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vol. 15 No.
15 December 1, 1992 PriC
e RS. 10.00
WMAR : TA
PEACE: (
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Benazir B long marc
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Registered at GPO, Sri Lanka QD/43/NEWS/92
RGET COLOMBO
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Citizens Appeal
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REGION hutto’s
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= Kesava. Menon
fter Clinton
hat 2 – Dilip Mukerjee

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TREADS
High Time Deputy Speaker Garnini Fon
teka Tariad ir the Hori:Fel rhai Er was high time the governmerit Stopped all i carrivals”
rid gave priority to the urge III seeds of the arried forces who tere fighting a war to safeguard the country. He also eased on the MPs to doide their recently arrounced 30 percert pay frike to the arried forces, he targed the to give a say their Pajero jeeps too to the hard pressed security forces
He said that during the SLFP regire a listerity less tres were frr:Troduced during Argent situations and that the gover Intell should follow that example.
Wol. 15 No. 15 DgCamber 1, 1992 PFIGE FRA 1000 Published fortnightly by Lanka Guardian Publishing Co. Ltd.
No. 246 Union Place, Colo Tibo-2
Editor: Marw yn da Silwa
TElephong: 4475B
Printed by Ananda Pross 825, Sir Ratnajothi Saravanamuttu Ma Watha, Colombo 13, Telephone: 435975
CONTENTS
News Background
Joint Campaign 5 The Region B The last Marxist Tragedy 1) Russian Revolution (2) 12 Conflict (5) 15 Anti-Federalism (4) S. Sinhala Nuwեբaբնr
Nationalism (2) |23 LettET 24
Lankar
Sri Laks interviewed by La rika '57 Sund that they like do electioris ! do it. If die, nostly acader elections in r hi and oper. The the recert Fire,
Particularly, they liked cardidate select de ha fe, frīct 5 dates, indepe coverge and pe of power.
A professor UrIiversity . eriga the Universi The truth of
| have to be fre
he defrocracy".
Most of the sais l'his I le Fr was free.
Court Orde
The Court a ordered The reli
"Wao MC5, Hee Ft sixth floor of I Trifer's Fir TC'e . 5ίiε ίς αίεgει boreai Varifa y pected to Marye fFie JOC Epophi} The CA Order, following α filed by the W.
DiSimCent Јара
Masů či ST Wi his less leader Yr af ferro Fī5 FFT 1 fo ffy'e 5 fFFEF" Japanese EIS pessinistic abo. Id feded to E. S. Bil, added that Jap. rarget of fel LTrik-I T F7al i! Japanese involy Interni fi programs

like it living in the US Keith Nayar for y Times said the way they ere thiar they The Lankaris, σία η , ταία τήαι US were free had served fader ffa' elecffor,
they had said he ritmethod of 7 FF, presider rial frut irly of Caridilíder electio тсеful transiїіол
of the Colombo ged in research y of Ohio said: ir is rie rrizedITI : if there is to
2 Sri Links F15 iedā ir lie S
3rs release
f Appeaľ ha 5 ase of a Yvornar effried or the
Police Headtly last year. fo fpe fir
it is 5.5- 777, Ster-rifled blast that year. d the release abeas corpus "?irTrr's Husband
ve, Says TESE
i, e Japa Flese
il Colo 5 rk 7 Sri LIFIKá.
11'" stacii soifa fiový "oye elsewhere, MMF. Sa 14' ki V&S Fajf te iris iri Sroj puld not effect er frf frpes
Fo,
gether at a
Briefly. . .
ASHRAFF CALLS FOR UNTY
Mr. Ashraff, the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress leader, said, in Parliament that he was seated on the Opposition side of the chambe T beccaulse the Te were sole differences. With the other side. But said that he would be happy with a chair, ÖT even a mat, soIlewhere in a corner as long as he was not branded an "Opposition MP'”.
Nobody, not even the press, had a clicar understanding of the role of the Opposition, he said. Everybody cxpected the Opposition to oppose the Government all the time and try to throw it out. Mr. Ash raff said to find a solution (to the ethnic problem) there must be the capacity to identify the enemy, "We Illust know Who our friendls al Te. With the mixing up of our friends and enemics We do not know where we are going''.
Mr Ashraf also said: This country Was prepared to accept the leadership of a minority Tamil to lead the national struggle. That is the history of our independence movement. The British history was the sane. The Conser. watives and Labour got totime of war, Today if this is a war against thic UNP Government the solution is simple, You throw out the UNP Government'.
**If the resignation of the Government is not the solution to the War, then what us the solution? Before we find the solution we must know what the problem is. The problem is... this is, not a war that is declared and carried on by the LTTE against the UNP. It is a WaT against the Sri Lankan nation,
*“While the Sri Lankan nation is divided into many parts we are playing games. We do not understand the suffering of the people''.
(Cori r iri ried a7I pirge 20)

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EARLY WARNING AND CONFICT RE
Kumar Rupesinghe and Michiko Kuroda (editors) August 1992, £35.00. 300pp ISBN 0-333-56952-0
Can We prevent violent conflicts and Wars in t terest in developing an early Warning capability humanitarian and aid agencies and in internatic
By "early Warning' we mean information that Key issues covered in the book include: the m translated into methodological approaches; iden flict situations; selection of indicators; determin possible development of networking; search för processing, analysis and evaluation of informatic
ETHNICITY AND CON FLICT IN A PO
The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China Kumar Rupesinghe, Peter King and Olga Workuli August 1992, E35.00, 300pp, ISBN 0-333-5695-2
The post-Communist World has seen a a drama societies are facing a crisis of staggering dimensi also has to cope with widespread demands for
well as the consequences of dismantling the tot
The volume explores the contemporary sources,
the post-Communist World. The authors addres: national, aftet perestroika and glasnost, within
the consequences and effects of the drama curr the former Soviet Union. Central issues explor. implications of internal conflicts and possible p. The processes of democratization and the pote I tries are also examined as is the question of r
NTERNAL COMFLICT AND GOVERNA
Kunnar Rupa singhe (editor) Анgцsi 1992, Е 35.00, 25брp, ISBN 0—333—56953—
Wiolence, war and internal conflicts have assum Cold War. Over 32 civil Wars are Taging today over 100 million refugees as a direct result of
logical, or conflicts over democracy and govern
This volume consists of case-studies and more Latin America and the Middle East, Taken to neral interest, Several authors stress the need through non-violent approaches. The focus of identity formation, democracy and violence in t
Published in association with International Peace
K S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S L L L L L S S T TT T T L L T T L L DD D D D D L S L S L L L L L L L L L L L S L S L S
To order: Jackie Perry, MacDillan Press, Houndmills, Bas Fax: (44) (256) 810-526, tel: (44) (256) 29242, please add É Please send The copy/ics of: Please charge my: Access ( ). American Express ( ) Wisa expire, date: Account number: Please send invoice to: Name/Address

:S0:LUTIOll
he future". This volume reflects the growing inwithin the research community, in international LLLLLL LLLLLLLLLLLHLS aLLLLLLLaL LLLL L LLLLLL aaLLLLLL LLLLLLLLS
can provide a timely alert to potential conflicts, anner in with the concept of early Warning is tification of root causes for disputes and conation of lethodologies; use of new technologics; conditions for the settlement of conflicts. The 2n is systematically approached in the collection.
ST-COMMUNIST WORLD
ova (editors)
tic ethnicity and nationalism. Many of these
ions, since the movement towards full democracy self-determination and minority protections as
airii State.
scope and intensity of nationality conflicts in ; themselves to the resurgence of ethnicity and a disintegrating Soviet Empire. They examine ently in progress within the various regions of :d concern identity formation, the nature and LLaLaL LCCCLLaLL aLLLLLLLaLLL LaaLaaaaHHH LH LLLaLa LLaLLLLLLLS tial generation of new conflicts in these counesurgent ethnicity in China,
NCE
cd a new intensity with the decline of the By the year 2000, our world may well witness
internal wars. Internal conflicts - ethnic, ideo
ance - are likely to increase in the future.
theory-oriented papers dealing with Asia, Africa, gether, they spell out implications of wide geto develop theories on conflict transformation this important collection is on questions of he south.
Research Institute, Oslo
S S S S S S S S S S S S S S L S LL S TS
ingstoke, Hampshire, RG21 2XS, 1.50 for postage and packing
Diners Club ( )
Signature

Page 5
"The final Option for Mr. Premiada na isto conti Laurant skalarnate, at laast Lintil alactions ars Gomp| Constant flow of casualties that this entails. Howgwg Ileans maintaing a defence budget, running at 4% of It would mean further cuts in public investment to m aaL LLT KLLCMCCa CCCHHaaLaTLL S aaa LHa MLLLLS terrin prospects for Oconomic growth. The progress a three years is a cause for optimism. The success of CLHCHHHHC LLL CH LHLCLL LHHLLLL LLLLHHLLLLLLL LLLL HH LLLHHH Lanka is to realise its full potential it must resolve flict. ..." (William Kocling, lead article in 10 pa Tir77 es Survey Oct. 27, 1992),
FEDERALISM :
RETURN
Meirw yn de Silva
he government's dilemma was made painfully obvious by two events in mid-November - the da ring assassimation of Wicc
Admiral Clancy Fernando on Now, 16 by a LTTE suicidebomber, and the island's first
international trade fair, together with an Investment Forum sponsored by the Sri Lanka Board of Investment, (Nov. 18-22). Both proved tremendous successes. So is this year's tourist season, with the total number for 1992 creepIng up on 400,000. The coldblooded, perfectly executed mur. der of the Navy's No. 1. did not take place in any War-zone of the North and East. It took place in the heart of the city, in the sea-front hotel district: in fact, right opposite the Taj Samudra Hotel, where some of the visiting businessmen were staying. The other equally newsWorthy guests at the same hotel were the New Zealand test team, many of its members promptly deciding to cancel the tour and return hone. Thanks to the persuasive diplomacy of the British and Australian High Commissioners, and the Australian Board President, the tour was not cancelled though some playefs did take the first plane out.
Celebrating his 38th birthday the same week, Veliupillai Pra
OF
bhakaran had lo his mind to kill mander, who had hard in the lagoor of the north, so 5 L1pplies and C. LTTE, 3 it C wice, for travelle insula.) Nor was Curtain-raiser fo. HEROES WEEK, sided impact-mur the shock-cffect the capital, to Ill Tale of the A message to the “enclave” econom: that secure i.e. e. Eage, and SubycT; Teason Was to shi; tradiction betwccI option'' school a] cal settlement to decipen the divisi halla political Esta intensify the fricti UNP government -led Opposition, : difference between regime and the IT the reason which Himself Cliffer el in had contributed-it -to a Tallil IIIth THAMILAR'" that merits special : ISTAND columnist ted Some liIcs i column).

nug with the It, With thig this course
GDP a year. Bot donor tarп8 thв Іоп0dв іп thв past
the Ella W. BLIt if Sri
=חםם ||iWם פit ga Fїлалсѓа!
THE
HISTORY
only made up the Navy Comli l-LTTE 15. aIld sea-la Illes wital for LTTE immerce. (The Will ClustöðIIS SCTrs to the pcnthe killing thic the LTTE" 5 It had a manyderou s revenge, to cle-stabilise undermine the Illel services. : World that the ly was not all Collollic Saboti UI. ALother arpen the conthe 'military 1d the “politilobby, that is oIS ithic Sillblish Telt åIld I between the and the SLFP and any policy the civilia lilitary. It is Prabhaka Tan a article he Se1fr Tale ewet lly OLAHATHI World Tamils) attention. (The TARAKI quon his Weekly
attacks fronts in the Eelam territory have
"Surprise Il 12 InY
struck fear in Sinhala soldiers and continue to undermine their will to fight'
Undermining Լիճ: morale, the Will to fight, is of course a basic lin. The territorial imperative is equally important since this is a separatist War, requiring a carving out of territory. Whether the LTTE can actually seize and hold the land from which they hawe pulled out remains to be seen. Attacking the will of the Sinhala army is a' important because the LTTE cadre is highly motiwated (the suicide bomber is notivation at its highest) whereas the poor - Irural Sinhala youth Who has found a job, may not be able to match such motivation. This explains Prabhakaran's next claim:
"We destroyed the army camp at Wanankulam that was giving protection to the colonists in the Wavuniya districts. Following this, as a Tesult of minor attacks along the Wayuniya bor. der many. Sinhala settlers left the district..." One massive, II lui Tadc TF3Li3 S5 Fullt Which breaks the spirit of the soldier, the protector of the colonists, creates a climate of Fear where Illinor assaults are sufficient to scare away settlers, "In the same way"
3

Page 6
the river.
he Writes 'Sinhala Settlers in Mannararu (Wellioya) and Trinco have also begun to leave'. Note that the LTTE leader liscs the Tamil name first, with the Sinhala na Ime in brackct, in an to whom assetion the land originally belonged? The truth of course lies in the flow of history, colonial and pre-colonial, and at which point you choose to dive into Since history is itself in fierce dispute, (and there are few ** objcctive” historians today,1) much of all this is purely polemical.
But 'colonisation'' was certainly a declared policy of successive Sri Lankam governments even before independence - settling Sinhala families from the overpopulated' south in the newly irrigated areas of the socalled Dry Zone. Opening new lands supported by irrigation Schemes and responding to the land hunger of the Sinhala peasant made economic and political sense. What is "colonisation" for the government, a rational policy, became in the eyes of post-independencc Tamil politicians and ideologues, 'internal colonialism'. And thus the fight for the east, the vital theatre of this separatist War.
The ethnic composition of the East makes this political-military
contest morc complex because a
third community is involvedthe Muslims. And the Moslems hold the balance. They constitute one-third with the Sinhalese twenty five percent. Since the Muslims arc Tamil-speaking rather Sinhala-speaking, which is true of the Muslims in the island's south, the Tamil militants took Muslim cooperation for granted. Accusing some Muslim groups of being used by the Indian arly when the IPKF was in charge of the East (the Indian commander was a Muslim) in the post-1987. Accord, the "Tigers' have treated the Muslims as collaborators' or 'enemies'. This was a blunder. In today's World there is no rallying cry as potent as Islam. The LTTE strategy bas gradually driven thic Muslim community, the Muslim MP's and the most articulate
4
Muslim party, Muslim Congre an anti-LTTE st of Mr. Ashraff Parliament is t group in the h only made a with the ruling tened a jihad. has ea Tincid thic Isla Illic World. With Pakistan a our neighbours, Muslims in II'd tal, Which ha Arab States a neighbours, the lessly opecncdı alı
In the sanne Fernando 5 assi Was an attempt pita residcntial the target? Sor the President's K. H. Wijcidasa; it Was Mr. Mun informed source that Mr. Ashra ferred target. ) requested arms jihad supported mic youth.
POLITIO'AL DE Territory is o sole issue in struggle. Terr "power' as the the Tamil strug rights. When Mr Sinhala Maha : parent U. N. P., S.L.F.P. We nayakam quit t gress after its Ponnambalain Minister in the he lached th Though SWRD appreciated the he officered muc Chelwanayakam the B-C Pact, th Chelwanayakam and extremist pressure forced tear up that p turn came, the Minister Dudley signed an acco leader. It w; Dudley-Chelva not implemente frustration of th cal leadership a

the - Sri Lanka is (SLMC) into ance. The SLMC has 4 MPS in le largest Muslim use. He has not tactical alliance UNP but threa. And his party sympathy of the In this region, ind Bangladeshas and With II10Fe ia than in PakisS III all the 5. its W55 EET
LTTE has needother front. Week als Admiral isination there in the Narahenarea, Who was he said it was Secretary, Mr. others argued 500T BLIt:botte Stend to agree ff was the preMr. Ashraf Has to launch his by militant Isla
AL
f CCLIITSC mot the this protracted
itory displaced
IIlain issue in gle for Iminority Bandlil Tallike"3 Sabha quit the he foi Tilled the MT. Chevale. TalIIli Conleader Mr. G. G. had become a UNP cabinet, Federal party. an intellectual federal concept, h less to Mr. when the signed e Bandaranaikeilct, Race riots Sinhala-Buddhist S.W.R.D. to d{it. WheII_hls UNPS Prile Senanayake also d' with the FP is called the act, That was either. It is e Tai Ilmil politild the growing
dissatisfaction of the Tamil constituency, and finally the rising anger of a new Tamil generation in the face of perceived discrimination', injustice, that the English-educated Tamil professional manning the political parties chose non-violent Satyagraha as their principal form of protest and agitation. The reply, alas, was assaults, firebombs, and anti-Tail riots. Prabhakaran, a teenagar, living in the Pettah, was the creature of that era, Today he is one of the world's toghest terrorists and guerrilla colm Imalders. He fought the IPKF for three years, ашd many an Indian general has Writtel boks about his military skills, tenacity and amazing ability to mobilise and coinIn and a new generation of Tamils.
Meanwhile history has repeated itself. The Mangala Moonesingha Committee was a brainwawe of an indiepcndent-minded SLFP Imiddle-rung MP. The parliamentary committec chaired
by him was an all-party committee, It represented the consensus of the democratically
elected. Perhaps I morc cru cuially, it offered the best hope of producing what had eluded the political Establishment for 35 years - a UNP-SLFP consensus. Last week, Mr. Moonesingha announced that an agreement has been reached. The main parties were ready to consider positively a proposal for federal constitution and two separate councils."
Within 24 hours the SLFP and Opposition leader, Mrs. Bandara naike was denying any Such ag Teement om her side.
History it has been said, repeats first as tragedy then as farce.
We Would add a third possibility - tragic farce.
Meanwhile Mr. Galili Fonseka, MP, and super-star of the Sinhala screen has lashed out to prove Prahbhakaran had read the Sinhala middle-class mind well. "It is time we made up our minds, that this is a state of War and thereforc thic country must be put om a war footing. If We stall to collect the pennies, we will be in deep trouble."
Mr. Fonsekal 15 MP If the UNP, and Deputy Speaker.

Page 7
-VOIMWT CA IMAPAGMW
Stop the war, press fo
Feeling the tragedy and pain of the killings and counter-killings, the terror, герtession and destruction that have taken place for many years in olur mother-land, We Taise մլIT whict: and proclaim to the Government and all those who have taken arms and all the political parties Eild groups that direct them: Stop, think and look around about you! The country that has givenus all birth is now a se մf blutյd. Sinhala people kill other Sinhala people. Tamils kill other Tamils. Muslims too a killed. The different races killed each other. But Whether those who kill and are killed are Sinhala, Tamil or Muslim it is the one human blood that flows. Tens of thousands of youth have disappeared and been killed. How much longer will you thus kill each other? Who will be left? Will it mot be still other tens of thousands of Widows, lakhs of 7TP hans, who will be eternally Weeping? The little children who are our hope for the future Te Weakened by under-lourishment, feat and insecurity. Those who have not taken arms live in fear and trembling before those who have taken arms. The way has been cleared for those Who take arms to commit crime Lni ETTTiZe the people. In such a situation tille has come for us to stop and think. Whe We like it or not. We all have one small Country. It is an island. Accepting this geographical reality let us even now think as people of one country and save our country. It is CXtremely important to understand clearly who is responsible for this vast destruction, this curse. The main political for TC es that have governed this country since 1948 Te, resposible i for this situation."Al clergy and religious leaders who are må to safeguard moral values are Tesponsible to some extent. All those elders, who by keeping silent have helped these conditions to Titul Te, should bear part of the ICSPCInsibility. So we raise our voices and say to all Tesponsible authorities and to all our Dין סטle: 1. Take immediate steps to create the political conditions that can enable the stopping of the Wii. 2. The Illajor communities in this country, Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim, recognize each other's distinct identities and nationalities and co-operate in building mutual trust and confidence between the majority and minority communities. 3. The UNP and SLFP declare im Inediately and unequivocally their sands regardling a political solution. 4. The LTTE declare immediately and unequivocally their Stands regarding a political solution. 5. Recognize the right of all people to live in Peace without terror. Ensure the human rights of all peoples. Repeal repressive legislation. Enact suitable constitutional
The signatories from the Maha San
 

r peace negotiations
restraints on the excessive powers of thic Executive Presidency or consider reversion to a parliamentary system. Restore normal democratic processes to all the peoples, including multi-party system and elections, Release immediately all political prisoners both in the North and the South, against who there is no real evidence to institute criminal proceedings.
All parties and groups and all the peoples in this country support reasonable and effective devolution of power and autonomy, With co-existence and mutual interdependence, which Will
(a) Preserve the unity, sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Sri Lanka.
(b) Enable revision of the Sri Lanka Constitution to make devolution of POWer and autonomy central features of
L.
(c) Recognize the democratic and pluralistic character of Sri Lankan Society and enshrine core values, both religious and secular in the Constitution, The Con stitution should have a Bill of Rights, that is justiciable.
(d) Meet the basic demand of the Tamils for a contiguous and viable unit of devolution in the North-East, with negotiation as to its size and other problems involved.
(e) Assure the Sinhala people that the essential character of Sri Lankan society, the essential inheritance of religion and culture, safeguarded through the cellturies, is not diluted or diminished, but preserved and developed.
(f) Assure the Muslims that their rights will be protected in whatever part of the country they reside. Such assurance may include special provision such as a Zonal Council within the unit of devolution in the North-East. The rest of the peoples of this country need to take Timore seriously thic recent catastrophic suffering of the Muslims in the North and East.
(g) Assure Sinhala and Tamil people also of their rights in whatever part of the country they reside. This may include special provision such as Zonal Councils within the unit of devolution in the North-East.
(h) Make clear that pluralty is not a disadvantage that leads to dilution or diminution but an asset that leads to greater richness and unity in diversity.
5
gha will appear in the next issue

Page 8
7. People of all religions, races, parties and groups launch a joint campaign to build a Ilass movement for peace on the basis of justice for all. Public meetings, fasts, marches, satyagrahas, poojas, services, seminars, and discussions be held in temples, kovils, churches, mosques, meeting-halls and in the open-air.
8. No party to seek partisan political advantage in this joint campaign for peace. There must be readiness on all sides to Ilake concessions as well as receive benefits. Different Communities and sectors can preserve their own distinctive identities and reserve the right to work for their own long term social and political goals and yet be prepared to make real sacrifices and concessions in the present, in order to put a stop to the seemingly endless slaughter and destruction and enable ргоgress towards peасе.
9. Recognize the importance and value of the solidarity of the international community. The Govern Illent of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, il consultation with other parties and authorities in this coluntry, to agree to mutually acceptable mediating and monitoring bodies, while at the same tille preserving national sovereignty, 器 and dignity. The help of distinguished citizens from different groups and sectors in this country and the help of international mediation as well as a peace-keeping force would be invaluable in participation with the Government and Opposition regarding effective formulation and implementation of promises and and arrangements to be made regarding cease-fire, demilitarization, protection of human rights, rcstoration of democratic processes including, Illultiparty System and elections, devolution of power and autonomy, with co-existence and mutual interdependence.
The above statement was drawn up after a discussion at a Public Meeting of representatives from different religions and communities held in Colombo on 3rd Scptember 1992 and further discussed, all lended, accepted and signed at another Public Meeting of representatives from different religions and communities held in Climb, 1992,
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FamagamuWar M. Razak, Chairperson, Muhuyiddin Jamma Mosque,
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Samal Sämaja Party. T. Nā Kulā, EROS: Mush ecr Rahuman, Progressive Muslim Front, Wasude ya Nanayakkara, Member of Parliament, Ratnapura
District,

Joseph Pararajasingham, Member of Parliament, TULF Mawaii S. Senal thirajah Member of Parliament, TULF K. Sinnathurai, TULF P. Siva palan, TULF. Aitorncy-at-Lay K, Ehamparanlı, TULF J. Mulkunsthānı, TULF A Thangath Luriai, Administrative Secretary", TULF G. G. Pennallıbalan, All Ceylon Tal mil Congress. Ranjith Nayaratne, Leader of the Opposition, North
LLLLLLL LLLHHHLLLLLLLS S LLLLLLLLS Tissa Herath, Provincial Councillor, N. W. P. D. MI. Chandra til leke Provincial Counciilor, N. W. P. Nihalasiri Ekanayake, Provincial Councillor, N.W. P. C. Wickramanayake, Provincial Councilir N. W. P. N.B. Kaluh indiwela, Provincial Councillor, N.W. P. Gilbert Jayawa riela, Provincial, Councilor, N. W. P. D. A. Jayawardene, Provincial Councillor, N. W. P. Salinda Dissaniyake, Provincial Councillor, N. W. P. L, N. GLIntileke, Provincial Counciller, N. W. P. LOLS LLLLLLS LLLaS LS LS S 0KK LaGHHaaK LHHHHaaa LaLSS LLLLLSLLS M.A. Premachandra, Attorney-at-Law, Provincial Councillor,
Saba riga minn Luwa, Kegali, Tennyson Edirisuriya, Attorney-at-Law, Provincial Councillor,
SLECTIEPT WilçE: HELIELOLE, M. R. R. Sunil Shatha, Pradeshiya Sabha Member
Hiripitiya, Nikada lupiha. J. N. G. Silva Goonetilleke, Pradeshiya Sabha Member.
Ibba gall Lwa. Saranelis Dayawansa, Pradeshiya Sabha Member,
Timելյlig:Illii Ti55. Tennekolon, Pradeshiya, Sabha Molmber, Makulweya, S. A. R. S. Hussein, Pradeshiya Sabha Member, Ridighina, Prosessor V. Thurairajah, Vice Chancellor, Jaffna.
|University. Professor Ashley Halpe, Department of English,
Peräidcniya University. Professor Wijaya Kullar, Department of Chemistry,
Peradeniya University. Professor Carlo Fonseka, Medical Faculty, Kelaniya
ԼIniversity. Professor W. R. Breckchridge, Department of Zoology,
Peradiciniya Professor H. Sriyananda, Dean of Faculty of Engineering
LLLCLLLaaaCaaOS CCHH LL LLLCLCaKS aCCaLaSS Dr. Berty Gajam cragederal, Department of International
Relä tions, Peraleniya University. LLLLLS LLLHaa aHaLaaaaLLCS LLLCLL LLTLLCCCS LMLmCLLHHHHH
of Political Science, Peradeniyal University, Dr. Ami Lura ilha Sein Lewira tni, Pierra diniya University, Dr. Gamini Kirawela, Department of History,
Peradeniya University. Sumansiri Liyanage, D-partment of Political Science,
Peradeniya LUniversity R. M. H. D. Rajakaruna, Lecturer, Peradeniya University, N. S. Kumar, Lecturer, Peradeniya University. aS LS aLLCLCKKS LLaLCuCSaLLS LLaCCS LLaCSS S LCHLaS LS LLaLLaLLKaaaS LLaaS CCaa LaaLHHHLHHHS Suni Kahagall, Special Correspondent, Island, Polpi thigama, Charles Abeysekera, Color:bl3. S. Sivagur Lunathal, * Wiw"El Tana" Monica Ruvan pathira na, PIDA, Bernadet Silva, Centre for Society and Religion. Sumika Perera, Progressive Women's Front. Priyanka Mendis, Co-President, World Council of Charches. Desinond Fernando, President's Counsel, Colombo. D. W. Abeykoon, Atorney-at-Law, "Voice" Organisation
Cultյլոbց, R. K. W. Goonesekera, Attorney-at-Law.

Page 9
Nirmal Punchi hewa, Attorney-at-Law, Law Section, Movement for the Defence of Democratic Rights.
Ainsley Samarajeewa, Attorney-at-Law, Centre for Society
and Religion.
Chandra Kumarage. Attorney-at-Law Lawyers for Human
Rights and Development.
Harith Sena na yake, Attorney-at-Law, Kicgalle. M, S, M. Ka meel, Attroney-nt-Law Kegalle. Dharmādasa Kula su riya, Attorney-at-Law, Kegal lle. Themiya Jaysena, Attorney-at-Law, Kegalle. Dr. Sunill Rathnapriya, General Secretary, United
Federation of Labour. Dr. S. Shivayogan, Family Rcbabilitation Centre.
Dr. Thaslim Mohammed, Chief Organiser Almeena Youth
CEILT,
Dr. Rajendra Wijetunga, Provincial Councillor, NWP, Dr. W. M. Guna ratne, Gar Impha Dispensary, Mahlawa. Nimal Mumasingher, Tcacher, Divulida mana. Patrick Fernando, Institute of study and Research for
Action. Lalith Ahleysinghe, Satyodaya, Kandy. Dushyantha Samarasena, Sri Lanka Vurthiya Journalists
A55 ciltīm, Kularatne Wickremasinghe, President, All Lanka Peasants
Congress. S. Balakrishnan, Secretary, MIR JE. Winal Fernando, Movement for Defence of Democratic
Rights. Kuliyapitiya Sri Prananda, Wimukchi Dharma Kendraya. Linus Jaya tilleke, President Conn mercial and Industrial
Union. Sarath Fernando, Dewasara na Development Centre,
Լեbag:1mսWa. Neil Wijetillcke, General Secretary Corporation, Cooperative and Commercial Labour Union. Wasala Bandara Gunaratine, World Solidarity Forum.
Chandra Peiris, Secretary, Organisation of Parents and
Family Members of the Disappeared. Julian Rozairo, Community Education Centre, Malabe. N. Kandasamy, World Solidarity Forum, Jayaratne Maliyagoda, President, Lanka General Services
Union, Kandy. P. D. SaraПараa, Secretary Government United Federation
of Labour. Prema pala Hewabatage, Secretary, Peasant Resource Centre. Sashic Peiris, Ceylon Student Federation. J. M. Tikiribanda, Sri Lanka Railway Niyamake Association, S. G. Ranasinghe, Secretary, Agriculture Department and
Health Department Laboratory Labour Federation. D. A. NA Ilayakkarā, Si:Cretary, All Lank El Security Servicc
Union. J. M. C. Jayasundara, United Workers Union, Peradeniya
University, K. A., Thilak Kur Lukulasuriya, Sccretary, Temperance
Moyennent, OthuWela, Niki da Lupotha, M. D. Pushpiadewa, Secretary, Wihara Sadhake Samithiya,
Weralagala, S. H. A. Riyal, Secretary, Welfare Association, Arankee, Arunisiri Dharmawansa, "Nirmani Gurusan sadaya"
Rambe, Maleliya. M. D. Daniel, Co-ordinator, Peoples Welfare Association,
BEI10 til. Shani Dayananda, Co-ordinator. People's Welfare
Association, Ben total. T. W. Milinda, Secretary "Dayake Sabha, Sri
Siddharthiara Timaya, Indlu TLIWA. P. Sumanpala, President, Janhitha Welfare Association.
Deledu Wici, J. A. S. Jayakody, "Sanasin", Barumbe, Nikadalupotha.

J. A. Jayawardene, President, Rural Dicvelopment Society.
Ihala Baru numbe, Nikadalup Otha.
RDM. Tillekratne, Secretary, Rural Development
Society, Ihala Baru mbe, Nikadalupcotha, C.dc, S. Neela muni, "Nawaka Jana sin niwedi Madhyavedi
Kawaya,' Kur LInegala. D.T.W. G. Dissanayake, Secretary, United Farmers,
Ágistitiation. R. M. B. Hearth Secretary, Human Rights Association
Kurunggala, J. Fernando, Family Rehabilitation Centre, Siridhiana
MäWältha Colombo 10. Bandari Hettigama, Radio Artiste. Srinath Perera, Co-ordinator, Legal Aid Section, Sarvodaya, Preethi Dharmasiri, Legal Officer, Sarvodaya. Jehan Percra, Co-ordinator, Communication Section,
Sагүodaya. Dharma Giunasingle, Напу, Treasurer, Sarvadaya. Wa santha Samarwick Tama. Sa Vodaya. P. W. Mahawatte, Wice President Sarvodilaya. Rose Perera, Secretary to the President, Sarwodaya. Rear Admiral A. W. H. Perera, Sarvodaya. Chandani Dodigam mana, SETIC, Kandy. Asoka, P. Perera, Ekarmuthu Children's Association. K. D. Thus Ara Cha minda, Janoidaya Kendraya. KTTMTa LTaL LLLLLaS LTMSLLL CeHHHaLaL LLLLLaaa LLLLa
Erwironmental Centre, H. M. Jaya sekera, F.L. D. H. Belligalla, Mahiya ngana. Wijith a Di55inayake, Uva Community Development Centre
PEISSELIH. Palithia Amarasuriya, Maruthaya Sanviada Samuhikaya, W. Murugaiya U.C.D.C. Badulla. Wasantha Dissanayake, Institute of Study and Research
for Action. Suresh Premachandrain MP. EPRLF.
K. R. Kuganeswaran, M.I.P. EPRLF Emmanuel Silva, MP, EPRLF. Prince Casinacter, M.P. EPRLF. K. Navarane, M.P. EPRLF. R. Somatilleke Rajapakse, Social Economic Development
Education Centri, Yatiyan tota, Lionel Jayampathy, District Secretary L.S.S.P. Kegalle, Ninal Jayasinghe "Game Wedak" Organisation.
Bulathkohupitiya, Raja Somati Ileke, Secretary, Peasant Organisation, Deew cla. Shanthi Prasad Kirihena, Sri Lankan Red Cross
Association, Kegalle. Damian Silva, Sri Lanka Scout Movement, Kegalle,
M. Senagana, Lanka, Estate Worker's Union. A. M. S. Nazeema, Kandy, Roshine Thaheer, Yahall teine, Meenal Fazi, Alawat hugcd. Rizvia Fazeez, Watapola, Shakila Fervin Cader, Katugastotal. Mina kull Washleena Marshuk, Katugal Stolta. Shahi abdelhin Udayar, Mu Tuthal Awal. M.E. A. Zahir, Kandy.
Shagik Alexander, Nilwalamբitiya, M. H. M. Aslımi, Matarı. M. I. S. Harned, Colombo O. Mohidegen Bawa, Polonnā, TLIWEA. Akra 11 Mohamed, Kandy. M. R. M. Arız, Kandy, H. Uduma Lebbe, Rambukkan dana, Ridigama. S. Zahia Lebba, Rambukkan dana, Riddiga rima. Atha Luda Seneviraltne, M. P. LSSP.
ஜோge Se nevira tine, Former Minister, North East
Princial Council.

Page 10
THE REGION
Benazir: Long March o
KeSava Meron
ISLAMARAD
ven as assessments are being mladce a s to Who hlas Wom and who has lost in the latest confrontätion between the Pakistan Government and the Opposition, the earlier question as to the date chosen for the Opposition's Long March has been superseded by the question of why the Government Went to such extraordinary lengths to prevent it. That switch in the priorities assigned to the two queries is its clf a pointer to the likely shape of the final asses
Elt. The Opposition, or rather the main chlink of the People's Democratic Alliance, had been toying with the idea of launching such a Long March for quite scoime tille. If I memory ser Wes correctly the first occasion on which this plan had been mentioned was during the Gulf War, but the idea had been put in cold storage for a long time after that. It was pulled out of the ice box a couple of months or so ago when the Opposition began holding a series of rallies in various cities in the north of the country. Even then it scemed to be a nere proposal, floating in the air, as the Opposition kept switching the tack of its anti-Government attacks and seemed to have been given up at a time when it was Waiting for a breach in the ranks of the ruling party, to be exploited for moving a succesful Wote CF ICF-lÇIl fidence.
It, therefore, calle as a Slitprise when Mrs. Benazir Bhutto suddenly switched tack once again and gave a call for a Long March to Islamabad. As envisaged the programme called for thousands of Workers from all over the country to Converge On the capital's twin city Rawalpindi for a final march to the square before the Parliament House complex in Islamabad. While the purpose of the march was to register the Opposition's
E.
lcinland that th MT. NaWlz, Sh down OT be 11: Was much Wagն the marchers W. got to Islamabi
The Te Secilled tainty that the they got to f: stage a sit-in b Ilment House si II Bhutto compare progгапnne to Yeltsin did in N When combine toric calling fo of the elected their claims that the "last push ehifice."the be "Wie WFed as ib a great deal of although the to rely on this the clai Tıp do WIl tıETE WES I among the pub gramme Would LLIT
Theoretically, tյf witleTitt :U iaWie beel Iecies March was to jectives desired If the Te Wa5 yi Long March - put it, if ther deaths - it col tion-wide uphe in turn have i cient or the AT MIT, NE SEET ey e the defeci Wis that MTs. and the other were the last II afford to trig tlığıt could layi ÖfTeil bickerin
gailst it,
As the dead all the Gove clear that it w to permit the Belzir Bhill Ltd) ates took pair

r Media Blitz?
e Government of arif either step ide to quit, there eness about what uld do once they d.
to be 501 e CCTmarchers, on ce lamabad. Would efo Te the ParliaIce MTS. Benazir d her proposed what Mr. Boris Moscow last year. with their ricir the ower throw Government and this would forI to the crumbling rogramme Could eing infused with militancy. But, GWEITL II e It WLS in justification of it was to order real anticipation lic that the protākie vilt
a Certain a ITIOLInt Lld dicelled to sa Ty if the Long result in the Obby its organisers. olence during the DIT IS 1 0b5eTWEET
WTë () T uld trigger a maaw all Which tւյլIld Ilduced the Preslmy Chief to force if to quit. Howin this theory
Benzi Butto Opposition leaders yersons Will could ger violence as e consolidated all g establish ment
line approached, TDIment Inade it a5 not in a mood Long March, Mrs.
Hind hile TâSSpeciis to point out
that their program Ille Was entirely peaceful in intent. They also began to be a bit fuzzy about the proposal for a sit-in. While they night have been successful in convincing the people about the peaceful nature of their proposed programme, they could never explain how they thought their objectives could be made to laterialise. Neither was Mr. Nawaz Sharif about to step down nor was Mr. Ghulam Isaq Khan in any apparent mood to sack hiIll,
For its part the Government put out that the PDA had planned the programme with quite different objectives from the dones it had stated. At one level, it was to claim, Mrs. Benazir Bhutto was merely interested in launching a * #media blitz' to boost hic T flagging fortunes. Rather more fancifully it claimed that Mrs. Benazir Bhutto, apprehending that the Government by successfully implementing it's economic programme would gain an unshakeable hold on power, had decided to launch her protest to both sabotage the economic programme and to retain the political support which she was in danger of losing.
If the Gowerlet Was as sure of its ground as it claimed there was little reason why it sold. It lawc Ellowed the Long March to proceed. Few would concede that any sit-in, even if staged, could be prolongeld considering the anset of Winter and the decline of mili. tancy in the PDA politics for many years. The onus would halve been on Mrs. Benazir Bhutt) to show that slie didi have the kind of popular support that she claimed. By virtually paralysing the country to prevent the Long March from becoming a success, the Government only seemed to substantiate her claim that she was the kind of politician who could bring the country to a standstill.

Page 11
THE REGION
No impact likely on in
Dilip Mukerjee
NEW DELHI
PRESĝo politics stops at the Water's edge. This American adage underlines the truth that U.S. foreign policy is based on a national consensus deriving from the country's perception of its interests. It follows from this that the differences, which figure in Indo-U.S. relations under Mr George Bush will continue to be as just troublesome during Mr Bill Clinton's tenure in the White House.
In fairness, however, it should be added that the factors contributing also to an un precedented warmth between New Delhi and Washington in recent months, as high-lighted by growing contacts in the military field, will retain their relevance beCause of the underlying geopolitical realities, chief among them being India's proximity to the Gulf.
AS MIT Clinton Said in a Illajor statement of foreign policy in New York last April, the end of the cold war does not mean the end of danger in the World. Even as We restructure our defence' in the eight of the collapse of the main adversary, the Soviet Union, we just prepare for new threats' of regional and ethnic conflicts. This means a U.S. need for access to the Gulf in case the region faces another intra-mural crisis, a context in which India's participation in "co-operative vigilance" could be helpful by way of staging facilities for aircraft and naval vessels. This perception will obviously count as much with Mr Clinton as it does with the Pentagon and the state deDartment und er MT Bush.
In other words, there is no reason to expect any change in the tenor of an improving relationship though there may be some difference in how Mr Clin
tČI I EL Til his assi their concerns of they make from instru Inents to g Objectivec 5 Luchi ; atin.
De Tlocrats håw
Very much conc da Tigers stemi spread of nuclea ugh it can be : legislation in thi headed by Mr J lowing India's have been put it readily by a Re dent. But it all noted that both Republicans have Prag Пlatic ili deal hald-Couts as evid Crs agreed upon dominated Congre aid to Pakistani strategic compuls. WELT. FTCII this infer that an ext Mr Clinton Will time and opport Blush administri adjust its nuclear current internatio
Indian policy-m ewer, have to ke Mr. Clinton is the International (IAEA) the authe take surprise insp ber countries as against the devel destic facilities can be presumed Will be given not El CCCSS, to the LA thern liable to U.
Human rights Other field in whi presidency many 1110 Te UICOIIlfortab those Of MT R311 MT Bush, MF C sed the Republica tion of continuin

do-U.S.
:iates put across
in the choice among available in a particular is non-prolifer
: always been rned about the Ing from the weapons, thorgued that the s Tcgard spela Tmmy Carter fol974 test Would 1 place just as publican Presiso necds to be Democrats and been equally ing with nuclear ent from Waiwby Democratiss to allow U.S. Il defeTence t0 tons of the cold one can safely cutive led by allow India the Lunity - as the tión did - to * St: ICE t011 hect Inal conceTIīS.
alkers Will, how:p in mind that кееп оп giving Atomic Energy rity to underections in Tlema safeguard opment of clana la Iraq. It thttis ice that barring EA Will Imake N. Sanctions.
constitute allich a Clinton turn out to be le than either ald Reagan or inton has accuIn administra. g to 'coddle
ties
(China's) aging rulers with contempt for democracy and human rights' and said there was no justification for doing so. A report in Tribune by its correspondent cites him as saying that India has been discriminated against in this regard. Even so, there is reason for concern that India's record in this respect in Punjab and Kashmir may invite harsher scrutiny once Democrats takic kWe.
By the same token, Democrats arc likely to be un forgiving of the export of terrorism from Pakistan by way of weapons, training and cash. The threat to name Pakistan as guilty of this may, therefore, become far more real. But it is just as well that New Delhi is already trying to respond to the criticisms it has been facing from Western human rights organisations as evident from the plans being drawn up for a statutory commission to prevent abuses and the consultations being held with Kashmiri leaders to revive the political process. India may well hal We El move father and fast CT to keep out of trouble.
In the economic a Tena to Which
Democrats are committed to giving priority, things may become marginally worse not only for Illia but Other third World trdes because of Mr Clinton's promise to open up markets for American goods and services. Questions of market access and safeguards for intellectual property rights may well become a more important factor in the U.S. relationship with nations than they have been so far. The fact that provisions like Super 301 now find place in the Statute book is because a Democrat-dominated Congress so wanted, as New Delhi would need to remember in dealing With the incoming U.S. administration.

Page 12
The Last Marxist Trag
Rajiva WMVijesinha
got to Cuba, finally, 33 years
■器 the revolution, 31 years after the Bay of Pigs fiasco that had seemed then to sanctify that revolution. I had becım particularly anxious to get there soon, for it seemed inevitable that Cuba too would soon change, likcall the other Marxist regimes that had climbled so dramatically; and I Walted to sce it before tleI.
It lid after till bec in the sixties when I was growing up, a unique phenomenon, a Communist regime firmly entrenched it secilled in the West. True, it had new cr been part of adolescent mythology, the way Vietnam had been, but with What we knew as the triumphant couage if Fidel Castry and the idealistic fervour of Che Guevara, it Hald Helen a force to reck.011 With
in the run up to the heady studient sixties.
At the time, and for years
thereafter, in some sense at least it had seemed an ideal. Reading in subsequent years about the repression that had developed, the stifling of dissent, the insistence on conformity, the building up of privileged elites, the desperate urge to flee of so many, one had begun to wonder. But even so, some air of achieveIllent had clung to the name, an air exemplified by the remarks of a very British delegate at the Conference I was attending in Jalaica, who Temarked oil the sense of hopelessness and desolatio he selt on "that CaribbeaT island, Cuba on the contrary, he commented, had pursued a wery different model of development, designed to produce colCrete benefits for all its people and even if things Were not going all that Well now, the ideal had been admirable and something surely had been achieWed,
And so indiced it lad, Health care was one gathered excellent, and the educational system
O
catered to eve awful deprivati doomed to by where in the W was not experi despite such general standa deplorable. T regime ha di su ving for its and widely lite be, was pitiful from rationing, from Widesprea St Coll. գլIE11Eing, for Side Stal s in ՃTange j\lice ( Ir WIngl:55 Ione, for the bucketsful, and pour Qut), for | för ice-Creaml. ductive activity 1992 was of C
Tulte. (. made a speech ked of further certainly the c. thTough its wor after the withd wiet hubsidies enjoyed. Certai were turning generally speak gTESSITIET VOtIT1 | tilt 1ןls iזנitן Imic collapse change. Such Tl appalling. Yet alternalitiw e? — g gime in Cuba of adjusting its
For the reali admitted to its present State primarily its o' in business to Still oli Sivict 30 years surely produced solet been less deper for energy, so I very basis of done so, ever, ltically had to was told, to his now recognized

gedy
ryone, so that the ion so many Were birth a line elseWesteen hemisphere EIGE IETE. But El chievements, the rd of living was ne life thit the ccede il chiecitizens, healthy rate as they might They suffered from shortages, td stagmation. Thic occupation was coffee from radthe morning, foT you had to bring н, суг else yoш got venders only had | one large jug to buses, for clothes, Of sustained prothere was little. Nurse particularly Castro had just in which he talalisterities, and untry Was going st crisis in years, råval of the SGit had so long Inly the Americans thic screws, cwcını ing liberal Cong to tighte11 sance that ec010might necessitate lthles SIeS5 se el cl I Wils there a iven that the reshowed no signs elf to reality.
ty it should have ef was that the of collapse was Will fault. It had be se dependent subsidics. After
it could have hing of its own, 1dent on charity
food for the life. It had not things produced
be exported, I elp ea Tim what was as real money,
so as to pay for fuel. The result Was rigid rationing, milk only for children, four eggs per person, half a pound of chicken a month, one pair of shoes a year, and after qucucing desperately for these, I gathered, the supplics were liable suddenly to run-out before I many of these who had stood for hours could be satisfied.
There were hardly any shops, only occasional outlets open for very limited periods to supply Ole or other of the few comodities of which supplies were El Villa||E. RE5 till Tit:5 lid Il exist, in the sense which we understand the term, For coffee, in the morning, one had to queue at little outlet5 that served only that, little splashes of black Coffee Timore Often till:lin not in makeshift receptacles of newspaper, Snacks in the evening could be obtained from vans after one had quened to get into the areas where they Were 5eTved. One OI alIlost two varieties anywhere iT town, dough with some sort of flavouring, no sileat alt all.
I did finally find what I took to be a restaurant; but there Was T10 chicce 5 to What Colle could eat. The tired-looking Waiter simply pointed at the LLCLYLLS SLLLLL LaLLLLLL S S aLLLLLLLatLLL S LLLL S C I menu. All there was spaghetti with watery tomato sauce, served with a side dish of rice and beans, boiled up tastelessly to
gether. There was nothing to diri ilk eitliler. I 10 beer, D13 Soft drinks, no coffee, only Water
But the Te was a m cxception to all this. That was the shops, al Id Testaurants, that cal tcrick to tollrists, as Well as to anyone else who was able to pay in dollars. Even in such places Elec. Weric Solle limitatios. The coffee for example had run out at breakfast at the hotel I stayed at and there was no jam. But there was certainly more than there was anywhere else, which was the case too at the shops in the hotels and in designated tourist areas, the only places where one could freely obtain, not only items such as postcards

Page 13
and batteries (which could arguably be classified as luxury goods), but also have necessities such ais toothpaste.
The problem for the vast majority of Cubans was that you had to pay for such things in dollars - or in a bizarre invention, Such as I had I lever Seen before, not even in the Soviet Unionin Brezhnevs darkest days; specially designated tourist money. This too came in pesos, as did ordinary Cuban money, but the exchange rate was one to one, a far cry from the twenty to One that once was offered over and over again, all over the Own. In theory one was not meant to make such exchanges, but in practice one had to, to use thic buses for instance, for the conductors did not know what to do with tourist money, and one quite patronisingly scorned the tourist coin I gave him and let Inc travel free. It was a telling commentary on the staff in the tourist shops, who insisted on what was deemed the more valuable money, which Il Ost Cubans doubtless Would Tot hawe hadi al CeSS to. The lunacy of the system came home to me most tellingly at the Bodeguila de Medalin, where Hemingway had been a habitue before the revolution. The fact was now being ruthlessly exploiEed in a grossly capitalistic fashion. You had to pay dollars, or the equivalent in tourist pesos to drink there low. The Cubans themselves, the vast majority who were not priviledged to possess dollars, the natives whose company presumably HeTuningway had Telished, we Te no longer welcome.
And this it seened to ne was the obvious sign of a defeat much sadder than one could have conceived of, thirty years ago: that Cuba had enshrined the dollar, icon of the United States, to estates, to establish a privileged class, with a status far far higher than that of the aveTaբ է: Citiքem.
Typical of this disgraceful situation was what Went on at Havana's most destinctive site, the ice-cream parlour Coppelia
that has flourish in a large tenta park. Cuban hundereds, fron morning even c. posed to be w en ter the tent ël ClŪS LITES Toul Il ice-cream. They Willit thTEc T T privilege.
Upstairs how parlour, one cal ght away withou hä5 kl.15. Til Was Illuch bette front of Ille queue said sadly been there the and I was to f cally that this better too, I wi thic choice of W blc. It was no doctor was surp exercisc the prix of real money, e.
But I this Wa5 dicte TImiTell the Cuba I15 h:lyt than two hours is, At that poi sess, I grew imp ped the queue. do this, for I si to Ille of the foi by a side entrans I had noticed letting in people WA5 even able ti cience il that II ally deprive апус I sat it a tab EE t Le the system that that people in to Wait: uti1 til sig malled to the i a table was free happened long had left, since tendants seemed gation to expedii
I tak - || 1 which was the L.
be served twice, vided Tefills For my table. All til
th:1Il time tl |lar, Illarket rate at , tained my Cuba Was the level only for ice-crea cor bus travel, o
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

led now for years -like structure in Տ ՎլIELle LIբ 1I1 In eight in the in what arc suporking days, to
or the various about it, to eat
teId. t) hEayc t) ELIT hours for the
ever into Ole In troop in strait waiting, if one e service in them r, the doctor in in the regular ... I had in fact previous day, ind out graphiwas trille, Much st discover was hält Wls Flyli|- wonder that the Tiscal II did Ilot 'illege possession
tiitlici Ille to.
second day I to Idul Te What eחנtווtt until I had passed that ilt Illust coatient, and ju IlIt was easy to Imply slipped inLitšideelses :e through which the attendants they knew. I -IlSיִTIl' tטSHW . did Illot ct LD1e .bf th1cIII1 si 1Ce le: where there hildren already, operated was the quicules hadi Hle hell Williter door-keeper that - which usually Efter Custo Illes One of the atto feel any oblite anything.
lur to finish, ille it took to and also prothe children it his cost me less it the blackwhitH I had gԷյ1 pesos. That of pricing, not ITS, or coffee, T eveIl the de
lightful ballet performance by a Wariety of young stars, from a Ta Inge of colul Intries including the the United States. BLI E Choice was woefully limited; and when I finally left Coppelio the good doctor Who hlad, co Ille the Te Ebefore Ile With his wife HiТd children, who had now been waiting for over three hours, Was stillin the queue, still a little distance from the zealously if not efficiently guarded main entrance to the te Int.
The proliferation of inefficiency seemed to be the most promiment chracterestic of the regime. Obviously, the main problem for statist sociālis II is the absence of a system of incentives for employees to give of their best and perhaps the problem is in superable. In Cuba however no attempt appeared to have been made at all to introduce any efficiency leasures, or to get employecs personally invol. ved to some deg Tee at least in their work.
The bus station provided a bizarre example of this, The desk at which tickets were finally, to be obtained had half a dozen people behind it, but most of the time they did nothing at al. Occasionally on strips of paper torn from already Used sheets, One Would Write om the reverse a string of the same numbers; generally Theo Te than Were required, for on tWo or three coccasions II Saw them count the number they had Written and tear up the excess.
The Illibers that were not -given out to pas ט'rטtorn up W sengers who had got to the top of the queue. This was determined by one of the expectant passengers themselves, as they all Clustered TOLIII di belches Illirked with the wa Triolus lesti II:Li tix) ms. The selected passenger wrote up a list on a piece of Scrap paper, which le T. she Teil Gllt Flt intervals to ensure that people were still waiting. Names kept being crossed out, and the list rewritten on still more scrap, until finally, at whatever it seeIned arbitary time the list was
(CarE ரா நாgச 14)

Page 14
RUSSIA IV REVOLUTIO MW (2)
Soviet Bureaucracy: A
Reggie SiriwWardene
cTc is illo doubt thält tille T self-confidence With Which Bolsheviks were calcil with the October insulTricci Il till their refusal to coil promise with the LLaLLLLLLLaS aLaLalLaLLLLLL S HLaL aatLLLLLLS ed by their conviction that a large European revolution was in sight. Commenting on this fact, Isaac Dcutscher raises the question whether Lenin and Trotsky would hawc actedl as they did, or whether they would have acted with the sale deterIllination, if they had taken a sobere view of international LLaLaaLLH SLaLa LLLLaaaaLaL aLLLLLLS S the course of decades their example would not be imitated in any other country." Deutschcr goes on to say: “History produced the great illusion and planted and cultivated it in the brains of the most soberly realLLLa LaLaLLLLLL S S LLLLY S LLLL S S S LaLLLLLLL the motive power of illusion to fu TLEler Ehler OW || Work, 12 LL is a pity that even so independent and intelligent a thinker as Deutscher Succum.b5 to the habit, so con non anong Marxists, of not Imerely anthropomorphising but even deifying history. It wasn't "history" that planted in the Bolsheviks" Eorain tElle illusi0n of the imminence of the Europčin revolution: the Illusion Was self-created, and fostered by their faith in the Marxist doctrine Lihat tille CŪLITradictil 15 of West
ern capitalism had reached breaking-point,
By 1923, however, Lenin had
to Icick with the fact that the European proletariat had not come to the rescue of the beeguered Soviet state, and the fiasco in that year of the attempted revolution in GcTII1 any Illa de the reality all the Timore inescapable. By that time Lenin was deeply troubled by the internal course of Soviet society and its state KK DHCaS S LLLL SS a SS SSLaa SaLLLL articles he Wrote Out of these
2
preoccupations, buit Better", he ing hope in t longer of Europ Teyol Lltio III:
Il til la SL 3 Cle Of Lle
determined by Russia, III dia accullt foT t Imajority of t the globe. A past few y majority that
into the stru
pation with rapidity, so t pect there c
s lightest doub 0lltcoile of t
yiII c. I complete wict is fully and : Ed:13
Wiլt:n I Tլ:it: remenin beri Ing Lt. ed Teflectis period on the Of Soviet socic party itself. I Weheiment Essertic Llot be thot s էfully and absol the attempt of to sustain his face of assailing
I shall retur. significance of th thinking in his an European to pective. But fir address frontall. WeTee: t R; and the State t birth, socialist?
The are two which this quest fronted assumin It isn't a TT Wiլճm in the Union all was all possible wo

Composite Class
Better Fewer, found a fortify he pгоspect по EFI ELIt Of Asia. Il
nalysis, the olutStruggle Will be til fact thit China, etc., le over-whelming hic population of And during the as it is this has been drawn ggle for eman ciextraordinary lat in this Tes. Illot be the What the final lic World struggle this sense, the ry of socialism absolutely assur
I this passage, inin's discouraguring the same burea ucratisatio II ty and of the sense in the Ils — +th CTC CHI|ightest dուլիt", Litely assuredthe dying maП Will flit in the
lbts.14
| lateT to the e Shift in Leni's last stages from
an Asian persSt, 1 illu St ICW y the question: sian Revolu tion, which it gave
possible ways in Eion can be coll, that is, that le BelieveT foT
former Soviet Ծr the ԷյԷել էնք rlds. One way
is to take all the attributes of a Socialist state and society als found in the writings of Max and Engels, and those of LeTin before the revolution, and put then in one pan of the scale, In the other pan one would put the observable features of the
Soviet state and society, and Weigh them one against the Other. There calbe 10 dubt what the Tesllit would be. This
is in effect, what lost dissident Marxists (dissident, that is, from Sowiet orthodoxy) hawe do Te. They hawe statted with an ideal I model of Willat sociallis IT should be constructed out of the classic texts, judged the Soviet Union by it, and found it Wanting. Ön this intellectual Toad, Once O11 e ha 5 come to the conclusion that the Swiet state deviated from true Socialis in the next questions will be: What went wrong, and when
When did the Revolution lose its in Točeliče? When Was the apple eaten, and who walls Tes
ponsible for the Fall?
In the Sowiet Unicol ul Ilkler perestroika, from about 1988, large numbers of intellectuals were engaged in asking these qui estions, with i Indubitable si Lillcerity, and often considerable heart searching and anguish, When did the Revolution go off course? With the great purges and trials in the "thirties. With forced collectivisation and breakneck industrialisation? With the establishment of the Illinolithic party at the end of the 'twenties? With the death of Lenin and the rise of Stalin to power? With the creation of the oneparty state and the banning of factions in the ruling party in 1927. With the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in 1918? Not surprisingly, some of the intellectuals who plursued this quest ended with the conclusion that the original sin lay in the

Page 15
Octobert Rewoluutico T1 itself. Today the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, similar questions are being raised and answers offered by non-Soviet Marxists, as one may see from a year's perusal of New Left Review or Ecoloric and Political weekly.
The sterility of that line of thinking-starting with an ideal model of socialism and m casu Ting the Soviet state and society against it - has been most lucidly and cogently brought, out by the late G. W. S. de Siva:
The aberration theory: The Soviet Union is an aberration (largely due to Stalin). It is by no means a model of a true socialist Society. This view was largely reinforced by the Chinese experience. Here at last a true Socialist model. But now there a Tc doubts ab õllt China todo. Is China also an aberration (due to Deng Xiao Ping)? And what of the countries of Easter Europe, N. Korea, Indo-China, Cuba, Ilot to mention Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, South Yemen, Afghamistan, GuineaBissau etco Are they all aberrations? This is a very idealist position to take reality is an aberration and only the idea of Socialism is real. 15
A related point was made in
his own way by the former East GcTI man dissident, Rudolf Bahiro, in the course of his
critique of the Eastern European socialist regimes when they were stil itu power.
Thcories of deformatic arc all ted in a Rolati manipulation of history. If only people, especially those in the Bolshevik party. had willed more intensely and acted more wisely, if instead
of actually existing socialism, we had genuine socialism, or at least a different and better
road. There is no need to be Tatalistic to dist TL1st colclusions of this kind. They
do not not provide any key to history or to the present, and neither therefore to the future of our system. 18
Besides the forms of Wishful thinking mentioned by Bahiro,
there a Te othe T; dent Marxists If only Lenin only Trotsky Lenin. . . If onl democratic leialde inist, according aborted the E tion. I. a 11 thes. fantasies crr by viduals and the to the level C. factor in human
It is true t historical forces otherwise than agencies of thin acting persons. that since these people in the T and ideological are so much individual actor ceptional indivi pens is that til makes his mark SCO because hic is by his persona play the role di In the specific c the rise of dicta revolutionary Ru: ship between hii:
mellt all indiv ities is, I think, by Bahiro.
A5, Plato al Tc the existence is tragic whic filind the Stat This was the Trotsky, Zino and many oth lutionaries, whic anticipated a thin that whic Tesult 5 of thici: lost power be at fit to ti in the process Stalin Won po did fit it.17
Bahiro's strictu Cyf dreformation" the book Which bably the most is certainly the of all those wril pouse the wiew Union was a td state" — Trotsky”. Betrayed. As a

S to which dissihave been prone. had lived. If hall succeeded y the socialership - or StalLo Laste — hiidn't uropean revolu- and similar clevatting indicir subjectiwities if the decisive
list.
latt Social Lld do not operate through the king, feeling and But one can say force - whether māSS LIET Tlalte Tial CITCLITT1St:1T1Ce3 – arger than the leven the exda || - what hap1c leader who on history does peculiarly fitted 1 attributes to Ilalded of him. 1FCll T115 tilICes Of torship in postsia, thic relatiostorical developidual personalcorrectly defined
ady discovered, f for to politics he his Tot : that Sllit: him." experience of view, Bukharin T foi T1c Teyrhad subjectively difficTellt sätte was the actual cfforts ...They Callusc ffrey" did e stilte that W3 of development. Wer becall se lle
e5 11 Theories apply even to has been proInfluential, and nost eloquent, ings which eshat the Sowjet formed Workers'
TYe Rejeffgir polemic against
the Stalinist regime and an exposure of its pretensions to have achieved the perfectly classless and democratic society of Marx :Lind Leilin's dirca Tils, it is brilliant feat of political pamphleteering. As political analysis it is seriously flawed by thclimplications inherent in its title and their development in the body of the book. Once again, the concept of betrayal' assumes an original uncorrupted condition which has been perfidiously Williteil, Whether ble tilli Ilk 3 of 0LLLLLL S LLO HH aLaLLHHLLLaLLS S L LLLLL S LLLLLL Soviet bureaucracy as a class, the charge of betrayal' belongs more to the realin of political mythology than to that of rational social theory. If the Revolution was betrayed in the sense that the hopes and aspirations of those who participated in it remailed unrealised, than the betrayal was less by a Iny indiwidual or group than by social Teality itself AS We
hawe scen, the original Mia Txist visio Il SSLITed i revolutio ellerging Collit Cf the ciconomic,
political and cultural conditions of an advanced capitalist society. No such revolution Inaterialised, and the undeveloped Russia that the Balshic:Wikis in Ellerited CCLIII not hawe provided a substitute.
The concept of the Soviet Ulil as a defined workers' state' that became part of the common parlance of the Trotskyist movement raises the question: At What stage does onc suppose the defoTTiation to laye takel place? One could Lusic the concept to imply that in comparison
with the icical socialist model envisaged by Marx, the Soviet state Wils defoiled from the start, like a thalidomide baby emerging from its mother's Wilb. 18 But that would be admit that the model was an
irrelevant criterion in the given historical circumstances, Ortone could use the description to Sluggest that the Soviet state was born healthy but suffered later maining. The historical evidence doesn't support this latter view because strong and persistent criticisms of the bureaucratisation of the Soviet state were

Page 16
being made by revolutionary participants of sympathetic observers from the early days of the Revolution - notably by Rosa Luxemburg is and by the small oppositional factions in Bolshevik party from 1918 onWards. 19
Trotsky’s explanation for the triumph of bureaucracy in the Soviet Unio Telli e5 heavily on the circumstance of the isolation of the Revolution in an undeveloped country with an economy of scarcity:
The basis of bureaucratic Tule is the poverty of society iI objects of consumption, with the resulting struggle of each against all. When there is enough goods in a store, the purchasers can come whenever they want to. When there is little goods, the purchlasers are compelled to ställd il line, Willem thic ines атe vегy loпg, it is пcccssary to appoint a policeman to keep Order. Such is the starting point of the power of the Soviet bureaucracy. It knows" who is to get something and who has to wait. 20 This parable of Trotsky is true as far as it goes; but in order to explain the power of bureaucracy in post-revolutionary Russia, we have to add other factors, some of which are indiccdcd recognised by Trotsky elsewhere in The Reportion Befrayed. The fi II da TTCT tall talsk of the post-revolutionary era was to lay the basis for an inclustrial revolution through primitive capital accumulation in the hands of the state; and Wish the scarcity of resources, this had to be accompanied by El drastic restriction of consumption, which necessitated coercion. Given the initially low cultural level of the masses and the influx into the industrialising cites of a raw mass of peasant labour, the requirement of a riigid libril discipline further 5 tTengthened the power of the bureaucracy. Two other factors, however, that Trotsky was little disposed to recognise were the Byzantine traditions of the Russi:lm Stäte, Ilow refracted through the Communist Party, and the nationally heterogeneous character of the
14
former empire wh held together by of the Inonolith less, however, Wa: to admit, at this life, the inherentl tendencies of it party as a contri in the bureaucrati Soviet State. Thi in spite of the f pre-revolutionary conducted a bit With LéIlill WEr tightly controlled
ation that the lo Il the course of hic had given ex memorably Worde Bolshewi SL Would tate towards a ci power: The part (the Caucus) at Í itself for the par then the Celt substitutes itself . isation: l'Ind fit է Filittator" sլյ1յht for the Central Trotsky, howewcT. on this insight ir he joined the B il the ciri tionary years he participated in t the first part of h process by which ganisation substi! the masses. By Write T. R. il exilė, lle lid of its later stag til of the Ccm for the party, tution of the dili Central Citt (To be C NOS I Deutscher 1954), 12 bid., pp. 293-294 13 Lenin (1977a, p. The article "Bette is in fact funda םrת ith rii:ikingי Inisation of the կրիiL:11 ILLI deplorable not to 5 e Sily (1988).
Hi Lihat it i5 li: Silyä'; eirler titils with Minis address the posit equite Mao's socialisil". Trots hand, would tal Lin1 i Irid Trots Itical IltiTII1, Iհու ble F 5 YILI IETEuble.

|ich had to be the steel frame ic party. Still i Trotsky ready time of his y authoritarian the Bolshevik butory element sation of the siblindness was act that in the years hic had er controversy he closcid and party organislitter stood for. hat controversy pression to a di prophecy that naturally gravientralisation of y organisation irst substitutes ty as a whole; a Committee for the orgal IIally a single itles himself Committee.21 had gone back mid-1917 well olshevik party, ly post-rewoluhad himself he fulfillent of is prophecy: the the party or Eutel its elf for tlle time le IIиtion Betrayed. become al victi Il ts: the substitutral Committee nd the Substitaito for the t. 후 ontinued)
р, 293.
725.
Fewer, but Better mentally concerned posals for reorgastate apparatus, iš Cibus is " "; say wretched". , 24. It List Be probably G. W. S. intellectui affiliaTI That Take him Il of these WHO "Fila yih "Le yists, on the other e Hig, R.Lg5 Tf y in power as the nםeptiטחll this co
16 Bahiro (1978), p. 139, I have not been ble to verify Whether G. W. S. de Silva was influenced by Bahiro's book though therc are some striking affinities in ideas between it and his essay. De Silva's essay was published in full (posthumously) only in 1988, but was apparently written nםicatiחuוחmםם nalםTSטט), 1979-80 in fronn Charles Aberysekiera). Bathro's book appeared in German in 1977 and in English translatian in 1978. 17 Bahro (1978), p. 116. 18. It is noteworthy that Trotsky's phrase echoes that of Lenin, a Workes" Stilte With bo LTCELICTEtic distortions, which he used as early 5 O o describe the Soviet state - and ironically enough, in a debate against Trotsky, who wanted the trade unions absorbed into the state apparatus. 19 Luxemburg (1961) contains her main critique, the pamphlet on the Russian Revolution, especially Chapter W on = "The Problem. Dyfi Dictor. ship", pp. 68-72. An excellent account of the early 'libertarian Bolshevik faction can be found in Farber (1990). 20 Trotsky (1945), P. 112. 21 Deutscher (1954), p. 90. 22. It must be said here that apart from the fact that Trotsky was by temperanent little capable of selfcritical reflection, he would in exile hawe been disinclined to look back DIl His former differences With Lenin because thic ruling Stalinist group had exploited there differences to the full in their propagan dist campaigns against him, and he was concerned to establish himself as the true ideological heir of Lenin,
The Last. . .
(CriIE ரீர நரgச 11) closed, the lucky ones left at the top were designated potential recipients of tickets for the Ilcxt available bus, on the following day if one was lucky.
That it least was how it scemed to me things werc micant to work. It provedl impossible to find out exactly, even at what was supposed to be the information desk. After two long draw II ollt Visits to the blls station, the Second at dawn, I decided to give up. The effort of getting out of Hawa na was clearly not worth it, There was only one bus a day to Trinidad which was the city I'd hoped to get to, it would certainly be almost impossible to get to, a seOHLL LLaLaLYLLLLLLL HH KLLa HHHLLLLLLL0 S SLLLL quite likely that I would fail to get back on time for my flight even with a couple of days grace if I had got to Trinidad. It seemed more sensible to head back
early to Jamaica.
(To be continued)

Page 17
| coNELIcτ (5)
Among five accords Me is a special case
John M. Richardson and
heir key role in bringing the
Nimieri regime to power was recognized. President Nimieri was personally committed to reaching some accord and empioWered a skillful negotiator, in the person of Vice President Allier, who could effectively communicate with both sides. Signing of the accord Was followed by implementation of its provisions, again under the direction of Vice President Alier.
In contrast to the Sudan, negotiations leading to The Punjab Accord failed to involve key actors with strong interests in the Inegotiations. The accord provided for major concessions, involving land and water rights, for the leadçi:Ts of Haria province. Prime Minister Gandhi first overestimated his ability to persuade recalcitrant provincial leaders and then lo Stitcesi the process when the configuration of forces in Indian provincial politics changed. In failing to ensure the support of militant Sikh leaders, Gandhi committed an error that he was to repeat in the Indo-Lanka accord, two years later, with equally disasԼrՕ11S CO11SèգlleIl Cé8.
ATTong the Five accords, Meech -Lake is a special case because Canada is a modern nation ind because there has been little violent conflict betwcen the English, and the Qurebecois . HoWever there are parallels between the problems encountered in ratifying this accord and those in the Punjab case. Implementation of each accord failed in part because the negotiations excluded parties with strong interests and effective veto power. Prime Minister Mulroney was so focused on resolving outstanding issues between Quebec and the
Jr. Jianxin WM
federal governma lected thic coil provinces and fai impact of the ac da’s indigenou s
When One CO Illedations f'TOTm flict resolution ag spired in negotia menting the five thic shortcomings become apparent. accords, especial third parties mac that could not, be kept. The power to key ac excluded from thi Was eithė T lInde ignored. Thus, IT nic peace accords lish communicatio identify mutual i solve fundamental major protagonist grounds for ho pc, It suggests that ethnic peace acco thing to learn fr CClFlict resolutio process of negot cords can be im
HOW CAN NEG DO BETTER
Effective Mediatio. Regulation
Studies of eth Horrowitz (1985), , others provide . dence that Wiolen flicts will ra Tely, solved” by the pri except through th deStrLICtib 1 h I (br c3 one of then. B solution' through is likely to be costly, destructive suming process (

aech-Lake
lang
int that he meg. er Ins of Other led to see the Cord on CanaJeoples.
Impal TCS Teck) Imstudies of coainst what tranting and implepeace accords Of thic accords Parties to the ly ** external” Le COITTThit IThe Elts or would not effective wet ors, who were e negotiations, restillated or C05E of the ethfailed to estabIn build trust, tCTES ES COT TICissues Elmong s. TEis offeTs not pessimism, negotiators of Tds have SomeIII StuIilie3 Cf 1 and that the iating such ac
rowed.
OTATRS
I rial Cornflict
ic conflict by Azar (1991) and convincing ewieth. Thỉữ C, Ilif lewer ble i Fretagonists alone e capitulation, termination of it **Cəlliflict Temilitary victory an uncertain, and time con. ichardson and
Samara singhe, 1992). Even though third party interwcntion Was largely ineffective in negotiating and implementing the accords discussed in this book, We believe that a strong case can be made for effective third party interwention, But what type of third party role is most likely to bring Warring parties together and mediate a successful accord. Principles of effective mediation, as described in the literature, may contribute to a successful outcome, but they will not be sufficient. To be cffective in resolving ethnic conflicts, third party negotiators must be more than skillful. They must be (or represent) key political actors in their own right who bring influence, strong interests in Tesolving the conflict and substantial resources to the negotiation PTCICESS.
Readers will recognize that this conclusion is consistent with Saadia Tuval's work on the Middle East peace process (1982) and differs from the view that an effective role can be played by a dispassionate, technically competent mediator who is not politically involved. Although Touwal is primarily Writing about international conflicts, I believe his findings, a Te Televant to the concerns of this paper. The more-than-thirty year armed struggle between Israelis and Arabs certainly qualifies as a protracted social conflict.
According to Tollwal, mediating powers in the Arab-Israeli conflict had strong national security interests in the outcome and were often biased toward one side or the other. However bias did not appear to limit their effectiveness. Serious negotiations were more likely when

Page 18
a mediating power could exert political pressure that would bring the protagonists to the negotiating table. When negotiations con 11111enced, the ability of the mediator to provide benefits for both sides and to reduce risks that adversaries assumed by making concessions were key factors contributing to success. Successfull Ille cliato T5, Were ble to Create a "win-win' situation by providi Ing positive incentives to both sides and serving as credible guarantors against backsliding or cheating.
The Camp David Accords illustrate many of these points. After thirteen days of arduous negotiations, Egypt and Israel Teached agreement oin the terms of a peace treaty and on Israeli Withid TELW:ll from the Siilai peninsula. There has been peace between the two nations for more tha II a decade, The United States used not only political pressure, but the prestige of the U. S. Presidency to bring toplevel representatives of two major protagonists to the negotiating table, President Carter provided not only good offices, but substailltial Tinamicial incenti We5 and Illilitary guarantees. In addition to these political, finalcial and Illilitary resources, the President and his glides used Imany of the techniques of “probell solving negotiation that hayfe beel described abwe.
The story of Camp David Accords illustrates that partial resolution of ethnic conflicts may SCInetimes be possible without Imi Litary Wictory; it also i Ilustrates that the task of fraining a sustainable ethnic peace accord should not be undertaken lightly, Entor With a II y certainity about the outcome. Moreover, Camp David may be a model of limited generality. Tensions between Israel and Egypt were high, but a In Lu Imlbert Cf CiTcu Tlsta Ilces, Ing easily replicable, contributed to the Tesults achiewed. Negotiations were preceded by major political changes in both Israel and Egypt, catalyzed by President Sadat's trip to Israel and speech before the Israeli Parlia
16
It. Bit E Were already pi to the United major recipien President Cart uniquely skille Presidents a 5 a willing to risk his Presidency
LtCole.
The circums ethnic conflicts ble thall till:0 Camp David ne bers of conflic be intermingled Ireland, Croatia Lanka, making demarcations may be multi divided authorit sides, complical tion process. L. groups may ha position toward take of negotia gains from a There may be external power the outcome; sc CTS II lily See gre; prolonging conl conflict resoluti WOLI 1 til be ilHcc1 Camp David resolution.'' R: Ina naged to red Ween the two ciently so that tion, rather thi force becil 1115 å table basis - for tially violent ce inning t) resolWi putes.
Mediation Illas; in resolving vio flicts and Imay si էլ ցլյticessfլյ1 biլ: conflict Imalılage the costs and such CüIlflicts, II flict reductil gernent strategi. breaks out Will far illore pro T1 effective. Prad far less detailed conflict avoidal diverse societies minutiae of the Etion aldi garbit]

gypt and Israel plitically beholden States; EIl di WeTe its of U. S. Aid. er Was perhaps d along U.S. peacemaker and the reputation of Il a faavyūTEIl ble
ances of Imany
are lCSS fl:WOTse faced by the :gotiators. Memiting groups may .. as in Northern , Tindia and Sri
Clear territorial iTilt. TIETE ple groups and y on one or both ing the Ilegatiaeade T5 If Illiliitlit ve little predisthe give and tion i Ild See fey el Ceful Outcóle.
Il Te thal Tic with a stake in yme external powliter benefits from FCE Elli frIl in. Meyer it u rate to label the results (conflict ther, the accords Lice frict in betrotagonists suffifurther negotiaAll the Lise Of
mutually accepmanaging potenInflicts and bege outstanding dis
a rolc to play lent Ellic Con inctimes provide is for long-term I ment. Blutgiven intractability of mplementing conT :ficta is before violence ld see IT to be lising and cost oxically, we have knowledge about Ice in ethnically
thāT1 Hhữ11t the gotiation, InediaLtiO, Nord 1in
5. Use of the “Workshop
ger's work on conflict regulating practices identified a promising area of research that, until recently, has received little attention. Horowitz's Work On Islech|- anisms of conflict reduction and his comparative analysis of structural vs. preferential policies to reduce ethnic conflict represents a significant step forward. Work in this genre can be helpful in preventing the outbreak of violent conflict and in building a du Table peace following à successful Tediation effort.
Recapitala tio.r7
Here is a summary of our Imajor conclusions:
1. If violent conflict hals broken Out, Ilegotiating a successful ethnic peace accord, Without Illilitary victory on one side, will require third party inLTETlt.
2. The third party should be substantially more powerful, politically, than any protagonist, should have a strong interest in reaching an accord and be willing to commit substantial resources to implementing its provi55. The Ulitel Nätis or a regional grմup such as the European Common Marketi, ASEAN, SAARC, COAS or OAU might play the third party role if group mediation is backed by major DLWETs.
3. Third party leaders must resist the temptation to try imposing a solution using Illilitary force. The use of пеutral peace keeping forces, under conditions agreed to by all key protagonists, may be a temporary expedient.
4. Third party negotiators should ble Committed to establishing communication, building trust and identifying areas of Ilutual interest among the protagonists,
forIlmat” lid other C&T Tlict Tesolution techniques can be

Page 19
an important part of the negotiation process, but should be wiewed 15 COImplementary to the role of a politically powerful, highly committed third party.
All key actors with potential veto power over impleIllentation of an accord should be involved in the negotiations
Conflict Ilmanagement is probably a more desirable and attainable goal for ethnic peace accords than conflict resolution. Many ethnic conflicts may be manageable, but not resolvable.
Successful negotiation of an accord should be viewed as the beginning, not the end of the conflict management PTOCESS.
Potential third party interWenors as Well as protagonists should recognize that the most propitious and cost effective time for managing ethnic differences is before violent conflict breaks out.
Among conflict management strategies found in the liter. ät LITe, Donald Horowitz's proposals, emphasizing design of political structures to mitigate, diffuse and channel chnic tensions appear to be the most promising,
As the 1990s begin, a new generation of political leaders is grappling with questions of constitutional and institutional design in ethnically diverse nations. These leaders need to understand more about the causes of ethnic conflict and how alternative institutional structures can either mitigate or exacerbate eth. nic tensions. Further, the costs and benefits of attempts to resolve ethnic tensions by force need to be realistically appraised. When tension does iead to conflict, leaders of contending groups and potential third
party intervenors need to know
which negotiation and mediation
Strategies are li effective. Those Scholars need t areas more full already known 30 D15 to be le:T that succeeded , D1)t al II. Whi knowledge, we Iniciatic wat w political leaders clear, powerful We need to ap knowledge more sectively.
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Tide-Frank Dukes, oorl7Cfcs fru Mfarrif frid Rei Fairfar.
artin's Press. ld Frank Dukes, rேg r Mr. fr. Ney York:
Кғерілg Faith: fir, New York:
Fai! Ceir y WegorCaucus, New Jer
Coser, Louis, 1955.
பிராங் ரேரி. The Free Press,
Deng, Francis M., Hand I William Zartman, cd, Conser Ferdfision in Africa, Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1991.
Deutsh, Morton, 1973. The Resolution of Corflict. New Haven: Yale Uni. versity Press.
De Silva, Kingsley M., 1986. Marra*Ілg ЕгЛліс Телліоли їл МfшIri-EїЛіпіс Socierie: Sri Larika 1880-1985. Lanha T1, Maryland: University Pre55 of Allica.
De Silva, Kingsley M., 1991, "IndoSri Lanka Relations: A Study in the Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict." In de Silva and May 76-105 . קיק (1991)
De Silva, Kingsley M, and May, Ronald J., cds, The ľriferrľaľľa ľaľхагӀол of Eгhліс Сол//fer, Lопdoп: Francis Pinter, 1991. Fisher, Roger, and Scolt Brown, 1989. சோழ Tரசr Elig Rerships as FFe Neggriaré. New York: Penguin, Fisher, Roger and William Ury, 1981. Gerring fu Ye. Boston: Houghton Miff. Garcia, Edmundo, 1989. "Conflict Resolution in the Philippines: The Ouest for Peace in a Period of Democratic Transition." Beller of Peace Frøparalis 20; 1, pp. 59-69. Garcia, Edmundo, 1988, The Tra7 FIL-f- farrari or of Society, Quezon City:
Cleretiam Publications. Grims, Erika and Mary Kay Satriano, 1990 "Northern Ireland Conflict - Agreements," Erh Prisc 5randier Report WII: 2 pp. 33–43. Horowitz, Donald, 1985. Ethric Groups fr Corfirr, Berkeley: University of Californil Press. Horowitz, Donald, 1991, a Delacralric South Africa, Berkeley University of California. Press, Kahn, Lynn S., 1988. Peace Making, A Syлғктігі Approach ra Conflict Mfатfragenen. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America. Kelman, Herbert C. and Stephen F. Cohen, 1972. "The Problem Solving Workshop in Conflict Resolution." in Richard L. Merritt, ed., Corr. TIFFT scarları ir rifer raffa VIII Pasifies. Urbana, Illinois; University of Illin
is Press.
The Fitriction of Glen COC, Illinois:
17

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Kodikara, Shelton U., ed, 1989, Indoபீri Lanka Arger of July 1987 Dehiwala, Sri Lanka: Sridewi Printers for the International Relations Program, University of Colombo.
Likert, Rensis and Jane G. Liket, 1976. Ney Ways of Μαπαξιμές σπ. flict. New York: McGraw Hill.
Lickleider, Roy, 1990. Ha H Cfr. Fair
Frsd: Prelirnirrary Results fram a ComPrative Prfect. Unpublished paper, prepared for delivery at the Igg Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August
30 — September 2, San Francisco, Cillis TI
Mao Tse Tung, 1957. On the Corre
ferrrrrrrig of ConrrraaderFont l- פחים היוt rhie People, Beijing: Foreign Language Press.
Mitchell, C. R., 1981. ":ாரig r
The Caroliffant" Role. FarnbՃrnլյgh, Hampshire, England։ Gower.
Nordlinger, Eric, 1972. ரேரி Rg. r i Dr Scleries, Canbridge: Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, 29.
Pillar, Paul, 1983. Νερατίαring Pεαρές * Triர ரோtrg Presif. Princeton: Princeton Uni. Versity Press.
Pruit, Dean G, and Jeffrey Z, Ruեin, 1986, Social Conflict. Eartர, Salernate arri Settleiner, New York. Random House,
Rothchild, Donald and Caroline and Hartzel 1, 1988. Tile Peace Procerr in பேr 19:-72. Per Prepared for Delivery at the International Political Science Association Meeting, Washington, D. C., August 30,
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de A. Sääs End Helleft Ctinflict: Thiէ: Forthcoming in Rupesinghe, Kuml;
fsfer Resouffør Dlliը: Ոիլը լII QIlāIldt, William B, ΡεΤΕέrηΗ Είπε πη, D.C.: The BT Sandole Dennis J. dole-Sarst 198 FIEFFIF TFIFA FF). for fai rifer Ney Work: IN Press, Scheirhan, L. ROI Ford, "The Or can States as M. and Zai Tt. rial in Theory Shellenberg, James
சr r (தர ford University Simmel, Georg, I
York: Fre PT Singer, Linda, 199
Солffer Refolшг. tச வாசி சின் ச COLTE: WELT
THOgi Muc
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M, Jr., and S.W.R. Touwal, Saadia, 1982, The Peace Brak
inghe, 1992. "Costs kkLL uSSS S SS t tttLTGGCHu SS YS SYaL S SASLOeHOYSLuOuM Of Wident Political|| Carrfic 1948-Ig Frinceto: PrinC53 of Sri Liliki ceton University Press.
I !-4"3rld De 'elgprrIgrIr,
ar, ed, 1989. Crfrr: Ugarrfar. Athens,
liversity Press.
LLLHLHCLS LCLLLLL LLLLLa S LLL S0 LLLS maп, 1985. Ілгеглагіолд! Мferїїагїал in Theory, and Practice. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. Foreign
1986 Cr David Policy Institute, School of Advanced Politics. Washington, International Studies, Johns HopItikiոբh Institution, kins University, 1985.
D. and Ingrill San- Uli 17. Солfїїcr Малаgа- Inited States Institute of Peace, CF
fr ffi'r ffer y ra rre Sfidy of Fecerriakாழி: A Bry தரி சராசரி சேரர் Projects. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, December, 1990.
Prif - 5 o lyfrgi. Ery ferperтагіола! Адр!їстffолл. w York University
Bal and John Y.V. Wolfers, Michael, 1985. The Orga
ganization of Ameri- nizintion of African Unity as Mediediator' Tin Tuya Litor." In ToLuwal and Zart Iman,
rtref Ffrain Ffr Melffa- Ir retrriatiorial Mediatriori irr Theory
Price, FIFAFFNET.
A., 1939. The SC. Ef. NEW JTk: リ Zartman, I. William, 1985. Ripe for
Press, 1988. Reғolution: Сол//fст алd Intervention) -
In Africt, New York: Oxford Uni: Салfїїcr. New versity Press.
). Serring pres: Zartman, I. William and Maureen R. Press, Fir- Berman, 1982. The Practical Negaal Syster, Boulder, rator, New Haven: Yale University FięW Press. Press,
DYNASTY
a days, what data! 1 psychology didn't go school masters ways. Ti Luch time for the grappolling Ones Lemnod as Drop-outs to become Bums 1ay be Crae peris for whita gagzers шпtry in tha Slawga caппp5.
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U. KāTLI natilake

Page 21
| PART 4.
S. Sathananthan
4.7. The foremost place' for
Biddis
The failure to switch over to the lunar calendar did not cleter the demand for a change in the secular nature of the Sri Lankan State. The secular State was transformed when the 1972 Republican Constitution accorded Buddhism a 'foremost place'. The meaning of this phrase was explained by a leading Buddhist monk and Mahanayake of MalWatte Chapter, Wen Siri malwatte Ananda Māhanayake: “Buddhism should be given priority and other religions be given reaso. able prominence' (Ceylon Daily NEWS, 18 March 1989, p.15. What constituted "reasonable բTCminence' for other religions was ofcourse decided by Buddhists.
4.8. On two official Іапguages A longstanding Tamil demand has been that the Tamil languge Illust be an official langu. ge. In response to POTESSLIITç from India under the 1987 Ind Lanka Accord, the GSL amemded Article 18 of the Constitution in 1987 to make Tamil the Second official language. But FW:n alt this late stage, the Sinhalese ruling fraction lacked the Wisdom to give gracefully that which cannծt be held by force. they lacked 'higher nationalism'. Their cultural myopia led them to amend Article 18 in such manner as to retain the primacy of Sinhala language; the i amenčied Article tead as follows:
"(1) The official language of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala.
(2) Tamil also shall be an official language'.
In Article 18, the subordinate position of Tamil is emphasized by speciying that Sinhala is THE official language whilst Tamil is AN official language. The subordination is further underlined by inserting the Word "also' when referring to Tamil. More importantly, the Words
The Federal Alternati
"Sri Linki" (2) above. T the impression does NOT spe shall be an of the whole of Tamils and M "pгорег гecogni then Siri Hualla a Հiges shւյլIItl ի equal status. should have si official languag Sll:1ll he Sinhà Today, Article do violence to E līties,
In short, the Sertion that Si ilוןPLITSIt Il:iti ently seriously Fep TesentatiöII. " controlled by th fraction has di systernatically the "proper reco pect" to Tam Ilationalities whic implied could ex of which was w (Jayewardena, 19 Despite the abs Initionalism' in El Od of its Appraisal claimed för federalism a To5CTL, 5e Ce5510Il II is premature and (p. 7, 10). But : textbook example (Tamil) nationality Mill Ore thiltil three Tills ways of res. nality question ti ations and non-vi Within the frame, tary State. A Were repeatedly fr Tieful Sal of Sihal CII promise (Wils deed, the willing leaders to cor misunderstood by ders as a sign of the Sinha lese MP tary Secretary to Finance, Mr Nimal
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

ere cxcluded in s could convey Lihat the Article ify that Tamilis cial language of
Sri Lankä. If slims were given on and respect, di Tamil langu|We been given nd the Article ply said: "The es of Sri Lanka il and Tallil". 18 continues to Le minor nationa
Appraisal's asInhalese did not unity 'sufficiis a gross misThe unitary State Sinhalese ruling eliberatelly and denied precisely ignition and resil and Muslim h the Appraisal ist and the lack e11 documented 85). ence of “higher d the unlikeliemergence, the that the demand nd, as a last nade by Tamils inappropriate Sri Linka is a where a minor explored over decades nul Ilmehlwing the natiothrough negotiolent agitations Work «) f i a , L1 Dnisuch initiatives ustrated by the ese leaders to on, 1988). Inness of Tamil in promise was Sinha lese leaweakness: thus nd Parliamenthe Minister of Karlu na tillake,
advised the Parliament that in respect of the Jaffna (Tamil) community... probably the best attitude that should be adopted to all these loud protests is to regard them with a certain amount of indifference, because leaders of their community seem to choose on every occasion to ask for 100 percent and be satisfied with 25 per cent' (HariSard, vol 33, 1958 : 1140).
Sinhallesc challuvinismo could not have tried harder to pave the Way for the emergence of liberation struggles by Tamils. 5. Irrelevance of a unitary State
The Appraisal defended the unitary State on the grounds,
firstly, that "ever since 1815 there has been a strong tradi. tion of centralism'' (p. 16).
However, the British in 1815 established the authoritarian colonial State in Sri Lanka to facilitate unchallenged Tulc over 'natives' and undisturbed plunder of resources (Sathananthan, 1988). To describe the centraliyed colonial State as a Sri Lankan 'tradition' is a gross misreading of history.
The Appraisal believed that an advantage of a unitary State is its 'efficiency'' (p. 14). But it should be amply evident by now that the inability to manage conflict has revealed the tragic inefficiency of the unitary State in the context of the multinational society in Sri Lanka.
Moreover, the Appraisal lesCTibed a federa1 State - a.:S ““a much too expensive a luxury for
a small State' (p. 14). This is nothing new. During Parliamentary debates on the 1956
Official Language Bill, a Sinhalese MP, Mr. D P R Gulawardena, claimed that by adopting Simhala as the Sole official lainguage, the State would 'save un necessary eXpenditure of Inoney" and un necessary duplication of officials for various types of work' Hansard, vol.24, 1956: 1731), which would otherWisse hawe to be incu Tred if Sillhålla and Tallil are both official languages. Thus, measures necessary to protect the language rights of, and ensure justice to,
19

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Page 25
Seren a Tennelikoon
During the latter half of 1984 and early 1985, the Kalina St. таda” (Contemporay Controversies) Pages of the Sünday Diwayina becamc the for um for three newspaper debates on Sinhala history, Culture and identity. The Sinhala daity, Diyayiña (hereafter P.), and the Sunday Divay indPyl ri Sangray - As well as their English counterparts are published by the Upali Newspaper Group which was establi. shed in 1981 by a Sinhala millionaire entrepreneur, Upali WijeWardena. Although both daily and Weekly Divajiria are new. comers on the competitive Sinhala newspaper market, recent (1985) readership figures indicate that that they are the most popular Sinhala newspapers. In the absence of survey data on readership preferences, the success of Divaying may be attributed partly to its selective criticism of government policies which is coloured with a strong sense of Sinhala nationalism. While such editorial policies may be formulated in response to the perceived needs of a nationalist Teadership invariably they also inform and influence mass opinion. In this regard, the Diyajiria The WS paper
debates represent not only a cross-section of the views of the Sinhala intelligentsia, but
also an example of the media's participation in the generation and maintenance of particular kinds of nationalist discourse.
All three debates concerned aspects of historical relations between Sinhala and Tamil. It is my contention that appearing as they did at that particular time, these newspaper debates constituted a culturally familiar node of discourse within which Sinhala identity and nationalism were examined and reaffirmed.
Since much of the Controversy highlighted nationalist versions of history and culture, throughout this chapter I shall use the terms history", "myth, and "past" loosely to refer to the various interpretations of the past which
Newspaper Nationalism (2)
The Kingdom of Jaffn:
Were debated. I Ct ta sist fict OT Tilly this from h of the extent eXeTCises are e, treat history as course which re. sof the natur. tion itself as it i ject matter whi fest occasion of Taiti01 n'. I analy Cultural-political is caught in the C0Imposing natio. examine how ti Selectively appro in Order to und Sent and shape
The first contri ked by a comm prominent Sinha mini IriyagoLIla, al Il cxtēlsire IIc published soon explosion - Whit to Tamil militant ras Airport in Iriyagolla, who : spoken on subje state irrigation I nationalism on tempted to refu to a traditional north and east. ally critical of t an independent had been establ; aTool Ind the Lili from which time Tamil Tulers h their separate Western coloniali domestic politics Tamil nationalist Iriyagolla charget They the Tami to resto Te Ll Tamil kingdom Ice had. Yet Such thing. A give them some had. liriyagolla's den sed on a widely. tanding of Sinha lugh time (histo (geography), d
TTTT SOLITICS
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

fy intentions is from fictions story, regardless to which s Luch en possible. I 1 mole of disFeals as Illich ; of interpretaS. Ef the subih is the maniitš OW elabse history as a Construct which process of (re) hal identity and C Sihlala hawlic riated their past erstand the prethe future.
Oversy Was Sparent made by a la lawyer. Gain the corse of rview which was after a bomb hi was attributed s- at the MadAugust 1984. has WTi Liten and its ranging from olicies to Talli his occasion ate Tani claims holl clandi in the He was especi:he Ilotion that Tamil kingdom shed at Jaffna teenth century, on Si Thala andi di administered kingdoms un til SIn trasforITed Dismissing the use of history,
Ils are fighting
he independent
they say they the Te Wa5 10 And We cannot thing they never
ial was premis-shared undersla identity throгу) and space erived mainly such as the
mytho-historical chronicle the Mahavamsa. In post-colonial Sri Lanka, the search for Sinhala national identity remains oriented to a past when they apparently retained undisputed hegemony ower the entire island. And within the parameters of such an imagination. It would indeed be difficult to admit the possibility of a separate Tamil kingdom in thirteenth-century Jaffna, as well als (by te || a politically autonomous Tami region in the north and the east today.
Iriyagolla's reconstruction of history was challenged by Carlo Fonseka, a 111ember of the Medical Faculty at the University of Colombo, who is perhaps better known as a leftist activist and social critic. Armed With the works of two Sinhala historians (KM. de Silva and Wijaya SamaraWeera), Fonseka declared that, contrary to Iriyagolla. Sri Lanka had been politically unified only by four Sinhala kings, and that in the thirteenth century an independent Tamil kingdom had indeed held sway in the north.
Although the initial dispute was between Iriyagola and Fonseka, it provoked a number of Divayina readers to offer their own historical readings and counter-readings. At a fundamental level, Fonseka's critics implicitly agreed that in the thirteenth century, Jaffna appeared to be outside the political control of Southern Sinhala administrations. Beyond this different interpretations abounded: that the kingdom of Jaffna Was short-livedl: that it was not an independent kingdom but a client state of a neighbouring south Indian kingdom; and that it was not a Tamil kingdom because although the population may have been Tamil, their rulers were of Aryan (that is non-Dravidian) stock. Whatever the historical cvidence, these claims resonated with the Sinhala political consciousness of 1984. For example, the emphasis on thirteenth-century Jaffna as a puppet regime of a south Indian kingdom was strikingly congruent with the widely-shared motion that Tamil Nadu "harboured terrorists' today and, if
23

Page 26
unchallenged would control the separatic Tamil state of Eelam toillor W. At stake the was Illot al. Il CT e hi5 to Tical detail - the medival kingdom of Jaffna - but Sinhala hegemony in modern Sri Lanka now endangered by Tamil separatism.
The issue of whether or not in medieval times the north was under Sinhala political control spilled over into a related consideration, the question of original in habitants. Some contributors to the Divayiria controwersy became preoccupied with establishing the pre-Tamil exis. tence of Sinhala settlements in the north. In this regard, a couple of contributors utilized evidence of ancient Sinhala-Bud. dhist ruins in the north and east to prove that the Tamils Were mere latecomers. And despite Some attempts to demonstrate the fluidity of ethnic identities through history, anti-Tamil sentiments surfaced in the rhetoric of P. L. Gomis, "The orginal invaders of Lanka W cre Drawidians. Gonis insisted that the Dravidians could not have bice the original settlers of Lanka. because they constitute a small population today. This he claimed, proved that the Drawidials cal Ille to Lanka, als in WädeTs and never as permanent settlers:
It would be accurate to define the Dravidians of North (of Sri Lanka) as descendants of South Indian invaders who who came to plunder weak Sinhala kingdoms. They multiplied at random and were unable to sustain a continuous independent kingdom of their own.... This is their true in hicritance (fırırla hafiya), Which C{111tỉIlles Lö. guide even today's Tamil extremists as they murder and plunder from South India.
As is evident in this passage, the past was closely and constantly juxtaposed with the present. Mytho-historical details Werc = not important in and foT themselves but as antecedents or models for the understanding of present events. History was a mode of discourse which both facilitated and fra med the dis
CLISSiOı Caf ethimi general and Sinh; particular.
Some of the thuis deba Le Wer these Ticta-histori instance, Carlo FC that Whether a existed il the II mately irrelevant ethnic crisis. All tor, M. T. Samar temel the Elbsurdi historicall hai Tsi” ethnic crisis by search for "origir to pre-historicall Tamil participant K. Kandasami, he hiT15:1F 15 : CE July riots, also a seka, conceding need history to b And, impatient of history, a (Si: to T, Susil G. Sen pted to change
liSCOLITSE:
It is my belief Le OIn Wh ether tC Fjc1 Tamil C011ceTrled With rical issues. If claiming their that we (Sinhal this debate to tlo’t hawe sluc result we are grāvest proble and avoidi Ing With it. I wo Titellec Lulls ting the issue directly. It is lot entire tile absence of "d OT COT tell POray tics Was dille to thusiastill 0. In thilt Diray frra-reading gentsia oT to t editorial discretic WH5 the GHEE th aders preferred the prevailing (, tially through his Titler thНП diТЕ terms of the II would seen that the past constitul mode of discour; they believed th future) could be redefined.
(To be c

c - relatio15 ili ala identityin
participants in schsitive to cal issues. For inseka pondered amil kingdom orth Walls ultito the present Other Contribula Ilayaka, heighity of "splitting tið Sol We the extending the all inhabitants imits. The sole in this debate, 1wing identified sualty of the greed with Fomthat "we only uild the futute”. with the surfeit nhalai) contribuevitatina, attellthe Imode of
* that the clébathe Te was a his
kingdon is not clarifying histo"the Tamils Éire rights, it is clear a) a Te directing
prove that they h rights. As a overing up the in We face today coming to grips uld like to invite tC stop obfusca
and discu55 it
ly clear whether irect” discussion
nationalist poli
a lack Of en a part of the
Sinhala intellille exercise of in. If i Ildeel it at Diyaryfria Teto contemplate :conflict ita IngenLorical 5ituatici tly through the resent, then it
For the Silla ed a significant 5. Within which e present (and
negotiated and
ontinued)
LETTER DEMOCRACES
Sri Kantha demics that India and Japan are dell'ocracies (L.G. of 15/11). According to how democracy, more specifically liberal democracy, is understood today a country has to meet two criteria to be regarded as democratic. One is that the people should be able to choose their government from among competing political parties at frce and fair elections. The other is that the goverrillent must res. pect democratic freedoms, the most important of which is freedom of expression.
It is beyond dispute that India. and Japan meet those criteria, That is why they are invariably listed among the democratic coultrics in the proliferating literature on the subject, for instance i Robert Dahl's bookS UT il Fukuyama's The End of History. Certainly democracy as practised in one country will not exactly replicate what prevails in any other. Cultural determimants, such as the fa IInily iıı South Asia or hierarchy in India and Japan, can be expected to give a localized shape to democracy, and some countrics can seem to be less deliocritic than others. All the samc, a country is regarded as democratic provided the two Criteri: Inentioned ab)We äTc 11et,
We can, of course, posit an ideal form of de Tlocracy al III argue that not just 1 India and Japan but the Western countries as well are not properly democratic. Democracy in an idealized form has not becn realized anywhere, for which reason Robert Dahil prefers the term 'polyarchy" to “democracy". It remaills, however that as Churchill once observed democracy with all its imperfections is the worst form of government, except for all the others.
It is important that we Sri La Inkas shÖLuld Illot be cČIl fuissedi about democracy, That confusion lel Lo tie failure to recognize the dagers pesed by the brutal and stupid 1977 regime, which spat on democracy and transformed the paradise isle into a blood-delchic Tror, The lorror continues under our system of 'nonsensc democracy."
Columbը 7. Zeth Hussian

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