

LANKA

GUARDIAN

Vol. 14 No. 5 July 1, 1991

Price Rs. 7.50

Registered at GPO, Sri Lanka, QD/09/NEWS/91

POLLS IN INDIA MURDER IN MADRAS

— *Izeth Hussain*
Mervyn de Silva
Jon Swain
Shekhar Gupta
Anirudhya Mitra

1931 and Lanka's Political Culture

— *Jane Russel*

Poverty and debt in Pakistan

— *Akmal Hussein*

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TRENDS

DON'T DICTATE SAYS LANKA

Donors have been told by the Sri Lankan government that it will not be dictated to on domestic issues. Some donor countries had demanded action against certain police and military officers for human rights violations. The government's attitude in this respect was further emphasised by a presidential speech at a public ceremony. President Premadasa said at the inauguration of the Koggala Free Trade Zone that providing economic assistance did not give anyone the right to determine Sri Lanka's political policies, or to finance disruptive elements.

"We will not sell our souls to satisfy our hunger", he said.

CAUSES DIARRHOEA

Health Minister Renuka Herath told a WHO sponsored meeting in Colombo that terrorism too caused diarrhoeal diseases by forcing people into refugee camps. Among the other causes listed by the minister: ignorance, malnutrition, insanitary living conditions, insufficient and unsafe water supplies; also, floods, famines, drought.

OFFICIAL'S HOUSE A BROTHEL

A prison official's wife admitted in court that she ran

a brothel in her husband's house in a suburb of Colombo. The madam and two other women were charged and all pleaded guilty. Among those rounded up was one described as a "beauty queen".

Among the businessmen clientele was a rich prison inmate, it was alleged.

NO HIKE

Power and Energy Minister Chandra Bandara told Parliament that no price increase in petrol was intended by government. Press reports of a possible price hike, quoting Petroleum Corporation sources, prompted the statement.

TRAVEL CURBS RELAXED

The Central Bank announced a loosening of travel restrictions. Henceforth you can travel any number of times abroad, within your basic foreign exchange allowance, provided you do so on the national carrier Airlanka. Earlier holiday travel was permitted only once a year.

Business travel allowances and allowances for travel abroad for conferences have also been increased. Chairmen and directors of public companies going west will now get US dollars 300 per day (South Asia: 200); other employees will get 200 dollars and 150 dollars respectively.

Briefly . . .

● Colombo University's Vice Chancellor Professor G. L. Peiris complained to the police that his life is in danger. An Assistant Registrar of the university too told the police that a student unionist had made the following threat: "If the Vice Chancellor persists in his present course of action he must remember that he cannot travel by helicopter; he must use road transport — and at that time we will look into that situation". The student had asked the assistant registrar to convey that message to the VC.

Referring to recent developments an official said that the university council had unanimously decided to suspend a student for assaulting another; and also that the VC had refused to extend the appointment of a temporary lecturer who had allegedly played a key role in the 1987 hostage crisis.

● Mr Gamini Jayasuriya, President of the Maha Bodhi Trust said at the opening of Anagarika Dharmapala Mahasaya at the Kamburupitiya Gam Udawa premises that the nation saluted President Premadasa for ridding the country of vice and immoral activities. The president had taken bold and fearless steps, Mr. Jayasuriya, a former minister said. Mr. Jayasuriya was apparently referring to the recent crack-down on casinos and jackpot parlours.

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Published fortnightly by
Lanka Guardian Publishing Co. Ltd.

No. 246, Union Place,
Colombo - 2.

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Printed by Ananda Press

82/5, Sri Ratnajothe Saravanamuttu

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Lessons of Terrorism: A new Indo-Sri Lanka relationship?

Mervyn de Silva

NEWS
BACKGROUND

In an exceptionally eventful fortnight, the commentator's first problem is the difficulty of picking the most significant—the results of India's tenth general election, the aftermath of the Gandhi assassination, the stunning suicide-bomber attack on the J. O. C. hqrs, the newly installed AIDMK administration in Madras, Chief Minister Jayalalitha's threat to wipe out the 'Tiger' menace, the EEC statement on the Gladstone affair where the EEC, an important donor group, said it found the expulsions unacceptable and the Sri Lanka Human rights situation worrying or the IMF-World Bank's new demands for faster structural adjustment.

While some of these news items, considered as part of a general trend merit attention, and indeed have been discussed in that form in recent issues of the L. G., one's initial reaction is to recognise a broad Indo-Sri Lankan context. There are links which seem to be part of a larger pattern of interaction and shared significance. If this tentative reading is correct then we may be entering a new phase in Indo-Sri Lankan relations that would require reevaluation and a necessary re-designing of that relationship. Certainly by Sri Lanka, the much smaller and weaker State.

The connections which one can spot at a first glance include the LTTE and terrorism, Tamilnadu and Sri Lanka, the Tamilnadu government's attitude to the LTTE as distinct from its position on Tamil refugees and the question of Tamils in Sri Lanka's North-East.

There are also some other areas of common concern. Consider the issue of 'Human Rights' and the role of the Army. Almost the same day that former National Security Minister Mr.

Lalith Athulathmudali protested strongly against a remark of the *Medicin Sans Frontieres* spokesman (he called the government's report "whitewash") a senior South Block official in Delhi had this to say about a U.S. decision to link US military training program for Indian (IMET) officers to India's human rights performance.

Calling it an 'unwarranted slur' on the Indian army, the official said India need not take lessons from anybody on human dignity, morality, civilised behaviour etc. It was a brusque dismissal of so-called American "conditionality".

Does this mean that India, though besieged on many fronts, is determined not to take the path followed by the Soviet Union, the erstwhile superpower rival that is almost holding out a begging bowl, praying for massive US and EEC assistance? Has Delhi decided to protect its sovereignty and follow an independent foreign policy path, the essence of nonalignment, in spite of the collapse of the concept of nonalignment in a new unipolar or multipolar world? If that is the case, then India will once more take the initiative and re-define non-alignment in a rapidly changing world.

The Opposition has preferred to regard President Premadasa's aggressive and persistent "Don't dictate to Sri Lanka" posture as so much bluff and bluster. Some Opposition critics have warned of the danger of an aid-freeze or a cut-off if official policy and posture are not changed. At least for now, however, Colombo and Delhi appear to be on the same wavelength.

The explosions at the JOC hqrs and Delhi's International Airport are the work of well-organised terrorist groups which by the selection of sensitive

targets are sending a simple political message: YOU ARE VULNERABLE. YOUR MOST TIGHTLY SECURED AND SENSITIVE BUILDINGS/INSTALLATIONS etc etc are NOT beyond our reach. While it is inconceivable that both operations were carried out by the same group, it is useful to recall that earlier this year, the Indian press, citing official sources, claimed that the LTTE had established links with ULFA in Assam. There were elections in troubled Assam and the Congress won most seats. However there were no polls in Punjab where over 20 candidates have been gunned down. It is the Sikh militants who got to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's security staff and murdered her. Surely the Delhi airport outrage was the work of the Sikh terrorists, who fight for an independent KHALISTAN as fiercely as the 'Tigers' fight for EELAM.

Once again, a common threat should suggest closer coordination between Delhi and Colombo. Counter-Terrorism has been discussed in SAARC but no agreement was reached, partly because India pursued its own line. The unstated assumption always is that India is powerful enough to be self-reliant. Is it? The new Narasimha Rao administration has some agonising re-appraisal awaiting its top policy-makers. India-Can-Go-It-Alone mentality needs change as much the 'Gang-up-against-the-Big Bully' line of thought in neighbouring capitals.

Meanwhile Ms. Jayalalitha, who abandoned her polls campaign in face of death threats, is evidently crafting a new

(Continued on page 5)

The Indian Elections and the Eelam Problem

Izeth Hussain

In the aftermath of the Rajiv Gandhi assassination and the recent Indian elections, the situation looks distinctly favourable for Sri Lanka, at least in the short term. We can surely expect strong Indian pressure on the LTTE to engage in meaningful negotiations with the Sri Lanka Government.

The Indian authorities are convinced that the LTTE are responsible for the assassination, and Jayalalitha has been convinced that she herself has been on the LTTE hit-list. The logical consequence of this, irrespective of the Indian judiciary's eventual decision on the assassination, should be the LTTE's ejection from India or the incarceration of its members there. At the most a mere token presence of the LTTE and no more, in Tamil Nadu might be understandable. Jayalalitha's latest statement, at the time of writing, is clear enough. The LTTE is to be rounded up and chucked out.

We cannot, however, be quite sure of this outcome because of Tamil Nadu's commitment to the Sri Lankan Tamils. The problem is that ejecting or totally incapacitating the LTTE might be seen as tantamount to abandoning the Sri Lankan Tamils. It is very doubtful that the LTTE's rebellion can continue for long without access to the Tamil Nadu hinterland, and its military defeat will probably mean that there will be no further accommodativeness on the part of the Sri Lankan Government. A political settlement of a durable order may not be possible. For this reason, abandoning the LTTE might come to be seen as abandoning the Sri Lankan Tamils. We cannot be quite sure how far the AIADMK will go in actually punishing the LTTE.

There is no doubting the strength of the Tamil Nadu commitment up to now. Since

1967 the DMK and the AIADMK have alternated in power in Tamil Nadu, and both parties have supported the LTTE while in power, even if they were against the LTTE while out of power. When MGR was in power the LTTE had hostile relations with Karunanidhi, even to the extent that Prabhakaran once rejected Karunanidhi's handsome donation for the LTTE. But as soon as Karunanidhi returned to power, they became buddies again. The party in power in Madras could not be seen to be antagonistic to the LTTE because it had to take count of the Tamil Nadu commitment to the Sri Lankan Tamils.

The commitment has not, however been a total one as it has always stopped well short of support for separatism. Part of the reason for this is that despite all the commonalities of race, language, and religion between the Tamils of Tamil Nadu and of Sri Lanka, they are not identical, and can be regarded as distinct ethnic groups in some senses. As these two groups are not identical, their interests cannot be identical at every point.

Furthermore, after the Sino-Indian border conflict Tamil Nadu eschewed separatism. The Tamils were the first in India to take to separatism, under the leadership of the charismatic Ramaswamy Naicker in pre-Independence days. But Nehru's accommodativeness on linguistic state prepared the way for Annadurai's abandonment of the DMK's separatist programme after the border conflict. Today there may be four or five small separatist groups in Tamil Nadu, who are in collaboration with the Naxalites, but Tamil Nadu has by and large given up separatism. It cannot very well support the separatism of the LTTE.

The Tamil Nadu commitment has been limited, but unfortunately strong enough to have

allowed the Tamil militants to break the law with shocking impunity. Particularly shocking was what followed the bomb outrage at Madras Airport which killed 29 in 1984. The suspects who were arrested were surprisingly allowed bail, which of course they proceeded to jump. More recently, the massacre of the EPRLF men seem to have been taken by the Tamil Nadu authorities with light-hearted irresponsibility. A society which condones lawlessness to that extent is getting adrift from its moral moorings, and a price has to be paid for that. It was paid tragically by Rajiv Gandhi. Now the alternatives facing the TN Government appear to be stark. It has to incapacitate the LTTE and having nothing more to do with it, allowing the rebellion to collapse, or pressurizing it into meaningful negotiations.

In Delhi, the future of the minority Government is problematic. It can be stable in the short term because the parliamentarian will not be in a hurry to face the hustings again. But the horrendous problems it will have to confront may make it unstable, and furthermore it may have to face disruptive power struggles from within the Congress ranks. For these reasons the Government could soon have so many pre-occupations that it may not be able to concentrate sufficiently, or act decisively enough, on the Sri Lankan problem. However, the motivation to help solve our problem should be strong because Rajiv Gandhi failed so disastrously over it.

The new Government may not insist on the letter of the Peace Accords. The one-sided constraints on our foreign relations make the Sri Lankans bristle.

A substitute Friendship Treaty, the draft of which has already proved to be problematic, may not be the best way of sur-

mounting the problem. Instead, why not a reversion to the unstated premise on which we had excellent relations with India up to 1977, which was that Sri Lanka cannot by itself pose any security threat to India but could do so only by getting together with an external power? A convincing case for this could be developed, if it is argued fully and in depth.

A great deal will depend, of course on the quality of the Congress leadership. Contrary to the usual assumptions, it might help if the leader is not a great or redoubtable personage. We must remember that after many years we succeeded in coming to terms on the estate Tamils with the unassuming Lal Bahadur Shastri, whom we must recognize from a Sri Lankan perspective as one of the finer sons of India. The image of Narasimha Rao seems to be a reassuring one, more particularly as he has considerable expertise in handling foreign relations.

For the first time India is having a Tamil-speaking Dravidian as its leader in Delhi. Would it be too fanciful to hope for something like a new outlook, maybe something qualitatively different, from the leadership, or will it be more or less the mix as before? We have in mind Delhi's rather undemocratic behaviour towards the states, and sometimes a heavy-handedness in dealing with some neighbours. Today Delhi has to deploy 400,000 troops to contain Kashmir, which perhaps may not have become necessary if democratic norms had been observed by Delhi. Kashmiri nationalism lost steam after the break-up of Pakistan, and it became possible for Delhi to reach accommodation with Sheik Abdullah in 1975. But in the next decade the democratically elected, and popular, government of Farook Abdullah was dismissed with a show of Delhi's might which caused outrage all over India. It is arguable that there has been a failure in integrating Kashmir

into the Indian union because of Delhi's heavy-handedness. In the perception of practically all of India's neighbours as well, Delhi, has sometimes tended to be rather heavy-handed.

One wonders whether there has been some kind of historical conditioning behind all this. According to Romila Thapar's *History of India* the vast Indo-Gangetic plain lent itself more easily to large unitary kingdoms than the southern peninsula which was cut up into smaller regions by mountains, plateaux, and river valleys. Perhaps India's leaders from the Hindi belt were carrying the burden of India's historic greatness, and may be a Dravidian leader in Delhi might be more flexible in dealing with Sri Lanka's problem while being firm with the Tamil militants.

According to some analysts the Congress Government could collapse in about a couple of years, after which the BJP will come to power. Its stunning performance in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, the centre of gravity of Indian politics, is taken as a pointer to the future. There is reason to believe that the BJP may come to support a separate state of Eelam. We have to avail of opportunities that may be coming up to reach a final political settlement over the Eelam problem.

It may be that the LTTE has already been under serious pressure from the Indian authorities, and hence the bomb at Flower Road, which may be followed by further exploits of suicide bombers to destroy the preconditions for a political settlement. The LTTE, which has appeared to want nothing less than Eelam, may believe that they can gain by protracting their struggle.

A final political settlement has to depend partly on the accommodativeness of the Sri Lankan Government, particularly

on the question of devolution which has to be understood as not just decentralization. It may not be impossible to be accommodative because President Premadasa has only recently won a mini-general election the legitimacy of which is not questioned even by the opposition parties.

Lessons of. . .

(Continued from page 3)

policy on the Sri Lankan Tamil issue. She has publicly recognised the de-stabilising effect that the LTTE presence in Tamilnadu has had on social and political life in Madras, its environs and on large parts of the Tamilnadu coast. Mr. Lalith Athulathmudali the former National Security Minister has said that Rajiv Gandhi may not have died if Mrs. Indira Gandhi had accepted the Sri Lankan proposal for joint patrolling of the Palk straits. Yes, closer surveillance of the straits will make things more difficult for gun-running etc. But the problem has become far more of a menace to Sri Lanka and Tamilnadu than it was in 1985-86. Effective security arrangements can be introduced only if there is the political will to combat the terrorist menace.

As for Sri Lanka, a commonplace observation should surely be accepted by us now. If the JOC hqrs and its environs can be reduced to rubble, and the scene after the explosion reminds one of a small part of a residential district after an air raid, tightened security is by itself no complete answer. How long can we evade the stark truth?..... There is no military solution; not any more, anyway.

Apart from an attitudinal change by people and opinion-makers, there must now be a restructured Indo-Sri Lankan relationship.

Was it an LTTE suicide squad?

A. S. Fernando

The occupants of the vehicle that is suspected to have carried the powerful bomb that exploded at Sir Ernest de Silva Mawatha, had earlier tried to gain access into the JOC premises, according to eye-witnesses.

They are now thought to have been an LTTE suicide squad. They had been seen speaking to the security guards at the Sir Ernest de Silva Mawatha entrance at JOC headquarters — nerve centre of the country's security operations.

The blast occurred minutes later. It shattered over 20 buildings and several passing vehicles. The entire "suicide

squad" and the security guards at the JOC entrance are thought to have been killed.

Minister Lalith Athulathmudali, whom this reporter met at the scene, said he had been assured that none of the children attending the three big schools close by — Thurstan, Royal and Ladies' — was seriously affected by the blast.

"I was away in Kalutara and came rushing here as soon as I heard of the explosion", he said.

Minister Athulathmudali was heard telling two foreign correspondents who had spoken to him at the scene, that it was high time the SAARC countries made a concerted effort to

banish terrorism from their region for good.

"Some seem to confuse terrorism with fighting for human rights. Now, see, many civilians appear to have been killed or maimed in this explosion. Don't these victims have human rights? So is it correct to equate terrorist acts with fighting for human rights?" he asked.

Minister John E. Ameratunge, State Minister A. J. Ranasinghe, SLFP national organiser Anura Bandaranaike and Additional Director General of Essential Services, Charitha Ratwatte, were among those present at the scene when this reporter visited it.

Abortive Rajiv Talks: LTTE Motive?

Jon Swain

Sri Lankan police believe they have made a breakthrough in the hunt for Rajiv Gandhi's assassins by identifying the mysterious suicide bomber who killed the former Indian prime minister and 15 onlookers.

They suspect that the woman, whose photograph was taken moments before the explosion, was an unmarried Tamil militant in her mid-thirties called Jayanthi. She was from Sri Lanka's northern Jaffna peninsula. They say Jayanthi was a hardcore member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam — the Tamil Tigers — the most fanatical of Sri Lanka's militant groups. Suspicion focused on the Tigers after the attack, but until now there has been no evidence.

The Sri Lankans also believe they have found a motive for the killing: the failure of secret talks three months ago when Gandhi met two Tamil emissaries. The Tamils were trying to rebuild bridges with

Gandhi after many years of bitterness.

Gandhi died on May 21 in Tamil Nadu, India's southern Tamil state, while campaigning in parliamentary elections. The explosion was triggered by a woman with plastic explosives strapped to her back.

Indian police believe the Tigers are responsible because of their willingness to use terrorism in a struggle for an independent homeland. The Sri Lankan evidence was given last week to Vijay Karan, chief of India's central bureau of investigation.

In the early 1980s, Gandhi was seen as a friend of the Tamils, providing arms and training for militants in southern India. He was also critical of the Sri Lankan government. But after he became prime minister, Gandhi signed an accord with the Sri Lankan government designed to bring peace to the country. While giving the Tamil minority considerable autonomy, it denied independence.

The Tigers rejected the agreement and India sent 100,000 troops, who soon became bogged down in a bloody war. The Indians were finally forced to withdraw, leaving a legacy of hatred.

Early in March this year, two Tamil envoys were sent to Delhi to give Gandhi a letter from Velupillai Prabhakaran, the Tigers' commander-in-chief. One emissary was Kasianandan, the Tigers' main representative in southern India. The other was Nadesan Satyendra. Both were from Madras, capital of Tamil Nadu state, near where Gandhi was killed.

The Sri Lankan security services said Prabhakaran believed Gandhi would be returned to power and wanted to restore relations. But Gandhi insisted the Tigers renounce extremist methods and abide by the Indo-Sri Lankan peace accord. The Sri Lankans believe the Tigers were so angered they hatched the murder plot.

Civil Rights Movement's statement on Kokadichcholai Massacre

The Civil Rights Movement of Sri Lanka is appalled at what has been officially described as "the gruesome killing of a large number of innocent civilians" in the Kokadichcholai area of the eastern province.

"This appears to have been the result of the armed forces going on a retaliatory rampage after the killing of three of their number in a land mine blast. Whereas army sources are reported to place civilian deaths at 52, members of parliament of the area report the death toll at over 150, and also that a large number of houses have been destroyed. The press further reports that hundreds of civilians are fleeing from their homes in the area.

"CRM, while welcoming the swift initial response of the government to take the matter seriously, promise an independent inquiry, and order quick relief to the injured and bereaved, stresses the importance of these measures been implemented quickly and effectively.

"It also stresses the importance of giving humanitarian organisations such as Medicins Sans Frontieres, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the UN high commission for refugees, who have demonstrated their commitment to serve the people of our country at the risk of their own lives, all facilities and protection to perform their humanitarian work effectively.

IN PARLIAMENT

Education Minister Lalith Athulathmudali said he was shocked to read in the press that the leader of the MSF (the French saukyadana outfit operating in the northern war zone) in Sri Lanka had thought it fit to say that the report of the commission appointed to inquire into the shooting incident in which MSF personnel were injured was a "white wash". The minister said that he took strong objection to the judicial process in Sri Lanka being condemned in this manner.

Could a Sri Lankan go to another country and call a Commission of Inquiry report a "white wash", the minister said.

Mr Dinesh Gunawardena (MEP Colombo District) said that trade unions had been banned under the State of Emergency and workers rights were being suppressed. He said that the Emergency

should be lifted except in the North and East, where it was required.

The MP said that a large number of youths were being detained without being charged; they should be brought to trial or released.

Mr M. H. M. Ashraff (SLMC Digamadulla District) said that hundreds of Muslims had been killed in Kattankudy, Saddam Hussein village in Eravurm Akkaraipattu, Muttur and Kinniya. Muslims had become "political slaves" as a result of the Indo Lanka accord, he said; the 33 per cent Muslims in the Eastern province had been reduced to 17 per cent after the Accord.

Thousands of Muslims were driven out of Jaffna and Mannar too, the MP said. And every day twenty to twenty five Sinhalese soldiers were being killed by terrorists, he said.

(Also see page 14)

"CRM further emphasises the importance of looking into the underlying reason and causes for such events, which have taken place right from the beginning of the escalation of violence in our country in the early 1980s. There is no doubt that the resort to retaliatory violence by the forces of the state, whatever the provocation from cruel and extremist opposition violence, whether this be in the north or the south, only makes more inexorable the spiral of violence from which we must extricate ourselves if we are to lay the foundations for a peaceful and democratic society in which people of all communities are secure."

LETTER

Whither Etymology

Tamil being my native tongue, I wish to acknowledge that I goofed in not differentiating between 'wither' and 'whither' (LG, May 15). I should say that I also underestimated your penchant for bringing archaic words back into popular currency. To satisfy my curiosity, I checked the unabridged *Oxford English Dictionary* (Oxford University Press; 1987, Compact Edition, volume 2). You have stated in your 'note' to my letter, only one interpretation of whither; "To what place?". In p. 3767; just above this meaning, it is also stated, "Now, in all senses, only archaic or literary". The first set of definitions given for 'whither' in the same page states, "a violent or impetuous movement, a rush; a blast or gust of wind; a quivering movement, a tremble; a rushing or whizzing sound; fig. an access or attack of illness".

I felt comfortable that the usage, "an access or attack of illness" does not differ much in context of what I have misinterpreted for 'wither', in relevance to parliamentary democracy.

Sachi Sri Kantha

Note by Editor:

Whither Sachi Sri Kantha? Satisfied Sachi?

Fitting the Pieces

Shekhar Gupta with Anand
Viswanathan and Kavitha Shetye

Never in the history of the subcontinent has manhunt of such magnitude been launched. Nearly 200 of India's best detectives, forensic and explosives experts have been working 20-hour days, for weeks, to solve one of the most complex murder jigsaws in recent decades.

With the claws of the conspiracy spread across international waters, clues have not come by easily—the CBI even approached Interpol for help in the investigation—leading to widespread speculation in the media, which either caused confusion or fouled up progress through premature leaks. Muddying the waters further, politicians have been flinging wild accusations and heaping blame on all kinds of groups—from Israel's Mossad to the CIA, the DMK and the BJP.

Yet behind the commotion, the Special Investigation Team set up by the CBI was engaged in chasing up hundreds of leads every day. The progress has been slow. But last fortnight, as vital clues surfaced in Madras, Colombo and Vavuniya (in northern Sri Lanka), the needle of suspicion seemed to point firmly to Jaffna, confirming the handiwork of the LTTE. The crime displayed the hallmarks of an LTTE operation: a suicide squad and cutouts to wipe out the trails. The killings of Mahatma Gandhi and Mrs Gandhi were comparatively simpler as the police got at least one conspirator alive.

INVESTIGATION

Identification by Elimination

Malligai. The stately building on Greenways Road in south Madras is the hub of the manhunt. Everything about Case No. 329/91 registered at Sriperumbulder is unprecedented:

the manner of killing, the reward offered and the composition and quality of the team assembled.

So is the method of investigation, the life-blood of which are the three telephone lines that keep buzzing. A dozen CIB officials man 839067, 839001 and 839227 throughout the day. Each day brings in about a hundred calls. Eight hundred kilometres south of Madras, in Colombo another half a dozen telephone lines are manned with the same alacrity. Every new lead, "even a fraction of a millimetre" of evidence, has S. K. Dutta, additional director of the CBI, staying in Room 759 at Taj Samudra hotel, spring into action despite his broken ankle.

In this game, no quarters are being given, no holds barred. At India's behest, nearly three dozen men from the People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), jailed in the Maldives for involvement in the attempted coup, were released last week, armed and sent to north-east Sri Lanka to join 40-odd armed EPRLF men to hunt for clues. Both PLOTE and EPRLF, once strong Tamil separatist organisations, have reason to hate the LTTE, which all but wiped them out in fratricidal battles.

The business is boring, not quite the way crimes are solved in thrillers. "Since none of us is Perry Mason, we are approaching this the hard way", says an investigator. Each call is followed up as a potential lead. By nightfall, 99 per cent are routinely eliminated. But there was enough substance in the investigations for a top official to cautiously declare: "We may announce something soon. Keep your fingers crossed."

"ONE-EYED JACK"

The First Breakthrough

As often happens in complicated crimes, the first real breakthrough seems to be coming from a lead which was initially ignored as being of no consequence. When the investigators released the first pictures of the alleged assassin—the woman carrying the bomb, flanked by Latha Kannan and her daughter Kokila, both Congress workers—they had deliberately cut out of the frame the short, stocky, bespectacled and kurta-pyjama-clad man sporting a gold chain and a writing pad. It was only later, when the investigators realised he wasn't a journalist, that the picture was given a closer scrutiny. Enlargements of small sections of the kurta, using specialised cameras, showed a tell-tale bulge, indicating that he too was wearing something, presumably another belt-bomb, on his body.

Soon a lowly LTTE functionary, who was on a routine supply run to the Tamil Nadu coast, and picked up near Nagapattinam, identified the fourth man as a key LTTE operative. He was known as One-Eyed Jack as one of his eyes, damaged in an explosion, had been replaced with a glass prosthesis.

Immediately there was a puzzle among the Colombo-based anti-LTTE Tamil circles as well. Sitharthan, chief of the political wing of PLOTE, confirmed that one of his aides, Babu, who had been in the IPKF's custody in Vavuniya, remembered seeing a one-eyed man fitting the description in the camp. Babu, however, told INDIA TO. DAY in Colombo that he had heard the man had died while leading an LTTE attack. But

information came in from elsewhere as well and the investigators seemed reasonably convinced that the fourth man was none other than Raghuappa alias Mathimagan. It is still unclear which one is the real name and which one the *nom de guerre*, the warrior's pseudonym. But he is believed to have had a hand in the killing of EPRLF's K. Padmanabha in Madras and was thought to be planning to kill Perumal, the EPRLF chief currently hiding in the anonymity of Dandakaranya forests in Madhya Pradesh.

But the lead could dry up. What if the man has reached Jaffna, taking advantage of the first 48 hours of confusion? The coast is less than a six-hour drive from Sriperumbudur and the Tigers' speedboats could zip him to Jaffna and safety in less than two hours. Knowing that he is one of the very few survivors able to unravel what could otherwise prove to be an eternal mystery, the LTTE will liquidate him. Such is the CBI's desperation that K. Karthikeyan, the inspector general heading the team, even offered to go to Jaffna himself to pursue the lead, only to be told by the Sri Lankan authorities that they did not wish to be "an accessory to his murder".

GIRL ON THE BICYCLE

The Key to the Mystery

With only a dismembered head and three limbs to work on, the investigators have had a hard time trying to identify the woman who combined Kamikaze motivation with a high-level of training. But this piece of the puzzle also seems to be falling into place. Some members of PLOTE, including a mother and her daughter once picked up by the LTTE claim that they were interrogated in Vavuniya by the woman fitting the description of the human bomb. Other operatives from the EPRLF and PLOTE have also confirmed that she was seen in Vavuniya, riding a bicycle, the name Nalayani emblazoned on its mudguard. Other names thrown up in the investigation are Sha-

lini, Shaloo and Thanu which could all be pseudonyms. She was believed to be a member of the LTTE's suicide wing called Shadow.

Immediately the investigators were scouring the group photographs of the LTTE women's wing, released by the Tigers' propaganda machinery, as well as those in possession of the IPKF. Forensic and explosives experts picked up hundreds of the minutest pieces of her denim belt over a week-long vacuum-cleaning of the site and pieced together almost all of its front, including the white detonator wire and the electric wire connecting it to the toggle-type twin switch. The steel pellets were apparently bought from a hardware store — identified as those used to grind paints.

The absence of ear-rings from the head was no mystery as these had been removed during the post-mortem and now are part of the case property. The *bindi* that is seen on the dead woman's forehead but not in the picture taken minutes before the blast is ascribed to a different camera angle. Another discovery is that the bag seen slung on her shoulder before the blast, is seen hanging from Latha Kannan's body, indicating that she had given it to her thus suggesting a degree of familiarity.

Given the confusion immediately after the blast, the CBI is fortunate that the pieces of her body are still in fairly good shape. Initially they had been stuffed into a gunny bag and left in a corner of the morgue with nothing but a few chunks of ice thrown over them. A few more hours' delay and the body would have rotten completely, wiping out any traces of valuable evidence.

At Madras Medical College, dental surgeons have established her age to be 25 years. Since her left hand has been found, the entire palm has been fingerprinted. But investigators have not had much luck with the finger-print records of Sri

Lankan Tamil militants prepared in 1986 when MGR had decided to arrest them in a swoop.

THE FREE-LANCE PHOTOGRAPHER

An expendable cut-out?

Three weeks ago this little, rundown house in the Madras suburb of West Saidapet was just another nondescript dwelling. Few people trod the rocky incline that led to the house from the road. Today, this house is the focus of world media attention. Every Saidapet urchin knows Haribabu's house. In a room on a shelf is a framed photograph of Haribabu facing a colour photograph of Rajiv. Haribabu, 23, who said he'd be a famous photographer one day, became famous all right if only in death. The sequence of eight pictures from his Pentax, borrowed from a photographer called Ravi Shankar, who is now being interrogated by the CBI, giving the only lead to the assassins "My Babu was innocent, some people have led him into this," says his mother, Rukmini.

Investigators think she may be both right and wrong. Haribabu, they say, was definitely mixed up with "LTTE types". It is possible that he was unaware of the intentions of his LTTE accomplices but the more acceptable theory now is that he was an active accomplice and perhaps could not get away in time. It is clear that he was closely associated with S. Bhagyanathan, the printing press owner arrested as one of the alleged conspirators. But why take pictures that provide such vital evidence to the SIT? Whatever the reason, the providential survival of his camera was a godsend for the SIT — particularly as the video of the last moments did not reveal much.

The SIT sources say that with the new discoveries it is possible to make a reasonable reconstruction of the crime. The kurta-pyjama-clad man used Haribabu as his cover while the woman assassin exploited her proximity

to Latha Kannan and her daughter — known to local Congressmen — to break the inner cordon. If the security cordon had been maintained as it should have been, the bomb would never have got past a metal detector. The major mystery now is the LTTE'S motive, particularly after reports that it had re-established links with Rajiv.

KASI ANANDHAN

Peace messenger
or red herring?

In the Sri Lankan Tamil circles Kasi Anandhan was never taken seriously as a political figure. A former member of the TULF and now on the LTTE'S central committee, he was famous for what he did best: writing rabble-rousing poetry. An example is the expression Italian - Parsi Killing Force for the IPKF.

It was a bit surprising for a key member of the family owning *The Hindu* group of newspapers that Anandhan came forward, seeking help to meet Indian political leaders, on behalf of the LTTE to rebuild bridges with India. Rajiv readily agreed. I. K. Gujral refused to meet him. His attempts to approach the BJP on the pretext that Hindu temples were being demolished by the Sri Lankan Army in Jaffna too were discouraged. He only met Rajiv on March

5. What transpired is controversial.

The pro-LTTE view is that Rajiv was sympathetic, conveyed his "fraternal greetings" to Velupillai Pirabhakaran and asked him to continue his struggle. Since the meeting went off as well, could the LTTE have killed him? Congress(I) sources say it is more likely that Rajiv explained the position taken by his party in its manifesto, that the Tamils should be prepared to live within Sri Lanka but with great autonomy. Sri Lankan government spokesman assert that their deputy high commissioner in new Delhi ran into Rajiv at a function on March 10 and, talking about Ranjan Wijeratne's assassination, Rajiv said it had to be the handiwork of the LTTE "who are a teacherous bunch of people". The deputy high commissioner shot off a cable to Foreign Secretary Bernard Tilakratne in Colombo (cable no. 222 of March 10) recounting the conversation. If the meeting had indeed gone so well, would Rajiv have used such words for the LTTE, especially while talking to a Lankan diplomat?

LTTE'S MOTIVES

Eye on the future

Indian investigators share the Sri Lankan officials' view that the Anandhan visit was a red herring. Partly to throw

Rajiv off-guard and partly to secure plausible deniability after the assassination. If the LTTE was indeed behind the killing, the truth may not even be known to Anandhan himself as he too may have been used as a cut-out genuinely believing that he was on a peace mission to build bridges, assuming that Rajiv would be returning to power after the elections.

Analysts, including Sri Lankan Tamils, say the LTTE could have a twin motive. One, that Prabakaran had felt humiliated when Rajiv invited him to Delhi in 1987, and put him virtually under house arrest until he signed the peace accord. "He has to be taught a lesson," he is believed to have told an associate. More pressing than vengeance, however, could be the LTTE ideologues' calculation that Eelam would not be possible as long as India stayed united. Rajiv Gandhi have seemed to them the only leader with a trans-Vindhya appeal, capable of keeping the south and the north of India together, and thus a long-term impediment to Eelam. His absence could help them exploit ethnic sympathies in Tamil Nadu. The short-term damage—loss of sympathy would then be more than offset by the long-term gains from the assassination, thus sealing Rajiv's fate.

(INDIA TODAY)

The Conspiracy

Startling Breakthrough

Anirudhya Mitra

Pieces of the complex jigsaw began falling into place with the arrest of S. Bhagyanathan, 25, owner of a printing press called BPL Allrouud Stationers, Letters, Press and Binds and his mother Padma, 49, in Madras. They were charged with harbouring the key conspirators, including the human bomb, now identified as Shalini alias Shalu alias Thanu, member of the LTTE suicide squad Shadow.

Detectives say at least nine accomplices have been identified: Thanu and the kurta-pyjama-clad man now also known to have the alias of Sivarasan, Haribabu, Nalini and Subha, Bhagyanathan, Padma and two others.

The breakthrough came when Ravi Shankar, the freelance photographer from whom Haribabu is said to have borrowed the camera, revealed to the CBI that Shudham Photo Agency in

Madras was the hub of LTTE activity in Madras.

By grilling Shubha Sundaram the agency proprietor, detectives were able to reach Bhagyanathan. It was discovered that the press owned by Bhagyanathan was actually under *benami* ownership, the real proprietor being Balasubramaniam alias Baby, a close aide of Pirabhakaran. Not surprisingly it was printing LTTE literature. The detectives also established that:

(Continued on page 12)

Cyanide Warriors

This Tiger got his first taste of blood at the age of 19. On July 27, 1973 Velupillai Pirabhakaran levelled his gun at A. Durajappa, the Tamil mayor of Jaffna and shot to kill, beginning one of the most remarkable careers in the international history of guerrilla warfare. This led to the evolution of a militant organisation whose 10,000 odd armed members swear loyalty to none else than their commander, a wise old veteran at 37, and prefer to swallow cyanide rather than be taken captive.

Born in a fisherman's family of the backward Karaivarar caste in Velvettithurai, widely known as the smugglers' village in Jaffna peninsula, Pirabhakaran was brought up on a steady dose of stories about the glory of Tamil history and so impressed was he, that later he often compared himself to the legendary Chola king, Karikalan. At 16, he dropped out of school to launch his Tamil New Tigers (TNT). The choice of that acronym was to prove prophetic as the Tigers grew to become the most consummate explosives experts in the shadowy world of international terrorism.

From TNT to RDX has been a chequered history for the Tigers. In the quest for supremacy that began nearly eight years ago, Pirabhakaran's men have devoured the frontline leadership of all the other major Tamil guerrilla groups to emerge the unchallenged rulers of the Jaffna peninsula barring a few enclaves that still remain under the Sri Lankan Army.

The Tigers' high motivation is baffling, since the movement lacks religious or ideological content. In fact much of the initial inspiration for separatism came from Christian pastors in a Hindu majority ethnic group.

On ideology, Tamil groups which began as leftists, have shown an amazingly practical ambidexterity. Former Sri Lankan defence minister Lalith Athulathmudali, who led a bloody war against the LTTE, ascribes it to Pirabhakaran's effective articulation of *Naangal Tamilar* (We are Tamil) kind of pride. His personal charisma and mystique has convinced cadres of the ultimate inevitability of Eelam.

Pirabhakaran picks his recruits young, predominantly in the 12-13 range. These children are already aware of hardship and the atrocities of Sri Lankan soldiers. Training completed by an oath of personal loyalty to Pirabhakaran and the gift of a cyanide capsule to the new guerrilla on his behalf. The credo of the Pirabhakaran cult is not death-or-glory. It seems to be death-and-glory. Less than three months ago some LTTE boys rammed a truck loaded with explosives into the Sri Lankan Army camp at Mankulam, paving the way to a total Tiger victory. The first suicide attack was reported in 1984 when guerrillas in a jeep loaded with explosives drove into the Chavakacheri police station near Jaffna, killing 29.

Pirabhakaran has been publicity shy and has rarely opened up to researchers or journalists. But supposedly he opted for the cyanide cult in 1974 when Sivakumaran, a young Tamil activist, became the first to swallow poison rather than be arrested. Glorification of death became the LTTE's credo from then on, building up today into the cadres' rather casual attitude to death — the enemy's or their own.

The 3,000-strong women's wing is equally motivated. Skilled in close combat, they form a

part of the LTTE's suicide squad, the Black Tigers. Adele Balasingham, 41, the Australian wife of LTTE ideologue Anton, is the unofficial head of the women's wing. She also edits the official LTTE organ, *Voice of Tigers*.

The LTTE works in tight horizontal compartments with very few vertical links and thus little is known about its structure and operations. The fact that almost all its senior leaders including Pirabhakaran hail from Velvettithurai has led to the group being branded as a 'mafia' set-up by rivals.

Though the LTTE has a central committee, Pirabhakaran depends largely on a small group of close associates for consultation. Some of these associates like "Baby" Subramaniam, who is the rebels' main emissary in Tamil Nadu, have made valuable contacts with groups like the chauvinistic Dravidar Kazhagam, are hardly known outside. Dissent is silenced brutally, often with a bullet in the head. It is said to have recently killed "Senkathir", a central committee member.

The money for arms comes from drug smuggling, *havalas*, rackets, extortions and donations from expatriate Tamils. The LTTE is even known to run a *benami* shipping line with at least three fair-sized ships. Arms are often bought in Europe, through Taiwan or Hong-Kong-based traders, then shipped to Singapore where bills of lading and containers are changed and are then transferred to smaller boats on high seas near Sri Lanka.

Investigations conducted by Interpol last year revealed that 80 per cent of the Sri Lankan nationals sent to jail abroad for drug-trafficking are reported

to be Tamils. *The Washington Post* and Bogota's Spanish paper *El Tiempo* first busted the Tigers' links with Colombia's notorious Medellin Cartell. In return for helping the cartel by pushing dope in Europe, the LTTE's men were to be trained at a military tactics school in Antigua, in the Caribbean. The trainer was none else than a retired Israeli Army Colonel Yayir Klein. In *By Way of Deception*, Mossad renegade Victor Ostrovsky has admitted to the Israelis training both the Sri Lankan security forces and the Tigers. According to him, deadly use of land mines was taught to the Tigers by the Israelis.

In the peninsula the Tigers collect taxes as any government would. They also raise money by running the most elaborate *havala* racket. A majority of the lakhs of Sri Lankan Tamils spread the world over prefer to send money through LTTE contacts. The LTTE keep the foreign exchange, delivering the equivalent in rupees back home. Lately there have also been complaints of extortion from expatriate Tamils. Last year the Danish police unearthed an extortion campaign in which lakhs of dollars were collected from terrified Tamils by the LTTE men operating from the Danish town of Sturer. But as a rival group leader admitted grudgingly: "Organisationally, they are clean. No drinking, no smoking no womanising and no embezzlement. You deviate, you die."

At quite another level, the cult of the Tigers would never come into being but for the insensitivity and atrocities of an utterly racist Colombo Government. For more than a decade now, Sri Lankan forces have behaved like a mob. The harassment of the population peaked this year with the Government's imposition of an economic blockade of the peninsula. Petroleum products, batteries, candles, electricity, medicines — even sanitary napkins — are not allowed in the

region in the hope of breaking the Tamils' will. Supplies get in only through a network of bicycle-borne smugglers from the Sinhala mainland and boatmen from the Indian coast. Last week, petrol was selling at Rs 800 per litre in Jaffna. To humiliate the Tamils, the Sri Lankan Air force has routinely rained barrels full of human excreta from Chinese-made Y-12 transport aircraft over Jaffna. No wonder there is no dearth of new recruits to the ranks of the LTTE perceived to be the only saviour of the Tamils.

But now, the LTTE faces a different challenge. Two decades of strife have forced nearly 40 per cent of all the Tamil population in the peninsula to leave, either for India, or Colombo, or the West. And LTTE is running out of manpower. "It's desperate for the LTTE. Its like fish watching water run out of their pond," says Colombo-based analyst. The Tigers are trying to thwart the outflow. Sometimes by force. Sometimes simply by putting a Rs 2,000 "foreign travel tax". But with little success.

Conventional wisdom would suggest that the tigers would see the inevitability of a settlement and move towards it. But no, the LTTE is stricken with an internal dynamics against compromise. Each time there is such talk protest are raised: "Did so many thousands of our Tamils die in vain?" The LTTE is an organisation held hostage to death.

Also to its top leadership's belief that Eelam, ultimately, is just a matter of time. What else would explain Balasingham's grave answer to a recent question on why the Tigers were continuing to fight while it caused such hardships to fellow Tamils. He said: "We are not thinking about fellow Tamils now. We are thinking of the next generation."

(INDIA TODAY)

Startling . . .

(Continued from page 10)

* The assassin and Raghu alias Shivarasan had stayed in Bhagyanathan's Vilivakkam house for 40 days.

* Two other accomplices, Subha and Nalini, whose photograph has now been released, had also stayed in the same house. Their names cropped up during interrogation of other suspects and Bhagyanathan recognised them from a picture of the crowd taken by Haribabu.

* The suspects had gone to Tirupati in a car hired by Bhagyanathan.

* Haribabu's involvement was more than coincidental. The ten frames in his roll have obviously been shot to keep a record of the killing — an LTTE practice.

* Ravi Shankar's wedding album showed the presence of Bhagyanathan, Nalini and some other LTTE contacts. He also used to go to Colombo to stay with his girlfriend Leela.

About 35 people have been held by SIT for questioning. This includes Madhur Nayakam, a lawyer and an LTTE supporter from Trichy. It is suspected that two persons had informed him of the success of the operation and that someone might come to him for medical treatment.

Another key discovery was from the examination of two unexploded grenades left behind at the site of the killing of EPRLF chief K. Padmanabha in Madras. The grenades contained RDX of C4 grade was presumably from the same lot as the one used at Sriperumbudur. It pointed to a common hand — the LTTE.

Investigators say the arrest of Subha and Nalini and perhaps even the so-called one-eyed jack is a matter of time. But the establishment of the motive and the involvement of LTTE high command will still be complicated.

Vicious Experience

There is a story the Sri Lankan Army officers recount often. A Lankan colonel, in a conversation with an IPKF major, cautioned him against the LTTE expertise with mines and explosives. The major brushed aside the fears saying the Indian Army had the experience of Nagaland and Mizoram. "But the problem is, each one of the Tamils you are fighting here has A-levels in science," said the Sri Lankan. Next week, after three Indian vehicles had been blown up by the Tigers using improvised explosive devices, the IPKF sent for the Lankan colonel for advice.

No army that suffered 4,000 casualties in a low-intensity conflict in two years will ever forget the experience. Even today the lessons of Sri Lanka are being taught at training Schools.

The Tigers' remarkable expertise with explosives was the first revelation — it was later calculated that 60 per cent of casualties had been through mines and explosive boobytraps. The Tigers had mined approaches to Jaffna and the network showed tactical and technological ingenuity.

First of all, the mines mainly consisted of plastic explosive stuffed inside plastic jerrycans, sometimes even hollowed trunks of coconut-palms. As an IPKF veteran recalls: "There was not a shred of metal to buzz a metal detector." Yet there was so much explosive that it sent 15-tonne turrets of T-72 tanks flying away.

The LTTE had perfected the technique of manually blasting the mines. Often they would wait till half of the convoy had passed, or till the only armoured vehicle in a column

reached the mine. The mine was then detonated by simply switching on the power by an LTTE operative waiting in a nearby house. The mines were connected with intricate networks of electric wires to houses sometimes up to a kilometre away, making it impossible for the IPKF to either track the LTTE men or to defuse the mine before it exploded. Similarly, horse-shoe-shaped anti-personnel Claymore mines were buried in walls of houses along the probable routes of army movement. These too were blasted by an LTTE guerrilla sitting at a safe distance. An officer of the Gorkha Regiment remembers seeing his colleague, Major Anil Deepak Gardner, getting his entire leg blown away by a Claymore. A senior officer recalls: "We tried our damndest but there was no answer to the mines. Finally we just decided to disconnect electricity in the entire peninsula. The casualties went down immediately".

But it was impossible to keep the power off for ever and the Tigers played a bloody game of wits with the IPKF. They observed that before crossing a culvert the IPKF columns always sent out a squad to look beneath it for mines. They began to mine the approaches to the underside of the culvert. Frequently they scratched out the milestones to confuse the IPKF columns not familiar with the region. A clever trick, it often lured the squad commander, or perhaps the only tamil speaker

in the patrol to walk up to the milestone for closer look only to find a mine blow in his face. This would leave the patrol without its officer or interpreter.

Officers remember how shrewd the LTTE snipers had in picking out officers from among the IPKF columns, an art apparently taught to them by none other than Indian Army trainers in the days of the India-LTTE honeymoon. Now, officers recall, it was time for them to take precautions: not wearing rank badges, sporting slouch hats, carrying heavy back-packs. Yet when the Tigers could not spot officer they picked out the radio-man always prominent because of the antenna. LTTE strapped sniper chairs under the crowns of tall coconut palm trees and a single sniper sitting on it could hold up a whole column for days, firing one-odd shot every once in a while to kill a soldier while the rest searched in vain for him or, in sheer anger, blasted the daylights out of a nearby village. "We fought the Nagas and the Mizos and the Sikhs in the Golden Temple. But none matched the Tigers in their viciousness, guile and daring," says an infantry veteran. No officer involved in the first round of fighting can forget the tragedy of Major A. A. Verghese, the only Tamil speaker in an infantry regiment who walked into a house full of panicky women to comfort them. An old woman pulled out a pistol and shot him. From then on, the Indian Army learnt never to take women lightly in north-eastern Sri Lanka.

War to win hearts of Tamils lost — Anura

Anura Bandaranaike (SLFP-Gampaha District) winding up the debate on behalf of the opposition said the predictions and expectations of the government had turned out to be a damp squib.

He said 90 per cent of the territory particularly in the North was still in the hands of the LTTE. The question being asked was whether the LTTE could be tamed. The more pessimistic question was whether we were

losing the war. The LTTE was one of the brilliantly organised and well armed guerrilla groups.

Mr. Bandaranaike said the "London Observer" had called the LTTE "one of the most efficient killing machines in the world".

He said the war to win the hearts and minds of the Tamil people had been lost.

The government had a habit of acting in fits and starts. It

has a bad dream in the night and acts in the morning.

He said the government had a record of paying the fines of police officers punished for violating human rights and giving them promotions.

A commission had been appointed to probe into the Kakkadicholai massacre and it was hoped that the government will act on the findings of that report. Since 1977 there had been commissions and commissions but the reports were not implemented.

Several Tamils arrested over Ranjan's killing

— Ranil

Leader of the House Ranil Wickremasinghe winding up the debate on the motion to extend emergency regulations told parliament that several Tamils had been arrested in connection of with the assassination State Minister for Defence, Ranjan Wijeratne and they were now under interrogation.

He said that investigations carried out so far pointed to LTTE involvement in the killing. According to a report from SSP Godfrey Gunasekera of the CBD Headquarters, a Toyota Hiace van had been used in the attack. Explosives placed inside the vehicle had been activated when Mr. Wijeratne's car was passing.

He noted that in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi the availability of photographs helped investigators. A camera used to photograph the meeting was found intact.

The Minister said there was no politics involved in the removal of Arjuna Ranatunga from captaincy of the Sri Lanka cricket team. "The decision to remove him was not taken by anybody here. The Minister did not interfere as there was no mala fide", he said.

Referring to the Kakkadicholai massacre, he said that he also accompanied the Prime Minister

to that village and spoke to army and police officers. The observations in that regard were submitted to the President. Mr. Jayalath also submitted a report to the President.

He said that 16 army personnel from the Kakkadicholai camp had been removed to Batticaloa awaiting investigation. There were different versions as to what took place. The villagers spoke to the Prime Minister during the visit. The number of deaths was 67. The investigation was continuing.

Mr. Wickremasinghe noted that the government held talks with the LTTE, but they were not successful. Was the government to be blamed? No stone was left unturned and a genuine effort was made to solve the problem. The SLFP also tried to talk to the LTTE.

He said there had been some progress since last year where the war against the LTTE was concerned. There were still areas particularly in the North which were still under LTTE

control. The strategy was being prepared to rout the LTTE.

He said the APC had its benefits. It was not a useless exercise. The dialogue was being kept going.

He added that Mr. Bradman Weerakoon did not hold talks in the North. He the Minister asked what was bad with a federal solution to the crisis.

Such a proposal had been forwarded and it was being examined. What was wrong with that? This was a crucial time for Sri Lanka. This was not the time to engage in communal politics.

Speaker M. H. Mohamed:

"Parliament can play a more significant part in finding a political solution. All the parties are here and all are keen in finding a solution. We can make use of Parliament to find a solution. We must consider this".

Gladstone affair and human rights — Herat

Foreign Minister Mr. Harold Herat told Parliament that there was no link whatever between the expulsion of former British High Commissioner David Gladstone and his "self-styled crusade on human rights".

The minister made this statement in response to a question by Mr. H. R. Piyasiri (UNP-Matara District) whether there was any connection between the expulsion and human rights in relation to a statement made in the British Commons by Foreign Office Under-Secretary, Mark Lennox-Boyd.

Mr. Piyasiri said:

We understand that Mr. Mark Lennox-Boyd, Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office has stated in the House of Commons that the expulsion of Mr. David Gladstone on 29th May was motivated by what was described as the desire to stifle criticism on Sri Lanka's unsatisfactory human rights record.

The minister has already dealt with this question in Parliament, could the minister give more details.

Mr. Herat

Mr. Lennox-Boyd has referred to what he describes as Sri Lanka's "unsatisfactory record" on human rights. No country is free of problems. Sri Lanka is no exception. Nor, unfortunately, the United Kingdom itself. Many of our problems have been caused by factors beyond the control of the government. Several democratically elected governments are battling against the menace of terrorism. As a democratic and open society we do not seek to conceal either our problems or the constraints we face in dealing with them.

We have therefore explained the situation in Sri Lanka at

the United Nations. In fact the Human Rights Commission has chosen not to present a resolution against us.

In recognition of our bonafides Sri Lanka has been nominated to membership of the UN Sub-commission on Human Rights from 1st January 1992. We have also permitted the ICRC to operate in Sri Lanka and its reports on the situation in Sri Lanka are submitted to the government. We have also several mechanisms such as the Task Force on Human Rights which keeps members of the diplomatic corps in Colombo informed in detail about all the actions we are taking in this field.

In fact, even Amnesty International has been permitted to visit Sri Lanka and a team is currently having discussions not only with government officials and ministers, but also with private organisations and individuals. This process continues

and we are quite open and honest about it.

I therefore think that it is inaccurate to say that we have reacted against Mr. Gladstone because he raised questions of human rights with the government. It is not only Mr. Gladstone, but other heads of missions in Sri Lanka have also been discussing the human rights situation with the government. The government has always given them a hearing and taken what measures the government considers necessary where a justifiable complaint is made. Therefore, there is absolutely no link between the expulsion of Mr. Gladstone and his self-styled crusade on human rights.

May I take this opportunity to reiterate that throughout this matter the government has made every effort to ensure that the traditionally friendly relations that have existed over the years between Sri Lanka and Britain are not stained by the regrettable personal conduct of an individual diplomat.

Army hold only part of north

— Anuruddha

Anuruddha Ratwatte (SLFP National List) said the peace talks broke down about an year back and the country was under the emergency law. The armed conflict with the LTTE had gone on for that period of time. The media, especially the state-controlled news media had been claiming successes at the battle front but the army had been able to hold only a small portion of the north for this length of time.

Since the state media was claiming victories in the front the armed forces had been made to look foolish.

Therefore in fairness to the bravery of the soldiers, who were sacrificing their lives the government should appraise the public of the factual position in the front. Mr. Ratwatte said.

The MP said about two thousand members of the armed forces and the police had laid down their lives at the front. A large number of families of service personnel who had died at the front were not paid compensation. The government should not allow the families of those brave people to suffer, he noted.

He said that Presidential Advisor Bradman Weerakoon had told the press that there was a possibility of resuming talks with the LTTE and the details of such a move were not before the Parliament.

Mr. Ratwatte, requested the Minister of State for Defence to inform the house regarding talks with the LTTE.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL CULTURE 1931-1991

by Dr. Jane Russel

The topic of the lecture is the development of political culture in Sri Lanka: this is a topic that I have chosen for a number of reasons — the main one being that I am trying to write a book on the subject and as I am not a full time academic, it goes along by fits and starts: A lecture such as this provokes a fit of activity and I have in you, a learned and mainly Sri Lanka audience, the perfect ping-pong table for me to try out my googliest shots, if I may mix my sporting metaphors so horribly.

The concept of political culture has fascinated me for a number of years, ever since I came across Pye and Verba's book on "Comparative Political Culture". For lapsed liberal-marxists like myself (an ex-card-carrying member of the Oxford University Labor Club), it seemed a way out of the impasse that political analysis had got itself into in trying to describe the behavior of political groups and nations according to grand impersonal theories, which although stunning in scope and design, seemed to bear in the end little relation to life as it is actually lived by human beings in the environment provided by our much-abused, long-suffering, darling little planet.

I was reading Trotsky's "Literature and Revolution" yesterday: it's a remarkable book, written in 1923 when Trotsky was still Minister of War in Soviet Russia, and I can recommend it to anyone who wants to see what it was that indeed shook the world in 1917, but I must agree with the unnamed critic of the "New York World" who is quoted on the book cover as observing that "This is a book of brilliant dialectic over which ripples a fierce humor,

and through which shines a generous love for a human race, none of the members of which are yet born". Nor ever will be.

But if marxist-leninism or any other of its sects, Trotskyism or Maoism, are now discredited doctrines, liberalism too seems to have played out its hand. It's empty and tired; Keynes versus self-sacrifice and idealism: materialism versus spiritualism: consumption versus investment. These arguments have been discussed endlessly and with what result? utter boredom on behalf of the participants in the debate and in the end, a gentlemen's agreement to disagree because finally it all comes down to a question of taste.

But the idea of political culture came like a fresh breeze into this aridity, for it seemed to open up new ways of looking at societies that while allowing a universal approach, at the same time related political behavior to the truly human: to being born, growing up, being educated, falling in love, getting married, pursuing a career, raising a family, working, growing old and dying — the six ages of Shakespeare's Man. Or to put it in classical terms: the concept of political culture appeared to link the macrocosm with the microcosm in a way that a medievalist like Leonardo da Vinci would have understood.

Defining political culture is not so easy. And there are probably some of you who would firmly deny the existence of such concept but, if you will bear with me for the next fifty-five minutes, perhaps we can nail this jelly to the wall long enough to gain some insight into the unique nature of the polity called Sri Lanka and by

association (and aided perhaps by prayers) we may be able to shed some light on present-day problems.

Political culture is a loose term: some might even think of it as down-right hazy, though in that respect it is no worse than liberalism. But its looseness leads to a flexibility which can be liberating. Political thinkers are no longer constrained by the strait jacket of political and economic institutions that 19th century analysts considered to be the dominant factors governing society. Marx, Bagehot, Action and Lenin all had one thing in common: a pre-occupation with the formal structures of state power. It was as if the societies they looked at reflected the monolithic machines they saw around them — the turbines and locomotives that drove the industrial revolution had been somehow subsumed into the Leviathan State that resembled an engine with levers and gears. It was just a matter of finding the correct means of operating these levers and hey presto! one had learnt how to manipulate the state for a given end. Not that these thinkers were wrong for their time: most 19th century industrial states, with their vast pool of a powerless proletariat, an overfed and overdressed bourgeoisie, illiterate peasantries and decaying landowning classes, must have seemed as monstrous and inhuman as the first traction engines.

But for the 20th century thinker, the mechanical has given way to the electronic. Sydney Verba has described political culture as "the spirit of the polity". If he'd been less Socratic and more science-fiction minded, he might have called it "the ghost in the machine." Not that Socrates would have

entertained either concept, probably. "Speciosity" is what I can hear Socrates exclaim in my inner ear and Socrates is right to utter warnings against the beautiful and showy which may lead us nowhere. As with a new generation of computer, one must tread cautiously and carry a Big Manual, for here we are dealing with sophisticated and sensitive responses within a society akin to the mechanisms of the human brain. At the frontiers of this novel form of political analysis, it is easy for the woolly-minded to fall prey to making the vague, even bogus, sort of generalizations that render all serious discussion spurious.

Between the Scylla of 19th century formalism and the Charybdis of 20th century mystification, it is vital to steer by the doctrine with most Sri Lankans would instantly recognize as that of the Middle Path. This is how I shall try to proceed: with success, you must be the judge.

My initial step is to define political culture in terms I can understand as "the psyche of any given sovereign or nation-state". What I mean by this is that a political culture comprises all those characteristics—institutional, intellectual and cultural—that correspond to the physical, mental and emotional planes of the human psyche or consciousness. And it is by the cluster of characteristics that any one sovereign or nation-state is individuated and thereby differentiated from any other.

I have divided states into the categories of sovereign and of nation states because there are sovereign states which include or enclose within them nation-states—for example Kurdistan, Eelam, Khalistan, Palestine, Protestant Ireland, the Baltic Republics, Quebec and so on—which are not sovereign states and may never become sovereign states, but as nation-states have sufficiently well-de-

veloped identities within the present time-frame to merit discussion of their political cultures on their own merits.

The characteristics which constitute the "nama-rupa" of any political entity at any given time are virtually infinite. If I was to try and list them all, it would occupy the whole lecture. But I feel I must attempt some kind of itemization in order to give credibility to my argument and I would ask you to bear with me through it. First of course, there is the name, and as we shall discover, this in itself is a moveable feast. Then there are the unchangeable factors, such as geographical location, size, climate, terrain and mineral resources. In particular, it would be important to note whether the state is an island, big or small, or a peninsula, landlocked or subcontinental, as this is a critical factor in the development of a political culture. In passing I would point out that islands situated close to continents—Japan, Cuba, Madagascar, Sri Lanka, Britain—to a lesser extent, islands adjacent to larger states—Sicily, Corsica, and Cyprus—have one vital factor in common: a need to delimit the influence emanating from the large neighbor and so protect or balance the autochthonous culture on the one hand while resisting the temptation to create an impervious, crab-like shell against all external influence, such as created by Japan in the 18th century, on the other.

Once the state is firmly placed on the world map, it is necessary to look at the culture proper: the language, its antecedents and development, its literary or oral traditions; whether there is more than one language, or a whole group of languages, their roots and interrelations: Then the religion or religions: the type... whether monopoly or atheistic; monastic or otherwise, exclusive or missionary: Then the family or tribal system and its relation to other lateral groups like caste or class and

to hierarchical structures like educational institutions, both formal and informal, and in the latter area, we must not overlook nursery rhymes, fairy stories and children's games—the seemingly trivial but symbolic expression of values that deeply mark the psyche at an age when it cannot defend itself.

This leads us to the traditions of the society: how deeply embedded is the tradition? Is there a Greater and Lesser Tradition? What are the myths and/or history of the political group? What is its attitude to the life and death cycle, to man's place in nature and the environment, which leads into the question of diet—is it vegetarian or cannibalistic or something in between? What are the dietary taboos and from this, what are the sexual or social taboos? What is the society's attitude to hygiene? to time? to scientific investigation? What is the mode or modes of dress, of ornamentation, hairstyle: what are the differences that mark the sexes in these areas? Are there differences? What are the rates connected with birth, puberty, marriage, illness and death? But to these questions, which are familiar to students of anthropology, we must relate those factors more normally associated with socio-economic analysts—such as birth and death rates, population growth, density and age structures: the literacy rate, banking penetration rate, availability and accessibility of media, transport and communication networks and then the mix of the economy proper, before we embark on a dissection of the superstructure of the polity.

However, within this intermediate area, I would also include fields of study that the more orthodox sociologist might consider the preserves of the market researcher, sports commentator, art critic and criminologist. Whether it is the shadowy areas where the "white" economy or formal political process meets the extra-legal, the underworld,

or the identification of sports stars as role-models or the advertising campaign as an arbiter of status or social mobility, there is almost no topic which does not become grist to the political cultural mill.

Finally of course we come to the relatively safe haven of the political institution: parliaments parties and pressure groups are easily recognizable institutions, within the constitutional framework, competing for the spoils of power. But there are besides the formal, organized groupings, informal and relatively disorganized groups which must also be looked at — the fraternities for example — as well as those groups, like terrorist organizations which, while highly organized, operate outside the constitutional system. These, plus the icons of establishment identity such as national flags, anthems, holidays, heroes and public decorations and awards, all merit consideration in a full investigation of a political culture: to reiterate my watchphrase — 'Tread cautiously and carry a Big manual'.

But if I had to compress the definition of political culture into a nutshell, I would say that it is the system of beliefs that hold a sovereign state together long enough to enable a public identity to arise sufficient to give form to the name.

Having arrived at a reasonably satisfactory definition, the next question is how can one begin the investigation, or more truly, how can one prepare for a beginning? First, by asking the kind of questions that might help develop the more fruitful sort of curiosity: for instance, why do some nations at certain periods develop with amazing rapidity and feel driven to conquer and impose their will upon other peoples, yet at others subside into placid stability and at others become obsessed with internal pre-occupations or degenerate into civil war?

Researching into the rise and fall of nation-states, empires

and political cultures across the globe and across time, in the manner of Toynbee's "Study of History", can be instructive in clarifying one's ideas. But caution is again required: attempting to classify nations at a particular stage of their life cycle according to some Darwinian scale of evolution can lead to dangerous generalizations. Toynbee was a historical genius, but he made elementary mistakes. He classified, for example, both the Theravada Buddhist and Shi'a Islamic cultures as fossilized: that is that these cultures were not just dormant but stone-dead, extinct, incapable of revival or resurrection in any form. He was wrong by about half a century.

Then given such an infinite, one might say plastic, field of inquiry, narrowing one's option becomes essential, if one wants to retain health and sanity. I have set two dates as the limits of my inquiry: 1931 and 1991. What I shall try to do is to take a snapshot of the political landscape in Sri Lanka in 1931 and compare it to the political landscape of today. Or to be more precise as data is often sketchy, I shall attempt an artist's impression — the thumb-nail sketch... and thereby hope to delineate the more salient features of the landscape, isolating those that have been continuous and those that have changed beyond recognition.

I choose 1931 because it marks a watershed: an abrupt departure from the earlier period. Why? Simply because this was the year that universal franchise with a secret ballot was introduced into Sri Lanka. It was so introduced partly by way of experiment, an experiment which over the next four decades was to be tried in some form or other in every newly-emergent sovereign nation and which has still to be tried out in several ex-colonial sovereign states, the most glaring example of which has to be South Africa.

However, to begin at the beginning — with the name. In

1931 the island which lies to the south-east tip of the sub-continent of India was universally known as 'Ceylon': 'British Ceylon', presumably to mark it off from 'Dutch Ceylon', and sometimes as 'The Crown Colony of Ceylon' or if waxing lyrical, 'The Premier Crown Colony of Ceylon'. (It may be noted that the last British Crown Colony, Hong Kong, is about to re-enter China's orbit without the principle of universal franchise ever having been applied.)

The word 'Ceylon' is an anglicization derived via the portuguese 'Ceilao' from the sanskrit word 'Simala' which is equivalent to 'Sinhala' or "of the lion race". "The Ceylonese" states Chambers 20th Century Dictionary "are the Sinhalese", and "the Sinhalese" it defines as "the most numerous of the peoples of Ceylon". Intrigued by this, I looked up "Tamils" and discovered that they are "members of a people speaking a Dravidian language, Tamil, who can be found in south-east India, north, east and central Ceylon". And in this contradiction in 1931 terminology, whereby on the one hand there is Ceylon, island of the Sinhalese and on the other, a Tamil-speaking people who appear to have spread themselves outward from south-east India into northern, eastern and central Ceylon, we have pinpointed the central dilemma of 1991.

But curiously enough, the name of the island in 1991 is no longer Ceylon, but Sri Lanka, a change effected by the left-oriented United Front government in 1972. Neither 'Sri' nor 'Lanka' rate a mention in Chambers so I appealed for help to a Sinhala lexicographer and was told that 'Lanka' comes from a longer sanskrit word meaning 'resplendent' and 'Sri Lanka' therefore can be roughly translated as 'beautiful land'. 'Lanka' was the traditional name by which the island was known in myths and epics of the sub-continent: Lanka is the home

of King Ravana, the anti-hero of the Ramayana.

A change has therefore been effected and it is a change which places the island more firmly within the ambit of the sub-continent and seeks to emphasize the relation of the island's people to their cultural and racial roots in India. It would superficially seem to suggest that a more accommodative attitude by the Sinhalese has been brought to bear with regard to peoples who have retained a strong affiliation with "Mother India," like the Jaffna or up-country Tamils. But not so: rather the reverse appears to have occurred (I use the word 'appears' advisedly) and the reason is the change in the power balance from 1931 to today.

In 1931, British Ceylon was protected against any unwarranted interference from British India by the Colonial Office in London. Ceylon was virtually co-cooned by the Colonial Office for over a century: hence its 'Premier Crown Colony' tag, and the C. O. mandarins being the most conservative of British bureaucrats, it might have stayed in that unreal world for several decades more had it not been for the formation of the first Labor Party government (a minority government made possible by the back-bench support of the Liberals) in 1927 and the appointment of the redoubtable Sydney Webb, later Lord Passfield and the nearest thing to a Trotsky ever produced by the British political system, as Minister in charge of Colonies. It was a serendipitous coincidence that Webb should arrive at the C. O. just as the good burghers of Ceylon (and I mean by that the class, *not* the communal group), the 4% of the population who were enfranchised according to the very restrictive educational and property qualifications then in force, had sent off one of their many memorials, more pious hopes than anything else, requesting an inch or two more of Home Rule. Webb's reply, a Constitutional Commission under Lord Donoughmore, arrived in 1928 and in 1929 recom-

mended universal franchise as the solution to the island's political ills and in 1931 it was implemented.

It is difficult to say who was more shocked — Ceylon's 4% or the Colonial Office. And I may add that the colonial administrations in France and the Netherlands almost howled in disbelief when it was announced. "Mob rule based on a bi-sexual electorate", yelled the gutter press in London: "Unprecedented non pareil", murmured the *Echo de Paris*, shaking its head wonderingly. But it marked the beginning of the end for 'British' Ceylon, and because of the relative success of the secret ballot and universal franchise principle, it paved the way for the end of all British (and other European) imperial possessions and protectorates. Thus British Ceylon and British India re-emerged as sovereign states in 1947 and it became immediately obvious to the discriminating that the power balance between India and Ceylon had swung entirely in India's direction.

The disenfranchisement of the Indian or Up-country Tamils and the subsequent creation of half a million stateless persons in 1949 was a knee-jerk reaction by the Ceylon Parliament to this radical change in the power balance. The fact that India had its own problems on its northern borders with Pakistan and China and the rise of the Non-Aligned movement with its Article concerning the mutual non-interference of sovereign states, enabled India and Ceylon to arrive at a relatively stable relationship, characterized by a "Loku Aiya and Podimalli" attitude. And so it might have remained had not the rise of Tamil nationalism in Tamil Nad in South India and the Jaffna peninsula in northern Sri Lanka de-stabilized the situations.

So we have today, in 1991, a scenario where Sri Lanka, while voluntarily and overtly acknowledging in its very name

its inalienable Indian connection, has had that connection rammed forcibly down its throat by the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord of 1987 and the subsequent two year sojourn of a goodly portion of the Indian Army on its soil.

However, the change of name does denote a more accommodative attitude where the Up-country Tamils, known formerly as the Indian Tamils, are concerned. They have been re-admitted to citizenship and voting rights, (those that remain that is after the large-scale repatriation programs of the sixties and seventies) after a lapse of four decades. That this problem which seemed virtually intractable in the 1950's should have relatively amicably resolved by 1990 speaks powerfully for the essentially plastic nature of the Sri Lankan political culture. The fact that the headlines are full of battles between the Tigers and the Sri Lankan armed forces should not blind us to the quiet, ongoing processes that are making people's daily lives in other areas more acceptable.

Having dealt at length with Name and touched on foreign policy in the rush, to use a Singlism, I shall get on to Form. And I shall start with population.

As with most other islands close to continents or large countries and directly on shipping (ie. wind) routes, Sri Lanka has a heterogeneous population. In 1931, it was just over five million. In 1991, it is over sixteen million. In 1871, it was two and a half million. With the benefit of some elementary mathematics, one can see that in the six decades from 1871 to 1931, the population doubled. Partly this is explained by the lowering of the death rate consequent on the artificially stimulated economy but mainly it was due to the significant drop in infant and pregnant-mother mortality rates and, last but not most importantly, to the influx into central Ceylon of hundreds of thousands

of Indian Tamils to work on the British estates.

In 1931 there were 700,000 Indian Tamils in Ceylon 100,000 more than the Ceylon Tamils, (the name by which the community who had been settled in northern and eastern Sri Lanka for centuries, if not millennia, were called by the British and themselves to distinguish their community from the newcomers). In 1931 Indian Tamils made up almost 13% of the total population; today it is about 6%. Here we have isolated the profoundest change in the population mix in the last sixty years and it's a change as dramatic as that which the British brought about by its whole-sale transportation of alien Tamil peoples into the Sinhalese highlands over the preceding six decades. Perhaps some balance has now been struck and this long-running sore on the body politic of Sri Lanka will heal itself. It should be noted, however, that if the people of the provinces of Uva, Sabaragamuwa and the Central Province sometimes betray a shell-shocked psychosis, it is due in no small way to the myopic greed of the British planting community and its collaborators in the colonial administration who considered the re-location of whole population perfectly acceptable in pursuit of the quick guinea.

However, even with the forced or voluntary repatriation of over half the Up-country Tamil community, there has still been a trebling of the population base since 1931. Whereas there was approximately one acre of agricultural land per adult at the turn of the century, there is now about a quarter of an acre. It now becomes obvious why colonization schemes should have become such an issue in the politics of Ceylon (and Sri Lanka) from 1931 onwards. For it was not just the Sinhalese leaders who dreamed of tanks and vast irrigation schemes in 1931; the Jaffna Tamils too were sketching out colonization programs in the Wanni for their surplus populations. The pressure on

land was certain to bring about a clash of interests between these two communities unless some early accommodation could be reached regarding the communal distribution of Crown lands.

In 1991 we must report that no accommodation was reached and colonization by the Sinhalese in certain parts of the Eastern and North-Central Provinces remains one of the bloodiest issues on the Sri Lankan political agenda. It is a pity that so many innocent farming families have had to have been massacred to underline the point that this issue remains fatally outstanding.

The other most significant indicator of change in the population from 1931 to 1991 is the baby and youth "bulge".

In 1931 the population of Ceylon was, relatively-speaking, naturally staggered; i.e. gently pyramidal. Today, there is a prominent bulge in the 15-35 age group, followed by a lesser bulge in the lower group. The present population structure resembles St. Exupery's python who has eaten a top hat — uncomfortable to look at and to live with.

Not that this phenomenon is unique to Sri Lanka nor to this period in world history. On the contrary, I would argue that Britain in the mid-19th century, Italy in the period after the 1st world war, Germany from the late 19th century and Russian cities in the last two decades of Imperial Russia would show populations with a higher than normal proportion of young people. Such a population structure is unbalanced, prone to instability and the adoption of messianic creeds. The young are by nature puritanical and extremist. They look for panaceas...an end to all their ills now! They despise syncretism and characterize compromise as shabby double-dealing. There is much in what they say and a strong dash of youthful idealism is necessary to leaven the dull, conservative consensus that the middle-aged

and the late middle-aged would like to have us cease tampering with, but it is necessary to balance youthful miranda and the dreams of utopia with the credenda of a rational workaday reality.

Matching the unmatchable aspirations of young Sri Lankans (and I am here reminded of the title of a report prepared by a notable group of academics led by Professor Dudley Seers which was considered an influential document when I first arrived to study in Sri Lanka in 1973) is and has been the most urgent problem facing decision-makers since the early sixties, when the bulge first began to make itself known. Whether the approach is right or left-oriented, the most important fact from the decision-makers' point of view is that solutions should be provided with all possible speed, and speed (as the saying goes) 'is of the devil'. Marry in haste, repent at leisure: take decisions in haste and you'll need all the luck on your side if they're to be the right ones! Decision-makers feel more and more oppressed by circumstances beyond their control and they respond by clamping down on all forms of dissent or criticism, be it constructive or destructive, just to give themselves the luxury of breathing space.

We can report in 1991 that the State of Emergency that was first imposed in Ceylon for a few days in the run-up to the 1947 election by D. S. Senanayake has been in almost continuous operation since the late sixties, under governments of every different possible hue and his being debated again in Parliament this evening. But to end this particular phase of the discussion on a happier note, let me say that by the year 2025, all being well, the bulge should have ironed itself out. And there we must allow future generations to draw their own conclusions.

(A. B. C. I. S. Lecture)

ELECTIONS — 1991 (Part II)

(Democrat)

TABLE I
Total Votes Received by Each Political Party at the
Local Government Elections of May, 11, 1991

District	U.N.P.	S.L.F.P.	LSSP	SLMP	SLMC	SLPF	MEP	NSSP	SLCP	BNP	CWC	Ind.I	Ind.II	Ind.III
Colombo	348534	157954	—	26324	10873	—	59844	13356	—	—	—	113222	—	—
Gampaha	322120	275880	1182	19128	3748	—	—	2253	—	—	—	19153	—	—
Kalutara	189681	162582	7989	13044	3759	—	3108	751	—	—	—	21406	2674	—
Kandy	263992	161329	1172	9897	12226	—	738	1435	—	1606	—	6755	664	—
Matale	94746	44820	—	7126	4309	—	—	1970	—	—	—	10274	—	—
Kurunegala	289580	209892	—	23577	6509	—	1615	4539	—	9155	—	9744	—	—
Nuwara Eliya	171986	59329	—	913	1065	—	—	1650	—	4591	59294	24174	807	606
Galle	195004	153665	—	22168	1853	—	2397	4485	—	—	—	13698	—	—
Matara	137720	101520	—	2758	200	—	1134	—	30912	—	—	16357	—	—
Hambantota	93070	88707	—	1936	501	—	3352	—	—	—	—	4803	—	—
Puttalam	122101	76578	—	—	5278	—	—	2539	—	—	—	14248	—	—
Anuradhapura	137470	89905	—	3667	2412	—	553	660	—	4342	—	839	—	—
Polonnaruwa	61273	49296	—	2523	319	—	—	—	—	—	—	1081	—	—
Badulla	174322	83478	—	4025	1644	—	379	2493	—	2201	—	4802	881	—
Moneragala	66871	47076	—	2458	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2947	—	—
Ratnapura	170823	137632	5568	4830	—	—	615	12998	12029	—	—	5398	—	—
Kegalle	171142	93382	28363	2119	3944	1553	—	523	—	—	—	11623	—	—

TABLE 2
Total Registered Voters, Total Polled,
Total Valid Votes and Total Rejected Votes

District	Total Registered	Total Polled	Total Valid	Total Rejected	Total polled as a % of total reg	Total Rejected as a % of total polled
Colombo	1,177887	786707	730147	56560	66.8	7.2
Gampaha	960866	694321	643264	51057	73.3	7.4
Kalutara	601755	444624	404997	39627	78.9	8.9
Kandy	681910	509076	459814	49262	74.7	9.7
Matale	236148	183250	163245	20005	77.6	10.9
Kurunegala	823270	610812	544611	56201	74.2	9.2
Nuwara Eliya	336820	255081	218415	36668	75.7	14.4
Galle	599524	442379	403542	38837	73.8	8.8
Matara	467337	321133	290601	30532	68.7	9.5
Hambantota	308224	214138	192369	21769	69.3	10.2
Puttalam	341856	242865	223531	19334	71.0	8.0
Anuradhapura	360811	273910	249848	24062	75.9	8.8
Polonnaruwa	177708	129929	114492	14437	72.6	11.2
Badulla	397322	313350	274220	39130	78.9	12.5
Moneragala	179407	135735	119352	16383	75.7	12.1
Ratnapura	505094	393105	349893	43212	77.8	11.0
Kegalle	469214	344514	312649	31865	73.4	9.2

(To be Continued)

The Crisis of Development

Akmal Hussein

In the context of development, government in Pakistan are up against a crisis that has four features:

i) Economic growth has been associated with poverty, and in some areas growing poverty. Almost 40 percent of the people are unable to consume 2100 calories a day per person. There has been impressive GNP growth (5.5 percent annual growth rate during the Ayub period, 6.5 percent during the Zia regime, and just over 5 percent during the brief tenure of the Benazir Bhutto government). Yet, after 43 years, a substantial proportion of the population remains deprived of even the minimum conditions of human existence. As much as 64 percent of the population does not have access over piped drinking water. (The percentage without 'safe' drinking water is probably larger since piped drinking water frequently carries bacteria). The housing situation is so bad that 81 percent of the housing units have on average 1.7 rooms which are inhabited by on average 7 persons. Finally, the literacy rate of 28 percent is amongst the lowest in the world. The standards of those few who make it to college are spiralling down at a dizzying pace.

The overall consequence of these features is a growing pressure on a fragile democratic polity. A significant section of the population perceives that there is nothing in this growth process for them, which is a factor in the resurgence of sub-national groups. Consequently, a new conflict may be emerging between centralized state structures and a polarized polity, which is associated with a heightened level of violence in society.

ii) The second element in the crisis is the rapid urbanization rate. In Pakistan, it is estimated that at current trends the urban population will double over the next decade, and what is worse, it is likely to be concentrated in large cities. Given the prohibitive cost of providing basic services in large cities, and the financial squeeze on government, a growing proportion of the urban population would be deprived of even minimum civic services. Thus, the percentage of urban population living in unserved localities (called Katchi Abadis) is expected to increase from 25 percent today to 65 percent by the end of this century." The level of social stress and associated violence may become difficult for any future government to handle. Thus, policies for slowing down the urbanization rate, and increased investments in basic services is an imperative of sustainable development.

iii) The third element of the existing development process is rising debt. With existing levels of indebtedness, and government expenditure on unproductive purposes, an attempt to substantially accelerate GNP growth could land Pakistan into an intolerable debt servicing burden. Latin America can be quoted as an example of what can happen when high growth rates are attempted with high levels of debt. For example, the total debt in just four Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela) was until recently over US\$ 282 billion. Their debt constitutes two thirds of the outstanding loans of Banks to all developing countries. When debt servicing burdens in Latin America rose, the creditors placed a squeeze which slowed down GNP growth to a point

where real per capital income actually declined in some cases.

In Pakistan, the situation today is not as acute as in Latin America. Yet, debt servicing as a percentage of foreign exchange earning is already 25 percent. An alarmed IMF has placed a credit squeeze which is already slowing down the GNP growth rate in Pakistan.

iv) The fourth feature of the development crisis is the rapid erosion of the natural resource base: The depletion of forests, desertification resulting from soil erosion and salinity, the rising toxicity levels of rivers due to untreated disposal of industrial effluents, and also rising levels of air pollution are not only making present life hazardous, but limiting the possibility of getting out of the poverty trap in the future.

Failure to devise a strategy that could come to grips with this development crisis has been an important factor in social polarization and the resultant difficulty in strengthening democratic institutions, particularly a democratic culture. The deepening of this economic and social crisis presents a challenge of governance to the three centres of power that purport to govern: The civilian political elite (through parliament and its executive authority), the bureaucracy and the military. One of the factors that may well determine the relative power that each of these protagonists is able to wield may depend on the effectiveness with which it can provide solutions to this crisis. In the ensuing Section II, we will examine how the balance of power within the state structure has shifted from the bureaucracy towards the military.

II. THE CHANGING INTERNAL BALANCE IN THE STRUCTURE OF STATE POWER

The changing relationship between the military and bureaucracy, the two vital elements of the state apparatus in Pakistan, can be understood in the context of three analytically distinct but interactive processes. (These processes were conditioned by the dynamics of Pakistan's security environment and its foreign policy priorities, particularly the nature of its relationship with the United States).

i) Changes in the internal sociology of the military and bureaucracy associated with changes in the social origins of officers in these two institutions respectively.

ii) Changes in the professional quality of officers and the internal cohesion of the institutions.

iii) The balance of power between the state apparatus on the one hand, and the institutions in civil society such as parliament, political parties, media and various fora of public expression, on the other.

In this Section, we will examine how these three processes influenced the dynamics within and between the bureaucracy and the military respectively.

Over the last three decades the social origins of both the bureaucracy and the army have shifted from the landed elite to a wider base in the urban middle strata and the burgeoning class

of rural capitalist farmers. The latter class did include scions of some of the former feudal landlords who had transformed themselves into capitalist farmers following the "Green Revolution" in the late 1960's, when the HYV made owner cultivation with hired labour an economically attractive venture. However, these capitalist farmers also included many rich peasant families who were able to move up the social scale by reinvesting the increased profits that became available from farming. While the change in social origins of officers in both these institutions has been in the same direction (a broadening of the social base), changes in the level of professional competence and indeed the internal institutional cohesion have moved in opposing directions with respect to the bureaucracy and military respectively.

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