Page 1
KASHMR: Indian F0||
Vol. 14 No. 18 January 15, 1992 Price Rs. 7.5
Thondaman's Move,
Privatisation:
Goiya: wise without
 
 

1, Pakistani Mischief — Inder Malhotra
ويجي 5 ينتج
།---- Sinhala Backlash
- Mervyn de Silva
- Saman Kelegama - C. P. de Silva
t a “Potha”
- Mamik Sandrasagara
YYiMTTYTeY i iiiSSSSSS
曜圈魔蟹-懿
Hussain ist – Jeyaratnam Wilson
Goodbye tC)
ssssss
G ** A B
o Reggie Siriwardena 8 Birty Gajaineragedera

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For quality
Depicting the Cultural
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et, Colombo 1,
Telex : 22773 LAKSA I CE
- 1 -54,582

Page 3
Considering the catastrophic situation ( is in, a group of persons from different country, belonging to different religious and munities and including working people, profe those holding responsible positions in public tuals and clergy, hawa drawn up and signĘ Appeal to the peoples and Government of Sinhala, Tamil and English.
Wen, Batapola Nanda Thero D. W. Wen. Pallewala Dewarakki itha Thero Linus J Wen. Madampagama Assagi Thero Tennys Wen, Kiranthidiya Panna sekara Thero N. Kal Revd. Fr. Paul Caspersz. S. J. G, G. F Rew.d. Yohan Dewarıları da Daya Revd. Lio Te Peiris Audrey Sunila: Wasala Sa rath With
Lanka Guardian Publishing Co. Ltd.
| ARDIAN сом:
Wol, 14 No. 18 January 15, 1992 LCttors
Price R. TEO
News Backgrour|
Peacea Appeal Published fortnightly by
Privatizati N. D., 246, Union Pla Cu,
Colomb) --2.
DIT DI D. S. (2)
ln à Goya's Mir Editor: Mervyn da Silva
Telephoпв 4 47584 Midi
KE:HTħir
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Mwath H CCIOTEKO 13.
Tglaph o: 435975 Gårbät:ht:ự

JRAL
DUT COuntry arts of the
racia | COITlssionals änd life, in telec2d a Peace Sri Lanka, in
Abayakoon a'ya tieke on Ediri suriya Hasany "OT1ľ) a Tibälä T1 Ariya wathie
RBEJBra Abeysek era
Gumaratna Ferlando Fernal d'Or
7 Committee)
TEMTS
15
ror (3)
18
19
23
Briefly . . .
Food not Eelam
"We don't want Eelam, We want food" said the latest poster in Jaffna. This WW a S. ar rn Counced at a pre5s Conference by the Army's chief media spokesman Colonel Sarath Mune singhe. Of the 800,000 people in Jaffna 99 per Cent Wåmt food and pola CEE, the Colome | Säid.
Some Sinhalase in Colombo TDC Were responsible for increasing the LTTE numbers; іп 1983 there were only a Couple of dozens, the Colonel said. The increase 1 ad now stopped, he said.
Two more go to courts
Two more MPs expelted from the UNP for signing the impeachment motion against President Premadasa have gone to courts challenging their expulsion from the party. If the courts do not hold with them they too will lose their seats in parliament. Eight expelled UN Pers lost their seats earlier.
More for FTZ workers
About 81,000 workers in Free Trade Zones and allied a reas Will get a pay rise of RS 150 per month (trainees and un skilled Workers) and Rs 200 per month (semi-skilled workers). The
basic wages will thereafter
ba R S 1250 and Rs 1750 respectively.
Church fights Aids
The Catholic Church is on the War path against AIDS, in Negombo and the neighbouring fishing villages. Posters have been put up in the vicinity of tourist hotels advising youths to keep away from homosexuals.
The police are also discouraging CLI tid: 15 Hetween local youths arld foreigners. H

Page 4
Bodie G identified The bodies of two women
Marawi la hawe been identified as those of Therese Fernando
(42) and Seelawathi (30). They are alleged to have been abducted by people
who came in a Pajero јевр.
Anti-UNP campaign Opposition parties are con
tinuing discussions on i a gainstם חaigקוחםט חסmוחסם the ruling UNP, They are
planning a series of meetings
and seminars to inform the
people about the state of
the nation.
The Opposition is also
organising a protest march
Katārgli.
Don't talk till war ends Kala niya University's Chan
found killed and bu r n t s near"
release that th no talks with the WaT in the There Should
Timore tama shahS, said.
Clarify, sa
MEP leader
Wardana MP fellow MP Ma singhe (SLFP) the parliamenta mitte appoin way5 and mei the Ethnic Cor Rura | Ind LI5trie CWC lead or has been delt by the Commit with the LT which arid be mittee. Mr G Lu asked the ques as a member CoTi Tittee.
celor, the Wen, Walpola "As a me Rahula said in a press Committee W.
LETTERs when he has
SIllall Way in hi
PEOPLE ty Tanmical poli Li
While I agree wholeheartedly with Mir. Piyalı Gamage's incisiye critique of both the Bandaranaike and the Jayewardene regimes and with his argument that frec a 11 di fair elections don’t necessarily ensure a free and just society, I can't concur with hill when he says: "What is wrong with politics is politicians. All our problems were caused by them and their greed for power. This is to romanticise ordinary people in the same way that some others di) when they believe there would be no ethnic problems but for politicians. There is lore truth in W. H. Auden's two-line epigram, "The politicians we condemm Are nothing but our LCM.” Un fortunately, even the common man is capable of misusing power
2.
domineering f: oversecr or villag becausc the pol space in which to
To suppose t rid of politiciar as the original of the witherin state in which in my sala di da is not in the s of politicians b of power itself. courselvęs theref visi Ing of as m restraints on
power as We Ca pressurising our theIll. It’s a lo but there is no
R
Colombo 4.

re should be
he Tigers till
also be no Rāhula Thra
North idd.
ys Dinesh
Die 5 h i Gunahas asked
ngala MooneChairmām đf ry Select Com
gd to find ins of ending flict, whether
s Minister and Տ. Thomtlaman : gated powers tee to di5CISS TE proposals for the conawardena has tion in Writing,
of the Select
test against this action", the MEP leader has said.
Edmund Dies
Weteran Samasamajist Edmund Samarakko dy died at the Colombo General Hospital on January 5. He was 80.
Comrade Edmund was onв of those jailed by the British in th 3 hir 3 te3Tl — fo r t i BS with fellow Trotskyites N. M. Perera, Collwir R. de Silwa and Leslie Gool e Wardele. Ha ente red parliament as a member of the Lanka Sama Saraja Party in 1952 and retained the seat Dehiowita) in 1956. In July 1960 he Wa5 elected to the BL | athsi ha la Seat.
Edmund Samarakkody left the LSSP When three of his
Marxist Colleagues joined mber of this tha SLFP government a5 hemently pro- ministers, in the 1960s.
it im his own GWE PEACE A CHAMCE s home, neighorkplace. The One finds that thc cry for peace, cian is only the har Tony al Indi restraint echoing lլt: usand, in Ty Places in the World. tl T the UN, EC, SAARC, Russia
e thug writ large itician has Thore
wield power,
lliլt we Lall get is is as utopian Marxisti dTeam g away of the I used to believe s. The problem pecial perversity ut i 1 the II:ltill Te Let Luis CCL1) y ore with the deany checks and the exercise of in think of and T Lles tC 4 CCCPL ng and ha I di Way,
Lher.
eggie Siriwardena
El 11d CoIITITh onwealth, Cambodia, Suth Africa. Ted etc. Il our country Teligious dignitaries hawe spoken in the same the Inc, particularly at Christmas.
It is said to note that a TepLL tedl academician religious dignitary should - in a country whic Te Illa Thy follow the teachings of Gau. La TT1:l the Buddha — des
Cribe certain peace proposals, as 'Wicious and dest Tuctive" alıd 1ITցt: ":1|| patriotic clerics a Indi laymen to totally reject such peace proposals.
For the record, the Church of England in UK does not
strike a similar note. The cons
titution of the USA precludes Inixing religion with education. Why, oh why?
B. Mahida
Colombo 7

Page 5
The Rise of th New Right
Mervyn de Silva
H=ချီistory Tepeats itself, first as tragedy, then as farce.
Not in Sri Lanka. It is almost always tragic, with the farcical reduced to occasional, filccting interventions. In any case, one rule has been firmly established - communalism is not the last, but the first refuge, of the frustrated and the opportunist, Clown and scoundel take their turns. IL is for this reason, we publish without an introductory note or conment an editorial in the Tiries of Ceylon of 218, 1957. It was called Record of an Opportunist'.
Opportunism is very luch alive but it is re-assuring to note that the New Year Message of the Opposition Leader, Mrs. Banda Tanaike, did not conform to the set patten, Far from it. In the simplest words, the SLFP leader appealed to fellow Sri Lankans, and Sri Lankan politicians and all opinion leaders in particular not to “pro Imote militarism"" or **Touse Tacis II"".
Only a few months ago, during “the impeach ment crisis" when the fate of President Premadasa's regime seemed utterly unpredictable, the rallying cry was the "right to dissent", to oppose freely, to a truly robust democracy, kept alive by
freedom of expression, by a lively parliament and a independent judiciary. But today? What's the issue". What's the target". The issue is a "negotiated political settlement' of the ethnic conflict, and there
fore the Thondaman proposals. One would expect, that responsible political parties and personalities in a country, ravaged by endless, Wasting wars, would at least Wait until MT. Thondaman went north and returned home and reported to the All
Party Parliame chaired by Mr. singe MP, 1) ! whose private the Committee Mr Thondarmal his proposals inզաiry, and ciplinary actio: singhe Commit But these pr the basis of til reactions to at to be debated
But Ino. Ew, of democracy fTle Preside I טPr 1: טון ראוון LJ and a pro1 min f sonality for 14 lith Athlalth II concerned with of Lhe docume te ILS. Was it the Preside It" Thond:lmäT1 m was pounced ready opportun President. (Ont pected sensible ding opinionthe exercise (in collent of the useful opportul Tamil pulse - and of Tallil La Ilıkal a Lld Lh patriate conm. lobby overseas important fore activist support ted it, the Sil the non-politic sations could OWI strategy,
In that Way tical Establish projected a p two crucially i. - the Western Inity and to o of aid (Japan India. While

(S
Il tary Committee, MāIlgala MoomeLlle SLFP, 011 member's T10tion : Was set up, That 1 Went public with is a latter for if necessary disin by the Moone
լ է::-
oprieties are not
1 near hysterical
i issle that Theeds
calmly.
L'In the cha Impion LT1 il disset, the lt of Lihle (Oxfordi siclent’s Colul Insel :Int Cabinet peryclrs, Mr. L:1- lilldal li was Timore L the authorship Int, not its con. Thondailan's nr 2 In short, the ission to Jaffna pon as another ity to 'shoot" the : W0 till hawe exleaders and legiIll:lkers to greet it necessarily the package') as a lity to test the first of the LTTE, opinion in Sri i Influential exInity, the Tamil ls Well als its ign patrons and crs. Ha ving teshill parties and ial Sin hala c)TgaInii: We filled their heir response.
the Sinhala PoliI1 (: I 1 t cc3ʼulul hı:1We positiwe image to 1portant audiences (donor) commuher key sources and of course ceping the dia
therefore galining time, the Sinhala EstablishIIlent could havc Čince more de
logue going, and
Illonstrated to the World the sheer intransigence of the LTTE. (A spin-off benefit would have Eccl. the islation of the LTTE and the strengthening of the anti-LTTE groups).
What is wrong in Mr. Thil
daman holding talk5 in Jassila and bringing back the LTTE's counter-proposals (or criticisms, Teise Tw:itions, suggestions) asked the head of a European mission here when Mr. Brad IIlan Weetakoon briefed members of the Aid Sri Lanka consortium. Surely commonsense would dictate a positive attitude to the Thond:Liman initiative, Whatever one's studied response to the Thondaman agenda. In other words, the Sinhala EstablishTT hent could llawe scizcell the II ral high ground, precisely the iTulage to project in the run-up to the World Bank-sponsored
donor Imeeting in Paris of Feb. 7.
TInstead what did wc have" Outpourings in the press reflecting atavistic fears of a carving out of Sri Lanka.
While "autonomy to the NorthEast will ultimately lead, said One critic, to a Sinhala nation confined to the deep South (Galle and Matara districts), there was a lew school of opinion which spotted the speictre of Malayana dul - a state of Indian Tamil plantation labour in the Central highlands, with Thonda. In an as President (or King).
Interestingly, Prof. M. B. Ariyapala, President of All Ceylon Buddhist Congress (ACBC), a key figure in the Sinhala Defence League (SAS) pointed out in all ACBC Statement that the CWC proposals would lead to
3.

Page 6
"a series of separate states' based on "linguistic, religious and communal grounds'. The
A CBC accused TEl Ilaim: if “slowly working for a Malayanadu' in the hill country. In that CCDT) Illection, hic drew atten
til lo the fact that the "Ceylon Indian Congress' has changed its naille to "Ceylon
Werkers CoIngress""".
The nightmare of ''Illini states' is a political reality in the World today - not. Thercly in the South (Third World) but in the North, certainly in what used to be the Soviet Union, and in Celial and Easter Europe, in Yugoslavia (Serbs vs. the others, particularly Croatia), and Czechs wersus Slowaaks in Czechoslovakia, to name just two state5, both sociallis L. WilaL makes a country a country? "One thing that doesn't matter for sure is size' Ila Les Danilo Turk, Professor of International Law at the Univ. of Ljubljana, a specialist in ethnic conflict.
Max Kempelman who led the US delegation to a conference In "National Minorities' in Geneva 3 months, algo, observed 'The a na moly of our world is that We are running into coiltradictory Irends... western Europe has had 45 years to learn L. IiWe - With cElchi, other. Bu L central and eastern Europe have li wied with a lil T. Now tillat
it is lifted''.
In excluding Western Europe, Mr. Kampelman was over-optimistic. There are no widespread demaids for Secession but the spectre of racis II haunts some E. C. countries too. The Teession, un employment and inflation, a flood of brown-andblack refugees (and now white too) and illegal immigration have Sca Ted WesteTIl societies so deeply that racist and neofascist tendencies are all Loo apparent. This is true of 'the
melting pot', the US, too, Unemployment is haunting the Blls a{i IThinistration — 400,000
jobs were lost in Oct-Nowe Iubet. The Trotskyist journal PWORKERS WANGUARD has published a Series of commentaries on the rise of racis II and racial bigotry in the US, and police terror against Ill-White and eccTL
4
Illigrants. But it Europe that "colo as a major prob growing hostility Tefugees froImı “sc "We cal' arr by a TIn ed instabi LiIl ster al Luxe: in an intervic I#ሽIII Streef sa Inc. Ilay be CÖlıIl tries in tHı seck to "contai challenges with äTImy. While E clci to nost S. militarist' opti B. rejected, is
Tlalny Sri Lan1 The Sinhala I (SAS) ha 5 bcc
by a BHUMPU ратt of the “ng
Reg.
r T. R. Jay lead some TITI 1CT Los Ft II problcılı. But thi Mr. Jaywarderic bi E LET erd"? () E COMO S LITE. After months. Mr. Jay IIlarly opinios i in March, 1956, Premirlerit spel urged then that without any say months la tert wit Only Bill before difTerelt tunc, “should and cor Iгу by tramplin ] : TTIL EH [ t[ [I T:gi Go Wern, [11ent pro manda, te by ma Tilil, Mr. Jayew; illent elected by til k l ',';', o'eyer
Thät thẽn, day, has been M. וטחאס 1יחhiTIs H$ quit ghwiously informing princi reCOTd Hadi MI that he has atti at outwitting air ı TEC-cı il qıf Trı: Timural Cry, ewe Only scrved to political wilder point. Evеп шпs does un principal Lunteered to leat We repeat, is - mind? Cour gues way through an instead.

t is in western lir" has energed leIT), along with " Li poor White cialist Europe. ive at stability lity' says Roger mburg Timister
:W with the Wa LirrIi II. TE said of many Ը ՏյլItll which l" Lilliese ethilic the use of the his should be
Ti La Tikams, thic 31, which Mrs. favoured by :Il Patriots''. efence League п ассопnрапісd IRA novement, 'W' RIGHT.
Even if the option was real, iL is Illot o II. The World BaliIikIMF has a cut-off point — 4.5% of GDP. Sri La Inka has goine beyond 5%, while growth this year is not Lis i 1 ressive as 1990, The d)L1OT3 ha We als) Imany questions to ask about * Iuman Rights, particularly disappearances. The reconstruction of Europe is drying up western allid. Sri Lankal which was pledged a billion last would be happy with US 800 million this year but even this lower figure is perhaps far too optimistic; certainly, if the US is in a mood to punish Sri Lanka
for its negative vote on "Zignism' resolution in the UN, If there is move to delay the
WOA project, the US will be eyell more hostile.
ord of an
Wardene, at
b) TL35 til
-Wäldele 1ls
itls
! Parliai riment,
a Tijority of
as the Prime Minister
r. Jayewardene's record. dicills, of contradictory and inconsistent attitudes which
cannot b understood or judged
iplo Jr 5 taii Iida ridi,
TFL til. 5חם וחווחTY &u:
13.S. TIL
d offer to direct
the UNIP ople in a civil disobedience campaign against the GowPt to finalize its negotiated settlement of the language question is - ca. In these people rely on his offer Can
ti || 15 " Win view is that it would be foolish indeed to be all, to judge from his record over the past eighteen been El Ilan of many opinions - as In fact as there have been political situations.
election time and Mr. Jayewardene was a kr at the fateful Kelaniya session of the UNP.
Sinhales should be made the sole state language but ing PTC) visiori for the Teisionable ge of Taimi. h the UNP defeated and demoralized and the Sinhala Mr. Jayewardene tok up i completely "No government," he declared at Bollegalla, Kelaniya, ıld Tiike Sinha lese the cofficial language of the coin g down the language rights of over a million of the ents of the country."
ceeding to implement the second part of its election king suitable provision for the reasonable use of Taardene's tune changed once again
the Sinhalese peco ple", think of granting concessions of this kind?"
In a word it is an opportunist's . Jayewardenc's only consistency has been in this - Ilpted to tack to every political breeze in his efforts Id ut Tilar cieuw ring his opponents.
Every mischievous - mov: to exploit thc: com
LL HHaLLLLLLLaLLS S LLLL HHHLL S CKLCLLLLLCLLL LLLLLLLLS til k L- Mr. Jayewardene fall TL her alıntı farther into
fOT the moment, however, is ha Trily the uccessful leadership seldom damns a min as completely 2d leadership and now that Mr. Jayewardene has wola majority civil disobedience campaign the question, - can anybody afford to trust him not to change his S 0 S LaLa t GOLL LtaLLaH LLLLL LaLHaaa CHLaaLL LLS
Illtritווa r
opportunist
rally on Sunday, offered to
םth היromisu t1 , ""tין has טh
THLIG
H
TT
A year later and with the
"Can am y go Werinhe de II:13, 11 deci
points out in I statement toIt is - El re CT of Colt i 1 LL15
in the light tif any
IL is als) of course,
tl :
IltטוIIיַינונltilgriitial r:ף
Tires: 21/8/1957

Page 7
OPIN
"A particular Sinhala grievance is that W or harassments, he is called a racist but wh their spokesman are not branded as such."
CD "The vast majority of Sinhala people - who hawe Ebenefitted from this government —
O ''The Sinhala people divided into several national rights. The one million Tami peop tion, giving Mr. Thonda man so much of pov
O "If the sufferings of the people of the solution which ensures their rights is not fo inevitable"
O The package of proposals to the LTTE fied at a referendurn. The President should Mr. Thondaman to have his own Way in thi all ethnic groups and the sovereignty of the
Wafia
O "Thondaman's proposals, although claime coincide with the wery demands of the LTT "traditional Tamil homeland" and self-determi a embodimet of EE ELAM, though the ter|T
Wes. Mad
"We must accept that our people in the racy and independence. We must resolve r
in the New Year. . ."
— Mr. Ēā
g "The first priority is to conclude this celebrations should be stopped till then. . ."
— Wern. Prof. Waldo/a Fas',
'They (the proposals) are steeped in ra with a gossa mer thin wenaar of a United Sri
O "It is nonsense to say, as some alarmis to EELAM. In fact they don't even amount Canadian or American kind".
D 'Substantial devolution" argued one mo kingdoms'.

ON
vhenever a Sinha ese speaks his grievances len other races speak out in their interest
— Gamini J āya Suriya, fou F7 der S. A. S.
even well-to-do industrialist and businessmen
were supporting the S. A. S."
(Jayasuriya Interviвиy, Sunday /s/алd)
groups, Could not unita to obtain their le ho We Wer Were rallying round One organisa"wgr" (SAS Speaker Island)
North-and East are not comprehended and a und, the division of this country could be
- President Premadasa, speech in Kandy
respect of any agrement Should be rati hold such a referendum without allowing s Tost important and de liCat C issue affectig air nation,
S YaLLL LLaaTCaLHHLTLLLLSSSLLLCHHLLLCS LLLLLL na / Security Minister, now Leader of the DUWF.
d as emāna ting frontin his own bat, se en to E. They are formulated on the basis of a nation for Tamils. They are nothing short of
has been tactfully avoided".
e Pannatissa, Maha Waya ke Thera, Y/SLAND)
- North and the South Want peace, democlot to promote militarism or to rouse racism
granaike, SIFP President's Wew Year Message.
dreadful war. . . . Peace talks and meaning less
GT CCCCCS LLLCCLSCCCCCCCCLGSLCLCLGLCCC LCLLLLLCLLLS
cism and geared to creating a separate state Lanka which could be torn as under at Will'. .
S. L. Gunasekera, SLFP MP in Sunday Tries.
its, have dona, that these proposals amount to a full-fledged federation of the Swiss,
— Reggfe Sїгfward'ела, гвршted' солтmentaІог
nk would be "tantano unt" to creating 'two

Page 8
Ошr Appeal to all those responsible and to a ||those Concerned is: * Stop the War
Declare terms and negotiate for Peace Declare terms of mediating and monitoring procedures Ensure rights of Minorities as well as Majority and recognise reasonable apprehensions of both * Continue dialogue om disputed issues
Repeal repressive legislation, lift state of Emergency, return to normal law and restore demDCratiC prCCE 55 E5 Bring down cost of living * Search for alternative economic policies
to bring justice to the under-privileged of a II COTT LI Titi 35 * Ensure rights of all working people * Erisure rights of Women and Children We are publishing this appeal with some representative signatures. We are resolved to continue gaining support for this appeal and campaigning and working for Justice and Peace. Signing this appeal does not necessarily mean acceptance of all the positions adopted in it. It signifies understanding of the urgency of stopping the War and commitment to common dialogue and action for Justica and Peace in Sri Lanka. The Peace Appeal will be published in Sinhala, Tamil and English.
It has been signed by about 150 represen: tetive persons from different religious and
An APPEAL to THE PEOPLES AND Gov CONSTRUCTIVE ACTION NOW FOR PEN
e call on the Peoples and
(Gwernment of Sri Latinkl. to consider seriously all lirgently the catastrophic situation our country is in and to take decisive constructive action now for peace, on the basis of justice for äll.
Stop the Ethnic Conflict
We feel that the most urgent problem facing us is the cthnic conflict. While recognising that there are many inter-connected problems affecting different comImutlitics and sections of the people in different parts of the Country, we realise that the most urgeut pirority is to put a stop to the ethnic conflict.
This conflict has caused and is callsing unutterably tragic death ATil destruction (Ti both "sides. This has been in the context of
a deterioriting tion and the bre mal legal änd cl Հէ:
With coult : st the Tc can be I10 cof society and military expend repressive legisl. the state of ELI till Til tC 13Tr Illal ration of dell Thus there call gress towards the resources which is . so - urg the people, esp Who are unde hardship.
We would em if a victory is side on the bat lem of al just still remain. A

racial communities from different parts of the Country - Colombo, Kandy, Anura dhapura, Jaffna, Mannar, Trin coma lee, Batticaloa, Monara gala, Hamban tota, etc.
Among those who have signed are:
1. Würm. Na wagamu W 3 Dhammad loka Thero, Chief Sangha Nayaka of li hala DoloSpaththuwe, Hiripitiya.
2. Wen. Mora galle Wimaladhamma Tissa Thero, Chief Sangha Nayaka of Eastern and Tamankadu Wa Pro WinCÉS, Trini Comalee.
3. Rt. Rowd, Jabez Gnarla pragasam, Bishop
of Colombo. 4. Rt. Revd. Andrew Kumarage, Bishop of
Kur gala. 5. M. K. Sellarajah, Attorney-at-Law, Presi
dant, Konesar Temple, Trin Comalee, 6. Professor B. E. S. J. Bastiampillai, Profassor of History and Politica | Science, Colombo University. 7, S. M. Salaku de en Lebba, Mohideen Jum
ma. Mosque, Trincomalee. 8. K. P. Silva, General Secretary, Commu
list Party of Sri Lanka. 9. Athau da Sēng wira tina, M. P., Lårhka Sama
Sama ja Party. 10. G. G. Ponna mbalam, All Ceylon Cong
ress, Colombo. 1 1. M. Senathiraja, M. P. TULF, Jaffna. 12. Prince Casinader, M. P. EPRLF, Batticaloa. 13. Jaya Pathirana, formĈar Supreme Court
Judge, Kurunegala.
"ERNMENT OF SRI LANKA FOR DECSWE ACE ON THE BASIS OF JUSTICE FOR ALL
ble is winning the wa T lnd at
economic situal
tak-down of InoreIl ocratic proces
op to the war tlemilitarisation cutting down of iture, Tepeal óf ation, lifting of 1ergency alThdi TClaw, and restocratic TiT{}Ըt8ses. be no Teal prodevelop11 ent of of this country ently needed by ecially the poor, going so much
phasise that even
won by either tlefield, the probsettlemle L Woll ind how practica
what cost. Even government Imilitary experts a Te not agreed oil this. A state of total war with frightful consequences will be necessary if the objective is to a chieve a milita Ty vic Lory in the North. Even in the East, after so much death and destruction the War is fiT from over. In the South, too, there is co Il timlimg u Intest.
Desperate Plight
We wish to emphasise that a special effort must be made by the Illajority community to understand the desperate plight of the people living in the areas of conflict, especially in the North. Norrnal civilisell life is severely disrupted. In the Nirth, the transport system is completely paralyzed. There has been To electricity for Iwer il year,

Page 9
telephonics hawe not been opera
ting for over five years, food and medicinics are extremely Scarce and prices have risen
several-fold. Most of all, there, the people are alienated and Inciglicct cdl,
Mutual Understanding and Common Action
There is a great necd for IIıutual u rnlcTstai ndling Which, c::L11 lead to mutual help and mutual building of confidence. All coInIIlunities. nced to underStand the serious threats, coilIllon to all, that they face today with the daily dicterioration of econo Illic situation and erosion of deilocratic rights. It is of the utmost illportance that fighting should be stopp cd so that they Could get together for action on these co II i Illo T1 issues. Ordinary suffering peoplc of all COmmunities in Wolvcd in the collflict silhoul ha We thic chalce to express their deep desire for
eace, understanding and co-existence. The positivc achieveInents of ordinary peoplc throough the traumatic experience of War could then give rise to Illeaningful expressions of justice and peace,
Diferent Comilmu ilies aI di sectors should be able to preserve their own proper identities and reserve their right to work for long-term social and political goals and yet be prepared to Imake real and sincere sacrifices and concessions in the present, in order to put a stop to the seemingly cindless slaug ther and destruction and enable progress to wall Tills pealce.
We also believe that the dif. ferent communities and sectors should, at the same time, given the necess: Liry de LeTriTmination, eble able to come together with the Government takes the necessary constructive initiative, to set up the necessary monitoring bodies and processes, composed of recognised and respected individuals and accredited representatives of organisations within the CollintTy als well als from the international community, to ensure the effective implementatio Il of WhatewieT aTTangementis are Inade to Illove towards peace,
Devolution a
1. The princip and autonomy widely accepte the struggles f majorities and : hlas to be čo: from people os public opin table foi TITS 3 effective Illes tio I. TH1 ero -- high tical will EC II: of power aid lity to enable of the people p}{r and unt the areas concé The Imajor this county, all i Muslim Ila derable period ally through th cent years, b of their separa Tlatico Italities. the LiI The Illas commulities to reality of each and nationality Arrangements ilm di al LLO1111.y independent de at the Saine Lit tence and inte mutual security Common ails.
The right of hawe been dispo honnes to Te LLITT should be els Lu1 all Communitie: right to live i II country. When ther's rights ino difficulty in
The Sri LäT needs revision tion and auton tures of it. Tw aspects Islay be 1. The charact Society — dem C. listic - should coTe values, bc secular, should the Constitutio also be gi Bill justiciable.
It shoլIll be that secular Wa bic understood w:ay ag:Linst Cor. dharmal or relig

ind Autonomy
les Of dev01ution h:1We - Litյ111t: tt bt: d as a result of it justice of both Ilinities. There ntinuous pTessure and development icon to dewise suif devolution and I of implementas to be the poliLike the devolution autono Illy a reathe development :, especially the de T-privileged, iTI ermed.
con Til Inities in Sinhala, Talli we, over a C3I siof til 11 e, especie co II Flicts of Te! 11 : CT1 S CIKLIS 1te identities and We believe that i come for Lll frankly face the other's identity
föT devolutio1 should enable welopment, while he enable co-exis-dependence for , help :ind wider
all those who la ced TTCIT th eiT | to their hÖmes red and people of should have the | any part of the all recognise each there should be ens Luring this. kaum Constitutiom to lake devolu40TTny cent Tal fealI other importent :ll18reטתוtiחטII1 eT of Sri Lankan Titic and plurabe recognised and ith religious and be enshrined in 1. TheTec Shaul Il of Rights that is
Imę IltiTel Here lues should not Els being in any exclusive of true i01. II, the con
text of plu Talis nin
in cquality and discrimination. 2. There should be
above the law and threatens proper division and balance pWers between the
to a parliamentary system be seriously considered.
Effective constitutional arrangements have to be made to ensure the rights and security of Mus
lim and Sinhala minorities
the North-East all of the Pla IlCentral
tiltion Ta1 Tils in Lle Provinces.
(To he continued)
HIMDU APPEAL The government of Sri Lanka:- l) To ii II Ilica Lince a mi immedia tc cessation of hostilities. The LTTE to respond positively; 2) To crasure that sufficient supplies of food, fuc! rid II ieklicines are sent regularly to the InternEl tional com illittee of the Ret Cross, who in co-ordination with the Government Agent will distribLite then: 3) To annouce that it would fully impletinent Without delay I hic IndoSri Lanka Agreement of July 29th, 1987: 4) TJ nominate an interiT COLIncil for the North-East province in ČUп5шITHtičП with the parties who Were elected to the North-East Provincial Council. The interi II Council should proportiorately comprise representatives of parties elected at the Provincial Council elections. LTTE would be inved to joi. The interi councill should function till the ProWilcial Council comes into being after it frck and fair election; 5). Tij initial te negotiations with the LTTE after the cessation of his tilities takes cffect. This should lead to laying down of arms and reciprocal measures by the governIllerit. A pTictical approach is Ilecessary in this regard.
The Government of Sri Lanka is the other party to this conflict and Cal T1, Tot expect tc), SLI pervis or It litr the cessition of his Lilitics and the laying down of arms. A neutral organisation is therefore, LaCLL00LLCS LLL Ct HHCCLLLLS S LLLL S LL HCLLCLaLL aaaaa LllL HHaLLL LLLLLL th is operation als India guarantreed the IIldt-Sri Lanki, agreg II:It. If Iridil is Luna ble to particip:Lite, thicin a friendly country like Canada, Australia, Sweden or Norway could be approached. - Hirtriti Capitci
- in modern political life, they stand against
suitable constitutional restraints on the WT f the Executive Presdency which is now practically
Executive, the Judiciary and the Legislature. The question of the reversion
LT

Page 10
Church Launches Camp
he street walls in Negombo,
the town neaTest the Airport, are plastered with posters. One such poster boldly proclaims girls in Thailand, boys in Sri Lanka'. The sligan has been TepToduced from a Europea T1 travel journal. The Catholic Church has now launched a new campaign to add to the lsland's many wars - the targets of the Church campaign are, aids, pollution, child prostitution and dTuigis. Its broadsicle is aiI Thecl specifically at a large Australian-financed tourist complex and a Woice of AImerica' relay station. Both will be located in the Chilaw district.
The campaign was launched at Christmas in the village of Iranawila. Some 7000 devotees clad in white, and led by scores of young priests marched in a de Iuno Tistration they called a pada rama skara (* oway of the cross').
* Their real target is the hotel project, not the WOA
But We are in the Cross-fire" said a US embassy official. The wist hotel collplex, which is
likely to cost over 4) Illillion LJ S dollars Will boast a race t Täck, El golf Course, casinos and
a long stretch ches. The Allst. ald the la Cil k su Te they can a crazy Japanese f Charter flights a jIl Sri Lankal wi in Japan, where El Club is; I CIL
but a long, lon
The WOA l; Laikal TT fort foT H II oderni with Thelwyr 5004 ters Were apprc. J R Jayewarden India, increasir the Island's et Clgel Lhe US strategically lcica
gather "sensiti 0 Il all sialwall Illia. Il ()Ce;
Il di officials the WOA facili Indian commun signals to US Iles. A Catholic bo said it was Wars' program. ject will cost ( lars.
IIլ է 11 - 1987 **peacc accord' wirtually impost
Ace Radio Cab
SSSLSLS
* Computerised meters " Can be summoned to W.
* No call up charqe withIn city IImIts "
WEhIclé de
" Receipts issued on request Company credit avi CaII 50 1502 50 1503 o
ệAset a
Another Aitken SpenC
 

paign
if the finest bearalian financiers :: |l|llib TiltoTS Te it tract the golfor Weekend trips. ind Weekend golf |1:35 till:53, thill : membership in Inly expensive g wait.
5 beël i 11 STi ty years. Plans sation program ilowatt transmitved by president à lIl 1985. Bllt gly involved in linic conflict acof trying to use ited Sri Lankal to ve information" traffic in the 11. Privately complained that y could monitor ications and scIndi nuclear submarijournal in Coloilpart of the "star
The new pro60) million dol
India-Sri Liik:
which India :di demm lil emba t
NEWS BACKGROUND
tled Jayewardena regime, there was an explicit reference to the WOA project, India demanded that broadcasting facilities granteki to the U.S. be reglılarly Teviewed to ensure that these facilities Were i Flot 115ęl for military or intelligence purposes' at that tille, the Soviet press also attacked S. L. for permitLing the U S such facilities. With the marked improvement recently in Indo-US relations, officials here were surprised when the Indian High Colin missicIler Mr. N. N. Jla, callel lL Foreign Ministry to express his i FConcern".
The strident Church campaign has puzzled diplomats here. In this predominantly Buddhist Is. land, the Catholic community is only five percent (5%). The Waltical is WIried all its position in the Third World, says the Sunday Island. The Pope's visit to Brazil revealed this concern, especially about the steady loss of ground to both liberation theology' as well new cults and rival religions. His Holiness urged thic clergy to take up new social issues that agitate large communities - enviromental pollution, aids, drugs, child prostitution.
DUT HOOf St BI)
cess from selected Stands
lite
|ր 501 504
e SerVICe

Page 11
ፆ†EርE/ህፕ ዘWፈ1ዶኞ¢
WOL TO MIO 4
For mortality's sake
Syed Mlavwah Haider Naq wi
The nature of the rural informal Credit market in Sri Lanka
Mlima Sanderatne
Tea policy in Sri Lanka
Joachim Betz
Economics of "Tourist Pollution'
Pani Seneviratne
Book review Towards a theory of rural de Welopment
Paul Ekim:S
Rs... ATO
WOL TITI MO T. Development of development thinking
Sukhamony Chakravarty
Environmental impact assessment and developing countries
Roh an H. VVickramasinghe Industrialisation and social development: comparisions of South Asia with East Asian NICs
Gапeshan Wignaraja
The Sri Lanka formula
Carlo Fonseka
BOOk. rewie. W
Conoclastic and courageous
Premadasa Udagama
RS. 55.00
MARGA PUB
61, Isipathап Color

A WOW RIVALS
WOL TT MOS 2 EL 3
Nutritional status of the pre-School child
Priyani Soysа Child mental health: meeting needs of the young child
A. D. Nikapota Training of pre-school teachers
D. E. M. Kota la Walla The household and the Care of the young child
Myrtle Perera Western theoretical perspectives & upbringing of the child in the traditional family in S. L.
Malkanthie Gunawardene Interactions between care-giver and pre-School child - a case study
Game ela Samaras inghe The Child's need to play
Мушra Goonesinghe The pre-school child in the urban Shanty
Mlamali Kannangara
Rs, 87,50
Wo 11 MO 4
National plan ning in a n open economy - The Challenge for S.L.
Godfrey Gunatieke
Trade policy and industrial development in Sri Lanka
Sаптап Kellegamma & Ganeshan Wignaraja Sri Lanka's continuing thrust on the plantation exports: Some explanations
Raghunaith Pradhan
A Sur wery of estate and tea
productivity debate in India,
Sri Lanka and Kenya PatriC. WEGS
RS. 49.50
BLICATIONS
a Vlavwatha,
O 5.

Page 12
Privatization in Sri La
Saman Kelegama
PEYGaton is a major ecolonic cxc Ticisc in Sri
La Ilıka today. Two yeaTs have passed since the completion of the first full-scale privatization of a public corporation. It is time for us to look back and assess what has happened in the sphere of privatization so far, for there is little information about its progress in the prevailing literaturc.
It is well known that, Over the last twenty years, public cinterprises in Sri Lanka functioned without any fear of bankruptcy or liquidation. Many were noted for their inefficiency, poor quality of their products, and consequent losses. By the late eighties, most of them needed restructuring; they also found it very difficult to survive in a liberalized economy without substantial taris protection and state subsidies. Tariff protection went contrary to further liberalization attempts which is now the norm in economic policy. Subsidizi Ing bicica Illine a bu Tiden to the State at a time when not only defence expenditure was escalating but also when there were imperatives to reduce public expenditure. Given the problems of public enterprises and the current World trends, the policy-makers were of the view that the only way out of the dilem na was a privatization programme.
There are four major steps in thic Sri Lankan privatization programme. In short, they are: (1) assets and liabilities valuation, (2) debt capital restructuring, (3) conversion of a public corporation into a company, and (4) divestiture of state ownership. With the blessings of the
ASLI nimilary of a the Sri Lankin vancotemcnt of Scie1 December 1991.
ment in mid-1 shows, privatiz
Privatizat
Public Enterpris
Inited Motors Mitsubishi Corp. Employees Public
Tullhiriya Textil Kabool Lanka
Pugo da Textile Lakshmi (India) Employees Public
Ceylon. Oxygen Norske Hydro ( Employees Pub 11t:
Din kotLIWY Porc International Cer Employees Public
Buhari Hotel Jathika Sewaka Employees Treasury
Ceylon Leather S. A. Pere Tal & Employees
Hunas Falls Ltd.
international financial institu- Hayleys Co. Lt. tions, privatization has been Employees pursued with much enthusiasm Public and vigour since its commence
The 14'rifer is a Fra hy of the Meyrirre Total Revenue
of Poly Studir, Corbர,
LO

mka: An
lecture leiyered EE 55ociation of Adce, Annual Session,
89. (ኢS ition
Tablic 1 has taken
Overview
place in 14 public corporations and, as Table 2 indicates, about 33 corporations are in the pipeline for privatization in the near future. The main objectives of the privatization programme in Sri Lanka are :
Table 1 ion in Sri Lanka : The Story So Far
(31 December 1991)
ration (Japan)
Ltd. (South Korea)
Norway)
elain
"amics Incorporatcd (Japan) 50
Sangamaya (JSS)
Products Co. Lld.
%. Shares Date of sale Annoulut
(Rs. Mm.)
5 Dեւ: '8') 5.O
5 90 OC. * 8) 9 OC)
OO Feb. 9) O).
5t) IլInt '90 + 60.0
O 3D LITET 3.
60 Վւյալ ""}) O.O
O O Арг. "91 27.0
Dec. 90 102.0 O 4) NC
EO TOEC, *9) 5.3 IC) O
90 July '91 40.0 1)
ՃՍ Aug. '91 1) 30 NIC
2.
632.3

Page 13
(i) to improve management, induce efficiency, reduce costs, and I, thereby provide a better consumer service;
(ii) to induce technology transfer and I11 odernization to increalise productivity and growth, by encouraging foreign participation in equity,
(iii) to relieve the state from the burden of subsidizing and and keeping afloat loss-Imaking public cnterprises, and thereby
induce better bl ment; and
(iv) to prom share-ownership plization' becoi eventually make futu Te govern || 11 the privatizati taken place:
Given the with privatizati premature to state 11c Ints albi Y"
Table 1 (continued) : The Most Recent Cases of Privati
Lanka Milk Foods Stassen Exports Ltd, Dubai Co. Public
Employees
%. Shares I
5. 39 1()
Asian Hotels Corporation (Lanka Oberoi) Asia Investment Management Services Ltd.
(Hong Kong) Public
51 49
Ceylon State Hardware Corporation
ABC Management Services Ltd. Employecs Sri Lanka Tyre Corporation Nowa Lanka Lid.
|Public
Employees
Mattegama Textiles
90 10
Ճ()
30 1()
Leonarc Textile Management (Singapore)
Frce Lanka Trading Ltd.
Public Employees
50
30 10
Cases which are pending handover to t
due to various problems
Oils and Fats Corporation
Prima Ltd./Free Lanka Trading Ltd. Public 3C) Employees 1)
Awaiting decision of the Fair Trading Commissi claiming that a private monopoly is being cre: stock industry,
Notes NC=Not Completed; it - Initial Payment
Source: Compiled by the author using various c Ministry of Finance.

idgetary Ina na gē
te wide-spread so that “picoLes a Teality and it difficult for :Ilit S T TEVETSe Ins that hawe
hort expericnice on, it is too 114ke conclusive it the positive
zation
late of Sule
Ngow. "91
NC
Dcc. '91 NC
Dec. 91 NC
Deէ:. "91 NC NIC
Dcc, '91
NIC
NIC
ιe Πew owners
Aug. '91
NC
ՒՎC: sin on a petition tcd in the live
Jcuments of Llle
and negative achievements of the Sri Lankan programme. However, impressionistic evidence and some published and un published data a Te available to make som le tentative obserwations. As can be scen, the first two objectives of the privatization programme are somewhat interrelated and thus can be considered together. In regard to them it appears that privatization has shown some positive results. A few case studies would be Worthwhile to exismile.
The Pugoda Textile Mill, for instance, hals in Wested R.S. 140 million in modernization, expansion, and a diversification programme after it was privatized. This a mount is very signi
ficant compared with Rs. 150 Tmillion j Invested ower the last ten years by Pugoda under
public ownership and the private Imanagement of Lakshi ni Textiles, India. Moreover, among other innovations, a new rotary screen printing machine with twelve colours, costing Rs. 35 million, has been added. Profits too have increased from Rs. 863 million in 1990/91 to Rs. 925 million in 1991/92. Similarly, in United Motors, the turn over doubled from Rs. 219.6 million in 1989/90 to Rs. 443.2 million in 1990/91. The pre-tax profit increascd by 15 per cent during these years and the company continues to fund its operations internally without resorting to any long-tem bank borrowing. During 1990/91 the company concentraLited, ir 7 er alia, on Ima Tketing, customer Tclations, productivity improvements, computerization, training of personnel and diversification.
In the case of the Leathet Corporation, production has increased by 50 per cent after privatization. The salaries of employees have also increased by 50 per cent. Moreover, some of the retrenched labourers froll the corporation are now engaged in subcontracting activities to the company, and some others are similarly engaged for other leather enterprises like Bata, Thus, in overall terms, it ap
1.

Page 14
pears that Indernization and growth have already taken place in some privatized corporations.
In regard to the third objective, the picture appears negative in the short run. Although privatization relieves of its fiscal burden in the long-run, there is no evidence to show that it does the same in the short-run. This is because
the state has to settle with banks many of the liabilities - of these public corporations
accummulated over several years before privatization, restructure
the site.
debt, and comp Workers. Somet obtained by si porations are ir Elli fl S C4.) I ll 1: Lil With the gove duction policit private scctor
there al Te comf ET"Il II l'It’s 511 of accum mulati with the privatiz
Finally, in fourth objectiv have not been Sri Lanka's p]
Table 2
Public Enterprises to be Privatiz
1. Weyangoda Textile Mills Ltd. 2. Distilleries Company of Sri Lanka Ltd. 3. Independent Television Network (ITN) 4. Acland Insurance Services Ltd. 5. Ceylon Manufacturers & Merchants Ltd. 6. Hevycuip Ltd,
7. Colombo Commercial Company (Engineering): 8. Colombo Commercial Company (Fertiliser) LLI 9. Colombo Commercial Company (Teas) 10. MILCO Ltd.
ll. Sathosa Motors Co. 12. Sathosa Computers Co.
13. Sathosa Printers Co. 14. Trans Asia Hotels Ltd.
15. Ceylon Fertiliser Corporation 16. State Trading (Tractor) Corporation 17. Nylon 6 Plant of the Ceylon Petroleum Cor 18. Building Materials Corporation 19. Building Materials Manufacturing Corporation 20. Ceylon Steel Corporation 21. Sri Lanka Cement Corporation (Ruhunu Cem 22. State Trading (Textile) Corporation (Salu Sal: 23. Lubricant Plant of the Ceylon Petroleum Col 24. Sevanagala Sugar Industries
25. Hingurana Sugar Industries 26. Kantalai Sugar Industries 27. Sri Lanka State Trading (General) Corporatio, 28. Consolidated Exports & Trading Co. Ltd. 29. Lanka Canneries Ltd. 30. Ceylon Shipping Lines 31. Cey-Nor Foundation Ltd. 32. Lanka Plywood Corporation
33. Kahatagalha Graphite Lanka Ltd.
Source: Ministry of Policy Planning & Implement

ensate displaced imes the funds lling these coradeqaate Tevenue o direct conflict "Il T1 EIt’s talix Tes for general initiatives. Thus icts in the gov. t-run objective ug Til o Te rewenlle ition programme.
regard to the , the attempts very satisfactory. rivatization pro
ed
Ltd.
rationטו
ent Works) i)
poration
ation,
gramme, with the ongoing private scctor development programmes, have contributed to increase the share owning population in the country from about 9,000 in 1989 to about" 40,000 by 1991. In a country While Te thic sharellä Tket Was in the doldrums for Illany years this increase could be considered as a progress. However, the share-owning population appears to be concentrated in urban areas and the same group of investors scem to hawe been involved in purchasing shales of thic recently privatized companics. The number of share application forms in the country was around 280,000 by 1991 compared with the 40,000 shareowners; a possible interpretation to this is that, on average, a person holds shares in seven companies. These are probably cxpected in an environment where share-trading has becn relatively unknown. Although the Securities and Exchange Commission undertook various In easures to educate the public on the virtues of owning shares, Lhese efforts scem Lo hawc hadl only a limited impact in spreading ownership to a wider spectrum of the population.
While the above discussioT has shed som c light on the positive achievements and slow progress in certain areas, it II lay be useful to examine the problems of privatization in its early phase of implementation. Although the privatization programme was persued with vigour, since of late it has faced several Sctbacks and various problems. Firstly, and most importantly, the lack of transparency in the implementation of the program Tunc has led to ru Imou Ts of corruption and fawou Tritis Illin. For, instance, the Ceylon Textile Manufacturers Association has alleged that unduly favoured market access for textile products was accorded to Kabool Lankal — the purchaser of the Thulhiriya Textile Mill ("Textiles Today, Wol. 1, Nos.1 & 2). These allegations have yet to be denied officially.
(Corred r page )

Page 15
Privatization (2)
C. P. de Silva
What is privatisation'? .
It is the transfer of manageIn ent of state owned enterprises from the public sector to the private sector. There are 4 principal types of privatisation, They a Te : divesting, co Il tracting out, leasing & deregulisation (allowing private sector competition),
Why has it become popular :
It is duc to the pragmatic realisation that thic state owned sector can not provide goods and services as efficiently as the Wtiwale sęy. W RWSWWWS subsidies are required to maintain loss making state owned cnterprises (SOEs). The pressure has mounted from lending ag cncies, dono T countries and Finance Ministrics.
Submotivations for privatisation:
1. The need for immediate cash income. In order to close budgetary deficits sale of SOEs would be better than increasing taxes or raising loans, This is the primary motivation of Thatcher's Government El CCording to SITT
ii. The need for foreign exchange to settle foreign debts.
iii. The desire to en Col.II Tage inclustrial development.
iw. The desire to En C011rage foreign investment. v. The desire to ensure future
cash income. Privatisation leads to higher profits and higher Lax TEW211 ule,
Wi. The desire to develop capital markets. Many workers have bought the shares of privaltised SOEs.
Some governments have come to the conclusion that there is no Clson to compete with the PITIWEG SECIL. IT i Il area wher
4. Il-earriera F' biss irrrrrrrrar, rhe jirrifer ma hெairman, Atter Sp:
the private sec torily perfor Ill. the gover Illic Int be lill ited to private sector d capital or the
Il healLh, edu electricity, it that the private wide cheaper all
The private s ficiency due to owners are inte profits and mill ested in the lo of the firm
\ęAA W WTY jobs. The care would depend
SC) Es : Ie ow the pictoplc. II buy or sell :185t:Lh Ilմr tlt t dual claim on is mainly the arc affected by losses of SOEs neither direct This the Te is tive for citizens performance of Illployees whic a practical imp.
The employee not directly a financial result Relullerati SCct CT is I CIL Illil Ice. Losses TCS llit il i levyiti ployment. The that most publ yces tend to pur: T: ther thal e Til is recognized t but still there belief in some practice the pu Inct been show I rily less efficien W: Sect,
Studies in USA administrative more in the pub taining and pu Teceivables cos

TOT Calli saltisfall CThe rule of sector should Treas WyleTE: the coes mot halwe the IIlotivation. cation, Lansport, las - bcc in found Se:LOI C1. Il Prd better sic Twiccs.
|cctly thir cxcels in elf
the fact that rested in greater agers are interng run Survival as losses would
NWS AW WYS (S !ers of managers on efficiency. ned indirectly by Il diwiduals call Tot public enterprise hey have a Tesithe profits. It tax payters th:ıt the profits and and the effect Il tot immediate. I 10 strong in Cent) Tiit T th: public sector 1 18 1n any case
ssibility.
is themselves alre
|ffected by the si cof the SOEs. in the public
tied to perforin SOE.5 cilo 11ot ble loss of emi
c insequence is ic sector emploille pre-reguisites cielley. All this he world over,
is a lingering uarle IS, th:It il blic sector has
to be necessat than the pri
halwe shown that
functions cost lic sector. Mainrsuing accounts 60% less in the
rivate sector than for the ederal government. The federal government takes a year or
more to obtain judgments against a debtor as compared to 5 months in the private sector, The cost of processing a payrol 1 cheque in the US army is S 4:20 as compared to Sl in El large private sector enterprise. When culls Liliall sic TW || C55 W CTC transferred from US Depart II ent of Defence to the private Sector it resulted in 5 to 25 per Cent Teluction. A COImpT13011 of 97 state owned hydroelectric plants with 47 privately
Wwe \\ \Wę\ \ \
cost pc Kilowatt hours was 2%, higher in the public sector. Similar studies in banking, hospitals, air lines and postal services have shown that the public sector was less efficient in providing goods and services.
Tl reltive ele Üf Briti wer the last 2 decades has coincided with a decline in the
proportion of UK equity held by individuals from 54% in 1963 to 28% in 1981. During
the sa IIle period the proportion in America has remained roughly at a level of about 60%. MTS. Tha Licher has Tealised II10-re than 20 billion by diverstitures of Aerospace, Telecomes, Road Hallage, Britoil, Sea Ports, Ferri, Jaguar (cars), The flow of tax income has increased as the divested companies made profits or reduced Inaking losses. The American Govern Illent owns only a few business enterprises and even the running of prisons is done by private sector (the Se Crict of its success.)
Obstacles to Privatisation:
The main obstacle to privatisaon cones from resistance from politicians and bureaucrats. Any time a SOE is privatised it results in loss of power and influe Tice and Imonetary benefits to the bureaucrats and the politicians who have influence CWC it.
13

Page 16
There ate SGI 11e of Lhe argulIments against privatisation:
a) A private monopoly will be created. Only a handful of companies will take over the shares and a monopoly will be created. Hence the assumption is that permanent public monopoly is hetter than tempøTāry
private Iloilopol
belief that el altrustic and enlightened.
b) Mamy public tural monopolies be operated by til
c) The services vided by the s
Privatization. . .
(Corrired from:7 page 12)
It is also alleged that there hawe been partial or full priyatization åtte ITıpts by InegotiatiÕIl with 'interested parties', withJut inviting cpcil offers. For example, Thullhiriya and Pugoda Textile Mills. In such cases, the Te is Ino evide:Ince up to date La L tle best te TITS hawe been obtained by the country.
Similarly, rumours of sales of assets at less than market wallule hawe bee Il flat with regard to the attempts to privatize several corporations. FoT example, al legations of “insider arrangements' have been made
in regard to the Corporation (se Times, 1.12, 199
land, 11, 12, 199 the given mark enterprise can
many different
the process of done openly, Wi iton provided t these ILLIOLITs lism' could hav It is Said that ci hawe been alpp) cabinet relating
in which enter privatized. These sco TaT lot beem,
(To be
VASA O
207, 2nd C Colomէ
Telephoпе
14

y. There is a terpreneurs are ]']l:1LICT : [3, HT
services are Illaso they should he public sector,
Illust եւ:
PTOSLI:
Oils and Fats The Sunday | titlti The Is1). Of course, et Wlue Cf al Il be subject to
estimatis. If j rivatizatioil WilŠ til full i InfoT 11:34, a the publicf "crony capitae been avoided. ertain guidelines rowed by the the Ital II rises should be : guidelines hawe
Illade public.
!ontinued)
that the poor will have access to it. But heavy subsidizing of SOEs can harm the poor. Gowernment monopolists are not concerned with quality of Serwice as there is no competition. d) Public Service should be Organised foT services and not for profit,
SLIbstantial
a) Misleading cost Accounting Private Sector prices are higher than Government Sector prices. Costs Illust not be confused with price. State cost is subsidised and often depreciation is not included and capital costs are, too, not includcl.
b) Fcar of unemployment c) Fear of corruptions d) Legal prohibitions e) Regulatory problems-Govt. Regulations may make privatisation impossible or unatLITEt Lil W. f) Inadequeate legal structure g). Undeveloped capital markets.
Cry: "The ral of the rriture of Carrered decorrar,
PTICIANS
ross Street, .11 - סנ
4 21 631

Page 17
D. S. (2)
From rebel to collab
A. Jeyaratnam Wilson
hic periodi prior to 1931
leves rinto Windct What his limbitions werc. II). S. hlal his secondary education at Saint Thomas’s where he did not s hinc. He did not proceed to any institution of higher learning. Inistead he took to managing the family business. We have no wailable informiLtion om the influence that his father, Mudaliyar Don Spater Senanayake had on him, leave alone his Imother. Nor did D. S. make any refercnce in his public utterances to his parents or even to his well respected brother, F. R. We know that D. S. grew up in the rural background of Botale and he therefore had to be conservative and traditional in his thinking. Nor was his wife helpful given that she was ailing. As for religion, he did not politicise his Buddhism but tok it as il fact of life. Al indeed he spoke respectfully of the benefits of missionary education because of his pleasant days at Saint Thomas's.
D. S.'s political experience Teached a milepost when the British colonial authorities g:Loled him for a short while du Ting the SiIıhala —MLIsliTIl Tibts oT 1915. But it was not the road to : nationalist Da IInascus. His performance in the Legislative Council during 1921-31 was not conspicuous though he became a Senior spokes Ilımalı Tlı for the UToficial Members in the early t Weltie 5 a fert SiT P. Ra:ImaThaillä began voicing the concerns of only the Ceylon Tamils. D. S. was not a good speech IIlaket but could articulate his ideas in his own homespun English.
II, 1931 D. S. Walls electical Minister of Agriculture and Lands and this led him to launch the various irrigation schemes in the dry zo Inc. Hic did ITJIt count this as a political plus. His
own experience rist in TTL mag eState all the carwing foT hit restori Ing the : Würks of Sinh possibly have factors. Howev il rld Poi frfor lors attributed to it Who Tinctioned signer of Lands indicated an in ting these alre c:lonists.
The years as evidelcic of til D. S. S. politica S. was a big whose Persona power rivals col He was fort II: backing of the R. Wijlewardene cooperation of : including the de til leke, a dista Libril. II, the si thirties, D.S., Britain lai LI: to a willing Teason being ImЕПt wait, II13 this way than path of the Congress. But the Bri Lish1 |iT Wils for exampl he resigned ow incident (1940).
By the la Le 1 achieved three (l) the seniors ing Bal Tom Jayati the Way and D. as Leader of (2) prime inii SLIch 15, G. C. S. W. R. D. B. edged (ծնt; as elections to t Council in 193 D. R. WijęWard Corca (g; c. s.)

Orator
as an agricultuing the family possibilitics of Tself a niche in 1ncient irrigation all kings Cull been notivating er his Agriculture onlyותותoט (1915) he civil servant as his Commis(A. G. Rana sinha) terest in popula:15 with Sinhal;
ter 1931 provide he unfolding of I aspirations. D. bir hlið til Colls".* Imal lity could overf chal Tim people. te i I having the բress barom, D, He had the ble civil serwants 2 ft Oliwer GooIllent family connecEttյ11ւI - 11:1|f tյf the the rebel against Insformed himself collaborator, the that self-governTC: alchlicy ble il by following the Indian National he did not tot: 1e alt gether as e Witnessed when er the Mooloya
hirties D. S. had Illajir objectives: tiltes man, thıc agelaka was gotout of S. succeeded him hle State Council listerial material S. C. rel und 4. In då Tanaike was early as after the he second State 5, D. S. had told EIle that **C|:1ucle
hal to be wat
ched' Dr. N. M. Perera thought that G. C. S. Corea was a possible prime minister. And Dr. Percra stated that Claude Corea it was shunted off by being appointed, after independence, as High Commissioner in London. As for S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, J. L. Fernando attributed to D. S. type of Cunning in that ** hic used to Imake occasional suggestions to Kotelawala ito ask embarrassing questions from S. W. R. D. Bandlaranalike . . . Bandaranalike flaredi up and used his vitriolic tongue to good ef. fect, sending Kotelawala in turn 19 i Tage. ..." and (3), the panSinhalese Board of Ministers had its composition altered with the election of a Ceylon Tamil as Minister of Home Affairs, Arunachallan Mahadewa (1943).
in place of Baron Jayatilaka:
thus Britain was made to rea lize that the Sinhala majority was willing to share power with the Ceylon Tamils. This feat of p litical engineering was ac
complished by D. S. and his friends. These successes can again be interpreted in terms
of a native cunning acquired in the hurly burly of the business and political World.
Blit IOW We come to more important questions:
(1) what were the main themes of D. S. Scmanayake's Princ Ministership (1947-52)?
to what extent was he influenced in his character, his worldview and style in ter Ins of his experience before he entered the high office?
(3) where does he fit into Bar
ber's paradigm?
the
(2)
D. S. was pro-West, in particular pro-British in foreign policy. He was suspicious of an aggressive India. But shirewd als he was, he did not lay all his
(Солтiпшғd on page 17)
15

Page 18
Part (3)
-H
In a Goiya's Mirror
Manik Sandrasagara
o we harter our envirol
ment for the greed of a few or do we plan for our real needs? This question must be settled first. Foreign aid agencies influencing our people in choosing what's best is inter
ferencein out internal affairs.
This 'NIC' versus ESD' question is of utmost importance to al those who live in Lanka. Befo Te any decision is made by a Centralised Government on what we do with our motherland it must be a subject of an open debate. This problem is more important than as to what system of government prevails.
Industrialisation
The industrialised world must protect the South Asia from industrialisation. It is in her interests to keep her 'green'. If SouthAsia were to follow the West, by the time the West wakes up, South Asia would have tiu Tined half the planet into one giant slum. Let's keep industry in the developed nations. They are used
to that way of life. Let SouthAsia Tetain its cultu Te as an agrarian basc. The Te is also
money in this. We know that we are custodians not owners of the elements. How then can we pollute this region with politics, World trade and labour unions replacing a priesthood of farmers who venerated the land as a mother
C) ISC15 LI:
First the people must be told the truth. No one person should hold the reins with divide and rule as a principle. Individuals Illust disappear and consensus Tust Tule. Only if the Sinhalese speak with one voice can we start a dialogue with the Tamils. If we are divided in W Call WC insist that the Tamils be united? Already in every village tradition is getting stronger. People are going to temples and shrines
1.
and pleading Wi justice. In Jaf hawe got used t. petrol, electrici but they :LTe becausc of :l Cail in. We don't h Limites LIS, ex Cet turing Jaffin. Wէլen we havէ: of Lanka. What Jaina? The yol pid – after 44 sent is the Tesl som cithing WTC) Tig not with indi will Prema dasa tried, all failed that i the present prol anyone else succ
LuTnders taT1d th1 £:
syst:Ill.
Thլ: Future
In 1971, I op
Til's fifth less I - I sail that this sary since the troy itself. This i The electorate i: confidence in it: politician canni streets without ::guarti111 - נוטווeIט
sic busy slal Indler so that the whol Who the Teill Cri] lia III 1 cut the Prei! Law are all bec The media is al it is als) playing
role all it is a do we go from he but anarchy is : of it will list and a new era, pocrisy and li ald Prabakaran
toils. Destroyin solve the proble:
Conflict
Traditionally li hala - Tamil di' introduction of come iTi Silllllllll,

th the gods for sila, the people to living without ly or kerosene, managing - Why use they believe ave a cause that pt perhaps capAfter that what? destroyed II est will we do with Il re I'll St l'1- cars if the preit, there illust b: with the Systell als. J. R. tried, but they hawe s why we have ble I11. Hoew CaIl teed unless they problem - the
posed Wijey Weearmed conflict. "S T1 i IELES" SysteII will dessnow happening. s fast losing its leadership. A it walk on the thugs and polihill. They a Te ing each other : call I try kth (WS minals are. ParIsidency and the Colling irrelewatı L. so s. Spect sice the middlella's Tilsit1ess. Wherc: re? Anarchy. . . . mot Hill badl, out : a new Illind devoid of hyes. Wijcy weera a Te only sympg them will not
1.
lete was no Sin
ville. Aster Llle
the Pitha
Ille in TallTil
people started fighting over what was in the Potha'. Even today the fight is over land. Land ownership starts with the Portuguese thombus, Dutch deeds and English law. Land grabbing is the cause of this conflict and lawyers have been the only regular beneficiaries. Instead of boundaries being watersheds and working towards common goals and idicals, we are Inc) w fighti Ilg over a land that is dying fast. Provincial bundaries weTc first 5, then 7, then 9. People were first ask cd Lo vote for colour, then a symbol and finally for a person. Division was bred and party politics was the method.
Јапnbudweера
To us in the willage, the Te is
but one land mass. From Kailas to K:lt:Talgal In:L there was only Jambudwc.cpa. This region
was culturally Tclated. For Centurics pilgrims walked from North to South all although they spoke a thousand languages they were united by patterns of behaviour. This cultural pattern was destroyed by nations, boun
daries and governments coming into being.
Consider the story of DharIn ashoka: Dharmlashoka killed every small King. He became Emperor of Jambudweepa. Then
he becaime a good man" and started preaching and sending Inissions abroad. Chanda-Ashoka become Dharma-Ashoka. This is what is in our history books - but the clever
man sees through this story. The Mahawams: is a secret text – a labrynth of a Walkagiri. Fools will fight over it and wise illen will laugh over
it. It is a story of Kings, blood
lines and Gu na Dharma, not
just a modern history book.
Constitutions
These a Te also "Pothai's. We
villagers do not have any potha'. Our culture is basei o in living siit". Tiš häs cxistel for coLuries. This has been tried and tested hence its sustainability. The present constitution. We are arguing about was decided in 17 days, experillented over 13 years and has 16 armendments. Why argue over this potha'? Why don't We realise Llat Lllis Pathi

Page 19
is based on Oil T ignorance and seck alternatives based on wisdo Ilm. Whiti ulimi Les Is is Timuch greater than that which divides us. Let us first study what We have in common. If Lawyers are to decide our future we can Test assured that We will only see division: that is their training. Co-Existence
Bats crime to a tree with fruit. If you don't give, you don't get. A King 11 1st always be magnanimous. He cannot be bankrupt. He must understand people's love for novelty, for money, for change, for power, in fact for more of everything. These desires naturally leads to slander and competition. Everybody attacks each oth cr. A false purity emerges.
Leaders are mostly merchants. A villager fears the ocean. The Wewa is the only ocean we know. Crossing an ocean is not our heritage. Traders, evangelists and reformers belong to another TienTality. As long as they kept travelling, we had nothing to fear from the Ill. When they settle down, they lon know how to use and
protect the land used to harwicsti Tot sowing and
The King
A King has ta' or how call he
willages the Te is Het rules Trom (veil). All ritua ciated with Kin out without th individual King, of a city cultu T wer was symbolis of a King who His rulle howe be his personal cy. He was #1 Dharma. It W Tuled Ilot the ! lage had its He residic by tree, on a hill, a cave. It Wals that the British many puppet Who was in Lh not Tilatter. I person only the
Nowadays, T like Gods. The own purity and w
From rebel to...
(Corfiried fra Pri page 75) cards on the table. In domestic affairs he was laissez fairc (let sleeping dogs lie). In ethnic imatters, he was opposed to the Indian Tamils, and was desirous of curbing excessive Ceylon Tamil ethnocentrism.
In relation therefore to the Ceylon Tamil and Muslim comIllulities, D. S. went for interelitist cooperation preferring to co-opt willing collaborator5. 1пstinctively he disapproved of political controversies trickling down to the Imonks all the masses (and in this he was correct). He was decisively a IltiMarxist, not for any serious ideological reasons but in the illerests of the tradition-blind peasantry and the conventional II i ddile class, Bült hic dicl Imao L. pattern a coherent political philosophy either in regard to state for nation building nor in respect of political ideology.
There are more aspects of the ** active-megative', 'thain thc
active-positive Llę fur and : D. S. held the Minister. Tiլ: combines inter: emotional rewal he tends toward Ilions. This wa way D. S. hanc of the LTI S feT Britain.
D. S. obtained with condition as the gTintin naval and air for a mutual under which BI Lo Ceylons : event of fort. agreement Was ing. The only sor was Irdi Britali II would led. This was Liam’s PTiTc Ali Khan le:LIIl :18Sllrances olg attack fTYI 11 til TITicit. () Il 2. Khan after f:

They are only 1g and trading,
protecting.
be a murderer Tule? I Oll an uns een King. pelind di Lhira" 1 functions assoship was carried : Ileed for ill With the rise - the uns een poed in the person played the role, te could Ileyer whim and fanse Twal Int of the as Dharma that King. Every vilown God-King. a Wewa, in a a rock or in for this reason el Countcrcd so Kings in 1848. e Pallanզաin did was new cI the : idea.
Le Th want to be cy trust in their Insteld
isdom,
of being like a pilgrim the Inodern ruler tries to be a missionary. He tries to impose his notion of Dharma on everybody. If he is not enlightened naturally there will be war. If he is enlightc:med, he will hawe nothing to fear because lhe Dharma will protect him. That is why there is a story that our King slept with a sword hanging over his heart. If he was just, he slept in peace, Humility
Lampooning was part of our entertainment. Kolamo illustrated this best. Nobody and nothing was sacred. Today's media is a pale imitation. It is "pandang karaya's media. It only leads to false pride and belief in one's self importance. This is dangerous to both the rulers and the ruled. Everything beço Illes sericus, Full is TeIT COved and laughter prohibited, Why can't we laugh at ou Tselwes? We arc a cultulic that Tidiculed even the King. This is best seen through ritual where we even use abuse to teach thic King humility. What has happened to our sense of fun."
ewid ential i Ill half yeaTs that office of Pric active-negative effort all low 'd for that effort; Is centrenched opis Illa Iuj festi i the led the question of power from
independence but attached such to Britain of bases in return efence agreement t:lin We uld come sistance in the gn attack. The die Woid of meanpolential aggreslglinst who. lever have Telthe lession Pakisfinister, Liaquat 1 When he sought IISL ELI Indian : Attlee governJune 1949, Ali ling to secure a
military alliance between his country and Britain "against Communism' proceeded in June 1949 til declil Te his conce Tms. He told the British High ComIlissioner in Pakistan, L. B. Graffley Smith: ; what I fear is that Great Brit:ı il alını d the world would look on with folded ai Ins if India attacked us' British policy then was not to offend India, rather to appease India so that India will reImain in the Commonwealth and thereby enhance Britain's prestige as a global power. If this were the case with a major state such as Pakistan what hope could there be of Britain coming to Ceylon’s assistance in Lhe event of an Indian attack?
Further Timore the probabilities of Indian expansionism at this stage were remote, given lindia's problems resulting from the partition of the subcontiment. Nehri's foreign policy, and the emergence of the nomaligned IlloveII CITI,
(To be Continued)

Page 20
MWELD WA
Free Press and Polls
zeth Hussain
he present Govern Illent might described as quasi-democratic. If the alternative to democracy is dictatorship, the Government night be described With equal accuracy, as has been done by Lalith Athulathmu dali, as a quasi-dictatorship. One reason among thers is that freedom of the press, Something regarded als a prerequisite for democracy, has been so scvercly constricted in Sri Lanka that we really hlave no press freedom in any worth
while sense. I want to pose the question whether for this Tcl son the Govern Ille L 11ight
bic more appropriately describcd1 as not democratic at all.
This question does Inol Tean that we are judging the GoweIII ent's democratic credelitials from i impossibly high sta Ilda Tids. It can be argued that democracy is an ideal which has probably not been realized anywhere in the world, no L ewem iIn the West. One of the forellist contemporary theorists of dellocracy, Robert Dahl, uses the term "polyarchy' to designate the Western systems of governTilent, not 'dello cracy' which in its full and strict sense Inay never colle to be realized by humanity. What the West has is ill perfect democracy, and the questico II, I a Ilı asking is Whethe we cal cliIl to liw c even imperfect deilocracy while We are demied sull press freedom.
Dahl stipulates seven institutions as necessary for polyarchy, Firstly the government Illust be elected, secondly the elections Illust be free and fair, thirdly th1cere must be uniwersal suffragic, fourthly all adults Illust have the right to Tun for coffice, fifthly there must be freedom of expression, sixthly the people Trlust Ilave access to älte Tnitive sources of information, and
A Career diplorar, The Horffer las Sri La Pika i rilir sador i ri Marila
18
seventhly there
ciaLiCill aut I people to form pendent associ: political partie grԸաբS.
It list be I i5: fir from E
in his stipulatio or imperfect
inst El Ince, he say separation of independence o All that is real
fee all fair basis of Liu Imiwe. free press and
formation, an autonomy. As really free pres: We cannot clai an imperfect or
We il Sri cycIl less de Illi about the Tequi fect democracy, been required gWCTIl cInt c( through frce an the expression the Imajority, gower III 11:Thit can over practically everybody with dc T1 CCTallitic cTek press has be something like benefit, which . with Collut affecti Ill It's lic CT beca Lise it s Lill mentally democ as it clocs th dete:Tlililled thT faiT c1cctioT18.
At this poi Is aise a fuirther government clair tically elected whi is suppressed. At We choose the a Imong conte:Tndi ties. The choi. the basis CF i II FT to the public a and performanc

Imulst be 1553 allowing צוו10T Telatively inde1 tills such is 5 aldı il terest
oted that Dahl eing demanding ins for polyarchy democracy. For 's nothing about powers and f the judiciary. uired really are elections on the rsal suffrage, a freedom of ind Elssociational We have I 10 s in Sri LalIkal, ml to hawe ewe.Il quasi-democracy.
LELI lika Hlw becn 1ding than Dahl sites for imperAll that is here, is that a Jill c tkb power di fair clicctions, of thıc wi II of after which the Tidic Ticuglish Jd everything and CuL lo sing its len tills. A free CI 1 Tegal Teled as an ancillary can be discarded ng the governatic pretensions Tc:Tllins fundaratic, expressing c Illajority will ough free and
Thit I was it tith զuestion. Can a Il to be de Il craile press Treedom General Elections gowler In I lment f'rom ng political pare is made on "Tiation a Wailable bout the policies c of the govern
ment, and the alternative policies of the opposition parties. Should in for Illation be suppressed about the gover in 11 ent's Imisgovernment, which certainly happens when the press is not really free, the people are denied the means to make a fully informed judgeIment on the goversi II.lent, and to Wole accordingly. It becomes questionable whether elections can be really fair and free when the press is not fully free.
It can happen that a governIllent which has suppressed press freedom los es al General Elections, which was the faite of the SLFP Govellent in 1977. The defeat might have been worse if the press had been free. An important question arises when al Leade : Tid his Go WeTIILI CIL get re-elected while press freedom is suppressed. At the very
least the legitimacy of their clection Wictories has to be quicisticon cd. Thic Sri Lankan notion that a government has democratic legitimacy through free and fair elections, a legitimacy which it does not lose
thcreafter however undeilocratic its behaviour, certainly requires that the press be fully free at thic time of the elections.
The President and the present GOver IlITlent certailly have achiewellents to their credit, which to be fairly judged have to be seen in the perspective of the gory Iness Left by the 1977 Jayawardella Government, which Om its record Was beyond doubt. {imũng the worst Third World (Gover II illelts sic: Lille 195O". It was among the worst because of its ir responsible ta Indi uncomstrained anti-democratic power. We must get back to the kind of democracy we had in the 'fifties, and for that the absolute pre-requisite is press freedom. It is known that when a regime mowes in an anti–democrátic direction the first casualty is the free press. Its restoration should be our first priority.

Page 21
THE REGIon
SPECWAL TO TAWAF L. G.
Kashmir, Myths and Re
Inder Malhotra
I few other issues is there O Illuch misunderstanding, mis representation, obfuscation, distortion, disinfo Tillation and downright falsehood as on Kashmir. The problem is, of course, immensely complex and has a long and tortured history. Only the then Indian defence minister and chicf delegate to the U.N.,
Krishna Menon, had the wit to sulIl it all up in a Speech to the security council lasting
In Iliç Te than ni Elle hours. BLI E that was in 1957, a good 35 years ago. Since then Inuch Water ha s flowed down the Jehlum, to say nothing of other subcontinental rivers.
It mły not be casy to do so but an attempt in list he inade to salvage a modicult of clarity from this awful mess of confusion its objectively and briefly as humanly possible. The story has to begin from the beginning but it might be useful to interposcherconę significant coliter|- porary facL.
For close to 20 years since the 1971 War for the liberatio of Bangladesh and the subsequent Simla Agreement signed by Indial and Pakistal II — which enjoined both countries to settle all disputes including Kashmir, peacefully and bilaterally and scrupulously to respect the Linc of Control without prejudice to their basic positions - It one in the wide world botlı cred about Kashı Tilir. It is understandable that the Sudden spurt of terrŪTism and a secessionist novement in Kashmir since December 1989 should draw international attention to the valley, But how clies the mixture of a virtual insultgency, a proxy wat by Pakistan and widespread alienation of the Kashmiris Suddenly Walidate and bring balck lo lifc ling discarded and discredited U.N. resolutions, passed under totally different
circumstances N how des a situa which is faced t and sul Til dry oth rant the cla11101 mination only Furtheliore, ho tion of indepel mir Irise tödly
was never Tleilti counteria Inced, Kashmir issue Wa
We will retir tions presently genesis of the complicated wic passed through
At thlc tiT11: a lil partitioIl IL1 dial, Kash Lillir state, among th a total of 562, which Wils Il holding of a partition was no India and Muslii Muslim-majority I) TL h-West Ill Copt out. But II Illice if the seillar site ill gions, clstes a cqual before Ll lirge number in India evell th Muslims live in Pakiställn.
A methodolog India Il provinces choice of joinin,
till existed. Th relatio to the States. Tile Bri
both ambiguous
The British par lapsed, the Dir make their vs. with the LW st
Ils. But his ilt best a techni lity Was, as the
eroy, Lord M. later beca The in first go VeTT1ữT
told the prince:

ality
Lore importantly, ion of this kind y, say, Sri Lanka ir countries Warfor self-deter
in Kashmir? w does the quesileT1ce fo T Kashwhen this option yned, leave alone ven When the 5 before Llle U.N."
In to these quesafter tracing the problem and the issitudes it las over the years.
of independence of LH10 British was a princely e larger few of the Sillallest of bigger than the goat herd, The it between Hindu
In Pakistal. The arcas in the north-east did
di Wils, a contiEternal India, a which all TeliIl di crcccts were e law. A very if Muslims live en. Today more India than in
y for the British
to exercise their g India or Pakiscre was no Inc. in
princely Indian tish position was and hypocritical, amountcy having 1ces were free to "In arrangements Luccessor dominiwas a myth o'r cality. The Tea
last British Wicuntbatten, who iependent India's general, bluntly , that certail
geographical compulsions' could lot be evaded. He had added Lihat the “, “COImmunal character of the ruler's subjects was also a relevant consideration.
The basic dichotomy between India ald Pakistalını beccamıc geyident almøst immediately. Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan and its
first governor-general, insisted that in a state's accession to either lIndia or Pakis Lan, the
ruler's discretion was absolute. India said that this was nonsense and the people's will must prewail.
Kashmir had a Hindu Tiller but a Muslim majority population. The Maharaja was unpopular and incompetent. He W',raWered a bah’ul L tlıe ful Lure of hıis state for Inlich too long. The popular leader of all Kashmiris, Muslim and Hindu, Sheikh Abdulla, Wals for the M:ıhı:LTajaʼs renoval and Was on cUrdial terms With Gandhi, Nehu and other leaders of the freedom mowe Illen L. He and Jill Illah detested each other. The average Kash Iliri w:is also more fearful of the Punjabi Muslim dominant in Pakistan than of the government and the people of secular India.
While the Maha Taja’s procrastination caused uncertainty and suspense, Pakistan tried to clinch the issue and grab the coveted state – undoubtedly a beautiful piece of real estate of great strategic importance - by sending in hordes of Lribal invaders led by Pakistani military officers quietly alliwed to join this essay
in fraud and Willence. The raiders mights have succeeded in their nefarious design. But they
got bogged down in pillage, loot and Tape.
The shalken Maharaja than alcceded Li India. The accession was accepted only after it was endorsed by Abdullah, the peo
19

Page 22
ple's leader who also became head of an interi.Il governmen L. Further more, India said unilaterally and clearly that after the state was cleared of the Pakistail-backed raiders, the wishes of the people of Kashmir would be ascertained. Nehru later elaborated, once again on his own, that any plebiacite in Kashmir to determine the people's wishes would be held under the auspices of the U. N. Indian troops were sent to Kashmir. Pakistan also stepped up its presence. The first Kashimir War had begun. After the war had gone on for nearly three months, Nehru took the issue to the U. N. security Collllcil to ask the world body to compel Pakistan to stop assisting those who had raided Kashmir and to withdraw the Ill. In retrospect, this was a mistake. For at the U. N.', Kashmir instantly became a play thing or international power politics.
Even so, the U. N. resolutions about which so much fuss is being made today clearly laid down that there would first have to be a cease-fire (which came into effect on January 1, 1949), then Pakistan must Withdraw its armed forces and personnel from entire Jammu and Kashmir. then Indian troops should be thinned down and finally the plebiscite be held.
Pakistani scholar, Pravez lubal Cheema, has documented the various occasions when Pakistan could have had the plebiscite it is painting for now simply by doing its part to implement the U.N. resolutions. But it did not do so. Why?
After numerous mediatory ef. forts, the U.N. itself concluded that it was best to leave it to the two sides to settle the Kashmir issue through mutual discussions. These discussions came to naught and were Wirtually destroyed by the U.S. Pakistan military alliance of 1954 after which Nehru stated that in the totally new context that impinged on Indian security, old assurances about Kashmir no longer held. It was only in 1957, however, that "the offer of the plebiscite was formally withdrawn.
70
Fiftcic Til do 11th death, Pakistan 1955 wat ill the bing Kashmir attempt failed. destroyed at hy Pakist:in LČ) t: Kashmir peaceful And yet Indi: this right in tr ment of July 1: reference has Allir The 1971 W.L am di Pakista. W the liberation () East Pakistal : Republic of B intense fighting also i Til the west mir. s
As a result (l fire lille estilbli: al Lered, largelyt tage. Under t Ill L. the new the Lille of C. respect to it by the siri e q r r f. accord. (Of CC Illent also prov of government tries would m * :fill settle II CIL ImiT question. was ever held for by Pakistan because the fiT1: dira. Gandhi El Bhutto hald Wis recognition of t trol - with Iiml li changes in it and in violable
It is III dialos has led to Wi tion in Kashm has becil briz, tToris111 111d sece: Live state of so that it's tir; including the trating with i The J. S. hals to put Pakista the coul Il Liries ! der tcrroris III,
Furthe TI 113Tc:, and I many oth publicly urged issue should b al Pakista. In discussions, T. support for internationalisi

1s after Neh Tu’s launchctl the hope of grabby force. The But surely it In oral clail of ilk of Settling lly. il dici col cele Le Siml:L agree72 to which : ready been made. betweel Indial as primarily for f what was thic ind is now the angladesh. But did take place including Kash
this, the ceaseshed in 1949 was o India's advan1e Sirilla 1 g Teeline was named Controll al-Imdl f'LI 11 both sides was of the whole ursc, the agreeridical thalt heads of the two col IIeet again for a t' of the KashNo such meeting o'r cwell al sked Why? Possibly 1l setteleitent Inİndi Zulfiqar Ali ualized was the he Line of Coltually acceptable – as an agTeed frontier.
OWI) folly thal espread disa fecit. But PakistalEnly helping terSio 11 in this sensiIndia. So Thuch di Licinal fric Inds, J. S., a II e Telmonst on this sco Te. indiced threatened on the list of elping Cross-borleaded by Libya. America, China I countries have that the Kashmir ! settled by India through bilateral ere is hardly any akistan's cry for ng the problein
though some concern for alleged violations of human rights is voiced.
On both counts Pakistan would do well to heed friendly advice. For the alternative, the continuance of present Pakistami policy of training, arming, funding, in doctrinating and manipulating those in Kashmir who are fighting for independence or Kashmir's accession to Pakistan, cannot but spell disaster for all concerned.
Willout bush, let
beating about the us face soille holle truths. If anyone believes that baLinds of Kashmiris who hawe turned into Pakistal-backed illerchants of hate, murder, terror, secession and smuggling of narcitics call clefeat thic India Il arly, he or she must be living in a World of makcbelieve. Tilat leaves the alternative of changing Kashmir's status through Pakistan's full-scale a TIned intervention. Many Pakistanis have in fact been saying that they must adopt this course if only to “t’awenge” Bangladesh circa 1971.
But the position in this respect is that if Pakistan was able to do in Kashmir today - iT terms of both its military power and support of world opinion — what India coull achieve in Bangladesh two decades ago, it would have done as by Ilow. The situation in the Walley is still very far from being satisfactory. But it is not as ball as it was, say, at the start of 1990.
Continuing Pakistani interference on the present scale certainly complicates the problem of pacifying and conciliating the alienated people of Kashmir, But this problem is not rendeгеci impossible. In any case, it has to be resolved between New Delhi and people of the valley.
Once that situation is reached India and Pakistan can Surely rever to what Simla asked them to do. And once the Line of Control is accepted as the frontier acceptable to both sides as in violable a lot can be done to facilitate free Tho wemclt of KashIliris on both sides of the diwide and cventually to extend
(Continuғd ол даgғ:24)

Page 23
Global Crisis (2)
The Challenge
Birty Gajameragedara
rof. Fred Halliday of the
L. S. E. To tes.
The failure f the communist LLaaLLLL LL LHHLLLLLLLLL C LLLLLaLLS S LLLLLLLLS MLCaa LCLLLCLL HaLLLLSS C HHH historical reversal of the process that began in 1917 do not appear in doubt,
And hic i gceis CT1 to aldi:
. . . Th. Cr is, pa Licity of ideal, Els to h City CIIl temporary Society should HHC LLLaaCa LL aua S LCaaCCCL LHH SCC LLLLLLL CHLL S aLLL S LLLHHHCLHa basis... Nether ft III 5 Cnci El I de hhcratic parties in the West, nor friðilm (Gorlçhvite. Tęforms in this: LLLCLLLS S aLaSS SY S SKLaL S S LL S LLLLLLLa critique of present-day capitalism CITET gC.
Jurgen Habermas quotes the Corrillis Mari festo as a thicretical guide L) the uIlderstanding of Russia and Eastern Europc today:
The bourgeoisie, by the rapid illprovement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of cofilm Linication, dra ws pall, ç:W:Iı L h1e . r1115 t barb:1- Irian, Til till:315 int0 civilizati T. THE: cheap prices if its commodities are the heavy artillery with which LaaLLLSS S S aMCOLO H S a S LLCCaLLS S LLLLLLLLSS with whichill it foilscitri L'ht: hiarbarians' intensely obstinate hitred of foreigners to capitulate. It aaHHHHLS L CCaaa0SLCHa CaLLL LL KKLLCLLaHS C SaaCa S LLL aaHCLCLLS LHHLL S LLLS HLLLLaaLLLaHSS CHHHLKL the introduce what it calls civilizátion into their Imidst, that LS HL LLaLaLLaLL aLM aLaLaLLLL LLLLLLLCCLLS In one word, it creates a World after it-5 O. Wn image, ... And as in matcrial, 50 a 150 il intcllectual production, The intelectual creaLL LLL LLLLL S LLLLLLaLLL S LLLLLLaLLLHHHt aaHHHH S LHCLLLLL S LLLLCLLLCLL LaL LLLLLLLaL00L LLLL aLLLLLLLHHHHHHHHLLLLLLL LLLS come more and Imore impo35 ibile, änd from thc ni mer 35 militicial and local literatures, there arises : World li terät Li. Te.
This is a misleading proposiLion from the point of view on understanding socialism in crisis ancl, more importantly, the current global Conjuncture. Gorbachev himself has rejected the idea of a reversal of history, Speaking at the plenum of the Uk Tanian Central C+1111 mit Lee in September, 1989, he insisted the 'perestroika is the renewal of socialisill, not dismantling of
to Theo
it. . . . Il Tey Clu|| formation, clirTiT : tion of sociallis TT1, Tesoration of ca: attempt to democ ea lucratically Orii lised state appa economic organisa billing socialis in
b Il Lbic dCi 11e hall Ildi economic plannin Illechanis Till 31 th, La be wha L is al L Gorbachew’s Terwyl way, PeTestTcoika central proble.Ils In oleil social or is totally historit thäL [[Th;1ỹ:lley’s lead to al capit 1iÜT) in Lhe SÜvie will ewentually : selves somewhere of the lille.
Sitict: 1989, Լիլt: become profound and compounded eruption of the II tion... Zbigniew " sents the proble the overal East է է: { | =
Herce furth, hic |וויד ווו 15 חוורון החיילים genous Soviet E. definic i šelf til III i Il s'; er Livel
Lihail til Trill, high probability" self-emancipation T1 Li L ) li חilניים sens to f IIIA tir LITT I ng thL: TI - F
: Swiet li li Ji the existing Swi for the globa's in tLinflicts.
He adds: . It only a slight awer that thile ) Illizati” Colf I could be para tw tI1ւլյtll - Leb:1Iii Swiet Unio III’’’ | t:wer, tl | es Tirit t integration of the visualises an to tary''' Sylviet Cyn Tational is sue l' emerged today a cisive internal is wie Union chilll

ry
tionary transati T1g de forrilai
b) LI LI Tigot the italisill. All :Taiise a bu Tited ceilt :- ratus and an Ltion by coll
With1 = frecilo)JITl, and 11: Crg with markct e other, seems
the core of Lutil. II this Loches th:
pertaining tỞ "ganisation. It a to assilic reforms will alistic Test-Chr:- t ll Umico Il They tabilizeo the Tilin the middle
problem has ly complicated
by the violent
:ltionality quesBrzezinski prem forcibly in
European con
Jingjing Crisis af
בחווחתו! םטוחד, חTi lic is likely to rough increased
es% Lili eYel rising Il fac L. I her is Lihat progrCssiv: Of Ing. El L Euro| r1-l the grt willբ Ial listinctive Tess Lissiän nations of iħ "" will :: T 1 Ik: et bloc the : FCIl:1 1List i Luto til tilbrill
may thus be :xaggeration to
%ten Ligal - BalkaEastern Europe Lleled by the
"Izatiran" of the Brazez Inski, llollowI1"wi:3. ge th1e «tilisU. S. S. R. Ho pein :Lind Wolhunfederali l-ħin. Tille iš I: Wcrtheless is the Ill. SL deSL1e if 11t: S - enging the very
foundation of Soviet integration The continued adherence to the Soviet Union on the part of three Baltic republics, Lithuania Latvia and Esthonia is problematical, given the fact that they became part of the Soviet Union only pior to the outbreak of the Second World War. The ethnic nationalistic assertion by such important republics as Georgia, the Ukraine, Moldavia, Azerbijan and Armenia has now merged with the gcinciral - proble Il of democratisticom and the decentralisation of the Swie L stilte and thc: ccTLICITY, Ethnicity and ethnic consciousness are not constants; they are changeable, depending lupon political and socio-ccion (Illic collditions. In the final analysis, eth Thic nationalism is a challenge Lo democracy. Decentralisation is a way of democratisation. Devolution of power will not lead to separation. But the absence of devolution and cleIllicracy can lead to separation.
轟 醒
Ti1c , co Ibi Illa Lill of the LWcrises - capitalist and socialist - defines the current World conjulcture. Capitalis II is a world mode of production. But it has failed to facilitate the establishiment of a basis of a stable World o TileT... Its Hlistoric:al development has been always uneven and combined. And indeed it is this factor which explains the actuality of thic scillist Tcvolution. The interaction of the expanding capitalism with the semi-capitalist, semi-feudal and semi-colonial countries eventualled the Socialist revolution. Fr. Til this angle, the Socialist revolution was a b Teak in la social formation, determined by World capitalism. Further Ilore, and Timore importantly, capitalism hlas yet to overcome its mist for midable internal contralictions, namely, the contradiction between labo bur and capital and the conc between the development at thc capitalist centre and the underdevel pinent at the capitalist periphery'. The latter may be El Im:Anifestaltiko II of am Ll new en globalisation of the former, The emel of the Cold WaT and prolonged recession in the world
21

Page 24
economy can aggravate these contradictions. And so is the 'inter-imperial contradiction which has been Illa churing ever since the early seventies, with Јарап and Germany challenging the U.S. hegomony in the world economy. The general crisis of World capitalism, which began in the second decadc of this century, continues with its usual lips and downs, Contradictions of democracy, on the other side, also remail to be solved. The Victorious bourgeois democratic revolution in the West carried in its Womb the germ of the pInletarian revolution. The Wictory of the bourgcois democratic revolution in the Wes L lcd to the defeat of the saille reWolution in the South. Democracy in the West and the dicta orship in the Third World are two sides of the same coin, Democracy, in a sense, is the key global issue.
Thc socialist transformation was neither Eurocentric nor global as Marx hald anticipated and Lenin continued to believe until 1923. The years between 1919 and 1921 were crucial. The deficat of Lhe German Tevolution witnessed the shifting of the actuality of the socialist revolution froll the advanced West to the under-developed and backwald East and, from there. Lo the South, IL CCT scolidated itself within the nationallistic, bureaucratically centralised structures on the denial of freedoll, leading to the current crisis. Today's global crisis that is determined by the specificity of the historical development of capitalism and socialism denotes our central problem: the actuality of the globall revolution is not predicated upon the victory of socialism over capitalism or capitalism over socialism, but on the Tesolution of the contradiction between two. History bypasses us.
t 事
Michael Gorbachev, a product of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union – and not i manifestation of a The meidorian reaction - being the central actor in the Soviet interingl draIma, rewolutionises mot only its
22
immediate nati also its i liteT The end of thi ance in East resultant Cid o the erosion of nist rationale international pc reunification, t Super power-ge in the Third W among Cother til war in the Gu mosphere of r: stability in the gion are all I the reforms has undertaken Union. Of all implications of Inost important E:1st—West ImiIit which the post W had rested so the Cold War Illilitary founda North Atlantic tion and Llle W end of the Col the independen rents of the America and til "The Te li e thilos control as a pr. the maintenaП bala Ince on the particular mix devoid of cult old weapon sy others who st and disarmam. tical in spite a Cold War. Hi termined by su by objective necessity for st wis do ITh cal II list techocratic Ima chael Howard
Our object sh. апу, гесiprocal - and a In y SLIE have to be Te
O illusjoni - L relationship wi mak: the p TC: a na chronisti C ;
As relations procal threat both sides Wi increasingly di Bandi eli: bin billi: a II lict frçe5 The iccIn trail p r control and mot conce Til th, nation of given

In all context but Th;itional context. e S3 viet dominEurope and the if the Cold War,
the anti-commu
Of the Wester licy, the German he ell of the
-political rivalry World leading to, lings, the recent lf, and the atelative cal III1 and Asi:ı —Pacific rcIla ni FeStations of which G3 Thachey in the Swiet the international his reforIlls the ČT1C wayalis II. He ary balance upon WELT WOT li bläcc a T. The end of has shattered the tions of both thc Treaty Organisa'a Ts:1 w'r Pict. Thic | War citrilises nuclear deter. Inited States of 1e SOWie Union. who wiew arms oblem concerning *e of a Drudent basis of solle If Weapon systems crSome expensive items. There are ill regard arms Tilt as problemaf the end of the
story is not debjective will but Concil tills. The
und conventional
be replaced by nipulations. Mia still tely observed:
uld be not directly withdrawal of forces h withdrawal would iprogal, le t there be Lut th: creation of a ich would graduilly :IIt't it if sitch foirces nd Lin nece: 55;ary . . . improve and as reciCription di Tiimish, Il som lielhawy find it ficult, for domestic "CSICS to 13 il til their existing cvels. ble T11 : bout at Illus isaTitlament does - Lechnical elimi
Weapon Systems;
at bottom, it touches the more fundamental question relating to the problem of a definition of order in a disarmed world. One feature distinguishes the post-war international conflict from the previous ones, namely, the conflict between the two opposing blocs had at its heart the determination of the shape of the world. The end of the Cold War has brought the problem of a definition of a global order to the for cfront of the current conflict. The germs of of a new global order could be
found in the end of the Cold War. Theretical articulation of it is the great challenge. This
brings America to the forefront of the global drama, Japan and Europe are formidable factors in the world economy and the world balance. However, neither Japan nor Europe will be able to replace the United States in the World system in the foresc
cable future. Japan is vulnerable to global pressures and lacks strategic depth. Europe
has yet to overcome its Ilalist predicament.
|natic)-
The United States of America does not have a theory to g Tiapplc with a fast cha Enging world, Pseudo theoretical dogmas emãTlating from the socialist East were leading to dead-end and crisis until Gorbachev came to power. Pragmatism ellanating from the capitalist West leads to blind alley and crisis. The domestic and the international contexts of United States foreign policy have undergone drastic changes since the late sixties. Yet the foreign policy making of America has stubbornly refulsed to undergo the necessary structural change. Henry Kissinger's innovations in the seventies were fundamentally tactical, He was preoccupied with combining a guardedly defined strategy of contain illent of communism with a tactical application of the classical balilince of power policy. The failure of the foreign Policy strategy of Richard Nixon all Henry Kissinger has plui Inged
(Corffnters of Page 2)

Page 25
Gorbachev: Triumph a
by Reggie Siriwardena
everal times during the last Si: years I have toyed with the ideal of writing a play aballt a y3ll Ing Tman in his early twenties during the last days of Stalin. The young man has Tmade up his mind that the SIviet system dloesn’t work, and he Illakes a personal decisionto dedicate his life to making his way up the political ladder to the very peak of power, so that he can then dismantle the Syste. I 11.
The young man in the play I imagined was to have been
Mikhail Gorbachew. I still believe it would hawe made interesting drama, and today I
can think of an effective coup de teatre on which to Ting down the curtain. As Gorbachev leaves the Kremlin in December 1991, the hammer and sickle is being brought down, and he pauses on the threshold to whisper Raisa: Well, that's what I dreamed of forty years ago."
Perhaps there are some people who will see in that version of history not a writer's fantasy but the hidden reality. The Chinese stigmatised Gorbachev after his fall as the g1 eatest traitor in the history of socialism.' And I am sure that in Sri Lanka too there are or thodox Communists who, stumned by the collapse of the Soyiet Union, can only explain it
by supposing that Gorbachev
Was a surreptitous imperialist
CIL. But the role of Gorbachey
has been too complex to be explained by conspiracy theories Cor even by my imagined fantasy. Therc is no precedent for
it, not only in the history of
the Soviet Union but even in the test of World history. To find a parallel one would have to imagine that in the sixteenth century Martin Luther had become Pope, and inaugurated from the Watican a Reformation thält ultimately led to the fall of the Catholic Church.
The Illinner exit from the Tew eatic both II. It all of left with the , Olsted hill p. him for what lished. Contra for Luries of O. Soviet leaders they fell from deported and Zinowiew, Kame in executed, Khrushchey thi inous obscurity. diclin't share an Wils dit Ie ty th norms of politi he hald die body else to e was the the The fact that tu Ility to abdit, honourably. Te final public In victions lind hi with his succes si ITe of what with perestroika
On the Other that he was | Union, that his maintain, in CIImIrlLII ist Par struggled to re and Iloribund, the f': il Lire – failure - if visio II, FIT — indictment of hi and others - hadi at tempted Seven years of Soviet Commun and democra Lisi Tc generated to Table in that pro hic clung to th
in the first da
to Moscow in abortive coup, the pressure of that had made obsolete that c abandon it.
For a man his adult life i

nd Tragedy
of Gorbachev's Kremlin was a of his achievehis failure. He "ery Illen Who had Elying tribute to he had accompst that with the ther top-ranking of the past when power: Trotsky later Illurdered, 2ı ey all'Indi BiliklılırMalenkow aitiúil List into ignorThı : L. CGITb:ığıcı'yı y of these fates e more civiliscal iCLl cIldult that more than any:stablish II whilt SOWiet Unii 1. e had the oppor::ite from power :a flirming in his essage his conis disagreements Sors, is a le:- ble hält, achlicycli
handl, the fact caving with the e la di striven to Illins, and the 'Lly, that he had for Ill, discredited was the sign of the in escapable Ile part of his contrary to the im by the Chinese Whalt (Gorbachley to create in his power was a ism transfor IIned id, and a CPSU play the leading Cess. Incredibly, at բարբԸst twen 's Elfter his return he wake of the and it was only the social forces this programme Impelled him to
who had spent п the party ap
paralus and risen through it to its very summit, Gorbachev had shown in his years of power a degree of flexibility and pragIlliltism that nobody could have expected. But at the core of his thinking he remained a product of the Leninist tradition, and his fall - even while the Inonuments to his guru were being toppled around him - marks the end of that tradition in the country of its birth.
Since Gorbachev's exit, in any C0| Tl Till Cintators hawe, with the bicnefit of hindsight, attempted to identify where he went wrong Whether there were any alternative paths that he failed to take. To my mind, the most misguided of these speculations is the argument that Gorbachev W citilld have donc better to follow the Chinese example and put cConomic reforIll before political liberalisation.
This supposition is un founded -- El In di not only for the reason that history has yet to deliver its verdict on the Chinese experiment, though we cannot yet say how long it will be before the regime faces the decisive test of political pressures that will be released by econdImic reform. But to draw an object-lesson in retrospect for Gorbachew from the Chinese experience is to igno Te the wastly different context in which the process of perestroika was launched. The difference goes
back to the clistance between the social character of the Russian revolution and that of
the Chinese from their very inception.
The Chile se revolution triumphed essentially through a peasant war, with the cities en circled by the countryside; the Russian revolution was made virtually in two capital cities by what was, in relation to the mass of the nation, an urban minority. The fact that the Blshevik party and its successor, the CPSU,
23

Page 26
unlike the Chinese Communists, never had any substantial peasant base was compou Inded by Stalin's ravaging of the peasant. Ty.
In China, on the other halld the peasant base which Wils the original motive force Of the revolution remained stro ng enough to manifest its pressure in the concessions to private farming made after the receding of the Cultural Revolution. In the So: viet Union, on the other hand the maintenance of the bul Teill. cratic collectivised structure of agriculture was one of the issues on which the party and managerial apparatus put up its mncost stubborn resistälT1 Ce to Teform. So strong was this resistance that as late as 1991 Gorbachev was affir Illing that there could be no privatisation of land without a referendum, Far from Gorbachev's failure being duc to WT0Tl priorities - putting political change before economic I would contend that he was right in seeing that no effective economic reform could be achieved without breaking the strength of the conservative political apparalls. WEulere he can justly be faulted, in Tilly view, is that he didn't go far enough in the latter direction. The crucial turning point which doomed the Gorbach CW PTO gramme, I would suggest, was in 1988 with the constitutional changes that opened the way for
the executive presidency. The idea of the institutions was right: Gorbachev was insuТпg
himself against the posibility of an inner party coup to displace him in the way that Khrushchev had been eliminated in 1964. His installation as President meant that he couldn't bc removed constitutionally except by the Congress of People's 1DepuԼlէ:5-
But Gorbachev håll still t'W C) options: was he to become President through direct election by the people or through indirect election by a legislature in which the Communist Party's Inonopoly of power and reserved seats were still maintained'? Gorbachev chose the latter option and this
24
fatally circul Inscri dence : Tı d i Initia Hild le BeeI people at that S halwe bli i L for hi and a legitimacy the Colllllllist P the In, the next : been to create for change, b. Communist Party isolating the co core of the pari Bult {#{11t}{1t:hẹ sLIch1 3. Ti1-o'We lt ultimately a ma. reared on Lenir the guiding role vangularil, Con thic course take siT, who broke and won a pop PresideTi L of Lilli ration against date, thus gain in the public : hiTIl to bec-01Tle the resistance 1991 coup,
Since the fill was finally dei refusal of the Withir1 the UJni led to salvage that as a figu Mai Txist til Taditi spite of his inn pendent mind, tive to the for Whe11he Caille a revision of t պա Է է:Il L:EI1ԼTt :11 lot Chile Cf his pushing his ca: cratisation, he beginning to : Timulti-Illaltic Thail viet Unicon, th, real democratis em ancipa Lion nationalities f.
Tol.
Gorbachey c. nationalities 다. wely late - an first (litbursts hail already s By the time LI:lt:Y Callic L. the strength a forces of li: coupled with th rated by econ disintegration

bed his indepenLive. elected by the tage, he could Imself a prestige independent of arty. Logically, step would have a borroad Troint til Witlil Lh: and outside it, Ilservative hard
W. ty shtank froIII jęcial se hic was: I of the party, 1st doctrincs of : of the party ETäst tha L. With 1 by Boris Yeltwith the party Lila election as e Russia. Il Fedele CPSU Clidiing the statuirc ye that enabled the leader if to the August
| CF (GTälchey er mined by the republics to stay I til at ble Wä Il
, I w{jլյld add Te breid in Lille om, he was, il
• w:Livre alını d i IndietOC little sensi Ce Of Lilatio[1:llism. Lo power in 1985, he relations betıd Tepublics was priorities. While Illpaign for demofailed in the Հte that in the State of the Soe Te could be na iation without the of the Illinority -חו)ט 11:LTון שט OI11"
are address the Llestion comparatidi cally after the af ethil Illic conflict 1:l kell the UIlio Il, the Ilew Utill to be for Ilm Li la Liedl, f the centrifugal 3C:ll Ila liialis Ins e discontent geneIllic decli Ile II11 de jewitable.
Yet Gorbachev, in spite of the partial nature of his achiewellent, remains one of the figures who have most decisively altered the course of world history. Perhaps i in time to Colle, when the Russian and other peoples of the former Soviet eIllpire look back on his era, they will say that his historic role was more to destroy the Cold thal to c Teate the IlęW. But a space has been cleared; the "future is tope II.
The article by Reggie Siriwarden. titled "Democracy and the Personal Pronolin" which appeared in the LL LSaL LLLLLaLaLL S 0 S HLLLS S La CL
part of a longer paper read at ICES and published in "The |
Patio" Lunder the title, “Po Woer, Personial Relations and Pronouns : A SocialingListic and Literary Inquiry".
The Challenge. . .
(32 שPנrת זrrטueri frוחriחטC) foreign policy decision making in America deep in crisis. Since the mid-seventies the formulation of the Americall foreign policy, in the main, has proceeded by Way of reacting unforeseen events. AIllerica's yietory in the War in the Gulf is a tactical gain for the Illilitary, How this could be translated into a political reality in the Middle East remains to be Seel. Euphoria can give way to bewilder Ilent. In any event, the war in the Gulf does not alter the structual problems of America's world strategy.
Kashmir ... . .
(Criti||Ted fram page 20).
this principle to the enti Te Ildia-Pakistan border. But Surely is an essential pre-requisite for this is that India should put its house in Kashmir in order, another is that Pakistan should
cease its lefarious activities there. Another though all South Asians might bear in mind is that an disruption of Kashmir's Inembership of the Indian family would have catastrophic consequences for not just India but even more
sco for Pakistam where Iminority provinces are claim ouring for an escape from Punjabi domination - and indeed for the region as a whole. For, nothing is more cantagious than a bad example.

Page 27
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"nt kind of Guardian for you.
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