Page 1
Price RS
Constituti
Foreign hands Mervy
vol. 14 No. 12 October 15, 1991
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Briefly . . .
N0 COM FIDENCE MOTOM OM SPEAKER
After Speaker M H Moha. med told parliament that ha had ceased to entertain the impeach ment motion against President Premadasa, which he had earlier accepted, the joint Opposition mo Wlad a motion of no-confidence against him.
In rejecting the impeachment Totion the Speaker said that it did not contai tha requisite number of valid sigātrs, Ā, pr9SS Confrën Ce following this Oppositio Leader Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranaike said that the Speaker had rejected a request by her to appoint a select committee of parliament to go in to the walidity of tha signatures. How could the Speaker now reject the impeach ment motion after hawing written to the President and to herself indicating that he had entertained the motion, Mrs Bandaranaike asked.
In the debate on the noconfidence motion on the Speaker the UNP forces rallied, minus the dissidents but together with some MPs of Muslim and Tamil parties, and defeated it 123 to 85.
FIVE CAMPS SMASHED
O Government se curity forCes were reported to be continuing-search-and destroy operations in the jungles South of Ampara in the Eastern Province, after smashing five large Tiger carps in the area. Operational Headquarters
said that cam joint агmy-aiг included a training base para de Square, and a bakery. A military s that about a C fighters who in the Northern
TO W per 3 trä tai
Province to bo of the Tigars
DE WELO
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Administrator C States Agency tional Develop said in Coom EO E3a especia II by tha Gowari Lanka's ecolor tion efforts in
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is seized in a orce operation well equipped Complete with bstacle course
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PMENT |RTS EAGING"
W. Roskens, if the United for Internament (USAID) bo: " "We hawe y er Couraged 1 mart of Sri mic libralisarecent years. ha WB en Coura - tiative, Created ёased exports to the counle e Conomic
growth rates in the last few years."
Dr Roskens was in Sri Lanka for a first hand assessment of the Country's deveopment efforts and American assistance projects.
DE FEMICE IN 1992: R S T 5.3 BIL OM
9 The government has al located Rs 15.3 billion for deface and Rs 6 billion for reconstruction and rehabilitation in 1992, because of the protracted northeast War, the state owned Daily News said, quoting authoritative 5D LITL, ES,
This a mount was slightly higher than the current year's a location, the sources said.
TEA CRISS O World tea prices have déclined 12 per CETit, This phenomenon will
come under intensive Study at the FAO meeting on tea | Rofe,
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CONTENTS
News Background 3 DET OCr HC y End a "Legal Coup" Land Reform (3) 1D
Land (2) 1.
The Rogiori 18
SANARC 9
Soviet Crisis 23.
Printed by Ananda Press 82/5, Sri Ratnajothi Sarawa na Tutlu Mawatha, Colombo 13.
TelephoПа: 435975

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Constitutional c foreign fine-tun
Mervyn de Silva
he constitutional "coup" has collapsed. The drama may be over, the final curtain likely to come down on a court-room rather than parlia
Inc intary scene. But the "crisis' may stay with us.
Meanwhile the UNP, take by total surprise and greatly shaken, will never again affect the cocky complacency into which it had so nicely settled. A rudely awakened public is no long cr a silcnt spectator. The media has re
gained something of its combative vigour.
A di 5-llimited United National party is always a nett glin
to its main rival, the SLFP but will the rc wird 5 be immediate and substantial, or mid
te III ad lodest?
My chief concern however is Lhic external factor Cor factors, Ele cxternal i Iwolwe II e Its and implications. The press too. I don't suppose the aim of the external players was to oust the government. It was to "soften' up the regime, to make it less powerful, more accountable to parliament. An independent parliamentary 'caucus””, UNP blit hosti le to the Presidency, would hallwc donc nicely. Both a numbers and check5-and-balances game. It didn't work out that way. The self-opinionated diplomatic fine-tuning chaps didn't write the final sco Tel
Regarding the external or the internal/external, what do we see? (I) The least politicised IIlirity is now an activist - IIlore self-conscious and a 555 cTtive Ector- the Muslims. With the Tanuils, they hold the traditional balance Include Mr. Thonda man's CWC, independent player, and that's it. Mr.
2
The Inda Irlan Was adviser-confiden Dicli for a Thi5 tille ble Either the ga II by a new set, T Lles, or the organised by t Pile Miliste ald his group. least of the gali weake II or T e Ilb
The two mos ternal players INDIA and the T largest and th powerful democ
1Լ] b titll Lւյլ Chicf is in chiefly because Critic Co 1 text are compelled t
(1) President
eve of a second. is 0 In an un prcc course With thi Lobby in the U. The Jewish Within and Out Stileti Illes with tration too.
(2) Mr. Naras much greater President Prenal groupings. El re. El /*It:ft;" writ c5 Nik India's lost He adds: 'The C. the Marga, th: Br are part of the bulary today, a capital. Open backbiti Ing go o table IIlli qıc fieldi he has Lð ste his leadership',
WEle del cI in trouble, II: operators al 1 d tlı Colle il to their their favourite the Imcdia, to w

Coup: no ing
; also the main to creatic confusion, to send tial agent of wrong signals to increase tenluarter century, sion. Wittingly or unwittingly, was left out, thic politician, the journalist : in Delhi is run and foreign correspondent, the or a new set of diplomat and the businessman
game was for are co-opted. le real bosses, Nara simhal Rao Was part at
Like the Tamils, the Muslim community is now an identiTMia!? "$$ fiable player. To mecit a cha l* lenge perceived as anti-Arab/ t inporta Int ex- Islam, the Muslim World Tesof course are ponded, and Sri Lanka's foreJ.S., the World's ign policy orientation became e World's most more West Asia (Pakistan westTa cies. wards) than South Asian, a possibility that the gamesmen in FÈ Bci'ny not ឯ់ anticipa
TDuble : nor thc Jewish Lobbw of the diclo- I eWISEl Lobby. in which
ပါနီနီစိုမှီ hеу IIn the In () r thl — 2:1 n d —e3,5 t, Sri Lanka has been ravaged by one Bush, on the of the world's fiercest ethnic-term callpaign, insurgencies for the past decade ed ented collision or more. Colombo and most E mighty Jewish parts of the Sinhala South S and ISRAEL, were in the vice-like grip of lobby operates a barbaric youth revolt that side the system, was brutally quelled by 1989. in the adminis- And yet in late 1991, after three island Wide elections - Presidential, parliamentary and provincial — We have a “coup", Not an army coup, once a co T1 Inom 3rd World mallady. It is a "constitutional coup' i.e. using the provisions of the 1978 J. R. Jayawardiena constitution, slipported by a conspiratorial parlia IIlenta Iy Iu Inbers ga Ille, to oust all elected President, the leader of the party that won all three elections, and has governed this island for 30 of the 44 years since the 1947 general election. And the plot was hatched before *atic lcalders a Te May 26, when five key perwericks, rogue- Sonalities in wolved, met for the c covert agencies first time. And the police own. One of didn't know, though the plot instruments is evidently was to topple a hip up passions, police state'.
imha Rad is in trouble than das L. ''Facto Illa 1 Lickin o wledged de thil Chakrawarty, espected editor. terie, the Palace, iga de — all th1ese Congress vocat least in the lobbying änd I. It is a werithrough which er to Tlali Itäin

Page 5
Since it was a 'coup", bloodless and constitutional, the masses were kept out until the parliamentary trap was sprung, the impeachment motion, supported, it is said, by 35-45 UNIP'crs, to be * ''entertained ** by the Speaker. But the main aim was "parliamentary democracy', an end to centralised Presidential power, concentration of authority in the an Executive Presidency, the vital change between the 1977 postindependence Westminster model, and the 1978 so-called "Gaullist' experiment.
Since the main banner unfurled affer thic impeach mcnt motion was "Democracy', it was hardly surprising to see the UNP "dissidents' making a conscious cffort to indentify their cxercisc with the World
wide phenome non of popular rebellion and a triu II phant democratic upsurge - not me
rely in 'socialist' Europe and the Sowiet Unicom, but in Illa Thy parts of the Third World, including South Asia.
The subcontinent has had only two sturdy democracies, India and Sri La Inka, though this island has had prolonged ernergencies which have led to the effective erosion of democracy, som citim cs tempora Ty.
The other South Asian regirmes have se en various forms of regimentation and authoritarian control, chiefly under the Inilitary in the two largest Muslim states (Pakistan and Bangladesh) and under mona
chies. (Nepal, notably).
As the world's most populous
democracy, India, certainly under Nehru, believed that the spread of democracy on the sub-continent was not just a virtue but a asset, Later, when the Cold War Contest intensified to the point where the actual independence and sovereignty of the 'new' States were threatened, Nehru place great value on non-alignment too. It would be easier for India to get on well with non-align cd - democracies -
that belicf Was a cornerston e
of Iridia's regio ojective was a feri 5 iar-free sec. in which India self so realise நூ0ாy and the H “greatles" of army quickly É effective Tulci Pakistano establi mal and Ton-f -dominated mi Nehru emphasis ewe I ll T: t t though he did
sings to dem tional movemer but such clciu crossed the line military interv 1 (ctio L or c () eTSi"Wi, * Inix" of a 11 thur of its military its close cooper LUS, and 5 mion,
was always a s
No Indiä Monroe Doctrin in South Asia Man singh in 1N1 FOR POWER, at lar Raju Thomas dian defense poll been characticise and arbivalen SECURITY POL Dewin Hagerty i WEY. BL[ Prof Gupta argues t Conflict in Sri L. an Indian doct security,
There are tw. rations to be when understa regional intere th:5ec a Te pour S LI rity must be broadest termins. Imocracy in E country is Welc but not if ti regime follows which is hosti the JR govern break with thi past. Secondly however friend a friend if its (cven arms sup ning) a re — liIı" country or col or cxtra-regions

fall policy. The accorrinodaig, игїїу єпvirorirлел! ta 2r lad re—bziIad i!- fii vișiori af the 7 first lly erdloped rift. With the : Inerging as the Of Pakistan, and shing links, forIlal, with US litary alliances, ed non alignment 1ап democracy, give his blesCri:litic opposiIts in the region, חטwטt mנL שנTHEG II o b c come direct "ention, Cao WeTt : diplomacy, or a "ee. C) til acco Lit 5 trength, Eı Ind ation with the China, Pakistan pecial case.
WCrsion of the e has functioned “obserwes Surjit IAS's SEARCH 1d another schoi notes that "Ilicy has usually !d by flexibility ce" (INDIAN ICY), quoted by ASTAN SUR
Bhaballi Sen hat the ethnic anka did spawn ine of regional
basic consideIOrne irl Irlind nding India's St5 HIld hrיו
d. First seculStudied in the An active deIn eighbouring 311'e il T) el Eli... at democratic 1 foreign policy e' to India e.g. ment, s a sharp Bandara naike a neighbtյլIT, Coil Se5 til s lefence policies lies and traied to a nother 1 tries, regional e.g. Pakistan,
China or US. Thirdly, a neighhour whose internal policies have a disruptive effect on India (e.g. Tamil problem in Sri Lanka.)
All three were factors when JR assumed office and Indira Gandhi was running India, after the defeat of JR's friend Moraji Dc5ai.
By the referendum of 1982, JRJ had shrewdly pre-empted Delhi, denying Mrs. Gandhi the policy option of subverting JR's "constitutional dictatorship' in the hope of Mrs. Bandara naike's return. The only options left Wère CUwert lctio Il and cercive diplomacy i.e. training and arming thic Tamil separatist-guerrillas and using the reasonable argumcnt of "spill-over effects' (Tamilnadu) to legitimise coercive diplomacy - the instant a Triwal of Narasimha Rao, External Affairs minister, in Colombo to be followed by the pressures of the Parthasarthy diplomatic cxercise the first phasc.
The advent of the Rajiv rc. gime showed a softening of the India. In attitude, with the LTTE recognised as a dangerous 'actor', Thus, the reply to the LTTE in the form of other Indiabacked military groups, especial
ly the EPRLF. Along with that, the JRJ government was gradually adopting a new
posture, influenced by (a) failure of the military option. Wadamaar achi, identified with Lalith Athulathmudali, the National Security Minister and (b) economic-diplomatic pressure within the Cabinet, identified with Finance Minister Ronnic de Mel (IMF-World Bank-do nors) and Mahavcli Minister (the proIndian) peace nik, Gamini Dissana yake, and (c) Imounting Indian pressure plus friendly persuasion (Dixit, N. Ram etc).
Nepal, the only other neighbour, comparable in a way to Sri Lanka, was following a preca Tious policy of counterbalance i.e., relying on China and the US as counter weight to India. Delhi's reaction, (Rajiv) was an economic squeeze choking of the land-locked

Page 6
Nepal) and political pressure via pro-Indian opposition groups to 'soften up' King Birendra through an agitational pro-demo. cracy campaign that swept the stricets of Kathlandu. The advent of the Prema dasa government coincided with the political crisis in Delhi - two minority governments W. P. Singh and Chandra Sekhar, the second hobbling along on Congress support until Rajiv Gandhi was ready for general election,
Regime Change
Persiste IL de mands for lhe withdrawal of the IPKF and talks by the Premadas government with the LTTE were ricceived with poorly su p pressed irritation, if not anger, by the
Congress and Foreign Policy establish Icht - in Delhi. Given his publicly declared 'good
neighbour' policy priority, Prime Minister W. P. Singh negotiated the IPKF's pull-out . . . . on Indian terms. It is during Mr. Singh's tenure that India's
relations with Nepal also im
proved markedly.
Indian Options
With the imminent collapse
of the Chandra Sekhar government, the CCT gress inccdcd to craft a new Sri Lanka policy - how to deal with the Prelladasa regime in the context of a Rajiv return. To a Delhi policy-planner the only practical realistic choice was a critical weakerining of the Sri Larıkarı
government, flot a ordst er by denocratic rears (the provincial council polls were nor
a good sign) nor a move by the arried forces. The SLFP, under Indira, was the preferred
option. Not any more. First, here is fire SLFP's Sir II Friddify constituency-bound
thinking on the Indo-Sri Lanka "Accord' and any serious quasifederal devolution essay was simply not on. Apart from that, the possibilities of a regir re-Charge Through der P20cratie fris Erzuriër Italities, were slir71.
Any intelligent South Blockwallah, and there are heaps out there, would however have
4.
noted an adva I Compensate for nä Trich w lilinits
choice:5. Il Te Lanka has in within range o sharp-shooters,
fact a ta rgct grali the donor age Lielbērs of til European and This is the brit issue from the De Zoy sa murde stonic. The ide, regirre, feci i fller rej (JPerthro
The gover nrr working well World Balık
more importā held and won tions to qualif the hard opti C.I.A-style car b Li similess of regime, ETT 1: political chan introduced (suci the centris: aging freer di bate, in the me 5 C) II nucll the be
US Policy
The minority Ilment is owe rare conjunct political, econo Thus the agot imposed adjL protest ower armcd violence insurgencies, in Kashmir air altio1 with Pia class conflicts, the Indo-So wie search for a le defence fra 11 afford the bur with not-so ower larger freedom But can India style regional thic risk of a li superpower" . Sri Lanka will interesting te emerging Indo - itself a test Superpower wil Tegional powe

tage which may
the inherently on operational :ent times, Sri
reasingly corne Human Rights In di becomic in lually of NGO’s, 1 cies, and som C: e AID Group, Commonwealth. f history of the ghastly Richard rtol'affaire Gladis fo puritish the si les soy, réther .II איוו
ent after all is within the IMFfrine Work (the t test) and has too many elecy reasonably for on of have-ho, lic. If in the 'punishing the CCInstitutional– ges can also be h Els opening up System, en Cour scussion and dedia for example) tter,
Congress gover Ilrwhelmed by a lure of crises, mic and security, fies of the IMFstment, popular various issues, and burgeoning the serious threat id the confrontzistan, caste – El Doll the collapse of t relationship and W foreign policyit work. All this eaucracy together tagencies, a much to r* ar ke policy. play the oldhegemonic role at 2nitting the single Although small, also prove an t of the new -US relationship of how the Sole relate to major rs, the division
of responsibility and influence in the context of regional con flict and conflict-resolution. (Even the large collective, the E.C., hills not been to ) successful in the experiment in Yugoslovia).
The notoriously outsize Sri Lankan tego) s bimetirın cs accQITn - modates the flattering thought that if the lights in the White House b LITT late Cor Messrs Baker and Snow croft a re Ol ed up in the basement, their labours a Te solchow con lected to some Til Ickus in Sri Lankal. The only useful corrective to such idle vanities is to give a school room globe a fast spin and try to spot Sri Lanka as it LL TL15.
Right now, in any case, the only crisis that concentrates the minds of President Bush, Mr. Baker and their top aides is thc Arab-Israeli issue, where the superhawk, General Arik Sharon
has created more problems for Mr. Bush by organising over flights to Iraq that have
angered Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, all important to the success of the Baker mission. Prime Minister Shamir is determined to sabotage the Bush initiative one way or the other. He may cvens dissolve Parlia
TLD I.
Jewish Lobby
Shan ir is not the only cinc my that Mr. Bush faces. The cinemy
within is Llore powerful. The Jewish Lobby could da mägic his campaign for a second
term, the drcam of every President.
One of the leading lights of the Jewish Lobby is Congressman Stephen Solarz, chai Tman of the Congress Sub-conmittee on Asia. El and Pacific Affair ;. In Ellis book, THEY LOARE TO SPEAK (C) UT, PA U LFINDLEY, who was a US Congressman for 22 years, says: ''Stephen J. Solarz, a hard-work ing Congressman who represents a heavily Jewish district in Brooklyn (New York prides hi Insclf on accomplishing many

Page 7
good things for ISRAEL. Since his first election in 1974. Solarz established a reputation as an "intelligent eager beaver', widely travelled, aggressive and totally committed to Israel's interests. In committee, he seems always bursting with the next question before the Witness responds to his first..."
1 hawe had two brief conver
sations with Mr. Solarz and about his brilliance and combative vigour, especially on any matter connected With Israel, there could be little doubt. The last trip he did
to Colombo was to try to persua de President Premadas a to change his mind on closing the Israeli interests section. He failed,
A few years back, he tried to get Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to agree to raising Indian-Israeli relations now very low-level, to Embassy status or at least Consul-General in Delhi. He did not succeed. One of those actively canvassing support for the same cause was Dr. Subramanium Swamy, leader of the Samajawa di Party, and the man who told INDIA ABROAD paper in Washington that it was he who used his Harvard contacts (he is a visiting professor) to get David Kimche, thic Dircctor-General of the Israci Foreign Ministry, to channel Israeli assistance to the LTTE, including expertisc in landmines, as We now know from Wiktor Ostrowski and JANE's Defence Weekly. It was Dr. Swamy's party that organised a demonstration at the Sri Lankan High Commission office in Delhi the other day. It was Dr Swamy who introduced US LTTE fund-raisers to Bma i Brith the powerful Jewish body.
The Jewish lobby consists not only of top US politicians but
eminent academics powerful businessmen and fund-raisers and US officials including
Tanking diplomats.
Mr. Gamini Dissanayake, who was not colucated at Oxford or Harvard, may not know Dr. Subrama nium Swamy since h c
has no connec know with C the former M. follows a post
Rogue Opera
If the Teiul gime—change (i option) then ficiary would Bandaran aike, its allies, all tІте of Indi aggressively ant forget that M shut down the in 19ճ0 and Statenlent OII P TOLITICE I Lillet to section' on July. As against Mr. Statelt 5 i liament, and է Messrs Anura Lakshman Jaya ] Ishak, the onl to Thatch then Hind pro) — Israeli National Securi Athu lathin udali Minister Gamin was later a ke Lanka negotiati tra Weller" so to Anura Bandati for the funeral Il cader (Mr. Ra both knew we Dissanayake, hi den tills in D lath muda li has With ISRAEL.
It is sectics press, chiefly that ha we lab CTeate Dchi-Cl Thot Prime M the Foreign M officials on the Illurder, and o only exception Dr. Subга пап it attempts were is da mage had E a nealt Colb Colombo circ foreign correspc journalist can The same may Colombo-Londo
That is why the ARAB LEA

tions as far as I anbridge where ahaweli Minister -graduate course.
tions
objeetive wая rei.e. a non-UNP the Enle benehave been Mrs. the SLFP and generally supporian policy but ti-Israel. People rs. Barıdarınıfı ike Israeli legation 1a de the first resident JR's anJpe an Interests 1984 to the L.G. S. Bandaranaike's and Out of Parhe statements of Batıda Tana ike, kody and Haleem y UNP Minister both in number We hellence was ty Minister Lalith for Mahaweli i Dissa na yake. He y figure in Indoon 5 and a "fellow say, with Mr. i laike to Delhi of an Indian jiv Gandhi) who Ty well. If Mr. l s excellent creelhi, MT, Athulhad close links
i Of the Indian Madris-based, illed hard to l'Ombo tensions, inister Rao nor inister nor top : LTTE and Rajiv I SA ARC. The is party leader 1T Swamy. Both Col de-fused but Heer) donc via a - Madras-DelhiI it which any indent or senior 2 asily Tccognise. hold good for n of course.
" I think that GUE and PLO'5
Yassar Arafat, both greatly encouraged by the bold BUSHBAKER Middle-east diplomacy, decided to give helping hand a beiged Colombo regime. The Islamic states, Pakistan and Iran, the two most imporat in this region, teamed up With the Arab League.
At least one influentual Indian
Paper, has raised the issue of hic w much llutonony Is exerciscd by su ndry Indian agencies When hic Central government i5 Weak, far too deeply immersed in politics, or is clearly a transition al li administration.
These are questions more frequently and doggedly բլIrsued by the U. S. media, now exci
ted over the revelations of the Senate Gates inquiry. Mr. Gates is the President's non ince for CIA chief. The
number of 'rogue" operations, clandestine work without the permission or the knowledge of governments and elected representatives, is staggering indeed. As democratic ideals spread across the world, it is possible that denodracy and even inter state understanding and cooperation are being subverted by men and agencies not answerable to the people.
With the superpower 5 LITLIggle Over and the US-funded insirgencies in Afghanis tam ir rclevant, the US sees South Asia and the Indo-Pak conflictina different light. As Pran Chopra notes that is clear from the paper on
'National Security Strategy" that President Bush presented to Congress recently, Spelling
out this strategy in much greater detail, the senior US official in charge of the foreign policy. defence planning for the region, Richard Haas who works in the White House, emphasises the nced for discussing regional and global security issues with India. The US visit of Indian Army Chief and the reciprocal Pentagon gesture prompted the HINDU to note editorially:
"Though the Pressler friend. rriert intended to di squalify Pakisfari's eligibility for US military

Page 8
a rad ecorrorrific a id, Triď fHe backing India is getting frரrt Mr. Stephen I Sol arz, do rifahi indi care a charge ir LVS perceptioris, rior Farij in India cold still seriously believe that the US would yet begin so discard (Ir ally in the SIl-confirief, and fake Friarters easier for India'.
Solarz has attacked Pakistan
On a nother issuc. QIl Oct. 3 Sola T. Warned Pakistall that Tclations could "freeze' if
Pakistan carried out a sentence passed by a Rawalpindi court on two Muslin Americans.
Domestic Problems
Democracies are more prone to internal differences and conflicts than one-party states. At
lcast thic differences are more Visible. Minority regimes in large democracies like India sind in difficult to conceal such tension, including the contest for leadership, Is Rao
all that secure? Are Jorger, Hore ambitious men advancing their (WII interests? Are the hire a cracy ad agen cies, Yuch as the Foreign Office and RAW, totally loyal to him or in total agreement With him? Is ambition, whether at the highest levels of the party or officialdom a factor that decides policy, including foreign policy? The SRI LANKA issue of course is newer cxclusively foreign. At least it co I1 ceTns TAMILNADU. Thlc Indian Establish ment is running scared about the long leap of the Tiger".
After all, the Te is separatist - terrorist movement styled ''Liberation Tigers of Khalistan’’. Chief Minister Jayala litha jumps like a terrified pussy cat when Prabhakaran's па пас is mentiо псti. Delhi's defence analysts talk of the "exposed southern flank" of India – the ene Ty here is not Pakistal or China but the LTTE.
11 [ኽ'ኬኒ'
Was Prime Minister Narasim Ha Rao "misquoted' (innocently' deliberately?) on the Rajiv Essassination? HOW was it that the , HINDU corresponde Est in Delhi (too shy suddenly to have
his – папle in the story that th ter would NO SAARC summ k[i] w all - albo l
Jayalali
தில் al Till El ple!
to call a si Said an aggres Chief Minister three-lonths l: Of Tiidu. in a long int. HINDU had t Central gower El I get.
The Sri Lank ant mena cc, the on the State E Cauvery Waters ing neighbouT Were: the In E They (the D. 11 LSL Tecognis C is not a party only to Tamil national proble issue. We are fillicial : 5 sist 1 these anti-lat here but the responded'.
Clicf Minis häls no w taki question which Indian and Sri II crits directly Denying the C is in pursuit of a policy on Centr to appease T sentinent, Ms. that her posi it distorted by 'I say Indiai Kachchitivo . . . must get back More than 50
h Hwee boce I kili Länka Nawy . . Ille LL of ILldial
Any PTC test si II

rint) promoted Lic Prime MinisT attend the it. Those It the vetera Il
կաԷ1Լյ =
G. K. Reddy's "special relation
ship' with South Block and how skillfully he handled it would hawe becil taken a back
by this clul II sy excrcisc.
News BAckground
tha on warpath
son who likes pade a spade” siwc: Tamilm a du
5 iul Im Illing Lup Els is a First Lady
The fire thunder rwicw with the he Congress-run ent for a tilt
a In Tamil II li litfinancial burdens budget, and the dispute involving Karna taka lin complaints. :lhi Luthorities) that the LTTE i5s c Telewa Ilit lnadu. It is Fl 11 l IIIS seeking special lice to deal With ional Tactivities Centre has not
Jaya la litha en up another concerns the Lankan govern- Kilchi chi tiW LI . harge that she | clfröTitation ist c-Stät Teltic || 15 Firmi 1 cha, ul"wiinist ayalalith a claims til Hills becil political rivals. 1us Tetrieve Tā lillidu Kächlich ati i'w llu . . . Til fishermel led by the Sri ... the gover Ilhas not lodged cc 1983, Was it
t
because Ramı eswaran fisherman are Tamilian'? . . . . They point to the 1974 agreement as though I was not aware of it. Under the agreement, our fishermen should enjoy full rights to dry their nets, visit the church or attend the festival without Visa S. What is the reality? Whenever our fishermen approach the Waters — El End th cy have to go there because there is only shallow water and this arca is rich in prawns - they are threatened and shot at by the Sri Lankan navy and the boats confiscated. . . . .
Commenting on the agreement signed by the Indira Gandhi : Ind Mrs. Blindi ra naike's govern Ilents, India's for most Scholar on the subject, the J. N. U's Prof. UTIlli 1 : Phladmis observed that whenever the issue was raised, Delhi adopted an all bivalent attitude, India. neither as serted its claims mor did it yield to Sri Lanka's claims, supported by cartographic evidence as well ils the ecclesialistic jurisdiction of the di Cj Cesc of Jaffna.
''The signing of the agreement — said Prof. Phadnis “augurs W cel as it sett les al cu Itf Coversiai || issue ficc El Till för all"". The issue of Sovereignty over Kachachatiwu, she said 'is part of a
II Luch broader settlement pertlining to the 18 mile Wide Pak Straits',

Page 9
Good Report From .
é ti
improvement'
was the IMF's sulIlling up in its report on Sri Lanka's performance in the three-yea T. IMF-supported SAF program, an Agency news release noted. It has now approwed a Sri Lankan request for US 455 hillion dollars for a year E.S.A.F. i programı, 91-94. Sri Lalka is entitled to 152 million in the first year.
Ewaluating the 1988-90 perfor Emance, the IMF said the output that began to pick in late 1989 (after past-insurgency JWP terrorism had ceased) grew in 1990 and GDP exceed 6%. maintaing that growth rate in the first six lilts of 1991, Improvement in export perforIIltınce was reflected in a 5trengthencd external position. Controlling inflation however proLLLLLL LLLLLLaLS LLLLLLLHLaLaLla0S S LLS inflation Imleal su Tc5 had cut iI
Ilä Iked
flation from 20% to 12% by August 1991.
The new program will seek
tc. El CCelerate ilustrialisation by expanding the arca in which foreign and local private inWestors will play a large role, with a correspondent lowering of the State sector's profile. The public sector will focus on (a) public investment on infrastracture and (b) agriCLI ILLITc.
C) Ille of the III1 a in tasks of the new progra II is Te—structil IIring the budget by (a) holding down current expenditure growth below nominal GDP. (b) avoiding cuts in capital expenditures (c) broadening the revenue base and (b) improving tax
çollecti.
Privati sati Olata. Il Lic fa ster pace in the next 2 years will be a top priority. Restricting state regulation of industry, lttracting foreign investors, liberalising trade and payments Systeil, overhauling the commercial banking system, ensuring interest rates reflect more accurately market conditions.
The govern I Inaintain an Illu of 5-6% in I The Celta 1 BI
Iltas LS to C ding, limit crec porations, and ket-based det:
Its lates.
Sri Lalka’s cern for polici the poorest of be reflected allocations for : Cushioning "il 11 ment'' on pc гсplacіпg consuп gri. Ils with incr ties for the p. in productive a
ADJUSTMENT
The six phas חH||סiן וורן i1111וון with a grai mt | O | in March. ISLAND report
* - FLT LIET TICH protection aff lill il u fact lil Tiers.
# T1: Lariffs spare parts and im [:lLld Ed im th! programme.
* Phase out CoTi approximate Imid-1992 (Only those items p national securi
* El llit ; in imports by for petroleum
* Eli Illi Ilätg letters of circd.
* Relix til C), Illsilics Cill bill foreign exchang 115 Tes: t , for cign exchang
* Pelit do make foreign under adequate

NEWS BACKGROUND
M. F. But... . . . .
ment hop cs: to a growth ratic lexit few years.
k . Will introduce ntain Static spenit to State corstrengthen martrilation of in
traditional cyles that protect the poor will n (a) budgetary social services (b) pact of adjustbo rest strata (c) 1 ption-based proeased opportuniOrst to engage citiwitics.
PROGRAM
e3 Cf the 455 ESAF will begin US 65 million The SUNDAY ed:-
Luctors illi tal Tiff bridied to ) Call
Con cal T5, Timotor Ce Iile:I1 t i Will be * talriff reduction
import licČInces ly 250 items by exceptions are osing thrcat to y or health).
state monopolies mid-1992, except
and wheat:
Stamp dilty on it by end-1992.
liilitatis nk holdings of e and undertake levelop forward e Illa Tket.
lestic banks to Cllrr en Cy loans safeguards.
" Restrict welfare expenditure (mid-day mical, food stamp etc.) to Rs. 3.5 bilion per year.
* Revise the exchange control law to per mit foreign investors free access to foreign exchange and simplify dividend repatriation regulations.
* Allow firms greater flexibility in employment practices to respond to fluctuations in output demand and more realdily adopt incw technologies.
* Eli Illina to the tax on transfer On equity from domestic to fo Teign own crship.
* Red LIce the restrictions that currently prevent foreign firms from undertaking investment in the Sri Lanka market, except for a limited categorics connected to health and security.
* Break up the JEDB SPC in to 22 independent lic companies to tes under Citics.
Lind բubOperate e8 talprivate management
* Privatisation peoplisation of the 22 independent companies over the Inediul terIIl.
" Accelerate the restructuring and privatisation of the public enterprise sector.
* Government expenditure to be restricted to 28 percent fo the Gross Dillestic Product and budget deficit to be under 8.8 percent of the GDP.
* Central Bank refinancing to be restricted to Rs.1, 5 billiom by 1992.
* Introduction of tax Tcf is recommended by the Taxilition
Commission, whereby Income
Tax will be brought down to
35 percent.
* Begin the introdution of
Walue Added Tax system from 1993, and
* No more tax holidays.

Page 10
CRISIS: Editorial opinie
We need to also reflect on otler Ile Tits of this drama. Despite the impeach ment motion being Ina de a public document when it was annexed to the plaint in a District Court action filed by rebel MPs last month, na national newspaper has published the cotchts of the motion. This was perhaps a matter of courtesy to the President. It was a manifestation of a sense of responsibility and We hope politicians would remember such things before thcy rush into press control or media commission bills.
The double-barrelled impeachment cum Inco-considence drama has also opened out political discussion and debate in the media and a mong the people. More and more, the people are exercising their freedom of speech. Thus we could say this Crisis has not donc any damage to the spirit of the democratic process which the sovereign people consider and ch crish as a Way of life.
Yet We Illust admit thät feelings have been hurt. The stress and strain of this six
week saga is obvious in every qua Tter. Through it all we have seen that politics makes strange bedfellows. The people are nOW con Vinced that in politics there are no permanent friends or stable relationships. In politics there are only personal interests and convenient or bought relationships. The
pɔlitics
of pol politics.
The nation i: the ruling par ded, This situ augur well for of the nation. the abortive pe: the UNP woul soon and a CT Teach cd On the T
The UNP has Tull force il th, Wing mass i Slipp split in this help the people
The Colomb C) which had be great deal of i funds abroad in suddenly saw til ing up. Sharp! nover clearly ir pening of fore Lankam Shaľčs. business Ilan Wil. columns saying eigners Were plu
on hold".
The Speaker statement to country hopes place the soand constitution Luis, and Sri La distraction, gt: urgent business agenda : fin din banishing pover
* Computerised meters
Carl be um moned to W ( " No call up charge within city limits '
Weh|Cle d{
Receipts issued on request Company credit av Call 501 502 50 1503-ը
Another Aitken Spenc
 
 

D
itics is 5 el fish
torn apart and Ly is also di wiltico des Il tot the greater good
Thus we hope ce talks Within d be resulled Scis L15 could be ife Tendum issue,
-n a power טטb is country t draCort and a major party will not
at large.
(Sunday Times)
Stock Exchange, !n attracting a In Westinent froll
recent months, 1іs попсy dтуy reduced tur1 dicated a da. Ilign interest in
A leading city S quoted in our
that many forIting their pians
made a formal
Parliament. The Lihat this will called political
all crisis behind nka can, Without on With the on the national g peace a Tid Ly.
(Daily News)
It can be argued by some students of politics that inner pally democracy is largely a fiction in countries particularly With a strong two-party system, The two-party system by its very nature requires a high degree of political conformity. While thic Te is solle trullith in this argument it is not the wholic picture. Inner party democracy is necessary if a democratic political system is not to Wither and die, It is not cnough merely that there should be several parties from which the Wolter cal cho case. It is als o necessary that these partics should be democratic in their structures and methods of organisation and functioning. The Te should be a free interplay of ideas and debates on policy. Even Marxist political parties recognised this as democratic centralism though sadly it became an extinct entity within these highly monolithic organisations,
The politics of conformity inevitably leads to the pysche of the underground. An open society cannot encourage such a mentality among its leaders. Democracy demands not only political pluralis but also a high degree of democracy within the parties which constitute the political system. No great political party has been har med by healthy differences of poli. tical opinion among loyalists.
Sunday Island)
ur door StE)
cess from selected stands
IE)
501 504
a Service

Page 11
Democracy and
Radhika Coomara samy
impeach ment cannot and should
not be a quick fix. If you are mowing against the elccted represcntative of the people whe. thcr it be the President or a mcmbcr of parliament, th Cre: must be a fair, deliberate and open process. One cannot hand in a motion for impeach ment on thursday and impéach a man on the following tuesday. The problem here does not lie With the rebel construction of their cal se but with Chu T Constitution. On the onc hand, thic threat of dissolution hangs like hic Sword cof De Inceles before: any impeach ment motion. On the other hand, the speaker can cintertain an impeachment motion and never place it on the order book, holding the Preside In t to Tans comm. Neithe T of these situations is healthy for democratic decision-making.
The reason for this peculiar stalema te is that we have tried to graft a presidential systern Conto a westminister Inc3del while our thinking remains west minister. When judges and Presidents are impeached in the U.S. and this is a very rare occurrence, a select Comittee of the House of Representatives first sits as a grand jury, listens to the evidence from all quarters and then only decides on Wheher to indict the President for inpeachment. This process can tai ke up to six months. It is quite different to our reality of Writing a resolution surreptitiously and then gaining signatures. In dictment in the U. S. is a m dpcm, consultative process involving both sides of the house.
Once the House judiciary Com II litticc i II dicts the President, then the setting moves to the Senate where thic impeach ment proceedings begin. Again, it is a very open process with the right to summon. Witnesses and listen to the general pub
lic. The Serhat cial body and are supposed the impartial fact. This pr another six moi the evidence is in the case of sident usually ri process also al to adjust to n new power blo hundred years there have bee peachment proc have Tcached t thc Tellwal () by Congress,
It is very of above, that does not provic of process wh impeach ment : mot a politica this lacuna, the пment сап appe political coup te:Tests. Thec | hi ve had anot it is important tion does go t sel blance of judicial process U. S. is Te produ. it will always of illegitimacy social and c a mũng thẽ m this illegitimac lised in the that the cont not have a the political
all si des mu:
All that an Country call as delib crate and cess with regar decision-Inaki dent dissolves

a "legal coup"
e sits as a judi. party differences tC) give way to CXa Ilination of ocess may take il tills CT S. If i very strong as
Nixon, the Pretesigns. The long lows the system CW Talities and CS. IT Hic two of U.S. history 1 Only two ineedings and none heir finality, ie f the President
bvious from the ill Constitution
le for the kind 1ich will make a judicial and l issue. Given present impeachtar FLS a wet by partisan inrebels IInay not her choice but
that if this mohrough that the he type of open
involved in the Ced. Otherwise, have the touch
and given the ass differences Iain contenders, y will be nobifuture to prove Ill On Illin dics llä Trice. That is eper Clission that t Stick to av Cojd.
citizen in this for is an open, Consultative protċ) c) Institu tioal ... If the PresiParliament then
it is important to go to the people in a general election and canvass their support. If the people feel he should not be impeached then their will should prevail. If he does not dissolve parliament then there should be patience and the political and judicial process should take their course without the hysteria and glare of media headlines. If the presidential system has to be scrapped, a move that I believe will not be in the best interest of the country since the system has sonne benefits, or an alternative formulation of presidential pOWCTS has to be delineated, let that also follow the proper course and involve the fullest debate.
It is time that we go beyond conspiracies and horse deals on both sides and try to interpret or Ievrite a constitutional order based on what may serve the national interest and not the Political exigencies of the hour. If We can move beyond ou T ve nomous, pa Tochial concer in 5 to a concer in With the democratic order then this crisis may have possibilitics of a In Ore Open Society. IF on the other hand, we allow the venonous and the personal to get the upper hand, then we will only drown in our own sline and it is the democratic system
Els a Whole that will take a bashing. In this climate of fear, apprehension and general mud Slingi Tng, We must keep stressing the Point that these are mon mental questions, that Constitutions should not be trifled with and if all else fails then you must go to the people. För when we come to constitutional issues of such i magnitude, the Incans are, definitely, more important than the ends.

Page 12
Land Reform (3)
Peasant Agrict
S. Sathananthan
ut the i political goals of (a) a voiding la Tid refor Til in the Wet Zone to protect rights of la indowners a nd (b)
turning the Dry Zone (with the possible exception of the Jaffna peninsula) into an area domimated by the Sinha lese Cow CT-Tude: environmcntal and oth cr considerations and could not be contain cd.
The debate over the c nwi on
mental proble IIns in peasant agriculture began in fits and stats. While reporting on El
motion by a Member of State Council in 1932, calling for clerial land to be Illade availablic for cultivation, the Executive Committee explained that ceria cultivation was de tri IIle Intal to soil conservation (PSC 1932: 51ճ),
To establish a more "scientific" approach, the Executive Committee in 1936 agreed it was necessary to adapt agricultural practices to climatic conditions: to divide thic Island into climatic zones and to carry out... experiments. . . in each zone to work out new varietics and to work up to higher stages of evolution of pure lines' (PSC, 1937:45–46). Yet there is no record of atte Impts to implement this suggestion at that time.
The first intervention by the State to deal with the perceived environmental problems in peasant agriculture in the pastcolonial period (after February 1948) was made in 1953.
4.1. The Paddy Lands Act of 1953
Price inflation during the Korean War in the early 1950s increased the cost of the rice subsidy. This underlined the need to Taise paddy output; which was further reinforced by a threat to cxport earnings
LO
and therefore, city on the Korean Boil reduction in 1 a crisis Tespons tial slupply sl: cIII ent of the Party (UNP) e. Lands Act of
The Act it reforms, offeri security of tic the minimum tenants (and no of paddy lan as an in centive of paddy out expected that is would i Liiduce watОГ to invest tally sound a tices which y the medium (3 long (I10-re tha
Thus the di mental impact of the type of begi I 1 1i I1 g t (b policy thinkin lation Was I modifying the turc als al II environmental
Under the bureaucracy Wi. L Il der L le 193: pect to colo to Tegula te l: "controlled på that i5, to paill. under the puri The Act empo authority, all Iment Agent, : (GCWETIT EIt A prescribed off to regulate c
tions, if neci the Meeting (KT P1 P2 a Imee:til
The cultivitr according to down by the

Ilture
to import capacollapse of the
which forced a rice imports. As i.e. to the potenortage, the gow
United National acted the Paddy 1953.
rduced tel Till ng a degree of nur e by fixing Let II for future t sitting tena in Lis) dis a five years 2 ty high Cr levels put. It Was als) ecurity of temure thic tcnant cultiin cn wirion Ilmengricultural praci cld Telu IT IS I
to 5 years) and in 5 years) term.
iffering environas a function ları d tcmlı re was be recognized in g : Ind the legisto provide for te Turi 1 strucTe-condition to management.
1953 - AC, the as all thorized, as LDO with resnization Schem C 5, and L15 e in al 1 ddy lands' (S.3), i dy lands brought iew of the Act. wered the "proper 1ely "the Goverii T äT Add i Liolal ligo It. . . OT 11y icer” (S.20 (I) ), ultivation opera25 sa Ty overtuling of Proprietors g5) (S.11 (1) ). was to proceed regulations laid proper authority
who could in sist up on the use of improw cd scedis a indi more efficient II lethods of cultivation (Hansard, vol 13, 1952:273).
The creation of the 'proper authority" was expected to minimize bureaucratic bottlenecks and improve implementation whilst the legislation itself was expected to facilitate greater State interwention in land use in paddy cultivation. However, the 1953 Act failed Elt the implementation stage in 1955 due to opposition from paddy la Tid o wners as well as due to resistance from Wested interests F. Lhe State,
An important reason for the failure of the Act was identiFicci cycl bc for its el C timelt. Du ring p:Lilia III entary de bates over the Bill attention was drawn to the absence of any provision in the proposed legislation FCT thic creati 1 of popular organizations of tenants which would ensure implementation (Hansa, Td, wol 11, 1951: 259). Not surprisingly, at the next attempt in 1958 policy thinking considered State interwention for thic refor II of tenu Tial structurc and establishment of rural organizations as necessary pre-conditions of
solını d ciniyi To Dırnental IIIlıları Elge
eIt.
5. Environmental Managern ent
Through Rural Organizations
5.1. Cultivation Committees
At the parliamentary election of 1956, the radical-populist Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) formed a Coalition government and Proclaied to introduce Socialis II f’T I below". Il Eligitarian reform the goWernment enacted the Paddy Linds Act of 1958, which repealed the 1953 Act. The new 1958 Act provided for State intervention

Page 13
to regulate temuri al relations,
agricultural rents and Wages, aId cultivation II lethods il paddy lands; and for the in
troduction of collectivic fall Tills” in paidd y cultivation (Parts II, II and IW). The legislation als o provided for the creation of Cultivation Committees (CCs) at village level (Part III). The
CCs, composed of lando wners and tenants of paddy lands, were expected to assist the
State to implement the proviSi Ils of the Act.
The urgency en wird IIImental degradation was evident during parliamentary debates wer, the Bill. For exall ple, a McInber of Parliaпепt (MP) commented that "unless we sal feguard five Jr six inches of top soil in this country there is no basis on which we can improve yields'. Supporting the Bill, he argued that the proposed CCs would ser we als all i 15 tituti UT1:ll fra Illework for cnwir Conmental Ima na gcII1eInt 3aI d h e belic"w : l i that 'the problem of soil erosion can be tackled in these units taking them as large units' (Hansard, wol 30, 1957:2078). This propic) sal to group together paddy lands in order to arrest environmental degradation indicated again : gTOWing TCCOgDition of the link between agrarian structure and environmental impact,
The aware less if the iced to T efør Til agrarian stricture was also evident in the concept, introduced by the 1958 Act, of a permanent and inheritable security of tenu Te which was expected to be an in centive to the temat not only to adopt Il Te efficielt Ille 10ds of production but also to undertake medium and long term investments in environmentally sound cultivation practices. But the well know I failu Te to ensure security of tenure under
of Stelling
the Act Imleat that the te IlluTill structure could not be Tefo Till Cid.
To enable the State to enforce pro per fari iling operäition s, the Act cIInpowered the CoIIn Tis
sioner of Agra) regulate croppil (1)), and the t of calci exte II required to mail ble stal II dard od ductio" which en witon lental keeping such dition to enabl to be filii Itali 1: (S.18). Where a ted to introdu the specified Soul Id cultiwa tid Act authorized ner to enforce of cultivati koll Supervision Ord the er ring te under the Corth II vision (S. 19). " Wision Order W CCII This sic Inter"s could require t comply with th S. 18 (S. 19 (3) cultivator still ply, the Col. issue all Orde sion S. 20 (1) te Illa Tit. The T e: OT the CC COLI the Collissio: of Supervision (20 (6) ). Th assist the Corn adlı il Stratiqi Tı li { Supervision an
For the Tir Lanka, the 19 the institution a cing ge) Cid hu paddy lands a to be applied But the Collll Over la Ild Ll Se and enforcing was equally 1972, only a Orders were
Ile Order of made (Weeraw
One reason to enforce glo that thic provis were far froll example, the le the tenant cul the owner-cult maintain padd dition" that w

ial Scr wices to ng pattern (S.58 et çultivitor of land was tail "a reas Coll - efficient proincluded the requirement of xtent in a coe such Standard ed in the futurco cultivator neglecce and practice enwir Qin III 1entally Il III ethods, the the Colli missiohigher standards by is suig a er, which placed at cultivator hissioner's superWhile the Superas in force the authorized agent hic cultivator to Le provisions of ). If the tenant failed to coinI missio Ier could I of Disposses) to evict the spective landlord ld also petition ner for at Order of Dispossession e CCS WCTE LO missio Iller i Ll the of the (Ordes of d Dispossession,
st tic in Sri 58 Act provided basis for enforsbandry in Ell ld for sanctions hrough the CCs. issioner's control was i Ille Tective good husba ndry iifficult: up to few Supervision issued and Ilot a Dispossession a Tdana, 1975:68).
for the inability d husbandry was ions of the Act
definitive. FoT gislation required tivator (but not ivator) merely to | land "in a conCould els urc effi
cient cultivation in the future (S. 18) and it empowered the Committee 5 to es uire "the efficient cultivation of paddy lands and the maintenance and improvement of their fertility'
(S. 36 (1) (f)).
Even where specific action by thic cultivators was required, it was found difficult to enforce the same. Land preparation was a casc in point: in this process the cultivators were responsible for en su ring efficient irrigation
and thereby preventing soil e T5io, sedi Tentation, Water logging or excessive salinity However, they could not be held accountable for failure since defaulting cultivators usually advanced sound reas cons, sluch
as the non-availability of agricultural implements. Consequently, it was impossible to allocate responsibility for default amongst the cultivators and the provisions relating to environmentally sound agricultural practices became un en forccablc,
A structural obstacle to enforcing enviromentally sound Standards of cultivation la y primarily in the contradiction between the imperatives of State interwention and the rights of private property. In order to protect private property rights, powers to control land use wested in the Commissioner and, by externsion, in the CCs were not applied to land owners. This excluded from the piur wie W Čf the Act those lands cultivated by owners, either directly or with wage labor, which constituted the majority (55%) of all paddy lands. Moreover, lando wners whipped up a climate of hysteriālower “creeping com II munism”. They resisted State intervention which impinged on their property rights and even the mildest intcntion to aggregate tena Inted paddy lands through the CCs to take adwantage of Economies of scale was ferociously oppscd on the grounds that it would be the first step in ‘collectivization" (Peiris, G H, 1976: 32-33. Hansard, Wol (), 1957: 2392). Thus environmental
(Carriedar page 17)

Page 14
LAWD (2)
Acquisition and
D. L. O. Mendis
A IC sponse to this longdistance pseudo - criticism
has been given by this author carlier:
'What these two authors are trying to say is that official land aquisition and blocking out was forcefully resisted by thc old villagers in a disord crly manner, because they were infuriated by the coming of outsiders". The first part is a factual report of events, the second part is the authors' supposition as to the reasons behind the observed facts. This "supposition' has Inore than a hint of a claim to 'cxclusive occupation' of the lands, of a type similar to the claim by Ponna mbalam, quoted above, in respect of so-called "traditional Tamil homelands'. However, supporting evidence that such a claim to exclusive occupation had been made by the local people has not been provided by these two authors. An altogether different explanation for their resistance to the alienation and blocking out of private lands, will be presented in terms of irrigation ccosystems. (Mendis, 1989, a).
Not long after the attempts by the authorities to force their blocking out plans on traditional pica sant cultivators was resisted as described above, the first in surrection against the EYernment broke out in April 1971 in the south. This was suppressed with great brutality, and became one of the major is sucs in the General Elections of 1977 when the incumbent government was routed, and a CW govern Illicit elected with 器 un precedented 5/6th s majoггty.
- It may be mentioned in pa 5 sing that this was the se Yenth
(and last) time the incumbent Sri Lanka had at the polls in General Electio pendence. Ther tive and negati the term frc & day שnט 1950 rall Election 5 hi in Sri Lanka. of votes polled, tulde of the Opposition arc tive indicators, of spoilt votics dicator of a ballot. -
After the abor of 1971, the MT5 Si i may() asked for Tech from the Peopl China for the pri Area Pol I, Lhe
at opportunities for in the south. b-Lı Tea, lL1 Cratic Itı: took place, and the Souther cleverly aborted Technical Assist was asked for a SC mille II in 0 f projects in the zone, and any storing some Willage tanks in dry zone was
Instead, step: investigate an new large reser the southeast, the 1957 Map, wiehera wwe wall Mendis 1989 a E b, c, etc). Dire given by the P. the Minister also in westiga te site for a larg locatio El called some 15 miles

blocking out
іп а го w that rn me nt inסwם E b1 defeated a frcic and fait in sic: Indecare both posiwe indicators of Ind fair". Silict: ill-island Genicit we been held The perccintage and the magnivictory of the considered posiand the TiլImber a negative infree and fili
tive in surrection Prime Minister Bän data naike nical Assistance es Republic of oposcid Southern objective being W employment frustrated youth Un scrupulous 0Wם ringטuWט1n thc concept of Area plan was (Mendis 1989 b). åTCC frol Clia nd Ohtal med for lood protection 50 Luth West Wet pTiCo spect of Te
of the small the southeast forgotten.
S Were take to other proposed voir project in identified f’Tol the Lunugam(Mendis 1988, I, Mendis 1990 a ctions WCrc then rie Ministe t if Irrigation to a II alternative e Tcsc Twir at lä Hur Hithgamu wa upstream of thc
proposed Lunugalimwehera da, T1 site. Over the next seven years, bureaucrats and technocrats conspired to defy the Prime Ministerial directions, so that the alternative site was never investigated.
This bureaucratic skulduggery that was to have the Ilost grievous consequences has been described recently as follows:
In ignoring the directions given by the Prime Minister's Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Irrigation (aided and a betted by the Irrigation department) defici both the basic telets of inter-Ministerial 1 Ind collective Cabinet responsibility, and the basic principles of wat Cr resourcCs development planning (or any planning for that matter) that at the plan Illing Stage if Dot later, alternatives should be Considcrcd (Mendis, 1990 c).
When the new government took power, the new Minister for Irrigation appointed a five Illan Committee of engineers to report to him on the question of the proposed Lunugamvehera Tc5cr Woir and the alternative Hurathga muwa site. The Co Inmittee included the chief proponent of the LLun uga rive hera site as Chairman, two others who were aspiring for office under the new regime, and two who were supporters of the alternative site and the proposed Southern Area plan into which the alternative site fitted b) LI t Int the IL LI In u gal Im wiehera site. Thrcc. In enbers of the Committee recoln Incided to the Minister that the Lunugamvehera project should be taken up for construction immediately since all investigation were complete, and that if the alternative site was to be investigated there would be loss of time! This incredible

Page 15
TCCommendation was accepted by the Minister who gawe orders to go ahead with construction of Lunuga mvehara. No questions were asked as to how long it would takc to investigate the nlterna Liwc site — esti mated at
six months to one year - or why the alternative sic had not been investigated for so long. However, on a later
Occasion thic Minister said that he hid followed a dicturn of Napoleon that a general could afford to lose a battle or cycin a War, but not to lose time.
In the event, construction of
Lunugamvehera did not start for another one year, in late 1978, during which the alter
native site could easily have been investigated but was not. The Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs was abolished at the end of 1978, and the two engineers in that Ministry who had favoured investigation of the alternative site were forced into pric mature retireIncit, Construction of Lullgam vehera held Works Was estimated to take four years but took eight, being completed in 1986. Cost is not yet known, but is r u Imoured to halwe escala ted to four times the original estimated figure. (Mendis, 1989b).
Shortly after the Lunuganvehera head works was cere noniously inaugurated with a lot of fanfare, the site engineers office was burnt down. The unexpected outburst of violence Hippire Intly Luck everybody by surprise, bureaucrats and politicians a like. The easiest explanation that politicians were ready to believe was offered by the bureaucrats - that it was the work of disgruntled antigove T1 linent elements". Hy we weras violence cscalated and spread, it was obvious to the discerning that such facile explanations We Te not going to help solve the problems. The underlying causes had to be found by studying the problems with an Ճբen mind. In the prevailing circunstances this Was easil y said than done.
From May 1988 a number of pa pers WCTC published in Sri
Lanka and abro to draw attentio of ern wiron IIn en1 ta the South, whic to b c C [c of 1 of the civil unres. This a OI1, aInd a limi 5 LI CCC55 : 3:1 1 2:A t. ported in this the 4lst Pugwash Science a Ild W. Beijing. It is series of prescinti cd particularly cause the Pug, is being held Te pository of ont hydraulic civili: World. More so Lcr5 from 41 Ties hil w c llet w Beijing at a Environmer a I. June 18-19, 199 the Beijing Dec. Wiro III1 ent Dew, is II (1st releval of this paper ( Wol 34, No. 27,
Professor Jos attention had all in 1984, to what to be an inci due to Brghier, and developmer systems in anci re-published in of his great W having studied quested this auth a comparative si engineering in a :Intl a fittitilt Ch set the record attempt has not com mence Such : Tepi Tai till of the Needhall R. in Cambridge ( followed by a II to China, in Jl.
Meanwhile, it most important prove that Ud. Lun uga mwch era of which had : numbers of anci when they were to the BT HiTE Wrongly located. new hypothesis and a study of

ld in an attempt to the problem Il degradation in sh was suspected he root causes commotion and tempt still goes ted in easure of present be rcpresentation to 1 Conference on rld Affairs, in another in a itions, considerappropriate beWalsh conference in China, the * of the greatest zations in the becausic Minisёvelopiпg couпter y rcccntly in confereace on Ld Dcwelopment, I, and published :l: ra tio ili ol ED1--- clopment, which to the Cott Beijing Review,
9).
eph Needham's ready been drawn Was considered OTTCC Stil te I11 of the evolution it of irrigation ent Sri Lanka, Wolume 4, Part 3 "Cork. Needha II, the subject, re„{)T to L11 deT ta kec Ludy of hydraulic Il cient Sri Lanka ina, in order to straight. An W bitel Tlade to | study, with the A Ill () Llti Ille” at scarch Institute Mendis, 1990 b), reliminary visit ly 1991.
Was considered li md urgent to
a Wa lawc and Te5er Woirs, both submerged large
c Il t STI lalll ta mk3 built according lypothesis, were An acceptable was required, f the history of
irrigation systems had therefore to be undertaken. For this purpose, history was se en as a
chronological record of successive changes in the means and relations of production, ReconStruction in the history of irrigation was therefor a study
of successive changes in the use of Water for crop product
ion. A seven stage theory for the evolution and development
of irrigation systems was the
direct result, from which the
concept of irrigation ecosystems
was a natural corollary.
The modern concept of eco
systems distinguishcs between terrestrial, aquatic, and atmospheric ecosystells. Irrigation
ecosystems are recognized als being based on the hydrological cyclic which encompasses land, water and air. The ancient irrigation systems in Sri Lanka are thereforc de scribed als irrigation ecosys t cms (Mendis, 1983 etc)
It is intercisting to observe, in passing that the abovementioned "Beijing Declaration on Environment, Developmento uses a similar turn of phrast in its opening para graph:
We are deeply concerned about thic degradation of the global cnvironment. This is largely on account of Insustailable development models and life styles. As a result, 1c bi5ic elements II di 5. pcins able for the human life - land, Water and atmosphere — Arc gravely threaterled. (Beijing Review, 34, 27, 9)
From this study of history, defined as successive changes i In the li li se of water as tille means of crop production, seven stages were identified in
the evolution and development Of irrigation systems, il contradistinction to the four 5 tages in Brohier's hypothesis, namely:
1. Rain fed agriculture
2. Seasonal temporary тiver diversion, and flood or inundation irrigation on river banks
13

Page 16
3. Development of permanent river di version structures, and
chan nel systems on river
banks
4. Construction a Tıl operatio Elı
of weirs and spillways on
diversion channels
5. Twention of the
(sluice) with its
(Access tower)
6. Construction of storage reservoirs equipped with sluices
SOWE bis ko tuwa
7. Damming a perennial river using a sluice for temporary river diversion, or thc twint::i, 1k II1 etl () d.
The following six types of irrigation ecosystems were identified from these seven stages:
1. Rai Tfcd agriculture: (a) seasonal cultivation including slash and burn or swidden 8griculture, (b) permanent highland plantations, like the Kandyan for est garden for
example 2. Seasonal croping systems based on flood irrigation Systeins 3. Seasonal cropping systems based on channel irrigation systems 4. Micro irrigation cosystems based on small village tanks 5. Macro irrigation ecosystems based on large village tanks With one or morc micro
irrigation ecosystems of types 2, 3 or 4 in its command HT:1
6. A complex of macro irrigation ecosystems based on a system of interconnected large reservoirs and channels.
It was argued that the "interrelation of groups of large reservoirs and channels' in the dry zonic of Sri Lanka, that Brohics had been the first to identify, was an example of the sixth typic of irrigation ecoSystė Th. Fach of the al cielt large reservoirs, considered in isolation was an example of the fifth type, and the large number of small village tanks was each an example of the fourth type. Seen from this perspective the wiew that the
14
shall tank was cvolution and irrigation syster so ne day be rc sub merged unde: reser Wit Wils ludicroլIs.
The BIOlier ass LI Illed thall St hald been buil diwersion. This tation of history right in the se thesis, which in Wention of the wa) in ancient ker, 1909) as a fore storage r hawe bo cel built.
The oth cI c55 in the two hy the Way in whi of water in agri tion is treated. It pothesis, Water in animate agent the study of h draulic engines Էcosystems app set as all air vehicle for cow rients in Ila ture": cal cyclics. The of water is an e the ecosystems irrigation ecosys clude the Soci and Cultural pra tion relations), the hydraulic er pective the soci is not usually pa Tt of hydrau (This is discussi
This new hypot standing the ar. sys. Le Tills i u Sri rcetived a mong t ngineers, but mäle any im highest levels ai political di as the conflict e5 Cala (cd. The IT clian Peace Ke brought in to conflict under th Candhi AccTd relca 5e Sri Lair CCT) tai i 1 LE1 e in 5 LI south. This w; violation of the

a stage in the development of 115 1 d. 5 holl lid
placed by being r a new large clearly quite
hypothesis had ΟΓΗ gς ISWIS t HEføre river
Wong interprey, has been sett wen stage hypoals o Tecognizes : sluice (SCOTTO W - Sri Lanka (Parwital stage beescIvoirs Could
:ntial difference othesis lies in ch the function Cultural produc1 the Brohier hyis se: : ; in exactly as in y diral ulics or hy:ring. Il blo (ach water is 11lte Flige It the "eyнцce of hutbio-geo-chemismallest drop cosystein. From perspective, an tem should inal organisation ctis es, (producWhere a 5 fl | gimė Cring persial organisation i Included als El lic technology. 2d again, below).
thesis for underIcient irrigation Lanka was well scientists and had not yet pact on the of bureaucratic ecision Imakers, in the country in 1987, an eping Force was the northern le Jaya ward cinc, allegedly to kan forces to irrection in the
T1 Sovereignty of
the nation by many, including the then Prime Minister, Mr. R. Premadasa, but was hailed by other ardent government party supporters as a clic wer nove to 'wipe out terrorism in the north'. It is recent history that thc IPKF failed to do anything of that sort. The conflict in the north actually escalated after the arrival of the IPKF, and when the Prime Minister was elected President in January 1989 he insisted that the IPKF should pull out, which they did quite willingly. But another dimension had been added to the conflict in Sri Lanka and another miserable chapter written in the recent tragic history of our country.
With the release of more armed forces to the south, the carnage there increased, quite understanda bly. Throughout 1988 als civil law failed to contain civil un rest, Universitics and then schools were forced to close down. The Rule of Law was now virtually abandoned, the only law being the law of the gun. While fear stalked the country, very little of this was reported in the foreign media where the ethnic conflict or "tribal war' in the north and its e scalation to the est continued to be the only newsWrthy ewents in Sri Lanka.
In these desperate circumstancc5 a præsentatiUn Was Tmåde at the Annual Sessions of the Institution of Engin eers, in October 1988, which succeeded beyond all expectations in drawing attention to the situation in the south (Mendis, 1988b). The President of Sri Lanka himself who was Chief Guest at the Ceremonial Inauguration, cast aside his prepared speech to say that there was a paper which ca Tried a “se were criticism of Ilny government'. He added: "My gowcrn IIJelt welcomes criti - cismı" – and said that he would ask the Minister of Irrigation to appoint a Commission of Inquiry into the Lunugamvehera project.
Ho wewe, before al Cominission could be appoint cd, a new

Page 17
President Logik Ofice in December, and a new Minister of Irrigation was also appointed. Thereafter a Crittee of Inquiry was appointed to report to the President on Lunugali iliyeheral. After that -- COI Lillit - tee had reported that socioecoIn comic proble II is in the south could i Iličed be traced to irrigation problems in the two major irrigation schemes, various suggestions were soon being made to remedy the situation,
The: President of Sri LT1 kl. His Excellency R. Prema dasa gave this Writer in opportunity to explain to him the sc views L. Il the Cll15 Es Jf th: problems in the southern area at a private meeting in his office on January 26, 1990.
The present position is that a suggestion has been inade to
a S aLaLSaLLLHH SLLLLL S S S LLLL S S S S L S shortage of water in the Lunugalı well beral Teservoir, arıd thı at this could be remedied by diverting Water from the adjacent Menik ga nga (river) to Lulu -
gan Wehler it. This proposal has been se werely criticized by Ç015CT wat tio Illists who a Te CCTcerned for the Wild life in the Sanctuary through which the Menik ga nga flows in its lower Telches. It has also been criticized by engineers at the Institution of Engineers, Sri Lanka, as a hasty and un
planned move that would create more problems than it could possibly solve. It has also been stressed that even uit this late stage the possibility of building a Ine w Teservoir at the Hurathga muwa site should be studied (Mendis, 1990c). There seems to be a great deal of Ielu: tā ce d his Cls: Lunugamwehera has already cone in to existence, although now everyone seems to agree that it
Should Illever ha ve bicen built.
Another problem is being
discussed related to the Uda
Wala we reservoir. A wild life
sanctuary had been declared in the upper reaches of thc reserw () ir in what is Illow s ccm to be prime agricultural land in the middle basin of the Walla we ganga. Wild life enthusiasts
a Te il collic and others El 1xiou,5 to Ll: cultivatio of ti) liliwe L T life Ol dyi Wild elephants il the hundre 260 are said Will We Nati problem beco re cGrilplicg סוח cause which i5 til of both and Lunugamo i5 n o W given gi by engineers, the courage in sist on the T tion of both in thcir altei locations.
The situati Whilt happens world I country, a stratification al Westernised the upper cc a dwising thc In Cre and II lesser stratific The bureaucral professionally trained technic Out much c: alleging that to he hillest vice to politici fore (hmly pa: PT) fessio Iial in ving an cupinio For their part, acquired a rep 5 hort SEl rift to technocrat whi. turn” or expr: Lihat may app cally un accepta
In Imodern situation has pounded and c fact that at th pende Tice in 1. gross dispron por bers of Timi: Compared to This was duc fact that thic education, espe Cition ånd s was 50 m cthing higher for Ta the north than

: With politicians Who Lre IIlde is the laid for
suga. I cane than eserved for Wild indling herd of is low estinated is of which some
be il the Ulla la Park. This Til es i Llore: Lld ited. TEle: "CO
the wrong locathe Uda Wall: Wic cher reservoirs uairded precedence but la Colle hlas Io stand up and erile dies — Telic::- these Tese: Two i T3 "native upstreal
In is typicill Lif in a po Cor third whic Tc there is of society with bureaucracy in
helons allegedly politicians who Ore come from
Ltions of society. is, including the qualified and Tats, Survive Withire for scruple, it does not pay when giving adans, They Therey lip-service to t Crgrity when gi1 t} : politicia II. politicians have utation for giving a burea ucrat cr speaks 'out of 255cs an opinion car to be politibic,
Sri Lanka this Je e Il furt hic T com - on found cd by the e ti III1 crf II de48, there was a til in the num| public SciT wants their population. to the simple availability of cially higher educience education likc se ween times IIlil students in for students in
the rest of the country (Mendis, 1989a). Thus at the time of Independence in 1948, whereas the proportions of Tails to Sinhalese Wä5 about 1 : 7 their representation in the higher levels of the public service was sometimes almost I : 1 (Ibid). From 1956, 5uccessive governIL1 ents have been evasive in speaking out about this problci, while at the same time trying to increase the proportion of the majority Sinhalesc in the public service, somctimes surreptitiously. Predictably these efforts have been sce Els in frige T1 e Tits in to the 'rights' of the Tamil minority, : Ind have been re sisted by them.
Educated Sri La Ilıkalı Tallils had started finding alternative meins Lif ||vclih:Jud by Inigrating or moving temporarily to foreign climes long before the ethnic conflict escalated. Today it is estimatcc that there are som - 300,000 Tamil expatriates in all parts of the world, Inost of whom arc believed to support the armed struggle of their
b Teithre 1 i 1 Sri Lanka. The Sri LEl Inkan go wcTn ment continues to employ Tamils at all levels of the public service, but in decrca sing proportions compa Ted to the Sinhalese. There is a fcelling of resentment among Tallils because the Public Service can no longer absorb
qualificd Tamils who pass out of the secondary and tertiary cducation system to the extent it once did, long ago. The Sinhalese masses too feel deprived because, lacking the better cducational facilities available to the Tunc Tc privileged Sinha lese, and Tamils they can find- ernployment only at comparatively la Wcr leyes, both a El Orlic and abroad. It has already been Tc marked that the wat in the Dorth and east is being fought by the misses, although this is not strictly Correct, Thus th c glimmer of a new class strugglic that may emerge from the war is already evident.
In this complex situation there is also a latent aspect which has the potential to explode at a futurc, date if it is
5

Page 18
not exorcised early. It is an un fortunate fact that many of thic decisions made in regard to the location of the rescrvoirs in the south were supported if not actually initiated
by Tamil public servants in the past. This again was a result of the disproportionate
representation of Tamils in the professions and in the public service, compared to their nu mbers in the population as described abow c. Thc wrong loca - tion of the reservoirs should be scen as bicing duc to ignorance or incompetence rather than motivated by communal feelings.
However, at the present time there is a World-wide movement organised by expatriate Tamils to give publicity to their cause - the struggle for a separate state in the island of Sri Länka — which hålls escalated from a non-violent struggle to an armed struggle amounting to a civil War. From till: to time, learned discussions are held in different parts of the World where speakers from Weste Tin Universities and Research Institutes also present papers which di Tectly or indirectly suppmrt this cause.
A recent cxample is a con ference organized in the State University of California at Sacremento, at which a prescnta tio in Was Tna de by Professor Brayan Pfaffenberger.
Pfaffenberger has previously published a study titled The Harsh facts of Hydraulics:
Technology and Society in Sri Lanka's Colonization Schelles. in which he argues that
the supposed causal relation ship between gravity-flow irri gation works and socioeconoInic differentiation is, in the Sri Lanka case, illusory and deceptive. The appearance is created, and becomes convincing, only to the extent that observers adopt a highly res
tricted definition of technology, a technology that includes only the hardware of
irrigation (such as . dams, pumps, a Tid Canals). As scho
15
lars in the h logy frequcint usefull defini logy would cultural wall behaviour, w El ll, wital tc and na intenal cal system, 1990, 364)
Socio economi in the south the bigger soci lem there. E quite correct that technology a S including cL Social behavio tion ecosystem irrigation perm tion of techn hydraulic engi does not. For a Dialogy with concept of ha soft спcгgy pat ecosystems app Fls a 50ft techn. and the hydra approach is di. technology pers
Pfaffenberger The questio addresses, th why Sri Lanll gation techn ciocco no IIlie
(Il the coil II is why the
design oil litt and behavio have mitigat tiation proces
Thic questio Answered in te could rais e a Eidd a new di already disa sti Sri Lanka. Th berger's parti Sacremento con o ned in this I be doubly sen plosive nature he is dealing makes presental Hippo a Tance 5 :Lt Hic should rea technology ir Ti perspective c{ understood by logist hydraulic

story of technoy argue, a TT10 re. in of technQertainly include es and scocial 1ich lre, after
the operation ce of a techni
(Pfaffenberger,
differentiation is only part of -political probfaffenberger i5 which he asserts should be s teh ltural values and I r ... The ir rigals approach to ts such a definilogy, which the eering approach that reason, by Amory Lovins rd energy and ls, the irrigation roach is defined slogy perspective, ulic engineering fined as a hard pective.
goes on to say I this a TLicle circfu Te, is not ka's Inodern irrilogy creates sodifferentiation: ary, the question schernes' 5ocial 5וון טu Stט e(d thE. urs that could ed the differenis (Ibid).
I he poses if trils of ethnicity hornets nest and imension to thc “ous situation in at is why Pfaffencipation in the feTence is ille Intilaper. He should sitive to the exOf the laterial with when hic Li do Ins and pe TSC Ilal such meetings. ise hit the soft gation ecosystems յլuld newer be E ha, Td tech ICDengineer lacking
the possessed by any farmer. reasons why the social design of the big irrigation schemes omittcd customs and behaviour is intimately tied up with this fact which may not be Casily discovercd by a visiting social scientist, although one of them,
basic knowledge of nature The
Leach, did document social customs and behaviour in a Imicro ir rigation ecosystem, in
his classic study a long time ago, (Leach, 1961).
Reft:Ten Ce5
JBeijing Declaration on Environment, Development, in Beijing Review, Wolume 34, No. 27, July 8-14, 1991, pp. 11-ل
Brohier, R. L. (1934) The Ancient Irrigation Works in Ceylon. GoverflIIlell| Pre55.
Brohier, R. L. (1937) The Inter-relation of Groups of Reservoirs and Channels in the Rajarata of Ceylon. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1937
Brohier, R. L. ( 1956), Somc: StructLI Tal Features of the Ancient Irrigation Works in Ceylon. Presidential Address, ಸ್ಥಳ: Association of Ceylon
wroey, Michael and N.Shanmuga ratIlam (1984) Peasant Resettlement in Sri Lanka. Tri Continen Letall.
Kennedy, J. S. (1934), Evolution of Scientific Development of Willage Irrigation Works in Ceylon. Proceedings of the Engineering A55cciation of CLylton,
Leach, E. R. (1959). Hydraulic Society in Ceylon, in Past and Present, April 1959
Lealeh, E. R. (1951) Pul Eliya - A Willage in Ceylon. Cambridge
Mendis, D. L. O. (1968) Solle: Observations Cari the Designs for Ulal Wallawc Headworks. Transactions of thic Institutions of Engineers, Ceylon Mendis, D. L. O. (1983) Ancient Irrigation Ecosystems of Sri Lanka. Uipublished, General Research Committee, Sri Lanka Association for thic Adwaith cement of Science.
Mendis, III). L. 0. (1988a) The Need LLL Sa LLaLaLS S LaLLSLLCLCLLLL HaLLSS LLLHLaLaLLaaH S LL S LLLLLLaLLaLLLLLL S LLLLK S LLCLLS
Transactions of the Institution of
Engineeri, Sri Lalnika. Mendis, D. L. 0. (1988b) Theory,
Paradigm and Crisis in Understanding

Page 19
the History of Irrigation Systems in Sri Lanka, Unpublished. 11th Conference of the International Association gaf Historians of Asia.
Mendis, D. L. O. (1989a) Hydraulic Civilizations, Irrigation Ecosystems, and the Modern State, Professor E. O. E. Pereira Commemoration Lecture, Institution of Engineers, Sri Lanka.
Mendis, D. L. C. (1989b) Development of Underdevelopment in Southern Sri Lanka: Destabilisation of Ancient Ir. rigation Fcosystems by the Impact of Hydraulic Engineering Transactions of the Institution of Engineers, Sri La rika.
Mendis, D. L. O. (1990a). Lessons from Sri Lanka's Ancient Irrigation
Peasant . . . .
(Carfired frarr page II) management was foregone in order not to interfere with private property rights.
5.2. Agricultural Productivity Committees and Cultiwation Committees The Agricultural Productivity Committees (APCs) were set up under the Agricultural Productivity Lew of 1972. All agricultural land in the arca of autho
Ecosystems. Proce Congress of the In sion on Irrigation NFCW Delhi,
Mendis, D. L. (). ( tive Study of Hy i Ancici Sri L China, Transactio
tion of Engineers, W. Mendis, D. L. O.
Development and im South crin Sri Li wicw, December 1 Si Lanka.
Mendls, D.L., O. vironmental Degral position of Wester
Irrigation Ecosyste froIII Sri Lanki.
rity of an APC the area under cil) were brol purview. This plantation and ture. Ho, Wewer, already been pli; The resulting the 1958 Act an was resolved by el Ct III t. T Lands Law of the 1958 Act
VASA O
2O.W. 2nd (
Colon
Telephone

dings of the 14th Fernational CommisInd Drainage. ICID,
1990b) A. Comparadraulic Engineering anka and Ancient s of the InstituSri Lalinkai,
(1990c). Irrigation LJnderdevelopment | Inkal, EçCIJI Inic Re990, Peoples Bank,
Mcndis (1991) Endation due () IITModels on Ancient mus: A Case Study
Unpublished. 12th
Conference of the International Association of Historians of Asia, Hong Kong, June 1991.
Needham, Joseph, Wang Ling and Lu Gwei Djin, (1971) Science and Civilization in China, Wolume 4, Part 3. Cambridge University Press.
Parker, Henry, (1909), Ancient Ceylon. Lisacs. London,
Y Pfaffenberger, Bryan, (1990), The Harsh
Facts of Hydraulics: Technology and
Society in Sri Lanka's Colonization Schemes. Tcchnology and Society, July 1990, pp. 361-397. Ponm anbalarm, Sachchi, (1983) Sri Lanka: The National Question and the Tamil Liberation Struggle, Zed Books.
(approximately a Willage Coun1ght under its included both peasant agriculpaddy lands had aced under CCs. Unflict between di the 1972 Law an additional le Agricultural 1973 repealed |and its amend
ments but introduced almost identical provisions; a nd it redcfined thc CCs as subordinate agencies of their respective APCs, The intention was that the APCs would be in overall charge of land under plantation and peasant agricultural production whilst the CCs would assist the APCs in ensuring security of tenure and regulation of rents in paddy lands.
(To be continued)
PTICANS
ross Street, . 11 - סנ
: 421 631

Page 20
AFO FEWG VW POLVCY
A Rao Regional
David Housego
P Minister IP W Narasil bla Rao's Congress administration Celebrilted its first 100
days in office recently a mid more al CCola des for its perfor Tillä. Il ce thal. Il it could hawe
imagined when it took power. But o ne area whic Te it Tc Imains a drift is over the handling of foreign policy.
Reflecting its difficulty in defilling where II dia stands in the new global Enviro IIIllent and how it sees its role internalti näilly — the issues clos c5 L Llo the hic Tt to fo IIIe Pri Illic Millister Rajiv Gandhi and the Neh. Tu family — the governmcnt allowed only a brief debate o In fico Teign affairs 0. I thic läst day of the recent parliamentary SSS.
The main point to cm crge froll the government's first foreign policy statenent was the Crucial importance' India now at taclı es to US suppo TL — an admission of American power that the Neh Tu family with their
dislike of US influence in the world would hawe been loathi to III a. ke.
At least three events have undermined the traditional assumptions
of Indian foreign policy. The first has been the collapse of the Soviet Union which was
IIndi{L's clos est ally, IIIain aTIT15
supplier and a leading trading partner, Purch 15 e5 frø In the Soviet Union Eccounted for
more than 50 per cent of Indian arms imports - supplies that are now vulnerable Lo di STuption and also to sharp increases in costs as the Soviets clici subsidised interest rates and prices.
India also looked to thic Swict Union to offset US support to Pakistan and to use its vict() at the United Nations to block resolutions hostile to India over Kashmir. The Soviet system als Co provided reas surance to India in its own choice of celtra lised planning and socialism as a system of development.
1E
We
Many Indians believe that the problems ar: Ill tory. Mr Nara: parliament recc developments in were a "tempor am not 15 pess Im 1 ple a re," hic 5 big country like go to pieces'.
The sccond been India's ow and balance of cits vil br" default C1 i Ls lier this y cal, T. ( Of this is iIn Cre on Western bila borrowings from er:ll institutions Tarket-Cricn tcd is likely to be gest clients Of ! Monetary Fun years.
All other coils I di a caI no 1 fila Ice he de
i Titiated i der e El Ice Illi" regional militar
emphasis is on spending and with neighbours and Bangladesh
Tի է: til ir tl e vg margin: lis: tion וון שWם נaligneti m in Which lildi claims to third The internal pr: lavia and Eg! key partners in – Ime in that it to Tewive.
The foreign revealed a go in conflicting TE W ELGSES II i оп the Gпе 1:11 of friendship ; the other. It government edg n if ui סWם ,US

2akness
still resu 5c: tr Soviet Union's ore than transi. ilha Radi told Intly that the the Sib"WicL Uni()I ary phase'. I stic as som c pe coaid, adding "a it just cannot
big event has y T1 LL171SSiWic fis cal pay Ilents defiLight it close to oreign debt carOne consequence :a, scd dependence !cial aid and on in thic multilatin support of Te for Ills. Indiak one of the bighic III. tcritional ld in coming
equence is that onger afford to fence purchases
MI Gandhi to
it is ty power. The cuts in military
mending fences such as Nepal
: It has been the of the 10 net – the film a projected its World leadership. iblems of Yugospt - two other the Ill Weinent Will be difficult
affairs debate vern Illent pulled directions by a of self-interest ld by older ties and ideology on also showed a i ing towards the
comfortably.
THE REGION
Mr Eduardo Faleiro, the minister of state for external affairs, said that the US had been of "crucial importance" to India in obtaining IMF loans, and Over Kashmir. The US in a recent reversal of policy has supporte di India's view that thic Kash
mir issuc should be settled bilatcrally between India and Pakistan - rather tha in through
the UN 5 Palki 5 til I WEL IS.
There are other signs of closer ties with the US. Increased 11 Lull tillåter: l jid Hill 5 b c c al CC 0 ITpanied by a halt to US aid to Pakistan because of its nuclear ambitions. The US has been pressing Pakistan to end supplies to Kashmiri separat 1st Illovements in India.
The Narasimha Rao administration hopcs to obtain more sophisticatcd weapons from the US if its purse permits and is making ai point of Wooing US foreign in Westment.
But closer ties with the US remain politically un popular in India and with in the Congress demonstrated
party - :15 Was during the Gulf war. Distrust of the US is an issue which
the militant Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) - the main opposition party - scells determined to exploit to electoral a dwa ntage.
In a fore taste of their campaign, Mr A B Waipayee, the BJP's foreign affairs spokesman and a former forcign minister hill self, told parlia. In ent: My concer1 is that they the US wEl Int to run the cIntirc World according to their doctrines.' Alleging that a “5uper-alliance“ was ernerging between the US, the IMF and multinational corporations, he called for al strength cinc di LJN to offset Allerican power,
In particular, he said countries such as India and Brazil should be given a placc con the Security Council. The difficulty for a Congress govern Ilent in answering such an attack is that Jawaharlal Nehru, Mrs Indira. Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi - the former leaders of the patty - would all have adopted much the sanc tones.

Page 21
SAAFC
Prospect for C
Godfrey Gunati i leke
title given to the
A. te
PäCT that I HEL ve beel asked to present can be interpreted very widely, it would bc. 115eful at the outset to define its scope. The term "Regional Co-operation' can signify the entire Tange of initiatives for co-operation El IL 13Trig a gThulp of Colum trics. Besides the economic aspects it will include the political and socio-cultural dimensions as
well. Given the limits prescribed for a brief presentation, this paper confines itself to
LaS aaLaLLLLLL S LLLLLLaLaLaLaaL S LLLLLL South Asian co-operation.
It is however important to beàT jI mind 1he inter relation 3 between the eclinic and the other non-economic dini cisions of co-operation. While the in. trinsic potential for cconomic Co-Operation lies in the structures of the economics of the SAARC countries and their processes of growth, the capacity to realis C thalt po tcl til in full || In easure will depend on the interplay of a large of other complex factors. One crucial factor will be the basic political pre-conditions which provide an environment free of conflict and conducive to intercountry trade and other forms of econ oninic exchange, This is well illustrated in the problems that beset South Asian econcoIllic co-operation. On the other hand, cwen limited efforts at the strengthening of econmic ties and the cxpansion of trade, leading lo sonne in crease in the económic interdependence of the countries of the region cil, 11 a ct independently to changc the political perceptions and pronote the Tesolution of political coilflicts.
The III fihar ir - Marraging I2irector of
arg Tr:
number
Beginnig i there his been research and st the problems at South Asian Cowritings, while areas for possib have flagged m t: issues. A them familiar today sion of South co-operation is : : ( 1 ) Ilia 5 th t : a, Thd the special 1:firון רft: ctווזרCut mi, As it where T1: . for nearly 80% GDP of the tegi Of e con Tic coeilg lists that thit
S C Cfeat of eccan1 (t): by the major p "n L1 שוו ri11חrctil Dr the 5e discu55io 1: 554.1 52 i 3, Trelevan | ment for the gTOTE11 cດ-mp ETL de5, It dea miny other r Te is; CLIFT co-imperation ha stage where the relities f the tion have been i is ill braid T. Within these I possible for the F1 Te de 5 til ei to bmurs tin work ( ble Tegime of HD er ti sin f Hit Wëll F3, the mi are directly add propriately take in lily such re.
The present pa il fru T bo Tic F first calls wit pattet in H m t ex te ז 1;ic exchוון רווח רוסE South Asian cur thc bi se fro 11 i tČ TT o We to WaT

ooperation
the late 1970's a large body of udy devoted to il prospects of Coperatio II. These exploring the le co-operation yst of the major se which is wery in any disc LusAsian economic the size cof the Te co-opera ting El re of the Ir å til Cf SÖLlth ountry accounts of the total n. The regime operation which a shaller partpe Tate without ni C do milltiCJI artner has figu. " іп па пy of 3. Although the I for an assessrospects of re:ico II, this paper With this and elated themes. on South Asian טul to thםWנווח S hii Td e Chrlic
existing situaIccepted. The Tc :grgnition that
"ealities it is countries which
live as neighbut a n accepta
et nn n mic c tյh the fear 5 a 5 is parehensions ressed and ap1 into account gile.
per is orga mised
Sectis flg. The h the cxisting
· Tit Of TT3 de l Ild nga amn ng the tries - in short, which we begin 3 greater econo
mic co-opcration. The second draws attention to some of the fa r-reaching changes that hawe taken place in the South Asian region both in the conditions for economic growth as well as in the development policies and ecc)n Comic management. These provide a perspective to regional Co-operation which is very different from that which prevai
led in the first half of the 1980's. The third section exaIllincs the implication which
recent di cvelopment in the world C :: Il commy çalı have foT South Asia and co-operation a mong its members. In this context, it discusses South Asia’s Telations with the rest of the World and thic po 55 i ble areas of South Asian co-operation in managing these rc.lations. The fourth and final section explores some of the promising elements of a strategy of South Asian Coopcration and points to a few specific initiatives that might b c possible in different a reas.
Trade and Economic Exchange in the SA ARC Region - the Existing Base
The fact that any economic co-operation in the South Asian region will begin on a very Lna, r r ) 'W' :1, D1 d ret,5 trictcd base is well known. The ciclo nomic eXchange and tradic that exists at present a II 10 mg thic South Asian countries is very small in size and limited in composition. This is partly the outcome of the structural features of their econo Ilies. First, with the exception of Sri Lanka the size of the cxternal trade sector measured as a proportion of GDP is relatively small. Next to Sri Lankal which Hills an external sector amounting to about 56% is Pakistan with about 30%, Bangladesh 22% Nepal 29%, Maldives 18%, and India 15%. Excluding Sri Lanka,
19

Page 22
they are cçonomies with a relatively low degree of openness. India as a continental economy however falls into a category of its own, and the measurement of openness cannot be applied in the sa Inc manner, A recent study compares the degree of openness of various developing regions and concludes that South Asil is the least open among them. South Asia has the lowest level with 19.3% compared with the next lowest 28.5% for Latin America and 78.5% for East Asia and the Pacific. Generally it can be said that structurally thc South Asian cconomies have limited capacity, as yet, to generate external economic exchanges and international trade,
It might be argued that 'open
ness' as described above need not be a necessary condition of economic exchange; what
matters is not the size of the external 5 cctor relative to GDP but the absolutic size of the external sector. After all, which is in the region of 16% of GDP, USA accounts for 15% of world trade - the largest national share. But this is because USA also accounts for a little more than a quarter of the World's GDP. In other Words externill trade is an outcome of high levels of production, high per capita incomes and the resulting high levels of supply and demand. In contrast South Asia is One of the poo rest regions of the world. The Lotal GDP of thg of the South Asian countries take together a mount to approximately 317 billion dollars (World Deve opment Report 1991) i. e. only 1.8% of the aggregate GDP of the World. The South Asian GDP has to be taken together with its population which accounts for 21% of the
World's population. The large majority of the absolute poor live in this region, All the
countrie 5 belo Ing to the category of thic 41 poor est countries according to the World Bank classification. This means that on thc margin of supply and dem
and above subsistence level is quite small. This is not a very qromising situation for
international trade and exchange.
2O
It is therefore that South Asia only about 1%. in 1989, Within share of world regional trade is small - approxii South Asia's wor This is in fact it was in the earl
But even at economic dicycli. capita incomes,
cngage in con with each other the structures of The economic s Luth Asial a cquiri features of the Inies which link Tuling country : strialised ccolor ced the familiar in which they e. commodities to ised countries пianufactured the Ill. The Wer trade between ea the industrealist domina Int feature tal links werie fully selected it coil illercial and terests of the The structures of de land in these fore had || 1 tle opened the In out generated trade wes. The post c Ilent Teinforccc tendencies and the small flow Il cnt of libour foreign investm created incipient in the region.
The Ibered that South Asia had national config desh, Pakistal single unit c) with i1 the Bri political and ei ment. This inc Illet of the ce) turc of transpo the system of tions, the intern and investment external trade countries was The changes

not surprising accounted for if world trade this Illinis culc rade the intraagain extremely Lately 2.6% of di trade il 1989. wer than whit 1980's - 3.2%.
low levels of pment and per cւյլIntrits can iderable trade depending on bei T economies. rlctures of Sold many of the colonial econo!d them to the Ild other indulies and produpattern of trade ported primary the industrialand illported products from tical flows of ch of them and di beca L1 e Lhe The horizonfew and ca. Te - 1 terms of thc economic inm perial regime, production and econo Illics the rein thcIIl which o each other indi anohg themselolonial develop. | thu5 c jnbllit further reduced of trade, loveand network of at which had economic links It has to be rethe colonial a very different | ration, BanglaIndia for red a f : dIllinistation tish cm pire for onomic Ina nälgelded the developnonic infrastrucit and irrigation, customs regulaflow of capital What is
"וו_tוI between these internal trade. hat had taken
place in the colonial period had begun the processes of intergrating the different parts of the of hic sub-continct. The Clwe Ints after independence and the partition of sub-continent reversed these processes, severing the growing horizontal links and strengthening the dominant vertical ones.
Apart from the divisive forces that werc released as a result of the political development which became a major barrier to the expansion of trade and economic linkages in the region, South Asian countries consciously followed development policies and strategies which further closed their economies to each other. First, they launched a major drive for import substitution which reduced the existing tra de flows among themselwesi.
The strategy affected Imany commodities which were being traded a long to South Asian
countries or which had potential for cxpansion of such trade in the future. This they did without any regard for the distribution of comparative advantage within the region. In these policices, they were following the conventional Wisdom of that period. The India-Sri Lanka trade flow is an illustration of what happened. As a result of these policies exports to India such as locally produced cigars, Conch shells and wegtable oils to mention a few items, declined, and imports from India such as vegetables, chillics, conions, lentils, pulses and textiles were reduced and later came under i 1 port cont Tol and bans. It is difficult to fault some of these import substitution policies as countries seized on the most readily perceived and available opportunities for production and employment creation. Comparativ c advantage Within the region, related to Some broad fra Illic work of regional co-operation which weighed the balance of shortterm and long-term mutual adwantaged, was Telmo te from the minds of policy makers. However the entire framework of econmic policies that were followed by the South Asian

Page 23
countries - import licensing, exchange, Controll, li ccensing of imdistries end inventries and in
vestments, un realistic exchange rates and the internal pricing regimes were severely inimical
to the sig To Wyt till of External taldic in general and within this overall situation to the growth of trade ãTrlũng South Asian cũuntrics.
A Illother Illa ja I thir Lust il the se strategies was the rapid expansion of public sector enterprise and the do Illilant role assumed by the state in the direction, Imanagement and control of the economy. This inevitably curbed the growth of the private scictor and drastically reduced the role of the Ilirket. The tinti T: economic enviroment that developed was therefore one which prewented the dynamic expansion of market-drive trade in which the i private sector could hawe vigorously participated and provided the base for regional tra de El End co-operation. A. recent study of tariff and non-tariff barriers conducted by UNCTAD reveals the state that prewailed as recently als 1987. It shari Wis that these barriers by far were highest in thic South Asia. Il region. The un weighted average for tariffs on all goods was 77%, in the South Asia II regi Cn. Fitr Illa 1 u flictures it was 81%. The corresponding figures were 21% and 22% for East Asia, 30, and 33% for Africa and 33% and 34% for Latin Americal and thic Caribbean. In South Asia, 48% of all goods were covered by non -tariff barriers, the corresponding figures for the other three developing regions referred to above were 22%, 30% and 21% respectively.
The overall economic perforIlmance under the Sic economic Tegions Was Ill dest, if not disappointing with the exception of Pakista. The economic growth for the region as a whole (dominated of course by the performance of India), was in the region 3.5%, both for the decade of the sixties as well as for the Seventies. The average per capita in come growth was around 1.4% for the 20 year period, lower than the average
for the low in of all regions excluding Chin With the growt ilico II e at this ges in the struc and pattern of Only Imarginal. of e: o n o mic: gri il the South A
El 1950's Indi Est Asia all ! Which could ha altered the exis THle5: Te th, 10 İliç, reatie:5 discipline our e {}LIT 133C33. Il: Il t5 when we consid that can promot operation in th region. Howeve past, there have b: me ints and tren. Salth Asili T gorlomט billנgl opportunities an growing potenti co-operation. Ti briefly surveys more important
Development in
First, there h; of greater dyna IT il SC Luth Asia i the 1980's, comp ceding decades." region as a wh have lowed to cconomic perforr encouraging of : mic performance comprises 80% Asian economy. Tage Tate g fico T t ble de căile and 1970's, In, upwards to an in the 1980's.
del 15 tratel i
Econo Illic: (GT0yyt
עץ ונוC(ju)
Bangladesh IL1 dia Maldi ya 5 Nepal Pikti Sri Lå Dkå
Source: World Ba

co Inc CounLics which was 1.8%, լa :1 titl IIldiH. 1 of per capita lewell, the chanture of demand tragic Cili be No major spurt with took place Li sian region in
19's is S0 til E3 A5 we dramatically ting trends, - טטט rinEטstyb : which sh tյլIld xpectations and of prospects, er the strategies t: :) Lin Ilit tiյe Slith Asian r iil the recelt !en new developis both in the legion : nd the y that open di point to the all for regional le Llexit Section sle of the t developments, the 1990's ave been signs Lism and gro With In the decade of ared to the preThe South Asian Colle appears to higher rates of In a ce. The lost 111 is the econo: of India which Ճf the StյլItll FITC) lil A 1 li w ċrowth of 3.5% if the 1950's. llia hills IT10. Wedi average of 5.3% The ect m to my ts capacity for
h of South Asian
growth by reaching up to an cxceptionally high ra te of 10.4% in 1988. An economically dynaInic India can make all the difference to the South Asian region. The table below comparcs the performance of the countries excluding the past two de Caldics.
The average for the 1980's for Sri Lanka reflects the decelera - tion of growth that took place with the political turbulence of the second half of the 1980's and leaves out the process of economic recovery that is taking place. Economic cxpansion and a reasonably high rate of growth is the basic prerequisite for the expansion of trade and economic linkages and Will pro wide the rationale for greater ecoיחיםrHtiשת נt-ס mid Gנnt
The other internal ciclo T1Q IL1 i C changes which are of far-realching and funda mental importance are those in the field of macro-economic policy and economic management. It can be said that the phase Which concentrated on import substitution is clearly at end. Which import substitution will L probal y cantinue to have an appropriate place in national development strategies of the region, the Soth Asil countries 3A Te Pl5 t the stage in which they created production capacity to supply a captive domestic market behind a massive wall of protection from international coll petition.
Any new import substitution that takes place will do so under a more neutral Tegine open to greater international competition, All countries of the region are Illowing decisively in the direction of El mire
liberal outward looking economy,
Countries - 1960's, 1970's & 1980's
Arun Lua! a verage Rates of Eco P7o777 ic Grosofh
19ճt)-59 I970-79 Iቧ8ዕ}-89
3.3 3.5 .4 3.4 53 6.5 2.4 2.7
7 4.5 4. 串。好 38 4.()
Ilk, World Developinct Report 1980 and 1991
교 1

Page 24
reforming the system of import control and state regulation of the economy, adjusting exchange rates and tariffs to support the process of liberalisation and undertaking a wide range of other macro-economic adjustments to enable the market to function more freely. The proÇe55 of libe Talli5a, tiðIl 5 Ft Wä ITious stages in the differ cnt countries of thc region. Sri Lanka has perhaps advanced furthest in libcralising the ect)- nomy. Pakistan is also moving rapidly through a sequence of measures dismantling the structure of regulations and controls. ID dia in the Ileasures tikel by the new government is decisively scit con a course of Progrcs siwc libcra lisation.
Liberalisation will perform the initial but in dispensable task of opening the economies of the regio In to each other while opeIning theIIn to the in tèID1a tion al econo II ny as a whole. This would set the stage for the expansion of intra-regional trade. But the impact of liberalisation will not be entirely in favour of regional trade; the outcome will be : Illixed C}ne. One Of the pressing needs of the South Asia. Il colul Intries is exte TI al resources for their development. Thc current account deficit of the balance of payments for the South Asian region as a whole was approximately USS 13 b 1 10 п. П 1989 while the iT mechandisc exports (FOB) a no11 Inted to USS 35.5 billion -- El deficit equi al to approximately 36% of exports or 11% of their LLLLLL S S LLLLLLLLS LL S S LLH S aHaL S aLLLLLS pared with South East Asia which also has a deficit of USS 13 billion but with exports which i mbuI It to - USS 113 billion - a deficit of 11% of the wallic of exports. To mobilise adequate external resources they need to look outside the region a find i Increase their ea TImiTngs in hard currency. Therefore the outward looking strategies that the countries will pursue with liberalisation will result in copetition a mong themselves for markets in the industrial countrics.
Many of the they export to will be the san ments, labour il tu Tes and proces with the tradi products such a But competition markets will militate against operation as ha trated by the E can provide () greater co-opera pect will be di: this paper.
The case of III strates the St for expansion trade with the Asia crven with Lu lisation. A larg ducts in slal ga Till ents, 5 El Tees
Ilents, capital LJ Illel tio In a found their Wii La Luka u Illa Tket f countries. One similar process the other cour libelli 5 till Of FILII, the Sri LELI the minix of goC) ÇI1I lodities rall such as low CO: w cal II etc cai teri and II liddle se IIlarket to the 5' goods to the l I 1 market. A 5 lub do class has gro" Asian coultrie: clifferentiä Licom o provides one industry trade Edwa Intage of TE such à5 in text je wellery, con: :ını d a lı dost of
It was Ille til the Te call be i growing flow a mong coill i litrit low levels of p and developine complementariti tures of product The Te huwe beet Whichl hl:AW: cxi: the exports and country in thi

products which these markets 1e textiles, garitensive mau fac$ cd goods, alöng tional primary s tea and jute. in international not necessarily eco II mic Č = s been dCTISEEC. In fact it pportunitics for tion. This asscussed later in
ri Likā deimulus provided C | Sri Lil Illkan Test if South Illilaterali libe Talje range of proquantities - textiles, or Dagoods, carpets fevy ite Ils h:1ve iy into the Sri To IIn the SAARC can expect a taking place in tries with the Lhe ir economies, ikan experience, is will iI clude: ging from items it textiles, footng to the lower giments of the Lipply of quality per end of the stilitial Well to wn in the South which seeks f products. This 2ntry to intrawhich can take igional diversity iles, OTrlame Ints, 5 Limer duriables other products.
Il : e TeT that Il Cideral te ad
of tril de eye :S w hi. Te at er capital inco II) e 1 t, ki - pending on es i 1 til ei T strucİdarı d d cilalıd several studics
Illined in detail | illports of one c region II atch
with the cxports of another: The cxcrcisc in which countrics were matched bilaterally comes out with indicators which reveal a relatively low level of coinplementarity, This is largely due to the Ilclusi 0.11 Of India Which with its special characteristics of a continental economy has moved furth est in the di Tectio I af import substitution and self sufficiency. Despite the fact that India comprises 80' of Lhe South Asia GDP, its shar e of the external trade of South Asia was about 63% in 1989.
Thc * "cos" " Il casu Tc of col il
plementarity has been computed by an Indian scholar from the Jawa Haral Neh. Tu University, Dr Indranath Mukherji, for 1983 and 1984. Il dia had :
leälle f (). 13 i 1984. The mical sures for other countries were much higher - 0.23 for Bangladesh, 0.33 for Nepal, 0.63 ft T Pakiställ and C), É55 foT STiL1 kl.
When the aggregate measure is take for the South Asian rcgion - as a Whole it is 0,59. THESe Illeasures (Jf. Course ref1ect the structure Of trade als it took place u In der a regulatcd Tegimic with all its Imarket distortions. The cstimates are based on 3 digit SITC data, Thc 11 časures are broad indicaetoTs of possible complementarities Eind ca. In 1105 claim to have identified the match in a 11 le cha TLC teTiStics of the products that would lead to a ready substitution of imports froll outside the region with goods from South Asia. Neverthe lesss with all these qualifications the studies reveal Lhe presence of complementaritics in the existing structures and the latent potential for expansion of trade. Diversion of trade ho wewer should not be the primary aim. With liberalisation it would take place as a result of market forces in commoditics where the comparative advantage is within the region. The more important outcome of liberalisation will be thic expansion and growth of new trade.
Next; SAARC and World Economy

Page 25
SOWET CRSS
History overtakes the
Professor Richard Pipes places the ey Soviet Union in a 70-year perspe
he abortive putsch in the
Soviet Union is the denoument of a dra Tina that began in 1917 and reached a climax in 1989-90 with the collapse of Communist rule in Eastern Europe.
As they unfold, these events bear an un canny resemblance to the days of February 1917 in Petrograd. Then, as now, the army mu ti nied when ordered to shoot at civilia Ins. Then as now, the population, disgusted with the monarchy for its inability to supply it with food turned in Tage against the regirme, toppling s t a t u es a T1d burning its visible symbols. The Tsarist bureaucracy melted away, much as the Communist bureaucracy is scurrying to safety today. The streets triumphed.
The major difference between 1991 and 1917 is that Russia then had no experienced cadres of administrators outside the Tsarist officialdon, but many radical intellectuals fired with utopian zeal. Today, the administrative staffs do exist, some recruited from among disillusIoned Communists, others from the raks of the Officials scrWing the republican governments and municipalities. The intelligentsia, for its part, has lost all appetite for revolution: the past 70 years have cured it of belief in the possibility of creating a new world and a new Man.
The other difference between hic two rewolutions las to de with the threat from anti-democritic forces. In 1917, Lenil waited in the wings, ready to exploit the spreading a narchy to impose a dictatorship. In
Richard Pipes is Professor of History LG LLTLGHHLS SLHGCCLLLLLCS S HCTL SLHGGT TTS Th-c: Russili Revolli diol.
October, he su lar coup i last
rably. For thi dangers to di they stern fro translating the dom into ins r:1th cr tha. Il frt
by openly anti
Historically, t probably marks October 1917 C. Leli li folli mde solidified, resti one-party rule, priwa te propert of production' of the media, corporation of nationalities.
Its ull T Tauweli T ago When it t to thic mo Te munist leader',5 longer be susta less major refo the country fa volt as well as World Statu 5.
The Te for IS
sabotaged by el groups frightent With which the LI TALW elled, TE kind of restora and might ha w in January, b coup in Lithua for Gorbachey's of nerve.
Apart from fore, the recen Ilo Surprise: Illi While if it in December i Yakovlev just took place.
The spark w sig Ting of a II that would economic and

new Tsars
ents in the ctive
Cceeded. A simiWeek failcd IliseS reasil, while mocracy persist, Il difficultie5 CF WeaTIning . for freeitu tional forms | m a threat posed clocratic forces.
he abortive p Lifsch the End of the Jup d'etat which di and Stalin g on four pillars: iti Tallisation of y in the means ", total contro
the forcefull inthe non-Russial
g begап siх уeаг5 ecame apparent intelligent Comthat it could no illed lind thalt LillTIL 15 were en AC Tel Cecil inter Ill || Te
dccliile til Third
were delayed and i tre Enched interest 2d by the rapidity ir familiar World ey plotted some tiGT last alt 11111 e : Tried iL o Ff eginning with a nia, were it not
last minute loss
its timing, thereE o carne as
e Worli hid been
by Shevardnadze ind by Alexander days before it
as the inline. It Lew union Treaty havě trä11S T
political powers
from the Soviet government to the republics, de priving the cent Tal Moscow apparatus of Illost of its authority, Those who stood to lose, spearheaded by the KGB and the military command, attempted to take power.
At some distance behind thern strode the Communist apparatus, ready to Teap benefits if the coup succeeded i nd * t) diso will it if it failed. Cowering in the sha dows were several high state officials, ano ng them Anatolii Llikia now, chair maiti of the Stiwiet Parliament, and Alexander Bessmertnykh, the disgraced foreign minister.
The failure of the plot was dulle to the i5 lati 31 of the Clspirators from 5 sciety at large, Diehards from Brezhnev's day, they consorted mostly with each other, Telin fOTC ing their Convictions and exacerbating their discontents. They had no inkling what had happened to Russia and het dependencies over the past six years.
Their decision to impose nartial law Tecalls a Similar Order of a sillilarly isolated Nicholas II, issued on February 25, 1917, that set off IT utilies in the capital and led to his abdication. They SceIn to have been genuincy astonished by the Willingness of ten 5 of thousa, Inds of Linar mcd
citiz els to risk their lives confronting tanks.
The other cause of their
failu Te see This to hawe be el disiagreement between those of the conspirators Who Wanted Tuthle 55 actic. Til å Til those who preferred to operate within the framle yw Tk. If the: ; Instituitial. Tılır:5e divisio) 13:Affirected the :ırlrımı ed forces, whose officer staff wis torn by divided loyalties. The Tesulting hesitations doomlet the coup from the outset.
The Communist Party played LL SSLKaK LLSLaDSS SLLLH LLLLLL L role: it did not actively parti
23

Page 26
cipate in the rebellion, but neither did it oppose it. By assuming such an equivocal posi tion the Party discredited itself still further, and it is doubtful whether it will be able to restore its fortunes. It is now taint cd with the stigmal of rcaction. The truim pha Lot dem Cocratic forces are likely to eject it from all institutions, the army included.
Yeltsin has emerged as the hero of these events. His coolne55 under fire, his ability C inspire the crowds and divide the cinemy leadership, were crtical factors in the victory of the democrats. Hic is the first elected head of state of Russia and popular political hero since Alexander Kerensky, who was premier of the second Provisional government before its colla psc in November 1917.
Gorbachev's position is IIllurkier. He bears primary responsibility for the coup that allinos deposed him. That he should have surrounded himself with such unsavoury individuals attests to lack of judgment and opens him to suspicion of secretly sympathising with their idcology,
He is as guilty as the plotters of Inis construing the Country's mood. The best thing he can dit is to muster the kind of coul Iage that Nicholas II displayed in March 1917, and resign. Such action would open the door to genuine elections for the post of the union's president.
This post is likely to become increasingly ceremonial in a Ily eventi: George Bush, the US president, seems to believe that GTobache y cal as suII e he exccutive functions of a Weste TI lead of state. But the SWict lion is not a national stateit is a multiInational empi TC close to disintegration.
The lo o se ning of thic bonds holding it together began scveral years ago with glasri O.Fr. It was accelerated by the dis-es
24
tablish Ilent of
Party which c. publican govern tive priť sch inak
break-up all bl
As Yeltsi Sil that sawed the dictatorship. T ed dictatorial to keep the em defeat, therefo centrifugal imp
Tenocracy is Russia as lon grtl11ps that dէ are kept under F Muscovites enjoy Soviet tanks pa of Riga or Tbi Latvians and ( unico II, they wis
Ye||5 il reali5 plains why he reduced to largely äF di to conced to those republ: it, Russia offer dented spectacle power extrica tir empire in order tic freedons f
Thic Wc 5 ti wyri]] this reality. It to dical with 5 (Y.
TWEE
Sore SCO
Sorre leay
Not their
Miles
Back to
Vierice T
| For The Bij Οιμο τηg S
Clow 77 s do Su!!yirig c

the Counist In tTQ1lcd the Tcments. The aborcs the empire's I t in1e WitElb1e.
id, it was Russia
country from he plotters wantpowers in ordci pire intact: thcir re, strengthens uses,
impossible in g as the ethnic :sire sover eing ty Russia. Il T Lle. Can democracy while trol the streets lisi to keep the Georgiams in a
to leave."
es this, which exWish es the ulliðI 'formal functions le independence ics that de Tilialıd s us the unprece: of an imperial ng itself from its to gain dello cra
r itself.
have to adjust to n ח1ea ל)L - ט"וWi11 hH, :Teign Russia, the
master of its resources, with, very likely, its own military force and foreign policy. It will have to acknowledge the independence of several Soviet republics,
This will complicate matters for diplomats and businessmen accustoned to dealing with a central apparatus capable or Imaking authoritative decisions for the whole country. But it would be entirely unrealistic to act ā5 if the Swiet Ullion - We Tc still the locus of political and economic power.
It would also be morally Wrong, since the only allies we would havc in conducting such El policy Would be the most reactionary and anti-Western elements in that country: the Very clinents that now face trial in charges of high treason.
The Communist system has proved itself incapable either of reform, or, as we now know, a return to the past. It seems that nothing short of its total disintegration Will enable the country to build a democratic order: paradoxically, the country needs to be destabilised before it can Attain 5tability.
DLEGARB & TWEEDLES IN
i'r dres i 77 rrask (her 7.se/wels 'e it to History
own befuddled generation, s, petty, en anno red of being led he labyrinth with flags of bygone kingdoms ir nie, reler fing, liberared fler77 rief sweet breath, betrayers fouled cripture on Permanent Revolution.
nning mantles from History's dus thin lean Red Armour with dollar jackboots
U. Karunatilake

Page 27
Nationalism and Soviet
Reggie Siriwardena
"Let him who wishes weep bitter
tears becau
In coves ahead so perplexingly...But tears are of It is niccessary, according to Spinoza's advice, no not to weep, but to understand."
in the day the coup in Moscow took place a coleague lls
ked me what I thought would happen. I said the coup had no chance of success because the republics that had struggled for the last foll years to achie ve cither independence cor autonomy wouldn't accept a reversion to a hardline regime. I added that this attempt to put the clock back would only accelerate the territorial disintegration of the Soviet Union,
This was at a time when, on the first day of the coup, llnreformed Stalinists in Colombo and Calcutta Wcrc celebra ting what they fondly imagin cd Wils the second coming of the Lord. These hopes were based on the fact that Mr. Gorbachev was patently un popular, since peres. troika had taken the gags off the Soviet people's mouths, but had failed to fill their stomachs. The plotters in Moscow must hallwc colled om this to C. But the tining of the coup Wils determined by the signing of the new Union Treaty that Was due the following day.
Obviously the conservative central bureaucracy sa W this treaty as thc writing Con the Willil. Even the partial dismantling of the centralised structure of the state that the treaty envisaged must hawe se em cd to them li moral threat to their power and privileges. These Were the Imotives behind that "monstrous act of Russian idiocy' (as one of Boris Yeltsin's aides was to call it later) - a last desperate gamble by the party and security apparatus to reverse the direction of change. What it
(An ICES le: fire)
Log Trotsk
a chie ved in fact i of SC Wiet Cu the former Um ro publics, d'urin ; coup, declared
In the five ye toika began, t WO Social for propelled the pr tical change. O viet people's desi rid of thic strail tical, e con o Tic regiotti. T re-assert in of ct i deri tities in a enor T1 Couls multip
a lities, languag. where an artif bĊĊ TI imposed
the Central is cd
The first devel been expected Elind other non-S though they ma supposing that could be conta fra T1C work of Lh The Second di Li ni magiin äble b. 11 ל"יהדוח רווח נוזל) :1n L they believed it of class and g estimated the p of nati nalism.
I sh1 (J LI lql 1 i ke What I WTC Le i 1990 TK:S Sessi Isaac Deutsch 40 utstanding inti history in his
I) e Lt.5 che of his life si: the Swiet U cie Il Cratisati gle against b' wilege and t aid this for it Welt, has

Dis-union
ise history 10 A'râil, to laugh,
.."
W Els the collapse Immunis In and i) El 15 twelve and after the independence,
T5 Sice PeresLice have heel CCS that have ocesses of poliIle Was the St. re to be finally jacket of poliElrı d intellectual The Other wis the hnic and national Country with an Ilicity of nation23 and cultures ical unity had from above by Soviet state.
opment had long by Trtskyists tillinist Marxists, de the cIII of dern Ücratisation itled within the e socialist order. :Welpinent was V th1 cm because, h all Marxists, 1 the supremacy "ie vously Linderotential strength
to quote here r 1 m aס נן 1}ם m H g the work of IT, wh) was the rpreter of Soviet * B ווןti
W1 t the ed W the full Tè - CT lion in ters of on and the strug. Lu Tea LI Cratis T11, prihe police static, ECElst, as fait as
been Windicated.
Author's Note
foi préparfrog l'his l'exr for Pilliarirfor I have fra de softe revisions of
LL S SLLTLLL S S LLLLuGTS S LLLLL LLLS Seperti ber 5th, I 751, party To fake || ír|f) cecarrif strbsegir er íle pescipJerfi.
LtL LLLl kkLkLT TT TLLGLLLLLLL T L GLLLLLLL TT GLL LLSLLL LLLH ttLLL LLL SS coclirdirgsee fori. I cri grateful fo kEנHir טe Jתו פrjik:Triיןדותק חללFTH Lail J CLlkLk TMGLaCCCLLLL S STT ukS S S kLLLHCa LSS uSekLSS pressed disagreelers,
But it would hardly have entered his head that within a quarter-century of his death th : So wiet Union Would also cxperie ilçe strident nationalismı with their contradictory potenti a lities - liberating as well as as retrogressive. It may be said that Deutsch.cr. Wits to Illich of a classical Marxist, sharing "Lhe clear bright faith in huila Il reason" that Trotsky conce affiri T1cd, to have expected that seventy years after the October Ricvolution, Sccncs like thosc: in Colombo, July 1983 would be enacted in the streets of Balkų Did other Swiet cities. The womb of history turns out to be more fertile in possibilites than the most acute Qf the ist5 clIl for Esee,
I Will be Inted that in
that paragraph I spoke of the ' contradictory potentialitics' of I1:4 L.i I1alism1 — “li beT:1 tiI1 g a s "W ell as retrogressive." This two faced character af nation illis II has becП Пuch in CwidЕПСЕ jТ the Soviet history of the last five years. Not only the ethnic riots and pogrons in various Soviet republics but also the growth of fascist tendencies like the Pamyat movement with its Great Russian chauvinism and its antisemitism exemplify the dangerouls ind destructive sides of
Til till: liSIL.
But we must not forget that it was both Russia. Ia tillis II
25

Page 28
and the nationalis Il of thic minority peoples that more than any other forces stood
in the way of the coup plotters who wanted to reimpose the old order on the Soviet Union It was the Tesistance Tallied in Mosco w and Leningrad by Boris Yeltsin as the personification of Rl55ial Dational is and the outer republics that brought the Emergency Committee tumbling down like Humpty-Dumpty.
II the Soviet LJ Illico I in the last few Weeks, as Illuch as in Central and Eastern Europe in
1989, it is Ila tilalis T1 that has been the lost powerful de L'Illa toT of the bul Tea Lucratiç Cor Inilullist state. I should like
to cite here the insight of Rudolf Bahiro, the former East German dissident. In his book, “The Alternative i EasteTT ELTope”, published in 1984, he said:
*Nationalis II has an objectively necessary role to play in the destruction of the holy alla - nce of party apparatuses, in as Tuch as it shows that these have not settled the natio
In al qui estion in any pro
ductive way."
I shall return to this questil la ter in this lect Lu Tc, Blit before con ing to gTips with
the problems of nationalism in Soviet Society, it is. Il eCe55Elry Lo sfer a chial Tal Çtic Ti5a, Lit. I of the Soviet State. II i cing SC, I shall try to confront some of the myths about Soviet socialism that stand in the Way of a clear understanding of present developIllents in the Illiids of many people.
Socialists up to now in their thinking about the Soviet Juin hawe adopted an el tirely different practice from what they have followed in the study of capitalist societies. What does oric de if Ille wa Its to u Ilderstand what capitalis II is? One doesn't go in the first instance to the ideologucs – to Locke ör Bentha IT1 OT Mill, Inc lks at the C - crete social relations of capitalist scoci city and trics to di criwe from them a theory about what capitalism is and how it works.
But in the c antיון חit Uniי Societies Ill Öst approached thi spectacle of the and Lenin. Til insisted, against that Soviet soci fillent of th denounced the failing to live up that either of is as much a ' it would be to can society by the Declaration or Fre Ich so Rousseau and of the Rights
Wat We hli thic first place tobic Revoluti conta diction til of Marx and 1917. Byth of eved that so would takic plac capitalist soci Europe wher c 1 of capitalism to 1 thr than elsewhere
A socialist
predo Illinantly was a historica Le Ilish Would n't before 1917. " change his Illi was that he be tern Europe, cof its society strains of the was ready for 1 LI til. He wɛ RLII 5 si::ı.I 1 re WolLI t. would be a sp European reve) טוf ט:tח טון ונחנח 1
The collapse regime in Fe him the oppor un his projec Rẹwũluti[} Il thā sII was a spo with no par 1 October, il c. opcration dire wa nguard mair citi es. In ci operation Len firmly fix cd I sociliilist I:

ase of the Soother socialist socialists hawe m through the theories of Marx hey havc either all the evidence, cy was the full(5c theories, or Soviet regime for to them. I submit these proceedings waste of time: as 3 m casu Te Amerithe rhetoric of of Independence ciety by that of the proclallation
of M::ıI1.
e to realise in
is that the Ocon was in flat the expectations
of Letih befo) Tc: ' them had belicialist revolution :c in the advanced ties of Westcrin he contradicti715 would, according y, m: Lu Te S07E1CT
rewollution in a peasant Coll Intry labsurdity which hivă entertă ined What made Lenin Id il that y cal T :liewed th;it WeigWyt till c floric subjected to the First World War, proletarian revoInted to Create. El ionary state which ringboard for the lution in whose firmly believed.
of old Tsarist bruary 1917 gawe tunity to embark L. Thic = February t yw crith Tew ITs a Tiintaneous uprising y in command. il ti'aist, wali 5 party cted by an urban lly in two capital trying out this in had his eyes ut do II a. Il isolaited ansformation of
Russia. Il society but on thC grandios - wision of a n | European revolution. The Sowict peoplc were to pay dearly in the next scwenty four years for Lenin's quixotic illusion.
The Russian revolution, like all other subsequent victorious TCW 0-, lutions led by Communist parties took place in a society that had produced no strong bourgeoisie and had therefore undergone 10 bourgeois-democratic transformation of society. Its main imperative was, therefore... to carry out the tasks of primitive capital accumulation that would make possible an industrial Te yolutio Dı.
These were tasks parallel to those that had been fulfilled by the British, French and German bourgeoisie in the 18th and 19th centuries, but in Russia this capital accumulation had to be carried out by the state, This was the II lain dynaIllic of Soviet society, and the class which has been bearers and executors of this mission is the bureaucracy – both political and economic.
The Sovjet Union als it has existed up to now has been a society in which the ruling class has based its power not on private ownership of the means of production but on the control of state property. Just as in a capitalist socicty the surplus created by the producers is partly ploughed back into investment and partly distributed as profits or dividends among the proprietors, so in Soviet society the sur plus has been divided between capital investment by thic State and the personal incomes and other benefits and economic privileges enjoyed by the bureauracy,
By comparison with the affluence of the bourgeoisie of Wester In countrics the li festyle of the Soviet bureaucracy mily Seem IInodest, but in relation to the Inass of thic people in their own society living at bare subsistence lewel, they hawe been in a highly privileged position, with a whole network of special
(Caririlled gri page 25)

Page 29
AOWTWCA. COMW/WEWARY
A Liquidation
Inder Malhotra
NEW YORK
F?" the Baltics to Cuba in the Caribbean to AfghaLista 1 in the helirt of Cent Tal Asia, the Soviet Union has yic lided to Americal de Inlands, having resisted the II for years and even decades. This surely is a IIleasure of the drastic shift in the balance of power from Moscow to Washington, and no one can say that AIIlericans Elre not mightily pleased about it.
PIcs ident Bus laid tried to be ni Ildfull of Swiet sensitiwitics on the Baltic issue by delaying U.S. ccognition of the three new Baltic states un til M35 co w was in a position to proclaim its acceptance of their independence. In the end he recognised Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania without waiting for Mr Gorbachow reconciling himself to the fiat accompli. For this the U.S. president has receivcd fıçı boluets, only brickbats. A writer il the New York Til Luc5 15 tartly Telli Elded bli II that America was the "39th country, after Mongolia' to recognisc the Baltic states which should explain the "cool welcome" given to the U. S. Secretary of state, Mr James Baker, during his whistle-stop visits to Tallinn,
Riga and Wilnius on his way to Moscow.
III dica Lliwe: cof the do mimai. Dit
Americal Ilood was a collment by highly placed but LII named sources in the Bush administratil Con thic Swiet Union's deciSi Con to terminate military als - sista. Il ce to Cuba, Something which has been al the TI i Im America's side for three decades, and Moscow's agreenient with Washington to end supplies of Weapons to their respective allies in Afghanistan.
In the words of these sources, what has taken place in the
Sale in
Sovic L LJli Il policy cquivale I til salic”, THc s ՃլIrces a tld է long-held foreig til 1s because ti to clear away a massive west cr Soviet Union latter is "despera
It is note wo has Illot Tcacited only and unders tion Mr. GUrbil in collection w willingness to Cuba the Red and contingents advisers, total 11,000 Russians the eld of t C in diti II is that t{}o, should to wa | tana II o base i '''i15 set up Illu has continu cd : Castro el... SJ C1 1s hawe said thing on this RLIS si al is do It" final de a II issue
During his ta With Mr Bak president went to emphasise th econo Illic relati Soviet Unil a continue. This the Americans | any way Mr Fi is livid that deal on ending tary aid to his have been coic back, without indicatio II to hi:
The Allerican that Whatever might hay, the lics til at are bcc. ful in the Inc WGuld refuse t וuנnts a ptטט 22 Sugar at a time

Moscow
is a "foreign ıt of a liquidaRussians, these 1. Wię alba Iudaled in policy posiley are anxious . 1 obstacles to aid to the on which Lhe tely dependent',
thy that the U.S. ät al I to the tandable condizhow mentioned ith his country's withdraw from Army brigade of trainers and ing altogether in uniform, by he year. His the Americals, Cuate thc (GullIl Cuba which ch earlicT but ill through the far the Ameriabsolutely no. point and the t sec.In to hawe of it.
lks in Moscow er, the Soviet out of his way at the present the ון טbetwe 5חר rld Cuba w tiլյld 1 S Ilt by the TCd In cor appeased in del CastT, whic a Soviet - U. S. the Soviet milicountry should luded behind his thit slightest ill.
calculation is MT Gibc10w various repub") rming all po WeIw dispensation до о п рауіпg nd for the Cubal when the world
price is a merc cight cents a pound. Interestingly, this view was indirectly endorsed by a Soviet specialist on Cuba who said, in the American TW froll Moscow, that the preferential treatment to Cuba was a fulction of Soviet-U. S. hostility and with all end of that hostility the preferential tricatinent was also bould to chd.
Of greater interest to India
and other countries of the South Asian region than the future course of the SowietCuban relations is the agreeIllent Ect Ween the U.S. aid the Sowiet Union on the terIllination of military supplies
to their respective allies in the Afghan conflict, now in its 13th year des pitc the completc Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in February 1989.
This "negative symmetry" between the Soviet Union and the United States the Russians could hawe had at any time during the last two and a half years. But they had been refullsing it on the ground that the tcr Llination of Alle Ticin äid to the Afghan mujahideen would not be enough if Saudi Arabian, Pakistani and Iranian assistance t0 the clied Whilc the Najib ullah regime in Kabul lost its only source of supplies of Weaponry. However, this position has now been accepted by
Moscow. The only thing the U. S. has promised in return is that it would try to "per
suade' other countries to follow its example and stop stoking the fires of the Afghan civil WELT
No wonder then that efficacy of the Moscow
in cnt on supplies of weapons to rival sides in Afghanistan has become a subject of debate hic Tc. The majority wie w is that despite the end of the supplies
the agree
27

Page 30
of weapons by both the U. S. and the USSR, the fighting in Afgha This tan would contin Luc for two reasons. First, that all the fighting groups have cnough arms and ammunition to go on
shooting at onc another for quite a while, And secondly, that Saudi Arabia, Iran and
Pakistan would go on funnelling weapons to their favoured factions. But thc counter wailing factors contributing to a more optimistic outlook on the termination of the Afghan conflict through a political settlement a Te strong and are likely to become stronger.
In the first place, neither the U. S. or the Soviet Union necds the Afghan conflict any longer. In fact, America might be inclined to persuade Saudi Arabia to stop supplying arms to mujahideen groups, especially to those which, during the Gulf War, had supported President Saddam Hussain of Iraq. This is becoming a matter of urgency because, given the Sad
da Il regi Time’s
there is talk Tie new cd milita Iraq. On the use of foreig the U.N. ob Mr Saddam H. way. But there terms of the Baghdad conti
Secondly, tb: that within Pa 10 m in favour set tellet of is gathering the replacem Aslam Beg b Na Waz, as til the Pakistan arbiter il 51 also said to E its earlier has
Thirdly, and tly, the U. N. intensify its a of a politica recent Illinths
Nationalism . . .
(Carrirrted for page 2.)
services to cater exclusively to their ... ncedis.
This is what "actually existing socialis In' (to use Rudolf Bahiro's phrase) has meant, as distinguished from the utopian wish es and thic Imhillel InäTian dreams. Or perhaps I should say 'the socialism that actually existed', because I feel pretty sure that we a Te Witnessing the end of that : Ta,
There have been several à nalysis of Soviet society and of Communist states in gen tral which hawe bee Til bals cd I thic perspective that these represenled a new form of class society with a bureaucratic ruling class instead Of property-OWI ing on c. But I think we must modify these analyses to accommodate tle fact that the Communist state seems now to be only a transitional phase in the life of societics that hawe failed in the past to carry ... through a bourgeois-democratic revolution,
28
some U.N. Tolle ha what subdued. in transigence, based Mr Be
Already th
which should Algust 20 republic to di. *forms of pri and incthods nagement. W. Tai Tice of tl: and the break Tcl sista Ince to economic cha pect that ther dier (TL) sitie economic and
What is li the Ilex L. Te W the greater p. Union (or of that may elle up) there wil of the la Tid : trial enterpris no doubt, it or established through ind: defence and duction as W wices will State hands.
The state amalgamate

in the U. S. Of y action against Juestion of the helicopters by ervets in Iraq, issain had given are Llany other ce:15e-fire that ues, to de fy.
ere arc reports istän itself opinof a political he Afghan issue Il cintu T1. With it of Generali y, General Asif c Army Chief, army, the final Ich matter 5, is e Tesi ling fr CT d-line position.
-rta L1ה נן ווSt 1 fטוח is expected to tivities in search | settlellelt. Il 1 and weeks thic become sometThe Islamabadnon Sevan, the
Union Treaty Hawe beci signed provided for each crline its WI pperty ownership of eco 1 o II) ic " Ima = ith the disappeaColl Tunist Party King of hardline this direction of
Inge, One Ca. Il cXc will bc a speein to a market
private ownership.
kely is that over
years in at least rt of th c SJ Wiet
Lhe Severa || 5 tatcs rge from its break Il be privatisation ld of Ilost indusies (so ne of thenn, association with by foreign capital), ustrics linked to capital goods proell als wel fare serrobably remain in
111 ל"י El ECW b ] IT
burcă ucracy with
U. N. Secretary-general's special representative for Afghanistan, had of lite been absorbed more in his simultaneous responsibilities 15 the C00Tdinaltor of rehabilitation in Afghanistan, to the det Tillet of his du tics of paving the Way for peace. Mr G. Picco, the top U. N. official in New York in charge of Afghanistan, his been atteilding H I most exclusively to the efforts to settle the hostages issue im West Asiä.
However, the secretary-general, Mr. Javier Perez de Cuella T, luas diccided to take personal inter est in the Afghan issue. During his wis it to Teheran he male list of Mr Ghula II Ishaq Khan’s presence there to hold a tri laterill discussion on the Afghal in question. The talk in U. N. lobbies is that beforc retiri Ing at the end of the y car, Mr. de Cuellar wants
to make visible progress to - wards peace in Afghanistan and clinch a peace settlement
in Cia, IIlıb) dili,
geoisie, or rather the latter will be recTuited in a large III el sure from the ranks of the old buea Luc Tatic Tulling class. This is already happc ning in the former Communist states of Central and Eastern Europe, where often the new proprietor of the private enterprise is the same man who administ cred it un die T State socialis In, This is al Ina tullfal develop Timcnt beca u se the bureaucracy arc the people who have the managerial and technical skills to seed the growth of new bourgeois property for ITS.
Ironic as it may seem therefore" when the epitaph is writ
ten on the seventy years of Communist Party rule in the Schwiel Union, it will have to
be said that its historic functi II was to cTicate the infri struicture for fu Lu Te bo Lurgeois dcwiclopment. To anybody who thinks this estimatic fantastic, I sub Illit that this is not the first occaSion when the historical process has Inade out of the actions of participants in it something other than what they intended.

Page 31
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