

10
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THE J. R. YEARS

J. R., MATHEW AND PREMADASA

— *A. Jayaratnam Wilson*

TAMIL MIDDLE-CLASS MILITANCY

— *Siri Gamage*

CONFLICT

THEORIES AND CASE-STUDIES

— *John M. Richardson*

TRADE UNIONS : The next front ?

— *Mervyn de Silva*

ETHNO-POLITICS: A challenge to the Opposition

— *Izeth Hussain*

U. N. : A North-South battle-front

— *Thalif Deen*

THE TAMIL ISSUE

THE RISE OF TAMIL MILITARISM

— *D. P. Sivaram*

THE ASSASSINATION OF RAJIV GANDHI

— *the charge-sheet*

STATE AND PEASANT AGRICULTURE

— *Kumudu Kusum Kumara*

THE NEW FRONTIERSMEN

— *U. Karunatilake*

THE BISHOPS APPEAL



Black Knight
It's your move

Briefly. . .

PETITION COSTS

The SLFP has launched a special fund to raise the money that will be needed to pay the costs of the Presidential election petition filed by SLFP leader, and presidential candidate Mrs. B. A report said that the costs will exceed one million rupees. But a later report which quoted a UNP source suggested that the costs may be nearer four million.

SLIPPING OUT

It looks as if the prime suspect in the GCE Exam. paper leak (GCE 'A' level physics paper 2 months ago) has hit the UDUGAMPOLA TRAIL. The ex-DIG is said to have slipped out of the island a few months ago. But the CID is still on his trail . . . right here in Sri Lanka. Students will face a new exam. paper in late Oct.

Awaiting the Frontiersmen

It isn't easy (having talked of plunder)
To intonate sweet compromise
To mobilize plausibility
Reverse the old arguments
And arrive at a Post-Doctoral
Thesis on Globality.
Globalism is Glassy
Doesn't throw Sinister shadows
Cloak and dagger on the cracked wall.
Whatever perspective viewed
Globalism dazzles, doesn't show
The clock turning slowly backwards
To the imperial Hour.
Turning on the smooth jewel of scholar's jargon
Coined in the Twenties for the Washington Conference
When Globalism heralded China's Sorrow
Resolved now beneath the Great Heavens.
No joy of course for those who defend the global thesis
Watching over their shoulder the Century turn
To what's left of Asia and the Pacific
Awaiting the Frontiersmen
The soldier-scholars
Jaws set to the Recessing Nineties
With no Gilt edge on the Dollars.

U. Karunatilake

TRENDS

Military Court

A military court headed by a Brigadier has commenced hearings in a trial where over a dozen soldiers have been charged in connection with a massacre of Tamil civilians in the eastern province in June. The massacre followed a 'Tiger' land-mine explosion where several Sinhala soldiers travelling in a truck were blown to bits. The same week there was also an LTTE ambush in which many soldiers died.

Tea and Propaganda

Two full page advertisements placed in mass-circulating British newspapers recently have fuelled suspicion in trade and government circles. Is this a part of some sinister anti-Sri Lanka campaign mounted by pro-Eelam organisations abroad, such as western NGO's? Or is it sponsored by Sri Lanka's commercial competitors in collusion with pro-Eelam organisations? Costly full-page ads. show (Indian Tamil) tea-pluckers at work. Their

living conditions are described as wretched as slave labour. Plantation Industries Secretary, Mr. R. S. Jayaratne has urged High Commissioner Sepala Attygalle to investigate the matter before taking counter measures.

Whip Removed

Chief Opposition Whip Richard Pathirana was removed from the chamber when he ignored the Speaker's orders and continued with his speech. Mr. Pathirana told the Speaker and the House that he, together with his colleagues, had decided not to restrict their speeches to a stipulated time. The decision was taken to protest against the new Emergency regulations on 'maintenance of Exports'. The regulation was passed. The new law extends emergency regulation to the export sector to prevent disruption. The opposition argues that it takes away trade union rights.

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CONTENTS

News Background	3
Letters	5
Barathy and the Legitimation of Militarism	6
Ethno-Politics (3)	9
Agrarian Change (3)	11
J. R.	12
The Tamil Middle Class Radicalised	15
U.N.	19
Conflict (2)	20
L.T.T.E. Trial	22

WITH THE BEST COMPLIMENTS

OF

ELEPHANT HOUSE SUPERMARKET

QUALITY AT AFFORDABLE PRICES

NO. 1 JUSTICE AKBAR MAWATHA
COLOMBO-2.

non-alignment, as opposed to the pro-West UNP's foreign policy, and of course democratic parliamentarism. It was a late-developing, post-rather than pre-independence anti-colonial phenomenon. The 'national question' (Tamil) was admitted to the agenda much later. So S. W. R. D. was able to make the best of both worlds. Today, the 'National question' is item No. 1. The SWRD formula cannot be repeated or re-written.

Mrs. B. has taken the broad front option, though she rema-

ins suspicious of the DUNF, except for short-term tactical moves. And for obvious reasons. DUNF's problem is not the UNP but its present leader, Mr. Premadasa. DUNF bides its time. Meanwhile it presents itself to the UNP electorate as the legitimate UNP. In this, it neglects the fact that Premadasa, by a most interesting ironic quirk, is seeking through his populism, to S. W. R. D.-ise the UNP.

The DUNF is doing its utmost to undermine, or better still, topple the President, and return

to the UNP fold as the legitimate leadership. But it is marked by an impatience; no, not impatience, desperation — but a different desolation from the SLFP's, which is rooted in fifteen long years in opposition. From Kandallama to Kanatte, we note how the frustration and the deepening despair finds expression. And that is possible because the terrain of politics as I argued last time, is so full of pressure-mines.

(Continued on page 23)

Political Roundup

No confidence motion defeated

A joint opposition motion against the Government was defeated in parliament 129 to 65. Four SLMC MPs, one TULF MP and an independent group member voted with the Government. The motion read: "Whereas this government has caused over one thousand citizens who were supporters of political parties opposed to the government to be murdered by killer squads and supplied arms, ammunition, cement, military and other equipment and funds to the terrorist organisation known as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam which had murdered thousands of civilian men, women and children of all communities who are opposed to their way of

thinking and has condoned the bribery of public officers, connived and condoned the commission of crimes such as murder, abduction and intimidation of political opponents of the government, robbery of poll cards, impersonation, armed attacks on polling booths, robbery and stuffing of ballot boxes and other election offences during the elections to subvert the democratic process, this House has no confidence in this government and calls upon it to resign forthwith".

Retaliation possible, says Ossie

Those who pelt stones must also be prepared to be at the receiving end of stones, said Ossie Abeygunasekera, opposition leader of the Western provincial Council at a public meeting marking the opening by President Premadasa of a garment factory

in Karadeniya. Mr Abeygunasekera was referring to the incidents at Colombo's General Cemetery (Kanatte) where government politicians were stoned during the funerals of military commanders who died in a landmine blast.

Appeals in defamation case

Both parties to the defamation case filed by former minister Lalith Athulathmudali against opposition MP C. V. Goonaratne are to appeal against a District Court judgment dismissing the action on the grounds that the allegedly defamatory statements were made on a "privileged occasion". The court also held that Mr Goonaratne was not entitled to costs as the statements were not true.

Press Freedom

Cabinet spokesman Ranil Wickremasinghe said that the Government condemned the attack on journalists and "will take every possible step to bring to book those responsible". He said that a suspect had been arrested and released on bail in connection with the attack on 'Aththa' cartoonist Jiffy Yunoos. Thugs stormed Yunoos' house one night and poked a pistol in his mouth; he was stabbed in the face at his gate on the following day.

Journalists demonstrate

Hundreds of journalists demonstrated at the busy Colombo Town Hall junction on August 19 pro-

testing harassment of journalists. The *Island's* associate editor Ajit Samaranayake told the gathering crowd that "the ruthless attacks on the press prompted the nation's journalists to take to the streets and confront those who manipulated thugs to harass the press".

The picketing campaign was organised jointly by the Free Media Movement, Sri Lanka Working Journalists Association, Sri Lanka Foreign Correspondents Association and the Union of Journalist of Sri Lanka.

Free expression

Speakers at a seminar in Colombo organised by the Council for Liberal Democracy called for legislative reforms to ensure greater freedom of expression in Sri

Lanka. The theme of the seminar was "Limitations on Freedom of Expression in Sri Lanka".

'Unimaginable' investment needed

Economist Lloyd Fernando, Secretary to the State Ministry of Policy Planning told a conference of administrators in Colombo that if Sri Lanka were to achieve a 9 per cent economic growth per annum "unimaginable" levels of investment would be required.

A nine per cent growth rate would be required, the Policy Planning Ministry official said, if Sri Lanka's per capita income were to be doubled to 935 US dollars and if unemployment were to be reduced to a socially acceptable level of five per cent by the year 2000.

to the government's plan to promote exports. The work-to-rule has cost the port millions. It was the CMU's Bala Tampoe who masterminded the combined effort of all the key unions to have the Ports Authority concede their demands. In the wrist-fight, it was clear that the unions were winning. And the port workers' action could be example for other unions specially those in key export-oriented sectors.

The government's export drive ("export or perish") is all-important at a time when Sri Lanka is increasingly dependent on aid and export promotion. While "aid" invites the critical attention of the larger western donors in the World Bank-supported Sri Lanka Consort that meets annually in Paris, export earnings must rise steadily if Sri Lanka is to pay its bills. And the war in north-and-east has now become the largest item of expen-

diture. The tourists are coming but they don't spend all that much. The tour operators get the largest share, not Sri Lanka. So "Export or Perish" is no exaggeration.

Party Debate

The inner party debate, with Anura and sister Chandrika as the natural leaders of the rival camps, is somewhat crudely described as Left-Right confrontation, with Chandrika keen on an alliance with the CP-LSSP-NSSP-SLMP etc, and Anura not too enthusiastic on the idea, certainly not on alliance; a loose anti-UNP front yes, but no alliance. He believes that what the SLFP stands to lose through close association with a 'discredited' Left is much more than any potential gains.

The debate is not wholly Left-Right. Ideology in any case, doesn't count much these days.

On the other hand, the ethnic issue is all-important. The alliance with the Left will give the SLFP, the Chandrika camp argues, a less chauvinistic, Sinhala-Buddhist image, and please a vital foreign constituency — the western governments and NGO's, and India. (Chandrika has just returned from a visit to Delhi).

His close association with HELA URAMAYA, the staunchly pro-Sinhala-Buddhist caucus in the SLFP (its leaders are Tilak Karunaratne and S. L. Goonesekera) makes Anura far more acceptable to the traditional SLFP supporters.

How the SLFP and the Opposition parties unions and interest-groups line up in the next few months will largely determine the political stability of the island, the strength of the Premadasa presidency, and the eco-

(Continued on page 21)

JHA ON INDO-SRI LANKA TIES

Indian High Commissioner Nagesh Nath Jha has called upon Sri Lanka to co-operate in preventing what he describes as a diplomatic quarrel between the two countries.

He suggested that Sri Lanka should not permit herself to be unwittingly or indirectly used for actions that are not its direct concern and which could have an adverse effect on Indo-Sri Lanka relations.

In an interview, Mr. Jha declined to specify as to what or to whom he was referring, but said the people concerned would know what he was talking about.

Political observers speculated Mr. Jha was probably referring to Sri Lankan sentiments at a recent South Asia Conference in Colombo and recent developments regarding SAARC.

Mr. Jha said Sri Lanka's main foreign policy issue was India but India had many other neighbours and therefore there were many other sensitive issues that concerned it. Matters that were not within the scope of bilateral interests should be avoided by Sri Lanka to prevent an adverse fall out between the two countries,

the envoy said. Mr. Jha alleged there were certain groups in Sri Lanka which did not wish to see more improvement in Indo-Lanka relations and said Sri Lanka should not allow them to gain the upper hand.

"Cordiality between our two countries is inimical to the self-interests of some groups. They therefore create obstacles to the further improvement of bilateral relations," he said.

(Sunday Times)

The only relationship which is possible is one of a high degree of friendship and cooperation. For this purpose it is imperative we must not live in the past but get on in the present and the future for even closer ties of affection and friendship. Our relationship has picked up but there still remains certain groups and elements who would like this relationship not to prosper. Sri Lanka should try to ensure that these groups do not gain an upper hand. A constant harking back to the past does not serve any purpose and only prevents further cementing of our

ties. Replying to a question on the gain perceived by these elements to keep up the ill-will, High Commissioner mentioned that a continued state of uncertainty would ensure the personal gains of these elements. In contrast, in India now there were no such elements. Sri Lanka should also note who their friends are.

Commenting on some recent write-ups in the Sri Lankan press, both government controlled and others, High Commissioner said some of the pieces were not exactly calculated towards further improvement of our relations. While it may be possible for us to understand the feelings of the Sri Lankan people on the ISLA and the IPKF, Sri Lanka must not permit itself to be used for actions that go well beyond criticism of the ISLA and IPKF and transcend into other fields which have no direct concern for Sri Lanka and would have adverse fall-outs and misunderstanding on Indo-Sri Lanka relations. It was advisable for Sri Lanka to keep away from such issues. Sri Lanka has only one neighbour, India, but India has several neighbours. (Island)

Bishops call for political solution to N-E war

The Catholic Bishops' Conference in a statement called for a definite political solution to the North-East war saying that all concerned should get together "as statesmen of stature, rising above petty party considerations".

The statement also said that necessary steps must be taken for the social, moral and spiritual reawakening of the nation, building on the country's ancient religio-cultural traditions and values and freeing it from both political and economic dependence on others.

The Bishops appealed to all men of goodwill in the country to reflect deeply and, in a

spirit of fraternity and mutual respect, urgently take corrective steps to heal the wounds and rebuild the nation.

The statement also said that all economic policies must be reviewed with a view to ensuring

a more just sharing of wealth among all strata of society and democratic values strengthened by ensuring the emergence of a politically unbiased media on all sides and a healthy role for political dissent and diversity.

JVP threat

When the Minister of Parliamentary Affairs, Mr. Vincent Perera moved on behalf of the Prime Minister and State Minister of Defence, Mr. D. B. Wijetunge the resolution to extend the emergency, he gave the House facts and figures to support what Justice Soza of the Human Rights Commission had already announced. A re-grouped emerging JVP is a potential security

threat that should not be underestimated. The arrest of suspects, the interrogation recently of JVP activists, the break-out of some hard-core JVPers in custody, the recovery of weapons, the propaganda activity and the examination of the literature, and most of all, the steady infiltration of the JVP to mainstream opposition parties and extremist Sinhala organisations revealed a dangerous pattern, the Minister said.

LETTERS

Rajiv Gandhi Assassination Case

I thank you for publishing in detail the "Final Report in RC 9/S/91/CBI/SCB/Madras - (Rajiv Gandhi Assassination Case) Under Section 173 Criminal Penal Code" (L G, Aug. 15). What strikes me vividly is its selectivity and superficiality in regurgitating the political events which happened in Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka. For instance, nothing of the following has been included in this document.

- (1) The role of Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) in training the Tamil militant groups in Tamil Nadu.
- (2) The assassination attempt on Rajiv Gandhi in Colombo, after the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord on July 1987.
- (3) The training and arming of the Tamil National Army by the Indian Peace Keeping Force.
- (4) Maldives invasion by the PLOT mercenaries and the

Indian "assistance in restoring peace".

Even for a non-lawyer like me, it is apparent that the so-called "Final Report" resembles the field note book of a RAW agent, than a legal document.

The non-democracy phenomenon

Now that I have read somewhat in detail the purported thesis on Sri Lanka's non-democracy by Izeth Hussain (LG, July 15 and Sept 1), will you permit me to comment briefly?

- 1) The non-democracy phenomenon is not peculiar to Sri Lanka. Even if one excludes the countries with communist influence such as China and Vietnam, none of the other nominally Buddhist countries in Asia (Japan, Thailand and Burma) are bastions of democracy either.
- 2) The non-democracy phenomenon exists in almost all the Muslim-dominated countries, beginning from Algeria in Africa, via all the oil-producing Arab states and

non-Arabic Iran in Middle East, to the Gen. Suharto - led Indonesia in Southeast Asia.

- 3) Among the nearly 175 UN-recognized states, only 16 (of predominantly White Anglo-Saxon Protestant heritage) subscribe to the "concept" of democracy. These are as follows:

- a) 12 NATO member countries (Belgium, Canada Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway United Kingdom, USA and Germany).
- b) 2 neutral European countries (Sweden and Switzerland).
- c) 2 Oceanian countries (Australia and New Zealand)

In popular image, it is these 16 countries which constitute the "advanced world", though these are the major league members who patented imperialism and colonialism. Therefore, in my view, the blind adulation for "democracy" is nothing but another example of slavish mentality exhibited by the oppressed to the oppressors.

Sachi Sri Kantha

Osaka BioScience Institute,
Osaka 565, Japan.

Barathy and the Legitimation of Militarism

D. P. Sivaram

One of the main figures of the Indian revolutionary movement in Tamilnadu at the turn of the century was Maha Kavi Subramaniya Barathy. One of its sympathisers was the Tamil scholar M. Raghava Aiyangar, who was the court pundit of the Maravar Kings of Ramnad. Subramniya Barathy has been one of the most powerful influences in Tamilian cultural and political life in the twentieth century. The fundamental idea of modern Tamil Militarism—that the Tamils were a martial race and that the rejuvenation of their martial traditions is necessary for national liberation, was enunciated by these two Brahmins in the first decade of the twentieth century. This idea has informed Tamil scholarship as well as the narratives of militant Tamil nationalism since then. It has been reproduced in many forms but its fundamental structure has remained the same. This narrative has been a basis of the vocabulary of Tamil nationalism in a) The Indian revolutionary movement in Taminadu b) The Indian National movement in T.N c) The D.K's secessionist and Anti-Hindi movement d) Caste revivalist movements in T.N e) The DMK f) The federal Party in Sri Lanka and g) The armed Tamil seperatist movement in the North and East of Sri Lanka.

Current (establishment) literature in the west on the use of history in national liberation organizations and terrorist groups, refers to what these organizations endeavour to disperse among their members and their people as 'the' authentic reading of the nation's past and present, as projective narratives which are, it is claimed, "stories that not only recall the past, but also teach how to behave in the present"

"Narratives of this sort tell individuals how they would ideally have to live and die in order to contribute properly to their collectivity and its future."

It has been argued in an analysis which draws attention to the frequent use of these projective narratives by the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, that the members of the Army are not marginal outcasts from Armenian society, but that the members of the Army are not marginal outcasts from Armenian society, but that projective narratives transform them into "paradigmatic figures of its deepest values." (Gerald Cromer: 1991) The projective narratives that shaped militant Tamil nationalism and its idea of national liberation were formulated as a reassertion of feudal Tamil militarism and its traditional cultural hegemony in Tamil society.

This was so because they were essentially linked to the Indian revolutionary movement's idea of reviving India's traditional martial heritage as a precondition for national liberation.

The importance of chiefly Barathy and to lesser extent Raghava Aiyagar in the rise of modern Tamil militarism lies in the fact that they initiated a political reading of the ancient Tamil text *Purananooru* in particular—an anthology of predominantly heroic poems—and a heroic Tamilian past in general, as basis of a Tamilian concept of national liberation. Their reading was conceived as part of the Indian revolutionary movement's ideology of national liberation through armed insurrection.

It must be emphasised that they saw the Tamil martial tradition from a pan-Indian perspective. To them the heroic Tamil past was a reflection of a great Indian martial heritage, whereas the Dravidian school vehemently rejected the pan-Indian perspective as a myth promoted by Brahmin interests. Therefore the politics of the views propagated by Barathy and Raghava Aiyangar have to be located at two levels: the pan-Indian and the South Indian.

1. At the first level the following factors have to be considered

- a). British recruitment policy and its theory of martial races
- b). the cultural and political reaction to it among the educated Indian middle classes in Bengal and west India
- c). the Kshatriya revivalism of Bal Ganghadar Tilak.
- d). Japan's victory over Russia in 1905.

2. At the south Indian level the following factors shaped the two men's thinking.

- a). the movement for elevating the status of Tamil language.
- b). the rediscovery of the Sangam anthologies.
- c). the status and role of feudal Tamil militarism in Tamil society.

1. The shift in recruitment to the northwest of the subcontinent toward the latter part of the 19th century was accompanied by the martial races theory which sought to elaborate the idea as to why some Indian people—Rajputs, Sikhs, Punjabi Muslims—were martial, while others—Marathas, Bengali upper castes, Mahars, Telugus and Tamils who had once been the predominant groups of the British Indian army—were not martial.

Lord Roberts of Kandahar—the commander in chief of the Indian Army 1885–1893 had made disparaging remarks about the martial character of the Tamils Telugus who had once formed the the backbone of the army's largest group of infantry units. "Each cold season I made long tours in order to acquaint myself with the needs and capabilities of the men of the Madras Army. I tried hard to discover in them those fighting qualities which had distinguished their forefathers during the wars of the last and the beginning of the present century... and I was forced to the conclusion that the ancient military spirit had died in them".

It was reasoned that long years of peace in the south had had a softening effect on them. There were protests and petitions from the derecruited classes including Tamils and Telugus. A need to prove their ancient martial character arose among many classes that were thus affected.

At a congress session in 1891 two Telugu Brahmins invoked the ancient Hindu law giver Manu in support of their contention that they were traditionally a war like race, to refute Lord Robert's alleged slights against the Telugu people. These sentiments had been already exacerbated by the Arms Act of 1878 which prohibited Indians from possessing arms without permission. This was seen as a loss of self respect. Raja Rampal Singh protested against it at the second secession of the National Congress in 1886.... But we cannot be gateful to it (the British Government) for degrading our natures, for systematically crushing out of us all martial spirit, for converting a race of soldiers into a timid flock of quill driving sheep". (Cohen: 1990. ch.1,2)

The Marathas had also been particularly affected by these developments. Thilak arose as a national leader among them. He propagated the view that the Kshatriya class which had been disfranchised by the British had to rise again. They were the traditional defenders of the realm and internal order. National emancipation could be achieved through the rejuvenation of that class and the traditional Indian social order.

Thilak's ideas played an important role in the rise and dispersion of the Indian revolutionary movement. The movement got a big boost in 1905 when Japan defeated Russia. The victory demonstrated a point — that Asian martial spirit could prevail over European military might. Hence, for the revolutionaries (the Raj classified them as terrorists) India's emancipation lay in the revival of its traditional martial values. (the impact of Japan's victory over Russia on the Indian revolutionary move-

ment in Bengal and west India has been examined in detail in Dua: 1966.)

At this time Subramaniya Barathy was the editor of a nationalist Tamil paper called 'India'. He was an ardent follower of Thilak and the revolutionary movement and was one of the few in Madras who were bold enough to propagate its ideas through his paper. On Thilak's fiftieth birthday he wrote an editorial (14. 7. 1906) "The Present condition of the country makes it necessary to have Veera Poojai (Hero Worship)... Veera Poojai is indispensable for a country's progress. The people of our country who have always keenly observed Veera Poojai, should not be slack at a time when it is most needed". A note in the paper says that Thilak's birthday was celebrated in Madras at at Barathy's house at Lingyichetty street and that a pooja had been held for India's martial goddess — Veera Sakthi — Bhavani (the goddess worshipped by the Maratha warrior king Shivaji) The revolutionary movement was spreading the Shivaji festival in many parts of India to rekindle the martial spirit which according to them had been systematically crushed out of the Indian nation and were establishing gymnasiums to improve its physical power. Barathy wrote an editorial titled in English as 'The Outrage of the Arms Act' reminiscent of Raja Rampal Singh's out burst — "An evil Viceroy called Lord Lytton Introduced this act in 1878. The people should have opposed it then. It is totally against divine law to make a great country's people cowards who cannot wield weapons." (1. 12. 1906)

Again he wrote an editorial titled 'Are Indian's Cowards?' on Japan's martial example. "A few Asiatics soundly beat hundreds and thousands of Russians. This is enough to show the valour of the Asians. The warrior's heaven — Veera Swarkam — is better." (29.12.1906)

He was opposed to those who upheld the value of English edu-

cation. The ideas of the revolutionary movement had to be rooted in Tamil culture and its deepest values; and they had to be spread among the ordinary Tamil masses. This could be done according to him only by adopting a simple style of writing Tamil. This view underlies his poems and songs through which he propagated the idea of the rejuvenation of the Tamil martial spirit as part of the of India's heroic reawakening and liberation.

"Amongst us, the Tamils, manliness is gone, valour is gone. We don't have a country. We don't have a government. Will Saraswathy (the goddess of learning) appear in this country in such a situation?"

"Tamil Nadu has now lost its wealth, independence, physical strength, and mental strength and has descended to a low state. Hence good poets disappeared from this country." In his Puthiya Athisoodi (a book of moral aphorisms for children) he wrote "Dismiss fear. Do not fail in courage. Learn the art of war."

Thilak's idea that the Kshatriya class of India that had been disfranchised by the British, had to reassert itself in the struggle for the nation's emancipation was more real and immediate to Barathy because he came from a Brahmin family from Tinnevely in the deep south that had served the Poligars of Ettayapuram. He was hence, acutely aware of the traditional status of the Maravar in Tamil society and what had befallen them under the British. The great famine of 1876 had brought untold suffering upon the people in the deep south and had led to a further decline in the standing of the poorer sections of the Maravar. They were constantly harassed by the police which was formed by Brahmins and other non-military castes. The poet, a Brahmin who had given up the holy thread, hated Brahminism and his castemen who were servile to the English. To Barathy the Kshatriyas of Tamil Nadu were the Maravar. (This view seems to have been common to Brahmin families that had

Peace Accords and Divided Societies

John M. Richardson Jr. and Jianxin Wang

INTRODUCTION

The peace accords I described did not lead to durable settlements. In this respect they failed. On the other hand, they were pioneering attempts at settling one of the most intractable forms of political conflict. In every case a framework for conflict resolution, agreed upon by some, was created. In several cases, the accords temporarily ended violent conflict and provided a breathing space within which further discussions could go forward. Thus, the peace accords can usefully be viewed as experiments, from which there are lessons to be learned. Identifying those lessons is a major purpose of my effort.

Table 1 summarizes the outcomes of the accords. The Addis Ababa agreement was most successful, contributing to nearly ten years of peace between Northern and Southern Sudanese, but now ethnic conflict rages again. About three years of stability followed the independence of Cyprus, mandated by the London-Zurich accord. In Sri Lanka, violence subsided in the North for about six weeks after the Indo-Lanka Accord was signed, but the accord catalyzed a new conflict in the South. The Punjab Agreement and Canada's Meech Lake Accord produced documents, but few tangible results. One could add to this list the several agreements that have attempted to resolve Northern

John M. Richardson Jr. is Professor of International Affairs and Applied Systems Analysis and Director of Doctoral Studies at the School of International Service, The American University. Jianxin Wang is a Doctoral Candidate in International Relations at the School of International Service. Dr. Richardson's work on this paper was partially supported by a grant from the U. S. Institute of Peace. Mr. Wang's work was supported by a graduate fellowship from The American University.

Prof: Richardson's recent B. C. I. S lecture was based on this paper.

Table 1. Outcomes of Peace Accords

<i>Accord</i>	<i>Outcome</i>
CYPRUS: London-Zurich Agreements (1959)	Greek dominated government proposed constitutional changes in 1963 to modify agreement. Turks withdrew from government. Subsequent unrest resulted in a pro-Greek military coup and occupation of the North by Turkish forces. Turkish Cypriots declared independence in 1983. Subsequent negotiations under U. N. auspices have failed to produce agreement.
SUDAN: Addis Ababa Agreement (Feb. 1972)	Agreement implemented as the Southern Provinces Regional Self Government Act. Act unilaterally abrogated by President Nimeri in 1982. Government attempted to implement Sharia nationwide in 1984. Conflict between SPLM/SPLA and Sudan Government forces continues.
INDIA: Punjab Accord (July 1985)	Provisions of the accord have not been implemented. Accord is now 'forgotten' by both sides. Sikh signatory, Sand Longwal assassinated by militants. Conflict between Sikh militant groups and Indian Government forces continues.
CANADA: Lake Meech Accord (June 1987)	Accord initially accepted by provincial premiers, but subsequently failed ratification as a constitutional amendment in two provinces. Status of Quebec unresolved Accord also raised consciousness about status of aboriginal 'nations.' Aboriginal status issues also unresolved.
SRI LANKA: Indo Lanka Accord (July, 1987)	LTTE failed to honour accord. Indian Peace Keeping Force failed to subdue LTTE. Northeastern Provincial Government officials fled after declaring independence. Conflict between LTTE and Sri Lanka Government forces continues.

Ireland's ethnic conflict, plus other negotiations and accords, signed and unsigned, that have failed to produce lasting peace. Shortcomings in peace accords point to the two questions addressed in this paper, which reviews both "scholarly" and "practical" studies of conflict resolution: (1) Why did the peace accords fail to achieve their objectives? (2) How can those concerned with resolving ethnic conflicts do better?

Apparently, ethnic conflict has not yet captured the interest of most conflict resolution scholars. A computer search of the major book collection in the Washington D. C. area devoted to "conflict resolution" produced 392 titles of which 121 were devoted to "international conflict resolution," but only 3 to "ethnic conflict resolution." A search of the

⁷ The collection is found in George Mason University's Fenwick Library.

Ethnopolitics and the erosion of democracy

Izeth Hussain

Our High Commission in Canada was transformed into an Emigration Office. The Canadian Government, in disgust, imposed quota restrictions on the number of personnel in our mission. The report suggests that the same sort of thing might be happening under the present dispensation. According to the logic of the argument developed in this article, the writer does not expect the opposition to go into these matters and bring out the details in Parliament.

It seems superfluous to go into further detail in support of our argument, but we might briefly consider the family tree. Under the UNP it became a family forest, or rather a roaring luxuriant tropical jungle, the 1977 Government showing itself to be perhaps the most nepotist in the contemporary world. In retaliation for the famous pamphlet on the SLFP family tree, the opposition did not think of publishing an encyclopedia on the family jungle of the United Nepotist Party. Pointless, because the beneficiaries were mostly Sinhalese. The ethnic issue was not involved.

A possible counter-argument to our line of argument has to be considered. This arises out of SLFP human rights activism through the Mother's Front. Human rights by definition are rights intrinsic to the very condition of being human, irrespective of creed, community, and caste, and therefore the human rights activism means that the SLFP has crossed ethnic frontiers. This is not convincing.

It will be remembered that when the Richard de Soya case first erupted, the SLFP took it up but quickly lost steam, which was entirely predictable according to our argument. It did not involve the ethnic issue. The

Mother's Front took shape a year later, and since then some SLFP members have claimed a leading role in that movement.

What is at issue are disappearances over the JVP insurrection which took place in majority Sinhalese areas. The victims were mostly Sinhalese, and what is really at issue are Sinhalese rights, not the rights of Tamils or Muslims. Involvement in the Mother's Front provides no earnest whatever that the SLFP is really concerned about human rights as such, anymore than any of our other political parties. Since there are these demands for investigations over the disappearances why, one wonders, have there been no demands for investigations over the 1983 pogrom, a matter surely of immense consequence for Sinhalese-Tamil relations. The truth is that our major parties, and perhaps all our parties, continue to function within the framework of our ethnopolitics.

In this article we are examining the possible role of the opposition in restoring democracy. We have argued that the opposition lack of dynamism has been common to all our opposition parties, since sometime after 1960, a fact which requires explanation not in terms of the shortcomings of any particular party or leader but in structural terms, that is in terms of the very structure of our political life. Our politics have been essentially ethnopolitics, and therefore the inadequacies of the opposition can be explained in terms of our ethnopolitics. A curious feature of the opposition performance, which we have examined in some detail, has been the making of generalized charges while ignoring the concrete, the particular, the individual cases which alone can galvanize the public. What might look like

potentially explosive issues have been given no more than lackadaisical treatment in the form of generalized charges. The explanation for this curiosity is that only the ethnic issue has been regarded as explosive. The opposition lack of dynamism is inherent in the structure of our politics, which is essentially ethnopolitics.

This argument leads to a question, which is whether anything but our present non-democracy can be expected, apart from some measures of democratization, as long as our politics remain ethnopolitics. We have already noted that democratic politics tend to break down under ethnic pressure. The opposition may have no democratic role to play.

The counter-argument to what we have argued might be developed along the following lines. Modern democracy is a phenomenon of the modern state, of which the distinguishing characteristic is that the individual relates directly to the state cutting across all religious, racial, ethnic, caste or other groups. The next point is that modern democracy is essentially liberal democracy, no other variety of democracy being regarded as feasible consequent to the discrediting of Communism, and liberal democracy relates to the bourgeois social order. It might be argued with some show of plausibility that Sri Lankan society is largely, though not entirely, pre-modern and tribalist and the bourgeois transformation has not advanced very much, so that democracy cannot be expected to function properly in Sri Lanka for the time being. But both those points apply also to India, where democracy flourishes. And we must remember that we too had a flourishing democracy at one time.

Certain social-economic changes can take place in Sri Lanka,

improving the prospects for democracy. Ethnic policies followed by successive governments since 1948 have brought horror, not just to the minorities, but to the Sinhalese as well. People are grouping for a way out. Our ethnopolitics may not disappear in a hurry, but a reaction against ethnopolitics could become important. The other change is a more certain one, namely the bourgeois transformation which is proceeding apace. The 1977 economic policies can be modified, but not reversed except perhaps for a brief and unsuccessful period. A point that has to be made is that the important place that has to be given to the market in an open economy can impact favourably on the ethnic problem, for reasons which will take too long to explore here.

Already the economic changes that have been taking place are having an enormously significant political impact. For decades the only issue on which the Government could be shaken between elections was the ethnic issue. Now there is also the

economic issue. Formerly, because of the welfare system the mass of the people, though not the JVP, could await the elections to express their economic discontent. Now Sri Lanka is becoming like other countries where economic policies have been influenced or dictated by the IMF. We may be moving away from a situation in which the only politics that really counted was ethnopolitics, and that could be favourable for democracy.

In assessing the prospects for democracy, we should look at the significance of what has been happening over the Kandalama Hotel Project. The opposition brought up the Thondaman factor, that is the ethnic issue, because in terms of the paradigm of ethnopolitics the most effective way of butting the Government is to bring up the ethnic issue. The Government's riposte has pounced on an ethno-religious issue, the display of Christian crosses of a Buddhist precinct, because in terms of the same paradigm the best way of discrediting the opposition is to

invoke an ethnic issue of some sort. The rhetoric of the Government and the opposition about promoting ethnic harmony is one thing, the reality of ethnopolitics quite another. But something else is happening. The Catholics went in their thousands to affirm their solidarity with their Buddhist brothers and sisters. It may be that, after decades, the people of Sri Lanka are beginning to count again.

The opposition must take that prospect, and the prospect for democracy seriously. They must show their seriousness by mounting a meaningful campaign for press freedom. And they must stop their soporific vapourings over generalised charges, and bring up the hard concrete issues that can really expose the Government. In doing that the opposition will be acting in a way that is usual in a democracy, which should help establish their democratic credentials and also promote a movement away from Sri Lankan non-democracy.

VASA OPTICIANS

207, 2nd Cross Street,
Colombo - 11.

Telephone : 4 2 1 6 3 1

The Impact of Growth on the Peasantry

Kumudu Kusum Kumara

Despite the differences in the means adopted by UNP and SLFP regimes to achieve self-sufficiency in rice and the general thrust of the development policies, in the post-colonial Sri Lanka the State emerges as the most single influencing factor promoting the growth of the peasant agriculture (as well as the overall economy), with profound effects on growth through its economic policies.

In the context of the high growth levels achieved in the peasant sector in the post-colonial Sri Lanka, the next question relevant for our discussion is 'What has been the impact of this growth on the peasantry?'. An attempt to provide an answer to this question is made in the following section.

The dispossession of peasantry which reached acute proportions during the colonial rule, under the domination of the plantation economy, continued in the post-colonial period (Report of the Kandyan Peasant Commission, 1951; Yalman, 1954; Sarkar and Tambiah, 1957; Ryan, 1958). Increasing commercialization and monetization of the rural economy combined with rising number of dependents on existing land continued to place the peasantry at the mercy of the elite groups: plantation interests, landlords, traders, money lenders, and the petty bourgeoisie which emerged on the ancillaries of the plantation economy. Land fragmentation, share-cropping, landlessness, unemployment and underemployment continued to characterise the peasant economy.

These problems were initially eased to a certain extent by the post-colonial developments. Resettlement programs provided land for a large number of landless from the wet zone. Expansion of area under irrigation, the introduction of the GPS, the provision of agricultural extension, services and subsidies on inputs, and the promotion of

modern cultural practices together with the external circumstances which were discussed earlier helped to bring about an overall dynamic growth in the peasant economy.

The growth, along with higher yields, brought about many other significant changes. These changes have been recorded in numerous case studies and surveys (Hammed et al, 1977; Morrison et al, 1979; Abeysekera ed., 1985; Census of Agriculture; ARTI, 1974, 1975, 1977; Shanmugaratnam 1980, 1987; De Vroey and Shanmugarathnam, 1984; Gunasinghe, 1976, 1985a). The evidence from these studies unless otherwise stated is used in this section to make some general observations. While domestic agriculture was increasingly commercialised, capitalist relations penetrated the rural society. Peasants were now marketing a higher share of paddy than before, while in addition to paddy, increasingly switching over to the cultivation of cash crops from that of subsistence crops (Hameed, 1979:192; ARTI 1977; Wickremasekera, 1985:97). The use of traditional forms of exchange labour such as *attam* had significantly declined in areas where it has been a prominent feature. Almost all categories of cultivators used wage labour in varying degrees signifying the emergence of capitalist relations of agriculture (ARTI, 1975:18).

The overall impact of this growth in the peasant economy on the peasantry in the post-colonial period has been one of slow and uneven social differentiation of peasantry, while agrarian relations have basically remained the same: family labour is predominant while share tenancy prevails. The process of social differentiation has given rise to a small stratum of rich peasants, and marginalised a section of the poor peasants who have become landless agricultural workers in the midst of a large mass of middle, and poor peasants. Agricultural wage labour

is almost totally casual/part time employment (Gunasinghe, 1979; Shanmugaratnam, 1980, 1987); In some rural areas, agricultural settlements in particular, a very small stratum of rural entrepreneurs of non-peasant origin is seen to be emerging (Wickramasekera, 1985; Gunasinghe, 1985a, b; Shanmugaratnam, 1987). The peasant bourgeoisie, a thin layer of affluent farmers or rich peasants represent a dynamic force within peasant society in the growth of peasant agriculture; they produce a marketable surplus of paddy and other food crops as well as commercial crops such as tobacco; they use only or mainly hired labour, bio-chemical technology and intensify land-water use through multiple cropping; many of them own farm machinery which are also hired out. Many of them have also concentrated a larger than average area of land in their hands (Shanmugaratnam, 1980:98 Hameed et al, 1977: 117). Another newly emerging group which represents the dynamism in the growth of domestic agriculture is the rural entrepreneurs, however, not of peasant origin: they are mostly traders, government officials, and professionals (Shanmugaratnam-1987: 201). They directly cultivate large tracts of paddy land up to 25-30 acres leased in on money rent from peasants, using the complete package of modern technology and exclusively wage labour. They combine cultivation with a number of other activities which provide the basis of their capital accumulation. These entrepreneur cultivators in the settlement areas at the same time own threshing mills, farm machinery and lorries; they also engage in large scale grain trade, money lending, government contract work, and supplying goods and services to the government. All these activities elevate them to the position of entrepreneurs

(Continued on page 13)

The J. R. Years: The Second Phase

A. Jayaratnam Wilson

President Jayewardene's term of office can be divided into two phases the first 1977-1983 was the more rewarding when he accomplished a great many things. The second, 1983-9, was disaster laden. He got involved in wars of attrition. He miscalculated fatally, imagining that his army could bring what he called the "terrorists", the word he used for the Tamil insurrectionists, easily to book! Again he listened to the wrong people, in all probability to the ministers closest to him.

The question has often been posed that he was a wicked communal politician who derived pleasure in skewering the Tamils. This perception goes back to the days when he mobilised Sinhala opinion against the BC Pact. There was no evidence of personal anti-Tamilism during 1977-83. In office he wanted peace to promote economic development. He was willing to pay a price, the District Development Councils, even though he feared a Sinhala backlash. On his opposition to the BC Pact, he took great pains to explain that he was against it because under its provisions, "the Matale Council could vote to merge with Jaffna". Nobody was deceived, including perhaps he himself. But he also used the alibi that he fully supported the DC Pact of 1965, a fact which cannot be disputed. 1983, things went awry and he was driven to the wall. But he let all this happen because he delayed implementing the DDC legislation of 1980. His ministers fed him with prejudicial information. And so did the state intelligence apparatus.

There is nevertheless the need to dispose of the accusation of communalism vis-a-vis the Ceylon Tamils. A few episodes can provide partial explanations. One answer is that Mr. Jayewardene wanted to retain power, if not for himself, at any rate for his party. There is indubitable evidence that until 1984, he had

decided he would not seek a third term despite the possibility that the constitution could have been amended. I cannot speak for what happened after 1984 as I ceased to have contact with him. Till then he talked of retirement and sought information on the benefits that were by law available to ex-presidents of the United States. Before the end of his first term, he was even wont to discuss early retirement. Presumably it became evident to him that the ethnic situation in the island was getting unmanageable. He said he felt deeply distressed after an outbreak of Sinhala-Tamil violence around 1980-81. One obtained the impression that the burdens of office were telling on him. He had in him also a strong streak of sensitivity.

During this phase, he remarked that one of his ambitions had been to have himself, Thondaman and Amirthalangam on the same platform, a very serious comment. He had no personal antipathy against the Tamils though here, individual one-to-one relationship must not be confused with mob psychology, when the battle lines are drawn between the two peoples.

He spoke affectionately of one or two Tamils but he was misdirecting himself here. Chelvanayakam, Naganathan and M. Tiruchelvam, he said had been his "good friends" unlike their successors in the TULF whom he described as "small minds, small people". He asked me the surprising question once as to "why the Tamils could not have leaders like V. Manicavasagar" the retired Supreme Court justice who lives next door to his Ward Place residence. (Manicavasagar was seriously concerned about the future of the Tamils but never entertained political ambitions.) He expressed concern for "Gnanam", a friend who after the riots of July 1983 had, he said, decided to move to Madras. With visible grief he related how the former UF minister, C. Ku-

marasuriar, was being marched by a Sinhala gang "with his hands tied with a rope to be cast into flames". "Fortunately", he added, "our party men" knew who he was and rescued "this majestic man" just in time. Never ever in his conversations even in his most relaxed and unguarded moments did he refer to the Ceylon Tamils derogatorily.

But there are other aspects of Mr. Jayewardene which are difficult to explain. To my surprise, a western academic told me that the president in explaining the communal conflict, referred to "us" (the Sinhalese) and "them", the Ceylon Tamils. I asked him once why he did not dismiss Cyril Mathew to which he gave the unconvincing reply that he needed Mathew as "a counter to Mrs. Bandaranaike's anti-Tamil propaganda". Mathew used to occasionally attend the JR-TULF talks. Mathew never uttered a word. I referred more than once to his "poker faced countenance", adding that I thought Mathew had deep convictions and should therefore be persuaded about the correctness of the UNP government's approach to the Tamil problem. Mr. Jayewardene parried this question, at least more than once. Mathew he said looked always the way he did and was devoid of humour. He laughingly referred to the Sinhalese kings peopling their borders with Mathew's kind. They are "hard fighters who will resist", or words to that effect.

Mathew wrote a letter to the president which contained a sentence I well remember: "Your Excellency is bending over backwards to please the Tamils and you will soon fall flat on your face". I asked what he planned to do. "I will dismiss him unless he apologises". To which I said that he ran the risk of losing the support of Mathew's people. He shot back the reply "he will have no power once he ceases to be a minister". Mr.

Jayewardene however was totally free of caste prejudices. Caste only came into consideration as a component of a political calculation.

The possible conclusion is that Mr. Jayewardene stood for the class to which he belonged. He tried to put together all the diverse forces in the island's multi-ethnic polity for political ends. They were relevant or dysfunctional insofar as they would be helpful to him. The Ceylon Tamils think otherwise and look on him as a demon. Impressions cannot be easily rectified.

There is then the question of party politics. The President was first, last and always for the United National Party. A senior western academic was quite disappointed with the president's reply when at a seminar he asked him what in his opinion was the most important contribution he had made for his country. He replied that after its 1956 humiliation, he lifted his party from the depths. Loyalty to his party in all probability explains his conciliatory relationship with his prime minister, Mr. R. Premadasa. Even in his most unguarded moments he referred to Mr. Premadasa quite respectfully as "prime minister", nor did he address him by name. He often stated that whereas he had evolved his political skills through "insights, instinct, intuition" and "an intellectual turn of mind" over many many years, the prime minister had similar talents having learned these in the school of life. He did not want to disturb the waters by setting off aspirants against each other. Gamini Dissanayake from 1977 to 1983 looked on Mr. Premadasa as the successor. I ceased to be familiar with the party situation after 1983.

President Jayewardene could not by any stretch of the imagination be regarded as ego-centered. During 1977-83, the word "I" was seldom ever used. He thought always of major decisions as collective undertakings. He complained but only once that his problem had been that his

ministers were inexperienced. He disliked Mrs. Gandhi but here he appeared to miscalculate. When I cautioned him, he waved it aside stating that the lady will not be returned. She was to be the bane of his life on the Tamil question. He went to Pakistan and made the "Zindabad" remark much to the annoyance of Delhi. He thought that President Reagan would stand by him after his visit to the White House in 1984. At a two hour meeting with him at Claridges (UK) in 1984, I urged him, alas, to reach an understanding with Mrs Gandhi but it failed to have any impact. He just did not grasp that by 1983, militant Tamil nationalism and Tamil resistance had come to stay and that it was useless without settling with the militants first to deal with Mr. Rajiv

The Impact...

(Continued from page 11)

with a very high outlay of capital and political power to back them (Gunasinghe, 1985 a: xi-xii).

With surplus accumulation and some concentration of agricultural land in their hands, rich peasants enjoy improved living standards. The emergence of agrarian entrepreneurs who cultivate relatively larger tracts of agricultural land, leased in from peasants, using exclusively wage labour also indicates increases in the opportunities of improved incomes in the form of wages for the rural poor.

In an overall sense, despite the continuing if not worsening income disparities, the real incomes of the rural masses except for the lowest income group increased partly due to the growth in the peasant economy, leading to relative improvements in their living standards. 'Except perhaps for the lowest decile, from 1973 to 1978/79, there was some trickling down of the benefits of growth to low income groups by way of an increase in their real incomes' (Lakshman, 1986:28). As illustrated by the real income figures for the lowest decile, which deteriorated over 1973-1978/79 period (from a mean one


Gandhi or the Tamil parliamentarians. The DDCs by then had become museum pieces.

On the matter of violations of human rights, he was at first very concerned. He read the report of AI and wondered what he could do. The advice that he should ensure that there should be no repetition went unheeded. Mr. Jayewardene's problem was age. His ministers, officials, policemen and soldiers thought they could flout him in the belief that he would fade from the scene. But the President completed his two terms. Power and its trappings had their attractions for him for their own sake. He failed to exercise power for constructive purposes because economic and political circumstances engulfed him and became a lonely sailor adrift on an uncharted sea.

month income per income receiver of Rs.33 to Rs.29) but recovered to reach the 1973 level again in 1981/82, the real incomes of the poorest group remained at the same level about over a decade. Absolute poverty among the lowest income groups in the country has increased as reflected in their 'severe nutritional deprivation' (NAFNS: 74; Thorbecke and Svejnar, 1987: 25). Poorer people have been spending almost three fourth of their income on basic food items. In the rural areas the extent of extreme poverty is found to be higher among the smallest land holding categories. The increased malnutrition and deteriorating health and educational standards with increasing mortality rates in the post-1977 period for the first time in the post-colonial period (Laksman, 1986: 30) most probably concentrated in the poorest sections of the society, among whom marginalised peasantry would form a majority, raises serious social and political concerns. It is very likely that unemployed young members of marginalised peasant families would have in desperation joined the *Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)* or the Peoples Liberation Front which mounted an anti-systemic violent campaign in the latter part of 1980's.

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The Tamil middle class radicalised

Dr Siri Gamage

INTRODUCTION

Most of the writings on so-called ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka point the finger at the Sri Lankan state for creating the necessary grounds for the radicalisation of the Tamil middle class and the continuing ethnic violence (e.g. Arasaratnam 1987, Nithiyanandan 1987; Hellman-Rajanayagam 1991; Ponnambalam 1983, Tambiah 1986; Wilson 1982, 1988). Many writers ascribe the increased tempo in the antagonism between Tamil political leadership and the Lankan state whose leadership has remained basically in the hands of Sinhala elites to several key areas of policy failures or discriminations, (e.g. Mathews 1988; Nithiyanandan 1987; Perumal and Thandavan 1989). Increasingly some Tamil leaders and intellectuals have also been forthcoming in their claim for a separate, independent state based on historical, ethnic and cultural factors. Another set of writers ascribe the root cause of the conflict to historically and culturally constructed ethno-ideologies or perceptions of the two ethnic groups in each others view as well as the view of self. In fact, there has been a proliferation of writings in this area covering topics such as nationalism, identity, consciousness and ideology (e.g. Nissan 1989; Valentine Daniel 1989; Jayawardene 1990; Mathews 1988-89; De Silva 1986).

In another paper, I have dealt with the way the Sinhala rural petty-bourgeoisie (RPB) evolved as a political force, showed signs of radicalisation at times, and in the eighties were structurally incorporated by the state making it a conservative force (Gamage 1992). There I did not deal with the re-radicalisation of the RPB youth by the

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Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) between 1987-1989. Nonetheless, it represents the second major recent historical instance when the Sinhala RPB in Sri Lanka became radicalised making it an oppositional political as well as military force against the elitist State. For the second time since independence that State was able to suppress this radical uprising of the Sinhala RPB. What I plan to do in this paper is a similar exercise to what I do in the other paper. Namely, to use a 'class perspective' as against an 'ethnic perspective' and to examine the so-called 'ethnic conflict' in terms of the selected class perspective. How far does this conflict represent a radicalisation of Tamil RPB or rather its youthful elements as in the case of Sinhala RPB as exemplified by the JVP uprisings? If so, what were the economic and political factors responsible for this radicalisation? Why is it not possible for the Sri Lankan State which controlled the Sinhala RPB radicalisation so successfully, at least for the time being, to control Tamil RPB radicalisation? Is there any benefit to the State in continuing a war with the Tigers of the Tamil Eelam? These are some of the questions that will guide my thoughts through the following pages.

The study of radicalisation or conservatism of a given class assumes significance because it is this radicalism or conservatism which determines the objectives, strategies and ideologies of political struggles launched by various classes. A political conflict cannot be properly under-

stood by limited analysis of its legal consequences of constitutional consequences alone when the conflict has assumed serious proportions in terms of a continuing armed struggle. One has to examine the force behind the warring parties, their social and class origins, and their objectives as well.

It is common and even convenient to describe the ongoing conflict between the Sri Lankan Government forces and the forces of the Tamil Tigers as an 'ethnic conflict' between the Tamils and Sinhalese people primarily because the chief protagonists in the conflict belong to these two ethnic groups. Definition of the conflict in such broad, culturally couched terms and concepts, while giving added flesh and blood in terms of popular understanding of the conflict, does not necessarily offer us a full understanding of the nature of true social forces involved, directly or indirectly. If we go a step further, beyond the ethnic categories, it will give us a different kind of understanding. In this paper, I look at the conflict from a 'class perspective' instead of an 'ethnic perspective' and try to decipher somewhat different details. In doing so, I need to describe different perspectives proposed by various writers as useful in the study of this conflict and those which appear to me as relevant.

Gunasinghe outlines four perspectives or 'perceptions' which he considers as linked with various social strata, factions and forces that are detrimental to any solution (Gunasinghe 1987). These four perceptions or reconstructions of social reality are:

1. Nation besieged perspective
2. 'It is individuals, not ethnicity that matters' perspective

3. Recognition of nationalities and devolution of power perspective

4. Eelam perspective.

The 'most articulate exponents of the first are the middle level mercantile elements engaged in trade competition, sections of the Buddhist monkhood, factions within the traditional intelligentsia who generally derive from a rural propertied background and cohorts of urban professionals who are generally self-employed and placed in highly competitive situations'. According to the second perspective Sri Lanka is viewed as a multi-ethnic, multi-religious country. Equality of opportunity is emphasised in education, employment and getting land. Right to live in any part of the island is also emphasised. The most articulate exponents are top entrepreneurs and westernised business executives, urban oriented educated monks. If not succumbed to the first perspective in times of ethnic tension, urban lower middle class may also share this perspective. The third constellation of perception, the least mytho-ideological one, proceeds from a concrete analysis of the concrete conditions. The multi-ethnic character of society is recognised by this perspective. During and after the British rule, ethnic consciousness increased and the communities drifted apart through the competitive political and economic processes. Elements of the Sinhala middle class believe that the Tamils were over represented in Government service under the British rule. Since independence this situation was corrected in various ways to advantage of Sinhalese for e.g. in terms of land, employment, education and language provisions. For the Tamils, the only way out is to obtain a substantial devolution of power amounting to regional autonomy. Entire political system has to be democratised and the existing presidential system modified or changed. Eelam perspective which is common to the Tamil armed militant group emphasises the notions of a separate state

within which Tamil people gain the right to self-determination and national sovereignty. The Tamil militants are not very different from the Sinhala youth who waged armed insurrection against the government. One difference is that there is mass empathy for the Tamil militants among Tamils.

In a review of literature dealing with the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict further perspectives can be discerned. They are given below:

- 1) As a class and political response to the traditional Tamil political leadership: i. e. Colombo based, elitist, Tamil United Front (TULF): radicalism of the new generation of lower-middle class youth in the Northern province and parts of the Eastern province is the focus.
- 2) As an ethnic and political response to the established, elitist, national political leadership, which is primarily Sinhala Buddhist, Colombo and South based: discrimination and grievance based arguments as well as the failure of the nation state to fulfil the aspirations of the Tamils are the key focus. Radicalisation of Tamil youth is viewed as a result of such discrimination.
- 3) As a territorial claim deriving from historical, traditional cultural and population factors: derive inspiration from similar minority or indigenous people's movements around the world: the inalienable right of the Northern Tamils to 'self-determination' through a 'traditional homeland' called Eelam is the focus. Human rights violations by the state are emphasised and the powers of international law are invoked.
- 4) Sinhalese politicians who received state power after independence in 1948 are seen as mismanaging the ethnic rivalries either by betraying the principles of democracy formally and/or informally or

by allowing the ethnic passions to dominate over universal principles of democracy. (There is a group of elite intellectuals who argue that the democracy in Sri Lanka has withstood the test of time, notwithstanding the conflicts which have claimed an enormous number of lives.)

5. As a question of two nationalisms competing for supremacy among two distinct populations but also with contested territorial claims in the context and beyond the concept (or construct) of the Nation state. There are differing views about the origins of Tamil Nationalism. e.g. Roberts sees it as a response to Sinhala Buddhist Nationalism (Robert 1988). De Silva sees the effects of South Indian nationalism/separatism flowing into the Northern nationalism (De Silva 1988).
- 6) The heartland of Jaffna peninsula is not economically viable on its own. Therefore the need for a wider hinterland to sustain economically a society and culture based in the Jaffna peninsula is emphasised. Traditionally this had been Vanni, Mannar and Batticaloa. But it is the land claimed by others like the Sinhalese and Muslims. The 'homeland argument' is partly based on this underlying economic necessity (e.g. Rajanayagam 1990; 103-106).
- 7) As a legal and constitutional exercise for the devolution of power to minorities: the centralisation of power is viewed as a British legacy which the post-independent governments in Sri Lanka were reluctant or unable to repudiate until the 1980s. The elitist, westernised Colombo legal bureaucracy associated with political parties and the government is very active in this area.

Looking at these various perspectives that one can adopt in examining the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict, and indeed the way

they have been used by various writers, it seems that a key question involved here is what Worsley has outlined as follows:

The overall question is whether conflicts between ethnic and racial groups derive from perceptions of physical and cultural differences which one group sees in another, or whether they rest upon the fact that there are conflicts of interest generated by the Political and economic structure, without which the cultural difference would exist — and be noted — but would not give rise to inter-ethnic or inter-racial conflict.

(Worsley 1987: 345)

Efforts to describe the political and armed conflict between the Tigers of the Tamil Eelam and the Sri Lankan state dominated by the Sinhala elites as a conflict between Sinhala and Tamil people or ethnic groups are misleading in several ways. Firstly, such efforts minimise the importance of a highly stratified social organisation in Sri Lankan society — North and South — in terms of social classes based on economic differentiation which started with the European colonial occupation of the island. Secondly, they underestimate the capacity of such social forces as classes to act as political forces with a 'political consciousness' conditioned by their specific socio-economic environment. Thirdly, they give priority to 'cultural' and 'ideological' factors in trying to explain the causes and consequences of the conflict without acknowledging that such ideological or cultural factors emerge out of the material conditions prevailing in a society. Finally, those who follow this line of argument operate with broad ethnic categories like 'Sinhala' and 'Tamil' as if they are homogeneous categories and go on making analyses and interpretations as well as broad generalisation, e.g. Tamil opinion vs Sinhala opinion.

I would like to give one example. Many writings on this

conflict refer to the Tamil opinion and Sinhala opinion as if they were uniform, historically and ideologically conditioned views. However, a closer examination of the opinion of either the Tamil people or Sinhala people would reveal that this is not the case. When I was doing field research in the

Sinhala heartland of central hills in Kandy in 1985-86, I included a question in my field questionnaire about the so-called 'ethnic conflict' widely known in the area as 'the terrorist problem'. Given below are the response I received from 110 households in the settlement called *Rajagama*.

TABLE 1

Table Giving Details of the Variety of Opinion held by Rajagama Residents About the Tamil Problems

The Main View Expressed	Number of Respondents
It is not good because so many die	21
Stops development, destroys public property	14
Peace must be established	14
The country should be divided	05
Until a part of the country is given to them it cannot be solved	03
The problem has increased, become complex	03
Their (the Tamils) fight is correct (justified)	03
A military solution is the right one	03
Their (the Tamils) part has to be given (to them)	02
Destroys the Sinhalese race	02
Am against the Provincial Councils (which would give internal autonomy to the Tamils)	02
It should have been nipped in the bud	02
It does not affect us	01
Whatever is given to the Tamils, will not be enough to satisfy them	01
The poor men go to the army, they die	01
No solution is possible	01
More power should be given to the army	01
Can be solved only through Buddhist philosophy (i.e. through not considering them as enemies or with violence)	01
All the terrorists should be killed	01
Am for the Provincial Councils	01
With a general election it can be solved	01
A leftist government can solve the problem	01
Any solution has to be within a unitary state	01
They are asking for a separate state (it can't be granted)	01
Terrorism has to be destroyed	01
India is interfering	01
Party politics is responsible for the problem	01
No idea	11
No response	10
	110

What this table shows is the sheer diversity of opinion about the conflict among residents who are normally generalised as the 'Sinhala people'. It is of interest to note that some residents even support the Tamil cause. If at all, it also shows the impact of 'development ideology' imposed upon the populace of Sri Lanka by each successive government. Fourteen people viewed the conflict in terms of its effect on the development of the country. Instead of a dominant view or two, there are a large number of minority opinions. This also disproves Gunasingh's claim that the urban lower middle class and the 'peasantry' support the second perspective that he described (I like to call the second perspective as democratic or multicultural). A common desire for peace is also revealed. It is duty of the social scientists to bring out complex dimensions of this conflict, as evident from the diversity of views, so that the dialogue and negotiation can be better informed — rather than trying to describe the conflict in terms of stereotypical, conventional ideologies such as those of nationalism, communalism or chauvinism on both sides. Any 'ism' developed by the Tamils and Sinhalese, or rather their urban elites or the rural petty-bourgeois elites, has to be understood in terms of the changing ground conditions in the economy and the polity as well as the forces unleashed by these changes, including class forces — leading to the creation of such 'isms'. Therefore on the basis of available literature on the subject, I will examine the economic, political and other factors which led to the present conflict, and the class forces providing the political leadership in the current conflict with a focus on the Tamil side.

In searching for the factors or causes of the conflict under consideration, various writers look at it in terms of history, politics, economics, language, culture and ideology. They emphasise one or other of these

dimensions. As stated already some emphasise the language, culture, identity and ideology aspect. Some others emphasise the power and political aspect whereas others emphasise the economic, employment, education and land aspects. For my purpose, it would be unnecessary and even impossible to engage in a detailed examination of all these dimensions or even one selected dimension for that matter. Since my aim is rather to look at the class character of this conflict, I need only to proceed quickly and briefly by way of a survey through these various causes and dimensions. Therefore, I will use a representative article from the many hundreds of such written on the subject which I consider as giving a condensed and concise description of various causes leading to the conflict. I have selected an article by Arasaratnam, a well known Sri Lankan-Australian historian. Arasaratnam's paper is titled '*Sinhala-Tamil Relations in Modern Sri Lanka (Ceylon)*' and appeared in a book edited by Jerry Boucher and others (*Ethnic Conflict: International Perspectives*, Sage 1987). Another article giving a similar chronological description is by Nithiyanandan, an economist from Jaffna University. It is titled '*An analysis of Economic Factors Behind the Origin and Development of Tamil Nationalism in Sri Lanka*' which appeared in a book edited by Charles Abeysekera and Newton Gunasinghe (*Facets of Ethnicity in Sri Lanka, Social Scientists Association, Colombo, 1987*).

According to Arasaratnam there was a pluralism in Sri Lankan society before the arrival of colonial rulers. This was frozen during the colonial rule (1505-1948). Competition between Tamils and Sinhala in the economy, education and public service however increased. Greater interaction existed among the ethnic elites who used communal matters for political horse-trading. A horizontal integration was achieved. The vast sub-elite mass was un-

touched for a long time by the political activities of the elites. In 1951 the ruling elite was factionalised. With the election victory of Bandaranaike in 1956 an ideology of Sinhala nationalism evolved in contrast to the elite nationalism. It was based on an idealised or imagined past of glorious Sinhala kingdoms, extensive political power and high cultural achievements. The Sinhalese were portrayed as the custodians of Buddhism and the island. The Sinhala hegemonic state used this ideology for its own purposes, especially at times of communal tension. The state used the power gained this way to provide educational and employment opportunities for Sinhala educated youth and to widen commercial opportunities for an emerging class of small-scale Sinhala entrepreneurs. The Tamils were negatively discriminated in the areas of education and employment.

The issue of land colonisation also affected the hearts and minds of Tamils severely. These concerns led to the politicisation of large segments of Tamil population. By 1979 parameters of political activity and the ground rules of political participation had changed fundamentally. 1976, the major Tamil party adopted the right of self determination as its political platform. It was only reacting to the radicalisation of opinion and the birth of Tamil youth militancy. The militancy had its origins in early seventies.

The Government was now faced with two opponents, the TULF on the political and parliamentary front and the Tigers on the military front. The TULF was not amenable to compromise settlements as they saw the Tamil militants over their shoulders. They increasingly talked the extremist language of separation and an independent Tamil state. They would certainly not settle for anything less than substantial devolution of power. The Government had behind them the forces of Sinhala extremism that had secured a new

(Continued on page 21)

North-South battle begins

Thalif Deen

NEW YORK

The proposed restructuring of the United Nations is expected to be one of the most politically controversial issues of the 47th General Assembly session which begins here 15 September.

The poor countries, which comprise the majority within the world body, are accusing the North of trying to manipulate the restructuring process in order to give added political weight to Western powers over developing nations.

'There is a growing suspicion,' the Geneva-based South Centre warned in a recent report, 'that through institutional change, the UN is being steered in a direction which would give still greater influence than in the past to a few major and wealthy developed powers of the world.'

The South already has rejected a proposal for a 50-50 equal representation of donor and recipient countries in the governing bodies of technical cooperation programmes.

'This is totally inconsistent with the principle of universality advocated by the United Nations,' a Third World diplomat said.

Under the first phase in the process of restructuring, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali announced in February the closure of several UN departments which were in charge of social and economic cooperation and coordination, and their absorption by a single department.

The 12 offices/departments which were discontinued as separate entities include the Office of the Director-General for Development and International Economic Co-

operation, the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, and that of Technical Cooperation for Development, the Centre for Science and Technology for Development and the UN Centre on Transnational Corporations.

None of these changes, the South Centre said, has been subjected to in-depth analysis or to debate within the UN concerning their implications for the Organisation's priorities and roles, or for the different sets of members.

'Opinions of small countries—and in the South, even large ones—seem mostly to have been neither sought nor considered,' the Centre added.

Until now, the proposals for restructuring have come mostly from Western industrialised nations and by the Secretary-General. The basis for much of the current discussions, however, is a paper formally submitted to the world body by the four Nordic countries, namely, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Sweden.

The 10-page Nordic paper, which has been updated since it was originally issued in May 1991, calls for radical changes the UN system, including the creation of an International Development Council integrating the functions of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

In a 41-page report released here, the South Centre points out that the majority of the world's people live in the South, and that since it is they who will face the basic problems of survival, the South, must play a leading role in defending the ideals of the UN charter.

The report, which is to be discussed by the General Assembly, is the first comprehensive report on restructuring from a Third World perspective.

Chaired by former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, the South Centre was established in 1990 as the follow-up office of the South Commission undertaking a range of activities to promote Southern-based perspectives on global development issues.

The report says that the evolving nature of the UN will have a vital influence on the future shape and management of the post-Cold War international economic and political system.

The crucial matter of restructuring the UN system has therefore to be considered by the highest policy levels of the South, says the report. It says the South is already late since significant changes are already underway, and that merely trying to block them is neither a credible nor viable strategy.

'If the South wishes to exert influence and be taken seriously,' says the report, it will have to seize the initiative, make its own proposals, and engage in serious negotiations to influence the direction of change.'

The Centre recommends that the institutional revitalisation and strengthening of the world body must be a comprehensive exercise which addresses all the organisations within the UN system.

It says one of the main objectives should be to protect and enhance the organisation's democratic character and moral authority, and that efforts to emphasise some areas of UN activity at the expense of others need to be resisted.

The Centre says it is particularly urgent to prevent the UN from being shaped into an instrument for political and economic intervention in the South while leaving the countries of the North outside its jurisdiction.

Further, it says there is an urgent need to strengthen the UN's role, functions and capacities in the economic field, particularly in relation to trade, development, finance, monetary issues and technology.

— Third World Network Features

Thalif Deen a senior Sri Lankan journalist is now Development Editor of Inter Press Service.

Some Case studies:

John M. Richardson Jr. Jianxin Wang

Burton's early classic, *Conflict and Communication* (1969) and a more recent work by Kahn (1988) illustrate a school of thought that emphasizes the importance of communication in conflict resolution. Burton argues that resolving conflicts "must involve processes by which communication can be made to be effective, [that is]... deliberate conveying and accurate receipt and interpretation of what was intended and should be conveyed, and the full employment of information as received and stored in the allocation and reallocation of values, interests and goals" (p. 49). Burton's later work emphasizes that effective communication, while important, represents only one facet of conflict resolution. Kahn, however, presents the more simplistic view that enhanced communication alone will be sufficient to resolve most conflicts.

Azar's work also illustrates a second, although rarely encountered genre in the literature: case studies and comparative case studies of ethnic conflict resolution. Azar's first insights about the distinctive characteristics of protracted conflict grew from in-depth study of his native country Lebanon. This lead provided a basis for further case studies, sponsored by the University of Maryland's Center for International Development and Conflict Management, and to refinement of the "problem-solving forum" strategy for resolving ethnic conflicts. Forums conducted by the Center produced useful insights, but inconclusive results. Rothchild and Hartzell's study of the Sudan peace process (1990) also focuses on the negotiation process and the potential for successful third party mediation. They identify five preconditions favoring success: (1) the emergence of identifiable bargaining parties; (2) evidence of a mutually hurting stalemate;

(3) the existence of leaders determined on a practical solution; (4) external political actors supporting conflict resolution; and (5) the presence of a mediator actively on the scene.

Other case studies focus on the need to address deeply rooted cultural, economic and geopolitical issues as prerequisites for resolving ethnic conflicts. For example, de Silva's work on managing ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka (1986) points to the importance of resolving constitutional questions involving language, religion, representation patterns and devolution of power. Garcia's work on the Philippines (1988, 1989) urges that attention be given to protecting human rights, agrarian reform, delivery of basic social services and the resolution of gross economic inequities. Rupasinghe's collection of papers on Uganda (1989) emphasizes the need for political institutions that are more responsive to minority concerns and more equitable, participatory agricultural development strategies. The authors of these case studies do not agree on what are the essential issues that must be resolved. Probably these issues differ from case to case and culture to culture.

Horowitz's massive comparative study, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (1985) maintains that while deeply rooted issues must be addressed, some ethnic differences may be inherently unresolvable. He believes that conflict reduction, rather than conflict resolution is a more practicable goal in ethnically diverse societies. Horowitz identifies five basic mechanisms of conflict reduction (p. 597): (1) creating proliferating points of power; (2) raising the saliency of intra-ethnic conflict; (3) creating incentives for inter-ethnic cooperation; (4) encouraging alignments based on interests other than ethnicity; and (5) reducing disparities between

groups so that dissatisfaction declines. He proposes that nations live with ethnic differences, rather than attempting to move beyond them, by "engineering" institutional structures and procedures that are based upon an understanding of how political incentives intensify or mitigate tensions. Horowitz believes that "structural techniques" that "change the political framework within which ethnic conflict occurs but do not necessarily make promises about outcomes," will be most effective (Ch. 15). He is skeptical about "distributive policies," such as proportional allocation of government positions, that attempt to directly change the ethnic balance of economic opportunities and rewards.

Eric Nordlinger's *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies* (1972) is an earlier comparative study emphasizing conflict management. The work argues that common characteristics of six cases — Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland, Lebanon and Malaysia — point to a general theory of conflict regulation. Nordlinger claims that these six "divided societies" were free of conflict for long periods of time because elite leaders of protagonist groups were both dominant and politically skillful. By politically skillful, he means that they successfully implemented one or more of six conflict regulating practices (pp. 20, ff): (1) a stable coalition between governing parties; (2) the principle of proportionality; (3) acceptance of a mutual veto; (4) purposive depoliticization; (5) mutual adjustment of conflicting values and interests through compromise and (6) concessions by the stronger group. When conflict regulation succeeds, "at least one of six practices is invariably present (p. 20)."

Horowitz's and Nordlinger's emphasis on conflict regulation (or conflict management), distinguishes their work from most studies of conflict resolution. They are more concerned with stabilizing divided societies over the long run than with ending violent conflicts after they have broken out. Their practices and principles provide useful broad

goals for negotiators, and mediators, however these goals might be difficult to attain or even unreachable when the positions of protagonist groups have been polarized by extended periods of protracted conflict.

Comparative case studies by Lickleider (1990) and Zartman (1985) point to the problems of negotiating successful ethnic peace accords as well providing useful insights for negotiators. However neither deals with ethnic conflicts specifically. Lickleider's study of *How Civil Wars End* emphasizes the limits of so-called "general theories" and the need for third party to be deeply immersed in the details of each case. Mediator's roles in his cases vary widely. In Zimbabwe, third party was decisive. In the Sudan, it was helpful but not decisive. In Yemen, third party intervention contributed to peace by creating a common enemy, which helped to bring the warring parties together (this was hardly the third party's goal, however).

Zartman examines four conflicts in Africa that offer promising opportunities for mediation, i.e. they are "Ripe for Resolution" (1985). He introduces the concept of the "ripe moment" when a mediator with something to offer both sides can sometimes intervene successfully. A "hurting stalemate" can produce a ripe moment (pp. 226-273), however it appears difficult to define ripe moments and hurting stalemates before the fact (Lickleider, 1990).

If negotiation and mediation can contribute to the resolution of at least some protracted conflicts, what are the essential problem-solving and conflict management skills that will make a difference? A considerable literature exists, based on experiences in negotiation, mediation and collaborative problem solving, that attempts to generalize about such skills and to make them accessible to both practitioner and student. Exemplars of this literature are considered next.

Practical Guides to Negotiation, Mediation and Problem Solving.

Practical guides to negotiation, mediation and problem-solving can be divided into those that describe general negotiation skills and those that describe skills specifically applicable to international and/or ethnic conflicts. A second distinction is between

The Tamil...

(Continued from page 18)

lease on life by this new challenge to Sinhala hegemony. The cry for a division of the island raised all the old fears and recreated the old alliance of Buddhist priests, Sinhala literati, entrepreneurs, unemployed and hoodlums. The Government, which was ill-prepared, started to face the armed insurrection with its armed forces.

The armed forces, and to a lesser extent the police, were overwhelmingly Sinhalese and had, after 1961, been impregnated with the Sinhala hegemonistic ideologies that succeeding administrations had espoused. They went into the campaign, not as a professional army fighting a war on behalf of a supracommunal state, but as an army asserting the interests of the Sinhalese against Tamils. The armed forces unleashed an unprecedented campaign of terror in the Tamil areas. The effect of these actions was to alienate Tamils totally from the State and indeed from the Sinhalese, on whose behalf they felt the State was acting.

(Arasaratnam 1987:33-49)

My intention is to use the chronology of events and cited causes adopted from Arasaratnam to examine the nature of class forces involved in the conflict.

The radicalisation of Tamil youths, who were educated, unemployed or under-employed since 1977 has been acknowledged and documented by many other writers apart from Arasaratnam (eg. Robert 1988: 50, Hellman-Rajanayagam 1991: 317, Nithiyanandan 1987: 144). In the article by Arasaratnam, it becomes abundantly clear that the Tamil youths in the North and East of Sri Lanka were facing hardships in terms of employment especially in the last two decades. At one point he states that by 1980, 40 percent of the Tamil youths holding G.C.E. advanced level or ordinary level qualifications were estimated to be unemployed. These figures are contested by other writers on various grounds.

competitive (zero-sum) and problem-solving (positive-sum) approaches. Cohen's *You Can Negotiate Anything* (1980) and Fisher and Ury's widely publicized *Getting to Yes* (1981) provide good examples of works dealing with general negotiation skills. Zartman and Berman's *The Practical* (Continued on page 24)

However, even if the 40 percent figure is a conservative one, details relating to the employment situation of the Tamil youths in other writings corroborate that the employment problem was a major contributing factor to the alienation felt by the youths. This was confirmed by Nithiyanandan when he said:

The 1971 uprising, apart from grim employment prospects faced by the Tamils, served as the singular event that influenced the young blood of the North and East.

When the land settlement issue came up in the political discussions in the eighties, the Government decided to adopt a policy of settling people according to the ethnic ratio in the newly irrigated area under the Maheweli river development scheme. How far this step was really implemented is not known. Even if it was implemented, it was too late especially given the tempo of the radicalisation taking place among the Tamil youths. (To be Continued)

GCEC and...

(Continued from page 4)

conomic situation. Each will be an inter-active factor.

For the important donors as well as the IMF-World Bank it will be the crucial year. Indo-Sri Lanka relations and Delhi's attitude to the Colombo regime will remain a critical variable. President Premadasa's brief visit this month to Delhi, after his highly successful trip to Pakistan, will offer some clues. How Delhi reads the Sri Lanka-Pakistan relationship could also affect the education: High Commissioner Jha's statement to the ISLAND, an attempt to "correct" impressions that may have conveyed by the SUNDAY TIMES report offered some clues.

Gandhi killing

30. Murugan (A11) was given 3 letters, two bound volumes of the book "The Satanic Force" and other articles to be taken to Jaffna and delivered to Prabhakaran (A1), Pottu Omman (A2) and Akila (A3). After reaching Kodiakkarai on 12.5.91, Murugan (A11) retraced his steps to Madras on the pretext that he could not make the clandestine trip due to non arrival of boat. While at Kodiakkarai, Murugan (A11) met Ravichandran & Ravi & Pragasan (A24). He also met Shankar & Koneswaran (A12) who was staying with a LTTE sympathiser and gave him a chit containing the office telephone No. of Nalini (A9). Before returning to Madras Murugan (A11) left his bag and other articles including the letters referred to above with a close associate of Shanmugam (A35) for safe custody. These were subsequently recovered at the instance of Murugan (A11) after his arrest. Shankar & Koneswaran (A12) reached Madras along with Jagadeesan Pillai and stayed in Easwari Lodge, Madras on 17.5.91 in the room taken in the name of Jagadeesan Pillai. Sivarasan (A4) met Shankar & Koneswaran (A12) at Easwari Lodge during third week of May, 1991 and gave a chit containing a contact number, to be used to contact Robert Payas (A17).

31. During the second week of May, 1991, Perarivalan & Arivu (A26) purchased an Exide battery and handed over the same to Sivarasan (A4) which was used for operating the wireless set installed at Vijayan's (A20) house for communicating with Pottu Omman (A2). He also purchased two battery cells and gave them to Sivarasan (A4) which were subsequently used by Dhanu (A5) to detonate the belt bomb concealed in her person, on 21.5.91.

32. Sivarasan (A4) and Santhan (A10) arranged to send Ruban & Suresh (A14) on 17.5.91 to Jaipur. Ruban (A14) travelled under assumed name and after reaching Jaipur stayed in a lodge giving a different name. He had with him the telephone number of Robert Payas (A17) which was given to him by Sivarasan (A4) as contact number and the telephone number of Shanmugavadeivelu & Thambi Anna (A23) another of Sivarasan's associates. The itinerary of Shri Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Tamil Nadu for election propaganda was confirmed on 19.5.91 and widely published in newspapers.

33. On 20.5.91, Sivarasan (A4) took Dhanu (A5) and Subha (A6) and met Padma (A29) at Kalyani Nursing Home and got medicine, viz. Brufan tabs. for Dhanu (A5). From there they all went to Padma's (A29) house, where they met Haribabu (A7), Nalini (A9), Murugan (A11) and Arivu (A26). Sivarasan (A4) instructed Haribabu (A7) to buy a garland and wait at about 5.00 pm on 21.5.91 at Broadway (Parrys Corner)

Moffusil bus stand. Arivu (A26) then handed over to Haribabu (A7) a Kodak colour film roll and asked him to bring a camera together with the film roll for the meeting. Sivarasan (A4) instructed Nalini (A9) that she need take only half a day's leave for the after-noon on the next day and wait in her house at Villivakkam at 3.00 pm.

34. Nalini (A9) attended her office in the fore-noon and after applying for half a day's leave for the after-noon, returned to her house at Villivakkam after visiting her mother's (A29) house. Haribabu (A7) purchased a sandalwood garland from Poompuhar Handicrafts, Mount Road, Madras, and went to his house at about 2.00 p. m. Thereafter, he left at about 2.30 pm carrying the sandalwood garland, for borrowing a camera from a friend. He met his friend at about 3.00 pm after visiting enroute Subha Sundaram (A30) and obtained a Chinon Camera from his friend and had it loaded with the film roll given by Arivu (A26). From there he proceeded to Broadway (Parrys Corner) Mofussil bus stand and reached there around 5.00 pm.

35. In the meanwhile at Jayakumar's (A18) house, at Kodungayur, Sivarasan (A4), changed his dress to "Kurtha-Pyjama". He also took with him a 9 mm pistol, kept inside a cloth pouch stitched by Jayakumar's (A18) wife Shanthi (A19). From there he proceeded to Vijayan's (A20) house at Kodungayur and met Dhanu (A5) and Subha (A6). After Sivarasan's (A4) arrival, Dhanu (A5) and Subha (A6) dressed themselves inside a closed room — Subha (A6) in a saree, Dhanu (A5) helped by Subha (A6) in a loose fitting "Churidhar", stitched in a shop at Purasawalkam, Madras-7, over and above the belt bomb around her waist. All the three, viz. Sivarasan (A4), Dhanu (A5) and Subha (A6) proceeded to Nalini's (A9) house at Villivakkam and reached there by about 3.15 pm. After offering prayers in a nearby temple Sivarasan (A4), Dhanu (A5), Subha (A6) and Nalini (A9) reached Broadway Mofussil bus stand by about 5.00 pm where they found Haribabu (A7) waiting for them. There all the five boarded a bus bound for Nancheepuram via. Sriperumbudur and alighted at Sriperumbudur around 7.00 pm.

36. Sivarasan (A4), Dhanu (A5), Subha (A6), Haribabu (A7) and Nalini (A9) took food in a nearby hotel and after buying flowers reached the site of the meeting place well in time for the meeting scheduled to begin at 8.30 p. m. They occupied different locations at the meeting place. Subha (A6) and Nalini (A9) sat on the ground along with the audience. Sivarasan (A4), Dhanu (A5) and Haribabu (A7) were moving around, during which time Haribabu (A7) had occasion to introduce Sivarasan (A4) as partner of his

friend, to a journalist. Haribabu (A7) was also moving near the dais and taking photographs. Dhanu (A5) befriended Latha Kannan a Congress Worker and her daughter Kokila Vani and stood between them holding the garland purchased by Haribabu (A7) in her hand. Sivarasan (A4) occupied a place a little away from Latha Kannan with a scribbling pad in his hand and a cloth shoulder bag, hanging from his shoulder, giving the impression of a journalist.

37. Due to delay in flight arrival from Visakhapatnam, Shri Rajiv Gandhi reached Sriperumbudur late. At about 10.10 pm after garlanding the statue of Smt. Indira Gandhi near the meeting site, he alighted from the car at the Red carpet area and started moving towards the dais receiving enroute, garlands and shawls offered to him. While he was hearing the recitation of a Hindi poem by Kokila and was appreciating her by patting her, Dhanu (A5) moved forward from behind and gained access to Shri Rajiv Gandhi. While in close proximity of Shri Rajiv Gandhi, Dhanu (A5) detonated the improvised explosive device, kept concealed in the waist belt worn by her. Simultaneously there was a loud explosion, killing Shri Rajiv Gandhi, assassin Dhanu (A5), Haribabu (A7) who was photographing the incident as record for the LTTE leadership. Fifteen others also lost their lives either on the spot or on way to the Hospital or after admission at the Hospital. They are:-

1. P. K. Gupta PSO to Shri. Rajiv Gandhi
2. Latha Kannan
3. Kokilavani
4. Mohd. Iqbal, S. P.
5. Rajaguru, Insp. of Police
6. Edward Joseph, Insp. of Police
7. Ethiraj, SI of Police
8. Murugan, Police Constable
9. Ravi, Commando PC
10. Dharman, Police Constable
11. Chandra, Woman Police Constable
12. Santhani Begum,
13. Darryl Peter,
14. Saroja Devi, and
15. Munuswamy, Ex-MLC

The camera was found on the dead body of Haribabu (A7) without any damage. The body of assassin Dhanu (A5) was the only body found blown to pieces and scattered in different directions. Forty four persons sustained simple/grievous injuries. The ten photographs taken by Haribabu (A7), before he died, at the scene of crime, show the presence of accused Sivarasan (A4), Dhanu (A5), Subha (A6) and Nalini (A9) besides the event of the explosion itself.

38. Having completed the assassination of Shri Rajiv Gandhi successfully at Sriperumbudur on 21.5.91 Sivarasan (A4), Subha (A6) and Nalini (A9) re-grouped near the meeting site and left the scene of crime. Enroute they drank water in a nearby house and informed the in-

mate that Shri Rajiv Gandhi was dead and left for Madras changing in all three autorickshaws. They reached Jayakumar's (A18) house at Kodungayur where Suthenthiraraja & Santhan (A10) was waiting. Sivarasan (A4) appraised Santhan (A10) that Dhanu & Anbu (A5) and Shri Rajiv Gandhi were dead. The three halted at Jayakumar's (A18) house that night. Next morning Sivarasan (A4), Subha (A6) and Nalini (A9) watched the T.V. coverage of Shri Rajiv Gandhi's death and aftermath with great interest and enthusiasm in a neighbour's house.

39. On 22.5.91, mid-night Subha Sundaram (A30) contacted a Freelance photographer over phone at Poonamallee Police Station and learnt about the death of Haribabu (A7) in the explosion and the camera lying on his dead body. Subha Sundaram (A30) then questioned him anxiously as to why he had not retrieved the camera of Haribabu (A7). Despite knowing the death of Haribabu (A7), Subha Sundaram (A30) kept back this news from Haribabu's (A7) father till evening the next day. On 24.5.91 he directed the father of Haribabu (A7) (since dead), to destroy all documents, audio and video cassettes in their house which may establish connection of late Haribabu (A7) in this case. Accordingly on 24.5.91 early morning the box containing Haribabu's (A7) personal effects was removed to some other house. The belongings of Santhan (A10) kept in the house of Haribabu (A7) were also removed from his house. Subsequently Subha Sundaram (A30) caused a press statement to be issued by the father of Haribabu (A7) refuting the news about Haribabu's (A7) links with LTTE, that had by then appeared in the newspapers. On 25.5.91 Subha Sundaram (A30) again advised Haribabu's (A7) relations to destroy the audio cassettes of LTTE songs and Prabhakaran's photographs.

40. The police investigation to locate the persons responsible for the occurrence on 21.5.91 began in right earnest and progress was being reported in Press daily in great detail. Combining operations all over the State had also begun. Therefore, after the assassination the accused concerned in the case, started shifting from one place to another so as to evade apprehension by the police. Murugan (A11) and Arivu (A26) hid themselves in the Printing Press of Bhagyanathan (A28).

41. On 23.5.91, Sivarasan (A4) transported Nalini (A9) from Jayakumar's (A18) house to her office and Subha (A6) was shifted to the house of Vijayan (A20) at Kodungayur. Nalini (A9) returned to her house in Villivakkam. Nehru & Gokul (A8) operated the wireless set from the house of Vijayan (A20) and was reporting all developments to Pottu Omman (A2). After learning about the death of Haribabu (A7), on the instructions of Sivarasan (A4), Murugan (A11) gave Rs. 1000/- to Bhagyanathan (A28) to be handed over to the father of Haribabu (A7), and the money was delivered. The motor cycle

— Kawasaki, purchased in the name of Arivu (A26) for the use of Sivarasan (A4) and others was handed over by Sivarasan (A4) to Bhagyanathan (A28) on 23.5.91. This motor-cycle was subsequently seized from the premises of his Press. Padma (A29) handed over a code sheet used for clandestine wireless communication to her colleague nurse which was given to her by Murugan (A11) with the request to keep it in safe custody.

42. For the first time on 24.5.91 the photograph of assassin Dhauu (A5) with garland in her hand was published in a newspaper.

43. On 26.5.91, Sivarasan (A4) met Ravi (A24) at his Aunt's house at Villivakkam. Sivarasan (A4) took Subha (A6) from Vijayan's (A20) house to Parrys Corner Bus Stand where Ravichandran & Ravi (A24) and Suseendran & Mahesh (A25) met them. Sivarasan (A4) and Suseendran & Mahesh (A25) took Subha (A6) to a safe hideout at Pollachi. At Pollachi Suseendran & Mahesh (A25) and Subha (A6) stayed in the house of the former's friend. Sivarasan (A4) returned to Madras.

44. Sivarasan's (A4) photo was published in The Hindu on 29.5.91 and all other Newspapers on 30.5.91. Between 2.6.91 & 4.6.91, Suseendran & Mahesh (A25) took Subha (A6) to Trichur, Cochin, Thirunelveli and Madurai and returned to Pollachi on 4.6.91.

45. Sivarasan (A4) went to Pollachi on 5.6.91 and brought back Subha (A6) to Madras on 6.6.91. Suseendran & Mahesh (A25) also accompanied them. On reaching Madras, Suseendran & Mahesh (A25) went away and Sivarasan (A4) and Subha (A6) went to Vijayan's (A20) house at Kodungayur and continued to stay there. On 7.6.91 Sivarasan (A4), Subha (A6), Nalini (A9) and Murugan (A11) met at Ashtalakshmi Temple at Besant Nagar, Madras. On the same day Nalini (A9) took Subha (A6) to a Nursing Home in Besant Nagar for treatment in the meanwhile Sivarasan (A4) was sending messages regularly to Pottu Omman (A2) in Jaffna, through the wireless set from Vijayan's (A20) house, operated by Nehru (A8). Pottu Omman (A2) sent a rescue party led by David, leader of the Sea Tigers, to take back Sivarasan (A4), Subha (A6) and Nehru (A8). This party met with an accident at sea and perished. This news was conveyed to Sivarasan (A4) by Pottu Omman (A2).

46. Sivarasan (A4), Santhan (A10) and Ravichandran & Ravi (A24) shifted some of their material belongings to the house of a person belonging to Sivarasan's (A4) Village living in Kottivakkam on 10.6.91. Amongst other belongings of Sivarasan (A4) and Santhan (A10) some diaries of Sivarasan (A4) were seized from this house on 22.7.91. The entries in the diaries of Sivarasan (A4) show the association of these accused concerned in the case and money spent lavishly for their operations. During this period Santhan (A10) received cash from Thambi Anna (A23), a LTTE supporter who was instrumental in providing funds for LTTE workers by converting gold biscuits to cash.

47. On 7.7.91, a dictionary of Sivarasan (A4) with a cavity in which he used to hide and carry a pistol, live cartridges, Sivarasan's (A4) artificial eye, diaries and other documents were seized from the house of Jayakumar (A18) and his wife Shanthi (A19).

48. On 21.6.91 a meeting was held at the house of a LTTE sympathiser between Santhan (A10) representing Sivarasan (A4) and Dixon (A38) representing Trichy Santhan (A36) of the political wing of LTTE. In pursuance thereof, Santhan (A10) and Dixon (A38) went to Vijayan's (A20) house at Kodungayur. Suresh Master (A37) had arranged a house on rent at Alwarthirunagar for keeping the LTTE injured cadres. On or after 23.9.91, Sivarasan (A4), Subha (A6) and Nehru (A8) were shifted to the house at Alwarthirunagar, occupied by Suresh Master (A37). Rangan (A32) and Amman (A39) were also visiting that house. On 27.6.91, Trichy Santhan (A36) instructed Amman (A39), Vigneswaran & Vicky (A33) and Dhanasekharan (A31) to go to Madras in a tanker lorry belonging to Dhanasekharan (A31) to shift Sivarasan (A4), Subha (A6) and Nehru (A8) from Madras to Bangalore.

49. Dhanasekharan (A31) along with Vicky (A33) and Amman (A39) brought his tanker lorry from Mettur to Madras on 28.6.91 and took Sivarasan (A4), Subha (A6) and Nehru (A8) from Alwarthirunagar, Madras to Bangalore, keeping them inside the empty tanker. When they left for Bangalore Suresh Master (A37) was present at the house at Alwarthirunagar. Rangan (A32) also joined them from Madras and reached Bangalore on 29th morning.

Some Case...

(Continued from page 21)

Negotiator (1982), Mitchell's *Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role* (1981) and Touval's *The Peace Brokers* (1982) focus on skills relevant to international and ethnic conflict resolution.

Cohen's guide to "negotiating anything, at any place" covers transactions from purchasing a

refrigerator to reaching agreement with the Soviet Union. Although he gives some attention to problem solving approaches, his work is most useful as an explication of zero-sum bargaining principles. Cohen sees control over power, time and information as essential to successful negotiations. Threats, exaggeration and lying may be effective tactics. Soviet diplomats

are described as good models of effective zero-sum negotiators. Their tactics have included (a) taking extreme initial positions, (b) limiting the authority of negotiators, (c) using emotion as a negotiating tactic, (d) treating adversary concessions as weaknesses, (e) being stingy in their own concessions and (f) ignoring deadlines.



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