

GUARDIAN

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THE FIRST

POST-COLD WAR

U.S. PRESIDENT

CLINTON: the new Kennedy?

— *Mervyn de Silva*

Foreign policy in a multi-ethnic society

RUSSIA

OCTOBER 1917: A re-assessment

— *Reggie Siriwardene*

KAZAKHSTAN: Problems of Nationhood

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John Richardson on Peace Accords

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
James Spain on Spies

D. P. Sivaram on Tamil Militarism

John Barham on Che Guevara

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Briefly...

CLINTON NO SUPPORT FOR TIGERS

Former US Ambassador James Spain, now resident here, told a Sunday Times interviewer that President-elect Bill Clinton would not support the Tigers even though the Democratic Party traditionally favours the underdog. The underdog was an individual deprived of economic and social opportunities and not one resorting to violence to settle problems, the retired diplomat said.

There would also be no significant change in economic policies to affect Sri Lanka, Mr Spain said that Sri Lanka was a free and democratic society not very different from the United States. Sri Lanka also had a healthy and consistent economic growth.

"Sri Lanka started liberalising much earlier than India or Pakistan. Although it is much smaller than the two it has a skilled labour force and has potential for stable rapid expansion as opposed to Singagore which has a limited expansion potential because it is a city state", the former ambassador said.

DUNF "UNSTOPPABLE"

DUNF leader Lalith Athulathmudali told a propaganda meeting in Gampola that no super-power could stop the forward march of the Democratic United National Front; nor could anyone buy over its leaders. "It is now high time to change the direction of the country, there is disaster ahead", Mr Athulathmudali said.

DEMOCRACY STIFLED

Thirteen opposition political parties announced a protest campaign to make the govern-

ment "roll back" the Emergency, which was stifling democracy.

The parties which will jointly take non-violent action to get back the "basic democratic freedom of the people" are the SLFP, CPSL, LSSP, SLMP, DVJP, EPRLF, TULF, SLPF, SPF, UPF, NSSP and DUNF. The first move was a joint rally at de Mel Park Colombo 2 at which Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranaike presided.

The first demand of the joint opposition will be the withdrawal of Emergency regulations which had no connection with the on-going North-East war, party leaders told a press conference.

"SOCIALISTS WIDENED GAP"

President Premadasa said at the opening of a garment factory at Diyatalawa that those who ruled this country earlier in name of socialism widened the gap between the haves and the have-nots, and generated hatred between them. The wealthy also showed contempt towards the poor and downrodden because of the ill-will and bitterness created by the socialists, the president said.

COSTLY CONFLICT

Scholars at a South Asian Dialogue held at Kandy were told that Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict had cost the nation over 140 billion rupees since 1983. The dialogue was a collective initiative by think tanks in the SAARC region. Participants were academics and researchers from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka.

At the end of their three-day talk session they called for a peaceful resolution of all types of inter-state and intra-state conflicts in the region.

TRENDS

Britain lifts embargo

Britain's decision to lift its arms sales embargo on Sri Lanka confirmed that country's support to Sri Lanka in its fight against terrorism, Presidential Advisor on International Affairs Bradman Weerakoon told the media. The embargo was imposed immediately after Sri Lanka expelled the British High Commissioner in Colombo for allegedly interfering in internal affairs.

The embargo was lifted shortly after the Tigers killed nearly two hundred civilians, mostly Muslim peasants, in their homes near Polonnaruwa, in an orgy of ethnic cleansing.

FTZ workers demonstrate

Police broke up a protest demonstration by picketing Free (Continued on page 20)

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Serena Tennekoons's article on Sinhala Newspaper Nationalism will appear in the next issue.

DRUGS ?

Doctors are aware that Market Oriented Drug Policies are not always desirable.

The main reason is that out of a bewildering variety of derivatives that proliferate from a single scientifically validated compound, only one or two finally remain in any Rational Formulary. This means that many claims advanced for marketing purposes fail under extended scientific scrutiny.

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FOREIGN POLICY

CLINTON TAKES CHARGE

NEWS
BACKGROUND

Mervyn de Silva

After 12 years — Reagan's two terms and four years of Bush — the American people have chosen to elect a Democrat in the first post-Cold War contest for the White House.

At 46, President-elect Bill Clinton is three years older than John F. Kennedy when America's youngest President moved into the White House, the official residence of the world's most powerful elected leader. Today, the word "elected" can be excised since life in the Kremlin for its present occupant must surely be a nightmare. From

January, Bill Clinton will be the most powerful politician in the world.

In the US, a new generation has taken charge. The popular press speaks of it as the "baby boomer" generation, a useful yet inherently American, view. For non-Americans, certainly for those billions living in the crowded, under-developed "South", post-Vietnam generation is probably a more meaningful description. The romance of the Kennedy years vanished quickly in the traumatic shocks and nightmares of the Vietnam war, par-

tly because young John F. Kennedy had succeeded the great war hero, Dwight Eisenhower. The spectre of Vietnam haunted this election too. Governor Clinton was accused of dodging the draft; that is, the cowardly act of not serving his country in its first major war after 1945. The GOP propagandists who had hoped to draw blood from such crude gimmicks were denied satisfaction. The ghosts of Vietnam have perhaps been finally laid to rest.

The man who challenged George Bush was also accused of visiting Moscow and Prague, and of participating in anti-Vietnam demonstrations as an Oxford graduate student. In short, a "Commie sympathiser" or "fellow traveller" in the standard idiom of that era. That did not draw blood from the candidate either, though he had taken on the hero of the Gulf War; the leader who presented himself as the man who presided over the liquidation of the "Evil Empire" and the collapse of Communism, to announce a "New World Order", in which of course the United States would be the sole superpower.

Two lessons can be drawn from the manifest failure of this G.O.P. propaganda. First, Vietnam is only a marginal concern for the average US voter, certainly for the "baby boomers".

Second, hardly any American family, regards the Soviet challenge and communism itself, as a serious threat to American security, or the well-being of the American people. Two experts of the American Enterprise Institute concluded: "As communism recedes, American poli-

OPINION

CHANGE-AGENT

Mr. Clinton's victory will be both a symbol, and by its example, an agent of change, observes Sir Ralf Dahrendorf, Warden of St. Anthony's College, Oxford. The change is partly generational, and partly a change of policies. . . . "towards a greater emphasis on things social'. While the 1990's will not be deliberately re-distributive of wealth, as the 1960's were, the supply side will not be taken for granted. The emphasis however will be on "entitlement". More attention will be given to the employment consequences of economic decisions. The economy will not be seen as "a programme in itself".

In the 1980's — the Reagan-Thatcher decade — the emphasis was on the supply side; the age of tax-cuts, privatisation and de-regulation; of the leveraged buy-out and the real-estate boom. In the early 1990's those chickens have come home to roost. Right across the industrialised world rapid debt deflation has choked off growth, bringing a rise in employment. Such effects almost inevitably in the realm of politics. In the 1970's nobody could get themselves re-elected. In the late 1980's, it seemed nobody could get themselves re-elected. I have long expected that we would see massive change in the 1990's.

Prof. David Calleo of Johns Hopkins Univ. Washington, sees the idea of a "more efficient public sector" as the main appeal of the Clinton platform. The flood-tide of neo-liberalism, the idea that the market will decide everything, is over. But the old anti-thesis of Big State Vs. Little State is in a way beside the point. The argument is for a more efficient state, politically stronger but administratively less intrusive, not growing in all directions automatically. That's the theory. We don't know it will work in practice".

tics faces a strange new dilemma. How will the US political system operate without anti-Communism as its central organising principle?"

NONALIGNMENT

What sort of foreign policy will President Clinton pursue? How will his administration respond to the declared aspirations and the persistent demands of the Nonaligned movement? Whether "nonalignment" is relevant or not in a world no longer bipolar remains largely academic. There is a group of at least 108 states that finds sufficient reason to remain members of a movement that constitutes the largest "group" in the UN's General Assembly. Re-structuring of the U.N. to make the institution more democratic is one of NAM's main demands. The United States and its allies cannot preach democracy to the poor nations without supporting the democratisation of the United Nations as we have argued in this journal on many occasions.

At least on the ideals and aspirations of the 3rd World John F. Kennedy was far more understanding and sympathetic than any American leader. Before or after him. His grasp of the historical significance of the movement was both intuitive and intellectual... and very American. Since Foster Dulles had been the high priest of American foreign policy, the contrast was even more striking. In an interview with John Fischer of Harper's in 1959, Kennedy said: "Oh, I think its inevitable. During the immediate years ahead this is likely to be an increasing trend in Africa and Latin America... The desire to be independent and free carries with it the desire not to be engaged as a satellite of the Soviet Union or too closely allied to the US. We have to live with that... It's part of our own history for a 100 years"

The battle for Europe, Kennedy believed had been, except for Berlin, essentially won by the end of the 40's. "Today's struggle does not lie there" he

told Henri Spaak of Belgium in the spring of 1963 "but rather in Asia, Latin America" (Arthur Schlesinger A THOUSAND DAYS).

SEPARATIST THREAT

The collapse of the Soviet empire has removed the main ideological challenge to the western world since 1917 and the all-encompassing security threat to the US-led alliance since 1945. Meanwhile American society is besieged by domestic issues of which the economy is the all-pervasive question; a problem that exacerbates other discontents, including most of all, the ethnic. [see p 6]

"It may turn out that the crisis of the multi-ethnic state, not the disappearance of communism, will be the most profound political event of our

generation." says Prof. Stephen P. Cohen of Illinois Univ., now a scholar-in-residence at Ford Foundation in New Delhi. This breaking-up process has far reaching implications for US foreign policy. In recent decades, Americans seem to have a special problem in determining if, where, and how Washington should intervene in a world made up of states of unequal power, stability, and importance."

In modern history the US engaged itself in two titanic struggles — against the Nazi and Japanese empires in World War 2, and against Leninist structures and Stalinist expansionism in the Cold War, the writer observes. Yet, traditional American isolationism survives, he argues, pointing to candidate Pat "America First" Buchanan as the latest example. America can

OPINION

CLINTON WILL NEED BIPARTISAN SUPPORT — Carter

President-elect Bill Clinton does not have a strong mandate to govern and will have trouble enacting new programs unless he is willing to ask for bipartisan support.

"I look on the election result yesterday as primarily a referendum on George Bush... I think there was a general rejection of him," Carter told a delegation of Mexican election observers at the Carter Center of Emory University Nov. 4.

"I think people were doubtful about whether Clinton had the ability and intelligence and character and good judgment to be president, and the final result was that the American people — at least 45 percent of them or so — decided, yes, this is an acceptable president," Carter said.

"So it was not particularly a mandate for Clinton. It was a rejection of Bush and the Reagan-Bush 12-year heritage."

Carter, the last Democrat to be elected president, had endorsed Clinton.

He said he did not believe economic conditions were primarily responsible for Bush's defeat. "In my opinion, the major issue was a desire on the part of the American public to have some workable government in Washington — some sense of teamwork, some sense of sharing responsibility, some sense of cooperation."

Many Americans, he said, feel "a deep resentment and alienation... from our government in Washington. It has been characterized by vetoes, by a lack of any sense of sharing responsibility in Washington. And obviously Bill Clinton will have a much better chance of cooperation with the Congress than did Bush or Reagan."

Carter said he spoke to Clinton on election night. Clinton is "looking forward, as I did in 1976, to bringing together Democrats and Republicans from the House and Senate to begin addressing some of the major issues that face our country. These are almost all domestic issues — the economy, health care, education."

He said that although there was very little discussion of foreign policy during the campaign, foreign affairs will now become more visible. "Publicity falls on foreign policy issues concerning the crisis of the day," he said.

only be contaminated by contact with a corrupt world.

The Conservative Right has a new ally, the burnt-out Left, says Prof. Cohen... a Left still obsessed with the non-interventionist lessons of Vietnam. The two isolationisms threaten the rational conduct of foreign affairs."

To me, Yugoslavia, was the first test of post-Cold War foreign policy. Bosnia has no oil. Though a crude illustration, it did reveal much of current American thinking its aims, its doubts and hesitation, and its anti-EC sentiment or, at least ambiguities. It was Germany, like Japan, a new challenger to America's global supremacy, that recognised Slovenia and Croatia first. It then became an EC affair. Like Japan again, a Europe in which German power is pre-eminent, is seen as an emerging centre in the post-Cold War re-distribution of power. Besides, power itself requires redefinition in a world that nuclear weapons and huge arsenals have little meaning. The nuclear weapon has never

been used since 1945, and the arsenal cannot provide food to the Russian people nor help impose law and order nor prevent the disintegration of the Russian empire, the old Czarist expanded under the new name of the U.S.S.R., and wider still as the Soviet bloc or Warsaw Pact. The Russian empire evidently faces the same problem of de-colonisation that the British and the French confronted at the end of the last war. So the US was content to leave Yugoslavia to the E.C., with US diplomacy more or less confined to UN intervention and the person of Cyrus Vance.

President Clinton will be the first to start a new term "without any need to worry seriously about this nation facing nuclear or even armed attack, the existence of another military superpower or a challenge from a hostile global ideology. He will be the first who can rely on a virtually veto-free Security Council in a more effective, veto-free Security Council." says Theodore Sorenson.

But what of the important ethnic constituencies to whom President Clinton will be directly and increasingly answerable seeing that they contributed much to his victory. And that victory was by no means achieved easily. Nor was the American electorate's verdict clear and decisive. If he had 44 million votes, Mr. Bush had 38, and Mr. Perot collected 19 million or just under 20%. It was only in the Electoral College, dominated by the large states, that Mr. Clinton's majority was impressive. Mr. Clinton himself put "the Economy" first. The budget will be his first battlefield. He has of course the immense advantage of a Congress controlled by his party, a privilege Mr. Bush didn't enjoy. Hence the large number of Presidential vetoes.

Mr. Clinton rallied the ethnic constituencies. How will these influence foreign policy? What is the precise nature of the nexus? We publish an excerpt from the Stanley Foundation report on the impact of Ethnic and Neographic diversity on US foreign policy. (See p 6)

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Ethnicity and Foreign Policy

The growing diversity of the U.S. population will have long-term consequences in the handling of external affairs.

The United States has long prided itself on being a melting pot of culturally diverse peoples, yet this diversity has seldom been reflected in the foreign policy process. A new era has come, however, in which ethnic diversity will have a greater impact on foreign policy. This is true for three reasons.

First, a demographic revolution is altering the ethnic composition of the country. Throughout history waves of immigrants have entered the United States, gradually diversifying the population. Recent immigrants, of whom there have been some eight million since 1960, have differed markedly from earlier waves.

In the 1960s, European immigration, which accounted for the majority of newcomers in the past, began to decline. In contrast, the number of Asian and Hispanic immigrants increased sharply. The number of illegal immigrants entering the country also has increased substantially, especially those coming from Mexico, Central America, and South America. The influx of new immigrants has altered the nation's racial and ethnic composition.

However, looking at new immigrants only in terms of overall numbers is somewhat misleading. Immigrants have not spread evenly; different parts of the United States have seen a greater influx than others. As a result, new ethnic centres of power are emerging. Florida, which already has a large Cuban and African American population, has been inundated by immigrants coming from Latin America and the Caribbean. New York, Texas, California, and Illinois also have received large numbers of immigrants. An indication of the impact of this trend is provided by recent forecasts sug-

gesting that in 20 years 85 percent of the population of California will be ethnic.

Second, in addition to becoming more numerous, members of ethnic groups are becoming more politically conscious. In the past there have been major differences in the extent to which ethnic groups defined themselves and mobilized along ethnic lines. Some groups — for example, Polish Americans, Irish Americans, Greek Americans, and Jewish Americans — have organized along ethnic lines and sought to influence foreign policy, but they have tended to be more the exception than the rule. Today ethnic mobilization is widespread. Among the examples of growing ethnic assertiveness is the increasingly important political role played by the U.S. Congressional Black Caucus. Another indication of rising ethnic consciousness is the debate raging in U.S. schools about the need to broaden the curriculum to reflect the roles of ethnic groups in American history.

Some experts feel that for groups who were formerly denied full participation in U.S. politics, ethnic mobilization provides a way of penetrating the foreign policy establishment. Especially for "people of color," greater access to the foreign policy establishment is important whether or not it changes policy. For other ethnic groups who maintain strong ties with their countries of origin, ethnic mobilization is a way of influencing U.S. foreign policy to benefit those particular countries.

A third change contributing to the growing importance of ethnic diversity in the United States is the increasing role of states and localities in shaping foreign policy. This trend is multiplying the channels through which ethnic groups can influence policy. National interests no longer necessarily coincide with

local and state interests. In response to internal economic pressures, many states are now attempting to engage themselves in the international economic system to develop trade links with foreign countries. For example, several states have established trade missions in Tokyo to attract Japanese investment.

* * *

The trend toward globalization in production is fostering direct economic links between American and other societies at the non-governmental level. Another set of links is tied to personal relationships with relatives abroad. Institutional ties are also being forged through the creation of sister-city programs and other cultural organizations. Policy is inevitably affected as a grass-roots initiative place more and more Americans in contact with people abroad.

One example of the impact of grass-roots involvement in the foreign policy process was the anti-apartheid U.S. policy towards South Africa. In response to pressure from churches, students, and African Americans, states and localities divested pension funds of investments in companies doing business in South Africa. Local officials also established programs to assist South Africa's black majority.

While the general trend is toward greater ethnic mobilization around foreign policy issues, there are considerable variations in the way this manifests itself from group to group. It has become obvious that the histories, interests and agendas of different groups vary considerably.

Although Jewish Americans are not, technically speaking, an ethnic group, they constitute the most widely discussed model of effective foreign policy mobilization. Several circumstances have enabled American Jews to become

Reprinted from the Stanley Foundation Report on the Growing Impact of Ethnic and Geographic Diversity on U.S. Foreign Policy.

a powerful lobbying group. The first is a history of persecution that has imparted a strong sense of common religious identity to Jews around the world. Second, the Holocaust provided the Jewish community with a powerful symbol around which to mobilize. Third, the objective of ensuring U. S. support for Israel serves as a clear focus for political activity. Finally, the American Jewish community is well positioned to influence policy because of its relative affluence and high degree of political participation. As some have argued, the Jewish community can afford to make the question of Israel a primary factor in its domestic political efforts in a way that other groups cannot.

African Americans are similar to Jews in that they too have a strong sense of ethnic solidarity based on their historical experience: slavery. The legacy of slavery has left African Americans at an economic and political disadvantage in society. Despite the gains of the civil rights movements, African Americans are still struggling for equal opportunities and fuller participation in the U. S. political system. Their focus is mainly oriented towards domestic issues of equity.

In the realm of foreign policy, African Americans have found it difficult to penetrate the system for a number of reasons. In the first place, they lack a common issue around which to mobilize. This is compounded by the fact that African Americans cannot identify with a single country of origin, nor do they have direct personal links with any single country outside the United States. The situation in South Africa, however, has provided an opportunity for African Americans to mobilize around an issue akin to their historical experience in the United States. The success of the antiapartheid movement demonstrates the potential within the African community to have an impact on the foreign policy process.

Although there is a tendency

to view Asian Americans as a homogeneous ethnic group, in fact the community is highly diverse. Japanese, Chinese, and Filipino Americans have long histories in the United States. In the past, however, they avoided ethnic politics. More recent waves of immigrants from Southeast Asia have been extremely active politically. Similar to that of the American Jewish community, the economic affluence of Asian Americans enhances their ability to influence the foreign policy establishment. The recent Asian immigrants are wealthier and more educated than earlier newcomers, and the established Asian American community is also becoming more affluent. This means that Asian Americans have a ready supply of funds to contribute to political campaigns at local and national levels.

Changes in the international system are also increasing the domestic political importance of the Asian American community. The self-image of Japanese Americans has been enhanced by Japan's growing role as an economic superpower. This has reinforced the perception that Japanese Americans can serve as a bridge between the United States and Japan in foreign policy. Among the issues that Asian Americans are attempting to influence is U. S. immigration policy.

As mentioned earlier, the Hispanic population in the United States has increased substantially in recent years. In 1970 Hispanics constituted 4.5 percent of the U.S. population. By 1988 this proportion has risen to 8 percent. Like the Asian community, this group is extremely diverse, the three largest communities being Mexicans (the most populous group), Cubans and Puerto Ricans. Economically, there are wide gaps within the Hispanic community, Cuban American generally being much more affluent than Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans.

The diversity of the Hispanic community has made it difficult for leaders to mobilize effectively on foreign policy issues.

One notable exception has been the efforts of Cuban Americans to influence U. S. policy toward Fidel Castro. For the majority of Hispanics, domestic issues such as access to education, health care, language rights, and social service remain the main focus of attention. With regard to foreign policy, different Hispanic groups have different agendas. Puerto Ricans are concerned about possible U. S. statehood for Puerto Rico. Mexicans are concerned about trade and immigration issues, especially the treatment of illegal aliens.

The Arab American community also is extremely diverse ethnically and politically. Its loyalties are divided among several countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Political mobilization is hindered by class and occupational differences. Relationships between Arab Americans and their countries of origin also vary. The Lebanese, for example, have been exceptionally effective at fund raising for Lebanon, while Syrian Americans have close cultural relations but fairly weak political ties with Syria.

* * *

On the domestic level, Arabs who have lived in the United States for some time consider themselves highly assimilated, especially those who no longer maintain linguistic ties with their country of origin. Though these Arabs do not seek to distinguish themselves along ethnic lines, they have been thrust into the foreign policy debate largely as a result of events in the Middle East and increasingly in reaction to the activities of Jewish Americans on behalf of Israel.

The picture that emerges of America's ethnic population shows diverse sets of groups, each with its own strengths and weaknesses, and each with a different base for mobilizing around foreign policy issues. This reality makes it extremely difficult to create a coherent, consistent, integrated foreign policy.

The U. S. foreign policy establishment has traditionally been the preserve of white males,

both within and outside government circles. Over the past two decades, this situation has gradually begun to change so that there are now more women and minorities involved in making policy. Nonetheless, progress is limited. In a recent survey of foreign policy experts by the media over the last 10 years, the majority were white, male, and conservative.

Limited access to the foreign policy establishment has made it difficult for some ethnic groups to penetrate the system even at the entry level. For economically disadvantaged groups, low-paying entry-level positions and internships in foreign policy organizations are not really a viable option. Minorities remain underrepresented in key foreign policy institutions such as research centers, elite universities, and the foreign service.

One value of inclusion is that it introduces new actors into the foreign policy process whose interest and experiences may differ from those of the traditional foreign policy establishment. For this reason, having a more inclusive foreign policy community would be valuable whether or not these new actors fundamentally altered the policy-making process. Including the full range of ethnic communities in the foreign policy community would help reinforce the image of an ethnically diverse country within government as well as outside government. Finally, through inclusion in the foreign policy community, ethnic representatives could serve as role models for their communities.

On the other hand, inclusion would not necessarily lead to meaningful change. Although access can provide an entree into the system, this may not translate into meaningful participation. The price of inclusion could be the wholesale acceptance of the status quo rather than an attempt to change it. Inclusion for "symbolic" reasons alone could lead to tokenism, thereby creating problems of legitimacy and credibility for ethnic representatives.

Furthermore, inclusion may

not necessarily broaden the range of issues on the foreign policy agenda for two reasons: if the only individuals who were included in the policy-making community were those who held the same views as the traditional foreign policy establishment, or if ethnic representatives who had a different world view were forced to suppress their views for political reasons. Although, for example, recent administrations have had some African Americans in senior foreign policy positions, this does not seem to have had any impact on U.S. foreign policy.

* * *

The role that ethnic groups play in the foreign policy process will be affected by the relationship between them and their countries of origin. Of course, this relationship varies from group to group. Among the factors that are important are how recently immigrants have come to the United States; why they left their country; what the political, economic, and strategic attractions of the country are; and whether its ideology differs from that of the United States. If relations are strong, ethnic mobilization can work toward the benefit of the home country, as has happened with Jewish Americans and Israel. On the other hand, if relations between immigrants and their country of origin are poor, ethnic mobilization can work to the detriment of the home country. Cubans fleeing Castro's regime have been staunch supporters of U.S. policies that seek to isolate Cuba.

Changes in the way that ethnic groups relate to their countries of origin can have a significant impact on a group's ability to influence the foreign policy process. Previously, much of the contact between ethnic groups and their countries of origin was conducted through informal, personal channels. The creation of sister-city programs and cultural organizations has helped to formalize, strengthen, and promote cultural ties. Currently, however economic and

political ties between ethnic groups and their countries of origin and becoming increasingly important. Often this is with the tacit approval of the home country, which hopes to benefit from better trade and economic opportunities. The Japanese government, for example, has developed substantial economic ties with California, which has a large Japanese American population, providing 30 percent of the state's total foreign investment.

However, the relationships are not without their problems for both sides. The problem for the home country comes when its emigres demand a greater say in the political process of the home country, wanting to exercise influence on domestic decisions. Also awkward for the home country is the risk of being drawn into U.S. domestic quarrels because of its relationship with an ethnic group. Some African liberation movements have been keen to have the support of African Americans, although they hesitate to become embroiled in America's racial situation.

At the other extreme, problems also develop for ethnic groups who do not want to function as lobbying organizations on behalf of their former countries but rather as U.S. citizens with particular views on foreign policy matters. Because of their involvement with Japan, Japanese American fear being seen as Japanese rather than as U.S. citizens. Nor should an ethnic group's involvement be limited to concerns about its country of origin. Many African Americans fear that by being too closely associated with Africa, they could become politically marginalized within the larger foreign policy community.

There is a way in which greater ethnic mobilization around foreign policy issues could be dangerous. Given the conflicting interest and agendas of different ethnic groups, there is a risk that ethnic mobilization could turn the foreign policy process

(Continued on page 10)

So farewell then, Che Guevara

John Barham on a revolutionary who was killed 25 years ago

Ernesto "Che" Guevara was born, lived and died in another time. He might have been killed only 25 years ago this month, aged 39, but he belongs to a different world. The future Guevara hoped to shape now seems as distant as the utopias dreamed of by the Communards of 1870 Paris, the anarchists of civil war Spain, or the revolutionaries of May 1968.

As perhaps the last romantic folk hero, and certainly the most famous of Latin America's guerrilla warriors, Guevara embodied the lethally simplistic revolutionary who believed sincerely that idealism, sacrifice and permanent, violent, struggle could one day build a perfect society of freedom, justice and plenty for all.

Guevara lives on, emblazoned innocuously on countless T-shirts, posters and badges. It is easy to picture his stark features etched in black against a flaming red background: his beret, long, scraggly hair and a distant, mystical look in his eyes. But the teenagers who look to Guevara are less interested in his life as a revolutionary than in the glamorous, romantic picture of a rebellious free spirit.

Che's appeal is undeniable. He was a wealthy, middle class youth who qualified as a doctor in Buenos Aires only to abandon the promise of a comfortable life to travel penniless through South America. He met Fidel Castro, then exiled in Mexico, in 1955 and they formed the nucleus of a rebel band that at first numbered only 16 men at the beginning of the Cuban revolution.

Their uprising is an astonishing saga of revolutionaries who triumphed through luck, courage and determination. They almost starved and faced the constant threat of annihilation, yet they went on to defeat — against huge odds — a corrupt, reactionary dictatorship.

But in 1965 Che, the revolutionary hero, effectively abandoned Cuba, probably horrified at Castro's bureaucratic insti-

tutionalisation of the revolution. That year, Guevara quit as industry minister to lead a motley guerrilla band in Bolivia rather than compromise his ideals by becoming involved in the difficult — and morally ambivalent — process of organising a state.

Che's vision of igniting revolutionary wars of liberation throughout South America was as quixotic as it was idealistic, and demonstrated a disturbing separation from reality. One of the perplexed Bolivian peasants present at Guevara's death at the town of La Higuera said: "He came to liberate us, but we did not understand."

His death at the hands of Bolivian troops — led by CIA advisers — on October 8 1967 seemed almost pre-destined. His violent end was appropriate for a man fascinated by death and violence in the best Argentine melodramatic tradition. Clearly, he had given the subject considerable attention.

Recalling (in a campaign diary he kept during the Cuban revolution) the moment in 1956 when he was wounded slightly in a shoulder, Che wrote: "I thought of myself as dead. Immediately, I began to think about the best way of dying in that minute when all seemed lost. I remembered an old story by Jack London where the hero, leaning against a tree trunk, prepares to end his life with dignity, knowing he was condemned to freeze to death in the frozen plains of Alaska. This is the only image I remember."

By dying before he grew old, Guevara passed into world consciousness as a mystic enveloped in revolutionary purity. If he had lived, Che would be 64 now and probably be a grandfather, perhaps paunchy and balding like Fidel Castro who has gone from beloved national hero to solitary tyrant.

In his biography of Castro, American journalist Tad Szulc comments that the sensitive and highly intelligent Guevara pro-

bably sensed this and deliberately chose exile and eventual death in Bolivia's benighted interior.

Our modern picture of Che; the self-denying revolutionary, could hardly be more distant from that of his successors. The urban guerrillas of the 1970s in Germany, Italy and Argentina appear to us now as psychopaths. The fat, bespectacled and middle-aged Abimael Guzman, leader of Peru's feared Shining Path guerrillas who was sentenced this week to life in jail for treason, is linked in our minds to Pol Pot, not Che Guevara.

Guevara is, to many, forever the romantic, valiant and mystical harbinger of peace and understanding. The famous, scratchy black and white photos of the dead Che, stretched out with his chest perforated with bullets, has transformed him into a modern day hero who gave his own life for an ideal.

But the myth obscures the sinister side of his character. Like all revolutionary purists before him, Guevara isolated himself gradually from the real world in an attempt to create the new man of socialist society, untainted by selfishness, competitiveness, or individualism. He dreamt of sparking off a South American version of the Vietnam war that would unleash great Marxist revolutions across the continent.

In his last radio message, from his Bolivian jungle hideout to a third world conference in Havana, Che exhorted: "How closely we could look into a bright future should two, three or many Vietnams flourish throughout the world with their share of deaths and immense tragedies, their everyday heroisms, and their repeated blows against imperialism."

Yet, in spite of this macho posturing, Guevara probably was perceptive enough to see himself as much a Don Quixote as a proletarian Simon Bolivar. In one of his last letters to his parents in Buenos Aires just before leaving Havana, Che wrote: "Once again, I feel beneath my heels the ribs of Rosinante [Quixote's horse]... I return to the road with my lance under my arm."

The Spies Who Leave Me Cold

James W. Spain

I like a good read as much as the next person. But I've soured on the international thrillers that dominate best-seller lists.

First we had Ian Fleming's sybaritic cartoon characters. Then came John Le Carre's agonized intellectuals. Now we have a herd of cause-serving Ramboish morons.

They are no longer plain ordinary spies but reputable "intelligence officers" and "field agents." They are almost always dedicated to a personal crusade — and they will lie, cheat, steal kill and maim for the U.S. government — or to democracy, or to avenging a dead friend as feckless and amoral as themselves, or to serving the higher interests of their favorite Elks Lodge or Yale eating club.

Their "enemies" — Russians, Muslims, dark-skinned foreigners and "moles" of all species — are tough but dumb. These folk seldom have qualms about their causes either, but they are never successful in them.

On our side, if the plan to make Fidel Castro's beard fall out or Moammar Gadhafi's wig slip in public or to implode Pakistan's nuclear plant with laser beams fails, the heroes can always fall back on high-tech violence or torture to keep their record of triumph unsullied.

There is no denying that in real life we have had our Caseys and Norths, and those of their associates now in the dock. But historians, journalists and columnists have amply demonstrated that these worthies lost more contests than they won — despite their refusal to be restricted by human decency, common sense or law.

These characters are neither real nor representative, as any-

The writer, now retired, was U.S. ambassador to Tanzania, Turkey and Sri Lanka. He lives in Colombo.

one who has had anything to do with the conduct of world affairs knows. They are political equivalents of the studs and nymphomaniacs who people pornography.

That doesn't mean they should be banned. It is pretty well accepted now that a bit of pornography does not turn an intelligent detached adult into a rapist. And reading best-sellers about the mayhem wreaked on our "enemies" is not likely to inspire a sane person to practice the craft on spouse and kiddies.

What the fiction does, however, is to reinforce the mind-set that has been developing since World War II that the intelligence business is somehow different from other professions, that loyalty to a person or an agency outweighs that to law, government and morality, that lying to an ambassador, the secretary of State, Congress, or even the president is just another part of the line of duty.

To young intelligence officers, it can be more exciting and sometimes more profitable, in career terms, to emulate the glamorous "shakers and movers" of the profession, real or fictional, than to plug away at the routine requirements of collection and analysis.

If something goes wrong, they can always say that the lawful authorities didn't want to know anyway. It is called "denyability," the opposite of "accountability," on which representative government is supposed to be based.

As Harold Lamb and Mary Renault demonstrated in historical fiction and Arthur C. Clarke and Isaac Asimov in science fiction, the more authentic the characters and ambience, the better the tale. Would that someone would apply the principle to espionage fiction!

Failing that, perhaps our spy-thriller authors could set their heroes among the Klu Klux Klan the neo-Nazis, Hell's Angels or the Mafia. All parties would feel at home, social realism would be enhanced, and literary royalties would continue.

Meanwhile, I'm going back to Captain Ahab and Tom Sawyer.

(I. H. T.)

Ethnicity and...

(Continued from page 8)

into a war among ethnic groups competing for limited resources, political appointments, and influence.

The end of the Cold War has left a void in the foreign policy-making process. No broader superpower framework exists to reconcile competing ethnic claims, thus creating a danger that U.S. ethnic groups will be drawn into conflicts abroad. If the Soviet Union and other countries collapse into rival ethnic entities their struggles might heighten ethnic conflicts in the United States.

Therefore, the inclusion of new faces into the foreign policy community could enhance the United States' ability to play a leadership role in a post-Cold War world. Some experts have suggested that Americans and foreigners could mobilize on the basis of common issues via broader society-to-society links. This approach would foster the capacity of other countries to resolve material and regional disputes. While the ending of the Cold War has eliminated one source of conflict, it could unleash other regional and ethnic conflicts with important domestic as well as international consequences. A way must be found to combine different ethnic interests and agendas into a coherent, integrated U. S. foreign policy agenda.

Constitutional transition in Kazakhstan

Neelan Tiruchelvam

Mr. Nursultan Nasarbáyev, the son of a shepherd who became the first President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, is widely regarded as the ablest leader within the Commonwealth of Independent States. Mr. Nasarbáyev has been described as intelligent, politically astute, eager to learn and anxious to moderate the forces of ethno-nationalism and to preserve stable ethnic relations. Since he became the First Secretary of the Communist Party in 1989, the country has witnessed dramatic changes without parallel in any equivalent period of its political history. Elections were held to the Supreme Soviet in April 1990, Presidential elections were concluded, and with the demise of the Soviet Union the country reluctantly declared its independence on December 16, 1991. In quick succession it has been hastily admitted to the United Nations, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The enactment of a new Constitution is the culmination of these processes.

The importance of Kazakhstan is linked to a combination of geo-political and strategic factors. It is the largest Central Asian Republic, almost three-fourths the size of India, with the population of Sri Lanka. Its oil reserves are said to rival those of Kuwait, and it has extensive deposits of coal and natural gas. It is a treasure house of minerals and precious metals. As late as 1989, Kazakhstan produced almost 19 per cent of the former Soviet Union's coal, 10 per cent of its iron ore, 7 per cent to 8 per cent of its gold and 60 per cent

of its silver. Its mineral deposits include copper, zinc, titanium, magnesium and almost 80 per cent of the world's chrome. In addition to mining and industry, agriculture also plays a major role in the economy of Kazakhstan. It has 20 per cent of the arable land of former Soviet Union which produced almost a third of its wheat. Although Kazakhstan has moved its short-range nuclear weapons, it will remain for some time a major nuclear power. It has yet to dismantle or dispose of its long-range nuclear missiles, fuelling the recent speculation that it may have sold three nuclear warheads to Iran. The Government has dismissed such speculation and publicly proclaimed its intention to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and declare its strong support for the implementation of the disarmament treaty. Besides, Kazakhstan conceives of itself as a bridgehead between Central Asia and Europe.

The economic potential and the relative political stability in Kazakhstan has often been projected as a model to other Central Asian Republics. However, not all commentators share this optimism. They point out that Kazakhstan has more than 100 ethnic groups of which nine are principal nationalities. These include almost 6.5 million Kazakhs, 6.2 million Russians, and almost a million Germans. Thus the indigenous Kazakhs constitute only 40 per cent of the population, while the ethnic Russians who were settled during the Czarist and the Soviet rule constitute almost an equivalent proportion. The Russians are concentrated in the North and East where the industrial cities are located and constitute an overwhelming majority of the industrial and technical workforce. The Kazakhs are largely concentrated in the South. It has thus been argued that the country is too diverse to forge a co-

hesive sense of nationhood and too vast to defend its borders. Despite its economic potential, it faces formidable economic problems and it is heavily dependent on manufactured goods from other Republics.

The process of Constitutional reforms in Kazakhstan therefore forces many formidable challenges. The political transitions that have taken place were not the result of a broad-based social movement or popular revolutionary struggle for independence. There are very few countries in history which have acquired nationhood so reluctantly. Nationhood came to Kazakhstan almost accidentally as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. There is, therefore, no revolutionary political programme or social agenda which can be embodied into a Constitution as the substantive achievement of a political process. Some guidance was, however, available from the declaration of independence on December 16, 1991 which provided some basis for the enactment of the Constitution. The principal task confronting the drafters of the Constitution was to frame a political instrument which provides special protection for the Kazakh nationality, language and culture without further placing in jeopardy the sense of 'nationhood' of other ethnic minorities. The other challenges facing the drafters were also daunting. How should the Constitution accord primacy to the rights, freedoms and the dignity of the individuals while safeguarding the right of the State to derogate and restrict such rights during times of emergency and where the stability and integrity of the nation State was an issue? How could you establish a strong and interventionist Presidential system while providing for such checks and balances that would ensure the separation of powers between the different branches of Gov-

Dr. Neelan Tiruchelvam was a member of a group of Constitutional lawyers who recently visited Kazakhstan at the invitation of the Government to undertake a review of the draft Constitution. Here, he offers a glimpse of the complex process of Constitution-making in the new Central Asian Republic.

ernment? How would you institutionalise an effective multi-party system and facilitate the growth of strong civil society institutions in a society with little or no tradition of political pluralism? How would you establish an independent judiciary where the judiciary had been for decades subordinate to the political executive at the national, regional and local levels, and where the public procurator was the custodian of socialist legality? How would you reconcile a centralised unitary State with the need to establish territorial organisations at the regional and local levels which could provide an effective measure of local self-government in a geographically vast and under-populated State? How do you reconcile the need to ensure that land and mineral resources are exclusively vested in the State, with the economic reforms which emphasise private sector development and the divestiture of State enterprises?

The complexity of these tasks was further compounded by the controversy over the very legitimacy of the process of Constitutional reforms. Some political groups questioned the legitimacy of the Supreme Soviet as presently constituted being clothed with the authority to enact a new Constitution.

The Government established a working group led by Mr. D. Petodova, Vice-Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, to prepare the text of the Constitution. Other members of the working group included jurists and academics drawn from the university and the Kazakh Academy of Sciences, officials of the Justice Ministry and of the Supreme Soviet, and two judges drawn from the Supreme Court of Kazakhstan and the State Arbitration Court. The group approved the draft text of the Constitution on the 25th of March 1992 and further amendments were introduced at a consultation at a broader political level headed by the Prime Minister, Mr. Sergy Torestichenko. The Constitution was subsequently published and the public was

invited to submit its comments and observations. The working group was expected to further refine the draft proposal and submit the same to the Supreme Soviet for enactment.

There were however, political parties and groups which questioned the legitimacy of the very process of Constitutional reform on the ground that it was being orchestrated by a Government and a Supreme Soviet which had not been constituted through a multi-party electoral process. The elections to the present Supreme Soviet were conducted in March 1990 and it was alleged that out of 358 seats in Parliament almost 330 are held by the former members of the Communist Party. These elections did not take place within the framework of a multi-party system and many of the candidates were uncontested. Similarly, in the Presidential elections held in 1991, Mr. Nasarbayev was the only political candidate. Two Kazakh political parties, Zheltoksan and Azat, staged a protest rally and a two-week sit-in in mid-June on the main square in Alma Ata, demanding the resignation of the Government and the Supreme Soviet. At present transitional provisions envisage that the President and the Supreme Soviet would continue to serve their term, notwithstanding the enactment of a new Constitution. This principle would also apply to the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, whose members serve ten-year terms. The concern is that the principal State and Constitutional functionaries are in place and would continue to remain in office. This is believed to derogate from the immediacy of the Constitutional transition.

Both the ethnic balance between the Kazakhs and the ethnic Russians and the concentration of ethnic Russians in the industrial and mining regions of the North and East, render it imperative that the Constitution provide an equitable framework for the coexistence of diverse nationalities and ethnic groups.

However, many Kazakhs recall their membership in the multi-national Soviet State, as one in which they were demographically, linguistically and administratively dominated by the Russians. They bristle with resentment at the neglect of their language and complain bitterly that only two of the schools in Alma Ata — the nation's capital — coach in the Kazakh language. They therefore contend that the Constitution needs to acknowledge a process of decolonisation and legitimise the cultural and political resurgence of the Kazakhs. This was to be achieved by imposing a duty on the State to develop and renew the culture, language and traditions of the Kazakh nationality, including the obligation to address the cultural needs of Kazakhs living outside the Republic. These measures have fuelled the insecurity of the ethnic Russians, particularly in the North who are apprehensive that they may be reduced to second-class status. Mr. Nasarbayev has, however, sought to moderate Kazakh nationalistic sentiments and to assure Russian and other Slavic minorities of equitable treatment. The Constitution declares that Kazakh would be the State language, while Russian is officially recognised as the language of inter-ethnic communication. The Constitution further guarantees a secular State, and religious equality. Religious groups are further prohibited from forming political parties.

One of the basic features of the draft Constitution is the primacy accorded to fundamental rights. There is a clear elaboration of the more important civil and political rights including the right to dignity and pri-

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The Federal Alternative

S. Sathananthan

Mr. S J V Chelvanayagam, the Tamil MP, criticised the lack of high ideals and regretted the medieval conception of nationality prevalent among Sinhalese, who "propose to have the Lion Flag unaltered, undamaged, unchanged, as the main portion of the flag. Outside its pale, there are certain markings to indicate the tolerated presence in this country of (Tamil and Muslim) people". A progressive Sinhalese MP, Dr N M Perera, described the flag as a "fraud... perpetrated on the minorities. They (Sinhalese) are going to have the Lion Flag and these stripes are purely for the outcasts" (*Hansard*, vol. 9, 1951: 1565-1684). The flag was adopted as the national flag in 1951. It was marked by a series of protest meetings in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

The anthem and flag remain issues of dispute to this day. Indeed in the 1985 **Draft Framework of Terms of Accord and Understanding**, which was formulated after the end of Thimpu Talks, the GSL was compelled to spell out that one condition for its implementation was the acceptance of National flag and Anthem by "all persons engaged in the current dispute with the GSL" (p. 21).

4.4 Sinhala as Official Language

In 1955, the two major Sinhalese political parties, the United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom (SLFP), declared as policy that Sinhala would be legislated as the official language. The Tamil MP, Mr C Suntharalingam, condemned the emerging policy "one (Sinhala) race, one (Sinhala) language" in the country and warned that if this new policy is implemented "there would be no united Lanka". In reply a

Sinhalese MP, Mr I M R A Irriyagolla, callously predicted cultural genocide: he declared that disunity would not arise because "we (Sinhalese) want to absorb you (Tamils) into our community" (*Hansard*, vol 22, 1955: 1754-55).

The progressive Sinhalese MP, Dr N. M Perera, argued that a law which imposed Sinhala as the sole official language upon Tamils was morally unjustified and drew chilling parallels with the treatment of Jews in Nazi Germany. He predicted that it will become necessary to send an "army of occupation" to the Northern and Eastern Provinces if Tamils are to be compelled to "swallow" the Sinhala language. He warned that such actions will result in "rioting, bloodshed and civil war" and will force Tamils to demand a separate State (*Hansard*, vol 23, 1955:572-623). The stunning accuracy of these predictions made in October 1955, more than two decades before the TULF adopted the demand for Tamil Eelam in 1976, requires no elaboration.

When a Bill to make Sinhala the sole official language was introduced in Parliament in 1956, a Tamil MP, Mr G G Ponnambalam, warned that the enactment of the Bill as law was "likely to result in the rupture (between Tamil and Sinhalese) so deep that it cannot be healed". He also placed on record that schools in Jaffna (in the Northern Province), which "on the basis of friendship" (that is, "higher nationalism") had taught Sinhala to Tamil students, "have decided to discontinue those classes as a protest against the iniquitous...legislation". A progressive Sinhalese MP, Mr Leslie Gunawardene, reasoned against the proposed legislation and warned that it could result

in Tamils "deciding...to break away from the rest of the country. Another progressive Sinhalese MP, Dr S A Wickremasinghe, condemned the language policy as "Hitlerism". A Tamil MP, P Kandiah, had this to add; "What is disputed is the right I have to use my language in the business of living and government. When you deny my language you deny me everything that I, as a Tamil national of this country, have and can have. You present me with a decision you have arrived at in your own wisdom, that I and my people should cease to exist, should cease to be. You will not be surprised, therefore, that I refuse to efface myself until with your superior strength, not of logic, not of reason, but of might and weapon, you remove me and my people from the face of this fair land". If Mr Kandiah obliquely referred to cultural genocide, a Sinhalese MP, Mr Sagara Palanasuriya, was more forthright: he told Tamil MPs (reported in translation), we want to absorb you. Why do you resent that?". By way of explanation, he add: "because there are 40 million people speaking the Tamil language across the Palk Strait, you people give up the Tamil language and get absorbed, get assimilated". He thus believed that Tamils in Sri Lanka should not grieve unduly if their culture is destroyed since the same exists in Tamil Nadu!

On a saner note, a Tamil MP, C Vanniasingam, declared that the Bill, when it became law would be "the beginning of the end of a Unitary System of Government...This Bill is memorable in that the foundations have been well and truly laid... for a Tamil State for the Tamil-speaking people". The progressive Sinhalese MP, Colvin R

de Silva, was even more graphic: he predicted that if Sinhala was made the sole official language, "two torn little bleeding States may yet arise out of one little State" *Hansard*, vol 24, 1956: 942-1917).

However, the Sinhalese ruling fraction ruthlessly pushed the legislation through Parliament and enacted Sinhala as the sole official language.

Sinhalese chauvinism cannot complain that it was not adequately warned of the consequences of its actions.

Constitutional . . .

(Continued from page 12)

vacy, and then the freedom of belief and movement. Further, the right to political participation, in formation and the freedom of assembly and of association are also recognised. There is also an elaborate chapter on economic and social rights. The Constitution contains an extraordinary provision that international standards on human rights embodied in treaties recognised by the Republic would take priority over domestic laws. This chapter needs to be strengthened in three important respects. The major lacuna is the lack of a clear and effective remedy for the enforcement of fundamental rights against abuses by the State. The courts need also to be expressly vested with the power to grant relief and to issue such direction as they may deem just and equitable were an infringement of fundamental rights take place. Secondly, the legislature is given the power to impose vague and unlimited restrictions on the exercise of this right and there is no precise criteria for the derogation of such rights. There is, therefore, the need to expressly incorporate into the

4.5. "Reasonable use" of Tamil

After enacting Sinhala as the sole official language, the Tamils were granted "reasonable use" of Tamil language under the 1956 Official Language (Special Provisions) Act. What constituted "reasonable" for Tamils was of course defined by Sinhalese leaders.

4.6. From Sundays to Poya Days

In 1965, as part of the drive to remold the country as a nation of Buddhists, the weekly holidays were changed from Sundays to Poya days, based on

the lunar calendar and allegedly in accordance with Buddhist traditions but with scant regard to the sensibilities of other religious communities. The four phases of the Moon naturally did not uniformly fall on the same days each month. The consequent alterations in the work-week each month massively dislocated the export economy of the island and the initiative became too "expensive"; and it collapsed in disarray by 1970 when Sundays were re-instituted as weekly holidays.

Next: Buddhism

Constitution international standards with regard to permissible limitations and derogation of fundamental rights. Thirdly, the standards with regard to the rights of a person accused of a criminal offence to a fair trial in accordance with the due process of law need to be more clearly spelt out. There are also very few human rights or civil society groups.

The new Constitution clearly envisages a strong Presidential system drawing heavily from the French and the United States experience. It is argued that the process of political consolidation of the nation-State and the management of a difficult and painful economic transition calls for a strong Presidential system. However, there is a need to ensure that there are adequate checks and balances to facilitate the separation of powers so that each branch of Government does not transgress its Constitutional limits and remains democratically accountable to the people on whom sovereignty is reposed. In this regard it is not only important for the Constitution to ensure the independence, impartiality and the competence of the judiciary, but this needs to be also guaranteed in practice.

The Constitutional Court is a pivotal institution and needs to be clothed with the real authority to defend the Constitution, its supremacy and values.

An important chapter of the Constitution relates to the foundations of the economy. An important Article in this regard is Article 47 which provides the land, mineral and other resources as the exclusive property of the Republic of Kazakhstan. This provision seems to be incompatible with the programme of economic reforms which the Government is called upon to implement with its emphasis on private sector development and privatisation. The Government has already entered into agreements with Chevron to develop the Tenghiz oil field and significant foreign investment is also envisaged in the development of the mining industry. Dr. Marat Sarsebhaiyev of the Law Faculty of the Kazakh State University explained "ideologically it is difficult to turn our minds away from socialist consciousness — the essence of which is the denial of private ownership. The transition to market economy cannot be done overnight. That is why you cannot find these formulations in the draft Constitution."

The legend of Cheran Senguttuvan

D. P. Sivaram

“The lines of a song in today’s ceremony touched my heart. The lines refer to the Tamil flag which fluttered on the Himalayas. Although this may be a thing of the past, history can be re-established. Today this country is at war because the youth of this area were denied opportunities in education and culture. . . Our youth have not only done well in education but have shown that they have the self respect to achieve their aims through armed struggle. If nothing is done towards finding a settlement to the crisis in the northeast the history related in the lines of that song will be reasserted.”

— Joseph Pararajasingham M.P. for Batticaloa speaking at a school function on 26.9.92 (reported in the *Virakesari* of 1.10.92)

The song referred to by the member of parliament is from an MGR film. The lines of the song about which the M.P. speaks, are “I see that era when Cheran’s flag fluttered on the Himalayas”.

Joseph’s speech and MGR’s song invoke one of the most powerful narratives of modern Tamil nationalism — the conquest of north India by the kings of the three Tamil dynasties, the Cheras, Cholas, and the Pandyas which was accomplished by imprinting the Bow (Chera) or Tiger (Chola) or Pandya Fish (Pandya) emblems on the Himalayas.

The legend of Cheran Senguttuvan is the dominant episode of this narrative. Its political life in the Tamil nationalist project in Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka has been more tenacious than the Dutagemunu — Elara episode in the narrative of Sinhala Buddhism’s struggle against the ‘South Indian Tamil threat’.

The legend of Cheran Senguttuvan, as we shall see later, was used by the Dravidian movement for drawing a compelling characterization of its anti-Hindi agitation. The legend forms the third part of the epic *Silappatikaram* which was written by Ilango Atikal, Seran Senguttuvan’s brother — a Jain ascetic. It relates the story of Kannaki who became the goddess Pattini. The epic is divided into three parts (Kaandam) named after the capitals of the Chera, Chola and Pandya kingdoms — Vanji, Puhar and Madurai. Unlike the heroic Sangam poetry which preceded it, the *Silappatikaram* speaks for the first time about a Tamil Nadu as such constituted by the three kingdoms, distinguished by a martial tradition superior to that of north India. It portrays the three dynasties conquering the north and imprinting their emblems on the Himalayas, together and separately. The Pandyan king who mistakenly causes the beheading of Kannaki’s husband Kovalan, bears the title ‘He who overran the Aryan army’ (Aryappadai Kadantha).

M. Raghava Aiyangar wrote a book based on the third part of the epic — the *Vanjikkandam* called ‘Seran Senguttuvan’. It was dedicated to Pandithura Thevar. A recent work on Aiyangar’s contribution says “This was the first book to give the *Vanjikkandam* in prose. It was after this that many scholars studied the *Vanjikkandam* and wrote books. . . the book made everyone realise and appreciate the Golden Era of the Tamils.” (*Annals of Tamil research*, M. Raghava Aiyangar Commemoration Volume. Univ. of Madras, 1978 pp 18–19) The book went through four editions in the first two decades of its publication. “It can be said that after the

appearance of this book research on the Sangam period expanded. Many times it was made a text in the universities of Andhra, Mysore and Madras and in Ceylon and is widely read” (Araichithohuthi, 1938 p. 20) We examined the life and politics of M. Raghava Aiyangar in the last issue. As we pointed out there, Aiyangar’s idea of Tamilian renaissance differed from contemporaneous Indian nationalists in one important respect. Whereas the Indian nationalists who upheld the cause of Tamil Culture and history, essentially saw them from a pan Indian perspective, Aiyangar’s writings emphasised a south Indian, Tamilian uniqueness and martial superiority. His most famous work ‘Seran Senguttuvan’ and the essay he wrote later to supplement and support it are clear attempts to establish and popularise that idea. Three reasons can be identified for his attitude. The first as we noted earlier was his close relationship with the Marava rulers of Ramnad — the Sethupathies. The second is that he was a Vaishnavite Brahmin — the Indian National Congress was dominated in the Presidency of Madras by Saivaite Brahmins. Many Vaishnavites have, as a result tended to sympathise with the Dravidian movement (Sivathamby 1989) In a lecture delivered to the 23rd annual conference of the Madurai Tamil Sangam Aiyangar said “The three Tamil kings, the Cheras, Cholas and the Pandyas established their martial glory beyond *Thamilaham* (Tamilhomeland) which lay between the Vengadam hills to the north and Comorin to the south; but their love for the Tamil speaking land was so great that they were not desirous of attaching lands where foreign languages are spoken, to *Thamilaham*... It will be appropriate to name the Madras Presidency as the

Dravidian Province." (Araichithohuthi: 1938. pp 318, 338)

The third reason is related to his stay in Kerala as head of the Tamil department in the university of Trivandrum.

Kerala was the ancient Chera kingdom. Aiyangar's writings during his residence at Trivandrum attempt to place Kerala history and culture within the tradition of Thamilaham. The Maharaj of the Travancore state at that time, Sithiraithirunal had told Aiyangar "Malayalam is the Tamil language that bathed in the sea of Sanskrit" (R. Veerapathiran 1978 p. 38) 'Some Aspects of Kerala and Tamil Literature' and 'Chera Venthari SeyuttKovai' (in two volumes) Aiyangar's 'gothra' (section) name was Aiyannarithan, a poet of the chera dynasty, who wrote the Purapporul Venbamalai — a treatise on Tamil martial culture were books which resulted from his work at Trivandrum. One of his most controversial essays was on the Kinship system of the Chera dynasty. All this stems from his work on Seran Senguttuvan. This book which has to be read in conjunction with his essay 'The Conquest of the Himalayas by the Tamil Kings' (Thamil Ventharin Imayappadai Eduppu) attempted to ground the story of Senguttuvan in epigraphical literary evidence. The work seeks to establish the story of Senguttuvan, related in the Silappathikaram's Vanjikkaandam, as a historical truth. The book as a school and university text book has left a deep imprint on Tamilian cultural-political vocabulary.

Annadurai, Karunanidhi, MGR and the speakers of the Federal Party have invoked the example of Seran Senguttuvan to bestir Tamil youth. The Silappathikaram portrays his expedition into north India as the assertion of Tamil military might over Aryan kings who had in their ignorance disparaged the martial prowess of southern Tamils.

Senguttuvan vows to defeat two Aryan kings, Kanakan and Vijayan ("they who could not hold their tongue" says the epic) who had cast aspersions on what is called 'Thenthamil Aatral' — south Tamil might and make them carry a stone hewn from the Himalayan mountain back to Tamil Nadu for the deification of Kannaki as goddess Pattini.

Senguttuvan is told "you faced the thousand Aryan kings in Combat on the day you bathed the goddess in the great flood of the Ganges... if you have decided on the expedition (to bring the stone) let the kings of the north fly the Bow, Tiger and Fish flags in their lands."

Senguttuvan, says the epic, was born to Neduncheralathan who bears the title Imayavaramban — He who has the Himalayas as his boundary and the daughter of a Chola king; and as such he is seen as representing a Tamilian unity. (The Silappathikaram says that Gajabahu of Lanka invoked the goddess Pattini at Senguttuvan's capital to come to his country and give her blessings on the day Senguttuvan's father Imayavaramban's birth was commemorated there)

The conquest of the north and the Himalayas is a leitmotif in the Sangam anthologies which precede the Silappathikaram. ("The Aryans screamed out loud in pain when you attacked them" says a poem in the Sangam anthologies) The three parts of the epic emphasise the theme to glorify each dynasty. The first part refers to an expedition undertaken to the Himalayas by Thirumavalavan who was known as Karikalan (Prabhakaran's nom de guerre) — the founder of the Chola empire. He is shown as defeating the Maghadha, Avanti, and Vajira kingdoms.

The second part speaks of the Pandyan who conquered the 'newly arisen Himalayas' when his ancient land of the Kumari mountains and the Pahruli river were taken by the sea.

It is a theme in the inscriptions of the Chola Empire at a

later date. One Chola emperor takes on the title, the Conqueror of the Ganges. Minor poetry which arose after the decline of the Cholas praising military commanders and chieftans of the Tamil country also utilise the theme. (Karumanikkan kovai, Kalingaththupparani etc).

The leitmotif of the Tamil emblem on the Himalayas finds the most vivid expression in the story of Senguttuvan. Aiyangar takes it out of its epic context to emphasise a perception — that the Tamils were historically indomitable martial race. The story of Senguttuvan's expedition repeatedly lays stress on the what is referred to as South Tamil martial might. Aiyangar's later essay on the theme of Tamil expeditions into the north tried to prove again that these events were true on the basis of evidence culled from the Imperial Gazeteer of India and the Hand Gazeteer of India.

In this essay he argues that Asoka did not think of invading Tamil Nadu because he and other northern Aryan kings were aware and scared of the martial prowess of the ancient Tamils who before their times had invaded and defeated the north and imprinted their emblems on the Himalayan mountains.

The first Tamil king to imprint his emblem on the mountain was Karikalan; the names borne by parts of the Himalayas such as the Chola Pass and the Chola Range prove the Chola king's expedition is a historical fact argued Aiyankar. (Araichithohuthi: 1938. p 184)

He did the 'academic' groundwork for the propagation of the narrative of Tamil military expeditions into the north as an expression of a unique and superior martial prowess and its symbol — the Tamil flag on the Himalayas. Dravidian propagandists and the politicians of the Federal Party transformed it into a nostalgic and powerful story of a golden era woven into the rhetoric of national liberation and youth mobilization.

Why did peace accords fail?

John M. Richardson and Jr. Jianxin Wang

We propose two explanations for the failure of the ethnic peace accords to achieve lasting peace. First is the *intractability of ethnic conflicts*. These conflicts, while they bear some similarity to other disputes, are probably the most complex and difficult to resolve by any conflict resolution method and under any circumstances. Our second explanation is *shortcomings in negotiating and implementing the accords*. Possibly excepting the Addis Ababa agreement, the negotiation process, content and follow-up of the peace accords fail to exhibit even the most elementary principles that conflict resolution specialists point to as prerequisites for success.

The Intractability of Ethnic Conflicts

A major theme of Donald Horowitz's path-breaking *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (1985) is, as noted above, that *resolving* ethnic conflicts may be impossible. It may only be possible to *manage* them. He illustrates with the following tale:

When the Japanese hurriedly evacuated Christmas Island, south of Java, they left some small arms behind. The Malays and Chinese who inhabit the island had enough of fighting, and it is said that that they arranged for the Chinese to keep the rifles and the Malays to keep the bolts. The Malays, on the other hand, were to keep the pistols but give the magazines to the Chinese. By these devices, a bloodbath was averted (p. 563).

The Christmas Islanders recognized that their predispositions toward violent ethnic conflict were dangerous, deeply rooted and not susceptible to individual good will. Fortunately, they were able to seize a propitious moment and limit the resources that would support violence. Protagonists and victims of most ethnic conflicts have been less fortunate. Ethnic differences often

provoke violence. The resources to sustain violent conflict are readily available. As noted above violent ethnic conflict often assumes a particularly virulent form, labeled by the late Edward Azar as *protracted social conflict* (1990).

The focus of protracted conflicts, according to Azar "is religious, cultural or ethnic communal identity, which in turn is dependent upon the satisfaction of basic needs such as those for security, communal recognition and distributive justice (p. 2)." Such conflicts "tend to involve an enduring antagonistic set of perceptions and interactions between communal groups and the state." Those perceptions are conditioned by the experiences, fears and belief systems of the contending ethnic groups. Each attributes the worst motivations to the other side. Hostility begets hostility, creating conditions of violent conflict that feed upon themselves (pp. 13-16). Protracted conflict weakens civil society, delegitimizes governmental institutions, destroys the economy and frustrates developmental goals.

At the onset of conflict, social and economic institutions mediating communal interrelationships may still be functional, and communal boundaries permeable. As conflict protracts, however, communal cleavages become petrified and the prospects for cooperative interaction and nation building become poor (p. 16). . . . With the continued stress of each conflict, attitudes, cognitive processes and perceptions become set and ossified. War culture and cynicism dominate. Meaningful communication between or among conflicting parties dries up, and ability to satisfy communal acceptance needs is severely diminished (p. 17).

Protracted conflict creates severe obstacles to any peacemaking process. Peacemaking is resisted even though for most of those

involved, the economic costs of protracted conflict clearly outweigh any conceivable long-term economic benefit (Azar, 1990, p. 7, ff; Richardson and Samarasinghe, 1992). In part, this is because leaders and members of militant groups, who must be key actors in any peace-making process, reap both psychic and material benefits from the perpetuation of conflict, while passing the costs to others. They may have little to gain from peace (Richardson and Samarasinghe, 1992). Often militant forces are far from unified; there may be multiple — even rival — key leaders with differing objectives. Sometimes militant leaders and groups comprising one faction seem as hostile to each other as to their adversaries from opposing ethnic groups. For high government officials, the perpetuation of conflict can divert attention from failures in leadership and from intractable social and economic problems (Richardson and Samarasinghe, 1992). For the foot soldiers in protracted conflict, symbolic considerations often weigh more heavily than economic ones (Horowitz, 1985, Ch. 4).

Clearly ethnic conflicts are protracted. Animosities contributing to a high potential for violent conflict can be traced back over decades and even centuries. When violent conflicts between ethnic groups do break out, they tend to last far longer than wars between nations. Although available data is more anecdotal than comprehensive, the evidence seems overwhelming that genocide, military defeat or enforced separation of contending parties are more likely to mark the end of violent ethnic conflicts than negotiated peace accords.

Shortcomings in the Five Ethnic Peace Accords

Formidable challenges clearly await those who would frame ethnic peace accords as negotiator, mediator or external arbiter. For negotiators or mediators the conditions for success would seem to include — at a minimum — bringing authoritative representatives of contending groups together,

establishing communication, creating trust, identifying acceptable terms for an accord, ensuring that those terms have adequate support among the adversaries and fully implementing the accord. Possibly, external arbiters can devote less time to building consensus to the degree that they have the capacity to impose and enforce terms of an accord. But imposing terms on militant groups is not easy, as the Indian Peace Keeping Force discovered in Sri Lanka and an imposed peace, unless supported by some commitment from contending groups, is unlikely to be sustainable.

Table 2 summarizes the negotiation processes and implementation of each accord discussed in this Book. External actors played a role in four — Cyprus, Sri Lanka and Sudan. In two cases, Cyprus and Sri Lanka, external powers attempted to achieve peace by imposing an accord. Although both accords attempted to deal with some outstanding issues, neither set of negotiations involved all of the protagonists and fundamental points of difference were left unresolved. In Cyprus the proportional representation schemes written into the new nation's constitution never provided a basis for real cooperation. Peace ended when Greek and Turkish Cypriots were able to draw their client states into a confrontation. In Sri Lanka, the Indian Government was overoptimistic about the ability of its Army to enforce the accord that Rajiv Gandhi had dictated to the LTTE leader, Prabhakaran. When the Liberation Tigers resumed hostilities, within two months after the accord was signed, the Indian Peace Keeping force was hardly more effective than the Sri Lankan army had been in maintaining order. The one case where external actors played the role of mediator produced the relatively successful Addis Ababa accord. However distinctive characteristics of the conflict, internally, also contributed to success. The Southern Sudanese rebels negotiated from a strong, if not equal position with government representatives.

Table 2. Negotiation and Implementation of Ethnic Peace Accords

<i>Accord</i>	<i>Negotiation and Implementation</i>
CYPRUS: London-Zurich agreements (1959)	Accord was negotiated by 3 external powers—Great Britain, Greece, Turkey—who agreed to serve as guarantors. Cypriots did not participate in the agreements, although they did sign the documents.
SUDAN: Addis Ababa agreement (Feb. 1972)	Accord was the result of three years of preliminary negotiations and several months of intensive negotiations, following the accession of the Nimeri Government. Abal Alier a Southerner, headed government delegation and played a key role in maintaining communication between northerners and southerners. Participation of influential outside mediators helped to bring negotiators to Addis Ababa and keep them at work until an accord was reached. As the Sudanese Vice President, Alier subsequently played a key role in implementing the accord, with President Nimeri's full backing.
INDIA: Punjab Accord (July 1985)	Accord was negotiated by Rajiv Gandhi and more moderate Sikh politicians headed by Akali Dal leader Sand Longowal. Militant Sikh leaders and leaders of states required to make territorial concessions under the agreement did not participate. Neither moderate Sikh leader nor Gandhi had sufficient mandate to implement the accord. Gandhi is later reputed to have manipulated the "independent commissions" established under the accord to produce decisions unfavorable to the Sikhs (Gill, pp. 21-22).
CANADA: Meech Lake Accord (June 1987)	Accord was the result of intensive negotiations between Prime Minister Mulroney (Federal Government) and Premier Bourasse (Quebec). Agreement was accepted by other Provincial Premiers almost without alteration. During three year period allowed for ratification, new governments were elected in two provinces and opposition groups mobilized. Agreement failed ratification.
SRI LANKA: Indo Lanka Accord (July, 1987)	Discussions leading to the accord were precipitated created by Indian military pressure on Sri Lanka. The accord was negotiated by Indian Prime Minister Gandhi and Sri Lankan President Jayewardene with no direct participation of either moderate or militant Sri Lankan Tamils. LTTE leader Prabhakaran acceded to the accord under pressure, but subsequently repudiated it. The Indian government was unable to keep its side of the agreement, to disarm the LTTE and enforce compliance with the accord.

"October" after 75 years

Reggie Siriwardene

I wish to open this lecture with a few historical snapshots. On the 25th October (Old Style) 1917, the All-Russian Congress of Soviets met in Petrograd on the morrow of the October insurrection. Speaking for the left and centre Mensheviks, Martov denounced the insurrection as a Bolshevik coup and demanded the formation of a coalition government of the three socialist parties. Answering on behalf of the victorious Bolsheviks, Trotsky rejected the demand and ended his speech with these contemptuous words: 'You are pitiful isolated individuals; you are bankrupt; your role is played out. Go where you belong from now on—into the rubbish-can of history!'² Martov left the hall with his followers, and later went into exile. Twelve years later, Trotsky, who had been so certain that the current of history was running in the direction he imagined, was overtaken by nemesis. In 1929, by a decision of Stalin's Politbureau, he was conveyed to the harbour of Odessa and put on board the ship that was to take him, in the dead of winter across a frozen sea, into exile. As his biographer, Isaac Deutscher, has graphically described the moment: 'As... Trotsky looked back at the receding shore, he must have felt as if the whole country he was leaving behind had frozen into a desert and as if the revolution itself had become congealed.'³ Another three decades on, and the body of the all-powerful dictator, who had deported his principal political opponent and later had him murdered, was ejected in disgrace from the mausoleum in Red Square. Yet another thirty years on, today, Lenin's body still lies in that same mausoleum, but the queues outside it have dwindled; his name has been erased from the city where he took power; his monu-

ments have been toppled in public places throughout the country; and tomorrow (November 7th) there will be no official celebrations of the seventy-fifth anniversary.

The Russian Revolution and its vicissitudes might be a theme for a Shakespearean meditation on the uncertainty of political greatness:

how chance's mocks
And changes fill the cup of
alteration
With divers liquors!

The changing fortunes of the political actors and their reputations are an index of the shifts of social forces in the three-quarters of a century between the birth and death of the Soviet state. What I shall try to offer in this lecture is not a narrative history of those years but a theory that can encompass and make intelligible the main lines of historical development, as far as this can be attempted in the compass of an hour.

I should like to remind you at the outset of what was the paradigm of revolution in classical Marxist theory — that is, in the work of the founding fathers, Marx and Engels. In the *Communist Manifesto* they said, of the epoch of the rise of the bourgeoisie:

...the means of production and of exchange, on whose foundation the bourgeoisie built itself up, were generated in feudal society. At a certain stage in the development of these means of production and of exchange, ...the feudal organisation of agriculture and manufacturing industry, in one word, the feudal relations of property became no longer compatible with the already developed productive forces; they became so many fetters. They had to be burst asunder;⁴

In other words, Marx and Engels saw the bourgeois revolutions — especially, the great French Revolution — as arising out of the contradiction between, on the one hand, the forces of production and, on the other, the relations of production, which had become incompatible with productive growth. Marx and Engels expected a similar contradiction to arise with the development of capitalism. As Marx said in *Capital*:

The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production, which has sprung up and flourished along with, and under it. Centralisation of the means of production and socialisation of labour at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated.⁵

You will observe the close parallel, in concepts and terminology, between Marx and Engels's account of the 'bourgeois revolutions' of the past and Marx's vision of the 'socialist revolution of the future. In the last few decades the orthodox Marxist analysis of the French Revolution has come under intensive criticism, and there has been much debate whether it can be considered a 'bourgeois revolution' at all.⁶ (A parallel debate has taken place over the Marxist view of the 17th century English Civil War.) In the case of the English and French Revolutions, it has not been until the second half of the present century that there has been serious questioning of the Marxist paradigm. But the claim that the Russian Revolution was a 'socialist revolution' ran into theoretical problems from its very beginnings. Marx and Engels had naturally expected the contradictions of capitalism to mature earliest in the developed countries of Western Europe, and had therefore looked to these countries to pioneer the socialist revolution. How then explain the phenomenon of a supposedly socialist revolution in Russia — a country

which was 80 percent peasant, in which the proletariat was a small urban minority, in which serfdom had been abolished only in 1861, and in which feudal absolutism reigned in the state until the February Revolution of 1917? Not surprisingly, Lenin's enterprise in October of impelling his party to the capture of power for the purpose of creating a socialist state provoked not only bitter opposition from the moderate socialist parties, the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries, but also deep misgivings among a section of his party. Two of Lenin's most long-standing collaborators, Zinoviev and Kamenev, even opposed the insurrection within the Central Committee itself.

Just over five years later, commenting on the book by the Menshevik Sukhanov, *Notes Concerning a Revolution*, which repeated the argument that Russia was 'not ripe for socialism', Lenin said:

Napoleon, I think, wrote: "*On s'engage et puis... on voit.*" Rendered freely this means: "First engage in a serious battle and then see what happens"... Our Sukhanovs, not to mention Social-Democrats still farther to the right, never even dream that revolutions cannot be made in any other way.⁷

In quoting the Napoleonic maxim, Lenin was admitting that there was an element in the October Revolution of a historical gamble. But the record shows that Lenin wouldn't have staked everything on this gamble but for one consideration which was for him a certainty. That was his belief that Western Europe was ripe for socialist revolution, and that the Russian October would be the stimulus that would make the fruit fall from the tree.

There is ample evidence of this — in the first place, in the text of the resolution that Lenin drafted for the crucial meeting of the Bolshevik Central Committee on October 10(OS) that took the decision to launch the insurrection. The resolution opens:

The Central Committee recognises that the international position of the Russian revolution (the revolt in the German navy which is an extreme manifestation of the growth throughout Europe of the world socialist revolution); the threat of peace by the imperialists with the object of strangling the revolution in Russia) as well as the military situation... and the fact that the proletarian party has gained a majority in the Soviets — ... all this places the armed uprising on the order of the day.⁸

Notice that in Lenin's calculations 'the international position of the Russian revolution' — that is 'the revolutionary 'growth throughout Europe' — took precedence over the internal factors. After the seizure of power Lenin continued to reiterate for the next few years not only his confidence in the proximity of European — that is, especially German — revolution but also its indispensability for the survival of the Soviet state. In 1918 Lenin had to contend with those who, both within his party and outside, protested that because the German revolution was imminent, the Soviet state had no need to accept the harsh terms of the Brest-Litovsk peace imposed by Germany, Lenin refused to take such a decision on the basis of an estimate that the German revolution would come in 'six months', or some such precise time schedule. Nevertheless, he asserted: 'That the socialist revolution in Europe must come, and will come, is beyond doubt. All our hopes for the final victory of socialism are founded on this certainty and on this scientific prognosis.'⁹ And again, two months later in 1918: 'At all events, under all conceivable circumstances, if the German revolution does not come, we are doomed.'¹⁰

(To be continued)

References

- 1 Until after the October Revolution, Russia preserved the old pre-Gregorian calendar which was by then 13 days behind the international calendar. Hence the anomaly of the 'October Revolution' occurring

in November, by the reckoning of the rest of the world.

- 2 Trotsky (1957), pp. 310-311.
- 3 Deutscher (1959), p. 471.
- 4 Marx and Engels (1977), p. 113.
- 5 Marx (n.d.), p. 763.
- 6 A neo-Marxist historian, writing in a special number of *Science and Society* commemorating the bicentenary of the French Revolution, says: '...the interpretation of the French Revolution as a political conflict between emerging capitalists and declining feudalists has become increasingly difficult to sustain in the light of accumulating historical evidence.' (Halkier, 1990, p. 322)
- 7 Lenin (1977a), p. 707.
- 8 Lenin (1977), p. 402.
- 9 Lenin (1977), p. 481.
- 10 Lenin (1977), p. 535.

Trends...

(Continued from page 1)

Trade Zone workers at Katunayake on Sunday. They were protesting the violation of labour laws by FTZ employers. Reports said about 10,000 demonstrated and that police used tear gas and also fired into the air.

Other reports however quoted police saying that no force was used.

Development Boards a ruse?

The Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP) said in a statement that the newly introduced School Development Boards were a ruse to destroy free education. Emergency laws were being used to set them up, the MEP said and the reason for School Development Boards when School Development Societies already existed was a shameless attempt to privatise schools.

Meanwhile the Ministry of Education explaining the move said: "School Development Boards are being established in pursuance of the recommendations of the Presidential Commission on Youth which states that the need to review the school as an autonomous institution at local level should be one of the highest priorities in an emerging educational policy giving expression to the aspiration that parents, principals, teachers, pupils, past-pupils should play an active part in its activities together with wellwishers"

The Rajiv Assassination

Crime at about 10.10 PM, Dhanu (A5) gained access to Shri Rajiv Gandhi and while in close proximity to him, detonated the improvised explosive device kept concealed in the waist belt resulting in the blast and killing of Shri Rajiv Gandhi and 17 others including herself (Dhanu-A5) causing injuries to 44 persons; immediately thereafter Sivarasan (A4) Subha (A6) and Nalin (A9) escaped from the scene of crime, reached the house of Jayakumar (A18) and Shanthi (A19), took shelter in their house; Subha Sundaram (A30), attempted to retrieve the camera used by Haribabu (A7) the scene of crime, caused destruction of documents/material objects linking Haribabu (A7) in this case and arranged to issue denial in the Press about any connection of Haribabu (A7) with LTTE. Bhagyanathan (A28) and Padma (A29) rendered all assistance and harboured Sivarasan (A4), Subha (A6) Murugan (A11) and Arivu (A26) and Padma (A29) accompanied Sivarasan (A4), Subha (A6), Nalini (A9) and Murugan (A11) to Tirupathi where Nalini (A9) did "Angapradakshinam"; thereafter Nalini (A9) and Murugan (A11) hid themselves in different places in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka to evade arrest; Dhanasekharan (A31), Rangan (A32) and Vicky (A33) harboured the accused Sivarasan (A4), Subha (A6) and Nehru (A8) in transporting them concealed inside a tanker lorry belonging to Dhanasekharan (A31) from Madras to Bangalore; Nehru (A8) operated the wireless set and communicated with Prabhakaran (A1) through Pottu Omman (A2) conveying the developments on behalf of Sivarasan (A4); Nehru (A8), Trichy Santhan (A36) Suresh Master (A37), Dixon (A38) Amman (A39) and Driver Anna & Keerthi (A40) rendered all assistance to Sivarasan (A4); Ranganath (A34) harboured Sivarasan (A4), Subha (A6), Nehru (A8) Suresh Master (A37), Amman (A39), Driver Anna (A40) and Jamuna & Jameela (A41) where at Konanakunte, Bangalore on 19.8.91 Sivarasan (A4), Subha (A6), Nehru (A8), Suresh Master (A37), Amman (A39), Driver Anna (A40) and Jamuna & Jameela (A41) committed suicide; Shanmugavadivelu & Thambi Anna (A23) rendered financial assistance to Sivarasan (A4) and others to carry out the object of conspiracy and abetted the commission of crime.

Thereby A1 TO A41 committed offences punishable under Section 120-B IPC r/w 302, 326, 324, 201 and 212 IPC; Sections 3, 4 & 5 of Explosive Substances Act; Section 25 and 27 of Arms Act; Section 12 of Passports Act; Section 14 of Foreigners Act; Section 6 (1A) of Wireless Telegraphy Act. Sections 3 (3), 4 (2), 3 (3) TADA Act, 1987.

In pursuance of the said criminal conspiracy and in the course of the same transaction A1 to A 41 committed in addition to offences under section 3 (3), 4 (2) and 4 (3) TADA Act, 1987 and individual specific offences as detailed below:-

1. Between July 1987 and 14.5.92 at Jaffna, Northern part of Sri Lanka, Prabhakaran (A1), Pottu Omman (A2) and Akila (A3) who are responsible for the design of the criminal conspiracy having designed the conspiracy entered into the same along with others in this case as referred to supra instigated A4 to follow up the design and execute the same in India according to the design agreed upon and in furtherance of such instigation, Sivarasan (A4) and other accused concerned in the case carried out the object of the criminal conspiracy in various places and thus Prabhakaran (A1), Pottu Omman (A2) and Akila (A3) have rendered themselves liable for offences punishable under Sections 302 r/w 109 IPC. (A1 TO A3 are absconding)

2. Sivarasan (A4), infiltrated into India, with common intention got into contact with other accused concerned in this case referred to supra, made necessary preparations for carrying out the object of the conspiracy, took Dhanu (A5) equipped with belt bomb for assassinating Shri Rajiv Gandhi under the guise of garlanding and accused Haribabu (A7) the photographer for taking photographs of all the events inclusive of assassination by the explosion to be caused by the human bomb so as to show to the designers of the conspiracy the successful accomplishment of the object of the criminal conspiracy and posed himself as a Journalist and helped the accused Dhanu (A5) to gain access to Shri Rajiv Gandhi to enable her to cause explosion at the proper time; communicated through the illegally operated wireless set with Pottu Omman (A2) and thus Sivarasan (A4) committed the offence punishable under Sections 3, 4 & 5 of the TADA Prevention Act, 1987; Sections 302, 326, 324, & 201 IPC; Sections 3, 4 & 5 of Explosive substances Act, Sections 25 and 27 of Arms Act, Section 14 of Foreigners Act and Section 6 (1A) of The Indian Wireless Telegraphy Act, Section 3, 4 & 5 of TADA Act r/w 3 (4) IPC. (Charge abates).

3. Dhanu & Anbu (A5) committed the murder of Shri Rajiv Gandhi, nine police personnel, seven members of public and caused injuries to 44 persons by exploding the belt bomb concealed in her person on 21.5.91 after having gained access to Shri Rajiv Gandhi under the guise of garlanding at Sriperumbudur at about 10.20 PM and in that process committed terrorist and disruptive acts and thereby committed offences punishable under Sections Sec. 3 (2) & 4 (1) TADA; Sections 302, 307, 326, 324 IPC, Section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act and 14 Foreigners Act. (Charge abates).

4. Subha (A6) and Haribabu (A7) in furtherance of their common intention to commit the murder of Shri Rajiv Gandhi and other by Dhanu (A5) exploding the belt bomb, accompanied Sivarasan (A4) to the scene of offence and were present at the scene of crime when Dhanu (A5) exploded the belt bomb concealed in her person and they also committed terrorist and disruptive acts and offence under the Explosive Substances Act. Hence these two accused are liable under Sections 3 (3) of TADA, Sections 302, 307, 324 & 326 IPC and Section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act r/w Section 34 IPC. (Charges against A6 and A5 abates).

5. Nalini (A9) in furtherance of the common intention to commit the murder of Sri Rajiv Gandhi and others by Dhanu (A5) exploding the bomb, accompanied Sivarasan (A4), Dhanu (A5), Subha (A6) and Haribabu (A7) to the scene of offence and was present at the scene of crime when Dhanu (A5) exploded the belt bomb concealed in her person and has rendered herself liable for the offences under Sections 302, 307, 326, & 324 IPC r/w Section 34 of IPC; Section 302 r/w 302 r/w 114 IPC, Section 212 IPC and Section 3 (4) TADA.

6. Nehru & Nero Gokul (A8), Santhan (A10), Shankar & Koneswaran (A12), Vijayanandan (A13), Ruban (A14), and Driver Anna (A40) came to India clandestinely in the early hours of 1.5.91 from Madakkal, Jaffna in a boat along with Sivarasan (A4), Dhanu & Anbu (A5), and Subha & Nithya (A6) under the specific instruction of Pottu Oman (A2) and they were given specific assignment by Sivarasan (A4) after they came to India and they aided, assisted and abetted Sivarasan (A4) in carrying out the object of conspiracy. Santhan (A10), rendered assistance to Sivarasan (A4) in the preparation and execution of the object of conspiracy. Nehru & Nero & Gokul (A8) installed and operated wireless set at Vijayan's (A20) house at Kodungayur for sending messages to Jaffna, Ruban (A14) went to Jaipur under the false pretext of fixing up a leg for his amputated leg while the main purpose of his visit was for arranging a safe hide out for co-conspirators. Hence all these accused are liable under Sections 3 (4) of TADA, Section 212 IPC and Section 14 of the Foreigners Act. Nehru & Nero & Gokul (A8) is also liable under Section 6 (1A) of the Indian Wireless Telegraphy Act. (Charges against Nehru (A8) and Driver Anna (A40) abates.

7. Murugan (A11) having come to India clandestinely cultivated friendship with an Indian Tamil family viz. Nalini (A9), Bhagyanathan (A28), Padma (A29) and Haribabu (A7) and acted as conduit between these Indian Tamils and Sivarasan (A4) in the commission of crime. He also carried letters written by Dhanu (A5), Subha (A6) and Bhagyanathan (A28) addressed to Pottu

Omman (A2) and Akila (A3) and a set of "The Satanic Force". He was also sending messages illegally to Pottu Omman (A2). He is therefore, liable under Section Sec. 14 of the Foreigners Act, Sec. 6 (1A) of the Indian Wireless Telegraphy Act.

8. Kanagasabapathy (A15) and Athirai (A16) came illegally into India together and they proceeded to Delhi to fix up a house to harbour the terrorists after the commission of crime and hence committed the offence punishable under Section 3 (4) of TADA, Section 212 of IPC and Section 14 of the Foreigners Act.

9. Robert Payas (A17), Jayakumar (A18), Shanthi (A19), Vijayan (A20), Selvaluxmi (A21) and Bhaskaran (A22) having come to India illegally without any passport, got them registered as refugees only as a make believe affair, but in fact they came with the purpose of assisting and abetting the conspirators in this case and took houses on rent at Porur and Kodungayur in Madras where they accommodated Sivarasan (A4), Dhanu (A5), Subha (A6), Nehru & Nero (A8), Santhan (A10) and Ruban (A14) before and after the offence was committed Robert Payas (A17) obtained a driving licence for Sivarasan (A4). Jayakumar (A18) and Shanthi (A19) concealed the personal articles of Sivarasan (A4) and also ammunition in a pit dug in the kitchen of their house at Kodungayur. Vijayan (A20) was given large amounts by Sivarasan (A4). A wireless set was installed in the house of Vijayan (A20) by Nehru & Nero & Gokul (A8). Hence these accused are liable under Section 3 (4) of TADA; Section 212 IPC. Vijayan (A20), Selvaluxmi (A21) and Baskaran (A22) are liable under Section 6 (1A) of the Indian Wireless Telegraphy Act, Jayakumar (A18) and Shanthi (A19) are liable under Section 25 & 27 of The Arms Act.

10. Shanmugavadivelu & Thambi Anna (A23) was keeping the funds on behalf of the co-conspirators and was converting the gold brought from Jaffna into cash. He was providing financial assistance to the members of the conspiracy in accomplishing the object of conspiracy as and when required. He was thereby abetted the commission of offence by the accused and has rendered himself liable under Section 14 of Foreigners's Act.

11. Ravi & Ravichandran (A24) and Suseendran & Mahesh (A25), as members of the Tamil National Troops in India, went to Sri Lanka illegally without any passport and got trained by LTTE and they came back to India with instructions from Pottu Omman (A2) to act as per the directions of Sivarasan (A4). Ravi & Ravichandran (A10) received about Rs. 10 lakhs from Sivarasan (A4) to assist LTTE men in India. They also harboured Sivarasan (A4) and

Subha (A6). They were found in possession of arms, ammunitions and grenades which were seized on 22.1.92 and 23.1.92 Pollachi and Koddikkarai and hence committed offence punishable under Sections 3 (4) of TADA, Sec. 212 IPC, Sec. 4 & 5 of The Explosive Substances Act, Sections 25 and 27 of Arms Act and Section 12 of The Passports Act.

12. Perarivalan & Arivu (A26) stayed in the house of Bhagyanathan (A28) and Padma (A29) along with (A11). He assisted Murugan (A11) and Sivarasan (A4) in their illegal activities viz. planning of modalities, preparation and accomplishment of the object of conspiracy. He purchased a motor cycle in his name using the funds given by Sivarasan (A4) which was used by Sivarasan (A4) for his activities. He purchased two two 9 volt battery cells as per the instructions of Sivarasan (A4) and gave the same to him which was used by Dhanu (A5) to detonate the belt bomb concealed in her person on 21.5.91. He also purchased a battery and gave it to Sivarasan (A4) which was used to operate the illegally installed wireless set at the house of Vijayan (A20) by Nehru & Nero (8). He was in possession of highly incriminating documents and material objects. He also visited Jaffna, Sri Lanka without a valid passport. He is, therefore liable under Section 12 of the Passport Act and Section 6 (IA) Wireless Telegraphy Act.

13. Irumborai (A27), is an active conspirator in this case. He left for Jaffna clandestinely and assisted Sivarasan (A4), Subha (A6), Nehru (A8) and other conspirators in the matter of achieving the object of the conspiracy by carrying important messages between the conspirators and shifting Sivarasan (A4) from place to place and by doing such other acts as are necessary for carrying out the object of conspiracy. Thereby he has rendered himself liable under Section 12 of the Passports Act.

14. Bhagyanathan (A28) and his mother Padma (A29) along with his sister Nalini (A9) assisted, abetted and harboured the co-conspirators in their house and further after the assassination of Shri Rajiv Gandhi, Bhagyanathan (A28) arranged a car for the killer group to go to Triupathi in which Padma (A29) and her daughter Nalini (A9) accompanied Sivarasan (A4), Subha (A6) and Murugan (A11). Further Padma (A29) concealed a code-sheet given by Murugan (A11) with her colleague nurse in the hospital and Bhagyanathan (A28) had written letter to an important functionary of the LTTE about the hope of successful accomplishment of the object of the conspiracy. Hence these two accused are liable under Section 3 (4) of TADA, Section 212 IPC and Padma (A29) is also liable under Section 6 (IA) of Wireless Telegraphy Act.

15. A Sundaram & Subba Sundaram (A30) was having links with LTTE leaders including Kittu in London and before the assassination of Shri Rajiv Gandhi on 21.5.91, Haribabu (A7) went to his Photo Studio and met him. Soon after the murder of Shri Rajiv Gandhi he made efforts to retrieve the camera of Haribabu (A7) from the scene of crime and advised the father of Haribabu (A7) to destroy all the belongings of Haribabu (A7) in order to conceal his connections with other conspirators in this case. He has aided and abetted the other conspirators. He is therefore, also liable under Section 201 IPC for causing destruction of evidence.

15. Dhanasekharan (A31) had actively assisted the co-conspirators by purchasing vehicles for the same use of co-conspirators in their activities and transported Sivarasan (A4), Subha (A6) and Nehru (A8) after the assassination in his tanker lorry from Madras to Bangalore. Thereby he rendered himself also liable under Section 3 (4) TADA and Section 212 IPC.

17. Rangan (A32) and Vicky & Vigneswaran (A33), Suresh Master (A37), Dixon (A38), Amman (A39), Driver Anna & Keerthi (A40) and Jamuna & Jameela (41) came to India illegally and they harboured the offenders and the terrorists Sivarasan (A4) and Subha (A6) to evade arrest by shifting them from one place to another and thereby committed offences punishable under section 3 (4) of TADA, Section 212 IPC and Section 14 of the Foreigners Act. (Charge against A 37, A 38, A 39, A 40 & A 41 abates).

18. Ranganath (A34) provided hideouts for Sivarasan (A4), Subha (A6), Nehru (A8) Suresh Master (A37), Amman (A39), Driver Anna (A40) and Jamuna & Jameela (A41) even after coming to know that Sivarasan (A4) and Subha (A6) are proclaimed offenders and continued to harbour them in his house at Puttanahalli and subsequently at Konanakunte house. Thereby he rendered himself liable under Section 3 (4) TADA, Section 212.

19. Shanmugham (A35) was a LTTE helper and smuggler who operated from Kodiakkarai. He received the conspirators in this case and the group of nine persons and actively assisted the conspirators in carrying out the object of the conspiracy. He was concealing communication equipment and high explosives for use of the conspirators. He is liable under Section 3 (4) of TADA, and Section 212 IPC. (Charge abates).

20. Trichy Santhan (A36) also came to India illegally assisted Sivarasan in carrying out the object of criminal conspiracy and after the commission of murder of Shri Rajiv Gandhi and others harboured Sivarasn (A4), Subha (A6)

and Nehru (A8) to evade arrest and to send them safely out of India to Jaffna. He is liable under Section 3 (4) of TADA, Section 212 IPC and 14 of Foreigners Act. (Charge abates).

The required sanction to prosecute:

(a) Ravichandran & Ravi & Pragasam (A24), Perarivalan & Arivu (A26) Duraisingam & Irumborai (A27) for the commission of offence under The Passports Act;

(b) Jayakumar (A18), Shanthi (A19) Ravichandran & Ravi (A24) and Suseendran & Mahesh (A25) for the commission of offence under The Arms Act;

(c) Ravichandran & Ravi (A24) and Suseendran & Mahesh (A25) for the commission of offence under the Explosive Substances Act; accorded by competent authorities and closed for taking cognisance of by this Hon'ble Court.

It is, therefore, prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to take this case on file and dispose of the same in accordance with law.

Chief Investigating Officer

CBI: SIT: SEB: Madras

Madras
20.5.92

LETTERS

The Mirage of Democracy

I wish to respond briefly to Izeth Hussain's letter entitled, "Defining Democracy" (LG, Oct 15). He has faulted me for excluding India and Japan from my list of democratic nations (LG, Oct 1). If one is willing to accept that a circus clown perched on a 20-meter totem pole is actually 21-meters tall, then I will buy the view that democracy has thrived in India and Japan since the end of Second World War. True, there have been general elections at frequent intervals since 1950 in both countries. But does that trumpet the triumph of democracy.

Since 1947, three generations of the Nehru family governed post-colonial India for almost 38 years (out of 45 years). The current Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao owes his position to the reluctance of Italian-born Sonia Gandhi to enter the Indian political stream. If Sonia Gandhi has expressed her willingness to lead the Congress Party after Rajiv

Gandhi's assassination last year, the Prime Minister's position would have been hers without asking. Even now, most Congress Party members are just abiding time for Rajiv Gandhi's children to attain the "coronation age" of 25 years, to make one of them the leaders of modern India. Analysts like Izeth Hussain may assert that democracy prevails in India. But it is an Indian version, which should be aptly labelled as *Dharbar Democracy*. One would also note that Mahatma Gandhi the founding father of modern India, was not a democrat in its truest sense of the word. He did not contest any popular election during his life time to become the adorable leader. This is true for his illustrious contemporary in China, Mao Ze Dong, as well. Mahatma Gandhi and Mao Ze Dong are excellent examples which show how the Asian societies choose their leaders. In text book description they may not be monarchs, but in practical sense, they behaved and made decisions like monarchs, and the masses accepted them without any elections.

Having lived in Japan for a total period almost five years, I can also assure Izeth Hussain that democracy is hardly practised in Japan. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is the Japanese equivalent of the Congress Party in India. It has been in

power since 1955 and has not been defeated by the weak parties of the Opposition for the past 37 years. The LDP is just a coalition of more than four personal factions of politicians who negotiate for power. If Indian democracy is 'Dharbar Democracy', the Japanese version should be called as 'Shogun Democracy'. In fact, democracy is an utterly irrelevant concept in the highly hierarchical society of Japan. Japanese themselves feel uncomfortable with the Douglas MacArthur's notion of American democracy. In Japan too (like in India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Bangladesh), blood - relationships paves the way to power than the democratic route. Nobusuke Kishi and Eisaku Sato (despite their different family names) were siblings who enjoyed a combined total of 11 years as prime ministers of Japan between 1957 and 1972.

Sachi Sri Kantha

Osaka BioScience Institute,
Japan.


Hieronimus Bush and Saddam

It is a matter of historical irony the Bush who tried so hard to oust Saddam of Iraq is now outsed while Saddam sits apparently secure.

Maybe God had other intentions than Bush.

Patrick Jayasuriya

Colombo 8

 ENRICHING RURAL LIFESTYLE


Why there's sound of laughter in this rustic tobacco barn....

There is laughter and light banter amongst these rural damsels who are busy sorting out tobacco leaf in a barn. It is one of the hundreds of such barns spread out in the mid and upcountry intermediate zone where the arable land remains fallow during the off season.

Here, with careful nurturing, tobacco grows as a lucrative cash crop and the green leaves turn to gold... to the value of over Rs. 250 million or more annually, for perhaps 143,000 rural folk.

Tobacco is the industry that brings employment to the second highest number of people. And these people are the tobacco barn owners, the tobacco growers and those who work for them, on the land and in the barns.

For them, the tobacco leaf means meaningful work, a comfortable life and a secure future. A good enough reason for laughter.

 **Ceylon Tobacco Co. Ltd.**

*Sharing and caring
for our land and her people.*



STILL LEADING

**Mr. William Thompson obtained a Royal Charter
and established the first Joint Stock Commercial Bank
in this island on
01st June 1841.**

**He called it
“ Bank of Ceylon ”**

**That was 150 years ago,
but that was not we.**

**We opened our doors in 1939
only to capture
our rightful place in Banking
and are proud to say that we still**

LEAD

**Over the years
banking profession
shared our expertise
and BANK OF CEYLON
became Sri Lanka's
SANDHURST TO BANKERS.**

Bank of Ceylon

Bankers to Nation