கவனிக்க: இந்த மின்னூலைத் தனிப்பட்ட வாசிப்பு, உசாத்துணைத் தேவைகளுக்கு மட்டுமே பயன்படுத்தலாம். வேறு பயன்பாடுகளுக்கு ஆசிரியரின்/பதிப்புரிமையாளரின் அனுமதி பெறப்பட வேண்டும்.
இது கூகிள் எழுத்துணரியால் தானியக்கமாக உருவாக்கப்பட்ட கோப்பு. இந்த மின்னூல் மெய்ப்புப் பார்க்கப்படவில்லை.
இந்தப் படைப்பின் நூலகப் பக்கத்தினை பார்வையிட பின்வரும் இணைப்புக்குச் செல்லவும்: Lanka Guardian 1993.10.01

Page 1
ANKA
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Page 3
TRENDS
Quicker, costlier paSSports, Wis as The passport office and alred depaLLCCMaL TLCL L LC CuLLLLLLCL LLLLLL GGLLSS dernised so issue quicker passports and Wisis. But is documents Wialso G0LLCS M KMaaOOCMLL LLLCLCLLL LL S LLLLLL million rupees arri Lally is expected after These charges.
More English in the interior
Rural schools in areas classified by "Hig Education Departimin Erfas "difficLu/F" (a pD0ffff9feirir for "backward") ar 9 To be posted Wish 850 regerfly passed OL reachers of English, Firy Thousand sa le exarillipr for Eglish chers, only 850 qualified,
The professor stands firm
Professor Carl FOTGEka WWF racinsider his decision to quit. The professor resigned in disgust when students of the Kalaniya University's Medical Faculty, of which he is the dear, broke their pledge to hiri that they would nor rag freshers.
"I find || ||Tipossible to teach with any degree of enthusiasm students who have decieved гле апd ошІwіїївd плg", ІЛg professoг, who has геfшsвої to wiIndra Wris rgsgräfiori, Sad,
Port Worker foils attempt
Ar aser porf Worker fased a confraCors i FerTript for STTLigg's farge quarily Of Lifta albārdā WE55|| Wish ser filizar Orld for the North, Uriars used by the L L L L H aC CGCGCHMMCtCLLLCCLL LL LLGLMMCLLS OLOMMLu LH LLLLLL LLLL L LLlLGHHLLLLLLLS LLSuO 5есілгїy fогcas are олІлв лшлf fога ELIST ESSET TGr, fr) Fr's Corl77FICTIONIT.
BRIEFly...
"TETOriSt' StateTert: ThOrh daTha Ca Luti OLIS
LLLLSelLLLLLLLLY LLLLLLLLS EES Šter. Thndārārās rāctdati Sly to PresidentD.B. Wijet Lunga's Statement that Sri Lanka had no ethnic probler but only a terrorist probler. In recenil public stater nefits thĖ President has repeatedly said that terrorism must be Wipped Jut, and that there was no "Tarnil problem". MrThondaman, a nember of the Government, Flas begritaIking loud and clear in recent times as a spokes Tarn for thë Tamil people. His reaction to the President's apparent hard lil HaS EEE CHL utiLIS.
In a recant newspaper interview the Tamil leader said: "It is the experience of history that Stater TjBrits are made by perSons in positions and these statements cannot be interpreted in isolation. CrB has naturallyt CD Consider SLCh, Sta=
L'ÈrTErits in The CON mal policy, Porsor part of thig Worldar stätBITIErlls form: Tipola tOblast the
No obje After the PLO-I PLO ESSEf HinTi Mp3 Tied : Palästir do ti the ro-Eastablish II tiÕITIS EGLWCOn Sri Lanka as a free to do whatever it its Writerests,
Elite NGOS
ETVirÜTIEarl M Tasinghe toldari by the Central En that elite"English: nned his Tinistry iri, NGOs, Liriti WEEE : SET) li
"COLu ask 5:1L םחקlalחEוחחסWIrחB with the NGOs",
CORRESPC
PreSidert
Whatapuny de ratulgariakes in dasa, to show tha Sri Lanka Wā5G a hit in liberal principle:
EVE if Ore C. on its face Walue, "depriwing his op rights", "marilբLilF for his partisan C: ngfully obstruct the life of Parliar "paridering to rai |issn", and "causir Tetri Etiri: from Parliament", Preliadasa front SE TE WEG I Willi powerful No. 2 po: (1977-88), Arriare that aiding and at a punishable offer
| WIGh EO IIGle Pri tā Werthere was against thatherlle A. Amirthalingart, ngers like Cyril Ma sբawing vandm Wat di PT2TTiad the highest tradi assembly? To porc TädäSa "Sailed W Tory SerWES, TE Ranaraja, the the

"text of general natioSiripositions in any e Cori Strained to Irlake lny a reason, for exaTorale of a people".
!ction TOW
ira el peace accord the in ColorTito, Mr Ibraaid that the people of nawa any objection to ent of diplomatic relaLīkā līSā. S Country had the right
thought was best in illé arnbä55:3dOr Solid.
shun ministry
iristar Will Wickreeting of NGOs called vironmental ALuthority spCaking" NGOSShI LErld War I:lld II ioning in the villages
mỉmistry, he Säitl.
uld be tha Solwing of tlers and not conflic 1 rTılirii:SEer" SBi.d.
DNDENCE
| Premadasa
ferth 52 Char 1 BikeH WAITH =
his Eulogy to Prer Täthe late President of Imaľnist, Whe bel|BWed S (LIG, Sept. 1).
capts the answer "No" for chargEas SLuchi aS, ponents of their civic ling the Constitution
I Werience", "Tearriticism", "extending art by a referendurin", cis/T and CommuragrTernbers of parliaTiirili ES. O ba drive OTE CETTO EXCTEIHEE hese charges, EECa Luпg particірапl a! lhв sition for eleven years Luriga should realis heltinig a Crir Ti E is also TCE.
only. Orle example of ics in the parliament. O-Confidence motion adar of the opposition,
and Verbal ITUd-Sl|- the Wand Others Were the TULF leader, isa do? Did he uphold tions of the august lect his position, Pretil Lil WWE". If ilright only Shelton n deputy minister of
Justice, took a stand against the nasty remarks of his fellow party incmbers and showed courage by voting Edgainst that ridiculous notio. Wils this the humanist politician who believed in liberal principles?
SEch Sri Fanta C)Saka Bild:SCETICE 15 tit Luta, Osaka, Japan
Human Rights
I fead the article by Dr Muzzafar om "HUMAN RIGHTSDEBATE-WESTERN DOMINATION" published in LANKA GUARDIANJuly 1993.
The Gulf crisis crept up in the 90's. In late fifties our Urdu poet Majid Lahori, a Editor of Weekly NAMAKDAN, Wrde:
"USA KA "UU" HAI BAKI SLJE. NO HINO" y:1135 l'UNO' ''' represent USA and rest is No - No El No.
Ayatulah Khoment the spritual leader and One of the two great revolutionaries of this century called USA 'SATAN".
The only way to combat and control this satan is unity of purpose among poor COUmtries, specially SAARC, ASEAN, NAM,
Mohamad Harco Ah TEd Kirci
GUARDAN
Wol. 16 No. 11 October 1, 1993
Price Rs. 10.OO
Published fortnightly by Lanka Guardian Publishing Co. Ltd. NO. 246, Unior Place Coll-2.
Editor. Mervyn de Silva Telephone, 447584
Printed by Ananda Press 825, Sir Ratnajothi Saravananuttu Mawatha, Color TıbO 13. Telephone: 435975
CONTENTS
News Background 3 TEMiddlEEH5 PdCI PICCggg ATTIECTIFICEtt
E1015 CV 日 Cābdi Ruralist Of the UNP PoIT 12 J. R. Years (11) 13 Keeping the Puritan at Bay 5 A Tale af Two Tigers (2) 17 A1 Encounter with Lalith O

Page 4
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* Computerised meters " Canbe Summoned to wOL * No call up charge within city limits " Wehicle acc * Receipts issued on request *. Company credit avat
CaII 50 1502 50 1503 or
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Another Aitken Spence
 


Page 5
NEWS BACKGROUND
THE END OF
Mervyn de Silva
"History repeats itself, first as tragedy, En Sfar.E." Si Marx.
Marx was Wrong. It could be the other Way about. That at least is the Werdict of modern Sri Lankan history. In mid-1956, the Federal party led by Mr. S.J.W. Chelyanayakam re-asserted publicly that "an autonomous Tamil linguistic state within a federal union of Ceylon" was the Only Safe guarantee of "The Cultura freedoгл алd ideлIїїy of Іле Талтї-speakiлg people." At another rally the FP demand Was the "Widest autor O'Tous and residuary powers consistent with the unity and external security of Ceylon'.
On 6th July 1993, Mr. K. Sirinivasan MP for Jaffna, the northern capital, addressed an "urgent appeal" to members of the multi-party Paria Tentary Select Commite. Saīd:
"Given its utmost importance to the political aspirations of the people of the North and East, and recognising the unfounded fear in the minds of the people of the South, and taking into account the day-to-day suffering of the people of the North-and-East, and to stop any innocent people getting killed, I have tabled a proposal on the basis of FEDERALISM as a revitable alternative to the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of July 29th 1987".
Mr. Sirinivasan is not only the MP for Jaffna but a member of the multi-party Parliamentary Select Committee chaired by an Opposition (SLFP) MP, Mr, Mangala Moonesingha. The Colmittee itself was a landmark in the island's political history. It was based on a motion moved by a пепiber of the major opposition party, the SLFP of former Prime Minister, Mrs. Bandaranaike and seconded by Mr. Stanley Tilleker at Ea a Stalwärt of the SLFP, Who was Speaker in the SLFP dominated pa
EL of the 1970S.
FortFTESTÉES lect Comittee it negotiated settler question" founded
la COSESUS.
THE LES OF TE COPTITittee WEFE9ED sufficiently pointe hopes.
"Thlat this Paria a Select Committe
(A) to arrive at a question in Wollwing! to the other an
(B) to prevent
(i) the disint:
(ii) the killing members of th youths fighting
Undate
The Iyster letters" has be:
There was ni
According to MP's Wre "r time". Or sh Millister Pre MP'S "*" te
etters of rei Secretary-Gen. mt:rit."
When Mir. Lg checked tii T. the S.G., Mr. replied the ne said "I did Lundated lette from any MP re of the 8th

UAW -
JAW
- and now 2
ns, the multi-party Se>ld out the hope of a ent of "the national on an all-party ornatio
ference of the Select Oad enough as Well as d to encourage. Such
ment is of opinion that e be appointed
political solution to the the devolution of power
eastern provinces
agration of the nation;
is of innocent civilians, earned forces and the
för a cause
2d letters
of the "ul Ildated 31 soliw c2d.
3. Tiny stery!
PresidentJR UNP ady to sign at any Ley had told Prime Ia da 5 a. And these own gave undated sig lation to the rial of Parlia
kshman Jayakody a cently (25/9) with Nihal Seneviratre, xt day. His letter not receive any Its of resignation during the tenuParliainent.”
(iii) tha increased militarisation of the culture of violence in our country, and
(C) toachiave peace and political stability and utilise the reduced defence expenditure for rapid economic growth and national development."
While moving the Motion, Mr. MoonesiTighe Dr[]p.0Sed an HTT1ẹndment to delelE. the Word "national" which appeared beWeen the Words "the" and "question" in the notice in paragraph (a). The House agreed, 45 MP's representing all parties Were named by the Speaker Mr. M.H. Mohammed. It is the biggest committee іп parliamentary history.
These were the Tail issues that einerged from the Submissions, proposals and evidence
(1) Whether the temporarily merged North and East (a provision of the JR-Gandhipact) should continue to be One Unit, with special arrangements frlade to safeguard MuSITT iritBrests.
(2) Whether North and East should be Taldeindependertunits af dewölution.
(3) Whether North-and-East merger Should continue except for the Siinhala populated, which could be annexed to neighbouring (Sinhala populated) provinces and
(4) whether the unit of devolution should be the district (or, implied, Province)
(5) Whether provincial councils should be abolished except in the NG|| :rd E:151

Page 6
Wat Were the Chief TES OF "TESLI sidestanding and mistrust". The report identfies the following-colonisation of lands, law and order, delays in implementing laws pertaining to devolution.
L LLL LLaaLHH LLLLLLLLSLLLLLLLL LLLLLLLLS nialism" is a familiar concept. "Merger" highlights another basic idea - "traditioa horneland". WOS deland? Or what is the claim based? History, of course. But history is always on the move, So to which page of the "history book" does one turn. The answeris most cases, is to "that page or chapter" which reinforces your case). "Law and Order" was also a vexed question. Of course. It concerns "security", personal security and group or collective security. The source of the anxiety is ethnic character and professional discipline, if the law-and-o- rder personnel - the police and the armed services - are drawn exclusively from one community (a party to the Conflict) then the highest standards of professional discipline and neutrality, Cannot be presumed. To the Tamils (or any minority in situations of high tension) the "neutral" instrument of a presuriably "neutral" State is never impartial. The allegiances represented by uniform are rarely as strong as the primordial loyalties of race.
LSLSLLLL aa aLLL LLaH aC LaLa LLLLLLL the 13tha Ted Teat Nationald Pro Wiricial police could be established.
A majority of the Committee accepted a proposal of Mr. Sirinivasan that each province, North and East, be treated as "district units" of devolution.
Unlike majority of the Muslims in other provinces, the Muslims of the east, speak Tamil. The representations made by the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress of Mr. Ashraf MP, made it clear that he emphasied the need to safeguard the interests of the Muslims. Traditionally, the Muslim community certainly the Muslims of the east, were the least politicised community.
But the "War in the east, the fiercest battleground, changed all that in the case of the Muslims, it is perhaps the internatioLL LLaLLL LLaLLLL LL LLL LLLLL LLLLH LLL0L resulted in a heightened self-awareness. refer of course to the Islamic resurgence and the very special attention paid to the beseiged eastern province Muslirts by the Arab and Islamic diplomatic missions in Colorid.
疊
Finally, Mr. K. Si Writtelto PrE Sidet | a multi-party parliami visit Jaffna to negoti the secessionist Tam
Sj
"What you carndo obviously what Mrs. E Thind Wheel She Said Ef ilt of afd to t Will be lo Solutio to St. Praka body, including the g Bild the North-e El5t W. if the problem was Sinhala race Would Sinhala paper герої toughly Worded reje separatism and the "del". We Callot CO
Thereby thank you for your continued Su tabled in front of you
| hawa diSCUSSCd || Eräivit ITOSt Of L about the deterioral Lanka -politically a political Solution to SO Luld be airTieġ cd atti tion of any form of na any community in Sr
If the Tamils shoul for their right of së leaders accept a pa that Will ensure thep cal, economical am Tamil people; and th a|OW drid facilitetet of thJSg TigaSUITES reality that Sri Lanka multi-lingual plurals Statese, Tails ar. grising that they haW and each ethnic groL ral andlingusticident sing that the Northe Provinces haVe béE habitation of Sri Lar peoples, who hawe lived together in the ethnic groups.

finivasa M.P. has Wijetunge to perTTit antary delegation to ate a ceasefire With il'tigers.
However the state lents of the President and the Opposition leader together With the military build-up in the East suggest that this is not the political climate that is best Suited to such an initiative,
rima's Tougher Line
|| Cal do better' is Bandaramaik3 Filad in "We would not give | EelaTiStS. TETE the North-East queran is arrested. NoOwen Timment, Want St0 ar. She Warned that lot. SWESCO the
be a minority". A l, included another ction of any deal or
clear reiteration of Cede airch, OfOLUT
motherland, Norshall We permitanybody else to do so. Even India failed to capture Prabhakaran. Neither this government or any other wants to end the war". Any final solution is only possible said the Opposition leader only if the SLFP is given the оррогішпity.
ThLS, Mrs.B. has Tiet President DB ("thereis: no ethnic problemonly a terrorist menace") Wijetunge's challenge in the traditional UNP-SLFP Contest for Sinhale
53 53TitiTEt Ed Wote.
Urgent appeal
all with appreciation pportto пyproposal
detail it hole and he concerned people ting situation in Sri nd economically any
til natiral CriSiS 1e Complète eliminational oppression on i LEarhka.
d to give up their fight Cëssion the Sinhala ckage of measures rotection of the politid national rights of at they are Willing to efull implementation
and to accept the IS TIL IL-GLC är society consisting of d Muslims and recoe Well defined history po hasa distimCt CultLtity, and also recogniIn and the Easter I areas of historical lkan Tamll speaking Bit al| ||ITIES, HIEFETLD) a territory with other
When such political wisdom is demoinstrated in practice by Sinhala political leaders then the Tamil people themselves may choose not to exercise their right of SeCESSOl.
Given to the utmost importance to the political aspiration of the people of North and East and recogni sing the UnfoLunded fear in the minds of the people of South, taking the day to day suffering of the people of North and East and to stop any further innocent people getting killed, have tabled a proposal on the basis of LLLLLL LLL LLLLaLSLLHLS0L LLLLLLLL LLLLGLLS KK a LLL LLLLLLLS0LL LLLL LLLLHLL a 0aa July 1987.
plead the Select Committee to accept my proposal or its absolute composite and strengthen if necessary so that it will nöt Orly Teet the aspiration of the people of North and East but of all the oppressed people of Sri Lanka.
Let us first federate Sri Lanka to Elossom into a United Federal Republic of Sri Lanka which will play a vital historic role in the economic and political stability of the South Asian Region and its commitrilent to World peace,
K. Siriris MP
AFFMA,

Page 7
The Middle East
John Gooneratine
(A BCIS Seminar paper)
OE can identify the following central issues in What Carne to be called the Question of Palestine, and the Middle East issue, and the efforts to solve the through What is referred to as the Middle East Peace process.
(a) Recognition of Israel:
Though a Tember of the U.N., Tiany states, especially the Arab States and its political allies refused either to recognise or to establish diplomatic relations with the State of Israel. The preference on the part of the Arab States for an international Conference Under UN auspices to Solve the Middle East issue was meant in part to avoid having to recognise Israel at a bilateral lewel. There are Still Some Arab States that would not even use the late Israel, preferring to refer to it as "the Zionist Entity". A refusal of one side to admit the equality of the other was frequently a major obstacle to negotiations.
(b) Recognition of the Palestine Libe
ration Organisation (PLO):
Parallel to the refusal of Arab Countries to recognise the existence of Israel, in turn Israel and the U.S. refused to recognise or deal With the PLO though it was Widely recognised as the representative of the Palestinian people. Most of the time, the Israel Government characterised the PLO as a terrorist organisation.
The problems of legitimacy and recognition of the PLO were not With the Israeli side alone. The Palestinians, scattered and living in different Arab countries, had to depend on the hospitality of the host Countries. It was often hospitality with strings attached. The strings were in the forn of havingto Supportorbeing manipulated by the host Arab country in the different inter-Arab disputes that took place. The PLO also had to depend on the generosity of the richer Arab countries for financial aid, Preserving Palestinian interests, and at the same time pleasing a host
A5епіогForeigпService officer, Ілеwгіїег Was Sri Lanka Ambassador in Baghdad, during the GULF WAR.
of dilwe TSB Ara ar difficult exercise for
Recognition of e. held as the critical of each party, and king peace. On the With recognition W. negotiations be on a Ver the overal ausp
(c) Super-Power
W:
The Super-p the US ard US after the grid O. red the Way Sey WEľE SEET. ( helped accent tгуіпg to get tf power of the L Apart from the different Arab this region con of the petrole World, helped East problena ly to the fluctu Super-power ri
A s a corrollar in the Middle also depended regional balan place under th r-powerrivalry, in the area Cor The TLS o ilitE that of the 5tat
eLIT.
(d) Different Polit Ctinga Solutic Issue:
Hawling a close eff the Palestine ques East SSLe Were the Ilda TS of the COLIntri: nging crises that fi priorities. Elections different administra need to solve the pr East in diffBré Sc events as they occu Shah Ճf Iran, the taki

Peace Process
Tibitions Was a Tost the PLO leadership,
ach by the other Was test of the intentions tS SeriOLISITESSin Ta! part of Israel, along et til dett bilateral level, Whateices be.
rivalry and the Cold
ower rivalгуbelween SR Which Setin SÖOr1 f World War II, ColoVeral regional Conflicts Countries in conflict Jate this distortion by le help of One Super ther on to their side. : strategic location of countries, the fact that tained the larger part JIT TE SOLITICES of the
transfix the Middle ndits solution secureating fortunes of the alry in the Cold War.
y to this, the progress East peace process On the charges in the Ce of forces taking Ie umbrella of supeThe balance Offorces mprised not only elletry strength but also ogic resource ofpetro
ical Calendars Affeto the Middle East
ector efforts to Solwe tiO I Bard ta Middle different political caleSiswolwed, and Chagured on their list of in the US brought in tions that saw the Oblets of the Middle ales of priority. Also red like the fall of the пg of Аппегісап diplo
Tats hostage in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq War, and mostrecently the Iraqi invasior of KL Wait, tended to take centre stage, pushing aside Other regional problems, Elections in Israel brought in different Governments that either saw marit in holding on to the Occupied territories and toughing it out, or others that saw merit in negotiating land for peace. In the Arab countries changes in Government soretires were accompanied by changes in policy, either emphasising Arab nationalism or concentrating on more immediate national interests. Calibrating all these forces or influences in the search for peace was mot an easy exercise.
One can discern three phases in the progression of the peace process to date. The first phase could be taken as the period up to the October 1973 war and the Camp David Accords that followed it in September 1978, and culminating in a Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty on 27th March 1979. A second phase could be taken as the period from 1980 up to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990; and the third phase could be taken as the period following end of the Gulf War, which also saw a little prior to it, the end of the Cold War following the collapse of the Soviet Uri.
PEACE PROCESS, UPTO THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS
After a prolonged period of demoralsing defeats in the Arab confrontation. With Israel, the military successes scored by Egyptin the October 1973 War, however short-lived they may hawe been, gawe a Certain confidence to the Egyptian leadership, The War also showed that Israel was not is tirnune to attack from Arab armies, inspite of the buffer areas they had captured in the June 1967 War. In addition to the military jolt givento Israel in the October 1973 War, the Arab-side Was also able toshoWan unusual amount ofjointaction, especially in the use of the oil weapon. There was also a change in the regional balance of power when Egypt sought a approchement With the United States.
(СолIїпшеd олpage B)

Page 8
Armed Conflict at the E
Peter Wallen Steer and Karin Axel
(Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala Univers
Predictions for the post-Cold War era
CLL K HL LMLLL HL HLLLLLLL LL LCHMK
LLHHT HLHCHL LkLL LLLLLL LkLLkLLL LL LLLLLL racked by ethnic and nationalist violeCLS CL MMMLLLLLL LLLLCCHLLC LMT LL CCC was of arried conflict for the period 1989-92 and makes a first analysis of them. So Гаг, пеfihвгthв птost pessіппіsחסlitfiםraנן:Limisfirםטstטr the mטsfip: m YLL ie LHLLLLHHLLL LLLLS S LL L LLLLLL 0L OLLLK LHHLHLLuL HCLL CLLCCLLLCL L0LCLCLHCS aa this is rif 1ain y drefol ar 1 find:Ted H.5ed i'r плілогягтпеdсолflicts, рагїїcшІагӀуfголп 797 foi 7592. Wars (in Wolfwing Treffan 1000 гlваih5 iл яsiпglв увяг) ялd fпtвг ediate conflicts show site charge over irre. Analyzed by región Europa Ілегеasingly has becргте ат агела for LLLLLL LLLLLLLLYLLS LLLLL S LL SLLLLLLS LLLLLLLT
L0LLLL LLLL K MMM LLLLLLL LHHLLK carfiels was reduced during the fairyearperiod. Ir Africa and Asfathgrevets Irre Grange drid in North Americano arried confircraft during this period. The Ending af frie Cald War ha5 perinLLLLLL LLLLHMMLLL HH LLLHCLHuLLL HLHHL MH bear suppressed rather than resolved. Affhe sarme firme, theendafsLiperpower Tiwaffroy has improved the conditions for Corn Tarrning and reso f'wiring Conflicts and prgWarnTirng thGir" asCaflatforT. To i. cfa fa hises two forces have kept each other
CEC.
truction
The four years from 1989 to 1992 hawe Seen momentous change in the global system. At the beginning of 1989 the World was still divided into two blocs aligned to the two dominant Superpowers. True, there had been a few years of detente in C relations, EdSorel VIITEL LOwards conflict resolution could be noted, e.g. in the Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq and NaTibia conflicts. However, the basic structure of the global system remained intact, EdEdITTEdCOficS ESWEES E SEEC for solutions often involved the blocs. By the end of 1992 this situation had changed fundamentally. The Soviet Union had - in a ref narkably peaceful way - been dissolved, to be replaced by fifteen coutries all facing the arduous task of state
6
-building." The Wars sidd || GTTT t/Russian troops Wer withdrawing from E. Europe, and US troco stern Europe. A see Order Constructed E poles Was replaced by USA appeared as th But the US CądgrSF to its own future rol E con its Way Out, but Y replaced by unipolar anything, there Was
patterns had chang n-making agenda WE flicts in Somalia, in andir Carbij Odia, WF1 powers no longer h. reading the situation.
Was the World place, as the threat Subsided? Would W. (Mueller, 1989)? Or W insEcure place, ästh lationalist violence mer, 1990)? Without E questions fully to rest data. On armed Confli Suggests. Some poSS
" Arted Conflicts mpatibilities which C and/or territory Wher force by two parties, is the govern Tert of least 25 battle-relate
" Art Conflicts Concept JSEd Ft ere, must have TËSulted in lated deaths duringt
Weld We died arried conflicts' ont of activity:
MOT ATTIECO in less than 1000 b. during the course of
" Interdat Co Thore than 1000 batti in the COLISE OLE

End of the Cold War
玛州
W Picted ary réunited. Sowie"e in the prOCESS Cof aSLETT Eard Cefträ| as were leaving Wemingly stable World round two military fragmentation. The Le Sole globalactor, po Was un Certaina5 , Bipolarity seemed was ricotir Tir Tnediately ity or multipolarity. If non polarity. Conflict ed: Or the decisiore, for instance, coformer Yugoslavia ere the former supead a simple rriapo for
OW EN TOESecure of nuclear War had TEOECOTE OESOlete as the World a Tore threat of ethnic and ad risen (Mearsheibeing ableto ay such this article presents icts in 1989-92, and
ble al SWEETS.
EE COtESE il COOMCBT) gCWernment e the use of armed Of which at least one a State, riġSults ir at di deaths.
is the lost inclusive To qualify, a conflict at least 25 battle-reПe year.
SeaWerali Sub-SetS Off ld basis of the level
nflicts haye resulted attle-related deaths EE COIfiliCt.
flict:SG Flä WEITWOWE e-relatedd death Silduconflict and at least
25 deaths but not 1000 during the particular year. These are protracted conflicts; Some are still on an intensive level today, While others may have peaked earlier, but remain unsolved and continue to be acti
WE.
Wars have resulted in more than 1000 battle-related deaths during one particular year.
Major Armed Conflicts are alarmed Conflicts Withı Tuqor Betharlı 1000. deathSE-dLIring the course of the conflict; i.e. starriadate Corfscs -- Wars.
2. Armed conflicts and Level of
Activity
A total of 82arried conflicts Were recorded for the four years. The Conflicts were fought in 60 locations, involving at least 64 governments, More than qone third of alIUN membergovermmerntSWeredirectly in Wolved in at least ore arted conflict in this period. Over 150 opposition organizations were engaged militarily. In fact, the real figure is even higher, since some are recorded as collectivities. In marry cases (e.g. in Afghanistan and Kashmir) it is very difficult to distinguish organizations from each other; in other cases (e.g. in Palestiпе, Guatemalaапd El Salvador]шmbrella organizations appear as actors.
Of the 82 ared conflicts, 35 were recorded as Wars, resulting in at least 1000 battle-related deaths in a single year. Although our data are insufficient to estimate the total. Il'UITiber Of death5 due to armed conflicts in this period, it was undoubtedly more than 70 000 in 1992 alone; for the Whole period the number of deaths is likely to run to six digits. What is reported here is by any gauge a very high number of conflicts and actors, invowing considerable areas and a significant proportion of World population. We cannot aLLLLLLLaaLLLLLLLaLLLLa LLLLLLLL LLLLLL at a high level of armed action throughout these four years.
Table shows the armed conflicts 1989-92 by year and level of activity. The most marked shift is for minor armed conflicts,

Page 9
i.e. armed conflicts which have resulted in less than 1000 battle-related deaths during the course of the conflict: In 1992 they showed a clearincrease. Intermediate armed conflicts-i.e.the more protracted ones - are gradually but slowly decreasing in number. New conflicts of this type have Eпerged, notably Croatia, classified as a War in 1991, but at a low level of activity during 1992. The number of Wars - armed conflicts resulting in LHHLH LaLLL LLLLLL aLLLLLLLLL LLLLL L a single year-has increased slightly, but notas dramatically as might be expected from media coverage. The number of major armed conflicts, the sum of the two highest levels of activity, remains Wirtually unchanged during this period.
The time-span is short, but significant, and there are several possible interpretations. The sharp increase in low-intensity conflicts in 1992 maypointinian important direction for the future. Several of these conflicts, such as the ones in Georgia, Moldova, Burundi and Niger, are likely to intensify or to become protracted. Nevertheless, the number of Wars has been kept at a tower level - suggesting that the international community has at least some capacity to contain conflicts. The number of protracted conflicts testifies, however, to the inability to find lasting SolutiOStO WEl-KOWIl ConflictS.
Table. Number of Armed Conflicts by Level of Activity and Year
TSJEGG GG7 gg ggg
Mill TAFTTECDTIFits 13 TE 15 F2
LGGLLHHLLLLLLL LLLLLLL LLMLLLLLLLL SS K SS 0 SS 0S SSS K
War TO TE O 2)
| ATCHES 5 E 5
3. Regional Patterns
The regional distribution of the armed LLLLLLLLS LLLLLLa Laa C LLa0LL HL00L0 LLL armed conflicts in Europe, a region with virtually no overt military conflicts during the Cold War. In 1989 there Were two Conflicts, one new and Very brief (Romania) and one very old and protracted (Northern Ireland). Since then new conflicts have been added continuously. Most other regions show little change,
although there is a tendency in Africa for .
Some protracted conflicts to end. Only Centra South ATmerica hlas a COSistent pattern of declining numbers. There were
10 arrThed Conflicts in North AITigricia d'U-
ring this period.
The number ofор (mostly non-govern militarily active in t follows the annual There is, however, 1992 over the previc sponding to the ir Some conflicts. With Iber of actors had teld (e.g. Lebanon) level (Liberia). All: Conflicts had at leaS
t.
4, Arned Cofic: Incompatibiliti
The Conflicts hav to whether they col territory, This distin ther the Conflicts a Within states. In fact, CÖlfiscSWBrèclaSS Only the conflicts Ira stan, Mauritania-Sel ma pittedtwo interni recognized states a th:355 CaSBS the til territory and the fou Thus, the bulk of gli What is legally de ISS Lues, father than the following We dis due to the OWLIT
filiCS.
For the full perior Conflicts - i.e., 49% 1. FOT Fo Id rcentage Were 54, 4 Tipatibilities overgo' are represented in throughout the peric sting regional pat ShareS OftGrritorial | rty high in 1992 for E (74%), lower for A Middle East (43%) a in Arnerica. Throug provided the locatio ongoing territorial a the intra-state territ Triddelards fra pendence for partic had several protra nature, notably in Inc and Indonesia. Af lar belief, such dis Common, although animportant factori actual break-up of

30sition Organizations Tental Organizations) he conflicts basically LIITiber of Conflicts. no great increase in us three years correCIESE COTICS 1. a corsiderable 1Lby then been terminaorbrought to a lo Wer arge number of 'ne'W tinitially, relatively fe'W
tälld
ES
"a been classified as ncern government or ction is applied Whea fought between or vегуfewof the armed ic'inter-state conflicts. q-Kuwait, India-Pakinegaland USA-Panaationally and mutually gainst each other. In ree first concerned rth one governmento. balconflict concerns Scribed as interial international Ones. In regard this distinction liber of inter-State CO
i, 40 of the 82 armed — сопсеппеdgove|widual years, the pe4, 54, 46. ThLIS, incoWernmentand territory fairly equal numbers d. There is an intereter, however: The ssues Were particulaurope (88%) and Asia frica (36%) and the nd completely absent hout the period, Asia Il for close to half the Irmed conflicts. All of orial conflicts conceItonomy or even indeular regions. Asia has cted conflicts of this dia, Myanmar (Burma) rica, Contrary topopuLute:S ha We Tot been Ethnic identity is of err in African politics. The states has been rare,
however, and the most recent example of such a process - the independence of Eritra from Ethiopia - is often seen as a special case of decolonization.
5. Beyond the Cold War This overview has presented some data on Armed Conflicts in an interesting four-year period. The number of armed conflicts in general increased-particularly during 1992, and particularly for minor armed conflicts. Major armed conflicts remained frequent, but stable. The most marked shift is that Europe once again has become an arena for armed conflict. In other Words, the new era is different from the Cold War period, but it is not dramatically more violent. Nuclear disarmament agreements are in place and Some are being implemented. Although nuclear proliferation was feared, there is yet no evidence that it is actually occurring. There is, in other Words, little room for nostalgia about the Cold War period which contaiпеdпапу апппеdconflicts frequenly fueled by the Cold Warrivalries. It is too early to make a finaljudgement, howewer, The only clearly post-Cold War year, 1992, augurs badly for the future with a sharp riSB i TiOTETTIGd Conflicts. At thila 5a time, however, the number of Wars did not increase. In general, the data suggest that nuclear bipolarity and nuclear non-polarity are both compatible with a high level of alled conflict.
The most important post-Cold Warshift affects Europe, Cold Warpolarization probably kept a number of conflicts latent and frozen, particularly in Europe. In other regions the Cold War was, in fact, quite 'hot'. Thus, the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet empire saw the re-emergence of conflicts which had been suppressed, rather than resolved.
This increase in lumber of armed conflicts in Europe has not been accompanied by similar increases elsewhere, hoWeyer. This may Suggest a pattern of delinking developments in Europe from those of other regions. In Central and South America, the number of arred conflicts has decreased. In this region Successful processes of conflict resolution have taken place, notably in Nicaragula and El Salwador, Creating fragile but Still lĖSS Wiolet Conditions. In Africa, Soltions have been found, notably in Western Sahara - but not without Setbacks, as in Angola. The Third World cases may be
구

Page 10
closely linked historically to the ending of LL LLaaa LLLLS a LLLLLL L LLLLL LLL LLLLLL ceased to be actively interested in pursuing certain Third World conflicts, and turned instead to processes of conflict resolution or disengagement. In some cases, arms supplies Were ended, which played a role in the downfall of regimes previously supported by the Superpowers, in Ethiopia-but it may also have resulted in the loss of control over Sofile actors, as With UNITA in Angola. Seemingly intraCitable Conflicts, like the One ilı Lebanıdı,
We elded.
The basic stability in number of major armed conflicts in other words, was the result of two forces operating in different directions. On the one hand there Were those pursuing a military end to existing incompatibilities, leading to new conflicts and, thus, resulting in increasing nuTibers. On the other hand there were those solving on-going conflicts through negotiations and peace accords, thus bringing dOWm the Owerrall riurnbers. The ending of the Cold War had an effect on both these sides of the equation, keeping Stable the OWET || Liber of arTTE CO
FICT.
NOTES
S LLL0LLLLL LLLkeuLLMM LML LCCCC LLLLL L LLLLL LLLLLLL
copiratively peaceful Ways, notably the British and
French empires in Asia and Africa, in contrast to the Experience With tha Czarist Russian Eind Astro-HuMMMMM LL MMLLLLS CLLuLLuHMMMMLLuLLGL LLLLLLLLMS LHHLKS
Wer, in the dating of the process of dissolution. The
Afghanisian War Initiated in 1977g Ildy WEll be Edgarded EWEartLJally as thB - Wiolent beginning of the Brodyr LHEB SGIDIWigt; Union 1.
2. For definition and opgrationalization ses Heldt, 1992 arid Ulridger, 1991. The lower threshold of 25 deaths was introduced to increas the reliability of the coding.
0S S LLLLLL LLLCLLLLeLuLuLuOLL LLu LCCHuMuLOLMaMueMMMML
lity Seg Walensigen, 1951, 1935,
KS LHL LLLL L LL LaH HLLL LLMHLHHLu LLeMMueuL LLLMLLGL LGLLLLLLLS
LHM LMLM LMMLC CLLL0 La LLMLL L LMMLLLLLLLL
privius reports (Hell, 992; Lindgren, 1991; Wallaristcon, 1989), conflicts with less than 25 ball-rela: led deaths were also included, Major arried curitics Suscidas irisgograd chapters in Lihle SIFRIF Yearticok
Held. Et al., 1992, 1993; Lindgren Blal, 1939, 1990,
1991, Wilso Wallensteal, 1988 theoretically
L LL uLLLL0L LLLLL uuu YLLLLLL0L LLLLLK LLLLLL LLL LLLL L LLLLL LLLL S
LLLMLLSLLMLLuLS LLLLuLLMMLLHLLLLMMLeLLLMLaaLLL
MLMLL LMMML MG LLLHTLTTLM LMMLL L LLuMMLLLLL
kL LL LLLLLLLLS LMLaL LLLLLLG L LaLLLLLLLLuuk
ட
reportigd dat On Emmed |ПЕ EliГпiпаtiоп г. БогTE
irl sorTig c35:S they ELTE
5, Ali Liss billi: Ħu l
The Middle E
(சோபசd from page:
Confirming this chan policies, in March 19 the Friendship Treaty Union.
The decisive chan Sidor to del direct W its long-held policy o Contacts. With Israel. 1977, President Sad nt OLIS als 10Uri Cer Thür) visit JBrUSalgTl. Per
jolle55 of the är. teda positive respor Mistr METECET
Sideeda hardB. Led JeruSalleľT CỦr 19 Prime Minister Begir visit to sailia or 2: TI COLCOTT Of Life ||
a decision t) iristitu
political and military Settlement.
WBltB diSCLISSi between Egypt and down in predictable dent Jimmy Carter W With the two leaders, step of inviting Presic Minister Begin to me to break the deadloc the beginning of Septı
Following the ne David With Fle active dent Carter Prile President Sadat sig which together provi peace in the Middle deat With the bilater: Egypt and Israel, W. undertook to resolve Ce Treaty providingf Wall from Sinaj and ! orial relations be Intries. Though it too the three month per Accords envisaged, signed between Egy MElfChl 1979.
TE SECCI d.CL

Conflicts BrĘ Tainly dua in G, h55mäler Corfiels, Ind
duEEoriginotation.
El llur gër, Birgely Colonial
history, daling to thig Ctiloittäin, British, French and US imperial days. This legacy affected issues ol LLuuLLL MauLLHLLMMMLS CT S C0L00S LHHLLGGCLLCLS LLLLCS ties had lagay recognized gach other.
ast. . .
5)
ge of direction of its 76 Egypt abrogated it had With the Soviet
ge Was Egypt's decliwith Israel, Shedding f not having bilateral | Ori 9th November at Ilade the Tomeof his readiness to парs it was the wегу LICETEt that eliciSefron Israeli Prime Begin, who was coPTESidet Sadat WISIl NWE TE 19of. reciprocated with a 5IF DELETTEET 1977. SäiliäSLITTiit Was le bilateral talkS On auestions affecting a
ons and negotiations Israeli got bogged difficultieS, US Presid) haid beari irtOLIC took the unexpected Et Sadat ad Prilla et him, In an atterTipt k, at Camp David at
bg 1978.
gotiations at Cartıp d II led||alis01. OTPIES|- Minister Begin and ned tWO documents ded a fra TeWork för
East. Ong of theSe a probles between nich the two leaders by concluding a Peaor alsraeli Withdrathe Stablish Tert of Ween the two COUka little longer than iod the Camp David a Peace Treaty was pland Israel on 26th
et deat With the
question of the future of the West Bank and Gaza, the Palestinian side of the Middle East question. No progress could be made in this area of the future of Palestine. In the Arab World the agreements Were regarded as proof that President Sadat had abandoned the Palestiiar CaLJSë ard hi5 Arab ali 55 i OTdI3r to satisfy purely Egyptian interests. Further, critics of the Accord argued that it was futile for Egypt to negotiate on behalf of LL L L0LLLLLLLLCLLL LHaLLL a L LLLKLLLaLLLLLLLS had Thot been CDISLulted.
Camp David Accord highlighted the following factors that led to its successful outcome. The first was the necessity of direct contact and dialogue with Israel. Secondly, it also showed the advantage that the United States held in being able to Tediate an agreement, being the only Super power that was able to conduct negotiations with both Israel and Egypt.
Though no progress was possible on the Palestinian part of the Cartıp David Accord, the Palestinian CaLSB received prominence and support from Arab Countries that were opposed to the Accord. An Arab Summit that was held in Algeria in November 1973 decided to accept the PLO as "the Sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people". In September 1974 the U.N. General Assembly decided to put on the UN Agenda for the first time "Le PaleStirliam Question". Im NOWember 1974. La Clair Taft E PILO E Sir Arafat addressed the UNGA. The PLO standing in the international arena was LLLLLS S LLLLLLL LLLL LL LLLLLLLOLLLLHLLLL 1985 the UN. General Assembly adopted three resolutions Concerning Palestine. The first established a 20-lation Comttee to Work outplans for the implementation of the Palestinian right "to self-determination and national independence" the second invited the PLO to take part illa | flutu TE UN debates or the Middle East and the third de Our Cedizionis Til as SK aLLL a LLLLLL LL LLLLLLLK aLLLLLLL0S ."חסון
Next: The Erply Years

Page 11
Cambodia : Polls, Hur
Jeevan Thiagarajah
(Coordinator, Cambodian H.R. Task Force)
n October 23rd, 1991, four
Cambodian parties signed an Agreement in Paris on a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian conflict, the airn of which is to, to restore and shaintain peace in Cambodia and to promote and ensure the exercise of the right of self-determination of the Cambodian people through free and fair elections. The Paris Agreement formally ended the internatiola and domesticated conflict. Which had affected the country since 1979.
As set out by the mandate flowing from the Paris Accord, UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority of Cambodia) coinducted an election from 23rd to 28th May, 1993 to elect members for a Constituent Assembly. Elections were held in all 21 provinces of Cambodia. From 23rd to 25th of May, 1,400 large, medium and small fixed polling stations were operated in äcdition g 200 mobilé EäITS in remolE areas pursuant to which the FUNEINPEC party won 1,824,188 votes or 45.47 per cent of the Wotes to CPP's 1533,471 votes or 38.23 per cent. The BLBP party won 152,764 votes or 3.81 per cent of Wotés Cast. The nufTber of Saals WGI In the constituent Assembly was 58 for FUNCINPEC, 51 for CPP, 10 for BLDP and | for MOLINAKA.
General ASSeSSment
In assessing changes in the human rights situation since UNTAC's arrival one year ago, it is difficult often to distinguish between the impact of UNTAC's human rights activities per se, on the one hand, and the impact of the peace process itself, including the mere presence of a large international peасеkeeping operatioп. The cessation of major art Ted hostilities, with few exceptions, following the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements, alone constitutes the single most important improvement in human rights. The absence of War has permitted greater econdmic activity and has allowed a much larger portion of the population to live free of forced conscription, generalized violence and displacement.
There exists very visibly much broader economic and social freedom throughout the country. The lifting of many restraints on private enterprise have allowed an improvement in the economic Well being of at least some segments of society, mainly in urban areas. The unprecedeinted growth of contacts with foreigners and the huge increase in the availability of new information and ideas, in the form of foreign publications and teaching, hawe
Worked to undermir Social Controls whic Active popular patr tionin religious activ after long suppress cal parties and hu. tions have opened administered areas gained hundreds (
TbJETS.
Cambodian politi has hesitatingly an process of re-e: aspects of which a rre Versible Whileo ngent upon the de attention and prote his transitional peri
Juxtaposed to thi wer, there rernains rious human rights into question the wial tic proceSS. The Si challenge facing the of human rights is state of Cambodian ted absence of an accountability... Er promote human rig legitimate state auth ctures run the seric or being seem to porc
Ethnic hatred, pr rSons of Vietnare: immigrants or borr resulted in mountil The potential for Wit explosive issue is Serious repercussio. ral process and for r Wing and violent raci rmine all other pro human rights and attention and cond rnational communit are directly respons attacks against et
Tmunities, other C Well have encourag part for political gair
WIlle Carbodiar begun to re-emerg of Various Conten over the past year, ssion still holds that in Check, Surveilla trary arrest and dete instances of torture arbitrагy executions ntrolled by all four These repressive
(The Writer works f

man Rights and NGO's
Le to Some degree the h previously existed. onage and participaitieshavere-еппегged ion. Alternative politiTinan rights organiza
offices across SOC and have collectively of thOLSards of Te
cal and civil Society di tenu0uslybegun a stablish ment, many "d even now perhaps 1ersmayStillbe contigree of interrational !ction present during
sliberalization, howea number of Very seconcerns which bring bility of a full democraingle Tnost important a long term protection the highly militarized Society and the relay rule of law or civil Iergetic attempts to īts in the ābēc of ority and judicial struIus risk of promoting,
mote, anarchy.
incipally against pese descent, Wheather in Cambodia, has g civilian casualties. lent unrest from this clearly present, With 15 for both the electoegionalistability. GroSrT1 Could easilyuridegress іп the areа of requires the closest frtination by the inteV. Although the PDK ible for recent violent flic; WieträmESE CDambodian parties as ed ethiiChatred, in
political Society has 2, mainly in the form ing political parties, ieverepoliticalгергеolitical Society largely Ce, intimidation, arbintion as Well assor The - and summary and COtiLE in area SCOCambodian parties. factices by Cambo
r I.C.E.S. Colombo)
dian security forces and party officials reflect an absence of any rule of law and call into question the long term viability of democratic institutions in Cambodia.
Together with socialland ECOnomic liberalization has come a variety of social and economicils which effect the funda Tental rights of Cambodian citizens. Rising incoThe disparities, particularly between urban and rural populations is readily apparent. The breakdown of already minimal Social Services in the Wake of declining state revenues has meant that many vulnerable groups in society, in particular, are not hawling their basic reeds riet. There is as Well as a rise in related Social problems such as child labour and urban Crime. The lack of support for basic economic and Social rights is a major destablizing force, which also undermines political efforts towards democratic government.
Buddhism has historically been an irportant source of social authority in Cambodia and the basis for many ethical supportive of respect for human rights. Though the Buddhist order of monks or Sangha hawe made significant steps foWard in reasserting their traditional role in Cambodian society, restrictions on religious freedom remain. All factions continue to intervene in the religious activities of individual and to exercise undue influence over the Sangha through attempts at political indoctrination and the appointment of the ecclesiastical hierarchy.
Finally, as a result of UNTAC's inability to access areas controlled by the PDK, no human rights activities for people in those a reas have been possible. Given the history of PDK policies and its current non-Cooperation. With the peace process, it must be assumed that no political freedorm is tolerated and that fundamental violations of basic human rights continues unchecked for the approximately tempercent of the population living in that zone, The increased mass killing of Cambodians of Vietnamese descent by NADK Units has raised again the question of a possible return to the "Policies and practi. ces of the past" in Cambodia, and is a major destabilizing factor as well as a grawe human rights violation.
Accessions to International Human Rights instruments
The signing of seven majorinternational human rights instruments by the Supreme National Council of Cambodia (SNC) has given the UNTAC Human Rights Componenta Useful startingpointandan overa|| legal framework for its activities. The

Page 12

g: 70 ADHOC ne= pated in the Taskfor will act as monitors :tiom period and poll knowledge gained ADHOC is in the zing a coLurse for its so that they too can in their regions. Oılır.E. 1400 TOT= antibodia for the one and plans to Take Sassessilent of the Is ld results.
DHCOC is contir Luing ducation program in and the provinces. action period, these adapted to include e electoral law and To date, ADHOC proximately 60 COLCBS With Ower 3000 OCS Confidelt of its to this educatWe if it. Custer the is for its program. It
assistance to the d.
ırk: ADHCC intend5 e process of drafting an. It has begun to by participating in a aoul Jenner (a TieTAC Corstitutionali na draft Bill of Rights
a Workshop on the the judiciary. The tatives agree that the uld embody and aspirations; but note
Were there is no
WEEEE BEDEE
20 years of isolation, it is difficult to generate meaningful discussion among ordinary people about their economic, political and social desires or needs. They suggest that international NGOs may be able to assist With the development of innovative strategies to assistin discovering and articuating people's aspirations for their future. They noted that one of ADHOC's long-term plan is to establish a research Centre.
Legal Reform System; ADHOC plans to monitor and evaluate the performance of the government and opposition parties in the post-election period. It noted its particular interestin ensuring the legitimation of customary law in the new legal system. Some ADHOC members are also being trained as defenders in the CourSBS Currently being run by the Human Rights Component.
Other Areas of Work: The ADHOC representatives spoke of the need for human rights associations to develop initiatives which improve the lives of ordinary people in a concrete Way. This necessity derives not only from the imperative of implementing human rights rather than just talking about them, butas from the asSociation:5 need to build up their credibility and support base. For its part, ADHOC has been chose two fields for this concreLE WOrk.
educational rights, to improve access to schooling; and
" consumer rights, to protect the Tost vulnerable from deception adud.
Na:Gerneral Corn CCITT75
AM & CO., LTD.
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MBO 13.
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433143-5, 27669,28812

Page 13
Ruralisation of the populism or authori
Mick MOOre
Introduction
The results of the 1993 Pro Wicial (COLncil elections attracted attention in part because the UNP (in alliance with the CWC) did relatively well in the more rural districts. The extent of this association is actually very striking. As is evident from columns (b) and () of Table 1, there was, on a district basis, a marked positive association between the proportion of the Wote obtaimed by the UNP/CWC and the proportion of the employed population Working in agriculture. This association is statistically very significant (see below). Discussion of the significance of this shift in the UNP's electoral base may be muddied by the fact that, as always, the UNP also did extremely well in Colombo, taking all seats within the Municipal boundaries. The UNPlaintained its 'traditional' Colombo base, but, Outside Colombo, becarle associated with rurality, agriculture, and
Two main explanations were put for rward at the time. One is the increasing voting strength of the Indian Tamil population because of re-enfranchisellent, and the closeness of the alliance of the CWC with the UNP. This is undoubtedly Walid, although there remains a question about why the estate population remained so loyal to the CWC (see below). The CWC wote is significantonly in Nu Wara Eliya and Badula distПCl5. Yet the "TUTalisation" of the UNP has also occurred elsewhere. The second and more popular explanation is the populism, and alleged popularity in rural areas, of the late President Preradasa, who was assassinated a few days before the polls. There is a great deal of plausibility in that argument. Janasa wiya, Gann Udawa, the Mobile Presidential Secretariat, the 300 garment factory prograTime - as well as Premadasa's increasingly open attacks on the urban, upper class and Golgaria, political, administratiWe, Social and business establishment - are all cited in Support.
One minor Worry about the "Prernadasa-populist interpretation of the ruralisatiom of the UN PiiS that there is little Gwideпсе 1hat Premadasa was indeed popular in the rural areas. There is howevera Tore tangible objection: the ruralisation of the UNP vote is not a recent phenomenon,
but a long term process that has been
underway at least since 1982, when the UNP leaderand President was J. R. Jaya
Wardene, an urba here, on the basis on Voting patterns ruralisation is prob personal factors St. political leadership the increasing ins UNP as the ruling state apparatus. W. districts hawe beco'|| Supporters notbec the party, but beca L. to pressures from to go to the polls, an Conversely, the op greater capacity to Tla Chine in the les stricts, Where there for political organis Voting, easier acce general, a greateг ruling party/statem
Before presentin I need to explain used, and how.
The data base
Sri Lanka has h elections over the Parliament, the F Councils, and loca and a Refered LT life of the existing is an indicator of th component of the p mentary elections a variety of alters liming and sequer political leadership ChanceSOfSUCCBS been Tarked by tion, The 1988 F ctions Were boycot electionS hawe lO rther and Easte Which remain unt LTTE, and parts arTed Conflict an displacement. Oth rent parties and : differet COnte:StS. cient stability to statistical analysis of all these proble been as follows:
1) have narrow polity I have stud rthern and Easter
(Dr. Moore teache

UNIP :
tariani Sm ?
'patrician'. I argue of statistical evidence since 1970, that this ably little affected by ch as the style of the but actually reflects itutionalisation of the
party controlling the ters in the Tore rural The reliably UNPCWC U5E oferthiUsia STT för se they are vulnerable the local party Cadres do Wote Sir StructEd. position parties have
resist the UNPCWC s agricultural rural diare alterratiWE DESES ation, a tradition of "left S5 to Colombo and, in capacity to resist the
Chile.
gthe statistical results, What StatistiC5 I ha WE
held a wide wariety of past two decades: for Presidency, Provincial al government bodies
in 1982 to extend the Partiamerit. Indeed, it e shrinking democratic ollythatregulaграгіiahave been replaced by lative contests Whose Icing is decided by the to maximise their OWr s. Some elections have Considerable intimidaPro Wicial Councileleted by the SLFP. Some bogel Held in the NOIn Provinces, parts of der the Citrol of the subject to continual id massive population er than the UNP, diffealiances hawe eltered How Carole find suffiundertake meaningful of the results in the face ms?’ my procedure has
ad the boundaries of the ied to exclude the NOPOWICE-5. Alte data
is at Sussex University)
below relate to the other seven ("malInstream") proWinces (ConTiporising Sewenteen districts), which accounted for 87% of the 1981 population. There is a justification for this procedure beyond simple necessity. I have effectively excluded the areas dominated by Sri Lanka Tamils. Here, a separate pattern of party Competition has prevailed since the Inception of the party system. In the seven mainstream provinces, the various ethnic minorities hawe mainly been incorporated into the Sinhalese-dominated two-bloc pattern of the UNP versus the SLFP and allies. By contrast, although the UNP has been a significant electoral actor in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, especially the aller Province and especialy in Barfier years, the dominant axis of political competition there has been between distinct Tamil parties. The pattern of political competition in the mainstream provinces has in fact been little affected by the removal of the two mainly Tamil provinces from the electoral arena in recent years. It follows that the data used here relate to a population that is predominantly Sinhalese-in 1981, 84%. Sinhalese, 6% Indian Tamil, 5% Sri Lanka Moor, 4% Sri Lanka Tamil,
and 1% other'.
2) I have analysed the data only for those elections which were (a) contested both by the UNP and the SLFP and, more importantly, where the voting itself Was reasonably free and fair. I have not included the April 1988 Provincial Council elections, which were not contested by the SLFP and were adversely affected by the JWP's attempts to enforce a boycott of the polls. More importantly, l Flawe excluded the Presidential election of December 1988 and the Parliamentary elections of February 1989, because of the impossibility of Sorting out the effects on Woting of the JWP and the other kinds of Violence and intimidation which took place under tē Clower of thE JWP.
Data for six national elections are included in this analysis: the 1970 and 1977 Partiamentary elections; the first Preside= tial elections, heldin COctober 1982, after the adoption of a new constitution and an Executive Presidency in 1978; the Refererldur held in December 1982 to Walidate the President's decision to extend the life of the 1977 Parliament by a further six years; local government elections of May 1991, after the JWP had been decimated
11

Page 14
" န္တုပြုစုစ္ဆင့္အမ္ရစ္သဖ္ရစ္ ပ္ရစ္ဌက္ကဌ၊ alia InCE mainstream provinces; and the Provincial leader entered the
Council elections of May 1993. Some observers may question whether the Referendurn should be in this list. There Was no doubt, by previous standards, a great deal of intimidation by the regime. Levels of Voterparticipation also dipped considerably compared to the Presidential elections held a few weeks previously (see Table 4). I stick to the view, formed by analysing the results at the time, that this intimidation did not substantially affect the districtWise pattern of results, although it certainly helped produce the overall result that the UNP government wanted. The Iain reason to include the results of the 1982 Referendum in the analysis is that, as will become clear below, the intimidation employed by the regime brought about a sudden shift to a new pattern of electoral support for the ruling UNPWhich
as since been Consolidated.
While the Six elections included in the analysis were different inform, they in all cases involved a clear contest between the UNP. On the One side and the SLFP and other mainly-Sinhalese parties on the other, and were contested in all arenas within the seven mainstream provinces.
3) While the UNP has become the dominant party in Sri Lanka in terms of size, organisation and electoral success, it has never contested any election without some kind of alliance or understanding With one or more smaller parties. Since this relationship has sometimes been close and sustained, questions arise about defining the boundaries of the UNP for statistical purposes, have made three decisions:
(a) The analysis has not been exteinded back further than 1970. This is largely because, at the 1965 general elections, the UNP had an electoral understanding with the Sri Lanka Freedom Socialist Party (SLFSP). This was formed the personal and Caste network of C.P. de Silva after he defected from the SLFP government and brought it down in December 1964. The SLFSP was a sufficiently strong electoral force in a small number of districts in 1965 to muddy the waters about the boundaries of the UNP.
(b) The MEP, was also allied to the UNIP ir 1965 and 1970. I ha Wen0t included its tiny voting strength -less than 1% of votes cast - in the figures for the UNP in 1970 on the grounds that this was a personal/family wote for Phillip Gunawardena andhiS SUCCESSIOfS.
(c) Most importantly, I have included the CWCin the UNP throughout the period Covered here. The CWC did not contest the 1970 general elections. It contested and Won one Seat in 1977, in de facio but
12
be a Minister EWE supported the UNPs been in close electo an increasing num hawe been a Warded voting rights. The ( significant electoral
rural districts. Nuwa its inclusion. Within UNPisimportant tot paperinways that wi
To Sulmarise, the rporate the following
itionS:
COLL C OLIT He Tills to Thoцgh
Ffiller Illicitly Hadg) Ireji
This glic Exterildi Οη α με Osa Ma
So OLT To T. Оп the Oficar a
The pго TLE ex. Misguiu Andre The CO BetLLee BEILIJEes Alf No
Backgr Signall: MeTTor Will His El Cfall Li RCICe CLI LfSo Wille F ΕsίΓατι BLI ELS Brough T Was Ch

With the UNP. Its |ovеппment апd has Since. The CWC has trongly and has since alaliance." In return, er Of Indian Tamils citizenship and thus EWC has become a orce in the two very a Eliya and Badulla. lebounda ries of the le Conclusions Ofthis be explained below.
StatiScSbelo WinCOprocedures and defi
(i) The term "UNP vote" refers to the Cobred UNP tid the CWC Wote.
(ii) Unless otherwise stated, all data refer only to the Seven mainstream Prownces, excluding the Northern and Eastern Provin.Ce5.
(iii) Totals of votes refer to valid Woles only.
(iv) The 1970 and 1977 voting statistics have been adjusted to allow for the existence of a few multi-member electoraLes irl Which individual Voter:S COuld Cast tWO or three votes.
To be cantinued)
The Scholars Tale PETEW
ошлп сопрцІed оп Pгодгапгте "o claiлпеd һе сопсешеdпо Родготъ Tror, he said later, LUCIs sportanleaLLS his corrupLLter Wirus pro Led Cort tagious
nore the framleLDork Trythology
sillel on sor Le doLUIl as poter lf potions ing the Elite LLuis FL Air Jarl Lotions
LITOLITOLIS ethnic (ILITI 2d Li to a religious diaspora ographically slanted Uersion lla Pari Nibb(ITIGISeTOI.
Hero's Programune locked im rele 55 U LILLE2 FGDC0CL Tire priniture Tythological interface "legedly Chosen Race
дгалпппе сагеfшllypiclcedшр Color fal elles Trtixed Lip) gs on Universal franchise 2 Education for the plain guys
pLiter aralysed the cort tradiction
the Don Carayas and the Kandyar Kingdon п Ilie Shop-keepers National Revival
ther serfdoms survival
LLnd noise from the Microchips d Chola.Il irluasion and int ÉrigLe '-stored for feeding the Facists Fir Indian Expansion ist Thesis ation thus printed Lith its load Iriables in their triggered TTLode d Religion researched into Night
Luisted, filses to dyrlarnise -Tech singerprintedgenes ec exert Sia These Él'UEFTS WTLIS" |TLOSEULTLLler || TILLIC fort
the prodding hallucination - Aryan топороly ofРошег
llenged. innipoterit, and soL r.
(Corld...)
U. KALLlatilake

Page 15
THE J.R. YEARS - (11)
The July
Arden
ithin the first two years of the
U.N.P. government, inflation had made heavy inroads into the living standards of the fixed-income earners, mainly public servants. The Joint Trade Union Action Cornrittee called a convention of public Service trade union delegates, LLLLLLLHH LLLLLL LLLL L LLLLLLLHHLLLLL LLH 0 LLLLL 0 March 1980. Nearly 4000 attended. It was decided to ask the government for a Wage increase of Rs. 300 a month (less than 20 U.S.S. at the rate then prevailing). This demand was communicated to the goveпппепt bшt по герly was received; the government offered no dialogue, The J.T.U.A.C. decided to call a day of protest on 5 June With a half-day strike.
The president called a gathering of the U.N.P. trade Linion, the Jatika Sewaka Sangamaya (J.S.S.) and said that the J.T.U.A.C. was planning to disrupt a popularly elected government and invited the J.S.S. to observe 5 June as a day of cooperation with the government by staging a courter-protest. Thls Was a foolish and provocative decision which openly invited confrontation and violence and, in fact, ended tragically with the death of a trade Unionist, D, SOrmapala.
A month passed. Then on 5 July 12 railway Workers at the Ratmalana Workshop were interdicted in connection with Some incidents that Were alleged to have taken place on 5 June. There was not any similar action taken at any other goveгпппent office orworkplacewhere workers had struck. The railway unions attempted a dialogue With the management but Without result; the management refused to discuss the interdictions. On 7 July the Workers at the Workshop struck Work demanding the reinstatement of the interdicted workers and a wage increase of Rs. 300 permonth. On 11 July the J.T.U.A.C. met and decided to call a general strike. On 14 July it informed the president that its member unions would go on strike on 18 July.
Neither the president nor the Labour Minister, even at this late stage, offered
198C
to di SCLUSS the ISSLE The government's r duce, on 16 July, el Ulder til E Public Se claring practically a and private, as "es that all Strikers in SL Considered to hawa
On 18 July the st til U.T.U.A.C. | Hyde Park was b. Tent instead, LE blic meeting on tha tt || Strikr5 ha Would not be permi This resulted into
The Strike Was Cru
The governme. 40,000 Workers had union sources clai bject WE3E3; 1 BC), and 10 the strikers Weree In typical Jayeward: Was permitted to m the re-employment his own ministry, th rent ITlinisters adog Thousands remain StrOLIS StrikB reSLult of Workers who lost Suicide.
The Way a simpl increase, to meet inflation, Was allow: proportions without government to talkt t0 underStard Ulle: deliberately engine With the intention regtaliation that WOL activity for years to Was the way it work
It WSG the ClO gawe statutory reCC WorkgrS tOfOTT1 tra ded for their regis trade Union had thi
and WOrkers Wh0 re.
Wera Within their le Unior Ordinal Ceo

) strike
is with the J.T.U.A.C. esponse was to introTergency regulations acurity Ordinance deservices, both public Seti SEWICES" ald Ich Services WOLuld bei vacated their posts.
like began. A meeting called for that day at anned by tha goVea president held a poLday and announced d lost their jobs and tted to return to Work. 'e unions walking out.
shed
it ETOLICE LHEt lost their jobs. (Trade irred the figure was Othousand). Some of Ventually taken back. nestyle each minister äkg FIS OWT UES fOT of Sacked WorkerS irn us ensuring that diffeited different criteria. 3d SackEd. Ti5 diSa2dina large number their jobs committing
e demand for a wage hardships caused by d to BSCalate to these the least effort by the Othe Unions is difficult SS it was a showdown Iered by government if inflicting a crushing ld inhibit trade union Corne; certainly that ed Out.
nial government that Ignition to the right of de Unions, and provitration. A registered e right to call a strike sponded to such a call gal right. (The Trade
1935).
The Civil Rights Movement pointed out that even during the War, when under the Defence Regulations, the colonial goveTrent banned strikes and lockouts in essential services, the order of the governor provided tribunals for the settlement of disputes. (Order made by the governor On 19 March 1942).
The Industrial Disputes Act of 1951 provided machinery for the settlement of industrial disputes but section 49 of that Act expressly excluded Workmen employed in the service of government and so the conciliation machinery of the Industrial Disputes Act is not available to gove
Tert Workers.
In 1979 the U.N.P. government of JayeWardene passad the Essential Public Services Act under which the president was e Tipo Weredito declare ary Service rendered by government departments, public corporations and local bodies "essential Services". A whole variety of punishments was provided for offences under the act including imprisonment up to 5 years, confiscation of property and, in the case of an offender who belonged to any profeSsion, cancellation of his registration to practise that profession. No provision was made for any alternative remedy which the public service Worker could seek instead of a strike.
During the 1972 bank clerks' strike Finance Minister N. M. Perera Sacked 2,644 clerks employed in state banks; President Jayewardene's response to the 1980 strike was equally ruthless but on a much larger Scale, involving the dismiSSal of (according to the government's OWnfigures) 40,000 Workers.
Jayewardene likes to Call himself a trade unior leader; but he approves of trade union activity only when he is in the opposition; when he is in the government he abhors it. When the 7,000-strong Public Services NUTSES Union Went Orl Strike LLYLLLLL 0LLLLLLL LLaLLLLLLL0LLLLLLaL LLLL LL Spokes Tart of the Lumion, Mur Luttett.We Ananda Thero, a Buddhist monk. Jayewadele claimed that a Buddhistork had
13

Page 16
no business to be heading a nurses' union because it was a violation of what the Buddha preached about "the relationship that should exist betWear the Maha Sangha and Women". He proscribed the union. (The Weekend 23 March 1986). President Jayewardene is a Buddhist; Sri Laikais a Secular. State.
At the Electricity Board's celebrations held on 5 April, the president said: "People are striking and demanding higher salarigs in the South While in the North and the East soldiers are dying for the Country's sake, People in the South did not SëëIII to realise this is not a time Of peace in the country". (Sunday Observer 6 April 1986). This would hawe gone down big With Lankans Who are ar ellotional people had not the Weekend, a paper not controlled by the government, on the same day, carried the following:
"A brand new fleet of luxury Mercedes Benz limousines Will be acquired by the government for use by politicos and visiting W.I.P.'s, Atleast five argon Order and one for use by a very important politician has just been landed and cleared. This 4.2 litre model, regarded as one of the lost luxurious, costs around five million rupees and has 60 extra factory-fitted accessories which are considered optional. It has also air-conditioning, power steering, power shutters, electrically adjusted rear seats, and curtaining on Windows.
Another four Benz 200s have been ordered. One Will go to a politico and the other three to the W.I.P. carpool. Last year the government ordered 16 Mercedes-Benz cars; five of them were 380s, eight 280s and the others 300s. Among the cars ordered is a fully bulletproof Benz 500 which is custom-built, but has been sent to England for special
Codificat 5.
The car Weighing more than 4.5 tons Will, hOWEVEer, not Carry the agents' guarantee due to the special modifications.
Another prominent politician who acquireda luxury Benz last week complained that his cassette player malfunctioned; the agent used D.H.L. Courier service to fly down a factory fitted Becker radio and cassette set within three days, as a replacement, at a cost of Rs. 40,000".
Toba Coring
14
Crick
D.A. de Silva
חr Sri_LankaטrmםF)
The August issue magazine carried the E CIG of Sri-L because they prefer South Africans later
dieShaWe CarlCell: planned Tests in No Can participate in asi in India. Like Some prominise suit, Sri La 24000 as compensat West Indies, presum EJE Sātigfield With tog i
Sport follows ther cricket is no exceptic kās ar he Test enthusiastic of crick to OST all to offer the from bigger crowds rship. Nor, most impi the large immigrant Imidla, Pakistan and til in England and Whi HOUSE. Tost of the ti SLuffer for reasolis Lu quality of our cricket.
If that were all, w bBar it. Buttoo ofter ofunWarrantedslight is unacceptable. For broLha-ha over the L. ntly concluded Seri Indians are chronic C protestationshaweth their 'holier than thoL tions. However I Wa news that the Sout for neutral umpires bowling actions of Our |Illa far ärld Warla W
| Wasa great fan of: before it was barred naiscene, Longbefo Mike Frjl:E ET LE Ten like Dudley NoL and Hugh Tayfield places in my World el: Cricketers, I Would
SELE SEISB y ETS WEľE Ot = W there Were so Tiany E tion, White Suprema sidg5 årld 50 favis t
NOW South Africa other Cricketing natio those Who I have SOLu Länkar Crickt. That

et Chaul Vinism
AIT bassador Algie de Silva fakes his gloves of
of the "Cricketer" bad news. Australia sanka's planned tour
this year. The West d two of their three vember so that they X-rlation tournarTlent ictim of a breach of nka is to be paid E. ion by Australia. The ably, think We should one night stand.
ОПey these days and om. Although Sri Laknowledgeable and it far is curlarket is eWards Which Cortle and richer sponsOrtantly, do We hawe COT1Lities Wic File:West dies hawe ch gшагаntee a ful| TE. As a result, We Conected Will the rs' регіогmaпce.
g can only grin, and We are the targets Orcriticism and that get for a mor Terit the Impiring in the recees With Iridia. TjE or plainers and their e same credibility as 'foreign policy posiis saddened by the Africans had asked and a Video of the "two spinners, MuraEET
SLAfric CTICKEt from the internatiore the emergence of a Pollock brothers, Irse, Jock Cameror WOLld CCT pete for
WEIS. South Africa TEASON, WESTE SJ0that their rugby plahich explained Why 30ers (and, by definicists) in their rugger git, Cricket glEWES.
alas, joins all the is in the black list of ght to denigrate Sri list is long and gro
Wing and among them are individuals who are living legends in their own countries. Take Imran Khan, for instance. He was One of the early qualifiers. Cricketers are free to criticise our umpires and We have heard plenty of that in recent times. But they are not free to go to such extremes, as Imran did in his autobioraphy, and say: "I hate to play in Sri Lanka". One would think Pakistaniumpires are paragons of Virtue. My memory goes back to the drawn out draws between India and Pakistan in the "fifties and the critical role which umpiring played in those deathless encouInters, Inmore recent times, of course, 獸 has belfast the redoubtable Shakoot
EE
To get back to Imran. The only way could get back at him Was to wish him the best of bad luck thereafter. That wasn't always easy when one happened to be present While Imran Was playing. Wasat Lord's in 1989 when he appeared in the gäfflE] [[]. C[]TTITIBITIDFBIE'MM'C's Bl=CErlEminial. It could hawe been his last appeararice at Lord's and refrained from praying that he go for a duck. To be horest, I did Want to be entertained by his stroke making too. So I compromised as Neville Cardus did when the old enemy in the shape of Some brilliant Australian baSman arrived at the crease. "Dear Lord", Cardus Would pray, "let him get 50 but no more, please". As it happened, Imran Scored Some 80 odd runs so I got my Stroke play but the satisfaction too of seeing him dismissed short of a century. Alās, he gawe me no futher CaLISe for pleasure ar dit Was With decidedly mixed feelings that reacted to his leading Pakistan to Victory in the World Cup of 1991.
Another icon to make my black list was the great Australian cricketer and commestator — Richie Bėnaud. His Wasan error
of Ormission - and a Very grawe one
indeed. One of the brawest centuries ever made on afirst Testappearance at Lorld's Was Sidath Wettimuny's 190 in 1984. Hardly had he arrived at the crease with Arnal Silva to open Sri Lanka's innings when a crowd of (shal We say sub-conti
They were duly expelled but took up residence on the Street and proceeded to tauntour batsmen with cries of "Corneon, Botham, bowl them out". The experience would have unsettled the most experieCed Of Test at5 – Jutt OU
TIETOJËS. (Toba Carrued)

Page 17
PEFSONAL WIEW
Keeping the Pu
Chanaka Amaratunga
The Puritan hated bear-Eating not becauseftgave palп to the bear, but because I gave pleasure to the specfa fors.
Lord Macaulay
think it is more than a figment of my imagination that in recent times We have Witnessed an increase of the attitude that it is in the interest of us all that We should be prevented from seeing, or knowing or doing several things which are 'decidedly unwholesome'. The decision as to what |Surn Whole}50The, a St O. What Wêr Titust be denied and the authority to enforce such denial is of course, in the estination of those who feel so, best left to them. As
deeply concerned with the public virtue, cannot wouchsafe an answer. But have no hesitation in saying that such considerations do not trouble them Morality is, afterall a matter of Superior judgement. The Way to heaven is not by the adherence to an opinion poll. These persons, Wholshall describeas moralists, investing in that Word all the subtleties of Which it is capable, are quite content that if need be, the few shall to only prescribe but also enforce, on the many, the sort of life which they are fit to live.
Lest st bg ITiSUnderslood that What COПCBrTS me here 5 the enforСGПЕПt Of popular morality by means of the notion of majority rule, let me make a disclaimer at OTCe.
My objection to the moralists is not on the basis that their standards of what is fitting for a human being to do are not widely accepted. On the contrary there Tlust be somme Coccasions On Which SLUIch standards are indeed widely accepted, My assertion that it is of little Consequence whether the attributes of a particular life style are popular or unpopular. My objection to the Thoralists is based on the principle that as long as the liberty of anyone is not being interferred with, a
person should beat person Wishes to di
It sects to The th: Some characteristic StS, Orle Sthat Lht they consider to be реттmitted to anyone thoroughly misguid claimed, and all the red, andall the edici been invoked, Wer abadonada||hur" that We believe Sc because We believe right, We may believ SE hE BLIddha or J. or the Prophet Moh or ConfuciuS OF THE said so, but it bacort SB We believe that \, utilate Sthat Of hul
Why then this force other peoplet nce with our own li the T10St. Ob WOLUS fa has displayed befo ment On WalLJ GIS, Qin good, the desirable is essential to the h silly, how absurd, ho that a nan be kille to be a fra Uda Tlal || he thinks is good a | thik is WiiCkEd?
The Second is th dislikes pleasure, W. ist 0 dBmand Häl dista Steful Should anyone else. The d deter Tination tOir righteousness is in Way of reaching hel XSS. For the Eās liberality of 'spirit, tolerance, not lar .pathyוחsy


Page 18
nuth hoWewer, is far different. Every civilized human being should oppose such reStrictions, Tot because hellows that Which the Toralists Seek to outlaw but because he upholds the right of very individual to live his/her own life.
The moralists commit another tragic error in their anxiety to ban that which they disapprove of. They believe that if inpublic it is pretended that a thing does not exist, it shall surely cease to be. Perhaps an ostrich can tell them a thing or two. The crusades to bar kissing, sex and violence as Well as political wiews which are not approved of, from our own electronic media, are based upon Such pathetic delusions, the result of which is the presentation of a highly false view of human life. The arts and the media must, if they are to retain value, reflect the real state of human life. By not showing people kissing on the Screen, Will people stop kissing in Sri Lanka? Because Violence is banned LHH LLLLLL LLLLL LLHHL LLOLLHLLLLLLL LLaLH LaL newspapers will there be an end to violemce and the abandonment of revolution by those dedicated to it? The playing of such games, the denial of the truth, the attempt to confine hLIrnan lifa to a prissy little mould, Will robus of last shred of witality and hope.
By this I do not mean that we must always portraya particular type of life, that the screens must contain nothing but kissing and sex and violence. Whatlarn saying is that no one has yet succeeding is ennobling human life by pretending that human beings are anything other than what they are, diverse creatures seeking their own different forms of fulfillent and happiness. **
if human beings quite obviously and often honourably and understandably, disagree about the ends of life and of the means by which they ought to be accomplished there seems to me to be no reasonable course Save the Taximisation of toléran C8.
It is by the exercise of the highest
degree of tolerance and the Conferment of the Widest possible degree of freedom
16
that is compatible W of the liberty of all, indeed the Wider Wor
Pľ09 PBSS.
It is easy to decla favour of tolerance, the ternerity openly they are intolerant. It Se it. For the Cid Sätisfied Čot Whës O| tOthät to Which OTE tlat Whic One Stre Would oppose the b: critical of the politic: how many Buddhists on Bhavatharaпауғ Stian S WOLIld OppOS SCOTSESE'S FIT TE Christ? How many M FE E O TE S maпу орропепts of rship of literature W on pornography? T tolerance involves up the exercise of Which huTan beings, Suc exercise of liberty m exclusively for the p. of others or for the Who are unready to for thlgi hoitgS.
There are many
inacCLurate and COr tions of religion and disagree with this, Bl founded upOn Sand the Kafanas, the B El Childividual TUS moral Code by indivic authority of clergy, coercioп отапу оih sand years before t Libery, the Buddha asumCompromising dualissil årld TrES Br quent liberal Work.
TE ROTT CatF Sir Thomas More, E timents. He asser gious intolerance, Fship between fai which the coercive Should tot interfere

ith the airlitairia TCE that Sri Lanka and ld can find peace and
WeryfEW Would hawe to acknowledge that is less easy to practiLest Of tolerañCe IS he extends tolerance | S indifferent BLIt to Ingly dislikes. Mary an of all newspapers establishment. But Would oppose aban i? HoW i many Chrithe Dao Martil Las Templation of uslims Would oppose H. W95,695? HOW
the political censopuld oppose the ban ld true exercise of holding every liberty, de Scotları Other
Jst be those adopted rotection of the rights protection of minors akefull responsibility
who seek refuge in |serwatiwe interpreta| Torality Who Would ut their arguments are | in his DiSCOUPSE FO uddha asserted that arrive at his/her OWn iual reason not by the
Scripture, tradition, er means. TWO thouhe publication of On inade as radical and a declaration of indiwihquiry as aпy subse
polic Saint and Martyr, Expressed similar Seed il the Era Of Tellthe intimate relatiotil and COrscience,
power of the state
red at his trial for high treason in 1535:
LLaLLLLL LL LLLCLLLC LL LLLLL HH LLLLL
LLLLMMML LLLCLCLuLTCLL0S MLLLLLLLL LLLHLLMaLLMH
Jr.
Broadness, light, fresh air and the sense of freedom, of those of liberal spirit, not the Cramped, Cribbed, confined and claustophobic atmosphere of the vocifefOL5 Puritaris in GLIr Tidst, is What WE rigtiti,
When the Toralist's strident tones are about to overwhelm you, remember that enforced virtue is the greatest of vices.
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Page 19
f953AADAFTE序
A Tale of TWO .
Zeth HUSSIT
come now to the question
preoccupying the public mind ten years after 1983. Where do we go from here?
There is apparently a broad national consensus in favour of a negotiated settlement and against attempting a military solution. Accordingly the Government's strategy is to see that the LT TEs support base among the Tamils gets more and mOre er Oded as a COinSequence of in Creasing economichardship in the North-East, which Will hopefully lead to the taming of the Tiger making a negotiated settlement possible. At present there seems to be no Sensible alternative to that strategy, consdering the impasse to Which We hawe been brought by post-1977 UNP folly.
However the consensus is being increasingly challenged by the demand that the economy and the country be placed on a War footing. The demand Seems to hawa behid it ||ILUSIOS about a possible military solution. Such illusions have firstly to be got out of the Way in ans Wering the question, Where do we go from Herg?
Our Soldiers can certainly take Jaffna, probably With heavy Combattant and civilian casualties. The problem is Whathappens thereafter, Guerilla Warfare can be expected to continue, and here. We have to take into our reckoning the fact that the LTTE is internationally recognized as the best guerilla fighting force in the World today, and further We hawe torg TETmber the discomfiture of the super-powers in facing guerilla warfare in Wietnam and Afghanistan as Well as the IPKF experience in taking Jaffna and eventually losing OVera thousand men. The problem is that a guerilla War has to be won by taking the minds and hearts of the people, not by taking territory. We can take Jaffna and find that our difficulties are compounded.
The experience elsewhere in the World of trying Tilitary solutions for ethnic conflicts has not been encouraging. For many years the Kurd rebellion was fuelled
by Iranian support. Iran. Withdrew that
quid pro quo аптап; the Kurd Taje|| looked like a succE to an ethnic rebelli Stil COПtПLJES BEB : for til Ct : t t problem in Severa Turkey the NATO be SUre that in the Was the ATEICarls separate Kurdistar Wisest policyto allo go on indefinitely.
The case of Nige in the latter half instructive. In a briel years over a Tillior rebellion Was Erde f00d Supplie:S är do Sir Cether the Ijo; Contentedly With th Which might looklik an ethnic Conflict. W. Was Plattle Muslist as other Nigeriane a Sensible acco each other after the |learTit E JESSIOm frOIT ESSO S. Well rETE the fact that recent aborted democratic that the folly of the lead to ethnic proble
The hankering as spite of an apparent SUS against it, is because itis exaspє years of conflict that a negotiated settler Se Of CCCasional Oya. It is an irratio Sane, We Can tak aSSUrning that We LTTE, We may sti|| problem cannot be
lated Stellt. TF Tebeli OWET. I thig in which it seemedt should be particular

Tigers (2)
| 1975, the Shah of support in terms of a ement with Iraq, and quickly collapsed. It ssful military solution 1. ButitreWiVed, and erious problem. If not e Kurds Constitute a countries, including ly of the US, We can after Tath of the Gulf Would have set up a State, it is Tot the Wan ethnic COnflictit:0
Fia's Biaffa Tabellion if the Sixties is also period of two to three were killed, and the Id by the blocking of the ensusing famine. of Biafra hawe iwedd heir fellow Nigerians, B a military solution to Thatactually happened is of the North as well thnic groups showed dativeness towards
War Was Over, having
their ethnic folly. The mbered, as shown by y General Babaglinda
Elections Out Offear
politicians will again
S.
tera military solution, yfirm slationalconseJuite understandable trating to find after ten We are GWhere near lent, and also be Cal LuLimilations like Wei nal hankering all the Ee Jaffna, and ever militarily defeat the find flat the ethnic inded withouta negoLe phases of the Kurd ecades, with periods o be practically ower, ly instructive for us.
I want now argue that the problem of reaching a negotiated settlement has proved intractable. So far mainly because We hawe ignored What should be am obvious prefinise that the solution to a problem should address the problem, or it Will not big solved. We hawe ower-sir Tıplified the problemasa whole by recognizing only the problems caused by the intransgence and undependability of the LTTE, and the supposedly excessive claims to federalism and a North-East merger made by the otherTamil parties. We hawe been ignoring the root problem from which those other problems derive, which is the undependability of the State. We hawe to ask whether the post-1977 UNPState can be expected to respect the sanctity and inviolability of agreements.
The record of the State in reneging on Commitments has been distal, That record includes going back on the Bandaranaike-Chelwanayagam Pact and the DudleySenaпayake-Chelwanayagaп understanding. It is arguable that both th0Se Sinhalese leaders WETE honourable men who meant well, and certainly wanted to implement those agreements but could not because of popular opposition.
It is an argument that does not apply to what happened after 1977. There was no popular opposition to the District Deveopment Councils, which could have gone along way to appease the Tamil demand for devolution. But the Jaffna DDC polls of 1981 were blatantly rigged, and the operation of the DDC's was thereafter made a farce. After the IPKF came here in 1987, the Indian side complained that the Peace Accords were not being implemented. On the occasion when a Special Envoy was sent to Colombo, the Indian complaint Was that the Sri Lankan side had gone back on an agreed position by the time he returned to Delhi. The ProVncial Councils could have been used to show that further devolution is unnecessary, if only they had been made to function properly. Instead they have been made farcical as shown by Chandrika Kumaranatunge's complaint that as Chief
17

Page 20
Minister she is no more than a glorified Chief Clerk.
Iп the precedingрага I have referred only to matters directly relevant to the ethnic problem. Equally relevant to the problem of the Undependability of the State is the pathological drive shown by the post-1977 UNP against standards of public morality, meaning not just the age-old hypocrisies of governments but actual attacks on public morality, as shown by the immediate promotion of police officers convicted by the Supreme Court of human rights violations, and the famous case of the convicted rapist who was pardoned and the Thade an al-Island Justice of the Peace. Evidently he could have said with Shakespeare's Othello, "I have done the State some service and they know"e." Under the present Government the Udugampola affair has provoked a spate of outrageed letters and editorials in the non-Government press. In this context of blatant disdain for the most elementary standards of public morality, it is question able Whether many Sinhalese hawe confidence that the Government will stand by its commitments. CanWe really expect the TaTIS LO SHOW COnfidelice that the Statea will abide by the terms of a negotiated settlement?
It is certainly arguable that the LTTE has proved so intractable aproblem up to now because of the undependability of the State. It may be that the LTTE itself has not been serious about a negotiated settlement because it really wants nothing short of Eelam. However its support base Can be er Oded becauSE of the e COIOTIC costs of its strategy to the Tamils in the North-East, and it can be progressively isolated as shown by the fact that practica|ly every other Tamil party has turned againstit. In other Words, it is theoretically possible to force the LTTE into a situation where it has to accept something short of EElam,
Why has that not been possible so far? It is obvious that the LTTE continues to hawe subtantial Support among the Tamils. Otherwise it cannot possibly function as the redoubtable guerilla force that it is. Very probably the support is largely negative support, meaning that many Tamils Cannot see an alternative to the LTTE because they believe that should it be completely destroyed the Tamils can expect to get little or nothing from the State. The LTTE can certainly argue that
18
all the very terrible: the rebellion on th others Will go for ni arms and negotiate One Carl BESUTE th by its terms. It can that the State's und: the Way of the total the LTTE.
THEinsistênce oft On federalist and can also be explai undependability of til Whyaminority shoul than fair and equal Thajority itself Want: Why the Tamil insi and a hoteland Y treatment can be gir special arrangemen lief is that the Tashi|| ments asstepping-s A more plausible an: Want special arrang and equal treatmen not just at present.
The ter "federa in different ways.W. stat Balind the Taf is is that the Gow should not be able пcial govemments nullify devolution. U deralism system sta been dismissed Wi thout regard for de post-1977 UNPSta over-bearing, шnргі Cratic than the OnEi obviously fear that tion l'ESS Than fgd farcical in practise. an unreasonabled by all the Tamil Thondanan's CWC Sterce on a NorthhaWe for its rational living-space to wh South can gravitat back on a negot root-problem behin the LTTE and Wha SSiWe de Tards frC; rties is the undepe
I have argued ethnic problem ini is not the result of |Sm of the Sinhal: O UNP terrorism

ifferings inflicted by
TITIIS ES WE|| a5 ught if it lays down a settlement Whild tithe State W|| abilde pe argued therefore pendability stands in rosion of support for
le other Tamil parties North-East merger ed interls of the le StatG. We Carlask I want anything more treatment. When the sld Tildre thaisil that, terlČE - Om dēWGlution then fair and equal ren without any such S? The Sinhaleseewant such arrangeOnestoWards Eela TT. WEr isthat the TäTils Enents to secure fair in the future as Well,
lism" can be defined latis practically impoi de Tlald for federaTert at the Centre o di SiS5 the PfOWjust as it likes, and nder India's quasi-fete governments have Ily-nilly, too often WiTocratic OTS. The te has been far TlOro cipled, and undemo1 India, and the Tamils any system of devolufä|ST W| bei Tads HerCC What OOKS like emand for federal SIT arties except for Mr . The unairToUSirlsEast merger seems to a desire for sufficient ch1 the TarTlil S; i Lhe 3 should the State go ated settlement. The d the intrasigence of Tight look like excein the other Tamil padability of the State.
"I this article that the spresent militant form he alleged communaSe people but of State
behind which is the
problem of a mad hierarchical drive in the State compounded by the anti-democracy of the post-1977 UNP. I have argued further that the root-problem preventing a negotiated settlena entis the Undepedability of the State, which makes it questionable whetherit Will respect the sanctity and inviolability of agreements. In terms of those arguments, the ethnic problem has to be seen in terms of the peculiar character of the post-1997 UNP State. To solve the ethnic problem, therefore, we hawe to solve the problem of the State.
In looking for a Way Out of the present imbroglio, We must give central importance to one fact and try to make it decisive. It is the fact that in the ten years after 1983 the Sinhalese people have interacted peacefully with Tamils in the South inspite of the most extreme provocations. In my view that fact goes along way to invalidate the claim to Eelam. For what is really importantin establishing the claim to separate statehood is not the debatable historical ground for it but the question of Whether the tWO COITIITILIITILIES CE I || ||IWE together or not. The Sinhalese people have given their answer. However, while the fact of peaceful interaction goes along Way to invalidate the claim to Eelam, it does not go the whole way because there is still the problem of the State, The Sinhalese and the Tamils may be able to live together, but the Tamils may not be able to live With the State.
It mightseem to some Sri Lankans that the Way out of the presentimbroglio would beto negotiate a settlementUnder international auspices, including guarantees for its observance by the UN, SAARC, orthe Commonwealth. They may be Willing to offer themselves as mediators, but it is very doubtful that they will accept the role of guarantors as that will requirean undertaking that they will intervence to force the State or the LTTE to observe the tens of the settlement. Furthermore, in agreeing to any such thing we will be agreeing in advance to a serious compromise ofour Sovereignity. Yetanother point is that such agreements could misfire badly for the reason that should the State be seen to be going back on commitments other countries may come to feel that they should recognize Eelam.
There is no alternative to our dealing With the problem of the State if we are to get to grips with the ethnic problem. In terms of my definition of the ethnic pro

Page 21
ble as the problem of the State and not of the people, the conclusion can be drawn that the people's will must prevail over the State if the ethnic problem is to be solved. We have to assert the supremacy of the civil society over the State. In other Words we must restore a fully functioning derinocracy, meaning not just that there are free and fair elections but also that the people hawe deToCratic rights enabling theппto control, or at least influence, the State in between elections.
However, democracy may not by itself make the State solve the ethnic problem. The difficulty is that the power of the Tode State, which We Tustreetber has in its hands the Ileans of legitimate violence against the people, can be very dreadful. We may hawe a fully functioning democracy and yet fail to control or influence the State to any significant extent. Democracy is the best conceivable answer to the age-old problem of tyranny. It is ГОВ ПОЕТUIT for all the ISOfПВПkПЈ. Democracy may help, but We have to go beyond it if we are to reallyргоппоte a solution of the ethnic problem.
| beliēWe that the CrLCial desideraturis public morality. As I have argued the essential problem is the undependability of the State, Which can lake the Tails question whether there is any point in reaching a negotiated settlement when they know that the State can with impunity go back on it. What is required is a thorough-going ethnical cleansing of the UNP, and respect for standards of public morality to the extent that it becomes inconceivable that there will ever again be another Udugampola affair. It is only in that situation that We can expect to reach a meaningful negotiated Settlement, backed by trust and confidence on all sides that it will be properly implemented.
The ethnic problem in its present militant formis the consequence of the collapse of public morality under the post-1977 UNP State, and it will never be solved without a restoration of that morality. As hawe shown, the problem took or a militant form after the post-1977 pogroms, the expression of State or UNP terrorism. There was a terrifying collapse of public morality behind those pogrons of the period between 1977 and 1983. That collapse had to lead to the disintegration of the State, because no society can hold
together with Outsta lity. Anyone looking ппогaltheогуwi||fiп агguediп fullbecau. Wident.
| Will provide or Bertrard FRLJISSE||Wh hEaded rationalistir tings. In his book Hu and Politics publish out that ethical be rded history, hawe ! sources, one politici al. He Went on to morality communiti rsonal Torality the lu." RUS53|| Would least surprised that in a 5tate of disi years, the Writ of th beyond Vavuniya. hooted with laught trying to put the p Without trying to re ndards of public TC.
The public must ethical cleansing of Party backed by m decent folk of Sri L. highest echelons SI human quality Whi country. They prot importance of purgii the body politic of S the Party of the Sen Wella. However th: political life since 19 Lihat their task as uphill. The public them in a progгапппт The alternative mig gration of Sri Lanka post-1977 UNPSta
The Solution of t the State in relation requires both demo tion of public mora help very greatly il State are limited a Peaceful Sinhala-T de the State sugge: area of that intera prospects for ethnic therefore Towe in Caled "liited GWI ideal Situatiori ir Will Government are liri

ndards of public Torag at the literature on d that that point is not Seit istakanas Self-B-
ly a quotation from oWas always a hard
his philosophical WriIman Society in Ethics ed in 1954 he pointed iefs throughout reconad two Very different aland the other persoWrite, "Without civic es perish; Without peT: SUWWE Hä5 TO Wai10tha WBDBerlin the Sri Lanka has botel tegration for several e State not extending Adhe Would ha WE er at fld idea of DLIr ieces together again Store elementary staprality.
demand a thorough the UNP. It is iss illions of the ordinary anka, and it has at its Ome politicians of fine o mean Well by this ably understand the ng the 1977 UNPfrom ri Lanka and restoring anayakes and Kotalaa degeneracy of Our 377 has been so great regenerators will be Illust therefore back he of ethical cleansing. ht be the final disinteunder the aegis of the te.
he problem posed by to the ethnic problem cracy and the restorality. In addition, it will F the functions of the is much as possible. amil interaction outsists that the greater the ction the greater the : harmony. We should he direction of What is elent", towards an schhe function Softhe
ited to traited
nce of law and order and the building of roads and public lawatories.
It may be that what is really important for the health, wealth, and happiness of humankind is not the form of government but the degree of government. All Sri Lankans who have actually experienced the horror of the post-1977 UNP State, and who are still in their right senses, will agree. The principle of "limited government" is relevant for ethnic problems, because the experience of Several South East Asian and other Countries shows wery clearly that the less the extent of Government the greater the prospects for ethnic harmony. I will not expand on that point as this article is already too long. leave it to the interested reader to consult the bookS of the black AmericameColomist Thomas Sowell which are available in the American Library in Colombo.
The paradigm shift proposed in this article does not include a blue-print for a Solution. One can think of several possible solutions, with or without devolution and
with or without merger, that are thoroughly
equitable for all our communities. There Will be no point in thern as long as there is no confidence that the State will respect the Sanctity and inviolability of agree[T19It:S.
The paradigm shift proposed here is based on the principle that to solve a problem We must address the problem, not something else. The core-problem is the undependability of the State, not just what many Sinhalese see as the intransigence and excessive demands of the Tamil parties. Therefore the pre-condition for a solution is the correction of the State through democracy, the restoration of standards of public morality, and I believe "liited GWEITE".
Wery probably the historians of the future Will Write of our ethnic conflict as a tale of two tigers. We have been preoccupied With the tiger which has been on the rampage in the North and East, with occasional forays into the South in the form of bomb-blasts and assassinations. We have failed to recognize the tiger within the gates, the State. For a solution to the ethnic problem we certainly have to defang the tiger in the North-East. We also have to defang the State.
19

Page 22
OPERATION LIBERATION
An enCOUnter V.
S. Velupillai
April 1987 the BBC predicted a major offensive by the Sri Lankan
forces against the LTTE in the North within a month. The All India Radio, which most people in the North-East relied on for routine news, maintained a mysterious Silence on the imminent attack. Early May 19BW te SLBC, liri armi Lurcharacteristic performance, quoted the Minister of National Security, the late Lalith Athulathrmudali, as saying that the results of a scheduled strategic Towe by the forces would be known in two Weeks.
MEO Wonder, "Operation Liberation" Commenced On May 26, ended on May 31, and resulted in over 1,000 deaths and 2,000 arrests in Wadamaradchy on its liberation from the LTTE. On the last day of the Offer SWE || Was arreSted frOf It One of the 16 temples specified as havens by the forces in a notice dropped from the air across Wadamaradchy. We, the captives, Were chained and shipped to a makeshift detention camp in Galle, though our destination, according to Our papers, LLLLLL aLLLLL LLLLLL GHLHaLLLL LLLaLLLL LLLLLLL Camp. Later, we came to know that Boosa was already full.
WE WETE COified to I WTEHICLISE turned into a detention camp, adjacent to the port of Galle, about 200 metres long, and 20 metres wide. There were 6 latrines, outside the camp. At a time 6 detainees would be led out at gun point to spend 6 Tir Ltd S irħith Blatri GS, MOSt Of LJS Filad no option other than defecating and usinating into a gutter deep inside the camp. The gutter overflowed. We Wallo WedirOUT OWF faeces ad Lurile that flowed from the gutter, under our feet, towards the Centre of the camp which EBITEd Wilf WOTTS and flies, womit and splittle. There were no baths. None of us
20
had bathed orchang camp and the immat
The camp was pa detainees Were split With 50 in each, ea its The Tibers, he barbed-Wire fenice { the body of the can
Om On about Ju afternoon, the grou up at the head of th TOWhere Miri Ster At
into the dreta 55: authorities, clad in W his face, flanked by about with a great pleasantries With resernbleda busy T but impatient to lea: dista relative. C) Toment, however, draw his attentio requirements: latrine
tried my best to he in a good mood Ty request? Was results of "Operatio alluded to earlier in
ClaT. O desEE CE
captivated by theim the impression he abrupt approach overwhelmed by a grip at my hand. speechless, in his ugly hard as thoug pulse. While stood promptly and candi [Ook5 TUC Etter til his hard for Teg

Vith Laith :
Jed for days. Both the
35 Stärlık
cked to capacity. The into ower 50 groups, h headed by One of aded group 52. A di Wided the head and
P.
ne 5, 1987, in the p leaders were lined 3 Campo. Almost from ulathiudalistored ured for the camp White, With ab ea T O HIS a.idg.S. HE TOWE di lace, and exchanged the officials. He an obliged to attend, We, the funeral of a in the spur of the made up my mind to n to our sanitary 2s, baths and clothing.
TEST. WES Would he entertain ld satisfied With the
LIEft" | May 1987? Did he dit fOT the SuCCESS Of
S Tot Surg. I WS SO age he presented and Woked. He made an
to TE. || W-S disarming ministerial | stood spel||bound, grp. He lifted up TTly gh he would feel my stupefied he quipped dly "Your Wrist-watch arl Time". Heheld Out U JUk at HS OWП
Wrist-Watch, and stor med out of the camp before I could compose myself to make a response or my request. He came, he Saw, heeft.
Taking Ty mind back to the circumstances which put me in close proximity with Athulathmudali in Galle Detention Camp 6 years ago, now regard my lightening encounter with him as an enlightening experience. He had caught Tie in a Zoorn, 10 doubt, prompted by my OWn attempt to gauge his thoughts. He had felt my pulse while struggled to read his mind. His grip at my hand conveyed to me that he was aware of the squaled state of the camp. He appeared to sympathise with the inmates whose detention Was a direct result of "Operation L".
Why did he make an abrupt approach to me? To carry out a pre-emptive strike. Why did he compare the Wrist-Watches? To draw a red-herring. What did he imply by his remark that my Wrist-watch was better than his? Look, you are better off. Be content with What you already hawe. As for the deterioration of your status, blame yourself.
That appears to be the message he conveyed to my simmering mind. Perhaps he was addressing his critics from the North, Athulathmudali's symbolism seems to SUrn up the Views of the people in the röst of Sri Lanka on the ISSLIJE of the North-East. My one and only encouriter with the late Lalith Athulathmudali confirmed my conviction that no Community has ever voluntarily preferred Winning the heart to winning the War. That applies to my community too.

Page 23
Why there's sc in this rustic
LLLLLL LL aMLLLLLLLL GLLL Ta LHHLLLuL uHHLHHLHSuu CLaLLLL rural di Tsils, ĻĻho ar bLIS, SIÇOrti Tg. Cut båCČIJI leaf in a barri, It is the cit the hundreds of such
barns spread Qul in th4: mid arid [[:fr:Unff}} LLLLkuLLL KLLK LHuLLL LlL LLuLLLlL uL LLHtLLHeS dall, during the Off SeaSOL
Here, with careful nurturing, tol-3CCC grows. Fis a
LLLeOLLL LLGLLL LLLLCHC HLLL LLHLHu uCHCH tLLtglLHHLaL LHHL LL gold, to the value for Rs. 250 million or more annually, for perhaps 143,000 rural folk.
 

ಸ್ಪ್ರತ್ಯ ENRCHINGRURAL LIFESTYLE
und oflaughter tobacco barn.
Trabacca is the industry that brings er TıplayLTEmt tro the second highest number of people, And these people are the { collixia." CC, barn Cowners, the tribx^2 CCC) growers and thise who work for the IT, on the land anti in the barris.
For them, the Ecb7eccc, lEaf Tegang Tia:Tiiriigful Work, a comfortable life and a secure future. A tood
erugh reason for laught ET,
Ceylon Tobacco Co.Ltd.
Sharing and caring for our land and her people,

Page 24
PEOPLE
Celebrating T
C
Dynamic
In 1961 People's Bank ventured out in the of only 46... and a few hundred Customers
Today, just 30 years later
People Resource exceeds 1 Customer Listings at a sta Branch NetWork in exCeSS
in Sri Lanka
In just three decades People's Bank has g in the Sri Lankan Banking scene. Their spec resources at their Command dedicated
dedication that has earned them the title
PEOPLE'S BANK
Banker to the Millions

'S BANK
Three DeCades
f
: Growth
challenging World of Banking With a staff
0,000 ggering 5.5Million of 328, THE LARGEST
rown to become a highly respected leader ;tacular growth is a reflection of the massive to the Service of the Common man - a
"Banker to the Millions'