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LANKA
VO. 16 No. 12 October 15, 1993 Price RS
ASIAN GROWTH: R
PRESSAND PAR J. R.'s DELEGATIO
NOT CRICKET, V
D. B. WW’S NORTH
U. N. P. : Changes
ANURA MIAK)
SRI LANKA: VOTERS AN
 
 
 
 

1 O.OO Registered at GPO, Sri Lanka QD/43/NEWS/93
OLE OF RESEARCH
- Godfrey Gunatilleke
LAMENT - zeth Hussain
NI TO JAFFNA — Argen
WHAT 2 - D. A. de Silva
- SOUTH FRONTs
- Melvyn de Silva
at the base - Mick Moore
ES HIS MIOVE
D POPULATION GROWTH
- Dayalal Abeysekera, Indralal de Silva

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SVOU
t
 

Knight
rmOVe

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news BACKGROUND
THE UN P’S TWO
Mervyn de Silva
ith his massive parliamentary Tajority, J.R.J. installed his Executi
we Presidency. Given his style, the UNP ruled and reigned. The Executive was the focus, the power-centre. When the parliamentary balance changed, the legislature becañe a more active a rena. Hem Ce the "impeachment plot" that nearly toppled President Premadasa. And now the judiciary intervenes.
Post-Premadasa politics may be less tense but far more complicated. The "One-man Show" attracts as Well as repels. With his five-sixths majority, the authoritarian J.R. presided ower a U.N.P. that few dared to defy. As he used to boast so often, his government could do what it pleased, except make a man a Woman or Vice Versa. Wholesale desertion could hawe altered the balance of power in parliament but such a conspiracy would not have remained a secret too long. To everybody's surprise, Mr. Lalith Athulathmudali and company succeeded in deceiving President Premadasa almost up to D-Day. The Executive President would nave bigg Ousted in a "Constitutional Coup" if the President had not been tipped off justin time.
Last Week, the Appeal Court held that the decision of the Goverritors of the Scillthern and North-Western provinces in the appointinent of Chief Ministers after the last polls "unreasonable and illegal". In both provinces the UNP fared quite Well butnot Welenough to wina Simple majority, or more seats than the SLFP and DUNF combined. The Bench (Justice Palakidnar, Court of Appeal president, JustiCe Sarath Silva and Justice D.P.S. GUnasekera decided unanimously to ask the Goverfors to "appoint Provincial chief ministers according to law". On Saturday, Mr. G.M. Premachandra took his oats as NWP chief minister before the governer, Mr. Montague Jayawickrema, former UNP Cabinet minister, Mr. Preachandra is nota T5 Tiber of the S.L.F.P., the main opposition party. In fact, he was a staunch UNP'er Until the impeachment motion against President Premadasa,
The politics of the Southern province COLII CiliS SOTIEWhat different. The Te the SLFP Won Tore seats than the DUNF but поl a clear majority. But once again, could have hoped for a stable working majority fall the anti-UNP groups combined. Next to the Western province, the southern is probably the most important Sinhala-majority province. The South has also been in the pre-1977 era, a traditional bastion of radical-Leftwing opinion. With the SLFP's Chandrika Kumaranatunge as
Chief Minister of the Opposition Chief M and North-West COL front which the COT PEP or Peoples' A their Presidential CE -December next ye; provinces, the Nort confidently included ral agenda).
The balance of pc. LS tilts āti ir: thi5 Orth's de W59||0 Southern Front
In the past forts focussed lot on t North. The War - DEWI, the mostantnb that arried forces. Lalith AthulaithnTLJId; BERATION, the pri WE TOW kñOW to thE
President Wijelun ptionally good job i nting tensions in Sol the party-political fr Mr. Wijetunge andhi ncy have been Warr rty by the middle-cla that classis a large S
Butпоgoverning alone - certainly office. 17 by the Contest is held T hoped that an asser (no more jaw-jaw, li dasa) Would do the YAL DEWI marked a military approach, in were psychologica the ground. ColorTt the army was not m taking the war to the Casualty figures te psychological gains military morale but S dent Wijetunge hac climate for it with problem, only a terr
So now the gove intrate once again of "Southern front", the |long Wär.
The UNP las = "enemy" though it successful. With the foe in the battlegrou ly because it canno of the enerny, or ify
E.
What is it that the to see? A grandalia
 

FRONTS
Western province, two inisters in the South d be astrongposition lined Opposition (the liance) could launch Tipaign by November r. (Of theisland'smine and East Cannot be in the 1994-5 electo
Werin the 7 proWinces against the UNP with Drient.S.
ight, public attention |ę SOLIth Dut On the - OPERATION YAL tious "joint operation" Wa LundEartakel SirNICE
'S OPERATION LDvocative prelude as Indiam iter Wartom, ge has don1ean Excein reducing the mouuthern society and on ont. The soft-spoken islow-profile presidenly greeted, particular SS, and in this island, prawling Community. party can win on style lot after 16 years in tir The the presidential Te government had tive policy on the War ké PrésidEnt Fr ETEtrick. OPERATION significant change in strategy, but its gains | rather thar Clairis or O took the offensive; arely re-active. It was enemy. But the large ded to reduce the - Torale, not just inhala rTiOrale. PresiCreated the Correct "There is no-ethnic ristamäe". TrT|Erlt rr||St COrle:E- the strategically vital political struggle, the
ways outwitted this las been Tuch IESS ther non-traditional d-the LTTE, largereally read the mind uprefer, Prabhaka
JNP does NOT Wish Ce – SLFP-led PEP
Which takes a deal With the DUNF. The DUNF mustered close to 15% at the provincial polls.... against President Premadasa, in a fight led by Mr. Athulathmudali, no mean anti-Premadasa strategist. Mr. Dissananyake lacks the single-miInded, driving ambition of Lalith. Any neWspaper sees his tactical manouevres as forwards-sideways-backwards; far too sharply focused on Hirnsalf han on the party. Bésides, he is less popular than Mr. Premachandra, a top pro-DUNF professional claimed the other day at a seminar. And yet, he will be an asset..... if only the UNP makes it clear that he cannot return to the old JRheir archy, as No. 2.
EWE at the bogstoftirTES. President D.B. is street-smart enough to realise the UNP, the spokesman of the Colombo-based business/professional classes, cannot have two Kandyans as No. 1 and No. 2.
After the DUN FİSSLEIS Selled the UNP Will maxirnise the advantage of the An LIsa-Chandrika Schism in the SLFP-PEP. It is not clear how many MP's, Anura can LLLLL0L aLSY LaLLLLL aL LLLLL K K aaaS deid emerTiny.
GÜARDIAN
Wol, 16 No. 12 October 15, 1993 Price Rs. 10.O.)
Published fortnightly by Lanka Guardian Publishing Co. Ltd. No. 246, Union Place Colombo - 2.
Editor: Mervyn de Silva Telephone: 4.47584
Printed by Ananda Press 825, Sir Ratnajothi Saravanariuttu Ma Watha, Color:TmboO 13. Telephone: 435975
CONTENTS
Briefly 2 Media 3. Ruralisation of the UNIP (2) Correspondance 5 The Need for Vigilance
E. Middle-East Conflict (2) ADI PA Ciniferancig 11 Cambodia (2) 13 Citi | Suti 15 J. R. Year:5 (12) 1. Cricket 20

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Anura Makes His MoWe
Who says Sri Lankans cannot keep a secret? Well, seven Sri Lankans can! And Who are the Magnificent Seven Who knew Anura Bandaranalike Was ready to make his move. Ah, that's secretl Many SLFP'ers and somëfamily members realised that Anura was heartly sick of What this student of history described to this journal as a "byzantine conspiracy" against him. In his statement, he has identified some of them. But the political reasons for this the most crucial decision in his political career are best described by him:
"Today, perhaps, is the saddest day of my political life. I have after consideration and much thought, decided to resign from the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, With irTimediate effect. I hawe already Written to the President and the General Secretary of the S.L.F.P. informing them of my decision, and Ty letters hawa berhad-deżeliwe Ted to the Ti both, | hawe been forced by events, engineered and Tanipulated by a few ConspiratOTS WHO hawe taker absolute and total Coltrol of the S.L.F.P. to take this TOment LIS decision.
it is now 89 days since I have been suspended and I still do not know why | hawe beer suspended. I have Waited patiently for a charge sheet to be sent to Tie, and the party has neither, the Courage northe gutsto presenta single charge against me. It is a gross violation ofali kr10W, Carlos Of CWillisgdbghaviour. Even a person accused of a serious crime has to be produced beforea Magistrate Within 24 hours and the maximum period he can be remanded Without bail is 15 days.
Politics is my life and my life has been the Sri Lanka Freedom Party. I have newer done business or made money out of politics. The only Wealth I had Was the Wastestate left tone by Tygrandfater Sir Solomon Dias Bandaranake and subsequently taken over Without compensation by the United Front Government. Honesty has been my forte and not even mysternest critic can ever point a finger at me on this score."
2
BRIEFLY. . .
War on
Three undred de figure. That included tt Ciwiliars. A hiLundrĒid ; |disearS hald been kililed the battle for a boatya were the LTTE was Tlaterials in their Eel Tllert fOCESaSS3 named "Operation Y ccess, the authoritie hundred and twentyr captured.
With Kilali secured hawe effectively Cut routes to and from t a Defence Ministry's army withdrew toba ssful attack, becaust Was stated. But the traffic the next day.
Government
Miri The Court of AppE B that the UNIP rhOrTni Perera and M.S. AIT): gally and unreasor Chief Ministers by th North Westerrl Provir Province. The appo shed.
In delivering the U of the three judge applications filed by Indra (DUNF — Mort and Mr Amarasiri. D. Alliance - Souther Sarath N Silva, With agreeing, said: "The a Chief Ministeris We by the Constitution Law of the land. T dOWs the Criteria or rtments should be of this pQWEr is a m concer. It cannot b of secrecy. We have clair of each Gower appointment on the confidential inquiries basis of the respecti crecy. Such a proce: is repugnant to Adn review of the decisio se of statutory pow LIrreasonabler)E55, 1 tion proper matters, t Wat TitterS, ad being basic tenetso Would be tendered Wested. With power refuge in confidentia

Tigers
ad was the official he "enemy" too, and and twenty-five soit was admitted, in Tidig Nortfro launching ITIërland am War. The goveult on Kilali, Code aldė Wi", WEIS EA SLIS announced. One be boats had been
government forces off g||g|| alti-523 le Jaffna peninsula, jokesman said. The se after the SUCCEof bad Weather, it Tigers resumed boat
loses Chief terS
| || || OCTODET nees Jayawickrema arasiri had been Illeably appointed as e Goverlors of the Ice and the South Eirisl Imlfrlents Were qLJä
Inanimous judgment
Bench on the Writ M. G.M. Prelian Western Province) Odangoda (People's in Province) Justice the other two judges
power of appointing Staditle Governor being the Suprestle he constitution lays which such appoimade. The discharge atter of grave public e ShTCLided in di Wei|| to observe that the or that he made the SiS COf LundiSCOSECd tends to Cast the WE de CiSOIS intOSEss of decision making inistrative Law. The Slade in the exercWe Oil the basis of aking into considerale exclusion ofifreleacting on evidence, f. Administrative Law, lusory, if the authority is permitted to take lity and Secrecy as to
the true basis of his decision. Although non-disclosures and confidentiality Tay be per mitted in rare instances in public interestor that of good government, such a plea cannot hold Water where the other side has made full disclosure offirm and werifiable evidence to the contrary.
"The same matter may bewiewedfrom the perspective of the fairness of the decision making process. At the stage the persons appointed Chief Ministers made unsupported claims of support outside their party ranks, the Governors Were possessed of declarations and affidavits of all other members pledging Support to the petitioners. Therefore the fair procedure to be adopted at this stage by the Governors consistent With the principles in Administrative Law was to have Confrorted each of the two Chief Ministers (second respondents) with the material in hard and require then to produce evidence to the contrary for their claims to be considered. Instead the Governors claim to have hurriedly embarked on confidential inquiries to seek support for such claims. This shows a tilt on their part in favour of the persons appointed as Chief EaLLLLSS LLa LLLLLLLLLLLLaaLLL LLLL LaL the decision making process is thereby fil Wed.
"Othe a fore Said rewie. W of therElgwärt facts and the applicable law. We hold that the decision of the first respondents (the Governors) in each of the applications, to appoint the Chief Ministers of their respeLLaaLLLL LLLLHHLLLLHHLLLLLLL LL LLLLLLLL0LLLLLLL GLLLa LLLS gal, We accordingly grant to the petitioner Writs of quo Warranto and certiorari as
Sked for".
"They are terrorists'- Europeans told
President Wijetunga told a Visiting Euroреan parliamепіагy delegatioп that the LTTE Were terrorists WTO hilad Cloaked therselves with a garb of ethnicity and a theory about a traditional homeland. "We are for a political solution to restore peace in the North and East", the Presdent told the delegation. But the violence unleashed by the LTTE had created a terrorist problem, he said.
"Everyone can See that it is mot an ethnic problem. It is a creation of the terrorists. As you can see for yourself Tamils live peacefully among the Sinhalese in ewery part of the country outside Jaffna Whereas they Would not allow Siinhalese and Muslims to travel freely or live in Jaffna. They ewen ha rass their OWri Tamil people who do not toe their line. All peace loving Tamil people feel more free LOlive Outsid the North W, tha in the North itself", the President said.

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MEDA
Reporting Parl
|Izeth Hu SSain
t would be unfair not to acknowledge
that even if freedom of expression is still not entirely satisfactory in Sri Lanka, there has been a vast improvement from what İt Was Linder OLUr. 1977 G0vernment.
My first-hand experience of the PhilippiES from 1982 to 1985 SHOW Ed that thera was far more freedom of expression under the Marcos dictatorship than under our five-star democracy. There was no fear psychosis there during those years. Retrospectively it seems that What We had under the 1977 Government was really a reign of terror.
Under President PremadaSa thgre Certainly was an improvement. But as soon as the press became too outspoken for the comfort of a Government having to face Provincia Counci elections before long, there was violence against the journalists. Patriots from places like Maradana and Wanatam Lulla had apparently coVinced themselves that Sri Lanka had to be saved from its journalists. Thrashings, and in one case knifing, of our journalists followed in the second half of last year.
The tactic of Vidlance Was abandoned this year, probably because it was causing a bit of an international riu Tipus, Our jou= rnalists having done ago Odjobinalerting their co-practitioners abroad to what Was happening in Sri Lanka. The new tactic, a less un intelligent one, Wasto exploit the financial Wulnerability of some of our publications to try to silence them. But the tactic was applied extremely unintelligently, beCause it Was a SOblatant. The 1988 Government showed no understanding that the art of controlling people, and making it seem acceptable, requires fineSSE.
That tactic too appears to have been abandoned by the present Government. Or it may be, and it seems Thore realistic to think, that it is being applied intelligently. Newspaper magnates and humbler owners of small-circulation publications having financial problems are expected to know where their true interests lie, and behave accordingly. In other words self-censorship, which is the most democratic method available to control democratic freedom of expression in democracies.
do not believeth expect much more of our slow progres. dom. People on the more particularly ; there is a lot to be s2 iSm. Thé Sinhal8SE cally shown a Taste lism, part of their shown in the exp ming". That master roll with the punche COTTEtOTS. We Flä W dons slowy-slowy,
The portents for pi to read quite fa WOLurë GowerT T Ent a SSLUIT year. On the whole portents hawe been given a nasty jolt m
| refer to the Tas press coverage of W. fÎleflt. After SÖ|The CGI that the press can proceedings straig Should be Strict adh Verson after Hansa Werris Tient should re this, taking into acc happened in the E 1939.
Ata time. Whenith that there was 10 a Waragainst Gегптап ville Chamberlaingo showing clearly that temporizing. When Party leader Arthur speak a Voice Was bāckbences exhof England, Arthur"HE had to be declared.
The British peop. "Speak for England the great moments, in the long history of ffent5. TEré Corne. of a people. When the buttostandup, andt The British people's grand contribution tc tion of Hitler and his nals, whose victory

annent
at We can realistically at the present stage from slavery to freewhole dislike change, brupt change, and id:after allforgraduapeople have historiyof the art of graduaancient folk Wisdom ession "Heming-he| means a capacity to s, and survive one's to recover our free
ESS free do ITTSEeerred bly When the present ed office in May this do. Otthink 1058 belied. But We WETE bге recently.
trictions imposed on lathappensin Parliafusi Omit WasClasified Cover Parliamentary htaway, but there erence to the Official rd appears, The Gothink its position on ount something that British Parliariet in
ad become apparent ernative to declaring y, Prime Minister Neup tornake aspeech
he wished to go on
the Acting Labour Greenwood got up to heard from the Tory ing him, "Speak for did his best, and War
a cale to feel that "represented one of erhaps the greatest, the Mother of Parlia
a time in the history y have no alternative y to rise to greatness. ood up and made a Wards the exterminagang of racist crimiWould have elded
Western civilization and every other civilization in a global barbarization. British pride in "Speak for England" is understandable. We must acknowledge that fact, even though our feet may itch with the desire to kick our former colorial masters.
But the greatest moment in the history of the British Parliament was never reported in the Hansards. Historians and others had to painfully reconstruct what actually had happened, establishing that it was Leopold Amery who spoke those historic Words. If the British people had been prohibited from referring to anything excluded or omitted from the Hansards, they would hawe been prohibited from Writing about the greatest moment in the history of their Parliament.
Our Government must certainly re-think its position. I can think of only one counter-argument that might seem to be convincing. It is that whatever may happen in the British Parliament, or half a hundred other Parliaments, there can be no great
Toments in the Sri Lankan Parliament.
We seem to be having some pecular notions about democracy in Sri Lanka. Orne is that Parliament is supreme ower the people, even though the Constitution states in Article 3 that sovereignty is in the people and is inalienable. We, the sovereign people, can therefore betold by the representatives whom We hawe serit to Parliament What We can say or not say about what actually happens in ParliaTErit.
In terms of yet another peculiar notion, We can electa Party and our representatiWes, but thereafter the representatives become the creatures of the Party with the Sovereign people being allowed no further say in the matter. A recent judicial decision has called that notion into question.
As such profoundly anti-democratic notions are prevalent in Sri Lanka, it becomes all the more important for the sowereign people to hawe full freedom of expression and a fully free press. Letthe politiclans speak for therselves and their Paties. But nome must be stopped from Speaking for Sri Lanka.

Page 6
RURALISATION (2)
UN P’s Changir
Mick Moore
n an analysis of the mainstream
districts classified according to the degree of rurality, i.e. dependence of the population on agricultural employment the figures Would suggest that the UNP has become steadily more dependent on the support of voters in the most rural districts since 1970; in part a product of the changing geography of the electorate, which has steadily become more rural. For this there are two reasons: the gradual re-enfranchisement of the Indian Tamil population; and the movement of population into the Dry Zone for agricultural BLIrբOSES
Given these changes in the spatial distribution of the electorate, some ruralisalion of the UNP's Electoral base i5 nCl unexpected. However, figures which stadardise results for the changing geographical distribution of the electorate, still reveal ruralisation. While there are no clear trends in the two inter Tediate district groups, there is a clear, steady shift towards the UNP in the most rural districts, and an equally steady shift away, at least since 1982, in the east rural districts. We Know that the re-enfranchisement of the Indian Tamil population and the UNP-CWCalliance is an important Cause of this pattem, especially in Nu Wara Eliya district. However, the CWC has no influerice in, rice growing districts of Anuradhapura and Polonna ruwa. There Voters have also shifted towards the UNP. There has been a broad and gradual change in the pattern of electoral behaviour which cannot be explained only by short term phenomena such as the political style of til Prigidest.
Statistical analysis
TE TESLJILS of the Statistical aralysis summarised throw useful further light on the issues. Those readers who understand statistics will be able to check my conclusions against the results. I hope the other Will excuse. The for not attempting to explan in detail what the various statistical Teasures are and how they are to be interpreted. In essence, | hawe uSed regression analysis to see how far, at each of the six elections, district-to-district Wariations in the percentage of the wote obtained by the UNP could be explained by two other variables, separately and jointly: "RURAL' - the percentage of the emplo
yed population emplic 1981, and "SINHALA of the 1981 populatio Se, TFESe afe the T Hawe been found sig two major findings, detail below:
1) The first is a conf diSCLSSed ab Ove, E ting preferences are
has been a gradual
base of the UNP, es suct that it is currently with "RURAL' (see B
2) The second find has been through a been distinctly unpg| voters (compared W ethnic groups); this L. but at Tuch loWET le!
1980s,
For 1970 and 1977 |ly significant COnni UNP's share of the ELE FURL C E OTT, 251 that Sir "h"E accurately, Sinhale opposed to the Tino stians - did noting parties other than the
It SideSE traditional'CCT15 titLIE to the UNP in the especially the SLFP relationship Was nol to emerge from the lysis conducted her the unit of analysis. tial election, the Opposition and Sinh; rgedagain wery Stro been identified in ë lysis, and precisely tics of the tie. PE Waspersonally Very Buddhist Tonks, as leaderships, becau. intellectual approac limited respect forth TiCliberalisatis, ar opening Up to forei Created a natural Buddhist establish tion political parties liberalisation, The W fractured by family

ng Base
yed in agriculture in - the percentage 1 W|OWErE Siffäléwo Wariables Which gnificant. There are explained in Tore
jgtig og WiderCE EWE ELHC TWOheld Costalt, there shift in the electoral pecially since 1982, strongly associated elCW).
ling is that the UNP
period when it has pular With Sinhalese with voters of other Inpopularity persists, vels than in the early
"the Bis 10 Statisti Caection between the wote, by district, and | HAIL'A'. Tillig tities lSE WOterS - TČ TE SE BLIddhistS, aS ity of Sinhalese Chrienerali ted to a WOLJr. UNP. They certainly
Bidliet WWE EB LIFE incy of the opposition Thaisistream districts, it is simply that this strong enough for it kild Of StatistiCal TE3 WL LIFE İSTİC ES In the 1982 Presideaffinity between the l353 BuddhiSSETTEgly. This has already arlier Statistical anareflects the Overt polisident Jaya Wardene unpopular with many despecially with their SE OF HIS OWN TELE | 0BLICHis FT1 ar:TIS airemier Ce. ECOTTOda SLJdiderard rapid gn trade and culture, aliance between the rent and the opposiopposedtoесопоппіс eak less of the SLFP. disputes among the
Bandaranaikes, had helped propel Some Buddhist moks and the militant lay BUddhist organisations into prominent positions among the organised political opposition to the UNP government. By the time the 1982 Presidential election was held, it was Widely known that UNP thugs had beaten up Buddhist monks demonstrating against the government. The Strong SiInhalase Buddhist dirtension to the anti-UNP wote was no surprise,
At the 1982 Presidential election, there Wasa smalland statistically just significant negative relationship between RURAL and the UNP share of the vote: everything else being equal, the UNP did rather better if the more Lura districts. The do Timant statistical relationship was however the strong negative association between SlNHALA" and the UNP Wote share. The distribution of votes changed considerably in the Referendum held a fe'W Weeks later. The UNP did relatively much better in the more rural districts, and relatively worse in the more urban districts. The Stift Was HC WEWerinsufficient for "RURAL to hawe a statistically significant connection. With the UNP vote share in the regressionanalysis. There Was Stilla Statistically significant negative relationship between the UNPWOle Share and SINHALA', but Weaker than in the Presidential electi.
At the 1991 |OCH BECtiOS, "RURAL' (positively) and "SINHALA (negatively) Were both a SSOCliated with the UNP Wote shareina statistically significant Way, With both variables being of about equal influence. Nearly 60% of district to district variations in the UNP Wole share Was "explained" by these two variables, and each had about equal influence with the other. The 1993 results indicate a further shift: a full B6% of Wariation in the UNP wote is explained, but it is "RURAL' which does the lion's share of the explaining. While Sinhalese voters still tend to prefer the opposition over the UNP. When other factors are held Constant, the dominant factor explaining the UNP's share of the vote is the degree of rurality of the district. These results are statistically very significant. We can be confidelt that the visible shift in the basis of electoral support for the UNP to the more rural districts is genuine; it is not a coincidental by-product of changes in ethnic Voting preferences.

Page 7
Explanation
have already referred above to the two most popular explanations of those dimesigns of the ruralisation of the UNP that Was evident from the results of the 1993 Provincial Council elections. There can be no doubt that part of the explanation lies in the UNP-CWCalliance, and the increasing number of Indian Tamil Voters. It is also at least feasible that part of the explanation for ruralisation, for the 1991 and 1993 elections, lies in the populism and popularity of ex-President Premadasa, who was in power from the end of 1988. Even if this is accepted - and suggest below that there may be a better interpretation of the same evidence-We are left With only two partial explanations - one locationally limited and the other short term - of a general, more long run pattern. What other explanations are avai|ab|Էյք
will deal first with two potential explana tions that are unsatisfactory:
1) The first is also short term: the role in the 1993 electio 15 Of the DEITHC}{Cfāti C United National Front (DUNF), a breakaway from the UNP, which obtained almost 15% of the total vote. The OWestlings of LLLLLL aLaHLCLL S LLLLLLLLL LLLL LL DUNF leadership precisely reflected the class issues raised by Premadasa's Presidency: a man of low caste and poor origins had virtually monopolised power, was appealing materially and symbolically to the poor, the non-Golgarna castes and to those who lived in renote areas, against the 'traditional UNP elite - urban, Wealthy, educated, and predominantly Gogaria. The DUNF was almost exclusiWely a Sinhalese and Gogarra party.
Since the DUNF collected nearly 15% of the Wote in the May 1993 elections, with a high of 22% in Colombo district and a low of less than 9% in Ratnapura, its performance influenced the distribution of the UNP vote. Generally speaking, the DUNF did botter if the m:OTE LUFbani Sed districts than did the UNP compared with 57% of the UNP vote. This reflects in part the origins of the DUNF as an "elite' reaction against the more offensive and pet Sonalistic dinansions of PreIIliada Sa's rule, There WashowgVern O ClOSe COlleCition between the DUNF's vote share and district characteristics. District Variations appears to have reflected in part the local influence of those prominent ex-UNPers attracted int-Othe DUNF: The DUNF alsn obtained a great deal of its support at the expense of the other opposition parties,
notably the SLFP. of the DUNF in the to explain the furth UNP's electoral bas WOLld Stil|| EE-d är E UNPlaintained a W[][Ers in the mũfE TL of the DUNF Challe
2) The Second po tina nuralisation of th SOIT120bServErSWO) - Would lie in the rests and governm rural areas shifted
EDECEUSE the UNP 1977 have pursue that has favoured : reject this suggesti related factors. One districts nave radica policy interests bec 3COOTEC Structurg. most of Uva provin tea, an Export pro{ estates; Wage labou major source of liweli populations of Anu: minarLIWa districts dé rice, an import-subs largly on a family-fat ever a latent COT rest' between the Second factor is the throughout the peri nce, the occupation: of Whate Werkird, ha cant in shaping the agenda; Voters have sons. And the third govенлments iпроу not been proagricult their policies of ec hawe märt that lÉ has been largely a nature, and Concer mbo. This latter pol an explanation oft UNP Wott Carlott king for location-spe tion policies. It is tr the large Maha Welli
project has brought tion in Anuradhapu districts, and some
new settlers. If how this an explanation rence of the Voters the UNP. We hawe to did not happen arol massive public in V Trade in new urba new jobs hawe beer

verall, the presence 1993 polls does little as ruralisation of the Had it done. So, One planation of why the
better hold on the a districts in the face
ցE.
ential explanation for UNP-aid the Orie |da prioriexplorefirst alsn of Tlaterial intent policy. Hawe the to support the UNP governments since an economic policy griculture? One can in because of three is that the most Ural ly different economic Use of differences in In Nuwara Eliya and Ce, the main Crop is luct grown on large On the estates is the nood. By Contrast, the adhapura and Poloрепd mainly growing ituting product grown "TT basis. There iG Tot on agricultural inteSe tWŐ a Tea S. THE it, in recent years as bd since Independeinterests of fartners, We never been signifiSri Lankan political Woted for Other realfactor is that the UNP Vef SimC 1977 ha.Ve lure in policy, Indeed, Onomic liberaliSation W economic activity f an urtarn findustrial trated around Coloit also indicates that 1e ruralisation Of the a found through loocific public redistribule that, for example, power-cum-irrigation |eW land under irriga'a and Polonnaruwa Histribution of land to WEr WE Fire to fird in f the incrasing prefein those districts for 2xplain why the same Irld Colombo, Where Strments hawe been infrastructure, and ECCETTEtc.
CORRESPONDENCE
Israel/PLO-South Africa
It is Well tied - the GOwerritt's decisiolto Sgrida Trade MiSSiOntOSOut Africa. It is as premature to open an Embassy in South Africal just now as it Wouldbe prernature and politicalyunWise to open a Shri Lanka Embassy in Israel.
However, the Government should take immediate steps to send a high powered Trade MISSicji to Israel amld a 5C) to thB PLO. Diplomatic Missions to both countries can Wait for a year or eighteen months, so we may see how the "accord" Works.
Tissa Wijeyera time
Kand
J.R. Justifies the Mob
| refer to the article by Dr. Chanaka Amaratunga titled "J.R. Justifies the Mob" at page 5 of yourissue of 1st August 1993.
That the Liberals have tragically undegone a metamorphosis of late is further underlined by the statement made by Dr. Аппагаitunga in the last paragraph on that page where he asks the question "whose idea was it to add insult to injury to a grievously Wronged ethnic minority by imposing the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution Which banished the moderate elected representation of the TarTi people from Parliamentand from the political mainstream for over five years?"
That the Sixth Amendment was adding insult to injury will not be denied by anyone. That the Tamil community is agrievously Wronged ethnic minority Will also not be denied by all and sundry. But that the Sixth Amendment banished the Toderate elected representation of the Tamil people from Parliament, art not So Stre.
If Dr. Amaratunga is referring to the TULF, he, of all people, should know that the TULF took a decision, on the 23rd of July 1983 at their Mannar Convention, riot to go to Parliament after the 22nd of July 1983 because they (like Dr. Amaratunga, I hope) were morally against the extention of the life of Parliament, The TULF had also taken a public stand to this effect in the Referandulf of DeCĒTIE ET 1982. THIS decision was, therefore, taken much before the passing of the Sixth Amendment, which was in mid-August 1983.
How ther, could it be said that the Tamil representation was banished from Parliament by the Sixth Amendment?
If my facts or reasoning is Wrong, pet rhaps Dr. Amaratunga, will be kind enough to place his new line of argument before the readerSõf "Larka Gardia"?
G.G. Ponna mbala T1 (Jr.)
General Secretary All-Ceylon Tamil Congress

Page 8
voters
The nee C
for V
Dr. Dayalal AbeySekera and Dr. W. Indralal de Sil
ri Lanka is one country that has
caught the eye of demographers for der monstrating a noticČably declining population growth rate in spite of a fairly low per capita GNP (usually there is a visible inverse relationship between the two). During the decade of the 1980s, the population growth rate of Sri Lanka declined from: 1.8 percent in 1980 to 1.1 percent per animum in 1990. The la test a Wailable provisional figure for the year 1992 is 1.0 percent.
"How does this low population growth rate match up to the growth rate of the voters?" was the question. We aspired to pursue. The population growth rate of the Country is a function of births minus the deaths plus or minus net migration during a given period of time. The growth rate of Waters of the country, Con the Cother hand, is a function of the entry of persons into
the 18 years or more age group minus
exits from this age group due either to death of out migration. Thus, What We expected to find was not a one-to-one correspondence between the two growth rates but areasonable level of compatibilty between the two.
The near-16 yea Gffleral Elections t. the POWicial COL May 1993 was pick thisperiod being furt PTSITIEI ECLC 1982 and 19th Dec effect gawe uS Ch growth rates of vote r-election periods, i. and 1988-93 with t пningthenear 16уе As the Northeast W.
GiCLE bOTEKOWri Cf SČCi |S Carried OLIt With|| LälKa OUtSide th country. (Furthermi Eg of dBatFland dj L. War, places the Nord OutSide till Wita|| d nces faced by ther WOLuld hawe. Unduly analysis.)
What disturbed LI: relatively high grow Woter population ol Wee 1977-93 Will регаппшпп. Iпlaym
Та
Number of registered voters and estimated population 18 of growth during inter-election periods and percent
FREnglisi Eryr Efyd Murr Titwg FCW, Wagfyr 25 Hyd
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Kand O0L0SSHH S S LSMLu SLOLOLS00KK SS LLSLLOLL Ալի էրlt: KLL SKKK S L00L S000 S S KKSLL0L00 S K00SL00 "Eliya 00S0L00 S 0S0LLLL S 00SKLa0 S00LL0SLLa
Galeg E E1
LLAF 333.4 g 3BB 451.34 4.7 HTI TE 755 7 - 1955 295.1 EO|| 3:23, E47
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EdLill 17:43 28, 392 3,5 Militära gala E.O. 125,555 5.27 2006
Falls gut- 325,53. 40222 1522. 55.992 Kâ 351,333 OBE 3E 1945
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6

riigiance
r period between the if 21st July 1977 and litil Elections of 17th 2d out for perusal with herpunctuated by the ins of 20th October ember 1988. This, in Fisice to M0Initor the rs between three intee, 1977-82, 1982-88 ha fourth period spa3r5 EgtWg Ee 1977-93. S ||Eftit ft Pro WI}Ils Clf 1993 []LIE tữ thE. all order, this aralysis the 17 districts of Sri
Northeast of the re, the higher incideit-migration due to the heaster districts Well emographic experieest of the Country and confused the present
S att E COLLISEL WESTE h rate of the registered the 17 districts bigich was 3.02 percent ar's terms this Teart
Էյlբ 1
that during each year of this 16 year period, every 10.000 Wooters at the beginning of the year increased to 10,302 by the end of that year. Since this was perhaps twice as much as the average growth fale of the total population of the country we decided to pursue the analysis in earnest in respect of the 17 districts.
Columns through iv in Table 1 provide the registered voters by district at each of the elections held in 1977, 1982, 1988 and 1993, respectively as given by the Department of Elections. Columns W through wireveal the percent exponential growth rate per annurn of this voter population for the inter-election periods of 1977-82, 1982-88, 1988-93 and 1977-93, respectively. The sortlewhat erratic nature of the growth of the voters is manifested in these columns with the 1982-88 period showing a Tarked depression of 2.13 in contrast to the two other periods which are Well above 3.0. We can only raise the question as to Whether the breakdown of social order under the onslaught of the JWP had an effect of even depressing WOLler registration in addition to precipitãting the dismal turnout of voters at the 1988 Presidential poli.
+ years at the elections of 1977, 1982, 1988 and 1993, rates
Voters of population 18+ in 17 districts of Sri Lanka.
Pop Itality. THE rears Estimated flyТ. 8. TMLM MMeHkHkH OuOuLCL LO S0S LLLLL LLLCClkkLkTLee K s ek crisis acuted for Trially during F-Lilla tiġri l-irtira FBl+Fêukalign during
IHE: IEկ: FFF8;? --845 845-1377-53 ॥
L00S00 LSL0L00SaaLLLL SS SS LL0S000LLS S 0e00SK0a 1.3 1 E. 1. 1 구 31 E5155g F EEE E 또 또 Si EfB i TDF 113 E3, E1, 52.5512-2 5,323 51 - 5호 ...D. 13
543,230 BCE, GBH, B.E.1 1.E. 3.13. 177635 201575 25.0,51E 245,172 1 E 호D 1. 3 59E 353.038 E9 i 15 A TIET TO TE E. 9.
YLSkLSKL00 S KLLSLLL00LL S L LLS00LS S 0L0L L00LOL 1.ET TE TJET 1.53 BET IIET IDEE IIE.D 33-H, HEF I 3 FH30 - 23 TIL 45,532 E.g. g3 - 1. EL TOE3 7. I .E 22, 23.750 270321 2EE,52. 1. 1, 1.1 111 - 1
L0L0SL0L00 S SKaa0SL00 S S0aaLS00 S S L0K0SL0La A B ITT TIL 11:1: 1 미 23, 27E1333, 33.35 로, 1. 1. 1. H2 i HD ] IT II
2774, 315, 362. 30.35 . . . . 3. Ell: 22 T-3 25 EEG TAE,483, 15755: 178321 1, - 1 로, 1. G.G.H.D.H. TDI
3 1 352 1, 52' 439,10- E. E.5 A. 13.75 E1E. 1EF 1구,5} 로 구 1. E 5 HF 3 ET TIE
Laaa S L0LS00 SS La00 S S 0LL0S000 1. T. TIFF, T. F.E. Big BGT3 00LSKL S SLL0LL SKO0K S00LS KKaSO Oaa 1 14 11. To E.E.1
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误 置 量 LI LI JRI JRI
OLOLL LK 0LLMHLT LLTLLLLLLS LLLLLLMCMMCCHHe MMTe M CL0GGGL aLCaaS LLeHLLLLHHL

Page 9
At the district level, the growth of voters reflects the general pattern of population growth with the dry zone districts generally showing higher rates of growth than the rest of the Country and the southwestern coastal districts revealing low growth. Nuwara Eliya rewealisa massive 10.6 percent growth rate during 1988-93 due mainly to the-hitheriodisenfrasolised Estate Tamils of Indian origin receiving citizenship. NuWara Eliya and Badulla districts had 42.7 and 20.2 percent Indian Tamils respectvely, the highest proportionate representation of this ethnic group in the districts as at the 1981 Census of Population of Sri Lanka.
In order to answer the question of whether or not the growth of the Voters (as provided by the Department of Elections) was compatible with the growth of the Voting age population, We had to obtain an estimate of the latter through a different Source. The TOStauthoritative Source for providing this information is the Depatrient of Census and Statistics which LJSLJally conducts decennial Censuses of population. Although We should have had two censuses during our period of concern, We hawe to be contented with only thE 1981 Census, the 1991 Census Scheduled being postponed due to the Department's inability to cover the Northeast encapsulated in bitter hostilities at that time. (Incidentally, this is only the second instance during this century that Sri Lanka had to postpone taking a decennial census, the other being in 1941 due to the World War II, which was ultimately taken in 1946.)
There is some evidence to suggest that the voter register accepted as valid for an election is generally compilad about a year inadvance of the election, (Table 255 of the Statistical Abstract of Sri Lanka. 1989 reveals the 1987 Voter register rather than the 1988 register as being valid for the 1988 Presidential Election Which was held at the tail end of the year, i.e., 19th December.) Thus, we could someWhat safely assume that the population enumerated as 18 years or more on 17th March, 1981 (date of census) would in fact have come very close to the register of Voters for the 1982 Presidential Election. Accordingly, We retain the population 18+ as at the census (See column x) as the comparable population to the voter popu|aliՃm tյf 1ցB2.
Although we do not have the benefit of a Second CEnsus WE ar E in a SCITEWlat lucky situation of being able to estimate the comparable populations over 18 years at the other election years. Even in respect of the 1993 election (the farth est away from the actual census), the 1981 census provides us with valuable information hepful for the estimation of the 18+popula
tion. Hit must beren ley Eritrants to thl had already been be the 1981 census. T years and ower at ! be eligible to Vote similarly the populat would be eligible elgCtigr. What TerT. estimate how many died before eachel adjust for net migr: rsons rarely wote! Voters at the 1977 23 years and abov Survived back Wards an estimate of the '77 elections. By W. strict reports publish Of CenSUSand Stati tions at 1977, 1988 ned for Gaahl of th national level, it 6,159,351, 9,4777 respectively (not in
Using Life Table mately facilitate the ctancy figures With are familiar) three derived (fram LifET. Lanka by the Demo Research Unit (DTF of Colombo in resp. adjust the censusmortality. These : 0.91 O60.8884 and cable respectively to 1993 populations 18 Tlated from the 198
(While there may associated With the the layman, the rob derived from life ta been demostrated is due primarily to th: are derived by the si mortality experience tion at a given point – to El TlaSSIVB Saľ born babies - know by surviving thernith
However, by ap across the 17 dist assunning that morta: Wary appreciably at This is usually not th been otable Ti Ortali districts like Garipal for example, the la a higher proportiona COLjrstand, hoWe Wêr, at hand (i.e., to arri, estimate of the popt election yearsin que of Ong Survival ratio of both practicality a

embered that all the
1993 voter register in at the time of taking us, the population 7 le "81 CenSUS Would it the 1993 election; On 11 years and over Wolt at the 1988 ins to be done is to of these Would have ction (and if possible, tion) since dead peWith regards to the 2ction, the population E at the '81 Census Would provideus with 8+ population at the ding through the di3d by the Department stics, the 18+ populald 1993 Werg obtai17 districts; at the nese figures are 78 and 10,631,067, able 1).
echnique (which ultierivation of "life expe
which most laymen Survival fati OS Were bles prepared for Sri graphic Training and RU) of the University act of 1981) so as to obtained figures for survival ratics are 0.8348 and are applithe 1977, 1988 and | years and ower esti| CEH15LIS.
pe an auга of "magic' Se Survival ratios for stress of estimates ble techniques hawe time and again. This fact that these ratios mulation of the actual s of a given popula
in time- or period ple of 100,000 new Tas the radix — and "ough their lifetime.)"
lying a single ratio cts we are ir Implicitly lity conditions do not ross these districts. a case as there have y variations between a and Nuwara Eliya, er usually depicting Cincidence of death. sthat for the purpose at a Census-based ation 18+ during the tion), the application Suffices for the sake 1d COr WeiernicE.
The resulting population 18 years and over adjusted for mortality is revealed in columns ix through, xiiin respect of 1977, 1988 and 1993. (1982 Was not adjusted since it is the census population which in effect counts only the living.) The percent growth rates per annum of these 18+ population figures are detailed in columns xiii through xviin respect of the inter-elections periods. If the voter registration systernis to be held in highesteem, there should hawe been a near One-to-Ole COrespondence between the number of voters and the 18+ population in terrns of identical locality and time. This is because the number of registered voters in a reliable system should be equal to the population 18 years or more if universal suffrage is an enshrined human right of that population as is in Sri Lanka.
The two sets of figures reveal that this is not so. Columns xvii through xx which provide the voter population (columns i through iv) as a percent of population 18+ (Columns ix through, xii) show that at the national level it appears to have changed from a substantial under-registration (85.2 percent during 1977) to an over-registration (104.8 percent) by 1993. It is possible that this under-registration of voters in 1977 resulted in there being the highest voter turnout of 86.7 percent recorded in any election during the postindependence period to date.
What is even more revealing is the wide difference between the growth rates of Voters and that of the population 18+, While the 18+ population grew at 1.71 percent per annum during the 16-year period in the 17 districts, the registered Voters as compiled by the Department of Elections grew by 3.02, 76.6 percent far ster than the former. During each of the three inter-election periods the voters have consistently grown at a faster pace than the 18+ population though at quite varying paces; during 1977-82 the the rate of growth of the voters grew by more than 82.5 percent dropping to an almost irstgnificant 19.0 percent more during 1982-88 but leaping to almost three times the pace of the 18+ population during 1988-93, a phenomenal 184.0 percent increase.
These differential rates of growth are Talifested in each of the 17 districts during each inter-election period. The districts of Gampaha, Nu Wara Eliya, Poloппагuwa, BadullaапdMonaгаgala reveal a voter growth of more than twice the rate of growth of the 18-population in that district during the 16-year period. Both Nu Wara Eliya (whose voters depict a growth rate more than three times in excess of that of the 18+ population) and Badulla would have this growth rate due to the high proportion of Indian Tamils

Page 10
receiving citizenship; Monaragala and Po|on|Iriaru Wa hawe been high in-migration districts situated within the dry zone. The proportionate difference between the two rates of growth is higher in Anuradhapura, Ratnapura, Puttalam and Colombo than the national difference.
What transpires from the foregoing is that a much higher growth of voters has been witnessed devoid of a compatible |evel of growth in the 18+ population of the Country Without there being a plausible rational explanation for this difference. This situation is further exacerbated when one brings in the net migration patters that have occured during these years. According to the Department of Immigra tion and Emigration, the country has lost B06,921 persons due to net-migration during the 16 years Бермееп 1977 апр. 1992 losing 50,432 persons on an average during each calendar year. If one is not resident in the country, the chances of entering the voter list on a de facto basis should be zero, though this may not be happening in actuality. Thus, if these Outmigrants were deducted from the figures revealed in Table 1, the rate of growth of the 18+ population would be depressed even further thereby increasing the differential growth between the latter and that Cf | WOLTS.
Those that might be interested in defeinding the credibility of the present Voter registration system may try to Counter Our analysis by pointing out that our estimations of the 18+ populatiom are "Una CCEptably low. While grating the fact that We would have liked to Work with a second census in addition to that of the 1981, the absence of such leaves us With no alternative but to use this estimation procedure. if Contestants of this methodology car furnish us with a superior estirration procedure, We Would be most Willing to look at such data With an open mind.
In the rimea Intime We WO Luld like tio predsent a 'check back procedure as a VerifCation of Our eStimaties, The gCWernment of Sri Lanka Works on projected national population figures and the mid-year estimate for 1992 (as given in Table 4 of Population Statistics of Sri Lanka published by the Population Information Centre of the Ministry of Health and Women's Affairs) is 17,480,000. What does our 18+ population estimate of 8,874,815 in 1993 translate into as a national populatio estimate?
Reaching-Out once again into the "known and trustable' 1981 census, the ratio of 18+ population in the 17 districts to those in the Northeastern districts needs to be worked out. Table 250 of the Statistical Abstract of Sri Lanka 1989 reWeas that in 1981 the Northeasterri di
a
stricts carried 1,131 Were 18 yearS OIT PTIC persons in the 17 Northeast. This work: 15014 in 1981. If W same ratio persisted compilation of the WC respectofthe 1993 el of 18+ population in be 1332,465. This estimate of 10.2072. population for the e! The Tatio Of the nati to those under 18 yea Celsus Was 1:0.712 8,670,321 populatio =Sarthe Source à Sat the Sana ratio pers population under 18 Works Outto 72712 18arld 18+թոբլյlatiմ WiiC GTS:t Lite:S th eritire latio at 1992 to 7,478,538 which 1,462 population fra late of 17480,000 pulation Information clISE to WErificatios \ thodologies as We demographic estinia
The prime aim oft to point fingers nor is motivated and p fostering of the inqu spirit, vital to be Wik the intelligentsia (if population) of a co|||| to achieve Newly if statuS, beforĖ the LLIT appears quite clear that the voter regists Country needs to be the system's output tål er Lu Teration of nöt suffer frORT1 Eith Tēration of Woltērs,
To achieve this, IT campaigns targetin children as Wellast specific instruction: (irama Niladharis , sponsible for COTE their diwisIdirls Woll kega COCrte Siomas to Whathaf 0 tion should be don jure basis has to series of detailed E. as to how to deter is an eligible Voter should be given tot or multiplicity of r overwhelming cat. growth, a straigh needs to be evolve registration for alle Establish.ITert of th system in Sri Lar

833 persons who |re to the 7.538.4EB istricts outside the out to a ratio of 1:0. eassume that this to 1992 (the year of ter register, Walid in ections), the number Hē Northeast WÖLuld Would give Lis an 30 persons in the 18+ tigatio 1 1992. on's 18+ population ars of age at the 1981 B6 (population 8+ = ri < 1B = 6,17Ճ431 ove). Assuming that isted into 1992, the years of age at 1992 58. When thë u nder sārtakentgether he population of the the figure Works out | devates byа тете m the mid-year estipublished by the PoCentre. This is as Пd Calian Gf GLJI FTETlay get in terms of
S.
his analysis is neither o apportion blarine, lt ropelled through the iring and questioning brant among at least not among the entire try Which is yearsing idustrializEd Country of the century. What y from this analysis is ation machinery in this tightened-up SO that approaches near-tothe eligible and does under-Orower-en
la SS SCalea WEITETI ÉSS gadolescent School he general public With 5 being giver to the who ultimately are reiling voter lists Within d FlaWE tObg Lideta| scale. A policy decinot the voter registrae of a de facto or de first taken. Then a but simple instructions mine if a giveпрегson in a particular locality le GNS, SinCe duplicity вsidence пmay be ап use of higher voter tforward mechanist d for ensuring a single ligible voters. With the a national identity card 1Ka and its approach
towards total coverage of the adult population, it is proposed that the same NIC murTiber ble recorded or Woter registration lists and the data COTiputerized so that periodic checks could be run to identify and remedy duplicity or multiplicity of registration. Those dying also need to be eliminated promptly from the register. Serious Corsideration shOLild be giver to Whlétér Or not the BStablishment of the fact of intertional attempt to initiate of maintain duplicity of registration be made a punishable offence.
Cppøments of registration Systems may be up in arms saying what is proposed herein is yet another step in the direction of establishing the police state paving the way towards curbing human rights. What happens in the absence of a fool-proof registration system is that human rights of the unsuspecting majority are violated by an unscrupulous handful by padding or deflating Voter lists. One should not forget that the existence of data banks and registration Systems do mot necessarily lead to abuse; internalized restraint and etiquette backed-up by enforceable reWards and purishments have proved that such systerns are more a boon than the barie of humanity. The Scandinavian Coutries.Which are the modern-day epitomes of democracy have What are called 'continuous population registers' dating back from the feudal period which are capable of providing the vital events of birth, death and migration on an individual basis. Democracy in these Countries has apparently not suffered due to the existence of these registers which Were initiated by and linked to parishes of the days gone by.
Within the current clime of constitutional reform in the offing, the establishment of a accurate Voter registration system caTot bē CO Wer-enghasized. No lESS ET eminent personality than Mr. Justice Mark Fernando in a recent address to the University of Colombo (50hanniversary celebrations) stated that "the legislative, executive and judicial powers (enjoyed by persons through representatives) and fundamental rights and franchise (enjoyed individually), thus constitute the five principal building blocks of the constitution". The practical exercise of franchise is determined by the efficacy with which the register of Voters is compiled. Thus, Our earnestappeal to the authorities to Seri OLsly indulge in this exercise as an integral part of the total effort to improve Sri La
kE'S COSİLLİOT.
A technica rotę Orl the Life Table Technique and how these Survival ratio15 Were LLLMLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLS LLLLLLS LLLLLLaL de Silva of the DTFU, University of ColoTibo, Colombo 7 by Writing to him,

Page 11
MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT(2)
The Empty Y
John Gooneratine
he next phase in the Middle East
peace process which wasearlierreferred to as begining from about 1980 Was quite barren when compared to the achievements of the Camp David Accords. President Carter was quoted in a recent news report, as saying that "there Were too many empty years between the 78-79 Camp David Accords and the present achievements". Part of the reason Could Well be that Other World ISSLJes d'Orninated the attention of the U.S. The latter part of 1979 5W, the fall of the Shahi Offa ir whom the US had invested heavily. There was also the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which Was to Consulte the attention of the U.S. for the next decade. Septemer 1980. Witnessed the Outbreak of War etween Iran and Iraq. All these events Worked to divert the attention of the U.S. away from the Arab-Israeli conflict.
NOVeTibGr:198O alSOSaWa U.S. PIESdential election where Mr. Reagan was elected. His worldview was dominated by the Soviet threat in different parts of the World. In the Middle East his preoccupation was not with the Palestine question and occupied territories but with the Soviet threat to the Gulf area. Prime Minister Begin who was first elected in May 1977, Was re-elected in June 1981, October 1981 also Witnessed the aSSäSiriation of President Sadat., THE ECCLinulation of these events tended to slow down the Middle East peace process.
It did not mean, however, that the Middle East remained quiet or lacking in tension. The events that did take place, when viewed in retrospect, did have a bearing in clarifying the forces at work in Middle East politics. These events could be grouped under the following headings:
(a) Events in Lebanon (b) The fortunes of the PLO, and (c) US-Israel relations
The Wrifer, Sri Lanka's former Arribassador. In Baghdad concludes, his analysis of the Middle-east peace process.
(a) The events
Several strugglē: in Lebah01. There WEET the Muslim groups for control There was the PalE this civil War. And, Syrian interest in n nce and extending t TOT). It Was ofte the three conflicts.
A1 earlier bout of in 1975 had been S gue mediation. But of fighting in early 1. fined over tha freqi across the northern 1982 the Israel Ari While initially the st drive the PLO beyo the Israeli border, th ntually took them : conditions for lifting thE GWaCLation of th from Beirutin Augu many more month Art Ty Seeing is prac Withdrew from Leb 1983. A politicalfa campaign was the Prime Minister Mr. E
The United State Lebanon in terms o interestim the regio given to Syria by th such a perception til ne. With France and Natiorld ForCE in National Force Was in early 1984, after Tibings that left 241 French Soldiers de;
With Syrian pres SUCCESSfLil CGirlfrOT Syria next turned its EBTrlärtoffle F based in the north Tripoli. This engage fat Palestinials end turefrom Tripolin
 

ears
Fill Lebaron:
swere being fought out was the Contest beand the Christian of the Government. Stinia imwollWETēr til lastly, there was the iaintaining their influeheircontrolQWerLEbaiifficult to disentangle Each fed the Other.
civil strife in Lebanon ettled after Arab LeaWith the latesteruption 982, srael was conceent attacks launched part of Israel. In June Ty invaded Lebanon. ated objective Was to ld a line 20 tiles from e Israeli iniwasion EWEis far as Beirut. The the Seige of Beruit was le PLO and its troops st of that year. It was IS before the Israeli ticality of their mission O In the SLITT mer Of Il-out of this fruitless resignation of Israeli Begin in August 1983.
IS Saw the conflict in a Sowjet threat to its , through the support * SCWiat Uniõ. E WES åt|Ed U.S. to intglygBritain in having a Multi Lebanon. The MLIt ultimately withdrawn i spate of suicide-boU.S., Marines and 58 diri dirincidert.
ige increased by its lation with the US, altention to EliTirlate O troops which were rn Lebanon town of rent with the pro-AradWith Arafat's depaecember 1984, along
with his supporters Under the protection of the UN flag.
Over all the events in Lebanon during this period would fall into the category of inter-Arab conflict. The only relationship one could trace to the Middle East peace process was that it strengthened the hand of Syria.
(b) The fortures of the PLO.
It is a testimony to the strength and survival qualities of PLO Chairman Mr. Arafat that, on leaving Tripoli, he started Out on Several diplomatic initiatives to rebuild the strength of the PLO. He visitd Egypt, and sought to organise a moderate Arab alignment between Egypt, Jordan, and the PLO. He sought the re-establishrinent of more Arab diplomatic Contacts With Egypt. In December 1985 Jordan restored diplomaticities with Cairo. Thesa moves at forming an alignment of moderate states Were opposed by Syria, Libya and the PLO's left Wing factions.
A more serious development that took place about this time was the Palestinian uprising in Gaza and the West Bank in December 1987, called the intifada. It was a mass Palestinian demonstration against Israeli rule. By January 1988 it had become clear that What was underway in the occupied territories was a Tlass popular revolt. This was worrying to the PLO and its local leadership, While there Was a Working relationship between the undeground leadership of the intifada and the various PLO factions in the occupied territories, it marked a new departure in that the PLO leadership outside the occupied territories Was notinstruriental in Organising and Sustaining it.
As the intifada progressed over the coming period, a new force emerged, namely an autonomous Islamic fundamentalist group in Gaza, called the Islamic Resistarice Movement known by its Arabica CromyTTI Harmas.
(c) US-Israel Relations:
US-Israel relations during this period grew closer especially with the US perce
9

Page 12
ption being dominated by a Soviet threat. About the time that the United States participated in the Multi National Force in Lebanon, the new U.S. strategy was for even closer identification of its interests With those of Israel. President Reagan on being re-elected in November 1984 for the Second term, concentrated on accelerating the US-Israel strategic relationship. The U.S. strengthened its anti-terrorist legislation aimed mainly at the Palestinians. And accusing it of supporting terrorism, the US attacked targets in Libya in April 1986.
At the 19th Session of the Palestine National Congressheldin Algeria in Nowember 1988, the PNC declared the establishment of the independent State of Palestine, With its capital as Jerusalem, Later, in a press Conference at the end of the PNC session, Mr. Arafat explained that he sought the acceptance of the UN Security Council resolution 242 as a mandate "to actively pursue peace" and challenged the US to respond to the PLO's overtures. The American response was not positive. In fact the U.S refused the grant of a visa G M. Arafato attgUNGeneral ASSe
However, later that year the PLO did achieve a significant breakthrough, as a result of the pressure applied by Presiden-elect George Bush. On 16th December 1988, the US Ambassador to Tunisia, or instructions from his Government, held talks with representatives of the PLO. The PLC thus chieved its nost importāli diplomatic breakthrough, although it did поtnecessarily expectaпусопсreleadvаnces in the peace process to follow quickly. This dialogue was, however, Suspended in June 1990 When the U.S. accused the PLO of failing to condemn in sufficiently strong terms an attempt by a Palestinian group, to land guerillas on Israel's MEditEFTEEEdC03 St.
Although this period was described as "the empty years", there were certain areas in which one could say that Sone advance in the peace process was achiewed. The European countries were begining to show a certain impatience with the US attitude towards recognising the PLO. The Irish Foreign Minister, speaking at the UN General Assembly in 1979 con behalf of the E.C. woiced Europa's strong criticism of Israeli policy, and mentioned for the first time a role for the PLO. In 1980 the E.C. Countries produced their Middle East statementata Teeting in Venice on
June 13. In this state ntries, for the first tirfı; Edthlatte Palestini allowed "to exercise
lf-deter Tilation", and "tij Eje associated with
Peace Process...The
In the third phase af UCI 1990 i Efe Hi significant change ir WirOTElt. The Col.
collapsed, with the Umi. The Hold that exercised on World ey broken. And in its plac ration of power bega U.S. Was the Sole Su
When Iraq invade 1990, there Wa5 T1C. Si de a counterWeight til of the far reaching invasion of KLIWait newalignmentofforC And the PLC), irl Cas Suffared tref meirnod OL 15: Support for ELS Cause,
In trying to drum up Iraq tried to portrayth as designed to bring : stinian cause by bri Israel to withdra W for triēS. Hovgvrfā-fg US understood the px ELS irith5 Arab) WOT any promises on this: any linkages BetWeer CCalition With a 5G|Litik problem, the U.S. me to find a equitable S. East probleIT, onceth
The U.S. taking ac nged circumstances Le Cg Mar El F in late 1991 renewe lasting Solutions to til blem. Secretary of LIndEarlOok a SETES 0 59, gra ME. E35 of the Gulf War, and on general negotiat S|L ti]] to the Middle; intries like Syria, and
lāV bĒē VāfB ti: having the customa Soviet Union, as a C Supportfor Israel. Fu Fa We Seelit to be in before even-hard dering the fact that ti
 
 
 

ET THE ECCL! collectively declaan people must be Tully its right to secalled for the PLO the negotiations".
Post-Cold War:
of events begining ad occurred a very I the international Wär StrLICurg-Slad collapse of Soviet the Cold War had rents had now been ea unipolar configuto takehold. The
Dr POWET.
di Kuwait in August Oviet Union to prowO, FL JES, Adg effects of the Iraqi Was the CCT poletely EST LATE WITH ting its lot with Iraq ily both in political and also financially.
support for its side girl Wilson of Kuwait support for the Paleinging pressure oni Til the CCCtupied territohed they were, the otency of SILIChargu
ld. While not making
score, nor promising joining the anti-Iraq to the Middle East da kW its de Sir E3 til to the Midi|| E GLIF WE WESWET.
wantage of the chaԷյՍtՒl with lit Brit tif le victory Over Iraq. di its afforts to Seek le Middle East proSIL JIES BEKET f W|SitS J Sräal änd COLtrieS attie B1 obtained agreement ing principles for a East question. COLUthg PLO WOLuld als) at they would not be ry support frofil the unterweight to U.S. rther the U.S. Would th5i OW interCSt to dthäi Espēfor, CorsiThe Strategic importa
ce of Israel had diminished somewhat now, and consequently the importance of the Araj CDLJПtriВЕ Пај пCreased
LL LLaLLLLL LL aaTLLLLLLL LLLaLLLL LLLKLLL LLL convening of the Madrid Conference in October 1991. The frarnewark af negaliatigris Cālēd för Eilatesa di SCLISSİOS EJEtween Israel and Syria, Israel and Letanon and Israelianda joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. There Were al SO LO ble multilateraldiscussions ornisSLjes of regiomal-importance such as, armis controland regional Security, Water, econominici dewelopment, the environment and refugees.
An important aspect of the Madrid Coinference process is that the Arab COLntries are meeting and negotiating directly With Israel on the problems between those Countries. And equally difficult problems of a regional nature are being di SCLISSēd in multilateral groups.
A noteworthy feature of the series of negotiations is that all countries have persisted in keeping the negotiations going, without Walking out as before whenever disagreements arose. The very habit of meeting and discussing with one's opponents has had a beneficial psychological effect in breaking down earlier barriers and promoting a willingness to negotiate With each other.
The Madrid Conference process is still underway. However, the recent agreeLLaLLLLS aLLLLLL LLLL LLLL LLL LLLL LLLLLLL to a externt be attributed to their Tiprowafrient in the political atmosphere following the Madrid Conference negotiations, And as in the case of Egypt and Israel, the decisive change Was the agreement of the LLLLLL L0LLL LLLLLL aa LLLLL0L0LL L0LSLLSLL0 aaLLLL recognizing the legitimacy of each other. Following the breakthrough in the Israel-Palestine negotiations, an agreement between Israel and Jordan is reportedly imminent. A further agreement between Israel and Syria is now Well within the realm of possibility, An agreement with LLLLLL S LLLLL LLLLLLLaaLGLLHHLHH LLLLLL aLaLLLLLL S S LGL agreerlerit between Israel and Syria.
When such agreements are finally coincluded one stage of the Middle East political process, would have been completed. Israel Would not be surrounded by Couintries with which she has only armistice agreements as was the case in 1949, but countries With Which she has peace treaties.
16 September 1993.

Page 13
ADP A Confera
Godfrey Gunatilleke
behalf of ADPA - the
Association of Development Research and Training Institutes of Asia and the Pacific - let extend to all of you a very Warm Welcome to this inaugural seLaLaa LS LL aLLa LSLLLL L LLLLLLtLLCLL0LaLLS Today, lenjoy the happy position ofгергеsenting both the Association as well as the lost Institute for the Conference - the Marga Institute. Therefore at the same title let me take this opportunity to bring to you greetings from the Marga Institute and to express our very deep appreciation of your presence with U.S.
Your Excellency, We are deeply honoured that amidst all your heavy responsibilities as Head of State you have so graciouSly Consented to inaugurate Our Conference. The Community of development research and training institutions in Asia and the Pacific hawe always regarded this bi-ennial event as an opportunity to strengthen their links with the World of policy making and action and to make their activities more relevant meaningful to that World, Theinauguration of the Conference by your Excellency helps us to place our deliberations in that larger context and truly enhances the stature and significance of the ConferBFCB,
The Conference is also a special event LaL LLLLLLLLS aLLL LLaaaLLLLL LL00LHS LLLLLSLL Laa twentieth anniversary of the association. ADIPA has a membership representing 18 countries in the Asia Pacific region. It includes all the sub-regions of Asia. As a cort munity of research and training organisations ADIPA has maintained a di SiCLWE Character. Tilgail CICEF of the member institutes is the field of development. The focus of their Work is on the major social, economic and political changes that are taking place in their societie5. The Association Corbilles Eboth TEsearch and training and tries to build on that complementarity. ADIPA is a partner of the international developTent Information network which links nearly 1000 institutions and has a global database Covering 4800 projects and 7500 researchers. Therefore, while one section of the reTibership is engaged in research, study and analytical Work that could hopefully enhance our understanding of the development problerns and helpin finding solutīCors to the Ti, the other SECtilor IS CONCE3rned with the application of that knowledge in developing the skills and human
rësoLrCES for Tilar ADIPA'S TITJET5|| tasks Which help th key actors in devel. participate in the upg administrators and pment. Therefore, t to make both a the practical Contributio Substaitial. It coul national and regionE
ADPA also as a It is a ulti-discipli TIETıbership COMTips rking in a wide rar economics, Sociolo and mariagement SI the only organisatio pment research Whi sciplinary forum in t together the differe SOCia|| SCIENCËS LO E of development, W realist over the last condition of Well-bei the term developm TOT ETTELS EESİ ridition; that the e freedoms, equitable logical balanCE a re development ar ditt priment has to be pe Ele. Whole. We lee Which Taintain and fast growth, Combir participation and si enhance the qualit With rapid structura Ileans that therapic Which Our Societies: OC COITI plex to be al LSO WILF ld. For this Wence and examine the systems and comp. development takes inces for their parth: task. It requires mor аппопg disciplines | the past Tore int study; a more шnifiє of knowledge drawn nes. ADPA, both regional levels prowi sciplinary network community of scho SES.
The bl-EFlmial C[]]

el Ce
aging development. ipis actively in Wolved e policy makers and pment; they directly rading of skills of the managers of develole potential of ADIFA oretical as Well as a to develop Tent is do S tot at the ||EWES.
lother unique feature. nary association. Its iSeS StituiOS WOge of disciplines – gy, political science ciences. It is perhaps in the field of de Velochprovides a multi-dihe region and brings int disciplines in the IddreSS the problerT1S 'e a|| H. WE COTE tO Wo decadé5 hat E ng We describe Under вnt comprises. папу des the ECCITOITICCOnjoyment of political distribution ard ECOall an intrinsic part of lat ultimately develorceived as an indivisd to design strategies promote equity. With Ig law and order. With "Eedo Ti, protect and of the environment changes. This also processes of change are undergoing are far contained, analysed ilir orlle single discipliiconstantly to identify larger patterns, the site wholes in which place, The Social Scieawe to be equal to that e inter Siw 3 literactiOI hal We hawe had in egrative methods of di structure and body from different discipliat the national and des a unique multi-diof institutions and a ars for those purpo
Inference has always
provided the Association with an opporturity to apply that multi-disciplinary perspective to selected developmentissues. The themes that have been generally selected för the bil-Ġnnial Confere CBS hawe had that objective in view. They are broad enough in Scope and content to enable the membership to apply their knowledge and experience to issues of major national and regional significance and interact With each other acrossa wide range of disciplires. Accordingly for this conferences. We have selected the there. The ECOOTC Transfortation of Asia: Social, Political and Ecological Perspectives.
The есопопnic performance of the region taken as a whole during the 1980's, and continuing to the 90's, has been widely acclaimed and has been the subject of extensive report and analysis. Both the speed of the transformation as LLLK LLLLLL LL LSLLLLLLLL LLLaLLLLLLL LLLLLS cting as it does the economies, the polilies, the social structures, the life styles of the region are unprecedented in human history. In the 1950's, development ecoLaLLLLL LLaLLL LaLLLLL LLLLaLLaL LLLL LLLLC fantasy the high growth rates achieved and Sustained by East Asian economies DVerlee dECHE5.TIE5CBIlari. Of Agian growth has opened entirely new wistas for the region which contains well over half the World's population. What We as a community of research and training instiLLLLLL L LLLLLL aL0 LLLL0LL LLLLLLLHaa00LLLLLLL LLLLLLaL LS gaining a clearer understanding of the nature of that transition and contributing to the procasses which help to direct it to desired human goals.
LLLLLL LLLLLaLLLGHHL0 L L C LLLLLLLK LLLLLL LL that direction. The Conférence ha5 bger organised in four Working sessions which follow three keynote addresses. The Working sessions focus on four major areas of development—econornic, Social, politiCal and ecological. Each Working session deals with the trends, prospects and chalenges in the selected area. We would be examining the perspectives in the rain Subregions-East Asia, South East Asia. South Asia and the Pacific. These Will be supplemented by papers on selected issues which bring together the findings of individual scholars, institutes and intenational agencies relating to the development problems and prospects of the region. We hawe also tried to reflect the Cornlementarity of effortin ADIPA as be

Page 14
tween research and training. The SGssions examine the need for developing new skills and Capabilities that are dermainded for managing therapid transition that is taking place in all parts of our Societies.
We are looking forward to a discussion which Will be of value instrengthening and promoting the links and forms of co-operation for development Wilhlmandamang the main sub-regions of Asia and the Pacific. The pattern of development that we are witnessing in the region is one which holds great promise for such co-operation. We hawe groups of Countries at differentle Wells of development covering the entire range from the most developed to the least developed. The structural changes and transformation that have taken place in Japan and East Asia have der tonstrated W COLUFtrias at differ Entle W Els Of dËVēlOpment can mutually benefit from the comparative advantages that flow from these differences. These mutual benefits hawe flowed from the shifts im LindLStrial production, transfers of technology, investment and trade flows and a CCESS to markets. We are now witnessing these same processes taking place in South East Asia, and they are poised for a take-off in South Asia as well. This gradation of development from the least to the lost advanced, also offers other unique opportunities for learning froTeach other - opportunities for the most appropriate forms of technical assistance arld co-operation among Asian Countries. Each level can benefit from the experience andlessons of the level which has gone before it. Out of these processes We also see new patterns of interdependence emerging as between developed and developing coutries in Asia and the Pacific, These can give a new dimension to the traditional North-South relations. Our Conferencesessions, hopefully, will examine various aspects of these changes and the immense potential they hold for Asian Co-opera|ltյrլ:
The Conference will go conto deal with the other far-reaching changes which aCCOrTmpany the rapideconomic groWith of the Asian region. The session devoted to the political perspectives deal with a set of inter-related themes; all of them in One Way or another concerned with two basic questions: First, how and to what extent is the process of democratisation and the empowerment of people in the Societies of Asia keeping pace with rapid economic development and what are the means of promoting this process? and second, how are the Asian Societies dealing With their internal divisions arising from their multi-e- thnic multi-religious character and What
1
are the systems and being evolved for the
The Session on So again provide a reWE the sharing and Com the experience in As are hardships and c. intrinsic to any proce: it that of an indiwi. initial phase of st which many societie take to ay the founc wal and growth has cult. The political n process is full of ha found satisfactory an questions. HOW Can pooragainst the harc We hawe to relTETE comprise alarge Sé The Asian societies. rapid growth in ama the Sari tirTie läkE wentions needed to
The session Will outCCITÉS Cf de Wel0|| Wide C37wą5. TH13 conties with developr the structures that g ships change. The ES DECOTT E need to address sq religion, Walue syst. indevelopment... Oni
tha i riSB of fulda
Which are Copp0Sēd ti tic values and instit there is the spread (, gies which erode the hawe traditionally or and enriched and life of the individual, perspectives will aid SSLIES.
Similarly the Sess rspectives will deally minimental Challeriges ties. The physical r environment of the nging beyond recog leW Habitat is takir many-emerging is Wich Stad Lut. E must designand strategies which aw Tental costs that rapid economic gr. and urbanisation. S velopment also rais ital is-SALIB5, as it w irrimpaction globalcliir affecting the plane a region Will hawe

I ir StiitUtiOS that art3 it purpose?
cial perspectives will riding opportunity for parative analysis of i SOCl3tiES. THE TE lisciplines which are ss of growth-Whether lualor a society. The ructural adjustment S Hawa Had to LIridedationS for their rengeen particularly diffmanagement of that zards. We hawe not ISWerstorTany of the We protect the very ships of adjustment? er that the Wery POOr ction of the low-in-COHOW Car Weachie We Irket economy and at : the large Scale intealleviate powerty?
cal With other Social plent. They cover a quality of life which ment depends Ori hOW O Wefri hlLJImam relatioa charges in gender a central issue. We uarely the role which ims and culture play hele Fälld WĠ TEWE mentalist ideologies Otha liberal dETIO Crautions. On the other, of laterialisti Cid ClO: value systerns which dered social relations iven meaning to the TEISÖSSiT CONSOČial dress some of these
ion on ecological pewith the crucial envirofacing Asian socieTian-built and natural Asian region is chaInition and an entirely Ig shape. Among the 5Les there a TE WIC) First, Asian SCCieti ES pursue development olid the heavy envirohawe a CICOTpa ried Wth, industrialisation econd, their rapid deies global environ TheWill hawe a significant maticcharges thatare as a Wold. Asia as to act collectively to
ensure that the responsibility for protecting the global environment is equitably shared. They need to find sufficient room for their rapid growth within the global EnvirOITEItal COTSträirts.
The scenario that is implicit in my remarks is one which is hopeful and optitistic; it projects the vision of a resurgent dynamic Asia. Of course there are many pitfalls and constraints on the Way, but there is little doubt that in the next quarter of a century, Asia, developing Asia in particular, Will emerge as a key actor on the global stage will assume a major role in shaping the World order of the 21st century. And this means that Asia will need to identify its collective and common interests in many areas ranging from the World trading system, and the internatioa division of abour to issues such as nuclear non-proliferation, the custody of the world's nuclear arsenal and the global compact om enWironment.
ADPA with its wide ranging membership can gear itself to tasks which deal with critical aspects of the many problems that hawe been flagged. ADIPA is Well equipped to play the overarching role. For instance, the resources of its etwork could be engaged for developing the long
Erin future Scenario of Asia.
Before I conclude I wish to convey ADIPA's deep appreciation of the support it has received from Several organisations for financing this Conference and supporting the participation of member institutes and Other Schol TS. We WOLuld not hawe been able to organise this conference if not for the generous assistance given by the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, The Seoul University, Korea, the International Development Research Centre Canada and the Australian International Development Assistarice Board. ADIPA is deeply indebted to the Asia Pacific Development Centre which prowded the Executive Secretariat for the Association, Last but not leastin my capacity as President of ADPA must convey the Association's thanks to Ty Colleagues in the host institute, the Marga Institute, for the share of responsibilities and local costs that the Institute has or 1 and tile untiring efforts of Institute's staffin organising this Conference,
Crice again let me convey Ty deep, gratitude to Your Excellency for agreeing to inaugurate this conference and express my sincere appreciation of the encouragemert given by all of you, ourdistinguished guests, by participating in this inauguraיחסiן

Page 15
PAFT2
Cambodia : Polls, Hui
Jeevan Thiagarajah
General COCES
Il additior to the two Cori:CaFTs Tertioned above (the need for financial support for their human rights education program and the fear that huTan rights associations may be locked out of the constitution drafting process), the ADHOC represafitativës also notë:
- thë sleed for ADHOC t0 COlduct an internal evaluation of its training needs; and
- the general issue of security, and their fears regarding reprisals and harassment by the authorities both now and in the post-transitional period.
LICADHO - Cambodian League for
LL LLLLLLLHHLLLLHH LL L LLLLLLLL0 LL LLLLLL Rights
1. Background
LICADHO was established in July 1992 and now has a Tembership of 120,000 members. Of these, approximately 160 are active Ernbers Who Work for tha LLLLCLaaHS KK KLLK LLLH L S LLLLLL head-office While the remainder are distributed throughout 16 provinces in 22 offCes, 3 located in pagodas. Most of the provincial offices have 4-6 staff, while the largest (Kompong Chhnang) has 18. The provincial representatives are drawn mostly from Phinor Penh, receive accomпоdaliоп, Ігапsропапdliviпgexpenses but no wages. LICADHO is attempting to LLLLaLLLLLTCLL LLLL LLLLLLaL 0 LLLLL LL LLLLL LHLL provincial offices more independent.
LICADHO receives a substantial amount of financial support from the EEC amongst other donors.
2. Areas of Work
- Human Rights Education: The primary function of the 140 representatives is human rights education, "though each is also is a potentia|investigator". (LICADHO receives an average of 10 Complaints a m0nth of hur man rights Wiolatios Which are translitted to the appropriate Cambodian authority or to UNTAC.) The representatives go out to villages and gathera group of people for a 2-4 hour discussion, Lusing an illustrated Khmer language Universal Declaration of Human Rights which
A mambar of theg Sri Lankan Tarrassociated with UNTAC, Pha Writar playgda kgyragri The Human Rights Task Forca,
3.
in i а)
b)
LICADHO has wish to take upt rship are then trainer retUrITS ir tileir TEITlberS been oppositior authorities Wi aբբTCach,
Elèctil Morit ES WETEti Egitti T Skiff ||izi : ILIEI poll Week,
Fostering SpBC CADHO has - SITaller assocE mSalWes, nana intellectuals, W. and tild SE inter are in the proce of TLS SEO If TESE ESSOCIE CADHCOS E
Plamed ATES DHC) has plans
" ProdCE TE
" Estab|5|1| 3
bוחBחח 1Bחסs) fairlifir flÉ Te t'S COLLITSE
mOre Syst human rights
" sponsor int. teach people al
orgапіzeа"lf Tī5ā
COICer ITIS
ICADHO is cur its Work by som tW0 Ways:
The lead-off that the SOC TICE5; WE FE | located in page ITIOlkS t0 Evil Копропg The Kald|| Ed StLu
In Some (uns LCADHO rep told that they a human rights i.e., they shou This pressure COMITILINE ChiE LuthoritiġS. LI

man Rights and NGO’s
leveloped. People who he offer of free Tembephotographed and the a couple of days with hip cards. There has 1 from some provincial IS "LEC"
pring: LICADHO mened as monitors by the ce. LCAD HOOC1400 observers during
ial Interest Groups: Lissisted a ri Lu Tiber of its to Stalistey gTOLpS COf StudertS, omen, disabled people, ested in the arts. They SS of assisting a group FIT1 in Kompong Cham. iOrS Flawe space in Lill-office.
of Future Work: LICA
wsletter,
system of defenders ers are currently being
ಙ್ಗman Rights Compo
Brmatically docu::Thient
ab LuSES,
arnational experts to Sallenterprise skills;
link-tank" comprised of WerSeas KHTherS.
rently being obstructed e provincial authorities
ce is receiving reports authorities in the prowLCADHO offices are } da:Sare pressuring the st them (Batambang, յm, Kompong Cham, пg Treng).
pecified) regions, the resentatives are being re only per nitted to run classes in their offices, ild not go the Willages. is coming from the if level as well as higher CADHO, is responding
by attempting to negotiate with the authorities on a case-by-case basis. Local representatives are being reInforced at these negotiations by a flying squad of head-office staff (3 Khmer and 2 foreigners).
The other major concern expressed by LCADHO are the transport and communication difficulties they expect to face in the next few months when they oper offices ir Rata ma kiri, Mordullkiri and Preah Wihleari - areas which can realistically only be reached by helicopter. On the same theTle the repreSentative note that CCITTLnications between their lead-office and provincial representatives are hindered by their lack of phones or two-way radios, To overcome the problem, the representatiWes from nearby provinces come to the head-office daily, while the leaders of all the offices Teetin Phnom Penhevery5-6 Weeks. In energencies, LCADHO use
LLLLLLLaHLHHaHHaLLaLLaLL LLLLLLLLaL have difficulties when this backstop is removed with UNTAC's departure.
OUTREACH - Human Rights and Community Outreach Projects
1. Background
OUTREACH was formed in September 1992. It is a small organization and apparently has no interestin mustering a large base of inactive members. Its emphasis instead is on developing a core of people Who Will Work virtually full-time for the association. Currently OUTREACH has approximately 50 Workers.
OUTREACH's philosophy is that human rights work and development Work Tust go"hand-in-hand". The leader beliaWes that, in a Country as por as CarTbodia, the two are intertWined". The Wg WI always be connected as long as there is a Cambodia. We cannot just teach human rights in the abstract. She also noted that the balance between human rights Work and development Workshould not befixed but should change as the objective Conditions in the country alter. "As peace and hur Tian rights ideas spread and take root, then Tay be there Will be both more title and more need for development work". At this point in Cambodia's history, OUTREACH is concentrating om human rights education and monitoring; but hopes to be able to supplement this With de Welco por Tert Work in the future as the political situation improves and funds beCOTE GWallable.
13

Page 16
2. Areas of Work
- Human Rights Education: In a three month period (to the end of February). OUTREACH COLCt six rights courses for 200 people. Exceptional students were selected to become teachers and 10 have already been trained. They will conduct further programs when funding becomes availa
le.
- Election Monitoring: 50 OUTREACH members were trained by the TaskfoLB arld WBrg floritor5 in Both the pre-election period and poll Week.
- Constitutional Work: OUTREACH Hlas a strong interest in being involved in the Constitution drafting process, particularly to ensure that the situation of Womenis given full consideration.
- General Monitoring and Defence of Human Rights: 10 OUTREACH members have received paralegal training by overseas judges and lawyers. They Will actas general human rights Ciritors and advocates for Wictims of human rights abuses.
- Women and Children: OUTREACH is particularly dedicated to addressing the needs of Worthen and children. (Half of its Workers are Women). It was actiWely inwolved in the National Summit on WorThem, and Will hawe a representatives on the Working Group which will coordinate the implementation of that Conference's "Five Point Agenda for Action". Il additio to their CJCET ft improving the economic and social rights of Women, OUTREACH is keen aH CLaLL a aLS HLLLLH a LCLLLLLLL L all areas of decision-makingard politiCafe.
3. Concerns
The OUTREACH representative expressed a need for assistance With formulatinga COTıpfehērlSiWE Organizational plan. The Human Rights Component will assist Witi tilIS taSk.
Vigilance - Human Rights Vigilance of Cabodia
1. Background
Vigilance was formed in December 1990 and operated clandestinely until it could officially register with the SNC in Jume 1992. It hasa Tier Tibership of 13,000 (3000 Women), of whom 120 actively Work for the organization in a voluntary Capacity. Vigilance has offices in Phnom Penh (14 staff) and in 14 provinces - four of them in rented premises and the remainder in the homes of members. Wigilance has no plans to specialize, insisting that its mandate Cowes all LJ Tan rights.
2. AfaS COf WOrk. - Human Rights Education: Vigilance
hlas approximatel ned as human rig Conduct classes i and those provinc zation haS EStat The organization Citizlād tā ir exрегіепcedпо | authorities in its
OrOWICES.
- GererqI MitOrir
if Writis: 24 tāv garī trā human rights mor rice and observe Pro WinCĒS.
- Vigilance has rece regardirigh Luman its establishment, two classes:
55 lutā (Such aS I TILurd{ ar 5 TE3f3fTEd til Rights Compor
" and disputes, tikES E TOre a tes between at Ctil.
Wigilance sees the ciation of Wolations of its Work, and ha: undertake the defen
- Constitutional W.
Period: Vigilance that human rights new Constitution. a Workshop con FOLIIT datio Oth: sees this as a Viab Zation W||| USGits ( parties to advocal nce already has: parties - the EDLF and the LD
- Future Plans: Wig Work in the areas Seritatio ad E also flLES to Ir рпnent projects, s Wing to Worner.
L.C.D.H.C.–Lig. DeSDOitSDe L'HC
1. Background
LCDHC W85 fO||| France With the goa änd derTIOcracy in C. promotion Of hular Citig 5. || NOWET opened an office in around 30 TË Tibër Same TILITiberin Ca Per office has 3 off
LCDHC believes Citizern" is particular ntry suchas Camb0

ỵ 30 members tralhts educators, who 101 POPG ES Where the Organilished a presence. does both training of ng of trainers. It has "Striction5 frOIT1 til
du CatiWE Work, il thE
ng and Investigation Vigilanca members ed aS pre-election itors by the Taskfotle situatiori ir 1 B
alved 120 complaints rights abuses since Tila CaSBS fall into
n rights violations ars by police), which UN TACS, HE 1eml; and
in which Vigilance tive role and Tediathorities and the Wi
exposureänd der Las an important part S Tembers keel to ders'training Course.
rkard POSt-Electoral
W|| Worki LO enSUre
are protected in the
It has participated in ducted by the Asia USCOStitutionald le model. The Organicontacts. With political E. for its ideas. Wigilasupporters in Warious CPP. FUNCINPEC, P.
lance Will Continue to of monitoring/repreducation/training. It itiate SOITE develouch as teaching se
Ie Cambodigienne mme Et Du Citoyen
led in July 1991 in of achieving peace ambodia through the rights and rights of bör 1992, LCD HC Phil Corri Perth, it has 5 I Frolfo af To
Tibodia. The PFlf) icial representatives.
Flat. La TOld Of "|13 y important ina Coudia, Where thereis no
real rule of law and Where the for Thai civil Society is non-existent or underdeveloped.
2. COCTIS
ASIAN NGO Response
Responding to the needs and aspirations of the Cambodian people and groups a few regional NGO's hawa respoInded by their operational presence in Cambodia as well as by periodic review visits with a view to formulating prograTimes of assistance. Such initiatives included the Cambodian Human Rights Task Force, consisting of the International Human Rights Law Group, USA, Union of Civil Liberties, UCL. Thailand, Interrational Centre for Ethnic Studies, ICES, Sri La rika, L.B.H., Indonesia and Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, H.R.C.P. which came together as a coalition to provide an operational presence by locating one Sri Lankan co-ordinator and a American on-site human rights monitor to Work closely with the Cambodian groups over a period of 4 months from February. Arrongst its activities in the 4 monthi pÉriod, it las =
(1) conducted training Workshops for
LL LLLLLtLLLLLLL LLaLLLLLLLO LLL rights fact-finding and elections; Using forms designed for the Workshops, the Cambodian NGOs provided the Task Force Withregular reports on human rights Violations and election-related incidents from a II ower Caribodia.
(2) assisted the Cambodian humar rights groups to issue several joint statements on the human rights situation, including condemnations of the slaughter of ethnic Wietnamese, as well as individual, pre-election position papers;
(3) published regular reviews of the hLITrian rights and electoral situation, using information provided by the Cambodian human rights gFOLIPS,
(4) trairied a cadre of election observers from the human rights groups who went on to train a nationWide network of po|-wathers;
Planned long-terri international Support for Cambodia through a mission of leading Asian NGOs to ESSESS the Eads of the Carltodian judiciary, a "Dialogue on Co13:titutionaliS" ES WE|| Sidors Teeting offuture SupportforassiStance to the NGC) Sector, in Bangkok iris Tiid-May,
(6) conducted an election obsever mi
SSiO.
Parf3: MobilisІлg World Sшpрогї
(5)

Page 17
Sri Lankan Conflict: C
A. M. Navaratna Bandara and Sumanasiri Liyanag
File: Sri Lankari etFinric Conflict
00LLLLLLL LLaS LLLLaa LSLLL S KaLL0S L the Northern and Eastern Provinces, particularly in the Jaffna perisula, a civil War situation became the normal way of life; the only exception was the early days of the Indian peacekeeping force intervention. Every 'attempt' by the Sri Lankan gOWērnmērīt to find a solution to this serious problem of civil War which has shaken the island nation, ended in failure. This failure Cābe ātributēt tV Tai factors: (i) the government's failure to put forward, With a firm commitment, agenuine solution to the problem, and of its inability to face Sinhalese-Buddhist chauWinistic elements, (ii) the intrarisigence of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and also of the Sinhala-Budhist Chauvinistic forces. The latest attempt - the Partiarrmentary Select Committee headed by Mr. Mangala Munasinghe has Tot Wet FeSUited in any Solution, Itappears that Sri Lanka and its people hawe to go on living with this problem in a War ridder Country Suffering enormous hardships imposed by the War situation.
The ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka has led to a proliferation of literature on the subject and in certain instances, has also become aprofitable EoLusiness for academia. These studies approach the subject using different but complementary methods, substanitive foci and theoretical perspectives. This paper is a fresh attempt to propose am alternative Solution to the ethnic probET. We are LindEITO ILSOS hatthese views are likely to receive Wide scceptance by the Sri Lankan masses in general or by political parties and pressure groups in particular. But, the continuing ethnic War With no viable solution might have serious repercussions for the future. A correct Understanding of the problem and the Creation of essential democratic prerequisites for its solution may at least be a step forward. What We hawe - suggested here emphasizes the need for democratic culitural norms and values in the Sri Larkarı Society. It society. It involves the "remaking of the mass consciousness.
We argue in this paper that moving a Way from majoritarian democracy toWards Consociational democracy can prowide a fresh beginning for redesigning the
This paper was presented at the CEYLONSTL DESSEM.INAR by Dr Surmanasiri Liyanaga and CT LCCLLDGaH LLuOMuLMMML HOK SLL LOLLOLH LLL Torth, Au"Fars Wish to thank Mr Krishnaraj Saswasafar for editorial help.
Sri Lankan polity in multi-ethnic, multi-re nguistic character. COSOCial Orali SITT ) theory and as a norI We theory. As Lijphar
The empirical theo explain and predic ring has been or and HOW WE|| it ha to Wijk, TH TTT tes power-sharing ti ES DE CELJSE) itİS LİF USually the onlyOf Wngther the ba are fa Wourable (1990:199)
The paper consis Section One We SUITr Tises of the Conso ction 2 gives a brief Lankan ethnic proble Consociaticflä || Soluti blem is attempted in
Section ti: The DET OCTE
The COSociation: (CDM) challenges ti but Eerror130LuS parad mely, (1) the equatio majority rule and (2) a democratic Syster societies. Although, t mutually exclusive in ted by two riwal Schiç that the two positions related and interdep and practice. When di With majoritarian ru SystemTl may ni Colbe a strilent in Culturally, e divided Societies. Ins jority rule may take the nism. Thus, orie pren How can this parado) it need a paradigma these notions? Lijpha proponant of CDM W
My argrinent will b that there are two democracy: in add democracy there is alternative type th "Consociational" de majority rule, con: SSESCOrl SeñSUald portionality, and r Condly, I shallargu mot inevitably desti

Onsociational Solution
E.
accordice With its ligious and multi-liThe paper presents oth as an empirical lative and prescriptit points out;
ry tries objectively to it where power-shalikely to be adopted S Worked or is likely ative theory advocaf0frFILIltigthlfC Sciegld optimal-indeed, solution, regardless
ckground Conditions Ör LITifa VJUrable.
Es of three parts: In marize the basic prelational theory, SeSummary of the Sri ITA outline of the on to the ethnic proSection 3.
Consociational cy Model
al Democracy Model Wo Widely accepted igrati C rotions, malin of democracy with the non-viability of n in deeply divided hase two seemingly оtions are propagaJols, it is quite clear i are very often inte2ndent both in theory епостасуisequated le the de TOCratic Viable form of govethnically and racially Luch a Situation, Tafor of authoritariaise feeds the other. be resolved ? Does tic shift to disprove twho is the principal rites:
9, in the first place, principalitypes of |tion to majoritarian a distinctly different at | hawe labelled Inocracy. Instead of SOCiationalis IT. Strecision-making, proTinority rights. See that democracy is ned to fail in deepy
...
divided Societies; if a democratic govemment belongs to the Consociational type or if it incorporates Corsociational elements to a significant degree, it should hawe a good chance to be Wilable and effective. (1977: 113-14)
What is meant by consociationaldemocracy? How doesit diferfrom majoritarian democracy? Majority rule has been given legitimacy by referring to the majority ruleminority rule dichotomy. In the absence of a general consensus, the decisions taken by the majority are more democratic than the decisions taken by the minority. When there is no practical mechanism available to get minority participation in the decision making process, a majority decision is the only logical rule of democracy. The Westminster model has thus been accepted as the democratic north for other countries with minor Todifications. Two questions can be posed: Is this majoritarian democracy truly democratic? Would it give even a semblance of democracy in a deeply divided society? Lijphart's anSWer to the first questionis:
- The primary Tule of democracy should be that citizens have the opportunity to participate, either directly or indirectly in making decisions. The Second meaning of democracy, that the Will of the majority must prevail, violates the primary rule if the representatives are divided into a government and an opposition: it excludes the minority from the decision-making process for an extended period, (1977: 15)
As Lijphart points out, the exclusion of a minority can be partially overcome 'if majorities and minorities alternatelingoweTinTent'. Il Societies Whare the Tirority majority distinction is not fixed and intechangeable in time and space, Tajoritariar democracy may work resonably well and the basic democratic rights may preWall. However, in the societies. Which were characterized by historically determined, and fixed majority/minority dichotomies based on ethnic, religious and cultural-linguistic diferences, the condition of altenation in government will rarely be fulfIled. As Arthur Lewis has said in such a context, majority rule is "totally, immoral, inconsistent with the primary meaning of democracy, and destructive of any prospect of building a nation in which different peoples might live together in har Tony" (1965:66). Many countries, in different degrees, belong to this category. HoweVer, it is true that majoritarian democracy
15

Page 18
can Work reasonably Well even in multi-e- thnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural societies like those of United Kingdom, the United States of America. This is due to two reasons: First, in addition to the Condition of alternation in government, Warious Constitutional guarantees and Conventions which projcet minority rights exist in these democratic Societies. Secondly, as Gramsci (1971) correctly notes, in Wesstern democracies, the civil Society structures are sturdy and deep rooted in these Societies and the power exercised by the government of the majority is limited. The civil Society which is like a Tosaic, is pluralistic and distinguishable from the unified state apparatus. But even in these Societies, the experience of the recent past demonstrates that the minorities has begun to feel that their position is not Secure. The emergence of the Scottish National Party. With a secessionist programme, Pyd cystrain Wales, block rebellion and the dissent of Asians in the United Kingdom are Clear indications of an emerging ethnic consciousness.
The concept of democracy as majority rule in deeply-divided societies has been questioned. John Stuart mill says:
Free institutions are next to impossible in a Country Trade Lup of different matiomalities. Amonga people without fellow
feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the United public opinion, necessary to the Working of representative government, cannot exist. (Quoted on Lijphart, 1977. 116-17)
If this is so, what can We suggest as an alternative? As Lipset (1960) argues, the chances for democracy Taybe enhanced if the 'crosscutting, political relevantaffiliations' are present. But the situation, by definition, is inherently Weak and unstable. This gives a kind of legitimacy to non-democratic method of Contro. Liphart is not so pessinistic and thinks that a better form of democracy can be desiցոEd.
Consociational democracy is characterized by four principles: grand Coalition government, Tutual Veto, proportionality, and segmental autonomy. All four principles deviate from majority rule... The Consociational Tio del describedir terts of these four characteristics is not just a theoretical construct. There are Several empirical examples of consociational democracy in Various parts of the World. (1977: 118-19)
How the Tajor components of consoclational engineering are assembled may depend on the situation. Its effectiveness
Will be a function of S
bles. As Lijphart not
the CDM is mot as
the SLCCESS of derTl
ties' (1977: 120). He
rtant in this approa
Coristitutional guara
ing between dif
Power-sharing, sai
Coalition Can take :
grand coalition cab
Systems, grand Co
advisory or Coordin:
grand Coalition of thi
high political functio
systems' (1979: 5C Seg"TEItalia Lutonomi
of power. Devolution tively different fromid devolution leans 't to geographic units
thatlie outside form: of the central gover tion iTriplies "the disp) ghout the structure 68), '(Devolution of the grand coalition p of CoITIIIon Intere5 made jointly by these on all other issues, d to each segment' ( This characteristic is System SQ hattfeder ties Canbe COSOCia decentralizedgover norities may exercie. tion Which arte of a d TīSissimilārr rrent majority" or Ha Veto". Proportionlity. presentation of SrTial|| of representation'. F des the joint exerci: Especially executive normy, proportionality Veto as the last Weap tional democracyisn to majoritarian demic rnative to partitionar how consociational
Work in War-ridden S SSary to look at the
problem.
Section 2. Thig E
Question
A. Pre-Independe
This is a compare With no direct corne between Tartisand history of the island that "it Was the fall Constitution of 1947 safeguards for ther motion the Vicious
 
 

veralcomplex variaes, “the application of fficient Condition for cracy in plural socieWever, what is impohis that it provides tees for power-shaBrent COIslfilInitias. | Lijphart, in grand variety of forms: a net in parliamentary Incils with important ting functions, and a president and other naries in presidential O). The principle of means a devolution isSomethingqualitaCentralization. While he transfer of power of local government COTITESTLCLE Tent' decentralizaersal of power throu' (Sherwood, 1969: lower) complements rinciple: on all issues , the decisions are agment's leaders, but ecision-making is left Lijphart, 1979: 500). cortion in a federal Pations in plural societions provided that a ment Exists. Thernsa Veto ower legislaisCritinators nature. C. Callo LISCOCL15. Daalder's "ThUtual ens Lures "the OWerreminorities and parity Power-sharing incluse of legislative and
power, group autoand minority/mutual bon. ThLJS, CONSOCiaot only an alternative cracy but is an alteld Secession. To See
enginearing Would Şri-Lanka, it is necePlatLIľe of the eth||C
thno-Nationalist
Sri Lanka
1Co, Period
tively new problem :ti) With théa Conflict Sinhalese in the early Kadirgamar thinks Ire of the Soulbury to provide adequate minorities that set in circle of suspicion,
animosity, hatred and Violence that COUntry has experienced since 1948' (1989: 183). However, signs of the future ethnic conflict may be seen in the constitutional reform Tovements in the 1920s and after. The Tamilleaders seem to hawe thought that arrangements for power-sharing between minority ethnic groups and the majority ethnic group could be made with a due place for minority communities by demanding adequate represertation in the Legislative Council. In 1918, speaking on the question of constitutional reforms, an Outstanding Tamil leader, K. Balasinghar I said:
| Wish to bring to your Excellency's notice that the Tamils desire that Whethe under a territorial Or racial basis of representation there should be the existing proportion of representation between the principal races maintained in any reformed council. (Quoted by GG POrlnaribalarm In State COLIñC| Of Ceylon, 1939: 896)
In 1921, the Tamil Maha Jana Sabha passed a resolution according to which "no electoral scheme will be acceptable to the Tamils unless provision is made for Tamil seats in the Legislative Council equal in UITiber to WC-thirds that of the Sinhaltse", SW RD Bandaranaike was the first to propOSeadifferent Constitutional fra ITIBWork to safeguard the minority interests. At a meeting held in Jaffna, he suggested a federal Constitutional StrUCture for Sri Lanka, but nobody seems to have taken this proposal seriously. The formation of the Pan-Sinhalese or Sinhalese-only Board of Ministers in the Second State Council in 1936 indicated clearly the possibility of Sinhalese dominance, if not monopoly, in the state and polity in post-i- independence Sri Lanka. However, the leaders of the Jaffna Youth Congress (JYC) who took a definite for a united Sri Lanka and total independence from British rule felt that Sinhale SB dominaПСе Would only be a transient phenomenon. Addressing the Youth Congress sessions in 1928, Nadesan said "that after long years of being subjected to foreign rule, the chances Were that the majority community, at the beginning of self-government Would use power for narrow and selfish ends; but some years of experience in self-government would teach then that strength required national unity... that parochialism would cease and that people Would think of the "nation" first and that self-government would provide the reinedy for the ills of the country" (Ceylon Daily News, 1928, quoted in Kadirgamar, 1980 and 1989). This position was reaffirmed in the criticism by the Jaffna Youth Co

Page 19
ngress of G G Ponnambalam's long speech at the State Council in 1939. Ponnambalan anticipated discriminatory rule by the majority Sinhalese after indeрепdепсе апd proposed balanced representation known as fifty-fifty as a constitutional guarantee for the defence of minority rights. He said that an institutional safeguard Was necessary So that snubual trust and interdependence between different COITITIUniti85 Would be a ChigVed.
If the various sections of the people of this country are to develop the virtues of compromise and co-operation, one COrdition precedetto that de Velopment is a feeling of interdependence, a feeling that any single community by itSelf Wil|| Tot be able to administër the government of the country, (State Council of Ceylon, 1939; 1004)
Tamil polities in pre-1948 period Wa5 dominated by this demand for balanced representation within the framework of a unitary system of government. The fact that "no Tamil leader of importance fought fora federal constitution at independence" (Hoole et al., 1990: 1) was an historical irony. The explanation given by the Tamil intelligentsia shows that they themselves had misunderstood the flature and the effectiveness of Unitary government in a multi-ethnic context. The following quotation proves this point
if Tamils did not show an interest in federallen before independence, there Were SOLITEd Thaterial T33505 fOT FIS. Their Tiddle class depended con gawernment jobs outside the Tamil speaking areas. A unitary state is not a moral issue and in Ceylon such a state could have been Workable with adequate deWolution such as in Britain. The peoples of Ceylon after all have much more in Common in terms of origin and culture than to the people of Britain. Conflict of the past too hawe been dynastic rather than along lines of language or religion, (Hools et al., 1990: 11-2)
Democratic institutions, the existence of a strong civil Society definitely would help the minorities and as We indicated in Section 1, these institutions also introduce LLLLLLL LLLLLLLLuLLLHtaLL aLLLLLL LLL LL Unitary structure. But What has been reVealed by recent experience in many couIntries is that in the absence of precisely definedConstitutional guarantees, minority rights are invariably at stake. The failure to Linderstand the need for a suitable Constitutional structure is One of the redsons for the decline of the JYC and the left political parties and some left-oriented
academics seen to nion. In this respect, posal for balanced r SEE ES E TOE C. approach than the
Jaffna Youth Cong nkan left. The left po Jaffna Youth Congr With alternative CO framework to coul propoSal. The repli speech in the State reWEFalstata SECt WETE in the for Efroit "poisonous vapour (Youth Congress, justification, JYC in lam's proposal as pr argued that it Tig communal prejudice se, In Our opinion,
giwen by ther Til to te hawa Caused them
proposal. Democra by the majority", si balanced represent underT10Cratic" (Yol, 30). The speechest had close links With Council on the Refo that they also did specific constitutior minorities although minority rights. Both Lankan left see Ted Class Coill radictions and dominant than
on ethnic-nationalis qu9 to the Sri Lanka of class contradictic World Marxist Towe WC the FET CI TESOWÉd WithCOLUL TIL
The Tail leaders to H CETtralized C0 det Sri Liik TF tten into it to protec Section 29 (2) unde poWertorrlake Certa (For the effectivene WETE Wardhea, 1 DI S Senama yake's Larlkarl Tlation HCC interests Was aime COalition' type of par leaders of minority borating with them party allong | class li post independence nnings has describe пalрагty, a partуlo" COITITUnities could p0Sed to treat publ mmunal lines' (1945 Uited NatiOI || PElft

hawe shared this opiPomnambalam's proepresentation can be 2ncrete and practical abstract ideas of the ress and the Sri Lalitical fortation or the ess did not come out 1 CTELE COITStitutional nter ponnambalam's y to Ponna mbala T's ! Council by the JYC On of the Tamil elite in fighting against the is of communalis' 1939: 4). With some erpreted Polla Tibao-imperialist and they lt lead to increased 3 among the Sinhale
TO W Hf|Titi riTmi democracy might to reject the fifty-fifty cy is the government that "the so-called ation Would be highly Ith Congress, 1939: by the left leaders who the JYC in this State It is Dispatch showed not think in terls of a protection for the they firmly stood for LFB JYC aid tfinē Sri to hawa assumed that Were more important ContradictionS based T. TITIS: WS mot Limileft. The diction Ons Was been by the Tlēt Ste. Da SiS. Om nitradictions (COLuld bod Ich difficulty.
finally agreed in 1947 Institution for indepe: he only provision Wriit minority rights was Which Parliarient's illa WSWas Testricted. Se of this Clause, See 260 and Wilson, 1960) project to build a Sri 3mmodating minority at for ning a 'grand ty either including the Communities Or Colla
and organizing the nes to take over the | administration. Jëditas "a Cri-COTITLUWhich TeberS fall elong becauseit proic policy on non-Co: 135). The name the y indicates this grand
design of D. S. Semanayake.
(It is probably Wrong to say that Mr D. S Senanayake Was involved in a deep anti-Tamil conspiracy to bring about Sinhalese domination. No Tisit possible to make a case that Mr Senanayake Was hatching a diabolical master plan ld Coldnis B Tårnil areas With Sinhalose. When Work for the Gal Oya settlement scheme in the Eastern province had been completed, first preference was given to people from the province. It was only after aboutsix months, when faced With the paucity of local applicants, that the doors were opened to applicants from other provinces, (Hoolsetal, 1990. 2)
The grand coalition was facilitated by the tacit agreement among all parties and political groups that both Sinhala and Tamil be regarded as national languages. In 1944 JRJaya Wardene moveda resoution in the State Council proposing that 'Sinhala should be made the medium of instruction in all schools'. However, he later accepted to incoporate the armandment proposed by W.W.Nalliah, member for Trincotlalee and Batticaloa North, that Tamil ble also given the Sami1e statLIS. (State Council of Ceylon, 1944, also see, Russell, 1982). The basis of this agreement was the proposal passed by the State Council in 1943. Until Bandarmake put forward the Sinhala Only policy in his party manifesto, no one had seriously challenged this position. Until 1958, Sinhala was taught in Jaffna Schools as a third language.
B. The Break-Up of the "Grand
CoalitIdirl."
DS Senanayake's project Worked reaSOnably Well fora shortperiodirTimediately after independence. He thought that the immediate threat to his regime Would Corne not from the Tamil minorities but from the Working class and the parties Which represented them, During this period, the plantation workers voted for the left parties or the candidates associated With and supported by the left. The Citizenship set of 1948 and the Parliamentary Election Amendment Act of 1949 diseInfranchised the plantation Workers and paved the Way to a reduction in the minority representation in Parliament and the support for the left in it. GG Ponnambalam, then a Cabinet Minister, opposed the first but voted for the second. The main objection to this undemocratic legislation came not from the Tamil representatives but from the parliamentarians of the Left parties.
17

Page 20
THE J. R. YEARS - (12)
Jaffna Polis : A Tale C
Arde
hough in its Manifesto the U.N.P.
had said it would call an all-party Conference to solve the ethnic dispute Once and for all, Jayewardene did not do this; he could hardly callan all-party Conference. When the elimination of Mrs. Bandaranaike from the political arena was his forestlost priority. However, he gave Tamil a constitutional status as a lationalaguage, abolished the much resented standardisation of marks in the university entrance examinations and got ready to enact the District Development Councils law (which was based on the report of a 10-member Presidential Comission appointed to report om de Centralisation of the administration. The Collission SLbmitted its report in February 1980.) No doubt. Jayewardene reckoned that these expare but progressive measures were adequate substitute for dialogue With the Tamil leaders and the others concerned. A Senior Tamil acadetic Professor A.J. Wilson commented: "Too little, too late".
In the meantime, by mid-1979, the president stationed a full brigade in Jaffna under the command of Brigadier Tissa Weeratunga, Chief of Staff of the army, and ordered him to wipe out terrorism in the peninsula within 6 months. By the beginning of 1980 Weeratunga reported to the president that he had carried out his orders and that all Was now Well in Jaffa, For the Whole of 1980 Tot OrE police officer of Serviceman was killed in Jaffna as against 3 in 1977, 8 in 1978 and 3 in 1979. It certainly looked as if the brigadier had Worked the oracle. What he had in fact done was to prove to the Tigers that it was time they got some training abroad and put their act together. Not having the training and equipmento take on a whole brigade the self-styled Tigers moved out of the country. Some settled
18
down in Tamil Nadi military training car Lebanon for training
"16 associates of fortraining in Leba агтапged by a Lс and Eelam Suppo C tinasabapathy. Int сопропепt of the TT|| E.E ET LE (T.E.L.O.), led by timuli, Was Eas Were Well-known their knowledge (. Tamil Nadu, they'r for training facilitic пmanoешvretheyгє army instructors Y this manner, 46.T ngadorai, KuttirTur The was from TE Charles Anthony Chelwanayagarn (E LTTE WEEretri
iTTINU". (T.D.S.A., Dissana
On 30 Septembe niam, U.N.P. Organis shot dead by U Libro-traired kille Case of Tiger violen 1980, When 1981. Ca Development Couri passed and, coinci gri-trained Tigers Wei
W.
The L.T.T.E., urldE the T.E.L.O, Lurdigar T up to rob the People and got away with 8 attack, which took pola:

if TWO Ministers
J Where they set up ps, others Went to
Jma Mahleswaranleft non. The training was Indon-based Marxist Irter Eliath.amboy Rahe meantime another Tiger movement, the aration Organisation Thangadorai and Ku3d in Madras. Both smugglers and, With of the underWorld of Were able to arrange 35; there. In a Clegywer Cruited retired Indian Who Were Tar Tills. Il igers, including Thahi, Jegan and Oberoi L.O., Prabhakaran,
(alias Seelan) and alias Sellikili) from the edinguerillaWarfare
yake: The Agony of Sri Lanka).
ir R. Bala Subrammāerin Killinocchi Was Tha MahleSW arian's irs. This was the only ce for the Whole of The round the District cils Act had been identally, the foreire ready for a guerilla
Prabhakaran and hangadorai teamed 3's Bank at Neerweli million rupees, in the Ce on 25 March, tw0
police Ten, both Sinhalese, Were killed. They were no longer killing only Tamils.
A Wholly new situation had come about in the peninsula. The Eelam fighters had acquired new skills, new techniques and aneWruthlessness. Incredibly, the president engrossed in his own plans and Concerns, did not seem to notice.
The bext big step on the president's programme was the D.D.C. elections under the P.R. system whichwere scheduled for 4 June, incredibly, the president had hopes of winning the election in Jaffna. He sent some high officials to study the situation in Jaffna and report back to him. They advised him that it would not be advisable to try to hold an election in Jaffna. But Jaffna Was What the D.D.C. elections Were all about. The president decided to hawe the elections under BTErgency. He sent two of his ministers Cyril Mathew, who was the president of the U.N.P. union the Jatika Sevaka Sangamaya (J.S.S.) and Gamini Dissanayake, Who Was the president of the Lanka Jathika Estates Workers Union (L.J.E.W.U.) to See What could be done.
On 24 May A. Thyagarajah, who headed the list of U.N.P. Candidates for the election, was shot dead at Chankarai by. Uma Mahleswaran's P.L.O.T.E. mem. On 31 May four policernen on duty at a T.U.L.F. rally near Nachchimar Kowlady terriple in Jaffna were shot in the back by Mah SWran's killars. TWO of the T1 died. A story was put about that while on duty the policemen suddenly decided to shoot at each other. This story Was Widely belieWed; no one thought to ask how it was possible for four men to shoot each other in the back simultaneously. This Was perhaps the earliest instance of Tiger disinfo

Page 21
rmation which was to become a regular feature after each atrocity.
That very night a large number of police personnel brought to Jaffna for the elections from other parts of the country mutinied and ran amok. The Jaffna Library which contained thousands of priceless books was buried. Also burned Were the house of the M.P. for Jaffna Yogeswaran, the M.P.'s vehicles, the T.U.L.F. office and
Tarly shops in the bazaar.
Although a press announcement indicated that the government Would appoint a Commission of Inquiry this was not done. The C.R.M., made a strong protest to the government,
The elections were duly held on 4 June,
The S.L.F.P. having decided to boycott the elections, the U.N.P. Won wery easily In Colombo, Gampaha, Kalutara, Matale, Galle, Hambartott, ATTpaira, Puttala TT, Anuradhaplura, Polonnairu Wall and Badu|la; but other than in Ampara, wherever it was opposed by the T.U.L.F. it lost. Even in Trincomalee the U.N.P. polled only 42,388 votes to the T.U.L.F.'s 44,692.
In Jaffna things went Seriously Wrong. Exactly what the two U.N.P. ministers were supposed to be doing in Jaffna in the days preceding the poll and on polling day itself was anybody's guess. They had no legitimatestatus there; the election was in the charge of the Commissioner of Elections and his Returning Officer, the Government Agent of Jaffna. But it was runoured that the two ministers had pulled rank with the Government Agent LLLLLLLLLLGLLLLLLL LLLLLLaLLaLLLLLLL
Corrissioner of Elections.
At the end of the poll the Returning Officer Yogendra Duraiswamy informed the Comissioner of Elections that the poll "had not been conducted in a proper Tarer". He added: "Certain EO||ÓLEOKES
had arrived late. Certain ballot boxes had
HH LLLOLLLLL LL LLLLS LL LLLLLLLL LLL HLLL LL counting officers had not conformed to the requirements stipulating that Written state
ments Should be del of Wotes cast fore independent group".
THE CITTSSE ited the Attorney-G Corrissioner that
invalidate a Electi0 direct the Returning awailable W Cote S illi t representatives of th ident groups. (The In spite of Jayeward spite of ballot boxe: TULF VII la 5
T.U.L.F.
U.N.P. T.C.
The Nation of 19.
"At the Eléstion ! Development Col. 150 officials picke Feröf Electio SW nees of the ruling poll. For the first this Country the CI Wa5 Wrestări frOIT
COStitute LuthO a political party.
U.N.P. Cerat LumiiWErSal adult SL
The Nations
that the Corliss M.A. Piyasekera
gnation as a prote rnment's attempt
Mr. Piyasekera shortly after the ele Tited Sri LK'S WAT
As a postScript
May-June 1981 the an interview given E rder het OS. Werkat N of India Today, and the cover story in indicatio of Watt of these events:
S.W.N. In Jaffnap

wered of the number ich political party Or
ir of ElectionS ConSUeneral "Who told the he had no power to and that he should
Officer to count the he presence of the eparties and indepeSUN 10 June 1981). ene's best efforts, in S. going Tissing, the amely:
263,369 23,302 21:369
June had this to say:
Otle afra District Incil held On 4 June d by the Cormissioare replaced by normiparty just before the time in the history of Old LCt Of Earl Election the control of the duly rity and exercised by Thus has the ruling I the golden jubilee of uffrage in Sri Lanka. from reliablesources
CL Of Ecti S. M. may tender his resiast against the goveto rig an election".
sent in his papers ction and Was appoibassador in ROITIE,
to the Violence Of following extract from y President Jayewaarayan, Senior Editor
published as part of that paper, gives aп he president thought
aople are very upset.
The policemen set fire to the 50-year old library and burnt 97,000 valuable books. They also set fire to a T.U.L.F. M.P.'s house.
J. R.J. That's because they think he is
OUCI With the terrorists.
S.W.N. It seems they were trying to catch him so they could kill him.
J. R.J. Terrorists do that too.
S. W. M. So it's tit för tit? This kird Of situation is causing a lot of alienation. Therefore, if you gothere and assure thern of your concern for their safety, they may fEE|reliewed. It may go alongway to Base tiLESi,
J. R.J. Want to do that but I must find the time. I don't Want to go. With so much security (sic). If something happensit Will
O WOTSE.
(Daily News 7 September 1981).
In the event, the president did not find the time. One year later a seminar was
LLL LL aa D LLTLLLLLK LLL LLSLSLL LS a LLL LLLLLL of Colombo by the C.R.M. on Free and Fair Elections. S. Nadesan speaking atit Sälld:
"On the day before the (Jaffna D.C.C.) election the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, on the Orders of the President, had given certain directives to the Returning Officer. One hundred and fifty Presiding Officers at polling booths had beef) refTh0Wedländ Other5 Substituted. Some of the substitutes were peons in government departments Who knew nothing of election procedure. At the end of the election six ballot boxes Were missing. When the Returning Officer asked the Commissioner of Electio 15 What to do the Commissioner had told him t0 declare a FeSUIt On a Wailable material and ignore the missing ballot boxes." (This was on the advice of the Attorney-General that the Commissiomer hadno alterrative Course Lunder the law.)
(Nation 30 July 1982)
19

Page 22
ΡΑΡΤ2
Cricket ChauVin
D. A. de Silway
Wettimuny was unbeater at the close of play. With 180 or so and Amal Silva shone in the second innings with a century of his own. Then there was captain Duleep Mendis's singular achievement. With a century under his belt in the first innings, her nissed by just four runs the rare double of Wincenturies in a Lord's Test and the unique one of achieving it on one's first appearance. What has all this got to do With Richie Benaud? Well, he did praise thē quality of Our batting in his BBC SuTimaries of the day's play. But the crime for Which he stands charged occured five years later when he produced a video of eight outstanding performances he had witnessed in his 25 years association with the BBC. South Africa, for obvious realSOMS, WES not a T10 rigthe then Test-playing countries represented but every other country was -bar Sri Lanka. No Country had Tiade as stirring a debut as Sri Lanka at the Mecca of cricket yet Benaud chose to leave that game out of his anthology. Face the wall, Richie, that Was a na Lughty thing to do!
There is another cricketer Who Would also qualify for his country's eleven of all-time greats but is high on my personal blacklist. Stepforward, Martin Crowe. He it Was Who in the late 'eighties argued Wehemently (and succesfully) for the abandor Thermt of New 器從 tQur of Sri Lanka which had only just begun, Terrorist action Was the reason given but Wasit just a coincidence that the English Cricket Season had opened and CrOWe Was Under Contract to an English county? He arTost scorada double in late '92 Wher there was a bomb blastin Colombo outside the New Zealanders' hotel and he again favoured calling off the tour. Fortunately Wiser counsel prevailed and he was persuaded, reluctanly by his own account, 00 jõi his fiveteamates Whõhise 器 leave, AS Captain, he could hardly do
SS.
The Wag WhoSuggested at the time that New Zealand should hemCelforth ble noted for chicker rather than lamb was carrying things too far and Crowe could beforgiven if those incidents alone surned up the case against him. What were unforgivable Were his transgressions on the second tour. Given out to a doubtful Catch is tile Second Test, CroWe did not Walk but chose to stay his ground until, following Consultations between the two uTipiires, the decision Was reversed. That he was right and the original decision Wrong is not the point. Cro We Would not Fayedargd to do thlis in El ESt Outside Sri Lanka. It Wasin that Sarne test og til at BacCLISad
2O
WaraWeera of ch Warna Weera, beits: a tour of New Zeal being called.
Chucking on the p Was բart of the e: England's defeat in this year in Colombic but some of the quE pers Suggested as 'n cketer' magazine W. graphs of poor Mur: Weera in compromi Speak, The "Sunda) nourable exception." can't Win" was its pi story of Englard's di a letter to their Sport HWE addEd: "Carl W shËd.
Wining and dining the har Tony of tour given Way to whinin to LSE LE CLTE
digeling. Sri Lankan |
red the experience Tmiddle — aggra Wate obscenity as in their Sri Lankan Lumpiring for criticism on the g charge has this old ( In the old days Wł Stop)0War to allow AL touring tearns to stre their Way to each umpires leaned ove Fle VisitorS. One WaS of WG Grace playin A teara Way young bi IbWparty in the inning much vigour. "Not ( "and no more of that people have cornet not you bowl". So it l in thOSebygone da heirives WBr-Wort to an appeall agair Наппопоi. The реп have swung in the o; it shouldn't bother L. say of questionable t0 EWE OLUL COWEJT the
DOES FISITEarl th a TE POLJre as the driw W3 FTHW9||BaľT18Cj tČ ATmericans Callit) anc gOOd to hawe Johl Matchuripire for the questioned or the Talde hiS OFTE IM though WE WEnt alo W SEWE dotiCEtla to take things lying

is inn
cking - the same aid. Who Went through all 1991. Witt
art of our off spinners Kplanation given for lhe single test played . Notjust the tabloids lity English newspa1Lich. So did tՒլը "Cr|- nich displayed photoalithiaran and Warnläsing positions so to Times Was a 10"Can't bat, can't bowl, Ithy headlire ower its efeat. I suggested, in sEditor thathernight hine". It wasn't publi
Which used to reflect Si gong by have now g and slighting or - EXPOTESSION — Slebat:SITE HAWE Suffeof needling in the 3d by the OC(CaSiOral Australian tour-and has been singled out IrOLIrds of bias. That Odger Spluttering. Ten Sri Lanka Was a Istralian and English toh their sea legs on others' territory, our "blackWard to fa WÖLJT reminded of the story gin a Willage match. owler had him plumb Sand appealed with Jut' said the LImpire it, young fellow. The See the doctor bat, Was With our umpires S. It was as much as to respond positively st a Bradla or a dulum now seems to posite direction and S one Whit. As they decisions, they tend long run. at Sri Lankansalone EISIOW. Not at al. } play hard ball (as it does this old eart Reid's selection as South Africal Seri ES ground that he had SOLuth Africa. Ewen 1g With it eventually, IWe are not disposed down; that is as it
Should be.
The cha Lulwinistic Cricketfandoes not let his mind dwell on such slings and arrows of outrageous fortune. The fact is that the good mer Tories far OutWeigh the bad. There was the time. When Keith Miller and C Gunasekera were engaged in a long partnership at our Oval playing againstan England XI. Both were racing towards a century and then Miller, almost imperceptibly, SloWeddown tolet CI getthere first. That showed class.
Then there was Jiri Laker. Never a commentator given to excessive praise, he was fulsome with it in reporting on our batting in that Lord's inaugural Test. When he died, paid my own tribute to him in Verse recalling that matchless performance of his in 1956 when he took 19 Australian Wickets in the Old Trafford test. Surrey County published it in their Yearbook and the veteran commentator, Don Mosey, included it in his biography of Laker published in 1989.
Orne tribute I would like to reproducē here isto another English spinner who had nice things to say about us, Derek UndeWood returned from a England tour of India and Sri Lanka full of praise for our Country, its people and its cricket. That did not go unnoticed and when he took six Wickets for some 20 odd in a one day game against Sussex, it seemed right to reciprocate, My verses were published in the "Cricketer' magazine of November 1 ԳB4.
"Hastings, July 1 1984 They told me, Derek Underwood, they told
The spin was dead They brought me bitter news to hear and
bitter tBarS tO Shed And then you came to Hastings and on
a father bied You spun and Wove that magic Web which
batsmen always dread. We saw again that Sequence, too long
dĒTÍed OLJr E WES — * The flighted ball, the groping bat, the foot's
TelUctantrise, The Whipped off bail, the loud appeal, the
batsman's sure demise. Thrice did all this unfold, "neath Hastings'
ClOLICHESS Ski ES. Eight Owers you delivered with guile or
deadly spin; Six times in all, We marvelled, as you
gathered Wickets in. And then you ceased your ration spent and left us savouring The memories of bygone years when
Kentish spin was king". We may be Cricket cha uWinists ELit. We honour those Who Olour our ow.

Page 23
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Page 24
STILL LEADING Mr. William Thompson obtain and established the first Joint in this island On
01st June 1841.
He called it
“Bank of Ceylon That was 150 years ago, but that was not We. We opened our doors in 1939 only to capture our rightful place in Banking and are proud to say that Wes
LEAD
Over the years banking profession shared our expertise and BANK OF CEYLON
became Sri Lanka’s
SANDHURST TO BANKERS
Bank
Bank
 

ed a Royal Charter Stock Commerical Bank
till
of Ceylon
ers to the Nation