini
The soldiers are a photogeni priests and Ter assor thent of 0 been pour ing Co L Cawes for tha pa The cameras of
WBT t hETh || 0 v
CITOSS SCB, C T ä5 th1 = to pull down a II mosqше, ап ever tated the preser Strike of their repeated the qu │ndia Would - sur
In reply, the walls an empha Chloru 5, Orchasi Bharatiya Janata ders reject the Nehru's India w are пaking a po0W er i NEW DE Tinded liberal, secular Indian, eak of fascist nails in nervous
Whethor fascis has won over m business and Cor and administratit ger a party of With the financi small traders. M. men hawe alsoj

mocracy
Durai backlash Of r claims to proIrland against a Iery, and against ts", as it descriS.
y, fo Lunded upon !gments of the rder, the Caste curb the growof the lower lict has inflamgid of Indian schislial instincts and it Cash är Lusg i India for sewea year ago, when E bo Lurred thig - 1 protest against ant's decision to Castes some pro. חנtitב
if this orthodoxy c army of Hindu dicants with an thars who hawe ut of their social iad St Year Cor LW O, TEWS Ten i Tiger singly as they
the electoral y tri 3 d. läst year
äCiert Musli it which precipiit elections. The piçka xe5 CT|| y lestion whether կմ I" է:
Hindu othodoxy
ti : ""yes" i a rated by the Party. Its lea
secularism of ociferously and Strong bid for |1i, THE Toderndemocratic and SLIS DE Ctig a Striin BJP, bit as his
SS.
I of not, the B.JP any in the upper mercial Sections J r1. It is no lon - fanatical youth a backing of any top military Oirla dit,
NEws BAckGRouND
and hope
But the BJP's problem is that Hindu social y is lika an onio III the more you peel in search of thig cora, the less you find it. This explains why many outside the BJP fear that its loyalties wi|| first an tagonise the nonHindu and then absorb the Hindu into a movement with no Coherent centre. These schisms and tensions, which are endemic, and the crises in to which they repeatadly erupt, give the impression that India is being ground down by poverty and torn asunder by di SSg Sion S.
They give this impression until you flip the coin. Then you see a Very different side of India,
The British left behind more than 500 Indias beside Pakistan: each of the 500 Odd "primCely 'states became fully sovereign and independent. But within a couple of years, India knitted them together without firing a shot except in Kashmir, and later Hyder abad. This must rank a Thong
the largest acts of peасеfшl assimiliation in history. It made India a larger juridical and
administrative unit than in had ever been, under or before British r Lu B,
Of al the territorial problers which acco pa ried the partition of India from Pakistam, i on hy og low simmers, i Kash Thir, All othar seCEssionist threats hawe been resolwed; that of Tamil Nadu was resolved entirely реacefully. (Thв “Sikh problвпn" is different because the Sikhs are not secessionist; only some militants are). Within the first three years, India also accomplished one of the largest relabilitations of refuga B 5 and COmpoleted, and una mimo Lsly adopted, One of the most detailed and complex Constitutions,
Under this constitution, India regularly conducts the World's largest elections. The last time it did so, in 1989, it had to hade an Electorāta of 500m, out of whom 297m voted. Except
11

Page 14
in this year, the elections hawe been free of any serious violence, hawe habitually returned centrist-liberal-democratic forces to power, have chшгпесd шp a broad national consensus and haw e democratisad, indige nised, rurali5ed and huma nised CO ITmunisin mors than in any other Country.
AlthoLugh undernourishment persists, famine has been banished, and production of food grains has risen fivefold. Poverty, which was absolute even by Indian standards, has been reduced by about a third. Indeed, | 1 dia o logar has thĘ Chap) surplus labour it used to hawe. Punjabi farmers hawa to import abour from 1,000 miles away from the poverty pit of Bihar.
Industrial growth touchod double digits in the late eightis. Agricultural growth, though slower, maintained itself over a longer haul, becama less dependent upon good weather, and showed a well co-ordinated increase in the productivity of several hundred million people.
Indian industry meats around 90 per cent of the country's reeds and foreign aid a CCOUnits for much less tham 1 []. per Cent of investments. Though India гвплаіпs gвпагally poог, плотв thā 100 di BSG Hä WE tha same consumption standards as many in thẹ lGSSGT, among the dewa loped countries and 30min to 40m compare with those in in thB TICHESt.
To an extent usually associated only with revolutions, political power has been transferred horizontally from the city to the town to the village, and
from the urban-industrial to rura l-agricultural interests, t has been transferred Wertically
from the - big industry to Tnedium ептергепөшrs, froпп the prepartition landed gentry to the des Candants of their tenants and cultivators, then to the medium and wery small land holders, and now, by hesitant steps, to the latter's hired abour and the landless. Few Countries hawa changed so radically and so
1교
quickly by dam and With ess W
Th3 EiffCt TT most willages ou 1 Uttar Pradesh an Тће пајп shop E55 er Ones in t vision antem na e broken roofs, T the plough ofter sistor radio. An Would hawa brā tham CT1B Wüi Rural household: tribute to the based corporatio important part hold Savings se turn is almost a Sawings, a props only in China.
If these bits change sa em to the following, snugly into the Wicked titles. B assassinations, in 1948 and Ol week, Іndіa caп the Western B super power' put it, ог at lві power, partly b military span din
Why then all dings about Indii | described earl side of the ci reflect the fact is bad, and part is B Wen Worst.
ם icוחםחסIn BG the Cardial bli forward withou ground. Heavy finalced by di and rackless big but little was prove the ef capital at worl the growth rati India faces its cial Crisis. The of confidelice rowings extrema so, the base hםuוח Wטון is ger, so a по! forward is atta right policies,
Similarly, tha ; but Tot i da C

ocratic iо е псе,
ITB di ITS
ay be seen in
Sid the Easter d Bihar regions. is similar to FB to Wri talpoke through Fë man behind 1 Carri e Sara 1sizeable village Ches of Tore known bank, 5" savings сопstock of cityns and are an of the houseictor, which in quarter of total rtion exceeded
and pic Ces Of - IBITIDIE DIE. which fits Tora
walues of Our Btwg Bn tha two Of the IT"|Other the son this me to feature in dia Eis a "rising H5 (T1B '' []f tham Hst as a ragional Bcause or rising
!--
those foreboa's future, which iar, of the other bin? Partly thay that the réality ly that the iппарge
olicy, India made under of rushing t preparing the in Westments WBTB eficits at hole rowings abroad, dona first to illficiency of the *, So, although a has improwed, Worst ever finan
resulting erosion lākos furt hör BOOTlly difficult. Ewen yוחס חסםf the Bכ wider and strone sound thrust imabl# With thã
polity is in disa rray ay. Most of its
Criti Cal COmponents hawe greater wigour than before, and have opportunities to rebuild themselves afresh. The Congress (1) part has the chance to rid itself of dependen ca upom the Crutch of the Nohru family. How ready it is to use the opportunity may be in doubt, considering the pathetic attempt to persuade Sonia Gandhi to beg , its r1 8 x t i presidornit, a S though anyone is good enough if the narma is right,
But it has the chance to rejuvenate itself with a collegiate of authentic leaders. Even if does not, India now has more viable parties than aver before, each with its distinct base and policy thrust, vigorously competitive and aach able to bi 3 an alternatiwa government by itself or in Coalition. Tha ar a of the on E-farTilly party appears, happily, to be over. I am not too greatly disturbed by the powerful emergence of BJP. It might perhaps become fanatically Hindu, But more than half of its support comes from those who are disappointed with the other parties. The appeal of its dogmatic Hindu face will not prosper so long as India remains a democracү
I ar sure that India Wil|| r9 - main so. Every time India has honoured the democratic verdict, it has succBaded in solwing it5 problems, be they the linguistic reorganisation of states in the mid-1950s, the aspirations of Tamil Nadu or the bringing of the geographical or social fringe into the mainstream of politics, Every time the verdict has been subverted, India has been in trouble, be it in Punjab or Assam or Kashmir. Now democracy is even more deeply integrated with the social and economic fabric, drawing strength from the lowest depths of the Indian pyramid. That is why the backward classes and castes, for the first timë, hawe a party B TÕng the front runners for power. There is also more promise that the other great systemic tension in Indian politics, between the Union, that is the center, and tha fadóra ting states, will be resolved. The Constitution pro
үСапtiлшgd on pagте 24)

Page 15
Hunt for Gandhi
killers. . . .
Meanwhile, Sri Lalkan in Westigators assisting the Indian Centra Bureau of Investigation (CB) in the Gandhi assassination probe have reportedly gone to Wavuniya and questioned S8 waral people in this connection.
Sources also said several Tail groups including the PLOTE and TELO, rivals Of th a LTTE, have assigned their own Cädras to à55ist Sri Lankan
authorities in the investigations.
The PLOTE, it is learnt, has assigned 20-25 of its cadres to conduct in Westigations in the Wani region. The Tamil groups are checking for LTTE links in
the killing of Mr. Gandhi, and ET3 maintain ing close Contacts With tha Sri Lak i Westi = gations.
According to
reaching the F here, the alleg assin of Mr. Ga to have received traillig in Tä T1 early eighti ES, Y her accomplices | iewed to hawa | Israeli camps.
חalוון סB WחT ko Will to ha WB
a Priso il M a hardcore LTT prior to the ass
“Loss to
freedom people'
Opposition Baldara laikė during a condol
VASA O
2O7, 2nd ( Colomէ
Telephone

latest reports oreign Ministry ad female assndhi is belig wad imitial militar y ii || Nadu in the while several of
are also bebeеп tгаіпеd im
bomber is also Visited the Cenadras to meet Eer two days assination.
all loving
-Bader Sirimawo told parliament lence Wote that
NEWS BACKGROUND
Rajiv Gandhi had attained the stature of a statesman not so TIL I Chl be Cause his mother ald his grandfather had been prime ministers before him but through hard work and dedication. Rajiv had representad a new styl G of government far different from that of his mother and grandfather; with him as prime minister India had jumped a generation.
Not only was he modern in outlook he was pragmatic and open inded, Mrs Bandaranaika said.
"His Sudden and un timbly death is a grievous loss not only to the people of India, but also to a freedom owing people throughout the World who dBsira à HattEr OTTOTrUW for themselves and their
children", the Opposition Leader заid.
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Page 17
THE REGION Background to
In der NMalhotra
t is easy to scoff at stability
which can, and does, sometimes become a cover for stagnation. But what havoc has been wrought by what was gleefully hailed by Tany, at the time of tha Ja mata Dal government's formatiom, as the "creative Confusion of coalition politics"? The collapse of two Indian governments in precisely 120 days has done the country no good at all. Any repetition of this mis fortune would be given more catastrophic.
Doubtless there can be many other points and counter-points about the response of different parties and leaders - despite their programmatic differences and implacable persona | hostility — to a popular mandate for a coalition. But these should be thrashed out after the election results are out. There is no point Counting the chickens before the eggs are hatched.
For the present, attention ought to focus one of the daunting consequences of the Thess made during the last 17 months. Since March 6, the country has been saddled with a government that the constitution newer envisaged and the 844 million | dians new er deserved. Whatever else happens at the hustings, the joys of a care taker government the Country should be spared in future.
To say this is not to den y that during the first few months after becoming Prime Minister - entirely because of the Congress support, for which ha did have to pay some price - Mr Chandra Shekhar impressed the country and indeed earned a lot of goodwi II. This was because of his mo-nonsense style of governance, a propensity to take quick decisions and give the burea LICracy un'ambiguo Lus directives and, in his public pro
(The writer is ang of Indig's toprank journalists. He. will be regular cartriburar ta aur special se cfar om the ragia7ri7)
the Ot
ոOuncements, birth to cant Indeed, so ple: CLula te opinion he could get flaunting of his the likes of Ch: shoggi and D say nothing ( dox Ways.
Since the , the conversion пmвпt iпto a сате hawe taken a matters, big an Causa for Çoc
To take up more Worrying Punjab and Ka like sore thun tas for holdi Punjab, regard vious risks in course. Mr C Carl 10 t be fa LIII. [0 TG5 tore the Cess there BW on the parties whi ted his decisior gress which rer posed) share M grave apprahel: ding the poll i stata a t this LI
The tro Luboc, the Prima Mji about promotir Pսոjab in a ang endered th{ cions about his hawe been stre! by the flap ow. of the elections post ponad or til Yadew ministry diamissed.
In any case, khar's OWr fr times, contadici his talks with cluding Fakistar wide a classic fusing an isSt of clarifying it, said by Mr Mc eviden ty tha n

h Indian election
giving a wide and hypo cгі су. Sed was the artiWit is that away with the friendship with Thdfa5wami, Khu labad drs, to f other LII Crthu
especially Sinca of his governaker one, things mose diwe). On di small, there is
f
the bigger and
questions first, shmir stand out bos. There is a
ng elections in 555 of the Obfollo Wing this Ehandra Shekhar ed for his anxiety democratic prothough some of chi hawe accep(un like the Conmains tota||y opIr Rajiiw Gandhi's sios about hol
the terror-tor I CILTE.
ho We Wör, is that ı ister has gong g elections in Tanmar that ha 5 de pest suspi
motives. These ligthened further hr. th Ea possibi tity
in Bihar being a Lalo o Prasad in the state being
Mr Chadra She: Guant and, at Jry staternents on Sikh Tilitants, in-based ones, pro}xample of Con8 in the are What has been han Gurus War Thy, ediator between
tha Prilla Misister and the Ti | i - tants, can only add to the misgivings about What is going on.
As if this was not not enough, the militants hawe shown how thay, or at least powerful groups among them, feel about a government that is bending over backwards to negotiate with the T1. The 52-hour fier Ce battle between terrorists entrenched in a fortified house, with built-in bunkers, in a Punjab villaga on the Pakistan border, and the arity-backed police only the other day speaks for itself.
Even more eloquent is Mr Chandra Shekhar's own disillusionment and disma y With Pakistan ower the brazern intensifica
tion of its continuing interference in Kashmir. That Islarnabad has been steadily raising
tha än te vis-a-Wis Kashmir, both on the ground a Cross the lima of control and in international fora, could be se en even by the purblind. But Mr Chandra Shekhar apparently happy with his talks on thB talephone with the Pakista ni Prime Minister, Mr Nawaz Sharif, continued to believe that the latter Would not allow the low-intensity conflict in Kashmir to go beyond a certain limit,
This hope has been knocked out by Pakistani attempts to hapo Pakista t-trained and armad militants infiltrate into Kashmir under cover of heavy firing by the Pakistani army and to protast When mor than WO) Of the SE Subwarsives were killed.
Mr Chandra Shakhar has told Pakistan tour Ey What thg COsequences of a misadventure in Kashmir would be. But the other side of the coin is that as long as India appears to be divided and weak, the prospacts after the elections rera in un certain Hnd the situation in the valley is not brought under at least a Serbelce Of Contro, Pakistan would go on exploiting what it

Page 18
per Ceiv ES as a "" widow of Opportunity".
In recent weeks a lot has been published about how some of the more wayward ministers in the caretaker council of ministers have brought the country's governance into uit ter disrepute. Governments in the past also hawa thrown norms and decencies to the winds but they Commanded the confidence of Parliament to which thay were answerable. The present bunch does not seem to realise that its position is totally different and that there are strict limits On what it can do.
But for timely Presidential intervention, many more monstrosities would have been per - petrated by ministers who scom to be behaving like rougue eldphants than is the case, Lucrative contracts held over at last minute by Rashtrapati Bha - van ara said to be worth several thus and Crores of rupees. The number of politicos who might have been appointed to offices with a lot of clout and profit is legion.
However, neither Presidential intervertion for the Chief Election Commi asioner's categorical directives have stammed in any way the orgy of Out-of-turn allotments of telephones, Cooking-gas cylinders, railway passes, government flats and so or
All this pales into insignificance, however, compared with the effrontery of the deputy health minister, MI Dasal ChäLudhry, which a mounts to a defiance of both the head of state and the head of the government. So far he has apparently got away with it. To cut a long, complicative and sor did story short, as Working chairman of the Red Cross, of which M R. Vankataramar is the presīdent, Mr Chaudhuri has reap. pointed for a period of five years a 65-year-old funtionary, recently retired at tha President's orders.
Distressed by this, the Prime Minister persuaded him to reascind the appointment. This he did. He even sent a copy of the calce |latio ordar to Rashtra pati Bhawan, Almost imme
16
diately thereaft the cancellatio a word to any When horrific formal meeting drew attention priety the deputy
AMERICA'S
Pakista
Mushahid
mid signs
States wict War has been t massive human by the exodus of the US is appare in its attempt to tam in to rever sing gråd TTÉ. Con ( are fresh indicat endeavours with determination 1 pressures and to options indep United States.
Three separati ara pointers to th Omā| scenārio, F Foreign Ministe has become t major Country te America notio World Order". 18 statement, th ign Minister sai be dangerous tC now has a sing | He also express wiew that “al tr United States, J ter in Europe wol the interest of th This state inent c weeks before Visit, in May, ot tary of the Chir Party, Jiang Zer Union,
Second, on Subcommittee on Affairs of the Committag of th Representatives
OFTE of Pakistā ir'! /ѓsfs the wг/tg/ the reg7јол as ал 554 525. Hi yw'r WWF
La F fó Ite

cancelled Without
r h 3
order
]|1: d officials, at a of the Red Cross, to the improTinisters måde
THE REGION
LLLLLL S S LLLLLLaLLLLSL L S S S LLLLLLa S LaaaS a President and the Pric Milister. Th9 transcript of his outburst is doing the rounds of the government at the highest level. But no one has yet said boo to Mr Dasai Chaud hur y.
REGIONAL STRATEGY
n's security options
Hussain
ISLAMABA)
that the Unitep Ory in the Gulf arished by the roblem created displaced Iraqis, tly unWavering
bow beat Pakis g its muClear procurrently, there iOS of Pakistai equally strong O fL}5ist Such ) pursue Security ar det of thig
* de Welopments is e wolwing regifirst the Chile 59 r. Clian Clichen 1. Ea leader of a o cha || 3:1 ge the of a "New During an April e Chinese Fored that "it would think the World 3 SLI pogr por Wero." ed the Chiese ILImwirāté Of ths dan än i Wesuld not represent la whole world". omes only a few
tle scheduled F General Secrenese Communist Ilir, to the Sowiat
April 19, the
Asia and Pacific Foreign Affairs e US House of jecided to apply
(Sargo* is l'Esskrir WrF fr? årssyst af security IE 3 regi sar Cid TriWAKA GJAQWA "W"
stringent curbs on possible arms transfers by China to five specified Muslim countries, namely, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria. In legislation similar to the Pressler Amendment, which applies only to Pakistan, it will now be incumbent for the AmeriCarl President to provide an alnual certification that China has not pro wided military assistances including 'ballistic missiles, adwanced fighter aircraft, or a major Component of technology for any such missile or aircraft, chemical We El po 15, or ar y Thätig rial for use in a nuclear programma". Interestingly, Syria has also been included in this list of the "most dan gerous"'' Muslim countries Which, in tha American view. should be militarily defanged, although Damascus has been a key Terber of the US-led War against Iraq.
Another manifestation of this American pressure was the meeting at the White House, on April 16 between president George Bush and Dalai Lama, the Indiabased exiled spiritual and political leader of Tibetans. This was the first such meeting between Dalai Lama and än American President since the former has been living in exile from 1959 onwards. According to a report in The Washington Post, the Bush mea - ting with the Dalai Lama "reflattad US u nhappiness with China 0 WEET TE port S that the Chi Sa sold missile systems to Pakistan in violation of pledges'".
Third, given this context of increasing American pressure on both China and Pakistan in the Wake of the Gulf War, Pakistani policy makers are seeking to
(Сопtiлшаға ол Рас, 19)

Page 19
INSTABILITY IN SRI LANKA — (3)
The LTTE - Tami Rei
P. Sarawana nuttu
he goverпment has received
genuine all-party support (extending to anti-Tiger Tamil groups) for its characterization of the conflict as a war against Extremism, Tather tham the_THTThĩl people. As a measure of Tiger isolation and in an ironic rolereversal, the EPRLF, who had in March 1930 threaterhed a Uniateral declaration of independence and in the era of governmentLTTE cordiality was cold-shouldered as New Delihi's pawn, is now upheld as a group that has disavowed secession. Internationally, and with India in particular, the government has emphasized what it believes to be its most effective propagarda Weapon - the charge that the Tigers alone are fundamentally opposed to the political solution dei Gateri in the ACCOrd and resorted to War as the only method at their disposal to destToy this consensus. The assassination of 14 EPRLF leaders in Madras during the fighting in Sri Lanka, though denied by the Tigers, and the slaughter of Cap turėd Sri Lanka policer The invariably ends credence to this argument When Set a gain St th9 well-documented LTTE record of political killings. It has also eased the task of the multi-ethnic Opposition delegation dispatched to South Asian capitals to publicize the government's version of events.
tha LTTE has to contend with considerable politica isolation – a not un familiar position for it, and one which it has exploited in the past to reinforce its Credentials as an independent nationalist move Tent fully committed to self-determination. Moreover, in a situation of armed confrontation, the governmentos propensity to use its superior military power indiscriminately has enabled the guerrillas to portray themselves as the protectors of the Tamil people. This calculation features in the Tiger attitude towards
Consequently,
both the curre the issue of part groups in the government's ar. LTTE sought to negotia ting table no longar absol of verifying at standing as the representative : is not mere conje refusal to acce tionally, plus its
TT1ants and Simho of the east, C cation to tha Til a re-evaluation
- the rene Wad separatis in throu as a prisiary g. the insurance Come in tha o of de tente with
The shift inp underlying this predicated upor שטוחra iם וח ,ndם ambivalence surr -Tamil relation always bei El a C servations and as by admiration referred to abo guard but par syndromo. LTTE ho’W yBars of resolved caste di ctions amorg: withstanding. T and battle fatig to the detries Yet if tha Sri Li Conducts this regrouped Tige emerge rejuven TOT DITLIT to W
Another factic strategic Conte hood of a SECO tion. To mainta Iпdiап expressi Colombo dispat secretary to N. Sri Lankar fid autonomy and civilian casualt With tha: || PKF it and Indian

ationship
hostities and cipation by other elections. The ument that the obtain at the what is Was utely confident
the polls - its sole auth9n tiC f the Tam i 15 — ature. Colombo's It this un CondiTilitary reinforceese colonization Instituted provdJers. It justified of their priorities promotion of յh armed struggla a and not as olicy it had batiristic Climä te tha government.
opular allegiance Teason ing is War waariness rtantly, the basic Ounding tha Tiger ship. This has companied by rerespect as much and Enthusià5 T"), wg as the bodyhaps not ruler
arguments about struggla hawe alt Cill:1g5 [:( I'll silst the Tamils notarmi I conser Watism ug might redo Lund t of the Tigers. ankan government war brutally, a r movement could ated by a popular ards secession.
1r in the changed kt is the Unlik, 93 lidi Indiari in tET WE - in this, following oms of Con CTT, thed its foreign 3W Delhi to affir IT elity to provincial to promise to keер ies to a min im L II rTn. experience behind
Prire Minist. Er
W. P. Singh's professed desire for good neighbourly relations, New Delhi has stressed its reluctance to become embroiled directly in the conflict. Nor do Indian domestic political considerations favour interwention. Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M, Karunanidhi's preferences for the Tigers aside, there is limited sympathy for their cause in Madras. The Congress opposition, not surprisingly, has baited the Singh government for mot adopting a higher and potentially interwentionist profile, The extent to which Sri Lanka becomes a major internal issue in India will invariably be a function of its utility as an instrument of everage in centre-state relations and local politics.
What has always militated in the Sri Lankan grovernment's favour, and continues to do so in the present conflict, is the Indo-Sri Lankan congruence of interest against secession. The Indians cannot be indifferent, but with Punjab, Kashmir and a host of centrifugal pressures unresolved, (not to mention their earlier manifestation in Tamil Nadu), they cannot champion separatism in Sri Lanka either. Their defence of the union in Kashmir inhibits outright cond Bmnation of the methods adopted by the Sri Lankan government. Yet this detach ment only signifies military retrenchment, not political or diplomatic disengagement. The protagonists" dilemma their ability to wage only inconclusive war and not indefinitely - underlines the inevita bility and urgency of external assistance in the search for a diplomatic exit from the impasse. In this process Indian agree
ment, if not assistance, will be sought. Until the conflict has been resolved and a solution implemented, signature of an
Indo-Sri Lankan treaty will be delayed - with Colombo, rathar thal Delhi, being the Tore Éager to sigri.
7

Page 20
Political and Military Asymmetries
For a Varigly of reas Carl 5. til B government needs a quick and decisive end to the conflict. In Comparison, the LTTE is no Stranger lo prolonged Struggle) апd сап simply retreat iпto the јшпgles. The есопопnү is evеп worse than in 1987 (largely because of the damage caused by the JWP insurgency), and so peace is essential for reconstru. ction. The Wital flow of aid and its disbursement has been promised on a termination of hostilities; continuation of the conflict will therefore try the pat i ence of the do nors further and fataly Tetard econoITic I.E.- Cowry, Politically, the COSequences could be a fillip to the JWP. As the programme for the al eviation of povarty promised by the President in delyed or redesigned beyond recognition, the JWP Would be able to denoLince it as yet anoth Or um fulfied electoral promise. Indeed, the repeated government failure to
address this fundamental grievEl Ce hāS SLJ Stailed the JWP through adversity in the past,
Another disturbing factor is that yet again Sri Lanka's fate depends upon the performanca of the security forces. More than mere brutalization of society, in the 1980s Sri Lanka experienCed un paralle ed militarization, A Coup Car e di SCOLInted i the absence of an indisputed military leader, but the prominence and politicization of the a TTE SE TWİCE's must be wiewed as a r 1 U m healthy precadent. Those who argued in the after math of the last JWP uprising for a return to non partisan civilian control of the security ser wices to w hawe to rafuta the apparently potent counterargument that such forces are se cu ring the Country against extremism, rather than eddgering democracy.
Therefore an early resolution of the existing military statemate is imperative for Colombo, and an essential prerequisite for whatever settlement it envisages. However, tha battle for Jaffna, averted in 1987 by Indian interwention on the pretext of
18
preventing a ci Will be mo | es — arguably ewe the stakes and Tiger entre ChrT) tion | Of both si military interve firms this. Ex Will be sought bäläC9, his da a particular di sufficiently to
El OW, or alterna a CE:353-fir É: 81 capacity to Sac a solution. Thi EWE T, the wi|| |i| powers to over tär Ce to tak, E
the Sri Lankam risk harassment til fror tha
The differing SträintS on bot that with regar the guerrillas Co flexibility than POfOLT TULL til Ed to T re inforces the Lincompromisisn objectives. BL the Tigers coul acceptance of tactical ground: sacrifice to thei lik Elli hl d d Of the Course Cf | 5 ETT A LIST en acted, in Wh raso | Ward to por and to Wear t
The grower hand, Carlot di cation regarding OLIt Seriously position in tha 'fight to the fi. accomplished E. ăion G, bout Wii || politi Cal Solutio standards of meaning fu dec solution impos ment will |last the case for should be we earliest opportu tha issues of i policing will| haw Sed withil the | of a distinctive d age for the Ta.

willian bloodbath, s bloody in 1990 in more so given
the degree of -siםנ]קם םEnt. Th
ideg to Extériä ration only Contess, Bill issistant;É
once the militar y finitelỵ SWLImg in ire : tio ni bout in
deal the filla tively, to monitior d in a mediatory штe agreeпепt to 5 а85шгтлв5, hDWIgness of extarnal Come their riu Ca direct role in
conflict and to Or (10 Il-CO-Operaprotagonists.
political Conh sides suggest d to a settlement, uld afford greater the governet. a distrust and la intain Credibility adherence to g definitions of I t, as il 1987, djustify qualified a Settlement Cor Հ, without great r repu lation. The this depends on the war. At pref wills is being ich Eäc 5idB is o We its tama city g other down.
ant, or the other isplay any eqшivosecession withprejudicing its south. Yet the ThiSh" Ca In 1 ot bQa Iy military means require a viable
that maats the legitimacy and entralization. No d by the governand the refore fresh elections ICC med åt the nity, In addition, colonization and a to be readdresbroad framework evolution packTills.
Provincial elections or not, there are indications that a referendum will be held, and
a territorial adjustment to refect tha a lactora | werdict in the East is a possibility, The Amparai district, with its Siri ha la Se-Muslim majority, could be detached from the arma lg a mated prowince and the strategic neutrality of Trincoma leg protected through an Indo-Sri Lankan treaty. The territoria | adjustment, however, would not be easy or represent a simplifying segregation. A general election to secure a rimarı da te or Just facto legitimation for these proposals and those e mara ting from the All Party Conference convened in September 1989 at the height of the JWP insurgency to del iberate on the national crisis, is another government option and that Could buttress the President's position.
Demonstra ble commitment by the government to decentralization and development is an absoluta min im Lifth Condi tion for a settlemant. Were the provincia | Council to be subjected to the same treatment as before, it would be Compromised. In tha north-east, too, durable bases for su 5 ta inable prosperity hawa to be laid. Finances pledged for this purpose must be released and this crucial Wenture expedited. Which ever, Tamil group or groups are elected to the Council, they must be treated as par til ETS, Ot Dawns, and Tot
forced in to militancy to avoid political extinction. In short, the Council remit Tust TBflect the
LTTE success in advancing recogaition of Tamil interests, even If the Council will be inaugurated Without it. Fai || LFC to do so Would be tant amount to inviting a debilitating war of attrition, eCononic da Wastation and Chroic instability.
The Tigers would dismiss the prospect of any solution without their direct participation or concurrence as a farcical duplication of the defects of the Accord, However, there is now a more widespread perception that a settlement is imperative, and that it should not be contingent

Page 21
upon completion of the LTTE's transition to main Stream pBacetime politics within Sri Lanka. Taking heart from other guerrilla groups that have prawailed after decades of seemingly hopeless struggle, the Tigers hawa wowed to fight or in the hope that international opinion Will ewantually shift in their favour. The a na logies with Coth ar groups are somewhat misplaced, given strained Indian-Tiger relations, and greater multipolarity in the international system. Furth or more, it is in Cor. Ceivable that iä my go Warnment in Colombo would, ha wing failed to da feat. Secession On the battlefield, be iTule to irred gntism the reafter. In this respect, the Tigers hawe yet to de Toistrato that they Could acquire the requisita conventional military capability or would be able to forge the alliam Ces ng Cossary for tha Battainm ant of Ealam as W 3 || 35 itS da f3 CE.
GLI erria TOWe martS O WCW er also adapt to survive. The LTTE is no doubt aware of the obstacles to the realization of Eelam. They arė fully cognizant, too, of tha power at their disposal, even in the changed strategic environment, to destroy any settlement that excluded them. Thereford, it is likely that the real signifiCance of Eelam is as a unifying force for the LTTE, espoused
to Ottai Taxi but not in ECESSE irı itsB| f. Exter C terity and a cutt thë power conf day, this could гтоdt/5 одегалd'ї. ently, its stri: could become locking its expo tracted and шnp and self-impose political arena. as the Tilitary fied, the Tiger decide whether CEritribution It can be recha politics of puri. promise. A Carries the ris COLI di b e Come a C In addition, tha bility that if a the Tamils pro WE B טH-tyםtifHחB m f ment Cold Spri Sibly 8CCgpts L. but in reality h of its own,
Conclusion
Between the flexibility that afford ald the that the govern IT lie the ingredie ment which rese Substan Cë but,
Pakistan's security . . .
Y Ca 7 ffr. Lygd fra FTT FLg7 75.)
evolve security options based on strengthening military and political links with China and Iran, Two high-powered Chinese military delegations have been visiting Pakistan, including one led by the Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Peoples Liberation Army of China and two Pakistani Senior militar y de legations are embarking on visits to Iran, with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, Admiral Iftikhar Ahmed Sirohey leading the second delegation which is scheduled to go to Tehrān next Week. Incidan tally, Pakista 1 had also played tha role of a bridge iń building ralations bet Ween China and the Islamic Republic of Iran.
In the debatt: ISSLua betWBBT Washington, t seem to be cle apparently not aid to Pakista to gat Pakistan m utilgar program trim it" to lett ments. Concurri political and Ili also seems to compromise is C acceptable on t DIring ar imit NEWS' on April Nawag Sharif cat
that "We ca. Cour SOVereignity

urll CD micessions, arily as an end ised with daxsensitivity to iguration of the be a Versatie Exercised frequ1 tegit: Tã tiữT13|[] to o tras päreht, mants in to prorofitable strLIggl8
Dixi ft T the Consequently, situation is ClariS Will| ha West) thair um diputed thg Tami | Ca LI58 mg|lքti ir1 til the lism and Comagative decision that rimi li ta In Cy liminishing asset. re is the possisettlement for s un satisfactory, -WBטוח חulaנtםם ng up that OstenTTE leadership, |85 El TDITIE Tht Ur in
greater tactical tha LTTE Gall
de Centralization ent can com Cada,
ment between thea principa|| balligerants, does not replicate its flaws. The legacy of mistrust
and bit tarnĘS s Wil | lt EE eraged immediately; it will be substan. tially reduced if this comto ground is seized with imagina. tion and magnanimity.
Perhaps tha form of externa | assistan. Ce that COuld best red LICe distrust ad elha C G Confide TCE in a settlə mant is the participation of tha inter Frational dolors in discussions pertaining to rehabilitation and de velopmental programmes in the north-east. Project-related aid, monitored by do nors rather than by a governTent which the recipients do 10 t tri LISt Would be a wis ibla expression of commitment to peace and stability. It is, of Corse, not ab Owe reproach. So T13 Would arguea that ecnomic aid of this kind would be a n Lunywellcorne interfenca in Sri Lanka's internal politi C5. But in an Gewer rimore irinterdependent world, one hopes that this would only be a minority concer.
Indeed, interdependence is a Central concept to the settlement of the conflict, Whatever forms of political association emerge, the peoples of the island will
ints for a settle - hawe to Co-exist. If they are
Tibles the Accord to prosper they carnot Survive
as a direct agree- in two armed camps.
ower the nuclear the nuclear question. Any policy
Islalabad and wo botto ITlines ar. The US is k to TCS LITB
Llti | it is E EJE to reverse the The or to 'suitably Americam require3ently, Pakistan's litary leadership be clear that no ithar possible Or TLICl3 är i 55 U 3. rview to "The 22. Prim Minister egorically stated
it compromise on with regard to
that discriminates against Pakistan and does not take into account India's a vowed nuclear artitions is Unfair, un acceptable and unlikely to further the goal of nonproliferation".
The myth of a 'sola power" and "Unipolar World'
IT List not demorais e PakiStani policy makers into accepting the
American diktat on the nuclear program ITB. Iran and China hawa already led the way, in resisting American hegemony in the region. Pakistan too must not lag behind
since its own wital national intefests and the broader interest of tha Mus| im World is at Stake.
Suբar
20

Page 22
ELECTIONS - 99
An Analysis of the Tr
— Dermo Crat
PREFACE
The Elect for 75 fr, Sri La rika are än 77 irror of public opinion. They also reflect the socio-econoic trends in the society at large. | The party results also represert the Changing rythem of opinion cycles in Sub Sectors || Grid among various classes and groups. Professionals in the field of investments, marketing and in politics ger era y take rite of these 'externalities" in strategic Policy and programme p/алпing. Political partfe5 normally do a past morter of how they did at elections and compare With their original expectations. Yet others identify by their strong and the weak points and plan LYGLLL YLLLLL LLLLtttLLLLSS S LCLLLLL LLaaLLLL S S SS LLCLL SLLmLLLLSS S gated by my professional interest at . tima | when parties were playing about with figures tā C/g im frg wictory.
MTRODUCTIOM
The period between 1977 - 1991 has seen 7 elections.
1, GEBIET I Electis - 1977
2. First Refered LITT - 1 BE2
3. Provincial Counci|5 - 1983
4. District Development Council - 1981
5. Preside Titia | Electi OS - 1988
6. Parliamentary Election - 1990
KS LLLLLL LLaaLHLHHLHHH LLLCLLLCLL SAS KK
These elections reflects the public opinions in the various sectors and the sub-sectors in the country. This study aims at relating these trends to the overal policy initiatives taken by the government,
During this period, the country has seen untold hardships due to terrorism in the Country. In the North and East babaric action by separalist militant terrorist is threatening the peace and unity of the country. The IndoLankan Peace Accord and the presence of the | PKF addi fugl Lo fire. It is Withil this a 1mosphere the democratic elections were held.
TLTH S LTeS L L T S S CCCLLLL SS SS LLCLCCCLkLLL LLLLLL
LkL GkLkTLTGT TT LTT aH GLLLL LLL LLGLG GGLGGTL Piffer F7E,
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ends
Peace was brought in the South and IPKF was asked to leave Sri Lanka the normal political ärd economi C process - EECa T18 o per at I WE,
The political history of the Sri Lanka reweals six political watersheds.
1948 - 1956 : The UNP 1956 - 1965 : The MEPSLFP 1 355 - : The UN P 1965 - 1970 : TE SLFP 1970 - 1977 : The ULFWSLFP 1977 — 1931 : The UN P. (to date) Patterns of electorates in the past revealed left power bases along the urban based snaritime areas and in few rura | areas. Tha SLFP had a rural base with the UNP having a broad base both in the urban and the rural Sectors. The balance got changed with the plantation workers of Indian origin getting Sri Lanka citizenship - especially in the Kandyan homeland. After 1983, few ethnic groups emerged as political factor - SLMC, CWC. EROS, EPRLF, There were transformation in the leadership in several major parties. The left got disarrayed and acted at cross purposes due to power struggle With i1 the move Telt,
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS 1991
The first local governim amt Elections si Ca 1988 was held in May 1991. It was held in 17 districts except the North and the East. The elections Covered 237 local bodies. There were 7499 polling booths. The total number of seats involved were 3533. There were 8,625, 1 45 registered voters, 11 political Partis and 82 independent groups contEsted, Neary 75,000 public servants of all categories assisted by 20,000 police men helped to conduct the elections. The election was to select Candidates for 10 M.C's, 33 UC's and 194 Pradeshaya Sabahas. The total votes polled at the Loca || Gowarm Tient ëlections was 6,293929. This was 72.97% of the tota I registered wo tes. The total walid wates was 5.704,990 or 90.54%. The total rejected votes was in the range of 7.2% in the Colombo district and 14.4% in the Nuwara Eliya district. The UNP won 1976 seats or 55.9% of the seats. SLFP 1148 or 22.5% of the seats. The UNP captured 19C local bodies, LLLLLL S00 LLLLL LLLLLLaL LLLL LLLLLLCLLLLLLL 0 LLLLL LLLLLLLLS
The UNP registered 58.0% of the polls in the Kandy district.
Registered 58.0% of the polled in the Kandy district and a low poll of 33." in the Nuwara Eliya district. The SLFP raca iwed the highes percentage of the Votes polled in tha Hamba ntota district where the figure was 46.1 %, and its

Page 23
lowest was in the Colombo District where only 21.6% of the votes polled went to the SLFP The MEP Collected 1.7% of the polled votes in the Hamban tota district and the lowest in the Badulla district whare they received 0.1% of the polls. The SLMP received 5.5% of the total polls at Galle district and the lowest at the Nuwara Eliya district whäTE thay r{:[:eiwed 0.4% of the tota | po||Is The NSSP received the highest at the Ratnapura district where it received 3.7% of the total polls and the lowest was at the Kalutara and the Kegalle districts which gave 0.2% of the tota | polls at the election. The LSSP received 9.1% of the total votes polled at the Kegalle district and received 0.2% in the Gampaha district. The SLCP received 10.6% of the total po || ed at the Matara district and 0.3% in the Badulla district. The BNP received 2.1% of tha total pollad at the Nuwara Eliya district and 0.3% in the Kandy district. SLMF received 0.5% of the total polled at the Kegalle district whilst the SLMC received 2.7% of the total polled at the Kandy district and the lowest was at the Matara district where it received 0.1% of the total po || Bd. There were three independent groups. Group 1 contested all 17 district and received 15.5% of the total polled in the Colombo district and the lowest was at the Anuradhapura district where it received 0.3% of the total polled. The Independent Group II contested 4 districts and its highest poll was at the Kalutara district where it received 0.7%, of thig total polled and thë llo Wast was at the Kandy district where t t received 0.7% of the total polled. The Independent Group III contested ong district – Nuwara Eliya – wher B it received O.3% of the total poiled. The CWC rec: giwedd 27.1 of the tota | polled in the Nuwadra Eliya district. SLPF received 0.5% of total polls,
Thus, it is clear that the elections reveals the following scenario,
(1) The U.N.P. has increased its votes over the years.
At the Parliamentary Elections
of 1977 it received — 1828,000 wotės
At the DDC Elections of Ju na 4, it received - 1 , 515, 1 06 wote SG At the First Referer du Ti
in 1987 - 3,141,223 woes At the Presidential Elections of Dec. 19, 1988 it received - 2,569,199 votes
At tha Ga nėra | Elections of Fab, 1990 it received – 2837,961 votBS
At the Lo Cal G0 w Erniert Elections of May 1991 — 2,910, 438 wotas
Thus, over 10 years the UNP has gained 1,395,332 votes or 92.1%, over 1981 situation. Beteween the 1989 Presidential Elections of 0000 S S LLaL S S 000S aaa S aLLLL S S aL0L S LLLLL S aLLC

341,239 votes or 13.28%, over 1989. Its gain Cow Cr 1990 General Electio was 72,477 or 2.55% over 1990. Over 10 years its gain works out to an average of 9.25% per annum but figures between 1989 - 1991 reveals it to be Sightly lower.
(2) The S.L.F.P. has had a slow growth in the votes
At the DDC Elections it boycotted At the Preside tia | Elections
it gained - 2,289,860 wo tes
At the General Election 1990 - 1,780,599 votes
At the Mini Local Elections
- 1996,820) wates
Thus, over 2 years, SLFP reduced 293,040 votes between Dec 1988 and May 1991 which was a reduction of 12.79%. However, between February 1990 and May 1991, it gain ad 216, 221 which was a 1214%, gain over 1990 Comparad to the UNP gain of 2.55% over 1990 votes.
(3) The other parties put together reveals that the "true left is an emerging force as a group.
DDC Elections 1981 - TULF, JWP, CTC.
Independents received - 1,062,449 votes
Prog5idgntii | Elegi: tio5 , 1989
SLMP, received - 235,719 votes
General Elections - 1900 - all except SLFP received - 977,758 votes
Local Governet Elections - 1991
— 1,222,339 wotas
Thus, between 1981 - 1991, the left splinter groups and ethnic groups have gained by 159,890 votes or by 15.04% over 1981. Between the Presidential Electionis a r n d the Local Elections 1991, it has gained by 916,620. Between 1990 General Elections of 1990 and 1991 General Elections it gained only by 244,581 votes which is higher than the SLFP gain and the UNP gain. If these groups form an alliance, it could og Crime a substantia | for C9 in the politics of thig Country.
(4) Tha Independents as a group is also einerging as a force in the political area.
DDC — 1981 - received — 21 (0,243 WOLĘS Local (GCWt. Electio ITS
- 1991 received - 280,523 votes
(5) The minority ethnic parties are emerging as
a 'factor' in politics.
SLMC received - 202014 Wotes at the General elections in 1990.
- 58864 votes at the Local Government ections in 1991.
21

Page 24
CWC received - 59294 Votes only at Nu Wara
Eliya district in 1991
TULF received - 468,560 votes at the DDC
Elections in 1981
- 188,593 votes at the General
Elections in 1990.
These ethnic parties are going to be a decisive factor in future formation of governments at F1 Genera | Electio CWC Could capture between 15-25 seats in the Hill Country if it decides to come out singly as a Regional party not of plantation workers of Indian origin but as a national party with Sinhala and Moslem representatives. The UNP and the SLFP could build its roots at farmer organizations outside plantations in order to meet this potential challenge from the CWC. Alternatively, the CWC should get Terged With the UNP instead of keeping their image and joining the UNP of an alliance.
(4) REGIONAL ARGALYSIS OF THE
ELECTIO MIS RESULTS IM TI 99Tl
An analysis by districts of the votes secured by each party has lot to reveal. The Janasawiya Powerty Aleviation was operational in 28 AGA Divisions in all 25 Districts of the Country. 188,000 families were identifield by the people themselves to be poor and the very poor drawing incomes less than Rs. 700 per month. These families were given their consumption and investment component from October 1, 1989, They will receive it for 24 months.
An analysis of the voting patterns has correlation to the assistance given by the Janasawiya beneficiaries.
- Kalutara JSH 10215 families in Aga law atte A gala watte PS UN P won. These was 59.33% of UNP votes
- Akuran a JSH 41 83 familes
Akurma P. S. UNP received 58.61% votes
- Galewala JSH 57739 familes
Gale Walla PSUNP received 55.94% votes
- Wala pane JSH 12163 familes
UNP received 63,47% votes at the Walapane P.S. CWC also contributed to the victory
— Niyagama JSH 70092 familes
UNP received 57.07% votes at Niyagama PS
— Hakmana JSH 93321 familes
UN P received 61.31% wotes at Hakmana PS
— Hambar tota 51 872 JHS families
UNP received 55,84% votes at Hambantota PS
22

Kobegane JSH 90918 families UN PIECGINE 60.70% of votes at Kobegane P.S.
Kaluwaragaswewa - JSH 4250 families UNP received 66.86% of votes at the Ki LuW Bf Bg3S WÈB W P.S.
- Horavapathar na 4508 JSH families
UNP received 68.91% of votes at the FS
- Elahera - 34881 JSH families
UNP received 56.92% of votes at the FS
- Ridimadiyadde - 93543 JSH families
UN P received 81.77% of the wotes at the PS
* Madu ||a — 49999 JSH families
SLFP WOn it. I UN P received only 43.70% of Wat ES LI E FT PS.
- Embilipiti ya — JSH — 1423)
UNP won PS - received 48,86%, wotes
- A Tana yake — JSH — 9415
UMP won PS — received 58.923 wotes
* Hanwela - JSH 9878
si tawaka PS won by MEP UNP RECEIVED S3%.) votes
- Div Llapitiya - JSH 15241
UN P won Diwula pitiya PS. Received 51.97% Writes.
The local authority wise and district wise results reveals
- Colombo highest UNP polls 60.92% in Seatawakapura UC
— Gampaя ha 63.80% in Minu Wangoda UC - KALI tal TEI - 59.33o in Agala wätte PS — Капriy 77.79% irii Farm willa PS H= MÉiäte *醉 , 76,03%. En Lagga la Pallegawa
PS - N LI wara Eliya , , 33.47' in Walaping FS. - Galle , B7.20 in Hikkaduwa PS – M31) : . 64.09% in Waligama UC — Hämban tata , L, 59,44% in L'Umugam Weher HPS - Kurunggala - UNP received highest votes in KL li yläpiti ya UC = 76.02% - F'LI LI tilla TIT -- l MFP reciedi , , , Chillä W-78.06% - A 1 Lura dhiapa Lura - U NP ... , , , HCrfi wapāEHF na FS - 68.91% - Polonnarսաa , Lirikalip Lura PS
- 57.35%. — * Bad Lu|| , , Ridinaliy Hiddi
-81.75% - Manera gala ,, ,, Kataragama PS - 65.73% — Hatпаршra ■ 甲醇 ... , Balänguda FS
= 56.097: —Kégalle 眶,卓町 r ... , DLr-Iniyagala PS
- 71.37%

Page 25
This reveals „that JSH families had their impact on the voting pattern. The popularity of
the UNP in each area apart from Janasaviya was due to
(a) Personality and Populariy of the President (b) Peace after terrorism
(c) Problems solved after Presidential Mobile eg, Hambantota, Lumluganwehera, Embilipitiya, Putlam, Kegalle, Matara, Anuradha
Lira,
(d) Lack of queues and availability of goods (e) Effectiveness of the local bodies
(f) Parsonal attention of the MP and the
local organization.
(g) Eradication/Minimising of waste and Corruption im eg, Lunu gam We hera. Ai u radha - pLIra, Wala We.
(h) Strong propaganda net Work booked by the Media. The TV played its effective role indirectly.
The UNP lost the following local bodies
1. Colombo -
Kotte, Kotika Watte — Mullariyawa, Kesbawa, Kadu Wela, to SLFP = Sita waka Mahargama to MEP — Homagama to Indapandents
2. GampaҺа —
Ja - Ela, Dompe, Minuwangoda, Mahara Gampahla, Atta nagal la PS to i SLFP. Ja — Ela UC - to Independents
3. Ka Lutara —
Pa na dura JC, PS to SLFP Dodangoda and Bandara gama, PS to SLFP Beruwela UC to Independents
4. Galle
HabārāduWà, Tawalama. NBluWa, Akm Bemana, Nagoda, Bope-Boddala, Baddegama PS to SLFP
5. Mitrā —
Mula tiyana, Welligama, Matara, Thiha ngoda PS to SLFP Maimbo da PS - Matara UC to CPSL
5. Hamban tota =
Tis Sartha har arma, Weera kati ya, B3 | iatt, and Ang ul ukollapelles sa to SLFP.
7. Kururegala =
Polgahawela PS to SLFP
8. Puttalam -
Nattandiya FS to SLFP
9. Anuradhapura —
Gä| 15wä PS to SLFP

10. Polonnar Luwura —
11.
1. Α.
Thб
(a)
(b) (c) (d) (e)
(f)
(ց)
Tha Ta kad Lu wa PS to SLFP
Мопегаgala — MU PS, O SLFP:
Ratnapura - UCI til SLFP
reasons of the SLFP gains are:
High cost of living, transport difficulties, high land Cost. The peoplea who migrated to Colombo started migrating to dometry å reas like Ratta läna, - Mt. Lawinia, Mora tuwa, Pana dura, Kalutara, Kalamiya, Kotte, Kotika - Watte, Mulleri ya wā, Mahara, Malabe, KaduW lala, Ja-Ela, Wattala, Negombo, Maharagama, Horthagata, Kottawa, Avisa wella, where they managed to purchase builable local to build hourses, but suffered due to lack of facilities like electricity, Water supply, drainage, sewarage, transport and thus, they protested against møt the lat:k of thạ5g facilitias, which thay saw the city of Colombo dwellers were еп0үпg. In effectivo and corrupt UCWPS in some areas. Un popularity of the existing MP Colpa Cercy of the UNPOrganizations
In fighting in the party ranks with individua
ism ernerging abowa pärly,
Unemployment and lack of economic develop
it.
Leaders being away from the people.
A less on that the major parties could learn
from the trands of the Elections ara :
Mot to be compla cent with wictory and expect the trelds to Continue becausa gvery steep trend could stabilize and the decline.
Regularly organize the people by participating i peple based Ctiviti 5.
Do the follow up of the Jarasawiya groups because they could turn against the goversamt conce they are left alora after 24 m On - this. Thig y must be streng the ned.
Wisit the glectora te regularly and do justice above party politics,
Take steps to bring down the cost of living by restructuring marketing and an aggressive food drive.
Discipline in party ranks.
Strengthen the power base in the agrarian society.
NEXT: Ouantitative Analysis
23

Page 26
Those long Afternoons
Gehan Wijewardene claims that " the fundamenta | characteristic " of the class to which he belongs ("our class") is vulgarity, Since he purports to speak for the whole class and not just for himself we can scarcely let this pass with a non cha lant " " If you say so"". The wulgarity, it is all aged, over rode "'even the very commendable scholarship associated with this class." Having made this striking assertion Gehan offers no proof of it. He considers that whatever evidence is needed to bear him out must bë documentary and he confesses he finds himself unable to summon the needed documentary evidence. He does produce a quotation from Michael Ondaatje's 'Running in the Family" but it is difficult to see how this helps him. It would appear that to Gehan "vulgarity" and 'a knowledge of English" are synonymous terms. Gehan speaks approvingly of Ludowyk's 'socialist vision', Ludowyk had this vision in the pink decade and during the War when most people with social conscience could scarcely help seeing Sociālism ā5 the antit hesis of fascis T. But, as Gehan concedes, 'he newer got very far". The particular brand of socialism Ludowyk favoured was (long after he emigrated) to degenerate in Sri Lanka from the highly principled standards it started out with to the ignominy of the masalawaday line, the illegal demonetisation in which currency notes with the signature of the governor of the central bank forged were foisted on the public and finally the disastrous constitution of 1972 which directly led to the Tamil youth taking up arms against the government. It is difficult to imagine Ludowyk subscribing to this post-1965 version of Sri Lankan 'socialism".
In his book written shortly before his death Ludo Wyk Luses What Gahan Calls "the idiom of his childhood" by which he means purely Lankan locutions which would be incomprehensible elsewhere in the world. There is certainly nothing Wrong With using such idiom in a book meant for publication in Sri Lanka (albeit after a failed attempt to publish in London). However, it is not merely Lankan usages that one spots in the book but also cluttered writing, sheer inanitias (like carefully explaining to the reader what the phrase 'she eats like a bird' meant), repeated This spellings, an occasional malapropism and so
Bigotry and death,. . . of State powe years in office
(Солt/лueff frагт дараа 12)
wides for a healthy and flexible But this exc balance between them. But about a wides the Congress (), subverted it. that the imb Being itself prone to a centrali- Corrected. This sed, authoritarian style, it carried for decentralisi the infection into the structura Villages, have
2A

co RRESPOVDEvCE
on. Take this sentence from a paragraph quoted by Gehan: 'So it was with no great sense of loss that my little knowledge of Sinhalese faded". What is this sentence supposed to mean? That his 'knowledge of Sinhalesa" falt no loss? The number of the sa peccadillo es is too large to be allowed as permissible in a teacher of English. One would imagine that the kindest explanation is that, in his old age, the author had become slipshod in his writing. Gehan, however, is of the view that kindness of that sort is vulgarity.
One recollects that DoriC de Sousa, like LudoWyk another talented teacher of English, had the same antipathy to knowing English as Gehan has, In October 1971 there was in Colombo a seminar on Youth at which Doric, speaking in English, пade the following statement i; " The thousands of children present at this seminar are not the real youth of the country because they understood English. The real youth of this Country
understand only Sinhala'. (Doric said nothing about the 'reality" of children who spoke only Tamil - this was after they had adopted the
masalawaday line.) Doric received this wry respose from one who had listened to him with astonishment:
DDRIC DM REALITY
What is real, what un real has always con founded The World's thinkers in the realms of
What — Why — and — Whare
Sinco Bishop Berkeley upped and propounded 'What's not felt by the senses just is not there'. Sam Johnson, stern realist, glowering darkly, Kicked a stone and shouted 'That refutes Berkeley'' But it's sad to relate that what suffered damage Was not Berkeley's theory but Johnson's cartilaga, So centuries passed without any light, On the question of which of the two was right. But now, to our relief, in terms categoric, The answer's been given by the outspoken Doric Of his clear exposition I give you the gist : " If you understand English you do not exist."
This was carried in the Times of Ceylon soon after the seminar but evoked no reply from Doric,
W. P. Wittach
If Gehan would permit me a little Wulgarity, it's 'riveting' and not 'rivetting" WPW
r during its long emerging Consensus. I can the refor o see many healling tenden - cies which can correct the dis
iss has brought tortions of the economy and
2 réad realisation lance must be , and the need g power to the lecome a part of
the polity. This is the aspect of the Indian reality, which registers much less, especially abroad, because it does not throw up menacing images,

Page 27

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