Page 1
A little light at th
A bus ride to Ho
IMF's perestroika - K
Indo-US ties - Chintam
Ayodhya — Ashgar Ali l
Militarisation and Viole
Turno South Commission: - Sa
'88, '89, '91: voter
O ERC HEFFER
 
 
 

e end of the tunnel
- Mervyn de Silva Chi Minh
- Rajiva Wijesimgha
iya Mitra
K( Sharma
ami Mahapatra
Engineer
nce - Sumanta Banerjee
蟹 డౌన్లె
懿 豪 《 臀 કું;
驚 歼
ut - Aberysek era man Kelegama
9 00 WYK

Page 2
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Page 3
Briefly . . .
UNANIMOUS SUPPORT
9 Opposition (SLFP) MP Mangala Moonesinghe's motion calling for a Select ComTittge of Parliamg It On the national question was passed una nirmously by the HoLISP. The notion said: This Parliament is of opinion that a Select Comittee of Parliament be appointed to arrive at a political solution to the question in Wowing the da volution of DOWer t
the Norther and Easter FrOWinCes.
TULF HALS SUPPORT
G. The Tani United Liberation Front (TULF) issued a statemet which said that "the Support of tha government and the SLFP (for Mr. Mooresing he's motion) are positiv 9 developments". The TULF also said that it would can Wass the views of all parties that are now represented in par|iament on the need to provide for the adequate and effective participation in the select committee of recognised political parties which are not in ратliaпепt.
KITTU CHALLE MIGES
EXPULSOM
Kittu, the LTTE's London spokesman announced that he would cha || enge the Order expelling him from Britai. Kittu was given ten days to quit Britain for a country of his choice.
AGAINST VEDA COV MISSOM
9 The Opposition in the Centr:3| PTowİncia || Council has given Tot ice Of d T O tio Calling or the Central government not to go Elhead With the proposed media commission bi II. Tha Tition in the Tiama Of Chief Opposition Whip La |
Wijena yake says is yet another destroying det doms.
BLOCKN
DE
3 Four hun
cases are stag Government AT et dug to age of staff. 50 Th | 3 | arta fu ni a Cadre Of Dyer
The departm Câ5Es läst yEi Crease Compar in the previou
Al other reas Dg Of Cases the Goverri TE maka repeated a CBS in COlle Cal S95.
OBER O T PEOP
The gove Of Hotg| La Tık be sold under sation" progra ment through the Treasury
Cert of the Shia
GOLD FO
O The Cen beg Lin selling { Earlier gold wi foreign currel cing this at ference Central Neville Karl Lihat the ultim TThak e the rLI p)
'It is gold quality. You for your L сап buy gold the Governor
And, no qu askēd.
MO ՍOES
O Answering parli ämnt, L G. M. Premach

tha L thig. Ei step towards
TDCratic frag
ANALYST'S PT.
drad ar Gotics nating in the alyst's Departan acute shortOnly 18 perction ing where 3) is needed.
Tt TV 2 S2O) r a sharp i r 1 - Ed to 333 c:H8 Ég S year.
for the backis the need for nt Analyst to
COLurt appea rction with the Sa
OO TO BE LSED
rri me mt's shara
a Oberoi is to the 'peoplim. The governthe CWE and OWri 51 per TBS.
R RUPEES
tra Bank ha 5 gold for rupees. is sold only for mcy, Anno u Ila media ConBark Governor In Fiti||EkEI said at ainm Was to Eae Convertible.
of the best Will gat wall La Ipees. Anyone at our counter" said,
estis Wii || bobe
IM JAPAM
a question in abour Minister dr Said tät
ܕܕܠܐ
there were no indications of eploy thent opportunitias for Sri Lankans in Japan, or Greece. Mr Nimal Siripala da Silva asked tha minister Whether thם g) Weger Tlot Would implement an impartial Scher The Of Tg Cruit Teant for foreign employment as it had been reported that there were man y copp) CortLinitias for amployment in the Middle-East, Greece and Japan.
The minister said that recruitment was done by private agencias.
ANERA
UARD AAN
Wol. 14 No. 8 August 15. 1991
РГЕН НЕ ТЕШ
Published fortnightly by
Lanka Guardian Publishing Co.Ltd.
No. 246, Union Place,
Clu ITib i = 2.
EditOT: MET WWT da Siwa
4,47584 :טחםTBlaph
CONTENTS
News Background 3.
Gandhi Pro Eag 5
rii 7
Polis "88, "8S and '91 13
Indochina Revistëd (3)
Militarization, Will States,
Wigt. St דו
South Col. Ti55 21
Correspondence 23
Printed by Ananda Press 82/5, Sri Ratnajothi Sarawanamu tu Mawatha Colombo 13.
Tցlapիքma: 43Eg75

Page 4
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Page 5
Moves to end “the senseless v
Mervyn de Silva
TTE guns went
Lနှီးဂျိုး Pass on Monday. The day before President Premada sa paid a rare tribute to ALL thic democratic parties in the island for "closing Tanks in a bid to stamp out violenice'. The President had already urged the LTTE to give up the path of violence and return to the negotiating table. The appeal came 24 hours after the A IIIlcd forces had broken the 25 day seige at Elephant Pass. "I hopc at least Inow the LTTE will give up the terror campaign and savc innocent lives. II · war, Ino One Wills, All El TC: Toscrs'.
sile It at
It was an Opposition MP's motion which had earned praise LLLLLL LLLL S S S LLLLLLaLLLLLLLS LL LLLLLS LLLLLLLLS Mangala Moonesingha is an SLFP MP, a member of the main Opposition party and the Illing UNP's traditional rival. For the first time in djur political history, the two leadiug parties had at lcast agreed that the possibility of a "political selle Illent to the island's larrowing ethnic conflict should be studied by a bipartisan parli:inmentary Select Committee, and an Opposition MP from the SLFP, had introduced the Tcs Colution. In that same political history, the SLFP had been identified, certainly since 1956 as the authentic spokesman of Si Tihala-Buddhist inte Tests. It LLLK KSS HHaLLaHL S 0LLLL OHa had a de 'Sinhala Only' its principal campaign slogan in "55.
The recent speech at Kotelawela Defence Academy by for mer National Security Minister Lalith Athulathmudali had brought out rather forcefully that debate had introduced three this schools of opinion, once Tiger terroris I had grown
the
into El 11 Hjor i CD Sid CT i Ing IOLIIT ties, El "mili-wa
a) The J. R. " Luw' sch00 WAR strate,
b) A primarily proble IIn mee Solution but tical of Illi (Lalith Athl like-minded positions, 5 that way, the fItule the politica c) The 'polit
peace-liks, El Indi ye5'te T:II1i1 e1i [e:
Mr. Ma Ingal had placed his () Tider blijk 3 for Lunes of the for Elephant P: Mr. Moonesingh: belongs to the Anura) group. ( Sunday Observer that there are MILIO DO LE GROOT
The Lil Tulst of ghlas motion su volution' and the specificity a Ind-east” regio issues that del and hopefully, CO151515. Pre.5i chose to "sault tic parties for end "this sense
Mr. Mangala IIloti)II call ld no till el. He lid Lhle question l Battle for Elep Prabhakaran chi Mithe: T - Cf. A 1] begun. It was the fortu Illes of

War'
Insurgency ind, arily's capaci".
'Murgaya marTOTAL Ey,
social-political lds a negotiated from a posiilitary strength. I lith LIdali 11 di
straddled these hifting this or according to 5 of War Elıd | Situal til,
icä| 501 Lltion" mainly NGO’s
rised Sinhaila
Ճբi Ill ton,
1. Moonesingha [11] tion On the ng before the - recent battle iss Were clear. i., incidentally,
moderate (proThe state-owned however believes
3 groups. See JIP).
MIT. Mc Illes ilIggests that "de
recognition of of the ""|TitlIl a Te the Illa i Il ilı d discussionı a parliamentary delt Preilada sa
’ the de catheir at terript to less war'.
Mooncsingha's Lha webce bette T becn discussing p ng hẹfore the hant Pass (what se to Call "The Battles') had the timing and War which loe
initiative st important, and possibly a turning point in Sri Lanka’s (postIPKF) EELAM WAR 2.
the less. In Eide his
*"It Was PT bhak Tl Who Get the stage for this operation and he boasted that hic C) Luld ccfcat the force,5. That WF15 obwill:5 when he called it the Illo theT of all battles'. Now the people will know the real position of the LTTE. PTabakar Ann’s COC er in is NOT for the people. History will tell if this is the turning point of the war' said General Denzil Kobbckaduwe, thic northern Commander, in an interwjew with Dillesh Woltawana, Illilitary correspondent of the SETIğday Tirres,
In the 5 a Tine paper, Briga dicr Willalaratile added: "The LTTE has thrown in all it has to fight Lis, Tho Lisa Inds al re being conscripted and thrown into the front. Civilians are being taken forcibly. This is likely to be the decisive battle. This has totally changed the complexion of the war. It will now be a fight to the finish'.
The al Tilled for TCC F Halwe not had all the material they would hawc liked but 8, OCC) troops in a combined operation, (the first amphibious) maldic (OPERATION BALA WEGAYA, the Inearest action that thc Sri Lanka II a II 11ed $ er Wicles have moulted that assumed the character of convictional wa T. All thi 5 of CJLIT,5 c vya 5 the LTTE's tactical build based on an Over-estimation of its fighting capabilities in th; i t kind of wHTTTe.
What is happening behind the enemy's lines? What do the Tamil people really feel? Is the is was-weariness and til ei bitteress cycT. LTTE"3
(Cri: த நரச ே

Page 6
Anura: “Save SLFP9”
he National organiser of the
Sri La Inka Freedom Party (SLFP) and Member of Parliamielt Anlural Bandarai Laike, häls told party MPs and organisers that it is his intention to enbalrk on El course cof action t C} save the SLFP from conspirators and forge ahead with vigour and vitality to en su re a resounding victory for the party at the next elections.
In a letter addressicd Lo pa Tty MPs and organisers, Mr Balda Tallike HıEls stältcd that he had decided to write to the Ill with a view to Tucussing their atten tio in Oil a plot and conspiracy against him by a few divill: 15 Willi le SLFP itself. "It is Iny duty to inform my fellow MPs and IgaL0LLLLLLL L S HLHaH S LLL S HLLLLLLL S HLLLL dedication and devotion, about this conspiracy," he his st EL ted.
Mr. Bandara naike says, inobody will be allowed to drag Le SLFP eter to WT15 the rightist groups or to the left. The SLFP is a party which
“Middle Group'
Perhaps, the rise of the "middle group' may be the Teism for Mr. A I1 L1 ral Banda Talnaike to smile his way through the Group meeting like a fait cat and not utter one single word. He did not declare his hand, one Way CT in other. Mrs. Siria wo B:lInd: TäII:iike, on the contra Ty, Was attempting to steer the Parliamentary Group towards her line of thinking. She was hoping that the motion to reSolve the question of devolution of power should be moved by the joint opposition with the Speaker, Mr. M. HI. Maha millned, spearheading the Select Committee. The Opposition, by a II di large, was Incit happy with the private Inember's motion moved by Mr. Mangala Mo onesinghe. They wanted it to be in the na Ille- of the joint opposition. This was agreed in behindthe-scene political discussions With all the Opposition groups.
(Sri P7 day' ČObserver)
had chosen th This had been ted by the fou It is the duty change with th ilt) äCçCult LE ging political trends. There Widc political experience in t III en tary grou II Committee an organisers.'
He says he MPs and party Illet during the
HTd on th; lop Elments : have cole I11) weg in LHe ргопрtiпg a w to look hopef the end of the The 5L cess of force:5 iTı bicati assault on Ele indication of Liberation Tigt territorialul exp; explored these bicen firmly 1: חentityיווח רום תן scurity forces, Il W Il cel to : the basis of its A continued allow il further security forces they have gaine
Scra
Mwera u T. O'r ffig During We got Poffs
Wof the M'Or51
Tfie sfă, Orie ya
A 70 fr)
Et år 77 yi WSF FC W Fevoort. And is

e middle path, clearly enunciainder of the party. of our Party to i.e. times taking le swiftly chan
tւnd :ct no miւ: Were people with
knowledge and he SLFP parliaı, tille Cıcı Lr';ıl di di Iloilg pirty
las called upon
Organisers, he last few days
p Ententeי
: heels of deveIl the battlefield
2Cr til in tentiative political sphere "AI - Wealry Digition
Lilly for light at
tunnel. the State security lig bäck the LTTE phā 11t: Pass is 1 m the limits of the Prs' capacity for li nsion ... Hawing limits a Ild ha ving talight : les son 1 strategy by the the ILTTE ,yi11 i Ct politically on Current strengths. statemate will build up by the il the enclave d in the northern
NEWS BACKGROUND
to take strong Such Soboteurs.
Several steps that should be take T in this regard is now being considered by him. The 2: Tty ITILI 3 L bec 5ä ved TTCI TF10S2 plotters and strict action had to be taken against them in order to secure a definite wictory at the next election, Mr. Bandaranalike has said adding that his proposed course of El Citio would be discil55 el in the coming weeks.
El ction against
(Island)
Stictor ther cby bringing more
IES5 lire is the LTTE. r
President Premadasa's quick initi El tive in Calling for a TeneWedi dialogue has done I much to clear the atmosphere of the SII C ke lid di o battle l l pave the way for civil political processes towards peace.
The subsequent moves towards facilitating a dialogue made by the parliamentary opposition and the positive response by the govern Ilent are the most significant political developments Since til LTTE Tc5 Lule 105tilities a year ago.
The inability of the government and parliamentary Copposition to cooperate in evolving a peace package has long been LLLLLL LLLSLLLLLSLS LLL S SSS S LLLLLLLHSLLLJa Incgoticting process ai Ted at resolving the cith nic conflict.
YIsland Edir azerica / )
mbled Sophomore ( 958)
Wie position of the Theravadiras
ess firs:
!he L niversity Strike f'7 WF3 fro 77 LLydawy k. joked up to the Russian. fassure of a revolution. orth is disappointed now r fai f'Wedi ir 7 MWojscowy. rks Out orig 5 53/vation he With a nation.
7ff WC3 te v 7 riis court
er 7 inert or the Supremie Court. forary Fufus married a capitalist's daughter 'tory is troubled with laughter.
Patrick Jaya Suriya

Page 7
GANDHI PROBE
A Dubious Twist
Anirudhya Mitra
he crack team probing Rajiv
Gandhi's assassination would halwe do De Well to turn the Splitlight of investigation on itself last fortnight. That Shanmugam, a prize catch in the cise, escaped from the SIT's custody only to be fou Tid hanging thc next morning, was an un forgiwalble lapse. But worse still, Circurl 5 til Titial evide Tige i the death of the key LTTE contact cks tie būtīl Cut f SI Ts escape theory and the Suicide verdict of the hasty postmortem report.
According to sources, the gaffe has even more disturbing implications as it points to a death-il-Clustody, a IId al III o I e deep-rooted conspiracy. That no prompt action Was taken to bring the guilty to book suggests SIT has since been trying La CJ WCT its LTL. Cik S.
Thc in for Illation suggests that in all probability Shanmugam di cd cof a sphyxiation, and was perhaps the victi II of a calcuI - ] atcail IT1 Lurder. TFibr Shali Inr 11 lLI gal, II1, squealing to the SIT, had begun lo implica le many local politicians and officials. Police sources say that fear i Ig IT, Öre Tevclations, someone could hawe Ordered his killing. Perhaps the LTTE which had threatened last fortnight to "rescue' its Il embers froIl SIT Custody.
The Tigers would certainly not have wanted Shan. In Liga In to rey cal more about Siwa. Täsään, Who Din he had harb OLIIT cd alo Lng LI Hint1וb8 DHHIוון טנb -ןir: נWith hum Shubha. The da Trk, cu T lyhaired Shän mugam, 40, il rich land IC3 Td El 1 SIL), Luggler Operati Ing from the cas Lil town of Wicida Talnya 11 in Tha Injawur district, was a II i Ille of i Il f”JT II lätico Il Con the LTTE as he was providing then logistical support in Tamil Nadu. He knew Siwarasan since the time the explosives expert had come to Madras to elimi. Tlate EPRLF leader Pad Illa labha
În Madras
last year. Afte July 17, Shanmu Tating with the u nearth huge a II Sive5 and comin T11 Elt,
The SIT's uga IIl hוSllan II brought in by rallıELI :: Toul Id 19 at the Traw in Wedara Ilya In being held. T pretext of was he Welt to the pillied by a lo in the där k di: the compound behind his K. White si Hirt, N body Was four ERL, trote: 2 ii iii : blue lungi wa Sր ()t,
The post-mor ted the Fame L Enam, 40 kil fr The Teport, tak Saliva, emissio St Ols, declaired the SIT story a aire riddled Wil militate agains do III1:
* There wils r bruise in the WHich Lll: TC) positively left
at thic tille of
* The tongue ding.
The face w; with a rush
the eyes had if he was han
* The saliva, dischal Tges colul іп the event strangulated to
No scratch thighs - a sure ging - for in

r his arrest b IgEl Ill Was COOpe
SIT and helped Ilounts of exploLlnication equip
'ersion is that äd his din mer his uncle Seetha9 p., III. I 1 July eller’s Bungalow
where it was The Linder the
hing his hands, bäckyard accom1 e gli rd. And Sappelfeld Scaling
Wall, leaving Ia di dhoti linici ext morning his ld hanging from learby park. A s found at the
tC I WIS CJIl dulclay at Nagapatom Wedara nyam. ing note of the 1 Of sellen a Tel it a suicide. But in di post-mortem h loopholes that t foren sic wi 5
1Co r0 pe mark of Wicti III's Teck pe Would hawe if he was alive
hanging.
Wasn't protru
15 not congested of blood. And not popped out
마,
StOOl and seinen d have happened
of his being
In El Tks on his sign of a hallthe last-minute
struggle and pain, the hands, unless tied, instinctively scratch the thighs. If Shanmugam was tied up, how could he commit Suicide"? Neil het We Te skil particles found in his nails.
* The only way he could have ha Inged himself was by climbing thic tree, putting a nose around his neck and jumping. Thc impact would have broken thc neck boIles or ruptured the arteries which was T1Ut the case.
* The rope from which he Wils hanging Was 14 fect long.
Where did he get it in the dead of night?
These are clear pointers that Shallugam's death did not occur due to hanging. The evidence suggests the death took
place in custody as even thic escal, pe story sounds dubiolus, Firstly, Why Were Seethariman
and his driver allo Wed to vi5it Shan Illugal. II, bring him diminer and sit with hill when earlier even Shan II liga II's lawyer was denied permission to be present during his interrogation Since he was held under TADA? Then, if he cscaped, it was by giving the slip to ne DIG Wo SPS a T di 11 ote thäD 20 ärmed police Ten. And if slich high security was earmarked for the key suspect, Why was he not kept handcuffed Cor padlocked'? Because he was 'cooperative", justifies the SIT. Stranger still, why did the gua. Id accompanying Shanmugli il Tever raise a n alam? CBI officials following the investigation from Delhi observic that either the guard was not carrying his gun or he sensed the man was fleeing when it Wils too late. In that case, why was just one unarmed guard escorting a key prisoner? Mo Te ower, if LH1 e Ted a lert wag sounded soon after the escape, how could he hang himself in the park just 50 yards from the bungalow.

Page 8
AR", tום 5 שחום טITם סטTט - sent at the bungalow on the night in question, it was a typical death-in-the-lock-up incident. He reconstructs the cvents thus: Shanmuga Ill's uncle Sicct haram1an, a local land loTd and money-lender, had brought food for him. Seetha Tama II. though considered an LTTE sympathiser, was liaising with the SIT from day One of their arrival near Sha III. Liga Im's willagic, Kodia kadu. Seetharaman’s taxi driver, Das, was also with li lil Before di I 1 Ilie T Shia In Illll Ilgam had an altercation a Tound 9 p.m. with his uncle, SeethaTaman accused him of settling
scores with rivals in the area by finlsely implica ting the In with LTTE activities or the a 55.55iati COT13piTELCY.
The argument went on till about half past ten. The DIG
and the SSPs had already gone to sleep. At one point of ti II1e, only Sh:1 Tn mm lugaim, his uncle, his driver. Das, änd two
unarmed constables were left. Suddenly, the constables, supposedly at the instance of Seetharaman, started thrashing Shanmugam. No one interve
In codi.
Thc 5 ou Tce co Il til Lics: " “All
we know is that he collapsed. We suspect that it was a case
of asphyxiation. The senior officers were informed only when the Ilan was dead. Yet
a party was sent out oste Insibly to search for Sha I1rTı Luga Im ew cDn as his body was very luch with us. His clothes were taken off before the body was hailged. But in à h11TTy Flnd panic, we forgot to remove his
wrist watch. The lungi found at the spot actually belonged to Das. Some-time after 3 a.m.
the body was hanged."
The post-norte Ill Was conducted at Nagapat na rin and not il Mali Tas where there: Te better facilities - fearing resent
ment from locals. The body was also handed over to Shanmugam's people immediately
for cremation. Something never don e in El sensitive case like this. Consequently nobody could challenge the suicide verdict.
Clearly, the S thing to hide, not a single | suspended. Not Seethä Taman b; BCCLIII5E, the Il SI la di ti colle CI ini Ing their rol gali III’s escape Cor Union Hole Chavan has sai Lllent is deter Illi the TOCJL ()f thic the purpose, t til Illa 1 di Tcc to T v inզuiry. But Sh arrc dcath, with Wider conspiracy credibility of th gation into dou וeשון tltטוח טוח the I in any questions
f:
The senseless
fСgrтіїлtterї fѓ, Il cth. CdS, Illil of tecna gers fro Imade then less halil-dominated the Sinhala I
As:
Lrce . É Tiss sifr Беarѓл9 th They grievi Fgự #L## !
a roads Wonderirg For air / O'r ffeir. Ei Yet ser sing Sansfпg / F5 S//гдfлgy f T'ia y cousa 7 forgy Fb (7 re?
But they C. Tsé Leafs Cass surg Te go=Ir LTC e Ho
TV7 5. Cert L. Offer fft, Yr Vo fuse w And who

SIT las
Thält i 5 policeman was hEid II); El Lld IEEI1 arrested. T W Ը111tl li a we record explaie i [1 ShaIILılLI - possible killing. Milis ter S. B. d t hic (GoycTITned to get at incident. For 1 e CBI's HiddiW:15 holding :1I1 anmugam's biz1 its hilt of El ", has put the e entire investiit, and SIT it is to answer El S 215 it is als king. WID FH TČ) I). Y }
S1why
W. . .
2 FFE PÉge 3) y C01 Scription m every family, ht}stile to Singovernments and Olitical estab
lishment. If that is thic case, the changing mood in Colombo als Ieflected il MT. M.) Illesingha's resolution and the all-party response, cal encirge as a major factor in that large national-political, political-military equation necessary for Sri LIk cs.lv ti national question".
Externally, too, the climate is most helpful. By this, I refer to the Talli| Iladu scene and the on-going crackdown in Madras -- Tot just by S.I.T. by the Indian Ministry of Defence, after the visit to Tillilädu of Defence Milister Sharad Pawar, but by the AIDMK administration and the State police.
International opinion too has swung in Colombo's favour. The Gandhi assa.55ia Ei On a 5 been too deadly all essay in i International te TTLJIris 11 for the international community to tolerate. The deportation order on Kittu by the UK authorities is a striking example,
sassination in the South
ad fad. Effo W use, a 7ť Wike, É: Fr 5 la Fr) leader.
а. fл даг/Na теалtary /алguage “hat сал agafл гтаver bg, they strade together,
ffs Stranga шгтсогтсаггт 3 Lug s'afer a triu rripsis fter days of defeat.
y ffs deťach ment Wiberating the rr7 from themse/wes, ѓs vis/ог) /fghtл/л797
world yn dri77 enfarily on their 5, ack into the darkness of many cravings "rit frtake Hirs 5/757rg.
him forth, just as they now bear him away ot / /f"r 7 t Ébr firng /h fr77 to t/ie d'eat/7 /he drea d'gd', Cof the figyfaf ar 7 t’ frig blood Wiwit si ir fhirm, злd'ar to rттотеу 5ї comp/acerтсе 777 Erfā / deať W ser 7f7f7:e,
53 να μηνή ή "y fS FT Jť y el Cowar. itude 5 Will rā//y
o rose to its Dawn
VW of grow old.
1. Kar Limatiako

Page 9
Indian perestroika cour
K K Sharma
Th new minority Congress govern ment of MT, P W Nara simha Rao has taken just 34 days to make radical economic policy changes that have been overdue for several decades and
could transform the Country's industrial structure,
This un usual a la Crity in a
country long t18 ceỉ to lakādaisical плwe II18 I1t Гашп its stiIllulus i Ti the need for immediate and urgent IMF assistance so that the country could avoid the stigma of being branded a defaulter on its huge foreign debt.
Whlüte wer the Teason for the brisk speed, India's pcrestroika has transformed the country I Tilich i 1 t ble III al Inter i 1 which the Soviet Union has sought to introduce a market economy.
The difference is that, unlike the Soviet Union, India already has a thriving private sector and does not Iced to fumble with novelties. Dr. Manhmohan Singh thic minister for finance, said
he did not fear III dia w lili 105ę OLIt III i LS Seach for funds from ab TCDa di alt a time which it is in competition with the Soviet Union, eastern Europe and the Middle East for foreign investile It,
Dr. Singh believes that, with its 870m population, India prowides a hillige, ready-Tade: T1 LTket and has the necessary skills to 15 e the i Ilvest Ille It bec: LI 5 C it has the third largest techniCal manpower in the world. What was needed was the right policies to attract investment, both by Indians and foreigners Til thics: halwe been i Titija Lel, In discussions with the Japanesc, hic rew called, they hawe said that Japan alone would provide S2bin (Él. Ibn) a year give In the right policies.
This is a Ticas Lu Te cof what he expects from the world now that market forces have been given freedom toe operäte and industry and tradic hawe beeD freed from th ciT b'LIreal1cT:ı tic sLuEack1e s.
Dr Singh says the Incasures taken to bring about structural
reforms in the part of "a coil El Cohesivc Strati thought-ոլIt ac Will takic the col of growth and appalling pove lop II ent rather The Incas Lu Te la SE III th 5 til per cen L de valut In all wallu: if til bled the governi. C0Il tro 15 0Il : export subsides 30bn (£698 m) a These were by :: Illew indu
swept aside lations on inve and foreign, that has red deficit fra 11 8 grOSS domestic IMF's requiren cent through bi abolition of su Th1 E. I this Liciwr ges a Te in Lille. El policy and ha' Welcomed Hilt F mily industria t()ʻ Fi SB1:] tered T competition, w. Operatic Il Of Il häTm thern.
鬥點 is bi and is pa Tt and 'painful" p Inoj W chio 5 en foro pressure from b1131.551 e Wi
estis, ho Wewer, Sion from the was the Til Lichcliallst that woil teci clas Lurc (If II Officials say, C:| C5 LII:S Will bi the ne w regim the III i Illis; ter | csid cribe th Teate Ted Lune icus ly, the m iyol ved il the formulation of
Foreign com of con urse Tu sh ply because thc

THE REGION
"tesy of the IMF
ecolony are a prehensive vision egy and a welltion plan' that Intry on the path thus tackle its ty through devethan hiацd-аџts. s til kell in the ited with the 2C) iOI of the extere Tu pee and etialiet to dis Illai Lle Lr: de ald sledi Worth Rupees W Ꭶ2ᏋiI .
Follo Weid strial policy that throttling regustment, internal and a budget Liced the fiscal .4 percent of the product to the ment of 6.5 per Old Thea Silures like bsidies. Öl Li tionary chain... rea of industrial we been widely 1 ough there a Te lists, long used Ilarket free TT I h{!} fe :) It is that the larket forces will
billi trid to be do Inc: of the FF di Tic.Lt""" aith that 11 dia has itself. Bowing to politicians and tlı Westel ilı LeTil strik ing Comisindustrial policy criticised exit.' Ild h:live perimit= profitable units. however, that e Lilla voidable il e, ewe Ti though for labor fears Test because of Imployment. Curinister was it discussio[15 011 the policy. panies will not into. Il dial si Il:y a Ie now allo
Wed a 51 per cc nt sharc in joint ""t:Il Lլ TL:3:
Indeed, the previous limit of 40 per cent was a de tcrrent Conly to scomic sin cc experience has shown that control of a company is possible with a SITaller per Centage of equity.
However, there are sna ny coIInpanies which Want total ownership before investing in India. But majority control is certainly am attractio II. More iTıp Ortalıt, foreign cUIllpa mies will now not need the scores of govern Ilent approvals that bred corruption and prolonged delays as proposals were held up for years by a bewildering array of com. It littees and officials.
These have not been totally abolished twell low bul autoIlhatic approval' for investment proposals in a list of 34 arcas of high technology Will require, for the most part, discussions only with their Indian partners, For investinents generating exports, the path will be even easier. Much Thore i III portant for Indial busi Illess Ille 1 is ticir Tclease from having to obtain industrial licences and thic abolition of cCIltr Gls CII.1 8. C-called 'large Inonopoly houses in a III a II) er so sweeping that it Illas
Ina de wirtually redunda ılıt the controversial Monopolies and Reg tri: tiWe- Trade Practices (MRTP) Act, or at least the
Elated clases in it that curbed in West II lents by those II1 ost capable of Illa king the Hill.
An era of deregulation his truly been initiated, even though this leaves many sheltered industrialists somewhat apprehensive of the operation of competition.
The government has now reserved for itsclif only 18 industrial groups, mainly of strategic illportance and mining" and Indian bil I5 i les 511e Lil Will 17 w Ille edi licenses (only for such scct Cors as Cars, coal, petroleuIn Eind 15 Others.
The policy on the public secto IT I e Illais al II bivalle It. A Teås
(Carfied сул де 1)

Page 10
AWWADAMA
Indo-US Relations in A
Chintamani Mahapatra
hile the post-Gulf War World is scine what differ. ent from the post-Cold War world, ups and downs in the US-USSR relations in the backdrop of fundatiental structural changes in the international system will be the key factor in World politics and international relations in the future. By no stretch of the imagination can one conclude that US-Iraq relations will have far-reaching implications over international politics, And at the same time, no one can exclude the important Tolc that the Sowiet Union will continue to play in shaping the Tapidly changing world politico-security and economic environment, not withstanding the current spell of turmoil the Country is undergoing.
Since the entire gamut of post-World War II Telations H. mong Tlations got directly or indirectly affected by the nature and intensity of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, leaders and scholars of many nations in today's post-Cold WaT environment hawe begun to deliberate con El India discuss the possible course of their relationship with the two superpowers in the coming times. Indo-US relations since India's independence have faced many ups and downs, Washington's India policy in the early years of the post-War period was targetted at preventing Cornin II list influence of any kind, especially Closer Telations belween India and the Sowiet Union. Although India has all allong maintained its democratic tradition and has even permitte di Communist Parties to participate in the democratic political process of thic country, close relations between India and the Sowiet Union hawe been a political rcality, particularly since the early 1970s.
8
As the US Were apparently growing Indo-Sc Over the years the India rule CÜn çerned abolu towards Pakist However, a Il cint i 1 II di-l taken place, the World began changes in the elwir o 1 i 11 cilt in of the 1980s. last long? Wh Illtu Tc of Indoring the last present century make a proper possible futuTe New Delhi-Was ship, one perha With a brief ja բast.
Journey into
India is an bL1 a new sta Statics of Aill civilisation, but The interaction
old and Ille w ill intellectual : level predates t independent. In the relationship oli and Ilew si Origin. As I de: l'Illised der Stil tills in the WT| Wir States emerged War as the Il a til in the w will be diverge ign policies an a newly in de pe tially powerful of El Illatured st acquired super pl Son cler. The ceptions of Ind Cans that hild only exacerbatec

THE REGION
A Changing World
policy makers disturbed at the o viet co Copcration in vario Lis field5, rs were clearly t the US policy 3ını – l ıd CEı il:ı. ı arkedi improveJS relations has especially since to witness rapid politico-sccurity the latter half I5 it going to at mily be the USS Tcl tills. Ldecade of thic In order to analysis of the Collirse of the hington relationp5 ought to start LI T1 Ery in to the
:he past
old civilisation, Lic. The United Eric A is al Ille w an old state. betweet In the5c civilisations at ind philosophical he birth of an di 1 statc. But between these ltg:5; 15. Cf Tecelt dia chieved a lo cratic republic after 11th of II, the United from the sa me List powerful Orld. That there nce in the fored perceptions of ndent but potenStilte f'Toll that Il te with a newly i) WIT SLLLLIE "EL 5 Tutual misperlia ihs , and Ameriexisted before i this divergence.
World War II wis still when the strategic thinkers in the United Statics began to c:11culate How best to ensure the post-War security interests in various parts of the world. Considerably confident of ultimate Wictory in thic War and aware of a vital liced of access to strategically located overseas bases for furtheralce of US security interests, the strategic planners had begun their study in the midst of the war. While m:lipping out the fu turc strategy, these plan incrs had visualised the emergence of a "militant Asia, or an Asiatic-European coalition' that might hamper :American interest 5 in the Pacific region.
l
At this time, upper most in the Ilinds of the Indian leaders was the massive task of nation building, on the one hand, and the issues of colonialism and imperialism, on the other. Jawa halırlal Nehru was clear in his mind that unless colonialism and imperialism ended and the newly independent countries stood on their own feet, no real progress in any ficlid would be possible. In the first evet Asian political conference of thc post-War period, known as the Asian Relations ConfeTence, Pa. In dit Nehru declar cd: '''For too long have we of Asia been petitioners in Western courts and chancellories. That story must now belong to the past. We propose to stand on Our own legs and to cooperate with all others who are prepared to cooperate with us. We do not intend to be play things of others." After about two years, Nehru convened another conference of Asian countries to discuss the Dutch military action against the Indonesian nationalists. During this confeTence, partly as a reaction to the "*.cooperative impulses” ap

Page 11
pearing in other parts of the World and partly with a view to Illinimising external influenCes, the IIndia. Il Pri IIle Minister floated a suggestion for the setting up of a machinery for Asian regional cooperation.
Pa in dit Nich. Tu was, of course, Eli Wa Te that the “cooperative impulses' in other parts of the World, especially in Western Europe, were inspired and aided by the United States - a party to the Cill War. While the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was largely an America in circa Lion, Washington played no little Tole in the ècnomic integration il Cowellent in Western Europe. The wellknow I Marshall Pla T 1 EL1 Iched by the Trunal Administration was, after all, a Hassive ecoInollic progra III. me: Himeci a E, tlmöng Qther things, maintaining Western Europe's financial, fiscal and political stability, AS fair als Asia was concerned, the United States was not prepared to assu Inc responsibility for the region's economic wellfare and development. There Wis 10 Marshall PELI for Asil. Washington, in fact, må de efforts to discourage such a policy for the AsiH. In continent ind used thic Ellic Comission for Asia and Far Filst (ECAFE) as a forum in which til instruct the Asian Ingmber5 of that organisation as to the necessity of their lica Tning themSclweS ...”"
It is debatable whether Nehru Woll lid hawe wcic Ted El Ma Tshall Plan-type aid programme for this regio II had there been slIch l programme. On the other hand, he was opposed to Illilitary blic for Islations, such as the NATO. Nonetheless, an Indian proposal for the establish ment of an Asian Cooperative Forum, surfacing at a time OF col Solidition Of Soviet pJwer in Eastern Europe and the imminent success of the COR 111 LiD i 5t fOTCes in the Chinese civil War, perhaps created concern in Washington. The two conferences sponsored by India appeared as pan-Asiatic tendencies to the Western eyes.
These events 5 ther in the ap) Washington ab TEEnEE OF HטוITט * 'Imlilitant Asi
Լ. II fl:ETI1 HT քիչ:Լ | that Asian (an lationalis T1 wa getted against . pel ni allies wh in the ensuing inst the Soy åll i CS was dici As i Tesluit, til hillil Nehru i see led to be pan-Asil Illis I til create strails i tiCL Telaltituls.
Will thic in the Cld War 1955 a di Illii licy of followi II path iiIn interni Ild-LUS Telitic setbacks, New shington did ni: Oil a variety is Slies, such a Peace Treaty, Chim El a Lld i Lisi the Jit Nät War, the IndoTegional EL 1 li al Inc. South-Est Asii
sation (SEATC Treaty Organis
While there
of minds on pt. Tity issues bety; El 1 d. Al cricii El || i11teraction bel countrics, along Tal Co Inc, conti tille Cold War
e CJ10 II hic assis Was neither gui Il ti yeS IT W; hig lly fall y Chu Talb America Il obse COn Lai. Il cIt 51 fact, a major
to II 13- US co. ecolonic field economic assis Other words, ili to achieve cer Curity goals. II George C. M. Secretary of Easter II and A.
**Were Sicut וז נונITנITל)tht: C

rengthened fur1rehensions iI ut the possible 1 unfriendly and ' The added ut of the faic d later African) primarily tarA Derical’s ELITse cooperation Cold War agaUnion and its :11ed essential. c role of Jawathic events that harbingers of was bound to In Indo-US poli
tensification of in the 1950s and 's persistent po.- g a non-aligned tional relations, ns suffered many Delhi and Wait see eye to eye (of inter Iha tional s the Japanese
recognition of
membership in ions, the Korean Clinil War, and :c systems like Il Treaty Organi)) and central ation (CENTO).
was по пneeting litical and seculWeen the Indial. Il eaders, econo Illic Ween the two with the cultunued throughout period. The US tance to India ided by altruistic 1s it granted Ó11 eters to India.
ssion with the trategy Was, in factor that led
operation in the
The Allerican tance policy, in ld been designed tain politico-Se
the Words of cghee, Assista Ilt State for Near
frica in Affairs:
Asia to pass to ist orbit, either
by subversion or conquest, there would then be in the Soviet orbit some 1,300,000,000 and We would be reduced to some 900,000,000. I just point this out to show. . . the sheer mass of people in this area, . . and I gave that background (to show) the importance we attach to the continucci orieltation of these peoplc toward thic frce World.
"There are, in addition, in this area, great mineral and ollier Taw IIläterial Tesources . . . We do, for example, obtain some 36 per cent of our total Inanganese requirements . . . Eind Wic: obtain some 87 per cent of cour mica in s t TaLegic grades from India.'
Such was the thinking of Annerican policy makers, especially after the CIIIllunist Victory in the Chinese civil War. They Would not just ignore India, the large Tesource-rich landmass With a massive population in the South Asian subcontinent which "dominates the vital comIn munication lines between Europe and the Far East.” A proWestern political orientation, if Ilot an anti-Communist One, OT the people of this region was considered essentil. Certain al T10 LITt Of eco 10 Illic äid to India, as to many other colintries, was granted to instill El pro-Western orientation at best and to prevent a pro-Soviet leaning in the least, of the government, as also of the people at large.
Regional factor
The most significant regional factor that was largely responsible for shaping the Indo-Annerican mutual perceptions in the post-War period Was, however, the ups and downs of US-Pak security cooperation. At a tine when the rising Cold War tensions and the growing Non-Aligned Movement stood as major obstacles in the developinent of a mutually beneficial trust bet. Ween New Delhi and Washington, Pakistan was only too willing to align itself with the United States. The
9

Page 12
Pakistani ruling elites, otherwise unable to maintain a political identity of their country, had begunto perceive al most a perpetual threat emanating from New Delhi and Scemed preparted to bear any political cost to strengthen Pakistan vis-a-vis India. While Washington viewed its security cooperation with Islamabad in Cold War terms, the latter, in spitic of its membership in SEATO and CENTO, sought to give thic impression that India, not the Soviet Union, was its principal enemy.
THC United States-Pakista In strategic relations have had a di rcct impact over the years on LLLLLS S SLLLLLS LLLL S GatS LLL HHHHHLLLLLLL S LLLLSS latios. New Delhi reaied un convinced of Washington's assurances that the US Security cooperation with Pakistan Was not targetted against India. However, during both the Illajor wars fought between the two countries, Pakistal used all the weapons supplied to it by the United States. The US governIn ent did nothing to prevent the use of such Weapons by Pakistan not with standing the assurance given earlier. The US government was aware of Pakistan"S intention 5. AS Cheester Bowles, the former US Ambassador to India, put it:
"If the Pakis Lan Army were actually designed to become part of a US sponsored defence syste Ili tu discourage a
Soviet or Chinese military Imovement through the Himally ELS CT the Hindul KL1 sh
| 10 u Itali D15, it WČ Ill be 5ecking equipment appropriate for fighting in the mountain a reas. However, the equipment we supplied Pakist – tanks, motorised artillery and the like - WFS sluit ble foT LISe only on a relatively flat terrElin, in Other words, on the plains of north India. Morcover, from the outset, the Pakistan government had itself Imåde Cleat that it had no quarrel with cither the USSR or China and privately admitted that its military buildup was, in fact, directed against India.
LO
"TO bala Ilce strength of th idi. Air Fər: equipping Wi F-104 fighter til talik5, the 1 Tito their exchange rese tLl rion tal nk51 planes from Mystere fight the French. India's purcha Teflected it5 ii r the United that under in would we per 11eInt given ti used against
However, the tok cxtremely during the Ind and did not ex Pakistan's War cxtent expected ce partner. As a hCE Wợecil the Ull India. It c sulf t:() T'Linued thr:1 downs. During the seventics, til: relations and a of ect nomic il On between the but divergence of political and persisted, and got accentuated, viet rift, howev ring this period of rapprocheime
The Nixon was cultivati Ilg objective of u. ELS E CILI L-ITWEI Jilid. Pakista acted as the go process leading са п dete 11te, y: ti IIle, a dTliniste pressive policies East Pakistan. East Pakistan affected India mate was hangi Asia. The em ciri tile security the region indu the Sth wiըԼ Ա 111t: a stronger relat With the Situati viewed with India's closer

the increasing he Pakistan Army which we were it El F-865 and planes and PatIndians dipped limited foreign rves to buy Cenind Hunter fighter tle British and er planes from The fact that Ses Were limited Cað till Lled tT LISt | States' pledge i) CiTC li mistaLiTiCeS "mit the tզuiբPakista 1 to be lia.
United States cautious steps -Pakistal Wars tcΠl SιμP Port το efforts to the from an allil Ilresult, relatio 15 itcd States and fered : " Tifi : Tı d 1յքh ups and tle decilde of le 5 ocio-cultural modest degree litectil WC:t two countries, of perceptions
security issues now and the
The Sino-So
er, Wide ned duwith no signs It.
All Ti Tistrati CT China with the sing the latter ght to the Soviet n, Which had between in the to Sino-AIll & Tils, during this ring highly rein the erst While The crisis in had adversely L Tid a wa IT cliing over South gence of a hosוt IוIטוון חטת m W1 = cc.d India and in to establish :ionship to deal on. Washington great suspicion relations with
the Sowjet UiO 1. Bu for Tiller
US President, collented in his book, Victory Without War:
Richard Nixon,
has 1999. """Thält a
democratic nation such as India
can have a forcign policy is
geopolitical paradoxes
pro-Сопmmuпist טf Lhל) - שנזר)
If this
century. It is the only major
non-Conil Immu mist Has Illot COIdem Dn
country that ed the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan and is one of the few lations to hawe
full diplomatic Kabul.'
Incidentally,
חס לNi
relations with
hi IIlself
was at the helin of affairs when
the US government
began the
efforts to open up the line of
communication W
it h (ChiTna. The
evolution of Sino-American re
lations since then
to the World. And
15. Ino 5ecret by 1988, when
Nixon's book was published, the
United States had becoille
thic
second largest trade-partner of
Communist China and its
p Ti
wate investment in that country
constituted the
the foreign
countries.
largest timծոց
Signifi
cantly enough, by the year la 88, US-USSR relations had achieved a breakthrough reflected in the
cyclusio II of the
ment on Afghanistan and
INF Treaty, One
ther such US policies
Geneva Agreethe wilders. Wh:- slic Lild
not be terred the "geopolitical paradox of this century.'
(Next-Recent Trends)
Indian perestroika.
("Carir fritër fra FFF präge 7"
Sulch als esse I til
il fra strictul Te
exploration for Oil and minerals
:ını d cildlı 5 tries
lCong-term die w ClO pAlle it
economy and sector in WestLment
**C. Licial to the of the where private
is iHadequate'''
still rei main in the public do III
aliin.
PTiwiti 5 til
of
the many
unprofitable public enterprises has not been explicitly accepted partly for political reasons and the commitment of the Congress
party to Nehru's public sector sho
'commanding heights' of
dustry.
But many expe industrial policy
the import Eince of
policy that the Luld be Elit the in
ct that the new will diminish
this dogma.

Page 13
The Storm Signals fro
Asghar Ali Engineer
HE Ayodhya dispute has claimed a heavy toll. Was this conflict worth it? The reply obviously would be in the negative Apart from the fatalities and hardships for In any in other ways, it also greatly daImaged our political processes. The Secular cons: Insus of Olur post-lindepence era was seriously damaged. The BJP used this issue to make a serious bid for power at the Centre and it did Hot sucticed,
Let us remember that for a In ulti-religious society like ours democracy and secularism are sie qua Parr, The Nehruvian model of secularism was and is still relevant for our polity. It does not make much sense to say that it has lost its vitality, much less its relevance. It had created a secular consensus and served us well all these years. It cannot be thrown out today saying it was only pro Illotion of pseudo-secularism all these years. The Prime Minister, Mr. Narasimha Rao, was right when he said on assuming the of Ficc of Pri II e Minis LcIship that the alternative to the Nchiruvian model is fascism.
We did witness traces of fascism in the la 15t fel 'W' y teiars, specially since Mr. Adwani's "rath yatra' and the WHP's high Voltage campaign for construction of the Ramjanma boohımi temple at Ayodhya. No one could imagine just a few years ago that a large army of sadhus and trishuls would be used for election ca III paign i In India. Mr. Gulzari Lal Nanda, when he was Home Minister in the late sixties, had tried to use sadhus for anticorruption cal Impaign, Even though the issue was corruption, the measure was strongly criticised and it had to be given up.
Religion for political ends
It W; LI If Titlula te that the BJP and the WHP Welt to i slich an extent in making use of
The writer is Director. Institute ஆ" Issarise offes, Infrf,
religion foT pt. is oftcIl said a Hinduism is in religion and i: to being used als 15 läII). Ho depends on the Cannot be i 11 mu in Sulch II attei not Illi Illithic is projected, b pending on t unite for politi BJP sought to di to for its ow e5t5. The BLd achieve the 5: Lanka. Thuis e ble Scc1 in th {
When religio to be achieved for political rat
CSOS
The history of such instalin( sought to unite to Eichieve: Pa gious leaders t th1eiT fi ||() W","er"ğ; religious ends, interests. But attellipt was Telj girl 15 Cor. Se his led to coil shed. The con CD1 TTjpilled t ) Limity leads to TniSm, dog IL1a tisI It is ofte 1 u Lil lect Lull lealth Change and EL CCC milia datin of mind.
It is highl: seek political siis of religio unhealthy even Society and Iml a multi-religi. Els III dial, Med titutions and : a soothing ba1I wers, but hard complex proble society. What i leaders and pri prepared for : these ideas a yet these ideas

REG OM
m Ayodhya
litical ends. It ld rightly so that ot an organised 5 Licht a Illen ble in politics such „wicwer, everythi Ing context. There table propositions 5. Ils llar il to 30 is in the sense it ut Muslims, dehe context, ca. In ici 1 ac Lið 1. The that with Hindus in political inter| dhists sought to Linnc end i Sri verything has to 2 proper context. ls unity is sought it is. Il Te Ciftcil her than religious
if Islim is full les. Jinnah also : : 11 L'he ML151i(118 kistan. The Tellscick to Lllite ; T1[]t t[], SETWP: ון "יום t the jrנוט yhe ICW ICT 5 LI ch1 ZA I Inade either by CLI ll T le Elders, it flict and bloodpeting interests this. Such a greater sectariaIn and finiticism. lealthy for intel
of the society. progress Tequire and openness
| dan gerous to unity on the ba1. It would be
in a umTcligio Llis ו1T נre StטווIch T
us society 5uch iewäl ideas, inssymbols can be
Il for tibicit folloly a solution for ims of a modern s WCTSC, religio LIS i est 5 i Te Illot even I rethinking on ld symbols. And
and symbols are
being projected as essential for national unity, They, con the contra Ty, Will bring about greater division il the society.
The Muslims sought to use the Shah Bano case for forging unity among themselves and failed. The progressive and the conservative among them were polarised though the progressivcs Were olItnumbercd. The unity among thic conscrwiltives too was illusory. There were competing interests among them too. Moreover, Pakistan has not succeeded since its inception in sorging unity in the name of Islam, The Pakista ni Society is deeply divided on ethnic as well as sectarian lines apart from political polarisation. It is so when Islam is thought to be more an enable to unity.
How Can then Ramjan mabhoomi bring about 'national unity"; it cannot bring about even Hindu unity. And yet, the BJP leadership repeatedly claiI Ined that Ramjanmabhoomi is a symbol of national unity. It would not have served this purpose cwen if India had been purely a Hindu country. India's diversity is not only due to the presence of non-Hindus, Diversity exists within the Hindu society itself and a rich diversity at that. Again, it is not Only due to castes, but it is also regional, cultural and linguistic in nature.
It is only unity in diversity which is a Walid political as well als social doctrine for India. This doctrine clearly implies that each religious, cultural and linguistic community should be ensured full autonomy and scope for its full flowering. It is this approach which would ultimately en sure true democratic unity, a unity not imposed from above, but one which grows from the hearts and the minds of the people. India is Ilot a natio II in Classical W:S- teron scn5e: it is Ileither L1 Inilingual nor unireligious no T unicultural. It is on the contrary,
11

Page 14
an 'agglomeration of nations." Still the people of India voluntarily decided to come together and formed a nation.
The unity of our country, therefore, very much depends on a secullar conscnsus. Nothi Ing should be a lowed to disturb this consensus. It has been achieved after great sacrifices a Ind steadfastness of our natioill leaders. We resisted the temptation to become a Hindu nation even in the face of the grim challenge, from the two nation theory of jinnah. Let us not give in to that temptation now after more than forty years of process of nation-building,
No shifting or Masjid
I AIT) saying all this as the Ayodhya dispute is still a grim challenge for us and for our national unity. Let us not labour under the illusion that now that the BJP has colle to power in U. P. it would try to defuse the issue and thus behave more sensibly. Even if it Wants to, it would not succeed in the prevailing climate of its own creation. The WHP would not let it do that. It is true that Mr. Kalyan Singh, on becoming the Chief Minister of U.P., said that he would try to resolve the Ayodhya is suc through dialogue with the Muslims. However, no such dialogue is possible as long as the
BP ll
the WHP insist on 'respectfully shifting" the Babri Masjid. The Muslim leaders
are not prepared to accept shifting of the mosque. The dispute would have otherwise been solved long before. Mr.Kalyan Singh's stand is nothing new. The BJP and the WHP leaders have been talking for long about 'respectfully shifting" the mosՎաc.
The WHP leaders are not even sincere about shifting of the mosque, Their leaders are On record on having said that 'what is there in the mosque now "to shift except the plaque inscribed by Mir Baqi.' According to these leaders the Babri
12
Masjid has alre Werted il to a te Lala is being w since 1948. To
seen that the W Illot talke their
to shift the Ill.) The Muslii this proposal f beginning aud l Ճnce again. An Singh has not II proposal. So wh tion of any dia
The Musli IIns
take kindly to the enti Te BIJI gone to Ayodhy ring in and res Ra Tijan ImabhoIII bc coIls LILICLed " Imos que stands. BJP's compulsio its Wote Is that about constructi di T is Lundersta yan Singh shou more tactfully. Muslims into
rigid stand as i [[1:lt Lhe B.JP y its GCW triment doze the mosq could hardly
ke Lee BJP { offer of dialog
Thus, the Ba tio Ll Com Dimitte| warning to the Government th; te d Ayodhya shli and any attem] damage or de Masjid and co! in its place it sed and resiste This, it said, tional and int. cussions. T Minister, Mr. II1311, Welt 3 warned that eve ment Hitוזrט"ויט G ** if it Temäir passive over thi ture of the E it to would responsible for which would f
The Centre cated that it its promise Ina

ady been con: Imple since Rail "orshipped there u 5 it would te HP leaders do
own proposal isque serici usly. eaders rejected ronin the very have rejected it d Mr. Kalyan looted any other iere is the queslogue?
als o did not the fact that P. Cibiet lill
'a after the swea| ved that the 1 i temple will Where tille Bab Ti Though the |18 tt, tt, I wilit:t: it is serio L15 OLI of Ram Mändable, Mr. Kalld have behaved It provoked taking a Timore t colwiced the III yoluld I'ı oy Lise all power to bulli.e. and thus they be expected to hief Milite's le seriously.
biri Masjid Acie his issued a : Kalyan Singh at ** if the disputine was acquired pt was made to stroy the Babri nstruct a temple would be oppo.Eטין ולf 11 נןth fן "יו H. W {}lLuldl h:1"We I1 a:rmation li li reperle former S.JP Shafiq-ul-Richastep further and : In the Congress (1) the (C:1tTCL13 t hed si l cint ald * Ayodhya adven3.JP Government, e held squarely the bloodshed" "", "ויו 110 נן
als already indiintends to keep ide in its пап
festo that it would introduce i Bill til Ilain Lain the FfIII's go of all religious shrines and places of worship as they existed on August 15, 1947, except, of course, in the case of Babri Masjid as the dispute i 5 i F1 tille CollTt. Ewell if the BJP accepts this - though it is It al I tilt certai — ble WHIP would certain 1y not a nd the BJP may not be in a position to ignore the WHP's stand.
It calı a5şlı filmle': 'very - Seri 115 proportions again if all of us do It TL1A1, ke al II 101 est attempt to resolve it. While it is highly necessary to respect the religiCius setlisibilities of both the Hindus and the Muslims, WC should see to it that it is not
blatantly politici sed by both the sides once again.
No peaceful solution to this
tangled problem can be found ut the BJP all tille, WHIP, On thc One haud, and, the Babri Masjid Action Committee, On thic o Liller, CC- 1 tim lle it.) I 110 110 - polise the issue. Their positions are too rigid to yield any meaningful solution. We can break the ice only if eImiment personalities - both religious as well as secular - who hawe 50 får bcc i u lil volved, step in and consider Various alternatives with an open mind.
There are powerful wested interests On Hoth sides, Money and power are also involved. A section of the print media is also controlled by Wested interests. The intelligentsia in both the communities is ills0 strongly opinionated. The challenge is really great But as historian Toynbee said the greater the challenge, the greater should be our resolve and creative lowers to meet it. It is a real challenge before the people of India. Their unity
and sur wiwal depend con a peaceful resolution of this problem. And peaceful resolu
tion should not be so far removed only we realise that no templic or Imos que is more sacred than human life. If it is, there is something wrong with ou I religion.

Page 15
POLLS '88, '89 and 9
Dayalal Abeysekera
f the 1988 presidential poll
was un precedented in thic annals (of Sri Lankal. In election history because of the funcast vote (sec, Madanayake in LG, 1st Janilary, 1989), democracy could, perhaps, enjoy a sigh of relief after witnessing the voter turnout at the local government polls held on 11th May. From the depressing levels of slightly over 50 percent of the registered Water 5 càsting their vote in '88, the local government polls soared to 72.9 percent for the 17 districts in which the elections werc held. This was well Within the range of normalcy for Sri Lankan voters who have turned up between 70 and 86 percent during the past 35 years at major elections.
This brief paper will attempt tit) present the compara tiwe electoral performance of the
Dr. a "glas Alleysekera Iy Asst.
Résidorf Ropre forfa rive of FORUT. ffl:Huffg
United National Sri La Ilka Free ing the three el 1988, 1989 and
of Sri Lanka, I the T1 EIld Ea To T Lund Off t a third residu
other parties' in the paper. raphic unit of
clections was
the '91 poil wa ment area speci C3ını paris Con of
In Cessitated the differcnt geograp Obwicusly was t
Before delving tical data, it re Illind o ne'5 5 ground of the [[]Illčots, S. } (18 the limitiitics bility of the di dential pol || straight fight bet a Ild SLMP Wit
TABI
Percentage distribution of votes re Parties” and percent voting duri
UN P 78.
ElectOTE District 1) SE S9 ஒழ்
A. In Liradha p Lira 42." 55. 55.0 PIETEILWEL 55.5 2. 53.5 Monaragaia 5.2 5고, , 모 Baill (), 59. 3. Rial tip Lura 5. 5.9 48.8 Kitցall: 57.1 (1.1 구 Капdy 54.9 517 5T.4 KLITLullegallı 5 Ι. 1, 53.5 5.: Malti l- 57.9 53.8 57.9 Nuwalira, Eliya 2. 53.3 60.1 PLL fail II 55.9. É 2.65; 54,0; Gamրaha 4.교 54.1 50.4 Colomb. 49.3 5. .47-ל Kill LIET 5. 49. 4. GEIIE 4. 5), 4. Malta Tal 42.9 55.1 52,4 Hi! I'llէlaritւյta 49.7 55.9 43.4
Sri Lanka 511, 1 5E.3 5:: (Mins. North-East)
CULLE ” iii
4.
SLFP :
R 8 ]
1 .
33.3 4.
5.4 37.4 효.
3. 32.8 교『.2
41.3 8. D. | . 鬣.马 9,7 3.2
{l}, ) 4. 39.5
.
3.4 3
莺节.卓
45.7
O.
.5 4É է (), 35.9 고. 8.8 45.1 4.5 5.
. 4T.4 45.
교.
9 35. 37.8 : 27.4 : 2.4 효. 4. . ().1 33.1 4. d. 1 .
5.

party and the dom party durectoral polls of 1991 in respect im iT1 LI 5 the . NurStern provinces, lhe performance, a category of is also included While the geogthe '88 li lil '8) the electorate, is local gover Inific. Thus, the the three polls selection of a hic cntity, which El district.
g into the statis. is important to :lf of the back1988 and 1989 to be warc of of the compara1 ta. The presiif '88 was a ween UNP, SLFP hout an explicit
LE —1
clcctoral arrangement between the parties. However, the left of centre parties (i.e., LSSP, CP, MEP and NSSP) backed the SLFP candidate implicitly by not putting forward a candidate of their owl. This backing wassi Ilot found in the par lillIn entary Election of 1989 with Imost of the pa Titics g) ing their own Way, except for the coalition Of USA. Het Weel SLMP, LSSP, CP and NSSP. The 1991 Local Govern Illicit poll saw a further break-up of the USA and the constituent partial no-contest pact between the SLFP 31 d. So, Illic of the Lict of centre parties like the MEP, LSSP and CP but this did not hold consistently throughout the
17 districts. The UNP field cd candidates I almost all of the 237 constituencies except 3, 2
of which they deferred to the CWC in Null wara Eliya IDistrict while an independent group fully supported by the UNP were in Akuressa Pradeshiya Sabba.
2ceived by UNP, SLFP and other ng 1988, 1989 and 1991 Elections.
“Other Parties' "g 38. Woting
* change MI|intl५ in regd.
SLFF" T'TE ali, 1988 1989 1991 – cəzali, 1988 | II 1 ES-89
9. IԱյ1
1.5 2 7.5 5. 3.5 A. 53.5 75.) S.
2.1 4.4 F. 31. ፲፰ዟ...7 도. 7, 8.5 9.5 F, G 3, 1.3 , 5. 2. 75.7 10.8 卫.5,5.6 昏.0 5. 4. 755 78.7 |-||||||||||||-||||| 7.8 5. E. 3.4 5. 78. 77.8 1). 고, 2.4 c. 5, 13.1 57.7 f.A. 734 7.3 55.8 1,6 f., 4 7,5 .8 S. 55. 『. E.
7.8 p. 5. O. J. 50.0 『효.) 74.7 .g 고, 5 1, 3.4 14.7 . 호9. 7.3 77.5 9. 鸵_{M 2.1 9.5 15. 雷.9 SEO. 8.5 7.7 5.S. (), .8 5.2 1. 4," TL).5 73.9 7.) 『, 꼬
3, . . . 3. 『4.5 S 7 || . -. i. 4.6 고D.U 3U. 9. 7. 5. E.
3.7 9.고, 1.0) 11,7 3.9 9. 3.9 5.5 {},{ 2.고 7.9 13.5 11,1 4.9 3. 78 5. 45. 교. 8. 12." 2. 23.7 9. É8.T 프. ւ5, 1 2.g 4.4 5, 『.|| 59), 4.
O. 3. 8.5 1. 7.3 455 . לד
"Wii viii ix 寓 xi xii xiii iw
I3

Page 16
Thus, the percentage distribu
tions presented in Table 1 refer to these different alignments of the parties. The
Other Parties' of 1988 refer to the votes received by the SLMP; during 1989 it refers to the votes received by USA, MEP, SLMC, ELJP, EPLF and Independent candidates. In 1991, it refers to the totality of non-UNP, non-SLFP, non-CWC votes cxcluding also the indicpendent group of Akuressil. The most consistent throughout the thir ce elections is the pe Tformance of the UNP; the SLFP had the left parties Support almost totally (except SLMP) in 1988, lacked this supOITt : tÓtally in 1989 and regained some of it in 1991. As a consequi Crl CC of this, the SLFP's 1991 performance is provided in 2 columns, Column (vi) where only SLFP's votes are given and Colul III) (vii) which gives SLFP plus its no-contest pact partners' votes where there was a bona fide appearance of a nCcontest at the Local Go WCTIment area level. In similar Inanner, "Other Parties' performance during '91 is given in two columus; Colul TT1 ns (x) prowides all no-SLFP, ICIl-UNP parties" wote while Column (xi) provides all non – SLFP and non-UNP parties' votes minus the Imst{1 m CES Where "C}[ht:T PHT-" ties" or Independent Groups have appeared as the major contender a gainst the UNP candidate
(with no presence of a SLFP candidate).
Thc data hai, 5 also to be viewed with the backdrop of the Inih sisiwe fluctLia Licin in Wotcr tuTIOut which L. Lhe district lewel Tanged fro 11 as low a
level as 16.9 percent (Mona ragala "88) to 81.5 percent (Nu wara Eliya '89). The percentage distribution of the voti Ing population is provided in Columns (xii) through (xiv) and Column (x y) gives the per cent in CT casc in the registered voters. There were 7.7 percent more voters during '91 than at either '88 or '89. Thus, in perhaps the lost affected fairly well populated) District of Mata I.a, there were 86,633 voters casting their
14
ballot in 1989 there were 32 their way to th ап іпсгcase (though sparsely ra gala w:1 s D) affected with increase). With of two years, that the Witing Malta Til '89 WL3 parable to th: co Instituency i T
alone. In C.I. changed minin 137 E8 to casting their
пеге 12 регсеп
In spite a fluctuating con is . III1 cos t "Wisible of the two mil for II an ce duri I. is tille I e Illa Tk with which the relatively nonof Wotes. In UNP displays stable perfor II SLFP. At th (meani Ing the l ding the Nort of the country Tedi betwee 5 cent of the Luc. SLFP : and 4ó.1 perce At the district range for the percentage poi I plu Ta (42.7 Ws for the SLFP diffeTence WELS
Wotea Securi dur
. Wotes Secured
0.1 - 25.
25, 3 C,
I - ,
5.I - d. ()
40.1 - 43.U
45,1 - 50-ն
50.1 - 55,
55. f,
E.1 - 55.

while in 1991 1,133 who made t polling booths, of 271 percent populated, Monamore drastically а 397 регсепt in a short span one Inight sily constituency of all lost incomit of its 1991 sheer nu Tıbcrs tast, Rilt:Pur: nally from 350, 393,105 citizens wote in ’91, a it change.
f these widely stituccies, What at a first glance jor parties perg thic three polls able consistency ty have secured a -fuctuating level this regard, the a much more 1ã T1 cẽ thäm thế: c Illa till level 7 districts excluHi. Il tElle East ), the UNP secu). 1 El Id 56.3 pertillid vistes While | betwee I 35.0 It if till Wilts. level thic Widest UTINIP i Wys F1 I 4.3 lts in Anu Tadla. 56.4 percent): (party alon c) the 24.5 percentage
points in Colombo (21.6 vs. 46.1 percent). When the SLFP and its coalition partners are considered (Columns iv, v and wi), the difference reducts to 19.0 percentage points, visible both at Anura dhapura and Matara,
of the relative wote securig strength of the two parties, a clearer picture emerges in Table 2. The percent polled by each party within each of the districts du Ting the three polls is categorized by 5 percentage point cut-offs and presented in their frequency and percentage distributions, While the SLFP only' uses Columns (iv), (v) :ind (vi), SLFP -- Coalition uses Columns (iv), (v) and (vii) of Table 1 to de rive its dalta.
Table 2 clearly shows that da Ting the three elections under consideration, the UNIP consistently secured more than 40 percent of the cast valid votes at Lille district levc1 while the SLFP alone could do this only in less than half the poll-districts (23 out of the 51); SLFP with its coalition partners performed better by securing 28 out of 5 l poll-districts ab Ow C the 40 percent range. Similarly, SLFP with or With Out it S calition Cold Llot se curic. El Singl: poll-district above the 55 percent range while the UNP was able to secure 24 out of the 51 poll-districts (i.e., nearly one half) within this Tange.
If teTI15
TABLE
ing strength of Major Parties at District level ing the polls of ’88, ’89 and '91
Իվը: '.
5.9
19.
14 27.5
5.5
효|..
5. 10.
SLFP Only SLFP-- Coalition ħin. '. N.
3. -
1.8 5.
7 13.7 17.5
교5.5 11 21.5
3 25.5 [33.3 ד
1.7 S 1.7
3. 5. 5.
100.0 51 T1000

Page 17
IMWIDOCHII IWA REVISITED (3)
The Road to Vietnam
Rajiva Wijesingha
undy had a great time inLŠ. them over to join me laughing at their reactions and minic (the latter affected too by the awareness that, not having wanted to change any more precious dollars, I had money just for two dinners, but certainly not for three, and probably not even for the extra drinks the girls were expected to consule While giving us the pleasure of their company).
It was clearly a lucrative profession, for We found that one of the girls had in fact come all the Way from Wietnam to ply her trade here. Many tables had at least one of them sitting down, while what seemed dozens more bustled a Tound, both in the main hall, and stecring skilfully in between the tables on the balcony, where we sat overlooking the lake, What was equally noteworthy perhaps was that all the tables were fill, which had almost been the case too at the quieter restaurant On the Lake Where I had dined alone on my first night in the city. There was clearly a class of entrepreneurs
Imaking quick money, and keen
to consume it quickly too.
The Te We Tc of cours c other levels too. Earlier in the cyening Lundy had taken me to see som c fricnds of his. The father of the family was a retired school principal, who had done quite well in Pol Pot's time, Lundy told me and was now obviously making good money by other means, for the house was new though small, he had a very modern and quite sophisticated sound system, and he even offered Ine whisky. He spoke English adequately, and French even better. His children howcwcr, a whole range of them WCT e much le SS flucht in their English, and much more inhibited than Lundy about trying to practice it. Presumably they were more typical than he was - and suggested an area in which
assistance to night be in valu capacity to c the world at built up, and area in which India, if we Our base of E
15 Wi 1 5 be in a posit positive contr .lחטTC1E
But there ar. Inuch less com Inight hope, in CUTL1, III unicati. Il roved. Lundy Write to him t to put down h zed that his h number. Evide receive mail, there was Ilo o would try to Soon however, took down Iny himself. As ye has been no postcards home El Triwcl, Lld w delay, so the CEl In fLI I 1 ctia)I. I that I should Cver receiving Lundy,
The Inext in I set off for ta TCe Walls Icsis til Iniles, and lupt border we Inc. With eyen the Mekong by ferr tha il a Inticipate lot well ho vycy been clear fro lady who sat CCITT1pārtment, full of notes American cigar dished out to bus som times ni to Stop, at ch Way.
Nemesis was We WeTc CiTT" idea. The flo Was laidcn with

Ehle new - In El tion able. Clearly the ImIllumical te With
arge has to be his is perhaps al II We als Well Eis
wiftly build up glish facilitators
easily do, Will ill to make a ibution to the
: other areas to
licated Colles 01: which Ileans of need to be impWanted IIle t0 ut, as he began is name, he reali3 Lusc 5 till llad II ntly they did Illot perhaps because 15 til WTi Le HL L a nu IIlberטE he said, and hic address, to Write how cwt there Word. My own hawe long since ith no very great lost itself clearly suspect however give my hope of är address foT
韩 罩
orning at dawn Wietnam. The dis1 cm two hundred Ll Cambodiin ved fairly fast, crossing of the y taking less time d. That all was fert SH1 uild Hawe m the sinart young in the driver's With a big bag a Indi packets of "ettes, which sce the soldiers, the :ot - even1 botheri Ing cckpoints on the
at hand, What ying II ha Yc Il 0 or of the bus
packets of what
claimed to be some sort of ecctronic equipment but were heavy enough to be gold bars or something similar. Certainly the quantities of money being dished Out suggested that they were extremely walliable; and the Wietnamese soldiers turned out to be quite aware of the short of thing that was going on. Our stop on the Cambodian sidic of the border was long enough, but on the Other Side We had an even longer wait, while pro tracted negotiatios plaec took place and more wads of notes changed hands at intervals; and the process was repeated again at the custom5 house just be, yond. We spent over six hours altogether at the border, and it Was Inlight before we were illoWedi Lo lelwc,
Only about forty Imi les more remained to Ho Chi Minh City, but our hopes of completing the journey in a couple of hours proved abortive. There were more checkpoints, on either side of the villages on the way, and a few miles from the border we were stopped again, That negotiation took a couple of hours; and then, on the other side of the Same village, the process started again. That was the last straw, and the foreigners on the bus, four Americans, an English Incil, and myself, shifted to another bus, that stopped there, where we were welcomed with cans of Heineken.
That should hawe warn cd us. The first bus left, but the second now turned out to be as much an object of suspicion. Meanwhile thic cars and was that passed, sometimes barely stopping, clearly had no problem. Finally, in desp cration, I jumped off and asked the driver of a van that had stopped briefly whether I could have a ride to Ho Chi Minh. -n la mרm tנn טט מנDESpite hawing r gllage. We understood each other, the English Iman piled in as well, and off we went. It turned olut that in fact the Van Wa.5 only going to the suburbs of the city, but for a couple of dollars each we were taken right into the ectric of town. En route we pas scd the original
15

Page 18
bus, stuck at yet another checkpoint, with the passengers spread out on the road While
the si Ilart young lady argucci
her case.
HCI Chi Minh turned Out til
be very different from the
IIa Lloi that I ICIT CIThbered fT011 my 1984 visit. It was much more lively and more Inodern, more developed to 0: than Phnom Penh, with a very active and quite elegant co I ll Tercial arca in the centre. In theory one's In ovements were not quite äls free as in Phnom Penh for the hotel thought that I had to register with the police within a couple of days of arrival, but that turned cult to be unnecessary. Conversely, the only Testrictic I 115 The Litel itself thought fit to impose on guests by Teilns of a Ictice in all rico Comis see Illed to Ille quite TeaSCTH ble —
CLLGLLCCCLLLLLSLS S LK S LLHHLLS SLaaLHCtl S To Take II rostitute ir to Hotel – LLLLLS S LLLrtLLL S S LLLLLLLLS LLLLL SSLLtLYLlLLLS SG rador F. Please dari "Y CE777 go ra?(PFP) Irid in crease people valuri ta rily. In case of great Eurring fire, please do rio rei brir cral for Hards fhre Terce exit/ladder. As a tourist centre the city Was sun to explore, if not es
pecially ill Dressive. The IllSE LITTI Was interesting en Cough, but nothing like the extensive
Collection i wonders of Phn pagodas that W on the tourist tively new, b I1)Ilk Ea t i ) T1 E: direct 1 e ti: toric temples, cal II 11i c: L'11 sig, The Wii da ting back a lelium in Wh w cre just begir tio I, I Was ql See the for Iller bassy, from th helicopters had last fւյբitives triumphant Wiet city in 1975.
Fyen II10 Tc f tiwic of thalt II tunnels of CILI after a twenty I thic count Ty Sidi of a no lobike wis tween 10 IgE ld It Tid wilt I Wanted me for a ple: s: less hour lo city). The tu Wilst uII dergrou the Wiccing used to stime ca. In 34 LLEIII DIS villages from a Lledr, and fror had lau Elched
VASA
O
2O7, 2 C Colomb
Telephone :
15

Hanoi, or the om Penh. The cre highlighted guide were Telaut a friendly of the did couple of hisboth of the Ill iful and impoLh fondation5 couple of mil1cll ExclwätiOI15 1 ni Dng, In addilite thTilled LC) All Tjä ETL’l- e roof of which taken off the as the finally cong eintered the
orcefully evocaTirol Wyre the Chi Teach ed mille trip through : In the back (and the jouTTiey :r, for the Tider erstood at first and had taken 1nt but purposeng tour of the 11 e 15 TOT 11ed il di TetWCTk that had successfully vi TiL15 A Tierit: 511 te the which they operIn which to they secret attacks.
So low that they we Te prol foundly uncomfortable to crawthrough for even five minutes, they Illust have required both tremen dous agility as well as CUIT Ili Illent to have been used so effectively ower so long a period. More than anything else on this trip or the previous one, they conveyed the reality of the effort sø stål i nation had gone through to win its strugglę.
On the last morning before my flight to Hanoi I wcnt t00 to a couple of Hindu temples. There were four altogether in the city, indicative of the relatively large community of Indian traders who had scittled in Saigon. I met one of them, whose fallily had come over early in the century. He secned to be the custodian of the one temple that was still i II i ctive lise. There are moves now to restore a Inother, perhaps in the light of the revival of trading connections. Interestingly, the guide at Cu Chi told me that a delegation of Sri Laikan businessmen had visi Led the tunnels; but who they were, and how large the group was and what its origin, I COL11 di ICE di 5 Cove,
'Cyfrifir er af FIFe gag)
PTCANS
|ross Street,
O - 11.
4 2 1 6 З 1

Page 19
Militarization, violent s
Su manta Banerjee
mong p05 T-Colonial imde
pendent states in South Asial, Indial se els to hawc enilcrged as the classic example of a state trapped by a builtin contral diction. Thic contradiction is between its self-proclaimed ideological basis and the Cobjective reality of its actions which consistently violate
its professed ideology.
The contradictiction is built
in be cåluse its Tots al Te historical. The Indian state's of ficial spokespersons - as well
as official historians – Would have us believe that independe 1ce was bTo Lıght a bol It through a non-violent midwife called *Gandhism," which is the state's proclaimed ideology. Yet history records the most violent birth-th Tocs which lcctolpa Inied the foundation of the independent IndiHT State. The HinduMuslim communal riots that preceded the partition of a subcontinent and led to the birth of "India, that is Bharat", are a historical reality which 10 L only knocks off the Indian state's official and ideological claim to its supposedly nonviolent parentage, but also challenges the doctrine of nonviolence as propounded by Gandhi als a harbinger of change. In fact, towards the end of his life, Gandhi sought to distance hillself from the violent political midwifery which delivered the twins - one called India, the Other Pakistan - from a tortured willb. His isolation from the mainstream, tiged by the rea1iziation of thic falilul Te Cof his life-long dedication to the doctrine of non-violence at the end of his political career, is Welldocumented (cf. “Studies in Gandhism' by his one-tine Secreta ty, Ni mal Kumar Bose, Calcutta, 1962). But that is another story
Piper Frefered af Ferrar or "Surf Asia" argarri fed by P. R. W. O. Garri field
| ,
Willit Illes, t. is that the IП Stil te which wä5 - and violenci life sty Ic. Un I these historical We Cal T1 INCL under Litbursts that today the fabri state, and comp. that Tuls it to sing Illilitarizi Illilitarzation respcoT 15 c to til pressions of th - religious, cl: Eind Otherwise herited by th fra In the pre-1. the post-indepei ['0 TCS :) We', ); State's declare F1 dherence to ta Violence.
In practice the Tes Črted to ti wiol Cince a 11 thics LC) Tc5 Olwe LHC c րlague Indian
The Indian : military charac its nursery days le WCl5 — exter la At the cxternal born state sen Kashmir in Oct first the Pakist and later regula Pakistan army tect al territory ceded hurriedly Union by the Of Kashlir. T accessio I TeIlla bric of COI Inı idi:ı aid IP : 1; people of Kas El Chall C c C F independent op they walit to I Lhic India. Il Jili: (which is in c. 32,000 square n original 86,000 have a El indepen pite a ccasefire w cel Pakisti D E

states, violent Society
be relen betted iian state is a bor D1 — 3 f Wi o1e 1 ce a still links its bEFוח טוון טT שW ו 85 E Toots of its birth, ställd the violet Il re teari Ing apa Tt C of the Indian elling the centre TeS0Tt tC) i]CreEl;Ltion is State is a desperate he Wilent exC COI tradictions 155, ethПic, caste - that are illE di Stilte 47 era, but which ldence state failed 'spite the Indian i profession of himsha" or non
: Indial state had le language of ile y el ris in trying in tradictions that society.
stalte il cquired a ite T illmost froll . It started at IW)
Il 4 1d i Til terlall. level, the newits trips to
ober 1947 to fight åT1-liided tribas, forces of the in order to proWhich was a Cto the Indial then Maharajah The question of
ins till to day a LC Inti Cill bet Weel istlIl, With the
1 im is yet to have expressing their in its to whether emain a part of II, CT of Pakista Il 'ontrol of nearly 1i1e 3 (f RXEsh TTirʼs sqlla Te miles), or det status. Des: agreement betand India, signed
on January I 1949, the Kashmir imbroglio has dominated the two Indo-Pak Wars till now, and contiInues to rei Inforce the military character of the Indian state which deploys contingents of its numeTous paral-Imilitary forces — the CRPF (Central Reserve Police Force), BSF (Border Security Force) - as well as regular army troops in the Kashmir Walley to quella secessionist movement there. The initial military interwentia. Il CF 1947 CC, Lıld mot 5 Clive: thc basic problem - the issue of the Kashmiri people's independent choice. It has only led India to get embroiled in a perpetual armed confrontation with Pakistan, which taking advantage of thic ding runtlement among the Kashmiri masses is Im Elking im Talba dis iri1 to the secess ii) - nist movement by offering it military aid. The Indian state is paying the price for having ignored in the past the need for a democratic solution of the problem of the status of the KashIni Ti people,
Three major wars followed the 1947 Kashmir adventure - the 1962 war with China, and the 1965 and 1971 Wars With Pakistan - in the course of which the Ililili til Tizial LiCl of the Illilm state grew by leaps and bounds. From telli dilwisi biss in 19 fi 2, its army's strength went up to 2l division in 1965, and further to 25 in 1971. By 1988 there were 37 divisions, which is expected to reach 50 by 2010 A.D., Similarly the annual def
тепсе, expenditure has gопс шр
from Rs 3,125 million in 1961
62 to Rs 157,500 million in 1989-90 - 50 tiles increase in three decades. Apart from the
three Wars, the extra-territorial military adventure in Sri Lanka has cost India dearly both
iп terms of army manpower and Illilitary prestige. Three years of the so-called peacekeeping operation left the SriLiikli Tallils (whic I11 the Tildian Peace Keeping Force was
דן

Page 20
supposed to protcct) thoroughly
hostile to the Indian troops which has to retreat without achieving the original goal of
bringing peace' to the war-torn island, carrying back hile the bodies of their dead comrades, and themselvcs mai med by LTTE TiiiTncis.
The entire Sri Lankan episode epitomizes the Indian state's pathetic search for recognition as a mini-Superpower in the subcontiI1 eIn t, It is iIı this :4TT bitio I1 th1:1 t the roots of Illilitararization lic. In 1962, a II negalnıa Iliac. Nchrui nursed the 1:live Diction of defeati Ing the Chinesc in al jiffy, which set Indial On a war which need -- Inot have tak cn place and Which imposed on it a humiliating defeat from which it is still to Tecover, Ever sice tlc 1, Hc Indian state has been trying to beef up its Illuscles - which meln 5 in increasing pace of III ilit :1 Ti?:iti ( II. The 1965 war PI kissit: I1 5 tarted with the la m farc thlığı L. Sialkott Elıd Lahı Corc Werc Within els y reach - a propaganda that helped to rally Indian middle cll55 public which Were still smarting unde T. the humiliation of defeat three years ago. But "what good came of at last?" -
the question asked by little Peterkin in Southey's poem 5 till C011t 1111125 t0 || alJ Int us. THC
Tashkhent agreement ended in a stillemate, with India gaining In thi Ing in cinc Tete terms, and left With yet another tally of dead a F (i mai Ted Servicelle II. In 1971, Inciril Gandhi vas lailed OI 1he walls of Calcutta graffitti as the "rising sul of Asia's freedom", Elfte T she inter werhed in the Civil WHT in tile the East Pakista II, and was supposed to have cut down Pakistan to size by dis memberi Ing the state and crea ting Bangladesh. It inflated the cgi) of Indian militaris Ill. Here at list was it concrete achievement. B. It finally, what was the outcome? Within four years, Bangladesh was back to square olle – with the army taking over (leaving the Bangladeshis with the same plight to which they had been used to during the Pakistan regime - with the only difference that now their rulers were Ba Digladeshi army generals,
18
50 Ille a III1 Ing recently ouste received thc
tary El cademies
the fall-outs o Inilitary i Inte:Tw bC all increa: on the på Tt | Islallabad suf humilia Ling de: have its reveng it can carry it back India in
in other words LTO Lubbled witi Ler 5 shelte ed, train "freed oil fighte Pakistalı, Pık justified in doi the Khalistania gents who have
its soil.
But the prol in Punjab and ble simply shi tal li mil a chiiI la Li 10 ITC W New I rapproch II1 ent and succeeds : іпsшгge пts iп from the souri tary aid in Pak 5. CC:55io Dis. E tI'e:
K:ish Ilir will less wehe IIe Tut | pcrhaps. We
past how III clutting off Hill Ints (following New Delli II ground El Titled after il brief emerged as a with I in Ma Tipu of Ille III Ilof the basic I is It s III e i Whether China bLIL in te TI111. T ill Which the ex to fish is IIldi:
This brings SOLIrces Of Ville til in India. SC El after its Tesorted TO II suppress its ow it sent troops Soulth. Il dia to princely state c. in the process of terror on pi had been wagin

Whom like the d Ershad having trairing in Iniliin India). One of f the 1971 Ildi: ention appcars to sing bclligerency If Pakistan. An feri Ing from the feat of 1971, must ge. The only way out is by paying
the Samci coil - , fishiigi India's . Il 1st a 5 India ed a Ild a TIned the 's' of the then East ista El also feels Ing thc same with ind Kashmiri insurtaken shelter on
3: Til of Wille C5 Kashmir cannot -ked off a s PakisCI. Ewell ifDelhi arrives at a 'with 15 li:li Elığı bal in culting off the those two states ice of their II il ilista II, the air IIed inds in Punjab and continue, al beit y foT 50IIle Lime have și een i Il Lic spite of China's t0 Nagal insurgea thaw in Beijingtil 15), The underNga movement lull has again f) T.:e t(b Te::EkbI I r a mid other parts 1st, The source roblemi the Tefore :xler II:ll ETI EIly – Cor Pakistan — le Lied Wilter5 ternal ener my like5 is own creation.
Luis L (3 the internal :I1cè Hindi militHrizHistorically again, birth the state i li til Ty talctics to 1 pc ple TT 1948 to Tele nga na in bi talk: Cower the if Hyder: blad, and unleashed a reign I) or peasa Ints who g ai guerillä strug
gle against the ruling Nizam of the state. Under the leadership of the then undivided Collmunist Party of India, they had liberated wide areas and distributed land among the landless. The Indian troops struck at these gains of the peasantry by crushing the guerilla squads and assaulting their peasant followers. To quote one of the participants: "People were made victims of severe violence and repression... They were beaten with lathis and bayonets and tortured to the extreme - like peeling thic skin in the design of the hammer and sickle,... Arrested comrades were tortured lost brutally and shot dead in the presence of the people."
Th1c , Telenga Ina Coperaticon of 1948 was Ille of the carliest indications of the Indian state's attitude towards the under-privileged and of its determination to violently suppress any form of self-assertion by these scotion of the population. A few years later – in 1953 - the same policies wer: extended against an ethnic minority group which the 5 tate set i Ls a Tlei forces to Nagaland to suppress the Naga demandi for independence. Since then, attempts at self-assertion by other minority groups (e.g. the Sikhs in Punjab, the Muslims in Kashmir) have invited mounting state reprisals. The core of conflict betwee these various groups on the olc hand and the Centre on the other his more to do with the basic problem of finding an allicable solution of Telations between the central authority and the different regional communities that i Tı Halbit al Ill'ultiTati 141 stilte. Fail ure to fini such El Sol Li tion Within the present constitutional framework of the Indian Union has generated the conflicts. They have been aggravated by the II dill Stubb COTI TEFLIS; 1 to acknowledge the failure and by its infantile belief in solving the conflicts through military suppression. We must keep in mind the various dimensils of this basic Colt Tal dictial betwee a centralizing authority represented by the Indian state on the

Page 21
one hand, and the independent aspirations of the numerous regional linguistic, cthnic communities who arc supposed to constit Lite - El In India In H, tion Col. the other.
Let us colle back to the issue of built-in violence in the Indian state's structure which unleashed its fangs right from its birth. A repressive Hippa. Tatius, consisting of the police and the army, which the static inherited from the for Iner Birtish colonial rulers, has been augmented all these years by increasing inputs of Illilitarization. In 1949, it raised the (CRPF (Central Reser ve Police Force), Indelled on the British government's plan of Crown Representatives Police Force. Sincc them, thic number of cent Tall para-military forces has been steadily increasing with the formation of the BSF (Bordcr Security Force), Assam Rifles, Indo-Tibetan BLT der Police, CISF (Central Industrial Security force) the National Guard, and the Black Cats."
Most of these para-military forces have been used all these years — a II di Still Com tillle to be 115 fod – to til ckle civil disturb:l Inces within III dia. Ti e CRPF and the BSF, for instance, have been deployed in the past to suppress the Naxalite pea samt uprisings in West Bengal (in 1970-71 period) — and are being used in Kashmir today to quell the sccessionist Inovement there. Reports by civil liberties grilus suggest that thici T : Ctions i 1 Kashmir are marked by indiscriminiate arTests ald Lori ture of innocent citizens who are not involved in the secessionist II ovement. Incidentally, this is That co Il fined to Kashmi T. TI any part of India, whenever the state deploys its police cor para - Tilitary forces, or the army, it is the 1п посетit citize 115 who suffer the Inost - a fact brought out by documentary evi derice through on-the-spot investigations by numerous human rights groups in India.
The roots of such arbitrary and mindless state violence against
ordinary citizens the IIndian State"š p Copular griewan of State respon: Wil Ilces follows quence of polic actions - wheth t CD p) CD Dr pe: sa Il W Tk:s IT IF : At L.h1c i Ditiä 1 de Ill'Istratio II Inands, the s! ignore them. WF of the ignored fests it self il di agitations, the treat the Ill as problems and di to suppress the I Ile 1 t (ofte: 1 Hiel temporarily con and prevent th ding into artined whilt is k II wil a i.e. the central But it is a di in the border north 3. Ild While the India El ble to co Il La 10 WYCIIle It iii li, I d Bihar wit of sporadic a encounters, it With lore Well-organized Punjab, Kash II Assall – all The Tę i 5 Of difference e W chill Tacter of th Tı kto yenilent ald Surgencies in il nd the ICrth former seeks the politics the la [[er are generall issues which Teate ti comm li lities, the c18-i SS: diffe, other Wise divi Inities. They bTing to the f politics of shared experie (whether base ligi identit in Punjab a Kashmir, or th tity of the .
Il orth-east, tot i of the Nagas tempts to bind

lie embedded in attitude towards ces. The pattern se to Slich gric
EL COTT TOT 1 S = y decisions and er in relation S lid i T1 du Striä l th Ilic mili) Titics.
stige Lif i ny of popular de:L: CH:s til
1 en accumulatión gri evances malliesperate militant state decides to lä w imid order eploys its police m. Such deployps the state to Eli Til the Litbll T3 tS enn from exploinsurgencies in S the *hıe;ı Ttları dil", areas of India. fferent 5ituation Stites in the the north-east, Il 5 til te has been in the Naxalite AT&h1T. Pr:1lesh i Il File: col files Il di brie T är Ted has to reckon well-armed and insurgencies in iri, Ma nipuri a mid ETT St:11:5, cu Tse: al bàsic een the political t: Naxa lite Hr med that of the inPLI Injab, Kashmir -east. While the base itself in if class-conflict, coil cer Ici with
41d Ct.) C1: TI 15 3 their respective irrespective of "ences that night de their c. 1 IlEl re trying to Te the secta TiaTi community-based nces mad beliefs i OI the Tey of the Sikhs ld Muslims in elinguistic idenAS same see in thc the tribal identity and Mizos). At
together members
of each community around it respective historical identity quite often prevail over attempts to forge a unity of the depressed sectioIls : IT10Ing all these COIT1unities around the Chrill Il goal of ending class differences. Apa Tt froIII this advantage of community-based sympathies that the secessio list lowerilents cornmand in their Iespective : Te:15 i E1 th1e II1 di::i I1 b (Jrder: 5 tE1 ti:5, iT1 terms of military tactics als) they enjoy benefits of a military ca Lichielt. II, the 1 (Tth - WC:st, Pakistan provides direct aid to the Khalistani and Kashmiri secessionists, while in the northcast, the Ill-Till Els ll Till il the bordering a reas of Burma has become an ideal shelter for thic insurgents of Nagaland, Manipur and Assa 11.
The India II State’s effyTits to suբpress lles: insurgencies through the same methods of repression therefore have proved to be less successful. Guided by the initial approach of trealting the expressions of mass grievances in these areas as simple law and order problems, the stilte has had to CSC:All te the pace of repression. Such repression invariably directs itself against the readily available innocent citizcns instead of the in visible armed insurgents. The in Ocelt victi T1s af statt: repression get increasingly illicnated and many among them join the insurgents. According to the Indian govern Illent's own Eldillission, the number of terrorists both in Punjab and Kishmir have gone up over the last few years. And this, in spite of deployment of paramilitary forces in increased strength in these two states. The military apparatus is getting bogged down in a futile civili wa T, Temporary 5 L1 CC csses – like the cleaning up of the Golden Temple in "Operation Blues tar' in 1984, or the arrest and killing of a few "terrorist' leaders in Punjab, or the claim of flushing olut terrorists by burning entire villages in Kashmir — leave a trail of destruction in the furrows of which a new generation of

Page 22
insurgents is born. Thus, the the cycle of violence continues.
The rebels were offered amnesty in exchange of their surrendering their weapons a Tid accepting the India Il Constitution. But this did not solve the problem of Naga insurgency. Other II le 11. bers of the Naga National Councill broke a way to form thit NSCN (Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland) which is
still carrying on armed resistance against the Indian state in pursuit of its goal of an
independent Nagaland.
Following the same approach, the new government of India under Chain di TäishckhäT which came to power in November 1990, Sent Overtures to the inSurgents il Punjab a Il Kashlmir föT talks. At thic till: 3f writing this article, prelilitary talks have begun with a Sikh leader - Simrinjil Singh Ma II - who claims to represent the Illilitant outfits of Punjab. Bilt se wer: l III i liitili Tıt groups have already till rei teled to discovy 1 him if he goes back on the demand for an independent Khalistan. Thus, even is ally accord is sigiled Eliud so III e of the IT1ilitant groups surren der their
IIIs, there des Illot sec. I 11 t) be any likelihood of an end to the cycle of violence that
has enveloped Punjab.
The history of the Naga in
surgency and the increasing spread of terrorism in Punjab and Kashmir in recent years
prove the resilience of such Wiolen treinds even in the face of powerful state offensive. Ironically, while Mao's folllowers i Il II dia — the Naxal lites - have so far failed to carry out successfully his mot to: power flows from the barrel of the gun' (barring a few spots in Andhra Pradesh in the south), the truth of his saying is being prøved every day in Punjab by the religious fundamentalist Khalistanis who at gun-point can force government
2O
officials to to terrorize the to support th In o1ey from the Weapons, cán im mille italist II Tri Zeils (like mak up Wearing jea head covered) - IL1I H1 : I w; stretches along
The language becoming a di political discot is gradually ed OT1 del CCTEl Lic. pressing disser
timi l lh u Lima I Both the India a Tim cd opp One
Kl:1511 lir, A. 55 år cast refuse to raill space for disagreements. t Teld Of ilto] Tatic disse it in III dian poli Independence general, and th which had Illin 44 years in II dia Ill State S of wicolating { when in 1959, Illet at the (
le fir5L del C COrihIL 11 uThis L Im1i Efter his o WWII ganged up be class, privileg the Te Who I'm OL agi inst the CoII t:10IL & Lt Cll: quos in educat LLITe Which Lh Te inte:TC s t s Jf Llı Since then, 1 Cen LTe ha d di gress s Late gow di: In Cnc p I
At the level tio In5 - betw.ccn and the opposi and later its gres5(I) Teplice de Il critic deb) wjont CLIlfTLL1 ca. In 1e brazen-f dili: Gandhi "5

their lic, סplטטcommorl p Em, Can CX to It * rich to buy more 1 pose their fundais on the citiing W011 en givc Ins, or k cep their - in short be able Tit across waist the border.
CEL
: of the gun is cisive FaTçe il ITS e il II dial. It ging out debates terms and sup|L of the tr:Ldiita rial wariety, | Il State A Ill its Ints in Punjab, In Eind the In Orthprovide a Ily. Det Lu
expression of
In fact, this era Ilce of democwas inaugurated tics by the postStEl të itself in Le Congress party it for the last particular. The: et the precedent emocratic norms Nehru's goverCentre di Si55 ed cratically elected nistry in Kerala, Congress party :hind the upper ;ed commu mites Tited an ilgitation 1munist ministry's nging thic status ion and agricula te Il editHic v cisted St C01111 LIII i ti :S. the Congress-run Ilissel II-C- =L5 111 1nון טוון ET II *:text Dr. En I10 ther,
of political relathe Illing party Lion, the Congress Iva Tia Ilt, the Co Lilld the language of Il te with thuilt of tiltil. This beaced during Inprime-minister
ship, particulary during the Emergency period, when her party gools under the leadership of her son, Sanjay Gandhi, Went around snuffing all signs of dissent. Congress musclemen virually dictated the law in those days. The Congress culture of violence manifested itself in the most murderous Way in Nowember 1984, when following Indira. Gandhi's assassination, her party Ile. Il Organized a Tull—Scale massacre of 3,000 Sikhs in the streets of Delhi. Both human rights groups and affidavits subImitted by survivors of the missacre have na med leading Congress men like H.K.L Bhagat (who stil Tema in s the secretary of the
Congress-I) and Sajjan Kumar, as responsible for organizing the
killings. Till today, none of the El ccused Congress II1 en hawe been prosecuted!
Thus, while on the One hand the Indian state fails to punish those guilty of Tlass killing of Illenbers of the Sikh community, on the other had it indulges in violent reprisal against the Sikhs in Punjab on the official plea of suppressing terrorism." As Simranjit Singh Mann, the Sikh leader who is at present negotiating With the Centre, stated bluntly in his memorandum submitted to the Prime Minister:"...while in Punjab people can be shot by the police on the vaguest Suspicion without any process of law, those guilty of killing Sikhs in 1984, freely roam the streets of Delhi." (December 28, 1990).
It is a against this background of the Indian state's acts of onission and collision that Colle should cxa inic the growth of "te Trois Tim” in Panjab, as well Els in Kashi Ilir.

Page 23
Some Reflections on th Commission Report
Saman Kelegama
A new agenda for the South
long overdue. The South Commission - perhaps the most impressive third World
i think tank' hither to established - has fulfilled this task by bringing out its report entitled: The Challenge to the South'. Mst of the Sättcred infoIli tio al Wailabe ) n thc - So Luth's problems and prospects have been put together in this Report. It analyses the global situation and the position of the developing countrics in today's world and suggests steps that could be taken by the countries of the South LLLLLL LL Sa LLLLLLLHHLL aHLL LK LHLLLLSS LLL0 at an international level to improye their cl Tent status. The Il climbęTS cof thic commissil should be congratulated for the task they have performed, for it häs not been an cas y job :: Ilsidering the financial and other constraints under which they Worked.
The basic theme of the Report is well captured in the Preface: 'Underlying all the Report's Temmeldations is oli recognition, and clear statement, that
responsibility for the develop. ment of the South lies in the South, and in the hands of
the peoples of the South'. The Report, therefore, mainly concentrates on the South, its potentials, capabilities and the Tcquired action. There is the Ti Till belief thält With Self-TE| - ant people-based development, the Squth Can break away from the misery of under development and diependency. Instead of putting the blame fully on the North and expecting a change of attitude on the part of the developed world, the Report calls upon the South to utilize
The fir for is í Reyes Trefi Feller y1,
is fire of Policy Sri dies, Calarift.
 ݂ ܒܫ .
| Discussion pape a seminar organ Lala Associati wancement of 5 challenge to it | Report of the 5 au | 2 June 1991.
its C wil hul III tively and adva cooperation to of developilent for them. At the interdepends Incrs in today's Tized, a id a ni programı ile of a .
At first i glan Line liltil 15 ft ST11e Willit (C) Tiy Some inportant Out Ild they based self reli: strategy, (2) G on regional { Proposal for a S (4) Proposal for Lariat. It is , these areas clos U Htil in a cleil T to cxplore the challenges they p Illkers.
(1) People-base development
It is Well k סw r 0ח 15 - 19805
5 L decide". of a diverse exteril the Te W:S t00 –5 ided f0 c11S 0 m domestic polici culties. It proper domestic the only way to tries out of t which they hac adjustment pri sponsored by and the IMF, y

e South
r presented at ized by the Sri on for the Adiconco om The HE SOLI 1: TH Ith Commission"",
Tesources effocIce South-South ensure the type most 5 li til ble thic 5:4111ę till:, 2nce of all partW Carl dl is Tc coged for a global :till is stics siel.
cc the Tec orthle Report appear en Lio Ill. Bl |new aTeas stad are: (1) PeopleIn tdcvelopment reater emphasis Cooperation, (3) itilith Ba mk, intl F1 SILIE. El Secreforth exa Illining ely in order to wjew and also prospects and resent to p to lity
1, 5elf-reliant
strategy
I Will that te FEITEd to as lhe
It Was a decade 1 f, T[iul Illes Williere much of ble the efficacy of es i 1 de veloping Els argued that adjustment was get these coul
1 & IL CIT: 85 i Illi) | f | e II. THIS; 3 gr4, Til ITC:s 1* : Tլ:
the World Balık At the beginning
of the 1985 the se istituti CIS SELid that there should be adjustment with growth, then during the Illid-eighties it was said adjustment should take place with a * * hul Illa face"", IN W i Ill the 1990s it is said that adjustirme: ut should take place along with powerty alleviation (see World Development Report, 1990). All these changes in cliphasis indicate that these adjustment-based de velopIlent strategies have not sufficed by themselves te push de Weltcuping countries to Wards rapidi development.
Adjustment packages have Illiny shortcomings. One factor is that is long as—the external en wir C). Ilmcnit Temains Llifa w Courablc, Eidjustment measures becomic very painful. The other factor is that these adjustment programmes assume that the supply response in the Southern countries are rapid and therefore such responses can offset the short-run adjustment costs. It has been the experience of a number of developing colli tries that this is lot the casc. and that the adjustment cost is onc of the major factors that act as an
impediment for developing coln
tries to further integrate with the global economy. These points hawe been identified in the Report before it goes on to suggest an alternative development strategy.
What has been eII phasized in the Report is susta ina ble developIlment. Now, sustai na ble de wel Capment Tequires more rather that II less resouries. But is the South receiving more resources". It has been estinated that because of the debt servici Ing and thic decli Inc in commodity prices and the tells of trade, the let flow of Tesolirces is Liot fr (Il the North to the South als it sh011 lid be but im tle rewerse direction to: the LLIne of US dollars lett fós) bil 1 - ion per year. All the in Flows of aid and new borrowing are offset by
1

Page 24
outflows to service and repay past debts, and also by the losses caused by falling cornmodity prices. It is true that developing countries have been borrowing large sums from the capital markets of the North, but a good proportion of this has found its way back to the financial centres of the North through capital flight for which the citizens of the developing collintries thic Iselvcs hawe been Tesponsible. Sustain blic development cannot therefore take place in developing countrics unless the existing situation is drastically altered. This feature too has been recognized in the Report, and it is by considering all these fa ws in thc prevailing development strategics that it has come up with peoplebased, self reliant development stratic gy.
A strategy of self-reliant people-based development Will need to be guided by certain common principles and objectives. Each country's developIment strategy must necessarily be specific to its stage of development, size, resource base, cultural heritage, and other Illatiomail characteristics, Thus, eTulating the development strategy of another country can lead to problems. So each country in the South will awe to fit ill this new development strategy according to its initial coIII ditions. The development strategy El country should liin at should provide high rates of growth With equity, while being at the sa Inc time environmentally sound.
Although people-based, self reliance, etc, are Intre in accordancc With inward looking stralegies, they should not be disassociated with outward-looking strategics which are now the non. The Report appears to be arguing on these lines. Of course, the new development approach is more micro-level oriented, and the implementation requires massive foreign aid, as has been clearly denon strated by Sri Lanka's Janasawiya progra IIInc. Tie importa It pit to note is that the receipt of foreign aid even for such people
based program Codi tio mallities which are appli macro-level. TF la ties Çalı tak: C such Els, de WER luit ing, disi Imantling i enterprises, priw tion of state certain projects, is worth noting ditionalities alre With the adjus of the IMF and So what is co how to integrat development st macro-level adj.
The Report ՃլIt strongly to T this Tella is a
to bic looked Imalika: T5. It is Teader Whcth:T
assumi Ing a ni cc Iloili C, CT der III e Itation of In ent strategy. them al Ille W , ! eStli5hed plementation o tegy. If not, tł חimith tורtט 15 a Ild Il e:1115 ha" for the purpose tiL.
The Slt Wy engaged in a dic CoTiCl titi CT W5.
tion, public s cles, logic II til di till Ini
The Report ha avoided this d pears 10 long requirement to the bocsL CF bi country should all W. I. Ilization bit at people-based, : lopment. Thes ally exclusive, cTildę free Imai Si) in order te balance we h the Tale of t this regard the have clearly id
The Tile f be (1) tu mai |Illa Cr Cecið 10 Illic: be a regulato

mics have 11 any attached to it Cable IT10re at F1 1c sic ConditionalWarious forms ion, tariff lowerinefficient public atization, reducexpenditure on and so on. It thät theść CũT1in accordance timent packages the World Balık, nfusing here is e the nic-level rategy with the ustment policies,
h:15 Titlt tt, T11t: this issue a Indi i a Tea which Illas into by policyit clear to the the Report is 3. W i Il te Tätig. I 13A1 for the implethe new developIf it is the case, ITET ES to be the silo oth illF the Ile W = 3 Era - ne above question arise and Ways we to be follid of macro-integra
is at One time bätc of Co Lt. W Tidim wardl-Oriel talector vs. SIIlä 11 technology vs. 25, and 50 on. is very correctly cbi te which i per Televät. The day is to hawe i dth. That is, a
fill the Liust häive IIIOder: thc: Sämlic tille Self-Teliant devicE HTC L1(JL 1llexcept in the Lrket fra Time work, | find the Tight a WC to redefic hic state, and in Report seeins to eltified tult ole, the Stilte should İntı il de Til ald stability, (2) to and a planner
right -
in a reas where the market fails, and (3) to act as an entre pre
neur. In such varied capacity, the static should be selective a1i 13Te cfficic I1 t. Wh1 crey er
the functioning of the market Techanism fa ils to su Il non forth the required factor (Inarkct failure), the state has to step in and do the necessary investment. As commonly believed, further liberalization af the economy does not provide solutions to market failures, Selcctive intervention is required to rectify a market failure. Furthermo Te, State control should
bic applied only in strategic arcas. The State's role as Lim entrepreneur is to push and
challenge industries to progress, and not to provide assistance
so that industrics can avoid adjustment.
Thc identification of these
significant areas for the state itself shows that the debate on Stä tc wls. Illa Tket i 5 INC W OWCT. Of course, the efficiency of the market and its capacity to deliver fast is now more or less universally accepted. But the Tolle of the State hals by Tho IInea 115 been undcrmined, but embedded in the market mechanism. There are very few policy-makers today who speak of a free market. Depending on the Weight an economy attaches to the abovementi öncd three Toles of the state, the economies may be called a "regulated market economy', 'competitive market economy", "social market economy', and so on. So in this regard the Report has done an excellent and praiseworthy job.
Next: Regional Cooperation
The Road. . . .
(Crird fr நாg ) In Hanoi. I had just one day, more for old time's sake than anything else, to walk through
Lenin Park again at dusk, and visit the pagodas where nuns lived, and the little pagoda on the lake with the massive tortoise in its glass case. I found the city, if E.
bit more lively now and busy, as chir IIlling as ever with its elegant French style avenues and rows of shade trees.

Page 25
Correspолdernce
Eric Heffer
It was with great sorrow and grief that I belatedly learned of the tragic and untinely death of Eric Heffe: T. As El Tember of the British Parli II la Titi, hle represented Walton, Liverpool, for 27 years and was a member of the Cabinet headed by Harold
Wis Il Bllt :lbWE all he Te - mained throughout his life genuine friend of the internal
tional working class and un COImpromising social democrat,
My links with Heffer are
entirely ideological, I have neither scc.n him, nor I listened to him. I have read some of his writings an di almı alw arc of some of his political work. The positio Ins hic took up on various issules W circ wcil k CI W T1 EIN di ELTE COTImendable. He resigned from the Cabilect of Harald Wilsol becausic he did not Want to CITpromise his beliefs. At the 1985 Labour Party conference, he walked off the platform as a protest against Kinnock's Witch hunt of the Labour left. He livcd and died as a radical social clocrat.
Speaking at the funeral service, Tony Benn said that the press tried to portray Eric Heffer as an old time socialist, a voice from the past. "But this is quite ultrue. Eric was the voice of the future of socialist idcas."
He was an internationalist in the true sense of the term and was convinced that the futur C of any country lies in Elin integrated international collmunity. He believed that a even limited goal of a reasonable level of development with social justice cannot be isolation. But he democratic socialist a capitalist one. referring :LSח טוזו
Walted a World 10t Het WTO te iIl to European develop
There is clearly a chcice before | hig Common Market, whether i begrHaHL S LLLLLLL S LLLL S S HHHHLLS LLLLaLLLL S L L cı mitinued aıııd is strength içined as the aMLLLLLLLLHHH LLLL S LLLHHLLLCLHS S SS LLCLLLLCLS leiding 13 El new Europe:El II i Imp :-
achieved in
ܡܨ rialism, Lir it Illu iTito a CCIT1Illini 1: socialist principl.
He defended 5 period in which Europe were tal gradual but per: He always stoo. socialis Ill which fighting for all be defended as than capitalism.
Socialism is der Illi L ii Iialis L. li r it List tak CCCLII deminds of it. tional identity a A. Wrigler - - LI Imily
Socialism, in qualitatively dif bureaucratic ch W Ellich tull Time til El 5lave Of the I ters ind led to Of the 5 tilte i Il hill in life. He thält a scociety w critic, just, peac can be bLilt in talism. Radicall cracy embodies in which such be built aid I ell thi5 shi Tt | propriate to qlli ing words of H
טיל w H5 | חטיWH sion of society, LILLI III, which fel I do wish first principle tercourse, if L thic socialism is İS, IL ii Stali is that A beginning äht| 15 till:110: пшst tгу то piar ! ies tO pLI LI bersectiye. . . ress" il irdi. LIrı Tegal5 tic', iu5t firזliril I or yhä L'5 :
Sшпа
Ludovv y llik
Wijevny
I thi11k that English should English or (if |
to define), at intelligible Engl:

st be transformed y based on gen uint
5.
ocialis II i El most people in king about its Illa Ile It dellise.
for a kind of is well Worth i which C thլյltl a better sy s tcm
In his words;
mocratic Lld in ter
is riothing, yet it nt Lf the legitimate ples why seek Ilitil frçlı yayithi
this sense, is ferent from the Immunist rulle e individual into CatallitariaL 1 I 11A5the hypertrophy all spheres of also believed which is dellCFL | Iidh Lulla. Il C place of capiS0 cilill De Ind1 programme al society cai Illi li ntlliimei Tik) :Tibute, it is a ph
Inte the follow . effer;
Ing 'W' HEIl 7 yi
1 i 182 yw W{3|| Ex:15ed ship. A world in ip would be the of one's daily init is in is list |5 E. BLIE 5 Liais;1 It is breu: ratic is rightly finish Cl. 1815 Lc5 1 11:le Til Lie 5 i Lialis Is WE חייום חוונם הטin"י חרום fer yfird such gl : Իt dՃլլիt the say this Utopian but surely, "Man's exceed his grasp, Heyl F.'"
nasiri Liya image
and Gehan ardena
a teacher of WI: Crect that is not easy the very least, ish. Gehan Wije
wardena thinks a teacher of English can write any way he likes and that it is up to the real der to figure out what he is trying to say. Thus, when ILLI do wyk Writes that his "" little knowledge of Sinhalese faded with Tic great sense of loss' Gehan thinks it is liced sad" if the reader finds it difficult to figure out what this means. Take another seltence from Ludowyk's book: 'She was ready to feed us ourselves.' If you cannու understand what this means it is your fault Gehan also thinks that when writing for "a wider audience" (readers outside Sri Lanka) it is not Il erely per mill issible but Imla li daltry foT LA, I kall Writers to 15 e "" [ LI. Telly Lei Inka 1 locu tions which Would be incomprehensible elsewhere' because to do otherwise would amount to all 'appalling culture cringe''. The reason is ` that such locutions 'go to nourish the creativity of the language they use. ''Among the Inumerous Lankään locutions thalt Welt to mourish the creativity of the language used by Lu do Wyk in his book a Tc 'bare-bodied" and "healty', neither of which expressions can be found in any dictionary. Although We Lankans know that * * blir e-bodied" III-lea. Ils with the upper part of the torso un Cowe red, a 101-Lankan would translate the words to Ilean naked. 'Heaty' may be interpreted by a foreign cr as either cal lusing a b LI r [ni Tig seinsa, tion or of a high temperature. We in Sri Lanka know that it is a medical terri used of certain kinds Of foJd and drink. Thus, ice Crea T is heaty. So il coT det to Inourish the creatiWity of his language and avoid an appalling culture cringe Ludowyk has to be un intelligible to his fɔ Teigin real, der 5. I think Gehan's reasoning is very similar to Doric"s when hic Said children who knew English were II) i Teal.
W. P. Wittachi
Colombo 3.
23

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