Page 1
* SPOTLIGHT 0N MA
Vo , 14 No. 15 December 1 , 1991 Price Rs
Ghanaka 1 Ajit Sam Sarath A S. Path Sumanda
Mervyn
Shelton Kodi Thomas Abr Dilip Mukerj
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

DRID
- Bertram Bastiampillai
4 maratunga arama yake ітитиgата Piravitana
Mahendra
de Silva
kara aham ее

Page 2


Page 3
Briefly . . .
SELECT COMMITTEE
Followiпg the acceptaпсе of a privata member's motion by the SLFP Kalutara District MP Mangala Munesinghe a 43 member select committee of parliament has been appointed to Work out a solution to the ethnic problem. Mr. MLInesim gha wi II head the Committee.
The Government Parliamentary Group not only decided to accept the opposition MP's motion but also to back him äS Chair mā.
* The motion reads: "This Parliament is of opinion that a Select Committee of Parlia
Tignt be appointed -
(a) to arrive at a political solution to the question in Wolving the devolution of power to the Northern and Eastern provinces.
(էյ)
(i)
t0 POTE WÊat —
the disintegration of the יחסatiח
(ii)
the killings of innocent
civilians, members of the armed forces and Youth fighting for a Cause:
the increased militarisation of the culture of violence in our country and
(iii)
(c) to achieve peace and political stability and utilise the reduced dafence expenditure for
rapid a Colomic growth
and national develop
it.
NEVV ARMY COMMANDER Lt. General Cecil Waidya. ra tre has assu Ted Com Thand of the Sri Lanka Army; ha Was earlier Chief of Staff.
The retiring Army Commander Lt. General Hamilton Wana
singha has General Offic the Joit O mand.
FIELD,
Mr. E. J. been appoiпtt missioner to succeed Mr. D
IMI DAMI AT Indial Prin Simha Rao h: Minister Thor on a Visit to WOL di COTe a SAARC su Scheduled aga
HOR DES (
Eighty thous practis ing mɛ Lanka Compa 3000 qualifiaC Was revealed Medica | Prac ciatioп presidє de Zoysa. He of the quaC hospital labo estate dispans returned nurse
The nation for a serious thea authorities something st
this, Dr. de 2
TRO UBL
CAMP
Polica releasi of those arres in Wolwemiënt in ties at the Sri DLIFE Uniwers Glashes On the Versity authorit SOLICES said evidence of JN hind tha umre: är e domestic, 1
The students ing against -- ith of Affiliated lêges.
At the Univer wo student g in fisti GLITsS.

been appointed er Commanding perations Com
NEW HC
Field CMG has 2d High ComSri Laka to 'avid Gladstone.
PM WILL TEND
e Minister Narais told Touris
da man Who Was Delhi that he to Colombo for it if it isךחוח
i.
OF OU AACKS
and quacks are }dicing in Sri Ired to about doctors. This by Independent itioners' Assort Dr. Berard
Said that most ks were exrðr5, Orderlies, Br5 and Dubaj
aides.
was heading
health crisis if did not do to check Oysa Said.
E AT THE
SES
Bd 14 students led for alleged
Wiolet activi
Jayewardeneity, following * Ca Thp US. Uniies and , police here was no WP activity beSt. The issues he police said,
Were protesthe setting up Jniversity Co
sity of Colombo roups engaged
MORE TOUR ISTS When a count is taken at
the end of the year, 1991 would hawa brought in 10 per cent more tourists than
last year, according to Tourist Board expectations. 1990 brought 297,888 tourists representing Rs. 5,000 million. Tourism was the third largeast foreign exchange earner that year, after garments and tea ёxports.
|АННА
GUARDAN
Wal. 14 No. 15 DGcember 1, 1991
Price Rs. 7.
Published fortnightly by Lanka Guardian Publishing Co. Ltd. No. 246, Union Place,
Golo Ibo - 2.
Editor: Meirw yn do SIIwan Telephorus: 4475B4
Printad by Amanda Prasa B2/5. Sri Ratnajothi Sarawanamutu Mawatha, Colombo 13.
435875 :BחםhםTBla
COMITETS
Navys Backgrouшпd 3.
MEİS
The Region 12
Tha Estato People as
Bridgg Builders 17
Middle-East B
Bok Rugwi. W 23

Page 4
NEW FRC
Sri Lanka: Towards a multiReport of a fact-finding mission to
What are the roots of the conflict in Sri La evolution of the conflict? What hopes are democratic society and how can the internatic
These are some of the questions which sioned by PRO, sponsored by the Norwegi NOWLB and Written by Neville Jaya Weera, Civil Servant in Sri Lanka, it will be of inte ministries, researchers and all those Working
It contains a review of the history and call of political parties, ethnic and religious grc groups and non-governmental organisations peace. It also looks at the impact of Presi lengthy interview in which he not only ex outlines his understanding of multi-ethnicit
The report makes recommendations for ac are already being considered by the govern
ISBN 82-7288-148-9
Published by the International Peace Researc 0260 Oslo 2, Norway.
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OM PRO!
ethnic democratic society? ) Sri Lanka by Neville Jayaweera
nka? How has the ethnic issua influenced the there for the emergence of a multi-ethnic Jnal community assist the process of peace?
this report attempts to answer. Commisin government, Diakonisches Werk-EKD and development consultant and former senior -rest to international donor agencies, foreign
in development in Sri Lanka.
ises of the conflict and examines the role ups, the military, vigilante and guerrilla
in the conflict and in the pursuit of dent Prema dasa" s presidency and contains a plains his past and present policies but y and his vision for the future of Sri Lanka.
hieving peace and multi-ethnicity which
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Page 5
MEDIA, STATE, AND POLITICs TOWARDS A W/A M
Mervyn de Silva
he. Im Otto the LANKA
GUARDIAN chose which it Wys la Lunched il 1978 was "other DeWS, another view". Wict have never forgotten our declared objective nor neglected its a vowed or implicit demands, Yet resources - human, mate
rial and other occupational constraints (time, deadlines, strikes, hartals and "red letter
threats in 1988) have taken too heavy a toll.
Though we did produce WIKALPA, which made quite an impact on the campuses and among radical youth groups, a steady Sinhala companion to the LANKAGUARDIAN proved beyond our reach.
The press, the daily press that is, has not only influenced political and political currents in this island but has been an increasingly controversial issue, certainly after the initial SLFP attempt to nationalise the proUN PLAKE HOUSE newspa pcrs was thwarted by a single vote - one of several cast by a group of defectors.
But long before the 'national press' became a targct of State intervention, the print media had become a II issule in thic inter-party contest for political power. If it newer led to legislative action, the reason had litt le to do with the int Til sic merit (or lack of it) the arguments presented by those who assailed the "national press' and its proprietors. The critics were from the well-organised Left parties which were a powerful voice in Parliament but newer came close to the seats of power, Their common target was the Wijewardeneowned Lake House press, closely identified with the ruling Conservative U.N.P. .
Lake HILI! Sinhala newsp Tamil). It wa W(ice of all (Buddhist) cap the English-ed
The press bi once M. S. W. naike, Prime Senarna yake’s d Cof the House b chosen successo is only when tE this Oxford-ed beca rime thic arti of a newly ene the Silih Ella-Bu the role of th Lanka’s politi electoral-parlial tur, the Sin E conservative (t SILUMINA) an pala's LANKAl assert itself as of a Timore s politically. In group.
In the light it is very net that while the papers wielde Ca Luis C of the c 'power elite', newspaper had and therefore a influence over events. This be lỵ truc Cince the CT the "et Huic dominate the p
ion, inter-part. rivalry. The was Ed Tittel
mentary agenda issue'. SINHAI battle-cry of Mahajana Eksat which the Ill agent was th Ilinded Bhikkh Ek saf Blikkhli in probable cha Was Solo IIlon
TLH LLLHC LCLCC LLaLaC LCCCCCLCCH C THCCL0 HT and entertainment, and as agents of manipulation

TED/A.
Տէ: did a pers (and is the authentic IIn ergent Sinn hala italist class and Icated clite.
ргint later
came "politics' W. R. D. Bandara
Minister LO. S. Cputy as Leadcr ut n0t quite his quit the UNP: It le SLFP, led by u cated a Tistocrat, CLI la te spokesman ging challenger, ldhist elite, that c press in Sri c5 became an Tlentary isSue. In Lala press, both he DINAMINA, di radical (DhanaDIPA), began to
the spokesmen elf-awa Te, more obilised Social
if recent changes, e55ary to note English language d : "power' beharacter of the the Sinhala the circulation Wider, potential opinion and :Catme particulairTamil question issue' began to olitical discuss
y debate and Ethnic problem
to the parlia
als al 'language A. ONLY, the the SLFP - led h Pera muna, of ain mobilising c politicallyls and their
Perari Liria. Its Tipion of course West Ridgeway Hiа ав
instruments of Eand in doctrination ir
BACKGROUND
Dias Bandara naike. Since that time, one can argue that the mass media became part of the problem when an enlightened press could well have been part of the solution.
Although the dcbate on this question finds most participants using the modish term 'media' (conscious perhaps that wc now have T.W.) it is often forgotten that radio which is well over half a century old, enjoys much greater access to thic community, than the written Word. And radio has always been 100% state-owned and state-Tull. A lid this is LC codinary State or regime. In the 1970-77 period of the SLFP-led United Front (the "Left" was kicked out in 1975) and in the 12 year J. R. Jayawardena (UNP) regimc, thic State of emergency lasted six and eleven
years respectively. In short, this Sri Lankan State is no ordinary State. It is the State
Of National Emergency, armed to the tech, with the most draconian laws. The "freedom of the press' must be seen therefore in that context, a context of a State, fully and legally armed for repression, and in which the two resourceful communication cha Incils, radio and TV, are part of the State's armoury.
Reporting Violence
Meanwhile trade union (labour) agitation, strikes and hart als the main modes of extraparliamentary, anti-government struggle were soon be replaced by armed revolt, JVP (1971) and LTTE by the late 70's, escala ting after the 1983 antiTamil mob violence in Colombo and the South in July 1983. The conomic and the ethnic were the main causcs of un Test, organised violence
Information
- HERBERTMARCUSE 3

Page 6
and Armed revolt. The L Wo forces of violent protest are in flt inter-ctive, Ad relil
S.
How does the press function іп such a context. A good example was the static-run RADIO CEY LON during the 1958
riots. Here is E. F. C. Ludowy k's
ACCL11
The Lonte Ilts of the bulletins broadcast by Radio Ceylon during the disturbances showed a meanness of spirit in keeping with the depths into which the country had sunk. The broadcasting services were a govern
Tinent de partment; their use by the party in power proved another deplorable result of
the incursion of party politics into the administration'
Is the nature of ownership (state) the cause of the offence? The government did use the
Imedia to se T we its cause but how? By playing to Sinhala cha lulwinist senti Ilment in Corder
to 'appease' the mobs and the
nob leaders.
Private Sector
Was the privately-owned press El my better? 20 years ago I presented a paper to a Manila seminar sponsored by the Press Foundation of Asia. I chose the title di The Three Woices of Lake House", the strident, pro
Wocative wice of the Sinhala papers, the tinid, plaintive voice of the Talil THINA
KARAN (I had excerpts from both translated into English) and the apparently neutral voice of the DAILY NEWS. ... all published by the same firm. Yes, private ownership does not reccessarily guarantee fair and
accurate reporting, responsible presentation of news, or Cool editorial detachment. It may
not always be racial-religious bias or to ill ediate an identification with the publisher's own ethnic group. The reason could be as vulgar as money, through ever-rising circulation. The majority buy more papers.
Whatever the Illo Liwe, the fundamental issue is "freedom' AND responsibility... a very
special social-l bility in the ki sion 503cial COInt mass media fun
Social Respons:
is a total fi press, gula Tantee titution but re. actual uŠe by professional coc the ideal yia
this suffices Will profession, there of still Ctle. M pecially of the be broken. But the two majo responded in then in power. have been a g of the press th: of office. Its President J. and its deputy President Prella ned in the stre ta 1. Mr. l. R. brother, the et pcaring before
nal Court, cla Press Council
death-knell Wild MI5, B
SLFP leader,
Lake House
And what is
thosc two po We: and Tadio? Thi L1 nוח וחטים חם וחייו logy and satelli Will make that and Testrictive less to audicnic places. But ur
No press car ly frecir than But is it Bradlce who as editor of thi POST, the pap "Watergate an Nikoll, th մst LYING as hi recent lcct Lu Te He demonstratie HOUSE has only the US in the World th The so-called KIN incident US inter wentio hữHX!!
”For the first time, the Young nro seeing F
4 censored by their oldor"
- IMHIREAE

oral responsild of high-tenext in which the ttinո5.
ibility
riccdon of the d by the consstrained in its a sclf-imposed lic of cond L1 c t, red Ewell if h regard to the is the question Monopolies, esstate, have to We know how r partics have Opposition and Nobody could Tca, te defelde: T the UNP 7 Llt l cac T, la tCT R. Jayc wardena) leader (now dasa) Campaigets of our capiJaye wardena, "5
Tlinent QC, apthe constitutioLic that the
Billi was the F Dе постасу. andaranaike the de-nationalise
to be done about Tful Elle dia - TW e day will come ications technotes in particulat, ional boundaries laR. W5 Im èä Inin1 ges in the poor est
til then?
be freer, wildthe American. responsible? Ben retired recently WASHINGTON er that exposed d brought down PRESIDENTAL s subject for a at HARWARD. show the WHITE manipulated not media but dcceived "ough the press. OG ULF OF TONwhich justificd in was a complete
2) Since
So what do we do?
1) As professionals, We must make every effort to open up the closed system. More and more 'space" - that
should be our common Aim. both major parties will resist total and instant privatisation, we must plan out a tra Insitional PTC) gra, Illine for re-structuring at two levels (a) board of management (b) professional
3) A pre-election committinent
(manifesto?) to broadcast what his/her party would do to 're-structure' the statecontrolled in cdia in the event of assuming office and a pledge to implement the promise within three months,
4) Organised professional bo
dies, particularly media and human rights-oriented groups, to map out a pre-clection campaign to mobilise the voters and dell and that all partics include "media' ווט טiment 155uוח טas a pr their platform.
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story boing made before it is
ET MEAD

Page 7
Friendly advice from Japanese Ambassador
TV should be indepenc
Rohan Abeywardena
Japanesc Ambassador to Sri Lanka, Isamu Nilla, be as outspoken or as wellknown as former Btitish High Commissioner David Gladstone, but Mr. Nitta, too has some "personal and friendly' advice to authorities here on such wital topics like the freedom of the media and human rights.
This may sound strange as the Japanese are ra Tely known for CEllising ruffles, but the Ambassador from the biggest aidEgiving country to Šri Lanka said he sincerely felt that Way
and expressed his feelings on Illa IV occasions,
Early last week amidst a
busy schedule, as he was preparing to leave for Tokyo for the annual briefing Ambassador
Nitta spoke to "The island Sunday Edition especially about the need to place the Rupavahini (an outright gr:11t
from the Japanese Government) under independent Sliper Wision like the British Broadcasting Corporation or the Japanest COL Interpa It NHK.
Mr. Nitta, however, insisted that the opinion was his ID TA' based on the Japanesc experience and he was not interfering in Sri Lanka’s domestic Effairs.
He is Saidi Inany Sri Linkan 5 turned to the BBC or the AllIndia Radio to EĈ A HIETTI
.rie Wו
"Government should explain their policies to the բcople but people should have the final say. So they must hear the Uther side"".
Besides he argues that an
independent medit was Vital to
pick out any malpractices." "Criticism is a 1u5 t,
Power corrupts'.
Pointing to his own Country, he granted that freedom of exPression was not Werty old... - BLI since the second World War
lest
may not
the independen played a big that freedom.
Mr. Nitta se dependent teley On POInography, diri ing 'leftist El Te Elsha Ilied on TV, yet th pendent televisi
“Our experie free : Lid inde both press ewentually help develop a soci:
WEıile so Ie have already res to Sri Lanka | lations of humi ambassador Nit ( Cover Ile It"5 high per capit Colombt in other poor coun a strong Icspons this area. We interest in the sident Jayewar speech at the Peace Conferent the country's 5
'Interview
Wijitha Naki
Leader of the Wickra maisinghic, "The island" se that it was the The Wspaper il tı
Answering a q foreign journalis Cabinet press Wickrama singhe Jalpa These Amba hawe known bett a.In interview to L itu, which the a said that the te be independent.
The Minister נhןw wiםr Wiם tתi

dent
TW there had rol C in fostering
es abuses in inision in Japan violence and in
view'. People of these abuses Cy prefer ildeOn', he obscrives.
nce tells us that pendent Inedia, and electronic, I Stabilize ad aty,”
donor countries tricted assistance for alleged vioan rights here, ta' defended his continuance of i assistance to Corin pari som to tries. We have ibility to cover have a special
Country - Pricdene’s historic
San Francisco te, religious ties, Ipecial location.
NEWS BACKGROUND
. . . . . Last year Tokyo granted Sri Lanka over US S 170 million in assistance HInd Over half of it as outright gTEIts.
At the same time Mr. Nitta Warned the Sri Lanka Gwel
ment '''not to give excuses to other countries to force Japan to cut aid. Our foreign policy
is also arrived at
itl conformity With our allies."
he said.
The ambassador who left for Tokyo to brief his gC WEET ILTill I a byl the collapsed SAARC summit El I110Ing other things, also warned that Sri Lanka was not the Only country in need of El SSistance,
Japan was obliged to assist the starving in Africa, the needs of poor South American countries, where there Were is Japanese settlers, Eastern Euгоре Just awakening from Communism
and even China and India lle Said.
Returning to Rupa wa hini, Mr. Nitta said: "Every night I
Watch TV news. To get different Views I read The Island' and translations of Tali mil and Sinhala newspapers.
State control is Something beyond our understanding."
(Sriday Island
' out of context” - Rani
k. a Vurita
HC Lusse Rai1
said recently eIL1cd to thjIk Inly independent JC Country,
| Lucis tion from a I at the weekly briefing Mr. said that the SSEldor sh tould er than to give he 'The Island" mbassador had -levision should
that the Japanese
said th
diplomat had been taken out Of context".
Asked whether it was proper for a diplomat to comment an internal matter, the Minister said that it was a matter for the Foreign Ministry, but he thought that the question should be asked from the Ambassador when he returned to Sri Lanka.
The Japanese ambassador is in Japan at present but the Japanese embassy has not denied the remarks published in "The Island'.

Page 8
Media (I)
The Case for Liberalis
Chanaka Amaratunga
WE thic attempted introduction of a motion for the impeachim cnt of President Rana singhe Prema dasa has produced a revival of the traditional Sri Lankan interest in politics, (whatever our views of the Imerits or otherwise of what was being attempted) one of the necessary conditions, without which any revival of political intercist would be a barren fruit, r спајп5 шпfilled. I refer of course to the media. The static of the Sri Lankan lic dia Icmains sadly constrained and it is glaringly obvious that thosc who for Illula tc the Incidia policy of government since 1970, hawe displayed not a single jot of intelligence or en lighten ment. What is further Dimore absurd is that such media policies are very counter productive. Those who would manipulate the media for their crude and narrow ends do not Lilti II ately halwe Inuch credibility with the pub
lic whose intelligence is not to be Linderesti Illat el.
Neverthele55, it remain5 true
that several of our principal parties and political personalities, while loudly proclaiming their commitment to a free media when in Opposition have, When in office, eagerly maintained and even advanced the degree of state control over the media. It is therefore cissential that the Gover Inct and the parties of the Opposition bę canvassed for El clear
默
unequivocal co liberalisation . of the media, tronic. The L from its incept vocally commit free media. : reform of thic il the III life:S cratic Peoples' entirely of it was included amidst a marke sia 5 min of some parties. The Lib tC. A free Ille developed in ou to the All P which II set would I think basis for an en of the STI IL therefore hope be established Il citation of t
1. That the go, inform all b Imedia Whetiler private that the of all opinior be permitted b! actively encourg 2, TE13 t 311 st prevent control: UWert and sub restriction of In
3. The repeal
Coll Incil Act a II With al Ille W Pri to guarantee media includin of individual jc the editors (r.
Media (2)
Journalists: No Group I
Ajit Sannaranayake
he paradox of Sri Lanka's press has been that while it has always maintained high professional and technical standa Tds and produced good journalists at all levels it has by
6
ā m{d large C{] I walues of the Most newspape tantly support National Party rests of their

ation
Immitment to Lhe If all branches print and eleciberal Party has ion bicen un equitted to a truly The section on media contained to of the De
Alliance was is making and at its insistence
id läck of Cth Luof its constituent tוחם וח1L וחוון טט rH1 טו diä was fu Tthe T r proposals ma de Arty Conference yסut below. Thל form a good lightened te form Ilıkalı III edia. I a consensus will
for the imple1e se propos als :-
fernment clearly Taiches of the state-owned or : free expression will not only LIt will also be lgcd. eps be taken to of the Inedia, t le such as the ewsprint.
If the PTC 555 d its replacement
es 5 Collici | Act Teedom i Til the g the freedom
purnalists aga inst Owners of news
papers, the preservation of high standards of journalism and the promotion of genuine choice in newspapers, 4. The repeal of the Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd (Special Provisions) Act and the sale of the 5 ha. Tees of Lake House by public auction reserwing 25% of the shares for the employees of the Company. 5. The enactment of legislation making any attempt to intimidel te journalists of the Owners or management of newspapers Cor thic electronic media, a criminal Offence. 6. The removal of the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation
and thic Sri Lanka Rupa wa hini (Television) Corporation from thic control of the state and
the vesting of them in an Independent Broadcasting Authority which would consist of representatives of diverse political parties, academics, media personalittes and other in dependent persons of standing. 7. The privatisation of the Independent Television Network. (The bids received for franchises for television Cor. Ta di C) shall be placed before Parliament and shall be made pub1іс.) 8. The adoption of liberal and objective standards in granting permission for public performances of theatre and cinema. For this purpose the powers, functions and composition of the current Censor Board shall bc Tc WIEWCd.
}, Cr Arg t சேர df rЛғ. І.Еғral Party
(NEXT: Proposals For Independent Broadcasting
Authority)
dentity
filled to the Establishı III e Llt. Is have consisthe United since the inteproprietors natu
rally coincided with those of the UNP, The journalists, although they have competent professionals, have been Elffected by the insular political culture
of all island I til and halwe taken for granted most of the smug assumptions on which
our post-independence political order has been founded. There have been no professional organisations which hawe becı abla

Page 9
sense of idenand H
to give them a tity as a community sense of their rights.
סxt they hawםn Lטט h HשIn su been completely un prepared for the assaults on press freedom by successive Governments, be they the take-overs of Lake House and the Times of Ceylon, the Press Council Bill, the progressively mounting pressures on the press and now the threat of a Media Commission with wide-ranging powers.
Il such a col text, whilc it is ncccssary to ask cach Political party to formulatic and present a media policy, I feel that the initial challenge is bicfore the journalistic community itself. It IIllust begin a process of looking in Wards and initiate a deep-going dialogue on the
nature of its flı Tıctions Flıd responsibilities. What is its social responsibility and how successfully ha 5 this been
Media (3)
accomplished' any limits one either by gover proprietorial fi press been obje discussing sen: issues such as Question and
posed by the ci Wee the WP a
Thic first impi condition for and vigorous pT the incubus o pressure which heavily owcr it the usc of the friendly newspa pricssures such s[rint or tייטn of proprietors, su ments have soug newspapers to Climate of cal myed. The one hand pious need to broad E
Alternative Press
Sunanda Mahendra
t was only recently that the
ter IIn "alternative" Came into usic in refer cnce to mass media but the concept is of significance to journalism in Sri Lanka to ().
The means by which the pcople at different times of history protested against social inequality and injustice may be Called "alternative Illea. Ils Of Communication. Against misdeeds of kings the people protested with cle or two selltences, a vers c or perhaps a fable. (Aesop was the greatest practition cI of the art of "alternative communication".) All this combined to convey an alterDative wiew of Society.
However, the Inost developed alternative form15 of CoIl Tunication resulted from the progress of education in the One hand and that of CoIII unication technology on the other,
The structure of established and traditional mass Inedia is
normally cont LIII i la teral Torce Imass communic a 1 authoritarian medium contro or by a religio al ny other est lever frees its foTce.
The definition Iledia of coII given in II edia h Paret Ehl's The E Amercia I. Journ: OLIT atten tio Il, Hlt eT na, ti"We II edi: I 1134 king publica i FTC) Til the Lidei Cinta il facts This category c Which Look To II LISt be C. Il 5 de duct of New started exposing in American so icted 8 a fóðri Wiet li mill war. T gTOL Tid to the e alternative mediu

Should there be ditorial freedo II Imental edict or iat? Has the ctive enough in sitive national the National the problems TifTa пation betTil the 5tate?
erative and prean indic pendcnt ess I is remo wing f governmental
is now lying ... Whether by CID against Lunpers, economic
Els curt liling hic intimidation ccessive Gower nhit to pricssurise the lic. This - Has to He re30 vernment Öı ly talks of the
ship pattern of newspapers but it is precisely this on Inipotent le of th GW-lt Which prohibits the growth of the newspaper industry in the climate of a freedom and a proliferation of ne Wspa pers and journals is the best guarantee of press freedom.
The Gower III en Can I10 10 Ilger postpone the broadbasing of Lake House as envisaged by the bill. Similarly the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation and the Sri Lanka Rupa wa hini Corporation should be managed by independent authorities constituted of cminent persons so that they will reflect the totality of national life and not be clumsy instruments of those who a Te in power. But the first inperative is a climate of frc cdom Without which nothing is possible.
The Hopfīrer is disfarfa f'El Ecliffar, Isları LCT HHH LLLLL LHLGGL T CT SSLLLLLLS
a se thic co w incr- JFF 35F
cation was the coming together of persons sensitive to certain social problems.
After Lhs second World War these alternative trends spread to a large number of other Ficids too. So Ile of them cPlled by some tended to alternative trends in ... E*Porto con sexual relations, and to alternaation call this is trends in enjoyment. AnoYit". A mass ther trend was the large
led by the state us sect or by ablished force elf from that
of EtCTIE ti'ye imunication as istorian Donald Encyclopedia of llis "" dese Twes It identifics I a S=In. On I 110 11 Cyn ions emerging ground which and collicht. if Illa 55 - 11edia it about 1966 red a by-proJournalis II. It the injustices ciety. It also Ce against the Thus the backImergence of an =muniנחםט fט נITו
number of publications against
aparth cid. In the U.S. and in Britain the alternative press made a great contribution
agaisint the black-white conflict In the same way it also conveyed socio-political messages.
The young Inc. and Women attending universities, too Werc attractcd to wa Tills alternati WC Inc -
dia of com Imunication and as a result they too, on many occasions bc camc alternatiwe media persons.
In this context the main
alternative trend of communi
cation appears to be in depth
investigation of existing condi
tions and to persuade the audience to protest. A media person can introduce an elle
ment of sensationalism to such in depth investigations and protest. But such a media

Page 10
person cannot last long in the field. Such media persons will not gain much credibility either.
In our country too, alternative press has a long history. However, it is a history of protest more than of in depth investigation. The religious newspapers and the nationalist
newspapers tool test. However
of political p Lankai. Sa I TIL S; C0III 1111Ilist Par tha Wi Inukt hij F El change in th alternative press was When the
Media (4)
Hand over to private :
S. Pathirawitana
ow that privati sation is in the air and nearly everything of major value is to be privatised sooner or later, it should be the govern IT ent's aim Ö hand Wer The In Ost valuable thing it now holds in the form of the Rupa vahini, the SLBC and the major newspaper group in the island to the priWELLC 5 CICLIT.
If we are told that steps are being taken to hand over some of these bodies to the private sector, then we must take care to see that they do not fall
Media (5) -
into the hands of the govern naturally have to those who cious gesture,
IIl the Schwiel that are being Fire told, are I of not crony cron y bur caluci that kind of not deliver the proponents of
in Illind.
The difficul Ilets hawe i
Need for an open political
Sarath Amun ugama -
P:೩! realisable demo. cracy has the following basic clements: universal adult suffrage in free elections, the right to run for public office, frc Cdom of expression, association, political organisation and dissent, alternate sources of information and genuine policy choice, the accountability of
g0 W e T111 CE1ts to waters; Tulle of law within a system of inclusive citizenship, equal rights,
effective participation, informed free choice and ultimate majority control of the public Elgenda.
Two conclusions can bc immcdiately drawn from this tabu
Dr Ariuri Igaria is as Secretary of the Mfrií fry of Irfortrů for Trid Brdůd. cas firg.
lation of Findii cratic society,
frcc.dom of il the Iledia is cator of de 11 CCT is that Sri Lan tull Tc is W ef precisely in th
| Will Confin to the electroni particularly its was comparativ setting up of ironic that the poration status WES TICA I 1 t t ) freed) II., IIn r: site has happe pressurcs of ou tiLTE
Now the Me is presented

a path of prothe emergence ties like the maja Party, the y and thc Jana:Tai mu na lcd to content of the One such stage power of the
SeCtOr
Of thic friends ent who would to be grateful made this gra
Union Ventures privatised, we ow in the hands capitalists but ats. Obwiously, rivatisation can: goods as the privatisation have
ty that govern
in parting with
| culture
ces" of a demoThe Tirst is that formation and a primary indi'acy. The second kan political culully inadequate is aspect.
Le my comments c mcdia. Radio,
incws division, ely free till the S.L.B.C.. It is granting of Corto Radio Ceylon
give it greater ality the opp ned due to th
ir political cu
dia Commission with a similar
lead struggle.
used to class
newspapers Was the working Another was when newspapers were used for the purpose of winning the teachers' demands, Dr. Siri Iida Mendri is Serior Lecturer, Depr of Mass Callurification, CTCCTTLT STLLLLSSLS LTTS LCLLLLLLS LS L GLHHL LHHLS Cerpr, frari a paper read (Ir 5th ArriverFary Mere ing of the R.A. VAYA.
their media is that they think that the job of dressing up the government can be done better by thenslves. But the trouble is that there are too many cle
ver tai lor5 ready to take up this task. All the prancing over the TW screens, all the
modulation of the sound waves and the print layouts cannot overcorne the impression formed in the public mind that the emperor has no clothes.
Or to put the matter differently by recalling a timeless Sinhala proverb at its pithies - Even though you may succeed in fencing the cntire country you may never succeed in fencing the Imouth (Rata wataka raveta bendath kata Wataka ra bate bandinda),
Yhe l'rsser
). WEPFS err.
ii r I farrier
sanguine rhetoric. The fears of media practition Crs are quite reasonable considering their past
experiences regarding state interwention in the media.
Sadly, the present govern
ment ha's the Worst Tecord sinc.: Independence regarding the media. Whilc talking glibly about media frecdom it has practiced
a vicious and undemocratic media policy.
Today everyone, except the
person who is legally entitled to give directions to the SLBC and SLRC under their respective acts ic, thic Cabinet Ileinber in charge of Information and Broadcasting - seem to be
giving directions to the electronic media. Legally, a Minister of State of his Secretary cannot give directions under
the SLBC and SLRC Acts of Parliament.
Politica 1 directions have, in terms of these laws, to be in
(Сот тілшғd on page 34),

Page 11
Media (6)
Democracy and Press Fre
Ajith Sarmaranayake
a IIn privileged on this occasion to be invited by the Editor and staff of "Ravaya' newspaper to språk om this vital subject at a time whicn it has assumed great pertinence to Sri La Inka’s wery existence as a democratic polity. "Rawaya' both as a magazine and a newspaper has in Waveringly upheld a collittle it to thic free
dom of the press and has acted as a for LIII for the expression of dissenting points of wie W at al ti IIle Whell the country was in danger of being gobbled up by an all powerful orthodoxy. This is in no
small measure duc to the courage and dedication of its Editor MT. Wictor Iväl who although coming into journalism late in a colourful and chequered life has boldly committed himself to the tenets of in. for led and decent discourse. I take this opportunity to wish him and his equally committed staff many more years of a Ctivc intervention in the affairs of this country.
Democracy and pTCSS Frcedon - these two concepts were almost taken for granted in that heady dawn after independence when we as a nation flattered ourselves with the comfortable belief that ours was thc Imodel democracy to emerge out of British colonial rule, the idyllic country with a literate population used to the Ways if adult franchise well served by the Welfare State, in short the archetypal political Eden of Lhe
Westmister et are again payil Image. But so pened since exposed on Wh that comfortat founded. Co. bordering om hc) full ethnic i. has earned a . | C}re Of El TITcd1 insurgencies by
of the majoriy
In ea T de Cimatica tion and the of democratic III i II:tti Ing in Int socictal collap to explo de our
What functi perform in this
Was it all ping force of taking society of democratic, alu/י' 1QIlizingח pliant tool of ment pa ndering prejudices and rabble". That
Lestion which d'IC55 coursel we5
Historically
know it was th hegemony of L cated compara
(WCT the rest
society immedi since indic pende Wardanc, Sri
0וand - n חwסנkI po Tess bH TCI, gi: a newspaper fr Daily News' I

edom: a short history
hos to which we ng nostalgic homlich has hipthe Which hlas at fragile a base ole: belief was שטח טlנal Witוחנן וחm locaust, a powerInsurgency which lace in the folkrebellion, two dissatisfied youth ' community, the n of El generalSCTİOLIS e T3SiCl institutions cultar a mar chly and Se hive 5 eved
illusions.
I did the situation"
press
to act as a shapublic opinion in the direction civilized, hars or was it thic the establishto the Worst instincts of the is the painful We hawe to ad
t
the press as WC Le product of the he English-edudor bourgeoisie of Sri La Luka D a tely before and Incc. D. R. WijeL1 kas b:5t st distinguished it the idea for GIT the British Low long defunct
though his own is thriving albeit fercnt dispensation. The Times of Ceylon was the authentic mouth picce of British Plantation interests. Even though the Guinase has who owned the recently colla pesid Independent Newspapers wore a striking Sinhala Buddhist visage they were at heart seeking to compete with the liberal, comparador Wijcwa Tidenes of Lake House for the mantle of press overlordship.
protege here under a dif
This class of newspaper owners shared the same outlook and beliefs as Sri Lanka's post-independence political leadership. This was basically a class educated in English and thus alienated from their roots,
reared on a comfortable liberalism which could not last bicy ond the boom days of the
Korean War, intellectually shallow and culturally and spiritually impoverished. They had known no great uphea vals or struggles, were not baptized by
the raging stres of revolt which
had raged elsewhere in thic colonial World. On the contrary they b.clicved in polite
protestation and parliamentary language,
The influencic of this class on the country's press Wis II e cessarily debilitating. The press by and large supported the establishment of the day which IIELL LEE UNIP. While ler. WYET ) owert restrictions, taboos or pressures on the press
9.

Page 12
as such during the first decades after independence the press was not adventurist or crusading in the sense in which that word is un die Ts tood in journalis III. To bc sure it was possessed of a high degree of professionalism and Sri Lanka
du Ting that period has produced some Outstanding End remarkable journalists. But by
and large the newspapers Were supportive of the establishment, conformed to its values and concerned itself with parochial issues which were of interest to the English-educated upper and Iiddle classes of the time. During these early years the Sinhala newspapers did not have an independent existence of their own as such. They largely reflected the thinking of the English-educated classes on major issues except for the Lankadeepa" which was known for its vigoTous and Tobust journalian and individual point if Wie W.
The attempt to correct this in lance provided even more disast Tous. The Sri Lanka freedom party (SLFP) both singly and in coalition with the left had been quite correctly critical of the imbalance in a press which supported the UNP and the statLI 5 quo. But its take ower of Lake Housc euphemistil cally rationalisted A5 a broadbasing only substituted a Gowernment monopoly for private monopoly, With the subsequent politicisation of the Tinnes under the SLFP lnd it5 tilke-over by the UNP the process of the Government's inter wention in newspapers has becomic accelcrated.
My contention, then, has been that caught up between the early laissez faire liberal"tole
1)
rance of the i: independence p later interventi mcilts i thic fic: publishing Sri H חששt bם וז - 15:h grcat crus Edding it in a newly-c If I see Il to or exaggerated
be to di TiWe L all the more si. me add that tic press it only ri I ure of our pi political elite The W STi Laikal
Now against and political 1) tok at the fall early years aft: til TC y CTC ( ) or taboos whi newspapers but happy to sup] The highpoint was of course t which were after math of t of D. S. Senana of the lati CT House openly 5 as the King maki ing his seemi Ingl Dudley on to th Luch to the rTorec ser1i) T bu qualified Sir Jr. Later when th revolt against Scina na yake (GC) tյut in August blandly proclai LIS Llall'" When th. my and administ to a 5 tandstill the har til by CP. S. W. R. D. the apostate f geoisie Was the he was daily drawn and quart ormously talente

Immediate postcriod and the on of Gwernld of newspaper Lalka's press ble to play the role expected of mergent country. have Werstated my case it may he point home rcefully but let be fair by the efected the faist-independence to rebuild the nation.
that ideological context let LIS its. During the er independence overt pressures ich flpplied to they were quite port the UNP. of this support he bizarre ritula 15 acted in the he sudden death yake, the fathcr , when Lake hoved its hand Sr by maneuvery un willing son e vacant throne chagrin of the t not necessarily hil Kota llawela. e first popular the first Dudley wern Inct broke 1953 the press ned Business as =ם וח סטט שlטWhו ט Tä tion had Co ITC as a result of the LSSP and Bandarama ike: ") I'm the bol i T.
ir pet ha te and thTo WIl to be
ered by the en!d but thorough
ly prejudiced Collete. It was only the visionary D. B. Danapala, bi-lingual to his fingertips, who dared to defy the brown salts of the "Titles' and their English Editor, Wictor Lewis, and reflected in the newlyestablished "Lankadeepa" the s tirrings which explo de di in the popular victory of April 1956. During the period up to this untinely death the architect of that victory got a uniformly bad press. During the first comil mill mill r ii) t3 in 1958 a li lillcm bracing press censorship was in posed by Governor General Oliver Gunatilleke who took over the show, whilic after Bali Ludaranalike ässassi la tid on thc short-lived Cai Teta ker Prille Minister W. Dahan ayake openly used the state radio for political broadcasts in the form of a Political Notebook."
During the first administration of Mrs. Sirima Yo Bandaranaike attellipts to take over the Lake House press continued. A Press Commission was appointed and a bill to establish a Newspaper corporation was introduced finally leading to the collapse of that Government. The campaign against the SLFP and its coalition partners was well orchestrated by the thrce-newspaper groups and thcre were even allegations that large sums had been spent to bribe and cajole. After an attempt to stage a coup de tat by rightwing officers of the army, navy and police against the Sirima Bandaran aike go wernment was aborted it was revealed that a front page welcoming thic new regime had been produced and kept ready at the Times'.
The Dudley Scna na yake Gowernment which took office at the General Election in 1965

Page 13
  

Page 14
Aspects of Indo-Sri La
Shelton Kodi kara
hawe known Bradman since o Lur student days in the University, more than 40
years algo, and sin cc those days hawe kept in touch With him, off and on, and always followed his career and achieve Linents with greall interest. Bradman has written an important book on an important subject. It is a valuable addition to the political literature of Shri Lanka. It is both interesting and infor llative, Written in El nice, easy style, making it wery Teadable to specialists in politics, both commın cn tators H Ilıd practitioners of politics, as well as to non specialist public audiences. The fact that the book was Written in a short time, to meet al deadlinc coinciding With the aborted SAARC summit meeting earlier this month detracts nothing from the value of the book. In fact, I am of the opinion that, a part from the mectings of the Standing Committee and of the Council
of MinisticTs of this SAARC summit which have already been concluded, this book
might stand out as one of the abiding achievements of that summit so far of als One of its worthwhile products, in the sense that Bradman might not hawe written the book had it Il tot been for the Scheduled Summit, Or at any rate he might not hawe written it at this time, You will note that I have said "one of its abiding achievements so far' meaning that I do not exclude the Sixth SAARC Summit from being satisfactorily concluded in the not too distant future.
However that may bc, the subject of my talk today is on ''Aspects of Indo-Shri Lanka Relations' and on this subject, too, I would like to take off
from the usciful discussion which is contained in the latter part of Bradman's book, in chapters
Thir Il by ki7raI . K-1":2 s giyer, a rected byrir hi rhyg i'r FPVeteraj Aktoj", kio Pri
Lanka: A politica :IL"Ա עוזטert3/H") India-Shri Larika '
7, 8 and 9, I der's a cCount U President's ow objectives in negotiations wit the Indo-Shri July 1987, to wow client Witt ethnic probler Indian military
Fנו me נI ;1 In t the view that was conceived in a hurry and recy, and delive ficient preparati of Sri Lanka a proper foundati duct of Indo tions and the s Lanka's ethnic of Exchange thic Accord w h i tion to the Act which coլIld h:1 опly as a gи which could h if the origina Accord, which peace and in Lanka, was in was the heigh the part of t that Accord t that Tamil m Sri Lanka coul been disarilled three days B IPKF to Si fore the ink in the Acco not only nost it was bound Lanka's freeds IInatters relatir Lanka's intern also proved to productive in escalation of

| THE REGION
nika Relations
d". Sieffer Koord
sir TeraFFFFFF" Ciritre of Fridrar orilla 51 of Sri biography". The ": y : ຢູ່:
Here is an insi. if the incumbent Il role and his respect of the h the LTTE, to „Elnka Accord of
India's own in1 Shri Lanka's l, and to the
in Sri Lanka.
those who take he 1987. Accord in haste, signed in relative secred Without sufion to the people ld India as the Con for the conSri Lanka relaolution of Shri problems. Letters WETE: ttc to ch had no relacord proper, and ve b Cen justified di pro quo, and lWC no meaning premise of the Was to establish *rmalcy in Sri it fulfilled. It Of In ai vete on le signatories to have thought litant cadres in | Cor would havc in a matter of inging down the Lanka, even beif the signatures
Were dry was Il conceived since t{1 inhibit Sri
11 af action om
strictly to Sri affairs; but it be very counterat it led to the 1 C. So Luthern in
surgency the suppression of which was precisely the objective of the former President who wanted the IPKF in the North so that Sri Lankan security forces could be released from the North for counter-insurgency operations in the South. What happened in reality was that not only did the TPKF got embroiled in a long war with the LTTE, but the very prics clice of the IPKF became a discrete factor confusing and compounding the structure of Sri Lankas" domestic politics.
These issues are graphically recounted in Bradman's book which gives us a clear insight into the workings of President Premadasa's mind when he asked the IPKF to quit Sri Lanka in 1989. The Indian military presence had enhanced the popularity of the Southern insurgency to such an extent that there was a virtual state of anarchy in the South. The President took the wind out of the sails of the JWP by asking the IPKF to leave.
There were other reasons why the IPKF presence had becom objectionable in Sri Lanka and I can express these best in Bradman's own words. At 75, referring to President JayeWardene's own statement that though Shri Lanka was a small Country, it had 15 million p Cople to die if anybody inwaded its Bradman writes:
"Now, in 1989,
in Prema dasa" s court. The IPKF was in his country albeit to disarm the LTTE. But their physical presence in Sri Lanka was Clausing major problems of governance t) li mili. In the North and the East his Governmcnt had little control. Visitors from abroad would come and O subject only to the whim
the ball was

Page 15
fancy of the Indian All airports and seain the North and East Were LI Endler the C) [1 trol of the IPKF. In practical terms, the 50 vereign y of El third of Sri Lankal had been ceded.
Tille ble of the IPKF i Sri Lanka has become the subject of de bakte and co III | Terit il India itself. Coincidentally a book on the IPKF has just been released i II I India itself, authored by a for her Connailder of the IPKF, and CC 11 mille I1ting on it, a Teputed reti Ted General of the Indian Army his said that the IPKF could Tot achliewe the desired result, a 5 it had no political mandate and the fighting command had too many masters to report to". This explain the peculiar irony of the IPKF fighting one group of Tamil militants while arming and training others and the Sri Lanka government doing much the same thing in a different context.
The fact remains, however, that it was precisely becausc the IPKF did not achieve the desired result that Indo-Sri Lanka relations has gotten to its present impasse.
апd ally. Ttsםם
I am very mindful when I say this that the IPKF was, as Our High CoIn Thissioner in New
D clhi put it, "an invitee force", and it is very deserwing of Shri Lanka's tribute
for the many sacrifices it made
in men and materials in
this country under wery diffi
cult circumstances,
My point is that its failure
to achieve its allotted task of bringing about peace and normalcy in Shri Lanka made the proper imple II cntation of that Accord difficult, if not impossible. We are still living under the shadow of that failurc.
I am not saying something that is already not known and which is already not the subject of comment when I say that Indo-Shri Lanka relations are at present at a very low ebb indeed. Wijesoma, some of whose cartoons illustratic the
pages of Bradr El Sketch of personality try a widelning cra La Lika Telation tigo. I think t gerates the real are elements o best of bilatt Indo-Shri Link so ab und nt good Will and to be a blic stor T1 in the E
Int11:1 H Ili had consultati status of the 1 Bradman his in new friendship
place it has posed. I thin portant at tlı i:
Wu countrics I their Tutual ot think it is imp should not giv. impression that fering in Shri 1 El filis.
נןIIlחַם It is ii intcr5tal te behi great deal dep til) Ils of thic
act 5 of the ac Very often perc to be mis percep been the case Lanka relations India misper ceir dencies in Shri policy or intern Lanka Inis perce tentis to w TdF
We arte meeti
the auspices of India Friedshi
it is opportuno this context th 1. Il di India halwe lens in their
the pist which in tractable. TE the citizenship
Til II ils i SHIT example, took
resolve, a list
was eventually tiation between tries in a spir. and compromise

an's book, had 1arassed-looking Ing to paper over ck in Indo-Shri only two days le cart001 CX:1gsituation. There friction in the al Tclationships. a Tclatio 15 halwe a tradition of onmon interests to weather the rcs ent situation.
1i Lakl ha ve oils about the 987 Accord, and entioned that. El treaty to realso been prok that it i5 imstage that bur must know what ligations arc. II ortant that India Shri Lanka the it is too interLanka's internal
mn attrih ute of viour that a ends on percepintentions and tors of politics. :eptions turn out tions. This has with Indo-Shri in the past, wes certain te InLanka's foreign a policy. Shri iwe 5 India's in5 - Shri LäLı ka.
ng today under the Shri Lankap Society, and E to recall in at Shri Lankal
resolved prob
relationship in at times sected le question of 5 ta tills of Indial T1 i Lanka, for
na ny years to 50 years, but it iettled by negothe two Cou L1it of friendship
"HE REGION
The problem of demarcating the maritine boundaries between our two countries presented no problems – it only demanded a lot of hard work and a spirit of give and take on both sides. I all sure that whatever frictions that presently mar the relationship bilaterally can be overcome in the same way and in the same spirit.
Shri Lanka simply afford to make mistakes in its relations. With India. There is too much at stake in the bilateral relationship as fir as both countries arte conccrined. For Shri Lanka the problem is not simply that India is our big and powerful neighbour, but that India is our only near Ileighbour. Our history has been dc termined by our proximity to India. We have null crolls cultural affinities. The potential for economic collab) - ration between us is wast, and it is a happy augury that the Indo-Lanka Joint Commission Was scit up in July this year, SAARC, though temporarily su spended, holds out good prospects for cconomic cooperation in the areas of tradic, preferen tial tariffs, joint ventures, andS. O.
can Im JË
We must hasten to restructure our relationship with India on the basis of mutually acknowledged principles of nonalignment. Towards this end, Mr. Chairman, let us hope that Brad Ilhan Weerakoon's book has made some contribution. It should find a place in the libera ries of political scientists,
journalists, politicians, diplomats, soldiers, in short all those who are interested in the
politics of Shri Lanka and of Indo-Lanka relations. I hope that we will see an updated second edition in the not too distant futu Tc.
13

Page 16
Indo-Sri Lankan amity
Thomas Abraham (Hindu)
hic dramatic collapse of the Columbo su III it of the South Asia Il Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) his left in its wake a clid of suspicion, a crimony and gloomy predictions about the future of Indo-Sri Lankan relations.
The Illo od in the Premada sa Administration is bitter, El Ind it is quite clear that at least in the Short ter IIn IIndo-Sri Lanka. In Ie|titoms will I el la il at al 10 W level. Mr Prema da sa had invested a great deal of time and energy in supervising every detail of the summit and häd intended it to be the grandest show that STi Länkai hild Stige di since the nomaligned summit in 1976 When MTS. Si Ti II) :"C Ba. Ildike Wä5 PT i Ime MinistèT. The SAARC summit was clearly intended to rivill thic non aligned summit, and prove that Mr. Prema dasa, who has maintained a low profile internationally since takig Ofice, had Whitlit took to a leader of the region, India wrecked this show, and the anti-Indian feeling that has Illever be el fall I below the 5 lurface in the Pricinidasa Administration erupted in full flow, The clumsy way in which India acted has shown up the weakness in its diplomacy and has cast legitimate doubts about New Delhi's ability to provide leadership to thic region.
Not the beginning of the end
But, despite the ineptness that India displayed at Colombo, it would be wrong to see this as the beginning of the colla psic of Indo-Sri Lankan relations, O SA ARC for that matter. In New Delhi's perception. IndoCLL LLLLLLL SLLLLLLHLL0 LH aLLLSS SL SC low cbb any way. MT. NaraSimha RHO's H'hsen cC H't Cỡlt mihit} was a reflection of India's feelings towards Sri Lanka. His presence in Colombo would not have led to any dramatic improvement in relations either.
To see the collapse in Colombo il context it is useful to Te
14
Wie W the Cur 5
Lanka In Tella tiro II y el T T SC). W drawal of the
Keeping Forces New Delhi Tel Shell. The il te: ionist phase Lanka policy W -|חטון , H 10W key of that Illin-ir Link m: Ex New Delhi's lis and except foi the presence Tamil Nadlu, th: was regarded : affait of ST i Lä FI ST Lälkä ideal state of : Written objectiv policy to wa Tids II avoid coming lu ofits giant nei Seve its Teed C the extent possib India Il Goveri I ed Colomb ac: crackdown oil Tigers of Tamil Nadu was anothe іп Indiап ро1 Colombo was co the underlying inter we Inti Ol 5 policy makers i El SSu red that likely to involv Lanka in the S
Several causes
While Sri LH ably happy wit its relations Wi Sal W Several T e: i II, but Imewer publicly. Mr. set in New fundamentally putation which Qppinsition [[} lLankan Agriccm its peak in Jun issued a public HE IPKF til Lav speeches till to da sa has alway efforts LL reTrls, o Tı c of the a ch ad II linistrati Il. gone down wel

THE REGION
- at low ebb
of Indo-Sri is over the last fer the withIndian Peaceill March 1990. reated int) E. 15 E, il ter Weltor 11 dia's Sri als replaced by -reactive, policy teTfeTence. Sri remely low in t of priorities, LIII II of refugees in Le etlı Illic issule: Ls, a il terill
Inka, , this was an i ffilis, The Lue of Colt II ho'5 ndia has been tj Il der the shadowy hbour and preIII of actit Lco le. Since 1990, ents have helpliewe this. Til
the Liberation Eelam i Täällil ir positive trend icy as far as ncerned. Though
fears of India t remairied, Il Colb) were India was not e itself in Sri ho Tt te TT1.
of Irritation nk Was teash tle; Stale Of th India, India L50 DS for iTTitiatarticulated them Premadasi Was Delhi as being Anti-Indial, a Tebegan with his the Indo-Sri et HII Telched c 1989, when he ultimatum to c, Ill his public lay, Mr. Premais described his We the IPKF as i'w clicints of his This has not
in Delhi.
The revelation that the Sri Lankan Government had supplied weapons – Colombo eu
phemistically described this as “5 ha ring equipment with the LTTE — was another callse foT annoyance. The arming of the LTTE by Sri Laaka was no secTet to the II di G. WeTImellt. Il fict, it W 5 I10 11 CoTe tL C S LLHHLLLLLLL S aa S Laa S LLLLL Government's original arming tL aL LL LLLLL LHHLLLLLLLS LLLLLLLHHLHaLLS S explanation that the arms had been given to fight the Tamil National Army (TNA) (allegedly
armed and trained by India) did not help matters.
The expulsion of the All
India Radio correspondent in LLaHHHaHS S HCHKKS LLaH HH S SKK SS S S CCL LLLLLLLHLLLL i 5 till CC of ST i L3; lk. El "5 15:1- sitivity to India's concerns. Indian diplomats in Colombo ha di urgld the Gower III ent to hold off the expulsion, and as a collpromise had offered to have the journalist recalled to India after a few weeks.
All these events had led to a situation where goodwill towards the Sri Laikal Govic T1 met was at a low level in New Delhi. Added to this were the genuine feEl TS Elbüllt the Primle. Minister's security in Colombo. Two Indian security teams visited Colombo in September and October and made a detailed study of the security environment. While the
Sri Lankans had done everything possible to see that Colombo was secure, the fact
that LTTE Suicide bombe Ts had been able to assassinate a senior Minister and destroy a military headquarters weighed heavily on
thCb5 e in chal Tge of the Prime
Minister's security, and they
advised him not to go.
It is quite clear that the
LLLLLL LLL LLLLL S HLHaKS SLLLLLLaLLLLLL S S LLLLL go to Colombo for various realsons, and when het did not come, III dia was understa Indably accused of engineering the failure of the summit. What happened in Colombo has highlighted one of the weaknesses of Indial
’’’Салrfлығd on page Iб.)

Page 17
India after the Cold V
Dilip Mukerjee
hic cert of the Cold Wall a Lld Sino Soviet rivalry gives India an opportunity that it has Lut it had in the past 35 years of ordering its relationship with
South Asian neighbours without,
the complications from F1 diverSe exteriläll i fil-Lie T1ce5. Another fort uit Qus but faiwOLITable factor is that the colntry's economic plight Imakes it obligatory to opt for al lowercost foreign policy, which mea Is relying upon diplomacy rather than military power to a meliorate security problems.
That there is a minority government in power in New Delhi is not necessarily a Serious handicap, There is a fnir degrec 0f Consensus a mong mainstream parties on the need for cooperative relations with the US, Soviet Union and China, the three major powers that have played a significant role 1In the Subcontinent. There are no sharp differences on issues involving South Asian neighbours either, though the Hindu
5 temming
nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) finds it necessary to take a sterner attitude to
Wards Muslim Pakistan.
It is something to be thankful for that India was well positioned to cope with the crid Of the Cold War. Ewen while cX. —prime minister Indira Gandhi seized upon the Soviet Union's Afghan predicament in the early 1980s to get the most she could out of Moscow by way of hi-tech weapons in return for India's grudging acquics cence, she also took care to hed gc hicri bets by making Overtures to Washington and Peking. The results were slow in coming but the cumulative
change was clear by the time
the Cold War was winding
down.
Among the most important
C0T1 s Cucces foT SO Luth Asia is the loss of Pakistans strategic relevance to the US highlighted by the cut-off of both
military and e Callu se of Luc lcE The change ha recognition of try With which portive relatio with US global
Not surprisin ministration is i India to explo) milita1 roy linkage technology for :lıcc cı blt illi has 5 et i t3, el il L1 Stratcs One other is symboli: cent steps for tr ties between the a Trici forces.
Simul Lilleusil ha5 1låde A gesture by acces position that issue which hal bilatcrally bctw and Islamabad the agreement at Simla in thcc fore, no leg to UN Security lute 35 of 1948 thwarting Pakis put India on t
UN.
The Clinese changed too. I ing declaratior With neighbours and other “ “heg ing now advo of bilateral pro Asia, including the basis of Pa principles of I La C
Peking is, () nursing its re. India's neighbou: supplies and T Els sista lice, but L. specifically gela mating India. India to be mag is at at the sa urging the smal seek realistics putes - as their acknowledge.

Var
ionomic aid ber transgressions, s haste ned the India as a coul
mutually supship will fit in
objectives.
gly, the US adlow encouraging e the scope for 5. Transfer of a high-performcraft that India rt on building facet, while the ied by more reaining a Ind othCr
US and Indian
y, Washington major political ting the Indian Kashmir is in 5 to be settled
el NW Delhi
as cinwisaged in the two signed L972. TEcirc i5,
:d to harik back " Council reso- thus implicitly tan’s efforts to he Inflt it the
posture has Instead of ringof solidarity is-a-vis regional gemonists," Pekčia tesi Te Slutiol blic Ills in South Kashmir, on
rich sheel, the five eaceful cocxis
f course, still lationship with rs through ar Ins Codicist econo Illic his is no longer red to checkWhile advising
nanimous, China The time quietly ler countries to olutions to di 5analysts freely
THE REGION
On the bilateral plane, the
remarkable improvement that has taken place since Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Peking in December 1988 is strikingly brought out by a perceptible ea sing of tensilo Dills a long the Il orthern bordcr. Confidence
building measures, a nong the in direct communications bet Ween local military commanders, hawe made it possible for New Delhi to mûve three Out of it S | 1 Inoluntains divisions fron its northern border with China to the western bord cr With Pakistan - evidently with matching cutbacks on the other side. The bugbear of Sino-Palkista in collaboration is gradually being laid t) Te5 ti.
With the sea change in the external con tcxt, can India afford to pursue a more relaxcd neighbourhood policy? Its stance, particularly during Mrs Gandhi's later years and her son's subsequent fiwc-year ten ure, has been se en by critics as overbcaring and hegemonistic, an assessment cWidently validated by an excessive preoccupation with building up its military muscle - a major factor contributing to un susta inablic fiscal and external deficits.
Although such comments have becn made by many others, both at home and abroad, a German diplomat, the country's deputy consul-general in Bombay, made news in August when he gawe woice to them with a bluntness uncharacteristic of his profession. His indictment was quickly disowned by his superiors but the issues he raised must still be addressed.
Leaving asi de Pakistan as a special case, India's overwhelming size and power guarantees descrence by other South Asian neighbours though this in itself does not make problems any easier to resolve. It should be
now clear to New Delhi that arm5–twisting is almost always counter-productive. The air
15

Page 18
dropping of food supplies or the so-called bread bombing of Jaffna in Sri Liika in 1987 was to signal that India could not countenance an all-out offcnsive against Sri Lankan Tallil enclaves in the north ecause a massive exodus of refugees across the straits would cau5c outrage to their cousins in India's Tamil Nadu.
Colombo was cowed into signing the Indo-Sri Lankan treaty but the rapidity with which it LinTa Welled show 5 it was basically flawed. Moreover, India has paid dearly for the II lisadvert L1Tc in tells of casualties sustained by the Indian peace-keeping force and Rajiv Gandhi's subsequent assassination for which the Tamil Tigers guerillas evidently bear responsibility. A fall-out from the Jaffna episode was Nepal's panicky purchase of arms, in cluding anti-aircraft guns, from China, leading to a crisis in Kath Iland L1-New Delhi Telations which was overcome only after a change of regime in both Էմuntries.
India will have to find other ways of solving the problems it has with neighbours: the demographic overspille from Bangladesh, the flow of the thirdcountry goods across the open border with Nepal, the detabilising impact of Sri Lanka's cthnic stri fe and demarcation of maritime boundaries with Pakistan and Bangladesh.
Negotiations arc the obvious way but India, more so than neighbours, can be faulted for dragging thern out endlessly and on occasions resiling from hard-won understandings. Demonstrations of good faith are called for, and this should include a willingness to accc.pt mediation or adjudication - to both of which New Delhi is very much averse,
As far as Pakistan is concerned, there is growing international evidence to substantiate India's charge that it is deeply involv
15
- mir.
ed in aiding Secessionistin
Secessioni both states ar Pakista ni impl thoughtful Indi the source of the violence concepts by a Gandhi and he for political even begin Sustained viole the present : there are few BJP's call to sai by armed actic tan because its Tent capability Outcome unlike
Taken toget international p escalation, thi Indo-Pakistan dragged on for t
Indo-Sri Lank
{Солfiллегl frм.
policy, a wea rather than subs|| bilcm at Colom much that India but that it fail cate the rell absence. The ernment was pe a Ware of the e: its relations w had sunk. Nei nor in public ly communicate with Sri Lank the one hand that its relation Were good, an it worked behi sce that the sl T Crucial
Colombo's act Delhi's reaction clear, and so
to stay away
Wä5 Scc1 a5 th, arbitrary bully.
A statement
A clear state concerns, follo" ing that Indi badly unless th

and ab etting Punjab and Kashit sentiments in : not, however, Llts : Id Illly ns. Te cogni se that the problem is one to federal iII perious Mrs. * Son. A seca Tch olutions cannot hile externally חנLinuES t חטם שט. cale. However, takers for the 1iti5e the b o TdleT I ggi inst Pakisformidable deterlakes a decisive
ly.
ter With Strong ressures against
S. cxplains the negotiations that
the danger of war by accident has largely been averted, India has shown no inclination whatsoever to discuss the substantive issue of Kashmir though the Simla accord specifically calls for negotiations to achieve a final 5 Ette Illelt.
In the present state of public opinion, no government in New Delhi cil afford to be accommodating in this regard. This, allas, means continuing tensions along the Western border, obliging both sides to
keep their powder dry. No policy of good neighbourlincss will be of any use because the answer can only be found by thic Indiam political establishment through hioncst introspect
II.
wo years. While (airfiety" FEIER)
. . . . sensitivity towards it would have proved more effective. Now, Ілн даge – 14) the message that India had tried kness of style to convey, by staying away tance. The pro- from the summit has been lost. bo was not so What India had bec in trying to
I did not colle, ed to con unireasons for its Sri Lanıklı GOW:rhaps not fully
xtent to Which ith New Delhi ther in private did. Delhi cl car
its unhappin.css a Instead, con it IIlaintained s with Colbo d on the other, 1d the 5ccncs i to Im mit collapsed. link httween ions and New W:15 nCWCT Il a de India's decision from the summit at of a wilful,
of concerns
ment of India's wed by is warna Would react
|: le '515 T10 TC
signal was that it wanted a more friendly foreign policy from its neighbours. Instead, what has been conveyed is the impression that India acts arbitrarily and is a danger to all its in cighbo'Ll TS.
The Sri Lankans are convinced that India incwer intended to colle to Colombo and that instead of saying so at the begin ning had allowed all the preparations to go ahead before backing out at the last minute. Wicwc.d from Colombo, this episode has illustrated what is perceived as one of the more
un pleasant characteristics of India policy - of maintaining a public faca de of highly principled idealistic policies while following a private policy based com umabashed Tealpolitik. If only India could drop the mask and clearly announce what it expects from its neighbours and what it is willing to give.

Page 19
Inter-Ethnic Relations in the Plant
The Estate People as
Paul Caspersz
t one end of the bridge
stand the Tamil-speaking people with real grievances (and more and Inore imaginary griewances tend to become real, if the solution of the real grievances is too long delayed). The grievances were acknowledged as legitimate by the now ruling United National Party. In its 1977 Election Manifesto it stated uncuuivocally:
The United National Party accepts the position that there are numerous problems confronting the Tamil-speaking people. The lack of a solution to their problems
has made the Tamil-speaking people support even a move In ent for the creation of a separate State. In thic interest of national integration and unity, so necessary for the condmic development of the whole country, the Party feels such problems should be solved Without loss of time. The Party, when it comes to power, will take all possible steps to remedy their grievances in such fields Els:
(1) Education
(2) Colonization
(3) Use of Tamil Language
(4) Employment in the public and semi-public Corporation 5.
We will sum III on an All-Party Conference and implement its decisions.
The Tamils
The elections were duly held and the UNP was elected to power with an overwhelming majority. On 4 August 1977 in his first Statement of Government Policy in the new Parliament, Prime Minister J. R. Jayewardent repeated verbatin thesic words of the Manifesto, merely substituting the words "my Gov. er Innent" for ""The . United
National Party' the words whe power'.
The Manifest
ment correctly Imain current Lanka's inter-e
the problem of of the Talli is arching identit of Sri Lälk : The formulatil ti CDI i accorded w tills of the Tar ration Front.
Of its direc Federal Party. the slightest ' dio? Lion Manifest Party stated:
The Tamil-s of Ceylon (al a Federal Ty til that wou to look after fairs alone w the from t Only under is tion could the people of thi in dignity and right to in eզuals with b) Teth Ten,
It is fir division of it uטl Wוןrטany f neith cr to Ll to the TH II i II-s Hence we app mil-speaking lend ther s political move Cates the bif CC) untry.
Thanı it was the Federal Party in 1972 thic Tal I i I for Ilıcd (DideT of S. J. W. Che the merger of th the Tamil Cor Ceylon Workers'

htion Areas of Sri Lanka (3)
Bridge Builders
and n it
omitting ches to
and the State
identified the y Toblem of Sri hnicity. It is the sub-identity Within the owert of the people s Sri Lankan. of the ques"ith the perceplil UI Imited Libic
ancestor, the the Te cannot be
ht. In its Elecin 1970 L hic
peaking people
so) believe that e of Constitu. ld enable them thcir o wrn alfould safeguard otal extinction. Luch a Constit L1: Tamil-speaking 5 country live with o Lur birthdependence as our Sinhalese
conviction that he country in ld be bencficial e country nor peaking people. heal to the Tapeople not to upport to any IL1 ent that H dwoIrcation of our
position of the 1970. In midUnited Front, the leadership :lwa nayaga m) by e Federal Party, gress and the Congress, put
forward their 6-point demands to the government of Mrs Bandarl Ilia ikc. The last dic Immand was for "'a decentralized structure of government'. The deIllands Welt unheeded by the Govern Inent and sadly had no resonance in the new republican Constitution of 1972,
[]: "וים though it was drafted by the Malrxist schola T and his Lorian, Dr Colvin R. de Silva. Disap
pointed and frustrated, thc Tamil Uni Ledl FroTn t a 1ter cd its designation to the Tamil United Lib cration Front. In 1975 the Tall United Liberation Front adopted the Wadukoddai resolution and with some resistance from the Ceylon Workers' Congress began its demand for
the separate socialist State of Ta DIni1 Eelarıh.
At the other end stand thc
Sinhalese in resolute opposition to the dermand for Eelam. If the opposition were only to separation, the clusions between the Sinha lese and the Tamils could be contained. This is so because the vast majority of the Tamils would not want separation if there was genuine redress of their grievances. It is thic read in c.55 and determination to provide redress, and actual redress, that are far to long in corning. Sometimes, as in the case of the language grievance, there is redress on paper but no implementation. Tri, T1i1 h:as bceIn decla Ted an official language by Constitutional Amendment 13 just as Sinhala is, but in the Tailway stations in places like Kandy the overwhelming majority of
public address announcements continues to be made only in Sinhala and English. Public
transport and private transport for the public carry name boards in Sinhala only or in Sinhala and English. The same gap
{Сонгfrтыed prт page 24)
17

Page 20
MADRD:
Bertram Bastiampillai
he Middle East Peace Coference is indeed a welcome and positive step forward. It is heartening to know that there are talks but patience is needed to be even optimistic; it is premature to be hopeful just now. One can only have hopes, after a while.
Forty three years of bloody strife and both parties still maintaining adamant aggressive attitudes cannot but Imake obser wers nervously anxious and truly sceptical. The recent ini
tiative cannot be expccted to yield miraculous results, and a CCLISalution 5 and COLI ItI
accusation from the parties in the talks, need to be anticipated. Emotion will naturally cloud the thinking and articullation of the belligerents. Anyway, in spite of an atmosphere of chargc and counter charge, that both Israel (Yitzhak Shamir) and Palestine (Hanan Ashrawi) would begin direct negotiations on Sunday (3rd November) is yet another step forward in what may turn out to be a pro tracted process with so many hurdles on the Way, and success at an almost unTeacha bly elusive distance.
The 5 tri fel bict Ween thic Israellis hi d beccm a mid is 5 Listained by mutual fear, a Tid the personal intensity of emotions that
is Illa Ili est make the leadęTS 3. [1].' differel, t - 5 de 5 10 ok. Htt anything donc by One Side OT
the other with distrust. Bitter experiences had made lhe peoples ranged con opposite
Prof. Elas rapia feche history Cular ribog Urriversity.
E.
Land
sides bclieve t justifies the em Imeans, ht) wew : eX a Cli Ig.
Historically, ground to ac Ilul tula 1 fearS the Palestinian: Before the gene 1948, the Jews s tוח t1שWi וIס שb The ATibs felt was bei Tig confis alien people. Israel was die Arab El Timmies e aggressively Wic Ol the Je Wish atrocitics occurrit
5 CIS WIC Arab villages. B culpable and o 1 cid Elit of thı types and in continue to exi still. Unfor tuna tried to expla: and justify thi their hostile ill; ald the Arabs similar exercise and ignorance the wrong ima of ill other (W. Cannit be et åse
Only a very prejudiced by This few can both sides and
understand one thic Lull till:14 te 1 tlc iiI ll 1 I Li ediate Continua ince of red depicted in time after time tence of these

MIDDLE-EAST
for peace 2
hat thcir cause ployment of any :I" T Luthlc5S OT
there is enough court for the leething a Inong 3 à Ind Israelis. Sis of Israel i i II Palestin e had of Arab Hittäck5. that thici land cated by another As the state of lated in 1948 In barked on all cnt offensive. side to o bloody :Id. Horrible Taperpetrated on Cth groups were le's :lctiQIl fLIC|- c her, Sereages of them St III el chi Side tely, the Israelis in their actions air existence by ige of the Arabs resorted to a
t. F: lliwe Tcil forced ge o ne has ha di :r decades; this di entirely.
ft W a TC 10t fear and häte. be found OT a Te i ble to another and see uscles sess and da II lage of the a Inge T and haltwident actions . It is the exisfeW thllt CHIl
inspire any guarded optimism.
It is in such a context that those who had been helplessly Watching the Israeli-Palestinian strife accompanied by mayhem and murder keep hoping even against odds for a political resolution. The present endeawo Lur by the United States therefore appears heartening and one wishes good fortune to President George Bush and Secretary of State James Baker. At the saille time OIC cannot discount the al II nost insupcrable a mid frightful huma In iirTn pediments to thic restoration of
բEilLiէ:
Israelis have because of their fear the Palestinian uprising committed Violent acts against the Arabs and generated wrath among their Imilitary leaders and other Illilitant groups. Fear, recrimination and reprisal, and des pising one another are usual and standard characteristics found on both sidc5. The consequen CC of nur sing such unhealthy sentillents is the creation of thic cycles of harmTull Teaction il each Side, (C) y CT the last forty years fear, both among the Arabs and the IsTaelis, have led only to more confrontation and Inilitant en
gagement and greater fright on
the two si clics.
However, when one immediately 1ooks a t i the meetiIıg in Madrid and what is to follow from it one cannot get away foll the fact that the real participants in the Middle East peace parley have not been showing serious signs of seeking

Page 21
peace. It appears more true to believe that they hawe been Imo Te than coaxed; they have been apparently coerced to come to talk peace. Yet the peace talks still can end positively if every participant in the discussions could go back with a scist of achievement or else they would soon work to flout any likely agreement. Also, the conference has to be represe Il
tatliwe of the realities on thic ground. Then both sides, the Arabs and the Jews, have to
realize that they have more to profit by taking to peace and abandoning ar Ins. Just now, one cal not sec that both sides are going to expcricnct a sense of achievement or that both sides a Te going to benefit by coming to peace. Israel does not have the mind to lose land or give up settlcm.cnts while the Arabs do not feel that they would have a state,
In fact, today's issues grown so intensely complex are diffi
cult ones that centre around politics. They are more complicated and not so specific.
One wonders whether therc had been enough thinking of peace ahead over 5ubstantive issues and of differences for which bila ICral solutions have already been considered. Moreover, reading the different statements e Ima na ting from the parties who hawe had al im Wolvement in the long lasting conflict they do not seem to have co Thwerged at the con fcrcnce With a clear sense of What the desired end should Illean. There is the thorny and mixed question of the representation of the Palestine Liberation Or. ganization (PLO) but here perhaps a weakened PLO may hawe to Teco Cile itself 10 TE to the representation accorded
to others with i flexus. Afte: erred in its regard to the Inay be conce pay a price for other hand are of the Syrians El part a Ind hard
Of course, tE haw C posed a PLO. The offic ganisation no di ted that they wil role in the pea the PLO want E for any Palesti tion in the disc assurance that a basis Will be
le gotiation. The cannot reject th initiative outrig the relevant A agreed on it. T hen Ce stal 1 El CC Lild SO le a had biffled til for so long,
Yet te time has it is not only Toole Els the scal of the Palesti that Israel and 1 could end thi Without solving is suc, pe Thal ps. head of infort of the PLO la Fear that "By PLO, the US be aiming at Ilain issues of drawal and. . . . tional rights.' " PLO hold tried it is a partic als bee I asserti be speaking on als Who do I10
PLC
:

whom they hawe all, the PLO judgements in Gulf crisis, it cd, and has to it, But on the not the stances and Israelis far
to reconcil c.
le present talks dilemma to the ials of the OTSubt have accepl hawe. Il a direct Ce process. But etter Çonditions inian participacussion and an | land for peace integral to the
PLO yyyy e pel ce tallking ht beca Lise al Tab states hawe he PLO cannot
process that problem that C Middle East
Hit the same "ehen 510Ils Lhlt
forfeiting its c representative ians but also ht: A Talib nations sir belligerency the Palestilial Jamil Hilal, latio II i In Tulis s expressed the excluding the El Tid Israel Italy excluding the 11. Is The II willPalesti lil Il IlThat is why thc to ir sist that ipant but Israel ng that she will ly to Palestinit represent the
PLO. Both the rights of the Palestinians and land are subiccts which if not addressed
would mean a peace that would be of little avail finally.
The issue of representation had certainly created scrious problems indeed. It was a challenge for the US, Israel, and pro-US governments to discover Palestinians who could participate in the talks without PLO approval. In fact, the US and Israel had wanted thc Pa. lestinians to be represented by officials who were neither PLO members nor residents of East Jerusalem and they even tended to exclude delegates from the Palestinian diaspora. On the other hand, important Palestinians had been proclaiming that their participation hinged On the PLO's acceptance and hence the leadership in Tunis hald the feeling Lihat it could not be completely left out. Then even though the Arab governments had not brought up the role of the PLO with Washington, exeCLI tive committee Ille beT of the Organisation, Abdullah Hourani had challenged all the parties to single out even one Palestinian who would participa te withOlut the PLO Consent.
The question of the PLO and its representation has definitely posed enough of pre talks problems; this should not be ignored. The US and Israel wanted the Palestinians to form a part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian team. The PLO on the contrary wanted to na Ile delegates and even to design the Palestinian negotiating position at the peace discussion. All this show's E3 w witally the PLO was concerned and now it being officially out of the conference does not spell smooth sailing in the talks.
19

Page 22
The PLO is bent on pressuring Israel to stop building settlement in occupicd tc Tritories. This has been a persistent and thorny problem and Illich of the Success of the: peace talks would depend on how the talks would end in bringing to a halt the establishmet of LH1-esc settle Ile Int:5 — LI itolerable 5 de to the Pales tinia I 5. While the US seems to have recognised the prldence of Israel ceasing to create scltile
ments prominent Israelis like A nel Sharon do not agree. Will the US make Israel see
Icason"
Another indispensable condition for making a my WČTLhWhile Iesult of the: la liks Wallld be adherence to the requireillent coltaic in the United Nations Resolu Lil 242 which w Lull mean an Israeli withdrawal from all of the occupied territories including East Jerusalam. T) Effect 111, ISTleis Withdr: Wäl from occupied territorics is difficult to in aginc.; and from East crusale II Would be a lost forbidingly formidable to envisage. And a complete withdrawal according to the Palestinians would imply the removal of all Israeli Illilitary facilities FIT0, the te Trito Tic5.
Thc there is the insistence of the Palestinians that they have a right to self determination which appea T5 un likely to be conceded by the US. Perhaps there could instead be a compromise that would allow somme kind of Els sociaticol b c tWccn the Pales Lilian territories And Jorda Ill Which Co L1 di bC acceptable to the US.
While the Syrians think of the necting as one where Israel would Tetu Tin the Golan Hicights
O
in return foT state of War, Is meeting is ab has nothing to A reconciliatio II rence in unders possible only that of Syria c US to push h side, Israel, to for an equitabl
The Israeli st
Wiwal with its soll ble less to w ПIHП5 hid heЕП all this tille had bailed it пшCh aid to a Wiilable as lo the US uild cI Wi Elwe beel later aid that need Elgaill be Call se : { Til LIClea T 5 l a t Luis bec glossed ov by the US W tole Tätes no ni among any othe ta' In or Indial. E of business or
wned in Isra Still considere capitalist state market econom: of her denial democracy to Isac had for der her Tule, 1 regarded her : iL1 :1 T egi 3I1 W devoid of del
Now after however whe only trusted all east, Israel, the Lcd Other ear li than Egypt, Wh recognise the This should II A gamble and ponsibility to single huբer ]

ending Syria's ael believes the out peace and
do With land,
of such a diffetanding can be if a sic Like an persuade the TCI thic other accept the need e settlement.
Tength and surb5 til alte - LITTEä - 1 Id5 the Pilles tipossible la T gely because the US ut always. S.) Israel had been a 15 beca Lise Of iting the In; loans C. Ilye Titel ilta not be repaid if the US. Thic OF IS Tael Hlas er and accepted hich of course clear capability TS Such als PHk 15wen though much industry is state el, the US has it to be a with a free y. And in spite of participatory Several, Whom sibly brough unhe US had yet as a democracy ith governments ULT : Cy.
the Gulf War a part from her ly in the middle : US had cl || Liwaler unlkely allies 0 are willing to state of Israel. ake thc US Tisk accept the resuse her present power status to
endeavour to settle this old fight. While acquiting herself of coil itinents to Israel at the same time she should show propCT concen for the interests of and her Tclations with the Arab states. In doing this the principal difficulty will be to Ila ke both the Jews and Arabs see the importance of humanism and Te150 m. This Howe We T is not easy for a few indeed are Tea 50 I:ible,
Neverthelss the present time looks ripe at least to have initiated the process towards creation of peace. Since the Gulf war some basic power relationships had changed and this furnishes hope for the prevalence of some reason in the Iiddle east. With the end of the cold War Soviet military support for Syria declined and madc President Hafez Azad till III to better relations with the U.S. Second, Israeli and the US apprehensions of comTunist influ cince hawe allmost ceased which made it possible for the joint Soviet-American invitation to the peace conference in Spain.
Substantial decrease of Soviet po WCT has les sened the need for the close tics of the past between the US and Israel and the enormous aid that the US dicted Cult to bil Her because Is Tal el is now Illot all that of l. strategic help to All crica in an important region. The Gulf WaT had de Illustrated that the US forces could be effective in thic middle east without Israeli help.
Although the US may stil becausc of historical and moral reasons have to assist Israel yet now a more detached con

Page 23
nection between the two is likely and the US will be re. |atively more committed to her own values and interests. And in turn the Israel is know that they cannot bank on unqualified 155 5tance from the LIS and they can relate to the US only by indica ting reciprocal concern to the US interests
t
It is in this background one häls to wiew the US cc II cern to cnd thic. 15 Iracl i hold of the West Bank and the Gaza strip i nd the iIi habitalints the Tc in Lumbering a round one a n d H half Tillion, But the US has El hard task here because Yitzhak Shamir and his Israeli government want to an mex, the sic weTy sa Inc territorics and if they te naciously cling to such a plan peace Will not come to the middle east. If on the other hand Israel would for feit the occupied territorics to preserve the US support then conditions augur well for a sett lcmcnt.
Also, if the Israelis want to hawe 5 Lubstantial forcign investments, and long term contracts are desired by Israeli companies then the inscCurity over the question of the occupied terri. tories needs to be solved peacefully. Further, the pressure of absorbing Soviet immigrants, building dwellings for them and Other economic Compulsions can iTive Israel to protective economic policics and enter into the world market. Economic pressures may therefore T1 akic Israel to be Illo Te accommodative and realist and perhaps make the pursuit of peace worth the while after all.
It is tille to Ila ke Is Tall accept that it is illegitimatic to deny the Palestinians freedom and justice. The suppression of the Palestinian a spirations for
alba Indon hcr |
freedom entlils violation of like the right assembly and a: tilians häve de Tic TT cedo: or force, from fiTCtim un llwful property and for freedom deportation, d death. Its only that ca I cac more fairly a retas ion and I1L do it if the U her plans to settlement of conflict succes
To sum up, rerence got of Tel LuctHTCC Of s Eltes Will { col do so to say оп ly supper po the debacle in
Cardinal W.
But it did
The mutit
At Gadinsk
Awaited ir
The Frge |
Walesa sai
Champagn: Fun toppli But only c TՃms Of B
TherBS a is

in its Wakcts individual rights to free speech, 3 Socia tio I. Palesfor long been il froIII tortu Te illegal detention, confiSc tipli Of those who battle lawe to fear of isappearance and the United States 'Ce IS IIa cl to act ld justly and see W is the time to S Wishes to push bring a peaceful the II iddle East sfully,
the peace confef because of the thic middle east lld Tot i fford to 10 to the world's wer especially with the USSR which
weakened Russia so much. But eiich actor also has an intercst at Stake: Syria would like to ha ve back Israeli occupied Golan Heights, and she can get it now not via Russia but the US and the West; Lebanon, subordinated by Syria, want Israelis expelled from the South; and, perhaps hopefully for all, Israel cannot do without finance from the US to manage thc Jewish imInmigrants from the Soviet. Yet, for -- peace to en dure and for problems to be solved, most importantly, the weaker Palestinians häWc to be assisted to get the Israelis to wacate the West Bank and the Gaza strip and the path should be cleared for the cmc.gc.nce of a Palestinian state. It is the In that one could acclain a task has been accomplish cod; a long distance lies ahead with scw
eral stop overs.
Brains Trust
Walesa Ebroke the
h't Work out the way The Master said. LI de by the dying Sea it Was, not Galilee wain from the miracle hats Market loaves (and the FM sprats) d that Demand would stir
a would bubble 8 wheels would whirr ng old Gods while the summer went by dead leaves stir in the Wintry sky utter gone rancid New Ships gone to rust lump in the shares of the Harvard Trust.
Bread
U. KarшnatiІake
21

Page 24
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Page 25
BOOK REVIEW
Sri Lanka Foundation.
H Luman Ri
Religions in Sri Lanka. A Comment
Universal
Declaration
of Human
Colombo: Sri Lanka Foundation, 1988.
In 10 December 1948 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Uniwersal Declaration of Huma TI Rights. On 10 December 1988 the Human Rights Centre of the Sri Lanka Foundation, having completed the work of three years on Human Rights and Religions, published its 350 pagc volum c on the subject. The publication was a fitting co II memoration of the fortiet anniversary of the Declaration. The Editor of the volum C i Il his Preface calls the patient work it required 'an intiative un paralleled in this world”. This remarkable clail is not without legitimacy.
The originality consists in approaching the subject of Human Rights from the standpoint of four great world reli
gion 5 : Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam and Christianity, Sri Lanka was well plac cd to
attempt such an approach. A small island, it yet has the distinction of being the only country in the World where the four religions coexist, each authentic in doctrine and vibrant in practice. What has to be said in a review which intends to be not merely laudatory is that the approach of the book is - as perhaps it consciously set out to bc, and as its title indicates - that of a passive commentary whereas it might without loss have also been that of a constructive Critique. The Commentary is
un questionably dical and auth is not playcd of dynamic, f II.It.
Froll no w; a better critiqu than from tha: Asian religious Declaration em macy of the Corrlmtntary oI 5 til indpoint of have emphasize macy of the C is fundamental
The individu: rights in the W - in which the fully anchored classical Gree Then began t justice as turn Ille what is the concept of as the follida for the indiwidu: by the King C the body of ht Polyn eices, An saying that sh
å CCT dance: will
laws of the I mod crn til Incs dition comes tWCntieth cent Agra Cart (1 ings of Aquinas tics of Hugo Gr the Petition o the Bill of Rigi writings of Loc
Woltai Te and

ghts and ry on the Rights,
careful, methoritative. What In it is the note orward develop
itch tower could c have emerged it of the great traditions. The phasizes the priindividual. A. 1 it from the religions should d the equal priommunity, which
to religion.
list approach to Western tradition : Declaration is - goes back to :e and Rome. hic definition of cuique (to each one's own) and the ius na fra le tion of justice al. Admonished teon not to bury slain brother, tigone disobeys, e has to act in h the in Ilmu table gods. In more the Western tradown to the lry through the 215), the teachand the Scholasotius (1583-1645), Rights of 1628, its of 1689, the ke, Montesquieu,
Rousseau, thc
American Declaration of Indic. pendence of 1776, the American Constitution and its famous Amendments, thic Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789.
The Commentary lost, so it seems, the ideal opportunity to turn the scarchlight of the castern tradition of community upon the western tradition of individualism. Indeed, it was the eastern tradition that was uniwersal ultill the WCStern to ok off schismatically in separate rationalist, materialist and technocratic di Tectio 15. The Comentary could have made a powerful casc for thic revision of the Declaration according to the rich insights of Community provided by the Buddhist ideal of the sangha, the Carly Christia In communitarian ideal of each for all and all for each, the Islamic vision of the oncness of all humanity as seen in the practice of table fellowship, the Hindu ideal (later witiated by the introduction of caste and outcaste) of the unity of all human life in the love and the life of Brahma. The Commentary could have pleaded that Article 29 which, alone among the 30 Articles, speaks explicitly of "duties to the community' should be centTal in any further revision of the Declaration. Whether through awe or through diffidence, the Commentary refused to handle the brief.
The Commentary gives evidence of the externt of the opportunities it missed nowhere better than when it gives the comments of the four religions on Article 17 which sets out "the rights to own property
2

Page 26
alone as well as in association With others". The fou religious traditions a Te un anillous in asserting that the right to property is not absolute and that the right of one person or body of persons to own property is cntirely subservient to the right of every other person or body of persons to live. When privatization is the fäshion of the IMF hour, the Temindcr Would hive bee II Ilost
timely,
The WesteTIn t. Ta, ditio.)I1 1&tWer tires of saying that the Static
is for the Person, not the Persom for the State. The Teby it mis seis the third intervening Tea
lity, na mely, the Community. The human person antedates the State, It does not intedate the Community. Person and Community begin their histories together, in cx trical bly linked to each other, for Illing
the Iselves and each oth cr. The greatest achievement of the Sri Lanka Commentary could so easily have been to point put the lacuna of a Declaration of the Rights of the Human Community in the Declaration of the Rights of the Human Individual.
The Commentary's approach to Human Rights though religion has also the weakness of its undoubted strength. The strength is in pointing out very systematically and most convincingly that each of the human rights as enunciated in the Declaration is in accordance with the religious traditions, cultures and beliefs by which we live and hence callnot be lightly trampled on. Aritrary arrests, prolonged deLentions without trial and tOTture prohibited by Articles 5 and 9, are violations of human
rights; they are also mortal sins against religion.
The weakness lies in every
approach to justice through religion. The religious approach tends by its very nature to blunt the cutting edge of Justice, It L1 In der plays conflict and urges collaboration. It abhors struggle and sanctifies har Inny. It promotes compromisc and fears confrontation. Religion
24
has in history upholder of thc institutionalized nearly always religious institut been the spiritu: temporal power II. Il edilewall al II it played the pr Consecratio Il of der 1 tiIIles its taries sit in th: State tā, Illa suas; Water Il the a the State. Tle in society is ex a Tears: cli]] [ aid The Static has II
action in the firs
The Estate
Carri rifer
betwcell State II Timelt :: Ild 5.3 mlet lack of al clear si terize the other grievance, as rei UNP Mali fest in the first Gwe TT1 et Pol
The role of th in the inter-et to Inake both s the imperative other halfway. hand, to the North and East the Celti Te Te argument agains of Eela II. If IE be established it East, the Estat: be in a state psychological an stability and un the other, to th tէlt: Stյ11th it titl ' Tamils by their in the Centre
Need for
Carrilled Jr.
writing. These to be published reports of these tions and shoul Parliamentary of these safegua today.
S. We have t the question of genuinely libera

ofte [1 been an Frar Luis qua? And religion has been 5). The
ibn Hals ofte all arm of the of the State, di earlier times imc role in the kings. In 110highest dignifirst T.W It it pours holy rmed forces of role of religion er ci. 5ed in tW 0. moral choice. to objection to t H. Tca: it gives
people something else to do besides thinking of how they are governed. It tolerates action in the second at least as long as religious confine it to the church or temple courtyard. Indeed, about religion's overstepping these confines, thic State need not really bother. Religion seems to have traded the right for security a nd a priwilege. Any lib cration thrust of religion is wholly marginal to the mainstream, rather like the clown's piece in a Shakespearean tragedy. The Commentary might have helped us to think that it le ed 1 Ot le CeSSaIliy be so.
(17 rri Hageל էլ է ii Ill fulfilimes cycn the
at Ilent ch:La Crei 5 of Tallil :ognized in the and rici terated Statement of ісу. e Estate Tamils hnic drama is idcs LI inderstand if meeting each On the Oile Tamils of the the Tamils of an irrefragable t the feasibility Eelm WCT e tŪ) thic North and * Tamils would Of int Jlerible d political incertainty. On e Sinhale.Se of
West the Estate Very presence
most compelling reasons for the fair and just settlement of Tamil grievance. For unless
these grievances of the Tamils are redressed, the conflict of the North and East will progressively engulf the Centre too with the direst consequences for every scction and for everyone. But the redress of minority gricvances has of Decessity to be based on the real and reallistic acceptance of pluralism and has of necessity to flow from the moral and political will to grant thic legitimacy of the separate subidentities and Consciousnesses of the groups that together form the society of the unified Llation-Stitc. The Estate Tamils are an argument both for such intellectual acceptance and for such moral and political determination. Their role may therefore be conceived as being one of integrating, without assimilating, the warious sub-identities in the COLL Intry in an overarching national
the
55
f the island are identity.
2... ture which provides 'space' for dissent. The Mcdia is a II. a jor instru Tment in ensuring ($, שצטיין זהל
direction5 are accountability of a govern Illent. in the annual Such a political culture
In edia institu- a rise only out of a new polid be subject to tics for Sri Lanka which Scrutiny. Nowe an end to the personality cult
irds Ic cffective
o go back to thc Iced for a | political cul
and sycophancy. To free the media Wenlu5 t Strive t cTeate an open society free from the old politics of manipulation and double talk.

Page 27
Why there's sc in this rustic
There is laughter and light banter arriorigst these rural dam.5els who are busy sorting out tobacco leaf in a barn. It is are of the hundreds of such lxarris spread out In the Tid and up.country irit ETT TEdiata zone where the arable land remains, fallow during the of season. Here, with careful nurturing, tobacco grows as a lucrative cash crop and the green leaves turn to gold... to the value of over Rs, 250 millian or more annually, for perhaps 143,000 rural folk,
 

ng ENRCHINGRUFRAL LIFESTYLE
bund of laughter tobacco barn.
Tobacco is the industry that brings employrient to the second highest Limber of people. And these people ar E the tobacco băTTI JŲ,Tiers, the tobacco gTowers and those who work for them, or the land and in the bat IIs.
For them, the tobacco lead means meaningful work, a comfortable life and a secure future. A good enough Texagon for laughter.
if Ceylon Tobacco Co. Ltd.
Sharing and caring for our land and her people.

Page 28
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for your future. We are trusted money, guiding you on how to
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A Differe
 

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