Page 1
LANKA
GUAR
Vol. 14 No. 6 July 15, 1991 Price Rs. 7.5
Constitution
RAUV What les
Rajiva Wijesinghe retu
Conflict
Bertrai
Izeth
 
 
 
 
 

DAN
Registered at GPO, Sri Lanka OD/09/NEWS/91
— J. R. Jayewardena — Piyal Gamage
sons will Delhi learn?
- Mervyn de Silva
"nS tO Vietnam
Bastiampilai ussein

Page 2

Knight
rmOVe

Page 3
TREADS
NO MONEY FOR
DIVISION
Whea Sri Lara ka Army fias she/wed plans for a fourth division because the Treasury Fhas said that theore is по топеy, The goverriment is facing pressing financial problems and can7 of afford such expansion
FOURTH
according to "reliable
sources' quoted in the
Sard.
MEDICS STRIKE, INFANT DHES
A day's token strike by Assistant Medica / Officers and Regio na / MMedica | Officers (apothecaries). Crippled rural hospitals on July 8. A six orth old child died on admission at the Polonnaruwa Base Hospital as treat 77 er 7ť fhad beer 7 UWr) - a wailable at two rura / Fospitals the infant had been taken to earlier. Among the strikers' demands: registration under the Medica / Ordinance immediately after their three year tra inY 77 COL TSE2, E 7 FW7CTEāSE allowar) Ces.
Briefly.
NO The Opp lia met had request for the June 2 | th: 0 Coland h Colombo, a frol the Offi government vn
WOA. S0 The Lank Party (LSSP) ãgãỉrist the gC
5sio II tC) g facilities to America. The
a Stale Tent: "' bo Lur Iridia ha; this operatio justifiable a militātes agai
position of 1.
Which Sri La t".
WDյ
G. While the tion parties W. Si | Erit Of ThE
Lanka's Musli and protested. to President
Federationı ir. of Muslim Yol (FAMYS) said |T. Ost OppČľILIT Of the Rajiv
for Sri La ilk the Close St r: tI Wwith bo
Tali | M | It is certainly
LA FRA
GUARDAN
Wol. 14 No. 5 July 15,
Prica RS, F, 50
1991
Published fortnightly by Ln nta GLIEardian PLublishing CO.Ltd.
No. 246, Union Place,
Colombo -2.
Editor: Mervyn do Siwa Telphpng: 447534
CCMT
News Background LettĒr J. R. – Five-Star L
Elettigna - 1981
Muslim and Tamil
Hilders North-E:
EL FT | C |f| it
Pakistan - (3) Th[] [:#11[]|[[: [HLI |firlL:hina FE','istFir The Military Sit Lui
the Eighties
Printed by A. B2/5, Sri Ratri ajo
Ma Watha,
TE Ephi

E BATE Osition in par
dropped its A debates of 1 bÖTıb b|Bisi int Operations gadquarters in press release Cë Of the ChigF упip said.
A (1) a Sama Samaja has protested Ivarnment'5 deciTär t ex parded tha WİCE of LSSP said in O LJ IT grat reighs A|WäS wiewed
With Tu Chil prehension. It st the basic
on-alignment to 1 kH is GG IIITit
A (2)
major opposiwere surprisingly WOA issue Sri T1 yn Luth Upped In a déSpätch Primada 5 the f Assem Elias Ith of Sri Lake : 'The time is he in the light Gandhi killing :ā tOil Cul|ti W3 td, ationship possi
Hi til di du governments. ' tit të ti më
ENTS
3.
EITT: THE
8
Disunity
15t Merggr? 11 13
r : H
2U}
til III
22
Pros thi Sarawana Ilut tu
to 3. ց: 43EE75
to force New Delhi to plan
out its modus operandi of repeating history, Any wrong emphasis on prestige may cost Sri Lanka heavily. So long as Western policy dictators remain willing to sacrifice Sri Lanka for India thgre is 1Co 1 2 Ed for Sri LĘ I kad to sacrifice India for the West Indeed such a course would not be in Sri Lanka's best ift Erést5.
"We are therefore of the wiew that the permission granted to open a WOA statiom, however harmless tha Conditions there of be, would Eventually become a security threat to Sri Lanka".
BOVE BLAST
(3) Wara thari, the alleged master Tı indi bölgi hind the car bomb that Wrecked the JOC headC|L'arters Of June 21 sWalloWed cyanide and killed himself When police closed in to arrest him, police Said, Warathan was hiding in a workers shack on a tea estäte in th B central highlands.
Police Said that Wärät hän Was also responsible for the car bomb that killed Ranjan Wiera tre, minister Of State for deface, in March.
LTTE MOLE
30 DE TEC; tiwes had traced a link be tweer the Rajiv Gandhi assassination, the murder of Ramjan Wijera tri e and the JOC bombo, Lanka pro Lu Walth, Lhee OffiCial news Page Il CW said. Wara ltil Hr. Whom polica said Vyas HB hird to JOC Hornb ind the Ranjan Wijerat na ki||ing took cyanide when he was arrested on a tea estate at Kotagala, Lankapuwath said he had an album of photographs which included pictures of LTTE terrorists assigned for Special opgrations.
Who Was Warathan? Taraki, the Well informed Stu riday is and columnist, Wrote that Warat han co Lu Tri hawe been, all along, a LTTE lie is the TEA (Tami || Eelam Army) where ha first came in to prominence. This could explain
(Consfirffers Jr. (ge s)

Page 4
"motorcy
Make tracks safely, C with YOKOHAMA M
Enjoy carefree, troub YOKOHAMA.
HIGH PERFORMAN YOKOHAMA Motorcycle Tyres
Automotive Products DV
Sri Lanka State fa
119, Wekanda Road, Col.
 
 
 
 

omfortably and economically Otorcycle tyres
efree riding with
CE
SO
ing (General) Corporation
TTpo 2. MWEN 422341-3, 432874

Page 5
THE TIGERS CENTRE STA
Mervyn de Silva
Imbassador Galbraith's "func
tion ing ana Tchy" has not dicgenerated into a 'rnal functioning democracy". Poorly cducated though he may well be, the Indian Voter has intuitively grasped the nature of participatory power and chosen to excrcisc it in the face of the most ficarful odds. The Sri Lanıklı electorate, somewhat better tes
ted, confronted even fiercer challenges in l988-89, and succeeded in Sawing the system.
Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal hawe la tely made their own rcas Suring contributions to the great South Asian experience (experiment?) in democracy.
Thc in-built constituency pressur les On popularly elected regimes irritat e the foreign policy establish ment, which usually prefers to conduct a clean, cnical exercise, especially when policy objectives have to be supported by coercive diplomacy and C.) Wer L actio I. With the assassination of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, the conce and future king, and the possible demise of a modern dynasty, it should be abundantly clear that India's Sri Lanka policy has proved a 11 Con u TicTntal failure, it has e vel ta rnishedl thic escutcheon of the
Il dia Ilı Army, the las E " * sacred cow".
A new neighbourhood policy
is not only desirable but necessary. And, in some ways, incvitable, India has reached its OWith 'end of history', its postindependence history. It faces all the challenges of transition, particularly in the sphere of economic strategy, which is funda Illen tall. There is also the problem of its world-role. Nehiru's Non-align Ilment was predicated on the thesis of two fiercely competitive power-blocs.
The emerging global structur such negative
India could stid u II its wirtull leider * third yyıl Quli" cı Delhi's diplom
E:K. tIT:l. dimilie which has no rightly so, W
India for the up 5 upport foi 5. tT L1 citu li ring al ni, is however 5 ment in the mi cconomics that dial atten til thic for c5 cc ab II di is. Tot eç III lic calla tio II like the S I cli'; NL Yugoslavia, Ind thıc Tesillicı ce cal With stand Critical issues the IMF, for
Dr. NMH | Tl coli: Side We the dial Scialis III * '''[hlid yw cor[r]'' In It! Laskian Was a 'caring ma de the pu malin engine . phase is over. perils of 'adjus lly in a liwely all too familia ST i L11 kl. 11, parliamentary ruling party.
Devaluation lowed by pi large-scille ill ge:Ted T'et rench II
state-run indu Ventures. A 1-tווים חים זוןEוון
globalism (No I require : 1) We

ON GE
...
still shapeless e does Incot pe T mit
Self-defi Titi ofl.
31 Tcl still ca II, 3W. Blit it was ship of a large
ollective that gawe L4 LiC i Il fill Llece a II si OI 1. N. A. M. disbanded, and ill now look to C01 Cept Lull backthe task of readjustment. It LTuctural adjustTe Wital i Teil of will engagic InlIld energies in e future, while at the edge of pse or disintegraSoviet Union, or ligned Cområde, |il des It halwe Of China, which US pressure on and also ignore T1 i TW",
in Singh will preliquidation of InLike Illich of Socialis Ill, it was than Marxist. It Welfaris Ill Which blic Secto I tillë if growth. That The pains and st Incnt, especialdemocracy, are I, certainly to a les politic the clear majority of the
will son be fol*iwa tisation and mediate or stagIn ent in the sick" stries and allied 3 arallel retrenchback in Indian alignet) would r foreign policy
profile at least in the short-run, like Chill.
Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's response to the Gulf crisis, instinctive, Well-leaning but naive, did
suggest that he had failed to gra s p tlıc implications of the current convulsive changes in
the global ordet. He Tushed to Moscow since the special IndoSoviet relationship was the Other pillar of Indian foreign policy.
The cut-back in investment should sec an orderly shift in eill phasis from an over-stretched El Id a II bitious global is to a far clearer regional role, thic firn soundation for a grander role in the ncxt century. Whilc the Indo-Pakista ni relationship Inay remain an exception, the Indo-Sri Lankan has many les sons for the regional policy planner in Delhi.
The LTTE, was trained ind ari Ined on Mis. Indira. Gandhi's orders, as a diplomatic option held in reserwe against a proAmerican Jayewardenic government thalt had a bandoned Bandaга па јke's Delhi-oriented "Nonalig III ment". When the time cal Ille the LTTE would be the cutting edge of Delhi's coercive diplo
11.El Cy.
In case the LTTE was Tot sufficiently pliant, Delhi trained and armed rival militant groups, II] Elinly the EPRLF, giving thicir leaders sanctuary in India just as it has donc for the parlia II el til TiSE TULF. Il til als ( ) used other political parties, Sinhala and Tamil, to weaken pTc5ident Jaycowardene, while: CXploiting “ “contradictions" (perSonal more than political) in the ruling UNP. In short Delhi’s Sri Lanka diplomacy seemed an impeccable exercise

Page 6
in K L LI tilly l Im stil t ic craft, thic Tell politik of thic Teginal hegemony determined to demonstrate and assert its parm ()ւIntcy.
When al delfiant Jaye wardena
turn cd LQ Pakista ind the to cxtra regional sources of help (US, Israel, China etc), thic thumb-screws were turned.
Terrorism was the weapon as bombs went off at the airport :1T1 (1 he: It Of C010Illb0. Wille. Il Jaye Wardena. In ulte di a final offensive India had to project its power openly though nonviolently. There was air-drop of fad a Lld IIle dici le Cower the Tamil North by Indian Mig"s. Colombo Teld the signal correctly, and Jayc w HT den är duly signed the ''Accord'.
A Sinhala sail OT in MT. Gandhi's Honour guard, tried tio do tio poor Mr. Rajiv Gandhi what an Egyptian soldier did to Anwar Sadat after he signed the Camp David Treaty. The marine was an active sympathiser of the proscribed ultra-nationalist JWP. Colombo was ringed by fires for three days when JWP-led Sinhalese protesters took to the SLTects t{} (le 1101. Il Ce the +traitor' Jayewardene.
After the first six thousand (6000) troops arrived Mr. Rajiv Gandhi insensitive to its possible parallels with Wietnam, told the Western press it would be a short, sharp excrcise and the boys will b c back home soon', More than two years and sixty thousand troops later, the proud Indian army had to be withdrawn by another Indian prime Minister, Mr. W. P. Singh, who placed "a good neighbour policy'' on top of his foreign policy agenda. By that time, two things had happened. The army had suffered its most hu milia ting setback since the China War, and accordi Ing to pro-LTTE. Tamil sources, some soldiers had gang-raped Tiri vēl ir fl, One of the suspects in the assassination case was evidently onc such victim,
While India, firmly convinced that this Was a State-to-State conflict, based its coccive diplomacy on the "right hand
4
ling of contra di the LTTE which silic Crcist 511 at skill, * "contralitik 15" Di Colomb : ) MGR HInd the
Kar L1 al lidh i #1 (Jayalalitha) an between thc Tall stration and thi nationalist Tall Prabhllkl II FlI ii it is said, With Brill Iiiii I Tamilil well as the Megalomania Cor to exploit the fi between India's O Tayyidill Sollt
The Hindu I mentalist'). BJP o 15, tcd the CD 1 Tural Hind i he: begi T1 Ini Ing Jf a
dịựido' Srị Lã T for TrC II he Ni Talsi Tı hal Rai,
the first sol Ller Minister but E. so to say, of In !ry of tר m = m ethnic conflict AS Extern El A ble was the fir: lombo after th anti-Tall mob watching a g "documentary' wisited a lea and puficha, sed Sri Lanką. Twi ter, hic w cull : to give the I Indian foreign priority.
The lattic changing. Thc ment i 5 comic of th tries in which the charactCT : the new chall prepared for con may add to is certill inly not Cf Cg Inflict T challenge is not bouring state. anti-systemic.
Pralbha karan | that hic is the IL12

ictions”, it WELS ducted the *IL Il : flore C01It exploited betwecil Delhi el h1i H 1d Madr":1s, DMK, and thern 1 || ALIOMIK di perhaps now ii || Nadu a dim limi - - Intre ridicii lill groups, Mr. entifics himself I b Cittle antiTÉldicilis IIn a S Cholan Empire. not, he plans nal contradiction North ill its
1.
evivalist (fundait is said, has ngress from the rtland. Is th is lle yw North-SO11th ka 15 talk: Crimhought that Mr. nlyה tסיון 18 נ: e til C PTIC cause he is part, |il's Institutional 1. Sri Lank ind its evolution. ffairs Minister, it to fly to Colate July 1983 wille Ice. After Wer III1 ent film Til the Tilts, he ding bookstore sic veral by C3 ks. Il ce Foreign Mins5urely be inclined “e-struct L1 ring of բolicy a high
of conflict is Indial sub-cantiLe la Togest labora - WW : l test | Lit ind complexity of enge. A m a Tmy wentional Warfare the problem. It the best Illegins esolution. Tէլ: from the neighIt is from tile
browed to mcc Illo Te st widely publicis
ed "" terrorist" (guerrilla) leatler II the World. He his used will Inodern "weapons' very skillfully - technology and communications. Hic is such a success 5tory that he will som hoc a role-model for every rebellcader in this region. Who was responsible for the Delhi airport bomb" This is a region where crossborder terrorism, the topic taken up at the recent SA ARC Conference in Maldives, is endemic because all the borders are 'open Cor “porous” or arbitrary and artificial,
Ethnical legiance, the persistent source of conflict today, travels light, Without visas. IL even walks over the waters. Prabhakaran continues to prove that the Pilks Strait is in exception. He has not been chas tened by the Crack-down in TA Til Nadu, Far fra II it. His vicious one-two punch (Mr. Gandhi and JOC Headquarters in Colombo) was a. Teminder to Colombo and Delhi. He is lying low now. It would be |ı ali yer to thınk, he hızı 5 Hh Iı İldırıcıl Ta mil mad u That is not just a rear-base or sanctuary. It is his traditional hole-laid.
LETTER
Pushing the “Poetry"
II TECIL W:ck5 W : hiye been subjected to a sustained propaganda, pushing the '' + poetry" of Guy Amittha. Il ayagäT1 : Ind son. The campaign has been so unrellitting and so Widespread LE1: I on Wolders Whether it Was Amirtha inayagam that handed it OT whether het hFred S:ıtchi a, Ild Satchli.
After so illuch exposure to the genre I too was tempted to try my hand at the rhyming jingle Il tulis is what I haWC becı able to come up with:
To Amirth Linayagan, pere e
fīlī, All I have to say is this: A joke is a joke is a joke
blit still There is such a thing as overkill,
Leonard Thirunawakarasu Colomba - 4

Page 7
The virtues of my 97
J. R. Jayewardene
hen: The first suggestijn
to introduce the Executive Presidency system of Gover IlI 11 erit of Sri La Ilıkal Wäs Illa de by the While I was a Minister i II, the Dudley Setia måyake Gove III ment of 1955-1970, in al speech to thic Science: Stude Luts Association of the Clo IIb) University in December 1966. Some of the Tema Tk:s I Illa de the II were as föllö W's:
" Τη τηiε τα IIHFriες, Γιά. Εκεί. Η - five is chose directly by the people ET P7d is F1CJ f de per derir or the legislar dring the perial y írs existence for a specified III/riEr of Pears, , , sie Eio Frérich Colis fit Fiori is a cari hiristial of
LLL S YYaaa SSS K SSLSa S S S LLLLLLLHHH s'sse P.S.
"Such at executive is a strong
executive, seated in power for a fixed riffers of years, not subject to the Whir775 (Trid sancies of sa 71 elected legis la rare; Tot a fra iad to take correct hit unpopular decisions hecarse of ceri si re froni iss Parliarierisa ry party,
""This Feer 7,5 ro 77 e a very rece 55 Try regirer7 er ir a de ye - Iaping courtry faced with grave probler 7, 7 SE CP 75 14'e Are y la ced With foday."
The Ilext Coccialisi CDT I Tilised this questi II wis while I wis in the Opposition. Mrs. Baridaranaike's Government was
considering a mending the Constitution, to introduce the Republicia. El Constitution of 1972.
I sluggcs tcd to thic United National Party Working Committee that we put forward our views supporting the Executive Presidential system at the Constituent Assembly. The Party did Incot å grec. But Mr. Dudley Senanayake who did not support it, stated that we Ilmust Tecnicimber that the II lost powerful country in the World ti. AncTici, h15 l'atta il cd that staturc under in executive Presidential system.
Lecture delivered
Constitution of
PRESIDENT J. F. E É I NA C
In February 'W':4,5 give the si için by Elı II introduced Il L. of CII Tols beca Ille a Tree Member of H IIh of שWתטות
In 1972, afte Assembly had berated Id Constitution, C a republic, but 110 del Wa,5 ret
Il 1978. Febr ch: Inge took p cutive power w sident elected country with 50 Tity and Legisla
Westcdii i El Lille: eo-1
The 1978 bCCD tailor-IIa CT : Cy. Le 1 118 |
Wisi (Ils Linder famous by the sident Abraha in 1863, openi til the die the decisive Federal forces defined Democr
līt f : people; for the
Of the peuple Chapter 1, Se the sovereignty L Irid Sec. 4 st exercised; (1) power by Parli: of elected repri Peoplc and by Referendu II; (b power by the Republic electe (c) the judical p In ent through Co El 1 d establislied by the Constitu ind established

8 Constitution
IT "Sri Links 1978' by former
R. TA 'EMWA IRENE |
blij Tmb) on July 2,
1948, Sri Lanka Tatus Lif DO III inldependence Act 1: British House al In di Sri Lanka El nd Independent le British ComNl Lions
T EL C) Instituent | 1:t EL I ll leliaccepted a new eylon was made the Westminster Lied,
El co E11 pletic lace, with exein i Pre
by the whole | բeT cent majdLive power being ected Legislature.
institution has Llic for a Demicoexamine its prote heading malde ! A Illerican PreLincoln's speech Ing the III1emorial Comme mÖr:lting victory of the at Gettysburg, A Cy El 5 ** a gwernpeople, by the people.''
by the people: c. 3, proclaims of the People its how it is the legislative lment consisting scitatives of the the People at a ) Lle executive President of the i by the People LW er by ParliaIILS etc. Cital or recognised I ti ”Il CT created by law. This
Section also refers t u funditI 11511 tal Tights and the franchise.
The Cabinet of Ministers shall com sist of the Presidcrit at the Head, and the Prille Millister ad Ministers fr a mong the Members of Parliament, ChapteT WII, S. 43 and S.
44,
The Sections dealing with the scovereignty of the people H Iud certalin Fundamental Rights cannot be amended Without a two-thirds majority in Parliament and approved by the people at a Referendu TT). Si Iailar approval is necessary for legislation to extend the terril of Collicc Cof the Presidic II L o T the duration of Parliament for Over six years.
This is a unique feature for even if the whole Parliament W latics i 1 farw o LIIT Of SILICI En cxtension, unless approved by the People at. El Referendum, it does not become law.
I think no deilocratic lition in the World has this unique power given to the People by its Legislature. It was with this power that the people exLended the period in office of the Pa.Ili artic: La L. elected in 1977 by six years. All previous extensions e. g. in 1975, werc by Parliamentary approval only, or by an Order-in-Council before Freed Ill.
The Government is clearly based on an elected President, With executive powers; TC5p on - sible to Parliament, as Head of an elected Cabinet, chosen from Parliament; charged with the direction and control of the Government, and collectively responsible and ans Werable to Parliament (Chapter VIII).
Many interesting questions for discussion can arise on an interpretation of the Section dealing with the Cabinet of Ministers and their executive powers, Do they derive them as agents
5

Page 8
of the Executive PT eside It II with power wested in thern when they are charged with S. 43 (1) with the direction and control of the Govern Ilent I leave this question for con
stitutional experts to decide.
To complete the part dealing with Sovereignty of the People, the Independence of the Judiciary is vital. While the Judiciary is clearly stated as exercising the Judicial pow Cr of the people, they do so through Courts, Tribunals and Institutions that are created by Parliament. The independence is secured in Warills Ways spelled out from Sections 107 լ է 117,
Fundarnental Rights
Appointments to the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal are by the President by wa TITEL, nt under his hand. They shall not be removed unless the majority in Parliament so address te Presidiellt L T CITL10 "We the Illi, Their sala rics Ice de Lermined by Patliament shall Tot be reduced after appoint III e Inti, Judges of the High Court are also appointed by the President and are subject to disciplinary collit til of the President Ill the recto Illi IIle Iida tio Il of the Judicial ScTwice CD III11550. П.
All other Judges are appointed by the Judicial Service Commission which consists of the Chief Justice and two other Judges of the Supreme Court. Disciplinary actico II is also by them.
Under the previous Constitutital of 1972, all the minor judiciary appointments were by the Cabinet of Ministers. This Constitution ättempts Els far as hull inly possible to creat Conditions for the Judiciary to be independent; the rest is in the hands of the Judges the Inselves, who Illust be rnen of Courage, Imel of wis du TT1.""
There are other Constitutio 11 which Buddhism (Chap. II), Language (Chap, IW), and Citizenship (Chap. W); also with Superior Courts (Chap. XWI), Parliamentary Commissioner (Chap, XIX),
sections of deal with
Emergency Law (Chap. XVIII).
A GOwегПIћеп by the People, is vided foT . Il approval by thi RefereIldull ca: ins be äInended de II cratically.
Restriction rights — How? Ilhentioned howe ment al rights porarily TC strict { Of altional scic religious harmor few ther reas I Chapter III, Se The power to til 15 iul Ilder the Ordina Ice Whic an end or susper of the provisio cxcept the pric Constitution, is Chapter (XVIII), of the PTC Emergency, Par informed and (Chapter XVIII,
No callic գuired the ap| Diment for thc l ) Em crgency or Emergency Law
The emergen party system si a democracy is by the inclus ""Full dimetal citizes of ** fre Publication, Union rights 14(1).
For the pe dealing with is also not forge WI - S. 27 to . L|Illor:l Led. Il Ille Section S. 27 possible to il the se ecOIIlic cies, it II list Prosperity but TitleT f'T|15, 3d hindra, ncc.
Also it. I mus: hit f'Tol Jul. Il 1970 til 1) e Illēts fall principles whic LJ Ilion ha s n 0 !
Recovery fr

5 S, 15 & 6 : nd
it of the People; i adequately proprotected. Only 2 people at a n these provis
or taken away
funda Iliental It should be ver that fundaIn ay be temdi Lihle il crests urity, racial and ly, econd Iny and a 1s. The Lioned in iction 15.
1 make regulaPublic Security h Can oveT-Tule, ld the operation
ns of Hny là W visions of the del L. With i Il
Within 14 days E1 [11ä Li(,) T1 DT a, D1 lia Iment Illust be approve it, see Section 155 (6)). Colsti till til TCprowal of Parliaclara till of an the operation of
5. ce of : multio esse I til for 3
Tina dc possible ;ioT1 2:1T11 coII1g the Rights' to every edom of Speech, Assembly, Trade etc"" in Secil
ple: The part "for the People' ten. In Chapter 29, these a Te e T1e di cite only one (2), If it is ully implement and social poli1ring Peace and terrorism and violence lite a
L = be rem en bered t: 1950 to 1964 77, we hall Gowwing Communist even the Swiet w bando led,
om these policies
has begun from 1977 - 1983 with the Frec Policy and other policies laid down in the Con stitution when terrorism reared it 5 headli :ı d lı it ilu 3 like: tradio.
Briefly...
தோ: fr; நரச why, Taraki said, the LTTE entrusted such an important job as the JOC bombing to a manı Who Çama Ower from יחסrganisatiם therסan
"""The rige of thia LTTE is only partly dua to its military prowess. It was also due tot ha efficiency of its in tal = ligan Ce Wing. Many groups may still be infected with its dormat Tales lewer to ba disc: weard"", the Col Lummist säid,
READY FOR TALKS
Former LTTE Jaffna cornTal dar Kittu, no in LOI1= dor, was reported to have said that tha Tigars were willing to resume negotiations with the Sri Lanka gOWernthB חם gווII חeוחוחסt. CחEוח offer, the presidential advisor om interatiola | relationis Mr Bradman Weerakoon said in Colombo that there was no change in the government's position on talks. The LTTE TTL. St de Clare that Wiole TCE would not be used as a means to achieve political objectives and they must acknowledge the democratic right to other
political opinions, he said. SMAP POLL? SLFP National Organiser
AILFH Basilda falaike W35 101 prasent at the party's Central Committee me e ting in Colombo, MIT B3 dara like had mot TGturned from his visit to the United States,
The meeting was chaired by party president Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranaike. Several new embers recently appointed to the central Committee were present. The meeting Welt on for four hours. The current situation in the Country and a possible Snap Ble: Ction wara discusseld, Sources said.

Page 9
FIVE-STAR DEMOCR
Piyalı Gamage
politician who has retired
from public life and has no further political ambitions can expect, för perhaps even clai II as his right, to be leeft allone to his devices, without being constantly dragged into the limelight of public controversy. JR is not dolce such... Hc frcquently makes public appearanCes to pronou Ice On a variety of Col troversial Tinatters, so Inlich so that We can take it that he has voluntarily diwe sted himself of the right to be left free from criticism. He who Would play opinion-maker must be prepared for come-backs. JR is constantly in the role of elder statesman. There are those who think that eminent persoпčigСЕ such His J. R. should That be criticised at all whatever the provocation. In contrast to this attitude is that of the AmeriCall pe Cople who refusc to be overawed by their public figures. Take this quote from the Time Magazine of 17 June 199: " 'The mask of respectable elder statesman Ilmselts a Way to Tew cal al de
ceitful, Wi Didictive character da Tigerously ar Ined with full power. . . Eind all too willing to use it, "That was what
Time had to say about ex-president Nix, Col. There arc Simile obnoxious features that we in the so-called third world perceive in the image the USA projects but we must all honour the America. In people for their Lu i qualified com Thit ment to freedo III of speech and publication. In Sri La Inka Ljo, 315; JR Would no di Lubit Els sure you, the constitution gurant ces frecdorn of expression. Let us not be rel Luctant to Lise that freedom whe. Ilcvet necessary, always fieri efendi, taking care not to cross the ill its into the area of libel.
Recently JR galve a talk entitled "Democracy and Human Rights'. To hear hin tell it, JR favours “free and fair elections held at regular intervals." He considers 'a judiciary which
is completely
) it}Iז I? !!!tIיif, cracy.” JR i be "freedom
both verbal also the right tings'. He ad
express wiews w of the govern I to it in the le side it becom necessary right livic all this. L
JUJNIUS IREX
While in pot h.c.st level, JR th:4t was wis il A few weeks if il Els pri IIle 71st brithday, gcl 1 Tall al II. Il est El pr:Türgi tiwe of not usually aw: politicians tran Het als O. Tevi wed a ceremony in til Illes, the Sin to play the key COin i was mint { circulation wiL it - SÜTething in the deilocr: g0 Werl II1c In t-o w II On l6 {}ctobe: after JR had -stitutional-aline to-have - been - dent) reported said, at Ele Anura dhapura: all right, but I cise these pow next day the carried a corre had really said has given me t
king, but I an No cle lid it Was. His king Conly i til His
I I JR's addres sions of the L hıc w:45 * # librowse and the judicia of 27 February del L. JR I C dolu parliament and what disturbs

AT
independent a of a true demo
15ists there Illust of expression, ind Writtel and
t') : d dress mee - is: "Freed I11 to whether in favour ment or Copposed gislature or culLe 5 al human al Indi "" ) es JR beO Ok Bit the Tecordi.
WCT at the highad a demeanour bly monarchical. te T he was 5 worn minister, on his
JR decla Tcl ii * for prisoners - Teg D1 E1T1 t m1 bIı arch5 ilable: ) electc siently ill office. the Wap-Magula, which, in ancient hala king used role. A rupee:d and put into h JR's head on LImprecedented tic World. The led Daily Mirror, r 1978 (shortly become by-con:Ild ment — dice med elected presihim to have El TT y tallo o in 'I am a king shall newer exerers. ** The very sa Ine newspaper C [1] Il.. WELL JR was: " *Parli II e It Elle powers of a in not a king.' ver thought he Y powers txisted im:1gina tiOIı. 5 to the 28th SesTNP h c clied both parliament ry. '(The Island 1985). A 5 presibt ranked abowę the judiciary but and disi Ilays llis
È
was his compulsive harping on
such matters in public. You don't hear of the Queen of Engla Tid bragging about her high ra Ilık !
UNIUS THE JUST
On 20 October 1986, addressing the students of Richmond College, JR Said "I air ring fly less to be a just ruler. "JR thought of himself and spoke of himself as our 'ruler'. We can just imagine what would happen if the president of the USA were to clain publicly that he was the ruler of the American people! The most likely result Would be impeachment procecdings.
On 31 May 1987, speaking at the Biyagana Export Processing Zone, JR said: '+In 1815 we gawe Over Ülır kingdom and exchanged the king of Sri Lanka for the king of Great Britain. I am the successor to that monarchy." ( Daily News of 2 Jurie 1987.) Such delusions of Ilonarchical grandeur ill accord with JR"s Oft-proclailed dello cratic value:S,
FREE, FAIR AND REGULAR ELECTIONS
III, the 11 odd years JR was in power not a single parliamen
tary general election was held i Sri Lanka.
Ill 198| DDC Electic L15 wer
held. The SLFP boycotted them. In Jaffna some very pcculiar things took place. Speaking at the central YMCA at a semilar L S SLLLLLK SL Laa S LSLL S LLLLLLaLHHLLSS Organised by the CRM, Mr S Nadesan had this to say about the Jaffna DDC elections: "On the day before the election, the secretary to the ministry of defence, In the order of the president, had given certain directives to the raturning officer. One hundred and fifty presiding officers at the polling booths had been renowed and others substituted. Solic of the substitutics were peons in govern Illent offices Who knew nothing of election
7

Page 10
procedure. At the end of the poll six ballot boxes were Inissing." "(The Nation 30 July 1982). The returning officer reported to the CO IIIII is siūlic of electi Iis that "the poll had not been conducted in a prup er man ner. . . . Certain ballot Exts had not arrived at all. A substantial lull be of counting officers had not conformed to the requirements stipulating that written statellents should be delivered of the ILLIlber of yotes cast for cach political party or independent group. """These un precedented cvents to tok place in the 50th an niverSary of universal adult franchise
i Sri Lalka.
1982 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
IR"s nost charismatic
Tiyal
Mrs Banda ramaike had becn deprived of her civic rights for seven years from 16 October 1980. The best the SLFP could come up
With Was the
lack-lustre Hector
Kobbe kad Llywa. Stimely,
NexL 3:LI11- || desig Tited to CCJI the transitional 1978 CCI 15 Liit Litir during Which p. continue to have: in parliament all any vacancies th I DIlimation, Th Tiries of India
Il editorial e TIL stra tagem" “Haw impressive Victo presidential pal "w:irdcTie has Teg to blot his c{1| that live up to h i5 e LO dissolve hird electio 15 to of Schedule he long his presen on parliament th Ilia II del Wre. FJ cutting of corne: eWardelle is at cisely Whilt has e
POLISARIALYSIS (
General Elections to Municipal and Urba
Fal
Ni), L. "I" ILIII til Register el LUNEP
WELT,
A Comba M 347,393 || 9,793
55.5% B II) chiwala-Mt. 33,508 | דני,15ן Lil Wii M II 47.8%. Killia, UC 0,419 10,339 55.6% T), Sri Jaya wa Tdc1aptura - 57,844 7,500 Kotte J 42.4% E Seetha waka Pura LJC ID,54f5 4,941
60.9% F Mr. L' U 103,956 33,963 53.6%, G Kritikawat. Le-Mulleri- 54,7Ğ2 14,73) yawa PS 40.4%. H. Kad wyella F’S 99,542 24.203
38.9% | See||1ël WElk El PS ճ2, 31ճ 19,505
45.1 J Hollaga|Illa PS 12,590 33,501 43.8%, K Maharigili PS 50, 623 14,750
38.1% L KE3bël PS (2,925 24,781 39.6% T 1177,87 348,54
.17.7%
District Results
COOO
NSSP NIE SI
2,027 - ().9% 1,125 1805 3. 1.5, 2.5 4
57 - 2.8 -
585 - 2 1.7% 5.
5| 2,789 4.7%. 34.4%
GT4 - 17:5 1.1% d
176 2,09.5 II 0.5%, 5.7%
1,228 9,495 2
卓
1.0: 15:32, 2, 19 21,669 4.90 5[],1} & 1847 - 2.7%
1,298 22,030 3.3%, 56.8% 1,283 - 3 2.1% 5. 13,356 59,884 1. 1.8%, 8.2%, 2.

R Win hind
lhe refere du 11 1 til Lille s Ille of TOWisions of the for 12 years, ri di JR C Lili his 5/6 majority ld keep filling at occurred by is is what thc had to say ill itled " "A shifmd dy ing Won it fairly "y in Sri Lanka's l, Mr J R Jayegrettably chosen by book. Rather is earli CT pro Emparliame Dit and it II luch ihreäldi s trying to proit Light control |rough a dubious
and eventually destroyed democratic i Istitutions in it number 11 countries in the region where Tindia and Sri Lankal Tematin | hi: only bastions of de E15 Cr El, cy,"
The way referendum was conducted, was un precedented i In Sri Lanka's voting history. JR began by taking undated letters of resignation from all his party MPs. The poll itself was rowdy affair. The Commissioner of Elections i Tı his cofficial report Con the poll told of polling agents bei Tg inti midated into keeping away from polling stations, those who did turn Lup being for Ced to leave polling stations, he told of voters openly displaying their marked ballot papers to show watchers how they had voted. He called this "'su T prising and shocking." He expressed 'serious doubts" Els to Whether voters hal
the kind of been able to 'exercise the degree rs that Mr Jay- Of freedom of Oting stipulated empting is pre- by the law. roded, weakened NEXT: Independent Judiciary
Gontd.) - Den OCrat in Councils and Pradeshiya Sabhas - 1991
- by Local Council District
FEP S L M P SLMC INL) | Vili Rejected Total
Wins "" titը: PIL - 11,04 10,028 7고,919 꼬15,815 18,777 234,592 5.1%. 4.6%. 33.8% 92.0% 8.0%. 67.5% 1,926, 1877 T[), b87 4,535 74,623 1, 2,7 l, 22. - 93.9% 6.1% Ճ4.3: 145 583 - 18585 143 7|20,0 في 3.5%, 3.1, 92.8%, 7.2%. 55.8%, (),679 1, 101 1, 교55 41, 고3 2,434 43,667 1.2, 2.7 3.12. 4.إدت ال5.5 * 4. إلا
— - 8, 111 58 8,519 94.1%, 5.9% 81.7%, 553 3,220 - m 63,115 3,682 67,097 1.3%, 5.1% 94.5%, 5.5%, 64.5% 6,234 2,543 - 35,469 고, 345 38,815 4.7, 7.0% 1.7% 94.0%, 5.0%. 70.9% 5.769 1,463 52, 1ճ5 4,465 66,630 1.5, 2.4. 93.3% 6.7% 66,9: - 43,283 3,909 47,192 91.7% 8.3%. 75.7% m 1,086 - 36,238 69.672 GSO1 76,473 1,6 52.0%, 91.1%, 8.9%, 62.9%, - 7. - 38,754 2,708 41,52
1.7%, 3.5 5.5%, 634 1,5고 2,730 2, 15 62.558 4. Գ52 67,520 1.5, 4.4%, ჭ,5 წ. 92.7 %, 7.3% - ნ5,ნ "ჯ. 57, 4 26,324 10,573 113,522 73D). 14T 5,550 86,707 I.5%, 3.6%, 555 97.8% 7.2%, 66.3%

Page 11
General Elections to Municipal and Url Final District Resu
Galle
SP EP
Nii, Lt. El CuIIIlui Register UNP
Winters
A (GHille MIT, . 52,639 18,315 49.2%,
B Albi langoda UC | 3,736 6, 193 59.7%
C Hälpitiya PS 고,457 12, 1
43.9
I A Inbalanguda. PS 29, 4ÉÙ 7,459
37.2%
B Karandcniya PS 50,602 17,948 55.7%
F BI tt FPS 30,343 8.55)
41.4
G Elpitiya PS 37,771 12,750 52.0%
H T1wällälläl F5 16,173 5,643 47.9%
I Nelu Wä PS 11, 545 4, 178 Hნ. ნ%,
J Niyagama PS 21,859) 9,243 57.1%,
K Nügoda PS 30,57E 9,955
43.9%
Li Bādlegālā PS 교, 43 10,263 34.6%,
M akkHillLula PS 24,537 8,437 47.2%
N. Hikku y PS 53,34) 5,65 67.2%
[] Bope Poddäl:1 PS 30,601 8,293 37.9%
P Ak I il cecil Il PS 3G, 404 10,837
4.2
Q Habilrädliwzi PS ճ3,628 19, 123
492
TJLil 3,52495, D4
48.
- 2,397 -
6.4%
58 -
3.8%,
3,727 -
12.6%
4485 2,397 1 (),
1.1%, 0.6%
2
General Elections to Municipal and Urb
Final
Nr. Lucal Council Register UNI*
Wters
A MELITE LUC 27,806 8,519 45.73, B. Welligamal UIC 13,755 3.
fi-4.1% C Kota pola PS , 53,015, 20,327
61.2
District Resul
Matar:
MEP SLIF
m 2,
25.85 134 II,74 3.Ꮞ% 35.4"

ban Councils and Pradeshiya Sabhas - 1991 Its - by Local Council
District
SSP SLFP
- 14,644 39.4%,
3380 37.4%
272 -
7,181 35.8%, 1, 고08 41.02, - 7,865 38.1%
1,790 48.0%
6,133 52.1%
4,541
50.7%
6,263 38.7%
- II 701 51.5%
1,973 43.7%
8.256 46.2%
11,810 53.9% 13,555 55.5% 19,764 50.8%, 272 153,665
38.1%
SLIME SLMU
3(JS 2.9%, 1,349 4.8명, 1833 9.1% 1.075 3.3% 2,179 10.6%
241 2.7%.
4.3%
1,387 4.7%
2,432 32.8%
76
3.1%
22,168 5.5%,
1853 5,ሀ%
1853 0.5%
INDO
4.67 14.8% 2,819 14.1%
2,041 9,99,
1,046 4.6% 1,314 4.4% 1, 181 6.6%
1,130 5.2%
13,698 403,542
3.4%
Wallieel Wotes
37,210 95. IB, 10,378 95.9% 28,119 91.6% 20,050 91.9%, 32,231 90.3%, 20,635 92.5%, 24,550 89.6%, 11,776 90.3% 8,960 9.8% 16, 197 92.8% 22,712 90.9% 29,ნ&4 9.6%, 17,874 90.9% 37,897 86.3% 21,909 93.9% 24,493 91.1% 38,387 90.4%
91.2%
Rjed Tel
Witės,
1,914 4.9.
-41 4.1%, 2,58. 8.4 1,759 8.1%, 고, 54 9.7%
1,662 7.5% 2,853 10.4% 1,272 되.7%,
gլ 17 9.2% 1265 72ಙ್ಗ 2.2.75 9.1% 2,724 8.4%
1,797 9.1% 5,999 13.7%
1,415 f, l'8 2,380 8.9% 4,129 9.6%
Pollel
39,124 74.3%, 10,819 78.8% 30.700 72.1 , 21,809 74.0% 33,ሳ95 70,8% 22,297 73.5% 27,403 72.6%, 13.048 80.7%, 9,867 8.7%, 17:4ճ2 79.9%, 2,987 81.5%, 32,388 74.4% 19,671 79.8% 43,896, 59.3% 23,324 76.2%, 26,873 73.8% 43,016 67.6%
38,837 442,379
8.8%,
73.8%
an Councils and Pradeshiya Sabhas - 1991 ts - By Local Council
District
P SILMIP SLMC CPSL
-
8
嵩
1.1%
9,920 53.2%
INDI
97 10, 1,
Walid Rejected
Wols
18,639 94.2%
9,632 95.8%, 33,209 85.9%
Wts
1,141 5.8% 고도 4.2% 4,97 13.1%
Total PլեIIEtl
19,780 71.1%, 10,057 73.1% 38,196 72.0%
Carriviliari di Neir Page)
9

Page 12
Վի,
M
Local Council
Hakma na PS
MILIla tiyan al PS
Pasgola PS
Akuressa PS
МајпHildi PS
Kamburupitiya PS
Thilingoda PS
Dewi LLIW III a PS
Dickwella PS
Mataa PS
Weligama PS
Total
Register UNEP MEP SLFP
Wotes
23,079 8,592 - -
61.3% 29,725 8,795 - 8,828 49.9% 50.1% 29,173 II, 423 6,95.
52.2%, 37.8% 48,317 - 14,315 48.2%
20,996 6,514 - -
49.7% 36,652 10,880 - -
52.2", 22,149 5.992 6,823 43.7. 49.8% 29,303 9,397 - 9, IGC) 50.6% 49.4% 4,601 11,613 - 10,048
53.6% 46.4 39,924 12,25 12,78C
47.2%, 49.2 58,836 17,525 - 13,378 A 8.49, 51.6%
467,337 37,720 1,134 (1,520 47-4", 0.4%, 34,9,
With the C.
of
HEMAS (DRU
36, Bristo
וחסlסC

SLMP SLMC CPSL INDI Walid Rejected Total Wotes Wotes; Poled
4,4 973 14,013 122 15,234 31.7%. 6.9% 92.0%, 8.0%. 66.0% - - 17.524 2.297 19,921
88.5%. 11.5%, 67.0% - - - 18,382 2,678 21,060 87,3%, 12.7%, 72.2%
951) - - 14,411 29,676 3,796 33,472 3.2%, 48.6%, 88.7%, 11.3%. 69.3% - - ճ,591) - 13,104 1,436 14,540 50.3% 90.1%, 9.9%. 69.3%
- umu 9,954 20,834 2,552 23,396 47.8%, 89.0%, 11.0%. 63.8%
332 - - 13,697 1,172 14,869 5.4명. 92.1%, 7.9%. 67.1%,
- - - 18,557 1,444 20,001 92.8%, 7.2%, 68.3%
- u - - 21,661 1,765 23,427
92.5%, 7.5%, 67.7% ԿՀԻ - - - 25,970 1902. 27,872
3, 6% 93.2%. 6.8%, 69.8%
- - - - 35,603 3,705 39,303 90.6% 9.4%. 69.8%,
2,758 2,03 30,912 16.357 290,601 30,532 321, 133
().9% 0.1%, 10.6% 5.6%, 90.5%, 9.5%, 68.7%
(To be Continued)
mpliments
IS) LIMITED.
Street,
}G-1.

Page 13
Muslim and Tamil Dist North-East Merger?
Bertram Bastiampil lai
T靶 rclationship bet Ween the
T: Tı ils Hind the Musli 115 il Sri Lanka up to the time of independence in 1948 had been peaceful; we do not know of any serious clifferences or discord between these two collmunities in these earlier years. In 1915, thcre took place the unfo Titu TalLC Sihila-Muslim riots where the Sinhalese got engaged in a conflict with the Muslims, A Tamil leader, Sir IPO nIllai Ilba la I Il Rai Tha Ina the Hildi the Il es plused the cause of the Sinhalese in his discussions with the British authorities when he presented to the colonial power the brutal behawill T of their local representatives in handling these riots. Unfortunately, as a result of the manic in which RaiIIlana
than had spoken and written Of the incidents and of the
ship of the Muslim community felt that he had been unfair by the III and became distristful of the Tamils. However, by and large, this espisode was forgotten by almost all of the Musli IIIs a Tid this incident did not seriously influence Musliitil at titudies lateT towards the Tamils, particularly in the North End East.
Today, new ertheless, the Mus
li ms hadi, beel c Il Wicted froll their habitations in the North be it in Malra, Jaffna or
Wa wuni ya or else WheTec. In the East, the - Tanrı il 5 a. Ilıd MuIsli 115 live in fear of one another, especially in the areas of Battical Coa al II di Kallu lai. This distressing scene is the consequence of many un fortunate and tragic episodes and all of them Were fraught with serious violence, murder and mayhem. Muslims have been attacked and destroyed sometimes by
The Hriter is Professor of His rary it Čaľa FIľjič Uffy,
Tails Eld the suffic Tcd simila the Eastern pia Pro perty häls
populations ha"
tcd. I thic E to a banlon til lands and b
while Muslims El 1d Cthers liv, security forces irregular, such the Special T home guards an iITS. From t about 65,000 M forced to wallis in places like COIb.
This battle b In 115 and the TeCo Ill Illic) this a by-product ( conflict betwee: alıd the Tamilis sisted Dno w almı a half decades. prior to the the Muslims h; in areas occ Tammills, cspeci ar and Jaff, in CCITilial Tel: II1 thL: Eä51 wh 33% Muslim a and 25%. Sinhal Muslims : Ild T together a II licat fully. Of col beel all occasi El specific Inatur SCIe - TTF1 IS CLI bec settled an
only a few as tjes; general ha upset. Wholesa
Tc aT of Conse a: a cha Tacteristic days, never pre T1cc lid b. tice of using t lura l labour o by Muslims an lills hawe becil y o w In edi li Indis ; fishing industry

unity Hinders
T: I11 ils LJ hawe: Ily at times in TLS of the ishid. been destroyed, ve beel dislocal -
tist., Tal Illils had leir homes and : come refugees
to hai to flee, fe protected by
, regular and :45 the Firmy and ask Force, a Lld tl armed civil
le North alone, uslims hild been h seeking havens
Put tällä Ill and
et Wee I the TaMuslims in the had Come CD als if the unending ll the Sinhill:5: which had perOst Owe T ile ald
Il te North ccent conflicts Ad been living upied by the ally in Manpe: Icefully a Ilıd Ationship while ere there Was H. ind, 42%. Tamil ese ethnic mix, El mil 5 hild lived lly and peaceLiric, the Te had inal dispute of חט tiח t:T 1Hיוני יש 1 but these had had embroiled aggrieved parTIme Iny Was not le mis trust OT Other which is of the prescint Wailed before.
een the pracTall mill agric u lfields owned
i likewise Musworking om Tarın il Similarly in the
i Ell tril de there
had been close collaboration and joint activity between Tallis ald Muslims. More over, in Tidic and CC3 TT1 e TCE, the Te had prevailed so much business interaction carried on Smoothly between the ICI bits Of the two coIII unities. The Muslim retail small trader Was ubiquitous and Waxed strong patronise by Tamil CLIS to Ilers a Ilong Others.
All this today 50 u Indis a part of history and even unbeliewable. Such is the rift. The power that is in the North and Strikes time and again in the East, the Liberation Tigers of Eela II, see 11ed to hay c accolul Ilted for the distrust and fear of one another that is so prevalent among the Musills and Tamils in the East, particularlly in the Blittical Coa, KallillIlai, Amparai region, and the abandonment of their homes by the ML18111115 0f the NOILH1. But when the Federal Party set out ilt first to State a Clai III for allt om OI 110 L15 i diministral, tio I l s als to be free of discrimination and repression from Sinhalese government 5 they hold got (In Well with the Muslims.
In fact, some Muslim political leaders threw in their lot with the Talli is and contested electoral scats, presented and supported by the Federal party, Ho Wever, Such collaboration did not often endure; after winning at the polls, sponsored by the federal party, Muslim members of parliament had drifted a part. It is beca, Illinic civident that the MIL 15:- lims had no durable interest in the politics of the Tamils, but the Ta. IIlils accepted the position. Their behal Wiciul T was L1 Ilderstal IIdal ble because by aba. In doming a place in the opposition where the Federal party was and by getting into the Ina instream på Ttie 5 such as the United Natiolal gT Sri Lanka Freedo II Parties, the Millsills had so Tuch to gain and hardly anything
11

Page 14
to lose in a laterial İler. The main stream parties formed governments and disbursed patrong c and Mus|ims could benefit there fT (om.
The Federal party had thought of the Muslims in the North and East as Tamil speaking and com monality of language and habitation provided a bond. Particularly, when discrimina ti on towards Tamil kino Wing people was practised by the Sinhalesc dominated administration following the Sinhala only legislation the need for Tamil speaking people to seek redress and fight discrimination was imperative. Adversity and misfortine seem to have welded together the Muslims and Tamils, but in seeking their fortline the Muslims naturally saw al III advantage in getting closer to the Sinhalese than to the Tamils. The pull towards the Sinhalese-run government Wils "1ling טון וחלGr.
The Sillal 5 til te to SFAW EI means of weakening a Tamil
ΠΠ ξΗ Π =
speaking opposit wooing Muslim1 best mode of ef tagonism of th king population ting the Muslim distinctively in 51 TCC5, EWEI W da mands of th king people this by catering to were also Tami excluding the Tamils who we letter was a dhe spirit forgotten.
The Federal a north-east. Whe la X i III, 11 ITh Ellt01 speaking peoples recognised real Muslill support tið Ille ey: T1 I1 C) North Elst lies tic link betw': Muslills, the Tamil speaking But as the Tami ted their objectiv fE ET 15 TIL WAT
VASA O
2O7, 2nd COO
Telephone

sion to it by support. The fccting this alle Tamil speawas by treas separately and distributing rewhicrı cateri Ing to c Tamil spea| coll lcd bc illet MI5 li Tills who 1 speaki Ing while Tamil speaking re suspect. The "ed to and the
party Wanting Te there would be nomy for Tamil Sa WWis d'OIT) and ity in Winning A solu 1d Filw for a merged in the linguisen Tamils and Muslims being in these arcas. l movement shif'e gradually from ds a separa testate
- וז ר, ט וח סII Tr טth stitutional Theans to extra parlia III1 en tary activism this agai m Thade the Muslims rethink their part in the whole exercise of working alongside Tamils, And when Tamil activism was opposed by the cocrcive forces thic göwernment Elnd the Tamil Eıctivists responded with armed conflict, the Muslims, particularly from the East, were trappred in a perilous position. Their lives were in danger, then they could not be merely a pathetic. They were in a real dilemma: they had to be with the rebels or lot with them in thc battle field, cspecially in the East.
oT E ell. Il a Tid
The Muslims had not shown a strong commitment to the objcctives of the Tamil militants. They were themselves a minority within a minority which if it realized its aims will 11 turn into a majority. Naturally they began to get worried about their future status then. After all they had an undeniable dis
(Слfinited or page 15)
PTICANS
Cross Street, bԾ — 11,
: 4 21 63. 1

Page 15
Ethnic Conflict: The Bre of Liberal Democracy
1zeth Hussain
here is al wirtual cos e 15115 that a serious erosion of democracy took place in Sri Lanka after 1970, followed by what a lolled to its destruction after 1977. This point has hecome a common place in Olir Conversations, and is Also milde some:Limes in pri Int., Without pro Woking any Tejo inder, ewidently because there is a Consensus about it. But there hals been no serious enquiry into the Teasons foi T. Whit is scIl as a breakdown of democracy,
This enquiry is important becausc in Sri Lanka, unlike il the T Third World countries. the breakdown did not take place = cataclys, I quically as thc result of a coup. It took place without a shot being fired, and with hardly any coercion. The coTtfast bet voyce I the t Tawai Is faced by democracy in Sri Lanka and in India is stark and wery striking. In India any attempt to interfere with the freedom of the press has provoked a storm. In Sri Lanka press freedoll was destroyed with hardly a Ilmu Tmur of protest. In dira Gandhi’5 cm ergency of 1975 prow oked a 5 to TT1, ČT a sub-C 0 Titinental scale, leading to the incia, Tcera tiom of scortes of t h o LI - slds. But when Our 1970 GWerrent awarded itself two additional years in power, there was no Iī10 Te than a symboliç protest, And thereafter our 1977 Government proceeded to savage democracy in serene joy and with total impunity. It appears 1lt 5 flI à5 Fl, CLIll mitment to democracy is concerned the Indials have bee Ti herbe5, while we in STi Link: halwe behalwek like a lot of CITbies.
The usual explanation for this contrast, at least the explanatio In that figures [most often in our conversations, is that it is all a matter of national character. The Sri Lankans, accor
ding to this e to o co wardly a II king to stand .ilt;11[t}{tTטווr ness and courage 11:15 htt: Il a :0115 the traditional 5 Sinha lese, and i believe that th In Gre 5elf–Seekill ble of al It Tui India. 15. This k tion, projecting natic al cha Talc'! Facile tio explair complex sociopolitical process the easy a bando cracy without
place. In fact smacks of racis: Our dest
has taken plac might be advant al distincti :) I'll b: cy and liberal go wern I11 cent cal II de ITocratic if it through free an an di cxe: Tici 525 of the will () On the other h. Inocracy would for the rights () and respect fo the Illinority, in of Illinority ct addition to whi i tions, such as : an independent to be regarded TH1 c cxcTcis; e Cof of the will () Tiding brutally the opinions ar minority, Tay the ** tyranny o! but it is argi Tever the less. It ly be called “I mocracy".
Bearing this di: We cal see t breaking down Goyern Tielt va rial demic licy

akdown
x planation, are ld too self-secup to guvernBut thic manli: of the "viraya' picuous part of elf-image of thc It is FFC Llt to e: SiD1h1:ıle 5c aTc g, Or less Capism1, th:l I1 th1e ind of cxplanaa stereotypical ter, is far 100 the obviously -economic El Tid es involved in Illic Int of de T1)- a coup taking the cxplanation
Inding of what e in Sri Lanka çel if We II like tweet der Ilcrade Tocracy. A be said to be con es t0 pQWer Il fait elections, power in terms f the Ilarity. and, liberal derequire respect F the individual, the rights of :luding the rights hinic groups, it 2H 50 me institulfree press and judicialry, hawe 5 silic Silict. power in terms f the majority, roughshod over ld rights of the be regarded as the majority', ably democracy should propermajoritarian de
stinction in mind,
lat what started under the 197)
5 not majoritabut liberal le.
mocracy, as shown for instance by that Government's irascibility over the freedom of the press. But it ceased to be deInocratic in any sense for two years by unilaterally extending its will ter II of office with o Llt a mandate from the people, The Free Hild fali T Electill:5 CF 1977 rcs tored majoritarian democracy, but thereafter the Government showed conte II pt mot juist for liberal democracy but for democracy in any sense. The victory of the former President in 1982 over a joke candidate, after his chief rival Mrs Bandara naike was incapacitated, seemed to be widely regarded as Lll deilocratic. And Sl wwiss the 1983, referend LI T1 which rm1:iii 1 LäıiT1 cd the UNP Se:1, t5 iD1 Parliamet while it was obvious thilt they would halwe been greatly reduced if general elections had becrī lieli. Furtlerīte, tler was bla tant Tigging in several places, a display of conte Till for the will of the people. The 1977 Government had ceased to be democratic in any worthwhile sense. The question of the legitimacy of the 1988 elections a Waits determination by the Supreme Court, but in the meanwhile del cracy has in effect been restored through the recent local government elections, the legitimacy of which
is not questioned even by the opposition parties. President Premadas a has rewer 5ed thc anti-deliocracy of the 1977 Gjy Wogeo TI Ille It.
This brief account of the
travails of Sri Lankan de 113cracy since 1970 suggests that what really matters in Sri Lanka is not liberal democracy but majoritarian democracy, that is government according tt) will Cof the majority. What is important for our purpose in this article is that the Imajority in question are the Sinhalesc. It is arguable that there has been in Sri Lanka in Casy acquicscence in or more correctly a positive acceptance of the destruction of liberal democracy because thlt hä5 begrl IlcULosslIy
for the quick advancement of Sinhalese inter ests, The Constraints of liberal democracy,
13

Page 16
with its respect for the rights of individuals and for the rights of ethnic minorities, Would have stood in the Way of that advance:Illent.
An explanation for the breakdown of liberal democracy in terms of Sinhale se interests, rather than in terms of a hypostä5jzed Sj Inhla lese + " csse Ice” or national character, seems far more convincing. We have to rem cIIber that a society is a syst CIT, not Inecessarilya tightlybuilt system hawing almost a monolithic character, but a systen in which Parts and processes i Tet inte T-Irelated. We häiye to Iceber further that ever since tle time of Angl. Tika Dharmapala in the la te nineteenth century ölır politics have been basically ethno-politics, not withstanding intra-Sinhalesc dissensions. Gowerno T Manning exploited oli T ethnic divisions in the 'twenties, those divisions were the major preoccupations of both the DInoughmore and Soulbury ComIllissions, and ethno-politics halwe raged in Sri La Inka si Ice 1956 With ever-increasing fury. It makes sense to try to relate the Sinhalcse acceptance of thc destruction of liberal democracy With Sri Lanka’s ethno-politics.
The contrast with India to which w c llaw c drawn littention shows that there hals been a Sinha lese consensus against libcral democracy. It appears that in Sri Lanka 'politics is organized ha tred”, soillet hing Innost dramatically demonstrated by the In urder olIs satu TTä lia that cII sued on the defeat of our former governments at general elections. The line of the poet Yeats about the II Tela Ild of his tille, “Great ha tred, litt le room'''", could apply to Sri Lanka. But under neath the divisions, and the eruptions of organized hatred, there has always bec in a consensus El Imong the Sinha lese, at least about liberal democracy. This was why its des truction could proceed so equably and in such even te nour, provoking not much Ilmore tha. In a slight de mur, certainiy Top outrage. The consensus could also explain why our opposition parties, quite unlike the opposition in
14
India and other the opposition have its say have usually beh. Iesurrected froIT through the m opposition and have Ilissed il TT tunities to ex El Tid to try L.) about the viola of individuals, les e i Il dividll:115 that they have sure grasp of til mics of our po ou T ethno-polit known, not jil opposition part the II since 195 Illinority cthnic that what real In Ot the intere Lankans as inc di Ing to thic ca democracy, but the majority, t a whole. None mcIts could ha from their pow te TIn Of Office were seen to p of thc majority ever much they dual Sinhallege. parties, except p: I ties, have sh against liberal It IIl St be We proceed a the argument th CIT a cy Was 500 C. because it was the promotion ilterests is in lable to thic S It is to be ex III ajoTity anywl Will assert a di Should a majo World country itself as under time of indep to be expected seek thic lost hods of ascell Of die III i Illa Ice. independence peculiarly undi jority, namely dhists, who pe as botto dog tW sects lized skills of a

countries where is allowed to In Parlia Iment, ved like zðIlbie 5 the dead to go re T10 tiOT1S Of no more. They u merable opporCse corruption, Tlise a still ion of the rights including SinhaThe reason is always shown a e internal dynaitics, or rathc cs. They have st the present jes b) ut :All of except for the political parties ly latters are its of the Sri ividuals, accorions of liberal the interests of Ehe Sihhillesc as of our gover Ilve been shakel er during their provided they erfoT II) hic Will Sinhalese, lowsavaged indiviAll our political so T the clic El Ted El colse I SL15 democracy.
cla, Tified before ly further, that at liberal delloasily a bando Illed an obstacle to of Sinha lese no way discrediinhalese people, pected that any ere in the will Illinant position. ity in any Third have perceived -privileged at thc :ndence, it häid that it would expeditious meting to a position At the ti me of Ti Lanka had al r-privileged mathe Sinhala Budceived themselves ; not just in one where the speciaIllinority counted
- as for instancic, with the Chinesc businessmen in South East Asia - but across the entire
socio-economic spectrum. Trade was see to be in the hands of Muslims and India Ds, even though the Sinha lese bouTgeoisie had made very considerable headway in business since the nineteenth century. The Tamils had wery considera ble a dwa mtagcs in education consequent to the excellent schools set up in the North by AIllerican II lissionaries in the nineteenth century. In the administration and the professions non-Buddhists were predo Illililt, While in the armed forces non-Buddhists were predominant until 1956 to an extent that would have been regarded by any majority anywhere in the World is an outrage. Even in the Static Colin cil, Simbığılcı5e Buddhists were less than their
populatico II. warra Inted. It had to be expected that the State would be required to practise
majoritarian de IT ocracy to facilitate the ascent of the majority to a do II ninant position.
An under-privileged III ajority culd reso Tt to more than One strategy to get what it regards as its rightful place. The Malays, who werc i Il a position compa Table to that of the Sinha lese Buddhists at the title of independence, resorted to positive discrimination in favour of the Bhumiputras, the soms of the soil. That Wils apparently necessary because Malaysia has the peculiar demographic problem of having a shortage of Malays. No such frontal assault on the problem of the underprivileged majority in Sri Lanka. has been necessary because here the Sinha lese Buddhists have been in a solid majority. Majoritil Tian democracy would suffice therefore to give them their rightful placc. It Will be reme inbered that al first ou Ir National Congress leaders resolutely opposcd the Donough Ilinore Cominission's proposal to introduce uniwersal Suffrage, obwiously because they were ou traged at the idea that the hoi-polloi should be allowcl a II y say or who ruled over them. But it appears that they came round to accep

Page 17
ting uniwersal Suffrage because it could serve the purposes of the Inajority.
It has to be clarified a this point that nothing like a conspiracy theory is being invoked here. The Sinhalcse leaders may hawe scc in certain advantages in certain Strategies at certain til Ines, but that does not Tell that they sa Logether in a Ciclawe ad lecided LH1 at liberal de In Cocracy had to be destroyed. No society is shaped in ter Ills of clearly and priccisel y articulated intentions, and it is e vel arguable that entirely unintended consequences are more importlint in Shaping a Society than intentions. Hegel's theorizing about the great World leaders seems to be very illuminating about what really takes place in a society whe changes of El fundamental order come about, The leader5 relentlessly pursue their own inte Tests, but at the sal T1 e til 11c they realize the purposes of the people, who though not fully conscious of their own purposes come to realize that these are incarnated in the great leader Sri Lankā's leaders hild to jettison liberal democracy, without foT I mulating any conscious programme about it because it was inconsistent With the imperative that the majority had to rise to a position of domiTILIÇe.
This hypothesis can be supported by a brief examination of what happened after 1956 in thc sectors of bureaucracy, education, and the economy. What is the explanation for the destrLiction of the i d'Illinistrative system set up by the British, which was acknowledged to be excellent by Third World standards? The usual explaination is the power-hunger and status aspirations of the politici: Dis, But there has been Ilo comparable Wreckage of the administration, although there Inay halwe been al det e Ti Tiatio II i Il Standards, in ther SC Luth Asian Collit Ties El 1 di elsewhere as well where power-hungry politicians or military men have been WTecking their countries.
Rtahe:T . peculi pear to hawe bt in the Sri Li destruction beg; a people's go to power with : socialis III, requi SiOIl of the sta
iוון וון הן:Thält c also thill offici government se I corporation se particularly at higher levels,
C mitmelt programme. A Of the bureat CI le criteri: Of rity gradually giwi ng place t articulated in E of the time, people. We can Was a cla. It L. destructio Il CF standards after tution gawe albos the Cabinet ow tration, appare El Socialist train country about ernment of the il el Test. T ment had no s
at all, but coi in the adminis played as new
facts are to nccdi Tecapitula'
We || before բլյblic outrage ti) 1 of lilimi 5 which b c cl mc in the Ine wspa It had cole t even a Free e required El T1 i fr | 1 the State, site for that ministrative sys the si Luccesss : Asia Elmdl St) L1 tlt thermore the selves appele cognized that tc. Il did not with wille poli shown by the Lessive g|Wer T11 I tills, Tic Colle friend, rela supporter IIla di

air dynamics apeen in operation 1 kill cal 5e. The an in 1956 when i"WeTIII1eL1 tʼ" ::ı. [11: El collit Ille t t iring a Il Expiln
ę 5ę:0.
tment required als, whether in * vice cor il the :itor, and III Core the responsible ad al 50 to Flave to the socialist politicalization "acy ensued, and eritad seiceased to apply,
o the criteri Li farmhous phrase We IllustaWe trust, 10. There III jump in the ad II i Illistrative the 1971 COI stiolute powers to er the administly to facilitate sfor Illiition of the which the Gowtime was really he 1977 Gower. cialist illi Lision 13 1 tempt for merit tration was diser Before. The well known to Li c) Ii l cre.
1977 the Wils C yw CT the cle.5 tir LLC - trativc standards, quite vocal even pers after 1977. be realized that interprise system Important in put ind a pre-requiwas a sound adtem as shown by tries in East I ELS LI Asia. Fliroliticians the IlHi to have Tethe spoils sysreally bring in zical Tewards, as dcbacle of sucments at general appUintment of tion, or political e tel 1115
Il fact it lät T Cälille to bi recognized that the spoils sysLCIl Was a major factor behind the JWP Teb c1 li do I because: thic clairns to fait and e qual tTeatTinent of our under-privileged castes had been ignored,
NEXT: Spoils System
W LI Slim an di Tamil...
|'Cuлтіпше:I fr:1/71 дене I2}
tinctive identity; they were a separate cümmunity although Tamil speaking. Religion, Gultural habits, customs and way of life Inade them separate. Wii Lhll Tilli li tirrisiti I of the North and the East particular y, and the state violently combating the Tamil militants by force, life becae insecure id surwiwal depended on the asser tion of a distinctive Muslim identity. It is in this context that Isla in grew even more salient in shaping a Muslii identity, more prominently in the East. New political and politicalmilitary groups such as thc Musli Im Congress, which is significantly east-based than national, and the Jihad energed. The situation got more complicated with the proliferation of ELT ms, intense militaris al tion, and El complete and confusi Ing pa ttern of alignments and orbilistil.
The Muslims had had hardly any truck, with the Tallil adtivists and militants. In the North, where they were nullerically weaker, they remained largely apathetic. If any Muslim youth had got involved in El Il y Tamil movement the number was so insignificant and they were hardly there in spirit or active commitme It. In the East, however, the illeri Cally significa II t am til sub 5tam cial Muslims sought a separite dispensation for themselves 33 l Way Out. Not Only did they distance the Ilselves Tril the "Liberation Tigers' but also from the Tini 15 [(0, This attitude hardly endeared the Muslims to the LTTE.
(To be continued)
15

Page 18
PAKISTAN (3)
The civil service: the pl
Akmal Hussein
PP the single most important factor in the process of institutional decay has been a sharp decline in the intellccLual calibre of the civil Sei Want. This has been primarily caused by the virtual collapse of Elcã de Illic 5 till då Ids it colleges ad univCI:5i Lie5 fTOIl Where prospective candidates for the civil service entrance examination HTC dra WT and the institutional failurc to provide them with high quality in-service training. To makc. In atters worse un like: t1 e 1950”s and 1950’s, With the dcclii Ilc in sociall sität us and prestige of a civil ser wice job, together With opening up fluctive Elternives iI busness and other professions, it has been observed that the best products of even the present prior education syste II do not normally sit for the civil service examination, The structure of the civil service is still prediC ted On the W lIllum dei assumption that the "intellectual cream' of society applies for and enters the service. Ha ving entered the civil service, the poorly educated young officers face a future in which the Te is an absence of rigorous formal education to equip them professionally at each stage of their careers for the tasks they arc supposed to perform.
There are three types of instituti CI5, which purport to PTC wide El semblance of “training" to th c Civil Se I väIlt: Tlle Pakista Il Academy for Administrative Training which gives courses tO each cTop of fresh e I trants I0 the civil service; the National Institute of Public Administration (NIPA) which gives courses to officers at the middle stage of their careers (deputy secretary level), and the Pakistan Administrative Staff College (PASC) which gives training to senior officers, federal joint
secreta ries a li hu Ille-ILS. III all Of i[1stitutions, Ll absence of a high ald Teliance is exclusively () i who lecture and t
COLITSES ETE SIO evaluatio 1 of soft as to pose in tull chille:Illige cv genera Lion of off modest in tcl lcct
The decljТе ј tual quality of in has been accom last Llyw o de Ca, de: of institutional decision Inarkin 5e wilçe. Arbit Til I of political facti points in the St Tuctul Te i Interf range of decisi is transfers, p dismissals of off decisions by d sicut. Ts - Il li. Il di up to the is su drug barols () major projects, of institutional is C ft en under III interests outside This has resulte insccurity, corr Coccasions dem cor sic Twicc Coffices. In ay hawe been the large scale senior officers, filialı siy charges b? mes. For example Illissed 1300) civi in 1959 by a sir in 1969, 303 we General Yahya the regime of 2 many as 1400 thrillgh L. Sin again in 1973, service officers nil Sly Telved
At a structura (Civil Services

rocess of decay
eads of departthir cc categories circ is a Wirtual quality faculty, placed al 11 ost Ivic speakers he leave. The superficial and participa Ints i s O o grea L i II telle cLIT LI til: C11 T Teil I icers. With rather Ial endo WWII e Ints.
in the intellecdiwidi Lla 1 coffi, CCT 5 pa nied cover the by an crosion mechanisms of g in the civil "y iTn tcI WeI1 tiJIns CIls at difféI e Int political power :Ilic i Il a Wide Cls whether it To motions and icers or judicial istrict cominisdisputes, right c5 of arrest Of r appro wall of The integrity decision Inaking lined by Wested the civil ser wice. od in increasing Luption a Ind OI lization of civil Schl attitudes ! I einforced by dismissils of SOL Ilic time 5 ( In successive Togie, Ayub Khan disIl service Offices gle corder, Highlin tre dismissed by Kh:111: (dll Til Ilg Z. A. Bhutto, Els Were di 5i55 ed gle order and 12 senior civil
TA' L E TLIET I T -
11. It we | ttle CSP of Pakista II) was
the clite cad Te within the Civil bureaucracy and its members inherited the ICS (Indian Civil Service) tradition. The CSP cadre: Te II lai II el d'Illi II A. Dit i II the bureaucray and indeed over Ilatio Tal decision III aking, Tight Lup to thıc eIlıd of the Ayub period. During the subsequent brief Tegine of General Yahya Klı H II the do Illi İlan çe: Of the CSP began to be broken by the military authorities. Subsequently, the regime Jf Z. A. Bhutt) further er Oded the interIlal cohesion and espirit de corps of the CSP's by a policy of "lateral entry' into the service. This II e It that i II diwiduals who were politically loyal to Mr. Bhutto, whether they were from various government departInefits or outside the bureaucracy altogether, could be appointed in key civil service positions. During the regime of General Zia-ul Haq (later President), the position of the bureaucracy Within the 5t Tuct Lu Te of stilte power was rehabilitated, and Zia gave greate confidence to civil ser Wants by putting an end to the device of 'screening civil servants which during the regimes of General Yahya and MIT. Bhutto Wilig like it g World of da miocles hai Inging in-service bureaucrats Who could bc disIllissed or transferred at short notice. During the regime of General Zia-ul-Haq senior bureaucrats had relatively long Le II L|It:5.
In the regime of Prime Millister Bezi Bhutt W stresses were placed on the structure of bureaucracy as a result of the growing political
conflict between a PPP govern
II) e[]t il the Centre l'Ind the opposition, IJI government in Punjab, the largest province.
The historically un precedented t:0 T1 tention for power between
f CC. Yfired for Page Io)

Page 19
Reffecčfопs ол а Селѓелary
The Catholic Church,
Paul Caspersz
he earliest all thoritative his
tory of the origins of the Catholic Church is the book that now follows the foli I Gospels in the New Testament section of the Bible, The book is called the Acts of the Apostles. It gives clear evidence of the communal, and We light
say socialist, character of the earliest Christ airl life.
The faithful all lived to
gether and owned everything in common; they sold their goods and possessions a Tud shared out the proceeds along themselves according to what each one needed... they shared their food gladly and generousy. Nome of their meinhers was ever in Walt, as all those who owned and or houses would sell them, and bring the money from them, to present it to the apostles: it was then distributed to any members who light be in
eed. Falling on the soil of preChristian Ilonasticism, these lines were to be the fertile seed of what is now called in the
Catholic Church the religious 11fւ, Sillall groups of me [1, later also of women, gathered
together to form what came to be known as religious communities, congregations, Corders, By the end of the 15th century there were several, among which the becst ko w Were thic Bcl -- dictimes, the Franciscans, the Dominicans. In the 16th, breaking new ground with daring originality, came the Jesuits, The originality consisted i II this: Illich that had lither to been considered SÜ İTıp Orta Dıt in the religious life - life in com. In Inity, a distinctive form of dress, asceticism, even prayer – had to yield, wherever there was conflict in the life of thic Jesuits, to the demands of active service of the peoplp. The older prime values arid rules were not abandoned. They were
tra Il 5 cended. Il within the very Church, of the profane with th säi Wed the integrated in wol in secular Lffli cally i Til the ca interhuman just
THE LIET I der T the , of Loyola, hundred years 49. On 27 IC COT HET ",""," proved Hind est: This year there 451st year of t tance. But thi th a fiTSE CET ter of the Papal Sc El Litled FREE ri ri as is the pri C circles, the firs
fficial Lati English) Thie Working Classes in 1891 by the Leo XIII. Is t wee 11 the Jesluit Ceilte Ties TI link is justice. It Would per tening to instil tive study of tilles, El 1 til secular reality, Loyola and Le prc 5 cı tı purpose time less spei restricted. It is the sta Ilice til ke lic CELITcl and in Tegard to int that is, to the justice is eith de Ili ed in humim; At le:St after sometimes to th of both the Order, the subj the Centrę Stag and practice ir in the Society
It was not a Jesuit Order, day's unequivo

the Jesuits and Justice
was the revival,
| heart of the
fusion of the le holly. Il foreuture dcep indi
wellent of Jesuits irs åld, specifirthly struggle for |İçe.
of the religious Tesuits, Ignatius was born five ago in Spain in September 1540 s formally apblished in R.II 1. fore begins the he Order's exiss year is also lary of the first icial Encyclicials. N'ayar LFF (using, te il R. COILEA I
w Tills of the version) CJII (in Colditions of the it was issued Roman Pope, here a link bet| titlti the Cl11Irch here is, and the
haրs be EnlighLitę H. C. Imp: THthe lives and he approach to of Ignatius Of XIII. But the : is at the 5: Ile cific ELI1 ll Il Ore i LL CLIII.111 Et 1L "I by the Cathothe Jesuit Order erhuman Justice, Imaller in which Sr promoted Ør an relationships. Rgrth WI'artir 1, 1c cibal Tras Smc1 it Church and the cct hlas CoIIle ty e of both theory 1. the Chiuchil ald
of Jesus. lways so in thc Or, rather to:- cal emphasis on
justice and humanı rights as alconstitutive element of the Chris tian Linessage was at the beginning still over the hills and far away. At the beginni Ing justice was conceived in terms of cha Tity, kindness, compassion. In this conception of justice you stay where you are, but you try to be as gen Črolls as possible to the less privileged who even after your ge Illerosity stay, have to stay, where
they had always beetl. Foltunately, even in those early days, the Jesuits kept Wide
open a window of escape from the rigidity of interpretation of law; they were hallmarked by a certain in built flexibility which made it easy for them creatively to apply old laws to new situations, to go almost anywhere for almost anything, The original 1540 papal document which c stablished the Jesuit Order set the ball Tolling when it formally asked thН t the infant Society of Jesus.
should show itself no less useful in reconciling the estranged, in holily als sisting and serving those who are found in prisons or hospitals, and indeed in performing other works of charity. The formulation Was the refore open-ended enough for Jesuits of the twentieth CC In Lury not only to understand that charity without justice was hollow but also to seize the opportunity, without any loss of Jesuit all thenticity, for the courageous pursuit of justice even in the most difficult and dangerous situations.
Indeed, already in the time of Ignatius and the first Jesuits, there were sa Tunc examples, Wery telling for their day and lime, of the other works of charity': Jes uit relief and reconstructi4). In work duriug the Winter of famme in Rome in 1538-9, work ilfv ole Jews Who WTe badly discriminated against,
17

Page 20
work in favour of beggars, courtesans and young women at risk. The Te is also cnough evidence that the first Jesuits proceeded far beyond the milk powder and biscuits typic of social I clief to Tellowing the structural causes of Social eWils. In the 17th and 18th centuries there Werc in Latin America the "Reductions of Paraguay' (of which the Warner film, The Mission, is about) which were really proto-socialist communes of native Indians, inspired and directed by European Jesuits. The communes were set up not only in present-day Paraguay, but also in what is now Argentima and the Rio Grande do Sul region of Brazil. The Reductions suffered from the predatory attacks of European fortu Tel-seekers and brutish White slave-tTaders. Finally, they succumbed to the land-grabbing feuds between Spain and Portugal. These events were part of a process that finally led to the suppression of the Jesuit Order by the Pope's prescription in 1973. With the suppression of the Jesuits the great cxperiment of the Reductions came to a sad end. If they had continued, and powers of selfgovernment had increasingly bee I LITa IlsfeTTe d to the i digenous people, Latin American liberation theology may not have been so long a-co Illing.
Still less had justice been the cent T Ell the me ower many, many centuries in either the Western Sectico II of the Catholic Church with its Iler we centre in Rome of the easter with its headquarters in Constantinople. Justice had, of course, been a cenTrall the Inc for Jc sus himself, In the synagogue at Nazareth around the year 27 he issued his deliberate and un equivocal Tanifest of God News to the Poor. He made it un mistakably clear that for him justice and deliverance from injustice and opp Tession were in extricably wow en with the Lille Illes of faith and divine love.
From then on, after Jesus had paid for his views with his life, there was no stopping the
18
message of Je: Ward II arch a of the Roman Was it ill Of di I u Ils or til pets. Its mess, Justice is on its grea, Lc5 t Te alleys and bytowns where th Inet, often in bettet Off Who side with thic | gle for deliv noticed the sic i tilanity. The fi. graph of The Deri tocracy, pub the year of his Engels" final tr volutionary spir tianity.
But a th is tely changed wi of Constantine thronic Of Rom fourth century. and practice th a different t II hierarchical stru institutionalism, dogma, formaliz and kept to it oppression of til class in thic cra pean industrial the emergence ( Working class 1 impossible for keep 5ilent an result, which L concessiciary a Was EerIIry Mk carne forty ye: and Engels publ rinist Manifest twenty five afte Capital.
The for Illal a hack of justice began earlier i (Church Els al wil Jesuit Order. A var Larry (1891), to somme: Littles frío T CaTn è Re?{"p risr rzu Ú) rider of Pius X sanfty and Soci. and Pede"e Of Ei by Maurice Cra of intellectual significance and walled by the s

LIs on its westO Ing the Toads of
Empire. But it ch t) the : becat e sound of trum|ge, the God of ur Side, fund so I ance in the ways of the big common people he homes of the
had opted to 'or in the strugerance. Engels rigins of Chrisal brilliant paraTactics of Social lished in 1895,
death, is also ibute to the Teit of early Chris
most unfortunath the accession to the imperial : in the early Church thcory en began to take rn — towards a cturing of power, rigidity of ation of Titual – un til the 5 tark he new working of the Eurorewolution a tid of a II ti-religious e:A ders II1äde it the Church to longer. The oday seems so ld conservative, ΓιΙη, Π 189 Ι. It LTS FifteT Marx ishcd thei T Cor F1J and Dearly r the volume of
d official co Illeto Centre Stage the Catholic øle tham ỉm the fter Rerffi Nsingle out only | the awal: nchic, 'ing the Social I (1931), ChristProgress (1961) 'th (1963: called Istorom o “a woTik orce...of topical urgency un riiccches of any
living statesman') of John thc XXIII, the path-breaking document of the Second Watican Council entited Te Churc II the Modern World (1965), the Medellin Documents (1986) and thc brilliant text of Justice fri the World of the Synod of Bishops (1971). Critics of the Jesuits (never a rare species since the Order began) would say that the Jesuits never Willingly play second fiddle too long. They came a breast finally when two hundred and thirty six representatives of the Order WorldWide met in RoIle in 1974-5 for what is called a General Congregation, the 32nd since its foundation in 1540.
The General Congregation issued its low fall Is Decree IW in which occur these semiIlal lines:
The mission of the Society Of Jesus today is the se I wice of faith, of which the promotion of justice is an absolute Tequirement,
These lines were to be of profound and catalytic importance for the Jesuits cver since. However, cane murmurings from the right and suspicions from the left. Would the Jesuits no longer be Teligious leaders of the faith of the people but social activists in the cause of justice for the dispossessed? Was it all a sinister plot of the CIA to break the monopoly of Marxism in the field of desirable social reform and revolution'. Others, like Reggie
Siri Wardene, wete genuinely puzzled. In the beginning, they salid if a Christian beca Inc a
Marxist, Christianity went overboard. Today they had to cope with the phenomen oil of Christian Marxists. (One might hawe asked Reggie Whether he could not be the parent of yet anothe species, the Buddhist Marxist, but maybe the evolutionary spiral had not yet reached that stage!)
However, one believcs. least one hopes, that the die hlas bee L1 cast for ever. In the Church and in the Society of Jesus an irrevocable and funda
O I : t

Page 21
mental option has been taken. And it is an option for justice for the poor, the disp Cossessed and, in countrics like Ours, which lay for so long under the heavy yoke of colonialism, the disinherited.
There arc those in high places in both Church and Society of Jesus who seek to blunt the cutting edge of the option: not a fundamental, but only a preferential option; not for the poor only buit, for the eventual sake of the poor, the rich also: not only institutes of social concern. but also schools of business management, not the IIn Ore secular slogan of faith and Justice, but the morc religious triu Ilinwira te of faith, hope and charity. But theirs is a losing battle, the 1989 cha Inges in Europe not-With sta Inding.
Exactly 410 years ago in 1581, in Oxford, the English Jesuit, Edmund Campion, later to be honoured in the Church and the Order als a Sainted Imarty T. issued his det filmt. Imanifest), called Campion’s Brag and Challenge, to “the Right Honourable Lords of Her Majesty's Privy Council':
And touching our Socicties, be it known to you that We have Illa de a league — Ellil Jesuits in the World, whose succession and II ultitude Illist over reach all the practices
of England - cheerfully to carry the cross you shall lay on us, and never to despair your recovery while We have Al la 1 left til enjoy y Ol T Tyburn, or to be racked with your to Timents, Cor consilimcil with your prisons. The expense is reckoned, the enterprise is begun; it is of God, it cannot be with studd.
Foll their minds and hearts, if not also from their lips, the same promise is issued to the principalitics and powers of the World by Jesuits and others toiling in Asia, Africa, in Latin America, and even in the Tich countries of the World, for the
estil blishı II helt of fellow huma m struggle for just It is of Gd. the highest valu
The Civil . . .
f'Ċ FI r iirTread fra
ä felecra, I : 1 di Pu gð vernment W:15 ma. Tipulating groups of civil List of bute;lu Crit of the political between the CE province was Il
lTallitic for Til Til F2T (GI)', sion to transfer five senior offic the Punjab pro tration. (The II Policic, Informal the Additional in the Punjab) gover 111 ent’s that these offic using their powe of political inter vincial gewer II Tie government in and then acql fcderal governi UT de TS FT FOLI officers. I 11 t Chief Secretary Government, Mr the Federal go LTuctions til tr Islamabad, we resisted by th Minister, Punj. Sharif).
The sett) Ind : with the imple II federal govern Programminc foi (PPD). This pr ged providing | the poor at the sich als schO05 bricklined will drains. The fic: which had als funding, a tem a federal gow al set of die wetli

justice to their beings, TEhc ice has beg III, (SCH tes es of hullimity.
It is therefore profoundly human and intensely divine. It call not be withıs tard. It cam have only one outco Inc: victory, foT: WET.
ті радг IB/
njab Provincial Ciftcı di Chile by ili wild LIal
servants. The is as instrumlets power Struggle entre il Til the anifested in a in LWC C24.5:5. er III e It's decito Islä 11 abad ters working in incia di ini5.G. police, S.P. tion Secretary, Chief Secretary
The federal erception was i 115 vere misr for the pursuit "ests of the pront. The Punjab
itially resisted c5 ced to the ment's transfer of the five
c case of the of the Punjab Amıwer Zalı idi, i'w ger III le. It's in 5– a Iger im ti Te successfully the Chief ab (Mr. Nawaz
a se is concer led 1entation of the Inent's Peoples tחשוון רן הr Devel ogram me envisaHassic ser wice 5 t.)
grassroots level, drinking Water, ige streets and deral government o provided thc pted to run as criment project, opment activities
which normally fall within the purview of thic Provincial government. The provincial guvernment decided to Tesist the implementation of the People's Programme for Development, on grounds that it was an attack on the authority of the provincial government. This conflict Created su ITcalistic scenes of villagers building Village roads and drains with bricks, and the local deputy commissioner sending bulldozers tC de T1 Colish the collist TL1C til 5 ) and arresting the workmen con charges of disturbing public pe:lce.
The typical civil servant today is faced with formidable problem of powerty, social pola Tization, breakdown of law and order and erosion of infrastructurc. He is presu med to be
tackling these problems in an environment where ofte Il conflicting demands from a still
nascent polical system arc impi Elging up () Il a In administra
tive Institution whose internal stability and Cohesion has already been under mined by the arbitrary and piece meal ItET y Titi C1S Cof :ԼlԱԱ է:55, 1Wէ: regimes. To bie ablic LC fulc
tion effectively in such El Sitllalin the civil serva It's Willd hawe to be imen of considerable professional acumen, integrity and initiative. Few of them today could claim to be imbued with these qualities. Given the poverty of their cducation and institutional environment, they are in Ihost cascs in cal pil ble of even comprehending thc nature of the problem they face, let alone conceptualize, fo Timula te and e wa lillal te policy interwentions to overcomc thcm.
19

Page 22
Indochina Revisited
Rajiva Wijesingha
In the sixties it had bec WictRa that had held centre stagc. Whatever one saw the opposing forces in that battle as represellig, it Was the struggl: thcTC Cof Conc small Asia. Il natic) in Eigainst the most powerful of military superpowers that caught the adolescent imagination. Cambodia Wa5 th cn Im Crely a detail, a neighbouring nation Where el sharp but not very appealing IIlonarch nämcd Sihän ouk Walked a tight rope between the various countrics and idcologies that fou - ght for the region' s soul.
In 1970 all that changed. SihaIncuk was deposed by Allerica's puppet ge Teral LC1 No.1, whic) gawe the United States ready access to the country so that they could disrupt, as they hoped, the supply lines of their Wietna mese elemy. The indiscriminate bombing and destruction they indulged in has been graphically de Scribed in Wi||IHITT Shil WCT 033." "Side show', the title of which aptly characterises the callousless With which US treated a nation and a people that were simply an appendage to their
ther designs,
The hCT TOT 10 W e W II did Il penetrate too deeply at the time. Thic e wemts of 1968, Tet ad Joh 150 I's fall and the COITTI e IlCement Lif negatiti i L15, had led Colle to believe that Wietla. Il Would 500 II le 11 lited and left in peallcc; youthful fe Two Lur as to the cause fided, for it seemed so certain to be won. Despite the la Ing drawing out of the process that Nixon engaged in, despite the bad faith that the takeover of Cambodia suggested, complacence, relatively speaking, continued. Indeed, with the issues no longer hawing coll. In alded close attention it even see IIc justified by the final triumphs of 1975, the expulsion of the America. Il client Tegi Illes in Saligon, Phnom PeIh and Wientiane, and their replacement by governİlerlts that, as alti C1älist5 TL ther than Marxists, seemed finally LO have cole ilt) theiT , WI
The Writer is Presider of the Liberal Party
O
The absurdity Cence became y cii T s tlıat foll necessary year; impo verished a C) Insiderably. " Wrought resenti T1čss that cũT1[I Inism in the ye |m Wietnam a this inhibited til ion of systems C{ʼbI1 t Tib Ll tegi t«) : opment, the limited in its bɔdia, with thi Pũ| P. ht led Kh to disilster. A. r of society on naire lines led El II ll SSiWe 5: rare form of it was practise the Saint race
Micanwhile th, another signific the seven year perhilips, frn1 Wiew, El Ind Kiss Machiavel Lian and Chili had closer together. the US was co that stage (unlik whic it is cli thik and care til be divorced) wa ralization, and do II, Those aft days when righ ships could be gTO LI Ilds that "freedo", cyc harsh restrict ir provided only allowed to for OLIS socialist ColltTool, da T Ta Vement Lo pror in the hands Uf. cd with the s acceptable, pro
business with a sort).
China thcm, g
Deng Hsiao Ping On thc status of nation; and in til tinuing hostility U Ilico II, with whi

of that complaclear only in thc Wed. Sevel unof fighting had | 1 three collu 1 Ltics
Worse, they had lets and bitteributed to extre
its that followed. ld Laos, though le productive fusthat might have more rapid develhe Iloillen on Was іпnрасt. Iп Camexcesses of the mer Rouge, it led igid Testructuring Tuthlessly doctrito gen Cocide on le; and a most genocide, in that d by members of upon each other. ere had developed ant factor during is of was te — or Nixon's point of inger’s, years of success. The US begun to Illove Tragically, all 1 ccr Il cd about allt c 1 (W, one trusts, car Lo all who hat the two cinnot s eco (Illic libenot political freeer fll Were the t-wing dictatoradulated On the they promoted jf freed 0ITI I11eant 15 con individuals, Lihat business Was ish without obwicontrols (statist Lher state in wolmote monopolies persons con nectate, Wä5 quit: widcd these did ind of the right
articularly after ; took ower, took a highly favoured le COIl teXL cfc1to the Soviet ch Wiet La Tl Was
allied, China's quarrel with Wietnam provided what could be seen as splendid opportunities for the US to pursue its resentment of that country for having defeated it in battle. Regrettably, during Carter's early years, when the US was prepared for closer relatio Ins, Wietna III1 es e hard lin erTis insisted on reparations. By the time that futile exercise was aban doned the horrors of so-called real politik had returned, and it was the US that played hard to get.
Though it is certainly the case that the liberalization it is low attempting would have occurred Inuch more swiftly had closeT ties with the West developed in the early eighties, Wietna III perhaps was not too adversely affected. It was Call bodia that SLI FfeTeci IIhost. Whel the WietThames e in wasion of 1979 g c t Tid of the Khmer Rouge, and establihed the Heng Samrin go wernment in Phnom Penh (now better known as the Hun Sen governinent, after its dynamic young prime Minister), a strange combination of Chinese and American influence ensured that it remained almost wholly isolated. Indeed, though it was patently clear to everyone that it was a much more popular and productive govern Illent than that of Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge continued to hold sway even at the United Nations for some time longer; and when at length their atrocities beca Ilic So clear that they proved an embarrassincInt, the formula was adopted of support for a coalition opposed to Phnoll Penh that included the Ill. This coalition consisted of a faction headed by the on deposed Sihanouk, a faction LIn der Son SalIIIl which to a great ext cnt represent cd forces that had supported Lon Nol, änd the Khmic Rouge, in theory no longer led by Pol Pot, but in fact as much und er his Sway as previously. Its titular leader
in fact was Khieu Samphan, who had been al Inost as proIn inct in the Khmer Rouge
Tegime as Pol Pot; while given its overwhelming strength as compared to the other two factions, it was clear that assis

Page 23
til ce to hic Coliti T W Could result if successful in a go Wernment dominated by the Khmer Rouge.
It was understanda ble that China would welcome this. What might have been surprising, were it not for the practically publicly cxpressed abandonment of all principle that the Ronald Reagan/Jeanne Kirkpatrick view of foreign policy entailed, was that the US was so happy to work to wird 5 a return of the Killing Fields. Yet this was the period when, Eis Hanoi conccdCd
Im Ore lIld more the JS begime more in transigent, Capable of g Teat in 12Ag ai imity in Wictory,
thic IJS like si T11 any others Was bitter in defeat,
So the War dragged on tragically inhibiting the process of recovery that the country, dragoloned i 1 to the Wietnam Wat so pathetically against its Will, surely deserved. Despite this however, the Hun Sen governilent hiLs bee In Eble tO I mi ke some headway. The economy has been freed from statist coltols, Illich II (re swiftly than in Wiet li lil Cbir Lillos, El Id the results are apparent, in the comparative prosperity of Phnom Penh, the thriving markets, the higher levels of consumeris Ill., the generally healthy appearance of the people. In the countryside of course development is slower, but even there the fields are lush again and the harvests regular, and life is more coilfor Lil blic Eind ScClure than it hij been for a couple of decades. A consequence and a measure of this is the decreasing support for the opposition coalition, which has been confired in effect to just a few arcas, main y in the West of the country, while Te its forces su rwiwe by mea Ins of Chiliese and Allerican al55ista Tince, cha nnelled through the Thai military. Yet even there, Angkor Wat, which at o me tilne was under threat, is now free to welcome tourists; and all this has been accomplished and is in the process of being conso|id-fcd e vel with the Withdrawal 1 cof wirtually the en tire. Wietnamese military presence, which had seemed essential for a
whole decade as of the Khile
Il te Tillti? Illally be perceived, C Ja palin and Fra (which has help relatively sophi I lications met W0 tion for the day can move in) for the US le be relived; whi ly solid hostilit ASEAN has W. due to the 11o roach of the Thai governmen tantly because I "לחנן h Hוונו T E 16ת bours absollt libi til i Chile 5 e 3 pressing for it Will 10t le CE55 nam en tirely is tion it is possi Bush, though eq exce 55:5, is le climited to th וחין וו Republica mil de El most H pragmatists whic in conducting til ke il to il CCCLII or the basic pri helped Americi: so much. Equit become quite tence in isolat the slurest way dependence on allowing investm ing ilternatinä is the 15 t ob opening the co AS i CCTS CIL hıc latest TÖlınç to be inching of success. No PI see Els t the other three but , שוח דום r שייט al Sol San El h Taged to take : the T1 Cls 5 er to herce futher f: is titut that AIII of W:ıri)Lus sh1a the Tecl tc) in Rմ11ցe in a Ily 5 grounds that it not possible (i that it is the se support, financ that goes with

ter the expulsion Rouge.
to o chal nges can o Lu I tlries such Ls Ce and Australia led to set up a Sticted colli illurk, in preparaWhen the World Lire o Inly Wai Ling di embargoes to lille the previnusy presented by :ake ned, in palitt re pTactical app - te winus civilia, Il -Tטpנחi שrטt; m ndonesia (always than its neigh; olute allegiance genda) has been settle ent that arily leave Wieto lated. In a ddible that George ually capable of 55 ideologically |cm thãn his twõ decessors, who fetish of being
SEW TLS Foreign policy to nt human rights inciples that have
itself a clicy lly, it has als o. : lear that in 55ing Cambodia is til Continue its Viet i F1 FL1, whic Teat; ent and a grow| presence there Wills Incans of untry up more. |ence of a || thlis, l of talks seems owards some sort longer is Phnom Whicllו lyחטrlט טh : together must ril ther Sihanouk lwe been el ca Lu - ;tands that Inowe Hun Sem, and l Il Pol Pat. I trical politicians ides still stress W Clwc the Kille
ett ellet, il the herwise peace is gloring the fact stresses, and the ial and otherwise, them that allow
the Khmer Kouge to still continue active and influential); but by and large there now at least seeins to be some light at the end of the tunnel, in which the Col. I try had been left blockaded for so long,
When I wisited a celsefi Te was in operation, having been El grc cd in preparation foT the talks that were to take place in Jaka Tta in May. Ewen before that however an enterprising entrepreneur had set up regular flights, five times a week, between Bangkok and Phnom Penh. In theory they were charter flights, but they could be booked j List like o T dina. Ty Comics from travel agents, a number of whom have established themselves in Bangkok over the last couple of years for tours to Imiochill:4.
Thic al gents : LITTEL ing2 a 150 foT the Carnbodian visa, to be picked up on arrival in Phnom Penh; and I booked too ai three day tour to Angkor Wat, as a flight to Wicitiane and a wisa for for Laos. When I got to Phnon Penh h0 Weiwer it was to discoVer that the flight to Wientiane on the next Friday was full, and I would have to wait another week for the next olc. The illternative Cffered was to return to Bangkok, on the quite expensive charter. Instead I chose to travel to Ho Chi Minh City, the for iller Saigon, and to fly frr:TI thic Te to Hill Doi and the On to Wientiane. The travel agent in Cambodia was enthusiastic about Iny wish to travel fra T PHI I Foel to He Chi Minh by bus, as much to save II (Incy as to sec the countryside, and prøved extremely effiCicnt ab C) ut arranging the required visas,
We lunched together con the first day, and it was then the full mea ning of what I had Tcad about but Iewer really understood be gırı to come home to Inc. Tan's husband had bee II an airline pilot, and they had been due to go to France together for further training in June 1975. In April Pol Pot had taken over the City. Her hus
(CαπfίΤιβέρι απ Ρέιξε 34 )

Page 24
The Military Situation
Major-General Anton Mutucumaru
t the end of the 60's, on th1e iTi "yita Lio Iı of thıc ILIri kaI Gardial, I Wrotc l n a Tticle (In the Military Situation in the
70's, NOW, a decade latcr" and on my own initiative, I am Writing sone thing on the
Military Situation in the 80's. This article includes the early 90's because the military Elims of Presidet Sald di I 11 Hussein, Whiç tok hill in L.) Lihle (Gulf war in the 80's, took him also in the carly 90's to the Gulf When he was involved in the CCITiduct of the Second Gulf War, if I may so describe the att c Impat m:Hdc by him te a Innex Kuwait which was frustrated by thic US licci coalitico II.
At the end of Illy article dealing with the 70's. I stated that not all 'defence' expenditl Te is motivated by Initional security requirements and that a Il exELIl ination G-f varicours nilotives underlying such expendi turc would lead to a deman for the setting up of a New International Military Order. Such an order would satisfy the wishes of the idealist. But the World is TLIll of Tealist: Who do not see the Ileed for such : In order. I Wish to Ilake it clear that, in examining the Illilitary situation in the 80's, I a III not looking for II ia terial to jutify the setting up of H. New Inter Til tional Military Order
but I a III hoping that what the survey discloses will hawe al be El ring on that I matter. Europe
li sta It With I ELI I ope , because it was in Europe that two
World Wars in this centu Ty weTe set in Ilotion by a milita rised Germany, not in defence of her territory but in an attempt to impose her military will in her neighbours. It is also in Europe that the for Illal end of World War II was signal led in the
ALCLCLCC S LTTGLGGHCHEHHS SLLHHL S LCT S TLSa
ri IT FIFT FT fi Fring Carl Il Trader
22
80's by the be A consequence
World War III y matio El in the two military in to deal with mili ging up in the
II eral, namely
Warsaw Pact, fi on military iss Il 01 — 111ilitary on ticall or Catherwijs the for egoing in an end to militi Slich as existed ing the XIXth (
Given the hist in Europe co the Napoleon W CJEl ducted duri II tury a Ild clding Wars of Lic 20 tled to ask whe actually witnes all confrontatio in Europe, If can face a picrio
On El Liber A II la Litic CF
a lice which ari: of thic Swiet - has beel weake of her econolly tical cycIts son with iT her by CSI Outside. With of her ecto Inom: tion of h Ci po Will a clfed Iminded Tepubl the de Ill OCI: Lic. T W 11 3 Te Union, presenti Cha Iacteristics : state, emerge? W talry hier:Archy, ened by the the Wirsil W Pac till its III aste IS adopt a policy Create its earlit power? And wo sed Swiet U JIli a powerful II present a thre security?

in the 1980's
Iligerent powers, of the end of was the transforobjectiyes of the 5 t un cits set up tålry issules sprin -
post-World War
NATO and the COI til H. Il cmphasis 1 25 t] ) T1e IT es, be they poli. ie... Pri Iina facile, lÖWSS CCInstituts Lry confrontation
in Europe durentury.
Ory of warfare film encing with Filr s a ıd 7 tillers g the 19th CenWith the World h, One i 5 cl ti: ther we have sed the cild of In for a|| Lillec not, Europe de of un certainity of Vital issues, Supre IIne imporSes is Lille futurc Empire' which ned by the 5tate " and by polile of Willich lic "ders and some he strengthening y and the 5 olulitical problems, :TätiCJI Cf likeics Wedded to process emerge witalised Soviet lig skille of the if : communist ould the old TiliCurrently Weaklisintegration of it, bide its time i I1 the Krem]II designed to re:I PITC:s tige and lld the Tevita IiIl Supported by lilitary machine at to Europert
In that event, what would the reactions be? Would there, for instance be a risk that a Tell inited Germany, once she is free of the teething problems of reunification, bccc; mcs elhamoured of a role in European affairs which would cindangcr European security as was once in the prelude to World Wars I Hind I'?
And What part Will the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe play in the circumstances Will the services of NATO have to be requisi
ti Ted'?
Africa
I 17 W turn til Africal willere
LHC Te is Illich turbule Ice a Ilid
little belligerence and, if there is belligerence as in North West Africa involving Morocco, Mauretanial and Algeria, the belligerence is low key, Colonial wars in Angola aild Morzambique have a balcd although thc ensuing peace : ce mis un Scttled, with suspicions of South Africa iWOWeelt. T: 80's have signalled the end of confrjutati II il Rhodesi but lei to speculation whether the decks were being clicar cd for the final Illilitary "show down" i Sault. En el Africa. This hlas however been averted by the prudent action on the part of President de Clerk releasing the de facto leader of the African National Congress, Neson Mandela, Hfter a qnarter century of incarceration. The next logical step was reconci1iation bull this has bec stalled by two developments.
Nej Lheľ the **black" T1 or the "white' community has emerged frce of internal conflict and clear ly, till there is an all-black and allwhite C0 mmunity, fully united inter se, there can be Ilo Tecomciliation. Black on black fighting continues apa ce and Teither Mr. Mandell of the ANC Ilor

Page 25
Chief Blith clczi of thic Inkatha IIIowę IIIcnt has been able to control their Tespectiv 5 COnlinuInities. And on the White African side, the cxtremists have prevented the emergence of an all-white community under the leadership of President de Clerk. No white on white fighting has admittedly been reported but there are signs of civil war breaking out.
Once the blacks Whites settle Lleir interial differences, thcrc Can energ: a setting for a black Versus White en counter. Only a III ir Eicle will olviätc thal e Icolinter and, already the possibility of Silch El miracle: has beel moted. This Will cicInitTe Tf3 L1 D d E w Col Llı tary movc by the whites into a white enclave, unshired with blacks, it a reenactment of the Trans Waal episode. Miraclc5 tire h0 W :WCT diffic11 || t t () achieve (if that is the right word) and the chances a Te that there will be fighting,
and the
It is not the security of the
whites or if the blacks that will be in issue. It is rather the control of territory which
each side world Wish to achieve through the military domination of the other. The Whites, having given up their European home in exchange for Ein African home on which they hawe lElvished lowe, w calth and som etiles life, are unlikely to give lip their new home without a fight. The blacks for their part see the same territory als their hereditary home which the whites, even though they are al minority, hawe usurped and in the process have relegated the black majority into a position of inferior status through their policy of a partheid which has earned the cI dellnation of almost the entire World.
If fighting breaks out, it will be bitter and prolonged. The White 5 hilw : il ccc, 55; to Sulperior weapons ånd the blacks hawe access to the suppo Tt of the i front line" states of Africa. The pent up feelings on both sides, so far avoiding military confrontation, Will in
duce a bilter the Will I Wall Tid Ia til T1, llit hert Africa.
Asia
And finälly differences betw led to belligere tal LiCl, howe w cr the exception. the Indo-Paki Arab-Israeli W fought for dec persisted to this peace has desc a Tech, with spel. whether there w in when the erupt. In Sol Campuchea re. ground whilst downs of negoti With 10 real se i55ues Which ha fighting,
In the 80's, llaw: Tisel. La bi first was the occ a This tan by the which roused t the Afghan Mul del Cristration i qualities leadil the withdrawal Justified by Pr LES EL TITTE: TK socialist neight itrusion Wils : CETT ELS S. SiTı ister leading til tblätt :: Ilpower to seize Gulf region w. by the USA, b sary, becausc · h TE:5 t;" wyer The scid : dispute (wer C Shiltt-al-Arabi Ller E hältl bLLIl וח 1:1r וL W HeTשוb was abrogated b sein on the te TT15, of thile with the so were The fighting t bitter and Wils the bulk if th was as Lil Ilex pe ning because b: Hillsisei I WLS ii conduct of War

e il StratiCI Of s power do I In i - ון 1 Wii נlk:Il tן 1ן ט
to Asia where een States huwe 125 ånd Confron
bitter, has been In South Asia,
still Fill the Hirş halı","ce beccını : de5 : Illi li hi, WL: day. An Linca sy el del oil cach
:llation, not. In ill be pea but next war will Ith East Asia, mains a battle the LIբs and iti on take place :ttlement of the we induced the
til Tee occasi CT1s tter fighting. The upation of Afgh: Sro Wict LJ mix Ii lhe passions of jahideen and a of their fighting g eventually to of Soviet troops. eside Llt Bricchino" help a weak ill the Swiet een by President mething TE to his declarawe by an outside control of the Juli e Tesisted y force if neces.
er vital intein the region. Casil was the
:ILL Tol Iwer the in respect of which a för Illal treality and Iraq which y president Iusround that the treaty inter fercd ign rights of Iraq. hält Em5iled was chill cted wer e decide It5 cl di cted FS it5 beginby Iow. President iw t, I wctl with tէլt: with Kuwait and
he did not want to fight on two, fronts. A significant fact concerning the Iran-Iraq War was that security interest of neither Side Wils involved. The thirel Occasion Wils the Oil break of the war conducted by president Hussein to incx Kll wait. Here again, the security of Iraq was lot in issue, it being fought ta satisfy the covetatis ai 11 of HusseiIl to Secure control of KLI will it's oil. It did not last long because of the swift action by the USA to mobilise western Teactio 18 and her skilful use Cf the Illilitary resources available to the US led coalition,
The second Gulf, War as I prefer to call it, was significant for three other reasons. Firstly, there was identity of views in the Security Council regarding th: con del nation of Iraq for its all exil til Of K Willit and the Theasures needed to bring about the end of the occupation secondly, the Te was the focus sing []f W[]rld H. Item tÎ1 m |}|m thẽ. Hitle|{{llacy of Japan's contibution to the war effort by the coalition. The grawa men of the criticsim of Japan was that she was cxploiting un du ly the limitiation placed on hcr by her Constitution not to use het military resources in a foreign engagement. This criticisin ca 11le hård on the heels of the clain Lhät 5 he does not do enough Lo share ililitary blIFlens 11 tille Ngirl Pfl r:1Fic which after all is her own backyard'. Perhaps, Japan herself regrets the constraints placed on her military postures by her Constitution, certainly in the discussions held recently חשיים וורrie:L Unitורthe St וWi LI the Future of the Kuriles, she must hawe longed to have her political posture supported by milita Ty strength such as she possessed at the turn of the century when her forces defeatcd Swiet forç:25, il late:T, Lt the time of Pearl HaThour and subsequently in World War II. And above all, Japan must have Il Lirls ab OLIE her SLI per OWCI status which her economic power, however great, is una ble to :Է:1ITL:

Page 26
The Military. . .
(Carl frர நாgg :)
Thirdly, LE1: Te is i hic i Titiltive taken by President Bush to stress tlı c. Ilced for : Elı world order "" where the rule of law governs the conduct of nations' ad o fin Which a crcdible UN can use its peacekeeping role to fulfil the promise and wlis iom "If its foundcTso". Such1 a role Would presumably include preemptive action through the deploy 11 cnt of a per manant peace-keeeping force. President Bushs wiews HTL Linsonant with ^ merica In idealism whose girealtest proponent was President WC) Čd T0 W Wils 011 Whlo 5 LľĽ55ed that peace depends onot on a balla. In CC of power but CT1 i community of power'.
My assess II let of the 80's Which I hal We Te Wie wel demonsLrates the Ieed for I New International Order. Having said that, I recognise two aspects of the require Ilent. One is that the World Order contemplated by President Bush may be so comprehensive as to obvia te the setting up of the more limited military order, The second is that there are i T1 situ :: Ilul Iliber of dc facto Teil sures thlt wLL1ld in Effect render the provisions of the Military order I con template, redundant. Some of thern are the Nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, the COIl clusion CIl t le limitation of strategic and other arms and of cours c the provisions (of UN Charter which are executed by the Security Council.
Pax Americana
There remains one final point for consideration. One of the features of the Gulf War which has just ended is the part played by the USA in dealing with president Saddam Huss sin. Her immedia te purpose was clearly to extricat e Kuvait from the clutches of Saddam Husssein. If one imports the view of President Carter that the gulf is part of the vital inter est of the USA, wę have another reason. But there is a residual matter namely that of
24
Tegional securi of the USA, i. been Willing Whe such Ieeded ill t of peace. That OF Ehler i Il y lly er World Wars if
Wii t tliet | 5 || 1: Le CCIl velle: IIL i Ill the a precedent? A det tille: ccTell TEIL 5 LA LLIS ELS of the Super thält evelt, i L tin1: before sh. k. responsibility b So II : ti II ie be
Indochina. . .
(Corriffred fr
band had beel eliiilii IIa tell sib i I
Apart from th and the Royal cipal sight t Phill iltisil Penh is sectand:Ty schill Rollige hızıl tur. Tı cipal re-educati city. It is ill li min Lussell Iim, With om the upstair dors to prevent OLL to their de escape, with th Of Tick T. W. OT 50 cr:LI11 IIlcd room) in which held in solita: with the well i Ft T LILLTE WTC folded, all kic were. Th1c las LOIT1:s t{) IIll photographs of t. were all illetic tcd) lid the punish Ilents ine witll էլ IIlt und effect is h0ITIE Els Corne goes i El Lutside, the Te ; skulls lying sci on the ground, wis, W T the teated hits :
In the light feels, the reco Wi Ilarkable. Ol What el se call forget? – or Tat it, in talking life she was tr.

ty. The record s lit she has inter Welle Inter critic Was he preservation is the significa Ince elt in the two this centu Ty.
of [[Eric future? Allerick II in WillGulf to be clic Ind is the precea Ty of her curthe sole member power club. In
will be 5. In is relieved of քtil ust it will bt: for e the Stivit
rrrrr pogo 21) Ile of 1 ifler, Le Silwer Pagoda Palace, the pri Inbe scen in Tuol Sleng, the | 1 thät thịt: Kh Iller cd into its pri 11c) rı carT1p = in the i Itali Ilici Il yw as the barbed Wire 5 outside corriբtople 1ւIInբing tills äs Illea. Ils of ic tiny cubicles od (about thirty i II to each classprisoners were ry Confine. Il ent, In which victiis ilııı : Seid bilir.ıd
tէլմ:
pt just is they it building one ais, after the
he in mates (who ul 1115 1y d(ht: urllen
pictures of the ted olut, ä I00 m of skulls. The
lying; and then, to the corridor Lire a couple of littered ca. Telessly
How cheap life ssly people were ::: O'r Wer Whelming lly. if all that, itle Cry hals been rethe i l lıcılr h i ldı, people do except her as Tallin put
about thic Ille WW ying to build up
Union rehabilitates Hersef Sufficiently to resume her position in the club lnd it Will bě 5cme Lime als) before Cit het Candidates for super po WeT stal til 15 (and surely this includes Mainland Chinal, GerTua Iny and Japan)
mature sufficiently to claim
Inellbership in the club,
It follows that the world
relies heavily on American
power to crıslı Te 5ccurity, region al cor global. Docs this Incan Lihat the eral of thic Pax Americimal has started just 15, in history, the World lived, il the era of the Pax Romana, the Pax B [ita, Ilica al End thic PELIX a lO1 milicą.
for herself, cease to remember, even if the II he lory of what was dest Toyed a Eld Wasted will always lurk in the background, Life has to go CI. S.) the city seems to be thriving now, with the restaurants full, and the la Tkets bustling, and the palace complex, clearly a place for pleasu Table ou tings, replete with meTry Inakers on the same Sunday äfteTT100Il that We had ILITched together.
As the premier to Li Tist attraction of the city, the complex is relatively Well ilmain talined, es
pecially the palace itself with its in pressive canopied throne and the plush sitting rooms.
Ewell Illa Te Teil Tikai bilę is the Silver Pagoda, na med for its shining lead floor, housing as inV:1.1 Liable CollectiOD of emeráld and gold in laid Buddhas, that fall T Coltshille the fa mðLLS EIllerald Buddha in the palace compound in Bangkok.
However, i II thic cupboards around the central group of statues are several slaller Buddhas with their heads hacked off: L aL LSaaaS S S S LLLLLLL S LLLLLaLLLLL LLLLHS might have thought, Wcre it in tot tilt the Indst Villable status:5 remained intact, which sugge5tel tlit thı III liti WC WELS Il COL purely doctrinairc. More p IC3ble was the explainaktion given by the guide, that it was Vietnamese soldicry, who in the course of their lission of rescue engage d to c) in plu Indering Whilt they though they could gel E. Wally will1.
(To be continued)

Page 27
| |
- -
¬sܕ ܬܐ 57
| .
The Pivotal Port
Ideally located region's tranship the world's ma
The best turn-around time
A streamlined fully - complu
* A Net work of Container
* A consolidated Rates Stril
串
Attractive rebates for tra I
:
Safe handling by skilled
SRI LANKA PO
9. Church S1 cct, P. O. 13(
& 42123|| 42120) 1 Telcx:
 
 

of South Asia
to cater to the ment trade and ritime industry.
is in the Region for all traffic.
iterised operation.
Depots & Freight Stations.
CİLTE,
1shipinent,
personnel.
♔
RTS AUTHORITY
px 595, Colombo l , Sri Lanka, 21805 Ports CE Fax: 54065 |

Page 28
铬 To Provide Financia
lowed
JOIN
BANK OF
CHILDREN'S SA
Give your child one of the m in life -
Financial security for a stab
If you have not, it's time yo
Your savings today is your c
BANK OF
ABA WAKERS TO
 

al Security to your
S
THE
CEYLON
WNGS SCHEME
lost important things
le future.
u thought about it.
hild's security tomorrow.
ΟΕΥ ΟΝ
THE WATIO/W