கவனிக்க: இந்த மின்னூலைத் தனிப்பட்ட வாசிப்பு, உசாத்துணைத் தேவைகளுக்கு மட்டுமே பயன்படுத்தலாம். வேறு பயன்பாடுகளுக்கு ஆசிரியரின்/பதிப்புரிமையாளரின் அனுமதி பெறப்பட வேண்டும்.
இது கூகிள் எழுத்துணரியால் தானியக்கமாக உருவாக்கப்பட்ட கோப்பு. இந்த மின்னூல் மெய்ப்புப் பார்க்கப்படவில்லை.
இந்தப் படைப்பின் நூலகப் பக்கத்தினை பார்வையிட பின்வரும் இணைப்புக்குச் செல்லவும்: Lanka Guardian 1992.06.15

Page 1
* Democracy and Develt
Vol. 15 No. 4 June 1, 1992 Price Rs. 10.00
Bye, Bye Peace Ze
U. S. and Indian F
Delhi's regional St
De Silva Vs Roberts e T
 
 
 

opment: The new debate - Meelan Tİruchelvam
Registered at GPO, Sri Lanka OD/43/NEWS/92
Dne
- Mervyn de Silva oreign Policy
- Shelton Kodikara Irategy
- Gamini Meera wella
ne Premadasa Presidency

Page 2
Why theres sou in this rustic to
There is laught III and light b:inter ITILI 1334. Ell:543
uraldasels Carohi sortig out tubi"C) leaf in a bar. It is one of the hard eds of such
LLLLLa aaaLaLLLLL LLLL LLuH LHHLLL aLLLLL LuGaLaaLLaak intermediate :cat e Luli: "ht: Arable karid TeTairit, falrw luritig the Off Season. L uuuLLSHHLHt SaLaLLLLL LLLLLLLLuDS LLLllaLa TauaLaaa tq C
lucrati, e c4:łı çırçıgı and the grec 1 leaves tuTTi trò gild. In the value: r:f Ly, er Rs, 25s millior (It mCre arinually, for perhaps 143,000 rural folk.
 

ENRCHINGRURAL LIFESTYLE
und oflaughter bacco barn....
gbacco is the industry that brings employriterit to he second highest number of people, And these 3eople are that tobacco Exarri yw'r ers, the !Cosbiki&g:0.
Towers and those who work for them, on the land 4 rıd irı the b:1TT1:s, For them, the tobacco leaf riters meaningful work, a cornfortable life and a secure future. A good
rough Teagrar ftyr la Lught Er.
CeylonTobacco Co. Ltd.
Sharing and caring for our land and her people.

Page 3
THEMIJS
RUPEE SLIDES
The Sri Lankan rupee has begun sliding against major international currencies, the Sunday Island reported. At the time of reporting last week the US dollar was Rs 43.98 and the pound sterling was Rs 80. Already most essential importS had gone up in price.
NOSE PROTEST"
The Opposition, led by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) decided to launch a noise protest, folllowing such demonstrations in the West where lunch hour motorists toot horns in unision and housewives bang pots and pans. It was not known whether the people will be asked | to contribute their lung power too with the traditional 'hoo-oo-oo...' The Jana Goshawa (Noise of the People) is scheduled for July 1. The Opposition is protesting anti-peo - ple activities of the GovernTet.
CAMPUS RUMPUS
When the Minister of State for Textile Industries and his entourage sat down to din ner on the Katu bedde Campus, the lights went Out, and there Were jeers instead of cheers and there
was also the "pelting of stones. The minister and other distinguished
Visitors were on the campus for a textile technology certificate awarding ceremony; the dinner was the
highlight of the program.
The minister W & out in darkness,
OFF THE In an appaГе of heart the release the S second tranche million dollar L. with held beca LIS was foot-dragg reed economic r recently the ( announced som wenue raising cluding an inc fence Lewy and O W T täXES, T steep price hil GSSential COri
Among the mendations hi privatisation O' the national C easing insteac sing the six dolar airbuse: state owned ail tracted to b This recommer among those i
VILTARY
UML 1. While a fier reported to the North, a C |ined Reuter that Sri Lanka to pou TSU e a tio to the | r against the Lit of Tamil Eela "The Tiger. led for their under du reSS a likelihood ( if they are Ther dominal is fairly Wel They hawe al of sovereignt to hold that said,

is escorted but safe.
HOOK nt change
IMF is t0 75 million * of a 450 oan, earlier e Sri La ka ing On ageforms. But GOW ETT CT t e tough re
leasures, inreased Dehigher turn esulting in KS OSt modities.
MF FGCOTawe been a f Air Lanka, arrier, or the of purchamultimilliOn Si Which the rline haS C() Ilսy outright, hdati0 n i S h Ot mplemented.
SOLUTION KELY
e battle Was ое гаgiпg in olombo datereport said was unlikely military soluhine-үear war eration Tigers im (LTTE).
5 a Te el 0Wability to fight and there is if a bloodbath attacked, . . . . ıce (in Jaffna) established the attributes y and will fight
重晶
"", the report
PRICE MCREASE
We regret that rising production costs, particularly after the one-to-three per
cent Defence Levy in Cre
a se, hawe Compelled US to || || raise the price of the LANKA, GUARDIAN from Rs. 7.50 to ten rupees,
An ann OUn Cement ab Out overseas subscription rates Will be made SOO.
D. P. Sivaram is on holiday,
Ho Wri | TESLUTTE hig, GETEG O
LLLLLL LLLLLLLLS LLL LLa LLLS
- E.
äÜARDIAN
wo || 15 No. 4 June 15. 1992
PC R5. TODO
Published fortnightly by Lanka Guardian Publishing Co. Ltd. No. 24B, LJnion Flaca, Colombo -2. Editor : Meirw yn do Silva Talephono: 447584 Printed by Ananda Prasas 82 y 5. Sri Ratnajoth i Sarawa na muttu Mawat ha, ColomboO 13, Talaբhting: 43ՃB7E
CO INTENTS Briefly 2 News Background 3. Domestic Politics and
Foreign Policy Dimensions Indian Ocean and Delhi's
Stralegy 9
DE SIWE WS. ROEDETTS
Human Rights, Democracy
and. De Welop ITigrit 3.
The Promadasa Presidency - (2) 15
Books 19

Page 4
Briefly . . .
To annihilate
Tiger strength The Acting State Minister for Defence. Jalı I1 AT Tha Tatu inge,
is Tepi Tited to have told a Timmy officers at the Palaly camp
Til tille North, է եTէլ է:
Government has worked out
his:
its solution tu the NOTth East
problem. lt has to be imple
Tile
Government would use Imaxi
In ented in two stages.
IIlulil force for the total
thic Tiger
strength and that Would con
annihilation of
stitute the first phase. After
the
thic
Government would try to seek
completely wiping out
menace in that Ilan Inc.,
a political solution to the problem. The total annihilation of Tiger power is an essential prerequisite for this
exce Tcise".
Rani balne:S
Opposition
House Leadic Rail WickTema singhe told parliament,
the debate
the GCựCTIIII1CTIt in the NC) - CCIlfidence motion on the Speaker,
Winding uբ fikT
that the Opposition was to blime for the Tecel L C III
till iI'll the House. Tիս
Opposition had been filibustering, had been trying to intimidate the Chair, he said.
and the Opposition
Drugs irCol.
The 5e Welt
SAARC Ticchi
Il til Prewe Trafficking a
Will be led Ceylon InterIլIIlւ 15 - 17
ran now 忙廿
Sri La Ilıkal's
Iran lawe so f:
tio Ili tri for
wants to brea
I1merci:Ilba I1ki
El ge in Cother
Trade Minist Closed.
In 1991 I
million kgs of cenu from 25,7
1990. Also, major portior Petroleum Co oil imports.
Līk las c
oI1e . I millior h i r
Iran, which
çelt of lical
No-Co TTOCOT
The joint parlia Tulent Im fidence 111 i Li M. H. Mchall Allegedly T. the Oppositic press their w Tesolutio1s: di tain resolutio to the House neglecting to Dale when Opposition.

meetingin
nbo
I'm cleting of thc пical Collimittee
nition of Drug ud Drug Abuse
it the Hotel
Continental frill
"eS for The WV ade
trade ties with
it been the tradi
וןi: חI "וול וללת
Lk Out intO COIil
oil.
ng here and engcapital ventures, Iy sources dis
ran bought 31.65 Tטין 28 קH, uטL 6 million kgs in ran supplies the of the Ceylon rporation's crude FoT 1992 Sri intracted to buy Il et TIC tOIls froTIl is about 66 per Tequirements.
infidence on Speaker
Opposition in øyữd a Nø Crimon on Speaker hiled for: efusing to allow in parties to exiews on certain eclari Ing that cerns had been put and passed; and take a vote by talled for by the
The Opposition accused the Speaker of depriving the Members of Parliament of the Opposition of their rights as McIlbers of På Tjämlict.
No leadership dispute
Sri Lanka Freedoll Party National OrglIliser Mr Amur: Bandara naike told a seminar for local govern Inc T t politiKandy that there was no leadership dispute in the SLFP, Mrs Sirim:lwo Banda Tinalike is the Lindlisputed leader of the parly. I will contest the וwllEmושrחט
it falls vacant'. he said. Others to will be free to contest and the election will
cians in
office
be by secret ballot, he added.
The aspirations of the people had changed and the SLFP's policies must change accordingly, Mr Bandaranalike said. The SLFP must gain victory by the popular ballot unlike Wijeweera who tried to grab power by the bullet. That had cost 40,000 youths
thici T liiwes, hile said.
Fatal foods
At least fourteen people dical when floods diT w Ted parts of Colomb) and the
suburbs following un precedentedily heavy Tai[1 0Il the Flight of JLTle 4. Some posh Colomb C Three w circ imlu mdated for the first in history but nobody was buried alive in these, although luxury limousines and hi-tech equipment were destroyed.
1111 cũ. TỉLĩ m110118
mansions in
also
tiile

Page 5
IMD0-US EXERGISES
INSTALLING A REGIONAL
HEGEMON?
Mervyn de Silva
N: impressed by the collapse
of the Sowiet Unio ad the end of the Cold War. 71 countries re-asserted the "re
levance" of nomalignment (NAM) at the meeting recently in Bali,
Indonesia. La ter in May, "nonalignment" was quietly buried at Sea. Appropriately in the
Indian ocean. Nehru, not Tito, was the authentic architect of NAM, although the first summit
was held in Belgrade. NAM Canlı still Count or two-thirds of the UN General Assembly.
The Indian navy conducted
joint military exercises with the US fleet. More such exercises are planned. Though the world
press paid little attention to this sea-change, an un precedented step in militar y coopeTB Fion Edet Ween the Sole Super
power and the founder of nonElignment. India's neighbours are talking. Has the US finally con Ceded to Erdia What it hasi so zealously sought for so long? is this formal US recognition of India"S regional pre- elmi mence?
Alt SC Luth A5 i a Cadili =XariciSBS fr'] = |ldira Gandhi "S пп в participaпts from the region ZWE leart to mind thair P's — PTE = eminent, paramount proponerant, primacy pivotal. They have also been duty mindful of
= fact that the Indial OC aan is the only ocean lamed after country. For all this polite coja, it is a quin tessentially Chinese tam that the neighbours teler in mind. Hegemonism.
The Word turned up the other tey in an unlikely place - the
Pentagon. A draft paper spoke of
monistic aspiratic in South Asia a Ocean". O tha exercises, the in nounced that the mark hadi bere li {
It late 1980, so editors and opp ans were surpris by post (sender document signe C David Joes, chE Chiefs of the StE ed in passing th was enjoying mu to Trincomalee, find than Subic B President J. R. Jay lamed "Yankee early in his polit pillo ried in parlii betrayed nona igr government a band Oceal Peace At the NAMI SLIT i 1970. Sri Minister MTS. Bd introduced a res the India O Cear peace" free of rivalry. The UN 1971. At the diplomats suspel Voice Was the Badara adikEd but thB haritl Of Indira. Gandhi, ( India Sign ed ai and Friendship W
Indian goals as said, Will tO thOs 3 Of Brita centuгү—a policү
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

| Defence Dept. India's "heg G5 OWE" St.EtĒS ld the Indian eve of the diari pre SS anoffensi W9, TEdeleted.
Til Sri Lakam sition politici
ed to receive Unknown) B | by Gвпeral
irman US joint ff, It T1 ention= at the US nawy Ch fra ar a CCSS a harbour far iay, Sri Lankan wewardene, nickDicky" quite ical career, was ament. Had he Tert ? Had the oned the Indian Zone" policy ? Tmit in Lusaka Lakal Prile da räaike, had ol Li tion to Th3k8 "a zone of o big po Weľ a do TSG dit i title, Wester cited that the voice of Mrs. the had was "big sister" The same year, Treaty of Peace rith the USSR).
Henry Kissinger "ba analognus in in the 19th essentially shap
ed by the Viceroy's office" in
Delhi. Yes, the wice regal legacy is the "burden" that Indian policy plaппегs sвem to bваг
so ma mfully. The "'mare nostrum''
or "British lake" idèas hawė irspired Indian scholars and stra tegists long bog fo ree that
burden had passed in 1947.
The Indian scholar (later Ambassador). K. M. Panikkar made a strong - Casa (1945) for "the strategic unity" of India, Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and Burma, a precondition for a 'realistic' Indian defence policy. The President of the ruling Congress party could say in 1949: "It cannot be that Ceylon is in friendship
with a group with which India is not in friandship". Yet arother strategist K. B. Waidya (1949) argued that Burma and Ceylon should be part of Indian defence policy 'whether they will it or not". The identification with Britain is clear most of all in Wice Admiral
Rawi Kaul's parallel : " "Sri Lanka is as important Strategically to India as Eira is to the U.K. or Taiwan to China. . . . ."
While the goals do parallel
imperial Britain's, it is the methods and the manners that are so suggestive of British practice. Delhi's relations with Sikkim, Bhutan, Nepal finally Sri Lanka ha We been
founded on 'treaties or "accord". all painstakingly proper and legal; right from the start, 1949-50 to the 1987, India—Sri Lanka "peace accord", Nehru (Cambridge)
3

Page 6
was even apologetic before being patronising. "As much as we appreciate the independence of Nepal, we cannot allow anything to go Wrong to Nepal or permit that barrier to be crossador Weakened because that would also be a risk to our security". (Too bad, chaps).
Having signed on the dotted line in 1950, Nepal lifted a leaf from the Indian book and produced a "реace zone“ proposal of its OW il 1975. mplicit in this resolution, supported by 115 states, including China, was a negation of India's unspoken extra-territorial, security-related claims over the central Himalaya guaranteed by
the 1950 treaty, with Nepal, says the Nepali scholar Chaitanya Mishra, Coercive diplo
macy, intervention, and annexation have ba en the familar instruments of Strategy.
Indira Gandhi feared that tho Staunchly pro-US Jayewardene's policies, economic and foreign, would lead inevitably to Sri Lanka being sucked into a prowestern 'alliance". The way it was going in the first few years of the Jayewardens's administration, Sri Lanka would become a Singapore in the middle of the Indian ocean.
Mrs. Gandhi ordered R. A. W. India's C. I. A., to train and arm the separatist Tamil 'Tigers' in special camps in India, Delhi did have a legitimate reason to support its argument that the ethnic conflict in the island's north was a 'security threat". Only the narrow Palk straits separated Sri Lanka's Tamil north from the larga southern Indian state of Tamilnadu, a state with a pre-independence past of secessionist agitation.
Instinctively, ''Yankee Dicky' Jayewardene turned to the US, only to be told by President Regan to 'settle it with India" Was regional hegemony, implicitly conceded Mrs Gandhi perhaps understood it as a US endorset ent of heir own "In dira Doctrine", a neo-Brezhnevite "limited sovereignty", and not
4.
а "Мопгов Doc other critics argi
Reagan 5ént " Of a Seal Creat Thissi As a result, aп Section was opg Embassy.
The Monroe di timise American Latin America b Created the cond monopoly in tha ploitation of the the extraction o SOLUTCE – 3 pl'OC. Eduardo Galear graphic expressit weils of Latin Is idian isitesitiosis enterprise were Tha preoccupatio Just as Brezhisigil about the possib іпnpact on his
(Moslem) south tha S-PakMrs. Gandhi
troubled by se militancy in north so dangerously t di. Of Lirs cause for India anxiety was JRJ Pakistan policies,
"Regional prim: our unstated but objective since W SeleS from Britis from the British Sa Curity. That Ir inent is one stra a concept tha TLIIl claired froT the
This is a Card Indian security di. British roots. TFCW is its esse fails other means stabilisation, diffe interwention and are adopted, The ACCOT di SG OTg strik ATOther Tider imposition of a Will Was the 'sa year's SAARC ; had to be post absence of King Delhi's non-accel Majesty"s попліпве

trime" as storia Jëd.
Wefri) ni Walter 5
մn tD CD|Ճmbը, Israeli interests ned in the US
Octrine did legiհlagamՃnism in Lut that in turn itions for a US Capitalist ExContinent, and f its vast reess for Which 10 fOLInd the in the Operi America". The and the dia guite distinctive. n is 'security" * Was WOrried la dé-stabilising Central Asian 3r flank and
日|1 allian Ce. V""5 deeply Jara tist Tari
Ibarri Sri Lanka, ClOSe to Til3, the other in angar anti "s pro-US, pro
acy has been clearly pursued We freed ourհ rule, but not Conception of 1 di Subottegid entity is пg вlite pгошd|y
British . . ."
d account of Ctrine and its Ер Егсive diploTCë: Where il such as derent forms of låstly invasion, Indo-Sri Lanka ing illustratio. Essay in thE hegemonistic botage" of last summit which Joned in the of Bhutan and ptance of His as a substitute,
Supported by the strong evidence of diplomatic "sabotage" presented by Italy reputed Indian journalists who had arrived in Colombo to cover the conference and had refused to "buy" the simple and innocent explanation put out here, this journal Was in Ciled to Seo a ""Indian hand". A eminent Indian Who should know the ways of Indian diplomacy, is similarly inclined. K. Shankar Bajpai has been indian Ambassador in Pakistan, China and the U.S., and is now a visiting professor at Berkeley, California. He writes: "the hostility between President Premadasa and Indian leaders was widely blamed as the reason for India refusing to attend the SAARC summit in December on the pretext that since the Bhutan King could not come another date should be fixed. . . ."
There was a time when US policy was broadly founded on the assumption that its regional interests could be best served through active cooperation with "regional influentials". Does the new military cooperation, dramatised by the joint exercises, mean a return to that strategy - Delhi as the sole superpower's regiопal rep? (Of coшгsв, | вхaggerate to make a point.) For the West in general, the litmus test is the ethnic conflict and its negotiated settlement, in the sage Of S. L.
It is the meeting point of all the basic concerns of the western alliance, and now Japan, the main donor. On this or that particular question, or in this or that situation, differences amerga. Yet that do S mot affect the fundamental approach to the Sri Lankan situation. The ethnic conflict is the point of intersection of three principal GOT GE TITSI
(a) Democracy and fundamenta li rights, with a Stress on national minorities who require special protection.
(b) Economic development based on free-market policies, that leads to capitalist growth.
(c) the political stability which is a pre-condition for such

Page 7
growth, WEES tot,
assisted by foreign in
An important consideration
which is a direct сопseqшепсв of this approach is 'disarmament" a steady reduction in
defence budgets. This is an important US platform, and policy priority.
Evеп регсепtages are now
fixed for heavy arrrls SpEnderS = the McNallara thesis. Which has influenced World Bank and IMF thinking. It is in any case, Conmon sense - development or defelce. (What the IBRD-1 MF don't quite grasp or comprehend fully is that some of its policies too rigidly or ruthlessly applied, lead to sharp price iпcreases which in turn causes economic –Social Unrest, and thLIS UnderTImiT ES the regime"s popularity and a Lithority i. e. instability. Either the regime is toppled or it survives by a steady restriction of democratic rights. Lika most of us, the IMF itself is caught in a Vicious circle).
Tha Mangala COTT| it te
Mot nésingha is the high point of
the Western di an all-party Parl Cormittee chair the main Oppos |1 - mittBBוחםa C SLFP MP'S OW
short, an amo Wigoro Isly s Lupp dent Prg Tada S
his Own partisa Oppositio WOLuli nCCESSäry ETC fore going propio חuוחוחםם נםatiוחסI wholly bereft Col ling to consider but the progre mittaa Outweigh ations, whether
ог апy other.
Com BSG the || 1 LTTE, and Hig Jha firing away, ing in the Wee signal, apparent diplomatic high Siwe, "Go for Prabhakafan" " "Extradite the the Opposition's
AIld them, thէ ughtless and
VASA O|
2O7, 2nd
Colom
Telephoпе

ploratic effort: iamentary Select ed by a MP of ition party, and inspired by the T3 solution, Irl st ideal forum, orted by PresiB Ih i TSE3 If — fOT п pшгроѕвs, thв d inter Wang in a diment to the sition. The dipoility, which is tot F brains. is Wil" that proposition SS of the CorTS Other ConsiderlJN P To tiwation
dian ban on the h Commissioner both guns blazКепсd papers, to lly, a new Indian pressure offenthe Tigers' "Get "Ban the LTTE" oastard" etc. is ; choric cry,
it inpulsive, thodisastrous step.
mangle the Mangala Moonesinghe Committeel
The "sole superpower" and its powerful allies part company with Regional influentials Inc. braches i Kathladu, Dhaka, Colombo, Thimpu etc.
Saner counse|| prewails aftar the minorities and their representative Organisations make their wiBWS wery Clear. The Ta Tills, Muslims, Christias and the US-led alliance were far too powerful a "lobby' for the opposition to ignore. Besides some of the Left parties were deeply disturbed too.
The SLFP particularly Mr. Anura Bandarana ike, decidas 9ough's enough. The Opposition's return and High Commissioner Jha's markedly low-key spégch ät Rotary announce the most significant event of June.
Of Coursa, it would be foolish поt to recogпise that this may
Tot hawe hapo parad but for President Prema dasa" s exceptionally clever Counter-mowe. Or onetwo po Luchi — military offersiwe in the peninsula, peace offепsiwa in Wawu iya.
PTICANS
Cross Street, bՃ - 11:
: 4 21 S 31

Page 8
New Trends in India's Foreign
Domestic Politics & Fo
Policy Dimensions
Shelton Kodikara
LE between foreign policy and domestic politics hawa become an important foCLIS of attention in the recent literature of international relations. In discussing new trends in India's foreign policy, this paper will attempt to highlight the changing Indo-US relationship against the background of these linkages.
The end of Cold War in tha West, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the effect this had O Indias external trade CorTbined with India's economic crash in 1990, impelled the Government of India to undertake an "agonizing reappraisal' of its foreign policy. To put the economy back on Course, it became necessary for India to ask for massive credits from international lending institutions, and agree to the inevitable 'conditionalities" to which such Credits are linked. India has already received S 2.2 billion from thea IMF/World Bank, and
needs at least S3 billion more to tide over its current economic difficulties. India has Ludertake a Tha Tket-Oriented package of economic reforms, with public sector spending reduced to a bare minimum in
the Eighth Five Year Plan, and delicensing and deregulation being undertaken across the -y. The Barוחס חסםard in thB Bטb liаппепtaгү Oppositioп, especially the Communists, have charged the government with Cawing in to IMF/World Bank pressures, a charge that is denied by the Prima MiniSter.
But it is all too clear that the Indian government, over the past two үеars, has been all toо
predisposed to policy aпd inte a reas SLCh, a5 Israel, Libya, t Gulf War, and Ir to hava joint with the US in vas a major v insistence that should be a PE
A diSCO dan US relationship post-Cold War interactions b B1 COL Intries Were i y, was always datarmination ti nuclear capabili US objective of пшсlваr capabili and Pakista. good reason, thd ПШсlват Treaty (NPT.) racent admissic we apons capabi the Indian star til Of thea - PE that the nuclea ing India and l ressed on a m With Five POW China, besides taո-jointly gu South Asia
UClear-fTeg, ha With India's a Prill 6 Milistët met President February 1992, Willing to ente tiwa dialogue Wit nuclear issue, E agree to a fiv önce Until its FOI I It Of CC Russia, were d Sa tisfaction. Th had in mind per Whet har these t F going to act

Policy
reign
accortiodate US "ests in important relations with le issuse of the dia's willingness паval exercises the India Ocean rsal of its earlier the Indian Ocean la CE 2018.
ote in the IndoEwell in the period when WBBIl the two пcreasiпg sharppresent in India’s D de Wel op her tias, and in thE containing the ties of both India India has; with refused to sign Non-proliferation and Pakistan's յո of a nuclear lity has justified i. The US adopakistani proposal T issue COT CBrnPakistan ba addlultilateral basis, ers-US, Russia, dia and Pakisaran teeing that would rai 5 al50 Ildi ITEt pproval. Whеп NäräsiThä RaO Bush early in he Said hea Was " into a construc
the US On the i ut hea COLld Cot e-power ConferSCopa and the hina, the US, and efined to Indian e questions India tained to doubts Tree powers were like monitors in
respect of India and Pakistan, whether they themselves would be subject to the sama rastri Ctions and prohibitions as applied to India and Pakistan, whether it WOU Id be a de qua tg to The Eat the open-ended threat of the spread of ex-Soviet nuclear weapons, and so on. The US Ambassador to India, William Clark, has himself apparently recognized India's many susceptibilities on the Subject, becausa ha is om record as saying, late in February (1992), that India could evolve an alternate propoSa | to on SLura a "'Workabla пuclear поп-proliferation regime" instead of signing NPT. He said:
As other nations progress toWards a saner and more secure non-proliferation environment, India Cal Contin Lue to stad in the wings. Or India can lead, as it has in the past, by bringing forward proposals to help ma kg a workabla non-prolifara - tion régime—Wheather oni a regional basis or on a wider scale —a reality. (Times of Jлdѓа (New Delhi), 25/2/92)
In the context of the Indo-US divergence om tha nuclear issue, and im tha CCTht|axt of a CD. TltTUversia | Peontagon policy document which advocated the use of force by the US to bring into line recalitrant would-be nuclear powers such as North Korea, Iraq, India and Pakistan, the American opposition to the transfer of Russion rocket technology to India provided the latest domestic political flare-up affecting relations between the two Countries. The history of the rocket deal goes back to November 1990, when Russia/USSR signed ап. agreement to provide oпе стуogenic engine to India in

Page 9
أمر 1994 and a second in 1995. A third was to be developed in India itself. The cryogenic engine, which is a secondary stage rocket, was to be used to placa a Satellite in geostationary orbit. Only three or four countries possessed this sophisticated liquid hydrogen booster technology, and India's launching facilities at Sri Hari kota WBr5 considered to be among the best in the World. dia's Contenti On WaS that tha 5a tallite was intended to be used Only for educational and meteOrological purposes. The US objected to the deal in May 1992, just at the time when the Russian Secretary of state, Genmady Burbulis, was Wisiting India to discuss the validity of agreeTets signed between India and the Soviet Union. Whild cofirming the validity of 67 of the 148 agreements signed between the two Countries, Burbulis also COf i Tad the rocket da I, The US objections were made on the Da SiS that thig rockĖet had dual use, and could be used to make a ba|listic Птissile also, and that it the Tefo Te Within th3 prescriptions laid down by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The American stance Carme as a Considerable embarassmert to both India and Russia, both of which which Were charting a new Course in foreign policy with the US. The American announcement that going through with the deal Would mean the in Woking of DEnBlties against the IndiaT Spaсв Resвагch Orgaпisatiоп and the Russian space agency Gg yk25r77o5 poLu t i both th 9 R LIsSians and the Indians ito a quandary just at the time of the Russian State Secretary's visit TO India. Stadt T ESMy Imada Onboth Russia ad India Sidgs that the deal would be gone throLigh, and American penalties were duly announced-these being Epplicable only to technology transfers to ISRO ad GWig Wikosmos, and being limited to two ears. The Indian parliamentary Opposition and media came out strongly against the American Ection. The Indian Express (7
May 1992) co rialIy:
Long before th sis last year, the lead in the Weste Tim tries to streng Technology (MTCR). Aft cipitated by t OKU Wait, t: tiOn sho Wad
ing obses5ē en largement
reason (obvio | experience o Saddam Husse administration substantial tri LISee techn O 10
сапme aп орап
the Gulf War.
Weighed hea, Cans". Thirds.
See Washingt. wity to the Ru: in isolation f logical factor
India's for The retary, Muchku in the Tf5 Cf | (11 May 1992
The US acti rise to wides in the coшntry been Ura nimi that India sh to US pres: апy threat o; ET OLI [ 1 t S t O
of Ou T -- So War gestion has that . We sF1 pola 1 ed joini
Statements IT by the Preside Parliament SegT thera ara SECO the R LIS-Sid Sid Russia Would judica Its burg

m ITented edito
le West Asian Crithe US had taken getting most of developed COLInthen the Missile Control Regime er the War prehe Iraqi invasion ; US administrasigns of a grow
ission with the of MTCR. The
usly was its bitter f dea ling with ii. That the US
had approwed ails fers Of du a ||- gy to Iraq EO B -
Secret Soon after
THis Lu5t ha WE ily on the Angri
It is difficut to 1'5 OVgr-Sei Sitissian-Indian daal топn this psycho
r Foreign Setrid Dubey, Wrote rida, New Delhi
ons have given pread resentrument Parliament has o Lus in dermandirng ould not succumb sшre and accept r dead which an abridgement aignty. The sugalso Ede en made Oud Cance| the
· na Wal exercise.
ade subsequently nt of the Russia 1 to indicate that nd thoughts on e about the deal. certainly not preeoning new rela
tionship with the US just for the sake of providing India with dual-use technology. On the Indian side, too, more important issues than the rocket deal are at stake in the Indo-US relationship. Development assistance is one of these, but there is also the developing new issuearea of defence cooperation. It is significent that Indo-US joint naval exercises did take place, involving two front-ranking warships on each side, in the
Arabian sea off Cochin and Goa at the end of May,
The Chairman of ISRO has averred that the American ban on
the rocket deal was intended to prevent India from occupying
an important place in the multibillion dolar space market, taking account of the fact that the
Indian side at Sriharikota iš ideally located and is only the
second best launch pad in the World next to Kourou (in French Guinea)'' It was his view, however, that India could overcome the effects of the ban though
there would be delays and cost overrums in completing the pro
ject. (Daily News, 15 May 1992)
Among differences of opinion
between the US and India, the issue of India's development of
its Agni and Prithvi missiles also looms largely. Prithvi is a surface-to-surface missile with a range of 150 kilometres. It went through its second test successfully early in May (1992) and, together with Trish Lis. a surface-to-air missile with a 9 km range, is expectad to be - Por Oduced in 1992-93, after the completion of user trials. Agni, which is a balistic, missile with
a 2,500 km range was successfully test-fired on 22 May 1990,
but its scCond test-flight, on 29 May 1992, was reported not to hawe been on target.

Page 10
Most important for India than these differences is the changed US Stand On Kashmir, Sharad PaWar, Indian Defence Minister told the India Parliament that the US had informed Pakistan in. Un equivocal termis that the
Kashmir issue could only bo solved bilaterally by the two
neighbouring countries, and that the US HE WETTE PEkiStil about its in wolwe ment in aiding and ab etting terrorism in Kashmir and PLI ni ja bo. (V7řa77 - Expre55, 7 May 1992) From supporting tha Pakistan is On thir di and for a plebiscite, this is a big change of attitude on the part of the U. S. Aid so, the Crisis in Indo US relations caused by the rocket deal, if it could be called a Crisis. has paSSEd Off Without апy apparent serious dапmage to the improving Indo-US relationship.
Аt the same tІппе, thвгв аге signs that India and Russia are reconstituting their relationship on the foundations laid by the erstwhile Soviet Union. During his May wisit, Secretary of State Burbulis said that the articles of a new treaty, Which Will replace the Indo-Soviet treaty of
1971 (renewed 1991 ) were finalised at talks with Indian leaders, and that it could be
signed when Russian President Boris Yeltsin Wisited New Delhi to Sgt. If of 1992.
With Russia's de Cisio to miaka the rouble convertible as from next July, there would also be a massive de valution of Russian currency in terms of the US dollar, and this might have beneficial effects for India. It has been anticipated that India might be able to sharply reduce,
if not cancel altogether, its outstanding debt to the legal heir to the Soviet Union. Its
B
entire rouble de
red by India
million, or eve Burbulis talks,
to regularise Crt to India and to
rences regardin of debts. Russia
defence supplies Rs 2.5 billio T for the export
tobacco, and sp India (New Delhi
A sign of the foreign policy ever, Was that opening out a defence cooper
USA. A. In BW Stree ring COT set up, the rol
not very clear But much sign ched to the wis of Indian Army General Rodrigu tagon, and tO t General Jimmy
lander-in-Chief in the Pacific, Were called "W cussions' With to Air Staff, A N. C. Suri (se: (Delhi), 4/3/92
The Indial Ai ticular, has been for control syst Service arm whic affected by rece getary cuts ir assistance from 1 dy been receiv its attempt to combat aircraft. seem to indicat attempts to ind duction of the craft may not b immediate futur hawe to rally i OI with the US.

bot C3 ble ClaWith US $ 30 I less. At the
Russia agreed Jde o il Supplies
sort out diffe
g the problem agreed to resume
to India opened credit to Russia
of tea, coffee, bices. (Tires of
i), 6 May 1992).
changing Indian Oriention h O'W- India Was also new chapter of ation with the Indo-US Army 1ittвв, has beеп of which is at this stage. ifiCal C3 iSi at talit, early in 1992 Chief Ճf Staff, to the Perhe later Wisit of W. Adans, ComOf the USAF who had What ide-ranging disIndia's Chief of in Chief Marshal The States ran
).
r Force, in paron the look-out ams, and is the :h has been least nt defence budIndia. Some hè US has alreaed by India in develop a light Present trends te that Indian igerise the proight combat aira realised in the е, апсi India may co-production Similarly India
ппight become depепdent oп the US for Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACs) and mid-air refuelling capabilities. Il dia has a choice bet Wee US French and British versions of the advanced jat trainer, but buying aircraft trom the US may not materialise in the immediate futur B beca USe of foreign exchaпge сопstraiпts. Iпdia паү eventually opt, as China did, for the Todernization of its Mig-21 feet, which forms the backbone of the IAF, in the present state of its economy. | dia also decided, in March 1992, to purchase on deferred payment, between 315 and 450 M109 self-propelled guns from
the US to strengthen Army strike formation. Indo-Israeli
joint ventures in the field of defence technology and purchase by India of Israeli radar systems, which are also projected, supplement Indian plans to modernise its defence system. The new ties which are developing batweеп Iпdia апd Russia епvisage the continuance of the supply
spares for the former Soviet weaponary in use in India, as well as deals for the supply of Miց-Յ1s and ՏՍ-28 fightar -bombers. The difference from the old arrangements are that these supplies will now have to be paid for partly in hard currency and partly on deferred payment. What Russia appears to be most interested in at the moment is the sa le of a (Charlie class) nuclear submarine, similar to the One which India returned to tha Soviets after the expiry of its four-year lease period. The indications are, however that India may not be so interested in this deal because India itself is close to developing its own nuclear propulsion system fог sшbплагіпеѕ, а пd пmight alгва
dy hawa acquired tha hull and system design for building an indigenous nuclear submarine,
(see Indian Express (New Delhi). (1992 GhזMa 9

Page 11
Indian Ocean and Delh
Garmini Keera wella
he Indian policy-makers were aware of the adverse impliCations of nurturing Tamil militants; but they hoped, at least at the beginning, that they could Control the Tamil Tiilitats When they want. They were confident, in the light of post-1963 politiCal de walopments in Tamil Nadu, that the ability of Sri Lankan Tamil militants to revive secessioi5IT i TarTıil NadLI is . IirTited and that the problems would be settled before the situations became out of control. The Indian policy-makers realized that Sri Lankan ethnic crisis and the actiVīti 5 f Sr Lākā Tā ir tant groups gave therman Oppro
tunity 10 influent:E, Sri LankāT1 foreign policy. They Warg Wary quick to exploit it. As such, it
is necessary to analyze the Indian strategy regarding the ethnic Crisis is to broad or context of Indian foreign policy objectives. |Titlla LISB{] this Cũ.Thự#Tĩi ra Tht" |EựE!- rage to exert pressure on Sri Lanka, specially after 1980, to change the foreign policy direction Which || || (dia Consider ed as contradictory to its foreign policy İnterESt5.
The change of governetsi both Countries in 1977 and their Common political Orientation broLught the regimes of tha Janatha Coalition of India and the UNP of Sri Länka more closer and personal relations between the two heads of governments were excellent bet Weer 1977-1980. This personal factor that led to cordial Indo-Sri Lanka relations Elegan to change after Indira Gandhi came to power again in "Э80. Jayaratnam Wilsoп геcalls t=t "|") ni Conversation with Täit Leaders, she (Indira Gandhi) referred to President Jayewareine and Morarji Desa i as the No old foxes". As Shelton KodiTa points out "Mrs. Gandhi ==Cited harshly aga inst the Jayaerdiene government's windicti| =IESS in de priving Mrs. BandaEleke of her civic rights on grounds which she regarded as Furious and which seemed to
be highly politi There was no Indir a Gaisitlhi i Wardene. It W, that India Ebgc usually sensitiw trends in Sri L Soria factors d derable in Impact of interstate re. not possible tic entire process tiwe Iiries. The in the foreign warden regimt apparent after importar t... I r t 1980, India si Laika Was g away from its aligned plank. feared that Sri lationship and With the Unit: open up the Southern flank of Security thre: policy initiä ti, птade || поlia th is entering it Washington a of Sri Laika u dвпв regiппе existan ce of 5 i tng | India of the Nor-a (NAM) was c for Indian app Thճւյgh Sri L ling of its ea lated position Superpo0W er na CHITE TOTE W Jayewardвпе гі 5 Hift in this di to 1975, bef assumed office, attitude Wis-a-w in the early b9 gan to me || C phasia of Sirir Premiership, an rent during th SU 1it 1 0 War5i J5 a t tal C Fleet (two mis troyers - the the USS Turrier Fleet replace w
SL TLL CTMHHLLL LL C CC LCCCCH LHHLHLCLLCL L0CC HH AALLLLLLL

i’s Strategy
cally motivated. owe lost between ind J. R. Jayeis in this context ama mDra tham a foreign policy anka'. The pero hawa a ConsiOn the climate |ations. but it is scale down the to such subjecрго-Aпmericaп tilt policy of Jaye - which became 1980 was Thore his context, after 15 pacted that Sri radually moving traditional nonFurther. India Lanka's close repossible al liance 3d States would relatiwely Cal Tin to a na W form at. Some foreign 5 of Sr Lāka ink that Colombo O the Karachthixis. The refusal der the Jaye War - to denounce the superpower bases Ocean at meetings igned Movement i tad a 5. а Пlatt E. I rehensions, anka's soft-peda l"lier more articuregarding the wal presence beisible under the agime, the gradual rection dated back ore Jayewardene , The morg Critica is the West held 1970s gradually w during the last a Badaranaike's d was clearly appae Colombo NAM tober 1975, U. S. led to the Seventh sile carrying desUSS Warder, and Joy and the US essel, USS Mispii.
afà,
ion) visited Colombo. When the opposition asked the Prime Minister how the granting of port visits to the naval Wessels of the U. S. Seventh Fleet could be reconciled with her professed policy on the Indian Ocean Peace Zone, Mrs. Bandara naike
replied:
(T)here is nothing incompatible WILH tha I OPZZ DB Claration El Id a
foreign warship, including that of Great Powers, visiting Sri Lanka port for arny purposta not associated with a threat or use of force against any Coastal or hinterland State of the Indian Ocean provided also that the wis its are not a GSOCited Wit any :S E facilitie5 for the sa Wassols in Sri Lanka. There is no funda Tental faran Ce bet Wee this and President Jaye war dema's explanation for granting port visits to the U. S. Navy. As far as the IOPZ is concerned. Sri Lanka strongly registered its reluctance to direct OPZ Only against the Superpowers by mid 1970s at the deliberations of the U. N. Ad Hoc Cormittee On the Indian Ocean, India's concern about port visits of the U. S. Navy after 1980 must be viewed in the context of the cha ngad politico-Strategic map of the Indian Ocean following tha Iranian revolution and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The U. S. response to the political developments to 'the Arc of Crisis' unleashed a new wave of militarization of the Indian Ocean began after 1979. The post1977 U.N. P. regime was heavily dependent on the United States and other western powers for economic asSİstance in the form of loans and grants. The success of the Tain elements of their development strat egy, namely the export promotion zone, the accelerated Maha weli development scheme and the integrated rural development programmes, were conditional to the injection of Western Capital. In this Context, India feared that Sri Lanka шпder Jayewardепе I was a easy
difStädter
9

Page 12
bid for Americas in their bas e strategy linked with the RDF and Sri Lanka would offer mill tary-logistic facilities in exchange for American military assistance to Suppress the Tamil militar Cy. Especially after 1983, Sri Lanka's foreign policy behavior generated an impression in India that it was trying to develop relations with Powers unfriendly to India in South Asia and outside. In this respect, Sri Lankan relations. With Pakista Caused much concern in New Delhi. Pakistan readily extended its assista TCe to train officers of the Special Task Foilsce (STF). President Jayewardene's visit to Pakistan in April 1985 was interpreted as an attempt to forge the Karachchi link which was believed to be anti-Indian in Content. Answering a question at a news conference in Karachchi on April 4th, 1985 Jayewardena said that "'we wish the people of Kashmir should be allowed to decide about their future themselves". Thus, JayeWardene touched a very sensitive nerve in the Indo-Pakistani rivalry. His remark on Kashmir Provoked strong criticism in India and Indian Minister of State of Externa | Affairs Alam Khan described the remarks as "deplorable" in the Lok Sabha. However, the impotant issue here is is whether the post-1983 foreign policy actions of Sri Lanka' cited as anti-Indian, were the reasons for or the outcome of Indian involvement in the Sri Lankan affairs because many foreign policy initiatives were desperate and defensive moves on the part of Sri Lanka to the Indian involvement in the Crisis.
Many foreign policy concerns of India vis-a-vis Sri Lanka that provided the inputs to the Indian policy regarding the crisis were ultimately linked to the defense concerns of India. The argument that tha Indian involvement in the Sri Lankan Crisis could sufficiently be explained in terms of Indian defense concerns is based on the assumption that the ethnic issue was not the
policy target in itself but a means of achieving other ends. These "other ends' must be
10
Lunderstood || || Concerls and The arguments "defense Schoo ded into two first, India per GCt iOS COf t| ragirne posed : to India, and, cally defensive the Crisis to f. change these India used the blish her hegem warranted by it which was be in nature,
According to argument, Indi: tions are Cente İSSUES: the alle facilities to the Trini COTale g t oil-talk far апd the agre Woice of Ame Sвгvice. Thв П of port-call wi. Nawy to Trinci El Recreatioп. tained Indian the possibility becoming am U post. This iss the Sri Lanka the National St. the President ained his posi doing nothing { Facilities). Of allowing wars tries, not nece Stat GS, t0 Ca II However. Ielaki document in W Jones, then C U. S. Joint ( referred to su providad subs Speculations. Lanka declared WES ET TOT U. S. Governm the error. In Ambassador to Toussant in a affirmed that t design on Trin
In this Conte Trincomalee Oil ject was hand alled the geoof the south framework. A

3 lation to defen58 Threat per Ceptions. preseпted by the Could be divibгoad categories: :e:iwed that som е Jayevvardene Security threat in acting basiIndia exploited rCe Sri Lanka to actions; second, Crisis lo estaIny in the region, military growth. sically offensive
the first line of 's threat percepгвd aгошпcl three ged offer of base U. S. Nawy in he handling of project contract, Tent with the ica Broadcasting oticeable increase sits of the U. S. malee for Rest after 1980 S LISapprehensions of Of Trinc0malge . S. in awal staging Je was raised by п oppositioп at ate Assembly and laye Wardene expl
tion as "We are of that kind (base COUTSO, WE E TEO
hips of all CoLInssarily the United
at our ports' ng of a secret
hich Gen. David Chair Tam of the Chiefs of Staff,
ch a possibility
tance to Indian e Sriוחti םח ח| that reference
апd_subsecuепtly ent also rectified 1981, the U. S. Sri Laka Donald public statement era was nO U. S. .alBBוחם: xt, the way the Tank Farm proed in 1982 rewapolitical realities Asian Security teг internatioпа!
Ca II for talders to reCOT ditio and lease out 99 fuel storage tanks used during the World
War II, overlooking the tg nder forwarded by the Indian Natural Gas and Oil Corporation, the Sri Lankan government Selected the coastal Corporation of Bermuda which enjoyed contracts with the U. S. Navy. It is important to note that the deal involved modernization of jetty and Inooring facilities. The Indian expression of its disconfiture made Sri Lanka to call for fresh Contracts with Condition that no feu| should be supplied for foreign military use and the contract was awarded to the Oroleum (Pvt) Ltd. of Singapore a consortium consisting of Oil Tanking of West Germany and Tradiaft of Switzerland. It was charged that the hastly-formed Orolė Lu Tim Consorti Lu Tl was a front for the U. S. Coasta | Corporation angineered by D. H. Miller Who Was a Tanager of the Coastal Corporation of Singapore. In that context, Sri Lanka had to cancel the offег апсi postpone the project. This entire episode heightened the Indian fears that the U.S. was eyelпg Tтіп сопаlee. This is wel reflected in the Writings of Indian analysts, For instance, K. Subrahmanyam renmarked:
The U. S. appears to hawa accorded in the recent period a greater priority to Sri Lanka and its maritim H. familitiữ5 tham Was the Cäsa in the past. This is understandable in view of (3) the greater need for facilitias in Indian Ocean, beCa L5 of the ir Crasd Ewell Of US nawal presence, and (b) to develop Sri Lanka or other similar alternatives as back-Lup options in the event of the denial of Subic Bay in the Philippines to the U.S. Navy at somë futurg date.
The news that Sri Lanka agreed to grant permission to the Voice of America to upgrade its facilities in the island was in the air even before the Tou - tiп e five - year renewal of an agreement, first concluded in 1952 with the VOA, сапne in 1983. India expressed its concern right
away and, in December 1981, Indian Externa | Affairs Minister Narasimha Rao remarked that India hoped that these
facilities given by Sri Lanka
( Салгілшгd on page I5)

Page 13
History
Fact and Fiction:
The De Silva vs. Robe
Jane Russel
"History it is said, "repEats itself: Historials ea CF Other." Though witty, this e Luphorism is rarely trup. Historians a Te for the main pa T t much too Self-opinio ma tad to stoop to parrot-like copying of each other's ideas. No, the borro Wing of a plum fact or even plum mier CLIDB With Wlicf1 TC Buttrass a pet theory while Woefully misreading or wilfully ignoring arguments which don't tie in With theair Own || ES been tha practica of historiams since the first intellectually curious man looked backward in the hope of gaining some pointers to posterity.
History is mot an exact sciencē, and I would suspect as a moun tebank anyone who arguos that it is, because history relies on the subjective discrimination and skills of the historia for the selection, interpretation and Communication of historial facts.
Facts may be sacred but for the historian the first question is always "Which facts?" (tho 2Ctual sub-conscious question is probably closer to "Whose history is this anyway?"). The Second question, "Why these facts in particular - what do they mean?", which may even CT=f3 CE the first, necessarily ariEls as ubjective response, Selection and interpretation are the Er Ead and butter of the histoEn. The Jan is communication. CHU Tchill Was a rotton historian but he Wrote like a crima raporter. His histories had the tipping quality of the good hodunnit and his idiosyncratic rew of history drew a far wider eadership than the equivalent Scholarly texts. These may hawe become the university textbooks
but by Compa chill's they we Water and pro EII b) LI t t l EB li
Howe wer, wel less a list" it is a dries Facts by the othing. They irto a Co Fierg king argument foldgid, stir 5 : [ ] tE Täid 3 f. ||
15 Ster, history ITOfdb|0 afld Wi literature. Ind Іevel, where Shakespeare foi history and gr. off each other.
About a ye a carbic debate feature pages Press between PrւյքE55 or gք է at Peradeniya his Brstwig C laborator, Michi sently lecturing thropology at t Adelaide, Austra W2r SW WW235 porom 1018-tCO-f8WOL Roberts' book FEDFBI Wt Thome and about the Port Burghers, "Peo Roberts took research trip Den H Couple de Silua'5 Critici the way for up Cudges ag bate png-pong ing fury for s the Daily New – if in Frswer editor's prayer
The argum er aspects of raci

erts Debate
Irison With Churre dLI || 35 - dift:| - Tıptly ditched by
St LHTTESt.
-d'OCLIrighted, Limi - y is well-writter, du St that til C. Ws. imselves convey
TUSt E 's Wei t, thought-prowoWw lil iCl... Whieri L Ire imagination of
the hards of a
Gan ble ås mewid as the finest ed, at the highest
PHL tāTCH megts example, great at literature feed
är ägo, a grittily
took polaca il the of the Lake House Singsley de Silva, Sri Lanka History
University, and Colleague and Cola Eel Roberts, prgg in Social Alhe University of lia, TF 9 Cort0pted by de Silway's rabola rewi W of
(Written is co| Percy Colinlsmeth Raheem) ug Lu Casa and Dutch pola lin-Betwee' ". adwantage of a ti 5rī Larkā t
of rejoinders to sm which opened de Siwa to take Jain and the deed Wvith rickie Wera | SSL as of WS and Observer
to the feature or good material.
its ranged ower ST), CastBiST1 a Ind
xerophobia manifest i Sri Lan - kā "S histor 5 ir tī 16 Century, but the core issue Was Wheth ar doT 0 t til Eare taxists ar objectiva standard of historia:Bi research and interpretation. De Silva maitained thät the WäS such a north or standard, which could be approached by use of tha empirical method, Which ha claimed was "based solidly on evidence". Although he did not State bal dly, the Underlying sug - gestion Was that this so-called "empirical approach' led to conC | Lusions that were wirtually irrefutable. As Roberts had patently deviated from this empiri
Cism in his book by adopting What Roberts ims of terred the "harmвпешtic" approach,
Roberts conclusions Werg the refore mere "fanciful theorising", whereas de Silva's were robustly correct and true.
It was un fortunate that Roberts should hawg Called his nonempirical approach to history by such a high-falutin nama: "hermeneutic" simply means to use the imagination creatively. Per. haps Roberts, still a little unsure of this new approach, has dressed it up, as academics tend to, in classically derived jargon,
It's a well known marketing ploy that a touch of latin or greek adds 'an air of respec
tability", but here it only served to cloud the issue (the academic might say 'obfuscate") which improved the credibility of da Silva's case, Lucky de Silva His case was in actuality so poor that it needed a || the obfuscation it could muster.
It is silly to maintain, as de Silwa trigid to do, that there is DnB and Orly DnB "Corract' istorical perspective. There are
11

Page 14
as many views of history as there are historia 15,
The reconstruction of the past by an historian can in Gwer bB thio Same as tha in diwidual Of collective experience of that past, although it caп терге sent it in som a relationa I Way. The actual past, as it was lived, is an absentee from history as it is recorded and recalled. The historian must take a leap of imagination from the present into the past in order to "sea" it at all. The facts he reprodu Ce5 to give solidity to his particular picture are but a tiny fraction of the ultitude a Wai|lable to him. His image, his thesis may well be solidly based con evidence, but a Wholly different picture or thesis could be built on identical historical sources. "Whose history is this anyway?'' is always the pertinent question. As Roberts argued last year, it is "the delusion of die hard empiricists that enables them to believe in the definitiveness Of their conclusions". One Credible historian's speculation is as valid as the next one; the point is who is to be the judge of credibility?
It would be instructive at this point to compare, say, the histories written by Dutch Afrikaaners about the Boer War and its consequences with those of British and Black African historians. The Varance of viewpoint about the same set of facts would maka startling reading.
A man's identity in the civic sense is founded upon his view of history. The line where mythology meets fact in history is very hazy. In the end it depends (as the physical sciences are now coming to realise) on the point of observation. History is neithear fact mor fiction: it is imaginatively selected and pre
sented facts creating a story that is not just plausible but exciting Enough to stimulata
the imagination and the emotions. It is in fact 'faction", that literary form belowed of autobiographical novelists which combines fictional facts with factual fiction.
12
Though unintel is significant. is in deed the wie a political от Sufficiently Soli. to lea w 9 its impl rations yet to col wamsa is the example of a used to perpetua stata, the Siml Originally it was ment, meant o il of kings, the of sität Be and tha the religion. lation from Wener to historica | tre: public scrutiny, i. of its mystique, thÐ Sinhales B fêels SeCuré en Ot parody of thB ME the lines of "" That' will it lo: hold on the ima majority of Sri L
Ho We war to Silya 8 Roberts: bona Over Whi Contending was racism (monocu T10rg neutral ter| the Sinhalase Burgher's from first Portuguese | De Silwa Challe tarmad 'the wali message of his that the Burghe n byסקu חWםd My contention is ng weer the object hostility". De with great style the 'solid emp for his content that of Roberts' de Silva's wig W, is absurd for de Taim that tha mot hostile to the Portuguese century Sri Lan Sana Way aS might come t today. Is it no the Sinhalese W. te Öst märk hostility toward and well-armed had dropped frc their midst to

itional, the pun Written history w of a 'faction" social interest ified to Want ess on geneB. Tha Mahaoldest known historiography Le la parti CLIl a r alese-Buddhist. a Se CTe t do C:LIy for the eyes ighest officers guardians of In its transited stata secret tise open to has löst mt ch but only whan Buddhist State Jgh to spawn |ha Wamsa along 1065 frld A|| 58 its powerful gination of the anka S.
return to de the particular ch they were the alleged turalism is a m) shown by towards tha the tir The Of the Inding onwards. nged what he ity of the basic (Roberts.) book is Wore looked the Sinha lese. that they wеге of Sim halese. Silva Conte ds but where is rical gwidence" on as against This is merely But surely, it Silvia to main$inhalesa Were the Burghers: CarTG tO 16th a in much the Space invaders planet Earth obvious that o Luld hawe had 2d feelings of the SD un Wanted
Strangers who I nowhere into cast awaricious
eyes upon their green and pleasant land? And would not their sense of alienation and resentment hawe increased With every atrocity made by the Portuguese upon their religion? And when the Portuguese were replaced by the Dutch, whose tongue twisting language must hawe resoundad in their ears like the donkey's bray to the "kuruminiha՛, thair Xenophobia Would have Tarkedly grown and reached its apotheosis in naked hatred of the snobbishly racist and class-conscious Britisher. Given their historical experience, Would it lot hawa be G astounding if the Sinhalese had not felt racially and culturally under threat?
That is not to deny that there Were individuals even in larga numbers amongst the Sinhales B as well as the European Communities Who Slought and gav B respect, friendship and even love to their fellow human beings from s Luch a differet Cultura | background. Out of the entire crew of the S.S. Ann, the only One Who did not Settle dOWr and live happily ever after was the misanthrope Robert Knox. But as a political group, the Sinhalese had been power less to resist the incursion of these outsiders, and impotence breeds TBS atlet.
If de Silva objects so strongly to Robert's, 'purposeful attempt to link it (his study of the Burghers) in extrica by with - here I quote his (Robert's) own words - the essentials of Sinhala history, of Sinha la thought processes, it can only be because de Silva, as one of the stoutest defenders of the status quo, prefers a communal compartTentalisation of the island's recent history which thereby enables him to portray the past forty years of Sinha lese Buddhist majority rule in something other than racist (or monocultura list) ta Tms. It is to Roberts' Credit that he has had the courage to call a "mammoty" a mammoty' (or would it be udella?") by emphasising in his "Outline "the racialist Sub(Сол тілшca" on pagyar 24)

Page 15
Human Rights, Democ and Development
Neelan Tiruchelvam
İnce your class entered High
School in 1988, un till this day of your graduation, the world has witnessed momen to US changes. Perhaps there is no Compara ble period in this Century which has so dramatically changed the course of human
destiny. During these years, We witnessed the liberal democratic transitions in Easter
Europe, the collapse and subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union into sovereign, equal and independant Republics, SOTIEWhat loosely link Gd to gathar as the commonwealth of Independent States. These changes had important consequences for
the developing world for with the collapse of an ideology there was similar loss of Cer
tainty with regard to the effiCacy of an alternativa developTEt vision. I SO Luth Africa, equally dramatic changes have taken place which have captured the political imagination of those Engaged in the struggle throughout the World for the dismantiling of a part heid. Constitutional negotiations are now taking place which are likely to bring about black majority rule, while
safeguarding the rights and freedoms of all regardless of colour or ethnicity. Even if a
Constitution acceptable to all is drafted the larger challenge WOuld ba to owerCome t ha exten Siw ë brutalisation, and TO
restore respect for the rule Of la W. Ewan Withi Ll|||| sub-continent, we have witESSE d during the past four years, changes which were
beyond our most optimistic expectations. In the land locked Himalayan Kingdom of Nepal sovereignty has been wested in the people of Nepal, who are
The author is Dractor, riter. пагfола! СелIra fог Ethлfc Stшоїїes)
пov governed goverпп1епt. Bangladesh, COLries T1 bloody partiti bruta Civil WWE Tocracy has of militäry regi moments of struggle for human rights,
We also ha tragedy, of despair. In Ji
Tiana nirinen Squ. were shattered democracy to ally crushed. San Suu Kyi dissidents llar ceration, while TEfu3H5 to tr:IT Natioпа| Leag Will WO victory in Mi Sociaty, tha reTiains elusi Cyce of bruta of the futility of destruction
Class of 19 the threshold tha rati WE||W ment of O. C problems ar adulthood in world. It is ate that We
Oiler tS OF issues which Confront in Se democracy a
Paul Sieghi human rights Vist, tās 5 most Cyrnica politics is rīk Tett ing eggs". economic de
meat that the benefits wiolating at the human

racy
by an elected In Pakistan, and յtյth tյf which arged out of a Ο Π aզually r, multi-party detakan tha pla CE ing S. THESE Were
triumph in the democracy and
H o Lur mor Tigrits of anguish and of LIThe Of 1989, il are many dreams When the students Vemant Was Brut
| Blur Ta, Aung and other political guish in incar
the military junta sfar power to the ue for Democгасү
Colossal electoral ay 1990. In our
quest for peace we, despite each ility reminding Luis of violепсё and
}92 yош are caп of Towing out of Sheltered em wirion= I. S. to faC a that ld challenges of a rapidly changing therefore approprirefect for a few moral and social man y Countries aking human rights, d de welopment.
Brt, the reno Whed scholar and actied that one of the | propositions in that "you cannot es Without break
the field of velopment, it has уош саппоt create of growth, without east temporarily rights of a subs
tantial mumbar of citizÖns. This
thesis has led many Countries in South-East Asia to argue that humam rights and dem O
cracy must be subordinated to the imperatives of development. The newiy industrialised countries -- Which are sometimes desctibed as the four tigers - are cited as inspiring examples of this dubious proposition. Bit of these countries, two, Singpora and Hong Kong are smäll city-states, and it would by difficult to draw broad generali sation5 from their war y particular experiences. In the absence
of ampirica || evidence the proposition seems no more than an assertion of ideology. It
became further discredited with the collapse of the Marcos regime, as it became clear that the proposition was nO T10 Te than a justification for authoritarianism and for the naked abuse of political power. It is one of the singular achiavaments of this develop Tent daCada that it is now Widely accepted that human rights is integral to development. This means that respect for indi widual human rights promotes and dogs not hinder BC OnomiG de WE) - lopment.
The question does arisa as to what we mean by human rights in this regard. Does it mean civil and political rights such as the right to life. the frgedorm from torturg or arbitrary arrest, and tha freedomTl of speech? Or should our definit
ion of human rights also include social, economic and cultural rights such as the right to food, the right to health,
education and a livelihood. This is an issue which in the past divided the East and the West. The Countries of Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union tended to accord priппасү to social and economic rights,
13

Page 16
while the West emphasised the centrality of civil and political
rights. With the collapse of the cold War, there is apprehension that social-economic
rights Would be further downgraded. Although it is frequently asserted that civil-political and social-economic rights are interdependent, this appears to be no more than empty rhetoric. There are no effective mechanisms to monitor socio-economic rights, and they tend to be viewed negatively as policy aspirations rather than giving rise to rights which are legally enforceable against a state. Central to any process of development is the elimination of powerty. Power ty is associated with widespread dania of human rights as tha poor are powerless, unable to organise and defend themselves. As more developing countries pursue developmental models which emphasise economic liberalization, there is apprehenSiOn that this Couid lead to the disrmantling of social Welfare measure and further decline in the physical quality of life of the poor and the disadvantaged. Even within industrialised countries, there is a realisation that they сап по Іопger ignore the social needs of the urban underclass and that th F. Continu ing neglect of these issues could place in jeopardy, the egalitarian ideals which are Central to the democratic Order.
A question which has become central to the relationship bet ween human rights and development is the issue of political conditionalities. This means that the industrialised countries which provide developmental assistance, now insist that the continuance of such assistance, would be dependent on the observance of political conditions such as good governance and the observance
of civil and political rights, Developing countries, by and large, have resisted I the link between the human rights records and aid on the ground that such conditions infringe on their national sovereignty.
Human rights groups on the other hand, have welcomed snch initiatives as they believe that
14
they are like imporowed COmpl national human They a so argu. no iSSues of na Which Would SE to international C rights Eind hum They furt har i ar oping countrie signatories to in rights instrum! accept internati their domestic records, EWC which had in t to take CCOLII
nic factors in cies on assistan ingly recognise of the 'good g
BLI Lha ilk rights and devel to further poli:
national Commu S0 L h i , eS.
In East Till 91, Indonesian a fшпегаІ pгосв injuring dozens response to int. against the in appointed an In consequenct the Gower Ten and suspended tary officials charge of the Observers mista the Iпdoпеşiaп acknowledge Tal rnacy of inte rights concerns Indonesian GO a few weeks t relationship W Eads which h HE Tost SBVBr East Timor inci siliar retaliat Ke ya When i Tatic relations response to N. of Kenya's trea di Ssident5. Chi of the leading attempt to lin records to aid, lateral assistar subject to cor of its suppress democracy mo politica | dissi

y to result in iance with interrights standards. tilt til TE ET tional sovereignty : We as a barrier Concer for humāni anitarian issues. gLe that deves by becoming erational hurial :Ints, WollLusitarily ional Scruiny of i human rights the World Bank he past, refused t of non-ggonode firi ing its poliCe, läs i CreāSte ir trī: W e Tiña CF".
E) gt Ween F1 Urman lopment threatens rise the internity along North
յr in Moverliber soldiers fired at ssion killing and
of civilials, arnational protest
ident, Indonesia inguiry tribլImal. a of the rap urt,
expressed regret tVMy SBir TiliWHO W Era i
soldiers. Many kenly interpreted TESPOOTSEB ES ET nt of the legitTmatical h Luar
However, the Wernet Within erminated its aid ith tha Netherad be GT Corea of 3 CritiIS Lof the det. There Wä5 ory action by t Severed diplowith Norway in rvegian criticism tment of political a has been one opponents of any k human rights trade or ultiCe. China Was tinuing criticism ion of the proWement, and of dents. U. S. re
presentatives of multilateral dewelopment banks are required to oppose loапs to goverпптепts engaged in the gross violations
of interria tibra I h t I ma rn rights. After the Tiemam men squa rē massacre, the U. S. Opposed loans to China from June 89 un ti Feb 90.
If the donor community is to be effective in main taining this policy, there is a need for both credibility and consistency. Credibility is related to the ability of the North to ensure that in the South within its national borders Categories such as refugees, migrant workers and its own i, under-class, are mot Subject to discriminatory and arbitrary treatment. There can be to such credibility if there is conscpicious disparity between domestic practices and international policies on human rights. The issue of consistency arises Wher thera is Selectivity With regard to the countries who are subject to punitive measures. is the decision to suspend of terminata da velopmenta assistance based solely on human rights considerations or is it more likely that factors such as geo-political importance, the economic model pursued by the recipient country and domestic politics are likely to influence such decisions
The Whole question of political conditionalities has also resulted in criticism that deveoped countries are seeking to imposa western wallues and inStitutios o lo lill-Wester s CiB - ties under the guise of promoting good governance and hi uman rights. The uniwersal character of human rights is now being challenged by many nations in the South, Aung San SLI LI Kyi recently argued that it is a puzzlement to the Burmesë on how concepts which recognise 'inhe rent dignity, equal and inalier a bol e rights of human beings, and which accept that all men are endowed with reason and conscience, and which recommend the Uniwersal Spirit of brotherhood can be inimical to indigenous values. It is also difficult for them to understand

Page 17
how any of the rights containEd il t 3O Articles of t9 Uniwersal Declaration of Human Rights can be seen as anything but wholesome and good. If ideas and beliefs are to be denied walidity outside geographical and cultural bounds of their origins, Buddhism Would be confined to North India, Christianity to a narrow tract in the Middle East and Islam to Arabia. HOW
ever traditional conceptions of justice and governance have been imaginatively invoked to
support the struggle for demoCrd CV.
The recent conflict in Thaiand between pro-democracy forCes and the Thai military, proWides us with an interesting example on the role of traditions in the political life of Thailand. The Thai King intervened in this
conflict and the reverence for tradition Was so strong that both the military and civiliar
groups engaged in the struggle for democracy unquesioningly accepted his resolution of the crisis. The King lent his weight in fawo Lur of constitutional a mendTent, to the effect that the Prime Minister should be elected by the Parliament, and this decision was unanimously endorsed. The explanation for this important example of the continuing Televance of Thailand's kingship's tradition is related to the intportance that law and custom play in upholding notions of just governance. The Thai king is on the one hand, regarded as an embryo Bшddha, aпd оп the other hand, the embodiment of justice. In the struggle for democracy and human rights, there is a role for the selective appropriation of tradition,
The next issue that we need to consider relates to the protection of What is known as group rights. In the history of the human rights movement, the international covenants focusised on the protection of the dividual. It is clear that this is no longer adequate. There are indigenous groups, ethnic minorities, and religio LJS minorites who seek protection, both of their group's identity and the
grՃաբ's rights. understood Co. rights is the ri mination. This a group to fre political status pursue its a Col :LI It Lura ride W BlC principle that i started in the struggle, but i into a legal rig be the subject It is equally is no advanta gгоup or miп: political freedo if indiwiduals - W do mot ha WÉ וחםWםוח ,speech si. Th g . irn t group rights rights become
The challeng consisting of S ferent countri of ensuring th: rights and dev be come polari south issues. linkages that Y B Cross Cultur Es zations Will er these forces W wide the global ԸՃmmunity in issues of dem rights are far become further hawa had the ing somewhat human misary people experier gle for daily e have also at thi 53 nsitized to ti Ctito ad desti and intoleranc' any society. Y build the bridg ding which : fashion a Wor by people wi to a core of
Aung San S that it should EdBå WOUr tO spirit of man flaws of humi struggle for h imIToral tO | YouT C|ESS TTILI

O IE of the least ncepts of group ight of self deteris the right of el y determine its ; and to freely nomic, social and pment. It is a s frequently astourse of political ts transformation ht continues to Of fierce debate. clear that there ga to a ethnic hiBWEםrity to aב m and self rula, within that group the freedom of епt or of expreserdependence of ad indiwidual self-evident.
e that your class, itudents from difes, fa CeS is that issues of hu må nh elopment do not ged into northThe bonds and ou have forged and across civilihable yoL to resist thic Seek to diand human rights this mannı gör, Thı 9 јcracy and human too important to politicised. You advantage of beinsulated from the " that ordi ar y Cg in their StrugXistence. But WOU e Same time being le ha VOC, da Strutu tion that bigotry y can Wreak on "OL CaT the refore Jes of understanarв песе ssary to ild Which is Limited no are con Titted hua Walues.
uu Kyi once said
be Our CDITT101
prove that the can transced the a nature. In the uman wallues. it is pe pessimimistic. st ensure that the
values of tolerance, pluralism and of accommodation Will ultimately triump againt the forces of bigotry, and of domination.
Indian Ocean. . .
Yarıfirler fra FF Fuge Tso)
Wil|| 0 t b Lised for "'''Other purpoSeʻ' According to the renewed agreement, a site of 180 CT95 at Eka | a, orth of Colombo was gran tad for tha instalation of a VO A transmitter of 600 kilowatts. The Indian concerns in this respect were well founded and the strategic implication of this agreement should ba wiewed in tha light of the fact that India was modernizing and upgrading its military communication system
warranted by the growth of Indian military Capability, espe - cially the advances in the air defence system, the blue-Water na wa | Capability and strategic nawa mobility. As Mohan Ram вхplained:
India alleged that the renewed WOA agreement provided for facilities beynnd normal relaying and covered electronic monitoring and the directing of nuclear missiles to their targets. It is said that now the USA, besides normal military comLiCEtio 15 il ha dia OG351 region, Would be able to monitor LL LLLL HLHHLLLLLLL0LaLHH LLLLLL LL
because the facility had an affective range of 3300 kilometers and Cow Grad av Em submaring communi Cati).
The question that the threat perception of India vis-a-vis Sri Lanka Was imaginary or actual is not really the issue. What is relevant here is that Iпdia perceived those actions of its southern neighbour as a så Curity threat. A 3 long as India entertained such perceptions its policy towards Sri Lanka becama reactiwa to the perceived security threats. As such, Indian defense concern and perception that Sri Lanka was undermining Indian Security provided the primary inputs for the Indiam policy towards Sri Lanka.
(To be Continued)
whether
15

Page 18
Premadasa Presidency (2)
Presidential Style: Ac not Confrontational
Mick MOOre
ha circumstances in Which
R. Premada sa became prasident were briefly described. During the first two years of his presidency, democracy appeared to be almost a lost cause. It seems likely that his initial election at the end of 1988 was 'stolen" from Mrs Badara Bike of the SLFP. There are lowever Considerable doubts whether, had She Won thB election, Mrs Banda ramai ke Would
HEW e bogem able to Solwe the pressing problems of political disintegration to anything like
the extent that the Preliadasa government has succeeded in in solving them. One of Premadi Sa "S first m0 WE5 WS to, EltET into a de facto alliance With the maiп ТаппіI separatist gгошp,
the Tamil Tigers, who were already engaged in a vicious war with thE Indian armed forces who had originally been sent into the Tamil areas in 1987 to protect the Tamils against the Sri Lankan army, Premadasa demanded that the Indians leave, thus stealing
much of the thunder of the JWP, Who Were Waging a Campaign on a platform of "patriotism" äid dgsgGg of the Silla lase against Indian invasion. Having failed in his sin Cere at tempts to reach a political acco Trinodation with the JWP. Premadasa presided over the crushing of the Tower et i Tid and la t3 1989. This was achieved through improved military intelligence and the slaughter of most of those suspected of involvement. There аге по ассшгate figшres, but 40,000 is probably the right order of magnitude. This was followed by a period when open criticist of the goverilent would sometimes evoke gruesome threats. In early 1990., a prominent journalist known to be
16
at odds with was abducted Hnd killed. Alle Was On Orde TS le Wels Of g|OWërT1 by most Sri Lan! the ter T, TOSE to describe the at this time.
Aductions Co. do today, on Few are report E Tlt:W5բaբET5 EST publish wery with Security . cations. Arter from the Island реacekeeping fo THE Tari | Tige On the Sri Lam That WaT TESLUTTE Little is publish the i Sri Laikai which is report grossly misleadi
|t WWaS r1) t 0 timidation that Lihat Sri Laikā
political status republico. Persi reached ne W p dent is obses
about his own
goes to great himself every the media, so Wity to a r1 y sL ՏՃnal slight, al and positions i Clearly intende sität LS. At the
|Evel, thB mat is CCL a lly pers C) are reduced to
reminded in hold office su president's satis регformance. T promiпепt miпі Wious Jaya War hawe bee hun

Commodative,
tha government in broad daylight gations that this from the highest mērīt ar bieved kans. 'Fear" was
commonly used political situation
jriti fil Lued as the W a Small scalë. d. Independërit e permitted to ittle on issues lf military implithe Withdä Wä of the India гce iп вагӀу 1990, irs again turned kan a Tmed forces. d i Jurie 1930.
Ed about it il
media, and that ed is generally 「1g.
nly fear and inmadв it appваг häid a Chiew 3d tha of a "banana onalism in politics eaks, The presisive y Conce red imago and Status, ength to project Where domina tös iWS great SensitiIggestion of pernd adops attitudes public that are i to imply a regal more substantive de of governing nalistic. Ministors Ciphers, regularly Dublic that they ject only to the ifaction with their Those who were sters in the predene government iliated and either
excluded from government or admitted on terms that appear degrading. Overt loyalty to the president is the first and major
requirement for holding political office, Very little power or respOnsibility is devolved to anyColle; but Tinisters are |ess influential than a sma || group of advisers, most of them public serwants who hawe served the president for many years. These ad WİSe r S adre, ho Wewer, COTS LIEad and use by the president in a rather arbitrary fashion. He -חסrBaIC סחI1BVB נE:lrs tננt fidants. The system may bedescribed as neopatrimonial in that it is these personal linkages between president and advisers, and furt har personal linkages at lower levels in the public ser wice, Which structure the floW of information, influence and responsibility, The forma | burgaucratic hierarchy has been bypassed to a greater degree than before.
A number of factors help make this highly personalistic managerial system relatively effective: the president's capacity to identify and win the loyalty of able advisers; his own wery considerable politica| talets; and his enormous energies. He works wery long hours. However, much of this energy is spent in the direct supervision of major Construction projects, especially those associated with the major public ceremonials that the president regularly orgапises at gгвat expense to Celebrate his own rule.
The End of Democracy?
Had this pa per been written in 1990, it would perhaps hawe ended at this point with very dire prognostications for the

Page 19
futuro of democracy in Sri Lanka. As of late 1991 it is possible to be a litt la mora
optimistic. There are a number of encouraging trends, some of the most significant emanating from within the regime itself.
The most important is that the president's preferred political style is accommodative rathat tha Golf Tottilä |. This style very much fits the "mood of the Country' after years of bloodshed and unrest. The president as SOW. Tuch more sensitivity to the concerns of non-Sinhales a minorities - and appointed many more to important public positions — than any
other government for several decades. He has similarly shown Special concern for the non=
Goigama castes among the Sinhalasa, both appointing members to leading positions and in warious ways giving them symbolic recognition. At this level in particular the Premada sa regime represents a major break with the past. All previous Sri Lankan governments hawa been dominated by Goligama Sinhalese; іп some respects, the Pтепnadasa regime is anti-Goligama. This поп-Goigаппа вthos appears to have alleviated the problem of Ha a lielation of loW-Status groups from the polity. Evidence of this Colles from the local government elections held in June 1991, the first "fair" elecis that hawe been held in Sri Lanka for some years. The ruling UNP largely swept the board, receiving over half the total Wote,
Another encouraging sign from within the regime is that fears Ebout it becoming a "crony capitalist" system along the lines of that established in the Phipines by Ferdinald Marcos seen unlikely to be realised. the past, the president has teen closely associated with a Tiber of businessmen, both relatively reputable and rather reputable. He has however shown a surprising capacity to Stam CD himself from the OCE power, and has embarked om (g=пшіпе) сапраigпs agaiпst Enuggling and orgaпised gаппb
ling which hav։ of tham adwETSE
Sопле ртоgге55 in recalling th came essential politicians in 1 in ra-e stablishir וf aם IWם מסnסm in disciplining in the armed police who had tical disorder f .SE5חַal purpחiרח widely expresse about an immin were much exi dit hawe SOTe that the status the armad force siderably, Espaci their role in CrL The sig fear5 ha the president ha ged to distant: Hg Ted fOTCE relation to the tality of the cal the Tamil Tiger ing into clear tt
" or submitting to
them. The Supo Ti political power appears to hav, re-established.
In respect of
оп the regime, only limited and оver thв last үв cratic opposition апy less Iпсоhe ganised, and те to the president paign to keep it at War with it: 5 סטטים חזaוח thB mains Crippled b ries Within th family. A Mo tho Talatives of "" was successfully late 1990 despit ment disapproWE been active. Fi i relatio to "dis appe arances cessfully tied in of future foreig the government attention to th Symbolic, but a tantive. This has гated a stгопg п from the presid

affected some ly.
has been a de a guns that betools for most 988 and 1989։ ng the state's led force; and those elements forces and the exploited polior personal criWhile fears d in recent years ent military Colup aggerated, thву walid basis in fם WBrסamtd p sincreased Conally because of Ishing the JWP. we low abated; Is so far manahe himself from зs, вspecially in continuing bruпрaign against S, Without CorrוחEוf וזוחל tםfliוחם ргвssшres from emacy of civilian Over the army re been largely
exterial checks there has been fragile por OgreSS la r. Thō do mohas not be Come romit and disormais vulnerable S. CeaSB BISS CarTn - fragmented and islf. The SLFP, ition party, rey personal rivale Bandaranalike ther's Front of the disappeared
gstablished i e strong governll, but has not oreign preSS LIT3 civil rights and has be}Er sucas a condition in aid, obliging to paү ппоге his issue-partly lso partly Subs, however, geneegatiwa reaction ent, and stimu
lated both the expulsion of the British High Commissioner in mid-1991 on false charges and a series of speeches aggressiWely defending Sri Lanka's sowereignty against attempts to use aid to "interfera in internal affairs".
The most striking recent political event was a revolt by about a third of the ruling UNP's MP5 åt the and of August 1991, in the for of an attempt to it peach the president of a wide range of charges. It is likely that the immediate Totivation for many of the dissidents Was talk of an Other genera | B | 9 CtiOn and fears that the president was to deprive them of the UNP ticket. The deeper factor Was, however, the extant to which the Prema das a autocracy had deprived MPs of both power and status. The system appears to hawe been CO StrLCt ad On the assumption that MPs Would r Ermain docile if giv GT adequata material privileges. This is not the case, and the Vulnerability of ашtocracy was revealed. Not only did to MPG dare to act this way, but thay managed to achiawe complate surpriso. (Using his command of state resources, Prema dasa appears to have reasserted control, and may indeed be strengthened by having flushed out his opponents.)
While there is no reason to
expect that the current president will ever himself relinquish power, it is now possible to envisage a democratically selected sшccessor regimв. WIB til social-class basis of liberal democracy has indeed disappeared. ita Sbg COCI that the E remain strong forces supportive of some kind of democratic regime. The more overt among them include the following.
1. The norms of democracy and Constitutionality have long ComTanded a following among the Sr Lāka Bectrāti, V St self-interests of the politicallyinvolved have led to their routine violation. There is по геasoП to believe that the political vio
17

Page 20
lence and chaos of recent years has weakened this commitment: it is evident to most Sri Lankans that the violence has followed from the rejection or distortion of the electoral process by government and its opponents.
2. In somewhat classic style, the dense associational life of the (mainly Colombo) 'middle
classes' has provided a strong reservoir of resistance against authoritarianism. It constitutes both a forum for Continual Critique of the regime and more positively, a basis for a 5Լrung if relatively dispersed civil rights TOW ETT ent. The et hic: ad Teligious heterogeneity of the Colombo middle class, along with its strong and continuing overseas links, Constitute major obstacles to any attempt to suppress disset.
3. Wery many Sri Lankan professionals hawe received their higher qualifications and/or workeď overseas. Thera is a long
history of emigration from the professional classes, especially Sri Lankan Tails and other
minorities, to Western Europe, North America and Australia. The country is highly dependent оп foreigп aid, апda very large number of foreign aid agencies are represented in Colombo. The conditions are there for the creation of a strong civil rights/democracy lobby. Using foreign aid as its point of leverage. These possibilities were not fully exploited in the early 1980s, in large part because the Sri Lankar go Wernment Was wery proWestern, and, in that era of Crusading Reaganism/Thatcherism, this Was a sufficient protection against any major expression of international concern about domestic politics. The international environment has changed, and, for the present at least, international concerns about civil rights are being Ebrought to bear on the government very directly. In addition, such foreign funding as goes directly to Sri Lankan political parties
18
靛
is поvv targetec directions thair
In addition to th ly overt bases of Cfa Cy in Sri Lank, factor Whichbec in Comparative c| Spective: the Sri Lanka of any frffordā Wisse state Control ower 'pariw life of the kind regimes influenc (or 'organic stat models of state-s It has become a in Sri Lankathāts ments expect to Owgr "privata" as: Case of trädas un i5 relativey dire Tets or trigs joining unions st party in power, T given no privia and the situatior tially competitive When the gover In the spheres of professions, Wel "development" - less direCt. Tg expected to put table to the party onus ts on them excliusion. They SCOTTE CSGES, there are parallel the sarie sphere loosely associate. partүEaloc. Thв relative the then change
thange.
| The general pi state influence Ciations is omgovernment is a reshuffling organ leading personne ments lapse whi Change, Thera hi stantial attempts perma 1 Brit Stat9 a réaS Of aSSOt give permanent
particular assoc fere CE to other fшпctional area,
the right to ciations. To this practices reign a

in more liberal" previously.
ese three relativazUppOrt for demoa, there is further 2mes evident only oSS-nation a Iperbar-absence from attempt to inst F. ! influence or ätt" a 550 Ciational that one fill dS i ed by 'corporatist ist) theories or ociety relations." Thatter of Tout illa Lu CCe5 sive gover1xercise influen CC sociations. In the ions, interwention : t: strong induceare offered for Jonsored by the hese are however, ged legal status, | rendins essen. It is 'all change, 'n ment changes. business and the fare, religion, and inter Wention is associations are on a face accep - " in power, Tha to adapt or face tend to adapt. In ably in business, association 5 in 2 of activity, each with a different ir influence and orship numbers as governments
bint then is that ver private assoCUTiu lative. Each CCommodated by isations or their al. Such arrangeas governments ave been no sub5 to establish COntrol Over iational life, to ргivilegв5 оvar iations in pres in the same Or t0 restrict astablish assodegree, liberal Tost un hindered.
non-liberal ideas state-society relations -
Alternative, about
that is, corporatist or organicstatist ideologies - have never been seriously propagated in
Sri Lanka. They are simply not on the menu of ideas available to politicians.
In some respects, current politiCal Conditions in Sri Lanka Would be propitious for the introduction of state corporatist arrangements into the relationship between the state and bote functional associations (business, labour, professionals) and the various ethnic communities. There is a sense of exhaustion with politics after Several years of bloodshed, disorder and fear. Labour in particular has lost most of the autonomous organisational capacity it previously enjoyed. It can plausibly be argued that lingering concerns about political disorder are the only substantial constraint on a major inflow of foreign investment Event if 'coporatist' ideologies are not effectively available, there are elements of quasi-corporatist practices from the economically more succeessful states of East and South est Asia Which are in principle open to inspection and emulation from Sri Lanka, Yet there has been scarcely aпу TowerTent in this direction. "With one exception - the attempt to accommo- date all ethnic groups both syrinbolically and substantively in the state, and thus to some degree rewersa tha "Sinhalisation" process Tema da sa has not attempted to, institutionalise a stronger state along East and Southeast Asian lines, Even if he could muster the imagination and intellectual capacity to do so, he would lack the political and institutional capacity. He is struggling hard to keep things ticking ower through a highly autocratic system of rule While he has it within his power to cause or permit the polity to begin to fall apart again, he does not appear likely to reconstruct itin a Way that would permanately strengthen the now-fragile State.

Page 21
BOOKS
H. A. I. Goonetilleke, A Bibliography (Sri Lanka). Vol. I & II, 1970; Vol III, 19 1983. Zug, Interdocumentation Company,
Asiatica, 5, 14 & 16.
Passionate bibliographer, humanist in the full sense of the term, Tam Golometileke is building up stone by stone the monument of erudition which he inauguratedl in 1970 with the publication of the first two woules of his Bibliography of Ceylon (Sri Lanka). This exhaustive Bibliography, with annotations, unique in its field for a country of the Third World, is not only an incolparable instrument of Work. Here, the bibliographical work, far fiom being a minor art, leads to the heart of thic process of research : he gives to those who ractice it. With 고r IC5 1T1 intelligence, a knowledge of intellectual production as a whole, especially in the field of Hunan and Social Sciences. That enables him to pose basic questions of method and epistemology, particularly questions relating to the relevance of research in à CouT1try which is dependent as far as knowledge is concerned. And the work which is the product of that labour becomes, in its turn, an instrument which directs research, whose function and use are by no means neutral. Goonetileke is fully aware of these implications: the long Drefaces he has given in each of his volumes are the expressions of his preoccupations.
In the first, the author deals ith the loneliness of the long
distance bibliographer', and the
emands of a task conceived di practised as a handicraft. a nually done without access any bibliographical data-bank, d without the help of any sistant, this task has given th to a masterpiece in the Te sense of the LCTIIl. An complished task, Ilot only tes use of the nature of things ich compel the bibliographer be at the heels of a gallop
ing production, of the personal prompted the provisionally in the publication and still illore tragic condition today in that co’ dicir, forcing ini cxilic Lleil wh integrity rejects comprio Illise.
The familiari grapher, who w
Librarian, with he in quoties (moi which he has p ted, and read part, is com coInments mad
important of th Lually still ulati but subscribe to "'to prefer pass and the arousii the promotion The plan of cation that ha Il di Teficil i the publication Wolumes is well Ileeds Of res Sciences, in references from the other help research of a lis phical Ilalitu Te to publications w ethnological, so IThic bent, ant the technical : lications are and the works languages (SiI arc left out f. grapher; but Writings in Eu dealing with t wiewed: Goor he thinks that random publica ted, endeavou due to the co

if Ceylon 76; W & V, Bibliotheca
but also because conditions which work to be left abeyance after of wolul Ille W, because of the is which prevail Intry torn a Sun() retirement or ose intellectual di any kind of
y of thic biblioas a long-time thic documents 'e than 25,000), Iersonally consul| for the most municative; the Lצטוות the ו01 e |cT1 a Tc intellecng, and one can the choice made ion to anonymity, ng of curiosity to of Inake-believe". hic Tlaltic classifis been followed the course of of the various adapted to the
:Arch i Il Social that the cross | One section to
Ine who is doing torical or geogratake Cognisa ilce of hich are of an ciological, or ecowice-versa. All |nd scientific pubnot invenilo Tised, in the vernacular hala and Tamil) r another bi bilothe entirety of opean languages Le Country is re2 tileke, although
папу пiпог or ions may be omits to be exhaustive, pelling demands
пу 眶 visit in Sri Lanka that
Having learnt during
Ian Goonetiako has been
awarded a well deserved Honoris Causa Doctorate by the University of Peradeniyo I am Sending the English translation of a review of his Bibliography given some time ago to a French historical journal.
I would appreciate Very much if you could publish it as a | trib Lute of Scientific approciation for his outstanding scholarship
and of personal regard for his deeply, i hurmanı qLualiticas.
E Meyer
Fø5 garry Director, Centro for Indian and South Asian Studies, Fg.
of intellectual honesty and
professional rigour.
The endeavour is all the more challenging, for Sri Lanka is robably one of the countries in 慧 which, considering its size, has attracted the greatest variety of conquerors, colonisers, then investors, tourists, and the culTrious. And in the local production in European languages there is an index to the magnitude and the precocity of the education dispensed widely by the successive colonisers.
But the usefulness and the excellence of the instrumcnt arte such that they give rise to a series of problems of which the author is highly aware, and whose implications are not always recognised by the users.
This inventory of writings clearly shows the degree of dependence of research in relation to an Imperialism of knowledge'' which tends to favour subjects of interest, fields of research of Wester. In culture. How far will such a bibliographical instrument contribute to Ima intain, nay amplify, that tendency 2 Is it not that its objective function is to facilitate external research, whereas at the saime tiIle, the poli
19

Page 22
tical degradition (most of the universities have been closed for more than two years) and the brain drain have died up the intel
lectual production of the country? ||
Besides the se Twice that the bibliographer renders, the research worker should be compensated by a feedback of infor. mation by the research worker to the bibliographer : that is how a real community of research could be established : but the relation is very often a one way. In this Tespect, the situation of research in Sri Lanka
is of the Salle I11 LuTe als thilt ||
of the socio-econo II lic crisis : thic inflation of external diri culmentation corresponds to that of the foTeig II i InvestIlllents : Td often carries with it the saille adverse effects : the devaluatill of intellectual production. Goo IlleLicke describes it il the following terms: "In the interests of a spurious interdependence and a so-called North-South dialogue, the information systems of the Third World will be penetrated by the ubiquitous da tal-bank, packaged as al Conm 110dity, and pillaged for a fee, in the same way as its natural
Elices.
This radical criticism has led a certain number of intellectuals to positions oscillating between Ilihilis IIl and isolationism. "The popularity of ethnocentric mili. tant II novements like the Janathal Wimukthi Peramu Ina (J. W. P.) among the Sinhalese, and the Liberation Tigers of Tallil Eela II (L.T.T. E.) among the Tamils, is an expression of this phenoIllenon. This withdrawal into an intellectual insularity was felt early by Goonetileke | as al Imajor risk; as early as 1975, he wrote in his pTeface to his volume III: In avoiding the trap of academic imperialism one must always beware of falling backwards into the pit of academic insularity”.
One cannot sum up better the dile IIIa faced by quite a number of progressive intellectuals of today in the countries of the South, a dilemma which their colleagues in the developed countries should do well to reflect upon.
ք0
FOREIGN M
Rглssјал Д.
Should Throw
his is the
Constitutio sia (CCR) is when on the 2E it said it intend. lawfulness of Decree "On the CFSL Ard of Party of the Federative Soci November 6, 19
Consideration
the lawfulness NDWE TLEr 6, 1 requested of group of the P would imminer other president same subject. tion should b Degree of Jul" barring the Party bodies in law епfогcіпg organs of RL
one of the fi TE ned by Presid to megt his ob
ted by the pi during the pre: of June 12, 1
| hawe an irt very de cree an pect of the become thema |last August pl and the State Ted by the ba wities in the art and law enfor attempted to merly undi wilder the Coupo.
They were fact, that the SiOT. fOUd a il tha adminis where politica abolished and deserted ele meant that the ցatting out o рагtү structшгв added that shar CPSU Was Woli

EWS SCENE Јi/елтлта
a Flaming Torch be n into a Powder Keg
dieta that the al Court of Rusconfronted with ith of May, 1992, 5 to ёхаппіПв the the President's activities of the the Cortunist Russian Soviet alist Republic“ of 99.
by the CCR of of til 9 DECE 0 f 991, which was the Court by a eople's Depшtie5. htly reflect upon ial de Cree5 On thea First of II Tel
e made of the nם ,1991 ,20 y Fictivities of the
the armed for Ces
and other state ssia. That Was zt documents sigent Boris Yeltsin ligation 5, SupporCople of Russia sidential elections 991. pression that that ld not the prՃsJnion Treaty has ir reasori for the
Itsch. The Party apparat ChikS SCAin on their acti
y, internal forces сепment agencies, “Bistore thair fosdi rule by staging
horrified by tha President's de Ciready response :rati we institutions | ог9апs wете the CPSU Wa SG SS In fact it real power was f the hands of is. It should be p critis ism against ced both in the
3 dia ad il the Pärligt. Subsequent events disclosedle = gal, political, sociopsychological nature of this organization which was the backbola of the tota - litarian regime.
And now thig CCR has to decide: right or Wrong was the President When ha terminatad activities of the CPSU and the Communist party of the RSFSR? From my point of wiew, the probability that the CCR will basically support the legal and political stand of the President amounts to 55 per cent. If the Court decides in favour of the lawfulness of Yeltsin's de Cre8S including the decree about the party property, as a wholв апd
lot in de tais, they will be Drese Wed in Ru55ia, Cautiou5ly speaking, the possibility for
comparatively pain less movement towards civilization.
That means that we at long last Had a chieved the eliTination of years-long slavery and serfוחםiם
Public opinion polls show that tot less than 90 po, C. of the population are in favour of the above and in this case the CCR's award will be the people's will, embodied in law.
Ngwerthela SS, a Tot hÉir WerSiO is not ruled out the Decree in its basis would be recognised as Lum Constitution 3 || . Needless to say, that in this case not Only Russia but the Commonwealth of Independent States and the World Order itself will face the enormous danger of resto Tati O of totalitarianism. And in such a form that history has пвver experiепced үet. The lewe of civil self-Cons CiOLISTESS of the people has codsiderably grown recently and the people, who had felt that they became free, Would fiercely resist the Oration of totalitariarism.
Солтшmғnitary — Rшiлian Gaхғгfғ.

Page 23
1. Fact-Finding M 1980
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Over sixty fact-finding missions have wis investigate the ethnic conflict and the sil bibliographic information and an annotatic
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3. , Ethnic Conflict and H
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The book includes bibliographic description riod between 1983 and 1988. It is probably th world. Available with 35% discount and
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A summary 31 the discussion on Sinhalt present time. This bibliography contains various views on the question of national
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An annotated bibliography of the article discuss the question of Tamil Nationalism in Sri Lanka, from the period between 1
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Ethnic Conflict and Hu An Annotated Biblio Compiled by Kumar Rup and Anton
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period between 1988 and 1992. A selection w the Sri Lanka Resource Centre; each an nota Price: USS xx.xx, UK Exx.xx (350 P. Information and payments towards: Sri Lanka F
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Page 25
BOOKS
"George Keyt Drawings' Edited with an introduction and Descriptive (
H. A. l. Goonetilake
Published by Colombo George Keyt. Founda
By Tillalk A. Guna Wardhana
This is a third publication devoted to George Keyt's work, and the second introduced by his long tille frield, and admirer, all well known art Critic H.A.I. Goleti lake. The album is confined to the artists drawings Which hawe lot been exhibited unlike his celebrated paintings, nor been presented and discussed in thcir own right in the two books that have appeared earlier, or in any one of the numerous articlcs that hävợc biçe published from time to time in Various jour Tlals herc and abroad. This covers a territory that would be largely new cwen to those Who hawe some aquaintance with his paintings. Hence thic raison d" et Te for Ialını Goloncti lakc’s lengthy introduction which discusses, again for the first timc, their evolution and place within the artist's ouvre complet". To attempt this demanding task there is попе поге фшаlified. Apart from being the artist's "alter ego' (as I characterised himlı itin a previous review) Iam Gooneti lake Possesses to a remarkable degree a capacity to read "between the lines of Keyt's drawings, and to articulate his own deep resOnse in language that is at conce revealing and relevant. As in Eood literery criticism, art criticismin must also be necessarily
closely relevant to the creative Work u Il de T discussio II. Ullfortunately most critics whose
literary exercises in art criticism appear in the daily newspapers Show a da maging inability to - 55 er we this Witzll TelewäIlcé in their analyses or judgements.
Ian Goonetilake's other qualication I have mentioned before the columns of this journal, I feel it bears repetition. At has to be viewed with close attention, contemplated on, and
Ilore than any Wittı. ATL must
part of Colles day Ille Elt, aild I d.
:1Ilytile except
will - Call cll iIT t thail a symboli Kcy L's palintings Readers of this p notic the Illa TT1:s " oil a few reprod is Illyt illl. Sum he possesses are examples of thei
11 this Tcview posc to Imlakke al III] cwcın “en passan has already beer contemporaries of decades in j abroadi. As I III even though so I Illot C1s:titlite in the strict sell I consider enoug ten :) In the more te Tistics of the What is needed of the artist's a (they have chang time) life as revi important work. is a respectable figuric Liccosted influential, and
căTlIlisseurs” co gious even to qu sive pencha Int fo or a la SäiväisI.
I am G001 etifa duction notices Cense”, 1 feel LH cept on which arı could be atteTTıp it has not be
11 enti ed it but Tate Din it... “III be a failing in One could be or politics. O kinds of innoce but the call It

Catalogue
til 1990
hing els c liwcd be a El in Licgral to day environIllot kijiw of Ia Il G30Iletiläke live with Illyre c collection of and drawings. Iblicatio II woulli l:LIl lind Rosalin" uctions, but this 2 of the drawings a but the Ecst
class.
I do not proOther assessment it, for enough 1 Written by his over a number Ou Tilläls here allid entioned earlier, T1C of the III do wiable ciliticism se of the te III, h has been writ: obvious chal Falcartist's work. is the analysis Ittitudies towards ;ed from time to Balled in his lore Since of late he establishment" by the rich and principally these Insidė T it sacrileestio Til his excesT eroticis II1 di Tect
ke im his introthe artist'; 'illois is a key Conanalysis of Keyt ted, even though done yet. Ian refuses to elabo. CCT sc' could also another sense. innocent of sex if course these T se’ many share, live in a society
and pretend to be innocent of the Workings of that society, innocent of the main problems, failings, and the motives of the key operators of such a society. ОПЕ could be “iТ ПОсепt" of the Degative forces for some Lille, or even ig Flore them, and scek refuge in a romantic world where onc's drea ill becomes one's reality I have always felt that George Keyt's world is largely confined to the erogenous areas of the fermale anatomy. The "yomi’ and lingam' his central symbols are central in the act of procreation, and according to Freud thcir associated objects are key deterIliriants in the creation of the Fulcicious'. Most of us are familiar with the concepts of libido and tid". May be Keyt like the Khajurao sculptors (if
that is the correct name) ure trying to find personal sa lwation in the ecstasies of sexual
union on can was and paper. Mily be that is Why so many of drawing: celebrate “alinga Illa, al Ind the exhibition of obviously erotic poses of WIWITI
Considering the selection of 236 drawings before us, I must say that la Il Geometilake ha 3 chlosserl then With discriII i Iha Lile ) Il and care, and they Spain a six ly five year period from 1925 to 1990. Here one finds the artist's earliest W31 k, a Tld the Imost Telcent, along with the extensive violent, experimental ones of the Tiddle period which enabled hit to establish his reputation as a great artist here and abroad.
In the earliest examples Keyt develops a very delicate fine line drawing that in its representational and pictoral element is conventional. In 1931 hic Tulakes a sudden break with conwentionality and werisimilitude and this is depicted in drawings
numbered from 8 to 12. Here one notices for the first time juxta posed perspectives which dolinated part of his later
work (especially in his paintings showing the direct influence of Braquc and Piccasso. Then Keyt evolves a fluid line drawing (earliest example in No. 14) in
"Dreaming in the sun which Till St. be the precursor of the Gothami Wiha. Ta mural style.
23

Page 26
Even though he settled down to three Illajor styles by 1940 he refused to be collpletely confined LLL0 aLLLLHS S L S LaaLLLLLL SLL S LLaLCLLK LLLLLLS perimented with sub-species of the main o Illes. Drawing -- Ino. 23 is a good example entitled +Head of al W III: T1, where there are echos of Polonna Ilwal mu TFils. C11e of his 1105t f:15 cin:lting drawings of the forties is No. 31 where light grey circular patches
Overlap circl lar and lear stral
ight lines depicting a Woman
with a Shelf.
By 1942 he was using the
three major styles to illustrate a wide variety of themes, Among them drawings from No. 51 to 60 had been inspired by Gita Govinda", a Sansk Tit Work tra Tslated into English by Harry Pciris and the artist. His subject matter fron then onwards is predominantly drawn from Hindu myth and legend. The Buddhist phase is clearly over. Terc were of call Tse the CCassional lapses into the realities
of the sensible contemporary world. Along with Hinduisation one finds the artist getting
infatuated with the coil tours of the female foT'In. They are at first only erotically suggestive, but later With the capitulation to Sawism the a Tiist goes i Til for the direct depiction of yori' and lingam' along with the other errogenous a Teas of the female body outside the main organs. 'Alingana" or "lowers, become the principal theme of a large number of drawings showing undclubtedly great inwentiveness in conception. Some times the erotic possiblities of female poses and male-female union so dominate his mind that their realistic depiction takes the upper hand as in drawing In 133 c titled 'Maithlia and in drawing No. 201 entitled Ganesh and Wigneswari'. In the latter the erotic Overtires that Wigneswari the woman wakes in the intimate company of Ganesh (the Hindu god with the head of an elephant) is complemented by the equally provocative probes that God makes with the tip of his exploratory trunk. Keyt's preoccuption with the erotic possibilities of the female for IIn a Tı d
th.c un disguised sexual union c his final phase.
I gather that drawing or pain is Eld to cite CaTreer of Our II. artist has C3Time should be happy genius and of a was born in thi haud put Sri La map of contem ther We fiIld til and predilection repugnant, his and the integral
his themes in h
Fact and Fic
Y Carnfirm ar ei fr StructUTO ër 11 EJ Od propogапda of S (Robert -- Sunda Leå wing asid issues of Burg tliera Clients ir century which portion of their most contestio Roberts' re-inter famous eating blood story of guese to Wisi (Roberts: Daily N There was suc divergence of Roberts and de tat at Tisk C: reader Who na thg debato at th like to quot E . in full,
"Mice F
the Siha | ES arrival of the depicted in t in a sense t the history חunity iוחmסם pro Ceeds to Wout ed exp "symbolic" Raja wa liya sit kno Wr One, Portuguese, s! to the Sri Li described as stones (bre blood (Win Roberts, this io do. With
Of Ft Sil

suggestions of ծTitinues լIբ to
assures him of a permanent place in the history of art. With about three major stylistic
in novations and al vast a TTay Keyt has stopped of Illinor variations, he has ting. While it created a corpus of drawings Tiplate that the that could establish and define Lost distinguished his contribution to world art, to all end, we even if his paintings by which that a lili of his he is known, are ignored.
lazing creativity The present work, which s country and according to Ian Goonctilake, LLLLLL S S LLLLLLLLS SS LLCLSLLLLLLLS LLaLS S LaLaLalH S S S LtlHH S tL S aLLLLLS orary art. Whe- for him, with the excellent e artist's mores reproductions of thic artist's s attractive or drawings, and the fine printing LLaLLLLLLLaLLLLLLLaa00LSSS LLCLL LLLLLHGLLL S S SLaHL S LLLLL LLLLLaLLS LLLLLLLaLLLL S LL S LL SLLLa S SSLLLLL S LLLL S aLLLL S atllL is major work production. tion: . . . horror at the ultimate poliu: tion - the eating of meat and omp79912) the drinking of blood. lied within the
imhal OSB Zealots' y Obs. 31/3/91). a the specific her lawyers and the mid-19th formed a major debate, the next us points was pretation of "tha
stone, drinking the fir St POTLUt our shores'. Jews - 27/3/91). a funda Tental
wiews between
Silwa ower this if wearying the y ha wa followed he time. I should e Silva extract
Oberts turs to e reaction to the
Portuguese (as he Rajawaliya) - he beginning of
of the Burgher Srī Lākā — rīd giWe LS a Conanation of its meanimg, Th согү is a wellin which the
TE TIgE ne WCOT ers anka Scene, are people Who, a te ad) and drank e). To Michaea | has somethig the in mata ra Cism a lese Teacting in
He tells us that his Wig W was challenged by Professors C. R. de Siwa and Shelto Kodikara, - who argued that it expressвp a sвnse of wondeгment at the first sight of an exotic people - when he origially outlined it in Perth at a Conference. Those Criti CS är 6 right; it is a fanciful theory. But like Goldsmith's Willage Parson ("e" en though Wan quished, he could argue still") he presвпts the sаппе argшгment here", (CDN April 91) Let us first look at the empiricists (i. e. Da Silva, De Silva and Kodikara) explanation - that the Sinhalasa description of the Portшgшese as a people who ate stone and drank blood expresSed the sese Of Wonderment at the first sight of an exotic people". This explanation, which has been current for a century or so, is a legacy from Colonialbased scholarship. It is founded firmly on the so-called "rational" norms of western Scientific matorialist according to which the medieveal (pre-Colonial) Culture of Sri Lanka, depicted as technologically retarded, had produced a set of unsophisticated rustics who goped in arrazement at these wondrous Strangers strutting about in The tal suits, che = wing or stores of ur leavened bread (or possibly ships biscuits) and quaffing pints of "bulls blood'' (a hшпgarian wiпе).
(To be Continued)

Page 27
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rsityl;1
welcome convenience of attending to all the preliminaries regarding their flights, eliminating the need for tiresome trips all the
Way down to Colomho.
S, if you are thinking of flying anywhere, consider the convenience, Choose t ly Λιr L. Ila and ΕΓιαν the பயி:ht service that has earned a ¥ယfါးဳ႕မှ Teputation, 60 Air Lanka flights leave Colombo every week
to 33 destinations in 24 countries. Check lie A- Lanka schedule und tale yk, PL Ir pick,
 
 

Get in touch with y LLr Travel Agent or call
Regional Office, Kalady Tel 08-32494-5 Colombo CEHice Tel 4211 (l
Air Lanka.Taking Sri Lanka to the world.
alal Anko
: ritori:
邮

Page 28
STILL LEADING
Mr. William Thompson ob and established the first
in this island on 01st June 1841.
He called it “Bank of Ceylon' That was 150 years ago, but that was not we. We opened our doors in 1939
only to capture our rightful place in Banking
and are proud to say tha
LEAD
Over the years banking profession
shared our expertise and BANK OF CEYLON became Sri Lanka’s SANDHURST TO BANK
Bank
Bankers

tained a Royal Charter Joint Stock Commerical Bank
t we still
ERS.
of Ceylon
to Nation