


● MAHATTAYA'S MAY DAY MESSAGE ●

LANKA

GUARDIAN

Vol. 14 No. 4 June 15, 1991 Price Rs. 7.50 Registered at the GPO, Sri Lanka, QD/06/NEWS/91



As a dynasty dies...

**DEMOCRACY
WILL
SURVIVE**

— *Pran Chopra*

**Caretakers, Coalitions,
and Governance**

Inder Malhotra

THE GLADSTONE ISSUE: A WIDER PERSPECTIVE

— *Mervyn de Silva*

Another look at those election results

Pakistan and American pressure — *Mushahid Hussain*

L. T. T. E.'s priorities, an agonising re-appraisal

— *P. Saravanamuttu*

Ludowyk, Doric and Bishop Berkeley — *V. P. Vittachi*

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Briefly

● Heavy rain and gale force winds destroyed the homes of about 150,000 people, from Galle to Puttalam and up in the hills.

The Meteorology Department forecast a continuation of the rain and strong winds, but with periodic lulls.

● The 15 years old boy who is alleged to have killed his army officer father, his mother and his father's batman was a follower of a demon cult, a psychiatrist told the Mount Lavinia Court. The boy had a pact with 'Manson' (the demon) to offer a blood sacrifice, the doctor said.

On the day of the killings the boy had been listening to 'heavy metal music — the music of the demon cult; he had been conversing with the demon while listening to the music, the court was told. The psychiatrist said that Diresh Thevanayagam who is alleged to have stabbed and shot to death his father Major-General George Thevanayagam, his mother Sarojani and the batman Nandana,

'was rational and has no evidence of psychiatric illness' and was fit to plead.

● Mr. Lennox-Boyd, under secretary at the British Foreign Office, cancelled his scheduled visit to Sri Lanka because the government in Colombo declared High Commissioner David Gladstone as persona non grata. Mr. Gladstone left the island on June 8.

The Sri Lanka government accused the British envoy of interfering in recent local government elections. The British Foreign office however said that there were no grounds for the expulsion and that an appropriate response was being considered. The cancellation of Mr Lennox-Boyd's visit was one of the responses.

● Representatives from Amnesty International were due in Sri Lanka early this month. Informed sources said that the AI team hoped to gather first hand information on alleged human rights violations on the island. They were expected to look into the plight of political prisoners and alleged instances of torture and "disappearances".

Crossfire

A farmer, body hard, black and lean as rock
Curved blade balanced upon naked shoulder,
Led us from the path,
Baked hard as brick,
To a patch of tilled earth —
Soft underfoot, covered with dried leaves.
Blade gripped in his sinewy hand,
He pitched aside the palm fronds.
Dust filled the air.

The angle of his strokes now changed
The cleaver, hot from the sun,
Swiftly probed the yielding earth.
It struck, as metal against wood,
And, with curved tip engaged,
The man paused,
Stared at the ground,
Expressionless, arid and alone.

Then, with two desperate tugs
A tangle of roots and clods
Came free — first one, then another,
How many more?
It took long seconds to comprehend
What we saw.

Kneeling now, the farmer cradled in his hand
One — much smaller than the rest,
Between the tatters of a dress,
With pink and yellow flowers,
There was a tangled mess
Of bones and flesh
That once had smiled
And cried
And laughed.

His raised eyes searched the sky
In mute despair.

The air was still.

The faint drawl of a troop truck
Broke his stare, and,
Eyes still clutching at the air,
He laid the Hopeless fragment back to rest
With choked farewell he left us,
Running from that barren place.

JOHN MCCONNELL 29/9/90

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CONTENTS

News Background	3
Mahattaya	7
Gandhi	10
The Region	15
Instability in Sri Lanka — (3)	17
Elections — 1991	20

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Human Rights — A Global Concern

Mervyn de Silva

"To be engaged in opposing wrong affords, under the conditions of our mental constitution, but a slender guarantee for being right".

W. E. Gladstone (1809-1896) on HOMER.

The hand was the well-trained hand of the High Commissioner, the self-assured professional, but the voice was the voice of David Gladstone.

"At times it has been my duty to express my government's concerns about questions of human rights in Sri Lanka. These concerns have always been seen by me and by my government, firmly within a framework of the warm friendship between our countries" says the final paragraph. Much earlier on, there is this passage:

"In my four years in this country, I have come to have the deepest affection and respect for its people. I have gone out of my way to acquaint myself at first hand with their way of life and their problems in order to advise my government and do my best to develop good relations between Britain and Sri Lanka..."

I think I can claim to have known David Gladstone quite well, not just as the British High Commissioner. We have had regular conversations over lunch, just the two of us, sometimes lasting many hours. I have often consulted him on matters both professional and personal, or a bit of both. And I was glad that he found time for a final chit-chat the day before he was due to depart. In other circumstances, these personal reminiscences would be out of place in this regular

commentary. The truth is that both the personal and the professional are quite relevant, in my view, to any serious attempt to understand the implications of **L'affaire Gladstone**. Just as the personality factor is a crucial consideration so is the larger context, not merely domestic-political, but the international. Ever since President Jimmy Carter placed "Human Rights" on the American foreign policy agenda, it has become both a global concern as well as a powerful instrument of the U. S. and the US-led western alliance. The self-same weapon of criticism has been wielded even more frequently by western H. R. bodies, notably Amnesty International, the US. Human Rights WATCH, which includes ASIA WATCH, AFRICA WATCH etc, and of course the western press. It has also been used quite effectively by the Pope, especially in countries with large Catholic communities e.g. Eastern Europe, Latin America, Philippines etc.

The biggest 'target' is the Third World. Since this "world", almost by definition, constitutes the former colonial territories, the western criticism — frequently a fierce sustained barrage by their former imperial masters and exploiters — produces a range of collective responses that strikes one as predictable. A serious study of the problem would probably identify these reactions in terms of regime, intelligentsia, and people, though often there is much overlapping.

NEWS
BACKGROUND

The increasingly persistent use of "human rights" as a tool of "benign intervention" took most Third World governments by surprise. It was seen and denounced as arrogant interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. Third World elites were outraged by the effrontery of old colonial powers whose record of savagery and spoliation was only too familiar.

The former US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance stated the issues in a fair historical perspective:

"The idea that a regime could be held accountable to international standards and to the world for the treatment of its people was regarded largely as an idiosyncrasy of the democratic West, invoked only when it served a western power's interests. A sovereign government, tradition held, could rule its people or its territory as it saw fit.

Even countries like the United States and Great Britain, which professed to follow higher standards did not seem to believe that those standards applied to treatment of people without white skins. There was no international outcry when the US used harsh methods to subdue opposition forces in the Philippines or brutally drove native Americans onto reservations. The British could employ the most extreme tactics in repressing native populations around the globe, and few whites thought the worse of them for that..."

COERCIVE DIPLOMACY

The turn of the screw that hurt Third World countries most was the human rights-economic assistance linkage. Now the instrument of benign intervention became the weapon of coercive diplomacy. Since the US was

a superpower with an aid program that had a global reach, the State Dept. had a special H. R. section with an Asst. Secretary of State as its head. Soon Congress got into the act, and some Congressmen made quite a name for themselves in a 'watch-dog' role. In our part of the world, Stephen Solarz is one such politician.

But the use of 'human rights' as an instrument of diplomacy has not always been uniform or fair. The US has strategic interests and these count more than humanitarian concerns. Thus, the practice of "double standards". The current issue of "HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH" states:

"The end of the Cold war brought an opportunity to introduce greater consistency. No longer burdened by superpower geo-political competition, the Bush administration had a chance to make the promotion of human rights the centre-piece of US foreign policy. Unfortunately, this opportunity was largely squandered, as the administration allowed one interest after another, to take precedence over the advancement of human rights. . . . It became almost inconceivable that apart from the State Dept's annual world wide report on human rights, public criticism would be directed towards human rights violations by US allies in the Gulf conflict, be it Egypt for cracking down on Islamists, Morocco for silencing dissent Saudi Arabia, for arresting women demonstrating for the simple licence to drive, or Turkey for displacing Kurdish villagers and committing systematic torture".

LOW PRIORITY

Sri Lanka has never been a high priority in Washington's strategic thinking or forward planning. The Reagan administration maintained warm ties with the Jayawardena regime and gave substantial aid to this country despite the fact that the Leader of the Opposition, twice prime minister was deprived of her civic rights by a special tribunal answerable to

the Head of State, who had used the party's massive majority to change the parliamentary system for which the people had voted into an Executive Presidency. (The civic rights of Felix Dias Bandaranaike, a politician described in a unusual burst of candour as a "foemen worthy of our steel", was of course the first casualty of this new judicial guillotine).

Nor did the U.S., the U.K. or for that matter the Commonwealth protest when parliamentary polls were replaced by a Referendum held under Emergency rules. The takeover of the privately owned TIMES by a party whose leader and deputy leader (later President and Prime Minister of Sri Lanka) had stormed the city streets when Lake House was nationalised, hardly earned the censure of the I.P.I. or the P.F.A. where Mr. Esmond Wickremasingha at one time held the post which is now Cushrow Irani's. And ASIA WATCH wasn't obviously watching.

The lesson here is that the **policies** of the government (economic, foreign affairs) matter far more to major western governments than human rights. The UNP in 1977 broke sharply from the statist policies of the United Front and SLFP, adopted a free-market approach, and abandoned the non-aligned activism of the Bandaranaiques, with its rather pronounced anti-Americanism. Nonetheless, whatever its selective use (vis-a-vis a target country' and specific issue / occasion) the US had armed itself with a new foreign policy weapon. The 'human rights' campaign was soon joined, and quite eagerly, by the west European community, not to mention very influential institutions and personages such as the POPE.

The combined pressure and concerted campaign were so effective that a host of small or medium-size, economically dependent Third World states caved in. . . . unless there was another source of help available. (With the collapse of the Soviet economy, that option no longer exists). In our case, over

the 80's, foreign aid had passed the 30-40% mark, as part of the annual budget. Besides, population and popular expectations keep rising, and even the most insensitive regime must finally respond to mass pressure and demand.

The situation soon makes way for a meeting of minds between the 'benign interventionists' and the local opposition, whether this is the official opposition in a functioning democracy or less formal groups usually described as "dissidents". The nature of the opposition of course depends often on how "open" or "closed" the political system is in any given country.

MINORITY RIGHTS

There is however an almost unalterable working rule common to both western governments and NGO's, which infuriates the the majority. An ethnic minority is presumed to be the victim unless and until the contrary is proved, and that is often never. The majority is automatically suspected of discrimination and oppression, largely because State power is in its hands.

To the rising gorge of the Sinhala Establishment, and the community as a whole, western opinion stood firmly on the side of the Tamils as distinct from the 'Tigers', the distinction was not often plainly stated. Neither western conscience nor 'liberalism' however was the sole explanation. The credit goes to the Tamil *diaspora* — from post-56 times. The middle/ upper-middle class migrants, many of them English-educated professionals, adjusted themselves to their new environment quickly. Their often better educated offspring moved into professions and institutions (e. g. universities) which allowed them to 'infiltrate' opinion-making groups in those societies. And eventually, the policy-making process. This is true of almost every expatriate group in the US, Canada, Europe and Australia in relation to an ethnic conflict in the land of their birth. Apart from that there is the practical burden of feeding, housing and

sheltering hundreds of thousands of refugees. Besides, the money, their presence becomes a cause of social disturbance.

Not only does western policy betray a pro-Tamil bias but it is deeply hostile to what it persistently portrays as majority insensitivity and obduracy. Given such a collective approach, the policy of the present UNP regime, the readiness for negotiations and a political settlement, was preferred to the opposition SLFP's standpoint described as "confused" "opportunistic" and "shifty" by the less critical western donors and as "thinly disguised racialism" by the rest.

PERSONALITY FACTOR

Personality intervenes. The US is the undisputed leader of the western bloc. It now occupies an even stronger position in the global power structure, though that structure itself is being reshaped. For reasons of history and culture, the US-UK relationship is special. The US does not assert itself in every area of the world in the same manner. Self-assertion is relative to self-interest. It would like Sri Lanka to be a lively stable democracy committed to capitalism. But US interests are defined in terms of the island's "nodal position" in the Indian Ocean and its proximity to India, the regional 'major', than in terms of Sri Lanka *per se*.

The more professional US diplomats take their cue from Roosevelt's advice "Talk softly, carry a big stick". In little Sri Lanka, the big stick is used only when important US interests are directly involved. There was such a demonstration over the request for re-fuelling rights in the run-up to the Gulf war. Otherwise, President Bush's representative is a model of Rooseveltian rectitude.

In some non-strategic parts of the world, where Britain had been the imperial power, there is a tendency for the US to allow the more experienced "cousin", Britain, to take the diplomatic initiative, unless US interests are imperilled by some policy or action of the regime. There is much to be said for this pro-

cedure. But it has its in-built risks on both sides; the psychologies and old behavioural habits cause friction, sometimes needlessly.

The former master thinks he is still bearing "the burden" and the 'native' must be quietly but firmly guided, for his own good. The former "subject" remains suspicious, reacting and over-reacting to the vaguest hint of headmastership. When such conduct is persistent or evidently calculated, his suspicion can turn into a perception of plot and grand conspiracy. With whom? The regime's opponents of course. Soon craftily hatched plots and conspiracies are suspected.

David Gladstone's tone and language was sometimes open to mis-interpretation. On one occasion, the OPA annual sessions, President J. R. who does not suffer patronising preachers gladly, delivered six of the best on the High Commissioners bare bottom. David Gladstone, who spoke before him, had spoken on human rights and democracy and then not-so subtly suggested that all was not well with "the independence of the judiciary". The Master (of Ward Place), I could see, was livid but he stood up, cool as ever, to relate what a famous Indian orator who was jeered by students when he addressed the Oxford Union, had said. He had reminded post-juvenile Oxonians that when their ancestors were leaping from tree to tree in the primeval forests of England, his ancestors were seated by the Ganges, contemplating the nature of the universe!

While the likeable, warm, humane David had a touch of Lawrence of Arabia - Lord Jim, going native, the patronising Gladstone could offend. Again, taking the "burden" solemnly, he took it upon himself to go public on the Gulf war, and answer critics of the US-led intervention.

Taking on critics, including the present writer, who had focussed on the oil issue, he dismissed this as so much nonsense from "normally reasonable people" in a lecture he gave at the Colombo Univ. It

was all about the "Rule of Law" he pronounced, in a somewhat pedestrian piece, which he then inflicted on an even more distinguished audience three days later.

JVP THREAT

World attention shifted sharply from North to South with the JVP insurrection. The barbarism of the *Deshapremi* invited an equally brutal reply from the state militia and supportive para-military, state - and - party organised vigilantes who made a charming contribution to the English language in the form of a now widely used grammatical construct "He has been disappeared".

Then came the traumatic shock — Richard de Zoysa. It shook Colombo to its foundations. The beast had entered the dwelling place of the English-educated elite that has governed this country since independence. A famous family name; a young man of immense talent; a voice familiar to listeners; a face known to the TV screen; a young actor, and journalist, about to leave on a foreign assignment. Like the rest of the media, this little journal had a special local artist's drawing for its cover. It was our way not only of honouring the dead but expressing our sense of outrage... and dread?

Looking back, I ask myself whether the reaction would have been as instinctive, as urgent, and uncompromising if Richard de Zoysa was an actor, newscaster and journalist in the **Sinhala** media.

Anyway, Richard de Zoysa, the Mothers Front etc represented a newly heightened awareness of "Human Rights". Politically, however, the significance lay elsewhere — the emergence of a new anti-government coalition, a growing alliance of domestic and foreign forces. Was it anti-UNP or was it more anti-Premadasa? Many a diplomat from the non-donor community put this question to me. And it is in that question (whatever the answer) that I spotted the outlines of the discussion within the UNP hierarchy and an emerging conspiracy theory.

- (i) Inflict a defeat or spring a surprise on the UNP at the local polls. A spectacular show in the South (the JVP terrain) in any case is certain.
- (ii) Establish contact, and make plans for a tactical compact, with the 'dissident' groups in the UNP i.e. the old established, English-educated UNP hierarchy).
- (iii) Be prepared for the return of Rajiv Gandhi and a forceful anti-Premadasa line from Delhi.
- (iv) The leading personalities in the 'dissident' UNP group have access to Rajiv Gandhi,
- (v) Exploit possible discontent if serious, in the military establishment.

The ECONOMIST exaggerated when it said that Mrs. Bandaranaike's SLFP was "electorally mauled". It wasn't. But the results in the south confoun-

ded the strategy planners, foreign or local. Of course, the third pillar simply collapsed with the tragic death of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi.

Conspiracy or no conspiracy, this is dangerous thinking by our westernised elite. What is the singular achievement of this ruling class which to some extent redeems its monumental failure in another area? If the governing elite made a sorry mess of managing inter-communal relations (the ethnic conflict and separatist war) it was supremely successful in pre-empting the class war by co-opting (and corrupting) the revolutionary Marxist Left leadership, which fortunately belonged to the same class as the doughty defenders of Sri Lanka's frail capitalism. Thus, political power has moved from Woodlands to Rosmead Place and Ward Place, while the British-sponsored exercise has embraced wider and wider sections into a lively dialogue.

Now power has slipped out of Colombo 7. Football has replaced cricket. If the cricket crowd tries to invade the football field and stop that less elegant, and apparently more vulgar, plebeian sport, Wisden may be declared *persona non grata* as Premadasaism merges easily into Anagarakism-Wijewerasingheism. Such reflections of course are well beyond the Gladstonian frame of reference.

Western donors will keep using the aid - human rights weapon in the hope of improving Colombo's performance. In the end however it will be economic policy and the regime's stand on regional autonomy to the Tamils that will decide the western choice.

In such a situation only a man of Felix Dias Bandaranaike's brains and authority could have crafted a strategy for the S.L.F.P. That is why he was the "foeman" whose civic rights were robbed first.

THE DAY OF THE TIGER

After the 1987 Peace Accord, when Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi placed the Indian national interest above the "rights of the Tamil nation" as perceived and advanced by the LTTE, the 'Tigers' distanced themselves from Delhi, moved closer to the DMK Chief Karunanidhi and Tamilnadu and opened a dialogue with the newly elected President Premadasa, more responsive to the idea of a negotiated political settlement than a grievously costly, probably unrewarding, military campaign to subdue the LTTE. The terms of the Gandhi-Jayewardena 'Accord' demonstrated to the LTTE leadership that to strategists in Delhi, under Rajiv or any other Prime Minister, national security interests and state-to-state relations were important to India, the regional power, than Delhi's proclaimed concern over Tamil rights, safety and security, and regional autonomy. The entry

of a 12,000 strong army soon to swell five-fold, and its increasingly brutal campaign in the north and east, taught the LTTE a simple lesson: India's national security interests and its safe-image of regional peace-keeper would always transcend Delhi's concern for the plight of the Tamils and, perhaps more crucially, impact of the 'war' in the north and the Tamil exodus, on Tamilnadu opinion and politics in that large southern Indian state.

The LTTE realised also that there were limits to any exercise in exploiting "the contradictions" between Colombo and Delhi, Delhi and Madras, DMK (Karunanidhi) and AIDMK (Jayalalitha).

In the next phase, the LTTE decided to "lean" towards the weaker... the Colombo government, all the more logically since President Premadasa had publicly declared his readiness to talk to the "Tigers". Apart

from that, there was Mr. Premadasa's determined bid to get the IPKF out of the island, an immediate and even more pressing need for the LTTE. The defeat of the Congress and Rajiv's exit from South Block offered an obvious opening for the LTTE's new approach... get the IPKF out, re-organise its militia, strengthen its hold on the main base, Jaffna, eliminate (discredited) rivals, repair its supply lines, and consolidate its position in Tamilnadu, by moving closer to the DMK, and helping the DMK if necessary to meet the challenge of the AIDMK Jayalalitha who, like MGR, was pro-congress. Time was the prime need. Prabhakaran gained that time when his negotiators in Colombo, spent months discussing the finer points of a political settlement that was unlikely to be reached... certainly not on the LTTE's **minimum** terms. President Premadasa however got what he most desired... the IPKF out of Sri Lanka, thus robbing the *deshapremi* — sup-

(Continued on page 9)

Mahattaya's May Day Speech

Dear people of Tamil Eelam,

Today is May Day, a day of celebration of the workers of the world. We have gathered here on this day to celebrate the first great victory of the working class.

We are Tamils. We are fighting to liberate our nation from occupation and oppression and to live with freedom and dignity. We are a unique people with a distinct language, culture and history. We wish to live with self-respect in our own land.

One day the flag of this nation will fly brilliantly in our emancipated homeland. As free men and women, we will march together in our liberated land. This is inevitable, since the sentiment of freedom that grew very deeply in our hearts has become a formidable force.

For a long time now our nation has been placed with unbearable burdens and our people continue to face intolerable suffering. Our towns and villages are systematically bombed; our homes are razed to the ground. Because of this reckless bombing, our people are unable to go for work and earn their daily living. Our nation is strangled by an economic blockade and our people are facing immense suffering. Our fishermen are killed in the sea by the Navy whenever they venture out for fishing. Our farmers are shot dead when working in their fields.

Fuel and electricity which are very essential for any work are prohibited. Basic materials that are necessary for agriculture are not

allowed into our lands. Many people, at home and abroad, wondered if we would ever survive. Against military aggression and occupation, we fought with fierce determination. In the paddy fields and in the sea our people waged a determined struggle for economic survival.

Thus the struggle continued in every sphere. The people of Tamil Eelam stood up to face challenge. They determined to stand on their own feet. They aspired to create a self-sufficient economic life.

The economic blockade that has been imposed on us by the Sri Lankan State has encouraged us to develop our independence and economic self-sufficiency. These are the gains that the workers of Eelam have achieved today.

The presence of the workers who have gathered here today in large numbers informs the world, very clearly, that we love freedom and liberation more than our lives. At the same time, it also tells the world that the Tigers are the authentic representative of the people of Tamil Eelam. I do hope that those who have gathered here today, those who share these strong sentiments, will understand this fact.

Recently the High Commissioner for India in Colombo, challenged the Tigers saying that we should prove democratically that we are the representatives of the Tamil people. It is rather surprising to hear that these people who preach about democracy are unable to understand the heartfelt emotions of our oppressed people.

We know very well about Indian democracy and its electoral practices. The Indian State

had also conducted an 'election' in our homeland. This fraudulent election revealed to our people the nature of democracy in India. We wish to place a few questions before the Indian High Commissioner, what method of democratic practice was employed to bring the present Prime Minister of India to political power? Was it the majority vote that installed him to power? We also wish to question how the Tamil Nadu Government, which was elected by the majority of the people, was thrown out of power? Certainly he will not have any answers to those questions.

If the Indian High Commissioner really wanted to know the strength of the people behind our struggle, he could have made it a point to be with us today. His doubts would have vanished, if he had seen this multitude of people fired with enthusiasm and ardent love for freedom. They have marched here confronting danger and death, prepared to face any consequences.

We do not want the Indian Government to interfere either militarily or politically in our national struggle. We would welcome initiatives that the Indian State would take diplomatically taking into consideration the interests of the Tamil people. We are ready to negotiate any settlement that would ensure the national interests, security and welfare of the people of Tamil Eelam.

At the beginning of this year, we created a congenial atmosphere to conduct negotiations for a political settlement and as a gesture of goodwill we also observed a cease-fire. The Sri Lankan State which faced a military defeat at Jaffna Fort and Manakulam, was not prepared to accept our peace gesture. The Sri Lankan State wanted to negoti-

The speaker, better known as Mahattaya, is the leader of the Peoples' Front of Liberation Tigers (PFLT) and deputy to the LTTE Supremo, Velupillai Prabhakaran.

ate from a position of military hegemony. Thus, the Premadasa Government falsely assumed that it can apply pressure on us from the position of strength. This is unacceptable to us. The International Community should understand the militaristic approach of the Sri Lankan State. The Sri Lankan State is in a desperate need of a huge input of financial assistance to continue the bloody war against the Tamils. The Sri Lankan State which stands at the brink of economic disaster obtains this monetary aid from advanced nations of the world. This financial aid which is obtained under the guise of development of the country, is utilized for the genocide of our people.

In order to obtain foreign aid the Sri Lankan State endeavours to impress upon the world that it is interested in negotiations and in a peaceful settlement. The Sri Lankan State has always obtained aid by creating a myth about peace. The past experience has taught us that this

money will be utilized for the destruction of the Tamils.

At the sametime, we strongly believe that it is necessary for the Tigers to engage in peace talks to gain recognition of the international community for the right to self-determination of our people. This is necessary to advance our liberation struggle.

Dear People of Tamil Eelam, today our brothers in the Southern Tamil Eelam (eastern province) are in a desperate situation having lost their livelihood their property and life. They are also people who lived with human dignity and respect in their own land and in their own villages. Today, they are living under trying circumstances as displaced people in refugee camps. This is the plight of all the people of Tamil Eelam today.

Our people are being killed regardless of class or caste in every part of Tamil Eelam. The

rights and interests of our working people can only be achieved by freeing our homeland. This is a lesson that we have learned from the long history of oppression.

The need of the hour is the freedom of our nation. The motherland needs today young men and women who can fight bravely in the very face of death. Death and suffering are part and parcel of our liberation struggle.

One day our legitimate struggle for truth and freedom will be victorious. A new Tamil nation will be born without the contradiction of class, caste or creed, where all men and women are treated equally and with dignity.

The Tigers will create history. Their heroism, their yearning for freedom, their supreme sacrifices will enshrine a noble place for the Tamil people in the annals of the history of mankind.

All casinos raided

All casinos were raided, and all equipment found at these places were seized and no preferential treatment had been given to anyone, according to a press release issued by DIG (Colombo Range) A. S. Seneviratne.

The text of the press release:

"On 1/6/1991 Colombo City Police, acting under provision of the Emergency Regulations, seized jackpot machines from various locations in the City.

However, there was information that certain operators had hidden

around 4,000 of these machines. On 3/6/1991 the Inspector-General of Police requested the General Public to provide information regarding locations so that action could be taken.

"On information received, Police visited premises No. 18 Kinross Avenue, Bambalapitiya and seized the following:

- (1) 60 Nos. jackpot machines
- (2) 25 Nos. casino tables
- (3) 05 Nos. Roulette machines
- (4) 100 Nos. casino chairs.

"One person in whose possession these articles were found is being questioned.

City Police following leads in this investigations also visited premises No. 102/12 R. A. de Mel Mawatha, Colombo 3 and recovered components of jackpot machines and cash Rs. 239, 146 US Dollars 136.00, Deutsche Marks 510.00, Australian Dollars 20.00, S. Dollars 50.00, Hong Kong Dollars 1000.00 and Sterling Pounds 20.00. Five Thai nationals and two Malaysian nationals including one female, who were in this premises are now being questioned.

"No preferential treatment had been given to anyone. All casinos were raided and all equipment found at those places have been seized".

Disclose terms of Media Bill — IPI

The recently-installed Chairman of the International Press Institute (IPI) Cushrow Irani, is in Colombo on an urgent mission. A suave and outspoken Indian newspaper editor (he is Managing Director of the 'Statesman' of Calcutta) Mr. Irani addressing a press conference urged the Sri Lanka government to put out the text of the proposed Media Commission Bill soon so that there could be a public debate. Delay would mean that the people would have no opportunity to discuss such a vital piece of legislation, he explained.

Mr. Irani said that he had met State Minister for Information A. J. Ranasinghe and the President's Advisor on International Affairs Bradman Weerakoon and urged the same views on them. 'I told them that the IPI is no busybody or travelling circus trying to advise them on Sri Lanka's internal affairs but that we are extremely concerned about the future of press freedom in Sri Lanka', he said.

He said that the most disquieting feature of the whole exercise was that no final draft of the Bill was ready. He had been told that the government had not made up its mind still. Further he had been informed that this Bill had originated from the All Parties Conference. It seemed that the government was not taking responsibility for the Bill. From what he had been able to gather the Bill could not be used as an argument for a liberalisation of the media. 'It appears that the greatest threat to liberalisation of the media is interference by the government', he said.

Mr. Irani said that the freedom of expression was too important an issue to be left to politicians. That was why he was urging as wide a debate as possible. With great humility and seriousness I urge the government to release the terms of this Bill so that

there can be a debate he said. He noted that the Sri Lankan press had been prevented from commenting on it because no final draft had been released yet. He added that the IPI expected to play a role in any such debate.

Mr. Irani also said that the Bill seemed to be modelled on the Second Press Commission in India in 1982 which the Indian Press had successfully resisted. In fact Mr. Irani is described as one of those who had been in the vanguard of that resistance.

This is the second time that he has been elected Chairman of IPI which has a membership of 2000 editors and publishers worldwide. At its 40th Annual General Assembly in Kyoto in Japan in April the IPI adopted the following resolution on Sri Lanka.

The Fortieth Annual General Assembly of the International Press Institute, representing 2000 editors and publishers, deplors the introduction of legislation to set up a Media Commission designed to bring the print and electronic media in Sri Lanka under state supervision if not control.

Under the guise of concern for journalists, the government nominated Commission will severely inhibit the setting-up of new newspapers, weaken the ownership patterns of existing publications, and generally by a wide variety of regulatory powers, make the expression of opinions unfavourable to the government a hazardous occupation.

The Bill is modelled on the recommendation of the Second Press Commission in India, which were successfully resisted by the Indian Press.

The Sri Lankan Government needs to be reminded that the

press does not create a crisis, it merely reports it. The IPI supports the Press in Sri Lanka in its struggle against the Bill and calls upon the government to abandon it altogether.

— *Island*

The Day of...

(Continued from page 5)

ported ultra-Sinhala-nationalist JVP of its main emotional slogan and propaganda weapon. Gandhi's electoral failure and the new V. P. Singh regime was a blessing for both the UNP and the LTTE.

The war started. The Army has not won but the LTTE has been quite severely bruised.

The speed with which politics moved in India, both at the centre and in Tamilnadu, took the LTTE unawares. A weak Chandra Sekhar regime totally dependent on the parliamentary backing of Congress was arm-twisted into dismissing the DMK administration in Madras. While Mr. Gandhi's principal motive was to break Karunandhi's hold on the state-machine, the dissolution of the Tamilnadu assembly was a move that Ms. Jayalalitha, the Congress partner, devoutly desired. (Jayalalitha, Sri Lankan readers should note, has abandoned her polls campaign in the face of death threats that the Madras police took seriously)

The hunt is on. It has assumed global proportions. The heat is also on. Velupillai Prabhakaran may dream of EELAM, a new Tamil Kingdom, a Chola empire. It would be naive however to think that his responses to this unparalleled pressure are governed solely by such *folie de grandeur*. All he needs right now is a little breathing space. He is ready to talk to Colombo... and even cooperate with Delhi in the Gandhi investigation.

GANDHI KILLING: MOTIVES

S. Venkat Narayan, a former senior editor of **INDIA TODAY**, and now a wellknown freelance journalist published in many regional papers, including the **ISLAND** here, has covered the Tamil revolt for over, ten years. When asked by the **NYK Times** Barbara Crosette for possible **LTTE** motives he gave two: (a) the Indian decision to disarm the "Tigers", "holding its leader, Prabhakaran virtually a hostage in a Delhi hotel. Gandhi then sent troops against a people who thought India was a protector. . . the Tamils will never forgive Gandhi for that" (b) Rajiv forced Prabhakaran to take part in a public surrender of guns in the heart of his town" (Jaffna). "Prabhakaran's hero was Clint Rastwood. Without his gun, he was nothing. Rajiv humiliated him.."

The **NYK Times** also notes that "Kittu" had told the press in London that the **LTTE** had nothing to do with the assassination. Gandhi, Kittu, added, met an **LTTE** representative in March.

As India Mourns. . .

NEW DELHI

Terror and rioting in northern India scarred the somber cremation ceremony of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, assassinated seven years ago, and many in this tumultuous nation expected the same awful scenes to be repeated after Mrs. Gandhi's son, Rajiv, was struck down.

But the remains of Mr. Gandhi, the former prime minister who was killed in a bomb explosion near Madras while campaigning for a return to power, were consigned to flames in a sweltering moment of grief that nonetheless occurred in something approximating peace and stability.

Indian spokesmen were quick to assert that the nation, the world's most populous democracy, was once again showing its maturity by handling the trauma of assassination without collapsing.

But the relative calm was also seen as a function of the uncertainty over who murdered Mr. Gandhi, which diffused public

anger. Security forces were deployed more swiftly this time, and the atmosphere seemed testimony to the fact that Mr. Gandhi did not raise emotions as his mother did.

"When we heard Rajiv was killed, everyone was apprehensive," said Dr. D. S. Dua, a Sikh pathologist at a New Delhi hospital. "People's reasoning goes to the dogs at moments like this, and everyone was nervous about going out into the street. But it looks now like things are safe."

Sikhs suffered reprisals in 1984 after the killing of Mrs. Gandhi by two of her Sikh security guards.

Government officials say they suspect that the bombing that killed Mr. Gandhi was the work of a Tamil separatist group from Sri Lanka.

Tamil guerrillas seeking an independent state in Sri Lanka have long used south India as a base of operations. They have also not forgiven Mr. Gandhi for his decision as prime minister to send Indian troops in 1987 to help crush their rebellion. □

Chandra Shekhar says Tigers killed Rajiv

India's caretaker Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar has said there is "definite evidence to link the Tamil Tigers with the suicide bomb attack on former Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi on May 21, the London Observer reported.

The Observer said on June 2 that the tip-off regarding Tiger involvement was given when Palestine Liberation Organisation leader Yasser Arafat met Chandra Shekhar at Rajiv Gandhi's funeral, according to the London newspaper.

It is believed that Tigers have links with Arab extremist groups in Lebanon, which "they have carefully cultivated" and, according to sources in Delhi at least 200 Tigers have been trained by Palestinian splinter groups.

* * * * *

But Indian Tamils are generally not sympathetic to the goal of a Tamil state in Sri Lanka, and Tamils living throughout India do not have a distinct religious identity that would single them out as targets for reprisals.

Separatist movements have led to bloodshed in the Punjab in the north, in Assam in the northeast and in the Muslim-dominated northern state of Jammu and Kashmir, where army troops are maintaining an uneasy vigilance against secessionists.

But none of these movements has stirred quite the anger that was felt among Sikhs after Mrs. Gandhi used army troops to rout Sikh militants from the religion's holiest shrine, the Golden Temple of Amritsar, in June of 1984. After the Golden Temple raid, known as "Operation Blue Star," many said her life was doomed.

This week, some workers in the Congress (I) Party have tried to stir passions by blaming the climate of violence on rival political parties, particularly the parties that speak for Tamil nationalism and militant Hindus. But these criticisms have not discernibly swayed people in the streets. (*NYK Times*)

Bigotry and death, democracy and hope

Pran Chopra

The Assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, his face blown off, the skull smashed, limb torn from limb, must be one more proof, for those wishing to believe it, that India cannot hold together much longer.

The idea is reinforced by the recent rioting during India's most violent election, which left many scores dead. This was a re-run of what had happened only seven years earlier, when Rajiv's mother, Indira Gandhi, was assassinated in a political-religious eruption. Rioters took over Delhi and killed several thousands. For years Indira Gandhi had been the only government, and none was left when she fell to the bullets of her own security guards.

Repeatedly, as the Indian drama has unfolded since independence, on August 15 1947, fate seems to slip in episodes from the same reel of violence. The most startling was the assassination of another Gandhi, the Mahatma, on January 30 1948. The most gruesome was bloody massacre of the partition riots, when hundreds of thousands were killed within a few weeks.

The grim greyness of Hindu-Muslim riots, between opposing mobs which look alike in their poverty rags and criminal rage, is a danger ever present behind every disturbance. But often, all too often, it is broken by holocausts with more vivid colour: head-hunting tribes in the north-east battling the Indian army with their own underground "field marshals" and generals"; the silvery peace of Kashmir ending in the wailing of hundreds of Muslim women clad in black; the flowing beards of Sikh militants at the Golden Temple in Amritsar, now as often seen carrying AK 47 rifles as naked swords.

The latest tumult in this unfortunate line is also the largest.

The saffron-coloured backlash of Hindu orthodoxy claims to protect the motherland against a rebellious periphery, and against "ungrateful guests", as it describes the Muslims.

This orthodoxy, founded upon the highest segments of the Hindu social order, the caste system, wants to curb the growing restlessness of the lower castes. The conflict has inflamed the most ancient of Indian schisms. The primordial instincts and loyalties which it can arouse much of northern India for several weeks over a year ago, when many young people burned themselves to death in protest against a new government's decision to give the lower castes some protective discrimination.

The soldiers of this orthodoxy are a photogenic army of Hindu priests and mendicants with an assortment of others who have been pouring out of their social caves for the past year or two. The cameras of news men linger over them lovingly as they swarm across the electoral scene, or as they tried last year to pull down an ancient Muslim mosque, an event which precipitated the present elections. The strike of their pickaxes only repeated the question whether India would survive.

In reply, the Hindu orthodoxy yells an emphatic "yes" in a chorus, orchestrated by the Bharatiya Janata Party. Its leaders reject the secularism of Nehru's India vociferously and are making a strong bid for power in New Delhi. The modern-minded, liberal, democratic and secular Indian, suspecting a streak of fascism in BJP, bites his nails in nervousness.

Whether fascist or not, the BJP has won over many in the upper business and commercial sections and administration. It is no longer a party of fanatical youth with the financial backing of small traders. Many top military men have also joined it.

But the BJP's problem is that Hindu society is like an onion: the more you peel in search of the core the less you find it. This explains why many outside the BJP fear that its loyalties will first antagonise the non-Hindu and then absorb the Hindu into a movement with no coherent centre. These schisms and tensions, which are endemic, and the crises into which they repeatedly erupt, give the impression that India is being ground down by poverty and torn asunder by dissensions.

They give this impression until you flip the coin. Then you see a very different side of India.

The British left behind more than 500 Indias beside Pakistan: each of the 500 odd "princely" states became fully sovereign and independent. But within a couple of years, India knitted them together without firing a shot except in Kashmir, and later Hyderabad. This must rank among the largest acts of peaceful assimilation in history. It made India a larger juridical and administrative unit than in had ever been, under or before British rule.

Of all the territorial problems which accompanied the partition of India from Pakistan, only one now simmers, in Kashmir. All other secessionist threats have been resolved; that of Tamil Nadu was resolved entirely peacefully. (The "Sikh problem" is different because the Sikhs are not secessionist; only some militants are). Within the first three years, India also accomplished one of the largest rehabilitations of refugees and completed, and unanimously adopted, one of the most detailed and complex constitutions.

Under this constitution, India regularly conducts the world's largest elections. The last time it did so, in 1989, it had to handle an electorate of 500m, out of whom 297m voted. Except

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in this year, the elections have been free of any serious violence, have habitually returned centrist-liberal-democratic forces to power, have churned up a broad national consensus and have democratised, indigenised, ruralised and humanised communism more than in any other country.

Although undernourishment persists, famine has been banished, and production of food grains has risen fivefold. Poverty, which was absolute even by Indian standards, has been reduced by about a third. Indeed, India no longer has the cheap surplus labour it used to have. Punjabi farmers have to import labour from 1,000 miles away from the poverty pit of Bihar.

Industrial growth touched double digits in the late eighties. Agricultural growth, though slower, maintained itself over a longer haul, became less dependent upon good weather, and showed a well co-ordinated increase in the productivity of several hundred million people.

Indian industry meets around 90 per cent of the country's needs and foreign aid accounts for much less than 10 per cent of investments. Though India remains generally poor, more than 100m Indians have the same consumption standards as many in the lesser among the developed countries and 30m to 40m compare with those in the richest.

To an extent usually associated only with revolutions, political power has been transferred horizontally from the city to the town to the village, and from the urban-industrial to rural-agricultural interests. It has been transferred vertically from the big industry to medium entrepreneurs, from the pre-partition landed gentry to the descendants of their tenants and cultivators, then to the medium and very small land holders, and now, by hesitant steps, to the latter's hired labour and the landless. Few countries have changed so radically and so

quickly by democratic means and with less violence.

The effect may be seen in most villages outside the eastern Uttar Pradesh and Bihar regions. The main shop is similar to lesser ones in the town, television antennae poke through broken roofs. The man behind the plough often carries a transistor radio. Any sizeable village would have branches of more than one well known bank. Rural households' savings contribute to the stock of city-based corporations and are an important part of the household savings sector, which in turn is almost a quarter of total savings, a proportion exceeded only in China.

If these bits and pieces of change seem too remote, note the following, which fits more snugly into the values of our wicked times. Between the two assassinations, of the mother in 1948 and of the son this week, India came to feature in the western media as a "rising super power" as one of them put it, or at least as a regional power, partly because of rising military spending.

Why then all those forebodings about India's future, which I described earlier, on the other side of the coin? Partly they reflect the fact that the reality is bad, and partly that the image is even worse.

In economic policy, India made the cardinal blunder of rushing forward without preparing the ground. Heavy investments were financed by deficits at home and reckless borrowings abroad, but little was done first to improve the efficiency of the capital at work. So, although the growth rate has improved, India faces its worst ever financial crisis. The resulting erosion of confidence makes further borrowings extremely difficult. Even so, the base of the economy is now much wider and stronger; so a more sound thrust forward is attainable with the right policies.

Similarly, the polity is in disarray but not in decay. Most of its

critical components have greater vigour than before, and have opportunities to rebuild themselves afresh. The Congress (I) part has the chance to rid itself of dependence upon the crutch of the Nehru family. How ready it is to use the opportunity may be in doubt, considering the pathetic attempt to persuade Sonia Gandhi to be its next president, as though anyone is good enough if the name is right.

But it has the chance to rejuvenate itself with a collegiate of authentic leaders. Even if does not, India now has more viable parties than ever before, each with its distinct base and policy thrust, vigorously competitive and each able to be an alternative government by itself or in coalition.

The era of the one-family party appears, happily, to be over. I am not too greatly disturbed by the powerful emergence of BJP. It might perhaps become fanatically Hindu. But more than half of its support comes from those who are disappointed with the other parties. The appeal of its dogmatic Hindu face will not prosper so long as India remains a democracy.

I am sure that India will remain so. Every time India has honoured the democratic verdict, it has succeeded in solving its problems, be they the linguistic reorganisation of states in the mid-1950s, the aspirations of Tamil Nadu or the bringing of the geographical or social fringe into the mainstream of politics.

Every time the verdict has been subverted, India has been in trouble, be it in Punjab or Assam or Kashmir. Now democracy is even more deeply integrated with the social and economic fabric, drawing strength from the lowest depths of the Indian pyramid. That is why the backward classes and castes, for the first time, have a party among the front runners for power. There is also more promise that the other great systemic tension in Indian politics, between the Union, that is the center, and the federating states, will be resolved. The constitution pro-

(Continued on page 24)

Hunt for Gandhi killers. . . .

Meanwhile, Sri Lankan investigators assisting the Indian Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in the Gandhi assassination probe have reportedly gone to Vavuniya and questioned several people in this connection.

Sources also said several Tamil groups including the PLOTE and TELO, rivals of the LTTE, have assigned their own cadres to assist Sri Lankan authorities in the investigations.

The PLOTE, it is learnt, has assigned 20-25 of its cadres to conduct investigations in the Wannu region. The Tamil groups are checking for LTTE links in the killing of Mr. Gandhi, and are maintaining close contacts with the Sri Lankan investigations.

According to latest reports reaching the Foreign Ministry here, the alleged female assassin of Mr. Gandhi is believed to have received initial military training in Tamil Nadu in the early eighties, while several of her accomplices are also believed to have been trained in Israeli camps.

The woman bomber is also known to have visited the Central Prison in Madras to meet a hardcore LTTE'er two days prior to the assassination. □

“Loss to all freedom loving people”

Opposition Leader Sirimavo Bandaranaike told parliament during a condolence vote that

Rajiv Gandhi had attained the stature of a statesman not so much because his mother and his grandfather had been prime ministers before him but through hard work and dedication. Rajiv had represented a new style of government far different from that of his mother and grandfather; with him as prime minister India had jumped a generation.

Not only was he modern in outlook he was pragmatic and open minded, Mrs Bandaranaike said.

“His sudden and untimely death is a grievous loss not only to the people of India, but also to all freedom loving people throughout the world who desire a better tomorrow for themselves and their children”, the Opposition Leader said.

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Background to the 10th Indian election

Inder Malhotra

It is easy to scoff at stability which can, and does, sometimes become a cover for stagnation. But what havoc has been wrought by what was gleefully hailed by many, at the time of the Janata Dal government's formation, as the "creative confusion of coalition politics"? The collapse of two Indian governments in precisely 120 days has done the country no good at all. Any repetition of this misfortune would be even more catastrophic.

Doubtless there can be many other points and counter-points about the response of different parties and leaders — despite their programmatic differences and implacable personal hostility — to a popular mandate for a coalition. But these should be thrashed out after the election results are out. There is no point counting the chickens before the eggs are hatched.

For the present, attention ought to focus one of the daunting consequences of the mess made during the last 17 months. Since March 6, the country has been saddled with a government that the constitution never envisaged and the 844 million Indians never deserved. Whatever else happens at the hustings, the joys of a caretaker government the country should be spared in future.

To say this is not to deny that during the first few months after becoming Prime Minister — entirely because of the Congress support, for which he did have to pay some price — Mr Chandra Shekhar impressed the country and indeed earned a lot of goodwill. This was because of his no-nonsense style of governance, a propensity to take quick decisions and give the bureaucracy unambiguous directives and, in his public pro-

nouncements, giving a wide birth to cant and hypocrisy. Indeed, so pleased was the articulate opinion with him that he could get away with the flaunting of his friendship with the likes of Chandraswami, Khu shoggi and Dhanbad dons, to say nothing of other unorthodox ways.

Since then, especially since the conversion of his government into a caretaker one, things have taken a nosedive. On matters, big and small, there is cause for concern.

To take up the bigger and more worrying questions first, Punjab and Kashmir stand out like sore thumbs. There is a case for holding elections in Punjab, regardless of the obvious risks in following this course. Mr Chandra Shekhar cannot be faulted for his anxiety to restore the democratic process there even though some of the parties which have accepted his decision (unlike the Congress which remains totally opposed) share Mr Rajiv Gandhi's grave apprehensions about holding the poll in the terror-torn state at this juncture.

The trouble, however, is that the Prime Minister has gone about promoting elections in Punjab in a manner that has engendered the deepest suspicions about his motives. These have been strengthened further by the flap over the possibility of the elections in Bihar being postponed or the Laloo Prasad Yadav ministry in the state being dismissed.

In any case, Mr Chandra Shekhar's own frequent and, at times, contradictory statements on his talks with Sikh militants, including Pakistan-based ones, provide a classic example of confusing an issue in the name of clarifying it. What has been said by Mr Mohan Guruswamy, evidently the mediator between

the Prime Minister and the militants, can only add to the misgivings about what is going on.

As if this was not not enough, the militants have shown how they, or at least powerful groups among them, feel about a government that is bending over backwards to negotiate with them. The 52-hour fierce battle between terrorists entrenched in a fortified house, with built-in bunkers, in a Punjab village on the Pakistan border, and the army-backed police only the other day speaks for itself.

Even more eloquent is Mr Chandra Shekhar's own disillusionment and dismay with Pakistan over the brazen intensification of its continuing interference in Kashmir. That Islamabad has been steadily raising the ante vis-a-vis Kashmir, both on the ground across the line of control and in international fora, could be seen even by the purblind. But Mr Chandra Shekhar apparently happy with his talks on the telephone with the Pakistani Prime Minister, Mr Nawaz Sharif, continued to believe that the latter would not allow the low-intensity conflict in Kashmir to go beyond a certain limit.

This hope has been knocked out by Pakistani attempts to help Pakistan-trained and armed militants infiltrate into Kashmir under cover of heavy firing by the Pakistani army and to protest when more than 70 of these subversives were killed.

Mr Chandra Shekhar has told Pakistan bluntly what the consequences of a misadventure in Kashmir would be. But the other side of the coin is that as long as India appears to be divided and weak, the prospects after the elections remain uncertain and the situation in the valley is not brought under at least a semblance of control, Pakistan would go on exploiting what it

(The writer is one of India's top-rank journalists. He will be a regular contributor to our special section on the region)

perceives as a "window of opportunity".

In recent weeks a lot has been published about how some of the more wayward ministers in the caretaker council of ministers have brought the country's governance into utter disrepute. Governments in the past also have thrown norms and decencies to the winds but they commanded the confidence of Parliament to which they were answerable. The present bunch does not seem to realise that its position is totally different and that there are strict limits on what it can do.

But for timely Presidential intervention, many more monstrosities would have been perpetrated by ministers who seem to be behaving like rogue elephants than is the case. Lucrative contracts held over at last minute by Rashtrapati Bhavan are said to be worth several thousand crores of rupees. The number of politicians who might have been appointed to offices with a lot of clout and profit is legion.

However, neither Presidential intervention nor the chief Election Commissioner's categorical directives have stemmed in any way the orgy of out-of-turn allotments of telephones, cooking-gas cylinders, railway passes, government flats and so on.

All this pales into insignificance, however, compared with the effrontery of the deputy health minister, Mr Dasai Chaudhry, which amounts to a defiance of both the head of state and the head of the government. So far he has apparently got away with it. To cut a long, complicated and sordid story short, as working chairman of the Red Cross, of which Mr R. Venkataraman is the president, Mr Chaudhuri has reappointed for a period of five years a 65-year-old functionary, recently retired at the President's orders.

Distressed by this, the Prime Minister persuaded him to rescind the appointment. This he did. He even sent a copy of the cancellation order to Rashtrapati Bhavan. Almost imme-

diately thereafter he cancelled the cancellation order without a word to anyone.

When horrified officials, at a formal meeting of the Red Cross, drew attention to the impropriety the deputy ministers made

rude remarks about both the President and the Prime Minister. The transcript of his outburst is doing the rounds of the government at the highest level. But no one has yet said boo to Mr Dasai Chaudhury.

AMERICA'S REGIONAL STRATEGY

Pakistan's security options

Mushahid Hussain

ISLAMABAD

Amid signs that the United States victory in the Gulf War has been tarnished by the massive human problem created by the exodus of displaced Iraqis, the US is apparently unwavering in its attempt to browbeat Pakistan into reversing its nuclear programme. Concurrently, there are fresh indications of Pakistani endeavours with equally strong determination to resist such pressures and to pursue security options independent of the United States.

Three separate developments are pointers to this evolving regional scenario. First, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen has become the leader of a major country to challenge the American notion of a "New World Order". During an April 18 statement, the Chinese Foreign Minister said that "it would be dangerous to think the world now has a single Superpower." He also expressed the Chinese view that "a triumvirate of the United States, Japan and Western Europe would not represent the interest of the whole world". This statement comes only a few weeks before the scheduled visit, in May, of General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Jiang Zemin, to the Soviet Union.

Second, on April 19, the Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the US House of Representatives decided to apply

stringent curbs on possible arms transfers by China to five specified Muslim countries, namely, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria. In legislation similar to the Pressler Amendment, which applies only to Pakistan, it will now be incumbent for the American President to provide an annual certification that China has not provided military assistance including "ballistic missiles, advanced fighter aircraft, or a major component or technology for any such missile or aircraft, chemical weapons, or any material for use in a nuclear programme". Interestingly, Syria has also been included in this list of the "most dangerous" Muslim countries which, in the American view, should be militarily defanged, although Damascus has been a key member of the US-led war against Iraq.

Another manifestation of this American pressure was the meeting at the White House, on April 16 between president George Bush and Dalai Lama, the India-based exiled spiritual and political leader of Tibetans. This was the first such meeting between Dalai Lama and an American President since the former has been living in exile from 1959 onwards. According to a report in The Washington Post, the Bush meeting with the Dalai Lama "reflected US unhappiness with China over reports that the Chinese sold missile systems to Pakistan in violation of pledges".

Third, given this context of increasing American pressure on both China and Pakistan in the wake of the Gulf War, Pakistani policy makers are seeking to

One of Pakistan's outstanding journalists the writer is wellknown in the region as an analyst of security issues. He will be a regular contributor to the LANKA GUARDIAN

(Continued on Page 19)

The LTTE — Tamil Relationship

P. Saravanamuttu

The government has received genuine all-party support (extending to anti-Tiger Tamil groups) for its characterization of the conflict as a war against extremism rather than the Tamil people. As a measure of Tiger isolation and in an ironic role-reversal, the EPRLF, who had in March 1990 threatened a unilateral declaration of independence and in the era of government-LTTE cordiality was cold-shouldered as New Delhi's pawn, is now upheld as a group that has disavowed secession. Internationally, and with India in particular, the government has emphasized what it believes to be its most effective propaganda weapon — the charge that the Tigers alone are fundamentally opposed to the political solution delineated in the Accord and resorted to war as the only method at their disposal to destroy this consensus. The assassination of 14 EPRLF leaders in Madras during the fighting in Sri Lanka, though denied by the Tigers, and the slaughter of captured Sri Lanka policemen invariably lends credence to this argument when set against the well-documented LTTE record of political killings. It has also eased the task of the multi-ethnic Opposition delegation dispatched to South Asian capitals to publicize the government's version of events.

Consequently, the LTTE has to contend with considerable political isolation — a not unfamiliar position for it, and one which it has exploited in the past to reinforce its credentials as an independent nationalist movement fully committed to self-determination. Moreover, in a situation of armed confrontation, the government's propensity to use its superior military power indiscriminately has enabled the guerrillas to portray themselves as the protectors of the Tamil people. This calculation features in the Tiger attitude towards

both the current hostilities and the issue of participation by other groups in the elections. The government's argument that the LTTE sought to obtain at the negotiating table what it was no longer absolutely confident of verifying at the polls — its standing as the sole authentic representative of the Tamils — is not mere conjecture. Colombo's refusal to accept this unconditionally, plus its military reinforcements and Sinhalese colonization of the east, constituted provocation to the Tigers. It justified a re-evaluation of their priorities — the renewed promotion of separatism through armed struggle as a primary goal and not as the insurance policy it had become in the optimistic climate of detente with the government.

The shift in popular allegiance underlying this reasoning is predicated upon war weariness and, more importantly, the basic ambivalence surrounding the Tiger-Tamil relationship. This has always been accompanied by reservations and respect as much as by admiration and enthusiasm, referred to above as the 'body-guard but perhaps not ruler' syndrome. LTTE arguments about how years of struggle have resolved caste and class contradictions amongst the Tamils notwithstanding, Tamil conservatism and battle fatigue might redound to the detriment of the Tigers. Yet if the Sri Lankan government conducts this war brutally, a regrouped Tiger movement could emerge rejuvenated by a popular momentum towards secession.

Another factor in the changed strategic context is the unlikelihood of a second Indian intervention. To maintain this, following Indian expressions of concern, Colombo dispatched its foreign secretary to New Delhi to affirm Sri Lankan fidelity to provincial autonomy and to promise to keep civilian casualties to a minimum. With the IPKF experience behind it and Indian Prime Minister

V. P. Singh's professed desire for good neighbourly relations, New Delhi has stressed its reluctance to become embroiled directly in the conflict. Nor do Indian domestic political considerations favour intervention. Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi's preferences for the Tigers aside, there is limited sympathy for their cause in Madras. The Congress opposition, not surprisingly, has baited the Singh government for not adopting a higher and potentially interventionist profile. The extent to which Sri Lanka becomes a major internal issue in India will invariably be a function of its utility as an instrument of leverage in centre-state relations and local politics.

What has always militated in the Sri Lankan government's favour, and continues to do so in the present conflict, is the Indo-Sri Lankan congruence of interest against secession. The Indians cannot be indifferent, but with Punjab, Kashmir and a host of centrifugal pressures unresolved, (not to mention their earlier manifestation in Tamil Nadu), they cannot champion separatism in Sri Lanka either. Their defence of the union in Kashmir inhibits outright condemnation of the methods adopted by the Sri Lankan government. Yet this detachment only signifies military retrenchment, not political or diplomatic disengagement. The protagonists' dilemma — their ability to wage only inconclusive war and not indefinitely — underlines the inevitability and urgency of external assistance in the search for a diplomatic exit from the impasse. In this process Indian agreement, if not assistance, will be sought. Until the conflict has been resolved and a solution implemented, signature of an Indo-Sri Lankan treaty will be delayed — with Colombo, rather than Delhi, being the more eager to sign.

Political and Military Asymmetries

For a variety of reasons, the government needs a quick and decisive end to the conflict. In comparison, the LTTE is no stranger to prolonged struggle and can simply retreat into the jungles. The economy is even worse than in 1987 (largely because of the damage caused by the JVP insurgency), and so peace is essential for reconstruction. The vital flow of aid and its disbursement has been promised on a termination of hostilities; continuation of the conflict will therefore try the patience of the donors further and fatally retard economic recovery. Politically, the consequences could be a fillip to the JVP. As the programme for the alleviation of poverty promised by the President in delyed or redesigned beyond recognition, the JVP would be able to denounce it as yet another unfulfilled electoral promise. Indeed, the repeated government failure to address this fundamental grievance has sustained the JVP through adversity in the past. Another disturbing factor is that yet again Sri Lanka's fate depends upon the performance of the security forces. More than mere brutalization of society, in the 1980s Sri Lanka experienced unparalleled militarization. A coup can be discounted in the absence of an undisputed military leader, but the prominence and politicization of the armed services must be viewed as an unhealthy precedent. Those who argued in the aftermath of the last JVP uprising for a return to nonpartisan civilian control of the security services now have to refute the apparently potent counter-argument that such forces are securing the country against extremism, rather than endangering democracy.

Therefore an early resolution of the existing military stalemate is imperative for Colombo, and an essential prerequisite for whatever settlement it envisages. However, the battle for Jaffna, averted in 1987 by Indian intervention on the pretext of

preventing a civilian bloodbath, will be no less bloody in 1990 — arguably even more so given the stakes and the degree of Tiger entrenchment. The opposition of both sides to external military intervention only confirms this. External assistance will be sought once the military balance has definitely swung in a particular direction but insufficiently to deal the final blow, or alternatively, to monitor a cease-fire and in a mediatory capacity to secure agreement to a solution. This assumes, however, the willingness of external powers to overcome their reluctance to take a direct role in the Sri Lankan conflict and to risk harassment or non-co-operation from the protagonists.

The differing political constraints on both sides suggest that with regard to a settlement, the guerrillas could afford greater flexibility than the government. Profound mutual distrust and the need to maintain credibility reinforces the adherence to uncompromising definitions of objectives. But, as in 1987, the Tigers could justify qualified acceptance of a settlement on tactical grounds, without great sacrifice to their reputation. The likelihood of this depends on the course of the war. At present a test of wills is being enacted, in which each side is resolved to prove its tenacity and to wear the other down.

The government, on the other hand, cannot display any equivocation regarding secession without seriously prejudicing its position in the south. Yet the 'fight to the finish' cannot be accomplished by military means alone, but will require a viable political solution that meets the standards of legitimacy and meaningful decentralization. No solution imposed by the government will last and therefore the case for fresh elections should be welcomed at the earliest opportunity. In addition, the issues of colonization and policing will have to be readdressed within the broad framework of a distinctive devolution package for the Tamils.

Provincial elections or not, there are indications that a referendum will be held, and a territorial adjustment to reflect the electoral verdict in the east is a possibility. The Amparai district, with its Sinhalese-Muslim majority, could be detached from the amalgamated province and the strategic neutrality of Trincomalee protected through an Indo-Sri Lankan treaty. The territorial adjustment, however, would not be easy or represent a simplifying segregation. A general election to secure a mandate or *post facto* legitimation for these proposals and those emanating from the All Party Conference convened in September 1989 at the height of the JVP insurgency to deliberate on the national crisis, is another government option and that could buttress the President's position.

Demonstrable commitment by the government to decentralization and development is an absolute minimum condition for a settlement. Were the provincial council to be subjected to the same treatment as before, it would be compromised. In the north-east, too, durable bases for sustainable prosperity have to be laid. Finances pledged for this purpose must be released and this crucial venture expedited. Whichever Tamil group or groups are elected to the council, they must be treated as partners, not pawns, and not forced into militancy to avoid political extinction. In short, the council remit must reflect the LTTE success in advancing recognition of Tamil interests, even if the council will be inaugurated without it. Failure to do so would be tantamount to inviting a debilitating war of attrition, economic devastation and chronic instability.

The Tigers would dismiss the prospect of any solution without their direct participation or concurrence as a farcical duplication of the defects of the Accord. However, there is now a more widespread perception that a settlement is imperative, and that it should not be contingent

upon completion of the LTTE's transition to mainstream peacetime politics within Sri Lanka. Taking heart from other guerrilla groups that have prevailed after decades of seemingly hopeless struggle, the Tigers have vowed to fight on in the hope that international opinion will eventually shift in their favour. The analogies with other groups are somewhat misplaced, given strained Indian-Tiger relations, and greater multipolarity in the international system. Furthermore, it is inconceivable that any government in Colombo would, having failed to defeat secession on the battlefield, be immune to irredentism thereafter. In this respect, the Tigers have yet to demonstrate that they could acquire the requisite conventional military capability or would be able to forge the alliances necessary for the attainment of Eelam as well as its defence.

Guerrilla movements, however, also adapt to survive. The LTTE is no doubt aware of the obstacles to the realization of Eelam. They are fully cognizant, too, of the power at their disposal, even in the changed strategic environment, to destroy any settlement that excluded them. Therefore, it is likely that the real significance of Eelam is as a unifying force for the LTTE, espoused

to obtain maximum concessions, but not necessarily as an end in itself. Exercised with dexterity and acute sensitivity to the power configuration of the day, this could be a versatile *modus operandi*. Exercised frequently, its strategic rationale could become too transparent, locking its exponents into protracted and unprofitable struggle and self-imposed exile from the political arena. Consequently, as the military situation is clarified, the Tigers will have to decide whether their undisputed contribution to the Tamil cause can be rechannelled into the politics of pluralism and compromise. A negative decision carries the risk that militancy could become a diminishing asset. In addition, there is the possibility that if a settlement for the Tamils proves unsatisfactory, an *intifada*-type popular movement could spring up that ostensibly accepts LTTE leadership, but in reality has a momentum of its own.

Conclusion

Between the greater tactical flexibility that the LTTE can afford and the decentralization that the government can concede, lie the ingredients for a settlement which resembles the Accord substance but, as a direct agree-

ment between the principal belligerents, does not replicate its flaws. The legacy of mistrust and bitterness will not be erased immediately; it will be substantially reduced if this common ground is seized with imagination and magnanimity.

Perhaps the form of external assistance that could best reduce distrust and enhance confidence in a settlement is the participation of the international donors in discussions pertaining to rehabilitation and developmental programmes in the north-east. Project-related aid, monitored by donors rather than by a government which the recipients do not trust, would be a visible expression of commitment to peace and stability. It is, of course, not above reproach. Some would argue that economic aid of this kind would be an unwelcome interference in Sri Lanka's internal politics. But in an ever more interdependent world, one hopes that this would only be a minority concern.

Indeed, interdependence is a central concept to the settlement of the conflict. Whatever forms of political association emerge, the peoples of the island will have to co-exist. If they are to prosper they cannot survive in two armed camps.

Pakistan's security . . .

(Continued from page 16)

evolve security options based on strengthening military and political links with China and Iran. Two high-powered Chinese military delegations have been visiting Pakistan, including one led by the Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Peoples Liberation Army of China and two Pakistani senior military delegations are embarking on visits to Iran, with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, Admiral Iftikhar Ahmed Sirohey leading the second delegation which is scheduled to go to Tehran next week. Incidentally, Pakistan had also played the role of a bridge in building relations between China and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In the debate over the nuclear issue between Islamabad and Washington, two bottomlines seem to be clear. The US is apparently not keen to resume aid to Pakistan until it is able to get Pakistan to reverse the nuclear programme or to "suitably trim it" to meet American requirements. Concurrently, Pakistan's political and military leadership also seems to be clear that no compromise is either possible or acceptable on the nuclear issue. During an interview to "The NEWS" on April 22 Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif categorically stated that "we cannot compromise on our sovereignty with regard to

the nuclear question. Any policy that discriminates against Pakistan and does not take into account India's avowed nuclear ambitions is unfair, unacceptable and unlikely to further the goal of non-proliferation".

The myth of a "sole Superpower" and "Unipolar World" must not demoralise Pakistani policy makers into accepting the American diktat on the nuclear programme. Iran and China have already led the way, in resisting American hegemony in the region. Pakistan too must not lag behind since its own vital national interests and the broader interest of the Muslim World is at stake.

An Analysis of the Trends

— Democrat

PREFACE

The Elections in Sri Lanka are a mirror of public opinion. They also reflect the socio-economic trends in the society at large. The party results also represent the changing rhythm of opinion cycles in sub sectors and among various classes and groups. Professionals in the field of investments, marketing and in politics generally take note of these "externalities" in strategic policy and programme planning. Political parties normally do a post mortem of how they did at elections and compare with their original expectations. Yet others identify by their strong and the weak points and plan their future moves. This study was instigated by my professional interest at a time when parties were playing about with figures each claiming victory.

INTRODUCTION

The period between 1977 — 1991 has seen 7 elections.

1. General Elections — 1977
2. First Referendum — 1982
3. Provincial Councils — 1983
4. District Development Council — 1981
5. Presidential Elections — 1988
6. Parliamentary Election — 1990
7. Local Government Elections — 1991

These elections reflect the public opinions in the various sectors and the sub-sectors in the country. This study aims at relating these trends to the overall policy initiatives taken by the government.

During this period, the country has seen untold hardships due to terrorism in the country. In the North and East barbaric action by separatist militant terrorist is threatening the peace and unity of the country. The Indo-Lankan Peace Accord and the presence of the IPKF added fuel to fire. It is within this atmosphere the democratic elections were held.

The writer is a senior S. L. researcher who has specialised in the studies of local voting patterns.

Peace was brought in the South and IPKF was asked to leave Sri Lanka the normal political and economic process became operative.

The political history of the Sri Lanka reveals six political watersheds.

- 1948 — 1956 : The UNP
- 1956 — 1965 : The MEP/SLFP
- 1965 — : The UNP
- 1965 — 1970 : The SLFP
- 1970 — 1977 : The ULF/SLFP
- 1977 — 1991 : The UNP. (to date)

Patterns of electorates in the past revealed left power bases along the urban based maritime areas and in few rural areas. The SLFP had a rural base with the UNP having a broad base both in the urban and the rural sectors. The balance got changed with the plantation workers of Indian origin getting Sri Lanka citizenship — especially in the Kandyan homeland. After 1983, few ethnic groups emerged as political factor — SLMC, CWC, EROS, EPRLF. There were transformation in the leadership in several major parties. The left got disarrayed and acted at cross purposes due to power struggle within the movement.

THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS 1991

The first local government elections since 1988 was held in May 1991. It was held in 17 districts except the North and the East. The elections covered 237 local bodies. There were 7499 polling booths. The total number of seats involved were 3533. There were 8,625, 145 registered voters. 11 political parties and 82 independent groups contested. Nearly 75,000 public servants of all categories assisted by 20,000 police men helped to conduct the elections. The election was to select candidates for 10 M.C.'s, 33 UC's and 194 Pradeshaya Sabahas. The total votes polled at the Local Government elections was 6,293,929. This was 72.97% of the total registered votes. The total valid votes was 5,704,990 or 90.64%. The total rejected votes was in the range of 7.2% in the Colombo district and 14.4% in the Nuwara Eliya district. The UNP won 1976 seats or 55.9% of the seats. SLFP 1148 or 22.5% of the seats. The UNP captured 190 local bodies, SLFP 36 local bodies and others 11 local bodies.

The UNP registered 58.0% of the polls in the Kandy district.

Registered 58.0% of the polled in the Kandy district and a low poll of 33.3% in the Nuwara Eliya district. The SLFP received the highest percentage of the votes polled in the Hambantota district where the figure was 46.1% and its

lowest was in the Colombo District where only 21.6% of the votes polled went to the SLFP. The MEP collected 1.7% of the polled votes in the Hambantota district and the lowest in the Badulla district where they received 0.1% of the polls. The SLMP received 5.5% of the total polls at Galle district and the lowest at the Nuwara Eliya district where they received 0.4% of the total polls. The NSSP received the highest at the Ratnapura district where it received 3.7% of the total polls and the lowest was at the Kalutara and the Kegalle districts which gave 0.2% of the total polls at the election. The LSSP received 9.1% of the total votes polled at the Kegalle district and received 0.2% in the Gampaha district. The SLCP received 10.6% of the total polled at the Matara district and 0.3% in the Badulla district. The BNP received 2.1% of the total polled at the Nuwara Eliya district and 0.3% in the Kandy district. SLMF received 0.5% of the total polled at the Kegalle district whilst the SLMC received 2.7% of the total polled at the Kandy district and the lowest was at the Matara district where it received 0.1% of the total polled. There were three independent groups. Group 1 contested all 17 districts and received 15.5% of the total polled in the Colombo district and the lowest was at the Anuradhapura district where it received 0.3% of the total polled. The Independent Group II contested 4 districts and its highest poll was at the Kalutara district where it received 0.7% of the total polled and the lowest was at the Kandy district where it received 0.7% of the total polled. The Independent Group III contested one district — Nuwara Eliya — where it received 0.3% of the total polled. The CWC received 27.1 of the total polled in the Nuwara Eliya district. SLFP received 0.5% of total polls.

Thus, it is clear that the elections reveals the following scenario.

(1) The U.N.P. has increased its votes over the years.

At the Parliamentary Elections of 1977 it received — 1,828,000 votes
 At the DDC Elections of June 4, it received — 1,515,106 votes
 At the First Referendum in 1987 — 3,141,223 votes
 At the Presidential Elections of Dec. 19, 1988 it received — 2,569,199 votes
 At the General Elections of Feb. 1990 it received — 2,837,961 votes
 At the Local Government Elections of May 1991 — 2,910,438 votes

Thus, over 10 years the UNP has gained 1,395,332 votes or 92.1% over 1981 situation. Between the 1989 Presidential Elections of 1989 and 1991, the UNP has gained only

341,239 votes or 13.28% over 1989. Its gain over 1990 General Election was 72,477 or 2.55% over 1990. Over 10 years its gain works out to an average of 9.25% per annum but figures between 1989 — 1991 reveals it to be slightly lower.

(2) The S.L.F.P. has had a slow growth in the votes

At the DDC Elections it boycotted
 At the Presidential Elections it gained — 2,289,860 votes
 At the General Election 1990 — 1,780,599 votes
 At the Mini Local Elections — 1,996,820 votes

Thus, over 2 years, SLFP reduced 293,040 votes between Dec 1988 and May 1991 which was a reduction of 12.79%. However, between February 1990 and May 1991, it gained 216,221 which was a 12.14% gain over 1990 compared to the UNP gain of 2.55% over 1990 votes.

(3) The other parties put together reveals that the 'true' left is an emerging force as a group.

DDC Elections 1981 — TULF, JVP, CTC, Independents received — 1,062,449 votes
 Presidential Elections 1989
 SLMP, received — 235,719 votes
 General Elections — 1990 — all except SLFP received — 977,758 votes
 Local Government Elections — 1991 — 1,222,339 votes

Thus, between 1981 — 1991, the left splinter groups and ethnic groups have gained by 159,890 votes or by 15.04% over 1981. Between the Presidential Elections and the Local Elections 1991, it has gained by 916,620. Between 1990 General Elections of 1990 and 1991 General Elections it gained only by 244,581 votes which is higher than the SLFP gain and the UNP gain. If these groups form an alliance, it could become a substantial force in the politics of the country.

(4) The Independents as a group is also emerging as a force in the political area.

DDC — 1981 — received — 210,243 votes
 Local Govt. Elections — 1991 received — 280,523 votes

(5) The minority ethnic parties are emerging as a 'factor' in politics.

SLMC received — 202014 votes at the General elections in 1990.

— 58864 votes at the Local Government elctions in 1991.

- CWC received — 59294 votes only at Nuwara Eliya district in 1991
- TULF received — 468,560 votes at the DDC Elections in 1981
- 188,593 votes at the General Elections in 1990.

These ethnic parties are going to be a decisive factor in future formation of governments at a General Election. CWC could capture between 15—25 seats in the Hill Country if it decides to come out singly as a Regional party not of plantation workers of Indian origin but as a national party with Sinhala and Moslem representatives. The UNP and the SLFP could build its roots at farmer organizations outside plantations in order to meet this potential challenge from the CWC. Alternatively, the CWC should get merged with the UNP instead of keeping their image and joining the UNP of an alliance.

(4) REGIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE ELECTIONS RESULTS IN 1991

An analysis by districts of the votes secured by each party has lot to reveal. The Janasaviya Poverty Alleviation was operational in 28 AGA Divisions in all 25 Districts of the country. 188,000 families were identified by the people themselves to be poor and the very poor drawing incomes less than Rs: 700 per month. These families were given their consumption and investment component from October 1, 1989. They will receive it for 24 months.

An analysis of the voting patterns has correlation to the assistance given by the Janasaviya beneficiaries.

- Kalutara JSH 10215 families in Agalawatte Agalawatte PS UNP won. These was 59.33% of UNP votes
- Akurana JSH 4183 families Akurana P. S. UNP received 58.61% votes
- Galewala JSH 57739 families Galewala PS UNP received 55.94% votes
- Walapane JSH 12163 families UNP received 63.47% votes at the Walapane P.S. CWC also contributed to the victory
- Niyagama JSH 70092 families UNP received 57.07% votes at Niyagama PS
- Hakmana JSH 93321 families UNP received 61.31% votes at Hakmana PS
- Hambantota 51872 JHS families UNP received 55.84% votes at Hambantota PS

- Kobegane JSH 90918 families UNP received 60.70% of votes at Kobegane P.S.
- Kaluwaragaswewa — JSH 4250 families UNP received 66.86% of votes at the Kaluwaragaswewa P.S.
- Horawapatharna 4508 JSH families UNP received 68.91% of votes at the PS
- Elahera — 34881 JSH families UNP received 56.92% of votes at the PS
- Ridimadiyadde — 93543 JSH families UNP received 81.77% of the votes at the PS
- * Madulla — 49999 JSH families SLFP won it. UNP received only 43.70% of votes at the PS.
- Embilipitiya — JSH — 14230 UNP won PS — received 48.86% votes
- Aranayake — JSH — 9415 UNP won PS — received 58.92% votes
- * Hanwela — JSH 9878 sitawake PS won by MEP UNP RECEIVED S%.!)% votes
- Divulapitiya — JSH 15241 UNP won Divulapitiya PS. Received 51.97% votes.

The local authority wise and district wise results reveals

- Colombo highest UNP polls 60.92% in Seetawakapura UC
- Gampaha 63.80% in Minuwangoda UC
- *Kalutara 59.33% in Agalawatte PS
- Kandy 77.79% in Panwila PS
- Malate 76.03% in Laggala Pallegawa PS
- Nuwara Eliya 63.47% in Walapane PS
- Galle 67.20% in Hikkaduwa PS
- Matara 64.09% in Weligama UC
- Hambantota 59.44% in Lunuganwehera PS
- Kurunegala- UNP received highest votes in Kuliypitiya UC - 76.02%
- Puttalam - UNP received Chilaw- 78.06%
- Anuradhapura - UNP Horawapathana PS - 68.91%
- Polonnaruwa Lankapura PS - 57.35%
- *Badulla Ridimaliyadda - 81.75%
- Moneragala Kataragama PS - 66.73%
- Ratnapura Balangoda PS - 56.09%
- Kegalle Deraniyagala PS - 71.37%

This reveals that JSH families had their impact on the voting pattern. The popularity of the UNP in each area apart from Janasaviya was due to

- (a) Personality and Popularity of the President
- (b) Peace after terrorism
- (c) Problems solved after Presidential Mobile eg, Hambantota, Lunuganwehera, Embilipitiya, Putlam, Kegalle, Matara, Anuradhapura.
- (d) Lack of queues and availability of goods
- (e) Effectiveness of the local bodies
- (f) Personal attention of the MP and the local organization.
- (g) Eradication/Minimising of waste and corruption in eg, Lunuganwehera, Anuradhapura, Walawe.
- (h) Strong propaganda net work booked by the Media. The TV played its effective role indirectly.

The UNP lost the following local bodies

1. **Colombo** —
Kotte, Kotikawatte - Mulleriyawa, Kesbawa, Kaduwela, to SLFP - Sitawaka Mahargama to MEP - Homagama to Independents
2. **Gampaha** —
Ja - Ela, Dompe, Minuwangoda, Mahara, Gampaha, Attanagalla PS to SLFP. Ja - Ela UC - to Independents
3. **Kalutara** —
Panadura UC, PS to SLFP Dodangoda and Bandaragama, PS to SLFP Beruwela UC to Independents
4. **Galle**
Habaraduwa, Tawalama, Neluwa, Akmeemana, Nagoda, Bope-Boddala, Baddegama PS to SLFP
5. **Matara** —
Mulatiyana, Weligama, Matara, Thihangoda PS to SLFP Malimboda PS + Matara UC to CPSL
6. **Hambantota** —
Tissamaharama, Weeraketiya, Beliatta, and Angunukollapellessa to SLFP.
7. **Kurunegala** —
Polgahawela PS to SLFP
8. **Puttalam** —
Nattandiya PS to SLFP
9. **Anuradhapura** —
Galnewa PS to SLFP

10. **Polonnaruwa** —
Thamankaduwa PS to SLFP
11. **Moneragala** —
Madulla PS to SLFP
12. **Ratnapura** —
UC to SLFP

The reasons of the SLFP gains are:

- (a) High cost of living, transport difficulties, high land cost. The people who migrated to Colombo started migrating to dometry areas like Ratmalana, - Mt. Lavinia, Moratuwa, Panadura, Kalutara, Kelaniya, Kotte, Kotikawatte, Mulleriyawa, Mahara, Malabe, Kaduwela, Ja-Ela, Wattala, Negombo, Maharagama, Homagama, Kottawa, Avisawella, where they managed to purchase builable local to build houses, but suffered due to lack of facilities like electricity, water supply, drainage, sewerage, transport and thus, they protested against not the lack of these facilities, which they saw the city of Colombo dwellers were enjoying.
- (b) Ineffective and corrupt UC/PS in some areas.
- (c) Unpopularity of the existing MP
- (d) Complacency of the UNP organizations
- (e) Infighting in the party ranks with individualism emerging above party.
- (f) Unemployment and lack of economic development.
- (g) Leaders being away from the people.

A lesson that the major parties could learn from the trends of the Elections are :

- Not to be complacent with victory and expect the trends to continue because every steep trend could stabilize and then decline.
- Regularly organize the people by participating in people based activities.
- Do the follow up of the Janasaviya groups because they could turn against the government once they are left alone after 24 months. They must be strengthened.
- Visit the electorate regularly and do justice above party politics.
- Take steps to bring down the cost of living by restructuring marketing and an aggressive food drive.
- Discipline in party ranks.
- Strengthen the power base in the agrarian society.

NEXT: Quantitative Analysis

Those Long Afternoons

Gehan Wijewardene claims that "the fundamental characteristic" of the class to which he belongs ("our class") is vulgarity. Since he purports to speak for the whole class and not just for himself we can scarcely let this pass with a nonchalant "If you say so". The vulgarity, it is alleged, overrode "even the very commendable scholarship associated with this class." Having made this striking assertion Gehan offers no proof of it. He considers that whatever evidence is needed to bear him out must be **documentary** and he confesses he finds himself unable to summon the needed documentary evidence. He does produce a quotation from Michael Ondaatje's "Running in the Family" but it is difficult to see how this helps him. It would appear that to Gehan "vulgarity" and "a knowledge of English" are synonymous terms. Gehan speaks approvingly of Ludowyk's "socialist vision", Ludowyk had this vision in the pink decade and during the war when most people with social conscience could scarcely help seeing socialism as the antithesis of fascism. But, as Gehan concedes, "he never got very far". The particular brand of socialism Ludowyk favoured was (long after he emigrated) to degenerate in Sri Lanka from the highly principled standards it started out with to the ignominy of the **masalavaday line, the illegal demonetisation in which currency notes with the signature of the governor of the central bank forged were foisted on the public and finally the disastrous constitution of 1972 which directly led to the Tamil youth taking up arms against the government.** It is difficult to imagine Ludowyk subscribing to this post-1965 version of Sri Lankan "socialism".

In his book written shortly before his death Ludowyk uses what Gehan calls "the idiom of his childhood" by which he means purely Lankan locutions which would be incomprehensible elsewhere in the world. There is certainly nothing wrong with using such idiom in a book meant for publication in Sri Lanka (albeit after a failed attempt to publish in London). However, it is not merely Lankan usages that one spots in the book but also cluttered writing, sheer inanities (like carefully explaining to the reader what the phrase "she eats like a bird" meant), repeated misspellings, an occasional malapropism and so

Bigotry and death, . . .

(Continued from page 12)

vides for a healthy and flexible balance between them. But the Congress (I), subverted it. Being itself prone to a centralised, authoritarian style, it carried the infection into the structure

of state power during its long years in office.

But this excess has brought about a widespread realisation that the imbalance must be corrected. This, and the need for decentralising power to the villages, have become a part of

on. Take this sentence from a paragraph quoted by Gehan: "So it was with no great sense of loss that my little knowledge of Sinhalese faded". What is this sentence supposed to mean? That his "knowledge of Sinhalese" felt no loss? The number of these peccadilloes is too large to be allowed as permissible in a teacher of English. One would imagine that the kindest explanation is that, in his old age, the author had become slipshod in his writing. Gehan, however, is of the view that kindness of that sort is vulgarity.

One recalls that Doric de Sousa, like Ludowyk another talented teacher of English, had the same antipathy to knowing English as Gehan has. In October 1971 there was in Colombo a seminar on Youth at which Doric, speaking in English, made the following statement; "The thousands of children present at this seminar are not the real youth of the country because they understood English. The **real** youth of this country understand only Sinhala". (Doric said nothing about the "reality" of children who spoke only Tamil — this was after they had adopted the masalavaday line.) Doric received this wry response from one who had listened to him with astonishment:

DORIC ON REALITY

What is real, what unreal has always confounded
The world's thinkers in the realms of

What - Why - and - Where

Since Bishop Berkeley upped and propounded
"What's not felt by the senses just is not there".
Sam Johnson, stern realist, glowering darkly,
Kicked a stone and shouted "That refutes Berkeley!"
But it's sad to relate that what suffered damage
Was not Berkeley's theory but Johnson's cartilage.
So centuries passed without any light.
On the question of which of the two was right.
But now, to our relief, in terms categoric,
The answer's been given by the outspoken Doric.
Of his clear exposition I give you the gist:
"If you understand English you do not exist."

This was carried in the Times of Ceylon soon after the seminar but evoked no reply from Doric.

V. P. Vittachi

P.S.

If Gehan would permit me a little vulgarity, it's "riveting" and not "rivetting" **VPV**

emerging consensus. I can therefore see many healing tendencies which can correct the distortions of the economy and the polity. This is the aspect of the Indian reality, which registers much less, especially abroad, because it does not throw up menacing images.



Black Knight
It's your move

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