

● Non-alignment and Indo-Sri Lankan Relations ●

LANKA

Vol. 11 - No 5

— **Sirima Bandaranaike**

included in Bound Volume 10

GUARDIAN

Vol. 10 No. 15 December 1, 1987

Price Rs. 5.00

Registered at the GPO, Sri Lanka Q1/89/N/87



DEFENCE — FOOTING THE BILL

Sri Lanka's endless war comes south

— **Mervyn de Silva**

India as Crisis Manager: a model essay ? — Dieter Braun
I.P.K.F.'s Role — the debate in India — Salamat Ali

Has the Accord belied hopes ? — M.I.R.J.E.

Foreign Policy quid pro quo — Nihal Jayawickrema

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HOME AND HOME

From 'National Security', the emphasis has shifted to 'Internal Security'. What with 30-40,000 Indian troops in the north and east the demands on 'national security' have been reduced so greatly that there were reports of the post being suppressed, and Minister Lalith Athulathmudali reverting to his old Trade and Shipping. As in the pre-1983 period, all the work would be handled by the Defence Ministry. Evidently such expectations of drastic change were premature.

Nonetheless, 'internal security', in the strictest sense of the term, seems to be the pressing concern right now. Perhaps, it should be re-named 'internal-internal security' since the latest report on Home Guard Training for the National Auxiliary Force (SUN 22/11) says that 400 persons from the NAF who were trained at five Home Guard training centres have 'passed out' of the 'Academy'. They are all security guards for M.P.'s presumably UNP MP's. Meanwhile the Internal Security Ministry which had a training centre at Horana has established four other centres — Anuradhapura, Bandarawela, Amparai and Kurunegala.

I. O. P. Z.

The UN Ad Hoc committee on the I.O.P.Z. will hold a meeting in Colombo next year. It was very unlikely that a conference can be held because "no consensus" has been reached at the U.N., said Foreign Minister Hameed, answering a question from SLFP MP Lakshman Jayakody. What Mr. Hameed really meant was that there was no agreement between the US and the USSR primarily because the US persists in demanding the total withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan before it agrees to an international conference on the Indian Ocean. It is this so-called "linkage" that has led to the postponement, year after year, of the IOPZ conference, a proposal arising from the concept of an Indian Ocean peace zone presented to the UN by Sri Lanka and ratified by the world body.

In this context, it is interesting to note that the Foreign Minister welcomed the superpower summit and the INF treaty. This was the first time that a treaty would lead to the elimination of weapons from the arsenals of the two military blocs.

DEBT RECOVERY

60% of the Sri Lankan public servants are in debt, the mid-level and lower grades sacrificing 50% of their salaries as repayments of loans from banks, State-owned financial agencies and loan sharks. These stark statistics have been included in a report on 'Debt' by the Public Service Trade Union Federation.

Why can't something be done? The Bar Association which is the main bar, protests the Minister of Finance who told Parliament:

"One of the greatest impediments to dynamic banking is the archaic debt recovery law. For the last two years I have been trying to bring in new laws but I have encountered obstacles from vested interests. Lawyers have taken a strong stand against my proposed law. The Bar Association is the greatest impediment to the state banks in lending to the farmers and the fishermen."

(Continued on page 23)



TRENDS + LETTERS

RAPIER THRUSTS

I have just finished reading Rapier's reply to Goonetilleke with great delight — not only for the many insights it afforded but also at the numerous rapier thrusts it contained, lightning — like and light, potentially deadly to an adversary but, I fear, almost invisible to your important audience, the average reader, I wondered at times whether an occasional blow with a heavier weapon might not also have been useful to your purpose. In the heyday of the art each fencer carried a rapier in one hand and a heavier weapon, a short dagger, in the other. This was meant for use in parrying rapier strokes but doubtless, could be used when necessary to strike a finishing-off blow.

I notice you haven't even queried the probable reasons for that "rare mood of contrition", though your seeing

(Continued on page 23)

LANKA

GUARDIAN

Vol. 10 No. 15 December 1, 1987

Price Rs. 5.00

Published fortnightly by
Lanka Guardian Publishing Co. Ltd.

No. 246, Union Place,
COLOMBO - 2.

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Telephone: 5 4 7 5 8 4

CONTENTS

News Background	3
A Novel Attempt at Regional Crisis Management	9
Foreign News	11
Once Again on the Question of Stalin!	13
The Gorbachev Era and Soviet History	15
Sri Lanka and Non-Alignment — II	17
The Accord — II	19
The Great Research Debate	21
Ethnicity and Economic Growth — II	23

Printed by Ananda Press,
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
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MINISTRY OF LANDS & LAND DEVELOPMENT

The 'North' as a sub-plot of the Sri Lankan drama

NEWS
BACKGROUND

Mervyn de Silva

The first lamp-post killing has taken place in the deep South, the Akuressa police area. The *Daily News* reported that the victim, 65 year P. K. Dharmadasa Siriwardene is "an ex-JVP'er". The man was tied to a lamp-post and shot dead.

It looks as if Mrs. Bandaranaike's warning in her statement of Nov. 15, published in all the Sunday papers, except the Lake House press, was timely and sadly prophetic. "What happened in the north may be repeated in the rest of our small island nation".

On the same day, the *ISLAND* reported three more killings attributed by the police to subversives. One was in the NCP and another in Amparai — outside the Southern province the main theatre of the UNP's 'undeclared war' on the proscribed JVP and its allies.

President Jayewardene has meanwhile appointed a top-level officials committee headed by the Governor of the Central Bank, Dr. Warnasena Rasaputra to present a report within a month on a program to "alleviate poverty" which can be implemented quickly. Prime Minister Premadasa made no attempt to conceal the fact that this is a direct response to the challenge presented by a resurgent JVP and the spread of violence — mainly directed at the government and its active supporters — in the Sinhala south. He said that the program would be aimed at "turning the tide of crisis of growing poverty in the country without delay". Tracing the causes of terrorism, he said that poverty and unemployment were the main sources of social unrest and youth violence.

37.5% of Sri Lankan children suffered from malnutrition, 13% were malnourished, and 50% suffer from nutritional anaemia. Seven and half million Sri Lankans, almost half the population, lived on food stamps and had no other source of income. Unemployment stood at 18% of the workforce (about six million) and youth unemployment accounted for 75% of this figure.

The north it was widely believed was militarily "pacified" by mid-November, with LTTE-IPKF confrontations few and far between, after the breakdown of 48 hour ceasefire arrangements when Delhi rejected outright the LTTE's main demand that the IPKF should return to the *status quo* on the ground before Oct. 10. Things are returning to normal in Jaffna city. Shops and schools are being opened, the hospital has got back much of its medical staff, food distribution is fairly effective, and supplies of essentials are pouring in by road, sea and air. Perhaps the most striking symbol of the trend towards normalcy is the re-opened Bank of Ceylon and Peoples Bank branches.

And yet, on Nov. 27, there was a battle in Uduvil, six miles north of Jaffna, in which four IPKF men, including an officer, was killed and seven injured. The LTTE had 6 casualties. At Neerveli, also north of Jaffna, 10 LTTE men were arrested before the group could attack a IPKF patrol. The IPKF's highly mobile presence in Jaffna — possible largely because of its rapidly growing strength — is making it exceedingly difficult to mount serious operations, even suicide attacks such as those it launched against the Sri Lankan army when it seized LTTE strongholds in the

Vadamarachi operation, and established new encampments. The SL army's fixed positions gave the LTTE's guerrilla tactics a greater chance of success.

But for all these developments in the north, the 'war' and the 'mopping up' outside the peninsula, and the search-and-destroy operations in the east, the 'South' has closed its mind, more or less, to what is now accepted as a rehabilitation-recovery problem for the Tamils and an exclusively "Indian responsibility".

In Colombo, such news still makes the front page, but it is a big yawn. Outside the city, hardly anybody cares, unless some Sinhalese settlers or fishermen or Muslims are killed.

The isolation of the North psychologically is no tacit acquiescence in permanent "separation". It is a by-product of a new preoccupation with the mounting crisis in the South. In a way, the Tamil conflict, once an all encompassing concern, is now a subplot of the drama which opened in Parliament last month. The government is yet to make up its mind on when to hold Provincial Council polls — and what voting methods to use (party or individual candidate or both) and where, in the Sinhala south only or throughout the island.

Before these issues are finally resolved, the UNP has major problem terrorism and violence in the South. The UNP leadership is still unsure in its conceptual grasp of the problem. Is it 'pure' terrorism and therefore to be treated strictly as a

(Continued on page 5)

J. V. P. Challenge

How 'united' is the United National Party?

Under the frontpage headline "JVP NOT TO BLAME FOR EVERY ACT OF VIOLENCE," says *M.P.*, the state-owned *Daily News* reported a speech made at a closed-door session of the ruling party's central organisation in the city. "If the proscription of the JVP is lifted, the country will be able to know the true situation" said the report. The Prime Minister said that JVP leader, Mr. Rohana Wijeweera had never advocated killing nor had the JVP accepted responsibility for any killings, unlike the LTTE which had done so.

The same day the *SUN* reported that National Security Minister, Lalith Athulathmudali, speaking at a public function, had said it was wrong to blame the JVP for the Maradana bomb explosion. It was probably a LTTE job, he added.

Finance Minister Ronnie de Mel interrupted his budget speech to address a direct, impassioned appeal to Mr. Wijeweera. He said:

In yesterday's budget speech, Mr. de Mel also sounded a note of goodwill to the youth of Lanka. Remarking that "if we antagonise our youth, we antagonise our future," the minister said that it was necessary that the problems of the country's youth be solved in a spirit of understanding and compromise.

"What good does it do to ban or proscribe them, close down their universities and their institutions of learning, deprive them of employment just because they do not happen to be openly associated with the party in power at a particular time?", he asked.

Harking to the President's recent statement that the proscription of the JVP and its associate student and other organisations could be withdrawn if they laid down arms, eschewed violence and entered the democratic process, Mr. de Mel said the prime minister and the cabinet have also fully endorsed these views.

"I now call upon Rohana Wijeweera whom I have known very well since 1962 and the JVP to respond to this magnanimous offer. The provincial council elections will give the youth of this land a fine opportunity to enter the mainstream of politics and serve the country and the people," he said.

It was State TV which accused the JVP of the Maradana bomb blast which claimed 32 lives.

While the UNP leadership follows President J R's basic 'line' of "surrender arms, renounce violence", the different nuances in the statements made by the top-level UNP leadership, have been noticed not only by the opposition but non-partisan observers.

These statements, incidentally followed Mrs. Bandaranaike's article on the subject of violence, terrorism and state-terrorism, published in all the newspapers, other than the Lake House press.

She said:

"A new menace is haunting Sri Lanka — the creed and practice of political violence, politics by gun and bomb, rather than by argument, manifesto and popular consent. Far from respecting the wishes of the people, this creed has no respect for human life itself."

"The Sri Lankan people who have never supported such doctrines of violence and have in fact always rejected their advocate, remain confused, helpless and silent. The people look for leadership, but there is none forthcoming from the ranks of those who govern the country in their name. They wait for a voice that will rise above petty partisan politics, but they wait in vain".

"For many agonising years now, we have lived with the spectre of terrorism and separatist violence which threatened this Island's territorial integrity and unity. Innocents were massacred, families destroyed and communities which have lived in peace for centuries were torn apart. The blood of our youth soaked the land."

"Today, the vast mass of peace-loving Sri Lankans are reduced to silent spectators watching the institutions of law and order crumble, and violent crime and political violence become a new and deadly virus."

"We abhor violence. We have suffered and known the pain of political violence of all kinds. We condemn without reservation the use of violence as a political weapon."

Yet we understand why such fearful challenges confront us today.

"When the opportunities for legitimate protest and agitation are seriously restricted, and the possibilities for democratic choice too long denied, other non-democratic and violent methods become the only options left."

"Right now, members and supporters of the ruling party appear"

to be the principal targets of political violence. We of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party do not condone this. No Opposition party committed to democracy can possibly derive any satisfaction from such an ominous trend. We recognise the threat to peace, to social stability and to the democratic system.

The present trend towards political violence is a creation of the UNP administration which introduced the concept of state terrorism. From 1977, the democratic opposition to the Government originating from political parties, students, monks, trade unionists and professionals were met by acts of state sponsored violence. Even today, the supporters of the SLFP are subject to state terrorism. The present Government is solely responsible for setting the trend toward the establishment of an

undemocratic society and allowing the country to slide towards chaos and anarchy.

What then are our tasks and responsibilities in this current national crisis?

The tasks before us are basically the following:-

Firstly, the recovery of the sovereignty we have lost so that we can once more live with all our neighbours on the basis of equality, mutual trust, goodwill and respect.

Secondly, national reconciliation and communal harmony, and as importantly the restoration of our once vibrant democracy.

None of these goals however can be attained in a climate of ever-increasing violence and turmoil. To grapple and overcome that problem is our most urgent task. We must act quickly and resolutely to stem this violence, to arrest this dangerous drift to chronic unrest and anarchy.

As always, the main responsibility for taking the initiative lies with the party in office.

Unfortunately, the Government's initial response to this challenge has been typically short-sighted, self-centred and potentially counter-productive. To protect its own kind, it has decided to create a party militia known as "Green Tigers" armed with weapons purchased from State funds, the people's money.

We have already lived in the recent past with 'Mafia-type' outfits enjoying political and personal patronage. That is no secret. Private armies, party militias, para-military groups will add to the confusion and aggravate the problem. It will certainly make the work of the Police and the security services, especially of its more independent and conscientious members, exceedingly difficult, for it may no longer be possible to distinguish ordinary crime or organised criminal activities and gang-wars from violent politics and political warfare. Sri Lanka must not become a Philippines under Marcos nor Colombo a Beirut."

The 'North'...

(Continued from page 3)

'law and order' challenge, which can be met, not only by conventional means through the enforcement agencies, but by other means, such as 'counter-terror'. That is one approach. The other which begins by perceiving the problems as primarily social-economic and thus, needing long-term or medium-term remedies, a political response to the "JVP phenomenon". At the moment, the general problem seems to be a somewhat confused 'mix' of the two, the tough, law-and-order approach the more emphatic.

The UNP is faced with fundamental problems — the intellectual-moral issues of violence, its legitimate and illegitimate uses, in a system that claims to be democratic. If the regime enjoys popular legitimacy, then, the problem is easier to tackle. Otherwise, the tough approach can be counter-productive. Just as 500 'Tigers' in 1982 became 1,000, 2,000 and up to 5,000 in a few years, the JVP can swell its ranks by the recruitment which inevitably follows as the crackdown creates 'sympathisers' from alienated families and the youth.

SPORTS MEET

*You are trapped, the young
Unthinking as the bar clatters
This Jump not making five foot one.
Unthinking as the white clouds toss
In the pale sky, swerve to your fall,
Tumble, sighting the ashen tops
Of the school ground trees. Crows call
Scattering to your lusty laughs
Heady with the scent of the dying grass
Records broken? Have no fear
Unemployment will not get you
You will make a sleek recruit. Be sure
This is no toy. It is deadly and its new
In rounds per minute, and its range
And swift reach of Death.
We taught you, and you fought
For the sports ground cheers, swift metres in your breath
While Applied Maths and Physics wrought
This gun, and the helicopter waits
Death, glib tongued, presents the silver cups
Shakes your hand (still there) and money bags your hate.*

— U. Karunatilake

Peace Accord — Expectations Belied

The Movement for Inter-Racial Justice and Equality (MI RJE) welcomed the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Agreement on two grounds; it promised to bring to an end the violence that has marked ethnic relations in Sri Lanka over the last decade; it also provided a framework for the evolution of a negotiated political settlement that would recognise the plurality of Sri Lankan society.

Developments since the signing of the agreement have unfortunately belied these expectations. All parties to the agreement have been responsible in varying degrees for this debacle. The Sri Lankan government was tardy in setting up the interim administration; it tried to re-establish its police powers in the northern province and announced plans for recruiting and inducting new officers to the force in these areas; it moved ostentatiously to prepare plans for long-term rehabilitation and to obtain funds for such plans; it appeared to place greater emphasis on the re-settlement of Sinhala refugees in the eastern province. These acts led to fears that the central government was trying to pre-empt the choices open to provincial administrations and aroused suspicions among the Tamil people of the government's commitment to devolution. The Tamil militant groups entered into a violent struggle for power among themselves, resulting in a large number of deaths. Then the dominant LTTE, after obtaining a commanding majority of seats on the interim administration and promising to co-operate fully in implementing all provisions of the agreement, went back on its commitments. Its indulged in abhorrent acts of extreme brutality, killing hostages in its charge, managers of the cement factory, a television crew and a large number of Sinhala

peasants in the eastern province. It then embarked on a futile battle with the Indian Peace Keeping Force.

The IPKF role has also been much less than praiseworthy. It stood by passively while the militant groups killed each other; it was also inactive while communal conflict assumed violent proportions in the East and while Sinhala and Muslim peasants were being slaughtered and forced to flee from their homes. This led many in the south to assume a tacit collusion between the IPKF and the militant groups in ensuring Tamil demographic dominance in the eastern province. Subsequent events forced the IPKF to attempt to disarm the LTTE; this action has now turned into a virtual assault on the Tamil people of Jaffna. Civilian life has been totally disrupted; civilians, particularly in the Jaffna peninsula, have been subject to continuous curfew; nearly the entire population of Jaffna has been forced out of its homes into the uncertain security of refugee camps; and have suffered from lack of food and basic amenities. Reports also speak of large numbers of civilian deaths and enormous destruction of property; it is also being stated that the IPKF has been insensitive to the plight of civilians. The IPKF is now involved in chasing, capturing or killing remnants of the LTTE and will no doubt extend this process into other groups in other areas as well.

The present situation cannot be allowed to continue. We cannot stand by and see the beginnings of another prolonged guerilla war which will make a mockery of the peace that was anticipated by the Tamil people and also lead to further de-stabilisation in the south. In this context we call upon all concerned parties to arrest this alarming process

of deterioration and to get back to negotiations that will lead to peace.

The LTTE must accept the fact that the struggle for Eelam has been brought to an end by the agreement of July 29th.

Its present tactics, differing totally from the stand adopted by its leader in accepting the Agreement and from their position as indicated to the Indian authorities on September 28th, are futile and not in the best interest of the Tamil people. We call upon the LTTE to declare anew its support for and co-operation in implementing the Agreement, to give up its present tactics of violent confrontation and enter into negotiations leading to peaceful participation in the political processes that must be set in motion soon.

We call upon the Sri Lankan and Indian Governments to review the present situation and take whatever steps are necessary to get back to a negotiated political solution which was after all the objective of the Agreement. For this purpose, we believe it necessary that the present offensive be halted and discussions begun with the LTTE as well as all other groups to make a reality of the intentions of the Agreement that is, surrender of arms, a cessation of conflict and a democratic process of transition to provincial councils; such discussions will necessarily have to recognise the relative strengths of the various groups. We believe that this is the only way of avoiding a long drawn out guerilla war which will probably prevent the establishment of democratic political structures in the north and the east, at least for some time. The Tamil people at large must also actively contribute to such a process.

(Continued on page 7)

C. R. D. Statement

Restoration of Democracy

With the passing of the thirteenth Amendment to the constitution and the provincial council bill, the framework has been set for a measure of power-sharing between the majority and minority communities of Sri Lanka. Neither side is satisfied with the legislation and there is general speculation about the motives and intention of the central government. However, the amendment and the bill are in the nature of a compromise and the CRD recognizes them as an important watershed in the history of Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict. We are confident that no responsible political party will in the future risk rejection of the general framework of provincial councils as a solution to the ethnic conflict, whatever disagreements they may have about certain aspects of the legislation

and whatever be their politics of the moment.

Given the fact that formal legislation is now in place, the time is indeed ripe for the brutality to stop and the healing process to begin.

The only way for genuine healing to take place is to revive the democratic, electoral process, and to bring the alienated back into the mainstream of political life. For this reason we appeal to the authorities to begin implementing a strategy for the political healing of our society along with the process of economic and social rehabilitation. To do so it is essential —

- (1) that the proscription of JVP be lifted to enable them to participate in the democratic process;

- (2) that a ceasefire be called in the North and negotiations begin for the surrender of arms and the restoration of civilian administration;
- (3) that provincial, presidential and general elections be held as soon as possible or a date be set for those elections so that the political process can be revived.
- (4) to support the call by the Civil Rights Movement to allow the international red cross into Sri Lanka and to make full allowance of their services in all parts of the country, affected by the violence.

Joint Secretaries
Reggie Siriwardena
Radhika Coomaraswamy

Upto 40,000 Indian troops in Sri Lanka

NEW DELHI

India has more than two infantry divisions in Sri Lanka battling to impose a peace pact on Tamil guerrilla, Defence Minister K. C. Pant said on Thursday.

He gave no figure for actual troop strength but western diplomats estimated that including para-military police the force totalled up to 40,000 men — 20,000 to 25,000 of them frontline army troops.

Previous estimates have put the Indian force fighting the LTTE at about 20,000 men.

Pant's reply to a parliamentary question was New Delhi's first official statement on troop strength.

"Over two infantry divisions along with 162 personnel of the Air Force and 114 of the Navy have been deployed in Sri Lanka for peace-keeping operations, he said.

Asked to comment, western military experts said some of the units sent to Sri Lanka were not at full strength, lacking armour and other support elements.

COVER PICTURE

The HINDU cartoon on our cover caricatures the fall in S.L. defence spending and the rising Indian costs.

Developments...

(Continued from page 6)

There is another responsibility that the Sri Lankan Government appears to have abdicated. The Government and the President cannot leave total responsibility for matters in the north to the IPKF or the Indian authorities. The Government must move in swiftly, restore civil administration and take all steps necessary

to relieve the distress of the people; It must move in adequate food supplies, restore common amenities, reactivate hospital and medical services, etc. Its very commitment to the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka can only be vindicated by such action.

We are aware that among the Sinhala people there is a great deal of opposition to the Agreement. Such opposition may be based on a variety of genuinely held views that look on the provisions of the Agreement as well as the present regime that is attempting to implement it with extreme disfavour. We do not wish to comment on all these issues in this statement; nevertheless, we would like to remind them that the institution of provincial councils all over the country and the devolution of certain powers to such councils may well be one of the best means of countering the present authoritarian and repressive tendencies of the government.

The price of power

Indian opposition questions military role in Jaffna

Mr. Rajiv Gandhi has been winning some political victories after a long, losing streak. He carried Nagaland by a one-vote majority but with 4 Independents to support the Congress, there should be a stable government. Its job now is to end the insurgency. More crucially, Mr. Gandhi has retained the support of MGR in Tamilnadu and this prevented a Tamilnadu backlash over the IPKF's operations in the Sri Lankan north. All the efforts of Mr. Karunanidhi and his DMK to cash in on the situation in Sri Lanka have so far failed.

However, this does not mean that the IPKF's presence and work in Sri Lanka is not a major political concern for the Gandhi regime. It is, and will become a nagging worry if the IPKF gets too deeply entangled in a mess, protracted war against the LTTE. Much would depend on the LTTE's fight-back capabilities and its skill in advancing the fight into a new and different phase. And that in turn will rest largely on the sentiment of the Tamil majority. Have the ravages of the war, especially the civilian death toll and the hardships and sufferings of the community, left behind too many deep scars. Or will the bitterness be slowly erased by the human urge for peace, security and normal life, and the process of adjustment.

Meanwhile, the role of the IPKF and its future still remain a major debate in political circles in India and among the Indian intelligentsia. Salamat Ali, South Asia Correspondent of the FEER, wrote this report from Delhi.

For the first time in the four years since the Sri Lankan ethnic crisis escalated, the Indian Government and the opposition are openly divided on a major foreign-policy issue. While the government maintains that organised Tamil militant resistance to the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka has crumbled, the opposition believes that India is caught in a trap and must find ways of extricating itself at the earliest opportunity.

Rarely in Indian politics do parties adopt antipodal attitudes on foreign-policy issues involving the Indian armed forces. The government thinks its peace accord with Colombo, which sent Indian troops to Sri Lanka, is a major achievement. The opposition calls it a military misadventure and diplomatic absurdity.

Those supporting the government's view argue that Indian troops had to be sent to Sri Lanka because the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the largest Tamil separatist group,

was not prepared to surrender its arms to the Sri Lankan army. Also, India could not watch Sri Lanka disintegrate and thereby threaten regional stability, including India's own security. It is also argued that the peace accord and the IPKF operations signify the emergence of India as the regional power. Any hasty retreat from Sri Lanka would make a mockery of the Indian diplomatic goal of keeping external forces from intruding into South Asia.

Replying to the opposition's scathing criticism in parliament on 11 November, Minister of State for External Affairs K. Natwar Singh emphasised the security of India's environs as one important reason for the agreement with Sri Lanka and added that India did not want Sri Lanka to become a "cockpit" of superpower rivalry and that by sending in its troops, New Delhi had prevented hostile forces from striking roots in Sri Lanka.

The opposition wants the IPKF to be withdrawn soon. Although the opposition would be willing

to give the government some time to implement such a pull-out. It is loath to admit this in public. Indian critics assert that while the army went in to protect the minority Tamils, it has ended up killing many of them.

However, the government has declared that the IPKF would stay in Sri Lanka until the LTTE is disarmed or voluntarily surrenders its arms and extends unconditional support to the political solution laid down under the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement. Ceasefire pleas by the LTTE have been turned down by India and there will not be a unilateral ceasefire by the IPKF.

Although the opposition has not yet made an issue of it, it is grumbling over the financial costs of the IPKF operations and the casualties. At the beginning of the operations India had about 8,000 troops in Sri Lanka. Since then Indian strength has increased to two infantry divisions in addition to several battalions of paramilitary forces. Sri Lankan official sources said India was spending more than US\$1 million per day on the operation. All this extradram on the public coffers is being sustained at a time when the Indian economy is reeling from the worst drought of the century.

The opposition suspects that the government is not disclosing the true casualty figures and that the announced toll any way did not include the paramilitary forces, which were not trained to deal with Claymore anti-personnel mines, booby-trapped houses and other such hazards. Jaswant Singh, one of the opposition's defence specialists, said in parliament on 6 November that Indian casualties in Sri Lanka were much higher than in any

(Continued on page 16)

A novel attempt at regional crisis management

Dieter Braun

The Indian role in Sri Lanka is without a real precedent. Providing an outsider's view, **Dr. Dieter Braun** a West German academic and Associate Director of the Research Institute for International Politics near Munich, looks at the experience of forging and implementing the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement and discusses the implications. While the final outcome is uncertain, he concludes, if India sees this through, the experience will become a model for regional crisis management in international politics.

In the Third World, military rescue operations of one state for the benefit of a government besieged by internal militants opposition forces are not a new phenomenon. One has only to cite Cuban assistance to Ethiopia or Syrian assistance to different governments in Beirut. However, what has happened in the case of Sri Lanka, with both the accord of July and the military operations of the IPKF after October 9 this year, is without a real precedent as a likely scenario by anyone.

For it meant nothing less than India fighting separatist forces in Sri Lanka that it had supported and encouraged for several years. It thereby came to the assistance of the Government in Colombo that had been maligned before as having tried militarily to crush these forces. There are first and encouraging results of the operation — accompanied by much international acclaim for this new version of regional conflict management. The final outcome, however, is still uncertain — the stakes of success or failure are high, and the process has raised a number of more basic questions of which a few only can be addressed here.

There is reason to believe that the authors of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement — on the Indian side at least — did not expect dramatic consequences, that is the need to fight the hardcore LTTE in a bitter confrontation which, by necessity, caused many

civilian Tamil casualties. To that extent, the accord itself may not have been fully in tune with reality, but the resolve of the Indian Government, since it saw the facts, showed, on the other hand, that the agreement was framed firmly enough to be adjusted to such an unexpected turn of events. Whether this resolve will stand the test of time — in case the LTTE will be able to pin down sizable Indian forces in guerilla warfare for an extended period, that is, for longer than half a year — is a different matter. After such a delay of the peace keeping mission, other factors would come into play, not least on the domestic front in both India and Sri Lanka.

Ominous possibility

Another question, with much more ominous overtones, is whether India might not be dragged into an adventure in Sri Lanka which it had certainly not anticipated, and for which it might hardly be prepared. For it cannot be excluded that the domestic situation in Sri Lanka, outside the Tamil majority areas, might fast deteriorate, and the Sri Lankan security forces might not be able to contain the extremist Sinhalese JVP. The latter might perhaps even join hands with Tamil radical elements in a common onslaught on the pillars of the establishment. Such a worst-case scenario is now being discussed by concerned Sri Lankans and Indians alike.

New Delhi's options in such a development would not be enviable; leave the island or take it over. Any geographical restriction of the IPKF to the Tamil majority areas would then hardly be feasible because Indian security — one of the cited reasons for the accord and its implementation — would then be much more threatened than before. It would be a grim re-enactment of the aborted, and largely amateurish, 1971 insurgency. Scenarios like this shape policies, even if in reality they remain remote.

Conversely, one can present the case for a positive outcome of the bilateral crisis management, in the success of which now both the Indian Prime Minister and the Sri Lankan President are personally and profoundly involved. The LTTE might be worn down by lack of supplies, of finances, and, most important, of popular support. Indian aid and assistance might be duly appreciated in the Tamil areas and change the sullen mood among the civilians that followed the determined efforts of the IPKF to confront the LTTE. A sufficient number of the latter grouping might then be willing to join the political process if not longer to dominate it (which it was on the brink of achieving before October 10). Other Tamil groups, including the TULF, might then participate in administering the newly created North-Eastern province and the Tigers would go the way of many radicals in other countries — the path through political institutions, along which they would be obliged to give up 'Eelam'.

Pressure on Colombo

This optimistic view, which is being held out to the public by both the Governments in New Delhi and in Colombo, must necessarily bear some scrutiny. The Tigers, and, for that matter, also the other Tamil militant groups were free to pursue their secessionist

aims without meting serious Indian objections. Officially, of course, and absolutely credibly New Delhi always stressed its support for an undivided Sri Lanka — for very obvious political reasons. Unofficially, however, and through declarations of responsible politicians in Tamil Nadu, there was much acquiescence in the militant's activities. Their support on, and from the soil of Tamil Nadu was obviously meant by New Delhi as a means to put pressure on Colombo to make concessions to Tamil autonomy demands. This whole episode, which got its full momentum by 1984, is one about which there will be much discussion at a time when everything can be placed in a historical perspective.

For the same record from hindsight, it is of course also clear that extremist Sri Lankan Tamil demands were the consequence of decades of grave misjudgement on the part of the Sinhala majority; it felt, and many Sinhalese still feel so today, that they had a right to turn their numerical advantage on the island into a lasting political superiority — thereby barring the minority's way to political participation in a manner which would have been consistent with the rules of functioning democracies. There is a religious aspect, too, with Sri Lanka being regarded by them as a last refuge of pure Buddhism south of the Himalayas.

When, however, the Indian Government under Indira Gandhi decided to let the Sri Lankan militants operate from Indian territory, this was a clear breach of international norms, which is borne out by the simple fact that it had to be officially denied for so long, even after Indian publications had made the extent of involvement known and the foreign press had established firm links with leaders or spokesmen of the "Eelam" factions in Tamil Nadu. A role for the Indian Army and intelligence was also alleged. It follows from this that the group most dedicated to and motivated for Eelam — and for nothing else — the LTTE, under the Indian

umbrella, had a long gestation period during which to develop its cadre discipline, weapons ability, and tactics.

To an outside observer, it seems hard to understand why the Indian Government should have actually believed that the Tigers would accept, if not the letter, then the spirit of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. Prabhakaran was repeatedly on record to stress his resolve to cling to Eelam no matter what was being decided in New Delhi and Colombo. He just wanted to make sure that his organisation should be the only one in the Tamil battlefield; so the LTTE physically eliminated many of its rivals. Even this did not seem to shake official Indian belief in the LTTE's usefulness or even in its indispensability in the political process which was to follow the Agreement.

After the events of recent weeks, it seems even more remarkable that in India the Tigers are still being held in esteem as a potential political force without which the accord could not really work. Even the TULF seems now to engage in coalition arithmetic. It sees a role for itself which previously the Tigers had scornfully denied to it. The final decision about political representation will presumably be made by the people in the Tamil majority areas. As yet, an outcome cannot be predicted and communal harmony among the Tamils is nowhere in sight.

Quid pro quo

One of the three aims of the Agreement as mentioned by the Indian Prime Minister — aside from meeting Sri Lankan Tamil aspirations and preserving the neighbouring island's unity — relates to India's security interests. They have been met by Colombo's commitments — a clear case of a quid pro quo. From 1977, Sri Lanka had strayed from the Indian interpretation of

"nonalignment" This caused mounting anger in New Delhi. Although the United States declared years ago that it had no strategic objectives in Sri Lanka, it was also not willing to underwrite Sri Lankan security vis-à-vis New Delhi with which Washington has been in the process of removing irritants.

Colombo's course was thus a risky one, but what it did — including some training of its security forces by Pakistan — was not outside the pale of its sovereign national decision. Had Sri Lanka been strong enough internally to quell the Tamil insurgency, India would hardly have had an excuse to intervene. But it was not so strong — not only because of covert Indian action but also because the Sri Lankan security forces were overwhelmingly Sinhalese and therefore particularly hampered in operating in Tamil majority areas.

So, in order to stem the rising tide of civil war close to its border, India had to come to Colombo's rescue, and it exacted a price for example the denial of military use of the Trincomalee harbour by third parties. This amounts to what has been labelled internationally as "Finlandisation", that is a weaker country's commitment not to do anything that might be regarded as a security threat by its stronger neighbour. This kind of policy is being practised in many areas, in the Eastern, Western and in the Southern spheres. In the case of South Asia, it has been a subject of controversy between India and its neighbours for a long time. India, as the strongest regional actor, would like its neighbours to forego links with outside powers which are being regarded as potentially unfriendly by New Delhi.

Unknown factors

The greatest sore is of course, Pakistan which is once more firmly linked with the United States, owing mainly, but not exclusively, to the Afghan conflict. With Nepal and Bangladesh,

(Continued from page 24)

Goodbye to hegemony

In a few days time, the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev will pay his first visit to the U. S., the occasion for a far-reaching and historic arms agreement, a symbol it would appear of superpower cooperation, another reassuring expression of the spirit of Detente. That much is true.

Yet, it would be singularly naive for students of international affairs, (especially of superpower relations, a vitally important aspect of world politics) to believe that President Reagan has agreed to sign INF Treaty, involving as it did a compromise on his pet project, S. D. I., out of a sudden change of heart. In politics, Mr. Reagan has cultivated an evangelical style. From his first election campaign, he has presented himself to the American people as a crusader with a mission sacre — a holy war on 'the Evil Empire', the USSR. No, he has not suddenly decided to make a lasting contribution, in this his last 12 months in the White House, to peace on earth and goodwill to all men. The realities of world politics, and the pressures and constraints of domestic American politics, have compelled him to do so.

The true significance of such a development cannot be assessed in subjective terms, that is in relation to Ronald Reagan. It has to be measured in terms of 'Reaganism'. The ideology is more important than the individual; the process more significant than the person. That is why, Secretary of State George Shultz's trip to Geneva to meet his Soviet counterpart, was preceded by the resignation of Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger, the most hawkish of Mr. Reagan's top aides. Personal reasons, such as his wife's health, have been offered. But David Shieler of the NYK Times placed the event in a broader political context. (See EXIT WEINBERGER).

However, when Shieler talks of a shift from 'ideological conservatism to centrist moderation' and of conflicting positions on key issues among Mr. Reagan's principal advisers, he grasps only

Exit Weinberger

The shifts come at a pivotal period, both in Soviet-American relations and in the pentagon's budget squeeze. When seen against the background of other departures and new appointments in recent years, they seem to further a process that has moved the administration away from ideological conservatism toward centrist moderation especially in the field of arms control.

The change also brings to an end the most overt rivalry in the administration — that between Mr. Weinberger and Secretary of State George P. Shultz, who have often been at odds over arms control and the use of military force.

part of the truth. The fact is that this Treaty signals the collapse of the Reagan strategy — one might even say, the Reagan Project — Just as surely as the Wall Street crash sounded the death knell of Reaganomics, and the two, the military-political

plus the economic are integrally connected. (See Galbraith on "The Last Chapter"). Military spending, including his favourite 'Star Wars', had much to do with the huge budget deficits of the Reagan administration. He has been compelled to compromise on both the budget and defence votes. Reuter reported:

The House of Representatives has passed a compromise defence bill curbing the "Star Wars" anti-missile program, aiming to avoid a conflict between Congress and President Reagan during the superpower summit.

The Senate, the upper house of congress, was expected to follow suit by approving the bill on Thursday.

The House voted 264-158 on Wednesday to approve the 1988 defence bill which curbs Reagan's "Star Wars" program and bans any further moves to exceed weapons limits under the unratified SALT-2 treaty.

Three days later, Mr. Reagan and Congressional leaders reached a long drawn-out painfully negotiated deal on the budget — a cut of 76 billion dollars in the next two fiscal years.

Mr. Reagan campaigned on the slogan "America No. 1". Whether he knew it or not, the powerful vested interests that picked on this former Hollywood "cowboy" and California governor as a winning candidate, did not conceive the slogan as a more chauvinist, vote-catching propaganda. It was more than an attempt to relieve the American psyche of the 'Vietnam syndrome'. It was a coldly conceived program to re-assert American supremacy globally. That was to be done economically and militarily. But militarism was the more obvious means. Its single objective was to recover

what the US had lost — global hegemony.

In "The crisis of Democracy" (New York Univ. Press 1975) Professor Samuel Huntington, hard-nosed rightwinger had regretted "the loss of U. S. hegemony" and spoken of it as a "dilemma" for which "there was no easy way out for policy makers." In the midst of Mr. Reagan's nomination battles in the Republican party, the influential US journal BUSINESS WEEK had lamented that the "U. S. had suffered a severe loss of hegemony. That constellation of political, economic and military strength that allows a great power to work its will on the rest of the world".

Mr. Reagan, or more correctly the forces that picked him as a popular candidate and a sure winner, undertook to resolve this dilemma by making America No. 1.

This meant a new or radically different economic policy (domestic) and a military-foreign policy posture (external). It implied a turnabout superpower relations, a change in the balance of power, embodied in the doctrine of "detente". That doctrine in turn was founded on the principle of parity or near-parity and rough equivalence at the strategic level, in the field of strategic arms.

Economically, the plan was to 'spend your way out' of the recession i. e. spending on arms rather than social welfare, the core of Reagan's economic philosophy and budgetary policy. Prof. Chomsky, the brilliant M. I. T. scholar, called it 'Keynesian militarism' in 'Towards a New Cold War', two years after Reagan took office. Reagan has been rapped by the Senate over the Irangate scandal; his nominees as judges have been rejected; his top aides are quitting; his budget has been slashed his SDI vote has been cut after he took his country into the worst crisis since 1929. And now he has to make a deal with the 'Evil empire'.

M. de S.

Galbraith on 'The Last Chapter'

The crisis that has hit world equity markets "is fully comparable to the crash of 1929, and in some respects worse, but this will not lead to another depression". That was the view expressed by Professor John Kenneth Galbraith, the American economist, at a conference in the Piedmontese capital.

He used the occasion to launch a harsh attack on the economic policies of the Reagan Administration, saying: "We can lay this market crash at Mr Reagan's door". He called the situation on Wall Street "the last chapter of Reaganomics."

According to Prof Galbraith the causes of the market crash are twofold—the "sophisticated stupidity" of market speculation and the economic poli-

cies of both Arthur Laffer and Milton Friedman.

Prof Laffer's supply-side economics had cut taxes and placed enormous liquidity in the hands of corporate money managers, thus contributing to the exaggerated bull market.

Prof Friedman's monetary policies, according to the Galbraith analysis, had led to high interest rates, an overvalued US dollar and, in turn, the increase in the US trade deficit and the influx of enormous foreign liquidity into Wall Street.

He stressed, however, that the drop in world stockmarkets was "substantially a financial crash rather than a reflection of the real economy". He predicted that the market would eventually rediscover the value of blue chip stocks. — (F.T.)

Why Reagan needs INF

Patrick Brogan (Washington Corr., London Observer)

The experts are probably right. President Reagan was too anxious for a summit meeting with Mikhail Gorbachov, so the Soviets decided to make him pay a price — to back off from "Star Wars".

We have yet to see whether Mr Reagan will pay up. He says he won't, and makes believe a summit is not all that important after all. But these are desperate days for Ronald Reagan: his economic policy has collapsed and he will have to accept the terms Congress sets to save the country from a recession; his policy on Central America has failed; he was resoundingly defeated over the Supreme Court. A successful summit would make it appear that he still counted for something, that his second term had served some useful purpose.

He was too keen on a summit that he revealed at his press conference on October 19 that he hoped to have Mr Gorbachov visit his ranch in California for Thanksgiving. The comrade General Secretary put in the boot the next day.

Will Mr Reagan make the last concession, agree to talk about Star Wars, and admit the possibility of giving up the programme in exchange for a 50 per cent cut in weapons? It is quite possible, and the President himself dropped a few Delphic hints that he might consider it. His position is desperate enough. The stock market collapse forced him to abandon his refusal to raise taxes. He could prove equally flexible over Star Wars.

(Continued on page 22)

Once Again on the Question of Stalin!

N. Shanmugathasan

The ghost of Joseph Stalin, who led the Soviet Government and party for nearly 30 years is still haunting the Soviet Union. After Stalin's death in 1953, Krushchev tried to exorcise Stalin's ghost with his secret speech at the 20th Congress of the Soviet communist Party held in 1956. Krushchev had to tarnish the revolutionary image of Stalin in order to ram down the throats of Soviet people the poisonous theory of modern revisionism and to take the Soviet Union back on the capitalist road. But he could not succeed in his task.

Today, in the context of the Soviet Union preparing for a war with its imperialist rival, US imperialism, the image of Stalin who led the Soviet people in defeating Hitler fascism in the world war II, cannot altogether be eclipsed. That is why, despite much hope entertained in the Western bourgeois Media and political circles, Gorbachev did not go all out to attack Stalin in his speech commemorating the 70th Anniversary of the October Revolution.

Although Gorbachev does criticise Stalin on the question of mass repression, he upholds Stalin's role in collectivising Soviet Agriculture, in safeguarding Leninism in an ideological struggle the enemies of the party and the State, and in safeguarding socialism and defeating Hitlerism.

The Western Media has always attacked Stalin about "crimes" "excesses" committed during the collectivisation of agriculture in the Soviet Union. According to them millions of people died during what they termed forced collectivisation by Stalin.

The figure of millions is of course a product of the fertile imagination of the Western bourgeois media. There is no evidence to substantiate this charge.

But, what happened? When the Bolshevik party headed by Stalin decided to divide the lands of the landlords and rich peasants (Kulaks) and distribute them among the peasants and later bring them under huge collective

farms, the landlords and the rich peasants revolted and resorted to counter revolutionary violence. They burnt farms and hay-stacks and killed peasants. Naturally the peasants in turn resorted to revolutionary violence to beat

The Gorbachev Report

No document to come out of the socialist world in recent times has attracted so much attention from the international media, western analysts, and Third World political commentators — Right, Centre, and most of all, Left — than the report presented by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to the CPSU Congress last month, on the 70th anniversary of the great October Revolution.

Reflecting, Quite often, their own bias, western scholars as well as policy advisers, presented violently opposed views. The basic point of divergence was not Mr. Gorbachev's style which is almost universally regarded as 'dazzling' but whether he was too bold or too cautious! Among those who believed that he was courageous and daring, a few felt that this boldness might involve serious political risks.

"Potentially he's one of the truly historic figures of the 20th century" observed Princeton University's professor of Soviet Politics and history, Stephen Cohen.

Marshall Goldman, associate Director of Harvard's Russian Research Centre disagrees. "He's moving too fast, stepping on too many toes". Goldman predicts that Gorbachev's dynamism may get him into trouble within four years. But Professor Jerry Hough, of Brookings, one of America's top Sovietologists "I think Gorbachev is as strong as Stalin was in 1927-29 it seems to me he has had one of great classical consolidations of power in Soviet history".

"Honest" was the comment offered by Egon Bahr, the intimate aide of Chancellor Willy Brandt in West Germany's own historic years of 'ostpolitik'.

Here in Sri Lanka, Mr. N. Shanmugathasan says the ghost of Stalin' haunted the CPSU Congress.

The ghosts of Stalin and Trotsky have haunted the Marxists movement in this country almost since its inception. Bitter ideological disputes led to rifts and splits, until fragmentation of the original LSSP characterised the local Left movement. Stalin-Trotsky, Pro-and anti-Soviet "lines" marked the main arena of furious, exhaustive and self-destructive battle.

In an article to the L.G., Mr. Shanmugathasan who formed the pro-China party at the height of the Sino-Soviet conflict, says that the Gorbachev report raised once more 'the question of Stalin'. Stalin, along with Trotsky and Bukharin, offered the 'three options' before the CPSU argues Mr. Reggie Siriwardene, who recently presented a paper on the Gorbachev era at a discussion sponsored by the International Centre for Ethnic Studies in Colombo. Mr. Siriwardene was closely associated with the LSSP in the late 40's. His paper written in a 'spirit of historical inquiry' was published in full by the **Daily News** (21/11 and 23/11). This excerpt is from Part I of the paper.

Unrepentant and combative as ever, Mr. Shanmugathasan defends Stalin against all his critics. — Ed.

back the counter revolutionary offensive of the landlords and rich peasants. A lot of people died in the course of this class struggle in the rural areas. That is what happens in a revolution. Revolution is not a dinner party as Mao pointed out. It is the overthrow of one class by another through violent revolution. Thousands of people died during the French revolution but nobody speaks about them now.

The general charge about cruel repression by Stalin must be viewed in the light of conditions at that time. The Bolsheviks were attempting something that was unprecedented, that has never been attempted before and which had no example to go by. They were attempting to build socialism in a country surrounded by the hostile sea of imperialism and faced with enemies both within and without the country. They were trying to build a new society. The wonder is not that they made mistakes but that they succeeded so well in building socialism and defending it against the most barbarous attack in history. In viewing whatever mistakes Stalin may have committed, we must not use the weights and measures of today. If Gorbachev is able to talk about introducing democracy in the Soviet Union today, it is because Stalin left behind a strong monolithic country which had, by the time of his death, become one of the two greatest countries in the world.

In his speech, Gorbachev pays tribute to Stalin and the party's leading nucleus for having safeguarded leninism in the ideological struggle that broke out in the party in the 1920s and 1930s. He says that in the first few years of Socialist construction, far from all party leaders shared Lenin's views on some of the most important problems.

Of Trotsky, he says that, "after Lenin's death, he displayed excessive pretensions to top leadership in the party. Thus fully confirming Lenin's opinion of him as an excessively self-

assured politician who always vacillated and cheated. Trotsky and the Trotskyites negated the possibility of building socialism in conditions of capitalist encirclement. In foreign policy they put their stakes on the export of revolution, and in home policy on the tightening of the screws on the peasants, on the city exploiting the countryside, and on administrative and military methods in running society. Trotskyism was a political trend whose ideologies took cover behind leftist pseudo-revolutionary rhetoric, and who in effect assumed a defeatist posture. This was actually an attack on Leninism down the line".

Of Bukharin, Gorbachev quotes Lenin's opinion that "Bukharin is not only a most valuable and major theorist of the party; he is also rightly considered the favourite of the whole party. But his theoretical views can be classified as fully Marxist only with great reserve, for there is something scholastic about him. (He has never made a study of dialectics and, I think never fully understood it)" Gorbachev says that facts again confirmed that Lenin had been right.

It is now history (although the bourgeoisie and the Trotskyites are trying to upset it) that Bukharin in the 1930s became an enemy of the Soviet State and was tried and executed for subversion. At the end of his trial, he made a full confession.

Enemies of Stalin have spread the canard that the famous treason trials of the Soviet Union before the second world war were staged managed by Stalin and that the confessions were false.

The then American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Joseph E Davis, attended the proceedings and found the trial "terrific" in legal human and political drama. He wrote to his daughter on March 8, 1938, as follows; "All the fundamental weaknesses and vices of human nature, personal ambitions at their worst — are shown up in the proceedings. They disclosed the outlines of a plot which came very near to being successful in

bringing about overthrow of this Government".

Three years later, following the Nazi invasion of USSR, Davis wrote;

There was no so-called "internal aggression" in Russia co-operating with the German High Command... The story had been told in the so-called treason or purge trials of 1937 and 1938 which I attended and listened to. In re-examining the record of these cases and also what I had written at the time... I found that practically every device of German fifth columnist activity, as we now know it, was disclosed and laid bare by the confessions and testimony elicited at these trials of self-confessed "Quisling" in Russia".

The same verdict was given by the American Correspondent, Walter Duranty, who attended the trial and later wrote his book, "The Kremlin and the people".

To those who still doubt, I will recapitulate a small portion of Bukharin's confessions at his trial. Let us remember that Bukharin was a well known Soviet intellectual and had been chairman of the 3rd Communist International. This is what he said;

"I shall now speak of myself, of the reasons for my repentance. Of course it must be admitted that incriminating evidence plays a very important part. For three months I refused to say anything, then I began to testify. Why? Because while in prison I made a revaluation of my entire past. For when you ask yourself; "If you must die, what are you dying for?" — an absolutely black vacuity suddenly rises before you with startling vividness. There was nothing to die for, if one wanted to die unrepentant... And when you ask yourself; very well, supposing you do not die; suppose by some miracle, you remain alive. Again, what for? Isolated from everybody, an enemy of the people, in an inhuman position, completely isolated from everything that constitutes the essence of life..." And at once the

(Continued on page 24)

The Gorbachev Era and Soviet History

Reggie Siriwardena

*We cannot revive old factions,
We cannot restore old policies,
Or follow an antique drum.*

I shall not be reviving any old factions or following any antique drums in this paper; in fact, I hope to do justice to all the three protagonists of the party battles of the 'twenties — Stalin, Trotsky and Bukharin — who represented the three options that were available to the Soviet Union at that time. Unfortunately, it isn't possible in history to run the film backwards, change the plot and see how things would have worked out. One can only discuss theoretically and speculatively the viabilities of the two options that Trotsky and Bukharin stood for in comparison with that actually chosen by Stalin.

Of these three options Trotsky's was the least viable, because there was a fundamental contradiction between his political and economic programmes. He advocated rapid industrialisation and increasing collectivisation of agriculture several years before Stalin adopted these policies at the end of the 'twenties — and implemented them with a ruthlessness that Trotsky didn't envisage. During these same years Trotsky was also the most consistent critic of the party regime with its monolithic structure and its growing curtailment of inner-party democracy. (Not even Trotsky stood for the lifting of the ban on other parties which he himself had supported when it was imposed in Lenin's lifetime.)

Trotsky's political programme at that time could have been realised only if it had been tied to the kind of economic policy that Bukharin advocated. Bukharin stood for a continuation and extension of the New Economic Policy which Lenin had adopted as a temporary compromise. Owing

to the political monopoly exercised by the Bolsheviks, various class interests tended to refract themselves through factions of the party, and the Bukharinist faction advocated policies which coincided with the interests of the upper and middle peasantry, the small traders and small industrialists. A mixed economy of the kind that Bukharin stood for, with concessions to small private enterprise would have made possible a minimising of social tensions and a political atmosphere of greater liberalism. This is not to argue that always and everywhere political democracy is necessarily dependent on the maintenance of an element of private enterprise, although the reconciliation of political freedom with the concentration of total economic power in the hands of the State has never yet been realised in any socialist state.

However, what I am arguing here is that in the specific circumstances of the Soviet Union of the 'twenties, with the embarkation on rapid and large-scale industrialisation and collectivisation, a high degree of coercion was made inevitable by the very imperatives of primitive socialist accumulation. On the one hand, Soviet industry just did not have at that time the resources to offer machinery and other facilities on a scale adequate to make collectivisation of the land voluntarily acceptable to the peasant. On the other hand, the furious tempo of industrialisation of the first Five-Year Plans necessitated dragooning a raw labour force and accustoming them to a modern industrial discipline which many of them, fresh from the village, lacked. Hence under Stalin coercion and draconian control reigned in the economy, and the tensions these created within the political structure had to be contained by purges and terror. When allowance has been made for Stalin's personal ruth-

lessness of temper, one wonders whether the outcome would have been fundamentally different, who ever had been in his place, once the Soviet regime committed itself to the goals of rapid industrialisation and development of the collectivist property forms.

Why didn't Trotsky see the contradiction between his political and economic projects? The answer is that mentally he was able to evade it because he trusted to European revolution to release the Soviet Union from its isolation. Not only in the 'twenties but right down to the day of his death in 1940 Trotsky continued to believe that the Western European proletariat would have to come to the aid of beleaguered Russia, or social ownership of property in the Soviet Union would perish, either by external intervention or by internal bureaucratic degeneration. One has to conclude that Trotsky both underestimated the capacity of the Soviet system to survive and overestimated revolutionary potential of the Western European working class.

Bukharin's policy would certainly have made possible a less coercive and more humane development of Soviet society. It would have necessitated a slower tempo of development ('We shall move ahead by tiny, tiny steps' said Bukharin in 1924, 'pulling behind us our large peasant cart'). Perhaps a triumph of the Bukharinist programme would have meant that the Soviet Union would have been less equipped with the industrial sinews of war to face the Nazi invasion of 1941, and might have had to fight a more total guerilla war, like the Vietnamese against the United States. Perhaps it was the awareness of the fact that the Soviet Union would have to face the challenge of survival in a hostile international environment which made inevitable the

victory of Stalin's forced industrialisation and collectivisation over Bukharinism.

Rejecting the Trotskyist and Bukharinist options, the Soviet regime went ahead to an immense development of the productive forces — an industrial revolution concentrated into a shorter space of time than in any country before. Apart from the enormous human price this involved, it was effected with many contradictions and unevennesses — especially, the imbalances between industry and agriculture on the one hand and between capital goods and consumption industries on the other. Speaking this year (April 1987) in Prague, Mikhail Gorbachev referred to some of these disparities:

'Quite frankly, sharp contrasts have emerged in our country. For example, the large-scale production of steel, raw material, fuel and energy resources — the sphere in which we have long been the leaders — versus the shortage of them due to their wasteful and inefficient utilisation. Holding one of the first places in the world output of grain versus needing to buy millions of tons of fodder grain annually. The generally recognised achievements of Soviet science, specifically in the field of fundamental research, and the largest number of physicians and hospital beds per thousand inhabitants versus the substantial shortcomings in the quality of medical aid.

'Our rockets find Halley's Comet with astonishing accuracy and fly to rendezvous with Venus, and yet, in contrast to this triumph of engineering, scientific achievements for economic needs and annoying imperfections in simple household appliances.'

These are some of the legacies in the economic sphere itself which the Stalin era has left to later generations. But when this has been said, we cannot deny the magnitude of the task Stalin performed in lifting a huge country out of its immemorial backwardness. I remember

a sentence from an article written by Isaac Deutscher in the *Manchester Guardian* in March 1953 when Stalin was dying — a prophetic article in which he predicted the coming end of Stalinism. But that sentence said:

'The core of Stalin's historic achievement was that he inherited a Russia of wooden ploughs and is leaving it equipped with atomic piles.'

Nor was this achievement, as Deutscher himself recognised, an economic and technical one alone. For the Soviet Union's industrial revolution involved carrying literacy and modern education to a vast mass of hitherto illiterate or rudimentarily educated people. Then, this cultural revolution was itself distorted by political regimentation, by the fossilisation of Stalinist ideology and by the barbarisms of Stalin's personal cult. Nevertheless, it bore with it certain liberating potentialities, which would in the long run react against the Stalinist political and ideological structures themselves. If today the Soviet Union is confronting that Trotsky and Bukharin envisaged sixty years ago — those of political and economic liberalisation — it is because these tasks have now become viable with the bases of primitive economic accumulation and primitive cultural accumulation laid in the Stalin era. However, in this process the movement towards liberalisation has to contend with the political heritage of Stalinism. That is part of the dialectic of history.

Indeed, when Stalin died three and a half decades ago, Stalinism was already outdated. Evolved to meet the political and intellectual climate of a still half-backward nation in the 'twenties, it could no longer satisfy the needs of a modernised society even in the 'fifties. However, political and ideological structures don't disappear automatically when the economic circumstances in which they emerged have ceased to exist. Not only because political forms and ideologies have an inertia of their own but also because ruling groups have vested interests in their perpetuation. That is why Stalin's

heirs — Malenkov, Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Andropov — seemed so self-contradictory in their vacillations between reform and retrogression. They were faced with the dilemma that they had to overhaul the Stalinist inheritance if Soviet society was to move forward; on the other hand, they could not in their own interests go too fast or too far in this direction. I would like to illustrate this dilemma from an anecdote related by Isaac Deutscher in the preface to the second volume of his Trotsky biography; since Deutscher was a responsible historian who had access to sources of information inside the Soviet Union, I think we can accept the anecdote as authentic. The episode is said to have occurred during the June 1957 session of the Central Committee:

'Pointing at Molotov and Kaganovich, he (Khrushchev) exclaimed, "Your hands are stained with the blood of our party leaders and of innumerable innocent Bolsheviks!" "So are yours!" Molotov and Kaganovich shouted back at him. "Yes, so are mine," Khrushchev replied. "I admit this. But during the Great Purges I only carried out your orders. I was not then a member of the politbureau. I was not responsible for its decisions. You were."'

That is why thoroughgoing de-Stalinisation had to await another generation of rulers whose hands were clean. Gorbachev does not carry the same burden from the past that Khrushchev did.

The price. . .

(Continued from page 8)

war the country has fought so far. The opposition hastens to clarify that it is not criticising the Indian armed forces but only those who sent them to Sri Lanka to fight an undeclared war on a foreign soil for a purpose which is not clear.

The Indian Government's strategy seems to be to hold the LTTE at bay, let a unified administration for Sri Lanka's northern and eastern provinces take hold and pave the way for a referendum on the unification of the two provinces.

Sri Lanka and Non-Alignment

Sirima R. D. Bandaranaike

COLOMBO SUMMIT

At the Colombo Summit, an important decision was to establish a permanent co-ordinating bureau of 25 members to function in New York under the Chairmanship of Sri Lanka until the Sixth Summit in Cuba in 1979. Members of the bureau were selected on the basis of 'Geographic distribution and continuity and rotation'. Its mandate was to co-ordinate the activities of the movement and was to meet as often as required.

Some critics in Sri Lanka were unhappy about the expense for this country in hosting such a Summit Conference. They thought it a wasteful exercise for a country with limited resources. In actual fact the Conference was self-financed. Contributions in cash and kind from Non-Aligned countries more than covered the total cost amounting to about \$10 Million. Among the contributing states were Algeria, Cuba, Guyana, India, Iraq, North Korea, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar and Yugoslavia. Countries like Pakistan, Philippines and Rumania which did not belong to the Non-Aligned movement contributed gifts for the Summit. This generous support and cooperative spirit I considered as recognition of Sri Lanka's role in the Non-Aligned movement as a pioneer member sincerely dedicated to its cause.

Our policy of genuine nonalignment and friendship with all states has been of vital importance in safeguarding our own national interests and security as well. In 1971, when we faced an uprising by an extreme left-wing group bent on over-throwing a democratically elected Government we were generously supported with arms, logistical support and Economic Aid by an array of countries East and West as well as Non-Aligned. I would like to state emphatically, that there were

This is the second part of the lecture given on 5th November 1987 at the Bandaranaike Memorial International Conference Hall, Colombo.

no foreign troops on our soil then, apart from a small group of about one hundred men from India to guard the Helicopters sent for logistical use. The uprising was an internal conflict which was resolved through the use of our own military forces.

During the period from the Colombo Summit (1976) to the Summits in Cuba (1979), in Delhi (1983) and Harare (1986) where membership had increased to 101, the Non-Aligned movement faced several challenges. There were confrontations over such issues as the Iran-Iraq war, Egypt's membership, Afghanistan, the representation of Kampuchea and several others such as Grenada, the Malvinas and the U. S. aid on Libya. A feature of this period was that despite these divisive issues there was a basic commitment within the Non-Aligned movement to "The unity despite the diversity". There was recognition by the membership of interference by forces outside the movement, and also that some group within the movement, seemed not to be able to agree on specific issues, for example the view that the Soviet Union was the "Natural Ally" of the Non-Aligned movement and the opposite view that the movement should be "Equidistant" between the super powers. Nevertheless, the strength of the movement lay in the fact that, stress was laid on the concept of consensus. In spite of difference there was no disruption of the Summit Meetings. Although problems exist and issues were left unresolved, the usefulness and continuing relevance of the Non-Aligned move-

ment were recognised by all its members — Old, New, Moderate and Radical with the exception of Burma which withdrew from the movement in Havana.

Another interesting feature of this period was the fact that the activities of the co-ordinating bureau increased, and its membership from 25 in Colombo to 36 in Cuba and to 74 in New Delhi, reflecting a keener interest in the activities of the bureau. Moreover, the meetings of the bureau were open to all members of the movement, and decision making was by consensus. To my mind, the threats of super and big powers to withdraw from certain UN agencies, to reduce budgetary contributions and even link the volume of Aid to the voting patterns of Non-Aligned countries, should alert the Non-Aligned movement. In this context, the need for a secretariat to service the co-ordinating bureau deserves serious consideration, as UN agencies may not have resources to pursue studies of vital concern to the Non-Aligned movement.

DISTURBING FEATURE

At this stage, I wish to focus attention on some new disturbing developments in Inter-relations even among the Non-Aligned countries. It is not only the former colonial powers, that appear to be interfering in the internal affairs of other countries especially their neighbours, on various pretexts, but really in pursuit of their national goals and ambitions. This is evident in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Interference soon leads to destabilisation. Not only is this a violation of the basic principles of Non-Alignment but it is also a retrograde step back to "Military Power" as the basis of Inter-State relations.

There also appears to be yet another disturbing trend in the International horizon for super powers to recognise certain countries as the "Dominant Power" in a region, on the basis of strategic and/or Economic interests of the super-and big-powers themselves.

Both developments could interact so as to produce very negative effects on Non-Alignment. This special recognition given by the super-powers, may well weaken the commitment of the chosen few to the principles of Non-Alignment, irrespective of their public declarations in given situations. Likewise, others outside this favoured few may also choose some kind of special relationship with the same super and big powers and so gradually get drawn into these emerging spheres of influence. Such developments, would be detrimental to the unity and cohesiveness of the Non-Aligned movement. Any glimmer of hope of developed and developing countries working together, as in the past, towards a new international economic order will thus be shattered. Unless the Non-Aligned movement is watchful and vigilant to guard against this now, the future may well see the emergence of a Neo-Colonialism of a different type, no less exploitative, than the old.

Let it be remembered that it was the unity of purpose and the tenacity with which the Non-Aligned countries pursued the adoption of the Summit declarations by the UN General Assembly, that made possible positive action on a number of areas of major concern to the developing countries; for Instance, Decolonisation, Anti-Racism, Self-determination, Disarmament, the charter of rights and duties of states, the law of the Sea, the Dakar declaration on natural resources, the New International Economic order and the New International Information Order. Most of these declarations have still to be transformed into specific measures to bring about inter-state relations based on the principles of Justice and Equity.

Unity among the Non-Aligned members is the bed-rock on which it can be achieved.

ARMS RACE

Too much time has already been spent on a fruitless North/South dialogue where no significant progress is possible because the developed countries say no 'Cosmic Guilt' can be 'Foisted' on them about the impoverished condition of the developing countries; whilst the socialist countries refuse responsibility for the poverty, which they ascribe to 'Colonialist and Imperialist Exploitation'. Indeed after world war II it is East/West rivalry as manifested in the arms race that vitiated the International atmosphere making progress impossible for the developing countries by diverting resources to military ends rather than alleviating the poverty of the developing countries. Moreover the super and big power ends.

A significant development which the Non-Aligned movement could welcome is the recent understanding between America and the Soviet Union on Nuclear Missiles. These two super-powers propose to move from 'Control of Production' of offensive weapons to the 'Actual Destruction' of the weapons already produced even though the weaponry to be destroyed is said to be less than 5% of the Nuclear stockpile. If the momentum and spirit of understanding is maintained, it is possible that we may move towards disarmament in stages and this has been one of the main objectives of Non-Alignment since its inception.

In the context of the present ethnic problem, some critics have raised the question, "What help has the Non-Aligned movement been to us"? We are also lately accustomed to hearing voices lamenting loudly that Sri Lanka once a proud, Independent, Non-Aligned Nation respected by the entire world, has been left friendless and helpless. Some Sri Lankans suggest in Parliament,

public forums or in the press that it is our policy of Non-Alignment which has left Sri Lanka defenceless.

I think those who speak in such terms do not have a proper understanding of Non-Alignment and forget that Non-Alignment was not based on military strength. Non-Alignment from its beginning, and will in the future continue to be a movement inspired by a philosophy based on moral principles. It did not emerge as a third bloc to confront the other two blocs. I did not profess to adopt a common policy, but only a common approach based on agreed principles. There was no attempt to 'Adopt a Constitution' and establish a Non-Aligned Authority' to maintain an army to protect its security or to enforce its basic principles. Instead, each member was expected at all times, to abide by and be faithful to the principles and objectives of the movement.

Many ask how a Government of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party would have handled the present crisis. It is a fact that when we were in power we had very cordial relations with India. Thus, in power, I would never have allowed our relations to deteriorate to the extent it has in the recent years. The consequences of this deterioration are tragic as we see now. I must add that both countries must accept responsibility for the present state of affairs.

The pursuit of a genuinely Independent foreign policy in a world dominated by power blocs and complicated by superpower conflicts and tensions is the essence of Non-Alignment. In practice it entails equally or more importantly relations with other states, especially in our neighbourhood, founded on trust and goodwill, mutual respect or equality and sovereignty and a common appreciation of National interests of each country. It is only on the basis of such mutual confidence between Governments that problems can be equitably resolved.

(Concluded)

The Accord

Nihal Jayawickrema

Foreign Policy

The Agreement calls for a return to Sri Lanka's traditional policy of non-alignment. That is the quid pro quo; the price that India has required Sri Lanka to pay for its assistance in bringing about a cessation of hostilities. Ordinarily, such a move would have received the warm and unqualified support of every shade of political opinion in the country. But because of the manner in which it was secured, it is today regarded as a humiliating blow that the Sri Lankan nation has been compelled to accept. From the mid-1950s, since Bandaranaike joined leaders such as Nasser, Nkrumah, Soekarno, Tito and Nehru in expounding the doctrine of non-alignment, Sri Lanka's succeeding Prime Ministers have kept faith with that doctrine, whatever their own local political flavours might have been. Jayewardene, however, during his long political career, rarely found time for foreign affairs, except to consolidate what he regarded as deep and abiding links with Britain and the Commonwealth, and to give expression to an almost religious devotion to the United States of America. Under his government, predictably, a steady shift began to take place from the traditional, non-aligned, middle course. For example, the Indian Ocean Peace Zone proposal, which Mrs. Bandaranaike had sponsored at the UN with the active support of Mrs. Indira Gandhi, was all but shelved; and Mrs. Thatcher received unexpected help from a new ally when Britain was called to account for its Falklands policy. There was more than a suspicion that a consortium which was entrusted with the construction and management of the Oil Tank

Farm in Trincomalee harbour had links with the Pentagon and the US Navy. For the training of military personnel and for military supplies, Sri Lanka began looking towards Pakistan, Israel, South Africa and British mercenaries. And, on a 20-year lease, a large extent of land in north-western Sri Lanka was handed over to the Voice of America to establish its most powerful station outside the United States, with transmitters capable of reaching beyond the Indian sub-continent into the Arab world, parts of China and the Soviet Union, and East Africa.

Military training in India

Under the Agreement, President Jayewardene has now promised not to employ foreign military and intelligence personnel in such a manner as to prejudice Indo-Sri Lankan relations, but to send Sri Lankan security forces in need of training to India, and to purchase all his military supplies from India; to review the VOA agreement to ensure that the facilities provided by him are used only for genuine broadcasting purposes; not to make available Trincomalee or any other Sri Lanka port for military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India's interest; and to operate the Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm as a joint venture with India. The appearance of an unequal treaty is to some extent negated by two Indian obligations: to ensure that Indian territory and Indian waters will not be used for activities prejudicial to the unity, integrity and security of Sri Lanka, and to deport any Sri Lankan citizens found to be, engaging in terrorist activities or advocating separatism or secessionism. There is little doubt

that had an Indo-Sri Lanka agreement on the ethnic problem been concluded by Mrs. Bandaranaike's government, there would have been no occasion for Sri Lanka to have been forcibly put back in this humiliating manner on the non-aligned rails.

The Ethnic Problem

President Jayewardene has recognized that Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, plural society, in which each ethnic group has a distinct identity. He has also recognized that the northern and eastern provinces have been areas of historical (though not exclusive) habitation of Sri Lanka Tamil speaking peoples. He has accordingly agreed to amend the constitution to provide for Tamil and English also to be official languages of the country, in addition to Sinhala; and to devolve legislative, executive and judicial power to eight provincial administrative units. The north and east will constitute one unit, but a referendum will be held before the end of next year in the eastern province to enable the multi-ethnic and multi-lingual population of that province to decide whether they wish it to remain linked to the north.

The formula that has been agreed upon is nothing very original. Its basic features were incorporated in the 1957 Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact, which was aborted when Mr. Jayewardene himself led the opposition to it by organising a 72-mile march from Colombo to the sacred city of Kandy, ostensibly to save the Sinhala

race; an important difference in the B — C Pact being, however, that the merger contemplated there was the creation of a Tamil linguistic region, leaving out the Muslim and Sinhalese townships and villages of the eastern province. More recently, a document known as Annexure 'C', which contained the points of agreement reached between President Jayewardene and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in New Delhi in December 1983, was almost a carbon copy of it. That document was expected to be placed before an All-Party Conference in Colombo, but was not.

President Jayewardene has a 5/6 majority in Parliament. He also has with him undated letters of resignation signed by each of his ageing members of parliament. It is popularly believed that among his other possessions are personal files containing highly incriminatory matter relating to the financial activities of several of his Cabinet and many of his parliamentary members. But with all this armoury at his command, he has not made any attempt yet to fulfil his part of the Agreement; which, in terms of time, having regard to past performance, he should be able to accomplish within a matter of an hour or two.

Assuming that sometime in the foreseeable future, he does succeed in having legislation enacted by the ten-year old Sri Lankan Parliament, it is not unlikely that he will be faced with serious problems of implementation. It is not at all certain that the Tamils of the northern province will vote the Liberation Tigers (or such of them who survive the truce) into office. After all, it was only as recently as 1982, at the presidential election, that the people of the northern province polled 100,521 votes for the Sinhalese — Buddhist nationalist candidate from the SLFP, 77,614 votes for J. R. Jayewardene, and 98,744 for the sole Tamil candidate

seeking election, in the context of a boycott imposed by the Liberation Tigers and thereby demonstrated their desire then to remain in the mainstream of national politics. If the Tigers are not elected to office, will they be content to be idle spectators? Nor is it certain that in the eastern province, the Muslims and the Sinhalese, each of whom constitute about 30 per cent, will lightly agree to be ruled from Jaffna, under a political structure imposed on them unasked.

Assuming that the legislation is enacted and also implemented, it may only touch the fringe of the ethnic problem. 512,327 or 27.37 per cent of the Sri Lankan Tamil population live outside the northern and eastern provinces. Almost the entire Indian Tamil population of 825,233 also live outside that region. The new political arrangements in the north and the east may be of very little practical relevance to both these groups. On the other hand, this section of the ethnic minority who have chosen to live in the south for reasons of trade and employment might well be subjected to pressure, if not coercion, from the majority Sinhalese, to move northwards to join their compatriots in their now exclusive enclave. The presence of Indian troops in the island, combined with the continuing movement of Sinhalese refugees from the east, will only contribute to their increasing vulnerability.

Finally, what appears to have been overlooked or grossly underestimated is the southern factor: the reaction of the south to the restoration of democracy in the north. There has been no general election in Sri Lanka for over ten years now. There are 30-year old Sri Lankans who have never had an opportunity of exercising their franchise at a general election. The south is still under a state of emergency, Public meetings and demonstrations are prohibited. The free trade union movement has been all but smothered. The universities are less open than closed. And southern jails are being filled

with thousands of Sinhalese youth who, denied the parliamentary alternative, have begun looking for other channels of expression to demonstrate their dissent against an establishment that is perceived to be corrupt to the core. In the absence of a quid pro quo, at least in the nature of a general election, how kindly will the south look upon any attempts by the government to nurse the north and the east back to the ranks of the free, and to re-erect among a minority the institutions of democratic life that are so flagrantly denied to the majority?

Inter-racial relations in Sri Lanka have been permitted to deteriorate to such an extent during the past ten years that a government seeking to resolve the ethnic problem and restore peace within the country will have few, if any, options to choose from. The disastrous consequences that attended the attempt to resolve by military force what was essentially a human rights problem would inevitably have led to the bifurcation of the island; a process now temporarily halted by the Jayewardene-Gandhi Accord. But a peace that is imposed from above can only be a very fragile peace. If there is to be a real peace, a peace that will protect, a peace that will survive, it must surely be founded upon the will of the majority of the people. In a parliamentary democracy, which Sri Lanka still professes to be, the will of the people can find true expression only through a general election. A general election has the capacity not only to cleanse the political leadership of hypocrisy, authoritarianism and corruption, but also to heal the gaping wounds that now separate two communities who have survived many vicissitudes during almost 2000 years of mutually beneficial co-existence. A general election will, above all, provide the country with a legitimate government, possessed of the necessary authority (which must inevitably flow from an election victory) to negotiate and, if need be, to concede, compromise, or yield.

Court jesters and James Bonds

Andare

The scope of the debate spawned by Dr. Susantha Goonatillake's crusade against what he termed the 'ethnic studies industry' (a not wholly inappropriate term to be used by a former president of the Sri Lanka Association for the Advancement of Science when one considers that in Sri Lanka, industries and scientific affairs have been lumped together to be presided over by the genial Mr. Denzil Fernando) has now become somewhat widened. This is substantially the work of Rapier (The Island — November 14) a pseudonym beneath which one suspects a very donnish and venerable high priest of the social sciences. Rapier has to be congratulated for salvaging the exchange from getting bogged down in irrelevancies, side issues and other such claptrap and placing it firmly in perspective. Not being sociologists we cannot comment on the academic issues involved but Rapier has surely scored a bull's eye when he talks of academic climbers and other strange animals of the same kidney roving about in the groves of academe now converted into a free market jungle.

Meanwhile, Carlo Fonseka informs us that he has a bone to pick with the said Dr. Goonatillake about a related matter. If Rapier approaches the question from the angle of the soft sciences Carlo Fonseka's approach is strictly from that of the hard sciences. Says Carlo Fonseka:

Dominated

Modern civilization is dominated by science and technology. As a result, men of science have enormous prestige in the modern world. They tend to be regarded as the oracles of our time. The public generally assumes that only truth and wisdom issue from these oracles. That no doubt explains why even a patently sophisticated columnist like Andare finds it hard

to believe that unsubstantiated, malicious piffle can possibly emanate from the mouth of a former President of the Sri Lanka Association for the Advancement of Science. (The Island, 29th September 1987).

When a man of science is dealing with a technical matter which is unconnected to his ingrained prejudices, primordial fears or paranoid jealousies, he is certainly more likely to be right than a layman. But when he is pursuing power, comfort, money, position privilege or prestige his motion and behaviour will be no different from that of any cheap politician. This is well exemplified by no less a scientific genius than Sir Isaac Newton himself who was President of the Royal Society of London some 25 years.

After the mental strain of writing his monumental *Principia Mathematica*, Sir Isaac declared that he was never again "fit for mental service". Shortly afterwards he took to politics. He had always been prone to quarrel with his famous peers and relatives and neighbours. For example, it is on record that Newton "the father of higher mathematics" haggled with his rustic neighbours about the number of sheep and cattle he was entitled to feed on the village grazing grounds. Again, the man who discovered "the language of the solar system" perfected a language of abuse against his wayward nephew. However, Newton, who never married, never quarrelled with his niece a woman of great charm and beauty. He was moreover, not averse from using her to further his political ambitions. Concerning this matter here is what Voltaire (a contemporary) had to say: "When I was a young man, I used to imagine that the court and City of London had named Isaac Newton, Master of the Mint by acclamation. But I was wrong. He had a most

charming niece. She greatly pleased the Chancellor of the Exchequer... The infinitesimal calculus and gravitation would have been of no assistance to Newton without a pretty niece."

Theories

What both Carlo Fonseka and Rapier illustrate in their own inimitable ways is something which has been a favourite theme of this column — the crisis of the Sri Lankan intelligentsia. The current national crisis has made it easy for instant pundits, charlatans and populist demagogues of every kind to pass off as savants and saviours. Half-baked theories and ill-digested notions are palmed off as nostrums and panaceas. Monolingual education has produced a generation thirsting for knowledge but yet cut away from the mainstream of global knowledge and thinking. It is before this audience that the populist preachers and dubious academics strut about hawking their pet fancies and fears as theories. It goes without saying that any serious body, whether academic, political or otherwise, has to relate to the people at large, talk their language and establish sympathetic communication with them.

It is also true that the bulk of the older elite and intelligentsia, cocooned as they have been in their small urban-centered world and academic ivory towers, have failed to do this. But the remedy is not to spin facile theories based not on rigorous research but the private fears, prejudices and motivations of social climbers masquerading as scholars. This is not providing intellectual sustenance to the people but telling the people what they want to hear and pandering to their prejudices. The eagerness with which some sections of the mass media court

(Continued on page 24)



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Ethnicity and Economic Growth

Sonali Deraniyagala

The nature of the state and its role in accumulation:

State involvement in the economy can be examined in several ways.

On the one hand, Neoclassical/Monetarist economic theory treat it primarily as leading to the distortion of market forces, as crowding out private investment as preventing the market system from achieving its equilibrium. On the other hand, with in a structuralist model, state involvement in the economy would be essential given the uncertain and unstable nature of private investment. Therefore in a developing economy with a low savings rate and a low rate of capital formation and a weak industrialist class, it is the state that can expand the productive capacity of the economy and lead the growth process. Orthodox Marxist theory, would see the state within a capitalist economy essentially in terms of the dominant class interest it represents and therefore state led economic activity would take place in order to promote and maintain profitability for private investment. These theories however, do not provide us with an insight into analysing a situation where ethnicity could dominate and determine both the structure of state economic activity and the growth process.

In Sri Lanka, heavy state involvement in the economy began with the SLFP led coalition in 1956. In policy terms this was articulated in terms of the state directing and leading the growth process — thus throughout this period the state accounted for around 4/5th of the total productive investment in the country. The election of this government was on the wave of a Sinhalese 'religious, linguistic and cultural fervour' and saw the introduction of populist politics into the Sri Lankan polity. This populist Sinhala

politics was one that denied any potentially antagonistic class distinctions among the Sinhalese. The political base was articulated in terms of 'peasants, workers and middle classes' — a term which seems to encompass the Sinhalese as a whole. In real terms, the dominant social groups behind the SLFP regimes were the Sinhala middle classes, the corresponding strata of the peasantry and traditional rival interest groups. In this sense, these regimes correspond to the Kaleckian model of 'Intermediate regimes'. However, in this case, it is necessary to introduce another crucial phenomenon into this model — i.e. ethnicity, as the ideology of this state was primarily Sinhala Buddhist. Thus, since this period, Sri Lanka has in fact, become a Sinhala Buddhist polity and state.

The UNP regime that took power in 1977, with its adherence to a full market economy, seemed initially to adopt a more secular ideology. However, for most of this period, the ideology it espoused has been essentially been Sinhala Buddhist, even though this may have worked against its economic strategy. In economic terms — heavy emphasis on projects like the Mahaweli with its strong ideological links to the Sinhala rural peasantry show strands of populism within the state ideology, even though its broad policies have been essentially geared towards increased capitalist development.

Although economic policy in this period stressed the liberalization of the economy, and the curtailment of state activity, the reality has been different. State capital expenditure has in fact increased 8.7% of GDP in 1977 to 20.1% in 1987. The aggregate share of public enterprises in the manufacturing sector has not shown a decline and has remained as high as 63%.

Thus any analysis of the growth process in Sri Lanka in relation to ethnicity, must consider the nature of the state, especially in the light of its central role within the process of accumulation. It is for this reason that this paper limits itself to analysing growth strategy only in terms of state activity.

In the light of the above considerations the following sections will go on to examine key policy areas like, private sector trade and industrialist, public sector investment and key agricultural policy, in relation to their effect on the economic performance of the Sinhalese and Tamils. The period considered will be divided into 2 — pre '77 and post — as economic policies in these 2 periods articulated a sharply different economic role for the state.

(To be Continued)

TRENDS...

(Continued from page 1)

Mr. de Mel further said that he had negotiated a four billion rupee loan from the World Bank to help the small businessmen but this was being held up because the Bar Association was standing in the way of the new debt recovery law. The loan will be given through the state banks only if they liberalised the debt recovery laws."

LETTERS...

(Continued from page 1)

in it "an inverted arrogance" does suggest that you suspect its genuineness.

I agree that a powerful corrective for charlatanism is professionalisation. But also feel that it is indispensable that the professionals help the laic (!) public to understand the basic essence of their special knowledge if quackery and mumbo-jumbo and rascality in the sciences are to be eliminated.

W. A. C. J.

Colombo

A novel...

(Continued from page 10)

however, India concluded treaties which also address security. Sri Lanka would be next in the line, and reportedly the President, Mr. J. R. Jayawardene, has proposed a treaty which, however, India at the moment seems not prepared to consider. There are still too many unknown factors in the equation, as under the present circumstances such a treaty might amount to an open-ended commitment to keeping peace in the whole of Sri Lanka. This is the other side of the coin of regional preeminence, one that up to now does not seem to have been too much considered in New Delhi's security concept.

Still, the balance of the accord has, up to now, been positive. To conclude it in the first place had required remarkable vision and courage on the part of the leaders of India and Sri Lanka. Both of them had to overcome tremendous obstacles, domestic ones, but also had to give up long cherished, "institutionalised" beliefs and priorities. Mr. Jayawardene's free admission that up to now he had simply "lacked the wisdom" to assess the consequences of his Government's previous policies is a rare example of candidness. On the Indian side, the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister's support for the accord has been important.

Main benefit

If India can see the accord through, without making concessions to the LTTE which would be uncertain of implementation, it may reap the main benefit: to win the support not only of the Sri Lankan minority but also of relevant parts of its majority, the Sinhalese, without whose cooperation there can be no lasting neighbourhood policy. This would be a much-needed boost for the SAARC (among the members of which the accord had received a mixed response initially) and a model for regional crisis management elsewhere.

—Hindu

Why Reagan...

(Continued from page 12)

Besides, the pragmatists will be spelling out to him that Star Wars will cost too much: if there is a recession, the country will not be able to afford it, and Congress is almost certain to cut it to ribbons to save money. Anyway, it probably would not work.

Against that is the argument that the Intermediate range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) can be completed in Geneva and signed by the foreign ministers. There is no need for heads of government to sign. Cautious people, who are by no means all Reaganites (Henry Kissinger, for instance) say that important treaties, such as a treaty on strategic arms reductions, should never be negotiated under pressure, particularly under domestic pressure. Much better to wait for calmer times — and a new President.

A wider issue is the underlying American attitude towards the Soviet Union and Mikhail Gorbachov's reforms. The weight of 70 years paranoid hostility is heavy in the balance, as it is in the USSR also. Republican Congressmen and columnists are already frothing at the mouth, denouncing Gorbachov's duplicity and demanding that Star Wars be pushed ahead as fast as possible.

Never trust a Russian, they say, build up the armed forces and the strategic forces — it's all very old-fashioned, and bears no clear relationship to the real world. The USSR is passing through a revolution that may be very profound and the American Right cannot bear the thought that it may possibly lose its favourite devil.

Once Again...

(Continued from page 14)

same reply arises. And at such moments, Citizen Judges, everything personal, all the personal incrustation, all the rancour, pride, and a number of other things fall away, disappear...

... I am perhaps speaking for the last time in my life... I may infer a priori that Trotsky and my other allies in crime, as well as the 2nd. International... will endeavor to defend us, and particularly myself. I reject this defence... I await the verdict". If this was concoction, then State prosecutor, Vyshinsky, must have been a Soviet Shakespeare.

There were no fifth columnists in the Soviet Union in 1941 when Hitler attacked it — they had shot them. The purge had cleaned the country.

Court jesters...

(Continued from page 21)

certain academics and highbrows whose views coincide with their have made these people into court jesters.

The isolation of the urban intelligentsia from the people at large has now produced an equally hideous distortion. It has produced a coterie of intellectuals who have made a fad of indigenisation and nativisation. They are no different from the urban mimic men they pretend to despise but yet behave as if they are in possession of some strange manthram or talisman which has given them access to the native mind and heart. The country has to be careful of such budding politicians speaking in the name of the people because they are quite capable of doing a great deal of damage. Witch hunts, smear campaigns and other such despicable devices carried out with the connivance of some pliable media men and women are the stock-in-trade of these quasi-politicians posing off as scholars and academics. Such activities fall not into the realm of scholarship but into the subterranean depths of skullduggery, private detective work and the secret service. Thus from the stereotype of the isolated academic we now progress to the comic but insidious image of the James Bond masquerading in cloak and mortar board.



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