

LANKA

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Black Knight
It's your move

FLASH

Presidential Election Petition Dismissed

SPOTLIGHT ON HULFTSDORP HILL...

NEWS
BACKGROUND

Mervyn de Silva

The post-Kanatte tensions soon subsided. The focus is now on Hulftsdorp, the Supreme Court, the Presidential petition before five judges, including the Chief Justice Mr. G. P. S. de Silva. The CJ and another member of the bench leave for Lagos via Zurich on 3-4 Sept. to attend an international conference of Supreme Court judges. Hence the air of expectancy, the rising tension in these last few days of August as this issue of the LG goes to press.

5-0, a unanimous decision, 3-2 (ah, but which way?)... the guessing game is quite easily the most exciting game in

town, even the close encounters of the visiting Australian XI forced to take second place. Mr. H. L. de Silva's line of argument as candidate Sirima Bandaranaike's counsel was such that President Premadasa can contest a fresh election. Mr. de Silva didn't attempt to prove that the UNP was responsible for the widespread violence which marked the polls campaign. The violence was directly responsible for the exceptionally low poll which meant that there was no "free and fair" election. Although Mr. Choksy, the UNP candidate's counsel, produced a mountainous pile of statistics to show that the UNP "suffered" more, Mr. de Silva said that far from rebutting his argument, that point only confirmed his own basic contention that there was 'no free and fair poll' so a fresh contest should be held.

An ISLAND news item (Aug. 28) on the frontpage had this headline: "MRS. B. CHALLENGES PRESIDENT TO RESIGN AND CONTEST HER". Many a reader may have concluded, correctly or not, that she was prepared for an adverse order on her petition. If her calculation proves to be correct, the SLFP-led opposition would have to wait till 1994. Two years or more. And there lies the political significance of this issue. The SLFP won national elections in 1956, 1960, and 1970. It relinquished office in 1977. It has been in opposition since then. It has had to suffer the loneliness of the long-distance runner. And more.

Its traditional allies, the Marxist Left, has shared the spoils of office. The SLFP-led United Front which took office in 1970, and extended its five-year term to seven years through a constitutional amendment, included four Marxist ministers — 3 from

the LSSP (the party's top trio, NM, Colvin, Leslie) and CP chief, Pieter Keuneman.

Though advertised as "socialism", the UF introduced 'State capitalism' via sweeping nationalisation — estates, banks, transport, a sprawling network of State Corporations. The tangible and immediate benefit of such a strategy was the regime's increased capacity to respond to the pressure from below. This was far more useful in practical, political-electoral terms than the grand slogan of controlling the "commanding heights" of the economy. Crudely put, "jobs for the boys", the boys who sported blue or red shirts, of course. The pressure from their respective constituencies was thus partly contain-

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TREND

More for travel

Fifty to 100 per cent increases in travellers' foreign currency allowances have been announced by the government. The Central Bank explained that this was in consideration of the rising cost of living abroad. The increases benefit those going abroad for business, education or on holiday. Those visiting countries other than in the Indian sub-continent will now be able to take out 7,500 US dollars per person per year (children half this), a 50 per cent increase. Those visiting the sub-continent will be entitled to 800 US dollars (adults), a 100 per cent increase.

For business travellers the per diem allowance too has been upped by half.

ed. Not enough. The first JVP revolt (1971), a generational rather than an ideological challenge, despite its romantic radicalism or "Guevarism", was a warning to the SLFP and its Left partners. However, the national economy, did not grow fast enough to meet these challenges. The "revolutionaries" in Mrs. B.'s cabinet had no answer to the typically Third Worldist revolution of rising expectations. Youth unrest spreading fast among both the new Sinhala and Tamil generation was a heaven-sent target of opportunity for the UNP. And its leader by then was the Sri Lankan Political Establishment's master opportunist, Mr. J. R. Jayawardene. He took personal charge of re-organising the UNP Youth Leagues and the trade unions.

By and large, discontented Sinhala youth turned not to the JVP, its old leadership in jail or dead, nor to the U.F. but to a more self-consciously capitalist, rightist U.N.P., J.R.J.'s socialist platform palaver notwithstanding.

Meanwhile the alienation of the Tamil youth was now almost total, a development which the Sinhala political elite, pro-UNP or pro-SLFP, hardly recognised. Over-represented in the public service... the bureaucracy had been since British times the main growth industry of the industrious Tamils... the new generation found itself on a downward spiral. Apart from the pressure on the main Sinhala parties to respond first to Sinhala demand, the Sinhala Only policy in education and public service recruitment, fuelled Tamil youth frustration and anger. The Tamil youth saw it as an expression of racial superiority, assuming various forms of discrimination. Enter the 'Tiger' and the school drop-out Velupillai Prabhakaran, quick to exploit the obvious failure of the Tamil parliamentary parties to "protect" or "serve" Tamil constituency interests. That the Federal party was smart enough to see the writing on the wall was most clearly evident in the party's desperate gesture of a name-

change... from Federal Party to Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). But the Liberation Front of Tamil "Eelam", (LTTE), gun in hand, had made the TULF's gesture too little much too late.

By the late '80's the JVP's Rohana Wijeweera had decided to re-emerge as the Sinhala Liberation Front-cum-army. Its chance came—or so it thought—with the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord and the IPKF.

The (Sinhala) Sri Lankan State and its armed forces could not crush a highly motivated, well-equipped separatist guerrilla group on its own northern terrain, with the crucial advantage of an accommodating rear-base-cum-sanctuary, Tamilnadu across the narrow Palk straits. The same Sinhala army could however decimate an over-confident JVP when it tried to exploit the vast propaganda potential of the IPKF's presence, and the accumulated grievances of the Sinhala poor, the lower-middle class, and the *deshapremi* (patriots) alienated from a UNP President who was blamed for "surrendering Sri Lankan sovereignty" to big neighbour, and the separatist Tamils.

The JVP's tragic miscalculation was founded mainly on its failure to appreciate the importance of (a) the fact that a presidential poll had been held, and as the figures showed, a keenly contested election (b) the winner, President Premadasa was as strongly opposed to 'Accord' and 'IPKF' as the JVP and (c) that the army had grown into quite a well-equipped modern force, already battle-tested and (d) that the head of State was no JR but a populist president closer in outlook to the JVP than even the opposition leader, Mrs. B.

This is the fourth year of the Premadasa Presidency. This is the 15th year of UNP rule, and the SLFP in opposition. The LSSP, the main Left party, has been in the cold even longer) Meanwhile the Cold War is over. All the radical-socialist and revolutionary slogans of the pre- and post-independence past are *passé*.

The SLFP which has held office in 1956, 1960 and 1970, has been out in the cold for one-and-half decades! By far the largest opposition party, the pressure from the support-base is severe. Only the prospect of power prevents further erosion of the traditional support. After her recent illness, Mrs. Bandaranaike realises that the conflicts within the party (the direct challenge from the Anura faction) will certainly widen the present fissures unless some issue or event compels the SLFP to forget internal problems and concentrate on the immediate. An early election is the most obvious answer to the mounting factionalism. Thus, SLFP eyes turn hopefully towards Hulftsdorp Hill.

A two-year wait is much too long for an SLFP burdened with all these problems, particularly Mrs. Bandaranaike's health and the Anura-Chandrika "civil war".

Personality is the main issue but in this Bandaranaike-built and dominated party, it is also political orientation. Mrs. B. is keen on a grand coalition, the Left and some of the anti-LTTE minority Tamil parties. The latter are pro-Delhi, largely because they are anti-LTTE and anti-Premadasa.

A broad alliance of these parties and the social forces they represent will make the SLFP more attractive to the minorities, India and the western group. In such a shift, Chandrika, not Anura, will be the key figure.

SLFP DIVISION

Yet such an alignment will immediately run into trouble with the SLFP's staunch Sinhala-Buddhist constituency, now represented by the Hela Urumaya of Messrs Tilak Karunaratne, S. L. Gunasekera etc. History and ideological inheritance haunt the SLFP. Realising that UNP leadership was reserved for the Senanayakes (father and son), the party's No. 2, S. W. R. D. decided he must strike out on his own. Time and circumstance were such, he could create a policy cocktail, of Sinhala-Buddhism, mixed-economy 'socialism' which appealed to the anti-UNP Left,

non-alignment, as opposed to the pro-West UNP's foreign policy, and of course democratic parliamentarism. It was a late-developing, post-rather than pre-independence anti-colonial phenomenon. The 'national question' (Tamil) was admitted to the agenda much later. So S. W. R. D. was able to make the best of both worlds. Today, the 'National question' is item No. 1. The SWRD formula cannot be repeated or re-written.

Mrs. B. has taken the broad front option, though she rema-

ins suspicious of the DUNF, except for short-term tactical moves. And for obvious reasons. DUNF's problem is not the UNP but its present leader, Mr. Premadasa. DUNF bides its time. Meanwhile it presents itself to the UNP electorate as the legitimate UNP. In this, it neglects the fact that Premadasa, by a most interesting ironic quirk, is seeking through his populism, to S. W. R. D.-ise the UNP.

The DUNF is doing its utmost to undermine, or better still, topple the President, and return

to the UNP fold as the legitimate leadership. But it is marked by an impatience; no, not impatience, desperation — but a different desecration from the SLFP's, which is rooted in fifteen long years in opposition. From Kandalama to Kanatte, we note how the frustration and the deepening despair finds expression. And that is possible because the terrain of politics as I argued last time, is so full of pressure-mines.

(Continued on page 23)

Political Roundup

No confidence motion defeated

A joint opposition motion against the Government was defeated in parliament 129 to 65. Four SLMC MPs, one TULF MP and an independent group member voted with the Government. The motion read: "Whereas this government has caused over one thousand citizens who were supporters of political parties opposed to the government to be murdered by killer squads and supplied arms, ammunition, cement, military and other equipment and funds to the terrorist organisation known as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam which had murdered thousands of civilian men, women and children of all communities who are opposed to their way of

thinking and has condoned the bribery of public officers, connived and condoned the commission of crimes such as murder, abduction and intimidation of political opponents of the government, robbery of poll cards, impersonation, armed attacks on polling booths, robbery and stuffing of ballot boxes and other election offences during the elections to subvert the democratic process, this House has no confidence in this government and calls upon it to resign forthwith".

Retaliation possible, says Ossie

Those who pelt stones must also be prepared to be at the receiving end of stones, said Ossie Abeygunasekera, opposition leader of the Western provincial Council at a public meeting marking the opening by President Premadasa of a garment factory

in Karadeniya. Mr Abeygunasekera was referring to the incidents at Colombo's General Cemetery (Kanatte) where government politicians were stoned during the funerals of military commanders who died in a landmine blast.

Appeals in defamation case

Both parties to the defamation case filed by former minister Lalith Athulathmudali against opposition MP C. V. Goonaratne are to appeal against a District Court judgment dismissing the action on the grounds that the allegedly defamatory statements were made on a "privileged occasion". The court also held that Mr Goonaratne was not entitled to costs as the statements were not true.

Press Freedom

Cabinet spokesman Ranil Wickremasinghe said that the Government condemned the attack on journalists and "will take every possible step to bring to book those responsible". He said that a suspect had been arrested and released on bail in connection with the attack on 'Aththa' cartoonist Jiffry Yunoos. Thugs stormed Yunoos' house one night and poked a pistol in his mouth; he was stabbed in the face at his gate on the following day.

Journalists demonstrate

Hundreds of journalists demonstrated at the busy Colombo Town Hall junction on August 19 pro-

testing harassment of journalists. The *Island's* associate editor Ajit Samaranayake told the gathering crowd that "the ruthless attacks on the press prompted the nation's journalists to take to the streets and confront those who manipulated thugs to harass the press".

The picketing campaign was organised jointly by the Free Media Movement, Sri Lanka Working Journalists Association, Sri Lanka Foreign Correspondents Association and the Union of Journalist of Sri Lanka.

Free expression

Speakers at a seminar in Colombo organised by the Council for Liberal Democracy called for legislative reforms to ensure greater freedom of expression in Sri

Lanka. The theme of the seminar was "Limitations on Freedom of Expression in Sri Lanka".

'Unimaginable' investment needed

Economist Lloyd Fernando, Secretary to the State Ministry of Policy Planning told a conference of administrators in Colombo that if Sri Lanka were to achieve a 9 per cent economic growth per annum "unimaginable" levels of investment would be required.

A nine per cent growth rate would be required, the Policy Planning Ministry official said, if Sri Lanka's per capita income were to be doubled to 935 US dollars and if unemployment were to be reduced to a socially acceptable level of five per cent by the year 2000.

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The press and pluralism

Ajith Samaranayake

The terms 'ethnic harmony' 'pluralism' etc; entered the contemporary scholarly discourse and even the popular dialogue, only after the horrendous anti-Tamil riots of July 1983. Before that the problem of Sinhala-Tamil relations and the movements of the Tamil people to win their rights was clothed in such coyly vague terms as the 'Tamil problem' or language problem and generally treated as the dirty little secret of Sri Lankan politics. Political parties of the south generally behaved as if no such problem existed or as if they alone if elected to power could solve it. The mass media too generally behaved as if the whole thing was some local trouble up north with which god-fearing men and women need have no truck. It was only if there was an outburst such as a communal riots or the satyagraha campaign of the Federal Party in the 1960's that the problem impinged even seminally into the national consciousness. In such a context it is difficult even to construct an ideological framework to deal with the subject.

It is true that the campaign for independence during the early years of this century was conducted by leaders of the Sinhala Tamil and Muslim communities who were also either Buddhist, Hindu, Islam or Christians. They were products of the anglicised urban class of professionals which was the apogee of British rule and the cream of the public school system erected by the British. Their goal was far from radical. They desired self-government or Dominion status within the

confines of the paternal embrace of the benign British rule. Though much has been made of the fact that this elite was multi-ethnic and multi-religious fissures were to set in no sooner than self-government appeared to be a distinct possibility. After the exist of the great disinterested elder statesmen such as the Ramanathan brothers, Sir James Peries and F. R. Senanayake lesser politicians took control. Soon the pan-Sinhala Cabinet had been instituted by D. S. Senanayake and G. G. Ponnambalam was raising his cry of balanced representation. It was evident that even at these early stages the outlook of the Sinhala leadership did not encompass any vision of a Sri Lankan state. Perhaps they may have thought sincerely as we are led to believe in the case of Mr. D. S. Senanayake that unity among the majority community would convince the British of their fitness to govern themselves and may have wanted to accommodate the Tamils thereafter but the result of this rising tide of Sinhala self-consciousness was that the Tamils felt excluded.

From the point of view of Mr. Ponnambalam it has been argued that his demand for balance representation better known as 'Fifty-Fifty' was not really Tamil communalist because he was thinking of all the minority communities, viz: Tamils, Muslims, Malays and Burghers, vis-a-vis the Sinhalese. It has also been argued that his outlook was national encompassing as it did all communities living in the whole of Ceylon and it was defeat or discrediting of this campaign which led to the demand for a Federal state which necessarily addressed itself to a particular region of the country later burgeoning into a demand for a separate Tamil homeland.

Anyway the early years of independence saw the first fissures among the anglicised political elite which inherited power from the British. The incorporation of Mr. Ponnambalam into the first Cabinet saw the shattering of his Tamil Congress and the birth of the more Tamil nationalist federal Party closer to the grassroots of peninsula politics. While the first generation of FP leaders such as the patriarchal M. Chelvanayakam continued to project a reasonable suave image a new generation of fiercely nationalist and militarist leaders who spoke the language of Dravidian radicalism was emerging best exemplified by the stormy petrel of 1956, A. Amirthalingam whose blood-soaked and bandaged head after the attack by Sinhala thugs on the FP satyagraha drew from Prime Minister Bandaranaike the taunt 'Honourable wounds of war'.

How successful was our media, particularly the dominant print media, in grasping these changes in inter-communal relations and their consequences? As I have already said the media like the political elite treated the problem as the 'dirty little secret' of politics and generally behaved as if the problem would go away or could be solve by reasonable men sitting round a table. Certainly it is difficult to contend that a reader of the Sinhala press would have received a reasonable assessment of Tamil grievances or demands from reading the Sinhala newspapers or that the Tamil reader would have been any more enlightened about the Sinhala point of view from reading the Tamil press alone. As for the English press it was little better. The English newspapers which were edited by the same anglicised elite as the political ruling class were immersed in the same petty little problems of parochial politics in a remote Indian Ocean island which few in the outside world knew and even if they knew thought only as 'Lipton' tea garden. The English newspaper to be sure were liberal but it a wishy-washy liberalism often bordering on Conservatism.

(Continued on page 9)

Text of a lecture titled 'The role of the media in ethnic integration' delivered under the auspices of the Colombo Univ. project to foster communal harmony.

Sivarasan's dry run

18. In February 1991, Sriharan & Murugan (A11), a hardcore LTTE cadre reached Vedaranyam from Jaffna by clandestine means and stayed with Shanmugham & Jayaraj (A35) (since dead). After few days Muragan (A11) came to Madras and stayed in the house of Robert Payas (A17) for some time.

19. In February, 91, Murugan (A11) went to Bhagyanathan's (A28) house at No. 22, Muthiah Mudali Garden Street, Royapettah, Madras - 14, through Muthuraja an Indian member of the LTTE and stayed there along with Bhagyanathan (A28) and his mother Padma (A29) Perarivalan & Arivu (A26) also joined with them and stayed in that house. Nalini (A9) the elder daughter of Padma (A29) had however, earlier left her mother's house some time in May 1990, and after staying for sometime in the house of Muthuraja, took a house on rent at High Court Colony, Villivakkam. Muthurajaa was a close associate of Baby Subramaniam one of the important functionaries of LTTE, and was a family friend of Nalini (A9), Bhagyanathan (A28) and Padma (A29). Nalini (29) was then working as Personal Assistant to The Managing Director of M/s. Anabond Silicones (P) Ltd. Adyar, Madras. Dhanu (A5) and Subha (A6) in May 1991 came to stay with Nalini (A9) during week ends as arranged by Murugan (A11) and Sivarasan (A4).

20. As expected holding of elections in May 1991 was officially declared in March 1991. The prospect of Congress (I) emerging as the ruling party with Shri Rajiv Gandhi at the helm became bright and was being repeatedly discussed in the Indian media which was being avidly followed by the LTTE. In March, 1991 about 10 days apart two emissaries of LTTE had separate secret meetings with Shri Rajiv Gandhi in New Delhi to father his mind to ascertain whether there was any change in his attitude towards LTTE and also to create a smoke screen to cover their evil designs.

21. In April 1991 Sivarasan(A4)visited Vijayan (A20) at Tuticorin and asked him to go over to Madras and take a house and financed him for this purpose. Accordingly Vijayan (A20) came to Madras and took a house at No. 12, Eveready

Colony at Kodungayur, through the help of his relation. After that he went back to Tuticorin and brought his wife Selvaluxmi (A22), and his father-in-law Baskaran (A22) and settled in Madras City to assist Sivarasan (A4) in furtherance of the criminal conspiracy.

22. Upto 15. 4. 91 Sivarasan (A4) was actively moving about in Madras City, meeting Haribabu (A7), Nalini (A9), Murugan (A11), Ravichandran & Ravi & Prakasam (A24), Arivu (A26), Bhagyanathan (A28), and Padma (A29) and thereafter left once again for Jaffna for further consultation with the LTTE leadership. In the meanwhile Murugan (A11) was at his request introduced to a photographer by name Haribabu (A7) (since dead) by Bhagyanathan (A28) who he employed and utilised his services for taking photographs / Video of vital and important installations like Central Jail, Vellore, St. George Fort, Light House area in Marina Beach, DGP's Office etc. He also used Perarivalan & Arivu (A26) to join Vivekananda Nilayam and Sabari College under the cover of acquiring proficiency in English language. He also got a press accreditation card for himself fabricated through Haribabu (A7). Haribabu (A7) had been trained in photography by Subha Sundaram (A30) Proprietor of Subha News Photo Services, Royapettah. Subha Sundaram (A30) is an ardent LTTE supporter and had visited Jaffna during early, 1990. It was he who had also trained Bhagyanathan (A28), Arivu (A26) and Muthuraja. On 18. 4. 92, Haribabu (A9), Murugan (A7), Nalini (A11), Arivu (A26) and Subha Sundaram (A30) attended the public meeting held at Marina Beach, presided over by Shri Rajiv Gandhi and Ms. Jayalalitha.

23. In the last week of April 1991, Kanagasabapathy & Radha ayya (A15) and Chandraleka & Athirai & Sonia & Gowri & (A16), LTTE Tigress, came over to Kodiakkarai through clandestine means as per the direction of Pottu Omman (A2), LTTE Intelligence Chief and reached Madras and stayed in the house of a relative of Kanagasabapathy (A15), at No. 2, I. O. B. Colony, Selapur, Madras, 13. They were also to take instructions from Sivarasan (A4).

24. On 28. 4. 91, the following LTTE conspirators assembled in Jaffna and Pottu Omman (A2) briefed them and directed them to act according to Sivarasan's (A4) orders:-

1. Sivarasan (A4),
2. Dhanu & Anbu (A5),
3. Subha & Nithya (A6),
4. Nehru & Gokul (A8),
5. Suthendraraja & Santhan (A10),
6. Shanker & Koneswaran (A12),
7. Vijayanandan & Hariayya (A13),
8. Ruban & Suresh (A14), and
9. Driver Anna & Keerthi (A40).

They were directed to go to Kodiakkarai. However, due to development of certain snag in the boat they returned to Maddakkal in Jaffna and finally on 30. 4. 91, they were once again seen off by Pottu Omman (A2) and Akila (A3). This group was received at Kodiakkarai by the workers of Shanmugam (A35) and other LTTE cadres in the early morning of 1. 5. 91.

25. On arrival there Shanker & Koneswaran (A12) was taken by a LTTE cadre to stay with a LTTE sympathiser of Thopputherai and to reach Madras subsequently, Santhan (A10), Vijayanandan (A13), Ruban & Suresh (A14) and Driver Anna & Keerthi (A40) were asked to go over to Madras separately with the assistance of a LTTE cadre. Sivarasan (A4), Dhanu (A5), Subba (A6) and Nehru (A8) reached Madras on 2. 5. 91. Sivarasan (A4) took them to Vijayan's (A20) house and settled them there. A wireless equipment was also clandestinely installed there and operated by Nehru (A8). Sivarasan (A4) himself stayed with Jayakumar (A18) and Santhi (A19) where Santhan (A12) joined later. Ruban & Suresh (A14) and Driver Anna & Keerthi (A40) also reached Madras and stayed in the house of Robert Payas (A17). Vijayanandan (A13) also reached Madras. After staying for a day in a lodge in Madras, by providing false name, address and purposes, he was shifted to a house at Indira Nagar, Madras, by Arivu (A26) at the instance of Sivarasan (A14). A LTTE sympathiser was engaged in printing the book titled "The Satanic Force". "The Satanic Force" is a two volume compilation of several paper cuttings, with their comments revealing in unmistakable terms the hatred of the LTTE towards Indian leadership and highlighting the alleged atrocities of the Indian Peace Keeping Force during their operations in Jaffna.

26. Sivarasan (A4) went to the house at Selayur, Tambaram, in the first week of May, 1991 where Kanagasabapathy (A15) and Athirai (A16) were staying and met them and arranged for shifting Athirai (A16) for staying with some sympathiser at Royapettah through Shanmugha Vadivelu & Thambi Anna (A23). Sivarasan (A4) arranged for the trip of Kanagasabapathy (A15) to Delhi through a syndathiser for fixing a hideout at Delhi and there-after take Athirai (A16) there.

27. On 7/8. 5. 91, Sivarasan (A4) attended the public meeting addressed by Shri V. P. Singh, former Prime Minister at Nandanam, Madras and managed to take a seat in the press enclosure, very close to the dais. Sivarasan (A4), Dhanu (A5), Subha (A6), Haribabu (A7), Nalini (A9), Arivu (A26) and Murugan (A11) attended the meeting and Dhanu (A5) attempted to garland the VIP (Shri V. P. Singh while on the dais, which was to be photographed by Haribabu (A7) and Nalini (A9). This was a dryrun Operation. Since they could not gain access to the dais they waited near the first step of the stage till the conclusion of the meeting and managed to hand over the garland to Shri V. P. Singh while he was getting down from the dais. Haribabu (A6) and Nalini (A9) could not cover this incident. For this Sivarasan (A4) pulled them up to be more attentive in future.

28. Having succeeded in this "Dry run" Dhanu (A5) and Subha (A6) wrote two letters in Tamil, one addressed to Akila (A3), Deputy Chief of Women's Intelligence Wing of LTTE and another to Pottu Omman (A2), wherein they affirmed that they would remain steadfast till the task was accomplished and are waiting for an opportune occasion, which would take place within that month. In the letter to Pottu Omman (A2) reference also has been made to the opportunity of having gone very close to 'Singh' and looking forward for such an opportune occasion. Both the letters bear the date 9. 5. 91.

29. Bhagyanathan (28) also wrote a letter dt. 10. 5. 91 to Baby Anna (Baby Subramanian) wherein he had mentioned about the shifting of the Printing Press to Gangai Amman Koil Street and the management of the same by him. He has also affirmed therein his loyalty to the cause of Tamil Eelam, even at the cost of his life. The said press was frequented by Sivarasan (A4), Murugan (A11), Arivu (A26) and other accused and served as their meeting place.

Peace Accords and Divided Societies

John M. Richardson Jr. and Jianxin Wang

INTRODUCTION

The peace accords I described did not lead to durable settlements. In this respect they failed. On the other hand, they were pioneering attempts at settling one of the most intractable forms of political conflict. In every case a framework for conflict resolution, agreed upon by some, was created. In several cases, the accords temporarily ended violent conflict and provided a breathing space within which further discussions could go forward. Thus, the peace accords can usefully be viewed as experiments, from which there are lessons to be learned. Identifying those lessons is a major purpose of my effort.

Table 1 summarizes the outcomes of the accords. The Addis Ababa agreement was most successful, contributing to nearly ten years of peace between Northern and Southern Sudanese, but now ethnic conflict rages again. About three years of stability followed the independence of Cyprus, mandated by the London-Zurich accord. In Sri Lanka, violence subsided in the North for about six weeks after the Indo-Lanka Accord was signed, but the accord catalyzed a new conflict in the South. The Punjab Agreement and Canada's Meech Lake Accord produced documents, but few tangible results. One could add to this list the several agreements that have attempted to resolve Northern

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Prof: Richardson's recent B. C. I. S lecture was based on this paper.

Table 1. Outcomes of Peace Accords

<i>Accord</i>	<i>Outcome</i>
CYPRUS: London-Zurich Agreements (1959)	Greek dominated government proposed constitutional changes in 1963 to modify agreement. Turks withdrew from government. Subsequent unrest resulted in a pro-Greek military coup and occupation of the North by Turkish forces. Turkish Cypriots declared independence in 1983. Subsequent negotiations under U. N. auspices have failed to produce agreement.
SUDAN: Addis Ababa Agreement (Feb. 1972)	Agreement implemented as the Southern Provinces Regional Self Government Act. Act unilaterally abrogated by President Nimeri in 1982. Government attempted to implement Sharia nationwide in 1984. Conflict between SPLM/SPLA and Sudan Government forces continues.
INDIA: Punjab Accord (July 1985)	Provisions of the accord have not been implemented. Accord is now 'forgotten' by both sides. Sikh signatory, Sand Longwal assassinated by militants. Conflict between Sikh militant groups and Indian Government forces continues.
CANADA: Lake Meech Accord (June 1987)	Accord initially accepted by provincial premiers, but subsequently failed ratification as a constitutional amendment in two provinces. Status of Quebec unresolved Accord also raised consciousness about status of aboriginal 'nations.' Aboriginal status issues also unresolved.
SRI LANKA: Indo Lanka Accord (July, 1987)	LTTE failed to honour accord. Indian Peace Keeping Force failed to subdue LTTE. Northeastern Provincial Government officials fled after declaring independence. Conflict between LTTE and Sri Lanka Government forces continues.

Ireland's ethnic conflict, plus other negotiations and accords, signed and unsigned, that have failed to produce lasting peace. Shortcomings in peace accords point to the two questions addressed in this paper, which reviews both "scholarly" and "practical" studies of conflict resolution: (1) Why did the peace accords fail to achieve their objectives? (2) How can those concerned with resolving ethnic conflicts do better?

Apparently, ethnic conflict has not yet captured the interest of most conflict resolution scholars. A computer search of the major book collection in the Washington D. C. area devoted to "conflict resolution"⁷ produced 392 titles of which 121 were devoted to "international conflict resolution," but only 3 to "ethnic conflict resolution." A search of the

⁷ The collection is found in George Mason University's Fenwick Library.

DWIL periodical index⁸ produced 447 titles on "conflict" resolution," 91 on "international conflict resolution" and 7 on "ethnic conflict" resolution.⁹ No doubt the reawakening of ethnic strife in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union will evoke new interest in this area and in the practical problem of framing durable peace accords to resolve ethnic conflicts.¹⁰

CONFLICT RESOLUTION STUDIES

The literature most relevant to resolving ethnic conflicts can be usefully grouped into three broad categories, (a) surveys of conflict resolution theory, practice and experience; (b) case studies of ethnic conflict resolution and (c) practical guides for negotiators, mediators and facilitators. This section briefly reviews representative works in each category.

Most scholars of conflict resolution assume there is commonality between conflicts occurring at the individual, family, group, organizational, national and international levels. Theories of con-

flict resolution propose that lessons learned from resolving conflicts at one level will be broadly applicable to others. The massive "St. Martins' series" on conflict resolution recently completed under John Burton's leadership (Burton, 1990a, 1990b; Burton and Dukes 1990a, 1990b) exemplifies this point of view. Burton and Dukes argue that the struggle to satisfy inherent human needs is common to all conflicts, although conflicts may take many different forms. Different forms of conflict may require different conflict resolution strategies, for example negotiation, alternative dispute resolution, mediation or second track diplomacy.

Other works in this genre include Sandole and Sandole-Saroste (eds., 1987), Azar and Burton (1987), Shellenberg, (1989), Berkovitch (1984) and Kressel and Pruitt (1989). The works of Shellenberg, Berkovitch and Kressel and Pruitt, however, illustrate a more specialized focus. Shellenberg argues that theories of conflict resolution must be based on a broad understanding of theories that address the causes and dynamics of conflict. Berkovitch focuses on the role of third parties in resolving inter-personal, labor management and international conflicts. Kressel and Pruitt report results from applying a single conflict resolution strategy—mediation—across a broad range of conflict levels from individual to international.

Studies by Deutsch (1973), Likert and Likert (1976) and Pruitt and Rubin (1986), illustrate work that draws primarily on social psychological theories and related empirical research dealing with individual, group and organizational behavior. Deutsch, writing in the tradition of George Simmel (1955) and Louis Coser (1956), views conflict positively and argues that the challenge of conflict resolution is to transform destructive conflicts into constructive ones. His work presages the emphasis on "win-win" solutions associated with contemporary "problem-solving" approaches to conflict resolution. The Likerts draw upon "research-based principles and

theories of organization and management" to identify more effective systems of organization for constructively managing conflict. Such systems, they argue, are essential for striking a balance between individual freedom and social order in complex industrial societies. Pruitt and Rabin examine causes and consequences of alternative strategies for coping with conflict. Under what conditions, they ask, will individuals engage in the cognitively demanding task of attempting to maximize not only their own outcomes, but those of the other side?

The press...

(Continued from page 5)

To them London was still the hub of the universe and if they saw beyond London only saw Washington where John Foster Dulles was busy frightening all god-fearing men with the bogey of reds under the bed. Their outlook on the world was that of an insular island people long ruled over by a mighty imperial power. Having gone to schools where Sinhalese and Tamil had studied together these editors and English language journalists either could not grasp the complexities of the problem or pretended that no such existed. For the fact is that by this time the issue had taken on a complex feature. While the Tamils were unhappy about the inroads made by post-independence Governments into their position in employment particularly in the privileged public sector Sinhala consciousness long suppressed by colonial rule and the rule of the UNP mimic-men was on the ascendant in the form of a demand that Sinhala be made the state language. It was only the left parties with their internationalist outlook who eschewed the extremes of communal politics and stood for the building of a Ceylonese nation but the very newspapers which failed to give a true picture of the problem were busy branding them as 'traitors' to Sinhala and Buddhism precisely for this secular outlook towards national politics.

⁸ DWIL provides simultaneous computerized searches of the following indices: *Humanities Index*, from February 1984; *Social Sciences Index*, from February 1984; *Social Sciences Index*, from February 1983; *General Science Index*, from May 1984; *Business Periodicals Index*, from July 1982; *Reader's Guide*, from January 1983; *Index to Legal Periodicals* from August, 1981.

⁹ Donald Horowitz (see esp. 1985) represents the most notable exception to this generalization. Also, the International Centre for Ethnic Studies, under whose auspices this book is written, has conducted a research program focused on ethnic conflict for more than a decade. The keyword search described above certainly did not identify all relevant works dealing with the resolution of ethnic conflict. However we believe it does accurately portray the relatively modest level of attention given to ethnic conflicts by scholars who are more generally concerned with conflict resolution. Whether or not lessons drawn from resolving other types of conflict are relevant to resolving ethnic conflicts will be examined more fully later in this chapter.

¹⁰ In the United States, major leadership in initiating studies of ethnic conflict and conflict resolution is being provided by the grants program of the U. S. Institute of Peace (1990).

The Twin Narratives of Tamil Nationalism

D. P. Sivaram

At the turn of the Twentieth century Tamil Nationalism was articulated in terms of two different interpretations of Tamilian identity, propagated by two distinct movements which were politically opposed to each other.

The one was the Dravidian school; the other was the Indian revolutionary movement. The former was closely associated with English missionaries and unequivocally supported British rule; the latter strongly opposed the Raj and preached violence as the chief means of national emancipation from foreign domination. The discourse that may be identified today as Tamil Nationalism is constituted at its basis by these two interpretations — or more appropriately 'founding' narratives — which contended with each other to offer authentic readings of the Tamilian past and present, of what 'really' constituted Tamilian identity. The Dravidian school gave political and academic form to linguistic ethno-nationalism; the revolutionary movement turned traditional Tamil militarism into a liberation ideology, which evolved into militarist ethno-nationalism. The militarist reading has also characterised Tamil ethno-nationalism in the twentieth century not merely because it was "constructed and deployed to advance the interests and claims of the collectivity, banded and mobilized as a pressure group" but also because, as this study intends to show, it appealed to, and arose out of the structures of experience produced and reproduced through folk culture and religion in rural Tamilnadu. (This is how, as we shall see later, MGR became Madurai Veeran, the warrior god of a numerous scheduled caste in Periyar district in Tamil nadu. Jeyalalitha contested from an electorate there in the last election). However, it is essential to understand the politics behind the claims and silences of the early Dravidian school of Tamil revivalism and 'historio-

graphy' for examining the rise of modern Tamil militarism.

Caldwell and his followers who wrote and spoke about Tamil culture and history endeavoured to show that Tamils were essentially a peaceful people who had achieved a high level of civilization independent of and prior to the arrival of the 'Aryans' in the Indian Subcontinent. This was the unique Dravidian civilization. The theory of Dravidian linguistic and hence cultural independence also contained in it the idea that the Tamils were originally a class of peaceful farmers. The politics of Caldwell's teleology compelled him introduce this idea into his writings. (It was seen earlier that it arose from the attitude he shared with the English rulers towards the Maravar.) The views of Bishop Caldwell were found to be extremely useful by the newly arisen Vellala elite which was contending for higher status in the Varna hierarchy of caste. Therefore the 'histories' which were written by the Dravidian school of Tamil studies at the turn of the century were underpinned by

a). The political and religious concerns of Caldwell and other missionaries like Henry Martyn Scudder and G.U. Pope.

b). The caste politics of Vellala upward mobility.

The interests of both were intertwined. Their express political interest was to show that Tamil culture in essence was pre-Aryan-Brahmin and non-martial. The first non-Brahmin Tamils to take up the Dravidian theory to examine the Tamil past belonged to the Vellala elite and were supported and encouraged by Protestant missionaries (and sometimes by English administrators). The writings of Professor Sunderampillai of the Trivandrum University on Tamil history and culture inspired many of his castemen who had been seething at being classified as Sudras by the Brahmins, and

worse, by the British caste census and courts of law as well.

Thus the historical works of the early Dravidian school were produced as "social charters directed toward the census, where the decennial designation of caste status became a major focus for contests over rank between 1870 and 1930." The first Dravidian history of the Tamils 'The Tamils Eighteen hundred years ago' was written by V. Kanakasabhaipillai, a Vellala from Jaffna who was a civil servant in Madras. Edgar Thurston thought it appropriate to quote the following excerpt from that work in the section dealing with the Vellala caste in his 'Castes and Tribes of South India'. "Among the pure Tamils, the class most honoured was the Arivar or Sages. Next in rank to the Arivar were Ulavar or farmers. The Arivar were ascetics, but of men living in society the farmers occupied the highest position. They formed the nobility, or the landed aristocracy, of the country. They were also called Vellalar, the lords of the flood or karalar, lords of the clouds. . . The Chera, Chola and Pandyan kings and most of the petty chiefs of Tamilakam, belonged to the tribe of Vellalas." (Thurston. 1906. vol. p. 367-8)

The efforts of the early Dravidian school of Tamil 'historiography' culminated in the work of Maraimalaiatikal — the founder of the Pure Tamil movement which became a powerful force in the anti-Hindi struggles from 1928 onwards. He published a book called 'Vellalar Nakareekam' — The Civilisation of the Vellalas — in 1923. The book was a lecture he had given at the Jaffna Townhall on January 1, 1922 on the 'Civilization of the Tamils'. A contribution of Rs. 200 was made in Jaffna towards the publication of the lecture as a book. The Jaffna Vellala of that time saw his interests as being bound with that of his castemen in South India who were attempting to

rid themselves of the Sudra status assigned to them in the Varna hierarchy of caste by Brahmins.

However, Maramalaiatikal had decided to publish it as a book in order to refute a claim in the caste journal of the Natukkottai Chetti community that the Chetties did not marry among the Vellalas because they (the vellalas) were Sudras. In the English preface to the work Maramalaiatikal says that his book "is written in scrupulously pure Tamil style, setting forth at the same time views of a revolutionary character in the sphere of social religious and historical ideas of the Tamil people. . . In the first place attention is directed to Vellalas, the civilized agricultural class of the Tamils, and to their origin, and organization. . . it is shown that at a time when all the people except those who lived all along the equatorial regions were leading the life of hunters or nomads, these Vellalas attained perfection in the art of agriculture. . . and by means of navigation occupied the whole of India. When the Aryan hordes came from the north west of Punjab and poured forth into the interior, it was the ten Vellala kings then ruling in the north that stopped their advance." Maramalaiatikal goes on to claim that the eighteen Tamil castes were created by the Vellalas for their service; that they (the Vellalas) were vegetarians of the highest moral codes; that Saivism and the Saiva Sidhantha

philosophy nurtured by the Vellalas for more than 3500 years were the pre-Aryan religious heritage of the Tamils; that the classification of Vellalas as Sudras was the result of an insidious Aryan-Brahmin conspiracy. Maramalaiatikal was also defending fellow Vellala Dravidian scholars and their claims against attacks and veiled criticisms of Brahmin Tamil academics. M. Srinivasa Aiyangar, a respected Brahmin Tamil scholar who had worked as an assistant to the superintendent of census for the Madras Presidency, Mr. Stuart, had made a devastating attack on the claims of the Dravidian school of Tamil historiography, which derived its authority from the 'scientific' philological works of Bishop Caldwell. He debunked the theory of the Caldwell-Vellala school that Tamil culture was constituted by the high moral virtues of an ancient race of peaceful cultivators, on the basis of what he had studied of the religion and culture of the Tamil countryside as an officer of the census and on the basis of 'pure' Tamil works that had been rediscovered towards the latter part of the 19th century. Srinivasa Aiyangar noted in his "Tamil Studies" "Within the last fifteen years a new school of Tamil scholars has come into being, consisting mainly of admirers and castemen of the late lamented professor and antiquary, Mr. Sunderampillai of Trivandrum." Aiyangar argued that contrary to the claims of the new school,

the Tamils were a fierce race of martial predators. He wrote "Again some of the Tamil districts abound with peculiar tomb stones called 'Virakkals' (hero stones). They were usually set up on graves of warriors that were slain in battle. . . The names of the deceased soldiers and their exploits are found inscribed on the stones which were decorated with garlands of peacock feathers or some kind of red flowers. Usually small canopies were put up over them. We give below a specimen of such an epitaph. A careful study of the Purapporul Venbamalai will doubtless convince the reader that the ancient Tamils were, like the Assyrians and the Babylonians, a ferocious race of hunters and soldiers armed with bows and lances making war for the mere pleasure of slaying, ravaging and pillaging. Like them the Tamils believed in evil spirits, astrology, omens and sorcery. They cared little for death. The following quotations from the above work will bear testimony to the characteristics of that virile race. 1) Garlanded with the entrails of the enemies they danced with lances held in their hands topside down. 2) They set fire to the fertile villages of their enemies; 3) and plundered their country and demolished their houses. 4) The devil's cook distributed the food boiled with the flesh of the slain, on the hearth of the crowned heads of fallen kings. With these compare some passages from the Assyrian stories of campaigns. 'I had some of them flayed in my presence and had the walls hung

with their skins. I arranged their heads like crown... All his villages I destroyed, desolated, burnt; I made the country desert.' And yet the early Dravidian are considered by Dr. Caldwell as the framers of the best moral codes, and by the new school of non-Aryan Tamil scholars... "Aiyangar even claims "We have said that the Vellalas were pure Dravidians and that they were a military and dominant tribe. If so one could naturally ask 'How could the ancestors of peaceful cultivators be a warlike race?' He argues that the crymology of the root Vel is connected to war and weapons, that it was not uncommon for cultivating castes to have been martial tribes in former days as in the case of the Nayar, the Pilli, the Bants etc; He also cites an official census of the Tamil population in the Madras Presidency, which shows that Tamil castes with a claim to traditional martial status constituted twenty six percent of the total number of Tamils in the Presidency. (Srinivasa Aiyangar; 1915. pp. 40-58).

Aiyangar's attack on the Dravidian theory of Caldwell and the Vellala propagandists had political undertones. Learned Brahmins of the day were acutely aware of the political interests that lay behind the claims of the early Dravidian school. Vellala Tamil revivalism and its idea of Dravidian uniqueness were closely related to the pro-British and collaborationist political organization that was formed in 1916 by the non-Brahmin elites of the Madras presidency — The South Indian Liberal Federation. Its proponents were, therefore careful not to emphasise the narratives of the martial reputation of the Tamils that were embodied in the ancient 'High' Tamil texts or in the folk culture of rural

Tamilnadu. (Tamil revivalism had been promoted by protestant missionaries and British officials in the latter half of the 19th century only inasmuch as it was seen to facilitate the social, economic and religious aims of demilitarizing Tamil society and diminishing the influence of Brahmins in it.) This was done not only out of a desire to promote Vellala caste culture, as Tamil national culture, but also in conscious deference to the concerns of the Raj about the 'seditious' views of Tamil cultural revival that were being propagated by the 'terrorists' and their sympathisers which were aimed at stirring the "ancient martial passions" of the Tamils in general and the Military castes in particular, by appealing to martial values inscribed in the caste traditions of the Maravar and linking them to a glorious past that had been sustained by, what according to them, was the unique and powerful Tamil martial tradition. The political life of Puranaanooru, the foundation text of Tamil militarism had been initiated by two Brahmins who were sympathisers of the Indian revolutionary movement at this juncture. (The one was the great Tamil poet Subramanya Bharathi; the other was the great Tamil scholar M. Raghava Aiyangar, the court pundit of the Marava kings of Ramnad.)

These concerns, had compelled the Raj to take lines of action aimed at the terrorists and the military castes. One, it carefully sifted through the Tamil revivalist propaganda of the suspected sympathisers of the terrorist movement, to charge them with sedition. Two, it introduced the Criminal Tribes Act of 1911, with the express objective of thoroughly obtaining knowledge of, supervising and diciplining the Kallar

and Maravar who were classified as dacoits and thugs under this act. The political mobilization of the Tamil military castes began as reaction against this act. The political leadership of this mobilization was inspired by the militarism of the terrorists. Modern Tamil militarism as a political force emerged from this conjuncture.

As we shall see later Karunanidhi, Thondaman, Kasianandan and Prabhakaran are all, in varying degrees products of the notions of Tamilian identity which arose from this conjuncture. [Students of Tamil ethno-nationalism's current phase will find that the martial narratives of Tamilian past and present are at work in two extremes of the Tamil political spectrum. Last month an audio cassette was released in Jaffna by the LTTE and a commemoration volume was released in Singapore in Thondaman's honour. Both are politically concious efforts to root two personalities and their nationalist projects, to what has been portrayed as the most powerful manifestation of the Tamil martial tradition—the Chola Empire. The LTTE cassette evokes a glorious past associated with Prabhakaran's only nom de guerre, Karikalan—the founder of the Chola Empire. The commemoration volume, on the other hand seeks to emphasise the 'continuity' of a martial caste tradition between the leader of the CWC and the great general of the Chola Empire, Karunakarath Thondaman. Thus the examination of Tamil militarism in this study is an exploration of the answer to the question—why does Tamil ethno-nationalism express itself thus and how does it sustain power to appeal to pan Tamilian sentiments?]

(To be continued)

Sri Lanka's Non-Democracy — The Role of the Opposition

Izeth Hussain

The writer has earlier argued that Sri Lanka has a nonsense democracy, which for brevity can be called non-democracy, and further that the Government cannot be expected to restore democracy without pressure from outside its ranks (L. G. of July 15, 1992). In this article we will consider the role of the opposition in relation to the problem of non-democracy.

A difficulty that has to be faced is that the opposition parties, with the possible exception of the Liberal Party, are widely perceived as just as devoted to non-democracy as the Government itself. Consider the curious performance of the DUNF. It has performed admirably in making democracy a central issue, but at the same time it regards the 1977 Government as having been democratic. That is to say, it considers the very Government which instituted Sri Lankan non-democracy as democratic. It should be understandable that there is widespread cynicism about the democratic pretensions of the opposition parties.

However, though the cynicism may be understandable it may not be justified. Part of the explanation for the cynicism may be that we are living in the aftermath of the 1977 Government's brutal contemptuousness towards all the democratic norms, which seems to have convinced many Sri Lankans that democracy is somehow totally alien to us. It tends to be forgotten that we had a fully functioning democracy from 1948 to 1970. And it tends to be forgotten that although the 1977 Government exercised power undemocratically, Mrs. Bandaranaike did restore democracy by holding free and fair elections in 1977.

It may not be unrealistic to think that the opposition parties will be responsive to the argument that since non-democracy has proved so disastrous for Sri Lanka, we had better try democracy again.

The opposition parties have to ask themselves two questions. They regard the Government as non-democratic. Why, then, should it be expected to hold democratic elections? The more important question arises from the opposition parties themselves being regarded as non-democratic. Why, in that case, should a non-democratic Government hold democratic elections and face the prospect of losing power to non-democratic opposition parties? It can reasonably be expected to hold such elections only if it is certain of winning. Obviously the opposition parties will be well-advised to establish their own democratic credentials.

Some readers will demur at this point, regarding the argument as naive because it is premised on the presupposition that Sri Lankan politicians can care for Sri Lanka. A more convincing argument can be premised on the brute fact, not just a presupposition, that politicians take to politics to come to power, not just to watch the Government enjoying power. It follows that anything that could promote their chances of coming to power should interest them. Their chances will be improved if in advance of the next General Election the opposition parties try to establish their democratic credentials, and the norms of democracy in Sri Lanka. In the alternative, there seems to be no compelling reason for the Government to hold democratic elections.

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At present most of the opposition parties have taken to mass action, an understandable reaction to the Government's display of non-democracy in disallowing Parliamentary debates on matters that could be embarrassing to the Government. Though this reaction is an understandable one, it could also be hazardous for reasons that need not be spelled out here. The point that has to be made in this article, which deals with the opposition's role in trying to establish democracy, is that mass action cannot by itself establish the opposition's democratic credentials, nor will it necessarily lead to democracy.

The opposition can go a long way in establishing their democratic credentials and democratic norms by engaging in a meaningful campaign for a free press. It is a commonplace that the idea of democracy without a free press is sheer nonsense. Therefore the opposition must include a campaign for a free press among their highest priorities. It will not suffice merely to announce an intention of denationalizing Lake House after coming to power, because the Sri Lankan people have got accustomed to thinking that a typical Government's performance in office is usually the opposite of

its promise while out of office. Strategies have to be worked by the experts in this field, that is the gentlemen of the Fourth Estate, and others to mount a massive campaign on the press, in which a major role has to be played by the opposition parties. Otherwise their democratic pretensions cannot be taken seriously.

The other way of establishing democratic credentials and norms is for the opposition parties to function in Parliament in the manner appropriate to a democracy. What we have in mind is that the opposition parties must take up the concrete, the particular, the individual cases, instead of confining themselves largely, though not exclusively, to generalities. That used to be done in the Sri Lankan Parliament at one time, particularly during the 'fifties, and it is certainly done in other countries where the democratic opposition is functioning properly. In this regard, the Sri Lankan opposition has been providing a spectacle of shocking failure for a long time. The writer believes that the explanation for this failure has nothing to do with shortcomings of the opposition parties and their leaders, but is of a structural order.

Before analyzing the failure and trying to provide an explanation, we must note that disappointment at the performance of the opposition parties, notably of the SLFP, persists even though that party together with others are far more active than during the period from 1977 to 1988. We must also consider the familiar explanations for the failure of the SLFP, which the writer regards as facile and thoroughly unconvincing.

A columnist in a pro-Government newspaper delightedly pounced on the political column in the 10 June issue of the *Rajaliya*, the DUNF paper. It charged that though the opposition parties woke from their slumber consequent to the impeachment motion, they have wanted to go on enjoying their privileges in their usual lackadaisical manner. They move no-confidence motions, but the speakers are not suitable and the facts

presented are not very interesting. They have failed to make effective use of the Udugampola allegations and the Election Commissioner's Report, the latter being something that ought to be presented to the whole world. The entire opposition depends on the SLFP, but its leader is unwell and there are problems within the family. "The anti-Government Opposition must resign immediately. "These strictures in the *Rajaliya* probably reflect widespread perceptions that the performance of the opposition parties, particularly in Parliament, despite all their frenetic activities is still thoroughly inadequate.

We come now to the explanations for the SLFP failure, which usually focus on Mrs Bandaranaike's lack of dynamism, her commitment to her family, and attitudes shaped by her feudal background, all of which have allegedly led to the divisions plaguing her party.

About Mrs Bandaranaike's lack of dynamism, the obvious question that springs to mind is "What have all the other party stalwarts been doing? "The attempt to exploit the shortcomings of a movement, a party, or a government in terms of the shortcomings of only the leader is usually, though not always, mistaken. It is interesting that her leadership is not being challenged despite her recent ill-health. It may be that because of the structure of our politics, which will be explained later, dynamism has not been expected of our opposition parties or their leaders.

The dominance of the family has been a well-recognized and peculiar feature of South Asian politics. It is arguably a retrograde phenomenon, but in that case it has to be regarded as the expression of something retrograde in South Asian culture, and not the fault of Mrs Bandaranaike or other members of her family. The important point to be made here is that the dominance of the family in no way precludes political dynamism, as shown by the case of Mrs Gandhi. In just four weeks after she lost power in 1976 Congress made an excellent and

exhaustive analysis of its shortcomings, proceeded to take corrective measures and thereafter Mrs Gandhi fought her way back to power like a splendid lioness. That was possible because there was nothing precluding opposition dynamism in Indian political culture.

The charges about Mrs Bandaranaike's feudalistic attitudes read rather strangely of a leader whose 1970 Government was one of the most left-wing known in the Third World, apart that is from the Communist ones. Those charges also read rather strangely of a leader who gave away huge chunks of her wealth, which is not the sort of thing one expects from feudalists, nor of course from the bourgeois predators who came later. Allegedly feudalistic attitudes provide no part of the explanation for the poor performance of the SLFP.

The charges analyzed above make no sense whatever, and cannot possibly explain the divisiveness in the SLFP. The explanation has to be sought elsewhere. We must firstly note that the SLFP became seriously divided under her late husband, but nothing of the sort happened under Mrs Bandaranaike's leadership from 1960 to 1977. There was, of course, the occasional politician who crossed over to the other side, but that is a phenomenon common to all political parties. SLFP divisiveness therefore has nothing to do with the personality of Mrs Bandaranaike or family politics or feudalism. It had everything to do with the 1977 Government which as everyone knows was grimly determined to destroy or at least incapacitate the SLFP, as part of what looked like a programme to roll up the electoral map, extirpate democracy and institute a thousand-year UNP Reich. The present President is willing to allow a role for the SLFP, although only within the framework of our prevailing non-democracy. The continuing SLFP divisiveness is the consequence of our democracy being nonsensical, which means among other things that the SLFP has to be doubtful

about the prospects for coming to power through democratic elections, the reasons for which have already been explained. This is a situation in which any party anywhere in the world, not just the SLFP, can be expected to start fissipirating. What might be regarded as really surprising is that the SLFP divisiveness has not been much greater. The explanation is that the SLFP is the expression of powerful socio-economic forces which cannot be easily eradicated, something which the last Government was not intelligent enough to understand.

In trying to explain the opposition failure we have focussed on the SLFP because that is the party people usually have in mind when they complain about the inadequacies of the opposition. Furthermore, it has a special importance as it is the Party around which others have to coalesce if they are to defeat the UNP, and would be a mistake to ignore the performance of the other opposition parties in trying to understand the opposition failure.

Because of the proportional representation system the opposi-

tion is now adequately represented in parliament, adequately enough to have made the impeachment of the President seem a realistic prospect for some time. There are over forty opposition members apart from the SLFP ones, not much less than the SLFP members, and certainly sufficient to make a substantial and powerful Parliamentary contribution. But their contribution is just as ineffective and differs in no way from that of the SLFP members. In fact the latter seem to be more vociferous and active in Parliament. We must also take note of the past performance of the UNP in the opposition. After 1960, they were certainly just as ineffective in Parliament as any other opposition party.

There has not been much to choose between our opposition parties, but there has been a difference in their performance in the past and the present. In the past they all showed more inanimation than animation, sleeping the sleep of the just and coming awake only intermittently, while awaiting their turn to come to power and enjoy

power thoroughly. Ours has been essentially a Fat Boy opposition. The reference, if the writer's memory serves correctly, is to the Fat Boy in Dicken's Pickwick Papers, who at one moment participates in the animated conversation going on around him, and falls fast asleep at the next. Most of the time he slept, just like our opposition in the past. In the present, after 1988 that is, our opposition has certainly become vociferous, shouting more than sleeping. But considering all the opportunities they miss to really expose and shake the Government, they might as well resume the sleep of the just and allow the unjust to enjoy power in peace. Ours is still essentially a Fat Boy opposition.

All this clearly shows that the explanation for opposition failure in terms of the shortcomings of a single party, the SLFP, explains nothing. We have to explain something that is thoroughly unsatisfactory in all our opposition parties, both in the past and in the present. There has to be an explanation in terms of the very structure of our political life.

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The role of the U.N. and NGO's

Kumar Rupesinghe

What has been the importance of the UN in solving these problems?

Let me again share with you some figures. I have given you a set of tables which indicates some of the things which I have been talking about. According to research, in the period 1989, there has been about 32 internal conflicts, armed conflicts. Armed conflicts are defined as having a cumulative casualty rate of over 1,000. If you reduce the threshold from 1,000 to 500, we have about 75 to 90 armed conflicts going on at a particular time. Of course there have been some intermissions, like the Gulf War, which have intervened in that process, but generally what we see is the development of armed conflicts. I have also included here a map which shows precisely the tendency of international conflicts to grow into state conflicts and the escalation of internal conflicts.

What does the research tell us? It tells us many things; it tells, for example, that most of these conflicts are in the south, the Third World, but now are no longer purely in the Third World, because we are now seeing also in Yugoslavia and in the Soviet Union the new civil wars emerging, based on ethnic criteria. I would suggest that we are going to have a situation with about 44 armed conflicts by next year.

And what has the United Nations been able to do about these conflicts? Very little. I am afraid. The UN has very rarely intervened in these conflicts. In most of these conflicts which are in this list, the UN has not discussed these issues in the Security Council, most probably because of the concept of state sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of a given country. But this doctrine of non-interference in the internal affairs of a country has been, and is conti-

nuously; being challenged. Does it mean that if gross human rights violations are perpetrated that the international community has to stand back and watch a situation develop? Like what happened to the Kurdish people?

Now, the other thing is that the information revolution — communications revolution — has gone beyond the state boundaries; we have now satellites communication, fax machines, E-mail communication and even this discussion is a process of that internationalization. Boundaries are getting unbounded, that is the important thing. And the concept of sovereignty is being redefined. And it is in this context also that we should look at the UN. People said, of course that the UN was never able to react because of the cold war and the superpower conflict, and that it somehow undermined the role of the UN. But I think now there are greater possibilities for the UN. We must not forget that the UN Charter starts with the Preamble: we, the peoples. Therefore, states are accountable, and they are accountable to the people.

It is important that the definition of "the people" is being redefined. The definition of a people of what constitutes a people, was those who lived within a sovereign state, and therefore after the decolonization process, after the struggle for independence, the United Nations would state that the right to self-determination is no longer valid. But peoples continue to redefine themselves and reassert themselves, and define themselves as a people, whether it is the Tamils, or the Kurds; or the Uzbechs, or the Tartars, or the Lithuanians — and it is to this problem that the UN must now address itself, otherwise we are going to have a process of "Lebanonization" of atomization of societies, and increasing violence.

Why violence? There are many reasons for this — the state is unable to cope with this issue, it chooses violence against genuine grievances of ethnic minorities, it suppresses and delegitimizes minority rights and denies them their language and discriminates them in employment, etc. etc.

The means of violence, on the other hand, is no longer the property of the state. It is possible to buy arms and lethal weapons in the international market, and there is a network linked to the drug trade which is selling small arms and very lethal weapons to both sides, thereby helping to reproduce and escalate violence. And it is in this context that one has to address the question of the role of the UN.

There are several points; there has been a discussion on early warning; can the United Nations build an early warning system for conflict prevention, can conflicts be prevented before they become pathological? I am afraid it is still very much at a discussion level. It is very difficult for the UN organizations, the UNHCR, the FAO, the Secretary-General's Office etc, to get their act together. And there is still the problem of the sovereignty question.

There has been a discussion about the role of the Security Council — should the Security Council have veto power and also be the monopoly of five powers, since it does not reflect the multi-ethnic character and nature of the global society? There have been proposals that there should be a Special Rapporteur for humanitarian assistance, a super-coordinator for refugee flows. There have been discussions about enhancing the role, not of peacemaking — you know the United Nations won the Noble Peace Prize in this city for peacemaking, it has a build-up of

competence in getting two sides not to fight each other; excellent experience — but what about peacemaking, or peace-building? Who is going to undertake this? Who is going to build and rebuild the confidence of communities after violence? Who is going to transform a violent process to a non-violent process? In this sense I would suggest that we cannot wait for the United Nations. The non-governmental communities and other actors must develop their own methods of working and cooperating internationally, and developing greater regional institutions, like the Contadora plan under President Arias for Central America. We need such plans for Southern Africa and many other regions.

Let us take the recent experiences of Southern Africa. The apartheid regime is in the past — with the dismantling of the apartheid regime; new forms of violence are destroying the very hope that the people had of a post-apartheid society. The neighboring countries have massive refugee flows, in Mozambique there are 3 million refugees, casualties at home; therefore, we need more regional and sub-regional forms of organizations which can begin to deal with the question of regional security. And in that sense I suppose there can be a lot of cooperation with the UN as long as we know which area, who is going to work, in what the UN as long as we know which area, who is going to work, in what area, and whether there could evolve a division of labor in the future.

You just touched now on the idea, when you were talking about the UN. how non-governmental actors, and religion for instance, could play a role.

The role of religion can be quite decisive. Religion has both a potential for human liberation, but also can and does have a potential for encouraging violence. I am not only here talking about Christianity, I am talking about Judaism, I am talking about Hinduism, I am talking about Buddhism. What seems to have happened

is that the religious discourse has been captured by the more militaristic, the more conservative, in society. In Christianity we still see a liberation theology, like in Latin America. But I do not think that it is in the same way for Islam or for Buddhism or for Hinduism. Therefore there is a need to demythologize religious mythologies and texts...

How do you see conflicts emerging in the future?

Let me try to clarify the issues which have been discussed so far by the use of this chart, which tries to suggest the phases, of the stages of conflict:

Stages of Conflicts	Processes
FORMATION	Early Warning Prevention
ESCALATION	Intervention
ENDURANCE	Empowerment
NEGOTIATION	Problem Solving
TRANSFORMATION	Structural Change

What is very important. I would suggest, is that conflict resolution and conflict transformation requires that we have a better picture of each one of these phases and what needs to be done at each particular phase in this process. I would also suggest that no conflict endures forever. All conflicts have a beginning and an end. What is of interest, then, and is a challenge is: can we reduce 1) the time from the formation to the transformation? And, 2) can we now begin to work more on neglected areas in the conflict paradigm.

The most neglected period, is obviously conflict formation, the early warning phase. The international system is very, very weak, as I have suggested, in the preventive aspects. And here it is obvious that the role of the UN can be certainly enhanced and strengthened by research networks and by other networks within the regions of conflicts, by the development of information mechanisms which can begin to get a better picture of the conflict

formation phase. The question is, even if the early warning capability is enhanced, and we are able to say with some reasonable confidence that a conflict is likely to happen, who can do what about that particular conflict? And there is another issue which is tied to early warning: can there be timely intervention by preventive action? This is one area of work which is necessary.

Escalation is when the conflict escalates into violence, and then of course, there are different forms of crisis intervention. In the kind of conflicts we are talking about,

there is unfortunately very little action by the UN concerning crisis intervention. I would suggest again that, in this area, much can be done by developing regional frameworks for crisis intervention. There is considerable discussion in the Security Council for a Contingency Force under the UN to be deployed in an escalating violent situation. We need to establish frameworks which would invite all the parties for continuous discussion even when the war is going on, the development of rules for cease-fires, the modalities of monitoring of cease-fires and getting the parties together. Of course in the Yugoslav case, these things came too late. But again, a contingent approach where frameworks can be created for continuous discussion within regions is useful. Here non-governmental organizations and those informed in dispute resolution could play a very significant role in identifying the actors, key issues, and various frameworks within which these people could begin to talk to each other.

Growth without 'Capitalism'

Kumudu Kusum Kumara

The post-colonial period in Sri Lanka has seen significant changes occurring in the peasant sector which has displayed a perceivable degree of dynamism. There has been a remarkable growth in paddy production bringing the country on to the verge of self-sufficiency in rice, while there have also been advances in other areas of agricultural production. These changes are clearly and primarily the outcome of the shift in focus of state policy from the plantation economy to domestic agriculture. While the revenue derived from the export crop trade remained the main form of state finance, for political and economic reasons the State took an active role in promoting domestic agricultural production through increasing investments in irrigation and other infrastructural facilities, the resettlement of landless peasants on agricultural land, and technological modernization. However, the

most influential factor in the growth of the paddy economy appears to have been first, the state policies providing price incentives to cultivators through a guaranteed price scheme, and later, the liberalization of the rice trade. The social impact of this growth on the peasantry has been their differentiation, although without any significant levels of disintegration among them either in the peasant economy or among the peasantry. The discussion in the present paper focuses on the growth of the peasant economy of Sri Lanka in the post-colonial period and its impact on the peasantry and future directions of change in this sector.

I. Growth, Accumulation and Poverty.

Agricultural production in the peasant sector in the post-colonial Sri Lanka has showed a remarkable growth in many aspects. Snodgrass (1966: 152) in a comprehensive study of the Sri Lankan economy up to 1960, observed the 'astounding' 'rapid transformation' of the peasant sector in the early part of the post-colonial period.

It was this sector which has been identified in 'simple stages-of-economic growth notions' as the 'primitive sector' and hence was the 'most unlikely place to find such dynamism'. However, during the period from 1946 to 1960, the peasant sector was the most dynamic sector in the economy, in terms of output, productivity and employment: The gross output of paddy, the primary crop of the sector, increased by two and a half times, while the gross output of its other products also rose however, at a slower rate; the value of the paddy sector's contribution to GDP rose by 75 percent; value added for worker (in constant prices) increased by about 40 percent; the paddy sector employed at the much higher level of productivity, about 2,45,000 more persons than it had in 1946, thus accounting for about 30 percent of the total increase in employment over the period (ibid:152).

This growth, while subjected to variations, has continued with an exponential growth pattern in the post 1960 period (Gunaratne and Karunasena, 1988:9). The post-colonial period taken as a whole recorded considerable increases in terms of output, harvested area, productivity as the Table 1 reveals.

Kumudu Kusum Kumara is a Sociologist attached to the Agrarian Research and Training Institute (AR&TI) Colombo. The views expressed in this paper are not necessarily those of the AR&TI.

The author is deeply indebted to Dr. S. B. D. de Silva who spent many hours with us to discuss issues and clarify concepts related to agrarian transformation in general, an agrarian change in Sri Lanka in particular. The analytical framework within which the present study has been attempted is mainly a result of these discussions from which the author has immensely benefited. However, the author wishes to acknowledge the sole responsibility for all facts and interpretation.

Table 1 INCREASES AND ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF OUTPUT, CULTIVATED AREA, PRODUCTIVITY AND CROPPING INTENSITY IN PADDY 1952-1985

	1952	1985	Annual growth
Total Output (mn. bu.)	28.9	127.6	4.6
Net Area Harvested ('000, ac.)	937	1898	2.2
Productivity (bu.)	30.80	67.19	2.4
Cropping Intensity	1.204	1.247	

Source: Nanayakkara, A. G. W, Progress in Paddy Cultivation and Production in Sri Lanka and Forecasts for the Future, Department of Census and Statistics, Colombo, 1987, Tables 1 and 4.

The total output of rice for paddy, the primary crop in the peasant economy, increased from 28.9 million bushels in 1952 to 127.6 million bushels in 1985, at an annual growth rate of 4.6 percent, making Sri Lanka nearly self-sufficient in rice. This increase is in return mainly due to increases in both the harvested area and productivity (Nanayakkara, 1987), while cropping intensity has remained relatively low constant overtime. Labour productivity in paddy production and other domestic food crops grew fast while export crops stagnated in this respect (Thorbecke and Svejnar, 1987:24). Volume indices of estimated marketed output of paddy, and other domestic food crops recorded a tremendous increase, from 13.2 and 47.2 in 1959 to 154.7 and 233.3 respectively in 1982 (ibid:29, Table 13).

Due to the rapid growth experienced, the relative position of the peasant sector within Sri Lanka agriculture, as well as in the overall economy improved continuously with an increasing contribution to the national economy. While the relative importance of the plantation economy in its contribution to agricultural value added and its share of agricultural employment fell dramatically, the paddy sector's contribution to GDP which was 5 percent in 1950's increased to 6-7 percent in 1970-80 and ranked highest among all crops; in paddy cultivation alone, its contribution to total employment which was 13 percent in 1953, increased to 20 percent in 1981, accounting for a share which exceeded the total employment under all the three major plantation crops, tea, rubber and coconut put together. The share of cultivated land occupied by the paddy cultivation which was 26 percent in 1962 increased to 35 percent in 1982, this being more than 20 percent the area under coconut cultivation and more than twice the area under tea or rubber cultivation. The contribution of

domestic paddy production to the total rice supply of the country which was 36 percent in 1950 increased to 50 percent in 1960 and to 90 percent in 1982 (Gunaratne and Karunasena, 1988:2-5, Table 1).

The cultivation of subsidiary crops or highland crops, minor export crops, fisheries, and dairy production which also predominantly come under peasant sector made advances during the post-colonial period. The volume index of 'other domestic food crops', a category which includes, subsidiary crops, minor export crops and livestock increased by about four times from 59.0 in 1959 to 219.4 in 1985 indicating a very good overall performance throughout this period (Thorbecke and Svejnar, 1987:18, Table 5;69). The total area planted to all subsidiary crops declined from 270,000 to 200,000 hectares between 1977 and 1980 before increasing to 300,000 in 1982 (Thorbecke and Svejnar, 1987:69-70). The extent of hectareage cultivated to, and the output of some of the subsidiary crops have recorded an overall increase since between 1980 and 1983 (NAFNS; 33-34; CBAR, 1983). In the dairy sub-sector milk collection increased gradually from 8 million litres in 1960 to 10.6 million litres in 1966, and then grew at a rapid pace to 62 million litres in 1979. Since then domestic milk production stagnated and stood at 54 million litres in 1983 (NAFNS: 53). Sugar cane cultivation, as a form of peasant production has expanded significantly in the post-1977 period. According to original plans, 7,835 peasant families will be settled on 11,373 hectares, under four such projects (Economic Review, October, 1986). In the fisheries sub-sector which directly employs about 60,000 persons, total fish production increased from 96,000 tons in 1970 to 214,000 tons in 1982 (NAFNS: 47). Lack of a comprehensive and reliable data base on all these sub-sectors other than the paddy economy appears to be a major factor which pre-empt analysis of their growth patterns.

Throughout the post-colonial period successive governments

alternating between the two policy regimes of left-of-centre Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the right-of-centre United National Party (UNP) have been committed to the promotion of domestic agriculture and achieving self-sufficiency in rice. All the regimes up to 1977 facilitated asweddumization of new land for this purpose, brought new or already asweddumized land under major irrigation, at a comparable level, a process which was accelerated in the post-1977 era. Successive governments have been actively promoting continuous improvement and expansion of yield increasing inputs and related cultural practices. They also maintained price incentives for paddy (and at times for other domestic crops) throughout the period which has been the single factor most influential in the growth of the paddy economy.

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
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Shekhar Gupta

A senior US State Department official likens it to a slow-growing love affair between cautious mid-lifers, with warm phases of growing affection interrupted by lovers' tiffs. That may be an overly optimistic description of Indo-US relations. But last fortnight, on the eve of the first formal high-level bilateral conference on regional security issues in New Delhi, there were ample indications that both South Block and the State Department were trying to ignore irritants and move forward with the relationship.

"If an Indo-US naval exercise is held on the same day that Agni is test-fired, does it not indicate the quality of the relationship?" said a senior official of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). At the political level, even the prime minister has directed that disagreements over issues like the missile programme, nuclear programme and intellectual property rights should not be allowed to impede the momentum of the warming up process. "The relationship is going through adjustment. We do not expect it to be an easy process," says Foreign Secretary J. N. Dixit. But he claims India and the US have progressed from a stage when such differences led to political distances. "Now we articulate our differences but still keep the positive momentum to the extent possible," he says.

Positive momentum, for the moment, is exemplified by the bilateral dialogue on the nuclear question, the most contentious issue of all. Today, both sides approach this question with unprecedented realism. Indian policy-makers talk in understanding terms about the US Administration's compulsions on the non-proliferation issue which is high on the post-Gulf War agenda. At the same time, US officials are talking less and less of India having to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and are indicating that they will be satisfied if India helps to create a

regime of nuclear restraint in the subcontinent. This is another name for a mutual Indo-Pakistan agreement to freeze their nuclear programmes at current levels. As Stephen P. Cohen, prominent South Asia scholar based at the University of Illinois, says: "It would be silly and self-defeating to pressurise India to sign the NPT. It may sign the NPT on its own five years later. Now it may be possible to develop a nuclear freeze."

The debate right now is centred on the American support for the five-nation summit idea and the Indian insistence on a bilateral approach. Indian negotiators have seized the opportunity provided by the Chinese with their recent nuclear explosion and statement through diplomatic channels that in any such summit, China will participate as an outside power and not as a regional player whose own arsenal could be on the negotiating table. India has told the US that this makes China's presence at the talks irrelevant and Russia simply does not command the same international or regional presence as the Soviet Union did. So India would much rather discuss confidence-building measures mutually with Pakistan while negotiating other steps towards a nuclear freeze with Washington.

Top policy-makers also play down other issues of discord. US sources underline the State Department's muted, one-line criticism of the test-firing of Agni which was apparently observed closely by satellites. "We knew about the test in advance and still did not cancel or even reschedule the naval exercise," observes a US official. The ban on ISRO and Glavkosmos, US sources argue, was directed more towards the Russians who, Washington fears, could be driven by their foreign exchange crunch into becoming aggressive exporters of missile technologies. As for the action under Super 301, Indian officials

point out that sterner measures have been taken under the same legislation against Canada, an ally of the US on political and trade issues.

The current phase of Indo-US relations also indicates that today the US too needs India in a rapidly changing world, where Washington worries about the future strategic stance of Japan and China and the unstable Islamic world. Analyst K. Subramanyam, a longtime critic of US policy on the subcontinent, believes that today India "does not have to crawl" because it "has a certain manoeuvrability".

It is because of mutually shared strategic perceptions and needs that decision-makers in both countries have played down the recent irritants. Top officials in the MEA, in fact, complain bitterly that it is ignorant press coverage that has helped create an impression of tension when there is none. They point out that the US has more tensions with all its allies—Japan, South Korea and the EC—than with India and yet security alliances and overall relations remain on an even keel. For the moment, the principle guiding Indo-US diplomacy is to ignore the disagreements and move on regardless.

Spotlight...

(Continued from page 3)

(PRESSURE-MINE AS METAPHOR, LG 15/8). The social impact of the IMF-IBRD economic strategy does have such a short-term impact. But how 'short' is short-term? Each month, each week, President Premadasa has not only got on with the ordinary tasks of government but turned from this problem to the other, run from this place to the next to de-fuse these tensions, aggravated by opposition activity, the reaction of an opposition that is deeply disoriented and divided, and thus, instinctively and desperately driven from one target of opportunity to another, with the help of a media, that is itself, target and opportunity.

Kandalama has been de-fused. What of the pressure-mine on Hulftsdorp Hill?

Correspondence

Two contributions in the Lanka Guardian of August 1, 1992 prompts me to respond.

Radhika Coomaraswamy's article on Muttu Coomaraswamy — from Law to Anthropology would have been all the better if Professor Nadaraja had shown her Ananda Coomaraswamy's letter in May 1946 to Durai Singam who wanted to be his biographer.

I quote:

"I must explain that I am not at all interested in biographical matter relating to myself and that I consider the modern practise of publishing details about the lives and personalities of well known men is nothing but a vulgar catering to illegitimate curiosity. So I could not think of spending my time, which is very much occupied with more important tasks, in hunting up such matter, most of which I have long forgotten; and shall be grateful if you will publish nothing but the barest facts about myself. What you should deal with is the nature and tendency of my work, and your book should be 95 percent on this. I wish to remain in the background, and shall not be grateful or flattered by any details about myself or my life; all that is anicca, and, the "wisdom of India" should have taught you, "portraiture of human beings is asvargya". All this is not a matter of "modesty" but one of principle".

As for Ravi Prasad Herat, his Eye witness in Rio would have been more accurate if he investigated sources closer to home. For example he complains that

"Tissahamy was not there" (sic). Perhaps Tissahamy does not know where Rio is and my be he was not invited (like Prasad) or perhaps he does not even have a passport. Herat should check this out. After all Dam-bana is closer than Rio.

The other Herath' statement is that Tissahamy is "not a Veddha but a Kandyan Sinhalese married to a Veddha girl" (sic).

Where did he get this information? Can he quote his source? Is it from the popular press via former wildlife officials or from the Dambana Veddhas themselves? Do the Veddhas decide who is a Veddha or is that too the responsibility of modern research and journalism?

This modern trend of 'updating' information is valid only if Truth is the criterion. Let us hope that both Radhika and Ravi scrutinise their sources a little closer in the future in order that objectivity surfaces and not gossip, prejudice and opinion.

Manik Sandrasagara

Trustee, Cultural Survival Trust

Martial Tamils

I read with wry amusement, and increasing bewilderment, Sivaram's curious assemblage of 'facts' about Tamil 'military' castes. The recluse in the Vanni, and his scolytes in the diaspora, should be grateful to the L. G. for providing a platform for this skewed rewriting of history.

Some random reflections on Sivaram's thesis. Does he seriously believe that the buccaneering Portuguese had the time to indulge in sociological analysis of Tamil militarism (a la CIA) and strategically decide to erase/Vellalise the 'military' castes? This also applies to the Dutch and the Brits. Sivaram's overall picture is of a truly fantastic war sodden people imbibing blood thirstiness with their mothers, milk. Weren't the vast mass of Tamils peaceable farmers, fishermen, craftsmen? Or was their sole function to service

these magnificent bravos? And whom did these 'military' castes fight during the eras of peace when Tamil civilization, in its truest sense, flourished?

Another fact for Sivaram. One of his 'military' castes the Maravar has made a contribution to the Sinhala language. To this day a 'maravaraya' is synonymous with 'thug.' This is, probably, all that these "warriors" were!

R. B. Diulweva

Dehiwela

D. P. Sivaram states:

I suggest that Mr. Diulweva go on reading before he finally decides whether it is skewed history or not. He should also study Prof. K. Kailasapathy's Tamil Heroic Poetry, which describes an earlier phase of the culture that I have tried to analyse. He might find the overall picture there even more gruesome.

I understand Mr. Diulweva's concerns given the current situation of the country, and hence his wish to think that the vast mass of Tamils were peaceable farmers. His wish and concern have had precedents in the British era. As for the sociological analysis of the buccaneering Portugese, it was based on Prof. Tikiri Abeyasinghe's 'Jaffna under the Portugese'. (discussed there in detail) I deal with the Maravar in as much as they were a political fact in the rise of Tamil nationalism. A write up in the Sunday Times of 23.8.92 by its Madras correspondent refers to the political influence of one Mr. Natarajan who he says "belongs to the powerful Thevar (the caste title of the Maravar) Community in Southern Tamil nadu". Mr. Diulweva will find, if he takes a closer look at the politics of Tamilnadu, still an important political fact.



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*Sharing and caring
for our land and her people.*



PEOPLE'S BANK

Celebrating Three Decades of Dynamic Growth

In 1961 Peoples Bank ventured out in the challenging world of Banking with a staff of only 46...and a few hundred customers.

Today, just 30 years later

*People Resource exceeds 10,000
Customer Listings at a staggering 5.5 Million
Branch Network in excess of 328, THE LARGEST
in Sri Lanka*

In just three decades People's Bank has grown to become a highly respected leader in the Sri Lankan Banking scene. Their spectacular growth is a reflection of the massive resources at their command dedicated to the service of the common man - a dedication that has earned them the title "Banker to the Millions"

PEOPLE'S BANK

Banker to the **M**illions

