Page 1
LANKA
GUAAN
Vol. 14 No. 13 November 1, 1991 Price Rs.
India - Sri Lanka American Studies
EGON
Godfrey Saman
POL J. R.'s Ego - tri The quest for demo
SOVIET The price of Russificati
A
Paul I Douglas
S. Sath
A. Kar
 
 

- Mervyn de Silva -- Inder Malhotra
OMICS
Gunatilleke Melegaтa
ITIGS
() — Piyal Gamage Cracy - zeth Hussain
UNION
On - Reggie Siriwardena
LSO:
Basperz
Kulatilleke Yamantham
dappah

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Page 3
Briefly . . .
NO WISAS
Sri Lankans are deniad wis as to visit most European countries and also some Countries in Asia. This is a result of some Sri Lankans attempting to traves on forged visas and others overstaying their visas.
Foreign Ministry sources said that bona fide travallars too were being viewed with suspicion by the embassies of Europo am and Asian - countries because of the legitimate activities of some.
STRUGGLE TO COMTIMI UE
There will be more crises ahead, wateran LSSP leader Bernard Soysa told a public meeting in Kandy. There was no provision for a speaker to reject an impeachment motion once he had accepted it, the LSSP leader said.
To stay in office the Pre. sident would compromise with the LTTE; he would also politically destroy any person who posed a challenge to his power, Mr Soysa said. The agitation for democratic freedom would however continue, he added.
GWEN TIME
The Supreme Court | a | Iowad timo to Gamini Dissanayake, Lalith Athu lathmudali and other 5a cked UNP dissidents to file Counter affida vits to the objections to their petition filed by the respondents, the UNP office bearers.
TAKING JAFFINA
As the war continued in the North the security forces Were confident that Jaffna would soon be in government hands again. Fhe army dropped leaflets in Jaffna telling the civilian population
that the tow beeri taken ei the army restr; avoid hurting Cross fire,
Meanwhile, P dasa addressin Trin Comaleg sai Curity forces w Č TESLO El Sta lian administrati
and East.
T#PE
PR WATT FORE EMPLOY In a hioy r the flow of for Cong in
WOrking abroa ress of recru, for foreign е to be entire/ Dryya ?e secto 1 W! VW step asñ, 77 ster for F. Mr. John Armë Гле сопс/слоir τηe Corηνεπίίο Region Lice Employment 50Cla FOF75 fr)
At present Stafe agency Workers for
äÜAR
Wol. 1 N. 13 N.
Pric Rs
PLI bolis hodi for
LEGLIErdia PLI
M - 246, U
Color
Editor: Marvy
Telephons:

1 C Ould hawe arlier but that Hined itself to Civilians in thig
resident Prema3 Tëėtings in d that the se. "ere поw ready J TLI |B and c[Wiom in the North
TO GNORE THE SPEAKER
Opposition parties decided at a party leaders' meeting to ignora decisions taken by Speaker M H Mohamed at these meetings.
The reason: 'a large number of members had expressed their lack of confidence in the Speaker Mr M H Mohamed by Voting for the motion of no Confidence on him".
VDS
SING GM MEMT
O. Streал7//ne Э/9/n Currency "O M P7 Lankaris "d, the bшsiing Workers 770/UWV 776/7 j5 W. Jeff to the "; //73 State Te the State Oreign Affairs i ra fu nga told g Sessions of I7 of SAARC 'sed Foreign Agency AsCD/o/77 bo,
there is a "ОО recrufting ёлттр/оултелt
abroad, mostly in west Asia countries anda so of Oring workers' we'. fаге ѓn those countries.
MIMORS M WICE
A million children in hocountry are in prostiLO, drug addiction, or are vicf. mised as child slavas. Terro|(757). 7āS also contributed to this number.
A Probation and Child Саге Department officia/ fold the Island that half Tillion childern were Victims of abour exploita. tion. 20,000 were in prostitution to earn a living, 10,000 were begging or the streets, and nearly half а Птії/fon were in refugeе
Camps as a result of ter
S.
pr ofл the grfp of |
DAN
Owamber 1, 1991
750
tnightly by
blish ing Co., Ltd.
ion Places,
.2 - ל
"i da Swa
4475E4
CONTENTS NWS Background 3. Martir Eng SAARC ל US Academia, India and
South Asia 13 Sri Lanka's Democracy 15 Nationalism and Soviet
Dis-union (2) B The Evil that Mr Do A Curse from the Gods at
23 הוurוa RufוחMldga Population Censuses of
o' di Ti5 CÜr responde:rıca E. Land Reform (4) 27
Prinited by Ananda Prans 82/5. Sri Ratnajothi Sarawa namuttu Ma Wath, Colombo 3. Telephunu: 435975

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LETTER
Udupiddy Electorate
read with interest, D.B.S. Jeyaraj's investigative article entitled, 'Who was 'Siwarajan"?" (LG, Sept.15). ThoLugh I am not sure about the accuracy of most of its Contents, tha information provided about the politics in the Udupiddy electorate seems incomplete and twisted a little. For sa ke of Corn polet en ČSS, will you note the following?
T. Udupiddy electora te was Constituted in 1960. M. Siwa sit hamparam (then belonging to the Tamil Congress) was returned in three general elections; March and July 1960 as well as 1965. K. Jeyakkody of the Federal Party became a vinner only in the 1970 general election, Jayaraj's observation that 'the political star of Udupiddy in those days Was a leftist Caled R. R. Dharmaratnam
of tha LSSP exaggerated, saying that thaп реасос attractio Ti. || thamparam v cal star of the 1950s.
. Though Jay:
""Chandra Seki his youпg si defied the lo supported the ist candidate Of the Fidt T. Rasalingan against Dha cording to birth given Siwarajan (b. Would hawa years Old Wł of ths Fede elected to the 1970.
| f | a T - Tot
Dharmarat na
VASA O
207, 2nd C
Colom E
Telephone
2

is some What This is like turkey - rathar & Was the Star raality, Siwasiras ""the politiԱdupiddy' in
Iraj has stated, ara T1 Piai and n ('Sivarajan") al Current Eind - Tamil nation 3is, K. Jey akkordy fa || Party and
of the TULF, "Taratam". EC
the year of i te article, (1958 1m חrג been only 12 her Jayakkody fa || Party was a parliament in
wrong, R. R. of the LSSP
did not Contast tha i 1977 general election in Udupiddy in which T. Rasalingam Of the TULF was elected with a majority of 14,747 wotes. Rasa linga Tm won that election by receiving 61.3% of the votes polied. Of the 8 Other CandidateS WO contested with Rasa liga IT, only one was able to sa we his deposit. In the neighboring Point Pedro Electorate, the TULF nominee received only 56 percent of the wotes polled. Ewan in the Jaffna electorat Ea, the TULF Orince Wol the seat with 56.6 percent of the votes polled. This being the case, the Statement Lät ""Chā drasekharam Pillai and his young som... incurred the displeasure of the people of Udupiddy" seems not quite accurate
O TE
Sachi Sri Kantha Osaka BioScies C | Sitit L. L. 0šākā, Jp 3
PTICIANS
ross Street, - 11 = סנ
: A 2 1631

Page 5
SAARC: Rao’s “message” to C
Mervyn de Silva
he Indian Prime Minister may arrive in Colombo on Now. 9 for the SA ARC summit and return the sa Inc day. But President Premadasa, according to the HIND's well-lifornicci Delhi correspUndent, K. K. Katyal, the Sri Lankanı lıca der "has requested thic Indian Prime Minister for an extended stay", meaning 7-9 Nov., and a chance to discus5 'bilateral mattcts".
The obvious cxplanation for Mr. Rao's quick turn around is the Indianı
week after the Colombo coference. This Was also the reason why he cut short his
stay in Harare where the ComIlla Iwealth su Il llit was held last month. After much agonising in the Congress heir archy and Gandhi family circles, Sonia Gandhi has rejected the the party's invitation to contest Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's safe seat. Apart from that major problem
- the whole sensitive question of dynastic claims - Prime Milliste Ra) leed§ think
about his own place in the Lok Sabha. For a minority Congress administration, by nc means free of political and personal conflicts, winning as many of the by-elections is it Imajor concer III.
As correspondent Katyal observe5 — Hind the HTML)''' click Tres - pondent is well briefed - "in the present none to Yarılı relationship with Sri Lanka the brevity of Mr. Rao's stay would have conveyed a II lessage to Colombo, "" The TIMES OF INDIA uses the same word 'message' (to President Prema dasa) in a report on the 21st.
The ISLAND's special corres
pondent S. Venkat Narayan emphasies the “security" situation and the LTTE menace,
and advice from Indian intelligence agencies.
by-elections the
Both incwspa tioned the e: AMIR correspon sign of deteri IL1 Inka. Il Telatit: the High Com dia, Mr. N. IN Iloric drawn : Sri Lankan gov to hour the Iiell who sacri to de feld the torial integrity
Mr. M1111
junior to Hig Jha in the IIId wice, and inde in his own picked by Prill and the Cabi important p0. Secretary. Mr. in Kabul, CO all bad, thre: It suggests tW. that Would hay wily with the (a) the region and (b) the nic Lilli L whil C: Il tary for T1 CoTe Mr. Tha will di tile left to c. Will do Lubtlc55 with a coveted London Was things : rc W, Delhi, quite Lln
REGIONAL PC
The greater Slith Asil is sensible respon chinging Wirl cularly the c Stյviet Utilio Il : has a special based Telation the Treaty w; IIIth for in the ille vitable v Indo-Soviet coi leled by a re II Il crit in Ild-l cluding "defe E11
FLASH: Mr. Rao is expected

olombo
pers have menxpulsion of the lcIlt als another Karating Indo-Sri * TT Meanwhile missioncr of InuJha has once It tentil to the 'ernment's failure IPKF dead, brave fi Cedi their li wies; unity and te ri
if the is id,
Dixit, who is h ComIT1issioner in Foreign Scred to two others
atch, has been 1c Minister Rao let to fill the st of Foreign
Dixit has served ltimbo and Is
sensitive posts.
considerations te weigheid headecision-maker5 as top priority cd t] ch1 b ("3 Sc a 5-T we F5, SCT ehan 2-3 y el Ts. jsent have Inugh mplete his career be reward cd posting – UN' thington? These fel 1. Ordered in like Colobo.
WER
C) Tce TitiTatian CT1 іп пnу view а 5e to thıc fa 5 tdi order, partiollapse of the With Wybichi Ildi:
20-year treatyship. Although ls Teile wed a 5t other 20 years, weakening of the nection is parallarkable improveJS relations, incc cooperation'.
BĀ
ason
A more explicit US accept Elince of India Eas the major regional power is the in mediate outco Ille of the Inc w US-doriminated international order. As a result, Indian perceptions of regional Security must change, India sees no threat in Sri Lankan policies, though it does Worry over the LTTE and its capacity to disturb or destabilise Tamiln adu, upsetting in the process, the ill-defined Congress-Jayalalith a relationship. Other pressure on the minority Congress regime So Severe that the Government had to resort to a glaring opportunistic clewice in order to blunt the propagan dist agitation of for
mer Primc Ministicir, W. P. Singh's Janatha Dal on the tricky issue of what INDIA TODAY called "the Manda
monster" i.e. the caste questic I and prcfcrcntii 1 job quo ta s. The agitation petered out, reports the I. T., because the wily Narasimha Rao stole the thunder by announcing job reservations for the socially and educationally backward based on economic crit cria".
Though Indo-Sri Lanka relations have deteriorated, especially in the context of thc constitutional coup in Sri Lanka, and high-level suspicions here of covert India Il en coll TagcITiet, if not active assistance to the local Opposition, there are no serious issues to justify Indian interwention of a my kind, NO WILL
However, Professor S. D. Muni who visited Sri Lanka some weeks ago argues that there is no "sincere political will” to resolve the ethnic conflict, like FRONTLINE editor, N. Ram. who was in Colombo recently to deliver the Bandara naike Memorial Lecture, Prof. Muni of the TNU is a seasoned Sri Lanka watcher to whom the
to spend 24 hours in Colombo
3.
園ミリエ。

Page 6
Indian Foreign Policy-making agencies listen with considerable respect.
There are no indications, he notes, of a serious "political will" to find an honourable place for the Tamils in Sri Lankan society and polity,..., This being so, the Select Commitcc looks like a non starter''. ( Hic is referring to the Select Committee that was formed on a parliamentary proposal of SLFP MP, Mangala Moonesingha, With thc collapse of the Athu lath mudaali — Dissana yake led anti-Premadasa pursch, the spotlight has moved to Hulftsdorp. The proceedings there are probably followed in orc closely by the middle-class, English-speaking, intelligentsia than by the crowds which gathered to hear the 'dissidents' in the first fel W. Wiccks of their agitational campaign. The more the controversy is tied up in legal knots, the less the mass attention and curiosity, one can be certain,
Besides, the furious motherson confrontation and the factional feud in the major Op
position formation, the SLFP, grabbed the headlincs this fortnight. (See: Mrs. B. quits
leadership mot politics). Another interesting diversion, a direct consequence of the parliamentary confrontation over the impeachment motion, was the Innove by the Tamil and Muslim parties. While the House sa W a series of early adjournment in the wake of persistent disturbances, five Opposition parties, Muslim and Tamil, SLMC, EROS, TULF, TELO and ENDLF, formed an independent group of 11 MP", Tim a Paliäämment of 225, this mands more votes than the "dissidents' now down to a meagre 8.
Befo Te MTs. Bandaranalike left for China, she said that A Thu Ta Bandar än aike, who has
been chosen Acting Opposition Leader, will be party leader soon. She hers clf will concertrate on forming a United Front to fight President Premada sa and restoric Democracy. But the first reactions to the idea strengthens the impression
new group com
Mrs. B.,
SLFF" | tha party li A 1 Lura tO
said that up politics bringing at indicated rankers, the Mrs. B: that once cision, the
This da as a step exist in thi
- of widening con tainty, with po divided on the community, all dis-united Unite and an oppositic the image of a fri Nothing illus! than the painք Bandara naike f sur Wiwor Ek Th 01 g families that post-independen Bandara naike
LTTTE: bo
fer the brt
long Tiger' Pass and rescu diers trapped Lankan A Trine bottled up the Jaffna peninsul the exits, Cilt peninsula is si top Army spol
The Army's
contain the LT base and grad control the Tid bands. The launch offen
Thondam
he LTTE
po nded te concrete prop form the basi with the ECWE and CWC lea told The Sun
M. Thon been invited

NEWS BACKGROUND
quits leadership not politics
aadar Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaika will quit aadership soon in order to pave way for son lead the party, SLFP sources said. They the move did not meam that she would give She would play a more important role in out a strong Opposition alliance. She had this position to some of the senior
sources said.
da Ta näika Who she ratured, sources said,
cision has been
left for she would implement the de
taken by that could halp sort a party, a serior SLFP member said,
party
China had indicated
Mrs. Bandara naika Out differences Hat
= ''); };f
fusio El Auld Lu Lucerlitical for nations basis of ideology, | personality a National Party, in split five ways,
gimented polity. rates this better Il rials of the amily, the last the Wic II know in
hawe dollil ted cc politics. Mrs. wat 5 to lead
a united front' of all opposition partics so that she can then accommodate her daughter Chandrike whose own party the B. N. P. is no shining example of unity". Mrs. B.'s charac. teristically determined bid to do so has caused rifts in faImily - for instance, Anura and cousin Anurudda - and the SLFP itself. It was to block this Imo we bin Cha Indrika a Indi A, II u IT u ddha, that Anura Bandara naike mounted a counter-campaign.
ttled up
: Elking the north seige of Elephant ng the 600 solthere, the Sri | Forces h:1ve
LTTE. I til a, by cutting off by one, ''The acid off" said a
S II, objective is to TE i In their hone ally restrict and Kement 5 of a Tmel Army Can El 15 i Wic 7 pert til Is,
Tet:Lining the cle: Lillet of prise.
+ + O LIT finall aill" Said Collel Sa rath Muna singha 'tis to defeat the LTTE militarily and
SI=
we believe we are pretty close t it."
The army is in full control
of all thc islands around Jaffna, and the ferry point at Pooneryn. The only access by land is the road from the coastal Chundikulam to Elephant Pass. This has been heavily Illined. The heavy monsoon Tai ns Will make any in ovement from the peninsula to the rest of the Northern province and the East cxtrell cly difficult,
an - Quaker peace moves
is still lit resa request for all 5 from it tu
of negotiations linent, Minister *r S. Thandaman y Ti I L1 cs.
LIna I), who has y the LTTE to
Wisit Jaffna for talks said he could not go to Jaffna without knowing exactly what the negotiations Would be based Inn. Mr. Thonda man said he had asked the LTTE leadership to submit their proposals through a working på per about one month ago, but there had been no response.
"Carl Fried or page 9.

Page 7
VART M EMMALS
If each man's death diminishes us (also DONNIE, like "no man is an island') greatly diminished is the ever-growing cause of Human Rights by the passing away of Martin Ennals, the Secretary-General of AMNESTY IN. TERNATIONAL. He was the pet hate of many a vicious Third World tyrant, or oppressive regime, and the favourite target of a wilfully blind or intolerant press. How persistently he was attacked by a media that put race, religion or country before humanity, Ennals won that debate because the beast, caring little for Tamil, Hindu, Sinhala, Christian or Buddhist, or Moslem came too closea for Comfort, So we are a II HLIman Rights Champions, now.
Martin himsolf took it lightly. Over lunch at the Galle Face hotel or across the road at the German restaurant, his favourite, he would say that he was the man that every Defence or
Ace Radio Cab
S S S K TYSS S SSSTSSSS SSS S SSSYSSSSLLLLLL
* Computerised meters " Can
be summonec O WO
National Se low ad to hate down the rt dirliers ir a
spot a cop o
Although h fle around, and poorly Sommetti imme5 li old prize figh turely retired
Lrti. Ella ind and Wit Writer". And science of a liked most his 5 en se of his extraordi of how he wi "Secret poli godforsaken country or South-East A Was Martin Went to Stock the Nobel had rightly e
Martil lat. here — Suriya Ehe, De5 T10 Neal Tiru Rajapakse, Fr. папdo, aпd
No call up charge within city limits. " Vehicle ac
'Receipts issued on request Company credit awa
Ca|| 501 502 501 503 Dr
Another Aitken Spence
 
 
 
 
 

curity Minister ... Just a glance had or at the
Cafe, he would r NIB chappie,
e used to shufa bit unkempt clothed, looking ke a batterTed ter or prema
football coach, had the lively of a talented
the 5tern Conpriest. What about hiri was hurlour, and arily racy tales ould dodge the
zia" of 50 ne atin American Si Tall to Wri in
sia. In 1977, it
Enna Is Who horn to receive Prize that A.I. arned.
many friends Wick Fe Tas ilInd Fernando, elvan, Mahinda Celestine Fer"- in thը
"ECght
Lu do Ortste)
cess from selected stands
Ele
- 501 504
2 Service
past, some Buddhist monks. The last occasion I had the pleasure of spending some times with him was the international conference on Ti BET held in London, the work of his equally energe†ie brother Lord David Ennals, the Labour party veteran and former Cabinet Minister. Last week, Lord David Emma 5 Said of Martin that " + if he needs - 2a rimermO - rial, it will be Amnesty International. He built it up from a wery modest organisation to one of enormou5 stature which no W Commands great respect".
Before the beast" came south of course, any Sri Lankan who associated with men - like Martin Ennals, was El traito" Who Hat 50 his country to the Christian suddas'. Life itself and men like Martin have given a crushing, if often cruel answer to such self-righteous
stupidities.
Rest easy, brother Mar.
EfT
M, g S.

Page 8
| Genin LT OTEIllized by
| (BCIS) on "* SAARC: Problems
SAARC
Economic Cooperation:
Saman Kelegama
presented at a the Bandar ElLike Centre for International Studies änd
Discussion paper
Prospects'', 6 October 1991, BMICH,
he arguments for cxpanding
intra-regional tradic with the objective of achicving higher economic growth and structural change in a framework of collective self-reliance are important and pcrsuasive. This is because, firstly, industrialized countries hawe been in circa singly adopting protectionist policies against the cxports of developing countries. Such restrictions are likely to become even more stringent in the future because they are hardly any signs of success of the current Uruguay Round of negotiations. Secondly, prcfcrcntial trading arrangments within the existing regional groupings and the form
ation of new ones (e.g. East Asia Economic Group (EAEG) and Asia Pacific Economic
(Cooperation [APEC) a dwCTsely affects the trade prospects of SAARC member States, Therefore, increasing trade within the SAARC mcmb cr countries is not only desirable but it is also the Ille ed of the hour.
The prospects for trade expansion in the SAARC region will depend upon fuller utilization of the present potential
for i tra-SAARC tradci based on the existing patterns of commodity trade and thic ex
tent of complementarity prewailing in the region, and that which could be greated by deliberate policy Incasures. At present the products traded arc, namely: foodstuffs, agro-based products, and a few manufactured goods. Thc import substitution strategy followed by most
The Writer is a Research" Fellok, சt f Fly Br, சொந்து,
SAARC co LITET j early years afte has made the pro highly similar in some cases, Cause of si Ili la T conditions and of the SA ARC's is considerable lapping and co the production fillo di ties and i An cxarmination structure of SA reveal sole of in an indirect
Share of S,
Ca Luri I ry
Bangladesh Bhuta II India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka
Source: Esti II
Percentage
ܕܕ
Year
1980 1981 1982 98. 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Вал:
Estir Year Data
Sorca.
Nofel

Facts and Figures
e5 (during the r independence) di Luc tion str"Luc tu Tc and competing Moreover, beities in clillatic in the structure economies, there degree of overmpetitive ness in of many coll
The importance of trade for the countries in the region is shown in Table 1. It shows that smaller countries rely heavily on trade vis-a-vis large countries. This is manifested in the fact that the share of smaller countries in trade exceeds substantially their share in GDP while the converse is true for the large countries.
in their trade. The intra-regional trade (import
9f the trade and export) varies widely among
ARC nation can SAARC countrics. The intra
these features regional imports aud exports
Way. fire shown in Table 2 and 3.
Table 1
AARC Member Countries in the GDP of the Region
and the Total Trade of the Region: 1988
% share in GDP % share in Exports
of the regio'r 6.42
O)
79.08
O.O2
O.95
11.3
2.0
% share iri Imports
ஆf the region of the region
9.) O.39
38.98 17.2
OSS 1.29 O9. 20.57 29.49 1.3S 10.6 | 49
lated from the World Development Report, 1990.
Table 2
of Imports of each Member Country from the Region
in Relation to its World Imports
iladesh,
3.7 II. () 4.7 13 2.9 O.S 2.6 O. 3. O.7 3.5 O.7 3. O.5 4.3 0.5 5.3 1.3 4.5 1.1
nated from book, 1990'.
FIMF"
Ir dia Maldi ve s Nepal Pakistari Sri Larika
2.4 47.9 . 5.2 .8 4.1 1.9 5.2 30. 33.O 1.9 5.2 8.8 33.9 O 7.3 9. 42.4 2. I 1. 9. 34.2 1.6 6.4 8.3 34.4 18 7.9 7.O 23.8 1.6 6.6 9.1 2.9 18 8.0 6.4 36.2 1.7 8, O
Direction of Trade Statistics,
for Bhutan were not available.

Page 9
Table 2 shows that, with the exception of Bangladesh and Sri La Luka, the reliа пce of SAARC count Ties to mc et their import cļu irmcilts from the region has been declining. Further, except in this case of Nepal, the dependence of SAARC countries on imports from the region is quite low. Nepal's sha Te of SAARC imports is relatively large because the bulk of her imports comes from India under a preferential trade arrangement between the two countries. Even Nepal's dependence on the SAARC region for its imports has declined from 47.9 per cent in 1980 to 35,2 per ccnt in 1989, It is Worth noting that India and Pakistan, the two largest economies of the region, received from the SAARC region 1.2 рег септ апа 1.8 per cent, respectively of their global imports in 1989.
Table 3 shows that, with the exception of Maldives and Nepal, the sa Tee of the SAARC member country exports to thic region in total world exports reImained less than 10 per cent (in 1984, Bangladesh exceeded this figure). Further IIlore, these sharcs have declined significantly during the 1980-89 period. The SA ARC region, in particular India, remain cd the largest market of Nepal, accounting for more than one-third of her export earnings. It is worth noting that in the case of exports too, India and Pakistan hawe the low est fig Lu Tes for exports to SAARC countries. The low share of trade (in port and export) of the SAARC member countries as compared with world trade, particularly for the larger cconomies of the region, is note worthy. It indicates the country disparity that already prevails in the SA ARC intra-regional trade.
Table 4 shows that intraregional trade retains only a marginal character in the SAARC countries, Intra-regional imports declined from 2.8 per cent in 1980 to 1.8 per cent in 1987 (lowest but increased to 2.6 per cent in 1989. Similarly intra-regional exports declined
froп 5.б рег с 2.5 per cent i but increased in 1989. As t of Table 4 show trade (imports among SAARC been virtually the eighties aic for an average (All these statis tוןuנtםם # tthוז 1 border trade a through third ( by their very in actions cannot Clearly, the reg picture of disi
Percentage o
Fer Trg 198) 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Source Estim:
book,
IntI
Year Infra-Regio
11:Ա 198O
1981 1982 1983
194 1985 1985 1987 1988 1989
Source: Estim book,

et i 1998) LO in 1987 (lowest) :o 3.4 per a cent hic last column Ys, intra-region El and exports) count Ties have stagnant during counting Toughly of 2.7 per cent. tics do lot tåke lificial cross ld transshipment :ount Ties beca u 15c: al tl 1 Tic thies tTransbe quantified.) gion presents a nal performance
of intra-regional trade
during the nineteen eighties.
The low intra-regional trade can be explained by the limited complementaries in South Asia. For example, (1) Pakistan needs tea from Sri Lanka and Bangladesh (although she is now buying more tea from Kenya) than fra 11 Sri Lanka, and Bingladesh); (2) Pakistan and Sri Lanka needs ju te from Bangladesh; and (3) all South Asian countries Inced Taw Cottom fra 111 Pakistan, The major complementarities morc or less end there at present because there are hardly
Table 3
f Exports of each Member Country to the Region in
Relation to their World Exports
la de 5 h. Frida , Mfa Kadiyes Nepal - Pakis fari Sri Lanka 8.7 3. 37.8 6.3 7.1 8.3 2.9 19.2 56, 1 5.5 8.8 8.2 1.9 12.G. 53.4 5.9 8. 8.5 교, 15-0 45.7 Τ 6.3 11.4 2.4 20.3 47.6 3.3 4.
7.7 . 17. 34.4 5.3 串.芭 6.1 2.2 18.2 39.9 3.2 5.D. 4.1 . 18. 32.1 3.9 3.8 5. O 2.9 7.0 25.0 5. O 6.2 3.9 . 24.6 3.Ճ 5.
atcd from IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, Year
199 ().
Table
"a-Regional Trade in the SAARC Countries
rial Inports Intra-Regional Exports Infra-Regional Trade
% of Total rld Imports 2.8
.
2... 2.5 2.5 2.7 1.8 1.8 2,8 2.6
as a % of Tof all
as a percenfage of
yor lad Exp0 rr 5 Pord fra de 5. 3.2 4.5 3. 3.4 2.5 3.4 2. 4 3.7 Α.5 3. 2.5 3.1 2.4 고, 5 2.3 4.O 3.3 3.4 2.9
ated from IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, Year
1990.

Page 10
al In y complementa ries il manlıfa, cL uring. Bu t i t is said that there is still a wide range of actual cor potential complementarity in the region. It is argued that there exists a large potential, both in terms of trade diversion from traditional sou Tces/destinations towards SAARC countries and trade expansion by easing import restrictions in products which are, in general, not being traded amongst the Countrics of the regi con but are their major exportables. It is Worth examining this argument.
Trade cannot be built on existing complementara ties in primary commodities. Mutual trade expansion in SA ARC countries is possible only on a new division of libour based not on agricultu Te and si Inilar complementarities, but complementara ties based on manufactured goods. In fact, future of economic to operation a mong SAARC countries ljes in the area of manufacturing. Trade in manufactu Ted items such as sarees, ornaments, capital goods, carpets, etc. is currently taking place on a small scale among the sic countries. But thic contribution to economic growth from trade in such items is minimal. Moreover, there arc many constraints on trade taking place on a large scale owing to a multitude of factors such as, for example, poor quality, lack of information, high freight charges, and so on.
All the South Asian countries hay c now liberalized their ciconomies to some extent. Some of the trade impediments will be Temoved with 5uch liberaliZlt i Con Ille aslı Tes, but some others will remain. For example:
(1) Because of the long dependence on good5 from outside the region, consumer taste had developed for such items and there is resistance to accepting goods from the region.
(2) The capacity to finance imports through export earnings i 5 linited in SAARC countrics. Consequently, 40—75 per cent of imports in the region are still financed through external
S.
aid, Aid to fi normally tied and the – b)T Country is nլ import from countries of diversion of SAARC countr ficult.
(3) India ha: persistent surp of trade wi countrics exce discourages f
IT LITäide,
Ewell if W: the cistränks 5in are Tem C lization measu bc the en hanc With the oper forces, some c will emerge in complema ntarat thc base for coopcration, BLI -tcI'm process contribuite to the in mediate because SAAR limited absorpti above all South la ck capital su in the región.
Give these to sericously lic ting potential cooperation in a different angl for South Asi operation shol froll a wider Tather than fro) perspective. The an over emphasi cooperation a m tions and it a cmphasis is important poir that t: Լ:L) Լ1 () []] El mong. El my gro" in the World W nomic develop1 operation amo countries will development a of growth. But
from cconomic rapid and sus| ment. In this
prudent to exam regions in the

mil Dlçe imports is to the source Towing SAARC it very free to kl :Uuntry tյT its choice. Thus trade towards ies beca Illes dif
5 Eir tā ine Ills in its balance
[h all SAARC 3t Paikistã, TE is If ther expansion
ASSII, that all for trade expani Wed with liberaTes, Will growth ed in the region? "El ion of market Omplementarities th1: fill Eure. These ies Will pro wide gTeater CC010Irlic I this is a long and will not rapid growth in filt lure. This is C markets have in Capacity and Asian nations plus es to in west
facts, we hawe ick åt the exisfor economic
South Asia from e. The potential in regional cold be viewed global context [1] : 5.11b regional TE S CCTS to be con subregional ng SA ARC napo pel T5 that this mis placed. The realize is C () Թբtratin m p cof countries Ould lead to eco
I ent. Even CDig Very polor lead to some
di Some degree What is needed
Copcration is | inable developCon tèxt, it is inc how certain World achieved
rapid is and sus tai na ble growth and develop II ent,
We shall examine the case of the four East Asian NICs (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong) and the ASEAN countries (Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand. Singapore, Brunei, and Philippines). Now the rapid development of the four East Asia I NICs i 5 mot a result of regional cooperation among these countries, but is due to investment by developed countrics such as Japan, USA, and West European Countries, Japan, for instance, found it advantageous to invest ill the four NICs because of high production crib sts in Japan y wis-a-Vis thc four NICs. Thc next fast growing group of countries is in the ASEAN. All these countries have shown very high growth rates except the Philippines. In fact, Malaysia and Thailand will become mini NICs very soon. Agilin, the growth in the ASEAN countries is not due to economic cooperation ano ng themselves but, as in the cal se of the four NICs, is due to foreign direct investment froIII countries outside the region and the consequent cxpansion of thcir trade both in the region and the world at large. These outside colntries were Japan, the USA, the West European countries, and the East Asian NICs, excluding Singapore.
It is true that there is preferential trade arrangements ano ng ASEAN countries, but
various studies have shown that this has not contributed much to expansion of Tutual trade gr development. Further, apart from Singa prire, the others do not have a capital surplus to in West in the region. Thus there is heavy dependence on Japan and thic three NICs: Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea for investment and trade, Taiwan, for instance, has now become the largest investor in Malaysia displacing Japan to second place in 1990, and in all probability the three NICs

Page 11
Will be the leading investors in thc region in the near fur. ture. Also, it needs to be In entioned, that the largest market for ASEAN products is not within the group but the USA and Japan. And the greater part of ASEAN trade is not in primary commodities but in manufactured goods, the leading item being electronic products.
Drawing from the experience of the ASEAN, it appears that the real inpetus for whatever
economic cooperation in the SAARC region will come not from the region itself but
from cooperation with countries outside the rcgion. The priIm: Ty aim of recent liberalization in South Asia should be to att Tact II Corc and II10 e foreign direct investment, because it is through foreign investment that complementarities in the 11a In LI facturing sector can be created in the immediate fu Lure for economic cooperation il the SAARC Tegin. Thus, SAARC must dewise a strategy to make Japa) and the four NICs take an immediate direct interest in the region in the same way that Japan and the fouT NICS did with ASEAN.
The importance of the aboveIn ention cd countries for South Asian development and growth can be se en from the Sri La 1kan post-liberalization experience. For example, Gunatilleke (1991) notes that Sri Lanka's share of trade in world trade with East Asia and Japan increased from 13 per cent in 1978 to 29 per cent in 1990 (see Gunatilleke, G, 1991, "Prospects for South Asian Regional Cooperation and Tradc', BCIS, Seminar Paper, 6/10, 1991. He g) es on to say that: "If Sri Lanka's case is any indication of the shifts that can be brought about by liberalization then the relationship between South Asia and the rest of Asia is likely to become a Illajor factor in rapid growth and transfor. mation of South Asia Il CCCDCmies. These possible developIments have to be given central
place in futu SOLIth Asia (p.11). In fact, recent liberali
has already ta attract II:55ive Japan to devel turing base. TI region has a force wis-a-Wis Tegin still co på Taitive aciwa III intensive produ IIlay only lack the il fra Structu moге fогeigп і El T1 are where t Cooperate to de then in order foTeign investm and the four
Japan and th foreign direct particularly im because of thc ments in the El 1r Cope is no in South Asia,
ke e Il in inwesi ElI Tope and L. USA, Canada,
for II led the Free Trade Zo West Ilt will Which ha 5 a che in addition to b Colur. It should here that in in West lent in L tied by their in their petroleut looking foT sou fo T the sa me, r. loping the indige It is becaused that Japan and El re i 11 portant. pose the questi biggest foreign Li Ikäl” si FTZ ?
JSA JT Weste the four Eas Thus, greater essential with which not only Slurplus, modern the kl 13 w-how the potential goods produced
Thus foll the pective, what is strengthen the r

"c strategies of
cooperation,' India, with its 2ation policies, cen the step to in Westment from op its manufache South Asian cheaper labour ASEAN, thus the
Ilands El Collage in labourcts. The region
the skills and re for attracting westors. This is he region should "elop and streng[Ö Httract 110 Te ent from Japan NECs.
e folur NICs Tor investment is
portal 1 t. This is recent dewclopworld. Western
longer interested
they are now ting in Eastern le USSR. THC
and Mexico have NÇ)Tth Americal II le, thus US ingo to Mcxico : Elp labour force, being its neighbe II ention cd any case US DCs was prompter est in Selling and oil, or ITces of supply ather than deveIn Jus industries.) f these factors the foi IT NICs Si Imply, let us OI 1: who are tic investors in Sri
It is not the rn FEurope but t Asja NICS.
cooperation is thicsc countries have a capital technology, and but also have to ab5 corb the by South Asia.
: economic persneeded is to elationship bet.
W cen the SAARC countrics and the East Asian NICs and Japan. The conomic growth that South Asia acquires from such a relationship can then lead to the har nessing of the potential that exists for economic cooperation among South Asian countries. Once SAARC c cont) - mic cooperation gathers moLentum, the Small South Asian countries will, of course, be wary of India as they are now, It is som etimiles said that India’s position in SAARC is similar to Indonesia in ASEAN, United Germany in the European Community, and the USSR in COMICON. It can be easily argued that India's position in SAARC is far different to the se cases. We shall not go into this issue here. However, the genuine fear that the countries of the region hawe of India's overwhelming economic power cannot be denicd or overlooked and it is India's actions in the future vis-a-vis these nations that could help reduce or exacerbate this fear. Therefore, along with the other factors m critioned above for the success of economic cooperation among SAARC : member Countries, III dia’s future rolc is also of vital importance.
Thondaman
(Continued fron page f
Mr Thonda Inan has refused to divulge to the public details of his own proposals to the LTTE. "These are CWC proposals and they are only meant for the LTTE at this II oment'', he said. It is reported that his peace initiative is being as - sisted by the US-based Quaker religious movement, which had occasionally promoted attempts to negotiate in the early 1980's.
In a speech on the cthnic crisis on October 15, Mr. Thonda man suggested the formation of a distinct administrative apparatus within the merged North-East Provincial Council as a solution to the problem.

Page 12
SAARC and World Ec
Godfrey Gunati i leke
changes that are taking ::־ך place in the South Asian cconomies have to be placed in the context of the new developments that are dra matically changing the configuration of the World econo IIny and the Te - lationships within it. First, the changa taking place in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is perhaps the most far-reaching in its impact on the flows of world tradit, in Westment and aid. The South Asian econo Ilies. With their large public sector, particularly India, had forged many ccolonic links with the Soviet Union and ther centrally planned economies. These can easily be a 11 og the Calrly casualties of the changes.
Next, the 1980's hawe witlessed some profound changes in the trading pattern of the Asian region as a whole. The recent "Asian Development Outlook, 1991" issued by the Asian Development Bank points out that Asian incomes grew more than twice as fast as those of the rest of the World and cxports expanded at about twice the rate of America and Europe. Il first half of the 1980's North America was the principal market for Asian exports,
рогt goes опцо Change is takin geograpical pat CX p. Corts with Asi most important pidly expanding
intra-Asian expo 270 billion = com
rts of USS
North America million to Euro And South East El Inajor role ir Intra-Asian trac
While Japan play a major r sha Te5 :ıre well Ween Japan and loping member the Asia. Il Die w (DMC's) as is trix given below tradic share of this Intra-Asian as y et cxtre Ille billitiը,
It is import Asia to place dynamic context panding Asia. L bring about ma trading patterns partners in alig ternationally co and costs of it
''Beginning with 1986'' the re- ports. The Sr
MATRIX OF INTRA
ΤΟ Sarı 5ошth Ear FRIČOM Asia Ifiri
South Asia S. 62.5 l Southeast Asia 143 3,093 NIEs 3,528 17,75 Pacific Islands 1)
Ch1i1a, 98O 1,376
DMCs 6,767 22,945 6 Јарап 3850 16,576 WORLD 39,658 71, 149
Source: Afiar Develo pri eror outlook 1991
O

onomy
Say" a dramatic g place in the 5r II Of Asian a becoming its and most ramarket. In 1989 TtS total lled USS parcd with ex2005 billim til
and USS 182 pc''. The NIES : Asia played
this boom of
continued to ole, the trade distributed betthe other devicCountries of the elopment Bank i C: il the Illa - . However, the South Asia in trade born is tly small-US$ 3.
ant for South itsclf in this of a fast exibCralisation can jor shifts in the and the trading IIle1t With il. mpetitive prices imports and exi Lankan case
illustrates solle of the shifts and diversification that can take place in the South Asian trade a long with libcralisation. The tradic flow which grew fa5 test 1[1 (he Case Of Sri Lanka in the 1930's . На 5 bc en that with South East Asia, East Asia and Japan. In 1978 the share of
Sri Lanka's trade with these parts of Asia was 13% of her total World tradic II 1990 i L a mounted to approximately 29% of her world tradc. In 1990,
Sri Lanka's exports to these countrics total cod Rs. 8441 million 11.5% of the total.
Exports to Thailand at Rs. 867 Inillion exceeded our exports to India - Rs. 825 million. The cxports to Singapore were very In lich higher - Rs. 1982 million, nearly two and a half times the exports to India. Out of a total of imports valucid at Rs. 105 billion, nearly half (Rs 5 billion) was from South East Asia, East Asia and Japan. From this the countries other than Japan had the major share.
The preponderant sharc of Sri Lanka's trade deficit (a Inct deficit of approximately Rs. 32 billion) is with these regions. The trade deficit WC had with the industrial countrics exclud
ASIAN EXPORTS: 1989
NIEg Pacisc Οι Τα IW Јарал
Irlands DMC
,255 7 349 3,067 1998 5,083 43 1641 21,291 18, 64 8,209 297 20,016 69,801 30,893
8 R B 534 3,645 26,020 8,80 18,310 379 22,014 20,416 59,769 2,511 259 8,477 8,673 - 24.700 1,930 52,754 390,191 197,225

Page 13
ing Japan in the Carly 1980's had meanwhile changed into a substantial surplus in 1990. These are indcc.d major shifts in the trading pattern. The trade deficit is itself not a negative outcome. It has emerged with the increase in the share of exports to the region. The exports have largely been in the non traditional category. The expansion of imports had led to the growth of trade links which in turn will fai cilitatic the further expansion of exports. If SriLanka's case is any indication of the shifts which can be brought about by liberalisation then the relationships between South Asia and the rest of Asia is likely to become a major factor in the rapid growth and transfortation of South Asian economies. Thcsc possible developments have to be given a central place in the future strategies of South Asian co-operati :) I 1.
A major concern that has been recently voiced at various fora by South Asian scholars and policy makers is the relation of South Asia amidst the changing regional relationships and links that are emerging in the rest of the world. Most parts of the developing world have evolved links with parts of the North which hawe imparted the character of a special relationship. This would apply in varying degrees to the relationships between Latin America and North America, Africa and the EEC and the rest of Europe, South East Asia and Japan with East Asia, the Pacific Islands with Australia and New Zealand. In most of these Telationships the economic links are closely influenced by geopolitical considerations. In the North itself, the greater integration of the EEC envisaged by 1992 will have a wide-ranging impact on North-South economic relations. In this global order of cconomic and geo-political 'partnerships' South Asia remains almost an outsider. This might be partly due to I ndia, her sizt and her i gcopolitical role. -
While this Tc has obvious neg the integration with the Test has also its o challenges. It Il eed FoT South co-operation. need thin ever Asian countrics gether the global they as region to Tespond col dynamic change figurations tha ! in the rest of
If the North pre-occupied wi relationship and ion and transfor cialist eco Tom economies, this duce the resour available to the II) Al situation in Will be contra c oping regions \ lationships with likely to hawe South Asia is default. In this tive South As position can hav South Asia, loca Weel differ It and with no st ships with any, h and can forge a of links. The Te had with the si gether with it setting enables it of thic II : W eco) [] tics that Te bi rapidly with the of thic Soviet al II economies.
Key elements of South Asia Co-operation
The discussic attempted to de ging economic South Asian Rei the far reaching global order wł implications for and prospects operation. Most tions and appr nal co-operatio may hawe start

lative cxclusion ative cffects on of South Asia of the world it pportunitics and underscores the Asiап геgional There is greater for thic South O examine toContext in which 2xist. They need lectively to the s a Tid new con
are energing the world.
will be morte
th, th, ac East-West the rehabilitatmillion of the soies to market is likely to reCCS that will be : Third World. which resources ting, the develwith special Tethe North are precedence and likely to go by l:011 text a collecia In Wolice and e greater weight. ited as it is betregional blocks ecial relationas many options diversificd set lationship it has Cialist bloc tos geo-political o take advantage опnic opportuniund to emerge transformation East European
in a strategy Economic
T. SO fäT ES CTibe the emer. ice a Ti) in the in as well as cha nges in the ich have major he possibilities f regional coof the assumpilches to regioWith which we d in the late
1970's and the first half of the 1980's are no longer valid. These assumptions were made in a regime of regulated, statedominated economies prevalent in the preponderant part of South Asia and in a world order in which two opposing cconomic systems w cre each playing a major role in the global economy. It is therefore
I1 eCessary L0 Te— exami 1 e the possibilities for regional cooperation in the Incw context and directions,
This paper cannot go into the details of El strategy of
regional co-operation within its terms of reference and thic tile available. It will therefore limit itself to outlining briefly some of the approaches to the e merging situation and flagging the key elements in a feasible strategy. It does not propose to go over familiar ground and enumera te all the main a reas of potential regional co-operation. This has already been done on numerous occasions and in various publications. The Committee for South Asian Co-operation for Development at the commcncement of its work formulated a comprehensive programme which identified the areas which held high potential for regional co-operation categorising then in two groups. One dealth with the sharing and exchange of development experience. There is obvious scope for co-operation of this type in the South Asian situaltion where there are countries at different levels of developITnent and income and wherc the eXpericnce gain ed in ome country would hawe Telewa rice for the other. The second group of studies dealt with more substantive issues of co-operation in the economic, sociocultural and political fields. They included El Teas of Critical importance such as the management and co-operation in the utilisation of 5 ha Ted 1 Ft Lu Tal res CLITcc 5 such as the Himalayan resources and the Indian Ocean, co-operation in improving transportation and Communication links, industrial co-operation, co-operation in
1.

Page 14
regional tourism, collective efforts at ma npower development, mechanisms for co-operation in the field of money and finance, Scholarly efforts of this type have the great advantage in that they can explore and uncover the full potential for regional co-operation as well als analyse the prevailing obstacles without being inhibited by any political constraints that would normally restrict the inter-governmental efforts. The initial Work that has been donc by scholars provides a base for identifying the agenda of cco. nomic Co-operation in the hardcr areas into which the interg) WCT In Inle D1 LH SAARC Tort has not yet ventured. But thic work done has to be taken much further and recast in relation to the new economic order that is emerging both in the South Asian region as well as globally, it has to be more purposeful and point to specific policy initiatives.
As has been stated repeatedly the inter-governmental effort in the field of economic or development co-operation has apргоpriately begun by selecting the areas which are not likely to Touse any national apprehensions and hesitations. As yet the areas in which the countries have become active are closer to the concept of Techpical Co-operation among developing Countries than substantive economic co-operation. They include the exchange of development experience, infor. mation technology, all of which have great value and can initiate processes which can be taken further in stages. It is only recently that efforts have Cille C to identify an agenda of co-operation in the substantive economic sphere,
Against this background it is
Possible to point to some key elements in a future strategy of regional co-operation.
First the process of liberation that has begun and which is opelling the economics of the region to each other has to be speeded up and the economic
1.
environment a mic systems is Tendered condu CO-Operation. here for a col exa Illining how affecting region gional co-opera nonic policies ned L Tid co-or Purp to 5e everլ է fic initia tiwes 0 per til are eX a. I 11 ble there in the levels the countries. past the Elwer been in the : for India 74.7% and 80.6% foi Would be pren ווטf a Go mmס T il CLS til Stage but we s dering the pri tariff structures p3 CE On the ri and moving which will ea to some type of and a system til Tiffs foT SL leading in stag Asian Commo could perhaps device - a pri Of El modest 5 board for Soul somewhat on t Commonwealth that was in t the past. This of Setting the p and assessing Slich measures : tifying the prot These issucs : the relations wl has with the re There a Te mai which the coun gión need Lo e: These have bee the preceding sec ging relations SC) Luth Ea5 al II relative islatio of envolving re ships, the opp may lic in the of East Europe economics, and cally the specia Concerns in maj

d macro-econoTCngthened and iwe to regional here is scope ective effort at liberalisation is Ll trade and retion, Macro-ecohave to be aligli mated for this efore any specior regional coIndertaken. For s wide variation f protcction in In the recent ge ta riffs have "ange of 41.2% for Bangladesh r Paki5tal , It
at lite to think tariff structure union at this hould be consi. blems of our and their in*gion as whole in a direction d us eventually
F Custons Union
of preferential th Asian goods ICS to a South In Market. Wic
with a simple rferential tariff calc across the
h Asian goods he lines of the Preferen tia 1 tariff le operation in can be a means rocess in motion the efficacy of is well as idenle T15 involved. are linked with lich Struth Asia st of the word. ly issues here tries of the reка mine together. In discussed in tion - the emerwith a dynamic East Asia. Our 1 in the context gional partnerfortunities that transformation an and Soviet more specifiIl South Asian Cor interiuational
negotiations such as the Uruguay Round, the Multi-Fibre Agreement, the World EnvironIn ent Conference, the co-operation possible in the field of commodities where South Asia has a decisive roc in the international IIlarket such as tea and jute.
Tesource situation in South Asia calls for a special effort. Here the possibilities of attracting direct investment flows from the surplus countries of East Asia, as well as from countries such as South Korea which have begun in Westing abroad, can be cxamined together. This may include regional joint wen turcs and in centive systems which cover the regional Inarkct. Another meaningful initiative in this same area night be a regional partnership of dc velopment assistance with Japan which prowides the franc work of priorities and creates the mechanisms for facilitating thc identification of programmes and the flow of assistance. The rapid changcs in the Suth East and East Asian cconomies will result in continuous and dynamic advanCes to progressively more advanced levels of technology and production where the pat
tern of comparative advantage and the division of inter
national labour Will change.
One important clement in this process will be the shift of comparative advantage in la
bour intensive manufacturing from South East and East Asia to the South Asian region which will probably continue to have the largest low cost labour force in the global
economy. In Tclation to inter
national competitiveness it should be possible for the South Asian countries to work to Wards their long term advantage by developing and protecting their comparative advantage on a
regional basis. This would indeed require a major collective effort in which countries would have to be ready to balance
the short term national advantages with the medium and long
(Солтiпнғd ал page I4)
Thic external

Page 15
SPECIAL TO THE - G
US academia, India and
inder Malhotra
SAN FRANSISCO
nyone who his taken SlsARå interest in Indo-U.S. relations over the years has noticci regretfully Hill almost steady decline in American illter est in not just India, but in South Asia as a whole. This, a las, is cven truer of the gTowes of acad cime than of the bureaucra - tic labyrinth in Washington D.C. The sixties was a period of ir mense inter est in South Asia in general and India in parti
cu la II. To the cicInitTes of South Asian studies already in exisLe[1çe 5 eVer:Al InCW 015:S We Te added. And although some of the Ill are still di Jing useful Work, there is Ino mista king
thic downgrading of South Asian studies in American universities. Whcncwer a distinguished pro"fessor specialising in our part of the world has retired in recent y cars, his post has either been abolished or filled by someone with expertise in a 11 entirely different ar ca. The Tegion in the highest favour these days is East Asia - both Japan and China taking a pride of place and the Koreas only a few steps behind, All of il sudden interest in the Soviet Union has shot up almost in direct proportion to the speed with which the once mighty and Tonolithic power has Star tcd disin teg Til ting.
This dismal backdrop has made it all thic Inore remarkable that carlict this TT101 hil
Berkley inaugurated not one but two chairs for Indian stilldies in addition 10 l Teas OT1
ably elaborate centre of South
Asian studies that has been functioning for III a lly years. What made the occasion even
In ore heart warming than it might have been is that funds fur the int Toduction of the LWC. chairs were contributed by the Indian Community settled in California. However, this having been salid, oine must hasten to add that the generosity of Biefkley should not beer underestill Eitcd.
Almost all A. Sities de III a Ilid C1 e a Ida half before agreeing Evidently this
le cdcd tc fill expenditure (I This should ex pite spiradic past, it has no to collect II 101 sity clair foT Pakistan, during solved the probl government fun bil ad Jill 13 h. 8שוr S1Lט"ו 11ו 1ן H1") BT itali, Bult wisely decided the govern III1 ent purpose and hi. ter to the initi dia 5 settled concerticil.
Thus when th in California a ing rather well collected S45 (), () up an Indo-AL nity Chair for at Berkley, the rost to the Oct. ed to COIl tribui S 11300,000 to m fessorial chair
It is in O se Cri of Indiais al II World agrees on America's West there is striking the un precedent til for a Llili" the Tesult El III the ti Tele555 eff diam C011$ul-g Fransisco, Mr Dr Prata.pditya the Sll Asi: Los Angeles r deed called it cle" 1 Mr AInd this werd by Mr K. S. E all bassador to mow a wis i tir Berkley,
The other siç ccin was und Abid Husain, dor to the U.

di South
III e II i Ça II Lliwe - a dollation of lililli Tı doll El TS to start a chair, Inuch corpus is ce the Tec Li Tring a professor. bliain why, desefforts in the t been possible ty for a univerIndian studies. the Zia Iregime, em by investing ds to start IqchiT5 i T SEWEin the U.S. åTid New Delhi has not to spend money for this si lest the Illa tative of the Ilin the country
c Indians living ld cidently do
for the Ilselves OO for setting ncrican Connu
Indian Studies 2 university also :asion and agricle 110 le 55 th:1 :lint:lin the pro
in perpetuity. it that no group
ywhere in the inything. Along coast, how CWCT,
| unii Ilimity that cd fund collecversity chair was
lost entirely of orts of the II-- eller all in Sa II
S. K. Lalbah. Pal, curator of 1 section of the n115elIm, his i11a “minor miraLambah's part. Fict is endorsed Bajpai, a former the U.S. and ng professor at
le of thC 5 : Illit ær scored by Mr. III dill al Ibas sallited States, it
Asia
the glittering function at BCrkley. The Indians overs cas, hic Said, 115ually Spent huge adıount:5 on building tellples, mosques and gur dua ras. Happily, som c of them had now started thinking of building temples of le:rning and hopefully this would prove contagious,
His hope might yet be windicated if the III1 a III e T 1 in which cfforts to star. It chair led to the establishmcil of the second one is a my guid c. The scic ond chair is, in fact, a tribute to thic success of Mr Lambal's fund-collection drive. Dr. Tho IIn Els K:Lila th, El Kerali-born professor Lif engineering at Stanford, Berkley's neighbour and traditional rival,
was so moved that he put down S 400,000 for another chair to be Ilaried after his wife, Sarath, as some kind of a 50th birthday gift to hcr. Berkley took up this offer, too, which explains the rather
high contribution by it.
In addition to the two chairs, a series of special lectures has El 53 bocc 1 il troduced. The first lecture will be delivered in February by the Nobel Laureatic Profc5 SOT S Cha Indra shekh El T.
Berkley, showed imagination also in choosing the keynote speaker at the inaugural function, Professor John Kenneth Galbraith, the distinguished Ha Tward econo II list and a former ambassador to India. He spoke with his characteristic wit and brilliance om his inwo1 we Incnt with Indii's coconomic development on both his capacities.
He started with the disclosure that initially, at the advice of Eisenhower administration, New Delhi had thought of requesting Dr Milton Friedman to counsel the Indian Planning Commission. Purely fort uit cously Prof. Galbraith met Dr. P. C. Mahala nobis, the brain behind the second five-year Plan, and said to him that to expect Dr Friedman to advise on planning was like asking the Holy Father
13

Page 16
to give advice on birth control. Dr Mahala nobis immediately requested Prof Galbraith to take Dr Fried Inan's place.
The Cuy Titent of Prof. Galbraith's speech was both pertilent and II o Leworthy, especially because everyone these days runs down planning and sings praises of
the magic of the market. For he pointed out, quoting chipter and weerste, that the Nehru
will T model of a mixedi e collomy, indeed of capitalisII with a human face, was extremely Irelic want and useful in Indiain conditions of those days. Nobody should undcrestimate its Fichie v Clet 5. At LC 5a Ille time, he was equally forth right in pointing out the Thain cause Öf what went wrong with the Indian experiment of combining
El Ind skilled hur were both comp est. In India
such a hull all turned catastro fl1 liber of th to ein Tich ther cost of society I While WelcUIL in econo Illic policy WaT med that t used controls to advantage woul. casily and arc gurb is cirt thilt iricfe i
Satisfactic c) In C l o p 3:55 doubless justif ծuglւt not to Til։ of 5) Ille less facts of life. is a strange lac of the importan
conomic growth. With social demia in U.S. justice through the Illechanism and in America of State intervention, rall. Ma 11 y pro !
a LS0LHHLLLLLLLS LLLLL S LLLLS KLLL S aLLaLLLLLL SS S S Galbraith, the most hurting versitics and t scarcity was that of trained the one hand :
SAARC . . . context what is
(Corri'r Heral fra rrit page 74') term regional strength and ad
WEl T1 tilge.
All these issues discussed ab Uwc can form a continuing
agic India of cconomic co-operation. After som c preparatory work it could be appropriately launched with a South A5 iam e con Comic surn mit of Finance and Planning Millistes
Libera Lisa Lion IIlca 15 L1 Other major shift in our approach to regional co-operation. In the past we have tinkere'd with initii tilwes which lawc ilha li li Im i tlcdl Capal city-bi-literal agree IIlents negotiated by governments Inaking few adjustinents in the import controls and tariffs; exploring the possibilities of co-operation through state trading. Scholars have spent much time considering a wide variety of institutional arrangements ranging from clearing arrange
ments, reserve pools, perferential tariff systems, a common |market a Tid s Co ton. So Ille of
these Te LCO a Imbiti ou 5 in the présent CO Intext. Most of the In are conceived in terms of state interwentions. In the prescnt
14
i 5 til eilable Lil tio pl Ely a majo expansion and e ge in the Sout Libera lisation for such a rol necessary for t to facilitate LH Work closely With each (yliler the policy fra Til institutional bas WELC Set T. Cregion. Chambe have to work to of market if have to be dew, tegic II. South A Industrial cxhib held. The priva be in the best p tify a Teas for and point out e. The first task identify coining immediately be Talisation. Fort c HS T սեber timd Sri Lāk vi COL1S SCO LITCC T : of proximity a But thic bulk if come from Mal

man beings who celt and hol
the scarcity of resource had lig }hile thEר
Sē die Eerlied Ilselves at the osc en Cormously. g India's new
· Prof. Galbraith hUge WhU Hild
great personal I III. giwe , LLP) Jound to Lry to TITT S.
We what las
Elt Berkley is ie. Bu lis
:Like Lu 5 obliwio L15
tha in pleasa Int II i Indial, there k of awareness Ce of the a c::-
policy making 's life in genefesso Ts, a L1 Elly 3 ts it betweetI u II li ilEı ilk tanks ötı Tld the go wern
In ent on the other. Even those who stay away from official do III are listened to with respect at the Capitol Hill where India and many. Third World countries encounter great and often wholly unexpected problems.
And yet the Indian government, especially the Inilistry for holl ffairs, 5 EC wsi i Ilexplicable sensitivity in responding to requests by Alerical acadeInics and Tesearchlers for Wisis for stay in India. It is not the refusal to permit research on sensitive subjects or in se Ilsitive areas yll ich hurls the A III erican aça de Illic com Ilunnity.
It is the infuriating delay in saying yes or no that drives Americit. Ti Sch 3 la Is Tound the
beld. Amb LSSL dr. Abid Husain, who makes it a point to visit universities and keep in touch with influential acadelnics, has tried hard to Initigate the probleil. But it would be wrong to cl: in that he has succeeded in eliпiпа ting this avaidable irritaПt.
most important e priva Le sector I TII e in trade comic exchallh Asian region. sets the stage ! It yw CyLl| ]] bec he govern Il cits is process and il Consultati
to create both eWork and the Se for such priperation in the Ts of Commerce age ther. Systems Li11 () זיו חנHLitוון חו loped for the sia Il Trade and iti T15; should be: tc sector would sition to idem— trade expansion xisting obstacles. would be to lities that cull efi t l Tr")L1 1 il) :- IIllicities such Vegetable oils d be thl: 0bWiupply in terns ind availability. India. In supplics aysia and Indo
Inesia. It is necessary to in westigate the Teasons änd inquire Whether the Te is any mutual advantage in promoting intraregional trade in these cominodi ties. A whole Tange of commodities fall into this category. These Collo di ties could be selected for a first initial effort as it would reveal many aspects of the prevailing systein which lilitate against regional co-operation, Tasks of this nature would be quite productive in clearing the stage for Co-Cpt. Tatı Çı.
A Illo the Teil vyhlich Teeds to be explored is the framework of in Celtives for in ovement of capital and regio Tal joint vcntures by the private sector. A beginning can be made by facilitating entry into other's capital Ilarkcts and stock exchanges. In the initial stages what Would be most effective would be to concentratic in a few strategic initiatives which can have a far reaching impact. Two areas which comic to hind Tealı dilly are thıc tical = sector :ınd tourism. Tea can offer major scope for regional co-operation.
(Confired or Page 26)

Page 17
| 977 and Sri Lanka’s Der
Zeth Hussain
he proble II of reviving de
mocracy i Sri Lanka, millore precisely the problem of proceeding fron today's quasi-democracy to the kind of fullfledged democracy we had in the "fifties, requires that Wetry to understand what democracy really means. We must first contextualize this proble II by taking a look at recent political developments.
The impeach II ent III owe and the constitutional crisis might be best understood as a stage in the ongoing revolt against the 1977 regime and all that it stood for, The period from 1977 to 1983 brought to Inaturity, or rather pushed to a point of rot te less, all that was LI I1 sa tisfactory in our political life in the prece di Ing decades. As this I might solund pole i mical, we Ilight clarify that the 1977 OG I Werl met did Eiliwe S3 Ille achievements to its credit, but the 1977 regime was rotten at the core.
We are here making a distinction between government and regime, meaning by the latter ter II'll the prevali ling systen of things and its ethos. The 1977 UNP Go Wernment, like : ll Our previous governments, did have si ile good ille ; rdt Tule, allid so did the UNP parliamentarians and party cadres. But they were for the most part in no cujus, they could not make any significant ill pact, and that had only to be expected because the 1977 regime, the prevailing system of things, Wils, El ccording to widespread perceptions, overwheel mi Ingly am affair "of paga, pajero and the fascist jack boot. It would be superfluous to Substai Til titte this charge, because the 1977 regime has coine to be al most universally execrated, both in Sri Lanka and abroad. It should suffice to make the incontrovertible point, something that can not be seriously dispuLed that so much of what happened under the 1977 regime would have been simply un
imaginable und
What WE HEL" hing 51 11t:e 1988 revolt not ag. but only against regarded as si atypical of the ration that has Lied ad cast why it is not cal thlt the Te" been i Ilitiated b the UN P. He dential carılıp Elig til of Hilself regime, asking his performance ted functi is : Il di 1 QL con il Dio milia | Pri IT: kDie WW th: [ if II 5 ociations le W« the ghost of a ting elected. that the people TOT EL CELTS Troll thic Sri politic.
Si Ice Hıcı Hic Eı iş rev') || tillır : be : 1 calck til ,"'n טn שנחטphen plex.phic inc). I'm cno of its aspects against the UN Tot just that of
There is a ver IIl:Ilt, LIII liike th one of 1977, t
El tirns Cif h: c disinantling of El Id destructive There is al ac|I tion which lin ÎT. Sri La Tikā"5
a chlie We The Int cul tus flows from : than fro Il a c} cllim to hawe II crit system in tcd, but aut leas begi mining 5 ccm made. All this
tilt with the hardly the po 5h10 W Il III the J Ta Inne and op whil, t looks lik

mocracy
er any previous
We been witnes
is an Cong)ing inst the UNP. the 1977 regime, Lui generis and
UNP, in aberto be quaran.
aside. That is :lt all pa T Fidxivolt should hawe
Prcis based his Prc5iri On a dissocia
Tror the 1977 o be judged on over tille |iTiis sig ined to him, is. Til e as the: Minister. He
I for tit di5Luld It hy haldi
Chilince of getLis נb witגIt W:15 t e were la Coking
to purge 1977 Lankan body
ha3 C11 til ued ) l I gb1 What bıas he 'Prelladasa This is a collIl which i I l s Jili: seems to go P et hos itself, the 1977 regille, -mm iL מט וחy Fir c rather wobbly the liberaliשy Hind thוון טון נו: the para sitic SEL E SET : w 11: L-I) Ticit:- ks. Ta ther mo wel b:15, i Caill y Fl Illti[ Lure, whic re stal - ascription rather lievement. The
estaibh! Ished a ly be exaggerait Sille s II of i to h:1ve Hegn may be consisJNP et los. But pulist policies a nasa wiya pag:oplisation', as e El successful
co-option of the Sinhala Buddhist et hos of the SLFP. Together with this has gone a cha Inge in the e lite-system of the UNP, which is no longer dominated by the Westernized and the type known as “Donoughmore Buddhists'. Also contrary to the UNP eth05 is the bing out of the Israeli Interests Section, which would have diriVem the traditional UNP types, notorious for their dog-like devotion to Israel, to a poplexy. The Preidās phetle Ilon' looks like a contradictory project to promote the burgeois programme of the UNP together with the populist progral Time of 1955. It may be contradictory, but it mal y also b e Seen positively a 5 a sensitive taking into account of the profound 50 cio-economic challges, which have been going on in Sri Lanka since the title of Ошп independence. In any cast it CBb wich Lusly ha 5 H potentill foT stirring rebellion fron within the Tanks of the UNP.
The Tecent rebellion has ap - parently been provoked not by the President's going against thic et hos of the UNP, but by his attack on the very core of what will S. Trotter1 i 11 thuc 1977 regime. The core of that regime was power exercised arbitrarily over the people, and abused, a power that had a fascist character because it was na ked, un principled and, as show when the SS or other UNP Storm-tro pers gol going, brutal. It might be argued that tJO ITILI ch should lot be i Ina de of thit hul 3: ec15e till: 1977 Tegime mercy contiued the abuse of power prevalent under the 1970 regime. Actually there Was a quilitative difference and distinçtii 03 of fuil Illetal importance have to be Imadc. Under Mrs Bandaranalike appeal w:als possible ilgainst w Tong-doing and ab L1 se of power, and samleti T1 C 5 Lt least Tedres W. Els provided. She was a lady and häd 51 ine 111 til 1 af 5 til tidlrds, at least the IOtion that Illere l rc things no fello w cam doConscillently she held nost of hCT minister 5 0Il a tight leash, a di Tc fu cd to ECW th. c1 -
15

Page 18
tal latitude to abuse power. The difference in the casc of the 1977 regime a rose out of the former President's conceptions about the relationship between the President and his Ministers. He apparently believel thithe 5171 |d IL i Liter Welle the Eiffairs of lis Millisters A5 t helt would II. LI It to inte Tference, and furthermore make him responsible for their wrongdoings and abuse of power, What that meant in practice was that although he held absolute power over his Ministers, shown by their undated letters of resignation, he allowed them absolute power to abuse power. And SCII e did, to a horre I dous extent. His regime was one in which the politicians and their
LLLLLL LLLLa H S S S LLLL SS SL SSS ttCLLLLL S S LLLLLL people.
PTF5; id: Tit PT emad Sa Would
have non c of that. He proceeded forthwith to cut the politici: Ins down to size. No Ilo Te global loafing, of the sort that II de al le 5 t One Minister El 1 international public nuisa Ilce, Corruption, and the privileges of which the Pajero jeep beca III e the motorious symbol, a Te being curtailed. The 'chit system" has been eliminated, and so has the power of Ministers to appoint relations, friends, supporters and whom ever they liked to whatever post they liked. Some of these claims may be exaggerated, perhaps even greatly exaggerated, but it CELTI Tot be doubted that il the matter of allowing corruptio II, privileges, I and abuse of power, the "Prema dasa phenoIII en on” is significantly different from the 1977 regime. Obviously the President has watutcd tco bring about a situa Lion in which Ministers, parliamenta Ti El Ins, and party cadres exercise no more than the powers legitimately exercised by their counterparts in countries where democracy is function ing propcr ly.
It is apparently this of the "Premiada 5a mcnon' which has the Tecent Tebellion.
Et spect phenoprovoked A reaction
against thc po hala Buddhis it the UNP class and cast in the backgro in וחסLl a prטטb the speeches Ill:Its of the Ministers, parli party cadres Ello y el the Fil in the p:.st. T impression tha WE Int nothing al I WCT si to the 1977 regim
Actually this less than fair They may th advantageous, i their rebellion ranks, to play cians' yearning ges. They Timay fore to spell certainly not lowing latitude 1977 malpract they will prol for a proper UNP, some at miscTearts she to book and pu nish Tent f loafing, corrup of power. In dissidents are revolt againist They certainly important extel to jettison the
If the argum the rebelli i the Latin-wide 1977, it mily [[]. T11 C l{} {1, Ill'T could conceiv: fully function This Inced not success or fail dents. As We h; it "Yya s PTe5ideI1 Self who ili against 1977, In Ote furt het L handling the h: We been i Inc. the 1977 regim the dissidents meetings withic

pulisin, the Sine thos, the cha Inge
::1 i te syste 11, and e may be the Te ilLllld., B LI L it Hlas
It citriotif in 1Tid Other statedissidents that iamentarians, and Ewe lot beeld Inctions they had his has given the t t ble dissidents no Te really than the practices of է:
reading miy be to the dissidents. İık II tac tically in order to spread Il o Ing the pa Tty In the politis for lost privile" not Walt the Teut that they a Te in favour of al: gli for the ices. If pressed, pably agree that clean sing of the le a 5 L Of the 1977 111 ld be brough t given condign or their global tio, and abuse other Words, the also part of the the 1977 regime. are to the very that they walit |1978 Constitution.
I
ent is Walid that 5 a new stage in : Te Wulsion a gair list be that We have ning-point which i bly lead to 1 ing der i 10 Ciracy. depend on the ure of the dissiawe already Inoted1. Prell das à limiated the revolt Find We hawe to hat his style in rebell i II would : Iceivable under le. For iT stance, hawe held ma 55 i Lut un to wa Tid ac
curences, whereas Sal rathchandra and others were brutalized at a small in-door lecting under the last regime, This new style may mean that account will be taken of the Significa Tice of the Illa L1 I ı ıth CT Wds attricted by the dissidents' meetings, and also of the Wawe of the democratisation sweeping the World, including the SAARC countries, from which Sri Lanka can hardly expect to be totally inIllu Ted.
The move ITlent for the restoraltion of full democracy in Sri Lankai has to takic a CCCLIII, t ) än important de sideratu IL1, which is the need for a proper understanding of what democracy is all about. That thçTe Te Wildcspread mis conceptions about deT1) Cracy in Sri La lika is shown clearly by the inadequate presentation of the case made by the dissidents. They want to move from alleged dictatorship to democracy by a shift from the Presidential to a parliamentary system of government. But 5urely they themselves have alleged, together with the rest of the UNP, that the 1970 parliamentary govern Illent was far from democratic even though it had been democratically elected. The equation of a parliaIllentary system with democracy is too simplistic.
It can be argued, of course, that i P1 c5 idential 5ystic III can be expected to enco Lu Tage dictatrial tendencies, a point that
has to be taken seriously in the context of what many would Tegard als Sri Lanka's
pronounced ly authoritarian and a nd hierarchical Cult LI re... In substantiation of this argument
We can point to our Long Parliament from 1977 to 1988, under a Presidential syster,
whel n () (General Electi, 15 were held, and characteristic malpractices showed a contempt for democracy. But that does not dispose of the point that a parliamentary system can also be a u Libri tal riam a mod li democIā tic.

Page 19
The important point to be taken into consideration in this collectil is that there i5 EL marked terıde Dıcy il tille ÇÖntemporary world towards celltralization and Concentration of power at the top. Walter
Bagehot pointed out in the last century that the su premacy of parliament was a Ilyth because power had passed to the Cabi
net. In this century, Richard Cross IIlan argued that power had passed from the Cabinet
to the Prime Minister, pointing out that Atlce's decision to Ilake Britain a nuclear weapons power was made without the Cabinet even being informed mbou L. it. The Irì ild and T10 dest At1ee, it is Tele: Wa. In t to It1eLı – til 1, was Incothing like the Iron Lady, Mrs Thatcher, El Ima El described by Churchill as a sheep in Wolf's clothing, a modest Iman as he had a great deall to be I 1103 dest about. But power came to be concentrated il llis häälds Ell the saline. This attests to the Iloilet Llr of the tred to Wards centralization and concentration Of PO wer at the top, irrespective of whether the System is presi.
dential or parliamentary.
Thc answer to the problem Worked out in the West is de
concentration of power through dcvoluti 1, which We in Sri Lanka hawe been resisting fiercely for decades. This is in addition to the traditional constraints on the power of democratically elected governments, such as the separation of powers, freedom of assembly, and freedom of expression. Our dissidents have not been giving attention to these constraints which are of crucial importance, for without them there can be no democracy at all.
For instance, they have faulte di Rupa wa hini for faliling to publicize their case and praised the non-gow er ni Ilment newspapers for doing so. It appears then in their view all that is required for total freedom of expression is that Rupavahini and governmncIn t newspapers should
not be exclusi, טFט tח טוח חTטWנgt titi Daly, the fict dents, attacks () have been publisl Ci TC Lull till Llew thinը inconce fw; 1977 regime, is ing for showing he able to proc 1. חשWט yםCTiלrווT are politically obviously all sort tht וונoperate t a Te still very fall of free press t the Wester I c. ITitlii1. If the to proceed fr) qul Hsi-democracy Tegärel ai 5 dicta 1 democracy they tcntion to thic II dom of cx pres free media. Wit can have pecLuli: fai 5 cist dcl) Crac democracy, but гасү.
At the core ceptio 15 about 011T fHill.ITC I. problematic na tu tation in what sentative demog sidents seen 1 all that is need mocracy is a s centration of po' o the PresidcL1 sion am Ong the UNP parliment this is al. In a 55l. power is excI representatives we will quite representative d is to ignore the problem at representation b pation after RC) as the father-fi Weste Til dem CCT ; the problem a English people to be free; it taken; it is fr

ely organs of paganda, Cer
that the dissithe President led in the ITassspape TS, SC) Illeble Lundet thic
1) SL (Il Collag
· that we may eed to full dethe dissidents destroyed. But 5 of constrilits
press, and We T. fr. In the kind hat prevails in o L1 Intrics Cor in
di 53; idents Willit m the present which they
.orship, to full
should give atroblem of freesion, a really hout which We at hybrids like y or coln Inunist
I real democ
miscondemocracy is understand the Irc of represen. is called repreracy. The disto believe that cd for full dehift fra II conwer in the hands to 5 diffuI - Ministers and arians. Bchind m ptico II that if cised by the of the people, simply have emocracy. This ble fact thit ic Ilia turo: of
քcame a preoccuLisseau, regarded gure of modern
f LI
Acy, recognized di wrote of The believes itself
is gravely II lisee only during
the c|cctic T T e Ibers of Palialt as 50 as the Members are elected, the people is en slaved; it is nothing.”' This I tot true of Ill Cocle TI Wester II dc T1 Cocracies. because the potential of representatives to become masters over the people was under stod and the Collstraints to which we have already referred in this article were imposed on the representatives. Thữse Comstr:1ỉIlts have been understood as an integral part of the democratic system, withOut which dem Crlcy i5 m LäniIlg lc 55. But Russi cau's obserwation has been tragically true of
Sri Lanka where the people have elected their representatives, when allowed to do so,
after which there were hardly any or no constraints on the representatives, and therefore no democracy. The 1977 regime alleged that its predecessor had becomic laster owcr the pc.plc. A3 for the 1977 regime itself, it brooked no constraints whatewer och its own Tnastery over the people.
Nothing bett cr shows the Illisconceptions about democracy prevalent at the highest political levels of our sciety th:1 the prominance given in constitutional discourse to Cromwicll's Puritan Revolution. In recent Weeks there halwe been references to the authoritative position of the Speaker as rcpresentative of the Parliament, During the Puritan Revolution, the Speaker asserted the power of Parliamen against the King, and herc at least there is an Hпаlogy of sorts because the President was being portrayed as the King. But over whom was the supremacy of Parliament being asserted under the 1977 regime'. Not over the former
(Солтiлуғd ол: pagғ 38)
17

Page 20
Part (2)
Nationalism and Soviet
Reggie Siriwardena
hic 17th century English Puri
tans who thought they were creating the rule of the saints are secrl I W to have cleared the roadblocks impeding capita list development; Robespierre Who Wanted to enth Tone relson in society paved the way for a Napoleonic empire. "History has In H. In y cu Inning passages, co II triwed corridors/And issues, deceives with whis pe Tig limbitions....”
Lct Luis CC). Il sider thic record of the Sowict bureaucracy si Ilıcc the industrial take-off of the late 1920s. By a combination of ideological fer wour propagated by the state on the one hand and regimenäition, coercico III and Te pression On the Other, it a chieved what appeared to be a Ilmiraculous tempo of industral progress in the first two decades of constructionmiraculous particularly if one forgot the human cost it cI tailed,
However, by the time of Stalin (who was the chief architect of the Soviet industrial revolution) the system was already rew caling its la tent colta dicti0n15, The political structure with its ruthless suppression of dissent, its imposed intellectual uniformity and its primi Live lcalder-cult that had been created for a society only recently encrged from medicvalism were hopelessly inadequate to cope with the conditions of a Inodern, urbanised and educat cd one.
This was the problem with which Khrushchev stro we to grapple in his h: If-heaTted aTh d sh.) T Lliwe dl endeavour at de-Stalinisation. With the reversal of that effort Soviet society settled again in the political deep-freeze of thc Brazh new years as far as thc structure and ideology visiblic On the official surface were coCerIled.
But below the iceberg the forces
top of the In a king for
18
cha Inge were sti COTScil 15 neg5 C and cducated S Meanwhile te COI tTä dictio I e tio l11 de File: grder,
The Cit. Il [1:1115 nonic system through the pri is. El till of thic had raised it a Tiilitary su TT CBTC that I thilt he Tent bureaucr and lack of dy SCb wict Union ha the bt unds of chic c conomy with advanced the world Dark
It II, CO W See Illus that il č0 KE viet society the ing up with a the Ulic St years. Actually ning of thic 'ci, e CJ1 mily was i Tca and the gap be of technology : and those of the talist countries those two decide bination of crea l political and ec t Lu 5 es that (GTE a.Ind thät het Str tion in the last
I shall try
bala Ilce sheet o years later in 1 I Ilust first cor t Crical conspect at Soviet nation since the Rewill bring me to th subject; it will qui estion ing the
Common a mong Leninism that t
: In a ti :) Thalities i Wici

: Dis-union
11 working in the of a littw y Ճ1Ing o viet generation, te was illiother merging that Wils
the established
:d cr: Il Im Eind ecothat had carried II1:1 ry industrialSoviet Unio 1 - Id to the status of perpower (it was ) showed its inatic inflcxibility namis In Unge the d to move beyond a largely autara Lld to contendi capitalisms in t:t.
lmost incredible lushchev set So2 til sk of c:1tchDd outstripping altes in twenty by the beginghties the Soviet ching stagnation, :tween its levels LIndi productivity : a dwa nced capi
had Wide ned in 5. It was this cornkingly antiquated :C0110111C appara -
a chew inherited "COWE: tÓ TCicli
five years.
to draw up a f the Gorbachey his lecture, but mplete my hisEus by looking a lities problerns I til. This wyi 11 e heart of Iny also involve
assumption so adherents of hic conflicts bette and II nin(o Tity re the result en.
tirely of Stalin's errors and cri
1 ES
At — Eı il title when statues and monuments of Leinin are being ravaged by Soviet citizens, when his name has been erased from the city where he took power and his face off the mast head of “Pravda", when the monst Tosity of his mummified body mảy 50 QL1 disappear under ground, the least we can do is to look sca Tchingly and at his intellectual legacy, One of the fields in which this is most necessary is that of Leninist policy on the question of nationalitics,
The Russian Tsarist empire was the archaic imperialism of a bureaucratic feudal state which, like that other "prison of the peoples', the Austro-Hungarian em pirc, should have disintegrat cd at the First World War. That it didn't do so was due to the façt that Lenin and the Bolsheviks were able to renovate it in ang the T for Tm.
Lenin is renowned as the m{111 Whith WTøte into thc MäTXist political programme thic slogan
of “sclf-determination of nations'. I shall soon bc looking at thic contradictions between
his theory and his practice in this respect, but I must first state that his understanding of nationalism was very limited and superfical.
In his polemics against Rosa Luxemburg coin the cwe of the First World War, Lenin's interpretation of nationalism was crudely reductive and economistic: nationlis Ill Was the product of the Inc.cd of the rising bourgeoisie for a unified national In arket, and cwen the role of language in relation to nationalism was reduced by hin to the necessity for a common language of commerce,
Lenin hadi no awa Teness of or sympathy for the cultura

Page 21
dimensions of nationalism: when the Austrian Marxist, Otto Bauer, put forward the derland for cultural autonomy for the subject peoples of the AustroHungarian empire, Lenin strongly opposed it, saying that this was counter to the internationalis II of the proletariat.
In fact, Lenin's entire approach to nationalis II was instrullentalist: he didn't really endorse the strivings of the subject peoples of the Russian empire for independent existence, but he was quite Willing to enlist then as an ally and tool of socialist revolution by putting forward the slagan of self-determination.
The Te was always a potential contra diction between his support of oppressed nations or nationallities and his socialist project, not only because he regarded the former only as a means towards the latter, but also biccause he was essentially a great centraliser, in matters of state as much as of party. He shared with Marx and Engels the belief that, other things being equal, the la Tiger state was more progressive than the smaller,
The contradictions between Leninist nationalities policy and Leninist socialis In would come to the forefront only after the TCvolution. However, the lost strious obstacle in the way of any genuinely liberating policy towards the minority nationallities was Lenin's dedication to the role of the vanguard party as the only instrument of historical progress.
This theoretical position was consuminated in practice in and after 1921 by the establish ment of the political monopoly of the Bolshevik party through thc ban ning of all other parties. It is a common fact of experience that in multi-ethnic and multinational states minority groups express and protect their incrests through the creation of ethnic and regional parties. There was no place for this in the Leninist one-party state.
Indeed from the standpoint of internationalist Leninism such
ntם וחקט,1סWסa d
In cd abhorrent, ist nationalism to be a disapp non which socii lega te to the di tory. In realit Lenin's subjecti Leninist state
different out.co
Given the fa volution and t party had been c sian heartland, to be its mail given the in equi ciconomiC deve Lucation between Outlying republi dee p-5ca ted tra Russia n domina table that the e נוuld be co IטW for the reproduc läti 5 bet Wei CCIntre and the
Lenin, the cic: internationalist, hlo Ille-bred suci. of Great Russ and he may E any intention to hegemony over ties. But Hic cE pated of the ch and pursing a pi monopolisinn or plrty which in possible any r equality in the I majority and I litics.
It is out 0. with in the spat for 11e to pl. degree of cc the fortunes of self-determinati Lenin yeaTS, I COIl Centra te on of Georgia, be most patent exa flict between a mination and the revolution :
saw the Ill.
After the Oc Gergia had c
dence, and excep of occupation by then by the B Civil War, had

Would have scesince particular5 were issuined caring phenomeali5 mm Web Lil d Teus theap of his y, and El gainst c intentions, the effected a very
ct that the re. he revolutionary el tred in the Ru5which continucd. base of power, ality in levels of Op The Int and edRussia and the ics, given too the dition of Great Ince, it wat 5 ilme wiOne-party state the instrument tion of une qual in the Russian
periphery.
Ismopolitan and
had, unlike Ellis lessor, Il trace i al cha LulwiniSIT, hic acquitted of preserve Russian
oth eT I1a tico In alinot be c.cularge of adopting licy of political 1 behalf of his
effect made imcal pluralism cor elations between minority nation
f the question ce of this lecture 1 risue with any Imprehensiveness the doctrine of on during the shall therefore the single cas e Cillie it is the imple of the con.tional self-deterthe intercists of L's the B 015 het wijk 5
tober Revolution lainn ed indepenit for brief periods the Germans and ritish during the
set Lup al gover 1
ment headed by Georgian Mensheviks which had been recognised by Moscow.
However, during the efforts of the Bolsheviks to bring the rest of the Transcauca us under their control, the independence of Georgia became inconvenient. Stalin and Ordjonikidze, who as native Georgians were in command of operations in the region, sent the Red Army into Georgia in 1921 to occupy the country. To justify this action, the fiction of a popular proletarian insurrection in Georgia under Bolshevik leadership Wa,5 in Wented.
The blatant contradiction bctween the in wasion of Georgia and the doctrinc of selfde termination was glossed over by the claim that the right of self-determination should be exercised not by the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation but by its prole taria L: lin practice, this ninea Int the party, who were the self
appointed spokesmen of the proletariat.
It is cvident from the historical record that Lenin was troubled by the invasion but he didn't condemn it or call it off; he confined himself to counselling Ordjonikidze to respect the sentiments of thc Georgian people and to deal with them in a restrained manner.
Thc invasion of Georgia had a sequel in 1922 in internal differences within the party leadership. In the interval Ordjonikidze had behaved like a provincial satrap and had dealt highhandcdly with local Bolsheviks. The issue came to a head around the same time that a commission headed by Stalin was sitting to define the structure of constitutional relations between the Russian Federation and the republics.
Stalin proposed that the government of the Russian Federation should become the government of the whole group of tcpublics; the Federation would incorporatic the others as "Autonomous Republics' This issue, together with Stalin and Ordjon iki dze's autocratic
19

Page 22
behaviour in Georgia, became the occasion for Lenin's struggle during his final illness to curb Stalin's dictatorial ten de Incies,
The letter hic dictated froIII his sickbed to the Twelfth Party Congress II nadc a vehement attack on Great Russian chauvinism, mentioning Stalin and Ordjoinikidze by name, and urged that the Tuture Union should be built On a footing of complete equality among all republics.
In the Soviet Union during the years of perestroika much has becn made of this document as El prif COf Lenin’s co IIc et for thc rights of minority nationalitics and of the good fortune of his interwention to thwart Stain's Inefarious purposes towards them. But though Lenin had his way on the constitutional issue, what equality did it establish between the republics beyond a formal and legal one ?
The trend towards centralisttion was inherent in the one-party state that Lenin himself had erected. His successor brought to the task of consummating it not only ruthlessness and single Ilindcodiness but also an identificaltico II with Great RL155 i 1 L1 i I1alism that was to grow more open with the years. Like Napoleon and Hitler, Stain seems to have compensated for the misfortune of having been born outside thic homeland of the majority nation by emphasising his on cness with it, even though we are told that he spoke the Russian language to the end of his days with a thick Georgian El Coll.
But it wasn’t just Stalin’s inse" curity about his ethnic identity that led to the accentuation of Gcat Ru55ian d'OII) inance 5 in thic Stalinist era. I ha vc a ready indicated that this was a natural conscil ucnce of the Centra lisel state; and that centralisation was to be Inade total during the years of massive economic construction through the imposition of Inonolithic unity on the party and the suppression of free debate ewell
Within its own Tanks. In this process the party leaderships in the Tepublics became merely
O
nominees of til carrying out its
There had be the early years of appointing froll Moscow it republics; for i head of the Bo: in the Ukraine, had been pac Army, was Räi mi FLE 1 by birth. III the party was pli tarian internati halwe see med But in time Subordination C ships to the c When these I di Tawm from the tical elitics, the the lack of ille Il ere Elgents of ! Ili el I änd -- Illa|| of their own per
Together with of the governme lics tcp the Moscow, Stair idcology with a Great Russian I. tendency be can during the Sec When the libili Tc5i5 til Tice to the Wils prollo el s. R.ll I 5 si:, ih Ta, Ti(JIn; times through peals.
Whel the GetT. at the approache 1941, Stalin Elit October Rewro 1 LI Speech IIIa de a til of Elle w El Tri imperial Russia images of our Aleksandr News. skoy, Kuzma Pozharsky, Ale In di Mikhai || K yolu ilı Lhı is w:A.T." "My Lhe Victorii great Lenin guidi as if Leili I assimilated to th pil. In theon.
Also in the mij thic III ter Tationa
5 the Swiet la o Te Which bega uble union of

centre docilely orders.
in a practice from of the revolution rusted party men 3 head provincial stance, the first hevik government after the territory fied by the Red kovsky, a Rumain the days when oud of its prolefinalism, this may unexceptionable. it facilitated the f the local leaderel tre: and e Wen eaderships were provincial polily became, with r party democracy he central governrepresentatives բles.
the subordination ints of there pubarty centre in 1 infused State strong element of 3. tionalisIII. This : Ost CD WCT t ond World War, sation of national (j cTImi 1 i T1 Yai ders metimes through alist and somepan-Slavist ap
man armics were s to Moscow in the end of li5 tion anniversary Startling invocaCors and hic Toes of "Let the mainly Te:it Einccst) Tis - :y, Dmitri Do I -
Minin, Dmitri ks and Suworow utuzov - inspire
When he added, Las ba nIncr of the c you' it seem ed imself had been c (Great R15 Siar
ddle of the war le was displaced tional ant hem by n, "An indissol
free republics
Great Russia has rallied for ever. It still remains the national anthem though many Soviet people now feel embarrassed by the words and only play the music; and of course "indissoluble onion' has acquircd a new irony after August 1991.
Already before the War during Stalin's great purges there had been large-scale elimination of those elements in the republics who might be suspected of showing the slightcst Tecalcitrance to central rule; 'bourgeois nationalist deviations were a frequent charge against thosc accused during the ր1յrges.
During the War Stalin carried out mass deportations of several nationalities; the Crl I mean Tatars the Wolga Germans, the Chechens, the Meshketian Turks and others were forcibly evicted from their homes and transplanted in Central Asia, on the ground that some elements anong these peoples had collaborated with the German invaders. Subsequent Soviet governments have acknowledged the injustice of these acts but the peoples concerned have not been returned to their original homelands to this day.
While the steel-frame of the monolithic central party and its grip over the republics was mailtained in the half century from Stalin to Cher nenky, there was room within this structure for fIu ctua ti () ns in certai In Tm Eit ters of nationalities policy that did not affect the essential character of centralised power.
For instance, con Russification as against use of the local language in the administration of the republics, there were variations from time to time and from place to place, and so also in the matter of the encouragement of minority cultures in education and the arts. At all times, in fact - even under Stalin - there was a cosmetic display of the exotic cultures and folklore of minority nationalities, and gullible fellowtravellers from abroad could often be persuaded by watching Cossack dances or listening to Uzbek folk songs that the Soviet
(Continiers on page 22)

Page 23
The evil that me
Piyalı Gamage
R's innings was over several J ägo but, instead of going back to the pavillion, he kcep5 ha. Ilging about at the crease. He should give us il chance of forgetting the great damage he has donc to ou T country, iD1s tea, d 0f ç:0IltiD1 lui I1g to make provocative sta tements, from time to tillë, 31 [ Ilit ters and in a reas in which he is vulnerable - such as democracy, freedom of the press, violence etc. JR's latest public appeara ince was at the Sau siri paya auditorium on 11 October whicre he addressed government cngineers. He refered to severall Asian CCI LI TI tries which he said were not democratic while Sri Lanka was. But it was during JR's 11 year ego-trip that Sri Lai Inka Callic to be lo okcid on by thic world as an authoritarial state.
JR came to power in 1977 after one of the cleanest elections ewer hic ld in this cu Il try. The proof of this is that Mrs. Bandara naike's party Was soundy beaten. Though J R deprived her of her civic rights for sic wen years for abuse of power (mainly keeping the clergency going from April 1971 to Fcbruary 1977) she ended the emergency five II in this before the general election so that not only the election itself but also the polls callpaigning could be done by all parties without the threat of the gowcrnm cnt wielding cinergic Incy powers to intimidatc them. In c) Il tras, L LÕI this J R had his שf thם stנr mtרrgency on Tiשוחט 11 years he was in office, never held a parliamentary gCill Crall i electi D1 i Lu Ting that period and even such polls as were held were conducted under cm ergency rule du ring which state power was used against political opponents. Misquoting Pope JR says: "For forms of government let fcools contendi". This from the man who spent
most of his po paring i form that suitcd his Cracics and, il luis life, Hill for tunc t } b c g to set it Lup.
So what did yilated the II just been give Constitutional cl וטז t1 11; נוL חן יעי וךן וןf it i T His a w II Il ent has given of a king' - -owned Daily October 1978.
JR I then pro Step, not tu ! and righteous promised, but ti Tcal and in Elgin Silence di 55 e 1 t. rity to (1) takir -SLFP Times g using the Bus Act which le and promised to moving from of Court judges h prove of; and ( T1 i 35 t cha Tis Illti: af her civic rigt of seven years.
This is what of the Bar A. LOS IT FT I Supreme Court ber 1990: The Suprenc Court the executive f be to in de per tט 1: - 11"וט stם III of Our country, A tó 3 till of 2. judges were Tem them accepted d Appeal Court w home.) It was th Wer struck it t of the judiciar un principled exec la Lu Te. A furt struck at tilg judiciary by givi judges offices

en do
litical life preof government own idiosyn
the cvcning of the great good iyice the cha Ilıca:
hic ? He first La I date e ha di by milking a 1 al Tge thalt Imlai de ator; als JR put WDTis: "PaT iLle the powers Entוןז חזWeנg t טth MiTTT IF 17
ceeded, step by set up the Free Society he had Wictitilise his ed fo e 5 L1 d to
He gave prioigi over the pro roup of papers iness Takeover had clienned repeal; (2) refice 12 Supreme e did not ap3) depriving his : political rival its for a period
the Preside. It SSO Ciation Mr. ni Sid in thic C)n 28 Septen11emoval of eight judges because elt they would 1dent was the in the history (Note: Actually urנCt טוSuprt:Il tյwed but 4 if emotion to the hile eight went e greatest blow e independence y by a totally :utive and legisLe T blow wris prestige of the ng hand-picked in exccu tiwe
agencies after retirement. These offices ranged from the goverorship of a province to a directorship in a ceramic factory. . . . The use of three sitting judges by the ruling party to Termo We theiro principal political opponent Mrs. Bandaranaike from parlia Di1ent i F1 November 1980 WE15. El 5ll II el c55 Willatil if the rule if ilw and Sri Lakil's international obligations under the Interiatill Club wc 1:1 ut con Civil ald Politicall Rights. That the se sitting judges should have been parties to this sche I11e als Q Teduced public confidence in the judiciary.' (Report in The 1sland of 29 September 1990).
With such a track Tec Ti behli Ili hii II, that JR SE1|| !d now preach Sila (Right Under
sta Inding, Right Thoughts, Right Speech, Right Action and Right Livelihood) cven adding "I know no other way" gives Luis Hii idea of the Illassi Wieness of his chutzpah.
In thic other wis c sycophantic first volume of JR's biography written by K. M. de Silvil there is a very revealing passage. (Note: The second volume which was to have been written by Howard Wriggins does not seen to be coming - may be Wriggins has haid second thoughts;): “These games often got them in to brushes with parental authority. When that happened and punishment was
called for, Dick was quite un prepared emotionally to accept it with equalimity
much less with good hun cour. On the contrary he often wept without even a parental beating, or he closed his cyes and hid his face under his arm in anticipation of punishment. Indeed the merest suggestion of it was enough to get hii in into a sulky mood."
What this passage clearly shows is that from his early youth JR found it totally im
possible to accept that rules In eant for other people could possibly apply to him. This
psychological quirk Ilay be the explanation for many of his
21

Page 24
1ater actions. This may explain why JR saw nothing wrong in giving thic executive president (in his new constitution) immunity from all Suit - an immunity not II Cormally available to Executive heads af stilte but only to constitutional heads who are obliged to act on prime ministerial advice. Mrs. Bandara nai ke in a Statement in par lia ment om 3 August 1978 said: "It is a gross deception, reminiscent of the technique of Adolf Hitle I, to combine in
one person thic powers of the president ald prime = ministCr and then argue that the head of state is always entitled to ". unity ותום 1
It was also this same psy
chological quirk that determin cd R5 course of action which the Appeal Court declared that the Special Presidential Commi55ion had no jurisdiction to inquire into Mrs. Bandaranaike's admilistration from 1970 to 1977 sin cc that period was prior to the S. P. C. Law. JR rushed a bill through parliament declaring the judgement of the Appeal Court null ad void.
It was this quirk that ena - bled JR in May 1980 to proceed with equanimity on
two mutually contradictory measures: (1) The government of Sri LäПka signed an international Covenant undertaking not to create offences retroactively and not to impose retroactive penalties; (2) Mrs. Bandaranaike was 5uilloned before the SPC to answer retroactive charges which earned retroactive penalties. It was this same quirk that enabled JFR to Tlule with emergency powers for close on 11 years after having deprived Mrs. Bandara naike of her civic rights on thic ground that she had a six-year emergency.
It was this sa me quirk that made it possible for JR to reWard with promotions two policemen who had becil faulted by the Supreme Court and to
order that the penaltics and costs ordered against them should be inct from public
funds. As JR explaired to Paul Sieghart of the ICJ such
22
steps were necc. tain police mor C) li il - LI WWE.3: immunity from the president Article 35 (1) o tion they light CTirminal Offence 116 (2)."
On July 1 (Gula T di ili çalı III jį With JR in W guarded momen Very damaging (
"It is the ess to acquire pi cally, to ret
lost to rega Wisest to Tet of the dew than to lose
to regain it.'
Here the is of Why he coo! lite scarc to ex parliament and dum instead of general electio the devil Of which this TI conducted by J letters of resi gr in his pocket t ha5וIם וחוון טם W Tldi o WCT, TE of Elections, report on til called it shoc I1o d) Lub t. that . power to do Sioner would h result of the and Void. JR h tort: he el Sure was not publish
JR. Tegards elder statics II: rather elderly, זן 15 וו חוויהיו חנןB would call hill
Lord Acton, letter to Bisho
ghton in whic the corruptibi YY" I t ( ) t.)
statement which know: "Almos are bad men'. 0 LIT STi Laikai a "great” man sense of the W

'to IIlai IIalle.” Sieghart's But for the äll sluit which enjoys under f the constituחםם B שhaW 11ם"וו s lic Article
55агу
1990 the Lanka : d an interview lich, in an unit, he made a
onfession:
ence of politics wer d clocratia in it and if Lin it. It was in with thic help il if necessary
and then seek
the explanation ed up a Naxateld the life of held a referena parliamentary 1, The belp of the Ila line in eferendl I Wä5 R. With undated lation froll MPs enough scathing been made the Ĉ: Commissioner
in his official le referendum, king. The Te is
had he the legal SO the Commisa We de Cla Ted Hitc. referendum null ad a simplc rethat the report led
Hi II self as am an". Elder, or hic II o ‘doubt is. "El Ck TeCOTd Wh () i 5 ta te 5 man?
in his famous o Mandell Crei:hi hic spoke of lity of power akt: a further is not so well t all great I men Granted that by standards JR is he is, in Acton's Cord a bad man.
Nationalism...
(Cord for Page 2)
Union was a multicultural paradise,
These illusions, as well as the corresponding political claim Lihat in tElle Soviet Union the national qui estion had been definitely solved, were blasted by the eruption of a multiplicity of Lutico Inalis Ils a Tid ethnic id el
tities once the lid of coerced co Informity was remowed by GCThäche W.
What was striking in the years of pcrestroika was the cIncrgence not only of valid and democratic clairns by minority nationalities for autonomy against the centre but also thic recrudescence of tribal anillositics of one ethnic group against another, expressing them. sclw.cs sometimes in the lost barbarous forms. Azeris killing Armenians, Uzbeks killing Meshkctian Turks, Georgians killing Abkhazis, Ukrainians killing Jcws, these and other manifestations of ethnic hatreds proved that seventy years of socialism
had done nothing to change mass consciousness.
What thic laboratory experi
II e It Of the 5 e decade 5 In the Sowjet Union dem OI13 trates is that one simply cannot Tog out ethnic differences by a political uniformity and a state ideology imposed fron above.
However, the reviwal of nationalism in the Soviet Union was not simply the explosion of primordial loyalties which had long been denied expression. Particularly in the republics of the Asian periphery, there was an important sense in which the emergence of nationalism was a product of Soviet development itself.
Recent scholars writing on nationalism in general such as ET I est Gellmer ad Benedict Anderson hawe focus sed attention J1 DihodeTn la tionalis min . a 5 a distinctively new phenomic non, When contrasted With older collective identities.
(To be continued)

Page 25
A curse from the God Magama, Ruhuna?
Douglas Kulatilleke
t is a fact known even to the layman that "Bunchy Top" (E.g. 3 at E3) of plantain-Banana (caused by a virus) has no
remedy in plant pathology; and the only corrective action is to "cut and burn' and re
move and destroy' the affected plant, to prevent it from spreading to other plants. A very similar, but not so deadly disease, we now fear has begun to spread and affect the plant -- the Illil Sol IT Cc5 (of liyelihood of Iman here — in the Magam Pattu, in the Kirindi Oya Valley, this last y a la seaΗ Ε. Τ.
Most of the skilled paddy Cultiwa tors here, have the Tefo Tc, in spite of very good weather conditions for paddy - this last ya la season — becil Lira ble to get the good, normal high yield of 70—80 bushels per acre. Those: who have had this yield, arc strangely those to whose fields. Il CO O Inc)t II hany i Insccti Cid C chemicals had been applied that cultivation season.
The average yicld this yala, here has therefore been varying from mere 20-30 bushe15 per acre (almost i to il the cost of production (C.D.P.) of paddy! could it be the beginning of a deadly Virus disease among our paddy plants?
It may be that beneficial insect and other life, which surrounds our paddy plants in Tissa Magama, have apparently been gradually destroyed by very powerful systemic chemical Insecticides, used so haphazardly for decades. To control pest, diseases, and even weeds in farming here. It may also be that the natural protective systems, and Inc.chanisms of the paddy plant meant to fight these unhealthy vir Lulent organisms may also have becn harmed, or partly destroyed,
throughout the in my hu minble to some wcry sighted, agricul DLIT innocent, paddy farm cr's noted by som Scientists, and go Wernment al. terests, in our one of our g plant patholog into this a spect in ou T paddy Magama, and ingly.
Լսոսganvehe
Now thanks t of a group of onal consciol since the early have had the g at least being mess up by a all" a titud: irrigation. Sor! gation enginee here, and in thereby by the brought im m t:r suffering to farmers here. ed and very ex Wehera irrigatio has been a to even accepted pTiCS CT1 t go We TI
A reservoir li With a watc. 5 half the irrig: its conIrland), just about 150 level, causing and sa linity p| old and new This sitting of the Kirinid Oy Wehera due pendiency was without Illuch aspects of w Tı anagement, : the reservoir gated lands u

ls at
years. All this opinion, is due harmful, shorttural practices of simple, p ca samt , actively proe not far 5 Ceinig ""all kino Wing | collı mercial ilcountry. Will ood enlightened ist look decply of plant dis case, fields in Tissa, dvice us accord
ΤΕ
3 the end cavours dedicated, natis engineers - seventies - We good fortune of Lladic a wa Te of a similar "know in the field of ile of alır iTTi:rs, and planners Colobo, have ir hasty action, sc hardship, and peasant paddy The Tuch b015pensive Lu nugan, Here - טוון טhט 5 ח all failure, and as such by the
.
ke a huge saucer, prcad (of almost ble extent under
ha 5 bcc built feet above sea severe drainage,
oblem, to all our paddy fields here.
the i b u [n d i accros fa, Elt Llun Lugainto political ex
donc in haste,
thought of all a ter and soil Ls so incone Wanted ind all the irriinder it, in the
Tissa mahara maya electorate itself
Thc correct siting of this reservoir (now accepted by most Engine ers) should hawe been in thc Uva Province, at HurathgaTuu wa (above the Kuda Oya Willage), at about 300-400 fect above sea level, where a cup like deep water reservoir could hawe been built. Waluable flat, well drained land, now used for storage of water, could thcn halwe been Lu Lilis cd - foT cultivation, without any salinity problems.
The irrigation engineers and planners in Colombo, too, may also hawe been in a hurry, or made to hurry, and been in indecent hastic, to construct, without taking into consideration all aspects of planning, in such a big Venture. They had als 0 certainly forgotton, and ignored completely, the national master plan of the Planning Ministry, drawn up in 1972 to develop the south eastern dry zone (S.E.D.Z.), which sought to bring the waters from the Wet Zone Riwcs - Kalu], Gin and Ni Hiwa la — tio Le SEDF.
Nu w with the failure, and severe water shortage, due to the very hurriedly constructed Llun Ligan Wehlcra scheme; a w cry hastily conceived scheme to build a permanent a nic ut, and chan nel costing billions to bring water fron East to West, from El dry zone river (Manik ganga), to another dry zone valley of the Kirindi Oya basin, has now almost tragically been accepted, by the present government. Again the southern area development plan has been forgotten or ignored! Why?
Isn’t uit Teally time that the
views of some of the far sighted
and national minded, irrigation
(СолтIпшғd ал дағғ 38)
23

Page 26
Соггеspолаетсе
Export Development & Inve!
The Government has announcc.d the withdrawal of the above Scheme with effect from 111/ 1992. The announcement has thrown the Non-Traditional Export Sector into a state of dismay uncertainty and confuSion. An examination of the thinking behind the original and laudable reason for the introduction of this Scheine and its abrupt withdrawal allnounced recently is perhaps a good illustration of how diffe
rent sections of the same Gower I1 II lent Sincti III es work in c01 tradiction,
H. E. the President recently declared year 1992 as 'The year of Exports'. The Non
Traditional Export Sector, which has now over-taken the traditional sector in terms of Export carnings, is the beneficiary of the EDSS Schelle. One would naturally expect a sector such as this, rapidly establishing itself as the country's foremost Foreign Exchange earner, to be assisted in every possible Way by the Government to achieve still better results. Curiously, the very year the Government lays the greatest possible emphasis on the Export sector is the sa Ilie year in which the Government decrees to withdraw a vital support scheme for the Export sector.
The EDSS Scheme was introduced years ago by the Government with the welcome objcctive of encouraging the rapid growth of the capital-short Non-Traditional Export Sector. Consequently, this Scheme was also responsible, in a significant way, to the phenomenal growth in the past few years, WhcTC earnings of this sector have exceeded the combined ea T nings of the 3 Ilmajor tradi - tional Export items. Successful Governments following divergent politico-cconomic philosophies since the 70's have enthusiastically backed Support-Schemes for the development of the Non-Traditional sector largely because recent history has shown, to the detriment of this country Incore than once, that de pe II
24
dicinct on a items (such as products) is un this Scheine al mo5t u Ili la Ler Tcviewed, parti thic (GCW er III e It decla Icd that it ports thic Non
I.
Strangely, Ot Wague presumբ է to know the e the Withdrawal Schee. So far the G () WCTIl ment էլ. Il {1|T111 31IIl CEI11 Ը prompted the e of the entire sc |äft to wender Lihle (GC), WCT 1 TT1 el Within it feel Elas Sie Tweed its therefore ha 5 J fullness. Mlny feel the Schelle drawn on the World Bank.
The Adminis highest level, I address itself I and reexamine assess if thc Sc (a) served a
from its in tify its comi (b) if some or ; covered in th still be s upp their growth tio - the econ potential. (c) if duc to the tional Capita
neurial skill from outside helped Sri L
The Scheme 183 itcIT1s. II1 ste ing the EDIS Scheme, I feel,
yed in respect ring support to
fecit’’. He Te on priority to E bringing in a
of Foreign Exch to items bringir Foreign Exchange Agricultural Prc

stment Support Scheme
single-group of our 3 primary
Wise. Therefore, being withdrawn 'ally should be
icularly because has at no stage no longer supTraditional Sec
than mere ions, few seen ХНС, Г са 50 I fUг
of this scful
as I am aware,
has not mlade lt. Els to WHL Il-blic remova he Inc. One is therefore, if
hr
hat the scheme I purpose and ut lived its useOthers seen to is being withdicta Les of the
tration, at its Sluggest, should no Ico objectively the Schelle and the Inc. hålls:- Iseful purpose :eption to jusng into being. 11 of the items Scheme should Orted, based on C (Intribution Imy and their
! Schemic Eddiand entre prehals CO Ile in the Sector and 1 Inka’s Exports.
-Imbrace:S Elbout Ad of withdraw. E. cn-bloc the 5hriլI ld Ec stilIf items requi'get off their should offer port products larger quantum Ange compared g in II nuch less For example, duce like Bläck
sections
resול)CI 95-98%, Comparati
itcI115 iI
Gram, Sesa Inc. Seeds, etc. bring in about Foreign Exchange.
vely, Several Export this sector - involving sometimes very substantial Import. inputs bring in much less ilett Foreign Exchange should engage better terms than one bringing in much less. The above is only an example of items which I am familia T. Il believe there could be dozens of ite. Ins such as these, some of
which should receive support while others pCrhaps not so. The long list of items given
by the EDB as qualifying for
EDSS will illustrate this illbalil nice ilde duately.
It must also be mentioned
that sophisticated markets like thic E. E.C., North America and Japan are now demanding extre mely high hygenic standards for their Commodity imports. This can only be Tealised via installation of expensive plant and Machinery for Cleaning Processing. As matters stand today, thic Sri Lankan Exporter of Non-Traditional Commoditics is hardly able to meet competition from his counterparls in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, India, Brazil and other origins who hawe the advantage of extremely low Intercist rates for their Capital Tcqui Tements, favourable Tate 5 for their Energy needs, Transportation Equipment, Tax bencfits etc. The withdrawal of EI) ISS at this stage, therefore, will - I suspect - result in, inter alia, the indigenou s NonTraditional Exporter not being able to Export Commodities ordered by discriminating overSeas buyers to satisfy the everincreasing demands by their own Government's who insist on stringent health requirements in their food imports. His profit margins, as it stands, are too thin to upgrade his Cleaning/Processing facilities and if he cannot conform to the health standards of his buyers, Sri Lanka stands to lose valuable markets — perhaps not to re
(Cori rrriread ar page !!!)

Page 27
Population censuses of
Paul Caspersz
hough in migration of South Indian persons
se Çond quarter of the last century, it was (): 1911 that they Were given sic parate classification country. The censuscs of 1871, 1881, 1891 and la tcr cens Luscs sepsi ratic ly called "Ceylon Tamils" ' the latest in a very long 5 cries of waves of imm wave that would not be rolled back and 50 m:
ISTIS
The figures are interesting and by themselves |
Indian Tamils' in Populati
Celsus Yei T 1911 192 1931 Total Population (in '000s) 4,106.4 4498. 53064 **Ceylon Tamils' (in "000s) 528. 57.3 598.9 "i1IdijEa [l T:i 1i1s"" (in '000) 53.) 5D2.7 88.5
* *Ceylon Tamils" as % of Total Population 12.8 1.5
3 "Indian Tamils' as % of Total Population 1. Η 3.4 15.2
Source: Statistical Abstra CF, 1985, Table 17
Many things can be said or hazarded in inter the population Cen5uscs, But for olur present pl than 50 percent fall in thic percem tage of “Indi: year period, 1971 - 1981.
One explanation of the drop is that some Tamils" in 1971 had acquired Sri Lankan citize Hence thic absolute figure of Ceylon Tamils' in th and the percentage rises from 11.2 to 12.7.
The second expla nation is "repatriation” unde Governments of Sri Lankal and India. In Parlia II: dasa stated that out of the 600,000 persons - Indian citiz cinship a Ind be tak cm away to India 4 1964 of 170,582 persons, had in fact received c. the Prime Minister's figure, 84,121 were still in is correct, 337,086 perso 15 — or about 80 per cc LLLLLL auH HHKaLLa LLa aLLLLHHLaJS S tLLL S00 a S0000SS "the natural increase' of 170,582 persons or ap last two censuses a total of approximately 47 reasonably, though not exactly with the figure o 1985 as being the total loss by nigration from
Two to the T expla na ticis a Te offic Ted for the ciri years. One is family planning, the planned dri cial in centive, persuasion and c cricion, and th probably orc effective in the estate scot or that of very minor influence, is that fact that when ethnic group, the children tend to take on the safeguarding life and property. Hard document however, lacking.
The four factors, bicfly described, therefore e absolutc number of Indian Tamils" between t

“Indian Tamils'
into the workforce of Sri Lanka began in the nly with the decennial population census of in the ethnic distribution of population in the 901 had lumped together as 'Tamils' what thic and Indian Tamils". By 1911 it was clear that tigration from South India into Ceylon was a new ited a special name and special slot in the
tell a story.
On Censuses 1911 - 19S
1946 1953 1963 1971 1981
657.3 SO979 O5S2) 1899 4846.8
733.7 88.7 1154-7 1424.0 SS.
780. 974.1 1123) 1415.B 818.7
O ().9 II.O 1.2 12.7
11.7 O 10.6 | LÉ 5.5
pretation of the significance of the figures of Irposes it is important to consider the more in Tamils" in the total population in the tem
of those who had been classified as Indian nship and entercd as '"Ceylon Tallis' in 1981. e total population rises from 1,424 m to 1.887 m
the Agreements of 1964 and 1974 between thic Lent on 30 January 1984, Prime Minister Prema"the accountable number' - who had to receive 21,207 canly, with " " the natural in crease” sin cc itizenship. Of the 421,207 persons according to Sri Lanka at the end of 1981. If this figure int of the accountable number - had gone to To this number must be added 80 per cent of proximatcly 140,000 persons. Hence between the 7,000 had gone to India. This figure tallies f 462,000 as given by the Statistical Abstract
197 t 198 op in the number of Estate Tamils in rccent ve for which through a subtle mixture of financ provision of woefully inadequate housing is elsewherc in thc country. The other, probably an Estate Tamil marries a person of another label of that ethnic group in the interest of lition in support of these two explanation is,
Ixplain the sharp drop of 45 per cent in the he population censuses of 1871 and 1981.
25

Page 28
A. Curse from...
fСолfiлifed fголт детѓе 83)
engineers and planners rather those of the short sighted, construction conscious be heeded, Action Illus b e take T 500 to prevent 'river of blood" being shed agai II.
In Ruhuna, With the
gTo W= ing a Spirati C) This Cof Co L1 IT
* n11 11ց
01:5, 11 di this: of ou T lillpowerished farmers are being ignored a gain. Once the pro
blems of the leaks on the right Balık if the Samalala wc wä are solved, and Water strict in it for developing Hydro Power, can’t this water be the El Tcle al 5cd to the mighty Walawe by the cIld of this year Water from w ct upper Teaches of the Walwe could the Il be brought into the dry Kuda Coya (a llajor branch of thic Kirindi Oya). All that is required in the view of a hulil ble layiman; is the construct
SAARC. . . .
(ரோlited fr pாgச 14)
It includes the global policy and the regional adjustments to global competition and changing In arkets, joint effort at blending and marketing, technological co-operation for improvement of the product and the development of new products, co-operation in auctions, the growth of the huge South Asian
market, Tourism offers widely varying opportunities for cooperation in the development
of the infrastructure tTawel, by land and lir, concessional Tcgic nal fares, regional tour packages which facilitate the routing of tourists from outside the region through a regional it in erary, interial tourism.
The first set of initiatives would have to be carefully sclected. In the areas of trade and industry, they should facilitate the market to devel op
26
ion of about a Ç0 Il tour chan Tť OO ft. CILLI :1ve WatcT5 fT existing Ukgall the already f haruWa tank. be made to join the Kuda ם 1Wם 5 חt וdow I age at Llun uganw important aspe porary solution, fiit i 11 til Id II to the 5 (Luth CTT ment plan,
Diyabetima ( cation - is the village in this the bou. Il diary ) ga muwa Provin be an indicati structure of gineers. Now E der good, virgi cast aside, fo collective, weak
the 5 tIL CtLII:s ווWith Comple I strengthen the compleme Tı tarit developed by air WErious for Ims of attempting gimes which se t Tilli 5 tiCJI I T. cialisti. Il fričio T ti ČIls of this t acceptable to complementarit specialisation emerge through the operatico II How govern Ill. to develop th policy, create tiwes and provi a te guidelines. specific suppor ca. In help to di titutional capaci to study and trends, i del tify bilities al Id sic of col In plement Cf regional s the basis of C0I co III parative ad

15 milc long :l, on about the to bring Walom the already :āl tota Jānic Lut t) functioning Bal
Watc. will the flow down and Oya, and flow the Water shortlcra. The lost of thi 5 te: Ilis that it will
TטLחiורים וזווית "Lנון 1 area de vel Cop -
* E3F): E) bisulit
namic of a jungle arca (almost On f the Uva Sabaraces) and Could in of an ingenous ur irrigation enHurried dccply un1, soil, and ПЈ W
ory yet these highly skillful, mighty feats of hydraulic engineering are today deeds only meant to proudly boast about It is such feats of engineering skill that III a de this now furgotton cast aside area be rescrred to the Well assa (lacs and lacs of paddy tracts) which was the solid basis of a Sri Lanka (Sinhala"?) Mahayana buddhist. CivilizätiÜIl als revelled I0 W, by the ruins discovered in the Buduruwagala, Okkampitiya, and Ma liga wila a Tea.
The Tefu sal to learn fr C3I Tl and evacuatic the skills of Cllr ancients could certainly be a punishment, a curse cast on
us all by the gods - to both peasants and engineers, for having forgotton this grcat
cultural heritage of that civiliZation that existed here in the
irgotten in our dicep southern Ruhul Dit in the
t, national men- 6th and 7th century A.D.
of production | Export . . .
entarities which (ried frர நரச சிே)
linkages. But gain thern again. It Will be
i es cannot be tifically imposing of specialisation Lo ili traducc TeT ek to plan indusi decide on spe1 abwe. Restricype will not be
countries. The ies Ei 1 di fo Tim 5 of
will have to the markct and of Illa Tket ToTc es, :Its can help is fr:Ille Work IF the right in cellde the appropri
In terms of more tive II Easles it 2velop the instity in the region monitor regional | energing capaiilitate the growth aritics ald for Ills pecialisation on In petitiveness and Will tilge.
conceded that most Export efforts, particularly of Land and Resource-short Dew cleping CCP Lintries entering Export markets against established competitors with Land-Resource advantages, need It I cast some tangible support until they are sufficiently developed to be con their own against competing Ilarkets. Thus, it will be seen the EDISS Scheme helped the Sri
Lankan Exporter to keep his 'head above water against heavy odds. The withdrawal
of the Schelic can Teal his absolute and untirnely dern ise in today's competitive World of exports.
Let us hope, therefore, when we enter 1992 - rightly declared
by the Government as "Our year of Exports" - We do so in a spirit of assurance and
support to the Non-Traditional Export Sector and that we do not en ter 1992 by strang ling 'the goose that lays the gold'en cgg'.
A. Kan dappah
SLLLLGGaLLLLL S CTLLLL CTCHLLCCLL LCCCLGL Chamber of CarНmerice)

Page 29
Land Reform (4)
Environment and polic)
S. Sathananthan
olicy deliberations in the
National State Assembly were conspicuous in their neglect of enwis on Illiental Iniail aigement; which is a reflection of the intensity of the food crisis facing the country at that time and the consequent need to boost agricultural output rapidly. However, environmental considerations were not ignored altogether. The minister of Agriculture and Lands explained that “there (is) Illo scientific plan for agriculture" and indiCatcd that the Ilain Eli II' of State policy was that "agriculture must move towards regional specialization" (Ha Tisard, vol 2, 1972:43-46) on the basis of agro-climatic regions. To Wards this end, the 1972 Law empowered the APCs "to prepare Hпd submit to the Minister for implementation. . . schemes for Cn su ring the efficielt fra Trining of agricultural lands and their management, mainten Tc Td improvement' (S.24(2) (d)).
The initiativic foT specialization, complete with its 'scientific' content, was evidently held out to be a policy innovation in 1972. But it had already been pTp 35Cd by the colonial State in 1936 (see above). In the event, regi CJnal specialization failed again; allegedly on account of shortage of data o n cnvironmental conditions.
regional
But even if this tcch nical problem was resolved, it is difficult to bcliewic that cTavirollmentally sound agricultural practices could be enforced. Because the disinvestment in plantation agriculture over a
decade by private ownership in anticipation of nationalization could hardly be reversed in tlı - sılı ort Tun.
In peä sal Int agriculture the reasons, rooted in agrarian
structure for elwirl III e Intal der le 1958 properly reseal less all sin,0 St ide were included as regards Su (S.6) and Orde sin (S. 7); and not a single issued,
In fact, so I cles to clfrc քոnd managem agriculture und was anticipated āçtile IL of til 1: WS p4, per sluim ation thuis: *: 1y El dd Lice tel go. why he obtains may be a pr with the 50 il always be the inadequate wat Le . . . No ob
çLuld be ewe 1972:1). A mer position critic
being based p and "totally de experience of reference to for efficien W by the cultiwat
argued that t pended on irri ture being pr
efficient Water
often impossibl operations wer for the average sard, Wol 2, 19
Il the was drawn to (economic) cc are inh Crent in sant agricultu יון c שm 1 וון tlerחu .tוtIווii: r
5.3. The Agrar
Ef 1975)
The rew dissolved the ,

makers
the faillITC of Iman agem en [ LID1ACt WCT : Il:"ET child, New eithemtical pro visi OL 5 i the 1972 Lil w pervision Orders rs of Dispossesthey failed and Order was We
Ille of ble ob 5 taling standards of cint ir pea 5:1, nt eT til 1972 Law befo Te the e 1c Law. A daily marized the sit 11cultiwal or could ld reasons as to ; low yields. It cabl cim collected there could problem of either ET T EXC:S WEIjective standard applied" (Stry, mber of thic Opized the Bill as urely on theory" void of practical farming'. With the requircle Int El ter II11 lage:Tcl or (S.3(2) (c) ) hic his not only degation infrastrucowided blt th1lt maПägепепt Wils e since levelling n51We סקאט , 0 e to" cultivator (Han72:89-91).
attention the structural instraints which subsistence pelTc and which ironmental man
words,
in Services Act
UNP government APCS di CCS i
1977 as part of a larger package of economic libera is 11, in which State interwention was to be minimized and entre prencurship was to be encouraged. However, within 2 years the le cd for Continuud State Inter vention in agriculture became ewid cnt and the Agraria. In Serwiccs Act of 1979 was enacted.
In many respects, the provisions of the legislation represelled a "throwback to the 1953 Act Lid those of cil wiro Ilmen täll management were: Inc) exceptions. Powers to make rles Which Would esr: 1vironmentally sound land use was once again Wested in El Il administrator, the Commission Cr of Agrarian Services Department (S. 42(1) ). As before, the provisions relating to environmental management Were unenforceable.
6. Industrial Production
Questions of en vir con mental management did not a rise with regard to the embryonic industrial sector until the establishmem L of la Tige-scalc man Li facturing industrics by foreign capital in the Free Trade Zone (FTZ) in the 1980s. The need to regula tc industrial growth as part of a broader plan of environmen tal ma ma gemel L. WELS recogniscd by policy makers in the early 1980s.
7. Environmental Planning in the
1980s
The Naturia Fid Corn y ger Wi:Ffibri, Sir Tregy, after its general statement of programmes and principles, outlined a plan of action. It specified measures which are to byc takci at Scctora i lewel i II 18 sectors to conserve the en
virol met and the natural Tesu Tçe bal 5 ç. 7. L. Agriculture
In agriculture, the Stra tegy
dealt with highland cultivation,
27

Page 30
agro-chemicals and tobacco cultiwa tion. However, most of the attention was directed to high!ון נlti/Htitנןtl gחlH
(a) The Stra tegy argued that beca inse farmers en agged in rain fed highland cultivation "lack. . . financial resources to
invest in and practice conserwation methods. . . (they) cause en Wironmental degrada tio In". It requested the Ministry of Agricultural Development and ReSČ a Tch ot) fem) WC CDyj To The Ital
constraints caused by rain fed agriculture by developing an alternative package, though b{15ed On Scientific Tesearch,
should incorporate the practical knowledge of the farmers who are expected to implement the new methods.
(b) Thc introduction of a subsidy scheme "to encourage far 15 to construct soil and Walt: T CD55 e Waiti) el Tith Works".
(c) Rehabilitation of irrigation i Ilfrastuc t u Te.
(d) Creation of a germplasm bank for crops.
(c) Research to sustain productivity of High Yielding Warieties (HYWs) of sedes and on cost reduction technologies.
(f) Discourage cultivation of annual crops on hill slopes Without soil conservation methlds and prohibit cultivation on slopes greater than 40 degrees.
(g) Minimize pollution of surface and ground water through excessiv c al CEL rele SS u 5e of fertilizers and agro-chemicals supported by extension educatil. 1
(h) Ensure income generation Hnd alleviation of poverty.
(i) Support production of minor CXp.) It (CIL) po 5.
(j) Regulil te tobacco cultiwa tion.
(k) Extend State support for horticultural development (CEA, 1988: 153-56),
What is remarkable about the measures proposed by the Strategy is that it shows hardly any a waren css of the history
R
of environment, Country. For in Tegressiv c land sistence agricul rooted in ag and arc obsta In CT) till manager halwe been cxt under the diffe discussed above :X a DI1 iI1e th1c T failur C of previ Clwir 0 I1m cntal I. $rாtegy is pe. CTibed 15 flIl Without any gri åt stake.
This ad higc Tiel Les the Actric the following mended to ensu
Il D1 El gement i II siste ncc farmin
(a) Discourage oil slopes with
methods; prohi practices I st 40 degrecs,
(b) Conduct a land farming t lc vcl of en wito and mi tiga Lory
Lited.
(c) Design a
vironmental pac O Ili ol 1 W | T | Tleil (d) Introduce a for farmers to
Fld Copt enviroIII tion leasures
The Act tcn l I Tial IT: fo II ag Ticlul I LI TC, I til Tärill. In reforin p1 three legislatic A CL, 1958 Act La W – Consider f3 TIT 1 Els an il ditiOH || LJ en Wi aige IIIE: III. The degra dation re imp) verish II het Subsistence pro mitigaited Imere a subsidy sche recognition of lationship to th l and of change the latt

debate in thic tance, it ignores tenure and subiure which a Te a Ilia [n 5 tructul Tc les to en WiT011ent; and which nsively debated ent legislations Not does it asons for the bus at tempts ät anagement. The haps best desId a response sp of the issues
approach perw Polar. Co 15 i der actions recome environmental highland sub
t
pesticide use Jut conservation bit agricultural pes greater than
survey of highKO) E 5 SC55 : ÇLITT: L. ninental da Image ! T1CH15 || TCS TC
training and cnkage for farmers Ell management. subsidy scheine induce them to lental Conserwa(CEA, 1990:2–7).
Pla Y has ignored In in pica sant hough major agtogrammes under 1952 ש1H - 115 נ. and the 1972 ed Len LI rjF 1 Tcportant prcConron II entil manenviron Inc tal ulting from the generated by duction is to be ly by providing The Without any its intinimale Tee ag Tarian structhe Iced to T.
The shopping list of measures enumerated in the Strategy and activities proposed under the Ac for Plari cannot ev en be dignified as a technocratic appT oa ch. As a pla n ning ex Crcise, it is hardly different from the discredited technique, of forIllulating a national agricultural plan made up of annual implementation programmes, which
had been in vogue more than two decades ago. As a plan of ac Licin, it is a collection
of environment-Telated activities which have little in collITO 1 with Environmental ITanagencint.
1977 and Sri Lanka...
(Corfirilled for Page ) President. Over the people.
The representatives of the people were regarded as supreme over the people.
Thc Pu Titan Revolution Was certainly an important landInark in the history of constitutional government. The mercha Ints and the gecntry checked the royal absolutism which had triumphed on the Continent, and the ideological ferment of the time inspircd further revo
lutions. But it failed, and Royalty returned. We must learn to give far more impor
tance to another revolution, the English Revolution of 1688, which succeeded. It established the contractual basis of modern government, whereby a breach of contract forfeited the crown. It has been described as the greatest thing done by thc English nation. It inspired the American Revolution and Jefferson's magnificent Declaration of Independence asserting the principle that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governe di and, what follows logically, the right of the people to overthrow governments which go against that consent. If we a Te really serious about democracy in Sri Lanka we must try to restore the contractual basis of government, and the first desideratum for that is an assertion of the su premacy of the picople over the Te presentatives of the people.

Page 31
Why there's so in this rustict
There is laughter and Eght barter amongst these rural dart-sels who are busy sorting clf tobacco leaf in a bat Ti. It is one of the hundreds of 5 Luch
has spread out in the mid and upcourly intermediate zone where the arable land remains falo - during the fi seist II.
Here, with careful rul Iuring, tobacco grows is il lucrative cash crop and the green leaves turn in sold. to the value of over Rs. 250 Italian or Flore annually, for perhaps 143,00) rural folk.
 

昌 ENRICHINGRURAL LIFESTYLE
und oflaughter obacco barn.
Tobacco is the industry that brings employment to the second highest rumber of people. And these people are the tobacco bar to Tiers, |-: 10bFCCJ growers and those who work for them, ori ha lard and in the barris.
Fut them, the tibi: CCC leaf TEF-ris meaningful work, a cornfortable life and a secure future. A good crough reasor for laughter,
CeylonTobacco Co. Ltd.
Sharing and caring for our land and her people.

Page 32
We are a different kind o
There are a multitude of Gua,
They who guard the fre
They who protect the b
They who guard the de each of us is entitled a
Each of us is a Guardian to others w.
dependency in day to day life.
But the difference is our Guardia
for your future. We are trusted money, guiding you on how to
and your dependents tomorrow.
A Differe
 

Guardiam to you.
dians during your lifetime.
2 dom of speech & expression. asic human rights of mankind.
nocratic freedom to which
citizens.
ho look to us for their
hnship rests on our deep concern Guardians of your hard-earned
spend and how to save for you
Reach out Today r life-long Guardian
LE*S BANK
t kind of Guardian for you.