Page 1
Vol. 14 No. 10 September 15, 1991 Price Rs.
CONSTITUTIONAL CC
DISSOLUTION: The ut
SPOT LIGHT on Speake
Hamish
THE PLANTATIONS: Paul
ENVIRONMENT AND DEV
GULF AND NEWS: Doug
 
 

'.50 Registered at GPO, Sri Lanka OD/09/NEWS/91
UP: The great disorder - Mervyn de Silva
imate weapon
— Машгісе Дшуerger
r and Supreme Gourt
- Manik de Silva
urari
Jeyaraj McDonald
Caspersz
ELOPMENT: S. Sathananthan
las Allen

Page 2

|r (TOVе

Page 3
TREMW E9S
A WILL LOOK BOTH
4.
AMWAYS Алтresty /лfеглаѓfола/ Wi/ in future look at
human rights violations by |armed opposition moveInents too. After a week | long meeting in Japan the fondon based international human rights organisat ions goverring Cour Cī I decided that it would also a get oppositor ovements which abuse human lights, but the core missign Will remain seeking the release of prisoners of conscience, working ... for fair trials for political prisoners, and Seeking to ಡ್ತಿ? torture and extra Judiсfа/ ki//ings by govern.tsחrhB .
Representatives of 70 | gguntries тet in Yokohama. The council also decided В. to focus more on hштап
rights abuses in Asia.
FREE TRADE WITHIM SAARC
Sri Lanka wants trade barriers removed with in SAARC. This wi/ be taken up, at thę SAARC summit Escheduled for November in Colombo. Preliminary discussions were held success| fully, when ministers met
in July in Male.
TABs on Two NARCOTCS RINGS
The POsica Narcotics Bureais is on the traill i ofn two drug rings following the recent arrests of eight Couriers at tha. Katunayake аїгд0 rї. //7е со!угїers were nabbed by PNB detectives after they had beел с/eared by Customs. The heroin seized over three weeks Was valued at over Rs. 5
777.
Briefly
TA MIL GR
6) Tamil in recent advisad cautio to the LTTE's LII:Onditional said that LTTE karan was port Coditio la t fם tחEוחחWBrםJ
Leaders of groups called caшtiоп" 5 т іп, LTTE's past Tamil leader LTTE leadershi
GOOD WORLD O The Wol the IMF are r Te Ward Sri Lar facilities Wortf dollars, the S said quoting inf А top moпetaг" Said that Sri L. al Stipula Ed
Among the down were the of all state ow CO T Therciálisati Owned banks, a restraits.
CRISS
тнот:
The plan Wa5 facing per Se Vere Crisis sir Crash over a Plantations M Karulatilake to in Colombo. COIltin Lad to teë) prices had t diբ, the minis thë minister's wi
two problems
O E3 the ab Thanagernet. Wit tio in CreaSia pro tWO, the ilabi strategies to f, World competiti
The 9owетппе serious thought Ellens, and a

UPS WARY
jolitical terwie WS Hawg 1 in responding a test call for alks.
leader Praba pared for unalks with the
Sri Larika.
other, Tamil for 'extreme wiEW of the
F G Cori, said that O WETE
tՒ18
SAYS O BAMIK
ld Bank and low certain to kali with credit 500 million 7day Island CrInBd. 5L LIIC55. W. official had
kā d Conditions.
Conditions laid 2 privatisation ned businesses, on of state d strict fiscal
DM THE TAMS
tation industry haps the most Co. the coffee
Century ago, linister Rupa ld a seminar Rubber prices be poor and aker a sudden iters said. 3 WW tll Ore Wera fundamentally; ility of the hin the sector ductivity; and ity to wolwe ace iпcгеasing
1.
it was giving to thesa promOng saveral:
groups
''g''.
Img
The BBC
One
alternatives considered "some form of application of private sector System of management. in the state owned estates while the ownership of the and remains with the state is gaining acceptance", the Thirth i Ster Siaid,
NOBOTHER FOR Il MWESTOFS
e The current բLilitical crisis should not bother investors, the leader of a | Japanese business delegation said in Colombo. Mr. Kikuo Ikeda, a businessman and spacial assistant to the Japanese Foreign is Minister, who was in Colombo with a Japanese delegation said that it was un likely that Japanese || investors would postpong
- + "Сангfлығdiан датқа :
wol. 14 No. 10 September 15, 1 g g
Price Rs. 7.50
Published fortnightly by
Lanka Guardian Publishing Co. Ltd.
No. 24ÉS, UiO PIECE, CD|LimԷը - 2:
Editor: Meirw yn da Siwan Telesphoria: 4475B4
CONTENTS
News Background 3. India and the LTTE 8 Who Was "Siwarajan"? 1[] The Unbealan Tigers 13 Rougth Ride to Jaffna 14 "Cyanide Edge 15 Stranger thām's Fiction לך Ethnic Relations in th
Plantation Sector 18 GLIF Wär (2) 1 tוחaוחחיםVirחE This U.N. in Disa IITiamant
and Security (2) 33
Prinited by Arhan da Prosg 82/5, Sri Ratnajothi Sarawanamuttu .13 םBוחםlםMawatha, C
Telephold: 435375

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Page 5
BEHND THE CRISS
THE CRACK-U CONTINUES
Mervyn de Silva
I though it has had rifts be
fore, the UNP, the island's conservative party, the traditiional defender of Wested interests, has always succeeded in composing serious internal differenccs and personal conflicts, far more quickly and effectively than the centrist SLFP or the Marxist Left. Unity rather than disunity has been the hallmark of the UNP. Not Elny more.
What has caused so serious an internal conflict that lica diing party loyalists who have once held the most powerful portfolios can conspire against their party president who led the Ill to so many electoral victorics in the most unsettled, and the least congenial circumstances Is it policy? Whatever its cosmetic touches, and grand populist gestures, the UNP policy is firmly rooted in the universally known IMF-World Bank philosophy. Private enterprise and the metropolitan affluent look forward eagerly to the day, not so fara way, when a Sri Lankan can go to his bank, and Walk out with 10,000 dollars in travellers, cheques for his next trip overseas, Inquiries from prospective foreign investors and collaborators hawe been on the increase, with the JWP insurgency over and the LTTE badly bruis cd both here and in Tamilnadu, its all-important rear-base and sanctuary. State
enterprises arc being steadily privatised.
Relatio[15 With IIndia have
seen a qualitative i III provement. Though som c sections of Indian opinion may not be entirely pleased with what they suspect is Fil corn genital anti-Indianism in Presidcnt Prenadasa's thinking, Prime Minister Narasingha
Rao’s admininisti every sign that on well with cularly the now that relatic have rapidly d ly because of Kashmir sittia old discredited mollists' in th or Intelligenc would Walt to policy of 'wit bouring regim u Inder mini Tg dit
| tl |lit ԼյSmunity howeve governments wil On Third Wor is not always American. Ul is a vital stra the US, Wash siltisfied that a Of free Illa will inevitably World stat e ti tory democrac social-political genial to respect for “hl
However, th do nors, especia peal Commu demand strict human rights that performan proved through sure or fcc. 1 such pressure be subjective fact factor is the the President In the latter coercive diplom stT LI IT eints - iTii factions or adh coalition5. "II the new platf weapon. It is a large u Imbri new opposition

JP
'ation Elas shown
it wants to get heighbours, partismall neighbours Ils With Pakist:11 !eteriorated large
the worsening tio 1. Only the “Te gið Til hege
c Fo Teign Policy e establishment
pursue the old :akening” neigh1 es cor covertly fiant neighbours,
ed Western CoIn:r there ite Some hich adopt a line |d regi Illes which the så line His the: less a country tegic concern of ington is usually formal adoption Tk ecolonics lead it. Third 3 wa Tids participa*y and th113 fi CIlWiTOTT1CIlt C011Cagli l-institutio Illal I man rights”.
2: Te EL, IC i Weste III lly in the Euroity, who either :r aderence to Il Tills CT belicvc ce call be illdiplomatic prcsle L1ged [0 exert cause of various rs. Cle Such personality of Prinic Minister, circumstances, acy requires inlividuals, parties, Դt, newly forged IIIlan Rights' is TIL 1; the Eate:S
Els CI SCOImle times | la LIII der which 1 coalitions can
by the benign inter wentionist force.
be assembled,
From the JWP insurgency onwards, international Human Rights organisations have gathered W01LIInin OLIS evidence Of H. R. abuses. Although some concede that the State's performance has
improved, other champions of human rights have been fad T froll satisfied. From the ghastly
Richard de Zoysa tragedy, the efforts of such external organisations hawc been Te-doubled. But thcse made nö 5erious impact Con the Pre II ll da sa regiune. On the contrary, President Premaas a hitself has exhibited a stubborn and aggressive defiance to wards such external critics, while treating their local partners with a studied col tempt, The sa Inc. un compromising attitude that characterised his reaction to the presence of the IPKF was evident ill his closu Tc of the Israeli interests section, despite persistent appeals from influential western agencies and personalities. Sri LE1 Inka is to o small and cconomically Weak a country to behave like China, Malaysia or South Korea.
At the same time, the locally mobilised "Human rights" campalign made little impTession. President Prc mada sa treated the oppositional front under thic H. R. ballner with di 5 dalin.
To lake a on a regime iper vious to critici SIn On the H. R. i55 le beca nue a fair more challenging task when the UNP acquitted
real impact
itself quite well at the local pells. A more effective coalitiCT had to be created to cha l
lenge the all-powerful presidency. It had to transcend thic traditional Government-Opposition divide. The External àltack

Page 6
was not enough. It had to be an internal-external on slaught,
It was not difficult to forge am ad hoc anti-Pricina dasa alliance under the new flag of "parliamentary democracy'. . . and against presidential omnipotence, It was easy for two
SIS
(a) The class background of the incumbent which had already led to an increasingly visible clash of cultures - the Westernised English-educated el
ite, and the “high castes versus thic rest." .
(b) – President i Premadasa's highly centralised and personalised system of government. Thus, culture and caste as well as the style of government. What was acceptable and in fact, humbly
accepted, from
was intolerable W11 MT, L da li refет геu а Inecting to the the educated, Audierce i Ild th alyst an invalu:
To Teifio TCE meaning of that mada sa was sp his time out of power-centre of tan Tulling strata ers of political dependence. Ca becil i factOT oral Co Inse Llein CH one factor in a It has now b factor in a new
Radio Cab
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in his 511 ccessor, ith Athulaith mut the Nugegoda alientition' of he Offered the e would-be a n1 ble clue,
un wittingly the clue", Mr. Preending most of Colombo, the -smopoliטט טth the real wieldpower sin cc ins te has always If serious elect, and yet only larger equation. e come 1 major | tզuation,
u rio Orsite)
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When the famous document secs the light of day, som c of the "charges' Ilay shock the newspaper reader - not so much for its serious content but by its tone. It may support our reading of a 'clash of cultures, in as Illuch as it reflects the class arrogance of the Iliot-50 well-bred English-educated who
still believe that political power is their heritage.
What anyway is the objective outcomic of this unifinish cd business? It has exposed the disunity of the United National Party and in so doing, acceleratcd thic process of structural crack-up that is now the main feature of our society. Race, clas 5, Castle . . . . . . these are the fault-lines of societal disintegration, the most important consequence of the national crisis.

Page 7
Government, party pol
of authority
Maurice DuVerger
'''Party unity obviously increases govern Ilment authority: the Assemblies turn into a RumpParliament in which well-ordered applause replaces debate: at the Inost, discussion is technical criticism on points of detail formulated by deputies against particular ministers and never questioning the general policy of government (this system is well developed in Soviet Russia). In practice an appearance of democracy and parliaIn entarianism cloaks strict dictatorship. Accounts must also be taken of the structure of the single party and of its true position in the state. A nontotalitarian party may allow the development of limited opposition and thus introduce a degrec of flexibility into dictatorship. A party that is not completely integrated with the state may itself constitute an opposition force; sometillcs Fascist single parties have risen against the coservatism of the regime and have had to suffer severe pufges and much capitis diminutid. Further moTC som c arc outside the government and in practice impotent, like the Portuguese National Union whose activity is slight. With these reserves single party has certainly been the means employed to conse Twee the external for Ins of a democratic regime with balance of powers and limit cd government while an authoritarian regime with an omnipotent government was substituted for it It represents the contemporary political incarnation of the hermit-crab technique, consisting in cmptying a political regime of all reality and
substance, preserving only the externals like an empty shell in which an entirely different
system is installed: thus in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the progressive separation of king and cabinet enabled the old absolute monarchies to transform themsclves" into parliamentary democracies.
Excerpts frovн Free sy'r ffer" y clari சாழ as polifical parffes.
limited to
Although it out so radical the two-party strengthened t the govern Inc. destroying the mocracy. We tends to su b5 tion of powers 5epara tion, bu tion operates of government ment of parlia beço Illes al Im the dominatio: by government, controlled by Who se subordir puties who fi in parliament hierarchy of th sense, projecte Inization of s Inside the g solidarity beco ment and the terial Solidari 1 between cabine authority of t ders of the pa ted represen ta the subordinati to government. writer, MT. Ra write Cf cabi The interna 1 party is more Incans of ic tige and autho crnment; the also entails a
nation of which each 0 fluences the characteristic täry regimec. parliament ca enment lose or their indivi The yote of c no-confidence, enable parlial the cabinet, achieve this snap votes if ween majority slight, but the exception. Wi only Weakness

itics and question
has not carried transformation, systern too has le au thority of t but without apparatus of deawe seen that it itute concentralfor their formal this concentrato the advantage and to the det Timent. The party :ans of en Suring of parliament for the latter is he party leaders, ates are the deorm the majority The internal c party is, in a on to the orgat:1te institutions. JvcIn ment party 11e5 the reinforcecc.nent of minis:y; in relations t and House the he supreme learty over the elecLives establishes on of parlial Ilment Thus a Liberal In say Muir, could nct dictatorship. hierarchy of the ver not the only 'casing the presrity of the govwo-party system radical transforthose means by f the powers inthe which are f the parliamen"hic ways in which 1 influence gowtheir importance dual significance. : Insure or that of which in theory ent to owcrthrow can no longer esult, except for the margin betand minority is ie : Te always thc h this one reserve or relaxation of
discipline within the government party can make it possible for parliament to recover its prerogatives and ovcrthrow thic Cabinet. Of Cours c the exercise of power always creates divisions within the party in office; it heightens the conflicts between internal fractions and the col trast between 13de
Ta tes and extremists, but these dissensions Tarely go so deep as to cause a split. At most,
some deputies of the majority party Will be found abstaining (and more rarely voting against the party) con a notion of confidence in order to show their disagreement with the leading fraction, so long as thc margin between majority and minority is adequate for the display of bad temper to cause no damage. The govern IncInt often uses the vote of confidence as a weapon to restore discipline within its party: it compels the internal opposition to su Trender by challenging it and threatening it with expulsion.
Thc right of dissolution makes this weapon highly effective. If the government sends deputies to face the electoratc. a 5 a consequence of a split in the majority party the dissidents will be in grave danger of being defeated at the new elections; by setting up against them orthodox candidates the leaders of the government party will in a single-ballot system put them in an awkward position. Thus the traditional means for interaction between parliam cnt and goverriIn ent are transformed into means for action by the government on its own party. A kind of 'general post' is produced: the internal hierarchy of the party becomes a link between public institutions; the official links bet w cen public institutiotus strengthen the internal hierarchy of thic majority party. The modification is however one-sided: only the means by which parlia
(Сол тілшғd ол раge I")

Page 8
KEEP OUT : ARMY TOD
hic political crisis sa W a T)
unusual response from Army Commander Hamilton Wilnasingha. Reacting to reports that some senior officers had “engaged in political activities', the Army Chief cracked the Whip. At a conference, General Wanasingha told the top brass that their duty was to respect the Constitution and carry out the orders of the legally constituted government. The Sunday Tiries said:
This move b: brass was pro II that certain offic cingaged in actio politics the off senior officer, source, had met leader.
The Army is r bing, the conduc officer to decid plinary action against him.
In a strongly w
Not the president’s mer
Manik de Silva
resident R. Prema dasa is a PE chaistened man now, hawing overcome art un suspected challenge to him. Thc usually sedate politics of Sri Lanka witnessed some fast-moving and stunning developments during 28 August- 3 SeptembČI: defectors from the ruling United National Party (UNP) joined hands with the opposition to impeach the president; the president prorogued parliament; four UNP minis ters resigned; the president goaded IIost of the UNP defectors to backtrack.
The parliamentary coup was led by two UNP dissidents: Education Miister ILa lith1 . A.t. h1 ul::ith ITn LI da Ii and ex-minister Gamini Dissana yake. The duo secretly mobilised a majority of MPs - party defectors and opposition MPs-to sign a IIn otion of impeach ment and presented i ton 28 August to the Parliamentary Speaker HaIliffa Mohamed. The speaker, a UNP stalwart who has fallen
out with the president, used His discreti Ilir y po Weir5 Eind entertained the motion before informing the president, who
must have been shocked at the un precedented development.
The shock was all the greater beçalı 5'e under the Sri Lafı katı Constitution the president is |head of stilte: as well as . Flead of government. The parlia Inent
F;
micrely has leg a titl can titlly dcIt successful Fl tywyd 3-third 5 the proportion system of clic ct mely difficult t0 abitali I lät 5, III. The UN the Ceylon W. currently hold house of 225, Wilc:lt.
If the speak With the dissic dent could halv lia [The In Li and c; tid. Ils to the 1: twe:Ilt, t, il 30 A chose to proro. of the next parli to 24 Septemb to w Cork Un UNP dissidents
Were persuade their signatures tio [1, Which T
lished in thi agenda. Some tors cail cd misled or misте Other's Säili Hei have been forg ters, including resigned. The go Ille Lal T y grup te Ilber when present fxprts: t the president : inform the spel:

y the Army top ıpted by Teports crs had allegedly witics, involving icial 5aid () e according to this a UNP dissident
2 ported to be proсt of tlјS 5čПлг e Whether discishould be taken
Orded address to
MEWWIS BACKGRO LIMO
the special meeting held in Colombo the Army Commander stressed the task of the Army was to safeguard the country from security throats.
Explaining the constitutionality of the impeach ment process, Lt. General Wanasinghe told his Ilen to refrain from taking sides and Wärmed the In not to sp read i Tu mours by talking amongst themselves. In keeping with the Constitution, the se Tyice Commit nders and the Police Chief had pledged to uphold, the Constitution and follow the orders of their Call minder-in -Chief the President,
islative functions impeach a presilly if it I LLIs ters majority. Under Ll representation in S, it is extrefor any party trength in parliaP and its ally, irkers Congress, 125 seats in a With 13 seats
had lit sided ients, the presi"e dissolved parilled fresh elecgislature. In the Ligi u siti Preilla dasa glle the opening i: menta Ty session Pr. His aides got
identifying the i, malny of wh011 i to withdraw
from the resoluemained un pub: parliamentary of the cx-defacthey had been presented, while r signatures Inay ed, Four minisAthulaith muid a li, -nt pii r!iaטווtrn r'י Thet on 2 SepL|le 115. MP5 2d coIl fidence in I Tid resolved to luker,
A president can be impeached for mental or physical infirmity, in tentional violation of the CO 15 titlu tion, troca sol - () r bribery, abuse of power or Tioral turpitude. Thc Parli al mentary Privileges Act forbids prepublication of a resolution due to come up in the house. But
the dissidents' resolution is known to have adduced specific grounds covering the gamut
of causes for impeach Tinent. If the speaker reverses his decision,
the president could dissolve parliament.
If the speaker decides to
take up the resolution at the next session, only a two-thirds majority can refer the issue to the Supreme Court for inquiry and report. If the Supreme Court finds the resolution justified, parliament must again endorse it with a two-thirds Imajority before the president is renowed. It is unlikely that the dissidents could Illuster Slich EL TIL verwhelmi Ing majority. Their strategy must be to persua de the speaker to keep the resolution pending to prevent the dissolution of parliament and garner a simple majority to keep defeating the gover IlLiller and e mbi TTL sisi ng the pcsident dIl Cather iš Sluts —— a highly improbable scenario acciri ing to most lIllly's Is.
(Corresy F. E. E. R.)

Page 9
Rebel UNP men deny
ebel ruling United National Party legislators seeking inpeachment of President Rana singhe Premadasa denied that India SLLLLL LLLLL LHHL aLLLLL aaHHLLLLLLL LLOLL LLLLLS behind their move.
Former Education Minister Laith Athula thmudali denied the report appearing in a section of the local press that India had pressurised few Tamil members of Pali: The It to back the Inc. We behind which there were also SCbIlle w cistic TT CCL Intrie5.
He was addressing a press conference a long with Mr. Gamini Dissanayake, a formeT Minister. Meanwhile, Mr. Chandra Gankanda, junior Minister for Handloom Industries, ha 5 also resigned from the government and his resignation was accepted. He is the fiU LILH II i Inis ter to Tessig from the Premia da. 521 Cabinet following a notice seeking impeachment of the President was entertained by Parliament SpeakcT M. II, Mohammed. The other two Iministers al Tec MT. G. M. Premacha Indira and Mr. Laximan SéLewir HIIlg.
"We did not have anything to do With lly foreig T. c3 L1 IntTy and wic Will Tot havic anythig in the future (i Til this con Illection)," Mr. Athulaith muda li as
serted, NO CASINO C.
MT. Athlillth Dissal Dayake i El wilers of the Casintis Wete fl adding 'only th
MP3 WETTLI
Ass criting tha UNP members. implicach ment me to do With Casi Athlu llathmudai local newspaper back printed a side Prellid: Joe Siim, who lu as Casino King
A Hong Ki Dig II was expelled
On the tilla i Ill ment grՃtlp th UNIP II e CT5 signatures pled President Premi laith muda li sai percent of 125 lic Sill: * - We path and they LIS I t tille Of Iloti in in Parl, MAJORITY RE
The UNP, claimed hawi Ti lost Iajority is
TweedleGorb & Tweedle
Some scou 7 adrells un roi ask thern selves Serie leave it to History Not their own befuddled generation, Middleclass, petty, enamoured of being Back to the labyrinth with flags of bygone Whence Time, releiting, liberated the For the brief, sweet breath, betrayers fo Quoting Scripture on Permanent Revoluti
Clowns donning martles front History's t Sullying clean Red Armour with dollar
U. IKTLI atik

NEWS BACKGROUND
Indian hand
}NNECTION mudali and Mr. 5 de Ilied thlåt
recently banned inding the move C COI science of nding the move.' t none of the supporting the o we hadi al nything Il OWIET5. MT. recililled thilt a - had so III e time picture of Presa's Wife with sed to be known
national, Joe Siim, fT01Tl STi Lanka, of the Governit it leit || 6 have put their ging Support to dasa, Mr. At hudi ilt 1 cåst i 8C) UNIP lebcTS LITE I EL COTTECE would suport voting' on the iament. GAINEO
men While, hås g regained its | Palä Illic It t)
Sin
ed Kingdorns,
uled
αη.
μΜιθίνι jackboots -
defeat the impeachment notion against President Prenadasa, But rebel UNP leaders alleged the MPs were being TI hade to retrict their position supporting the impcach ment move “under du Tess”.
As mamy as 116 of the 125 UNP MP5 had given Written assurances to Prime Minister Wijetunga, that they had not sign cd an impeach Tinent motion, the State-run Striday Observer said.
Government . . .
(Cr: ரீரா ரீஜிச சி)
ment cal II i Influence government are deprived of efficacy OT cornpletely diverted from their o Tiginal purpose, to the extent of becoming weapons en a bli Ing the cabilet to milikc recalcitralint representatives to the line. The means by which government inFuences parliamenti a I e Indified in operation but not in result; they remain devices for exerting pressure on parliament.
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Page 10
India and the
S. Murari
in Madrids
ongratulation to STT, now tracc; EL Tid a Trest illl Indial. Il links', SElys a hı Carding tıp in Madras, right at the doorstep of Malligai, the official headquarters of the Central Bureau of Inves" tigation team probing the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case.
Whether the SIT deserves praise for having tracked down Siwaras an and Subha despite the vast network the Liberation Tigers Eelam had built up in this part of the country or condemnation for failing to capture them alive, is a matter of opinion. But the challege thrown by the assassination of Mr. Gandhi on Indian 4oil cannot be met unless India
sewers links with the LTTE, That calls for a whole new approach.
The LTTE has been able to build a vast base in Tamil Nadu over the years, thanks to the
cloack and dagger diplomacy that has characterised India’s Sri Lankan policy from
1983. It is a tragic irony that like Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, LTTE's Welu pillai Pirabhakaran too was a monster of Mrs. Indira. Gandhi's creation.
From the very outset, India's Lankan policy was neither open nor guided by enlightened selfinterest. Neither Mrs Gandhi nor her son supported the Tamils' demand for a 5 eparate Eelam or the right to self-determination because of the repercussions this could have in Jammu and Kashmir. Yet, they nurtured their armed struggle, using the militant groups as bargaining chips in dealings with Colombo,
8
The facadem: Gandhi that thi milita Its ICT. tri Indian soil, bu activists, foi oled Colomb. It W gantic te plily, separatists wer Struggle from were, in the ba be a source of Challwinists her!
During the the militants, M alone had the g the tide and po dishonesty of in Sri Lankan : denning Pakist in Kashmir and then argued til 10t remain Lur ower 200,000 refi over to Tamil
[In th1c iDL1DIn cd the July 1983 Tamil riots, t clarou T. fOT operation by In But Mrs. Gandh becausc unlike Rehman, the T Ecratic Front gain Was not leader of the MI5, Gandhi f urd policy of 1 boys as pressur CC30 Imbi to Il TUL F. And N tacit recognitio: by involving th talks.
It was obvi manda Tins in the LTTE Wy Ou in the Indial

LTTE
lintained by Mrs. cc -- We Te Ieither aining Camps IIIl it only political not least of all ya5 a dan gerous for the Tamil c directing their Tallil Nadu Lind irgain, proving to inspiration for
with חטטymשחטו r. Moran rji Desai Luts to go against it out the bil sic: India's medding Lffl iT5 whilc c) Ilan for doing so Punjab. It was at Il di Could |con Cered Wh Cl gees had crossed Nadu.
iate aftermath of island-widic antihere Was eWel a Bangladesh-type dia in Sri La Inka. i stayed her hand Sheikh Mujibur Tal Im il United Lisl A. Amirtha linthe undisputed island Tamils, lowed the absusing the militant : groups to coerce egotiate with the Mr. Gandhi gave In to these groups em in the Thimpu
Luis to all but the Sollth Block thilt ld soon be a thorn
side since it was
Delhi's
cven then the most powerful and the most ruthless group devoted to the cal LLGC' of Eelam. The right lesson was not learnt from the II assacre of the Indial-trained Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation by the LTTE in 1986. Mr. Pirabhakaran had ilade DO secret of his plan to make the Ee la TIl of his drca. Ils a 0Ileparty State.
When the militant groups bcgan resisting pressure, the Tamil Nadu Gover 11ct, at New bchest cracked down on the Ill in October 1986. Much is bei Ing Ima de of the fact that the the Director-General of Police (Intelligence), Mr. K. Mohand as disarmed the Illilitants without firing a single shot. The fact is that up to that point of time, the militant groups had respect for Indian authority because they wanted India's support to achieve their goal.
When New Delhi wanted the LTTE, at the Bangalo Te South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation summit in November 1986, to sell the proposal to trifurcat e the Eastern prowince and merge the Tamil areas in the east With the In orth o Il the basis of contiguity, the then Chief Minister of Tainil Nadu, MI. M., G. Ra II la childral. II, ordered the arms seized from the LTTE restored to it. New Delhi billite di MT. Pirabhaka Tall with the offer of Tinaking hinn Chief Minister of the enlarged Northern province. But Mr. Pirabhakaran told the then Indian High Commissioner, Mr. J. N., Dixit, that he was already the defacto

Page 11
ruler of the north and wanted the east also,
MT. Pirabha ka Tal çale bäck from Bangalore to find his Wireless sets seized by the police, Within a day of his commencing a fast, MGR restored them to him. But New Delhi was not prepared to forgive him so easily. From January to May 1987. Jafna reeled undcr an economic blockade imposed by Colombo and New Delhi refuscd to intervcne. All the while, fuel and other essentials were going from Tamil Nadu, thanks to MGR.
Even when the Sri Lankan forces launched Operation Liberation in April that year, New Delhi kept aloof. Yet, MGR got the Assembly to pass a resolution in support of the Tamils and in the name of providing relief to the refugees, passed on Rs. 4 crore, all government mon cy, to the LTTE to by arms.
India's policy in the postaccord period was again dictated by the LTTE. India was ready to recognise the LTTE as the dominant group, but not the sole spokesman of the Ta IIlil people Mr. Pirabhakaran agreed to go along with India and got the first instal TCIt – RS. 50 lakh - of the promised Rs. 1.5 cTo Te for “ “ rehabili Lation” of his cadres.
But within three months, he had turned the Tamil people against India by engaging the Indian Peace-Keeping Force in El War of Fittj tio ih... (Once ... the IPKF failed to disarm the Tigers, India lost whatever little lever. age it had with the Sri Lankan Gover In IIntern t... The accordi its clif eventually collapsed with the exit of the IPKF.
FTO TT1 OCObjeľ conflict with t to August 198: maining LTTE m Nadu were dep the Research an (RAW) was neg LTTE. And the cxploited the di different agenci cause. It colt ar tills fra Ill Tal the Wolu Idded the and Carry OIn h0 ey: Il Wille cu fighting a futi island.
It was during te LTTE de well fDT India's ter and started trea Els äl. Il exter15 ili the Dravida Mur rolling out the the post-IPKF calle to believe away with, lite
The Rail; it out in Februar) sa Cree of Eell Im Lltina Ty Libera K. Path manabhi Madräs in Ju D abduction of Oficials and fist pointers to the Troll the LTTE
The tragedy the Chandra SI ment Only expl to get rid of thi
lit.
NI W tlere i5 Mr. Gtindhi'; should not go up is talk of İıd; seek the extra Prabhakara 1 a this is El Ct in practical politi mb) could lay

1987, when the e IPKF started, B, when the reilita Ilt5 in Tamil 'Urted to Jafna, di Analysis Wing otiating with the : LTTE clewerly fferences among es to further its inued to ferry lil Nadu, bring *re for treat Illent Stile propaganda f soldiers were le War on the
this period that oped a contempt ritorial integrity ting Tamil Nadu of EeläIll. With 1 netra Kazhaga Im : red carpet in hase, the Tigers they could get tally, nurder.
...hapuram shoot1990 the mas
People's Revoltio Il FroIl 1 cadc T ı li Ind othlı er. 5 il e 1990, and the Indian customs Lerm cI, were all
ellerging threat
Was that ewell 1ek hill T Gwerited this threat : DMK (G) Wer 1
the cry that 1555 si 13 til i punished. There i H planning to
dition of MT, ld Kittu. All the real of
:s, for, if Coloits hal Inds on
Mr. Pirabhakaran, it hang him twice ower.
Wtյ111ti
On a more sober leve, it is said that in the name of fighting the LTTE, India should not forget the ha pless Tamils and should nudge Colombo to grant them thic political rights that they have been long denied. However, such counsel does not take into account the ground
Tcl lities in Sri Länka,
India's options are very limited, if past blunders are any guide. It can no longer fight a proxy war with either Colombo or the LTTE, using other Tamil groups as cat's paws. The anti LTTE group are all with Colombo now
though they still believe India has a role to play.
the into
An option is to carry battle against the LTTE Sri Lanka, stopping short of another IPKF-type operation. The US attack on Libya and Israeli hot-pursuit raids on Palestine Liberation Organisation positions in Lebanon are In entioned as examples of stra
tegy to combat te ТToris II at one's doorstep. But the fact is that it is no longer a bi
polar world and the US may no longer allow India to play the role of regional policeman.
Besides, unlike during the days of the IPKF when the LTTE was pushed deep into
the jungles, the leadership is now well entrenched in thicklypopulated Jaffna and the cadres scattered elsewhere in the north and east. The Tigers also have no fixed positions except in places like Elephant Pass, Palaly, Karainagar and the Mannar islands, which also houses Sri Lankan air Illy, navy and air force camps.
"Салт тілінғі/ арту ірде 341

Page 12
HE GANDH
ASSASS NATON
Vho vas "Siva
An exclusive investigation
D. B. S. jeyaraj
he 90-day manhunt is over,
Sivarajan or "One-eyed Jack, the master mind behind the Rajiv Gandhi assassination, is dead. Who was this Siwarajan? What was his real name and background?
Here is a brief life-Sketch c{}IIlpiled from telephone interviews with close relatives, schoolmates, former Udupididy residents and ex-comrades from various militant ETUլIբs,
"One-cyed Jack' used in any aliascs, including Siwa rajan, Rajan, Rajah, Arumai, Arawinth, Raghuvai'an, Raghu and Raghuappah. Hiis real n Tmie however was Pickirchildrar arid he his fled fron Udupiddy, El town about 32 km from Jaffnel city and about 3 kill inland from coastal Welvettithurai.
Packillachlandriari "sofatherivas Chari
drasekhara Pillai, a teacher of
English ar Tsie (Wadi pirally Afr77 erscarı Mission School, leading educational institution in the Area. Cha IndTH Sekha TELIT. Pillai Wä5 native of Udupididy and lived in the northern part of the town near the Veerapathira. Temple. TV e postal a d'adress 1471 y Verapa Ihira Koviladdy Vadakku or Peerapahira Temple, North Area). Packii chandra was alled af. ter his parents, taking Packia fr Com his mTo ther's na Tunc, SiwaPolkiä mm, Hind the Clia, IndTELT TITI 11 his father's. He is the eldest child and Earl in 1958, the year of the first Imajor anti-Tai Til prograr 71 in Sri Lanka.
ע"ar The Hi/tribrיין תנrrrrיJey .ל. .D. B. LSLLtCHLL LLTLlTCCHCLTTLLSKS HCHHHH LLLSLL Sefirhafızarti, T Tarrıfı içeekly isi Toronto. He worked for The ISLAND.
O
Packichladra are interesti Ing. a Wellala, the Illina. It caste it Кагауаг, а пuп Castle heavily the CCistill regi so I st-divisio Tiarakkarar, a 5. which traces it Thana Vaisya Ch The Thailakkir: Udupididy is cor Weerapa thirah Ka pLilliyady and El Tels. HitleT:5 til karal T of LJdı Ipi they a re Superic las and Karayar certainly enjoy. a Tid i fluence i
Young Packiac Cle vi TI
si sher". Chandra alt. ho) Lugh an Eng a staunch suppt deral Party an Tallil United II In this, he si beater track of po The political st in those days , led R. R. Dhar belonged to the Sa illa Samalaja P of Udupididy w; red of Leon Tr strongly support the-scii Dharma COILested the L Il:Illä Ty constit Li from Udupid dy it coulted for of the Udupi Tbbı:1TII13H r:4tm:Im he always gaine Slippi. It of the tO VII.
CYFIdri7, sekhara J"Uliffg 50/1, Hữ H'el"F.

rajan” ?
's social origins He y £15 Tacite: II LI Imne Tically do| lAFTna, nor fi 1erically smaller concentrated in on, He helor ged of Chettis Called F77 il fra dirig Caste origins L. Lhe Letti r5 il II dil. 111 ityון וונוז וווטט ח 1 Centrated in the iyiladdy, MottaliWasigasala iady 1gly, thilt. Tharlakiddy Clin that 5r til bt Volds and they hawe !d some power in the vicinity.
hindran Was frIIf I Til I forialist felelorder age by his Sckhārn Pillai, ; lishi sch Kola T, Wais } ILI" - " ) HT - L: Fedi later of the liberatio 1. Front. ra y'ed Wirar ffe "ro ir Liidy. a of Udupid dy vas a ieftist ca l11:1 "Hilar who Trotskyite Lanka arty. The people : : Ih Iit : In: II. Oll'otsky, but they ed the son-ofTä LIlä IT When he fdupid dy parliaency. The votes
Lil Won, ho, Wewer, in ly. Il per cei L idd y clcictorate, newer won, but :d the electoral
people of the
F1 Fillaf ard His ", defied the local
carrer f 7 P77 FZF Fiore il the Tarril Perio Tallis T car7 diada res, K. Jeyakkody of the Federal Party and T. Rasali Inga min of the TULF, against Dhamaratnam. This federicy to defly local opinior incurred the displeasure of the people of Udipiddy. This fendency or frair beCarlie Flore prarlarıyıced later 14'her Packii charidrari joined the LTTE and incurred the wrath of rary
Lipida resider.
Packichandran was a ceyer stden at the local American Mission school. He had an aptitude for languages and passed his General Certificate of Education (Ordinary Level) examination with flying colours. He was studying for the GCE Advanced level which would have enabled him to cnter the University, when his fa fer die ir are / 977. Beirg sté eles Chfll, sie had so hear the family burden and dropμέd oι I of 5τήσσι.
The family paid a large amount of money to an agent from Udupididy who prorised Peckiachaudran a lucrative job in West Asia. The Lagerit de fa real CIFIC' the young mari became extremely
frustrated. He hen enteredgavern
CLLLS LLLLLL KSLL S HHHHHHHHLLLLLLL LLLLLLL to the Electricity Bard, He served as in Electricity Board em
ployee in Trincionalee and
Battical coa in the Eastern Pro
Vince for some time.
While Working in the East,
Packiich and rail was once arresred für distributing les Flers contairiTg Trg-EelII viev5. While in custody, he scribbled "Long Live Ta Tinil Eelam" slogans on the walls of his cell and his platc. He was severely assaulted for this and had to be hospitalised.
Lāte T, ir Jfris, sie Pro Irreve orce again for posting Taniil Eelam

Page 13
posters and was detained at the Jaffria Fort Carp Prisar. When the large-scale anti-Tamil violence occurred in July 1983, Packiachandran was apparently locked up inside the Dutch Fort, He was cleased shortly afterwards and promptly joined thic ranks of the Tilitats.
Strange as it Inay seem, Packia charidrari's first choice of group LLGL ST S GGCLS LLLLLLLlLLLH S SYLlmLLkuGaLL Organisation (TELO) and rior the LT" TIE. There had been for Se:- wera l de cadics a In ll 1 dercurrent of hostility between the predominantly Karayar' Welvettithurai and the predominantly "non-Karayar' Udupid dy. The original leaders of TELO, Thanga thurai, Kutti mani and Tegan of Velvetti thurai bad al been killed in the Welika de Prison massacre. The new leader was Sri Sabaratia. In from Kalwiyankadu Whereas the top leadership of the LTTE was essentially fro Tu Welye[[it: Eılı Tğı i.
A secord reason for a large influx of Udupiddy pouth into TELO. Vas The Phenomenom of Das, ffe E. O ry frčí ry car IPTrider, Das wa5 himself from LJdupiddy and because of this, many local lads joined his movement. Packiachandran and Das were of the LHHLLLL LLLLL LLLS LL LLLLL LLLuuLLLLSSS ed. (Das was murdered in 1986 by the Bobby faction of TELO at the Jaffna Hospital premises.)
Packiachandran joined TELO arid left for India in October 1983. He is 57 fail! Topı Fıacive received nitry rig rர சer Kurtbakorapt in Tarruil Nadu. Het was then posted to the propaganda Wing of TELO and interacted a lot. With students in Tamil Nadu as well as Kerala, Karlı takal and A Iidh Tal, PT: desh. Fluent in English, Packiachandiran also had a smalt tering of Malaya la T1, Telugu, Kannada and Hindi and spoke Tallil with an Indian accent.
TWhile ir The TEILC), Packacha rdrai was closely associated with the group's Velve tithurai corportent. Unlike most Udupiddy youth, Pakiachandrari had great rapport with the WWT group.
צHטיH .
Hij political men Mario MISE thurai. Soon probl the TELO and
of Velvet Iithurai } Mifas fer i roko Iridi ir refrr: In late 1984, "Sir cerrari hyda757 JP2
Back in Sri mastcr conti Im LI with in TELO, C the rightful heir gathurai-Kuttim. ckich Tridrar, Wh. fία, Για αrigεr The Mfarit MI Ffe TEL. Will T Killinochli barık, acted sharply, , killed by Rai yir7
Fir, fe ffer L.
"I Mig M verif fıtra i Fhe Clar; of the LTTE. foil WWT eith of militan Cy, LTTE.
Packia chat irid rari exr-TELO rFilir aI Yi Triesh Rargay (IF) : LTTE. His new L. was Raghu. He long time with wing and was the collectil Udupiddy and :
Packacha Idra to Udupididy res riflless fri e: Udupiddy wis 1 supportive of Päckich alltiran person from his Feri for Friere This did not Ilmany. He is r virtually ferrorise la fior, at time: a gun at the W apparently impa collecting, con o ing (SL), Rs.2 yטח נWry mtםti her wedding da portions of th to nearby LT hati נ1e Whtטון וו property found appopriatiпg oп

rwy'r llyfr TELO ir front Pelvet riens arose within a large HLAPIber fourt led by Mario way, Ef South tid to Sri La rika. rajar" or Packi! of therri.
Lanka, Mai 10 d to function Iaining he was
to the Thainitradition, Pa. se still sy'r platze
Priored if r led fiction of ELO Tobbed the the LTTE reMIIIа Мике г. иду "ri. If P. IdTTE esser.
asfer's death Velне тне поподоiy TELO Illitart:5 er dropped out
or joined the
, a larg 11'i li u ther İç like Satıl, RIBahr, jo fra el the TTE FlorH-déguerre function cd for a in the political
responsible for of full is from
adjacent areas.
in Was, according iidents, extrerrey :I racting FYIrley, not traditionally the Tigers and
was the only clan who was 严 üf 凸、凸TT巫. eldear hill to eported to have od the local papu5 even pointing icti II. He wä5 rtial in this fund Tc (cca.5il 5eiz 15,000 from the of a 1 : LI Il t ) y and diverting e wedding feast TE ca 11 p5. An
jL15 t soldi some his Tiger nephew lakh of rupees.
Raghu also earned the haired of Udupity residen for is Par in the killing of Pooraria sharithi, the widowed mother of five children who was allegedly an informant working for the IPKF. Although Raghu did not kill her personally, he is said to have warned her one day before her death. The children are now in an orphanage and the town people remain very
angry over the whole affair. Another killing, that of an Udupididy youth Kamaradas,
who belonged to a rival militant group, is also ascribed to Raghu.
Packia chandran alias Raghu is also reported to have warned his first cousin Who Was an ex-TELO militant to flee the
country. The man took the cousinly "advice' and is now ill the West.
According to informed sources, Packiach andran alias Raghu seems to be have been the 'Visible targer"" for the subirerrarier hostilir yr i'r Udu pridd y f g yw ards in the LTTE. His own high-handed behiviour, on top of the maverick attitude of both father and SOI), has contributed to this sentiment, Raghu's un popularity in his native place can be gauged by an Udupididy woman's reaction upon hearing that 'Sivarajan' was dead. She quoted from the ancient Tamil poet Auwaliya II's Kondraiventha'': O oruda. In pahaikkin verudan kedum." ("Incurring the enmity of the village will result in destruction down to the roots.')
Ir 1987, Raghi Eya,5 frjured d'u- ring a skirrnish Hear the Jafia Forf. Hog ou 5 ! Fils l'e/r gye, the reby earning the sobriquct, "Oneeyed Jack." When the confrontation with the Indian ATIIly began, Raghu is said to hawe Shified for the Peria to the Easterri pro virice. He carre back ir early 1988 Trid fircrítonel Fder the Vadaritarachchi coririander Rrithrapathy Sridhør (Tsias "Major James' of Velverrir Fitri (VVT).
(Om one occasion, “Major James” launched a successful attack on an IPKF sentry post. The first rocket-propelled grenado was fired by Packia chandran alias Raghu, Later, when "Ma

Page 14
jor James' was summoned by LTTE Suprcmo Prabakaran to the jungles of the Wanni for **consultations,'' Ragh II furt crioried for αθομι α η ιαπιΗ ας αστης Ραdari arachchi corrim Tari der. Despite this, Raghi was of propriated arid confirtued as a lieutenant.
Mystery surrounds Raghu's movements after thc departure of the Indian troops. He was Plot sighted in the North afferywards and one view is that he was in Batticaloa. According to an account put olut in Sri Lanka, hic had bu Ingl cd some assignment relating to the Muslim popula
tion and had been thrown out of the movement.' He then left for India. Another
version is that he had "dropped out of the movement" in late1989 or early-1990 and left for India. The question raised by both versions is: Was this hardcore LTTE cadre, trained in the usc of various types of weapons, working for some other powerful external "agency' in addition to the Tigers? But the versions put out in Tiger country could be a cunning camouflage or cover-up story.
The Ilore
among Sri Lank the Udupiddy : kia chlandırlı mev ing for the LT" ment subject , ! time frame, W. perhaps to e persons and in his arca of exp; for the ST Irve lish, beyoid sh doubt, the start II. drar allas "Ragh II | fle ITTE hierarcsy.
Contrary to out in the Indi investigative or cies, "Siya raian" ' "irrelligarice chfe til recently, til LTTE's intellig becil “ Pottu A well known an Ta mil militant a very senior f
Further, cont which I have ap scations of th even Packiach det Tactors from
VASA O|
2O7, 2nd
Colom
Telephone

prevalent view an Tamils from Tca is that Pacer stopped WorkTE. His assigno a particular puld hawe been liminate certain eed this seemed :Irtise. If is vifa 5ίίgα Γιαπ το εσία - shadow of a of Packia chari| alias "Sivara ia'' organisat for arid
the reports put al 1 T1 e dia citing Intelligence agenis I of the LTTE's f", " At least unhe head of the ence wing has mman,' who is ong Sri Lankan groups and is unctionary.
rary to reports peared in some e Indian press,
that he did not smoke or drink - at least publicy. Also, he was not known to have had any relationship with any woman or Women in Sri Lanka.
Packiachandran's mother is still alive. So are his three brothers and two sisters, all younger to him. One brother is living abroad, another is a technician in Sri Lanka, and a third is a member of the LTTE. All three a Te maTTied. One sister was born mentally handicapped while the other, a school teacher, is un marricd.
There hawe been reports in the Indian press that both the ʻʻhu1i1alin bombʼ" Dh1a1u and Subha' were relatives of Packiachandran on his IIlother's side. The mother, Siva packiyam, is fo Tim Cha Wakachcheri. The relatives whom this Writer interwic wedi (fromin Canada) were all on Packiachandran’s paternal side; while confirming that Sivarajan's mother was from Chavakachcheri, they could not shed much light on his mater
andran's many nal relatives at this point.
Sri Lanka say ( Frarrr li rrey
PTICANS
cross Street, .11 - סכ
: 421 631

Page 15
Army successes fail to shake Tai
Mauled, but un
Hamish McDonald in Colombo, Jaffna and
espite heavy casualties at the hands of the Sri Lan
kan army in the recent battle for Elephant Pass and the Indian crackdown on their
Tamil Nadu support base after
the murdic T of formet Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi, the separatist Tamil Tigers
appear to be in a position to hold out indefinitely in their stronghold in Sri Lanka's northern Jaffna peninsula,
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) drew a lot of blood when the army was obliged to send an 8,000st Tong amphibious force to rescue the besieged 800-IIlan garrison at Elephant Pass, a causeway on the highway to Jaffna. By their own count the army lost 178 men. Many Colombo analysts say the true figure would be double that.
But LTTE spokes man Anton Balasingham admits to setbacks in the Tigers' attempt to seize Elephant Pass, and puts the In ovement's casualties at about 500 killed and 1,000 wounded. Other observers say the LTTE dead could number nearly 1,000. The army's northern region commander, Maj.-Gen. Denzil Kobbekaduwa, said LTTE radio traffic listed 955 names. Although each side presents a post facto strategy of drawing the other side into a killing zone, a guerilla movement with perhaps 8,000 fighters cannot afford conventional battles,
Thc costly success has proWided a much-needed boost to the army's standing in Colombo. After its brutal clampdown on the cxtre Ilist Simhalese leftist movement, the Janatha Winukti Peramu na (JWP), in 1989-90, the military's reputation had suffered in the inconclusive fight that resumed With the LTTE in June last year.
Many scnior are now eager press u Te Il into action new has started arris il Teccht wecks a dozen 30 pieces, six jet 43 a Timou Tcd we Shanghai-class p nic W. Weapons W lance betwccn Brig. Asoka commander of base, ad Ilits tha ing, tactics and the LTTE the e
BLI LI the a strength scens t b) more than LTTE. Since th Tamils broke 01 army has tripl 77,000 men. As increasing dem budget, thic mili to be Seen as a for the first it country's indepe thing which cau іп a countгy w tradition to si nt WanטrnmטWטg milita ry just ei the Tigers, but .natחne diploס
The governme joying greater i its relationship Gandhi's assasi widely on the
lowed the la: IП dian Gover ПП the Tigers. The El pool of Suppi tal settlements Strait whicre fisherman has re
Billi t iim TaTi whole the lood tics has swung sympathy in th fear and anger. when the Tiger

nil Tigers' hold on north
beaten
didras
army officers to keep up the affna, bringing equipment that ing from China This includes In 11 artillery ighter-bombers, icles, and three atrol boats. Thic ill tip the bale two forces. Jayawa Tidhana, the Wawu niya Superior trainmobility give ge in the field.
riny's growing Co w or Ty Colomit does the e War with the It in 1983 the ed in size to well as making ands on the tary is starting political player ime since the indence - someics deep un case ith no i martial
cak of. The is to give the lough to beat
no more,' said
It is also cinldependencic in
with India. 1ation, blamed LTTE, has Tet elements of 2nt tolerance of Tigers retain rt in the coasa cing the Palk In early every atives in Jaffna.
Nadu as a of state polifrom outright II mid-1980s to The shift began took on the
Indian peacekeeping force (IPKF) in 1987, and became more Imarked when the LTTE gun ned down Indian-backed - riwas in Madras itself in June 1990. Chief Minister J, Jayalalitha is a Congress ally and won the May-June elections partly on pledges to root out the Tigers.
But thic attitudes of Tamil Nadu and New Delhi could change quickly if the Sri Lankan army did start advancing into Jaffna. Given the sorry human-rights riccord of the ill-trained government troops, and the casualtics they would take on the way in, massacres of ciwi1ia 15 I would b c al min 005 t inevitable. A large percentage of Jaffna's 1 million people would seek refuge in Tamil Nadu, where the present 210,000 refugees are already putting pressure on resources and jobs. New Delhi would get appeals to intercede,
As it is, the Sri Lankan Government of President R. Premadasa is taking advantage of India's failed peacekeeping rolc and subsequent retreat to flout the humiliating geo-political riders attached to the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka peace accord. Woice of America was given the go-ahead to build a broadcast rela y station im Sri Lanka, and India's longstanding fears of an American 'spy station'' on its doorstep were ignored.
Premada sa himself is preoccu pied with sustaining the cconomic boon that started in the Simha les c-dQIThinated South la st year - when GDP growth hit 6.5% - and spreading his p(- verty-alleviation programmes to backward areas where the JWP exploited unemployment worrics. This depends on continuing to attract tourists, investment in the thriving stockmarket and
13

Page 16
IMF-World Bank Tcstructuring credits.
Colombo has already drawn
Enougb inter national Criticism over the estimated 30,000 executions - including citizens
who disappeared in the crackdown - by police and arily death squads during the antiJWP campaign. Amnesty International, a US Congressional sub-committee and relevant UN agencies arc all making in quiries. But the government is sto Ine walling.
Analysts sce a dichotomy in Premadasa's response to the outside world. As One put it:
There is a struggle between those that think Sri Lanka should be a modern nation
state integrated into the World economy, and those who hawe Teddiewal wie WS, who think the high point was the civilisation of the 12th century based con a uniform culture, language апd religion. Prema dasa embodics this com trä diction in his personality.'
MC St concede La LPrema d:5i is not parsonally anti-Tamil. But he cuts himself off from foreign contact, has not t TalWelled outside Sri Lanka since becoming president and railcly meets foreign leaders or diplo
Inats. Attempts at outside mediation have Come fT[]IL1 se veral sources including a Norwegian group, the Quaker
church and the Commonwealth. No Ille have been take in Lupo.
As for direct negotiations, both the government and the LTTE profess willingness to tal ki, but without much obvious conviction. The Tigers an 10 ulced i Lumillte Tal cea Sefire at thic New Year, but this lapsed after several days. After the LTTE broke a truce last year with the abduction and murder of hundreds of policemen from isolated stations, the army believcs атny truce proposal fтоп the LTTE is merely a tactic to allow resupply.
The government's conditions for talks are: agreement that
14
the armed struggl after a politi participation by
groups; and ac of the i 1 divisi Laiki, The LT"
conditional talks Balasingham sai Willing to discu up of a Tarmil
fel:I: 5|Ill:LITL. invited Colnb Tamil Iminister,
to Jaffna for tä
The governmel that. Meanwhile in setting up all liaillent Elly CCIll I
լյր բeace բTC: Il CT til and Cäsi сопsiderable sce the LTTE - Sclick:
thing other that tage in the tal Illow hawe uLidiis th: TOT thi, MÇIS" resigned to Jaff g) Bil Il
Rough
Th car Zigz. last army the West-TL 1 - Oll|| niya, the nor Col Tolled by נiiI?נןttlt Iון For about al. the road, it is As the car sl large crater, th silently: four camouflage, TL their feet, and Fles. One has radio i Ti his are propped a էl tյ115t.
The boys rei and vigilant identities. At block furt het OT guard a shed st sacks.
Beyond this sparsely popula

cbc abando ICd cal solution; Other Tamil knowledgement bility of Sri TE Wä1ht5 - LIII - and spokesman d it was still ss the settingstate within it The LTTE HELS to to send a S. Thild a man, lks.
nt may do just it has joined 1 all—på Tty pa Tlittee to draw posals for the ... But there is pticism whether S to gli ETyi tactical adwanks. The Tigers puted power in i Simhal:Se are: na being a 110
ride to
ngs through the
Cablack5 CI skirts of WayllEller III 75t tCOWI the government road to Jaffna. killetrc down nic-Imam’s land. ows to skirt a Le Tigers appear eenage boys in bber thongs on | toting assault a walkie-talkie pocket; bicycles gainst a Tuined
main stern-faced
while checking a second roldI, III1 o Te teellage:TS acked with grain
front lille i 5 å tcd Tallil z 1 C
"Emotionally and psychologically thcre are two nations,' said a Tamil in Colombo. "If the government continues to cut off support lines to the people in the north, people will get used to living without the Colombo) government.” In Jaffna itself, the population is wearied by privations but still supports the Tigers.
There arc. In any things with the Tigers with which you can disagree," saidi Fr Nathan, El Roman Catholic priest in Jaffna. But they are the people who keep the Sri Lankan army from corning in her c and co IIInitting a trocitics. Only after the Sinhalese accept that we have a right to stay here as a nation, as a peoplc, not just as individuals, could we a CCC pt a settlement. But frankly I would be very siad if they (the LTTE) settled for anything less than Eelam (hom cland). After all this suffering, we Would be back to square One."
jafna
where life is slipping back to a pre-modern era, Power lines arc down, the few trucks and motorcycles move at night when the Sri Lankan air force cannot strafe traffic. Oil lamps glow in the few hamlets, and fircs burn outside isolo tcd holl5 es to keep wild animals a Way. At Madhu, the Inight hides til wast settlement of 27,000 Ta Emil Tcfugees from the fighting,
But at Poonary 11, the only Toad acces 5 to Jaffla sin Cc the closing of Elephant Pass, tle rising moon Teve als intens C a Ctivity in the midnight hours. Dozens of trucks line up along the approaches to a cause Way. Long lines of men in sa Tongs and tattered shirts hold up bicycles strung with sacks, boxes and even live goats. Across a 500-m stretch of the Jaffna
Carried dri Page is

Page 17
Tigers thrive on recruits brutalis
Cyanide edge
he Liberation Tigers of
Tail Eelim (LTTE) is anxious for a political solution if only the Colombo governmet would talk, according to Tiger spokesman Anton Balasingham. Not so, says a diplomat in Colombo, who calls the LTTE a Frankenstein that hals no interest in giving up the gun or sharing power with anyone else.
By all accounts, the LTTE is one of the World's lost effective guerilla forces - as demonstrated by the heavy casualties it inflicted on 60,000strong Indian peacekeeping force in 1987-90, its alillos certain role in the assassination of India's Congress party leader Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan defence minister Ramjan Wijeratne, and its protracted clash with an 8,000-strong Sri Linkeln force in July-August.
Yet, at the heart of this well-organised and well-funded Tiow enment is an extremely priInitive - and to students of extremist movements, få Tliliar — psychology: the surging energy of youth channelled into a cult of suicide.
Orchestrating this cult is an u ni II pressiv c, in articulai te indiwidual with a genius for improvised battle tactics, whose secreti"WeI1 e:ss ha5 ser Wedl tC) eD1hance a carefully fostered Tinystique, The king of the kids in the LTTE is W. Prabhakaran, who admitted in one of his rare interviews that the cyanide pill carried by LTTE fighters and cadres is the movement's tallis III,
Prabhakira told the Madrasbased newspaper The Hindu in 1986: "Carrying cyanide on one's person is a symbolic expression of our co III. Titlerit, our deterIllination, our courage. This gives our fighters an extra meil
sure of belief i special edge.'
To some Tal Iii the workings of recruits - mostl theit sub–1L LT1 ready socially Tecruits HTU ClF by LTTE cadr put through test: political activis The most ill detachincnt fr: They no lenger fallily; th: Ill.) the finily.
"The organis total loyalty, to If they lie S. Will häive tŪ parents. They value on tilcir
Once indictet a recruit learn clic Lice. A - 501 5aid that in the WS invariabl penalty for an superiors. "Th called the "g offe der Wis; t executed, and out at sea Wi cult Open SC float.
For må ny T: response to th conditio II el by war II:1 ir ke di l both hidt: 8, "W ar is i We here, W been brutilise Chilindrahasa 11, WILC) works Wi in Mai Tas. "*" paren tal contri death and Wils nothing about they're experts of fireal."
Chinclralia.5l refugee influx illud Cl s CCire had fought Wi

sedí by atrocities
In the cause, El
ils familiair with the LTTE, thc у соopted in years — ar ei ail
dead. Young e fully I LIII turcil es. “They arc i,' said a Tamil . רוin C(310 tilb ] portal Int test is 3 m the family.
belong to their Vem Cilt becomics
lation demands ital co IT ITILII:n t. ord cred, they kill their own El Te to pllit Ilo
Will lives.'
l, the first 1:3501 5 is total obelice in Madrils Tid- 1980s delth y the LTTE o questioning of ey had what was cell boat'. The a kei to a beach, he body duImped th the still:lch
it would not
Li mil children, thic : LTTE 1515 bcem
long years of ly a LTCities C. In lci tie childre.Il : find they have i" said S. C. : Tamil law yer h Jaffni refugees They are beyond 1, inset sitive to nce. They know the country, but
in every kind
said that the io India last year of youths who h the Tigers in
Sri Lanka. "Their pattern of behaviour was different from that of the average person. They have been built up by militant groups which adopted Marxist doctrines in Order to justify on e-party Tule. They are not Willing to see the other person's wiewpoint, Even listening tO] the Views of another person was objectionable. We tried to break this down by getting them into sports, where they could learn to win and lose. But there was a hard core we could not reach. They did mot open to us.”
Diplomats in Colombo said that as well as carrying out cold-blooded killings, am Cong non-Tamil groups, the LTTE has also deliberately exposed the Tamil population to retaliäition by Sri Lankan fo Tces, A Tassacre at eastern Kokkaddicholai village om 13 June is cited as a case in point. The Tigers planted a mine in the village to kills an army officer. They could have got him on the road well alway from the village,' said a diplomat. "But they wanted a reaction, and Leven had the press statements ready." In retaliation, the firmy went On a rampage, killing 52 Tamil villagers.
Yet, cwcIl Tia II, 15; who criticise Pribhakarit II angl. the LTTE as fascist concede that it ca Tefully tends its relations with civilia ns. Their support is not principally based on fear," said a Tamil lawyer in Colombo. "They ensure that institutions Continue to functi III: Sillhals, foi distributi II and Welfare. They are sensitive to the need to maintain a measure of popular support."
Also, Colombol has virtually driven the Tamil population to the LTTE by its brutal repression, particularly the bombing of civilian areas. People saw

Page 18
that even at the height of the
Sinhalese extremist Janatha Wimukthi Pera munal uprising there was no bombing in the
South. Nothing transformed Tamil opinion as much as that. Then there was thc economic blockade for 14 months. There is no power, hardly any fuel. Nor is there any alternative democratic leadership to turn to. Most of the professional and educated classes who night have resisted the LTTE have moved out.'
Tamil observers note that the Tigers' rise has parallelled the de cline of traditional PattoTIS of authority - including the increasing rejection by Women of their traditionally subservicnt role in Jaffna society and a fall in religious obser Wiln Ce among the Hindu population.
Prabhakaran's emergence reflects these social changes. Although the son of a governIllent official, he belongs to a lowly fisherman's caste, Most of the illner circle of LTTE leaders are of this caste - and also from Prabhakaran's village, Valvettiturai. Prabhakaran hadi little formal education and speaks little English. He hals not travelled except to India,
rarely makes public app carances, and is believed to be para noid about riwall Tamil groups gaining access to the population,
The political wing of the LTTE, the people's Front f Liberation Tigers, is a feeble appendage of the fighting force. is leaders, notably Balasingham and Yogaratina. In Yogi, are widely seen as having little influence. Ideologically, the LTTE still subscribes to somewhat dated concepts of political liberation, and London-educated Ballisi Ingbı almı Temain.5 lppelrently infatuated with nowdiscredited Third World Ill CWments. “They have Tot absorbed the transformations in the rest of the World,' said a Colombo Tamil. “They a Te not concerned how they relate to
16
international opii has not harin pere
The alienation cated Tallils has en su red a E support allong outside Sri La mil the 210,000 in perhaps another tercd around th disapora is regul fulds. III. SCOTIC are made again ill Jaffna. It"] more branches (' than Colombo 5:1 itl : 11t: ht: 1ITCէ:
Rough ride t
Y Caffirirfedd y
La geocon, a baltit comes into sig Imotor Tew iwi Tig
[]m tillữ L1[II causeway is men transhipp trucks and b diwm, the fer T away from p. The town of da Tk and si El til WHIS W' Iment forces S recorum Imenced
In the Il () circles the { mission for but people In Air force bt. August, when Dutch fort was aband Il after a costly Tiger gueril into their it the fort. A wasteland: st buildings El Il library,

ion.' Yet this the LTTE.
of even edulfrom Colombo ood degree of Jaffna Tal mills ka. As Well as Tamil Nadu, 200,000 are scatc world. This larly tapped for cases, threats st relatives still The LTTE has utside Sri Lanka has embassies,"
I. M.
o Jaffna. . .
rgy pe TAN
ered Stocicl fer Ty ht, an outboard
furiously,
“thern side, thc also busy with ing supplies from ullock carts. At y will be hidden issible air attack. Jaffna itself is ent: the po WCT recked by gover IlCon after fighting in June 1990.
rning, a . sca pla ne ity on a spotter
the government, ove around freely. mbing ceased last
the 400-year-old on the water front ed by the army two-month siege. sole ball Tely
OW Occupy found the Iin is a reets of shattered d a gutted public
lisi,
CIS,
With only 20 to 40 trucks a
day getting through stringent army checks at Wavuniya and Man Luar, and 48 items totally
emba Tgoed — including fuel, ellectrical batterics and medical dressings - the prices of daily necessities are five times those in the south of Sri Lanka. Petrol costs USS30 a litre; only the Tigers, international agencies and a few public transport operators run motor v chicles. Some Jaffna residents coax their motorcycles along on kerosene, having got thcm started with a few drops of petrol in the carbLITIC LLOTS.
“People have learned to live with a bare minimum,' said FT Nathan, a Roman Catholic priest. They are using up their savings, selling their jewellery, getting money from their relatives abroad.' The state-owned Bank of Ceylon branch in Jaffna operatics without interference from the LTTE, but has to ration out Cash which is topp cd up every two months by a ship sent from Colomb Co.
Retu T ning to the government zone is more nerve-wracking than leaving. After the last Tiger checkpoint just north of Wavuniya, the road crosses a rough trestle-bridge and runs through open ground towards fortified army positions. Passengers must walk ahead of the car. Young Sri Lankan soldiers don heltinct 5 and -- Tum Eitt El crouch to take up positions around the vehicle while it is searched for bombs. The Tigers are just 500 m behind. To one side, a line of Tamils queue up with their bicycles and empty containers, waiting to get into Wavuniya's Inarkets.

Page 19
Loose ends throw doubt on Ga
Stranger than f
f the plot that killed former
Indian prine minister Rajiv Gandhi unfolded like the pages of crime novel, that Ilay not be surprising: key elements of that operation, notably the use of explosives and electric triggering devices sewn into the assassin's belt, appear to have been inspired by the Frederick Forsythe thriller The Negoria for copies of which have sold out in Madras.
The assassins approached their Larry With all the deliberaltion of the genre. Arriving in Tiimil Nadu boat Troll Jaffna on 30 April, the group met landlord and smuggling boss Shanmugam who guided thcm to a series of safehouses run by sympathisers of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). On 8 May they carricul Coult i dTy Tlını alt Ell electico 1 campaign meeting addressed by former prime minister W. P. Singh,
On the cvening of 21 May, having ingratia tcd themselves with local Congress party figures, two members of the team slipped through security lines at Sriperumbudur where Gandhi was due to speak, Others watchctl from a distance. A young Madras photographer, hired by the assassin, stood by to take pictures. As Gandhi Walked from his car to the dais, the young woman assassin approached with a garland, bent down, and tiggered her belt binib.
The aftermath too has classic ciri IIle thriller overtones. The local police panic. The site is left unguarded after Gandhi's body is taken away. Only when forensic scientist P. ChandraSekharan Strikes out on his own are vital clues assembled. The assassin's face is found intact, along with fragments of the belt, wires and traces of
txplosive. Th paper finds th Caillefil in tilgt i pictures of the group leädler, as a reporter. Official D. R. detached from lead a special of Investigatic Find the case Imake significan
Working fro and photographi thikeyan's tear up the LTTE : that ided the ports say they radio interceps leader, a 33-ye Il C1 cd. Si back-up Wiman 5 till in the: çu ing to Tendezwa way boat from Ճn 20 August, the Womic air police in neigh taka state. T others takt cys: fashion. Siya Ta: Self in the Hic
What is missi positive link instigator, and
The involveme Tamils, the lo suicide element
the LTTE: # i H else going to fi kan lady Willin self up?" said
The plot look too neat. Why take the risk of tographer if it its hand? Why and his group I Jaffna in the fic: before the pictu shed? Why were sympathisers in w a sensitive opera they get through

indhi murder theories
ti
e Hildl newse photographer's indi IT u Ins billi Irred Bliss El SG in Hind the who was posing Senior police Karthikeyan is New Delhi to Central Bureau Il task furce,
Soon begins to t headway,
m the foi el5c c evidence, Karin quickly rolls support network EL SS355 i 15. Retalso knew from that the group lr-old one-eyed Wara sa Tm; and L. assa 55 in were Intry after fail'us with a getaJaffna, Finally, Siwarasan and cornered by buring KarnaThey and five L Tide il LTTE sil shoots himdi as well.
ing 5 ) far is the the ultimate a clear IIlotive, :nt of ethnic lation and the all point to How is anyone di El Sri Laing to blow her
ne diplomat.
is neit - almost Will the LTTE hiring a phoproposed to hide
did Siwarasan it get back to ur or five days res were publi
so many LTTE Il ved in Fuch | tibi? Hrow did
security? Was
it only police carelessness that allowed Shanmugam to cscape from custody, to be found dead later - an apparent suicide,
Conspiracy thcorists have had a field day, working back from the question "who benefited?' The most obvious beneficiary goes beyond most imaginations: results from the first dily of voting on 20 May indicate Con gress would have lost seats but for the sympathy factor. The Sri Lankan leadership halted Gandhi's assertion of a si I ndian Raj and has been helped
by the backlash against the Tigers. But Colombo has virtually no ability to operate
covertly in Tamil Nadu.
For its part, the LTTE denies any involvement Eind professes not to know the alleged assassins. Spokesman Anton Balasingha II suggested a host of Indian groups or aggricwed Sri Lankan individuals could hawe done the job. He said the Tigers had twice scint cInissarics to talk with Gandhi in New Delhi in March, and hud found him Cordial.
Many other sources, including rival Tamils and foreign diplomats, believe otherwise. They said the LTTE could have feia Ted Gandhi’s Teturn to power Would lead to Tenewed Indian meddling in Sri Lankan affairs.
Tiger leader W. Prabhakaran
is also said to have held a deep personal grudge against Gandhi for having been put
under arrcst while wisiting New Delhi, and over the death 5 Uf close colleagues during fighting
with the Indian peacekeeping force. This school of thought assigns a degree of "irratio
Inality' to Prabhakaran.
(F. E. E. R.)
17

Page 20
Ethnic relations in the
Paul Caspersz
ew perhaps would disagree that ethnicity is the domi
nant problem in Sri Lanka, though there will be serious disagreements about the deter
Illinants of this problem.
But what is precisely the problem of inter-ethnicity in Sri Lanka? Om ål, question SC critically important it is necessary to have an approach that is as little negative, and as much constructive and positive, as possible. Such an approach would demand that the problem of inter-ethicity be scen as a challenge of building a common Sri Lankan consciousness and identity. Identity relates to the obicctive condition while consciousness relates to the Slubjective El Wareness and accepta Ilce of the identity.
A national consciousness becomes al proble II only in a plural society in which there art: TTlälly nationalities or r141tions and many religions and distinct cultural groups within the nation-state. The proble Tull then is to achieve an overarching national consciousness that transcends, without denying, the particular consciousnesses and identities of the different nations, nationalities, religious and cultural groups.
In Sri Lanka the plurality is linguistic, socio-economic and religious and - for want of less incorrect words - is castedeter Illined and ethnic. To substantiate the plurality of our
society by citing census and survey figures is un necessary and can only be distracting.
On the other hand, it is necessary to outline the problem as clearly and practically as possiիlt.
The problem is how a Sinhalesc who speaks only Sinhala may achieve an identity and attain a consciousness that
18
allows for the consciousness of speaks only Talli El Hilu | W | idcntity and CO the identity and of others within
Te Buddhist5, Christians". The proached also f cf Lc Sci CEC3;: is how a Sinhal educated at Lad College, and S1 at home, can national identity Il css as til youth or Tali | TLIT: | 181 d. How does larist identity all within one's relate to one's änel CD nSció15115 nation?
A simplistic T4 that these part and conscio 11511 cf all i Il ferior : lument of the fo tion, destined larger national CCL 5ci] Lu5I 1:5 S " of production
arist identitic this wic WW, al Te possible in pri societies where production are : Lld thic II 12 El 15 Lii) Il LTC: Fe5 t |
Te dicisti Ilied new social Col the place of t
In fact, how of many soci that there i: change in the Ըtյ115ւ:1 1115 m t:55, there is a t the material b: superstructure al l-embraci Ing u5TeSS 5illy spontaneously breaks out of

plantation sector
identity and the Talli who 11. Or how canı in that person's lsciousness for COT, Sciol.15. Il e55 tic nation who ir Musli ils, or problem — арIn the aspect nomic crisisese or a Tamil, ies or at Royal eaking English live the saille ''' :And consciousil the Si Thala O c5 al te hilteroncos particuld coil sciousness particular group national identity SS Willi Il ole's
:sponse would be icula T idcil tities es 5 es a Tc Telics stage of developces of producto yield to a l identity and when the forces cha Tige. Particlus, according to the only ones Titiwe oT feudal the mea. Ils of everely localized of con Illu ilica
icted. But they o disappear as figurations take le old.
ever, the history 2 ties has shown I o auto IIlătic superstructure of nd identity when ansformation of Se on whichl the "el T s itself. Am lational consciodoes not e III e Tige myל) נן טטס חWhen a its feudal shell
and becomes a bourgeois-capitalist society.
The history of the past few hundred years and recent events in various parts of the world show us that Ilore or less tribalistic identities and consciousnesses persist tenaciously in capitalist America, in the socialist Soviet Union, in Britain, Canada, France, Belgium, and Germany. The phenome non of ethnicity and national language or religion politicized to the degree of dem and for political separation appears also in various countries of contemporary Asia Ind Africā: tie KāTes i Burma, the Musliills in the Philippincs, the Kurds in Iraq, the Sikhs in India, the Baluha in Zaire, the Buganda in Uganda, the Ibos in Nigerial, etc. It is only that the caste of politicized ethnicity are borne with less difficulty, in the Ticher countries tha II in the poorer ones,
Some political analysts have Trade thie mistake of LI I 1 der estinating the strength and resilience of separate identities based con language, real or imagined ethnic belonging, religion, or a verying combination of these. They would then argue that these separate identities have no right to exist and are in any case a la cronisms ad are di Come di to disappear. Others seek to #1 CC Commodate and even to pronote the identities of sillaller groups within a larger political identity, defending their right of self-deter IIliation, extendable even to the right to secede. One then scrutinizes the texts of the masters (and, if we read Rosa Luxembourg, the mistresses too) to find 5upport cither for particularistic Inationalisms or for transcending internationalisms. In fact, however, in the best of these Writers, when at their best, thic Te is profound
Y Corri'r tred ar page 20)

Page 21
GULF WAR - (2)
NEWS AS
Douglas Allen
- W. Call Luderställd the effectivc formulation and perpetuation Offälse stories interrns of the necd by those in power to defect attention from donestic problems änd discontent; the necd for U.S. multinational corporations and banks to hawe access to and control over the World's list attractive sources of oil; thic thic Inced by the U.S. to u se its IIImilitary s up criority to Tessert its d'Illi Titic I over the Third World and to counter JapaInese, Pacific Rim, Eind Wester D1 European económic chal lenges: the need by Bush to change his previous “Wirnp'' image and improve his ratings; and so forth.
Si Imilarly, one can analyze much of the War-as-Ilyth, in the first sense, in terrils of the media's role not only in reporting highly censored and limited accounts, but also enthusiastic Ilindless cheerleader and as itself creating and perpetuating much of the mythic 'news."
Psychological explantions also help us to understand the mythic function of these widely bclieved LIntruths. For exa III ple, before and especially during the Persian Gulf War, Inost of the public was led to believe that perhaps the lair characteristic of the U.S. antiwar II overn ent had been its Inistreatment of returning troops from Wietnam. Mainers rushing to the Bangor airport, e WC11 alt 2.000 m, to IIIe et retu Triing unknown Persian Gulf troops, frequently cited this as their first reason; collective guilt over the a busive treatment (by others) of Wietnam War troops and the desire to do the right thing this time. Of course, very few in the antiWar movement ever spit on or heaped verbal abuse on returning Wietnam War troops; a larger number of returning soldiers, who had becomic critical of the war, became appreciated and honored
MYTH
participants in t ment; and by number of retur siri ply ignored not a ti Tget or a in the antiwar historical all f. had little effect logical and poli and other myth and the media.
So why is it to consider the of IIlyth by th: and 'live' myth providing the II cal, e como Inic, tary, psycholog explanations, on that she or : serise Ճf the Wht thing else, so I also going on frustrates and 1 by solic of the Illent and, mori Left.
Myth as “t
Bangor it rea
cially the centr; Ding, point to SCIII ething else
Miny Teactions" that they seeme tially, to el II d. explination. So that they did n
- 'the experience"
po T t cV cnt was of à li Fetisme." pects, there was pl. I 1 Isi : 1 : Lim Casp : religious pil certainly was a till sphere of it Ce|gbrátic). Il SGT troops the way ti ball s Lipcr står OI music sup Jackson or Bri SCT et chi Ig, Higg hundreds of pr asking/begging

c al 1 tiwa IT I 10 Wc - far the largest ning troops Were since they were pricssing concern agenda, Yet the |ctual record has on the psycholotical use of this s by politicians
LlecCSS ar y CWen
traditional use յst wh t) beliewt: s' Because after Lecessary histori
political, miliical, and media e has thic feeling Le has Ti't Lilade ble story, Somicmething more is
that perplexes, s usually ignored * à Inti WERT TV10Wee generally, the
l-ue story”
responses, espell airport happethe fact that was going on. were so excessive d, at least pare any rational me Mainers said Ot, want to IIniss '; that the air''the experience Ili certa in1 , resfor some particihere approaching grimage. There a carrival-like terse er motional ne regarded the ley might basketMichael Jordan estars Michael Lice Springsteen; ressivley seeking ized all tographs, for medals uni
form buttons, or other 'icons'/ momentOS,
The “something more' dimension is illustrated by observing that factual and historical considerations often seemed totally irrellewant to participants, perhaps similar to the irrelevance of such evidence to the mythic faith of certain religious people. Some of the returning troops, when they deplaned at Bangor, seemed initially confused and even embarrassed by their heroic idealization and the falsification of their actual role in the Gulf Will.
Participants in local antiwar groups provided a more accura te! account of whalt occurred and then were frustrated by the seeming irrelevance of what they were saying for those caught up in the military victory euphoria. While W c indicated that We weTe glad these men and women had returned safely, we pointed out that most of these troops sat rather bored in the desert for four months (the most difficult part of the whole cxperience according to most of them), encountered no real danger, and
then callic home. For those who did some fighting, what does it tell you whicn 2,000
sorties of bombing missions are flown daily over Iraq and usually not even one plane is shot down? What does it tell you when U.S. planes simply slaughter retreating, often unarmed, Iraqi troops without any U.S. casualties? And yet these returning troops are idealized into un precedented heroic dimensions, regarded as if they had suffered through the most life-threateThing war conditions of, say, W W II Korea, or Wietnam and finally overcame a strong opposing military for cc. “ “Something else' is going on.
It is Iny interpretation that at least some of this perplexing ** som ething more" is not fully mythic in the strong sacred narrative sense, but it cambe u inder
stood, analogously, as fulfilling
mythic functions, as part of a reconstituted secular mythology. That is, without the clear articul
19

Page 22
ation of a sacred narrative - as one often finds with Sinhala Buddhists, Hindu Tamils, and others in Sri Lanka - and usually Without the traditionally pescribed, formalized, ritual reenactmcnts, the Persian Gulf story" reveals various mythic features.
For many rushing to the Bangor International Airport, for example, this was a self-transcending experience, emotionally charged, a "peak experience,' opening them up to something bigger than normal life. As with so much religious experience, they stated that their Persian Gulf experience was overwhelming, 'incxpressible'; that you had to experience its reality yourself to know what it meant. They experienced the returning troops not as fully human, imperfect, flesh-and-blood individuals, but as romanticized, idealized, attain ing an excmplary status with little regard to their actual histo rical cxis LcIn cc, During the se enlotionally charged encounters, the rcturning soldiers, if not 'deified,' scieties attained a morethal-h III al staltu s CC 110T1 t0 tflower' spiritual, historical, and political figures in various Illythologies.
The mythic behavior at the airport (as reflected, im Orc gen CT ally, in the mass media) allowed participants believers, at least tempora Tilly, to make sensc of ald endure their present existential crises: powerty, unemployment, sufferimg, a Hic nation, lack of im cal Illingful, alcoholism community, do Illestic violence, and so forth. So Ile stTuctured II meaningful order was at least temporarily created out of thci r normal, cha, cb tic, fragIL1eInted existence. They were particpating in something value affirming and ultimately significant in contrast to their cveryday existence. There was a spiritual, ethical, and communal dillensi on to their participation. Thcy waved flags, brought yellow Tibbolis and flowers, and sa ng religious and political songs. Some caTIne close to . "" W cortsh1ippiTg'' the bigger-than-life soldiers. For a few hours at the airport, Illa Ily felt themselves part of a meaning
2O
fu1 community, diffe Te It Milie T5
Ict.
Conclusion
I law e tried t ugh local illust1 understanding of light on U.S. To war with Iraq. of myth, the cre pctuation of unt to get at nin 0.5 t (i)
political, ideolog gical, milităTy, ПЕПЕјџ П8 Of LJ,
the Per 5äl (Gill important for us tth5. id Tei myths.
It has also bc. a Second Scinsc gous to that of ti'w cs | b cliciwced i: sheds light on se Tcsponse. The fi ting and popule accounts and () ofte ni rcligat cd to 1 Somic thing ilinii ma title : Tild f'LI LI tional - religiolus by historically false accounts. the Litir Luths de re Ilove the bel mythic behavior that il this se sense of Inyth, to the causes co nath of the WE fc: tuT:3.
This Second m interpretion Cou by un covering de nomic, and cu myths (often h; "aura”) that ha' of U.S. history foT exil imple, E U.S mythology deds of CW I10 Wies, waar I11 for is of social veloped än ile belief system a States, which c. thle test of histo mic justification stoties that tol people came to settled and civ

even with very they had newer
to show, throration, that än
"myth" sheds actics to the The first sen se :ation and per.ruths, helps us f the cetino mic, ;ical, psycholoand Ill edia deS responses to F Crisis. It is to expose the LiCS ver 5, 15 the
my Wicw thatם ח: of myth, al In Bildo - religious narraLis true storie:5, Ille of the U.S. ISt Selse of Creairizing fictitious ther unt I'll this is the Second se15e: logous to the tion of tradistories is fue led and factually But countering s not necessarily iewed III nythis o T I have sugges:Old traditional U.S. responses induct, and afterir reveal mythic
(TC controversial ld be developed ep political, ecoltural, "secular' awing a religious W c defined Lluch
Many of us, grc w up with a by Watching hunboy-and-Indians II wies, and cothcr ization. We deology, a shared bill the United pulli Iney er stall irical, cor eccont1. We had shared is till lic this country and ilized it for the
most noble moral, political, and religious reasons; that "God is on our side"; that “the U.S. has Ille WCT lost a WAT”; that we are good and our oppопепts ewil; that we are an egalitarian (class less) society with unlimited opportunity and social mobility; and so forth. Such myths gave many of us a sense of being part of a meaningful united whole, justified our country's behavior at home and abroad, and were re-enacted through flag waving, prayers, patriotic songs, and other "rituals'.
In many respects, more honest recognition and analysis of powerly, racism, scxism, homophobia, militarism, and imperialisII, the Wietnam War, Watergate, ecological devastation, and other historical developments helped to de mythologizic and debu nk some of these mythic, 'sacred" beliefs, Part of the recent Inythic behavior, of reacting to the pe Tsian Gulf War as Inyth, involves a process of remythologization, of at least partially Tetelling and re-enacting some of those earlier stories about United States, "our way of life,' Elind the World.
Ethnic relations...
(Corffrired frg FF; Page 18) awareness of the complexitiesof the problems of allowing genuinely for lcgitimatic sub-idcntities within the imperative of an over-arching nationall Cor even international identity. Indeed - and here thic insight is at its profoundest - it is only by allow ing freedom for the as scrition of sub-identity that the ideal of the over-arching identity can best be al chiewed and conce a clieved, guarateed for the future. To really and truly accept the right of self-determination, even the right to secession, is perhalips
the safest guarantee that thc
right will, in fact, not be
exercised
Next: Migration and
Indentity

Page 23
EIVWRONMEWT
Environmental Policy a
Development Strategy
S. Sathananthan
1. Introduction
During the 1970s, policy makers Within government became increasingly aware of the need to arrest e vironmental deg Tadation and its c{,}15 equences as pa Tt of the broader development strategy. A given programme of economic development was to be assessed not merely on the basis of its contribution of goods and/or services to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) but also in terms of its environmental impact. Thic importance = of a coordinated programme of environment al management was recognized and it was reflected in Article 27(14) of thc 1978 Constitution. The National Environmental Act of 1980 was the first legislation which specifically addressed the question of environmental II na nagc ment. The Centrali Environmental Agency (CEA) was scit up under thic Act in 1981 as the institutional framework for imple Iluentation,
Two other environment spccific legislations were enacted: the Coast Conservation Act of 1981 and the National Resources Energy and Science Authority Act of 1981 (Jansen, 1989:5), although about 50 legislations have been introdudced over the years which have greatcr or lesser relevance to environmental conscrvation (Wickremasinghe, 1988: 114-15).
The III for read for the focrora degree at the University of Carri bridge, விா hெirai Marய, துரி,
The preparation Inental 11 pact A. for each econ ensu Te that it friendly” w El 5 m
1984.
A task force by the then pres design the Natl. Strategy. The S mulated by 198 Elıd it was a 'gi of programmics The CEA trans Action plan: "a lines Fild Faction: that the Strateg dly transformic mentation prog 1990:2).
The present c the sic currict in the historical wided by the official policy Incntal manag Lankil beginnin a century ago. management is to be all order relationship bety $ 0Cicty in whi energy are excl the LW) withill CF pacity of natu to the reproduct
2. Plantation Ag
The mail clwi II in the country was caused by clearance of th early 20th cent

nd
üf àIl Elvis Inssess Incnt (EIA) ili C i Iliti Htive tu is “em wiron Ilment nade mandatory
was appointed idet in 1983 til nal Conservation trategy was for8 (CEA, 1988) eneral state Illic Int and principles'. alted it in tC, ET if policy guideoriented plan y could be rapid into impleTammes" (CEA,
is say will assess itiatives against backdrop, procvolution of
fDT CIlWir 0Il* Tıtıt 111 Տri g more than talח טוח חנWirtים E here understood :d and dynamic W ė ÊT IA til ITE: alld ch latter and hanged between It reducing the irc to contribute tion of society,
riculture
onmental change in recent times the massive land e alte 19th Tid Iries, during the
establishment and expansion of the colonial plantation economy. The clearing of forests was aggravated by existing cheria cultivation and was accelerated due to undcridevelopment cha Tacterized by involution i.c., the decline of paddy cultivation and the consequent Tcversion to technologically less sophisticated
certa cultivation, The for est cover was also depleted by felling of timber to supply
plantation and domestic necds.
The cnvironmental consequences of plantation agriculture were identific d by an Assistant Conservator of Forests in 1885. He attributed soil erosion, the disruption of domestic irrigation by silt carried downstream by rivers and a drop in ground water supplies to the growth of plantation agriculture (Debates of the House of Represantatives (Hansard), vol 10, 1951: 465-66). Although two Forcst Ordinances were introduced iD 1885 and 1907 (Nanayakkara, 1981 : 6), the 1921 Lushington Report again drew attention to the declining reserves of timber and recommend large-scale reforestation (Sessional Paper (SP), no III, 1931).
The Imre direct ole f the British C010Ilia 1. St: Le il eIlWironmental degradation was highlighted in 1932, when the work of the Forest Department was described as resembling the
depredations of a large-scale rter a cultivator in his most

Page 24
reckless mood (SP no 1932; 15). Noting that most of the rivers originated in the central highlands at an elevation of over 5000 feet and that most of the lands adjoining the rivers were in private hands and subject to deforestation, the Executive Connittice of the Ministry of Agriculture and Lands observed in 1935 that "this un satisfactory state of affairs' Was the ICs ult of the injudicious alienation of forest land for planting purposes, particularly since "large-scale planting operations have been started without previously testing the suitability of the species to Soil and climatic COIl ditions", Accordingly, the Con Inittee recommended that all plantation W Tk i Il ft Test la Tid abwe 5,000 fecit should be disconti Ihuled" (Minutes of the Procccdings of the State Council (PSC), 1935: 671-73). But, apart from negative strictures on land usic introduced
W III,
u Ilder - thic Soil - CešeIW 1 tio Il Act of 1951, lfc w positive I mea -
T
1Ilit
STS Tolimental
The principa neglect was a la Id Telfor II i
(the south-wes the island) wi ft Te With the
Cf la Ilid wleir5 profitability of ductio I - Çairied El Ild local ent was evident relation to the which frequen loss of life da Image to I than sacrifice some owners of to build flod (because the Te5: TwrciTs to Te Would in undate of land under а 1952 герогt tional Bank f. and Dewel op II1e mended Illerely COI sequences minimized; til
of
HEMAS (DRU
36, Brist
COl Dri
??
 

iated for լage ment.
епWi
1 reā50 foT; this avoidance of
the Wet Zone tern quarter of lich could inter
property rights and affect the plantation proon by foreign repreneurs. This particularly in çit Tol af floodis itly resulted in and considerable roperty. Rather the interests of plantation lands co Introl structLIIT cs construction of gulate river flows : significa Int a reas plantation crops), of the InternaJr. ReConstruction Int (IBRD) recomthat the adverse of flooding be it best course
Would se en to be the Linheroic one of accepti Ing the fact that floods will occur, abandoning any idea of preventing them by TSE'Y') ILIT construction. ... and concentrating on Initigating the effects of floods in populated
areas" (IBRD, Part III, 1952: 210). In this connection the ccono II hic constrali Its con both
environinental rehabilitation and agricultural diversification in the Short al Id imediul Il te TIIS were spelt out by the leader of the CP in 1951 (Wickrellasinghe, 1951), and in 1958 he further argued the need for agricultural diversification and industrialization (Hansard, Wol 30, W, 1958; 2940),
Environmen tal management in plantation agriculture suffered further in the next two decades. The radical-populist rhetoric Willich dell Ilded Iāti ligāti of plantations in the 1960s created un certainity over future prospects and the owners of plantations avoided long terril jIVe:5 till:11; Willich i Tę: e55 cIltial for environmental management.
om pliments
GS) LIMITED.
ol Street,
հbՕ-1.

Page 25
PATE - 2
The United Nations in Security - Evolution a
Jayantha Dhanapala
ember States do not Want ME, United States and USSR alone to negotiate disarmament and security. At the same time, negotiations involving the cntire United Nations membership is Commonly rcgarded as un wieldy and impractical. What then is the optimum modality given the con 5 en sus that bilateral and multilateral negotiations are complementary? Pressures for expanding the Conference on Dis Eir Imament in Genewa hawe led to an agreement in principle that four new members should be admitted but the implcmcitation of this remains overdue.
But it is not just the number of delegations around the negotiating table that will guTante e El Illore effectivic and durable disarmament agreement under the aegis of the United Natio II15. The circulustances must be right, so that all States arc convinced that it is in their national intercist to forge the agreements. Thus, for examplc, France in 1978 found that the time was propitious to reenter the multilateral disarmament forums. The improvement in United States-Soviet relations has altered the atmosphere in the multilateral fora and in First Committee of the General Assembly more resolutions are now adopted without a vote thall before.
Despite this, a number of “hardy perennials' are repeated als resolutions and calls are made on nuclaer-weapons States to disar II, to ceasc the nuclear arms race and to halt testing. The United Nations role beyond providing forums for discussion and negotiation is essentially attenuated by the pursuit of the national interest of some States
who halwe the Thic fact that place at all is tive developm ing of prioriti Ill:1 T1ent lgend dertaken by tE unless there is the Me II ET S regional disa TI Wentional diisi Wiewed Will 5 States W1o II agenda of glic disarmament ple II ented.
A point frc that all Iha tio! guard their in The **realist” El rigt:1C that II and not high dictate the act lets. In decid fresh evidcIce CWC Ints. But does rest (). acceptance of ples such as internaliti Illa || 1 L5c of force. principles in th Charter ensure of civilized in Willir. Nation lot dictate til principles be ( Occasions on 1 0therg or thilt Vcly applicd som C la tills,
United Natio 15 the Charter pri ly and withou is thereføre på
The Tole f tions on regio hal 5 attracted The United S prochement ans the cold War Tevived interes

Disarmament and nd Prospects
:apacity to do so.
dialogue takes obviously a posint. A re— ordcres in the disara cannot bc une United Nations CInstns U5 åIll CD-g tates. A shift to lament and conTma ment is still uspicion by some laintain that the ball and nuclear ls Illyt bec11 im
quently made is ns, want to safe
lational security. school would ational interests
moral principles ions of Gower n, we may find of this in recent national security חנtוחרון סthe C [] certain princicompliance with a W and the nonThese and other e United Nations an orderly world ternatiomäl behaal interests Conat the accepted bserved on some y and not on they be selectiwith respect to The röle f the in in plementing ciples consistentt discrimination Tä 101I L
the United Nala 1 disarna ment great attention. State-Soviet rapthe ending of has led to a t in a chieving
regional disarmament and se curity. It arises from a convictio 1 that the cold War transmitted malcific influences to regions cxacerbating regional conflicts and even triggering off "proxy wars'. It also arises from the recognition that insecurity and arms races in one region can hawe an impact con the Test of the global system. Many useful suggestions and proposals have been made, including the need for more regional consultations on global disarma ment issues, such as chemical disarmament. The existing Charter provisions for regional arrangemcints can be utilized to cm sure a close harmonious working relationship between the United Nations and the regional organizations. Successes achieved in some regions should not lead to the assumption that the world body is no longer directly relevant to the needs of those regions. Attempts to bypass the United Nations would have the cumulative effcct of Tendering the Organization inpotent to carry out its Charter functions when called upon to do so.
A United Nations role as a ** deus ex r71 a chira" is obviously un realistic. Despitc the great relaxation of tension internaltionally and the proclaimed end of the Cold War, United States, USSR and Great Power influences continue to hold sway. The vast majority of Member States are conscious of this and have rescrivations about welcoming the una nimity a mong the permancint members of the Security Council or the non-use of the Wet). The United States emerged as the leader of a coalition upholding Charter principles and reinforced by the legitimacy conferred on their actions by Se
23

Page 26
curity Council resolutions. One may regret that the Security Council was not able to undertake, or at least to control, the military operations instead simply authorizing, in general and implicit terms, the use of force by. Member States. Among the questions asked therefore arc Whether similar action would be taken when Charter principles are violated in future and whe: ther a United Nations directed operation would not have been more desirable.
In the wake of the Gulf W. Security Council resolution É87 adds á new dimension to the disarmament process. On the basis of Chapter VII it im POses some sqecific obligations on Iraq establishes El mechanism
India. . . .
(Cartinited fair page ") Another option is to go along with the Sri Lankan Governo ment’s view that the LTTE has become a security threat to both the countrics and it ought to be eliminated or weakened. This calls for joint military operations or at least India playing an advisory Iole. This option, put forward by Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Harald Herath during his recent visit to New Delhi, has not been received very favourably.
The only viable option is to wipe out all LTTE bases in Tamil Nadu, however long it takes, and nudge Colombo to strike while the iron is hot by offering the Tamils a comprehensive political package that will be an improvement on the controversial 1987 Raiiv-Jayawar da mic accord. The vicious crackdown in Tamil Nadu a nd the debacle in the battle for Elephant Pass have made the Tigers offer a ceasefire if Colombo is willing to resume talks without pre-conditions,
24
for their impl provides for th Will that cito Tisti Adding to the undertaken by th eral during th W i 11 it bc 34 TIL ification funct United Nation Temain 5 do Libht| legal basis is C concerns "'the threat to the the peace, or (Article 39), a ment. In this solution has a linked with sa State which lil: Charter has to aggressive běh Secondly, the rounding the C
Despite the signal triumph
Pass battle, пnadasa has d wing his call co II e to the
י לTטייט זאוסH deeply distrus and is lo 1 cognise it as tive of the prove a majo.
And to the the President an implicach mé present circuit Sident CEL 110 the Tamils, TigeTs.
II thic ulti Tigers can de IICC Tallitt C I when the pe C against them,
The island ate the LTT) Col(IIbo Ill OT between the blue sea. TE for Colomb) fidence by Q

ementation and ieir Wcrification. tute a precedent'? fact-finding tasks le Secretary-GenIll-Iraq War. cleus for til WCT
ion within the s? In fact this Ful. Firstly, the
Chaptcr W II which existence of El Ily peace, breach of act of aggression' Il 13 t di S3, TITErespect the recoercive il spect nctions against El lving violated the be prevented from aviour in futu TC. Till still CCS STGulf War were, of
course, unique and are unlikely, to be repeated. Nevertheless the Security Council, on the basis of Article 26 of the Charter, is entitled to intervene in the disarma ment process in cooperation with Member States. But such an action can only be efficient and durable if it is undertaken on a balanced and non-discriminatory basis. The dismantling of the Iraqi Weapons arsenal could thills b c See T1 ES a Security Council decision aimed at a vanquished State which had been universally COIdem nel 15 a blata It 24 ggTESSOT, It may not therefore be a pointer to a future role for the United Nations in disarmament
Sri Lanka. In forces" in the Elephant President R. PreOLe Wicll ith Te11cto the Tigers to negotiating table,
15 W סçolombo n tful of the LTTE Figcr ready to TChe sole терге:5епtaTamils. This will r obstacle.
Tails" ill luck, hilin self is facing nt motion. In the instances, the Preafford to plicate least of all the
mate analysis, the be brought to the iath only if and ple of Jaffna turn
Tamils still tolerE because they fear c. They are caught devil and the deep le only Way out is to Wi In thlejT CO1ffering them a pack
Briefly....
and security in normal situ altil 15.
Concluded)
age that ensures genuine auto
nomy for the Tamil a reas and makes the sacrifices of the last several diccades worthwhile.
The road from Sudumalai to
Sripcrumpudur was paved with mines and body traps. The time has now come to strike
out on a bold, new path to
peace.
(Confired friar Page 7) decision because of the current political crisis. An eight year revolt by Tamil gu Brilla 5 had not deterred in Westment, he said.
A release from the Ministry of Trade and Commerce said that Minister A. R. Manspor had told the delegation: "You have assisted us in Than.Y ways and emerged as our number-one aid donor."
LALITH WELCOMES CD
e For minister and rebel UNP-er. La lith Athulath muda li told a press conference that he welcomed CD personnel if they would openly attend his press conferences "Without posing as journalists and insulting journalists".

Page 27
The Pivotal Por
Ideally located region's tranship the world's ma
5=දු
The best turn-around time
* A streamlined fully-compu
A Net work of Contailler
TE
A consolidated Rates Stri
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Attractive rebates for tra II
Safe handling by skilled p
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SRI LANKA PO
19, CLIC See, P. O. By
Ar 42|23|| 42|20|| Telex ; 2
 

t of South Asia
to cater to the
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s in the Region for all traffic.
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Depots & Freight Stations.
"fIIT{o.
shipment.
rsel.
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x 59S, Colombo Sri Lanka.
| 805 PCTS (CF Fix : 5:4 () (35 ||

Page 28
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