கவனிக்க: இந்த மின்னூலைத் தனிப்பட்ட வாசிப்பு, உசாத்துணைத் தேவைகளுக்கு மட்டுமே பயன்படுத்தலாம். வேறு பயன்பாடுகளுக்கு ஆசிரியரின்/பதிப்புரிமையாளரின் அனுமதி பெறப்பட வேண்டும்.
இது கூகிள் எழுத்துணரியால் தானியக்கமாக உருவாக்கப்பட்ட கோப்பு. இந்த மின்னூல் மெய்ப்புப் பார்க்கப்படவில்லை.
இந்தப் படைப்பின் நூலகப் பக்கத்தினை பார்வையிட பின்வரும் இணைப்புக்குச் செல்லவும்: Lanka Guardian 1991.09.01

Page 1
Vol. 14 No. 9 September 1, 1991 Price Rs.
Piyal Gammage
Mervyn de Silva
Douglas Allen
Mfushahid Hussein
Rajiv Wijesingha
 
 
 
 
 
 

7.50 Registered at GPO, Sri Lanka OD/09/NEWS/91
pm J. R.’s joke
需
om Mangala's Move
on American Mythology
om Nepal's perceptions
on Laos and Lanka
on the United Nations

Page 2
Why theres sou in this rustic to
There is laughter inci ill inter artingst this: T
rural dartisals who are busy sorting out to bill.i.
leaf in a bari. It is one of the Ilindreds of such
bars spread jut in the finid irid 1px").Jrity interniciale : One where the arable and r:Tiiiii 5. fally, during the of seaso, Here, with careful tur Liling, tobacco city's as : LLLLaaLa LLLS H LLLLLLa aHLL LS LaaLaaCL CLaLCC LLLLL LL glc. to the valie ist over Rs. 250 tillion C: more
mnLI.Ill,, lrır : irrh;ır::: 1:13, IMM) TI I r 7ıl fo ilk,
H
 

ENRICHINGRURAL LIFESTYLE
nd oflaughter bacco barn....
acci is the Iridustry that bring: er:lyrint to ne ggcorri highEst number 2 perple, And thos: copie are the tal.acco barr. civilers, the tobacc. rowers and those who work for therit, on the lard II: 1 + '"' : 1 s. of them, the tuliaccin lead Tears meaningful work,
gamfortable life and a secure future. A tood Tityugh reason for laughter
Ceylon Tobacco Co. Ltd.
ShcIring and caring or our land und her people.

Page 3
Briefly . . .
DOOROPEN, TIGERS
Cabinet spokesman Rani Wickremasinghe tցիtl thE weekly media briefing that the door was open for megotiations for the LTTE. The ext TOW must cond from the Tigers, he said.
A military spokesman said that the role of the army Was to Weaken the LTTE, which the army had done with the victory at Elephant Pass; the rest was up to the Gower melt.
T GERS WILL TALK
TO THOMOA
3. The Tigers are willing to
ta || k to Mr S. Thorida Tarn, minister in the gCO Wernment
äÜARDIAN
Wol. 14 No. 9 Septembuar 1, 1991
Pri Rs 7.50
Published fortnightly by
Lanka Guardian Publishing Co. Ltd.
No. 246, Union Piece, Colombo - 2,
Editor Mervyn de Silva Tglphos; 447584
CONTENTS
News Background J. R. Rides Again The Region 7 South Commission (2) 1) TE. Persit Gulf War 13
| Hj-US Rū|ilio 13 14 Indochina Revisited (4) 19 THğ U - Ni ii ) is list
at Scurity 1 CorrespQIl du FICE 2.
Printed by Ananda Press B2/5, Sri Ratnajothi Sarawanamu tu Mawatha, Colombro 13,
Telaph II E: 435975
and leader WOrkers C trade Unior WorkGrS Wha:
di TaTi
Announcing ity of Mr TF ideologue A told a press
Jaffna that Would hawa to: "If he is gen about peace hÉi Cal CoTe Balasingham
ARWY
COM
p5 B ססTr ) expanded the tro I to a rad רח סetres frוח
stretc. fr.
at Wetti||aiker Was also Lic
Ce5 COft rol i told a media Referring t
Parantha, the that a gather had been ob! ad eel di Strikes; there 24-hour of
THARASU
G A gang ad India 1 the Madras a Col troversi: Weekly. Mr S (who had no time) has a C the Hir du re
THC}. Tharas a floor imme office of a S leader. S., C. Who is domi the three pe Mr Cardial ignored tha Thara SL. TW Wara ki||ad.
LAST HOU
O Sivarasan prime a CCUSei Gāndhi assa! Committed Su five associate fCLIFIffffries)

of the Ceylon gress (CWC), a of plantation are mostly of des Cent.
| the acceptabl10 dama, LTTE ton Balasingham S Conference in Mr THQndämlar I Come to Jaffna. Liey Corld ful negotiations էD Jaffrla", Mr 5Hitl.
EXPANDS ITROL
t Elephant’ Pass - ir territorial Coius of four kilotheir camp. The the beach head ni to the camp der security for- - all dry spokes
briefing.
O air raids at ! spokesman Said ing of terrorists ser Ved and they islodged by air
had beëi Ilo քing,
' ATTACKED
of Sri La ka Tamils attacked ffic Of Thara slu, il Tamil political hyam, the editor t been in at the cused the LTTE,
ported,
LI office is or liately below the ir i La Tika Tamil Chandrahasan Ciled in Madras; icemen guarding El Sarth apparently
ättACk öfl the) press workers
RS OF SWA and Subha, d in the Rajiv SSination case, icide along with s in a hideout " сэл page 3:/
TREMOS
MER IT, NOT RATIO
Promotions in the public service in future will be on rimleriť, not eth 7 sic ratio, the government has declded, rescinding an earlier decision.
Also, а // : адроintments in future wi // be or Wy affer clearance by the National Inte//їgуелсе Bureаш.
OPPOSITOM MP HAILS
GOVERNMENT DEC SOM
Мr Sfал/ey Тї//ekегаѓле, MP, (SLFP) has cassed President Prema dasa's decision to appoint SLFP MP Малga/a Moonesiлg/he as chairптап of the parliamen) - tary select committee on the national question "а great лтоve їл t/he correcї direction". In a statement ir 7 the Daily Wews Mr. Tilsekaratne said: 'This is Lindoubtedly a Spsen did opдогtuліїy fог а// po/їtica/ parties to prove to the people that they should staлd above ра гtу до/їїїcs їn the greater natforта/ їпfefef".
MMr Moonesingfie was the proposer of the 77otion to арроїгтt a Se/ect Солтmftfee of Parament to reсолтптелd ways and means of a chieving peace and
political stability in the СошлIrү.
FRAM DOM RAIDS,
NEXT7
After the end of major Confrontations in the Worth,
security forces believe that
the Tigers will mount randor raids of Cwiar fargets, according to Sources quoted in the Daily News.

Page 4
AFECEWW7" AMAF
MO 10 MO 4
For mortality's sake
Syed Mlavwah Haider Mlaq wi
The nature of the rural informal Credit market in Sri Lanka
Mina Sarideratne
Tea policy in Sri Lanka
Joachim Betz
Economics of "Tourist Pollution'
Pani Seneviratne
Book review Towards a theory of rural dévelopment
Paul ElkinS
Rg. 47. 50
Wo 11 MO 1 Development of development thinking
Sukhamony Chakrawarty Environmental impact assessment and developing Countries
Rohan H. Wickramasinghe Industrialisation and social development: comparisions of South Asia with East Asian NICs
Ganeshan Wignaralia The Sri Lanka formula
Carlo Fonselka
Book review
1 como clastic and courageous
Premadasa Udagama
RS. 55.O-O
MARGA PU
61, Isipatha Colo

PGA WOLWR VWAS
WOL T T MoS 2 E 3 Nutritional status of the pre-school Child
Priyani Soysа Child mental health: meeting needs of the young child
A. D. Nikapota Training of pre-school teachers
D. E. M. Kota awala The household and the care of - tha WOLung child
WWrtie Perera Western theoretical perspectives & upbringing of the child in the traditional family in S.L
Walkanthie Gunawardene Interactions between Care-giver and pre-school child - a case study
Gameela Samarasinghe The Child's need to play
Myura Goonesinghe The pre-school child in the urban Shanty
Mlamali Kannangara
Rs... 87.50
Woll 11 No 4
National planning in an open economy – The Challenge for S.L
GOdifre y Gunatieke
Trade policy and industrial development in Sri Lanka
Saman Kelegama & Ganeshan VVignaraja Sri Lanka's continuing thrust on the plantation exports: Some explanations
Raghunaith Pradhan
A Survery of estate and tea
productivity debate in India,
Sri Lanka and Kenya Patrick Mendis
Rs. 49-50
BLICATIONS
la Mawatha,
O 5.

Page 5
Mangala's flotion:
A window on Lanka's crisis
Mervyn de Silva
he Hon. M. H. Mohammed,
the speakcr, is a veteran top-flight UNP'er, who has held ministerial office. As thic natural symbol of an elected, multiparty assembly, and as a Moslell, he had reason to believe that an initiative by the Speaker to use the House for a fre: and frank roundtable of the ethnic conflict could yield better results than any other forum. The All-party Conference, a UNP-promoted exercise has not proved, for instance, a truly "all-party' forum. The ethnic issue. In oreover, is widelly u Ilderstood to be H conflict between the majority Sinhalese and the Tamils, the millim Illinority. So what better 'neutral' than a Moslem Speaker? But
The UNP preferred to support a notion by the SLFP MP, Mr. Mai Ingalal Mobilesi righ a than Speaker Moha III Inted's II O W, Which inter esti Ingly, fico L Tid am eager backer in the SLFP President alııd (Oppositikanı Leader', Mrs, Ba Ilda Tali In Elik ic Im o les5. A. Indi
So Mr. Moonesingha's motion was una nimously approved. What's II10-re President Pre 11:1-
dasa, the President of the UNP,
gave a UNP green light to the choice of the Illower of the motion, an Opposition
backbencher, as Chairman of the Parliamentary Select Cornmittee. I don't recall a parliaIn eritary Committee on El III: I tet of such immense political importance chaired by a junior Opposition MP. It has made parliamentary history, of course.
To make the Linus LIE 1 5 tra 1ger still, we had Mr. Stanley Tillekerat ine, SLIFP MLP and the Speaker of thc National State
Assembly in t d) Imilated ULI ment (1977), I developments praise on Pre: for his IIIa sion". RecogI a "dcparture procedure", (ob sicrwed that the firm resol dent and the explore the just solution t ." נוb1e I
* Let this fi for propagand. tical advantag above Hll titll to look for a for this grave
POLITICAL COMIMENTAR
While e:g cho {1 Singha's Pres li mil Mr. Stil li is praisc w Cort E. of all three ti well als eich i II in these partic CIS title politics and s
To sole party gaine ilggrava te the (5C) [Ine analysts Was in fact that two-par power and thi promoted) sil the constitutic Mr. J. R. Ja duced in ord power in an dency at the
inct, the
JNP-dominate year term to 1 divisio 15 in

he days of SLFP. ited Front govern"espond to these
by showering sident Premadas a g|In a nimous dccilising the step as from the normal MT Tillekerät Ile this move shows vi f the Pres
gOVETIlme It to Ossibilitics of a o a pressing pro
TILL III1 Ilt be L5 el a and petty polic. Let us rise CT ConsideratioIls las ting solution
tilä isse",
W
ction, Mr. McIleide It Preladisi's ley Tillekeratine's, IW, the Child L1 ct 1kẽn together, as 1 diwidual decisio II, lla" circunstances, Commentary on ociety today.
extent, the twowhich helped to Tamil problem
say the problem El by-product of ly contest for Copport Lillis II it 1 goes on. But inal changes that ya Wardena intro. Cr to centralise
Executive Presi. expense of ParliaExtern Siarl of the di Pr-1 je It"5 6 2 years, the deep
the Opposition,
the the
dccliile CF *Old Left", the chaos and bitt cr
dramatic
squabbles in the SLFP after Mrs. Banda Tanaike was deprived of her civic rights, have all taken quite a toll. While these deveolpments were altering, often imperceptibly, the traditional structure of politics in Sri Lanka, two other parallel proccses were underway. The Tamil agitation moved out of parliament, the traditional Ta mill leadership was soon marginalised with whatever token gains they had made through Parliament becoming more and more Ileaningless. In that area, the DDC polls in Jaffna and the manner in which these were conducted, together with the campaign of terror unleashed by UNP goon squads", stand out as the turning point. From Timur der and terrorism, the violent Tamil agitation of the new generation grows into a full-scale insurgency calling for the total mobilisation of the armed forces, and their Steady expansion.
THE ARMY
The expansion and modernisation of the army introduces a new factor into Sri Lankan politics and society - a distictive Third World characticristic that beca me quite proIn in ent in Ilan Y countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, in the 60’s-70’s. The politicians find it necessary to expand the army to protect their increasingly isolated and unpo. pular regimes; the army and the defence budget cxpand, and soon the military become a dominant feature of the political-social landscape. Militarisation, a sharing of power
3.

Page 6
between civilians and the services, the advent of jHrisas, groWing economic distress caused by ever-swcling defence budgets arc all part of the pattern, As a rule, the cwer-increasing usic of forcic almost always decpens the crisis, particularly if thic civil War" is chnic or tribal, and the army is drawn from the 'majority'. Such ethnic Strife Titler thåT frevolution" soon becomes a prominent felturc of Third World politics.
While - Slich CIII f’EditLIITE:5 can be recognised in the South 5i: 5Cel ld Sri Link is no exception, what makes thi 5 il 5|End different is thät dello cratic system did not wholly collapse and the party competition continued, albeit under the TestricLive "De W Tulle5' introduced by President J.R. The other crucial change of course was in the El rel of ecolonic policy. To simplify, the JR years represents another rupture with the past, the rejection of social Welfarism as al co II ponent of Sri Lanka's "caring capitalism" The total integration of the island's economy to the global economic system under IMFWorld Bank supervision became the central objective of the JR dlinistriti. Il novelli ed the inheritance of all parties. At first, the new UNP administration of President Prelladasa, with its distinctive populism, resisted the trend. Premada sa 'pop LI lism' went back to the wcfarism of the 'old' UNP, and the policy outlook of the island's post-independence elite, a more socially aware conscience-stricken governing group,
ECONOMIC STRATEGY
Given STi Länk Eli’s size, Tesoul TCes and its "de pendence' on the world economy, the JR policy was in fact irreversible.
While Preside was sillart enough to “adjust to the IMF 'structural adjustment", the SLFP and the Left, found theiselves naked. Global political change was the next bitter blow. The collaps of the "socialist system' has left the
Pr ETiladásl
4
SLFP-Lift ico of ideas, and l. a 5 eTiLI 5 CCLIII
It is thi5 CI հit the major so hard that it is now played Stage, duly re dicta il by State-1 Lihle - SLFP is - tE Banda. Ia, Inaikes, a family scud. S comics up with Illula Cof - " ChandlikEı - KLI identified with b) Tot 1 CITA ILITE I W ald M5, Bad in thic Illiddle b drika-Wards. Fo w could sce: it a W5. RatWELL, Ill professionalis Ill PT:5'de Tit PIC11 learnt from hi R is is lic T but with some his own. Anti
for leadership b
Mother
le. Si
Party's parl Ilmeeting Col NM) to be an explo the differences Si rima Bandari son, A Illiura, be the open.
According to the Ilother W son of bringin in the party, countered that who was the prevailing prob timacy in preve Tull transfer the party.
Anura's slippi Dr. Neville I Kimal Karuna Hiema. Na Inayak ferous in their Bändlanaikę, porters who go. central coIIl|Illit Dissallal yake, N.

alition" bereft Inable to pTCscnt ter-pTog T El 11.
isis' which has Opposition party s internal strife ut on the public ported in great tun In edia. Since Le party of the
it his beco III e Since One Section
Old tested forUnited Front", IL1 al ra na tlu Inge is
Hic * "Lcf” and "ith the " Right'', a Tan Elike Caught
ut leaning ChanThis pat It, Anura s Banda Ta Laike dernisation and Wiers us feudalism. à das a who has 5 for iller chief
as the master
stri tegems of UNP forces cry ut ther c is none.
Apart from that, Prics ident Premada 51’ 5 Lick hals held, Thc Opposition was too easily temptied to hill Emmer the Tegine con its failure to defeat the "Tigers' and for alienating the Indian government whose cooperation is needed to tackle thu Tail threat. The SLFP in particular
was even more tempted to champion the cause of the ar ITiny and la | 1blast the UNP
foT 11 tot allowing thc army free Tein, or the weapons needed to fight thic war to a finish, The President, the critics said, WELS ""if" " ( L : LTTE.
Ironically, the LTTE changed all that, and in doing so, disarmed the Sinhala opposition. The post-Gandhi Liss Elsination month5 hawę 5 ccm i fierce Crackclown in Tamilnildu with the "climination' finally of those who carried out the execution. By a particularly hopeful coincidence, the Army broke the Elephant Pass seige to give the Prc Inada sa gowcrnment the first significant military victory,
-Son dispute surfaces
La Inka Freedom iamentary group day turned out isive affair, with between MTs, inflike HIld her ing brought into
SLFP sources, as accusing her y about divisions
While the si it was his Ill other Oot Cluse Of the lems by her obsinting the peacef power within
or ters, especially Fernardo Prof. na yake a Tid Mr. kara Were vocicriticis II of Mrs. While her supit into the party's cc recently (S. B. |imal Siripala de
Silva and Mangala Samara weer 4 Taint:Lincd a silence Which surprised then ill.
When the rolle of Mrs. Chåndrika Kumaranatu Iga was taken lup, members said the question did not a rise because she was T10 t even. H The TпHe of the SLFP El Lld her wie Ws Were Illot known.
Aura was found fall. With for a lack of dedication to the party and his 'frivolous" trips Libroad.
Several members expressed the Wiew that Mrs. Bandaran:Like should Tenai || 1 || Colinall head of the party and delegate authority to Anura to run the show.
A committee Li Tcsolve issues between mother and son was appointed. The committee coinprises C. W. Gooneratine, K. B. Ratnayakc, Anil Moonesinghe, D. P. Wickremasinghe, Dharmasiri Senal Inayake and Sumasara DOS Santi yake.
Daily News

Page 7
JR Rides Again
by Piyalı Gamage
et önce more, he's do ile it,
this time an interview with the BBC, no less! He begins by allowing us know how his father was a Supreme Court Judge, JR's father, for a short while before his death, held an acting appointment on the Supreme Court but the Was Iewer COIl firmed als El Puistle Justice. A SITlall llatter, would you say? Recorded history is never reliable because it consists of a whole lot of half-truths. There is no reason Why We should conspire together to ensure that Whit is not true passes in to recorded history. JR. Il cxt claims that all Illic Ilble T5 of thị: Cabilet i Were Lillanimous that I should sign the Accord". But We know that Prime Minister Prema dasa openly opp Lscd the signing of the ACco Tcl, Minister Jaya Suriya resigled from the cabinet I the issut :: Ind even Minister Ath Lllath muda li distanced himself Tröm the Accord and TeLLIIled to the fold only after some time, thus earlig for himself the sob Tiquet Yalith Ath Lula thw u nemi.
IR also told the BBC: “ I am not for violence. I do not know why people take to violence... I Would never say a person is iustified in achieving his good objects through violence." This the sa Inc JR., Imark you, who not long ago, beforc a maminoth CWd in the Suga lādas Stadium, called upon his party supporters to use 'violent or miñ—wille Tt means" to em su Te victory in the presidential election. I think the smart thing for JR would he to be less vehement when he publicly deDoln Ces violeil. Ce.
To me the most impressive show of chutzpah in the whole interwie W was JR's comments on the
referendum: "The people wanted referendum. The decision was not mine.' He blandly
makes this claim without any
explanation of E Communical te t
And then, qui contradicts hil the people buit Walted the r thought I must to the people t parliament shol Ineans Continue tima te life-spali lia lent elected representation." R. Hillsc1 tla portional repres CCTS titlul til. A opportunity he Iment proportion he Wants to whether they avoid it by ex of parliament to těll a ficti Dw i'n fabriciatic; Naxalites hild c; Naxalites are kill people and JR's: + " Nxa 1 it: Were the wimpi kaduwa who til a gC 35 e lIl y Colling leader W Il ge Who ha gi
til 11 e i Hindi cine C01111111111 ha T had no evide
these tw. “Nax: ning assassinati claimed) is es flict hic took I them arrested
Next yiye ELIT I call JR's unco () T t, ÇQ i l Struc tipi de Wisc di to be locutors: “ FIF : tion at that t llaw e either foot though I was country Would un Stäbe." TH the impression heard it right sed to ask f On an earlier

ow "the people' lis Want to him.
ite typically, he elf. It was Ilut he himself that eferendum: "I give a chance die cilic which T ild continue (he beyond its legi1) or have a paron proportional It was of course t imported proentation into OLI I it the very first gcts to impleal representation, ask the people would prefer to it cinding the life JR then goes on inal tale of his l: 'A group of aptured the SLFP. assassins. They cult their necks.' 5'' in the SLFP sh. Hector Kobbecould't say bոճ d the cha Tismatic Vijaya Kumaramadevoted so much rgy Working for mony. That JR ice at all that a lites' were planin (as he publicly tablished by the io steps to have and indicted,
treated t What 1summated either l, which he has fuddle his interWe had all elecime, they would imed a government, resident, and the have become very Le liste 1er foIITis
that he has not and is too be muuirther questions. occasion, he used
this same gambit when explain ing his decision to hold a referendum; I had to decidic whether to allow the Naxalites to form a military government or to ask the people whether, in addition to my being allowed to govern the country with a democratic parliament ensuring peace and progress, or to permit a set of hooligans to enter parliament. The effect aimed at is confusing the listener and this is exactly what is achieved. But, reverlois a los riot for 5. 'So I asked the people: 'Do you want the Naxalitics to gover I the country?" By 52%, they said: 'No'. "Now this is simply not true. Even if wic ignore the scathing comments of the Commissio Iller of Elections on the illegal conduct of the referendum poll, only 3,141,223 votes were counted for the Lamp. This is just 38% of the total registered voters. 62% of the voters failed to vote for an extension of the life of parliament.
Questioned about the government issuling por traits and busts of his likeness J R claims: "It was not for personal reasons but for the glory of the state." How JR's head on a rupee coin could serve the glory of the state is the problem we are confronted with.
When asked whether the Accord did not stir up a hornets' nest JR coolly bluffs: "No, my friend, it dici not." But thic whole World knows the Accord met with violent protests in the course of which thousands of millions of rupe cs worth of damage was donc to government -owned buses, cars, buildings, telephonic exchanges, electricity stations etc. Also, an attempt was made on JR's life in which one i minister was killecd and several minis LCTs injured very seriously, JR himself escaping unsciathed. In an interwiew, he

Page 8
granted to the London Times and the New York Times JR said contemptuously: "The Sinha les c häTC to follow the ACcord. Otherwise they will be locked up." (Quoted in the Sunday Times of 9 August 1987). JR is finally asked what his greatest folly was. After a long pause he says: "I haven't thought of that."
Yeats Wyrote:
An aged man is but a paltry
thing A tattercd coat upon a stick,
LI Inless Soul clap its hands and sing,
and louder sing For every tatter in its mortal
dress,
It is fit and proper that an öld man should contemplate his follies to prepare himself for What is to c3Iı1 e. R, IIIh ally perhaps find his greatest folly from among the following:
1. The Imbulgoda march leading to the tearing up of the B-C Pact which i tille WELS to cost tens of thousands of lives; 2, the taking over of the Times Group of newspapers under
the Business which he had p!
3. the fining the Observer what crime the an act which
cised abroad t of this country
4. the failure Council Law as
5. the depriva rights of Mrs long after she invitation to cabinet;
6. the Jaffna which the gow Էtl with the
the Commissio resulting in ch
7. the 1980 puէ in which JR
public ser wants. large number C 8, thuggeгу а and other acts in the conduct c vidc the report sioner of Elect
9, the complet the 1983 ctic
VASA O ||
207, 2nd C Colomէ
Telephoпө :

Take over Act, romised to repeal;
if two editors of "without knowing had committed' was much publi{j the dish Ճn Our
to repeal the Press he had promised;
tion of the civic Banda Tallike It
had rejected his her to join his
DDC ClectiQIls il crlicht interferarrangements of It of Elections, a 05 at the Count;
lic Service strike sacked 40,000 | resulting in a յք 5լlicitics: Id intimidation of 1:lWles SIl e55 if the referendum, of the Chrillisi tls; c Inish andling of wito lence, culm
inating in the deplorable 6th Amendment which left the govCTIn ment with no Tail leaders to talk to except tigers with քլIT15:
10. interference with the highest judiciary, publicly insulting senior judges, treating all judges gf the Supreme and Appeal Courts as having vacated their posts and locking up and planting guards outside the courts to prevent judges from entering;
11, the promotion of police off. icers immediately following their being faulted by the Supreme Court etc., citc.
The above are just a few of the follies which JR might consider as being among his greatest blunders. But my own fawou rite choice als JR's greatest folly is his having called Mrs Indira Gandhi a cow when she was in the political Wilderness. WCT y so co T In di Tal was back in office as prime minister. She acted swiftly to arm the tigers, provide them with military training and finance their war against Sri Lanka. JR's joke was very costly.
PTICANS
ross Street, O - 11.
421631

Page 9
MWOWAMW REFORMIS:
Good start roc
K K Sharma
O. of the most fragile gowernments in India's history
has, paradoxically, started to make the bold economic policy changes that not even Mr Rajiv Gandhi's ostensibly more stable administration of the mid-1980s cCull risk.
The minority govern Illent of Prime Minister P W Narasimha RELO has realised that the widespread unwillingness to contemplate another election campaign has given it an opportunity for decisive action, while the danger of a default on India's 57 Obn cxtcInal debt has provided an incontestable case for it.
Yet, even though the proposed reforms are a response to the balance of payments crisis, their content is fair Wide T than Stabilisation and export promotion. They introduce a long-discussed and widely-desired, if still limited, liberalisation and dcregu
lation of India's sclerotic ECO nomy.
The liberalisation appears decisive, at least by Indian standards. But the projected
reduction of 2 percentage points in the budget deficit as a share of gross domestic product does not, by almost any standards. None thic less, the International Monetary Fund is likely soon to announce il loan to ease India's current balance of payПЕПТЕ СТјEјS. THE IMF"; regponse reflects India's importance El nd I a. Il appreciation of its changed policy stance at least as much as the stringency of the proposed stabilisation.
Mr Michel Camdes sus, the IMF managing director, has welcomed thic reforms, "including the initial stabilisation measures and the initiation of a more liberal trading system. We want to continue supporting
In dili"si efforts
balance of pay the foundations Sustained growt
BLI L is Wyhlt intends to do וט be Hillow - וחשיים intends' Thics their forct. N. hä15 been dung For that tyi m115t tike the
In Dr Mai 11 new finance II
Of the two, WetiטTנן 5 ThHDטים prising. By giwi g-El head, he h self to be a political strateg when he becam prime minister Congress gover months ago. O cal throw lit At the Tisk () government, wh y et a nother elle illud a half . Il 18:1sin:tti Ó11 () during the last
The result is
government has unexpectedly ra refor Ins go thr could still fouI permits the fa within Congress from the oppos of a Lld — II d hil we II10 Weid to
isolation.
"The gover II tÇ0 LT15l CTCCCCIII and structural will unleash th clergy to bring tcd development "The country beyond its mea soft options. I itself to take sant decisions.'

THE REGION
ky road
to strengthen its
Tents and build
for Strong and h.'"
the government enough? Will it to do wat it questions retain :Wertheless, what is significant. pivotal figures credit: Mr Rao han Singh, the inister.
Mr. Rio his the mote suring DT Singh the as shown him
ITC Stult ist than thought Let the CůT15ě 1515 of a minority ment. In early two pposition parties the reforms only f toppling the ich Would entail
ction only two onths after the Gälld Hi
T MIT
that the Indian Illowed at all pid pace. If the Ough - and they der if Mr Rag i Ctitional quarrels and Tumblings ition to get out ia will finally end its 50-year
10:IIt is committed 1ic StabiliSEti C1 Teforms which e, I'll tion's Eltent y El bout accelera,' said Mr Singh. has been living ns and adopting t must preparc lard and un plica
The Inted to secure a further IMF loan to shore up India's foreign exchange reserves, on top of the S1.9bn already in haIld, has un doubtedly spurred the government into speedy action. But Dr Singh - a techTlocrat who hlas held all llost every important official position in India. In economic policy-making — is not being disi Ingen uolus when stati Ing that the Telforms are in India's own intercist. He his ciðin victio II i Inside hill and the Cri5i5 heid il whic II: - ting to: * Sweep aside the complicated regulations governing foreign trade, following a decisive twophase dewa luation of the grossly– over valued rupee early in July;
* Welco IIle direct Lwe5t. Det by multinationals;
* Dismantle the "licence raj'
(reign by licences) on Indian industry — 84 pe T cent of industry has now been freed from licensi Ing requirements;
* Partially frec the financial system from controls on interest rates, and;
Propose a more limited role for the public sector.
In addition, by reducing thic fiscal deficit from 8.5 per cent of gross domestic product to 6.5 per cent, the governmcnt has made at least an initial step towards returning India to its historic fiscal conscrwatisi Tı.
None of this has been easy. Critics have lamented what they consider the shedding of Nehru's socialist model, based on selfreliance and a public sector that holds the commanding heights of the economy.
Thc reforms were also frow. ned upon by many bureaucrats who fought a brief but bitter
7

Page 10
battle against them, partly bccause of their wested interests in a government-regulated economy and partly because of conviction. Mr B K Modi, a leading industrialist, said: 'I don't think the bureaucrats arc going to change over-night. You can feel thc resistance already."
But Dr. Singh acted decisively, by telling senior officials that those who could not support the program nic would be transferred. He was helped by the fact that many senior officials, particularly in the ministries of cominecc and industry, have been unsuccessfully clain ou ring for deregulation for years. They feel the finance ministry has obstructed thc process of liberalisation by cx erti Ing to o great a co It Tol Cwer economic lift.
While the reforms have begun to have an impact, many are only statements of intent. Much has still to be done, including the implementation of what has low been decided. And although Dr Singh has cut subsidies and government expenditure, for example, and reduced the fiscal deficit, he has failed to introduce long overdue tax refoIII m.
Thc minister has declared a virtual open-door policy for foreign investment by increasing the limit on foreign ownership of the equity in Indian joint ventures from 40 to 51 per cent, thereby assuring them of control. He has also suggested that they could be allowed 100 per cent ownership if high technology and an export commitment are involved. Yet foreign investment is still not permitted in key arcas such as energy or oil and mineral exploration.
The Monopolics and Restrictive Trade Practices Act has been considerably liberalised and therc are now 10 festrictions on fresh investments by the so-called "large monopoly houses' - companies with assets of Rs.1bn. Nevertheless, industrial licences are still needed for some products including coal and ca T5. H
S.
MI Rial Ellil and managing Auto, El Scott the lifti lig of requirements: difficult it ca someone in N licence, Th en the whole pro tina ting, becau thing for himse other things. things will ch
The gover 11 the Tight to ri require more th of capital good contend that t sing has beci the back door has promised limit will be Telmowed Whcı change positio:
Many entrep nomists say no ind L15 trial even in the El 1 defence indust government ha dustries within and has made ases from pr a broad. Corn that private II should be allo freely in this a ing al goverill I any case there for massive defence spendi disproportional un productive I 1.2m strong a II
In the tWO the public sec tion, the gove take bold init reforms wirtll: a reas, mainly cept of a str: is considered rous ground The governme retailed owner and Illineral of Which wou domestic and in Westment.
There is a foi den tio Thali

Bajaj, chairmanı lirector of Bajaj r maker, praised
most licensing "I know low In get to chase W D clhi for a some fool delays ect by procrasSe he wants so Illelf, or a thousand | Llt Inow I thik. inge.''
ent has I eta i Illed ject projects that än Rs 20m-Worth imports. Critics his means lice insawed through But Dr. Singh hat the RS 20In Tallised and ewen the foreign ex1 improves.
Tenieurs and ecotlerc should be Licensing at all, ;omic energy and ries. So far, the s kept the sic inthe public sector substantial purchivate companies Tı: İltito Ts argue ldian companies w cd to compete real without need1c Il t lice Inc C. In is a strong case cuts in overill ng of which a e share is on the 1ain teni lice of al Illy,
crucial areas of or and privatisa"Ilment Ille edis, t) iatives. But the lly ignore both because the conng public sector politically dangeto tread upon. 1t bas, instead, hip of the energy industries, both d benefit from
foreign private
o a strong case iation of the lo 55
THE REG OM
making coal industry and for giving incentives to Indian and foreign companies to search for oil, production of which has stagnated for more than a de
cade. This forced the government to increase oil imports and is one of the principal
rea5 ons foT the cu Trent balance of payments crisis.
The public financial institutions are also in need of an overhaul, particularly the natio = na lised banks, which a re noto
riously inefficient. Although the Indian capital market is now well developed, funds for
industrialisation Would be easier
to rais: if the balık55 Wert de nationalised.
Mr Ramesh Chauhan, chair
man of the Parle group, a soft drinks company, said: "The policy on public sector disinvestment is disappointing. As far as the industrial policy is concerned, it should be se parated from the foreign investment policy. Why should licensing be required for any industry where there is no foreign direct investment?"
Also absent from the reforms is a policy that would allow loss-making businesses, both in the public and private sectors, to close down. Painful deciSions arc involved, particularly because of opposition from trade unions and the left-wing political parties as a result of the feared impact on employIllent. The entire issue of industrial relations needs scrutiny.
Many industrialists think the government should have announced a competition policy on the British pattern. Although deregulation has been Widely welcomed, a competition policy is required so that industry can be restructured and consumer interests protected.
Industrialists say the refoms have not gone far enough and they urge the ministry of industry to play a role that would help in the restructuring
(Солтільfed on page I7)

Page 11
Nepal's security percep
Mushahid Hussain
eopolitics has always bee,
quite predictably, a key ellement of Nepal’s security perceptions. If historically, Afghani. 5 til W Els i 5ec In as EL bluffer biet Ween Russil and the South Asiain subcontinent during the days of the - Imperial Raj, similarly Nepal has been perceived as a buffer between the two Asian giants, China and India. The fact that these two Asian countries later developed an adversarial relationship contributcd to en hancing the importance of Nepal for both China Eind India and it then provided greater leverage to Nepel to embark on a policy of tightTope Walking in diplomacy with tilt to wa Tids India fi blanced" by growing intimacy across the Himalayas. With China. In fact, the last major crisis in IndoNepal relations in March 1989, when India virtually imposed in cCononic blockade of landlocked Nepal on account of a bilateral tradic dispute, was sparked by the 1988 Nepalese decision to plu Tchase some military equipment fryn China Tuch to the cha grin of New Diclhi. Most of this military equipment, artillery and infantry weapons, rolled down from the Chinese mainland via the land route to Nepal.
Indian influences on Nepal, which, incidentally, is the only other Hindu-majority state in the World, apart from India itself, OpéTäle in varicus Teils With open borders between India and Nepal, a large number of Nepalese trek towards its souther neighbour for jobs and the Indian currency is legal tender in Nepal. While Nepal earns approximately 40 million pounds from its annual tourist traffic. meistly Western enthusiasts pursuing trekking and mountaineering in some of the World's most adventurous landscapes, another 10 million pounds flow into the Nepalese treasury
Theo , ĉar Fiar is al li!'' Ek Filiport PAIA, israIJI ciri FFFFF
eVery year as par Salary payments iers and depei Indian governme bond is reinforc. given that appro Nepal's popula thic central regio tracc5 its linea ge tionally, Nepal the Nepali Cor currently in the
als well, las friidi close ties with nal Congress, w leaders. See as the
Indian interes tia11y perciחטess close to the King ou s political pat be essentially til a pliable gover
11. Il di which I TOT e possible t political system, tion is Tilire a Int ilees, H. lute monarchy experience with
ofte be diffici Second, preserv։ Indo-Nepal tre på Tt of El pattern ping institution; northern neighl the termination trl in 1947. Ind int 5 i Tilar tTeil in 1949 || Sik that respect Ind inherit of th tradition, which ilar links witH. during the da Third, Nepal i withdravy YI CHI TT) idi: "5 Tibb get': so since 1959 La TTa, aftcr fcie refuge in India u prising, the Indi Tibet, probably 111's Achilles. Het importance for I
Given this ct sought to expl location to gain

ions
of pension and pr Gurkha soldi - ents from the t. The religious by ethnic ties imately 40% of on, mostly in known as Tarai, to India. Addilargest Party, ress, which is uling coalition ionally enjoyed e Indian Natioich many of its
it parent party'
Es in Nepal are ived by sources a5 Well as varities in Nepal to ree-fold. First, nnlent i11 KathIndians feel is hrough an open which by definiinable to outside T than am ab 50which, as India's Nepal shows can 1t to deal with. tion of the 1950 aty, which was of India develoall ties with its pours following of Colonial conlia , thus, entered ties with Bhutan kill in 1950. In i: Sees litself E18 e Imperial Raj established 5imthe se countries is of the Rai. s an important a and vital for :cy Innection, more when the Dalai ing Tibet sought and since that lians have viewedi rightly, as Chi1. Hence, Nepal's India,
intext, Nepal has coit its stratègic increasc di lewe T
THE REG OM
age, and by extension, greateindependence from Indian influr ence, by alter na tecly seeking options other tham India, notably China, Pakistan and the Unit cd States. Intercistingly, while many Nepalese consider the 1950 IndoNepal Treaty as being “un equal” considering that it was signed by the Prime Minister of Nepal and the Ambassador of India, no Nepalese government has called for it to be revoked. The turning point for Nepal to promote its secuity interests, independent of India, came after the uprising in Tibet in 1959 and the subsequent deterioration of Sino-India. In reliltio [15 Which cu 1 mi Inated in their border conflict of 1962. Those events suddenly elevated Nepal to the ole of a buffe between China and Indial, with both kecil to cultivate Kathmadu. It was in the early 60s that Nepal took a decision which carned it American goodwill, namely, Nepal beca me the fist Solitl Asian country to formally establish diplomatic relations with 1srael and the Israeli President Illade his first visit to South Asia, to Nepal, in 1966, with an Embassy in Kathmandu to ensure a political prcsence.
From 1975 onwards, Nepal has been presenting its proposal for declaring that country as a "Zone of Peace' essentially a diplomatic ploy aimed at gaining international recognition for its sovereign status vis-a-vis fears of Indian encroachments on its independence. It is thus not surprising that while 116 members in thẽ United Nations General Assembly backed Nepal, including China, the United States Lili Pakistall, for its quest for a 'Zone of Peace" India consistently opposed this proposal. Nepal also took a stand contrary to that of India, on such
issues as Afghanistan and callbodia.
During the 80s, Nepal develo ped close political ties with
(Carr ir real or page 23)

Page 12
South Commission Report - (2)
Regional Cooperation
Saman Kellegama
egional Corporation is ano
ther arca on which the Report has laid much emphasis Julius Nyerere has once said that the North knows the South, the South knows the North, and the North knows the North, but the South does not know the South This statele Tit is uit: correct. South crı Tations är e practically all quite ignorant of the tremen dous tra de Coppotunities that exist in the South itself. In fact, the South colstitutics a huge market which, at the Inoment, is accessible largely to the developed countries. The advancing trading nations of the North a Te knoWledgeable about these markets mainly because their private companies and public agencies have been in business in Southern markets for diccades. Thus the Southern nations have been exploited by the traders of the North simply because the South has not made use of other Southern markets Wing to weak information networks and data banks. Malaysia has taken the first step to overcome this problem and has proposed the setting up of a Trade Infornation Network and a South Investment Data Exchange Centre to service the South,
The Te is a lot of The toric Co. In South-South cՃt peration, but the reality is much more conplex. Let us take a SouthSouth forum that is cl05e to wiz. SA ARC (South Asia Association of Regional Cooperation). There El Te certai I EL Tca. 5 whic Te cooperation is difficult due to various reasons such as "big brother do II i Illaltiol", etc. FTIT example, trade and industry have been deliberately left out of the SAARC agendä because many disagree emnts a rise ip these areas. Let us take a look at thic current trading patterns of SAARC COLII tric 5. Thic bulk (of
O
production of S is traded with the association. in 1989, SAAR amounted to : their total expt While mutul I to 2.6 per ceu imports front there is the qui Terחוןם matinim H1 tTEdC i SARRO the Asian Clea established in tle l3e of e: ald transfer c{ ill its infall intra-group tra lugh this chif about 10 per c trade With the there is a lit
Hic Inc. i1 South coopcration.
In this conte son 5 to believ cooperation ca. by ha Wing so II external cataly Tre has beeh case of ASEA South-East As Japan, which established a s financing the Industrial Proje ventures) such but hawe also : up of ASEAN plementation automobile Ilia prises. Japan ccc 10 Illic i Inte: and, in 1989, it 9.4 per cent o compared with SAARC, CCLIII tie: 12.3 per cent imports from A with 1.3 per c: collitries. S0 är force for regi Sccl5 5cul.
This a spect been recognize

SAARC Coulties |countries outside For Example, C mutual exports 3.4 per cent of rts to the world, imports a mounted t of their total he world. The lestion of using cies for mutual 2. In this regard ring Union was 1974 [] Tinirtıize xchange reserves sts. It is still cy because the de passing thronnel today is :ent of the group world. Clearly, of work to be Asian regional
:xt there are rea
e that regional be enhanced me type of an ItjC force, This
fulfilled in the N (Association of an Nations) by has not only pecial fund for large ASEAN ts (regional joint Els L1 Tcl plants, ssisted in setting Industrial Col. rojects such as ufacturing enterhas a special ’est in ASEAN provided ASEAN its world export 1.4 per cent to s, and it imported if its total world SEAN, compared :Dt from SAARC external catalytic onal cooperation
See 15 to have in recent years
and 50 met ideals hawe been mooted by the World Institute of Development Economic Research (WIDER) in Helsinki. WIDER has suggested that the enormous Japanescisur plus should b c di Tected towards the dewelopment of the South, in general, and South-South cooperation, in particular. A new opportunity has been presented for South Asia by the commitment of 20 per cent of Japanese Over seas Development Assistance to the
region. It is believed that such a step should help invigorate SAARC activities. In overal terms, regional cooperation, though a very rosy idea, has many problems to overcome.
And in this regard the Report has not come out strongly with
respect to the mechanics and
the modalities of it.
South Bank
The third i del that stands
out in thic Report is the cstablishment of a South Bank. This idea was first mooted in 1973 - a time well-known for the OPEC surplus, It was said that such a surplus should be effectively mobilized to establish a bank. Now this idea has reemerged as major theme. The strategy is to mobilize the surpluses that emerge in the Southern countries. Of course, there is the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, Latin American DevelopIlent Bank, and so on, which provides funds to the countrics in the South. But they are Il Codici 1 c d ) In W CT 1d Bank li mics and are to a considerable extent controlled by the North. This is why aan autonomous Southern Bank has been proposed.
The Bank Will have new norms, new terms of reference, controlled totally by the South, and it will finance sustainable development. There are reasons

Page 13
to believe that World Bank has emphasized poverty allevation in its 1990 report, it is not geared operationally to finance power ty a llc wiii tio, This tasko cal - bc taken over by the South Bank, טSון טווח ווזו Tם שנlti bוןם:t t ו tiוןa: benefit to a people-based institlı til 5 Luchi as, for example, the Janis: viya Trust FLInd in Sri Lanka. Although the Report has not outlined the operational guidelines of this Dey balık, the entire idea is praiseworthy a Tid the St Luther"Il Columitrie S5ha. Il di Work towards establishing this institutio II.
although the
South Secretariat
Let us now tu TI OLI I attention to the proposed South Secretarialt. This is a major step because neither the Non-Aligned Movement nor the Group of 77 had anything Thore than a FudiTentary a Trailgement to Tepre| scnt tlie South. All other för L111S that existed were ad hoc arrangeThe Ints and were not coherent enough to represent the South. What is important is that the South must act. The South must set in motion the processes which will make this wholly Southern effort WOTThwhile a Tid productive. The South has nothing even remotely equivalent to the OECD. With the emphasis now on the North-South divide Tat het than the Eilst-West divide, the need for more formal
coordination of the South is even greater. Without waiting for a agreement with all the
130 countries of the South, the formation of the Group of 15 for South-South cooperation is
an importa step, This foru can be a stepping storic for the formation of the South
Secretariat.
Prospects and Challenges
Most of other recommendations of the Report a Te praiseworthly. But how will
this new outlook for the South fit into the international framcwork? This is a crucial question The first factor that has to be taken into consideration is that the Southern strategy should not pretend to be a big plan
but rather hig issues on WE should to rict II Southern sta leg 4 mbitious, Tı or Imhore - Te-a listjc.
why this shoul
The World B TA D, etc, hallwe casts of global 1990s, in par Imedium te TII). are illne Insely cause the Coll have presented
Ice Cf El dec:: going to be We the 1980s, assu ILIāti T1 Of 198s West. These p dicite tlıat the tTil liged CCILIIltf will grow only did in the 198 two to three p Tle FOTE:: St.S E the CITT1) di ty || Il Odity prices V significantly frt which they fel HC Weyer, 11th tions depict a going to be signi from the pre: ,tטון 111 W 19905 al Illi TriCT imag Te | )() || dy na Inics, its c, of it positive, 1 f Whנt ;111 tנוט way or another, all el Wirn Irell very different 1980s. Thus, i tisk of the S0 capture that sp Çorrect al ctil. the North C: neglected in the Ine It strategy a I10t gCling to er pletely new si iIlı tı: Ileat full
Befo Te the : West started, ( annual meeting of Milister 5. que they gave deep sense of the situ la tio D1 in * They said that t Were adequatic, everything was

hlight some key 1ich the South trate. Secondly, y should be less e selective, and Let us exInile d be the case.
ank, IMF, UNCmilde some foretrends for the ticular, for the These forecasts discouraging be11 on picture they for the 1990s is ide that is It ry different from Ining the contiis policies in the rojections all ildeveloped indusits of the North, slowly - as they 305 - at betWeel er cent a year. 1150 || Tedict that Tarkets lind comy Could not Tec Čhwe
m the trough to | in tilt 1980s, ugh the projecdecade that is not ficantly different with 115 (int, the Eill the saille, be
e of the 1980s.
hil we its OW I 10gIG, 5th Ille וWIו
so I me negative, ich Will, i Lle Cric: EA tie : scenario, I, which will be to that of the should be the uth's strategy to iirit al Id to takt This is because not be totally South's develop. ind the North is -IIIטט - n aם nbark
rategy, at least ILIIC.
recession in the
ECD had their of thici T - CoLIci II their communiexpression to a satisfaction with the OECD region. heir growth rates and basically Well in their part
of the World. But the Inlessage that they need to grasp is that no matter how good things Inay appear, in the long run they Will not be able to -indeed, no part of the World will be able to — il Sul late the Tisel WCS from upheavals and chaos, from tensions and breakdowns, that Illight emerge on a largo 5 calle in other parts of the World, in particular, the South. So it is esse Il till for the il to alt ta çı great importance to the problems of the Soul.
But if the North ignores the the South and coil siders it a threat, then there is no option
fai the South but tu take a "We do it care' attitude. The South should put across thic
message to the North very clearly, that adjustment in the South for what is done in the North is u II Tair, and has to stop. So for a chiewing fairplay al sensible North-South dialogue should begin. The Report has a full Chapter on improving NorthSILLE Telatica IS. New te Tills of incorporation 1 Els been suggested and the Report has gone to the extent of suggesting a new international, economic order.
It is nccessагy to fогge a пеw in Lernational economic Order because there is ample evidence LS SLLaaLLLL LLLL S S LLLLLLK LLLL L0LLLLL is collapsing. In the 1950s and 1960s, with the IMF, World Bank, and Bretton Woods, there emerged some kind of modest consen sus on Cooperation for development. There was agreemcnt con aid targets, on preferential tariffs for developing coultrics il the Illa Ikets of develpcd countries, on the need to reduce fluctuations in co III midity prices. Today, the picture is totally different. There is no agreement on whether aid targets should even be adopted, let alone implemented; there is
Titsט וון שth תם LנHEFE&me r סוT Of international regulati II to stabilize commodity prices; and there is wery little chu
siasm for the extension of tariff preferences to developi Ing coultries - in fact the problem today is that developing countries

Page 14
are confronting escalating proTiÖn ist barriers. A5 long as this situation CCT) tilles, there will be no basis for the reslimption of the North-South dialogue or for the formulation of good and effective Southern dew clopment strategy.
Clearly, there is a need create a ney international consensus and find ways and means to fit in the TCC 0 til merida. Li 15 of the South Commission into this new agenda. This particularly important because it is being said that although the World is getting more integrated, although financial markets El T: converging, there is also a possible trend in the Other direction. A possible danger is that these very processes can lead to the marginalization of the countries jf the South. The developing Coll Intries, instead of being drawn Into the wortex of the Will Cconomy, could remain, and continue to Termain, increasingly Con le periphery, Therefore, in effective North-South dialogue has to be induced and this is a challenge not only for the South but also for North.
III COinclusion, thc Rc port deserves the full Httention Of the governments and NGOs of the South, since it gives a cornprehensive analysis of the deVelopment experience from the Southern perspective. Besides, it gives. El multitude of specific Toto0 til T1 e Il ditions and policy options and shows where the South is moving and where the South should aim at moving, The Report should be translated to as many languages as POssible. It is now in the hands f the people of the South and cven more so, in the hands of their leaders, to take the initiative and implement the Report's recommendations. Let us liopט that this will be done and the Report will not remain yet another academic excrcise.
12
Indo-So O:::
the Indo-Soviet for and hc twic Widely welcome רוןwh טsנEWen tilt allergic to Indi: the Soviet Jiji hardly inclined breathtaking ch: taken place in r Soviet Union a should Haye di ideological han Էnarled up at tit centrally planne
It is WCT TE signed the Trea With the Soviet 1971 FL|Illast el the itti tu de Whic del L. MIT, Ric: Lake towards his II labased st. which llad Lline: ter TI il y hat to be colle B Mr. Nix UIl HI1 h Kissinger who w to India's predic to handle a Sta refugees hound homes by Islat had brazenly pl an impossible ps rious public co policy of U.S. There was, of c. the country at . this Teally had helpless and m for it to sign the Sovie LJII com little it by Article IX w H cent of either E :Icted to II Ett thereof, the H Partie 5 5hä11 jTil in to II i Lutual Order to remove to take appro III: SL TCS LC) CISL Security of their implied that II active Soviet it a military enga kista 1 a IId also t tive of the pri Alignment of ni El I1y Lmilitary ||

viet Tie
easonably certain the Tene Wal of Friendship Treaty Tilty y Cai TS WILE da in the country, have long been a's close ties with i ( ) I will now be te) Qoppose: it. The linges Whichi have ecent years in the di Eastern Europe issolved it the g-lip3 = 'whıclı Huad Ludes to Wards the d economics. alling that India Y of Friendship Onion in August tirely because of h the U.S. Presihard Nixon had "his country and Pop Cort LC) Pakistan 1shed a reign of S subsequently angladesh. Both ls aide Dr. Henry ere wholly blind **1II13 tilt in having ggering influx of 2d out of their nabad's genocide ut themselves in sitiot by a notoTallit ment to the "tilt" to Pakistan Irse, a debate in he tím č whether *ft India so very ade it necessary Treaty with the because of the T1p C5 t"rl IIII - Intif{1 ! Ich said. “In the 'arty being subjFlick Cor a threat Tigh Cottracting Imediately enter (Il Sultations im such threat and PгiH te effective T: . Ip eEl, Ce" E1 Ind the Countries." This 1 dia could seek Crvention du Ting genent with Pa. hat it was violai ciples of Nil. L e ntering into a Ice With either
THE REGION
of the sliperpowers. The liberation of Bangladesh achieved within a fortnight in December 1971 by the lindian armed forces did. however, render this commitment under Article IX wholly of academic interest. Nevertheless the bighly intimidatory Inoves made at the time by President Nixon to sail the U.S. Seventh Fleet towards the Bangladesh coast reveilled that the threat of an active U.S. intervention in the subcontinent had to be taken seriously and ensured against by India.
The wind of change in the USSR and Eastern Europe ushering in democracy, the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty of the Cold War era and the signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between the U.S. and the Soviet Union all virtually a mount to the burying of the hatchct by what were rival power blocs. This should remove all the complexes which have cloud cd the attitude of the U.S. towards India and the other Third World countries which have developed close relations with the Soviet Union. The renewal of the IndoSoviet Treaty for another 20 years would help in strengthening further the economic and cultural relations between the two countries. It will be ridiculous to imagine that there is a military threat ilh cent in the Treaty against any country though
it is a fact that India is not being left in any peace by the persisting provocations in
Kashmir and Punjab.
The far-reaching political and economic changes in the Soviet Union being Thanaged with superb statesmanship by Mr. Gorbachev are bound to impart a qualitative change to whatever agreements India Will be signing with that country for promoting trade and economic development and make them very much alike the agreements it has reached with other countries. This should rc.love thic suspicions about the exclusiVeness' about Indo-Soviet relations which had been prevailing not only abroad but also a mong U.S. änd Western-oriented segThe Ints of opinion within India its cel F.
(Hīrridu)

Page 15
The Persian Gulf War
Douglas Allen
uring the August-January
period of preparing thic U.S. public for the predetermimed slaughter of Iraq and especially during the JanuaryMarch boni biting and ground war, the United States became cought up in an exhila, Tating at in Cosphere of war euphoria. Perhaps more than any place in the United States, the Bangor, Maine area Where I teach and live became caught Lupi in this Thational War euphoria,
The Inail objective factor in this intense regional reaction was the locatic II of the Bangor International Airport (formerly a military base and a rare success. ful "peace conversion' project), A large percentage of returning Gulf troops deplained in Bangor on their way hole to North CT Clia, Illi Ilois, a Tid other parts of the country. The daily flights became trainformed into a competitive event a way of outdoing the rest of the country and putting Bangor on the map. The Tiational edia obliged with heart Warming, coinplimentary accounts of the Temarkable Bangor story' with hundreds, often thousands of Mainers flocking each day to the airport to Welcome and celebra te heroic strangers.
TITLIC: , the Chamber of Col. merce End local business interestis, politicia n.5, churches, Schools, and the Lin Critical III le dia (Ilot only providing overwhelming coverage but listing all incoming troop flights and encouraging Citizens to get on the båndwagon) were part of the construction and perpetuation of the fictitious war myth. But that doesn't fully account for the incredible reaction.
lin. In any respects, the Persian Gulf War euthoria, both locally
(The Istriter issar Ed Frar of the Bullettri TT SLLLLLLGL LlTaMS eTL LLLLLSuTTGLL LLa TTL
ELLLLHHLk KLLGCCMHC L L L L HH LLLLa of the ha: "Colling ră Terrii, - LJ.S. Indo-China and the War)
El Tid alti Cally, of many expe Lanka during 1: hild i Classica training in Hin dhisi 11 FILII Had Il Balla T3. Hi in Indial, built ha ledge of the ci Lankan experien Inyo naive, lumiI cepti 13ıs alını d lex l1ןIfu טtx:impl fluc Titial Sĩ Th:1 munks, Schola and other - citi of the Buddha to explain and Initillents and I had always u basic teachings lerance, coopera lowing kindness, were being use intolerance, h: 2ı ild Wide Inc.c. II i Ing Sri Link' best-known Imao: ther the Bild CC3.Tle til Sri L8: the compassion El 5 Fl Conquerer citing the Chro Inc. His reply:
Most of the and justice st Illet i El Sri Lan
des pair. Their h : analyses, and Ta seemed to tally
fuil cinci Ing the se the hatred raci: winis T1, Te pressit
Similarly, a lld Schlär5 Maine : Tea all United States despair during t March, as the tion and others have continued patriotic war e t divert il tte structural prot their popularit their power. Pa irse from El se

as Myth
Temi I del Te Tiences i Sri 85-1986. I laid 1 philosophical duism a mill B LI lspent a year Indu University di limited knowinte Imporary Sri ces contridicted for Illed precoilpectations. For ned 5 i Thany inla Buddhists - rs, politicians, ng the authority allık Elis di 7 FF FFEI ustify their compolicies. What Interstood to be cmphasizing toוrרp:i5$ifווcúr וווtit
indi non violence d to legiti III1 a te Litrcid, repression, Il cic Tecall Fisk5 internationally nk-scholar wheihah haldi reālly Linka (and not as te Buddhiä but
), 13 s 0. IT14. Ily, nicles, had told * Who Iko Wi?""
leading peace H11 Tactivist S I ka were in great i5 Lcorical Tese:F1 T ch, tional argızı ile Ints irrIc1 w In t iil in
caught up in TIl ethnic chaun, and violence.
Titiwar activist, in the Bal Inggris throughout thc awc felt a deep he war and since Bush Adminstra -
with influence
to exploit the uphoria in order tion from deep e1s reinforce y, and increas: rt of this despair 15e of full Statio El
and confusion. Historical rese
arch, political and economic analysis, arguments, - all secmcd- irrel W111t to those pro LLd
citizens displaying their yellow ribbons and rushing to the airport.
This article is a brief attempt at malking 50 Ille sense Of What has been going on in Melillo and thic United States and pe Thaps also in Sri Lanka by introducing analysis and concerns usually omitted by anti-imperiallists and others on thic Left.
Two Senses of Myth
The history of philosophy and rcligion reveal two, diametrically opposed meanings of 'myth' Plato and especially Aristotle, the Greek philosophers who most defil cd the Ima turc and - future direction of western philosophy, introduced Our cCllITUn II1 eining of ''Ilyth' as something untille'". To label, and usuallly dismiss, something as El myth, as "merely a myth'', is to regard it is an imaginary creation that may be belig ved but is irrational, does InCt c Chr:- I cspond to factual all historical evidence, and is fictitious and false. Thus, in a traditional wester Il in Lerpretation, philosophy and science involved the evolution from and rejcc. tion of myth 15 111 elflicT, subjective, non reflective, and Luncritical stage of human developIlent. Today, Olir ordinary language usually reflects this meaning of ''Ilyth' as contrasted With truth" and reality".
There is a second meil ning of "myth', much older than classical Greek philosophy, Teflecting the views of religious
people who believe myths, 'live' myths, a Te “Illythic people.” For such people, myths are special narratives, 'true Stories' Ĉi fo sacred or transcendent reallities; they are to be told and retold, are re-enacted through rituals and other practices, and
Y (J rr rfrTr#g": r r! Fagge" 23)

Page 16
Indo-US Relations - (2)
China, Pakistan — oth
Chintamani Mahapatra
GE by simple logic, the improved relations between the United States and the Soviet Union should bring about a change in the US perception of, and policy towards, India, since Allerican officials often raised questions and cypressed concern about India's policy towards the Soviet Unico I: The Tecelt trend, of course, shows a little improvement for the better in the relationship bct ween New Delhi and Washington. The on-going changes in the global political, security and economic environment are too rapid to justify any rationalisation or predict the development of a future pattern or relationship. Nonetheless, with the relaxation of the new Cold War and eIIergence of a new equation between the two most powerful cold Warriors, the Indo-US relations in the fic lids of trade, investment and technology transfer also seem to be improving. For instance, in 1987, onefourth of all foreign collaborations in India werc with Armerican private companies. The А петican fiТпs" contribution to the total equity investment in India in the same year Was about 40 per cent. Washington in the same year once again approved 3,916 export licences worth S.563 million. In recent years, the United States has replaced the Sovjet Union as the largest trading partner of India, the bilate Tål trade betwee the two countrics touching a high of S5.7 billion in 1988. The growing Indo-American cooperation in the field of science is brought out by the fact that scientists from both the countries are today working together in a thousand scientific fields, including Weathcr prediction, con
trol of dis cases, dryland agriculture and marine research. In de cd thic Te is hardly a s igni
ficant ficld of scientific. acti
14
vity in which a of Indian and tists is Ilot Wo
The efforts by A.III erican gover I y ea Ts to improvi C0-FTC duction « Ce Tellited. Le II thy developmen Collah (1rition ficture di Li TE 5 rel prototype of th; ly to be red 1992. El le ille TT djall Air Foi While I1 K.C. P3 Tl Defence Minis submi Fi Tinc tech during his visi רון (1989 סוחן וT הןז indigenously III Harine fleet, was reported The talks betw in fact, were fic: Tange of War Sen Sits, ye tes ched missiles, a 1 di ni hero reel; en ce systems al t]]8 CL155ỉ011. Th! On its part, of co-produce an jet engine with was made is p US presentation co-production o jet. It was a significant US als to India, El is capable of сатгу шp to 7 Tdılarıce Hrı d gc air side-winder
The Te is litt recent spurt in Illic and secuti facilitated by a super power det
10 Illic libe Talli: the government this tred cc) 1L years leading te

er factors
lest Ille te II Almerical scienking together.
/ the Indian alld 1ITients ill. TeceIlt e cooperation in if certain defeTis is a Illico Le WOTL. In fact, joint iIT -- thic Ilma II u Ilight Combat Airdy started. The is aircraft is likey by the years aircraft may be use by the InIce by 1994-95. t, for I'll cr. I ndia in ԼtT, sought US Ilology systeins to Washington e Ille Ildil til inlu flotl Te El sub:he US response y encouraging een the parties, i Cussel o Il a wide fare technology. such as sca-laul IIdeep sea sensors liited IIW II de sso figured in the 2 United States, TETed II 198) t
advanced fighter Idi:1. TH1is ) ffer Tt Of 1 Chye:11 t) II1dii1 for the f the TF-5 til Iler Inc. Of the II st defence proposs the trainer jet du II || LI 5e Fildi cal ',200 pounds of Il ha. Ide i IT-tjIIIis Siles,
doubt that the
Indo-US cointy tics has been In atmosphere of 2Titic å Tid thC e COiation policy of
of Tпdja Will iույc through the the twenty-first
centu Ty'? It would undoubtedly depend on various domestic, regio II al Hinc international - fac
OTS
First of all, a careful analysis of the on-going changes in inte TInational Telations is Tiecessary in order to make a proper as5 essme: It of tille direccio I of IInd (1—Americain relatiOIls ill the
Comming yeELTS. The Te is little doubt today that the structure of the international system in
the early years of the last decade of the current century is 5 Lubistal Intially differ cilt fT (om the
oI ne that e Wollwed in the afterTit Hill of World WaT II. This structural transfor Illation was
brought about by the cessation of the Cold War a Ind un precedented improvement in the two super powers, equation with each Other which in turn led to arms C0 IntTūl negotia tions, Sowict troops' withdrawal from Afghanistan, pull-out of Vietnamese military forces from Cambodia, beginning of the end of Cuban military presence in Angola and independence of Namibia.
The factors that strengthened this princess of new detente, however, Were the Soviet policies of gľašF7 osť, pere, fraika, de10 critisation of hithert Connin L1 Thist Tegimes in Eastern Europc, German , L1 Inifica Lion - H nd collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Such developments replaced the prolonged pessilis II of Cold War days by a new optimism that cooperation would take the place of conflict in the El Tea of international politics. The entire World was undergoing a period of euphoria at this time and not må ny had time to pander QWET the fact hält thc new detente was a mere product of compulsions.
Mikhail Gorbachev, upon assuming office, was seemingly quick in recognising the ills of

Page 17
the Sowiet scociety: the dones - tic conomic crisis exacerbated foreign commitments, the diploIllatic isolation of the Soviet Union, the increasing cost of involvement in Afghanistan in terms of blood and money, and папу паге. The accumulated
problems threatened the very 5 til tus af the country in the community of nations. With a view to checking the erosion
of the country's status, GorbaChey lost Llo ti me LInd a Linched his peace offensive.
The US President's positive responses to Gorbachev's peace proposals WeTe neither influenced by the Soviet leader's cha
ris ma noir just altru istic: motives. Reagan's War against the *e wil empire" had cost the
United States dearly and the Sound economy of the country had begun to falter during Reagan's reign in the White House, The largest creditor nation in the World had turned into the largest debtor nation. The American allies, whose security was subsidised by Washington, began not only to behave Imre assertively but also started to clean up in the international market when the huge trade and budget deficit told upon the nation's economic health. A variety of compulsions thus led the cildership of the United States and the Soviet Union to bury the hatchet and to work for the improvement of bilateral relations a Tud reduction of regional conflicts.
New Detente Under Stress
The crisis in the Persian Gulf that eruptcd with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, s hattered the drea III of those who appeared confident of a peaceful world in the wake of the new detente. Though the Soviet Union indirectly suppo T tcd the United States when the later decided to use force against Iraq, tensions in US-USSR relations began to surface while the Gulf war was still going on.
At noon on February 23, 1991, when Gorbachev called George Bush on the hotline and made
a repeated reql days time to to teld KLIWylit fore launching tack, the US Pre Was Tegal tive, " dent, according Top Corts, was la the US policy ready taken thic Tlie:IT to llur s LI It 1 - the Kuwait,
Since the da: rejected Gorbac EC E1 the G et ident til ilt til was preparing the post-War s if the GL il its own specifi ting the allies the Soviet Un either a tok cn | ball o OI. Scon i W II when Prc:5 Illın Çed the di American centu the American i the Ile in the so-call Order."
SCl al Title : ger US military necessitates the ene Ty. The S regarded as t enemy by the U and strategic ti ut the Cold W. of the foreign rity clict Ties, containment, mi flexible respoi targetted at the
The emergenc ten tc in the W: bachev phenon all the 5e dici Many influentii Warious W:1|ks : lly Spokenחטpט til of the 5 threat. But pe. tered in policy i Til the United S: bited their Sl Soviets. It wa George Bush's nald Reagan, bok, Naria rial ! fegy of the Ur

cs to give two (addam Hussein occupation bethe ground atident's response The Sovic Presito later days' rdly aware tha L. makers had aldccision a week ch a ground t1sraqi troops in
Presid: IL BLISE hew's pica cc plan lf war, it was e United States itself to shape ecurity scenario accordance with cations. Consuland cspecially ion, gesture or a trial after a victorious ident Bush – a [[1- W II of 8 **Ile:W ry', it signified Intention to play a global cop cd "new World
requires, a stron
which i T t LITI creation of an Wiet Union wä5 he number onc S. policy makers hinkers throughair period. Most policy a nel secufor instance, Lssive Tetaliation, 15E EL C. W.T. e Sowjet Union.
e of a new delike of the Gor1el CIl Tendered rifles obsolete, Americans in of life have about the reducC-called Soviet FSC Ils Who Illa t-making circles States still exhispicion of the 5 in 1988 that predecessor, Rowrote in his Security. StraIsted StafEF, that
was to be
in the Soviet Union "'We hear talk of "new thinking' and of basic changes in Soviet policies at home and abroad...but we have yet to see any slackcning of the growth of Soviet military power, and a bandon ment of expansionist aspirations'." The following year President Bush in his book, NatioTal Security Stra tegy of the United States, 1990 - 1991, wrote that the United States would seek to fostcr “ “Te Stralint" i Sowiet military spending and to discourage Soviet adventurism'
And now while admitting that the Soveit Union will increasingly find it difficult to project power "beyond their borders.' Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney has mentioned in his annual report to Congress that recent changes not withstanding, thic Soviet Union retains "considcrable nawal power and, hemcc, still poses potential threats to US interests." Cheney has further pointed out that the continued deployment by the Soviets of a range of sophisticated weaponsincluding new aircraft carriers, cruise missiles, and increasingly advanced submarines - underscores that meeting the Soviet challenge is no less technologi
cally demanding than it was
before perestroika".
The mistrust between the
United States and the Sowict
Union has, Iloreover, intensified with alleged Soviet violation of the Conventional Forces in Europc Treaty (CFET) through reassignment of some of the land divisio 1 s. that were to be abolished, to the Soviet Navy. The Soviet reply to this accusation was that thrice motorised rifle di Wisions were deliberately moved forward "in order to provide better protection of coastal areas of operation against US and NATO strike and Ilobile Ill Wal forces.'
According to First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Gerral B. O melichev, the motor rifle divisions Will not be used to reinforce naval infantry but rather employed in a coastal defence role. This appears to be a Soviet ploy to drag the Americans to the negotiating table to
15

Page 18
discuss In awal al Tims control mica s
LITE:5.
But such a reply in the backdrop
of a rising Soviet defence budget apparcntly created concern in Washington. The Soviet defence expenditure for the current year will actually Tise by 35 per cent according to Andrei W. Kottu Ilow, head of the international departLHLLLLLLL LL S LLtttL0LLaHH uS SSLLLLLLLLLS SLLL USA ald Canadil Studies. All these developments, including the perceived resurgence of the
military's influence in the Soviet
decision-making circles, led Dick Cheney to War in that he night hilve to Tecom Imeld a Slowdowil in the planned 25 per cent cut on US årIsled forces (Jy er the Ilex t five years,
Factors influencing Future Relations
The Cold War is not likely to return, Since Moscow hals Ileith er the will nor the resources to fight it any longer. But reemphasis on Soviet threat can work as a good justification for US military and Security policies both in the sphere (of public consul Tıpti con at homine and diplomacy abroad. The US leaders, in fact, tell their people that the So witict Uslit in is still the only power on earth that can destroy the United States.
The Te is ili Lill: dOy Lub L, LL: L ne United States and the Soviet Union Will continue to be the military superpowers in the forseeable future. The nature and the intensity of the Cold War are bund to cha Inge from time to tiIThe New actors and new factor5 Ināy cm e të play a role in interEl Li-I1äl ffairs. IBLIL it does Illicit entail the to tai elimination of Cold War as an important phenomeno in relations anong natiOns. If the situations in Afghanist an and Cambodia in the i ftermath of foreign troops withdrawal lre any indications, one may assunle that the Tesidents of the developing world need not be too Optimistic about the current changes in the world politico-secuTity e II wiTonment, Indo-AmeriCan Telations in the Luca T future a Te thus likely to be greatly influenced by the-level of security
Cooperation be and Moscow an JSSR relations
Indo-Allerica nl I Clear isS Lies of missile proli arc un likely to l mת 1טUS How שth ITT CCLII prolifcration of a Tid missile sys mont of India H for their total long as there Te. El T-hiwe S ad II United States F1 in Indil's Wie others to give fore"yer". So 1on; strategists the change their coi the deterrence Weapons, othe Weapons, other Crs cannot be their quest for k10 Who W.
Last but not policies towards of the United S be ii II TLIenced Pakistan Eld El CCCLIII i L. Cif 5eWeT of US-USSR typ IIldia indi Pilk:
Did II di i51
Indit and Pal; three wars in of il century si endence, Altho Il Cid ç0Dıfli CL bcL Ween the Lliw the list WAT IT state of hostili in spite of occa them to red Luc Iless ind impri the fields of tr; CLI ILLI ra l coopei Il CT West Piki i dTlit their Illi; sively dealing CF ELISt Paki; squarely put a India, dubbing cal Intry that w; 5ible for Le: Pakist: 1. The : nies, dle to lac analysis, of the kista Ti elites Hн to purs lle a poli

W cel New Delhi the state of US
diference ve und the question eration mor cow cr, he resolved. While ent appears to be
ab ollth Corizontal
nuclear weapons tems, the governas been pleading
eliminatio II. SI |1 H in a Tc w Illicicissile-halves, the Lis Ino 111 oral Tight, W, to preach to up their options as the Western Ilselves do not tention regarding wa | Lle of nuclear * Inear nuclear near nuclear powjersuaded to quit
nuclear weapons
the least, India 1. i, and perceptions tates will largely by Washington's hina policy. On äl factors, a sott e de Lente betw een istan, and China mote possibility, istan halve fought !he first quarter ince their in depugh no major arhis taken place collitics since 1971, a general ty his remained isional efforts by - mutlil bitterOwe Telations in ade, touris nin and "El tion. THe forstani 5 are yet to
itakes of IpTes
with the Bengalis ta m... They hallwe 1 l tliet billine om the latter als the as solely responis melberilent of i el f-inflicted a gO - k of proper self
present-day Pawe induced the II icy-goal of achie
wing in lilitary parity with India at any cost. The begin in ng of the second round of intense Cold War with the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan created a propitious ground for Pakistan to acquire more and more sophisticated military equipment from the United States.
While India rightly refused to alıccept the argument tlı alt the American consignInent of arms to Pakistan Was Ileant for dcaling with the threat from Afghanistan, large-scale US - ilin ilitary assistance to a country that was instigating terrorist activities in India's sensitive provinces was sure to strain Indo-American Te|tition 5. IF at :1|1 the fourth
' round of a Titled conflict takes
place between India and - Pakistanı Llığ cent Til cause of Such an eventuality will perhaps be Pakistan's encouragement, instigation and assistance to terrorist elements in the Punjab and Kashmir. And the fu turc course of Indo-US ties will be substantially affected by the extent of Wshington's strategic equation With I5 la Illa ball,
Similarly, the US policy towards the People's Republic of China in the colling years Will constitute yet another major determinant of the level of cooperation betwein India and the United States. China is a developing country with nuclear weapons. It is potentially a very powerful country with no hidden intentions to play a major role in World politics. Its military capabilities have steadily increased since the first deilon stration of its nuclear capabilities in 1964, and the United States has come to provide a unique position to China in their foreign policy calculation. In the 1970s and 1980s, the United States' attitude to wa Tids China Was guided by the consideration that the lätter" could zict Els a Coulterweight to the Soviet power in the Far East. A slow and steady strategic cooperation that evolved betwicIl the UIIited States and Chinai did not go unnoticed in India.

Page 19
Until recently the Chinese policy towards South Asia had a
heavy anti-India overtone. Signs of improvement in Sino-Indial Telticals in TCC 52nt y el TS
are marked by a change in the tone of the Chinese for cign policy. But for all practica purposes the contents of the Chinese foreign policy objectives in the region remain substantially the same. Although the American policy makers are not known to give adequate considerations lo Indilin 5 ensitivities while mapping out their policy towards China, the Indian attitude to Wards the United States is bound to get affected by the nature of Sill-American Tell tills,
Thc reduction of the Soviet threat in US perception Inay make the Sino-American Security cooperation appear is relewant. But it is too early to come to such a conclusion. The eagerness and endeavour of the White House to patch up with Chinese authoritic5 a Fte a brief strain im Sin C-LIJS Telati CoIS il the wake of the suppression of the pro-democracy movement in Beijing, on the one hand, and the steady efforts by the Kremlin tio givic | a | positive direction to Sino-Soviet = relatio 15, O In the other, indical tc that the sul per - powers may continue to compete with each other to befriend Beijing.
As long as China remains a hostile country, India will have clusic for concer if either or both the superpowers take actions Lihat migh L bolster China’s strength1. Whıille th e UIıited States has clear T est: Twälti C1s ahout ITid I-Soviet Telations India has Llot so far bee Il y Ocll about the implications of SinoUS cooperation, especially itin thic field of advanced technology, which will prove to be more da Ingerous to III din tha II the US military assistance to Pakista
While the systemic changes in the globall political e como - mic and security spheres have not gone un noticed in lndia, a 5eTj)Lus re"Wie W () f T[1 di:iʼs fo) Teign policy objectives“ strategies and priorities is the demand of
Ele time.
ΝΟΤ
1. Thc peoplt tւ բ: yw ein the Unitell : very recent origin only a microscopi guisheti AI11-rica: Lugh thicir special: nt have à large: à tiä Ilirimber of th: inther hi ril, W, seilly side: Culf III pressions Werl. reportis firmish: missionaries, TF A rimerican life it come Sile di indi irli W. Norilla Brow. ¡' ';', 'k'; bridge, Mass, 19
2. MemorandLIT To; William (). Le: | Le CITI I Til til det i and Navy, Ocll f : Uliet S Siti f.: R 2 1 3, Branch, Nation ngton, D.C.
5. Weah, "infri! N'ko hiri
1946 May 1949 բ. 303,
4. Ibid.
Good Start. , (Cr நீர் of industry by punsion, a Ina mergers while watch for the Cartels.
In spite of in the reforms to de ny that ti lisation has fint force 5 a chi more frcely. T Indian entrep challenge for long been clan M S K BT the Federltic bes if CII try, said: ''The is the First mā is necessarily : cess of deregl na my. MElny ľ tiss have hee Cr a ImendCd, til 115 Creilted friendly system Industry ha: given a Oppo its claim that tLL re5 entrcp Ten lity, ingenuity However, Iman trialists still de El Ce to fit ce internal ald fi

"ES
-ople interacticI betStates ånd India, is of In the 19th century, C: Illii Ii iurity ) f listin5 kilicy I di L HITstudies, but they did Liece , , Libs ta Ilוחט .lEקטשק חric HטוחW 'ere aware only of the ili Efth Ii Ft. Theit IIargely based on the til Ey the Christiar e Lunderstanding cof
India was likewise Le FDT (le tail.3, 5e C n, 7'YE LVF fra Sfaires II, Berglides Call2).
r the President, by hy, Chief of Staff to in Chief of the Army er 19, 1945. Records E: Les Joint Chiefs Of
Modern Military El Archives, Washi
Speeche, September '. Wol, 1 (Delhi, 1949)
5. For details, sec. Chinta mani Mahapatra, irrifericari Roll: irT rie Origina fairird (Groeg hyffi gof ASEAN (Nicw Delhi, 1990). ... I bid. 7, 890. 20.9.1429, Top Secret Memorandum of Conversition by the DirecLaLL S LL aa LS S LLLLL S SLS LLLLL S LLLKLYLY Affairs, Washington, D.C. September, 1949), Foreigr. Rig Varieg yn g: rif ffre Ulri fferid Sffr fer, Wol. 5. Part II. 8. Quotel in Balley Raj Nayar, Aylerier Geopolities and India (New Delhi, 1976) pp.37-38. 9. Ibid., p.38.
LS LLL SLLL S S LLLLaHLLCLK S aLLaaaHLS 00LL
M. S. Wenkätär:Armani, Arrierrcari Role fri Pakisfart (New Delhi, 1982). | || Chester Bowles, Freyri i fer f7 Keep”: Misso Forsi irt Philir Life I gi-A I -II EFS7 (New igrk,1971), pp. 48]-481. 2. Richard Nixon, 799: Pierary Pfic lif
War (New York, 1980), p. 274. 13, The Hird. August 16, 1989. 14, Ronald Reagan, Nair for Til Security String of the Lified Stares (Washingto il 1989), p. XI. 15 George Bush, Natioா பிரேiyநfe LFruirea 5 ferres, I AF-977 (Washi Tigri 1989), բր. 8-9.
(Concluded) 曙 画 panies, and they are already {FFF pr:gro 8) : {: ಟ್ಗಞ್ಞ! LO 器
Cinco LI rai ging cx- at. 黑 lg:1 n11a tions and Ureign 1nvestment P W.
keeping a ca reful emergence of
the many gaps it is difficult he present liberailly given market 1ince to Operate his has presented Teleurs with a which they have 1Ճ11ring,
al, president of of Indial II Clai IIIerce li mill 1d lisindustrial policy jor step in what i continuous prolitting the eco"ctrograde restricni et llet Tello y el and the coldfor a larket
beel rtunity to prove the country nureurs of high quaand flexibility. Indian induslack the coficompetition, both "om foreign com l
But most observers think this response reflects fear of change stemming from years of living within a system of harsh regula tic T15, ho We WCT frustrating. Painful adjustments are inevitable low that the government has begun the process of re
form. Dr. Singh says that while the government plans to go further along the same road, the pace will be slower, and that it will take thre: y EFTS for results to show up in the - 1Wחרונול וטיט
The question is whether he will hawe the time: he needs. Both Dr. Singh and the prime Illinister will have to show
skiful managemcint of the Colgress and the opposition, a The government may also find that it faces a far from unprecedented policy dilemma: WithtյլIt successful stabilisation, liberalisation usually founders; but the pain imposed by stabilisation cain make thit gover nment founder, instead. T government has made an excellent start. But both luck and Inuch determination are needed
for ultinate success.
Frticial Tries
17

Page 20
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Board of Directors: 3 1C38. 33 EE || || - RECE [ RsE "U[JD } A.P. U. JEyad Wardena Čhaifftiain & M:ri:Egin Director)
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EED5 OE Sehanathan
E. EEE AFTE SETIH تعي ELEEE 22E.2 R, D, C. de Saw 15.E. 1:E: Dr. L.P., Jaririder
3, G3 3,763
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Tambulegama

Page 21
WIWIDOCHI MWA REVISITED (4)
Last stop. . . .
Rajiva Wijesingha
o Chi Minh's tomb (the body had been in Moscow für TešLUT{1tiữ T1 UT1 the lāśt CC– casion), and the house in which he lived, a simple structure specially built for him in the gardens of the old Presidential Palacc, overlooking the lake so that he could feed his belowed care. Somewhat in congruous a Imidst all this, built i II pressiwc to in its CW in Way, was the new Ho Chi Minh Museum, with its high tech impressionistic eWOCat:0115 Of the Rey 01ution.
As had provedl possible with my, ticket from Ho Chi Minh. to Hanoi, T was able to get my ticket from Hancoi to Wientiane, on Lalo Air this time, over the counter; and to get to the airport, loath to spend on a taxi and quite used now to motobikes, I arra Inged a ride on onc, a distance of thirty miles, including the long bridge across the Red River that had so impressed mc on my first visit. All in all, things werc IIIuch IIIore flexiblic than they had been then, which plans for travel and for stay had had to be fixed firIlly, and within very narrow perimeters, before hand. In Hanoi, since the hotels recoilTime Inded to Lourists scelled ulnecessarily expensive, I stayed in a very simple hotel where I seemed to be the only foreimẹT. In Ho Chi Minh, on my last day there, Iny cycle driver tok II le to his hlo II le La Lleet his family, which I gathered later in Bangkok would hawe been almost un thinkable just a
few months previously, when foreigners in residential areas would have been thought a
distinct anomaly, and a potential Soll Tice of trouble OI eInbar. rassment, Clearly, in most respects, the solid hold the state used to exercise over everyone and everything is fast being relaxed. It would be a great
: Laos
pity if, becaus recognized soo: 155istance profe the experiment the clock permi Died back.
■ 摩
After thic pa and Cambodia, L. also apparently way anxious fo] diffect. After capital city (and only about 30,0 must be a mong in the world) ccintre picce a fou coloured lights fall While TechIT forth? I reca Ile
saying I had that the Wic rice, the Calbi,
grow while the growing plants.
Perhaps tied i a phcnomenon apparent, not on but also in L the old Royal hills: na IIncly, th religion. Every of monks and all had building With elaborate
indeed, the on negleict one not of the two IT
Illnastories in W the central struc clverted into : had heals of b heared il cor
Tecess i One O Doլյէյtlt:55 till Were on displa could be disregat trast bet. Ween W. officially taken state, and the where religious authority, could
hawe been greate Apart from it: tiane had a l low-key Revoluti which depicted :

e thi5 Wils Illot n enough and red as required, were to fail and tted to be tur
ice of Wietnall a Cos was, though in its (W1 r change, quite all, What the Wientia Inc, with 100 inhabitants, St the SIIlä Ilest Could have als In tail, on which play at nightde di Lusic: Wafts d at once the h card in 1984, tnamese plant dians watch it Lao are the
In with this was that was quite ly in Wientiane, Iang Prabhang, capital in the le Teslurgence Of temple was full acolytes, and s being rebuilt, additions too, ly comparative ed was at one Lost important Vientiane, where *ELLTe had been II useum and cautiful statues լքusiըn in a f the arcades. th C best Ones y, and the se “del, The cothat had been ower by the vibrant activity orders exercised
יוט"ושיוונL htטון
s temples Wieninstructive if ;y MuseuIIlחIlaי) a moving strug
gle, and a long drawn out one too, but with none of the intensity that its counterpart in Hanoi displayed. Correspondingly, its historical section too was modest, as perhaps befitted a country which appears to have gently floated along without cver taking on any vary dynamic role. Again, in Luang Prabhang, the Royal Palace, now a museum (the King and Queen are dead now, I gathered, but the Crown Prince still lives in exilc in the north of the country, where the three of them were taken away when the Revolution triumphed in 1975), is not a very extcinsive building. It has so Illine b cautiful artefacts, notably precious and orna te religious statues, and a fabulous
mosaic ceiling, put in by a French architect in the early years of the century, but it exudes a general air of simplicity. The royal apartments indeed, and in particular the bedrooms, could well be des
cribed as almost bourgeois.
And yet, despite what might be termed the very retiring nature of the country, or perhaps because of it, it was here that, lik C Lily Briscoe in "To the lighthouse', I had my vision. It was while I was having lunch in a restaurant on the river in Wientiane, looking across at Thailand which lay on the opposite bank of the Mekong (which begins in Tibet, and flows in or by six different countries). The fact that I had had a bottle of beer after a hot morning's strenuous Walking may have contributed to the vision, but for what it is worth it strikes me still as not entirely chimaerical. Looking at a group of seven children playing on the sands of the shrunken river (the dry season was just ending, and the II non soon due to break soon in all its splendour), scat tcring and then coming together again, I began to reflect on the relative isolation in which French Indochina has existed for centuries; and I thought too of how we
9.

Page 22
i Sri Lanka hawc b c El Cut a Wally fra II those countries, and
indeed Thailand too, despite the cultural al Id ewer Histo Tical ties. We once shared. EWell
Burma, it Occurred to ne, despite its being under the British I too, Was never placed in any really constructive relationship with us, and cominercial ties too were by and large purely functional due to the historical accident of Ceylon having been a Crown Colony, whereas BLIT II la un till the thirties was a part of the India. In EII pirc.
Lean Wing aside our (3 win situation, I turned to the concept sf Souther Il Asià fls l whule, the region that had 5 cell thic spread and development alıd synthesizing (when they had not been draw'n into luostility) LLLLLL S LLLLLLL SLLLLa S LLLLLLLLS Buddhism, and also what might be described as the Asiatic Versions of Isla III and Christianity, more flexible, less dogImatic, inspired by a south sca. island mentality, or a south wind as Norman Douglas might hawe cha Tacterized it, or Whatever
ter II minology one uses to describe tolerance and War IIlth. Now what we hawe in this
a Tea is : collection of dispaTa te groupings: SAARC, which finds it difficult to proceed further because of the dis proportio na te size of India as compared to the other nations in the group; ASEAN, which See Ills to be doing Temarkably well despite its members having come together across What at first sight might se e III historiCzil. Feligious, reticial a'i ild cultuTil divides – hut Which is now under pressure to expand, With both AI cric: Eind Australlia advocati Ing; a Pacific ColII Luity : a ıd FTech India) china, struggling to emerge from the tWi yokes of doctriaire 5cilism and exploitative superpower rivalry.
As far as we were concerned, One Solution that was put for. Ward, in the early eighties, Was in the form of an application to ASEAN. That however, though perhaps it had a stronger socio-cultural fundition than it was credit cd with at
2O
the time Was III additio 1 : LJ of geographical the suspicions felt by India What was at ceived as a hii influence, if s tion had beten E E1 till L. our membershi would hawe With an Elrea have п1uch cla: Ili Inks... 11 add a spect has bec we should have significa Int elen which would it necessarily to Would, in the contrary 1110 tiva Il ved furthe El 11 IIle I til: left us both co; geographically Certainly, with ity bון uוון נחנ}C and becoming ASEAN t00. I - as Australia haps America : The lible Wii of a Pacific Co. is that, desp. 5 title: If cycli: is likely to the combinci 51 and the Unité question is, d. alter Ila Live"
Perhaps not. SčII tL IllL case for tTying för al start, in TOT 11t : Է Ը Til TITL 1 F tliet larger souther takt II as ä think, have a p able li role tio pl cess. Though India aloc t tics with ill it Indochima, ou gives us ewen work together w from the cul
recent political
ha 5 becni simili na tely we are o ahead in the had a statist

IOL EL S LE Tt T. the difficulties distancic, a Iud understandably with regard to lät period perstile sphere of uch an applicasuccessful at 1e expense of of SAARC it ca. It al., break with which we er sicci-Cultural ition, and this me clea TeT m) W, been the East ent in a body | ti mc have hald expand - and absence Of ilny ting factor, have to the east, in t Wycolul lid hawe tonomically and further behind, the European oth expanding, more exclusive, Leeds to chill Inge must, and per = and Japan to Oth the concept mmunity however ite its present pment, ASEAN be dwarfed by trengths of Japan ld States. The ics it have any
It does ho Wewe that there is a to bring together Watcy er 1005 e S appropriate, luctries in the Asian region while. We otentially invaluEty in this proat present it is hät häs formal he countries in r (o Wyn history Inte. Ilson to ith them. Apart tural tics, our experience too 1r, though fortuslightly further cycle of having cconomy that
proved disa strous, which is now in the process of being libera
lized. In such El context it seems to ille absurd that we should not be thinking of
establishing an embassy in at least cinc of those countries, to strengthen ties; for the pooling of knowledge and experience, and the dew cloping of common strategies to cope with the trials of the change over We are undergoing in common as well as possible exploita. tion by countries further a long the road than we arc.
At the same time, we should be playing a more dynamic role in urging SA ARC too as a body to work more closely with such countries. The wealth of expertise and initiative that personnel from SAARC countries could furnish would prove invaluable there. Conversely, those are potential markets for the Telatively stophisticated products that can be provided at far less cost by us than would be required by the Western industrialized nations waiting to move in,
In addition, the development of such bridges should go hand to hand With the development of closer ties with the ASEAN countries Will wlich to We have such affinities. At present, French Indochina Would be swamped by ASEAN, whereas a larger grouping, which Would be economically less polarized, Would provide 5orne sort of a balance. At the same time, in a context in which for historical Tea so II SA ARC countries arc still too dependent on the West for technology, it would Imake much more sense, for them, collectively and individu
Hilly, to turn morc to thc Inewly industrialized ASEAN nations. Truc, we have out
selves began to do this, but it would make a lot of sense for the region as a whole to work Imore coherently towards this.
I Suspect some such movement will develop over the next few years, as India, now
(CortiηHεί ση Ραβε 23)

Page 23
The United Nations in D Security - Evolution an
Jayantha Dhanapala
t is 10. W lixiomatic that di S
a TIT1 Elment is a lileans to Wards ach it wing security. On that premise alone the real achievement of disarminent since the INF Treaty of 1987 - the CFE
Treaty of November 1990 and the sign:lture of the START Treaty El t the recent Moscow
SuIn mit – augur well for global security. President Bush's statement of 13 May 1990 will also undoubtedly act as a catalyst in the negotiations for El Chenical Weapons Convention.
The percentage of actual Trıs Ted Llicti Olls that hawe becı achieved may be disputed but there is II o gai Lusaying the fact that a long a Waited process of disarmament involving the werifiable destruction of Weapons has begun. It is a process that will be difficult to roll back. Whether it can be consolidated and accelerated is arguable. The Gulf War at the beginning of 1991, however, has dissipated the optimism of the recent past and the present situation is fraught with complexity having
both positive and Inc gative el cIm erit S iter Willed.
The prospects for security
hawe been greatly strengthened by fundamental changes in international politics. The Paris SuIT1Tit in November 1990 certainly symbolized the end of the Cold War era replacing the confrontation of a bipolar world with the conciliation cof a CoccTt Of Initions. We have a II begun to search for architectural metaphors as we contemplate the construction of a brave new World in a post-cold war Cra. But cras in history do not separate themselves in clearly demarcated segments. There is inevitably a phasing out of one
LLTTHLHTT HLLTLTCCTT S CCTCLHHLHHL S LLLL TLLLLS kII FI diplorYIar is cirrreri rly , Direcrar, of LLLL S SCCaLLS LLLLCLGGGLHL CCtLLGLL T LLLLLLLLS FF Y y; er l' RIFFFAIFFT, (Fe'i
Adapted from a f publication "The
and SԸըLrity - F pects' edited by .
er: 515 the Die Y Elen1crits of b0 in the transitio are still in thi: siliol. The List mot been exorci politics althoug ceive that glob likely today.
Cerıtral t3 { role of the Un. greatly reinvig Member States of its Chlaritics oil five years in, tions finally a ceded thic power the fiT1:lle 5 – [[] implc. The Tit collective secur the Chiar tes. It new challenges tu] [hi ties to fulf old à spirations CHILET THC, U being increasin, to consolidate acceler:1 ted ch witnessed and wards common
The impact on disa Tim: men The World con an estimated n HIm5ט שLנוח 1 וח 1 billion peopl poverty line. E Europe remains other regions th Lul Te5t Time di T tinue with II וn regioטmוח טC chexist in a with wital link habitants, who e TviT i Illet al II ce5 Wiich Fre finite, It has

lisarmament and d Prospects
TE Çolling, LUNDIR UN LOITTILIILE
FILE: il lid PrisJayantha Dhanapala,
y one o e merge5. th er 15 tijerist nal period. We 5 period of tranI of force has zed froll global h one can pera Will is less
.hlis era is the ited Natio Is It w orated by its in the discharge oligations. Fortythe United Näppears to being - and hopefully that are necessary the concept of ity embodied in is a title of and nt:W օբբըril old hopes and inspired by the Inited Nations is gly looked upon and manage the ange We have to direct it to. ly desired goals. of this chal inge t is incomplete, tinues to spend ֆ 1.9 milliյդ էլ while more than live below the Even after CFE, Overal III1ed While rough practically Ils transfers CCIlarms build-up, nal homes Illust Common planct 5 ärmong — its i I1shire à collIIlon = L}uT 5טn r כווח נח רd "Crו both fragile and becı Temarked
that the disma niling of the
Iron Curtain still leaves the Poverty Curtain as a divider.
Il a World Where di 55ide Il t5 hawe become presidents the indigent Temain in Stark Contra st
LL LLLL SLLLLLLLL LLSS LaHLHHLLHHLLLLHHL
concerns, economic Linder development, regional conflicts and the continuing violation of hunan rights in warious parts of thic World Continue tode Ima I til global Solutions,
The invasion of Kuwait punctured the balloon of complacency that began to float wher the East-West conflict ended, We were Teminded of the harsh reality that the threat and use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of States remains a basic cause of global insecurity, AI Ins transfers in the past have fuelled aggression but We are condemned to repeating past mistakes. The silver lining in the could over the Gulf was the rare un animity a chiewed in the United Nations in condening this act of aggression, The forull LtLLL S LLLH00LtH S SLLL SLLLLLLLLS making in the Gulf crisis has be el alid ree Dil:li Di15 [hig Unitcd Nations Security Council. This is ils it Should be – a[11. Il III for this crisis alle.
II this Critical Sitiliatiol it is. El pproprial te that we should reflect hw the ole f the United Nations in disi Tmament and security has evolved and what its prospects are. In the Tield of distrinitielt the Lil of the United Natio 15 jill:11de5 the prevention of war and achiewing the least diversion of the w Corld’s resources for armaments. The General Assembly was empowered to consider principles goverling disar 11amet and the - regulation of arliaments and to lake recoilmendations thereon. The Secu
1.

Page 24
rity Council was mandated with the task of formulating plans for the establishment of a System for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments. In terms of main tai ning international peace and security the Charter has of course a number of provisions. At this point. I would like to quote Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar who has said in his 1990 Report on the Work of the Organization that:
"The larger - and saner - concept of security, encompassing all its dimensions, which has begun to emerge is precisely the one the United Nations has been expounding all through the years. It has been a stable theme at the United Nations that Bn obsession with military Security results in a SelfPer Pellating irris race, distorts prioritics, hampers social and economic progress, construins political dia icogule, affects the institutions of the State to their long-term detriInnent, a Find aggraval tes the sense of in 15 CC Lirity in III nations. "1
It has been reaffirmed at the 1978 First Special Session of the General Assembly devoled to Disarmament (SSOD I) that the United Nations has “a central role and ргіппінгу responsibility in the sphere of disarmament'. A great deal of Work has been El CCII) plished in discharging this responsibility. The deliberative Tachinery for disarmament within the United Nations systern has a number of successes to its credit most notable being the Final Docu. ment of SSOD. I. At the same time it is a fact that a number 9s agreements have been
negotiated outside the frameWork of the United Nations. In a vastly changed political WIronment We need to assess what prospects the te are for the United Nations to facili
ta te more advances in disarmaTT TIL
and to exert a more decisive role in disarmament and security.
Would such a
1 RECT OF THE Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, As 45, II, 16 September 1990.
22
role be des iT; Member States so, is the ex adequate to a and responsibi Unit cd Natio: point of his opportunities lis have nel The pattern relations as we -first century determined by Itlilke of thes 1)1ת טיול e WוA I the United Nat ble.
The Tc is ce Ti W:15iWet 5 EISE tha ITieni tal inti 3 - is in the ai politics affect Nations, disa ri rity. At the is obviously in the disti Tina Ine hawe withinesse INF Treaty ar. as they have be. The expt United Nations hortatory den and bold initi: listic appraisa tions placed to by the nationprise it. Th late The Succes United States. ment negotiat multilateral sp recognized. I Illid:lities for CE SY 11 gee C: benefits of thi til s C abwica II
וו סינון נון סA C be the Leed Nations to pla rity firmly on Close Collab existing regio Il till: UT suggested, "F the United
through the ciri Comit This sioms
Confidence B proposal that Another propo til of a ce preventi II, co i Ind i di Satılmını

ble and -- Would Welcome it? If sting machinery :hieve the tasks ities before the We are at a ory when the (I multilattraer been better. If international enter the twenty will largely be what use We opportunitics. oTder without ions is un think El
ainly an all-pert change — funda
tructural change of international ing the United
la 111cDit and SecuSāmic time the Tc consensus that 1t il greements: We di silice the 1987 e as significant been hailed to citatio Il 5 of the fluctual te from a Indis for fresh1 atives to a real1 of the 1 i mitain the world body States Who Cone leed to transscs illi billi tterill USSR dista Taions into the here is clearly However precise this a Te Ilot 1. Nor fire thic S multilateraliza - s to everyone.
the me seems to for the United ce regional secuits agen da. A yra Liol bet w cel nal organization ited Nations is ederalization' of Nations system :ation of regional of Security and uilding is one is presented. al is the creantre for
cTisis Il flict Teso||LI til ent. Generally,
however, it is true to say that the identification of issuics that have to be de allt with in multi la terial fora is accomplished to a greater extent than the examination of how the United Nations could actually respond to the chall cnges.
The problems of poverty in the South, global issues like arms transfers, non-military threats to security and the danger of a growing North -South divide, not only in cconic terin5 but als in politico-security terms, are identified. What can the United Nations do. Within the constitutional limits of the Charter to ameliora te this situation? There is a recognition that the advances made in disarmam cnt have largely been achieved outside the fra Inc work of tne United Nations. And yet the United Nations has played a most important facilitating task creating the ambience for such concrete achievements.
Military power has not ceased to be the valid currency of mo
dern real politik. Indeed with the diminution of the ideological factor in world politics
sole observers see a return to traditional nineteenth century balance-of-power politics. That being the case the United Nations is unlikely to be given more than 1 limited Tole in disarmament and security. Of course, proposals to activate dollant elements of the Charter like the Military Staff Committee and to give new life to
Chapter WII continue to bc made. A new dimension of the peace-making and peace
building role of the United Nations was seen in 1989, and is likely to be repeated in the We Etell Sala I i Il 1992, That is, the supervision of democratic elections and the decolonization process giving birth to new nations in a peaceful transition. But the United Nations Tole in disa ma ment remains largely dependent on the Willingness of Member States to cede the United Nations with the power to play a role beyond what is formally stipulated in the Charter. To be Continued)

Page 25
Nepal's Security. . .
(Corfirified from Page 9)
Pakistan's Institute of Strategic Studics and Nepal's Centre for Nepal and Asia n Studies (CNAS) holding H regular dia lagu c } In regional security issues. Privat cly influential Nepalese also convicyed to visiting Pakistanis their listing regret at not having sought a corridor from the departing British rulers in 1947 through the 17 kilometer strip of Indian territory which separatics Nepal from what was previously East Pakistan and now Bangladesh. It could have provided for a converient outlet to the se i for this landlocked kingdom. And it is perhaps no accident that till recently both India and Pakis lan - had senior military Inlen as thcit Ambassaihr5 in Kath Tandu: a Lieutenant General and Brigadier respectively.
Last stop . . .
(Carr fi real fra f7 page 20) in the throcs of the greatest economic crisis she has hid to fact, moves towards liberalizatjon; as thic en larging European Community initially at least tu Tims its back on the World and in particular on Asia; as ASEAN seeks Ille w Tmarkets in the face of pressu tes from more powerful industrial conglomerates around the Pacific Basin. Yet with Sri Lanka in a unique position to help to advance the process, it Would be Lun fottu la te if we allowed the opportunity to pass us by, simply because our foreign policy in so far als We can be Said to have oie, can only move in pedestrian fashion along od i Tes. Now, On the contrary is a time for vision and dynamism, for the identification
of goals and the development of methods of achieving them. A far-reaching foreign policy based on the St Tengths of our past and our future vision of where the world is, and should be heading is within our reach; if only we are prepared to
nake an effort.
(Concluded) " .
The Pe
(Cig/fiллён Г.
pro wide H n e5s for the lived ““sacred listijГ of particulaT Illic, Social, e experientially II1:l, tical in1 teI im tCTical cortext: transhistorical significance fic: These symbolit in wolwe the :
timate meanin "In deri'' west rational, if no Lhic i Ft Tu Hig"" ; tio mia ke se 15 tential crises (s le551 ess, death, structured Urd and to in teէ With in a coher mythic/religiou
Both of the myth shed ligh tions to the over Iraq.
Myth as fur
In the preser euphoria over victory over Ir: few politicians the Imass mcdi: lect { T1 the bä sequences, and War. Bush and er, aided by t tio matries i tb constructed in logy' of the w
For Ill) 5t TĘ Grafia F1, there substantitatic til war-as-myth in Articles in Lari progressive put United States Persian Gulf

rsian Gulf. . . .
-
(17 = iri & Paggשr
ential foundation World. Myths are ies,” al rising out historical (econdtc.) Co. Tı texts fırıldı erified or legitis of specific hiss, but they Tey cal
meinings and ir mythic people. : Sacred a Tratives i 5 CISLIT: jf u l
gs that to most TISSEE IIt irrational. Myallow beliewers to of their exisuffering, 11 ca ningetc), to bring a eT , but of chas,
rate the Inselves "ent, meaningful .ltiחטs W
se meanings of It on U.S. Teacmilitary victory
true'
it atmosphere of the U.S. nilitary lq, thcrc are very i Cor Ille TıbcT5, of 1 willing to refsic Causes, Conles 50115 of the others with powheit Serville TucLe 11edia, ha ve affective 'mytho
"I",
aders of LIFERI
is led to le Persian Gulf : the first sense. ki (FIIrdiari and blications in thc whether about the war or other to
pics, are often efforts at exposİng, debu Tuki Tng, and exploding classist, racist, sexist, imperiry list, and other contemporagFם tאטn t ראש .H t_J. S נy Lh S. IIוח relative economic and political power lessness, Left critics have often been most effective in analyzing the Establishment's ideological/mythic obfuscations and falsifications, a process of de mythologization that, at its best, exposes the reality of domination and injustice, Similary, Noam Chomsky and others in thc antiwar movement were qLuite good a t – de bu inking the myths of the war (even if limitcd resources allowed us to reach only a minority of the public); what we did not have was the pUWer to prevent Bush from sabotaging all peacc negotiations, achieving the determined Iraqi slaughter, and mowing to. ward intended U. S. hegemony in the military-defined, unipolar "Ile w World Corder".
If the first sense of myth, as a fictitious story, something that is factually and historically false, gets at much of the Persian Gulf War story, why is it even necessary to consider the more Controversial Second Theaning, as something analogous to the traditional nature, structure, and function of religious myth'? After all, without even citing myth as beliewed **true story,' we can make sense of most of the Persian Gulf Inyhic CoolStruction il te TLS of dominant U. S. e çonomic and political interests.
(To be continued)

Page 26
Correspoлаелсе
Distinct in some senses
M. P. de Silva (L. G. 1891)
Illust TlOt
tha L in L. G. 1 that the Tallil Lanka. In Tamils distinct ethnic g L.G. 1/7/91 I can be regardcd
ups "in some senses'.
to my that I refer Ted to part in L.G.
wrote, in paras that
abstract fIOn theit contexts.
State C15 He writes 3.90 I stated Nadu and Sri collstitute two roups, while in state that they as distinct groRefeTencic
1990 article will show
its introductory 1/290 where I two and three,
the two groups might be
regarded as "constituting a single
ethnic" in ter factors, while it
in terms of other
they were "two groups.' In
Other
n5 0F certain could be argued factors that distinct ethnic Words my
original position, which has not
changed, Was
that they are
distinct in some senses,'
Of course, as practically, every
One k.In CIWS, not a Tamil.
occlul Tred to Ille point explicitly
Na Tasimha R10 is
It had not to make that because one
assumes a certain levci of sophis
tication among
As for his being
he is multilingu Tamil fluently.
point in the
C. Itxt
L. G. Teaders. Tamil-speaking all and speaks I made the of my
hope that he would show greater
ability
in handling the LTTE
than his predecessors.
I wonder why that it is nowy
de Siliwa 5 ays accepted that
the terms A Tiyan and Drawidjan
are Inis used. If.
he has in mijnd
the mistaken theory of an Aryan race, it was rejected long ago
by Max Muller
Hic
HC Weyer, the
originally propounded
to TIIS
Elitself after it. are used,
not misused, because they point
to significant Tc1nces and Cult
linguistic diffcuTal variations
within the over-arching Indian
cultural unity. them, I used th
The rest of t la Tgely
i Televant. serious note of it because important to promotic
1 did not misuse
he letteT seems but I take it is dialogue
between the Sinhalese and the
minoritics. De
Silva cosidcrs
it "smart" of Ine to say that
the Tamils
24
WCT2
the first to
take to -separ after which ht was the Musl it first." Why to Icfc to Tamil scparat sub-continental Incints? And W thic establish for my artic with the Eelan after math of t assassination? to say that all took first to Indian Muslim to bc fär Immo T haps the impli wary cye shou Sri Lankam M.
He will dou reading. But сап, соппе шр tive Teading, cogency the irrelevance. W questioning is usly he would his point ab Colu lims had Ily : ten by a Sin that Hussain i to lo com large ness, 1 sugges' processes have anti-Muslim ch
Lincoln's
Dem
So, the form Jayewardene be tic conception col I"s definiti. as a governmt by the people, (LG. July 15). wicw if this di. suggest that he Bernärd Sh:ı W face to the pl (1928).
Shaw stated, coln is respre: ällid the cal Tillä field of Gettys
ing that all Americans by red in order
should not peris the Allerican

tism in India, Writics "But it ms who realized was it is in art the priority of ism over other separatist moveat Televance has 2nt of Pakistan c, which deals problem in the he Rajiv Gandhi Is de Silva trying hough the Tamils separatism, the actually prøved dangerous? Percation is that a d be kept on the 1slins.
btless reject that I doubt that he with any alternaexplaining with joint bchind his hat prompts my that quitic obvionew er häwe Ima de t the III dial. Il MusArticle been WTithalese. The fact 5 al Muslil 11 scells in his conscioust that lli s lental been queered by )Immunalism1.
Izeth Hussain
Definition of Ocracy
er President J. R. lieves in the poeof Abraham Linof democracy, nt of the people,
for the people'
For a pragmatic finition, I would
better tead what Wrote in his prety. The Apple Carr
“ “Abrahal Il Lill: Inted as standing e of the battleburg, and declarhat slaughter of A II mericans occurthat democracy
from the earth... Civil War was
not fought in defence of any 5uch principle, but, on the contrary, to enable one half of the United States to force the other half to be governed as they did not wish to be governed. It seems impossible for statesmen to make speeches about democracy, or journalists to report them, without obscuring it in a cloud of humbug. . . Government by thic people is not and never can be a reality; it is only a cry by which demagogues humbug us into woting for them. . ."
Sachi Sri Kaltha
Ostka BioScience Institute, Japan,
Briefly. . .
(Солгiлнrd fѓолп page j)
in Bangalore When police commandos closed into nab them. Siwarasan bit a cyanide capsule, in classic Tiger fashion; he also shot himself to make doubly sure. Subha, the wanted Woman who Went into hiding with hit, was
also found dead in the room;
five other bodies were also
found.
Other finds in the room
included an AK-47 rifle, anOther automatic wвароп, other firearms and rounds of a munition, bombs and grenades.
The commandos stormed the hideout, blasti mg | the doors with bombs, shortly
after da Wri on August 20. While the Commandos broke in nearly a thousand men from the National Security Guard, the Central Reserve Police, the Karmataka State Reserwe Police and the Bangalore City Police, ringed the house. A fleet of ambulance also stood by.
After ninety days on the run, Siwarasan's life as a fugitive was over, in a house in Komona makUnte on the Out
skirts of Bangalore. Sivarasan and his female accomplice, along with the bodyguards,
are dead, but the Indian authorities are continuing with the investigation.

Page 27

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Page 28
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