கவனிக்க: இந்த மின்னூலைத் தனிப்பட்ட வாசிப்பு, உசாத்துணைத் தேவைகளுக்கு மட்டுமே பயன்படுத்தலாம். வேறு பயன்பாடுகளுக்கு ஆசிரியரின்/பதிப்புரிமையாளரின் அனுமதி பெறப்பட வேண்டும்.
இது கூகிள் எழுத்துணரியால் தானியக்கமாக உருவாக்கப்பட்ட கோப்பு. இந்த மின்னூல் மெய்ப்புப் பார்க்கப்படவில்லை.
இந்தப் படைப்பின் நூலகப் பக்கத்தினை பார்வையிட பின்வரும் இணைப்புக்குச் செல்லவும்: Lanka Guardian 1992.09.01

Page 1
Vol. 15 No. 9 September 1, 1992
Price Rs. 10.00
NON-DEMOCRA sLFP Which way for
Can Peace Acc
- John
Problem solvin
Tamil militarisi
Gandhi: Tigers
Media in a mi.
Growth: Must Road P
 
 
 
 
 

Registered at GPO, Sri Lanka QD/43/NEWS/92 澤
Y: Challenge to the
- zeth Hussain the oppositionP
- Mervyn de Silva
M. Richardson, Jianxin Wang g, phases and processes - Kumar Rupesinghe
n and the Chola empire - D. P. Sivaram
varasa's target report
ed society
— Ajith Samarana yake
VAV8 take the capitalist – Kumu du Musum Kumara

Page 2

ܗ
+5

Page 3
FLASH
Presidential Election Petition II
SPOTLIGHT O HULFTSEDORIP
Mervyn de Silva
post-Kaпatte tensions son subsided. The focus is now on Huftsdorp, the Supreme Court, the Presidential petition before five judges, including the Chief Justice Mr. G. P. S. de Silva, The CT and another member of the bench leave for Lagos via Zurich on 3-4 Sept. to attend an international conference of Supreme Court judges. Hence the air of expectancy, the rising tension in these last few days of August
as this issue of the LG goes LO preSS.
5-0, a unanimous decisio II,
3-2 (ah, but which way?) . . . . . the guessing game is quite easily the most exciting game in
GUARDIA
WՃl, 15 No. 3 SEբtember 1, 1992
PT Ft TI
Published fortnightly by Lanka Guardian Publishing Co. Ltd. No. 245, Union Placa, COID TEC-2
Wgrw yn de Silva
475E
Printed by Ananda Press EE|5, Sir Ratnaյալի SaravanHInuttL ME WEIHE, COITIE 13. Telephong; 435975
Editor;
TElephong:
CONTENTS
ME di ET LTTE Tria II (2) ES POECE ACCOTIS Eld
Dida Sigtig3 8. ThED TW in Narrati WEES OF
Ta Til Malti Orali O Non-Democracy - The Rola
of the Oբբnsition 13 Conflict Resolution (2) 17 Agrarian Ghange (1) 19 חםRegi שהחד
COTTESPİT ETICE 24
n the טיוט - wn aטL of the visiting ficē to tie MT. H. L. de argument as ca Bandarama iker's c:: that President Contest a fresh le Silva didn't that the UNP for the wides which marked the The violence wa ponsible for thi lew poll which 1 Was Il "free all Although Mr. C. candidate's Coun muntainouspile show that the U. more, Mr. de S far from rebuilt that point only OWIl basic Conte WE15, "I LO TTēle. Il El fresh contest : ATISLANDnev on the frontpage line: MRS. B. PRIESIDENT "TC) CONTEST HER“ Tilly hawe concil T 10t, that she for an adverse petition. If h. proves to be cor led opposition Waliitti II 1994. IIl Tc. And the political significan The SLFP won it in 1956, 1960, an linquished office i. Бееп in oppositio It has had to suf less of the long
0rgוווTitl
Its Faditional xist Left, has Shi kif iffice. The SI Front Which togk ald extended its to seven years th titutional amerid1 foll T Mail Tixist mini
 

Dismissed
N
H.L.L...
close encounters Allstralian XI Secoпd place. Silva's line of Indidate Sirima Öll 11:sel w:15 such Premada sa can election. Mr. El ttempt to prove Was responsible pread violence : polls campaign. is directly rese exceptionally Theat that there i. fair' election. loksy, the UNP sel, produced a of statistics to TNP E#5IfTer:l"" Kilwa said that ng his argument, Confirmed His ntion that there fair poll so should be helt. sitein (Aug. 28) had this leidCHAL LENGES RESIGN AND Many a reader lded, correctly Was prepared Tide" in her T Calculation rect, the SLFPwould have to Two years of lics tHը: ce of this issue. itional elections d 1970, El re1977. It has In since then. fer the O.Lelidistice Funer.
Allies, the Marxared the spoils LFP-led United office in 1970,
five-year term -5וונIgil fictרַr 1ent, included isters - 3 from
the LSSP (the party's top trio. NM, Colvin, Leslie) and CP chief, Pieter Keuleman.
Though advertised as 'socialisim', the UF introduced State capitalismo via sweeping nationalisation - estates, banks, transport, a sprawili Ing network of State Corporations, The tangible and immediate bencfit of such a strategy was the regime's inincreased capacity to respond to the pressu Te froIII below. This was far more useful in practical, political-electoral terms than the grand slogan of controlling the commanding heights' of the economy. Crudely put, jobs for the boys', the boys who sported blue or red shirts, of course. The pressure from their respective constituencies was thus partly contain
IE)
MOTe for travel
Fifty to 700 percentincreases in trawe/lers“ foreign currency a//owancas flava been an r7 our7 ced by the government. The Central Bank explained that this was in consideration of the rising cost of Irving abroad. The increases benefit those going abroad for business. edLVCafior7. or on i ho/iday. | Those visiting Countriës i other than in the Indian stub-солffлепf w/// Лow be able to take out 7500 US | do//ars per person peryear | (children half this), a 50 percent increase. Those visitiлg the sub-сопtiлалt Will He er firsed fo BOO US dollars (adults), a 700 per cent crease.
Fair y tu 57 a 55 frig Weers, fe рег diелл а//owance fog has beел идped by ha/f.

Page 4
ed. Not enough. The first JWP revolt (1971), a generational rather than an ideological challenge, despite its romantic radicilis Ill CT + + Guevaris III’’’ Wä5 waTIning to the SILFP and its Left partners. However, the пational есопопny, did not gгоw fast enough to meet thicse challenges. The “revolutionaries' LLLH LLLS S LLLSS S aLaaaLa S LL S LLLLLL answer to the typically. Third Worldist revolution of rising tations. YtյլIth LITTE:Stטטxpט spreading fast among both the new Sinhala and Tamil generation was a heaven-sent target of opportunity for the UNP. And its leader by then was the Sri Lankan Political Establishment's master opportunist, Mr. J. R. Tayawa Tidene. He took personal charge of re-organising the UNP Youth Leagues and the trade LI In ioms.
By and large, discontented Sinhala youth itu Tined not to the JWP, its old leadership in jail or dead, nor to the U.F. but to a Tore self-consciously capitalist, rightist U.N.P., J.R.J.'s socialist platform palaver notwithstanding.
Meanwhile the alienation of the Tamil youth was now almost total, a development which the Sinhala political elite, pro-UNP or pro-SLFP, hardly recognised. Over-represented in the public service.... the bureaucracy had been since British titles the II ain growth industry of the industrious Tails . . . . the new generation found itself on a downward spiral. Apart from the pressure (In the main Simhälä parties to respond first to Sinhala de 11a Ind, thic Sinhala Only բolicy in education and բլյblic service recruitiel L fuelled Tail youth frustration and anger. The Tamil youth saw it as an expression of racial superiority, as.SuIlling various forms of discrimiIlation. Enter the Tiger" and the school drop-out Welupillai Prabhakaran, quick to exploit the obvious failure of the Tail parlia Ilmentary parties to “protect." I serve". TåIlli Constituency interests, That the Federal party was Smart enough to See the writing on the wall was most clearly evident in the party's desperate gesture of a name
2
change. . . . fro to Tamil Unitet (TULF). But Ft F Ti i բաn in hand, TULF's gesture too latc.
By the late Rohana Wijewie to re-elilege Liberatic Fro cha Ilce cal Ille — — With the Peace Accord a
The (Sinhala) and its armed crush a highly equipped sepa group on its o' Tain, with the טוון ווf Him Hict:0jה cumn-sапtшагу, "I the arrow Pa. sa Inc: Sinhala at cwer deciate a JWP while it it valst popgalda lPKF's presence mulated grievanc poor, the low and the desha
līcāted frī Who Was blame ring Sri Lankan big neighbour, list Tallis.
The JVP's trag Was foliII del TEL to appreciate th (a) the fact tha poll had been figures showed, ted election (b) t det PTEmadas Copposed to “ACC as the JWP and had grown into equipped moder I) battle-tested ill
lead of State w, a populist presi Outlock to the the opposition
THis is Լիլը: EE PTERIS IR is the 15th year
TIL TE SLFP The LSSP, th party, has bee
even longer) Me WaT is owcT. A ssocialist and Te. gans of the pre–a dence past arc p

1 Federal Party Liberation. Front the Liberation “Eelam”, (LTTE), had Inade the to little Luch
80's the WP's era had decided as the Sinhala t-cum-army. Its or So it thought Lld-Sri Lanka ld the IPKF.
Sri Lankan Statc forces could not motivatel, wellratist guerrilla WI. It ter. crucial advantage dating rear-baseinilnadu across Ik 5 traits. TH1rmy titյլIld liմwIn iii) wet-confident ied to exploit the potential of the , and the accues of the Silhala er-middle class, ргепі 豎 UNEP President i for "șurrendeSOW er eignty" to and the separa
gic mis Calculation inly on its failure e importance of it a presidential 1 eldi, and as the a keenly conteshe winner, PresiWils as Strongly Cd' a TPKFo (c) that the a Tmy quite a wellforce, already I (d) that the FHէ Լ1յ TR ԷյլIt dent closer in WP chill even |leadeT, MI5. B. fourth year of residency. This of UNP rule, in opposition. Ie - I'll 1ain Left 1 in the cold anwhile the Cold the radicalvolutionary slond post-indepen
55.
The SLFP which has held office in 1956, 1960 and 1970. has been out il the cold foT one-and-half decades. By far the largest opposition party, the pressure from the support-base is severe. Only the prospect of power prevents further erosion of the traditional support. After her recentilliness, Mrs. Bandaramäikes realist5 thät the cũTiflicts within the party (the direct challenge from the Anura faction) will certainly widen the present fissues unless sole issue or event compels the SLFP to forgct internal problems and concCltrate on the illediate. An carly election is the most obvious answer to the mounting factionalism. Thus, SLFP eyes Lurn hopefully towards Hulftsdorp Hill. A two-year wait is much too long for an SLFP burdened with all thicsc probilcms., particularly Mrs. Bandaranaike's health and the All-Chillika - י"ivil Warסיי •
Personality is the main issue but in this Bildarallike-lilt and dominated parly, it is also political orien lation. Mrs. B. is keen on a grand coalition, the Left and solic of the anti-LTTE minority Tali mill parties. Thic latter are pro-Delhi, largely because they are anti-LTTE and allti-PT e Illasa
A brord alliance of these parties and the social forces they represent will make the SLFP Ilore attractive to the minorities, India and the Western group. In such a shift, Chanclrika, not Anura, will be the key figure.
SLFP DIWITSION
Yet such an alignment will immediately run into trouble with a 0LLLLSS S u LaaLLaaSS 0aaaLLLSSLLLLaS dhist constituency, now represented by the Hela Urumaya of Messis T:s Tilakk Karullarältne, S. L. Gunasekera etc. History and ideological inheritance haunt the SLFP. Realising that UNP leadership was reserved for the Senanayakes (father and son), the party's No. 2, S. W. R. D. decidel Hic must strike L1E com His Ovn. Time ind Circumstance Were such he could creatic a policy cocktail, of Sinhala-Buddhism. mixed-economy socialism" which appealed to the anti-UNP Left,

Page 5
non-alignment, as opposed to the pro-West UNP's foreign policy, and of course democratic parliamentarism. It was a late-developing, post-rather than pre-independence anti-colonial phenomenon. The national question' (Tamil) was admitted to the agenda much later. So S. W. R. D. was able to lake the best of both worlds. Today, the "National question' is item No. 1. The SWIRD formula ca II not be repeated or re-written.
Mrs. B. has taken the broad front option, though she rema
ins suspicious cept for shoI mowes. And foi DUNF's probler but its present Illadassa. I DUNF Meanwhile it p. the UNP electo Tlate UNP. In the fact that P most interesting seeking through to S. W. R. D.-i:
The DUNF is to undermine, OI ple the Preside
Political Roundup
No confidence motion defeated
A joint opposition motion against the Government was defeated in parliament 129 to 65. Four SLMC MPs, one TULF MP and an independent group In ember voted with the Government. The motion Tead: --Whcreas this government has caused Over one thousand citizens who Were supporters of political parties opposed to the government to bc murdered by killer squads and supplied arms, a munition, cement, military and other equipment and funds to the terrorist organisation known as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam which had murdered thousands of civilian men, women and children of all communities who are opposed to their way of
Press Freedom
Cabinct spokesman Ranil Wickremasinghe said that the Government condemned the attack on journalists and Will take every possiblic step to bring to book those responsible'. He said that a suspect had been arrested and released on bail in connection with the attack on Aththa cartoonist Jiffry Yunoos.
Thugs stormed Yunoos, house one night and poked a pistol in his mouth; he was
stabbed in the face at his gate on the following day.
Journalists demonstrate
Hundreds of journalists demon
strated at the busy Colombo Town Hall junction on August 19 pro
thinking and ha bribery of public niwedl Lld i COIhd. Sion of crimes S abduction and political opponen ment, robbery impersonation, a polling boths, I fing of ballot be clection offences tions to subvert process, this Hol fidence in this calls upon it to re
Retaliation p. OSS
Those who pe also be prepared receiving end o Ossie Abcygunase leader of the W. Coll.Incil alt alı marking the open Premadasa of a
testing haraSST1 en The Island's assoc Samaranayake tol Crowd that the on the press prom journalists to and confront the pulated thugs to ha The picketing organiscid jointly Media Movement, king Journalists Lanka Foreign Association and Joill Tinalist of Sri L.
Free expressi
Speakers at Colombo organise for Liberal Democ legislative reforms ter freedom of e.

if the DUNF, ext-term tactical r obvious reasons. is not the UNP leader, Mr. Prebiles its title. resents itself to atc. as the legitithis, it neglects Temadasa, by a ironic quirk, is his populism it the UNP. doing its ut most better still, topnit, and TetLIITI
S. Colled the officers, comed the collisuçlı Eas murdeT, in Lillidatin f its of the governof poll cards, TIlled Attack.5 Gn "obbery, and stufXesad ole
during the electhe dellcratic Se has In c01gove rument and sign forthwith'.
ossible, says
ів
It stones Illust
to be at the f Sto Illes, Said kera, opposition :stern provincial public meeting ing by President ga IIIlent factory
Et of jou Tallists. iate editor Ajit d the gathering ruthless attacks ited the nations the streets =1H miח נtהוליו ש5 rass the press". campaign was by the Free Sri Lank: WorAssociation, Sri
CorrespondeIlt;
the Union of
anka.
| Selinä in by the Council racy called for -IlSLITE FEaסנtI prcission in Sri
to the UNP fold as the legitimate leadership. But it is marked by am impatience; no, not impatience, esperation - but a different desocration from the SLFP's, which is rooted in fif teen long years in opposition. From Kadalama to Ka Latte. W e Il te how the ft ListTaation all the deepening despair finds expres
sion. And that is possible begause the terrain of politics as I argued last time, is
so full of pressure-mines.
(Cராrd பிா Page ேே)
in Karandeniya. Mr. Abegungsekera was referring to the incidents at Colombo's General
Cemetary (Kan atte) where gowernment politicians were ston Cd during the funerals of military commanders who died in a land
mine blast.
Appeals in defamation
ESSE
Both parties to the defamation case filed by former minister Lalith Athulath mudali against opposition MP C. N. Goonaratne are to appeal against a District Court judgment dismissing the action on the grounds that the allegedly defamatary statements were made on a * * privileged occasion". The court also held that Mr Gordona Tat-Tnic Was Il Cbt El titled to COS ES als the Stal Ele
IIEITS WE TE IlQf TTL15.
Lanka. The the of the stiliar
was "Limitations on Freedom of Expression in Sri Lanka'.
"Unimaginable" investment
needed Economist Lloyd Fernando, Secretary to the State Ministry of Policy Planning told a conference Of a di ListratoT5 il Colombo Elat if Sri Lanka were to achieve a 9 per cent economic growth per annuIn "unimaginable' levels of investment would be required.
А піпе рег сепt growth rate would be required, the Policy Planning Ministry official said, if Sri Lanka's per capita income were to be doubled to 935 US dollars and if unemployment were to be reduced to a socially acceptable level of five per cent by the year 2000.

Page 6
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Page 7
MWEFADAVA
The press and
Аjith Samaranayake
Fethnic har Timony pluralism' etc.; entered the contemporary schoolarly discourse and even the popular dialogue, only after the horrendous anti-Tamill riots of July 1983. Before that the problem of Sinhala-Tamil relations and the movements of the Tamil people to win their rights was clothed in such coyly vague terms as the Tamil problem or language problem and generally treated as the dirty little secret of Sri Lankan politics. Political parties of the south generally behaved as if no such problem existed or as if they alone if elected to power could solve it. The mass media too generally behaved as if the Whole thing Was some local trouble up north with which god-fearing men and Women need have no truck. It was only if there was an outburst Such a 5 a communal riots or the satyagra ha campaign of the Federal Party in the 1960's that the problem impinged even seminally into the national conScillSIESS, In Such a COII text: it is difficult even LC construct an ideological framework to deal with the subject.
hic tc Tm5
It is true that the campaign
for independence during the early years of this century was conducted by leaders of the
Sinhala Tamil and Musli1 cmInities Who We Te also either Buddhist, Hindus, Islam or Christians. They were products of the anglicised urban class of professionals which was the apogee of British Iule and the cream of the public school system erected by the British. Their goal was far from radical. They desired self-government or Dullini status within the
Terr of a lectrire fired "The role of the ாசரி சr rசரFr' சோசரி under the Irispices of the Calariba Univ. "project ra fos fer carri rrurial ויעחטחחHar
pluralis
co El files of the of the benig Though much of the fact thị: multi-ethnic at fiSSll Tes WETe Lj than self-gover to be a dist After the exist intere5ted elder as the Ramana James. Pe Tie:5 al nayake lesser control, Sool Cabinet had be D. S. Senanayake nambalal was of balanced re. Wis evident tha. early stages the Sinhala leaders ԱOIllpaSS Hny W Lankan state, hawe thought | are led to beli of M. D. S. unity among th: munity Would co. of their fitness selves and may Hggging titite the ԷյլIէ էիe result 0 of Sinhala is Was that Lle cluded.
From the poi Mr. Poll Tıllı billa argued that i hii balance repres known as Fifty really Tamil com he was thinki minority commur Muslims, Malay: Vis-a-Vis the Si also been argue look was at as it did all c. III the Whole 0 was defeat or this campaign v della li for a which necessari te a particulaT couDntTy lateT b1 demand for a honeland.

T
paternal enbrace British rule. Els bee Imacle this elite was di multi-religious scit il LiO SJÖTET Thent appeared nct possibility. of the great disStatCSIlen SLCh han brothers, SiT di F. R. Seläpoliticians took the pan-Sinhala en instituted by and G. G. Po IIIraising his cry presentation. It even at these Rutlook of the lip did not enision (if a Sri Perhaps they may sincerely as We eve in the case Senanayake that : Imajority comWillice the British to govern themHaye Walted t0 Tillis thereafter f this rising tide elf-consciousiness Tamils telt ex
ut of wiew of In it has been 5 deTali for intation better -Fifty' was not Illulalist because g of all the ities, Wilz.: Tamils, and Burghers, hallcse. It häs, that his cutal cincompassing Ilmunities living Ceylon and it discrediting of hich led to the Federal state addressed itself region of the rgeoning into a separate Tamil
Anyway the early years of independence saw the first fissuures among the anglicised political elite which inherited power from the British. The incorpoTation of Mr. Ponnam balam into the first Cabinet sa W the shattering of his Tamil Congress and the birth of the more Tamil nationalist federal Party closer to the grassroots of peninsula politics. While the first generation of FP leaders such as thic patriarchal M. Chelwanayaka In continued to project a reasonahle Sulawe image a new generation of fiercely nationalist and militarist leaders who spoke the language of Dravidian radicalism was emerging best exemplified by the stormy petrel of 1956, A. Amirthalingam whose bloodsoaked and bandaged hica di after the attack by Sinhala thugs on the FP satyagraha drew from Prime Minister Bandarinaike the LLLLLL SLLLLLLaLLLLL KHHaaLLaLLL LaLL LLLS
How successful was our media, particularly the dominant print media, in grasping these changes in inter-coIl munal Telations and their consequences? As I have already said the media like the political elite treated the problem
as the "dirty little secret of politics and generally behaved as if the problem would go
away or could be solve by reasonable men sitting round a table. Certainly it is difficult to conted that a reader of the Sihall press Would have received a reasomable ass5 c55 Ilment of TaTiili1 grievances or demands from reading the Sinhala newspapers or that the Talil realer Wild have been any more enlightened about the Sinhala point of view from reading the Tamil press alone. As for the English press it was little better. The English newspapers which were edited by the same anglicised elite as the political ruling class were immersed in the same petty little problems of parochial politics in a renole Indian Ocean island which few in the outside World knew and even if they knew thought only as “Lipton' || tca garden. The English newspaper to be Sure Were liberal but it a wishy-washy liberalism often bordering on Conservatism.
(Солтtiлшесі ол дара 9)
5

Page 8
LTTE TRIAL (2)
Sivarasan's dry run
18. In February 1991, Sriharan & Murugan (A11), a hardcore LTTE cadre reached Wedaranyam from Jaffna by clandestine means and stayed with Shanmugham & Jayaraj (A35) (since dead). After few days Muragan (A11) came to Madras and stayed in the house of Robert Payas (A17) for 50IIIe time.
19. In February, 91, Murugan (A11) went to Bhagyanathan's (A28) house at No. 22, Muthiah Mudali Garden Street, Royapettah, Madras - 14, through Muthuraja an Indian member of the LTTE and stayed there along with Bhagyanathan (A28) and his mother Padma (A29) Perarivalan & Arivu (A26) also joined with them and stayed in that house. Nalini (A9) the elder daughter of Padma (A29) had however, earlier left her mother's house some time in May 1990, and after staying foT solleti Ille in the house of Muthu Talja, took a house on rent at High Court Colony, Willivakkam. Muthurajaa was a close associate of Baby Subramanian one of the important functionaries of LTTE, and was a family friend of Nalini (A9), Bhagyanathan (A28) and Padma (A29). Nalini (29) was then working as Personal Assistant to The Managing Director of Ms. Anabond Silicones (P) Ltd. Adyar, Madras. Dhanu (A5) and Subha (A6) in May 1991 came to stay with Nalini (A9) during week ends as arranged by Murugan (A11) and Sivarasan (A4).
20. As expected holding of elections in May 1991 was officially declared in March 1991. The prospect of Congress (1) emerging as the ruling party with Shri Rajiv Gandhi at the helm became bright and was being repeatedly discussed in the Indian media which was being avidly followed by the LTTE. In March, 1991 about 10 days apart two emissaries of LTTE had separate secret meetings with Shri Rajiv Gandhi in New Delhi to father huis mind to ascertain whether there was any change in his attitude towards LTTE and also to Create a SI Tloke Screen to cover their evil designs.
21. In April 1991 Sivarasan (A4) visited Vijayan (A20) at Tuticorin and asked him to go over to Madras and take a house and financed him for this purpose. Accordingly Wijayan (A20) came to Madras and took a house at No. 12, Eveready

Colony at Kodungayur, through the help of his relation. After that he went back to Tuticorin and brought his wife Selvaluxmi (A22), and his father-in-law Baskaran (A22) and settled in Madras City to assist Sivarasan (A4) in furtherence of the criminal conspiracy.
22. Up to 15. 4.91 Sivarasan (A4) was actively moving about in Madras City, meeting Haribabu (A7), Nalini (A9), Murugan (AI), Rawichandran & Rawi & Prakasam (A24), Ariwul (A26), Bhagyanathan (A28), and Padma (A29) and thereafter left once again for Jaffna foe further consultation with the LTTE leadership. In the meanwhile Murugen (All) was at his request introduced to a photographer by name Haribabu (A7) (since dead) by Bhagyanathan (A28) who he employed and utilised his services for taking photographs Wideo of vital and important installations like Central Jail, Wellore, St. George Fort, Light House area il Marina Beach, DGP's Office etc. He also used Perarivalan & Arivu (A26) to join Vivekananda Nilayam and Sabari College under the cover of acquiring proficiency in English language. Hic also got a press accrcditation card for himself fabricated through Haribabu (AT). Haribabu (A7) had been trained in photography by Subha Sundaram (A30) Proprictor of Subha News Photo Services, Royapettah. Subha Sundaram (A30) is an ardent LTTE supporter and had visited Jaffna during early, 1990. It was he who had also trained Bhagyanathan (A28), Arivu (A26) and Muthuraja, On 18, 4.92, Haribabu (A9), Murugan (A7), Nalini (A11), Arivu (A26) and Subha Sundaram (A30) attended the public meeting held at Marina Beach, presided over by Shri Rajiv Gandhi and Ms. Jayalalitha,
23. In the last week of April 1991, Kanagasabapathy & Radha ayya (A15) and Chandraleka & Athirai & Sonia & Gowri & (A16), LTTE Tigress, came over to Kodiakkarai through clandestinc meams as per the direction of Pottu Om man (A2), LTTE Intelligence Chief and reached Madras and stayed in the house of a relative of Kanagasabapathy (A15), at No. 2, L. O. B. Colony, Selapur, Madras, 13. They were also to take instructions
from Siwarasan (A4).

Page 9
24. On 28.4.91, the following LTEE conspirators assembled in Jaffna and Pottu Omman (A2) briefed them and directed them to act according to Siwarasan's (A4) orders:-
Sivarasan (A4), Dhamu & Anbu (A5), Subha & Nithya (A6), Nehru & Gokul (A8), Suthendraraja & Santhan (A10), Shanker & Koneswaran (A12), Wijayanandan & Hariayya (A13), Ruban & Suresh (A14), and Driver Anna & Keerthi (A40).
They were directed to go to Kodiakkarai. Howower, duc to development of certain snag in the boat they returned to Maddakkal in Jaffna and finally on 30.4.91, they were once again seen off by Pottu Om man (A2) and Akila (A3). This group was received at Kodiakkarai by the workers of Shanmugam (A35) and other LTTE cadres in the early morning of 1.5.91.
25. On a Trivalthere Shanker & Koneswaran
(A12) was taken by a LTTE cadre to stay with a LTTE sympathiser of Thoppu therai and to reach
Madras subsequently, Santhan (A10), Wijayanandan (A13), Ruban & Suresh (A14) and Driver Anna & Keerthi (A40) were asked to go over to Madras separately with the assistance of a LTTE cadre. Sivarasan (A4), Dhanu (A5), Subba (A6) and Nehru (A8) reached Madras on 2.5.91, Sivarasan (A4) took them to Wijayan's (A20) house and settled them there. A wireless equipment was also clandestinely installed there and operated by Nehru (A8). Sivarasan (A4) himself stayed with Jaya kumar (A18) and Santhi (A19) where Santhan (A12) joined later. Ruban & Suresh (A14) and Driver Anna & Keerthi (A40) also reached Madras and stayed in the house of Robert Payas (A 17). Vijayanandan (A13) also reached Madras. After staying for a day in a lodge in Madras, by provi. ding false name, address and purpsses, he was shifted to a house at Indira Nagar, Madras, by Arivu (A26) at the instance of Sivarasan (A14). A LTTE sympathiser was engaged in printing the La a S aLLLaaL S SLLaaL LLLLLa LaLLLLLLLS SSLLL LLLLLLLa Force' is a two volume compilation of several
paper cuttings, with their comments revealing in
Unlimistä kable teTims the ha tred of the LTTE towards
Indian leadership and highlighting the alleged
atrocities of the Indian Peace Keeping Force
during their operations in Jaffna.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

26. Sivarasan (A4) went to the house at Selayur, Tambaram, in the first week of May, 1991 where Kanagasabapathy (A15) and Athirai (A16) where staying and met them and arranged for shifting Athirai (A16) for staying with some sympathiser at Royapettah through Shan mugha Vadivelu & Thambi Anima (A23). Siwarasan (A4) a Tranged for the trip of Kanagasabapathy (A15) to Delhi through a symdathiser for fixing a hideout at Delhi and there- after take Athirai (A16) there.
27. On 7/8, 5.91, Sivarasan (A4) attended the public meeting addressed by Shri W. P. Singh, former Prime Minister at Nandanam, Madras and managed to take a seat in the press enclosure, very close to the dais. Sivarasan (A4), Dhanu (A5), Subha (A6), Haribabu (A7), Nalini (A9), Arivu (A26) and Murugan (A11) attended the meeting and Dhanu (A5) attempted to garland the WIP (Shri V. P. Singh while on the dais, which wai to be photographed by Haribabu (A7) and Nalin (A9). This was a dry run Operation. Since they could not gain access to the dais they waited near the first step of the stage till the conclusion of the meeting and managed to hand over the garland to Shri W. P. Singh while he was getting down from the dais. Haribabu (A6) and Nalini (A9) could not cover this incident. For this Sivarasan (A4) pulled them up to be more attentive in future.
28. Having succeeded in this **Dry Tun" Dhanu (A5) and Subha (A6) wrote two letters in Tamil, one addressed to Akila (A3), Deputy Chief of Women's Intelligence Wing of LTTE and another to Pottu Omman (A2), wherein they affirmed that they would remain steadfast till the task was accomplished and are waiting for an opprotune occasion, which would take place within that month. In the letter to Pottu Omman (A2) reference also has been made to the opportunity of having gone very close to Singh' and looking forward for such an opportune occasion. Both the letters bear the date 9.5, 91.
29. Bhagyanathan (28) also wrote a letter dit. 10. 5.91 to Baby Anna (Baby Subramanian) wherein he had mentioned about the shifting of the Printing Press to Gangai ATıman Koil Street and the management of the same by him. He has also affirmed therein his loyalty to the cause of Tamil Eelam, even at the cost of his life. The said press was frequented by Sivarasan (A4), Murugan (A11), Arivu (A26) and other accused and served as their meeting place.

Page 10
COWFLICT
Peace Accords
and Dis
John M. Richardson Jr. and Jianxin W
INTRODUCTION
The peace accords I described did not lead to durable settlements. In this respect they failed. On the other hand, they were pioneering attempts at settling one of the most intractable for IDs of political conflict. In every case a framework for conflict resolution, agreed upon by some, was created. In several cases, thic accords tellporarily ended violent conflict and provided a breathing space within which further discussions could go forward. Thus, the peace accords can usefully be viewed as experiments, from which there il Te lcssons to be learned, Identifying those lessons is a major purpose of my effort.
Table 1 summarizes the outcomes of the accords. The Addis Ababa agreement was most successful, contributing to nearly ten years of peace between Northern and Soulthern Sudanese, but now ethnic conflict rages again. About three years of stability followed the independence of Cyprus, mandated by the London-Zurich accord. In Sri Lanka, violence subsided in the North for about Six weeks after the Indo-Lanka Accord Was signed, but the accord catalyzed a new conflict in thic South. The Punjab Agreement and Canada's Meech Lake Accord produced documents, but few tangible results. One could add to this list the several ag Teements that have attempted to resolve Northern
John M. Richardson Jr. is Professor of International Affairs and Applied Systems. Analysis and Director of Doctoral Studies at the School of International Service, The American University. Jianxim Wang is a Doctoral Candidate in International Relations at the School of International Service. Dr. Richardson's work on this paper was partially supported by a grant from the U. S. Institute of Peace, Mr. Wang's work was supported by a graduate fellowship from The American University.
Prof. Richardron's recent B, C, I. S. lecture was based or his paper.
S
Ta
Accord
CYPRUS: London-Zurich Agreements (1959)
SUDAN: Addis Ababa Agreement (Feb. 1972)
INDIA Punjab Accord (July 1985)
CANADA. Lake Mecch, AC (June 1987)
SRI LANKA: Indo Lanka. Ac (July, 1987)
Ireland's ethnic other negotiatic signed and uns failed to produ.
Shortcomings it point to the dressed in this views both “ “ schi tical'' studies c tion: (1) Why accords fail to jectives? (2) Hic cerned with rest flicts do better

rided Societies
lang
le 1.
cord
:0Tol
Outcomes of Peace Accords
ОілІСолте
Greek dominated government proposed constitutional changes in 1963 to Ilodify agreement. Turks withdrew from government. Subsequent un rest resulted in a pro-Greek Imilitary coup and occupation of the North by Turkish forces. Turkish Cypriots declared independence in 1983. Subsequent negotiations under U. N. auspices have failed to produce agreement.
Agreement implemented as the Southern Provinces Regional Self Government Act. Act unilaterally abrogated by President Nimeri in 1982. Government attempted to implement Sharia nationwide in 1984. Conflict between SPLM/SPLA and Sudan Government forces tontinues.
Provisions of the accord have not been imple mented. Accord is now forgotten by both sides. Sikh signatory, Sand Longwal assasinated by militants. Conflict between Sikh militant groups and Indian Government forces continues.
Accord initially accepted by provincial preImiers, but subsequently failed ratification as a constitutional amendment in two provinces. Status of Quebec unresolved Accord also raised consciousness about status of aboriginal nations,' Aboriginal status issues also unresolved
LTTE failed to honour accord. Indian Peace Keeping Force failed to subdue LTTE. Northeastern Provincial Governillent officials fled after declaring independence. Conflict between LTTE and Sri Lanka Government forces COLLITTLICS
conflict, plus 15 and accords. ned, that have c lasti Ing peace. peace accoтds To questions adpaper, which rearly' and pracconflict resoludid the Leace chiewe their obCan those con ing ethnic con
Apparently, ethnic conflict has not yet captured the interest of Illost conflict Tesolution Scholas A computer search of the major book collection in the Washington D. C. area devoted to conflict resolution”7 produccd 392 titles of Which 21 were devoted to **internationall conflict resol Lilltion," but only 3 to ethnic confict resolution." A search of the
7. The collection is found in George Mason University's Fenwick Library.

Page 11
DWIL periodical index a produced 447 titles on Econflict" resolution" 91 on international conflict resolution' and 7 on ethnic conflict' resolution, 9 No doubt the reawakening of ethnic strife in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union will evoke new interest in this area and in the practical problem of framing durable peace accords to resolve ethnic conflicts to
CON FLICT RESOLUTION STUDIES
The literature most relevant to resolving ethnic conflicts can be usefully grouped into three broad categories, (a) surveys of conflict resolution theory, practice and :ಸ್ಥ್ಯ (b) case studies of Ethnig conflict resglution and (c) practical guides for negotiators, mediators and facilitators. This section briefly reviews represenLative works in each category.
Most scholars of conflict Tsolution assume there is CITInality between conflicts occur ing at the individual, family, group, organizational, national and inter national levels, Theories of Con
8 DWIL provides simultaneous computerized searches of the Гollowiпg iпdices: Hurrariries Index, from February கேபிசாகச விசா February 1984; Social Science Index, from February 1983: General Scient ாதி, from Mாடு 1984: Fire. Periodici ride, from July ;ே சேவிசேச பேர் 3 January 1983. fo Lega Periodicals from August,
9 Donald Horowitz (see esp., 1985) represents the most notable exception to his generalization. Also, the Interia. Final Centre for Ethn SILIdies, under whose auspices this book is written, հը: Conducted a research program focused on Ethnic conflict for more han a dÇCıdır. The keyword search described above Certainly did not identify a II relevant Forks dealing with resolution of ethnic conflict. However we believi i does accurately Portray the relatively modest level of attention բiven tՃ ըԼhnit: conflicts by scholars who are TTTgenerally concerned with conflict s ution, Whether or not lessons drawn fron resolving other types of conflict are Van to rēsolvingi COIliflicts. "YyiII be examined morë fully Inter in this chapter.
10. In the United States, major leadership in initiating studies of efhnic conflict and conflict resolution is bеіпg provided by the grants program of the H. S. Institute of Fac (1990).
flict resolution
som s learned fr flicts alt one lewe applicable to otէ “St. Marting" se Tesolution Tece LI Ender John Bul. (Burton, 1990a, an di Di ke5 I99) fies this point
and Dukes argue to satisfy inherer CCIT IIl) to all c. conflicts may tak forms. Different flict may require resolution strateg negotiation, alt. resolution, Initiedi track diplomacy,
Other works clude Sandole and
(eds., 1987). A (1987), Shellenbe kovitch (1984) :
PTuitt (I989). T} lenberg, Berkowit A Ti di Pruitt, how In OTe specialized berg argues that th resolution must broad understand that address the c.
mics of Cönflict. Se5 heleF resolving inter-p Irlangement ald conflicts. Kressel: results from app conflict resolution ation-across a b conflict levels fron
international.
Studies by D Likert and Like
Pruitt and Rubin ( WE3 Tk that Traws
Social psychologica related empirical ri With individual, gr. zational behavior. . in the tradition of
(1955) and Louis views conflict positi that the challenge
solution is to trainst conflicts into con His work presagest "Win - win sout With contemporal solving' approach Tesolution. The Lik
"research-based

PTOPOSC that lesIn resolving con| Will be broadly rs. Tl 55iv ries” on conflict intly completed rton's leadership 1990b, Burton 1990b) exempli. of view. Burton that the struggle it human needs is inflicts, although e many different | for Ils of Condifferent conflict ies, for example *Tnative dispute ation or second
In this genre inSandole-Saroste El T lnd Bulto "Tg, (I989), Berind KTessel and le WCTks of ShelChl and Kressel VeT, illustTea focus. Shellen. eories of conflict be based on a ing of theories a uses and dynaBerkahwich fothird parties in eScrial labor international nd Pruitt report 1ying a single Stralt egy-Ilimcidi| roadrange of n individual to
eutsch (1973), Tt, (1976) and 1986), illustrate
primarily on il theories and search dealing bup and organiDeutsch, writing George Simmel
Coser (1956), Wely and argués of conflict Teför in destructive structive ones. he emphasis on ions associated y "problemשטTIIתS tu coט erts draw upon rinciples and
pictul Tc of the
theories of organization and management" to identify more effective systems of organization for constructively managing conflict. Such systems, they argue, are essential for striking a balance between individual freedom and social order in complex industrial societies. Pruitt and Rabin examine causes and consequences of alternative strategies for Coping With conflict. Under What con ditions, they ask, will individuals engage in the cognitively demanding task of attempting to maximiZe not only theirown outcomes, but those of the other side
The press. . .
(Continued from pagg 5)
To then London was still the hub of the universe and if they SW. beyond London only saw Washington where John Foster Pules was busy frightening all god-fearing men with the bogey of reds under the bed. The outlook on the world was that of an insular island pcople loпg ruled over by a mighty imperial PWer, Having gone to schools Where Sinha lese and Tamil had studied together these editors and English language journalists either could not grasp the com. plexities is of the problemo pretended that no such existed For the fact is that by this time the issue had taken on a complex feature. While the Tamils were unhappy about the in roads made by post-independence Governments into position, in cemployment particularly in the privileged բublic sector Sinhala consciousness long suppressed by colonial rule and the rule of the UNP mimic-men was on the ascendant in the form of a demand that Sinhala ble Ima de the state language. It was only the left parties with their internationalist out. who eschewed the extremes of communal politics and stood for the building of a Ceylonese nation but the very Plewspapers which failed to give a true PTEbern were busy branding them as *LIITalitic T5" to Sinhala and Buddhism Precisely for this secular outlook towards national politics.
9.

Page 12
The Twin Narratives o
D. P. SiWaran
the turn of the Twentieth
century Tamil Nationalism was articulated in terms of two different interpretations of Tamilian identity, propagated by two distinct novellents which were politically opposed to each other.
The one was the Dravidian school; the other was the Indian revolutionary movement. The former was closely associated with English missionaries and un equivocally supported British rule the latter strongly opposed the Raj and preached violence LaL SLaLa LLaaaLL S S HHHHLLLLLLL tH S HaaLaHHHaL enhancipation from foreign domination. The discourse that Inay be identified today as Tamil Nationalism is constituted at its basis by these two interpretations - or more appropriately foundling" narratives-which contended with each other to offer all thentic readings of the Tamiliam past and present, of what +really" constituted Tamilian identity. The Dravidia In school gawe political and academic for ill to linguistic ethno-nationalism; the revolutionary novement LLITT ed traditional Tamil пilitarism into a liberation ideology, which evolWedi into milita Trist eth T10-nationalism, The militarist Teading has also characterised Tamil ethnonationalism in the twentieth cetury not merely because it was constructed and deployed to advance the inte:TC SLS a Tid clai Ils of the collectivity, banded and mobilized as a pressure group' but also because, as this study intends to show, it appealed to, and arose out of the structures of experience produced and reproduced through folk culture and religion in rural Tamilnadu. (This is how, as we shall see later, MGR becale Madurai Weeran, the warrior god of a numerous scheduled castic in Periyar district in Tamil nadu. Jeyalalitha contested from an electorate the Te il the last elec:- tion). However, it is essential to understand the politics behind the claims andl silences of the early Dravidian school of Tämil revivalism and historio
O
graphy" foT exa of Ilodern Talli
Ciliwell äldi h wrote and spok Cultute and hist til Slot lill Til tially a peасеful achieived a high zation independe to the Trival
In the India. Sub was the unique lizatio. The the linguistic and independence als it the idea that originally a cla farmers, The pli Well's teleology introduce this idi tings. (It was si it arose from shared with the towards the MATA, of Bishop Caldw to be extremely newly arisen Well was conte:Tndi Ing f in the Wall hit Therefore the Were written by School OF Tai Til tlITT of the cent pinned by
a). The politic: concerns of Cald Illisio Llaties like Scudder and G.U.
b). The caste lala upward mobi
The interests intertwined. The tical interest Was Tallil Culture II pre-Aryanı --Bahı Timi martial. The Firs Tamils to take ur theory to exami past belonged t elite and were encouraged by Pro aries (and someti administrators). T Professor Sundera Triwar:Llm Uli WE history and cultur of his castellen seething at bein, Sudras by the

f Tamil Nationalism
mining the Tise 1 J11ilitäTi5IL1.
15 Followers wiլը :ie abbilit Tall li
Ty endeavoured Tills Wye Te esselpeople who had lewel of ciyilint of and prior of the "Aryans' continent. This Drawid ill civiry of Dravidian hience CLlLLI rigal contained in tle Tali li lis Weite ss of peaceful litics of Caldcompelled him in La Hilig WriEn el rier that the attitude he English Tuilers var.), The views "t11 Were foլInt1 useful by the lalla elite Willicl or higher status rachy of caste. listories which the Dravidia studies at the ury were under
ill and religious Well and other Henry Martyn
Pope.
politics of We|- lity.
of both were T express poli -
to show that 1 SISTIC I WLS
Il lIlll IIt ill-Brahmin p the Dravidian Ile the T:LIT111 the Wellala supported and testant Inissionmes by English The Writings of m pillai of the Ersity on Tamil a inspired many who had bec g classified as Brahmins, and
Worse, by the British caste census and coll its of law as well.
Thus the histo Tical Works of the early Dravidian school were produced as "social charters directed to Ward the census, where the decennial designation of Caste status became a major focus for coltests ower Tank between 1870 and 1930." The first Drawidia history of the Tamilis -The Talmilis Eighteen hund Ted years ago" Was Written by W. Kanakasabhaipillai, a Wella la from Jaffma who was a civil servant il Madras. Edgar Thurston thought it appropriate to quote the following excerpt from that work in the scction dealing with the Wella la caste in his "Castes and Tribes of South India". "Allmo Ing the pure Tamils, the class Imost honoured was the Ariwar or Sages. Next in rank to the Ariwar were Ulavar or farmers. The Ariwar Were ascetics, but of men living in Society the farmers occupied the highest position. They formed the nobility, or the landed aristocracy, of the country. They were also called Wellalat, the lords of the flood or kara lar, lords of the clouds... The Chera, Chola and Pandyan kings and most of the petty chiefs of Tamilakal, belonged to the tribe of Wellalas.' (Thurston, 1905. vol., p. 367-8)
The efforts of the early DraWidian School of Tamil historiography" culminated in the Work of Martillalaitikal - the founder Of the Pure Talli | Indow-nt which bEuame a powerטוחט ful force in the anti-Hindistruggles from 1928 onwards. He published a book called Wella lar Nalika Teckan" — The Civilisation of the Wel11 allais, -- jIn 1923. The book was a lecture he had given at the Jaffna. To Whall Col Jamuary 1, 1992 on the Civilization Of the Talli 13", A contribution Gf R8. 200 w:15 milde ill Jafna towards the publication of the lecture als H book, The JaffIIa Wella of that ti III1c Saw his interests as being bound with that of his castellen in South India who were attempting to

Page 13
Tid themselves of the Sudra Status assigned to them in the Warna hierachy of caste by BrahIni 15.
However, Maramalaiatikal had decided to publish it as a book in ordeT to Teful Le a clai 11 in thic caste journal of the Nattukkotai Chetti community that the Chetties did not marry among the Wellalas because they (the
vellalas) were Sudras. In the English preface to the work Maramalaiatikal says that his
book "is written in scrupuluosly pure Tamil style, setting forth at the samme time views of a revolutionary character in the sphere of social religious and historical ideas of the Tamil people... In the first place attention is directed to Wellalas, the civilized agricultural class of the Tamils, and to their origin, and OrganizatioTh. . . shown that at a time when all the people except those who lived all along the equatorial regions were leading thic life of hunters or nomads, these Welalas attained perfection in the agriculture. . . and by means of navigation occupied the whole of India. When the Aryam hordles came from the In Orth west of Punjab and poured forth into the interior, it was the ten Wellala kings then ruling in the north that stopped their advance." Maraimalaiatikal goes on to claim that the eighteen Tamil castes were created by the Wella las for their service; that they (the Wellalas) were vegetarians of the highest moral codes; that Saiwism and the Saiva Sidh Imtha
it is
art of
philosophy nur Tällä5 foi T mTe were the preheri Lage of the classification o Tais was the r dious Aryan-Br: Maria Imalaialtikall ding fellow W scholars and th attacks and Wei BTahrin Tamil Srinivasa Aiyan Brahmin Tamil worked as an superintend of Madris Presider had made a di on the claims () school of Tani. which derived it the scientific' pl of Bishop Calc bunked the LH Caldwell-Wellala Tallil CLlLLTE W the high moral ancient race of vators, con the b had studied of culture of the side as an offic and GT1 the basi. works that had ed towards thic the 19th century. angar noted in dies" ** Withi tl
WealTS El Ile W. S scholars has co consisting main
and castellen of ted professor and Sunderampillai ca Aiyangar argued to the clails of

ured by the Welthan 3500 years Aryan religious Tamils that the Wellallas. Els Suidsult of an insihmin conspiracy. was also defen:Llala Drawidian air claims against ed criticisms of academics, M. gar, a respected scholar who had assistant to the Cc 15 LS for the cy, Mr Steuart, vastating attack if the DTaWidia | historiography, s authority from hilological Works
Well. He decory of the School that
is constituted by Wirtues of a peaceful cultiasis of whaithe he religion and Tamil countryr of the census of pure' Tamil OēlēIl rediscoWerlatter part of Sriniiwasa Aiyis Tamil Stue last fifteen hool of Tamil he into being, of admirers the late la Tenantiquary, Mr. TrivandլլIIn."
that contrary he new school,
the Tamils were a fierce răce of martial predators. He wrote Again some of the Tamil districts abound with peculiar tomb stones called Virakkals (hero stones) They were usually set up on graves of Warriors that
were slain in battle... The names of the diceascal soldiers and their
exploits are found inscribed on the stones which were decoratcd with garlands of peacock feathETS or some kind of Ted flowers. Usually small pies were put up over them. We give below a specimen of such an epitaph. A careful study of the Purapporul WenbaImalai doubtless convince the reader that the Tamils were, like the Assyrians and the Baylonians, a ferocious race of hunters and soldiers armed with bows and lances making war for the пnere pleasure of slayіпg, гатаging and pillaging. Like them the Tamils believed in evil spirits, astrology, onnens and sorcery. They cared little for death. The following quotations from the above work will bear testimony to the characteristics of that wirile race. 1) Garlanded with the entrails of the enemies they danced with lances held in their hands topside down. 2). They set fire to the fertile willages of their enemies; 3) and plundered their country and demolished their houses.4) The devil's cook distributed the food boiled with the flesh of the
slain, on the hearth of the crowned heads of fallen kings. With these coImpare sa Tine passages from thc Assyrian stories of campaigns. 'I had some of them flaped in my presence and had the walls hung
Ell
Will
a Ticient
11

Page 14
with their skins. I arranged their heads like crown.All his willages I destroyed, desolated, burnt: I made the country desert.' And yet the early Dravidian are consideTed by Dr. Caldwell as the fra Imers of the best moral codics, and by the new school of non-Aryan Tamil scholars... " Aiyangar even claims We have said that the Well allas were pure Drawidians and that they were a military and
naturally ask How could the ancestors of peaceful cultivators be a Warlike race?' He argues that the Crymology of the root Wel is connected to WaT and Weapons, that it was not uncommon for cultiwating castes to have been martial tribes in former days as in the case of the Nayar, the Pilli, the Bants etc., He als 0 cites in official census of the Tamil population in the Madras Presidency, which shows that Tallil castics with a claim to traditional martial status constituted twenty six percent of the totall number of Tails in the Presidency. (Sriniwasa Aiyangar; 1915. pp. 40—58).
Aiya nigar's attack on the Dravidian theory of Caldwell and the Wellala propagandists had political undertones. Learned Brahmins of the day were acutely aware of the political interests that lay behind the claims of the early Dravidian school. Wella la Tamil Tevivalism and its idea of Dravidian uniqueness were closely related to the pro-British and collaborationist political organization that was formed in 1916 by the non-Brahmin elites of the Madras presidency - The South India Libera Federation. Its proponents were, therefore careful not to emphasise the narratives of the martial reputatjon of the TäIIlils that Were elbodied in the ancient High Tamil texts cor il the folk Culture of Lil Tal
12
Tamillnadu. (Tam been promoted by SiOIlari e 5 di Br the latter half of
only inasmuch a facilitate the soci: religious aims o Tamil society and influence Of BTahı was done not only to promote Wellal is Tail national il coil scious de concerns of the seditious views revival that were by the terrorists' pathisers which
stirring the "*anc
** Ft TI the Military cast by appealing to inscribed in the ch the Mai TEFL/Tar 3: Tid glorious past that Ined by, what acc. was the unique Tali I Imla Tia 1 trail tical life of Pulur. foundation text
rism had been i Brahmins Who W of the Indian Tew ment at this jur was the great T. Imanya Bharathi;
great Tamil scho Aiya:İngar, the cou! Marava kings of
These concerns the Raj to take aimed at the te Inilitary castes. C sifted through the propaganda of th pathisers of the mcInt, to charge tion. Two, it Criminal Tribes. A the express objec hly obtaining kno" vising and dicip

i1. Te wiwillism had
protestant misitish officials in the 19th century 5 it was seen to al, ett) ոճTHic and demilitarizing
mins in it.) This out of a desire a caste culture, culture, but also ference to the Raj about the if Tail cultural heiпg propagated and their syllWETE ELilled ät ient martial pasils ingeneral and as in particular, mäTitial Wallues Ste LT aditio 115 3F linking them to a hädbeelsustaording to them, and powerful dition, The polianian Oru, the of TaTi 1 Tlilitainitiated by two cre sympathisers ilutiопагу поуе|cture. (The one La mil poeto Subrathe other was the lar M. Raghava. rt pundit of the Ramnad.)
had compelled limes of action "rorists and the ne, it carefully Talli Te Wiwit 3 Sul spected symterrorist IIOWethem With 5 ciliintroduced the ct of 1911, with tive of thorougwledge of, superining the Kallar
and Maria WaT WHO W cc classified as dacoits and thugs under this act, The political mobilization of the Tamil military castes began as reaction against this act. The political leadership of this mobilization was inspired by the militarism of the terrorists. Modern Tamil Inilitarism as a political force emerged from this conjunc
T.
As we shall see later KarunaInidhi, ThÖndaman, Kasiana Indian and Prabhaharam a Te all, in warying degrees products of the notions of Tamilian identity which arose from this conjuncture. Students of Tallil ethno-nationalism's current phase will find that the martial narratives of Tamilian past and present are at work in two extremes of the Tamil political spectrum. Last month an audio cassette was released in Jaffna by the LTTE and a commemoration volume was released in Singapore in Thondaman's honour. Both are politically concious ef. forts to root two personalities and their nationalist projects, to what has been portrayed as the most powerful manifestation of the Tamil martial tradition-the Chola Empire. The LTTE cassette evokes El glorious past associated with Prabhaharan's only nom de guerre, Karikalan-the founder of the Chola Empire. The commemoration volume, on the other hand seeks to emphasise the continuity" of a martial caste tradition between the leader of the CWC and the great general of the Chola Empire, Karunakarath ThondaTilan. Thus the examination of Ta Inil militarism in this study is an exploration of the answer to the question-why does Tamil ethno-nationalism express itself thus and how does it sustain power to appeal to pain Tamilian
sentiments?
(To be continued)

Page 15
Sri Lanka’s Non-Demo of the Opposition
zeth Hussain
he Writer has earlier argucci
Lihat Sri Lanka has a 110 Ilsense democracy, which for brevity can be called non-democracy, and fu rther that the Gover IIIlent Cannot be expected to restore democracy without pressure from outside its ranks (L. G. of July 15, 1992). In this article We will consider the role of the opposition in relation to the problem of non-democracy.
A difficulty that has to be faced is that the opposition parties, with the possible exception of the Liberal Party, are widely perceived as just as devoted to non-democracy as the GowcTIhment itself. Consider the curious performance of the DUNF. It has performed admirably in making democracy a central issue, but at the same time it regards the 1977 Government as having been democratic. That is to say, it considers the very Gowenment which instituted Sri Lainkan non-democracy as democratic. It should be understandable that there is widespread cynicism about the democratic pretensions of the opposition parties.
However, though the cynicism may be understandable it may not be justificid. Part of the explanation for the cynicism may be that we a Te living in the after math of the 1977 Government's brutal contemptuousness towards all the democratic norms, which seems to have convinced many Sri Lankans that democracy is somehow totally alien to us. It tends to be for gotten that we had a fully functioning democracy from 1948 to 1970. And it tends to be forgotten that although the 1977 Government exercised power undenocratically, Mrs. Bandaranalike did restore democracy by holding free and fair elections in 1977.
It may not be un realistic to think that the opposition parties ill be responsive to the argument that since non-democracy has proved so disastrous for Sri Lanka, Fe had better try democracy again.
The I two quest non-den OG to hold E. сшestioп а selwas bei that case de IOCTEti C pOWO" to I reasonably if it, İS Geri: parties will democratic
Some readers Wi point, regarding naive because it
the presupposition politicians can car A more convincin be premised on
politicians take to to power, not ju: Government enjo follows that any promote their cha to power should Their chances will in advance of tl Election the op try to establish it credentials, and
democracy in Sri alternative, there compelling reason ment to hold dem
The opposition
ask themselves tw. regard the Gove democratic. Why it be expected to
elections? The II question arises f tion parties then
garded as non-de
in that case, shoul Catic Governile tic elections and of losing power te opposition partie bly be expected te tions only if it ning. Obviously

cracy - The Role
pposition parties have to ask themselves ions. They regard the Government as ratic, Why, then, should it be expected mocratic elections? The more important rises from the opposition parties them|g regarded as non-democratic. Why, in should a non-democratic Government hold
alactions and face the prospect of Osing non-democratic opposition parties? It can be expected to hold such elections only in of winning. Obviously the opposition | Elie Well-alt luised to establish thair own
Credentials.
Il demur at this the argu T11 cnt as is premised on | that Sri Lankan "e for Sri Lanka. g atgl Il CInt Can the brute fact, upposition, that politicsto come it to Watch the ying power. It thing that could nces of coming interest them. be improved if Le next Gene Tal osition parties hei T dc Tlocratic the līm5 of Lanka. In the cells to be no for the GovernCratic clections.
parties have to questions. They "TTTT ETTE ELS TOT -- then, should hold democratic 1ore important 'om the opposiSelves being remocratic. Why, di a non-demohold democraacc the prospect non-democratic It can reasonahold such eleccertain of winthe opposition
parties will be well-advised to establish thei T O WL1 de Illo Cratic Creidentials.
At present most of the opposition parties have taken to mass action, an understandable reaction to the Government's display of non-democracy in disallowing Parliamentary dcbates on matters that could be embarassing to the Government. Though this reaction is an understandable one, it could also be hazardous for reasons that need not be spelled out here. The point that has to be made in this article, which deals with the opposition's role in trying to establish democracy, is that mass action cannot by itself establish the opposition's democratic credentials, nor will it necessarily lead to deΠlOCTHCy.
The opposition can go a long way in establishing their democratic credentials and democratic norms by engaging in a meaningful campaign for a free press. It is a commonplace that the idea of democracy without a free press is sheer monsense. Therefore the opposition must include a campaign for a free press among their highest prio Tities. It will not suffice merely to announce an intention of denationalizing Lake House after coming to power, because the Sri Lankan people have got accustomed to thinking that a typical Government's performance in office is usually the opposite of
13

Page 16
its promise while out of office. Strategies have to be worked by the experts in this field, that is the gentlemen of the Fourth Estate, and others to Tnount a massive campaign on the press, in which a major role has to be played by the opposition parties. Otherwise their democratic pretensions cannot be taken seriously.
The other way of establishing democratic credentialis and normis is for the opposition partics to function in Parliament in the manner appropriate to a democracy. What We have in mind is that the opposition parties must take up the concrete, the particular, the individual cases, instead of confining themselves largely, though not exclusively, to generalities. That used to be done in the Sri Lankan Parliament at one time, particularly during the 'fifties, and it is certainly done in otheT countries WheTe the dem Ocratic opposition is functioning properly. In this regard, the Sri Lankan opposition has been providing a spectacle of shocking failure for a long time. The Writer believes that thic explanation for this failure has nothing to do with shortcomings of the opposition parties and their leaders, but is of a structural Order.
Before analyzing the failure and trying to provide an explanation, We must note that disappointment at the performance of the opposition parties, notably of the SLFP, persists even though that party together with others are far more active than during the period from 1977 to 1988. "We must al só con sider the familiar explanations for the failure of the SLFP, which the Writer Tegards as facile and th OTCJughly uпconvinciпg.
A columnist in a pro-Government newspaper diclightedly pounced on the political column in the 10 June issue of the Rajaliya, the DUNF paper. It charged that though the opposition parties woke from their slumber consequent to the impeachment motion, they have wanted to go on enjoying their privileges in their usual lackadaisical manner. They move noconfidence motions, but the speakers are not suitable and the facts
presented are not They have failed
use of the Uduga and the Electio Report, the latte that ought to be
whikolic World, TE tion depends on leader is unwell problems within t anti-Government resign immediate ctures in thic R. reflect widesprea the performance parties, particula despite all their f is still thoroughly
Wc Cole now Lions for thic SLE usually focus on naike's lack of commit Ticht to attitudes shapel background, all allegedly led to t guing her party.
About MTs Bln of dynamism, the that springs to hawe all the othe been doing ? '' exploit the sho I 110 W e Tilent, a paTt ment j l te Tills mings of only the though not alwill is interesting tha is not being challe Tecent ill-lilealth. because of the is politics, which W later, dynamism h ected of our oppo til EiT 1ēdēTS.
The lo Illinanci has been a Well peculiar feature politics. It is ar. rade phenomenom it has to be regard sion of somethi South Asian cult fault of Mrs E other Ilenbers of important point { is that the do family in no way tical dynamis Im, i case of Mrs Gail Weeks after she Congress made :

vегy inteгesting. to Ilake effective Tipola allegations 1. Comissioneiros being somethi Ing presented to the le entire opposithe SLFP, but its Il di Lhere are he family. The Opposition must ly. --These striajaliya probably perceptions that of the opposition rly in Parliament, renetic activities | inadequate.
to the explanaFP failure, which | MTS Bandarddynalism, her her family, and 影 her feudal of which have luc divisions pla
di Tallike's 1äck obvious question Illind is ' + Wat r party stallwarts The attempt to rtcomings of a Y OF El gCWCTIof the shortcմleader is usually, s, mistaken. It
ther leadership
inged despite her
It may be that EFLICLTITE CIT L.L.T. ill be explained as not been expsition parties or
: of the family -recognized and of South Asian gllably a retrog... but in that case ced as the expresg тetгоgrade iп Te, and That the amda Tanaike o T her family. The be a de let illance of the
precludes poliS shown by the hi. In just four St DOWET in 1976 excellet and
exhaustive analysis of its shortcomings, proceeded to take corrective measures and thereafter Mrs Gandhi fought her way back to power like a splendid liconess. That was possible because there was nothing precluding opposition dynamism in Indian political Cul
1T.
The charges about Mrs Bandaranaike's feudalist attitudes read rather strangely of a leader whose 1970 Gover IIIIICIlt wäs ole of the most left-wing known in the Third World, apart that is from the Communist ones. Those charges also read rather strangely of a leader who gawe away huge chu Inks of her wealth, which is not the sort of thing one expects from feuda. lists, nor of course from the bourgeois predators who came later. Allegedly feudalist attitudes provide no part of the explanation for the poor performance of of SLFP.
The charges analyzed above Dinake no sense Whatever, and can Inot possibly explain the divisiveness in the SLFP. The explanation has to be sought elsewhere. We must firstly note that the SLFP became seriously divided under her late husband, but nothing of the sort happened under Mrs Banda Tanaike's leaderThere .1977 נShip from 1960 tt was of course, the Occasional politician who crossed over to the other side, but that is a phenemenon common to all political parties. SLFP divisiveness therefore has nothing to do with the personality of Mrs Bandaranaike or family politics or feudalism. It had everything to do with the 1977 Government which as everyone knows was grimly determined to destroy or at least incapacitate the SLFP, as part of what looked like a programme to roll up the electoral map, extirpate democracy and institute a thousand-year UNP Reich. The present President is willing to allow a role for the SLFP, although only within the fгаппеwork of ошт prevailiпg попdemocracy. The continuing SLFP divisiveness is the consequence of our democracy being nonsensical, which means among other things that the SLFP has to be doubtful

Page 17
about the prospects for coming to power through democratic elections, the reasons for which have already been explained. This is a situation in which any party anywhere in the World, not just the SLFP, can be expected to start fissipirating. What might be regarded as really surprising is that the SLFP divisive less has not been much greater. The explanation is that the SLFP is the expression of powerful socioeconomic foi Tces Which cannot the easily eradicated, something which the last Government was mot intelligent enough to understand. In trying to explain the opposition Faille We hawe focu15 sed C1 the SLFP because that is the party people usually have in mind when they complain about the inadequacies of the opposition. Furthermore, it has a special importance as it is the Party around which others have to coalesce if they are to defeat the UNP, and would be a mistake to ignore the performance of the other opposition parties in trying to understand the opposition failure.
Because of the proportional representation system the opposi
tio In is how ad in parliament, to have made the Presidents spect for som over forty of apart from th much less than and certainly sh substantial an mentary contr Contribution is and differs in n thc SLFP mem latter seem to b and active in Pa als Lake I10 te Illace of the U. tion. After 196 tainly just as in Timent 15 aly party.
There has in chose between parties, but thert rence in their pe past and the pres they all showed than animation, of the just and c. internittenty, Wh turn to come to p
VASA OF
207,2nd C山
Colomb
Telephone :

Lately represented equately enough impeachment of m a realistic proLine, There åre sition Illembers SLFP ones, not * SLFP members, icient to take a powerful Parliation. But their Lust als in effective way from that of ers. In fact the In Ore Winciferious itment. We must
the past perforP in the opposi, they were cerFFective il Parliather opposition
been luch t0
our opposition has been a diffeformance in the ent. In the past
more in antition leeping the sleep ming awake only ille awaiting their ower and cnjoy
power thoroughly. Ours has beer essentially a Fat Boy opposition, The reference, if the Writer's memory serves correctly, is to the Fat Boy in Dicken’s Pickwick Papers, who at omic moment participates in the animated conversation going on around him, and falls fast asleep at the next. Most of the time he slept, just like our opposition in the past. In the present, after 1988 that is, our opposition has certainly become vociferous, shouting more than sleeping. But considering all the opportunities they miss to really expose and shake the Government, they might as well resume the sleep of the just and allow the unjust to enjoy power in peace. Ours is still essentially a Fat Boy opposition.
All this clearly shows that the explanation for opposition failure in terms of the shortcomings of a single party, the SLFP, explains nothing. We hawe to explain sonnething that is thoroughly unsatisfactory in all our opposition parties, both in thic past and in the present. There has to be an explanation in terms of the very structure of our political life.
TICIANS
iss Street, - 11.
21 631
15

Page 18
  

Page 19
Kumar Rupesinghe
Итат на Беел не Importance of The UN in solving these Η Γαία η ΕΡ
Let me again share with WOL some figures. I have given WוטI al set of tables which indicates SÖTTE of the things which I have been Lalking about. According to research, in the period 1989, there has been about 32 internal conflicts, artilled conflicts. Armed conflicts are defined as having a CLIITTILI lative casualty rate of over 1,000. If YÖLI reduce the threshold from 1,000 to 500, we have about 75 to 90 armed conflicts going on at a : time. Of course there El We been 5e intermissions, like the Gulf War, which have interWened in that Process, but generally What we see is the development of armed conflicts. I have also included here a map which shows precisely the tendency of international conflicts to gTLD W into state conflicts and the ESL:- lation of internal conflicts.
What does the research tells It tells us may things; it tells, for example, that most of these conflicts are in the South, the Third World, but now El TC ) longer purely in the Third World, because we are now seeing also in Yugoslavia and in the Soviet Union the new civil W:lIS EIII:I- ging, based on ethnic criteria. I would suggest that we are goiпg to have a situation with about 44 armed conflicts by next EI,
And what has the United Nations been able til de) about these conflicts Very little, I an affaid, The UN ha WCI y Talrely intervened in these Conflicts. In īs these confics Which are in this list, the UN has not discussed these issues in the Security Council, most probably because of the concept of statė SVeTI gnty and non-interference in the internal affairs of a givеп country. But this doctrine of 10T1-il Lerfecence in the internal El ffairs of a country has been, and is ח טטlti
CONFLICT RESOLUTION (2)
The role of the U.N.
nuously; being it mean that if ! violations are p international Stand back and delelop 2 Like the Kurdish p
Now, the ot the information Thunications rev beyond the sta have now sate tion, fax mach Illllllication and is a process of lization. Bound unbounded, tha thing. And the eignty is being it is in this
We should loc People said, of
WES Illey
because of the
3l PCTF) Wer con SCbIl chaw under the UN. But I
TSR. ETeater posis UN. We must UN Charter sta amble; we, the pe 51<es arc accu HTC accountable
It is importan
Inition of the redefined. The people of what բctiple, was thuse a sovereign state, after the decolor after the struggle dence, the Unite state that the rig mination is no iրը peoples continue thems clives and reca and define themse whether it is the Kurds; or the U. Tart:Ts, or the Lit it is to this probi Illust now address We are going to of a Lebanonizatio tion of societies, violence.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

and NGO’s
:hallenged. Does oss human rights petrated that the Ilmunity has to Watch a situation hat happened to iple ?
ir thing is that evolution - Comlution - has gone e boundaries; we lites communicaInes, E-mail conWe In this discussion that internationatries are getting is the important concept of soverredefined. And Il text also that k at the UN. Cours that the able to react cold War and the ict, and that it nined the Tole of think now there Ibilities for the ot forget that the rts with the Preoples. Therefore, in table, and they to the people. t that the de Fijeople' is being definition of a
Ciri T15 titutes : who lived within and therefore lization process, : for indepenNations would ht to self-deteTger valid. But to redefine ssert themselves, lvesas apeople, Tarmils, or the bechs, or the hulainian 5 — and sin that the UN itself. Otherwise have a process n" of atomizaand increasing
Why violence? There are many reasons for this - the State is unable to cope with this issue, it chooses violence against genuine grievances of ethnic minorities, it suppresses and delegitimizes minority rights and denies them their language and discriminates them in employment, etc. etc.
The Illeans Of Violence, on the other hand, is no longer the property of the state. It is possible to buy arms and lethal Weapons in the international market, and there is al met Work linked to the drug trade which is selling small arms and very lethal Weapons to both sides, thereby helping to reproduce and escalate violence. And it is in this context that one has to address the question of the Tolce of the UN.
There are several points; there has been a discussion on early warning; can the United Nations build an early warning system for conflict prevention, can conflicts be prevented before they become pathological ? I am afraid it is still very much at a discussion level. It is very difficult for the UN organizations, the UNHCR, the FAO, the Secretary-General's Office etc. to get their act together. And there is still the problem of the sovereignty question.
There has been a discussion about the role of the Security Council - should the Security Council have veto power and also be the monopoly of five powers, Since it does not reflect the Illultiethnic character and nature of the global society ? There hawe been proposals that there should be a Special Rapporteur for humanitarian assistance, a supercoordinator for refugee flows. There have been discussions about enhancing the role, not of peacemaking - you know the United
Nations won the Noble Peace Prize in this city for peacekeeping, it has a build-up of
17

Page 20
Competence in getting two sides not to fight each other; excellent experience-but what about peacemaking, or peace-building? Who is going to undertake this? Who is going to build and rebuild the confidence of communities after violence? Who is going to transform a violent process to a nonviolent process ? In this sensic II would suggest that we cannot wait for the United Nations. The Inc.) I 1-go Wernmental communitics and other actors must develop their own methods of working and cooperating internationally and developing greater regiona institutions, like the Contadora plan under President Arias for Central ATeic, We Ieed such plans for Southern Africa and many other regions.
Let us take the recent experiences of Southern Africa. The apartheid regime is in the pastwith the dismantling of the apartheid Tegime; new forms of violence are destroying the very hope that the people had of a postapartheid society. The neighboring countries have massive refugee flows, in Mozambiquc there are 3 million refugees, casualties at home; therefore, we need more regional and sub-regional forms of organizations which can begin to deal with the question of regional security. And in that sense I suppose there can be a lot of cooperation with the UN as long as we know which area, who is going to work, in what the UN as long as we know which area, who is going to work, in what area, and whether there could evolve a division of labor in the future.
You just Touched поиг гол гle idea, when you were talking about the UN. hoyw" ritor2-gover 77 mer fall actors, artid
religion for instance, could play a rē.
The role of religion can be quite decisive. Religion has both a potential for human liberation, but also can and does have a potential for encouraging violence. I am not only here talking about Christianity, I am talking about Judaism, I am talking about Hinduism, Iain talking about Buddhism. What seems to have happe
18
ned Is Llıat the T has been captu militaristic, thi Wative, in Societ We stil 1 see al li like i11 Latir Á Ilot think that
way for Islam
OT TOT Hi Ilulis II is a led to de gious mythologi
Haji w do yo see ir: The fi II Hire ?
Let Ille try to which hawe beeT by the use of tries to suggest the stages of c.
Stages
FORM
ESCAL
ENDU)
NEGO'.
TRANS
What is ve. would suggest, resolution and mation requires better picture of phases and what at each particu process. I would 1.5 conflict :: end CCI1.flic E8 hā'ựe : altı cild, I Williıt j5 and is a chall reduce 1) the for Illation to th And, 2) can W. Wörk more On the conflict par
The Thost neg obviously confli early warning p national systen Weak, as I hawe preventive aspec obvious that thi can be certainly strengthened by and by other the regions of development of hanisms which C a better picture

cligious discourse red by the more L. JT1 TITE JT13:T= Ly. In Christianity peration theology, Tilerica, But I d.
it is in the Gille CBT foT BIddhism 1. Therefore ther I mythologize reliLes and text:5.
Conflicts energing
clarify the issues | discussed so far Llis chart, which
the phases, of
flict:
formation phase. The question is, even if the early warning capability is enhanced, and We are able to say with some realsomable confidence that a conflict is likely to happen, who can do What about that particular con flict Ald there is all other issue which is tied to early Warning: can there be timely interwention by preventive action ? This is OIle area of Work Which is mcces
S:lTy.
Escalation is when the conflict escalates into Wile:Ilce, and the II of course, there are different forms of crisis interwention. In the kind of conflicts we are talking about,
of Conflicts
ATION
ATTON
RANCE
TIATION
FORMATION
Processes
Early Warning Prevention
II tecTV c1 tiOI
Empoweriment
Problern Solwing
Structural Change
ry important. I is that conflict conflict transforthat We lily a each one of these пcсds to be do ne lar phase in this also suggest that lures frewer. All 4 begiTnining an dl cof interest, then, enge is: can we Lille frdin the et TatisfGTITiation? : now begin to neglected a reas in adigm, lected period, is ct formation, the ill: Se The inter1 is wery, wery suggested, in the t5. Aldi hilere it is : Tele of the UN P e[ılığını ced IId TeSearch Het Works networks Within conflicts, by the ifð Tillation mecan begin to get a of the conflict
there is un fortunately very little action by the UN concerning crisis intervention, I would suggest again that, in this area, much can be done by developing regioal fra Ille WorkS for CT isis i Il te Twention. There is considerable discussion in the Security Council for a Contingency Force under the UN to be deployed in an escalating violent situation. We need to establish frameworks which would invite all the parties for t:[]]] tỉT1110118 dĩ8[:1155ỉũIl e:Wem When the War is going on, the developIlent of rules for cease-fires, the modalities of monitoring of ceasefires and getting the parties together. Of course in the Yugoslav case, these things came too late. But again, a contingent approach Whereframeworks Caribe CTeated for continuous discussion within regions is useful. Here Indongovernmental organizations and those informed in dispute resolution could play a very significant role in identifying the actors, key issues, and various fra meworks Within which these people could
begin to talk to each other,

Page 21
Kumudu Kusum Kumara
Past-colonial period in Sri Lanka has seen significant changes occurring in the
pcasant Sector which has displayed a perceivable degree of dynamism. There has been a remarkable growth in paddy production bringing the country on to the verge of self-sufficiency in rice, while there have also been advances in other areas of agricultural production. These changes are clearly and primarily the outcoine of the shift in focus of state policy from the plantation economy to domestic agriculture. While the revenue derived from the export CTøp trade remained the main form of state finance, for political and economic reasons the State took an active role in promoting domestic agricultural production through increasing investments in irrigation and other infrastructural facilities, the resettlement of landless peasants on agriculLiu Tail landı, and technological modernization. However, the
#ேIt RI kr இ. logist arrached to the Agrarian Reசீனக் கா: Tாழ r (AIRaf:TI) Colonsa. Tie vievy expressed in thi
PPP are for recessarily those of the HIRET.
The author is deeply idebred a Пғ. S. E. P. de Silva o PEir fHi!} Parrs with is ray discussi É55Fief frd clarify concepta related fa TFrர Frar sforrrrarion inti gerrera li, ar FF; charge ir Sri Larika in PTF T analytical frare park within which the PoéFIF TFFrry Har HFFF சராசரி mainly a resulir of the se discissions JFוחט fisch the auf har fra frr:Friersey, ferre. Ffraid, சிசேச சாரr r: ேொ9:ச ச "தேரார ரீதர்
 ேேச விரி சராசr
AGRARIAAV cHAAVGE (7)
Growth without “Capit
Ilost influentia growth of the ippears to hay State policies
incentives to ci a guaranteed p later, the libc. rice trade. The this growth on
been their di though without
levels of disintegr either in the pe among the pea: Cussion in the pri Ses on the growt CCC)nOnly of Sri L. colonial period : the peasantry a tions of change
I. Growth, Ac
Poverty. Agricultural p Teil SallTilt Secto Til Sri Lanka has sh ble growth in ma grass (1966: 152) siwe study of the S my up to 1960, ot nishing”, “гарid of the peasant se part of the post
Table 1 INC
OUTPUT,
CROPP
Total Output (m Net Area Harve Productivity (bu, Cropping Intensi
Source: Nanayakka
in Sri Lanka and tigs, Colombo, 1987
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

alism
factor in the paddy economy been first, the providing price Itivators through ice scheme, and alization of the social impact of the peasantry has Ferentiation, alany significant ation among them saint Cicon 01mily do T antry. The dissent papcir focuh of the peasant anka in thic postLind its impact on nd future direcin this sector.
Cumulation and
roduction in the the post-colonial 3 wedi a Temarkany aspects. Snodin a comprehenri Lankan eco3D10
served the lasttransformation
Lor in the early -colonial period.
It was this sector which has been identified in 'simple stages-ofeconomic growth notions" as the primitive sector' and hence was the most unlikely place to find such dynamism". However, during the period from 1946 to 1960, the peasant sector was the most dynamic sector in the economy, in terms of output, productivity and employment: The gross output of paddy, the primary crop of the sector, increased by two and a half times, while the gross output of its other products also rose how. ever, at a slower rate; the value of the paddy sector's contribution to GDP rose by 75 percent; value added for worker (in constant prices) increased by about 40 per cent; the paddy sector employed at the much highet level of productivity, about 2,45,000 more persons than it had in 1946, thus accounting for about 30 percent of thic total increase in employment over the period (ibid.:152).
This growth, while subjected to variations, has continued with an exponential growth pattern in the post 1960 period (Gunaratne and Karunasena, 1988:9). The postcolonial period taken as a whole recorded considerable increases in terms of output, ha Twested area, productivity as the Table 1 reveals,
REASES AND ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF CULTIVATED AREA PRODUCT WITY AND ING INTENSITY IN PADDY 1952-1985
lin, bu.) sted (000, ac.) )
ty
I"52 1985 4má growth 28.9 127.6 4.6 937 1898 2.2 3O.S.) 67.19 2.4 1.204 1.247
ra, A.G. W. Progress in Paddy Cultivation and Production Forecasts for the Future, Department of Census and Statis
Tables I and 4.
19

Page 22
The total output of rice for paddy, the primary crop in the peasant economy, increased from 28.9 million bushells in 1952 to 127.5 millionibus hels in 1985, at an annual growth rate of 4.6 percent, making Sri Lanka nearly Self-sufficient il Trice. This ilcrease is in return mainly due to increases in both the Här Westel area and productivity (Nanayakkara, 1987), while cropping intensity has remained relatively low constant over time. Labour productivity in paddy production and other domestic food crops grew fast while export crops stagnated in this respect (Thorbecke and Svejnar, 1987:24), Wolume indices of estimated marketed output of paddy, and other domestic food crops recorded a tremendous increase, from 13.2 and 47.2 in 1959 to 154.7 and 233.3 respectively in 1982 (ibid.:29, Table 13).
Due to the rapid growth experienced, the relative position of the peasant sector within Sri Lanka agriculture, as well as in the overall econolly improved
continuously with an increasing contribution to the Illational economy. While the relative importance of the plantation economy in its contribution to agricultural value added and its share of agricultill Irall employment fell dra Illatically, the paddy sector's contribution to GDP which was 5 percent in 1950's increased to 6-7 percent in 1970-80 and ranked highest among all crops; in paddy Cultivation alone, its contribution te total employment which was 13 percent in 1953, increased to 20 percent in 1981, accounting for a shire which exceeded the total employment under all the three major plantation crops, tea, rubber and coconut put Logether. The share of cultivated land occupied by the paddy cultivation which was 26 percent in 1962 increased to 35 percent in 1982, this being more tha In 20 pcrcent the arcial under coconut cultivation and note than twice the area under tea or rubber cultivation. The contribution of
"
domestic paddy total rice suppl. which was 36 increased to 50 and to 90 percen rattle and Karun Table 1).
The cultivatio crops or highla export crops, fisi production whic nantly come und made advances colonial perio. index of the crops, a categor subsidiагy cгор crops and lives about four titles to 219.4 in 1985i good overall perf out this period Svejnar, 1987:18, total area plante crops declined 200,000 hectares
1980 before inic Te in 1982 (Thorbe 1987:69–70). T tarage cultivate output of some Crops hawe recoTc Crease sice betw (NAFNS; 33-34 the dairy sub-sect iпстеased gradu: lioTl 1itres in 196 litres in 1956, an rapid pace to 62 1979. Since the production stagn 54 Illiliol litres 53). Sugar cane form of pica sant panded significal 1977 period. A ginal plans, 7,83: Will be seLilled 0 under fol II Such Illic Review, Oc: the fisheries s. directly employs sons, total fishp sed from 96,000 24,000 tons in 19 Lack of a compre able data base sectors. Other that no Illy appears to which pre-empt : growth patterns.
Throughout t period successit

production to the y of the country 1950חrgentiסֻp percent in 1960 t in 1982 (GunaEl sena, 1988:22 — 5,
Il of subsidiary Tld Crops, mino T heries, and dairy th also predomiET PICES: Tilt 5 CCt CDT du Ting the posti. The Wolle domestic food y which includes, xportט S, minor ck increased by fr1590 in 1959 Indica ting a very In ance through(Thorbecke and Table 5:69). The to all subsidiary from 270,000 to between 1977 and asing to 300,000 ke and Swejnar, he extent of hecdi to, and thic
of the subsidiary led an overall iI"Cel 1980 till 1983 ;CBAR, 1983). In OT milk Collection illy from 8 mil| tel 10,6 milliöIl d the grew at a Illili litres in In domestic milk ated and stood at in 1983 (NAFNS: Cultivation, as a ridiction has extly in the postCcording to Ciri
peasant families 11,373 hectares,
projects (EconoEgber, 1986). In b-sector which about 60,000 per3 duc LiCT iCTea
ts I 170 82 (NAFNS: 47). emisiwe lil reli1 all these subI the paddy ecole a major factor nalysis of their
e Ost-colonial e gCWTIIIlents
alternating between the two policy regimes of left-of-centre Sri Lanka Freedon Party (SLFP) and the right-of-centre United National Party (UNP) have been committed to the promotion of domestic agriculture and achieving selfsufficiency in rice. All the regiIles up to 1977 facilitated as Welddiurnization of new land for this purpose, brought new or already asweddumized land under major irrigation, at a comparable level, a process which was accelerated in the post-1977 era. Successive governments have been actively promoting continuous improvement and expansion of yield increasing inputs and Irelated culLural practices. They also mainLained price incentives for paddy (and at times for other domestic crops) throughout the period which has becn the single factor most influential in the growth of the paddy economy.
Next: Incentives.
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USS 55 for 1 year, USS 35 for 6 months
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USS 45 for 1 year USS 25 for 6 months
India, Pakistan.
USS 40 for 1 year USS 22 for 6 months 輕
Local Rs. 250/- for 1 year
Rs. 150/- for 6 months

Page 23
AIR LAN REGIONA
蛇
器
鑒
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=
...a boon to tourists and residents in and around
the hill capital
The popularity of Air Lanka's first ever ူမ္ဟု office at Temple Street, Kandy already a hive of activity shows what a boon it has become. This office allows travellers the welcome convenience of attending to all the preliminaries regarding their lights, eliminating the need 觀 tiresome trips all the way down to Colombo.
So, if םll alre thing of flvi 卧 anywhere, consider the convenience, Choose to fly Air Lanka and enjoy the inflight service that has
carnet a wovid reputation.
60 Air Lanka flights leave Colombo Every wee to 33 destinations in 24 countries. Check the Air Lanka schedule and take your pick.
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Get in touch with your Travel Agent or call.
§: Qfice, Kandy Tel 08-324945 Colombo Office Tel. 426
Air Lanka,Taking Sri Lanka to the world.
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<ܠܹܗ؟ کا تقابلوچی;AHR":"AFAiگر
:

Page 24
MWWTAW TAYF AEAFST
ELEPHANT HOUS
OUALITY AT AFF
NO. 1 JUSTICE. A
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CO/WPL/WEWTS
SE SUPERMARKET
RORDABLE PRICES
AKBAR MAWATHA
MBO-2,

Page 25
REGION
Cautious Manoeuvres
Shekhar Gupta
senior US State Department A official likens it to a slowgrowing love affair between cautious mid-lifers, with warm phases of growing affection interrupted by lowers' tiffs. That may be an overly optimistic description of Indo-US relations. But last fortnight, on the eve of the first formal high-level bilateral conference on regional security issues in New Delhi, there were ample indications that both South Block and the State Department were trying to ignore irritants and move forward with the relationship.
If an Indo-US naval exercise is held on the same day that Agni is test-fired, does it not indicate the quality of the relationship?" said a senior official of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). At the political level, even the prime minister has directed that disagreements over issues like the missile program mc, nuclear programme and intellectual property rights should not be allowed to impede the momentum of the Wa Tming up process. “The relationship is going through adjustment. We do not expect it to be an easy process.' says Foreign Secretary J. N. Dixit. But he claims India and the US have progressed from a stage when such differences led to political distances. Now we articulate our differences but still kecp the pɔsiEive momentuTan to the extent possible." he says.
Positive momentum, for the noment, is exemplified by the bilateral dialogue on the nuclear question, the most contentious issue of all. Today, both sides approach this question with unprecedented realism. Indian policy-makers talk in understanding terms about the US Administration's compulsions on the non-proliferation issue hich is high on the post-Gulf War agenda. At the same time, US officials are talking less and less of India having to sign the NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) and are indicating that they will be satisfied if India helps to create a
regime of nuclea Sulbicoltilent. Ti for a Tmutual Ind Illent to freeze gralmes at Cu Stephen P. Cc South Asia Sch University of Ill would be silly a to pressurise. In NPT. It may sig own five years la be possible to di freeze.""
The debate rigt on the American five-nation Sull Indian insistence approach, Indi: have seized the vided by the Cl rcccnt nuclea statement thr channels that in nit, China will an outside powe regional player senal could be ting table. India that this lakes ( at the talks irrelle simply does not same internation presence as the St. So India Would II CLISS confidence-b mutually with negotiating other nuclear freeze W.
Top policy-ma down other issues Sources underlin partment's muted ciSIIl of the tesi which was appa closely by satell about the test in : did not cancel or the nawal exerc; US official. The and Glawkosmo atgule, was di Tecte: the Russians wil fears, could be foreign exchange coming aggressive sile technologies. under Super 301,

restraint in the s is another na TT1 e -Pakistan agreeheir nuclear proPent lle Wels. A5 Len, prominent [ar basedl at the nois, says; . It di self-defcating Lia tio sign the the NPT o its er. Now it may velop a nuclear
W is centred support for the mit idea and the
on a bilateral an negotiators opportunity pro
linese with their i
explosion and ugh diplomatic any such sum| participatic as r and not as a Whose OWIn arIn the negotiahas told the US hina's presence at and Russia command the all or regional viet Union dilid. 11 Ch. Ta the T lisIilding measures Pakistan white steps towards a th. Washington.
Eers also play of discord. US the State Deone-line criti-firing of Agni ently observed es. We knewy dvance and Still EWen Te5 Chedlule e, observes a ball o ISRO US sources Timore towards Washington riven by their Tunch into bexiporters of misis for the action ndian officials
point out that sterner measures have been taken under thic same legislation against Canada, an ally of the US on political and trade 18Stles
The current phase of Indo-US relations also indicates that today the US too needs India in a rapidly changing world, where Washington worries about the fullture strategic stance of Japan and China and the unstable Islamic world. Analyst K. Subramanyam, a longtime critic of US policy On the subcontinent, believes that today India "does not have to crawl'' because it has a certain manoeuvrability'.
It is because of mutually shared strategic perceptions and needs that decision-makers in both countries have played down the recent irritants. Top officials in thic MEA, in fact, complain bitterly that it is ignorant press coverage that has helped create an impression of tension when there is none. They point out that the US has more tensions with all its allies-Japan, South Korea and the EC-than With India and yet security alliances and overa TT Telations Tema in OII an even kcel. For the Illoment. the principle guiding Indo-US diplomacy is to ignore the disagreements and move on regardless.
Spotlight. . .
(Cதார்: ரிசர நாழ 3) (PRESSURE-MINE AS METAPEHOR, LG 15/8). The social impact of the IMF-IBRD economic strategy does have such ashortterm impact. But how 'short is short-term? Each month, each Week, President PreInadasa has not only got on with the ordinary tasks of government but turned from this problem to the other, run from this place to the next to de-fuse these tensions, aggravated by opposition activity, the Teaction of an opposition that is deeply disoriented and divided, and thus, instinctively and desperately driven from one target of opportunity to another, with the help of a media, that is it - self, target and opportunity.
Kandalama has been de-fused. What of the pressure-mine on Hultsdorp Hill'?
23

Page 26
Gorrespondence
Two contributions in the Lanka Guardian of August 1, 1992 spondטprompts Ille to r
Radhikal Colomaraswa Iny’s a Iticle. On Muttu CoöIThara SWany - from Law to Anthropology would have been all the better if Professor Nadaraja had shown her Ananda Coomaraswamy's letter in May 1946 to Durai Singam Who Wallted to be his biographer.
I quote:
"I must explain that I am по аt all interested in biographical matter relating to myself and that I consider the modern practise of publishing details about the liwcs and personalities of Well known men is nothing but a vulgar catering to illegitimate curiosity, So I could not think of spending my time, which is very much occupied with more important tasks, in hunting up such matter, most of which II have long forgotten; and shall be grateful if you will publish nothing but the barest facts about myself. What you should deal with is the nature and tendency of my work, and your book should be 95 percent om this. I wish to remain in the background, and shall not be grateful or flattered by any details about myself or my life, all that is a nicca, and, the twisdom of India' should hawe tallight yell, "Tip CNTtraiture of human beings is asvargya'. All this is not a matter of ti modesty" but one of principle".
Als For Rawi Pasad Herat, his Eye witness in Rio would have been more accurate if he investigated sources closer to home. For example he complains that
24
'Tissahamy was Perhaps Tissah kW, While Te Rio he was mot inwil or perhaps he have a passport. check this out. bala is closer .
T H. is that Tissala Weddill but EK In arried to a W.
WEET I Illaltion' Call he I5. Li TTT tute : former Wildlife the Dailbail E. W. We5 2 TDC) the Wed is: Weddh,3. oT responsibility of and journalism?
This Idle Til t ting information iF TELLE is the us hope that bo Ravi Strutiniste little close in order that obje and not gossip, орiпion.
MI
Trustee, Cult
Martial Ta
I read with
and increasing
SWELTTI’S CLI Iridul:
SCILL TIL tes. Tile Teluge II his scolytes in the be grateful to th widing a platform rewriting of histo
SCHE TLrldCIIm Sivia ITi'5theSi5. believe that the tuguese hald thic ti sociological an ill militarism (a la gically dccide to the 'military' ca: applies to the Brits, Silviral's is of a LTuly fanta: people imbibing t With their lither: the wast Ilass of T failers, fisher. The WELS their Sle full

not there” (Sic). ally does not is and my be cd (like Prasad) dloe's Ilût eyen Herat Should After äl.11 TDällilll Rio.
Tath" statellcnt пny is “поt a Indyan Sinha lese :ddha girl” (sic).
get this inforquote his source? popular press Wia officials or from edd has theimselld has decide Who
is that to the Il Cidlertil Tesea Tch
rend of upda1 is walid only Criteriol. Let th. Radhika and their Sources Fl the Full Te in :ctivity surfaces prejudice and
hik Sandraisiagari:ı
LITE I SLI F'Willy El TTLIGE
Trini IS
WTW a Till ISCI11 ent, bewilder Irient. assemblage of il *Imilitary" casthe Walni, and diasport, should e L. G. for profor this skeyed
Y.
reflectie)In S 011 Does he seriously LIccaneering, PCTElle to indulge in lysis of Tamil CIA) and strateerase/Wella lise stes? This also ILLI tii | Le Overall picture Stic War Godden Jlijod thiTštine35 3. Tiki Weren't amils peaceable 1, craftille O ction to service
these magnificent bravos? And whom did these 'military' castes fight during the eras of peace when Tamil civilization, in its truest sense flourished
Another fact for Siwaram. One of his Illilitary' castics the Marava has made a contribution to the Sinhala language. To this day a * Tharavaraya' is synonymous with "thug.” This is, probably, all that these Waiors' were
R. B. DiLil Wea
Dehiwela
D. P. Sivara III States:
I sluggest that MT. Di LIWeWä go on reading before he finally decides whether it is skewed history or not. He should also study Prof. K. Kailasapathy's Tamil Heroic Poetry, which describes an earlier phase of the cu Lu Te that 1 have tried to analyse. Het might find the overall picture there even more grueSITT
I LI Tilderstand Mr. Diu lwewa's concerns given the current
situation of the country, and hence his wish to think that the Wast Ilass of Tamils were
peaceable fallers. His wish and Concern hawe had precedents in the British era. As for the Sociological analysis of the buccaneering Portugese, it was based on Prof. Tikiri Abeyasinghe's Jaffnal under the Portugese'. (discussed there in detail) I de With the MLTV ir i ELS much as they were a political fagt i Llle rise af Tami nationalism. A write up in the Sunday Times of 23.8.92 by its Madras correspondent refers to the political influence of one Mr. Nata Tajan who he says belongs to the powerful Thevar (the Caste title of the Maravar) CoIT munity in Southern Tamil
Iliad Ll'". MT. Di Lil Wey wi|| find if he takes a closer look at the
politics of Tamilnadu, still an iI in Portant political fact.

Page 27
Why theres sou in this rustic to
There is laughter and light banter amongst these rural damsels who are busy sorting out tobacco leaf in a barn. It is one of the hundreds of such
barns spread out in the mid and upcountry
inter mediate zone where the arable land remains fallo, during the Off season,
Here, with careful nurturing, tobacco grows as a lucrative cash crop and the green leaves turn to gold... to the value of over Rs. 250 Inillion or ridre annually, for perhaps 143,000 rural folk.
 

ENRICHING RURAL LIFESTYLE
und oflaughter bacco barn....
Tobacco is the industry that brings employment to the second highest number of people. And these people are the tobacco barn owners, the tobacco
Towers and those who work for thern, on the land ridin the hars.
For them, the tobacco leaf means meaningful work, a Cornfortable life and a secLure future. A good
rough reason for laughter.
CeylonTobacco Co. Ltd.
Sharing and caring for our land and her people.

Page 28
PEOPL
Celebrating
Dутат
In 1961 Peoples Bank ventured out with a staff of only 46...and a few
།
Today, just 30 years later
People Resource e. Customer Listings Branch Network in in Sri Lanka
In just three decades People's Ban respected leader in the Sri Lankan growth is a reflection of the massi dedicated to the service of the co earned them the title “Banker to t
PE 0 PLE’S BA MWMY
Banker to the Millions

tES BANK (
Three Decades s
of
fic Growth
in the challenging world of Banking hundred customers.
cceeds Io, ooo at a staggering 5.5 Million
k has grown to become a highly/ Banking scene. Their spectacular ye resources at their co mańd / mmon man - a dedication that has he Millions' |