கவனிக்க: இந்த மின்னூலைத் தனிப்பட்ட வாசிப்பு, உசாத்துணைத் தேவைகளுக்கு மட்டுமே பயன்படுத்தலாம். வேறு பயன்பாடுகளுக்கு ஆசிரியரின்/பதிப்புரிமையாளரின் அனுமதி பெறப்பட வேண்டும்.
இது கூகிள் எழுத்துணரியால் தானியக்கமாக உருவாக்கப்பட்ட கோப்பு. இந்த மின்னூல் மெய்ப்புப் பார்க்கப்படவில்லை.
இந்தப் படைப்பின் நூலகப் பக்கத்தினை பார்வையிட பின்வரும் இணைப்புக்குச் செல்லவும்: Lanka Guardian 1993.05.15

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VO. 1 6 No. 2 May 15, 1993 Price RS.10
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Page 3
News Background
VOLENCE: TH
Mervyn de Silva
F: Countries in this violence-prone post-Cold War World hawe been rocked by two political assasinations on this scale in less than ten days. Yet, the transition has been Surprisingly orderly. Evidently, the Sri Lankan political-system can still absorb such shatteringblows. But this is no reason to underestimate the gravity of these threats to the island's peace and stability,
In highly charged situations of this kind What is relevant is not what the investigations establish or Who Will be indicted but What the public believes. And there's little doubt that while the Athulathmudalikilling has prompted many theories, almost all "politically" coloured, there is not much Speculation about the Premadasa assasination, All the information in the press, particularly the "deep penetration" of the
س |
GARDA
Wol. 16 No. 2 May 15, 1993
PrСЕ НЕ 1 U. U
Published fortnightly by Lanka Guardian Publishing Co. Ltd. No. 246, Union Place Colombo - 2.
Editor Mervyn de Silva Telephone: 447.584
Printed by Ananda Press 825, Sir Ratnajathi SaravanäTuttu Ma Watha, ColorTibo 13. Telephone: 435975
CONTENTS
News Background Foreign Reports Shan (2) 9 Poem 1Ս The J. R. Years (2) Islam 13
The Proud to the
Indo-Sri Larka Accord'873) 18
PreГ11atiasa housЕ least two years, : deed, showed the U of the LTTE, the Totivated separati:
Did the LTTE pla täckläsh? Or Madras-based HN ITQst Will-inford Csered the Correspondent, W. sit slå LTTE 5 få they can be expe possibly in Coloml a personal or politic to diwent attention, provoke an ethnic in Sri Lanka to attention. That as they will whip up c Whip up sympath project themselves
With "refugee-fa in Europe. I COITTIJIWealth Co for "refugees' in ge This is certainly cli U.S. as Sa W for leading personaliti Community, includi four der of the "Ta such body in the U
T. "Ecks" by the same p Correspondent Ja Lankan security f living in and arour WES O TESOT 0 been strengthenec
The President, M quite clear in his problem and the L
"It is Tore a terri etli: Ole. Ter wסח חסenוחםחheט to COThe to SOThe
us what they Wal fanatics and extre

E SOUTH ASIAN WAY
hold, which took at and the final suicidal nimistakable signature World's Thost highly st rebel organisation.
include an anti-Tail Tamil opinion, the DL is undoubledly the , Tamil sources argue, HNDL's Colob Jayanth, "whether or hind this assasiation, acted to strike again, Do, and it may mot be altarget. They say that the Tigers may try to Dr COTTula Outbreak attract interational been their pattern and or Itural clashes and for the Tamils and as Saviours.".
tigue", as it is termed US, and "White' untries, official Support eral is on the decline. Bar in the all-important myself. When talking to 2s of the "expat"Tatil ng Prof. Benedict, the mil Sangam", the first
S.
theory was reinforced aper the next day, yanth wrote "The Sri OľCES SSLJrd TT"|S |d Colomb that there panic ... Security has ...."
Mr. D.B. Wijetunge was | Ilirld On the Tartil T TE thrgest:
orist problem not an rorism is a global ..We expect the LTTE terms. They must tell nt. They are a group
mists".
President Wijetunge who was speaking to foreign Correspondents said "our main Objective is to Carry on with President Premadasa's program of Work for the next 18 Tonths. The search for a solution to the ethnic problem Will continue. He was particularly anxious to assure foreign investors that the climate for investment had in 10 Way changed.
It was left to Minister S. Thondaman, CWC boss to charge certain foreign Correspondents of "adding to the fears of the minorities by Warning of impending Wiolence agair 1st the TI.
What is abundantly clear now is that Sinhala political opinion represented certainly by the two major parties, UNP and SLFP, hawe Teached consensus themselves, whatever each may do in any given situation to maximise its own advantage by embarrassing the other..... and needless to add the opposition has the tactical advantage. It can talk; it need not Do anything.
THE QUET LEADER
Both as a person and a politician, Prime Minister D.B.Wijetunge offered a contrast in style, if President PreTadasa was irrepressibly combative, his Prime Minister Was accomndative. If Le President Was a Compulsive debater "D.B.", fellow parliamentarians called him Was a good listerer.
The happiest hint of quiter era was the extraordinary smoothness of the transition. Both Wester diplomats and the international observers low in the island to Watch the Provincial Council polls were deeply impressed by the smoothness of the transition. In large measure this was a direct COT15€{qu'CTCC of the Choice of a successor. As Prime Minister, Mr. Wijetunge had to carry the burder of Taraging parliamentary business, and this was a House quite different from that

Page 4
which President JR and Prime Minister Premadasa had to cope. Both had the huge advantage of a five-sixths majority, With the traditional riwal, the SLFP reduced to 8 seats. As both President JR and Prime Minister Premadasa were to observe, the SLFP made a fight largely because Opposition leader Anura Bandaranike had inherited sorte of the professional
skills of his father, S.W.R.D. Bardaranakie, partia Tlentarian Jäf excellerica.
The Parliamentary balance was hardly tilted in that fashion after 1989. The elections -- presidential Erld parliamentary - had been conducted in the midst of "War" - two violent reWolts, the secessionist LTTE-led in Surgency in the пOПh and East, and the JVP insurrection in the South. Both Were made more violent and fiercer by the presence of a large foreign army, the IPKF.
The UNP won both but the polls Were fiercely fought. The after-effects of these bitter battles were felt for a longtime most
of all irm the House.
President Premadasa picked the right man, a party stalwart and a political weteran, for tha post Prime Minister, D.B. Wijetunge, a man who could defuse tensions not inflame passions - the quite D.B. Wijetunge. What's more, he picked a very young man to assist him - Mr. Ranil Wickremasingha. The "balance" was perfect. The veteran "D.B." non-combative and conciliatory, and young Rani Wickrensingha, Royal and Law Colleges, not only skilled in debate but a lawyer with a sound knowledge of parliamentary procedure, Erskine May and all that. The balance was evident not in age and backgound but in the Contrasting constituencies - the upcountry Kandyan, and cosmopolitan Colorit O.
The wote would hawe been by secret ballot. With the opposition and Tost of all, the SLFP deeply (and publicly) torn by internal, ideological, and family disputes, the anti-UNP forces Would hawe beleri foolish to field a candidate against the non-controversial, Prif the Minister Wijetunge. The post-1989 Leader of the House has been rewarded for his services to party and Presidency.
2
THE SM
rifle Minister Ra
as OW SECO Totior. I his TW bor Tlade it clear that th im UNP policy. Si Wijetunge WES Prefiladasa's Fira, emphasis on econd Tic policy Wickremasinghe'ss marked by the busi agencies (IMF, Wor and the island's in WC
With provincial pc the Stress or C performance Was ( Though some tra Confusion can still for Ted P.E.P., the is in announcing a . that this new versio FrOIl faCes SOme How NOT to be C. DIFFERENTrorith to do so in politics rarely in the field of
| til CE5E of the is, JR and after) CO recognised. You Ca economic Strategy Premadasa did Wa: the rural areas. O adopted the Chines dramatically used E using foregin inWe capitalism to the rur
The ideologues "SCIS" — til by a different m Prehadasa's Case, populism, somethi Bārda arhaik-is Chairpersom Begur "pro-people". The politics on a tiny isl:
There See St.
South Asian blood can fully diagnoSE Cure. This may imaginative Writer
properacademics grasp of the dark
nationalistic, racial
AS Ryszard Kapu: corrent on the li Lankan Crisis, Willi: MAN SVILE, itis " portrait of the Asi Which we may livei rationality and high prevali."
Long before he

OOTH CHANGEOVER
arni| Wickremasingha ded the President's oadcast, the Minister ere will be continuity 1Ce Primo Minister
also President Ice Minister, the the government's
i - MT. Rai|| peech was doubtless less community, the ld Bank and doors) :S tOTS.
||5 Tould the COf TET, onomic policy and ioubtless deliberate. ces of ideological be seen in the lately SLFP-lgdaliance, it :lear eCoľ10ľTiC poliCy I Of Få 1970 UEL wious difficulties. apitalist. How to be e UNP. It is often easy even ideology, but economic policy.
post 1977 UNP (that htinuity is quite easily mot fool about With ... What President s to carry JR-ism into in a small scale, he estrategy, now more y the Vietnamese - Stilet to introduce al, semi-rural areas.
still describe as Sa Tle aims achiawad Blod. I Pro5idefll it was all a part of his ng of the old 1956
WFlät SAARC 1. Klaleda Fia Caled rest is South Asian and-Scale.
be some fewer in the that no social scientist mor any statesman explain why the rather than the dry, EITs to have a Surer forces unleashed by and religious conflict. scinski observes in a atest book on the Sri am McGowan's ONLY a deep and harrowing an drama... the World m if the commonsense, human Walues do not
Wentured into national
politics, Premadasa seems to have found an anchorin Buddhist precept. To the wery end, nonetheless, he retained something of the natural aggression of the "outsider". Caste made hit SO.
A distinguished prime Tinister of India and his political party regarded caste important enough an issue to be given high priority in the electoral agenda. That could not happen in Sri Lanka, the dharmradeepa, the island of the doctrine, the Buddha's rational, humane teachings "banished" from its birthplace. The Sri Lankans are the "chosen people", the carefully selected custodians of the dhamma preached by the Enlightened one. Man is judged by his actions.
And yet caste exists, a subterranean force, often assuming subtler for ITIs and deceptive guises. But the myth of its non-existence is sustained by SOThe quaint conversational habits. Alphabetics games, for instance. "Is he actually G?" "I really don't know but his mother is definitely K?" "G" is an easily decipherable "code" for golgaria. Meaning farmer, the largest of course in a primarily agricultural Society. "K" stands for "karawa"the fishing Community. Mr. Preliadasa was neither,
Since democracy is a numbers ganTe, the caste composition of any constituency was logically an important Consideration in the choice of a party candidate in the island's highly competitive and lively electoral politics.
With the obvious exception of Mrs Sirima Bandaranaike, a product of St Bridgets Convent, Colombo, an elite Catholic school, the prime ministers including Mr. J. R. Jayawardeme, later president, came from two schools - Royal College and St. Thomas's College, Colobo. Not Mr. Prelladasa. Did PrerTadasa study at St. Joseph's College Color Tibo, the male Counterpart of St. Bridgets. Much investigative journalism, supported by some semi-academic research, was deployed to prove that Premadasa Was a fraud who had newer known the portals of St. Joseph's College, His funeral procession however Was proudly led by the sixth formers of St. Josephs. Though trivia these biographical details are useful in uFiderstanding what seemed his natural aggression, and often abrasive personality.
Caste has been a stronger formative force of modem Sri Lankan politics than class. It is certainly one explanation for the dismal failure of the Marxist left. Before

Page 5
independence (1948) and certainly in the first two (2) post-independence decades the Marxist "left" not only controlled the trade Unions but dormilated the intellectual debate and contributed Tost to the national political agenda. But history, With some help from the farsighted British, chose to cheat the Marxists.
Once the British withdrawal from India had become inevitable, there was no further need for Ceylon, except for Trincorralee and some defence facilities. It Was characteristic of the British to Take their necessary withdrawal look like a reward for the good behaviour of the "model Colony". The nationalist movement became apost-independence rather pre-independence phenomenon. And as usual, a subjective factor reinforced the objective need. When Mr. West Ridgway Dias חסוחס|50 Bandaranalike, Prime Minister (D.S. Senanayake's loyal deputy) realised that "the old man" had his son, Dudley, in mind as a SUCCESSOr, Bandaranaike quite the UNP and formed his own Sri Lanka Freedom Party. SWRD thought he did not do too Well at the 1952 polis but he did belter tham the established Marxist left. Just four years later he trounced the mighty UNP. He prodeced a heady policy Cocktail front an anti-colonial, SinhalaBuddhist nationalist, a Welfarist radicalism, and a dynarTic nonalignent. From the Marxists, he borrowed many ideas, nationalisation most of all. But by Taking Sinhala the only official language, he unwittingly planted a time-bomb with a surprisingly short fuse.
The young Premadasa, an early a dTiricer of Bandaranalike and of the laboUir leader, A.E. Goonesingha, was smart enough to learn from both and borrow ideas selectively. Born in suburban ColorTibo, he grew up in a district which had Tiany communities - Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims, Dutch Barghers, Malayalces, Buddhists, Christials and Hindus. The environment as well as the electoral de Thands of such a mixed constituency fashioned his thinking. Besides he was a "minority" constituent tՃՃ, Caste-wise. LOng before "multi-ethnic" and pluralist and the nature of the Sri Lankan "polity" had entered the Sri Lankan discourse, he knew what it meant. Hence the praise that Was showered on hir That his funeral.
The two anti-systemic movements which ravaged the island, threatening both the State and the country's territorial integrity have underlined the role of caste and its mobilising power. The leadership of the JWP (peoples liberation front) which took to arms in 1971 (seventy one) was non-gogara. With a brave but naive,
rCorriantic adwenturis banner of Chile Gue Was a gut-hate of the ruling elite. And this the rughtwing UNP. a coalition led by M. the two main M (Trotskyist) LSSP ar
The WP FigOrgic StL Jodied ät LLJTUTE Struggle" but it was . identified the enemy golgama elite. In Prabhakaran Was til same ideological cc Was Tot the Sir English-educated v federal party. The Was the English-E Jassilä,
Wheeft LHC JWP TE eighties (80's) it anti-Indian, The pr after the Irdia-Sri Li a Jayawardene ini Minister Prernadasa JVP re-emerge a patriots, branded Pol Marxist parties,
JWP-LTTE
The JWP reign of by a ferocious COL about Created Cordi polls. The astute J: repeat lot hesit PC Tadasa. It left Minister, Lalith Athl Lands Minister G. utterly dejected. representatives of professional class determind UNP polic knew What he was and Sinhala-Bu (Premadasa criticise rate of national Sc Could not repe Presiddasa. He Bardara raike, CruS found Mr. W.P. Sing dernand for the phas troops. The UNF parliamentary polls.
Instinctively, Mr. P hAWÉ CÓscluded til a TamilJVP. His que a mutual hostility to brother"India) was fic (and now tragic) mis mind. SAARC gawe he Could an area Lankan where ha Strengths — b project-oriented harc Mr. Narasingha Rao

ST, they raised the !rWara but beath it 2 gogara dominated elite included not just The government was "s Bandaranalike ad larxist parties, the ld the pro-Soviet CP.
ians (Wije weera had a) spoke of "class bvious that they had as the Westernised
that Sese Mr. he other side of the in. His foe, initially, lala state but the ellala (upper caste) first important wictim educated Mayor of
-emerged in the late is battle-Cry Was 3Sence of the |PKF anka Peace Accord, tiatiiwd wicc Prim
Opposed, found the S. Sinhala-Buddhist |Pottists by the major
Error Was answered Inter-terror that just tions for presidential aya Wardee did not ate to Olimate
National Security lathrmudali and the
amini Dissanayake They were true the upper-class
which had always cy. But Jaya Wardee long. Cm anti-ellitism dhist patriotis I d the 'a CCOrd' in thg Vereignty) the JWP Et Outra rhåJuewe
defeated Mrs. hed the JWP and |h1 TE Sponsiwe to his ed pull-Out of Indian P also WOn thë
'rem'hadasā, See ThS tO : the LT TE was only Si-alliance based om the IPKF (and "big Unded on a grievous reading of the LTTE him an arena where larger than the Sri Could display his OUrdess energy, d Work, SAARC and opened the Way to
---
qualitative improvement in Indo-Sri Larıkarı TelationS.
THT disappointed duO, Mr.
Athulathrudali and Mr. Dissanayake masterminded an impeachment plot which prowed abortive. President Premadasa reminded this writer of the Sinhala Cook who flavours the rice with a leaf called rampay. Once it is ready, the rampay is thrown away. He was in no mood, he assured me, to play the part of tՒit På 703 y. Bated, MESSTš Athulathmudali and Dissanayake formed the DUNF, a third force. With the assasination of Athulathmudali (the LTTE is also a suspect) the DUNF's fortunes are poorer, the only winner is the LTTE.
Mr. Amura Bandaranalike has drawn the right lesson. If the culture of the gun is not eraldicated, the very existence of democracy and the nation are at state. So says Vaclav Havel in his statement calling for a "World wide struggle against terrorism in all its forms". But it is the SAARC Chairperson conveyed the correct Tessage, "Let us join hands in Corribatting mindless Violence and SenSeleSS terrorisIT". On the të rrain of ethnic and other conflicts, terrorism grows easily but its success has much to do. With inter-state tensions, with each regime advancing its own interests, often using terrorism or terrorists as instruments of policy. The murder of Rajiv Gandhi and Premadasa demonstrates that it is tha third force, Weakest in the Conventional sense, that gains the most,
Sri Lanka lidentified As An Emerging Market
In a major study of Asia's investrilent prospects Sri Lanka has been identified as an emerging Market, China, Hong Kong and South Korça are wiewed as tha most iTportant markets in Asia for long-term investment, according to a survey by Euro-T10rey". Wietnam Was na Ted as newly-emerging Tarket with the most exciting long-terri potential.
Within Asia, the survey revealed that investors allocated 84,5 per cent in the developed markets Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand - and 15,43 per Centin ernerging markets, Such as Bangladesh, Chira, Indonesia, Taiwan, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, South Korea, and the Fhilippines, Some 0.07 per cent was placed in "dormant or incubating" markets which include Brunei, Macau, Papua New Guinea, Wietnam, Bhutan, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar.
" Asiar IrTWE:strTrent Survey 1993, EurorTMoney Publications, Nestor Horse, Playhousa Yard, LOrdo ECAWEEX:Eg),

Page 6
FOREIGN REPORTS
Murders Set to Bring
Stefan Wagsty and Mervyn de Silva
his last speech before being
killed by a terrorist bombat the Weekend, the late President Ranasinghe Premadasa of Sri Lanka issued a grim challenge to his political enemies: "Assassinate me by whatever means but please do not assassinate my character".
Such is the Wiolent rature of Sri Lankar politics that the president's fatal wish was fulfilled during a May Day parade last Saturday. A tough streetfighting populist, who preferred village life to mixing with the elite of Colombo, Mr Premadasa died, as he had lived, milling With a crowd.
The president was assassinated by a suicide bomber just over a Week after one of his Train political riwalls, Mr Lalith Ath Lulathmudali, was shot dead at an election Tally.
The prime suspects for both killings are the Tamil Tigers, the common name for the LTTE separatist movement which has been fighting for more than a decade for a hortle and in norther Sri Lanka for the minority Tamil community, in defiance of thB ITlajority Singhalese,
Although the LTTE has denied responsibility, police say the evidence seems to point to the Tigers.
Whether or not the Tigers Were resposible, the assassinations raise Serious questions about Sri Lanka's future political stability, Ifwiolence spreads it Could Lindeline the hard-Won economic success that has made Sri Lanka's living standards the envy of other developing nations,
A Crucial test will be how Sri Lankans behave on Thursday at the president's public funeral in Colombo and at provincial assembly elections due later this Tonth.
As Mr Gamini Dissanayake, a close associate of Mr Athulathmudali, says: "The assassination of both the president and Mr Ath Lulatih mudali add up to a mational Crisis. It sends entirely the Wrong
signals to the WOric
Much Will deper politicians react. M authoritaria rule leaves a vacuut a UNP party.
He came from a Was regarded as a Call elite, SUC1 35 former president of t UNP CLut Prema dasa's rapp rural masses.
Mr Premadasa 1988 at a low point just after the sigr agreement with In 60,000 troops into the Tamil Tigers showed thair resen a mediationalisti dasa Was judged to only man to win Singhalese,
He largely SUCCE curing departure though also withs measures against gawe strong ir Tipe economic reform p
He pushed ahea import tariffs and O' Tarkets in a bold E to domestic compe StПЕП.
The economy annual rate of 5 pe to 1992-acredita the cost of the W Foreign investmen 50m (£ 32.4m) a O arČud S200Tl
However, the p rewolt in the UNP, i, W10 lb da break:

Passions to the Boil
".
d Carl HOW Sri Larka's Ir Frema dasa Was a fi r whose departure ut the top of the ruling
poor background and In outsider by the politiMr Ath Lulath Ludali, a trg (Oxford UiO. BLI afford to do without Mr {t W| Flè S|A|''S
became president in in the UNP's fortures, ing of an unpopular dia which let India put Sri Lanka to try to tarTne . Many Singhalese tment by supporting an nsurgency. Mr. Premay UNP chiefs to be the back the disaffected
3eded, primarily by seof the Indian troops, Ome tough repressive he insurgents. He also lus to a long-running rogramme.
dWith privatisation, cut Werhauled the financial ffort to open Sri Lanka tition and foreign inve
grew at an average rcent in the three years ble achievement giwen 'ar against the LTTE. it soared from under S year in the mid-1980s last year.
rice of success Was a d by Mr Athulath mudaa Way group which tried
to impeach Mr Premadasa. They failed last year, resigned their Seats to Create a new party, the DUNF, which claimed to be the true inheritor of UNP ideals,
The split left the way open for a revival in the fortunes of an alliance of Socialist opposition parties headed by the SLFP, led by the veteran former prime minister, Mrs Sirima Bandaranaike, matriarch of a leading political family whose own husbartid had als C) beri Turdard Wher prime minister (in 1959).
A month ago, Mrs Bandaranaike Was poised to do well in the forthcoming proviricial election. Then, Mr Athulatriudali's death created sympathy for the DUNF, Now, the ruling UNP hopes for a boost.
In Colombo, white flags, signs of Inourring for the president, fluttered around many buildings; but earlier, fire-crackers had been set of in some districts to celebrate his departure,
A senior government official said the UNP had rallied around Mr DB Wijetunga, the acting president. He said Mr Wijetunga Would now have little difficulty securing a parliamentary majority allowing him to stay in office until the end of Mr PremadaSa'5 terIT in DeCerTiber, 1994.
Whether or not they carried out the killings, the LTTE could profit from the Confusion. A caretaker governmentisunlikely to give as strong leadership to the fight against the Tamils as Mr Premadasa. Also, Mr Prenada sa advocated a two-prong policy of armed action coupled with tentative efforts at political dialogue.
The senior official said the new government may now face a backlash from Singhalese demanding revenge against the Tigers. Such demand could play into the LTTE's hands by reviving international Concern about the Tamils-not least from
dia.
Fra FLITTE

Page 7
Death Strikes a S
Jefferson Penberthy
the Conflict ower Sri Lanka. The
suicide bomber has become a grisly artisan of terror. Knowing that, President Ramasinghe Premadasa had many bodyguards, as always, at a May Day march last Saturday in a northern neighborhood of Colombo, the capital. But they were of no availin preventing a human bomb from penetrating the Security Cordon. A huge explosion followed. So chaotic and grim was the scene, with parts of bodies blown allower the Armours Street Junction, that fios a tir The sit [.isIE Was sUrE. WHI ElhlEis FTEmādasa, B8, was among them. First ra= ports had him whisked away to home or to a hospital. Then, hours later, the dark truth: "The President's entire staff are dead. He is no Tora", announced a shaken presidential aide, Evans Cooray, Whose own life had been sawed when he moved away from the noisy procession to take a mobile telephone call. The impact of the blast was so large that it had taken TThüre tham TWC h[]Urs fCT the PresidẹIll's personal physician to identify what was left of Premadasa's body.
At least 17 people were killed, and scores were injured. "The place Was a shables. There were arms, limbs and human flesh all over the place", said Sydney Chandrasema, a television producer at the scene. Exactly what had happened was not immediately clear. Some
eyewitnesses said carrying a portable
Tiada sa and his st prepared to greet the sted that a Totorcy strapped to his b0 g0 LP,
Colombopolice W. however: the killing Liberation Tigers ( Tarni guerrilla arm sawage 10 yearSep; eastern provinces modus operandi W L.T.T.E. Suicide S. Black Tigers. In 19 Suicida Hornber, D Indian Prime Minist election rally near M he could again inw La karl Wärt. Of the suicide bombingshi Аппопg many: in 14 cked the country's Immand headquarte 20, and last Nower bob killed the Sr Adriiral Clarence F. tary headquarters. quicky denied in Wol killing.
"The governmen
A HOe in Sri La
eak countries need strong leaders to hold them together, and strong leaders leave large holes when they leave their jobs. So Sri Lanka, after the assassination of its president, Ranasinghe PreTadasa, on May 1st, is a Weak Country with a big empty space in the middle of its government. This is a dangerous position to be iri.
For a city that has seen plenty of violence, Colombo was curiously calm after Mr Premadasa's death. That may be becauSe people hawe got so used to killings: after the murder of Lalith Athulathmudali, One of Sri Lanka's two main opposition leaders, on April 23rd, the assassination of the president who some suspected of involvement in his rival's killing was no great Surprise. And there is, as yet, nobody clearly to blame. The police have indicated that they believe the Tamil Tigers were responsible for the bomb, but people
are sceptical: Mr
closest thing the Ti friend. Still, Tamil : closed. Memories thOLI Sards of TarTi Colombo, are lively
Mr PrE3Tlädä Säa"5 hawe left Sri Larika '' and the Worst that and West of the is Liberal economic pi gulation of trade, f priwatisation, hawe zone of SITall ind king, shoes, toys - a poor Country rhe years, tourism, th| ggest earner, has r
The cast and E the Tamils live, as Wiolence has blight years ago the north

Steely
a mar con a bicycle radio rode up to Preaff as the President a Tarch. Others repoclist with explosives dy crashed into the
'ere sure of one thing,
Was the Work of the of Tamil Eelam, the y that has fought a aratist War in the north
of the Island. The "as that of a faratic Juad known as the 91 - Woma L.T.T.E. Dhanu, killed for Ter er Rajiv Gandhi at an la dras, Out Of fear that "owe India in the Sri
teardrop island itself, ave become frequent. 391 a car tort Wre
joint operations Cors in Colombo, killing Tiber, a Totorcyclist's i Lankan nawy Chief, ernando, near the miliAs usual, the L.T.T.E. werTent in läst Week's
t blames the L.T.T.E.
nka
PreITadaSa Was the gers had to a political shops in SOme areas if the 1983 riots, when ils Werg butch CT0 dir]
five years in office With a taste of the best it Cal do. The South land hawe prospered. olicies, including dereinancial Services, and created a flourishing Istrias – ClothBS-Tä- of just the sort that leds. In the past two a country's single bi
WWed. 3 north, where most of Ea a different country. led the economy. Five her peninsula, Jaffna,
President
for everything", said Paris-based spokeSTilar La WrECB Thilakar. "But ProTādaSa hadenemies ewerywhere".
Hours after Premadasa's death, Dingiri Banda Wijetunga, 71, the ruling United National Party's unassuming Prime Minister, Was Swor in as acting President, and a 16-hour curfew was clamped on the entire island to curb further mayhem. Pubolic reactionSto Premadasa's death WETE mixed. Some Celebrated the ni WS by setting off fireworks in parts of Colombo and particularly in the South of the Country, where government death squads in 1989 had mercilessly put down a rebellion led by the People Liberation Front (J.W.P.), a Sinhalese extremist group opposed to India's im wolwa Tet in tha lation's affäir S. The President's killing came just eight days after the assassination of his former party rival and opponent, Lalith Athulathmudali, a popular Oxford-educated lawyer who since 1991 had led the breakaway Democratic United National Front, Athulathmudali, 57, was shot five titles in the stomach and chest by an unidentified gunman at a local election rally at Kirulapona on the easternoutskirts of Colombo. While the government blamed his death also on the Tigers, D.U.N.F. officials had accused Premadasa of involvement, leading to political unrest in the capital.
used to be a Cosy place, with neatly kept houses and Well-Taintained Streets. NOW the Tamil Tigers run a totalitarian state, blockaded by troops, without electricity, Lurining Water or se Wers, and often short of food.
In the past decade of War, terrorists and soldiers hawe killed tems of thOLI Sands of civilians. About 500,000 Sri Lankans, out of a population of 17m, are reckoned to hawe left the Country because of the War. But over time Mr Premadasa's approach to the problem changed: foreign pressure and the failure of the military solution to terrorism combined to persuade him that the army needed to be discouraged from indiscriminate killing. According to hur Tan-rights Workers, the number of people disappearing has dropped from 6,000 a year in 1989 to around 60 last year.
Mr Premadasa tried to close the gap between Sirhalese and Tails. He rew
5

Page 8
rsed some of the laws on language and education which discriminated against Tamils, and took to visiting some of the Tamils' Hindu temples, even attempting the odd public statement in Tamil. He set up a select committee with the job of trying to devise a political settlement to the problem of Tamil separatism; but it got nowhere.
The government has been quick to say that it plans to continue the economic policies that have pleased businessmen and kept the country relatively well-off. But Mr Premadasa's approach to the Tamil question is less likely to be followed. His belief that compromise Tight be possible and necessary had few followers in the ruling United National Party (UNP).
It did not bother Mr Pretadasa that he Was disliked by most politicians, including many in his own party. He paid little attention to his cabinet, taking most decisions by himself and keeping ministers in ignorance. Most colleagues of any stature were forced out of the party or left of their Own accord-like Lalith Athulatih mudali, once a UNP national-security minister, who tried to impeach Mr Premadasa.
As a result, the UNP, which has run Sri Lankā since 1977, is Weak and demoralised, Mr Premadasa had groomed no successor. Dingiri Banda Wijetunga, who has been appointed acting president and Will probably get the job premanently because the UNP has enough votes in paria Tent to Secure it for him, is an unassuming 71-year-Old compromise candidate. (it may, however, be worth remembering that indira Gandhi became prime minister of India as a compromise candidate who others thought they could manipulate.)
Sri Lankams, Who hawe lost two of their three main political leaders Within eight days, will be asked their opinion of the remaining politicians at provincial elections on May 17th. A presidential election is due next year, and parliamentary ones in 1995.
The persistence of elections is perhaps odd. Democracy might be expected to collapse under Such pressure. But Sri Lanka, which held its first general election with universal suffrage under the British in 1931, has stuck doggedly to the system.
Perhaps it is because Sri Lanka's politicians hawe, in the past, been people of some stature, and the army used to be kept small. But the army has more than quadrupled in size during the War, from 26,000 in 1982 to 112,000 in 1992, and at least Within the UNP, the stature of the politicians has shrunk. Probably some politician or party will grow to fill the hole that Mr Premadasa has left. But if the chaos continues, the attitude of the army will be worth Watching.
Scoorst
Did the
t took a full Government and that President Prer Since nome of his SE to be Seen in the Wi that shook Central Saturday.
The first premise had been eSCOrted O The the Prire Mimi nga, and other Minis segments of the Ma Whenthe police c dasa anywhere, the the the Industries spokesman, Mr. Rar Who Was at the hea which was continue after the assassinati
Mr. Wicker a masin niwehicle nearby to Office to mOmitor th contact with all the President's residenc cause Premadasa anywhere. Then Can All the President aides along with Pr wiped out in the ex suicide bomber riding dent's body was no fied. Only at the morg his nose, the Watch E the lurking suspicion Mr. Wickerarila Sir and wisely too. Orde Commandosto isola and escort him safel Secretariat.
Mrs. Herma Prem Kandy and a helicc bring herback at onc news to her. Curfew ghout Sri Lanka and in the acting Preside tution.
There were striking the assassinations Minister, Rajiv Gand President, Premada: out with precision by had the limited effe immediate circle aro were unfortunately s be with the people t By a strange coin Premadasa's last pL ction rally, Was in Sul

Tigers Stalk Him?
half hour for the he police to realise adasa Was no more, curity personnel Was inity of the explosion Colomb) that black
Was that Premadasa ut safelly from the site. ster, Mr. D.B. Wijetuters Were i different
Day procession. }Luld not tra Ce ProTmaimmediately alerted Minister and Cabinet il Wicker amasinghe, d of the procession, for quite some time Ο Π. ghetooka Rupavahihe Defence Ministry a situation. A quick hospitals and the e made it Worse, behad not reached he the realisation. ial bodyguards and emadasa had been plosion set off by a abicycle. The Presit immediately identiue could they identify Indring - to confirm
ghe thought quickly rs Wert Out to Sesld e the Prime Minister y to the Presidential
ada sa Was away in pter was rushed to e and then break the was clamped throuMr. WijetungaSworm nt, as per the Consti
similarities between of the for her Prime i, and the Sri Lankan a. Both Were carried “h Lu Tarn bombs" and it of wiping out the Ind the targets, who tting ducks trying to ey lOWed.
dence, Rana singhe plic meeting, anelleurban Kirillapone on
Friday night. Exactly a Week before, the Opposition leader, Lalith Athulathmudali, was gunned down by another assassin in the same suburb. This again reminds one of both Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi's farewell visits to Orissa before meeting with their end.
Like Indira Gandhi's emotional speech pledging to shed her last drop of blood for the country, Premadasa told the Kirillapone audience: "Assassinate me by whaitewer means, but please do not assassinate my character—an asset | hawa treasured from childhood."
Premadasa Was not believed to be on the LTTE hitlist, only because the Tigers knew he was their only hope to return to the negotiating table anytime they want. But even after Lalith's assassination, he Would not take the security precautions his officers prescribed. He had to be in the middle of the road, with his people and that too in his OWI Central Colombo coInstituency — where he imagined he was Safe.
Little did he realise that the assassin, believed to be a Tamil Tiger, though not confirmed, moved wery freely for two years in and around his 'Sucharita' residence, cultivating the contacts and waiting for the right time to strike. He had worked his way to contacts within the President's residence to gain confidence and information. And struck a deadly blow on May Day, strapped with explosives on his Waist.
SoTewhere down the line, his unwritten understanding with the Tigers had snapped. In a characteristic manner the decision to get rid of him had been taken Well Over two years ago. The assassin had been selected, acclimatised and allowed to integrate in the atmosphere and then the date must have been set. The police Confess that the slain President could have been an easy target any time, any day.
Though the investigations are proceeding cautionsly, sources say the only motiwe could have been to destabilise the country and the Government, eliminate many political leaders, create anarchy and then bargain.
It requires a measured and mature response on both the security and the political fronts, without confusing the terrorist menace with the ethnic issue and restore order and peace in Sri Lanka.
W.J.

Page 9
A Smooth Transit
W. Jayanth
Aig tall leader, With an authoritarian grip over Sri Lanka, gaining in regional and international stature, has been eliminated. The President, Fanasinghe Premadasa, fresh from basking in SAARC's glory and waiting to test his popularity through the Provincial Council elections, was assassinated by a suicide bomber while organising his United National Party's (UNP) May Day rally.
TWO quick assassinations in a Tatter of eight days have robbed Sri Lanka of two towering leaders – Prema dasa and his archriwal, Lalith Athulathmudali.
The Sri Lankan police appear to be in no hurry to identify the assassin, though they are convinced it is yet another deadly blow inflicted by the Liberation Tigers of Tari | E | T.
Mrs. He na Premadasa, Widow of the a SSassinated President, vowed at his funeral to serve the people and continue to Workfor his ideals and policies. "My future and that of my children lies in your hands," she told the international audience and the Tourners. Though she may not jump into the fray right now, Mrs. Premadasa has made it clear to the UNP that she has to be accommodated in the future scheme of things. To Premadasa's supporters, this Tust be a shot in the art T.
Transition, a peaceful funeral and preVention of a possible backlash were the priorities of the interim administration under the acting President, Mr.D.B.Wijetunga. Every effort was made to achieve these objectives.
Much to the disappointment of the Cppostition parties, the ruling UNP managed the transition wery Smoothlyand effectively, rallying behind the non-controversial, soft-spoken but grossly underestimated the then Prime Minister, Mr. Wijetuոցa.
The Country's Parliament subsequently elected Mr. Wijetunga as the President, in which office he will continue ti|| January 2, 1995, when the ter TT of Premada sa Was
0 end.
By making the election through Parliament, as provided for in the Constitution, Unanimous, the Opposition parties too have displayed a spirit of understanding and cooperation at this hour of crisis.
Such a response at this juncture sets the tone for a healthy and constructive dialogue between the Government and
the Opposition - lacking and Consid: the dynamic, but st leadership of Mr. P.
There is a sudde fresh air and roor CONSENSLIS COf the of the Opposition le daranaike, set the tO la Lunch a cons Lu. approach to end th i Sri Lanka. This ti reāli 5āti tā should be ended : island abroad resur
A similar offer car tiC United NlatiOH1aI Mr. Gamini Dissäriä Minister himself, t Wanted the initiatis erstwhile colleague
The President, M t0 reach Outhis har it may take some tir nciliation to take
WEET LE UMP | President, Mr. J.R
Sid bāk fr provide a behind EOLICH.
Soon after assu dent, Mr. Wijetung: stries Minister and Mr. Ramil Wickera T1 Minister. Mr. Wijetu STE ET of 22 the sama portfolios mādasa.
From an omnipr wielded all the pow stration is expected real sense and Tia sters Tore indepe functional. PETlad: such as Defence, P. Education and a f Wijetunga, as the F charge of Finance just two. Indications Ce Minister Willa a fresh thrust om Fc Defence and Sect Significace in anal tWO Successive assi
There is also this the continuity in polic of Premadasa, at II months. To keep

ion in the San C
something that was red impossible under ong and controversial eřThadasa.
1 feeling of openness, 1 for compromise or jolitical horizon. One aders, Mr Anura Bapace for a new effort tative and concerted a problem of violence comes in the Wake of
the cult of violence ind the image of the ected.
he from the DemocraFront (DUNF) leader, yake — a former UNP Jrned Tabel. But he fe to Comie from his S.
ir. Wijetunga, is ready ld in cooperation. But me for a political recoolace, especially bethe DUNF. The former 1. Jaye Wardene, has 'ew Delhi, and could |-the-scenes healling
ming office as Presiappointed the InduCabinet spokesman, asinghe, as the Prime mga has retained the Cabinet Ministers with they held under Pre
"esent President Who "ers, the ne Wadminito decentralise in the ke the Cabinèt Miniindent, effective and sa held keyportfolios olicy Planning, Higher aw others, while Mr. 'rite Minister, Was in and Labour to name i are that a leWi FiraWe to be named with reign Affairs as Well, Jrity assume special mosphere witiated by a SSirationS.
eagerness to signal cles and programmes east for the next 18 the economy going,
attract and retain the foreign investments that were coming in, the new Government will have to launch arenewed political and foreign affairs thrust to reassure the nation and the international community that Sri Lanka has the resilience and strength to overcore this setback and continue with its policies,
When the pressure from foreign donors and financial institutions Was increasing On Prema dasa himself to find a solution to the ethnic issue and end the War in the North-East, Mr. Wijetunga will be under greater stress from all these sources.
Without losing time of Worrying about the political consequences, the Wijetunga Government will have to sit together with the Opposition parties and the minority groups to hammer out an early and acceptable political solution to the ethnic tuSSle, Whether or not the LTTE enters the negotiations process, a political package to meet the legitimate aspirations of the Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese in the North-East, Will| hawe to be ewolwed and impler ented within a title span.
But the first and daunting hurdle ahead seeins to be the Provincial Council elections, scheduled for May 17. Strangely, all parties Want to go ahead with this poll, because it could provide the real support base of each of thern in the present political scenario where two major contenders for the mantle have been eliminated.
Once the results of these polls come in and the relative strengths and weakneSSes of the political parties are clear, there Could be a pragmatic approach to reconciliation. This naturally entails the strengthening of the democratic process and the institutions, including Parliament,
Whatever the policies of the Government in power, for which they receive a mandate, the need of the hour and the demand from all parties seems to be for a more democratic, less totalitarian system of governance.
The first few nonths could be Crucial for the new Government and Mr. Wijetunga and his Cabinet will have to impress the people and the World about their ability to carry on. Their performance will decide Whether they can earl a freshmandate from the people next year or lose out to the Opposition. Their future is in their hands and the hope lies in the fact that they realise this.
TOL

Page 10
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ONSHIP

Page 11
Shan, the Long Mar
Dayan Jayatilleke
B 部 revolutionary movement required above all, a Correct revolutionary theory. That in itself is no guarantee of success, but is a prerequisite. And Shan's dogmatic adherence to the strategy of the New Democratic Revolutionin a social formation in which the national bourgeoisie had become hegemonic as forback as 1956, deprived his party of this Tost wital of all precorditions for SLECCEssfullpraxis, Beirigan eclecticanda semiplagiarist (so quintessentially Sinhala) Wijeweera intuitively grasped the nature of the Lanka Social formation and the state of the Lankan Revolution Tore correctly than Shan. Linking that understanding to racorous social resentment and Sinhala ethnic prejudice, he spawned in a paroxySm af paranoidrage, at novement that pushed Shan's far behind,
Përhaps it was urëven developTierit which made it impossible to keep the Various sectors of Shan's party together. Ferhaps it was the 60's. Or because ha was middle class, middle aged and English speaking, While his followers Were lot." Or because he was blessed With too happy a family life. Or perhaps it's the destiny of every rational, radical but uncreative Marxist party, such as Shan's Was, to be but the midwife of every dependent Society pregnant With its malevolent, marginalised offspring. Or may be he failed because Fine WaS a Tamilin a racist Society.
Shan made two attempts at rectification. At the Party Congressin'68 and after his release from Sirira Bardaranaike's jail in 1972. The first was organizational and the second political. But they were in the Wrong Sequence and too late. The publication of his essays penned in prison provided a renewal of recognition and a degree of intellectual influence. That his Writings, er Tiinantly Tadable bout rather basic, constituted a literary labour unsupassed by the Lankan Left leadership, is a sharpindictment of that leadership itself.
Shan's political destiny was part of the involution and implosion of Maoism. Brigfly rehabilitated when The Four were in āscendancy in 1976, the third and permament coming of Deng Hsiao Peng saw the final parting of the Ways between Shan and the Chinese Communists. Whe Enwer Hoxha who had fired the first shot against Krushchevism - even before the Chinese party - correctly concluded
(though mot With Out E rianism and dogmati just Deng Was in el and faithful as Wi. against Tirana. Frost no repository in a ruli It J LI I id dl dt) ) del ir the Revolutionary ment (RIM) the mos Which Wä5 ils relatic Wian Sendero Luri LInsurporising that Sh We the disgraceful Exhibitionist articSir GLITiari,
Locally, the spora ad that T1 Ost SiTICE Old TE WOLuti TariBS, (K.W. de Silva), to r rists, failed, TIL I Iachinations of r boLIt also beca US th rned Oms Were Ill templation of politice had Lankar Origins the beginning Was t feʼmir"hisim, in Sri Lar always the political.
Sha TI Was Tore I fisicist thais, theoreti popularize the funda: Leninis Tithan d'ici a leader. One of his g| Luncompromising ar logical Struggle aga ľmism, socier reWi (which he had Liri contempt for andw TIETOİTS ES "CO Scist"). No Trotskyis Omeland of Third W. got the better of hi Came even close. F As for the "Cotta FR scornfully termed th IEVEr dared L de the Selwes with The the publicity he reç rgeois Like HaLISE! Tutterings about his la Wadii' liri C, wa: Ah t'ha's "ideologica anti-revisionistribe
Ideologically, Shi liked fundarter day guards the pass Che, Whose purity inspira at the Sai TE

Ch and Eelam
| largestreak of sectasm) that Mao and not "ror, San Consistet år, took up Cudgals the is faith had ing Communist Party. the grouping called nternationalist MOVeit serious thing about lnship with the Peruinoso. It's perhaps Iam did not lang survicapture and puerile custody, of AbirTael
dicattemptsby Shan are and exemplary of COITrade Wimalapala Eunify "Ma Txists-Lenionly because of the arlrikirl MachiäVEalis eprodigals who retuIt immune to the Old alparricide. If the Bible it Would have read "in he Ego". Long before lika the perSCfinal Was
JEI dagogue and poleClas. Ho di TT Jrg til Tertals of Marxissiliny OthêT Lānkar Left reatest merits Washis Id unremmitting ideoinst Trotskyism, refoSiÖris:rT1 är1 tFg JWP dying suspicion and lich categorised in his Tā ir Ēr-i- t, ir tfiss, tfi: traditiorill World Trotskyism, gwer m in a polemic - or He flattered ther all. Oad Clique', as Sha e pro-Soviet CP, they bate him, contenting aningful asides about :Bi"Wed frOIT1 the bOLI
preSS and insidious ; ethnicity. The "Masas tha C.P.S.L's and I'response to Shan's lililor.
ir's Weakness Was a Italis, Fidel, Whotoi at Thermopylae, and
Will lewer Cease to ! time that it shames
us, he turned permanently hostile to, after an initial sympathy in 1964. He had nothing but scepticism, Verging on contempt, for Läti ATriä revolutioäres. Gramsci of the diamond intellect, he was dismissive of, while Althusser (without Whose distinction between "ideology' and "theory" One cannot accurately Situate Shan) and Poulantzas Counted for nothing. Even Dmitrow's landmark speech in 1935 to the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, which gave the antifascist Resistance an in Waluable strategic perspective, Was regarded Linenthusiastica|ly by Shan as containing the seeds of revisidrišTI. MarxišT-LGTinis Tl-Magtse Tung Thought was to him a closed, st|f-sufficient syster — a Catechism of Cg
täihitiÈS.
Shan's ironclad ideology protected him against a Crisis of faith, and the Collapse of the USSR probably burnished it, but it falls far short of the Jesuitical theoretical Sophistication needed today, to spearhead the Marxist Counter Reformation, globally, Shan had the faith and the denuinciatory fire of a John the Baptist, but today the World movement has need of ar lgr llatiLJS L'Oyolā,
The last decade of Shan's lifespanned the Tost eventful, traumatic and blood drenched years of this century, for our Country. Blighted by a multiplicity of illnaSSes (the cure for one which was often incompatible with another) Shan displayed the stoicfortit. Jde of the True Corn Tunist. Rendered increasingly inactive by physical debility, Shafi reacted to the caScading horror the only way he couldby Writing, and later, dictating, his thoughts. These appeared as articles in
"Lāka Guardian and Race & Class and of Course, in his autobiography. (The Writing of one should be regarded by all Left leaders as a mandatory duty and act of гесопрепse).
* Shan's place in Tamil politics and his Complex relationship to the Tamil Movement is not for Tie, a Sinhalese, to judge Or assess at length. Denying the primacy of the national contradiction and even the existerCe Of a distinct Tami│ nation at the time some of us were supporting that national liberation struggle, Shan, howeWer, instinctively Sympathised With the reCourse to armed action and guerilla warfare. The shock of July 1983 confronted him With his is escapable Tamil-less and irst

Page 12
rted it, insinuated it into (at least) the semi-periphery of his consciousness. He applauded the Tigers' struggle againstan enemy of his that was older than it had been of Wijaweera's - Indian Expansionism - but he wrote repeatedly and with a note of increasing desperation against their flouting of the protocols of People's War. His attempts to ideologically intervene in and influence the Eelam struggle Were newer really Successful. Shan, who suffered politically among the Sinhalese petty bourgeois Left for being Tamil, was to suffer politically among the newly awakened Tamils, for having been too integrated with the Sinhalese proletariat.
In Jaffna, Shan's Maoism had preceded the Eelam struggle, but Eelar Maoism was choked in its infancy, WishwanandadË Wär" ("Chutta"), its most dedicated and theoretically literate product and founder of the NLFT, disappeared at the hands of the Navy – anotherfriend we've lost along the twisting Way.T. Santhathiyar of PLOTE, abducted and killed by Muhumdarı's murderousthugs, EROS leader W. Balakumar, Whorr last Tet in Shan's home in 1990, now tailing behind the Tiger, in the hope of outliving it.
Despite twenty years of Prabakaran's armed struggle, the extent of territory "liberated' remains unimpressively nodest by COmparative international standards and the Water, the populace, is flowing away from the fish. When Prabakaran finally sails, the myriad reasons for this Will be Cordensable into one - he ignored the iron laws of Peoples War, as urged upon him by Shan. He should have had more respect for aman, Who had met Mao, the colossus of protracted guerilla Warfare in the 20th century,
And now, some Words of personal gratitiLJade, the inadequacy of which is un redeemed by the awarenss of it, for the Little Red Book, the Selected Works of Mao, the polished bamboo badge, the Mao tunics - all sent through his friend, Ty fath Er, or gruffly gifted at our house o his return from his many trips to China. But most of all, a debt of gratitude which could mot be publicly acknowledged during his lifetime, for such are the rules of the game, observed by anyone but a dilettante: thanks for the Tonths of sheller and support duгіпg, пny subteгтапеan years.
From the low-voiced nightime conversations of those months then, a single phrase of self description uttered after a pause, by Shan, which remains for me, his self definition and self-portrait: "In matters of ideology, I am a Brahmin".
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U. Ha Llatilake

Page 13
THE J. R. YEARS - 2
Deu Sion S O
Arder
her Alexander Borgla was elected
Pope he said "Now that We hawe the papacy let LIS proceed to enjoy it". J.R. Jayewardene, at last prime minister after 35 years in the wings, said "I have climbed the greasy pole" (echoing Disraeli's jubilant exclamation when he became prime minister of Britain). His euphoria was Unbounded and delusions of grandeur Soon assailed him. On his 71st birthday, which was a few Weeks after he was sworn in, he declared a general amnesty for prisoners, a prerogative of ruling momarch15, 10 CUStorTarily available tO elleCted politicians temporarily in office. Soon it became obvious that his obsession with identifying himself with royalty wasan idee
Exag!
The Constitution was amended making the incumbent prime minister the president and executive head of the govermir Ternt. It Was enlacted that Where weer in any statute the words "prime minister" occurred the word "president" should be read. He was going to eat his presidential cake while Continuing to hold on to his prime ministerial one. It was also provided for the executive president to hold ministerial rank and administer departments like any ordinary cabinet minister. The executive presidency was a hotchpotch institution tailored to the personal idiosyncracies and ambitions of Jayewardene.
The president revived a custom of the ancient kings of Sri Lanka of participating in a paddy cultivation ceremony known as the wapo magula. This Was to becoTe a regular feature in his official life.
A resplendent Uniform of red and black,
was designed for the guards at the presidential palace. A SUN reporter took a picture of brassware worn by these guards Which borg the letters ER, obviously left over from pre-republic days. The SUN carried the picture causing public amusement. The Daily News published Jayewardene's comment: "The letters Should really hawe been JR for Junius Rex". He was not really joking.
A rupee Coin Was minted and put into circulation. With Jayewardene's head on it. Pretty heady stuff for an elected politician While still in office. At the army tattoo in the Anuradhapura Stadium, he was repo
Tted to We Si: " with all the powers fläWEr ExerciSB th government-owПed October 1978). Th October carried a Cc really said Was: "pal the powers of a king He protested too TIL existed only in his ir
Many years later, Suited Oct
ng is Still on the th bemused Common Said:
"Our recorded hi gCČS back i am Lu the arrival for Wijaya in 543 B. ruling Our Country queens of various — Sirhalese, Iridi. glu, British — Har ad tWO Preside 1972 and Tyself, 1982, the 193rd in KEn ling Of heads oldest of its kiri, Wr".
(It was typical tha it wrong. Since the British occupation W f(de To COLIld 10t Cas this long and unbr. Omitted the Harlow: of who there wer 1972). While all this doubt, of unending it ne, his distinguish hardly hawe failed i embarrassed by the Old Tä.
On 20 October students of Rico We find him saying: to be a just ruler (sic (whose 1972 consti diate cause of the T: totake up arms aga
" George III (1815 — * 1830), Williarry IW (18; - 1901) Edward WI W. (1910 - 1936) Ec WI (1936–1952) El

f Grandeur
"I am a king all right, of a king, but I shall ese powers" (The Daily Mirror of 16 e Sarme paper on 17 irrection. What head liament has given The l, but I am not a king". Jch. His kingly powers magination. at the COTTOWealth ober 1985 in Nassau, eTie. Addressing his Wealth Colleagues he
story is ancient, and nbroken sequence to North India of King C. There hawe been since then, kings and s races and dynasties ans, Cholas and TeleOWET 3Fld WildSOf – nts, One Selected in
elected in 1977 and this long and unbroof state, possibly the and unique in the
it he should hawe got
last king before the as the 191st, Jayawat iiTi Self ċis 193rd "ir kĞr" |ille" ule SS ha IrS and the Windsors e Ti" fra 1 BT5
information was, no terest to Jayewardeed audierCg Could O ble distrESSed and posturings of this wain
986, addressing the nd College, in Galle, "I am trying my best :)". Colwin R. de Silva tution was the irTn Tleamil leaders' decision inst the government)
1820) George IW 182030 - ) Wikctora (1837 I (1901 - 1910) George Iward WIll (1936) George izabeth II (1952 - 1972)
said of the 1978 constitution that under its terms it was well-nigh impossible toget rid of an incumbent president even if he were gШilty of grave misconduct or rendered incapable by physical or mental illness. "We may have to put up with not Terely a bad president but even with a mad president" was the Way he put it.
In his address to the 28th sessions of the U.N.P. President Jayewardene claimed he was "above both parliament and
the judiciary". (The Island 27 February 1985).
On 8 August 1984 President Jayewaridene addressed a Conference of the World's attorneys-general held in Colombo. On this occasion he quoted from a private letter Written by Abraham Lincoln in which Lincoln said that his oath to preserve the American constitution impoSedon him the duty to take even unconstitutional measures to preserve the nation. (The Island 9 August 1984).
This letter clearly had made a lasting impression on Jayewardene for, a few Weeks later, addressing the Magistrates "Courts Lawyers' Association, he referred to it again, adding that "there were occasions when in the clash of arris the laws were silent". (silent enim leges ir 7fera "ma Cicero: Pro Milome).
During World War II in Britain Lord Atkin, in Liversidgew. Anderson (1942), said: "In this country, amid the clash of arms, the laws are not silent. They may be changed, but they speak the same language in war as in peace. It has always been one of the pillars of freedom, one of the principles of liberty for which we are now fighting, that the judges are no respecters of perSons and stand between the subject and any attempted encroachment om his liberty by the executive, alert to see that Coercive action is justified in law".
As for the "uncornstitutional" step Lincoln felt obliged to take it was the suspension of habeas corpus at a time of crisis. In his OWI Words:
"The constitution provides that...Fabeas Corpus can only be suspended in cases of rebellion or invasion. I have decided that We hawe a rebellico, and I hawe suspended, in certain cases, the Writ of habeas corpus, it is insisted that the

Page 14
power to do this is invested not in me but in Congress. But the Constitutionis Silent as to Which of LJS is to exėCILJ te this power. As Congress was not in session when rebellion endangered the city of Washington acted as swiftly as | could to preserve the city".
(Gore Vidal: Lincoln, 1984)
In December 1985, the president Was chief guest at the Royal College prize giving. He said: "All can sayis, for good Orfor bad, follow my example in Word and daed. Where ya Lil Will end I do not know, but you cannot be (sic) far from the top". (Daily News 4 December 1985).
In February 1986 he is back on the the Tile of his near-kingship),
Speaking at a farewell ceremony for one of his Secretaries, he reminisced about his days at the bar: "H.W. Perera was there, so was LA, Rajapakse and E.B. Wikremanayake. All of thern became King's Counsel, except myself. But I becamepresident who could make King's COUnsel" (Daily News 26 February, 1986). Jayewardene could not make King's Coumsg, What he could make Was President's Counsel - P.C.'s. ("Polyester Cotton, not silk," sneered an old-time Queen's COUT5gl),
Keertisena, a fitter, Was COWicted of murder and was sentenced to death by the High Court of Galle on 13 September 1981. On appeal, the sentence was reduced to one of eight years imprison Tient. His old father appealed to the president for clemency for him. On the ground that he needed his som to look after him. The president called for a report, in the usual way, from the Minister of Justice. The report said that the prisoner had already received substantial relief and recorris Ilended that the president should not intervenie. Norrally such recommendations are
routinely accepted. The president Ordered
the prisoner's immediate release. In his appeal, the prisoner's father had called the president "Our only visible God on earth". (Sunday Observer 12 April 1987).
On 31 May 1987 President Jayewardene speaking at the Biyagama Export Processing Zone Said: "For 2500 years We hawe held our Own With the biggest Cou= tries in the World.... In 1815. We gaWe Ower our kingdom and exchanged the king of Sri Lanka for the king of Great Britain. am the successor to that monarchy". (Daily NeWS 2 June 1987)
The state-controlled media often referred to the president's address to parlia
Tell as "the throne speech".
12
THE NEW GOVERM
PRIORITIES
While the new gow sWornin, the Wiolence lding up in the Jaffn over into the rest of th more the islard Was violence. Unlike Jaffn Tamils Hārd Weated fo elections.lt was the llir the Worst of the fres rnment, enjoying its ria, Was So reckless events in the Country to protect its Indiar Tany thousands of W ranks of the separal Tamils (Tostly Indian died in the Widel CE.
Onı 18 August, almı WE5 5Woor iri, Prime me addressing partial so for this Conflict was a surprising end the rilan Who Filad pOrO to solve the tric C al-party Conference rever did get äroLink Cigar Lithë Ethic II in WHich JayeWarde inter EastEd i Tid COISE rmed about. His lack of infortation Went late as September 1 president, telling S. ior editor of India rba cē5 ārs a5 Ti Lurder of UWET 20 || Jaffna District. They sa and sorra Tami September 1981). H Work E. Would a We he spoke exactly 2 been killed by the ti Were Tamils, 1 Was 6 WEITC SinhalĖSE, E the police officers W tha Cliflict but IE of the 1972 CO 1stit With the disdainful government to dial leaders, caused the ctrinating the youth a deep hatred for group. At the sa Tit World-Wide propagé separate state. Alb "side the Third Re Its fore the W. Ssing the chies ed newspaperS Said." be presented in SL nsciously the mas:

MENT'S
ernet Wästbeing that had cer Euia peninsula spilled Le Country and CriCe
engulfed in ethnic a Ta Tils, the indian the U.N.P. in the idias. Tassills that goil violence. The goveJoost-electiOTI È UpohOly out of touch. With that it was unable | Tamil Supporters, hom later joined the ists tյf the Tigrլի, Գ8 is) and 30 Sinhalese
ost a lijft hi after He Minister JayewardeEt Said: "ThEa realdo not know". This Lugh Confession1 fr0m TiSEd the Electorale ispute by Calling an ! (a conference he id to calling). But it is ispute Was a subject nie Was not greatly squently not Well infofilterest and lack om tog lorg. THILIS 3GS 981 Willir, as Wenkat Narayan, seToday: "These distua result of (sic) the police officials in the Were largely Sinhales". (Daily News of 7 adh done is OTieKIWI Lhälttheti TE Opolice officers had errorists of whom 13 a Mosler, and Only and that the killing of as not the reason for of the Consequences ution which, together refusal of the the ague With the Tamil m to retaliate by indoof the peninsula. With the majority ethnic time they started a anda campaign for a art Speer, in his book ich", relates that afBW "arbegan Hitler addreitors of the Gerrillar Certain events should Ich a light that unCOSes Will autOTaticaly
come to the conclusion: "If there is no Way to redress the matter pleasantly, it will hawe to be domē by force; We can't possibly let things go on this Way'." The Jaffna |leaders Could hawe taker these Words ES their text.
The president's lack of information on the reasons for the ethnic Conflict (after four years in office!) was no different from thig itsoucián Ce of the preg Wii) _s goWefTTET.
J.R.Jayewardene WassWorninas P.M. and announced his cabinet on 23 July 1977, While a 9 p.m. to 5 a.m. Curfew was om in Kandy, Matale, Kegalle, DiVulapi tiya, Minuwangoda and Nittambuwa. There was Lurrest im Jaffna tot ELi ta C.Ceiding to a request from Mr. Amirthalingam the P.M. d'id noterifOICB a CUrfèW ther2.
From the TOII ent he assurned duties as prime minister Jayewardene's posture became near-dictatorial, even ITIOriarchi
Solving the ethnic dispute had to Wait —ther Were more Urgent pri Critis, dermaInding the new P.M.'s attention. High on the ist Of théSE WE TE.
1. silencing all dissent and Criticism
frCII. Whatever SQUICE: 2. Crippling the P.M.'s political foes, chiefly Mrs. Bandaranalike Whom hĘ regarded as his most charismatic and therefore most da Tigerous politital oբբDոant; 3, enacting a new constitution Taking
him an all-powerful ruler, The pro-S.L.F.P. Times group of neWspapers Was taken over Within ten days of his becoming P.M., under the provisions of the Business Acquisition Act (which he had condemned and promised to repeal): This take-ower did not inhibit Jayewardgrefrom Continuing publicly to proclaim his dedication to the freedom of the press, which he kept insisting was vital for the preservation of democracy.
On 4 October 1977 the second angndment to the Constitution was passed with a two-thirds Tajority making the inclumbent prime minister the executive president while rotaining all the powers of the prime minister. A parliamentary select Committee Was appointed to draft a rew Constitution. ܒܪ
The Special Presidential Commissions of Inquiry Act No. 7 of 1978 was passed. A Special Presidential Commission comprising two superne Court judges and a judge from the minor judiciary Was appointed on 29 March, 1978 to inquire into and obtain information with regard to the abuse of power during the period May 1970-to July 1977.

Page 15
HSLAM: We Ster
Chandra Muzaffar
s there American hatred towards
Islam and the Muslims as alleged by some Muslims themselves?
While ha tred Tay bê too strong a Word, there is no doubt that the influential and articulate stratum of American and indeed Western society is guilty of a Whole range of negative attitudes towards Islam and the Muslits. At one end of the Continuur. is ignorance compounded by prejudice; at the other end is aversion alloyed with antagonism.
These negative attitudes are deeply embedded in the Western psyche. Frost time to time, in the course of the last 1000 years or so, they hawe manifested themselves through religion and scholarship, folklor and literature, Education and the media, domestic politics and foreign poIісу.
Starting from the 12th century onwards, the Church, for instance, through distorted translations of the Quran Sought to disparage Islam and the Prophet Muhammad, There Was a deliberate endgavOLIr to tarnish Muslim history, to willify Muslim S0ciety. As a result images of Arab despots and bloodthirsty Muslim tyrants gained a Certain notorietyin medieval Europe. Unedifying images of this sort Were often embellished by ugly portrayals of the wainto lust of lascivious Arab Sheiks Wallowing in harlot studded harems. Even in the Writings of illustrious European poets and playwrights - Dante and Shakespeare to Byron and Shelley-there were pejorative references to the Quran and the Prophet, to "Moors' and 'Saracers'. They became part of the regular intellectual diet of Tanya European student right down to the present,
The Islamic Threat
Today, the mainstream Western media portrays Islam or what it describes as 'Tiilitant Islam'or"fundamentalist IslaT'as a threat to the West. Writing in 1981, Edward Said notes, "For the general public in America and Europe today, Islam is "news" of a particulary unpleasant SOt. The media, the government, the geopolitical strategists, and - although they are Targinal to the culture at large - the academic experts on Islam are all in cocert. Islat is a threat to Wester civilization. Now this is by no means the same as saying that Only derogatory or racist caricatures of Isla T are to be found in the West. What I am saying is that negative images of Islam are very much more pfewalent than any others, and that SUCh
images correspond, ... but to What pro particular society ta Sector S beCOT18S Tl present, than all othe
Light ಕ್ವಿಂf
If anything, that the West has 2CO the minēties. As Joh few balanced non-M |ars on Islam put it Some ways, the att Wards Communist nsferred to or replic; "I5||aTIC LUIdäTEesti that selective preSi biased analysis of Is to this perception
Taistream Wester he says, "Islam and easily reduced to against the West, is rnity, or Muslim rag Cismi, terrorism. Thı "fundāTērtāli" beCOf The linked in Selective and ther: adds to our ignor: knowledge, marrOW tlIET tha, broaderir reinforces the prot ning the Way t0 new
On numerous c kers and politicians rly the United State ignorance, this na
 

1 Perceptions
Otto Wat|5āT "İS" Tinet sectors of a ke it do be: Those Ore prevalent, more STS
otion of a "threat' to me even stronger in nEsposito, one of the LuSliTI A Tri:aṁ SCHOİı a recerlit bÖok, "lrı Etude of the West 10SegTS a tiT12 Straated in the flew threat alism". He suggests entation of facts and slam hawa Contributed of the religion within Society. As a result, Islamic revivalist are stereotypes of lsla in la II's War. With Todde, extreTiST, fanatie "F" and "" Words, and "terrorism" hawe the minds of many. efore biased analysis ICE Tater tal OUT s our perspective rang our understanding, llem rather than Ope' Souliosis".
ccasigпs, policy-паin the West, particulais, hawe exploited this arrow perspective to
advance self-serving foreign policy objectives. In the after Thath of the Iranian Revolution and the hostage Crisis, for instance, they used all the major American television network and newspapers to whip up mass hysteria against 'militant Isla Ti", the Shiites, Khomeini, the Mullahs, purdah and soon. 13 years later, following the 26 February 1993 bomb blast at the Word Trade Centre in New York, one hears a similar - though far less Strident - shriek about Islamic terrorism and islamic fundamentalism. In spite of the filiT5isst of Bovidence, AITErican irive Stigators, and more. So the Artierican redia, have concluded that the blast was the work of Islamic fundamentatists, also known as "Islamic terrorists'. Though there are solid theories that implicate other groups - notably Israeli intelligence, the Mossad-in the bombing, the US establish Tent had decided to put the blame on the Muslims. And, as the Writer Jane Hunterpoints out, "...in a Society with Very little understanding of the Middle East, there is a danger that all Arabs and Muslims will be stigmatised".
Conquest and Crusades
Why, one may ask, are Muslims stigmatised in this manner? Why is there so much bias and antagonism against Muslims within certain crucial segments of Western society? Part of the explanation lies in the Muslim conquest and occupation of parts of Weste T1, Southern and Eastern Eorope for long centuries. Though Muslim rulers were, by and large, just and fair to the Christiam ard Jewish ConTulities uider their charge, there Was, nonetheless - and understandably so - a certain degree of resentment towards the alien Conquerors. The infamous crusades which ended is the defeat of the Christian in Waders of Arab-Muslim Hands in West ASİa also heightened European antagonism towards Isla T and its foll) WÉrS.
It is a measure of the intensity of European antagonism that Western civisation has consciously chosen to downplay, even ignore, the immense debt that it OWS | Slår äld the MuSliTIS, I al TÕSt every facet of life, from medicine and algebra to law and government, Islam had laid the foundation for the progress of medieval Europe. In the Words of the distinguished Irish scholar-diplomat, Erskine Childers, "Inevery discipline upon which Europe the began to build its epochal advancement, European monarchs, religious leaders and scholars
13

Page 16
had to turn to Arab Sources. When Once any Western student of history manages to learn of this Arab inheritance buried out of sight and rimind Western historiography, the astonishment that the very facts of it do not appearin Western education is the greater because the proofs are literally in current Western language". Childers describes the unwillingness of the West to acknowledge the intellectual inheritance of Islam as "a Collective amnesia".
Colonial Subjugation
However, What perpetuated this collective amnesia through the centuries was not just the mere memory of conquest and Crusades. The West was determined to blockout Islam for yet another more important reason. This, in a sense, is at the root of contemporary Western antagois towards slam and the Muslims. It is the persistence of Muslim resistance to Western colonialism and neo-colonialism. At the height of Western colonialism in the 19 and 20 centuries, Muslim groups were amongst the fiercest opponents of alien Subjugation. Even in preponderantly non-Muslim societies like India, Muslim elements were often the earliest to express their rejection of Western colonial rule. This is why Muslim freedom-fighters like Siraj-ud-daula and Omar Mukhtar and Syed Jamaluddin al-Afghani Were often defamed and denigrated by the colonial authorities. Of course, there Were a nuImber of illustrious lon-Muslim freedOfThi-fighters too who incurred the Wrath of the mighty colonial powers.
Oil and Domination
Since the ed of forma| colonial rule, Muslim societies are discovering that they are once again the targels of new forms of Western domination control. This is primarily because most of the Word's oil rgSeves – the lifeblood of Western civiliSation – lie berleath Muslim feet. Contro|ling Muslim and Southern oil has been a fundamental goal of US foreign policy for at least the last 4 decades. Anyone Who dares to resist Arterican control, or Worse, challenges its hegemony, is at Once branded as an 'extremist', a 'radical' or simply "a threat to peace and stability.
This Was the fate of the Iranian Prime
Minister Muhammad Mossadegh who for a brief but spectacular moment in 1953 nationalized his Country's oil. This has been the fate of the Iraqi and Libyan leaderships ever since they gained control of their oil in the early seventies. This is also the fate of the Iranian leadership Which since the Islamic Revolution of 1979 has tried to exercise sovereignty over oil and other Tineral resources, Whatever the ideological orientations of these leadership - and indeed each of them relates to lslamina different way-the West has decided that they are all Muslim militants
14
and sponsors of terr ral public in the Wes does not realize is denigration of these to do with their misd exist) and Tore to ( of authority ower the natural resource,
Zionis T1
The desire to cont nation to perpetuate arė. However, mot t the depreciation at slar and the Musli played a big part. Zi and Muslims, which ry itself. became ev the Creation of Isra disproportionate inf Tedia and Western have been targetin Islamic theology an question of polygant Women -in order to and its adherents. depict Islam as a mili as indiwiduals prome
It is mot difficult to massive Zionist prop chosen to project is such a derogatory Islam as ewil and Mi the Zionists are, infa own illegitimate, ims annexation of Pales In other Words, the Craftiness, are atten their violence and op the Wictims of their ssion as the aggre why those Palestin resist Israeli occupa - the real freedombly described in the media as "terrorists'
Islamic Resurgenc
It is quite conce portrayals of Palesti sting Israeli and We get Worse in the C. partly because ther tion sentient too nation but also to lo{ in Cohorts With We being channeled th| Islam. Indeed, Islan as the ideological slims everywhereas neliberation from th despotism and glo Given the prevailing Within the major ce West, one can exp and opinion-Takers resurgence With e'\, antagonism.

rism. What the geneand ever in the East that the Conscious leaderships has less meanours (which do O with their assertion ir one most precious
ol oil and the digtermiWester dormination Ie only forces behind d disparagement of ms. Zionism has also list attacks on Islam legan in the 19 centua Tore interse with I ir 1948. With their Luance ower Western scholarship, Zionists specific aspects of d society - like the ly and the position of discredit the religion They also sought to tant faith and Muslims
to violence.
understand why the agandarmachine has slam and Muslims in light. By presenting uslits as loathSome, ct, trying to justify their Thoral usurpation and tinian and Arab land. aggressors, in their pting to camouflage pression by depicting violence and oppressors. This explains ans and Arabs who tion and subjugation ighters— a reinwariaTaistreal Westerri and 'Tilitants'.
wable that negative hians and Arabs resistern domination may }ming years. This is hain thrust of opposi| only Western domialregities which are itern powers, is now ough the ideology of is rapidly emerging allying point for Muthey aspire for genuifetters of both local bal authoritariamiST. perceptions of Islam |tres of power in the 2ct its political elites to respond to Islamic Bn more anger and
This would be a real pity. For it can only lead to greater strife and conflict, exacerbated by all the prejudices and mundestand Islam and the Muslims with an 'openness of mind and heart' which is sadly missing today. As the Christain scholar, Karen Armstrong put it, in her analysis of Western-Muslim relations. "We in the West must come to test Is With our own inner demons of prejudice, chauwinism and anxiety, and strive for a greater objectivity". In the process, one hopes that the West will realize that if there is to be genuine peace and harmony between the West and Islam - and Within the human family as a whole - those structures which allow the few who are powerful to dominate the many Who are powerless Would hawe to be replaced by meWinstitutions that promote equality and justice for all.
At the same title, as the West Valuates itself, so must the Muslim World examine itself critically. The rise of Islam with all the emotional power it commands makes it incumbent upon us to ask some searching questions about certain Muslim attitudes and priorities. Islslamic resurgence giving enough attention to some of the crucial challenges confronting the Ummah-challengespertainingtopoverty and hunger, disease and illiteracy? Hawe Islamic resurgents gone beyond rhetoric in addressing issues of education and knowledge, science and technology, politics and administration, economics and management in the alternative islamic social order that they envision? Isn't it true to some extent that Islamic resurgence as a whole tends to be pre-occupied with forms and symbols, rituals and practices? Isn't there a tendency within Islamic resurgence to wiew laws and regulations in a static rather thana dynamic manner? Does the conventional position of Islamic resurgents on the role of women in society and the place of minorities in a Muslim majority state, accord with the fundamental values and principles of the Quran and the Sunnah? isn't it true that the exclusiveness of Islamic resurgence reflected in a variety of matters ranging from charity to politics is a betrayal of the letter and spirit of the Auran? Are Islamic resurgents, by insisting upon their interpretation of Islam, as the only correct approach to the religion guilty of promoting sectarian sentiments within the Ummah? Have Islamic resurgents therselves Contributed, perhaps unWittingly, to the factionalisation and fragmentation of the Ummah?
Perhaps it is time that we conceded that there is also another side to the truth: the We Muslims are also responsible, to a certain degree, for the negative perceptions of the religion and the community in today's World.

Page 17
Wiew fror T7 New DeWi
Time to Retrie
Kuldip Nayar
had not realised the extent of hurt the demolition of the disputed Babri Masjid had caused to the Muslim psyche ti|| || Went round the country. The Wound is deep and raw even after nearly five months. The Muslim community feels humiliated and helpless. The demolition has severely hit its elar as well as Confidence. In the last few weeks, I hawe travelled through parts of Assart, Bihar, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal and let a Cross Section of Muslims. Ewen a small talk with thern ended up in a serious discussion on their loss of faith in the law and fairplay.
The injured feelings are similar to the Ones found among the Sikhs after the Golder TrTipole Was Stormed in WAT ritsar in 1984. There is, however, one big difference. The then President Zail Singh and Prile Minister Indira Gandhi flew to Amritsar within 48 hours. Narasimha Rao has till today not wisited the site to make some sort of amends for What has happened.
The historic city and traditional ir Tıportance of the monument should hawe impelled the government to be more demonstrative in its response. The package of building a temple and a Tosque and referring the issue to the Supreme Court is a cold, official approach to a problem that requires human and Sympathetic handling.
Therefore, the solution-s gekers hawe to keep in mind the sensitivities of both the Muslims and Hindus and none of the two should have a feeling of defeat. So far it has been a one-way traffic. The structure has been der Tholished, a make-shift temple has been allowed to come up on the site and the Muslims have been told that the Masjid Will be built "somewhere else". Rao has also not reiterated his declarations to rebuild the Masjid and to remove the make-shift temple.
Perhaps he did not perceive the realities on the ground - not a healthy trait in a Prime Minister - when he assured some
Muslim leaders Corn Di is that Rao has st emotional strength COTT Lurialists hawe of the tepla. He ha reluctant to take required. I ar mot rights or Wrongs of an unfortunate realit
It is time to re
community from of funda metal beginning to r future lies in alig With Secular force happen, they wil fundamentalists
Muslim leaders W
They mayfalla pr and violence, a Which hawe alrea
Yet, rebuilding the where the Masjid stoc in the Muslims wou giving legal Sanction Rashtriya Swayams and its front organisa the Wish Wa Hindu P. emboldened. The p a CCOmpli is no b, recognition. There he give and take. Oth dictation, With farm.Or the Muslims' morale
The Teference tot an attempt to pass th should not be broug situations. The prob legal. The govertime way the Supreme C. the initial hearing indi

Ve MUSInns
Cerber 6. The Worst ut his eyes to the that the Hindu gained in the name 1S been too slow, too action when it was commenting on the the case but stating W.
-trive the Muslim
the stanglehold ists. They are 2alise that their
ining themselves
2S. If thiS does Illot
I get back to the and the so-called
rith a vengeапсе. ey to desperation few examples of dy been seen
LLLS
terrple On the Sile 2d Will be rubbing salt d. It will amount to to an illegal act. The lewak Sangh (RSS) tions like the B.JPasilid arishad will only feel resentatio of a fait asis for according as to be a settlement, Wise, it will be a eadwerse effects on than at present.
he Supreme Court is buck. The judiciary ht into such messy lem is political, not nt KroWS it. And the Jurtis proceeding at Cates that it does not
Want togetinvolved. It may drag the matter un necessarily. The passage of time Wi|| aggravate the problem further, allowing the fundamentalists in both religions to polarise the society still more.
The formula that building of the temple be allowed on the disputed site is relevant if the RSS farthily can win the confidence of the Muslims. That means renouncing its anti-Muslin stance on which it has fattened itself. I have noticed a change among the Muslims. They are Willing to give up their claim on the Masjid if it can help solve the problem, but they want to be sure that by doing so they can end the process of claimTis on other mosques and ensure for themselves and their children a secure future.
The Narasimha Rao government has spoilt things by sitting pretty. It should at least make a public announcement that the temple Will not be built on the Babri Masjid site. This does not restore the mosque to the Muslims but it does not pola Cat Hindu chauwinists either. Probably the best Way out is to leave the site as a Vacant plazaso as to remind the generation Sto come of the Wound inflicted on Our values and traditions on December 6.
The plea by Some Muslim leaders before the Prime Minister the other day to rebuild the Masjid at the same place may be a good tactic but not a good strategy. They have to take the dispute out of the Hindu-Muslim arena, away from the status quo ante. What Was pulled down on December 6 was known as the Babri Masjid but it was a historic monument, representing India's long, traditional composite cultire. True, the Muslims have been Wronged but so have been those Hindus who have faith in that Culture. The two must come together to express their protest. And they are in a Tajority in the country.
Some of the Muslim leaders still live in their make-beliewe world. They hawe
15

Page 18
planned an All-India tour - they go to southern India from May 14 - to Consolidate Muslim opinion. This will only provide thë grist to tha anti-MuslinT propaganda mill of the RSS family. Whatever their grievances, the Muslim leaders must find Ways for a secular expression, try and consolidate non-communal forces. The politics of arraying Muslims as Muslims is Counter-productive. This is probably yet to penetrate the Muslim leadership.
The memorandum that the All-India Muslim Personal Law Boards (Way out of its avowed purpose) and a few others havë Submitted to the PrirThe Ministër justifiably asks for steps "to squarely deal With the Teace of Hindu clauwinist". But Muslim chauvinism has to be equally TI ft With Steps, At leist El Couple of leaders, who were in the delegation meeting the Prime Minister, are no less Lundesirable than Musli Manohar Joshi and L.K. Adwa ni to the BJP.
It is adfTitled in the TETOranduTT that "the Muslims and all justice-lowing anti-fascist citizens were betrayed" when the Babri Masjid Was destroyed. Strange, none of the "anti-fascist citizens" was ever Consulted When the cliche-ridder memorandum was prepared. There is yet no effort to get out of the religious syndrome and make a common cause With the forces fighting communalism.
However, I hawe noticed the exasperation of ordinary Muslims with their traditional leadership.
It could acquire speed provided an average Muslim sees that justice is being done to him on the Babri Masjid case. On the other hand, the secular forces should give him confidence because he does feel onely.
in fact, this is the time to retrieve the Muslim community from the stranglehold of fundamentalists. They are beginning to realise that their future lies in aligning the Selwes With Secular forces. If this does not happen, he will get back to the funda Tletalists ad the So-Called Muslim leaders With a Wengeance. He may fall a prey to desperation and violence, a few examples of which hawe already been seen in the country. Any otherframe-work may solve the problems temporarily but Will spell ruin in the long run.
TF
West's Unf
Abdur Rauf
B WESLEf
of had suffer twists and exaggera Work, A Study of Arnold Toynbee: "In discount thë të ndër popular in Christend the extent of force i Islam, in the conqu: Roman and the Sa alternatives offered death" but "Islam O. policy traditionally enlightenment Whi afterwards in Engla Queen Elizabeth" (P
The plain fact is . even the early Wars the east Of the Ele аggгessioп iTWO Commenting Lup) on th Orientalist, Lichtens! Work, Isar 77 ard (F7E at til till of th { century of Islati, act comparatively mino COnquests Were aci and peace treaties COItaim ClaLISES people of the Book territorie:S COUlci rela tO Certair), Orl the W Conditions. The Otic and the Sword" does Ewen the "pagan' Conquared territorie: SWOrd."
The foregoing frequently shared b other equally outstan are literally true oft Prophet (PBUH). Th can by no stretch o Called "Wars' in the CL Of the terrT), Wher) perspective of regulations governin which the Holy prescribed and meticulously, those package deal for the in Wolved in the CC ir citiec Of blods customary War-tirr immoralities, tha Luri: blir Wri Lurde showered Ower the their SOCO-CUlUral tri extremely blissful for are hard to find in a taking place anytime entire history of mar
CaSO3 s of Fadil

ounded Notions of Islamic Wars
riālists otrs frOrr 1 à Thultitude Of tirs. In his farTiOuS History, thus Writes the first place We can icy which has been Oil to Wer-estinate the propagation of ared prowices of the sanian Empires the Were not "Islam or r a super-tax, "— a
praised for its en pursued long nd by a Laodiceam '.488).
Iatent ori record that of the Muslirls had ment of hostility and Wed i them. e SituatiOrla fa TOLIS adter, Writes in her Modern Age: "Even conquest in the first ual fighting played a r rol E. MOS:t Of the lieved by Surrender s. These invariably | Inder Whititi "lije s' in the conquered in their faith subject hole not too painful, in of 'conquest by fire not conform to reality, population of the s Were mot put to the
(SEWälicJ15 äré y a large number of ding historians. They he Wars of the Holy e wars that he waged f the imagination be Istomany connotation studied against the the hur Tårnitarian g the conduct of War, Prophet (PBUH) implemented so Wars look a blissful I persons and parties nflict. TB minifflä| lad, Cla at ISSICE Of le excesses and Expectedly liberal and rSeweld allestie:S 'aniquished foes and ansformation, proved 'them. Such parallels ny account of conflict and anywhere in the ikirdi.
OLIrd Whereinforce
as an inevitable Evil Was reduced to optimal minimum. Such cases are the clearest to demonstrate that the focus of the Muslim defence policy revoled round educational Orientation and cultural ÎrldøC[TirlätiøT1 rather thäf1 blind farlaticism of territorial Lebensraul. This fict is best illustrated by the standing orders of the first Caliph of Islam, Hadrat Abu Bakr Siddiqu (RA) issued to the Muslii army Commanders when they were about to march off for the first great campaign to Syria. In his enlightening Work, Tie Casphase – Jfs Fise, Décsre ärld Fass, William Muir quotes these historic orders thus: "Men || hawe ten orders to give you, Which you must observe loyally-deceive nome and steal from none; betray noma and Tutilate none; kill mo child, mor Woman, nor aged man; neither bark nor burn the date palms; cut not down the fruit trees for destroy Crops, slaughter not flocks, cattle, nor camels except for food..."
The Muslim of the wanquished people and places Was exceptionally civilised. Human history abounds in instances of the non-Muslim population of the conquered territories preferring the Muslim conquerors to the erstwhile rulers Of their OWI kith and kin, Cult and Creed. Such feelings were spontaneously Woiced, for instan Ce, When the Muslim army ra ChÉd Jordan and Hadrat Abu Ubaidah Camped at Fehl, A series of similar instances are also patent om the annals of history of the Muslim conquest of India. Muhammad bin CasirTi's Conquests, for instance are known for the Woluntary Surrender of the Hindusthan for bloody battles. In fact Muhammad bin Qasim was so popular with the people of the liberated areas that they are reported to have Wept copiously on his sudden departure for home.
The Muslim conquests were invariably characterised by their disciplining factor and the Civilising Cor. Just WiSLJalise the havoc Wrought by the Goths, the Huns, the wa mdals of earlier tras and the Mongols of the later days. One readily finds the differential feature characterising all Muslim Wars. It is they who ushered in a new era of Civilisation and Culture in a World which had drifted headlong towards naked aggression and gross injustice, chaos Confusion. Emerging as a powerful, purposive and popular civilising force Islam soon began to modify and reform the fossilised social and Cultural structures of the wanquished races. It thus reclaimed them from the very brinks of suicidal ignorance and all-round destruction.

Page 19
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Page 20
The Prelude to the Indo-S
Negotiations Between India and Sri L
K. M. de Silva
Ithough both governments, the Indian and the Sri Lankan, Were anxious to treat the TULF as the main representatives of Tamil opinion in Sri Lanka, there was an element of unreality in giving them this status. By living in self-imposed exile in Tamil Nadu and elsewhere - largely because of fears of assassination by LTTE'hit squads'-they had cut themselves off from the Tamil people. To convert the position that had been Conferred on them into a hard political reality the TULF would have had to give up living in exile, and to face up to the challenge posed by the separatist activist groups who had filled the vacuum caused by the TULF's absence. This the TULF were not inclined to do, and yet the longer they stayed away their chances of a political rehabilitation became more of a chimera than they already Were. Thus the negotiations with them were an exercisein futility. Yet they were the only group who could understand the complexity of the devolution exercise and could negotiate the details in a spirit of give and take. Nawertheless they themselves Were stuck with the concept of a Tamil ethno-region - a Tamilhorneland-Which had gained currency since the early 1950s with the Federal Party. They had abandoned this in the 1960s but revived it after 1976.
The main Tamil separatist group the LTTE had established their position among the Tamils through their resistance to the Sri Lankan armed forces, as Well as by a series of bloody internecine encounters in which they had eliminated their rivals. They were in no mood to accept anything short of a separate state. Nor were they inclined to respect the new status which the two governments had devised for the TULF. On the contrary they were intent on treating them in the same way they had their other rivals, as an intolerable challenge to their own position. Throughout the second half of 1986 Indian mediators made a sustained effort to break the deadlock caused by the TULF's insistence on the Creatio of a
18
Tamil ethno-region and Easter Provinc Tediators - came divide the Eastern units, one Muslim, or se, With the Tami|| ur NOItherIn PrO'WirhC:g b dor, When this propi least of all from the negotiators prevaile government to consi Sinhalese parliame Amparai from the Ba Eastern Provincē, SC component in the p a level of parity W groups there. This S from A.P. Wenkates nkateSWararı himsel ssed by Rajiv Gant 1986, his suggestio Amparai from the Ea rued tO be Official lrn(. of the year. It formed 1986 for IIlula Whic rnment proposed sh further negotiations Lanka government LTTE, however, reje totally unacceptable. minority, Who forme ment (40%) of the po to accept it.
The proposals agr 1986 for led the between President Prime Minister Rajiv met in Bangalore a South ASiarll Associa operation (SAARC) Tmber. These Were aC Wed by discussions Rajiv Gandhi and hi. engaged in frenetic the rival Tamil sepa particular the LTTE, sals that hadernerge of quiet diplomacy as ble fra The Work for a ir Sri Lanka. Most C

ri Lanka Accord of 1987 anka, November 1984 to Mid-1987
inking the Northern }s. They-the Indian p with a proposal to PrOWinCe into three Tamil. One Sinhaleit being linked to the a narrow land CorriAsal Won no support, Tamils, the Indian | upon the Sri Lanka er the excision of the ntary electorate of ticaloa district of the that the Tali ethnic Ovince would reach th the other ethnic uggestion had come waran. Although Wewas abruptly dismihi in the middle of or the excision of Stgrl Province Contiiam policy till the end part of 19 December the Indian goveould be the basis of between the Sri and the Tamils. The Icted the formula as Nor was the Muslim d a Substantial elapulation there, Willing
eed to in September asis of discussions Jayewardene and Gandhi when they the SLUTT liit of the ion for Regional Co
In 17 ar hyd 18 Mawg:oTpained and folloit a ministerial level. i advis Ors were also legotiations to bring atist groups, and in o accept the propod from several years the basis of a Workahonourable peace these groups were
Willing to accept these proposals or at least to give then a try. At the end of the Bangalore conference it was announced tät:
"Apartiram lhe subjects of finance and admi
istralion which WCT mot : la rited with the TULF, the matters which requirc further clarification and agreement were)... fully set out ina working paperon the Eargalare discuissions, dated 1B (November 1986,"
The LTTE alone adamantly refused to accept these proposals. The Indian government showed its displeasure by imposing restrictions on Sri Lankan Tamil actiwists operating from Indian territory. This Was the first tire that such restrictions had been imposed. The initiatives of the Indian government in this regard were nullified by the Tamil Nadu governTient's unconcealed reluctance to co-operate in these moves. In addition the Indian government sought to prevent the LTTE leader Prabhakaran then operating from Tamil Nadu from leaving India for Jaffna. These pressures succeeded until the end of 1986 by which time Prabhakaran and the LTTE ideologue Balasingham slipped across the Palk straits to the Jaffna peninsula, to continue to fight from there.
The progress made in the Bangalore discussions could be gauged by the fact that the Working paper based on them set out a lentative time-table for the signing of an accord. The first of the steps indicated was for the Sri Lankan government to give its final consideration to the proposals in the paper, as well as its response to the suggestions made by the TULF on the Sri Lankan paper, to the government of India by 25 November 1989, that is to say, within a week. The Latter would then consult the Tamil groups and convey their responses to the Sri Lanka government before 2 December. A draft accord Was then to be prepared by the Sri Lankan government and given to the government of India before 9 December, and the latter in turn was to Secure acceptance of the draft accord, before 16 Dece Tiber. The final stage the signing of the accord presumably by the two governments, was to take place assoon as possible thereafter,

Page 21
preferably in January 1987.
Chidambaram and Natwar Singh wisted Colombo again - their second visit — or 24 November forfurther diSCUSSions With President Jayewardene. The Eastern Province was still the insoluble problem. No headway was made on this occasion as Well. At a meeting of Muslim organizations with President Jayewardene on 11 December 1986 opposition to any merger of the two provinces, or an excision of the AIT parai electorate, much less the Amparai district, was made abundantly clear, When Chidambaram and NatWar Singh visited Colombo again on 17 December for discussions with the Sri Lanka goweT"|11ënt this isSLJe resitair lied The Thor rliest and Tost contentious. While agreement was possible om all others, this defied Settlement. Not a Single group Saw any positive advantage in it, Muslin MPs who met the leaders of the Indian delegation expressed their strong opposition to this proposal.'
Art official state Tertissued after the 19 December Teeting made the following points:
"President J.R. Jayewardene and the two (2) Indian Ministars discussed further ideas in Continuation of the discussions held in the past. At the end of the discussions the following proposals emerged: () The present territory comprising the Eastern province minus the Ampara Electoral District may constitute the new Eastern province.
(ii) A Prowincial Council Wi|| be established for the new Eastern province, (iii) The institutional linkages between the Northern province and the Eastern province discussed earlier will be further refined in order to make it more acceptable to the parties concerned. (iv) The Sri Lanka Government will be Willing to consider a proposal for a Second stage of constitutional development providing for the Northern province and the new Eastern province coTning together sLubject to rTodalities being agreed upon for ascertaining the Wishes of the people comprised in the Northern province and the Eastern proVince separately, (W) The Sri Lanka Government is Wiling to consider the Creation of an office of Vice President to be appointed by the President fora specified tem.
(vi) The five (5) Muslim M.P.'s of the Eastern province may be invited to visit India and to discuss Tatters of Tutual
Concern with the auspices of the G
At this stage a LT mOW, Sent OL ta fee the government. Th insistence was ago" MP. Although w; government decide small delegation Wa to Jaffna to hold : second rung LTTE groups met at Kank C90er 1986 i til COLIncil there, AT these unofficial and y discussions Was Cia E.F. Dias AEE record of What Was Dias Abeysinghew E0 ||12. Political Faf äd 5vedasser delegations frost th talks, had been a SS tiationS ar di SCUSS:
He sted 13 til spokesman had b. "what We say is . views as ordinary The LTTE spokesmr
"hat I T HB it evident of the stard of the negotiations. India Y her Politi Calgair ard Wiccis-fir Il til of thịa Tri Supplying arts to all er Tiphatically that thi ppets of the Indian resit any invasion b, The Crily TåTil grup: but at ha sa Tie tir TIE IIT Cract WilhJLI 1sort in their media'
They were distrusilu Timent too. It had a ses."
These discussion the insights they pl of the LT TE at that EISE, THE I Witti clearly intended tod the governments o' at the very mome settlement of Sri L seemed ready for SpokesTan Sugge:
the top LTTE leade
Balasingham who w - so the LTTE spok to get out. Clearly
for any governmen need for visas to
ir possible to mai LTTE, of course, h;

Tamil side under the iQWEffè f||.." TE group, insurprising iler för direct talk5 With Ie intermediary in this vernment party (UNP) ary of the offer, the d to test the Waters. A ssent for this purpose Secret talks With the leadership. The two 35a Inti LI rai Ol 27 Dege office of the TOW ong those attending essentially exploratoa knowledgeable offilysinghe, who kept a said on this occasion. no was then Secretary ties Conference, and etary to the Sri Lanka e time of the Thimpu :Cociated With all regiois iridia. E LT TE group's chief egun by saying that Jn official, our private citizens of Jaffna."
l:HI1
that they were suspicious Indian gayernment in the was using the situation for Her interiālsecurity. Ewen Tad bgen asranged about pu laiks ir 1985India Was 5 TarTil groups. Hg statud B LTTE would not be 'pugovernment." They would "Indian forces. They were I who wErữ resisting Thūm, they would not break with their awareness and CoIory process.
of the Sri Lanka Gowdlways gornebackompromi
SWere more useful for rovide to the thinking time than for anything to informal talks were rive a WCdge between f India and Sri Lanka nt arh äCC)rd Jr1 the anka's Ethnic Conflict signature. The LTTE sted SECret talks With 3rs, Prabhakara and were the in India and eSmar Said-Lable this was not possible t delegates since the India Would make it ntain secrecy. (The ad their OWI methods
of illicit entry). More to the point, the
government spokesmen stated quite ca
tegorically that
"India has always played a mediatory role and Was interested in helping Sri Lanka) to achiev a solution. We cannot distance ourselves so frorT ridia' -
Even more significant, in view of future developments, was that the LTTE insisted on being recognized as the one group with Which the government Wouldnegotiate om issues relating to Sri Lanka's Tamil problem. There was no response to this from the government group but they did take particular note of this request. As for their principal demands, there was no evidence at all of any anxiety to compromise. They did talk of being prepared to "accept any practical solution, but they asserted also that because they have been let down Over the last thirty years". "We therefore decided to ask for the Taxi Turi, Eela IT."
The only encouraging sign was that the LT TE Spokesmen expressed the Wishes that secret and informal talkS WOuld be followed by formal talks with the govefrisment at a future date. And, On a more piquant note, the spokesman asked the government representatives to ignore any bellicose Comments utterred by the LTTE leadership from India,
CONFLCT
Prabhakaran's return to the island early in 1987 marked the beginning of a more activist and violent phase in the on-going conflict between the Tamil separatist groups spearheaded by the LTTE, and the Sri Lankan forces. It Would appear that the LTTE was intent on scuttling the agreement that the two governments Were om the Werge of signing and as a meals of prevention this they hit upon the notion of an unilateral declaration of independece in the north of the island. The Sri Lanka government's response to this was predictably tough. In an attempt to pre-empt Such a declaration government sent troop reinforcements into the Eastern and Northern provinces with instructions to clear these areas of the LTTE and other Separatist groups. Contrary to expectations, the LTTE did not put up much of a fight. The LTTE's retreat was anything but orderly. The LTTE forces fled to the Jafna peninsula.
The Indian government, much perturbed by this turn of events, put considerable diplomatic and political pressure on the Sri Lankan government to abandon these military moves and to resume the search fora political Solution. These public expre
9

Page 22
ssions of displeasure from New Delhi strained relations between the two countries in February and March 1987. On 14 March 1987 an Indian er Tissary, another Minister of State, Dinesh Singh was sent to Teet President Jayewardene in the hope that the political process could be revived. In response, the Sri Lankan government offered the Tamils a cease-firefor the duration of the national holidays in April 1987. The LTTE spurned this offer and responded with the Good Friday bus Tassacre where 130 persons were rowed down by automatic Weapons on the road frÕTTI TriCo Tale to COIOTO. The LTTE's allies followed this up with a bomb explosion in Colombo's main bus station in which over 100 persons were killed.
Faced with a serious erosion of political Support as a result of these outrages, the government decided to make an attempt to regain Control of the Jaffna peninsula. "Operation Liberation' which began on 26 May 1987 in the Wadamarachchi division On the north-eastern part of the peninsula Was directed at preventing the hitherto easy TOW Terht of Tier and matcriel fro Tamil Nadu. By the end of May Sri Lankan forces had gained control of this area. The LTTE, the most formidable Tamil separatist group, had suffered a serious setback, and in a region they had dominated for long. This demonstration of the LTTE's failure as a fighting forces triggerred off the chain of events which resulted cwgntually in Indian military interwention in Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict.
At this point India moved swiftly to prewent the Subjugation of the Jaffna peninsula by the Sri Lankan forces. The Indiam High Commissioner, J. N. Dixit, pointedly informed Lalith Ath Lula thir Tudali, Minister of National Security, that India would not permit the Sri Lanka army to take Jaffna.' The same message was conveyed to President Jayewardene himself on 27 May. That afternoon he had ceremonia|ly opened the Bank of Ceylons's new headquarters building. In the course of his speech on that occasion he had dwelt at Some length on the Wada marachchi operation, and the government's intention to proceed with that ti|| the LTTE forces Were defeated. In the evening Dixit called on him at his in Ward Place and conveyed a message from the government of India. The gist of it was written by Dixit (on an envelope!)It read as followed:
1. "Deeply disappointed and distre
SSed.
2. Thousands of civilians killed since
2O
1983 a 5 : Indignation. 3. Your latest of Isula has alt of our unders
4. We Callot a
5. Please do not policies."
The "review of ou threatened on beha rnment came very q a Well-published mc 3.2 m fror T1 the TarTi| the LT TE ad its || rnment, for ils part, itIS OW rl irħi Wollweer Tier irTimbroglio when it al sending shipments ( products to Jaffna W facing a sewere sh through a blockade forces. Despite the nkan government to COrCade Hig Tiggd si in a flotila of abo Wessels, was dispat but Was turned ba mawy. When this hap force il a blatat wi) law and of the Sri L poped food and medi On the following day a UITiStikable de support for the Tamil in Sri Lanka. The tO 3ffrì a Corti. Le Weeks by sea with reluctant agreemen government. There Erld of June, IndoWere mired in mutl. deep suspicion. An conflict seemed hea debilitating deadlock
The north-east CO; Insula — the Smug under the Control Ol and navy, and the newly established ir territory braced ther the attacks the LTTE against them. The fa been dislodged from of the Jaffna penins. booster to the army, Jaffna peninsula ha Irldiami ter"Wention – and the JT3 for Tai|| Welcome supply off meSSage India app seerTed clear enoug either the military s

LrOused tre Tmendo US
ensiwe in Jaffna periered the entire basis tanding. ccept Genocide.
force LIstorgwie Wour
r policies" which Dixit lf of the Indian goveLuickly. There was first retary grant of USS Nadu government to ies, The Indian goWeescalated the level of it in the Sri Lankan nounced that it was if food and petroleum which, it claimed, Was rtage of these items by the Sri Lankan refusal of the Sri Laaccept this offer, Cor or it, a first ship Tent, ut 20 Indian fishing led Qn 3 JLIris 1987 Ick by the Sri Lanka pened, the Indian air latior fit-Tatial -апКап аігspace droCal Supplies in Jaffna Alt15E COristitute monstration of Indian separatist move lent dian supply of food | Over the next few he formal but clearly t of the Sri Lankar Suit was that, by the Sri Lankan relations all recritination and d the island's ethnic ded for prolonged and
ast of the Jaffna peniIglers Coast - Was the Sri Lanka army Camps the army had that narrow strip of Tselves to withstand Was certain to launch |ct that the LTTE had the north-east coast ula came as a morale BLlt the TiTi|S. Ofte takenheart from the - the air-drop of food, ly correct but not very pod sent by ship. The eared to be sending gh: We will not permit ubjugation of Jaffna
with the bloodshed it would cause, mor Would We permit an economic blockade of the Jaffna peninsula to bring its people to their kness. The Indian High Commission in Colombo through its first secretary H.S. Puri figured Wery prominently in this food distribution campaign in Jaffna. The eCStatic Welco T1e the Indians received in Jaffna - it was garlands cheers all the Way - was one of the most conspicuous features of this episode. Those who maSterminded the distribution Off OOOH or this Occasion Were left With the illusion that they had Jaffna literally in the palms of their hands, They were to learn soon enough that nothing is so enwanescent than the plaudits of a hard pressed people in their first encounters with their presuTed liberatorS.
In the rest of the country the Tood was a mixture of anxiety over a long War of attrition in the north (there was less anxiety about the eastern Coast) and among the people at large as Well as among large Sections of the intelligentsia an attitude to India which ranged from atavistic fear to a helpless rage, an attitude which the then Prime Minister's (R. Premadasa's) speeches mirrored all too accurately.
NOTES
22. On the problers of the Easton Provirica and its links with the concept of a traditional homeland of the Tamils, see G.H. Peiris, "An Appraisal of the Concept of a Traditional HTEländ in Sri Lankā“ Eric Susses Fgport Wol IX (1).January 1991, pp. 13-39; K.M. de Silwa, Tradiliaria/ Horrelands of hig Tamils of Sri Lanka: A Historical Appraisä. |CES Occasional Papers, No. 1987,
23. This is Extracted fram paragraph 11 af "The Working Paper on the Bangalore DiscuSSIS." 18 November 1936.
24. Two groups of MP's rorth the Eastern Prown|CO met the Indian delegation om 18 arrd 19 DeCerTiber. Tha first was led by K.W. DigwalayEIgE, IT), Mirhistor of HTTE AFfläi '55, and Lig meating was held at the Parliament building On 13 DeCerTiber, Tho Second group consisted of five Muslim MPs from the Eastern Prowincg.
25. Wincent Perera, MP for Yatiyantata, and later
District Minister for Amparai,
26. These extracts are from Dias Abeysinghe's
riLէE5,
27. Ilyicd. The LTTEspokesmam om his occasion Was Balasubfa Tania Ti Kanagaratnam better km10"Wm by his rarı da qLJErre of Pahint, and associated with him was Sathasivam Kristiak Litar or Kidd Lu.
2. Allah TLdlimā d thS kW Presdert Jayewardena and the Cabinet om 12 ALugust 1987, J.R. Jayewardene Miss,
29, This note is now in the J.F. Jayewardene Mss. Whether the warning to Athulathmudal Was prior to this Tot is mot ceriläimi,

Page 23
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Page 24
STILL LEADING Mr. William Thompson obtain
and established the first Joint in this island On
01st June 1841.
He called it
“Bank of Ceylon That was 150 years ago, but that was not We. We opened our doors in 1939 only to capture our rightful place in Banking and are proud to say that we si
LEAD
Over the years banking profession shared our expertise and BANK OF CEYLON
became Sri Lanka’s
SANDHURST TO BANKERS
Bank
Bank
 

ed a Royal Charter Stock Commerical Bank
till
of Ceylon
ers to the Nation