Page 1
  

Page 2
SVOU
t
 

Knight
rmOVe

Page 3
TRENDS
DiSSOVed COL ci: protests
Outgoing Chief Minister Amarasiri Dodangoda vowed that that tha PA - DL/NF (People's AIlarice - Damocralia United National Front) солтbїпe would mobilise Iha people fa profesi Te dissolution of the SOLthern Provincial Council where they held brief power. They would also Jake fhg SSLg foffig COLIFf5 Of la W. Dodangoda told the media.
А пеw governorappointed by the Coffrg 7550/wÉd FITE COLITICIl affëf. The abduction ofanner 77 berupset Thig balance of pro Wer sir 7 a II ESSETTEJy where the using aris-LNP coalition Fra dory a care Wolfe 77ājority.
Power cripples
The Ceylon National Charlier of LaLLLLtLLtLLL LCCLL LCCMCLL a La LLLLLLS Cricity OriiCeo Frike expected 2f7is north will Cripple local Industry. Sri Larika Will loserscoperative edge Ir |he World export marke, CNCI Chairman Nia AbaySekara has fo/ed, KF269 goWertr7r77er?!.
T7he Ceylar I Electricity Board Fhas är 7 ricourced a 30 per Cerf power price increase, to go up to TOOper сепt byІhe end of 1995. Theїлcreаse fras begri Caled for by the World Balk,
BRIEFLY . . .
SPC nominations
NOTilatiq15 fOf the SOUEFET
PriOWincial COUlci| W||| De received from January 18 to January 25. The CQUICi Wa5 diSSOlygdaftera brief existence when the ruling coalition's
опе-ппап пnajority abduction of a TE
of a Wot3 0 til dget.
Only by
MEFPT Di na told a public r GOVeTITEnt'SLO
Cause Of Tarda
but because of th opposition. Fear E human rights rulE before in the hist he told a Teeting
TE MEP e
a local and intern
stroy the Culture La Folka.
Language гi
TE DETOCTE
O FOI ES C COTITissioner : Tamil persons forms for filling nguage, despite I Official Language been sent outb Br'S ColorIlig D.
Anura 1 (
Higher Educati Bādārā laikē T
CEIOTS Of the ir tha ClairTarı Grafts CTiSS remedies for ATong them qL awaliting adrTissi : ; filiāt c
Sedition Clau
PreSide It O.B.
SCd3d the rei Emergency regu titյր" arլt "IIltitցր
Ed Coffeder SV

was upset by the TEDET. O the EWE
COLCi|'5 fir 5t bu
default
Tashi GUnaWardeally that the UNP ge Wity Was rÖt bÖte from the people e Weakness of the
and the Violation of 2d today as never pry of the country, at Kiribathgoda.
er alSO Warmed Of iational plot to deand heritage of
ights denied
cPeople's LiberaOmplained to the if EIECtions that Were being Sent the Sinhala laamil also being an 3. The for ITIS Flave y the CommissioVision office.
bld5 tak5
OIT. MiľTiSLEľ AIlLITA
E| LFE WICE CHEd
le Universities as
if the University of a take of
major problentis. cues of students on; staff pay stru
leges.
Se rescinded
Wijetunga has recently introduced latiOS o "Sed|-
19nt"|Which threawith 20 year prison
terms. The Opposition, civil rights organisations and trade unions protested vehemently when the new |äWSWErEällLICEdor DBCETBr 21. An amended set of regulations were announced on January 5.
The amended regulations retain the 20 year jail term for those who "bring or attempt to bring the CoIlSt|LUtiOľ1 Oľ thE ELdminiŠtľätiOTI Of justice into hatred or contempt. Also, no person shall "affix in any place visible to the public or distribute among the public any posters, haldbills or leaflets, the contents of which are prejudicialte public security, public order of the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community".
GUARDAN
Wol. 16 No. 18 January 15, 1994
Price R.S.O.OO
Published fortnightly by Lanka Guardian Publishing Co. Ltd. No. 245, Union Flace CICEC - 2.
Editor Mervyn de Silva e:4475B4חםTEleph
Printed by Ananda Press 825, Sir Ratnajothi Saravanamuttu Ma Watha, Colombo 13, Telephone: 435975
CONTENTS
News Background
Ed Chester Bowles (3) NGO's: 구 J. R. Years (18) J.W. P. 12
Fighting Youth Revolts 1É Correspondence 17 The TC'S WE
of Cotr 19

Page 4
NEWS BACKGROUND
D B FACTOR IN NEW
Mervyn de Silva
SY the pace of politics has quickened. President Wijetunge is a quiet soft-spoken, self-contained man with no taste for high-intensity politics quite unlike his predecessors, President Premadasa Who lived from Crisis to Crisis, or President Jayawardene who had a passion for personal intervention, stagemanagement and Iranipulation of rationalpolitics.
And yet the Wijetunge Presidency is noW fighting om many fronts, sorne of these opened by his own interventionist initiatives e.g. the Southern province, and the dissolution of the Opposition-contro|Ed COLICII
The UNP effectively blocked the CWC
DUNFTOWE to TikEMT, GITTI DISSEyake, Chief Minister, With CWC support. The DMF TOW failed EECUSE tere was a revolt in the CWC led by his General Secretary. For 15 years Mr. Thondarian has been a minister in the UNP government, a privileged person in both the JRJ and Premadasa cabinet. He enjoyed a freedorn, or autonomy, that no other minister enjoyed. His proven utility value Was such that both President JR and Mr. Premadasa responded to his requgsts/demands Connected with plantation abour, his constituency. Like the two leaves-and-a-bud that the worker plucks, Thondaman did the plucking at elections, and put what he collected on polls day into the UNP basket.
In a study of the UNP's changing electoral base, Dr. Mick Moore of Sussex Univ. OEDISBrwedd:
"There is a clear, steady shift, toWards the UNP in the lost rural districts and an equally steady shift away, at least since 1982, in the least rural districts. We know that the reElfranchiSEITEIIt Of the IIldia. TäIIli population and the UNP-CWC alliace is an important cause of this pattern, especially in the Nuwara Eli
ya district. Howey influence in riceg Anura dhapura E They have also si
Does Dr. Moore's
mparison with TAIWA Some of his conclusic the PC polls:
(i) Both hawe a essentially urban Chedi te State
וth,theסii) in b) ral population are likely to go to the the opposition.
In Lhatstudy ofic: O CF "PIETES: Cat COinSideratior different, one migh different presider Tiddle-Cla SS KBriti Slicker of quite hur was a "minority" n rise, though Sinha and religion, Caste Tada hiirT ta tari sicJuèvre, the impe,
Prg5idEl DB5 class Kandyaп, пс Wattes, Köbbeka may prove to E strength, And stan may rake hirma the Kandyan poo CESS WIC) BSEI of the "white' plant rjldir TaTiI |l lies introduced i Ome-land" of the tr |OCK for War SitS TEWI" il til the tea-pluckers ir a vote for their " and its ally? But IT of the million-plus Ett UNFP

M EQUATIONS
Per to CWCHS TO growing districts of Il di PO OTETUW. ifted to the UNP"
(LG Now. 1).
rather surprising coNhold? These Were ons in his analysiS COf
dominant party of origins well entreapparalUS, otes of the agricultu3 Significantly more ruling party than to
Ourse Lhephenomeiaism" Was a signifi1, NOW We have a it even say, radically |tiа регеола - а yarı rathertharı acity mble beginnings. He man in the larger SEla-Buddhist by race Tad Hill Sto. ItalSO get for an elite-maacITEIt motion.
Kandyan, a middleat a radala (like RaJ Wes etc). But that De President DBS ding up to "Thonda" hero in the eyes of I did O. Wriddle not just Life irnwasion ers and the indentubour the tea compa
O "til traditi Kandyans, Can We to a Kandyan "peaa polling booth while TOTTE'S FC)-- "God Father's" CWC HeartirÎle, l'OW Tuch DUNF. Wote ES TELL
THE ECONOMY
Privatisation, Work-days and wages Were the CWC's main grievances as the IMF-World Barks Luperwised re-structuring exercise moved into the next phase. A Norwegian (NORAD) vocational training institute was theirmimediate proWOCation. The Presidential Secretariat Wrote to Mr. Thondaman informing him that a committee had been appointed to inquire into the project since the money had not been challeled through the appropriate channels.
For once Mr. Thondaman was caught napping. His own General Secretary, Mr. Sellasamy had a sizeable group Within the CWC COTittee and in the Central Province council. Mr. Todaman knew nothing about the internal TeVolt Luntil his rmowe toget DUNF leader GaminiDissanayake the post of Central Pro WinCE- Chief Minister, Was SCL titled. Rallying his forces, Mr. Thondaman has COLInter-atlackadand 5gized the iniţiat
V CEITTE
The CWC Commands about half a tillion Wote S. Carl the arti-THCl dalam sentiment in the Kandyan areas Winfor ng UNP half a million Sinhala Wotes? President D.E. evidently believes that his tough line or Thondarian and the LTTE will see a swing of the Sinhala Buddhist Wote, CIS, i S T 1ore S.W.R.D. than D.S. but he does reflect something of their political approach and electoral tactics, certainly in cotraSttOSLFP-PAPleader Mr.S. Baldararaike Whose strategists are busy building a "peace constituency" in the belief that the vast majority of Sinhalese are War-Weary. The peace constituency' Will of Course include all the non-LTTE Tamil groups, which can influeCe the middle-cla SS Tarfil Wote. But it Carnot convince, let alla COThwert, the LTTE. And Prabhakarari, haWing proved he can take on the army and the navy, (he is only vulnerable to air strikes), is now in northood to accept anything but a merger.

Page 5
Media Without Walls: S
New Delhi Statement
Media persons from five South Asian Countries, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and India, meeting in New Delhi on December 11-13, 1993 at the invitation of the Namedia FoLundation, hawe after extensive discussions come to the firm conclusion that democracy having become a north in South Asian Over the last few years, a pluralist society and media are imperatives for reinforcing and developing the democratic edifice in this part of the World. In fact these are becoming more and Tore visible in different countries of the region today in spite of several impediments in certain areas.
2. Acknowledging the fact that there are barriers to communication among South ASia latio 15 and COITISCHOLUS of thig need to remove these barriers which impede the free flow of information, this Colloquium on "Media without Walls: A South Asian Initiative" is of the firm opinion that specific measures must be undertaken to enhance the exchange of media programmes on the radio and TW, as Well as TIEWS Cortert betwee reber-States of South Asia for the purpose of fostering mutual understanding and appreciation, and to remowe misunderstanding and diSUSt.
3. The Colloquium felt that the Media needs to give due recognition to the shared heritage of the region, while draWing inspiration from our respective natio
a Cultural identities.
4. With these ends in Wiew, this Colloquium makes several recommendations to the Media practitioners in South Asian TELLOS:
(1) The establishment of a South Asian Media Commission to study the condition of the Media and propose appropriate Steps for its advancement In the region,
(2) The setting Media Centre to of the tedia in th
(3) The publica research on med in South Asia.
(4) Through ind mal membership, Voluntary multi-r SLuch as the Sout Cliation tOil CTESE peration.
(5) The forging linkages ar Tong r Organisations With facilities for exch ring their experier
(6) The develop SEErwiCE for the di analyses and fe: Wide range of mate T1edia of the regii Asian Countries.
(7) Madia group. tions should regul other and when
opinion for concer of COITTO CUCE
5. The Colloquium rt S.
A To Wawe the for South Asian jo their travel in the of the facility enjo the ASEAN merTIE
B. To give due Subject of media E at the Eighth SAAF in 19g.

outh Asian initiative
up of a South Asia nonitor the functioning е геgiоп.
tion of a journal for a content and trends
vidual and institutiothe strengthening of Tedia organisations Asian Media ASSOnetworking and coo
of direct exchange media institutions and the aim of providing Inge of staff and sha
CES,
ment of a syndicated SSermination of news atures by offering a BrialS däriwed frOthe on among the South
S in the individual aarly interact with each neceSSary, mobilise ted action on Tatters
.
1 urges the goveSiarl COL trieS:
reguire ent of Wis as surnalists to facilitate region (on the lines yed by Journalists in ter-states).
prominence to the and COTitulications RCSLummitto BéHeld
C. To amendi media-lumfriendly legislation like the Official Secrets Act to increase public access to information. The Colloquium notes with regret that despite al|| South Asiam governments being signatories to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (wherein Article 19 guarantees freedom of information and expression) no country in the region has adopted a Freedom of Information Act.
D. To end the contradiction between being democratically elected, and not permitting the expression of pluralism in state-owned media. The first requirement is to terminate the government mornopoly ower the electric media.
E. To evolve low, uniform rates among South Asian Countries for the tWO-Way communication of Tedia Cointent (fax, telex, postal and satellite facilities).
F. To share satellite facilities available in the region among Countries on an equitable basis.
G. To facilitate free exchange or reWSpapers, magazines and books.
6. The Colloquium also identified issues of long-range importance for Tedia in the region:
() The establishment of a South Asian newspaper;
(II) The setting up of a South Asian neWS agencies pool;
(III). The development of a pool of South Asian media practitioners who would cover world events from a South Asian perspective.
New Delhi, December 1993

Page 6
Participants
Bangladesh Syd Manuddin HashirT, France Journais SyCd Badrul Ah5an, Assistant Editor, "The Moming SUN".
alנןNB
Gokul P. Pokhrel, Secretary, Nepal Press Institute. N. P. Upadhyaya, Editor, "Talegraph" Weekly,
Pakista MsTehrmina Ahmed, Contributing Editor,"NEWslime", M.B. Naw, Freelance Journalist JawEd Jabbar, Chairmari, South Asiam Migdia ASSICciti.
Khaled AHTEd, Editor, Froligri PSL.
Sri Lanka
Ms. SharTrini Boyle, Precision Productions. Manik da Siwa, Editor, Daily News. Maryn di Siwa, Editor, Lanka Guardian Victor Gunawardena, Senior Consularit, Marga Insti LLE.
AMIL, SingaբurB Wijay Mann, Sg Crigliary GETT Brall, AMIC.
Mir Kesava Menon, Assistant Editor, "The Hindu".
DE|H]
Arun Bhattacharjee, Editor, DNS.
Ajit Bhattachiarjeta. A.R. Dao, Chief Editor, Press, Opinion & Trends. Bidyut Sarkar, Times of India Group. FTET Bhatia, J.LullisL. Dileep Padgaonkar, Editor, "The Tires of India". Dr. J.S. Yadava, Director, Indian Instituta of Mass CCIIIILIIl|Il. Nihal Singh, Director, Press Institute of India. H. K., Dua, Editor, Hirt dusilan Timas. Chamchal Sarkar, ColurTitlis. Ramartha Rao, Adviser. G.S. Bhagawa, Journalist. K.K Bhargawa, Member-Secretary, Indian Council for So Luth Asian Cooperation, Kiran S. Karik, Director, Consortiur for Educational СЈПГПШrication. Saged Naq wi, J.Lumalist & TW Producer. Sumit Chakravartty, Editor, "Mainstream". Rashid Talib, FTE BEACTW Producir & JOUTESL. K.K. Katyal, Deputy Editor, "The Hindu". Up Endra Wajpayi, General Secretary, National Media | III. G.M.THlang, SeniorEditor, "Iridiäri Express". K.M.Shrivastawa, Associate Professor, Indian listillle CF Mass COTTTILUnication. М. Р. L.Ed. DDG, Dijardarshan. Wiren Chhabra, Editor, Printing Times. A.N., Dar, Free ElçE JOLITIESE. HHrish Kharlia Forsflger DG, Diardarshan. Amrit Rao Shiride, Reld. Dig, AIR. S.P. Ojha, Deputy Director General (International Relations), Department of Posts. P.C. Chatterjee, Flammer DG, AIR. K.K. Sud, AIRIMCEM NAMEDIA. Roop Spark, Producer, Doordarshan. Shashikant Kapoor, Diretor Geral, Dordarshal S. Dhamarajan. PK Bandyopadhyay, Press Trust of India. Ja5p. Al Siddh Lu, Com Esprident, LUNI. S.W. Natara, Construction Engineer,
Sunder Rajan, Adviser to K.D., Tripalhi, ICSAC, Indi; Thomas Rings, German T Ms Neeliria Mathur, SPO' Ms Adili Phainis, Special ( "5LINDA". Ms Radha Wiglowasialh, "Di: Scriä Basu, "The Hiridu". Anil Maheshwari, Principa ELETTE 55" Ms SuTiegha, Joumalist. M500 HOra, "Mistra Salish Wasier, "Maisistreal
The Cer HigFS FEJF Wегергog
Orte Axlor, LT le 55 G So CL.III Were? 5'r Il recer GOECT
Sir Celtig (CFLCLIlfois Tரப்ார,
Hill Epeig Arld LOLL.
MËWEC GeVlIg FIF WILLE The deep BOOSted. Er Tuir lg o'L'! Will seg. Exhогtiлg To del WTuile Lyph
Tore CFC
T) IS EE OLr Hero'. Ir L Fil IspLits FJTDI RICé
Vof Flls IF Ace FK To reriday. CILJI LJT.

Georga Forlandes. Rajandra Joshi, Chief Executive. DEPCOM.
1 International Cambre. .K.Sardānā, Juris,
Wox, Cologne.
FILMS Hosts
Forruspondent, Nikhil Chakrawartty. Chaiman, Narmedia. S. Viswan, Secretary General, Namedia.
LLIT Cirrlic|E". M.W.DBSai, Trust.cg, Namedia.
JAG Mohan, Executive Secretary, Namedia. | Correspondent, "Hindu- Dr. Heinz Bongartz, Resident Representative, Frig
drich Ebert Stiftung (FES).
H. Dyal, Adviser, Friedrich Ebart Stiftung. ,Ms Beata Marin, Friedrich Ebgrt Stiftung "ךח: .Kabir Seth, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung "ון
The Scholar’s Tale Part 9
sing Our Hera frurried İrı Punched Mathematics dir la Les LLP huicum Lay La Le been som LeŁUhuc t a Thurific. тпs iп their digitalппеfаппorphosis |Iranтшned to pгіппordial praxіs.
In LUCIs that Po LLer dissipated
LHLHHLLLLHHLHL0 LLLLaLaL LLLLLaL LLLLLLLLLaL LLLLL LLLLGLLLLL II. History and Geography Irbled arid scanned electronically cise Luhere an erasure of riteriory JSSings cleruriserlethrtical|L!.
Soul Wester TIL LOTILUL MILIË ZOTILEG Paul Ir Sircule Ebda rifores ishing and peeling The righteous liபப்g and dealing Mid Gard Upcountry Hettilars LLLHCLCHK LLHHMLL LLLLLLaL LLLL LLLTL LLLLHLLLLHHLLL |dgar seed afMalabar princelings
Uith cereIIIonial thinklings. Sout Will's Arabitara gerte barruk, ade on the Sirhala II air flank er City Bark. CIrld Bazaar. 5 CLITTLJie ke Scir TīEIT LFLe YaJckas, HeLucas cLr Ldl Nagas he beaches and passes olders of the Faith cirld the Nation } each constitiLLer I portior.
LITLS ing Todelled in Math LeTTICII fics 5 thLr List applied Ecor Lor Titics, iculturoLugh the et huic LundergroLLUthi * [hta [ LLYCLIS Class and Mor LeLy LLYTOLight.
PrograLITTLI I ne the MonoUÉrate Called onl. gs Men, Masic, CITLd hood Lurrus
artin HargபlழJulழ son Lihich he could not rely
U. HKaTiLInatilake

Page 7
  

Page 8
- rather than on control - the new technologies will, in fact, provide ore and not less opportunities to mediapersons.
Finally, one sees that the new communication technologies are creating new global communities - ones in Which class, interests, professions and life-styles Create closer bonds than nationality or proximity. At the same time, the rise of ethnicity provides a counterpoint. Will the dialectics between these two seemi
пgly opposing thгus synthesis? What for a prediction with an Would be foolhardy,
the shorterm trends regional groupings
the Supra-national) rmony and, most c ment of ideaS, COTT ple. In this, Wein Sot carrying the deadwe sities While unfortun
CHESTER BOWLES (3)
Success in indi
HoWard Schaeffer
owles's influence and standing
Waxed and Warned over the years, but he Was always a unique and arresting figure. He had great strengths: his enthusiasticandindefatigable energy, hiscreative skills as a Wordsmith, his long-sighted approach to the great changes coursing through the mid-century World, especially in the developing countries, and his ability to inspire younger people with his realistic idealism and devotion to public service. But he also suffered from glaring Weaknesses: an inability to master the game of bureaucratic politics, a cultural insensitivity which led him to underestimate seriously the obstacles to the kinds of social and economic change he wanted the developing countries to undertake, a reputation in Washington as a visionary unwilling or unable to deal with immediate pressing problems, and an overidentification with the Third World in general and India in particular that reduced his credibility and effectiveness,
He was enormously successful in his first assignment to India, where his role in Winning greater understanding for U.S. policies and fostering the newly established economic assistance program coIntributed to a decided improvement in relations at a time. When these had become badly frayed. As a leading Democratic foreign affairs spokesman later in the 1950s, he effectively propagated his liberal interwentionistapproachtoforeign policy both within tha party and outside. Perhaps his most important Contribution in those years Was the lead he took in persuading Americans to recognize, if more dimly than he wished, that something significant to U.S. interests was going on in remote, newly emerging countries of Which they had known or cared little or
6
nothing, and in ca States to bring abot democratic World by pport for the status instead a driving for and economic chang me a strong Voice administration and to less emphasis on in great disappointmer sifice he had WiéWB which brought Kenn opportunity for a hist America's approac affairs.
His early dismissal position in the State especial y grievOUSE blow from which he ri The most important decision to sack him Wles's opposition tot Wasion of Cuba a reminding the presid after the fact also a public. Il hawe dealt C and difficult tenure rtment. Readers inte United States Take find instructive the a to reform the Tlachi practices of the de moreresропsivetohi century political real ssion of the personal stic differences he Kennedy and Secret frustrated these initia
Bowles's long, s rship to India in the 1: ctive than the first. He in the effort to bring food and agricultura

resultina Hegelian Will this take? While " degree of certainty is already clear that (and benefits) are in some bordering on or trade, political hafinitely, free moveflUnication and peoth Asia are laggards, ght of recent animoately ignoring Centu
ries of shared heritage, language, life-style and oppression. Without moving quickly towards a "common South Asian homeland" We are in danger of being marginalised, and Will continue our petty battles at the cost of the billion-plus people of this Subcontinent.
Hopefully, the next meeting of this type Will hawe the Words of this year's theme slightly rearranged, so as to read: "South Asia. Without Walls: Media Initiative".
2
ling for the United ut a more equitable, abandoning its suquo and becoming e for political, Social, G. Hisfailureto becowithin the Kennedy persuade it to place lilitary power Was a it to him, especially the 1960 election, edy to poWer, asan oric breakthrough in to international
for the number two Department was an olitical and personal ever fully recovered. factor in Kennedy's in was probably Bohe failed Bay of Pigs rd his bolunder S. İnı ant of this opposition lowing it to become arefully with his brief at the State Depaested in the way the s foreign policy Will CCount of his efforts nery and perSOrrel artilent to Take it sconception of mid
ties, and Ty discuty clashes and stylhad With President ry of State Rusk that tives.
Cold a Tiba SSado60s Was less produplayed a major part jout the refoTTTS in policies that led to
the Green Revolution. But he was less successful in his campaign to strengthen U.S.-Indian Security ties. To his constenation, the outbreak of the second IndiaPakistan War in 1965 led the United States to reduce sharply its political interest in India (as well as in Pakistan). In his final years in New Delhi he saw India slip down Ward on the Johnson administration's foreign policy agenda, which was increasingly dominated by Vietnam.
Throughout his years in foreign policy, Bowles Seemed to alternate betweeri moments of great hope and others of almost bitter despair. But over those two decades, he never flagged in his persistent efforts to promote the fundamental changeshebelieved necessary forthe preservation of ATmerican security and the flowering of American ideals in the postcolonial Cold War World. He Would no doubt have seen in the Outcome of the Cold War the triumph of these ideals and the windcation of his belief that they represented universal aspirations. Although the United States and the rest of the World are vastly different now from what they were in Bowles's time, I am sure that if he were alive and active today he would be in the forefront of those urging Washington to employ its resources to sustain and strengthen free political institutions and more liberal and equitable economies in the former Communist countries, Tuch as he had called On it to do in the Third World in the 1950s and 1960s.
In this brief account | hawe tried to giwe you at least Some idea of the main points about Bowles sought to bring out in New Dealer in the Cold War. Would hope that some of you will take the plunge and go through the book to get the full story.

Page 9
| PART2
NGO's: The question c
(d) Trust Ordinance
A charitable trust includes any trust for the benefit of the public (within or Without Sri Lanka) of any of the following Categories:
I) relief of poverty; ii) advancement of education or knowledge, iii) advancement of religion, and w) any other purpose beneficial to or for the advancement of Tankind.
A trustee is under a duty to take care of trust property as if it were his OWT1.
There are separate provisions as to the raintenance of accounts and as to the investinents allowed to trustees. A trustee is bound to keep clear and accurate accounts of the trust. He is entitled to hawe the accounts of his administration of the trust property examined and settled.
There is special provision for Suit by persons interested in religious trusts which exposes them to a level of scrutiny not generally obtaining in the Context of charitable trusts. The Court is also invested With further investigative powers concerning the accounts of religious trusts. A court may, With respect to religious trusts, set up a scheme of management with provision for, among other things, periodical auditing of accounts.
(e) Tailored Acts of Parliament
It is also apparent that some NGOs derivether existence and juristic capacity by virtue of specific legislative enactment. Such NGOs are deeply rooted in history and tied to the controlling constitutional and operational provisions in their respective governing statutes. It is questionable whether such statutorily created NGOs should, as a matter of policy, be subject to any higher level of regulatory and administrative supervision given that, on the whole, the relevant ordinance makes detailed provisions for matters such as the filing of accounts and external investigation.
(f) Unincorporated Associations
Many NGOs exist as unincorporated
associations. No E nCorporated assic and capacity exist. other jurisdictions with the permissi sued in the lar Secretary and Trea: tion, There is a qu such bodies can wer, there is Scope of property loап present members.
Unincorporated validly open accoul Efter into restal a ceipts and other With others so as achievement of the
5. is there a need
The operations of res an NGO to Stand policies or philosopol government in powe incipled interference NGO by a regime dri WationS meCeSSilatas Some areas, such E rights work, there is government supervis of NGOs. It is, how that where NGOsapi funds, legitimate inti funds are utilized m: regulatory control. AC Tain ag:OUntäble to
Anargumentisfais financial benefits from therefore, open to SCr it is submitted, just scrutiny as is strictly tain Whether the NG of its status Which E benefits.
The operation of as opposed to the further base relied Control. However, the the Criminal law Woul. further control is unn
Three concers in gated, the debate ow

f accountability
nactment giving uni:iations legal form in Sri Lanka, unlike Such bodies may, of the Court, be of the President, Surer of the aSSOCiastion as to whether old property. Howefor reading a grant SSociation as to its
asSociations may ts, enterintoleases, јreements, give reise deal effectively
to function for the ir objects.
for RefoT?
GOs at times requiin opposition to the nies of a particular r. The fear of unpriWith the Work of an jen by political motiacceptance that, in as human and civil simply no scope for ion of the activities ver, acknowledged roach the public for rest in OW, those ty be manifested in ditiorially, NGOs reheir do TOTS,
ld that NGOs obtain their Statu Sard, are Jtiny, Theargument, Fies only so much The C8SSary to aSCeOtherits the award tracts the financial
|GOs in the public, rivate, sphere is a by proponents of scope and effect of tend to suggest that CESSary,
rm, and hawe instiir effective and elle
Tentary, in the sense of universal, regulation of NGO's. First, the proliferation and pervasive influence of the NGO's has initiated examination of their governance. Secondly, there is the spectre of impropriety and misappropriation raised because of fears that in the absence of close scrutiny, NGOs can engage in activities detrimental to public order and cultural harmony. The third concern is the most tangible: it legitimately questions the extent to Which NGOs are accountable. Accountability involves several aspects: financial accountability in the sense of substantiated ascertainable expenditure on proper purposes, and operational accountability involving the achievement of established objectives in conformity With the law. it is therefore Submitted that the prior question With respect to most NGOs (leaving aside those who raise funds from the public) is whether they must be accountable, in a larger sense, the operations of NGOs are but exteinsions of the work of individuals. Any challenge to the right of association must, therefore, beseen as a challenge to individual rights.
No concern individually subsists as a LLaLLLLL a LLLLLaLLLLS a LLLLLL LLLLHLLLLLLL LL NGOs and the breadth of their activities marks them as a phenomenon meriting some policy. However, this concern implicitly recognizes that a global approach to regulation, in an environment where among NGOsthere is no uniformity inform or function, is not feasible, The fear of Thaladministration and improper action is closely tied to the expressed need for accountability. However, a real question exists as to Whether, if at all, these misgiwings as to the duty of accountability are Well founded.
Two distinct strategies may be used to tackle the accountability issue. First, the extant legislative framework may beameInded to bolster and strengthen provisions for accountability. Secondly, the introduction of a woluntary code of conduct, Capable of uniwersal application, and addressing, on a consensus basis, all major concerns may resolve the accountability probleT1 Without impinging on the fundamental principles of autonomy and independence crucial to the efficacious and sound functioning of NGOs.

Page 10
(a) Amendments to Existing Legislation
... No Extension to Albit of Application
The existent statutory framework should continueto apply to those entities which, either beca LuSE of their for or due to the activities undertaken by them, fall within the purview of the relewant enactment. The arbitrary exteInsion of the scope of an enactment is more likely to complicate than to clarify the system of control.
i. Enhancement of Disco Sure Requirement as to Operations
The precise objectives of an NGO rust be stated in a constituent document to be filed at the stage of formation. ProviSic for the bo-elimia|| Ira WiaW of this statement of objectivas should be inse
LLLLLaa aa aaLa LLLLLaLLLLLLLS
iii.) More Stringent Financial Disclosure Requirements
The provisions contained in the Compamies Act Tay be adopted as a mode law and included in all other enctments, such as the Trust Ordinance, having application to NGOs including specific acts establishing NGOs. Further the provisions in the Companies Act may be bolstered in the following manner
(a) Disqualification of status as a company or deregistration for the unexplained failure to file annual returns; and
(b) Provisions for powers of investigation in cases of inadequate Compliance with the accounting provisions (in amplification of section 431 (d) of the Companies Act).
W. E.Tf OTCDITTG 1t MechE ISITIS
Failure to comply with requirements as to disclosure concerning operation and accounting should entail deregistration or removal of status.
W. Cottents on Disclosure Requirements
Two issues are pertinent to consideration of the validity of a recommendation as to the strengthening of disclosure requirements. The first relates to compliance and practicability: it is pointless to impose duties of disclosure of Which LIEFES ||ittle fulfi||T5 tald Jräl means of achieving compliance. In this regard, a voluntary code, founded on consent, may produce better results. The second issue concerns the appro
priateness of enhar quirments at a time to limit the applica requirements (fore 13.8 of the Discussi 1993 on Company Advisory Commiss Law) and serious qi the functional relew reuire mērīts. Inot and for What purp provided in connec requirements, utilize clusions on this is: adoption of the
made in paragraph
(b) Woluntary Code
The primary elern code is the fact that it is based on self regulat Sector, Therefore it W. paration of a Voluntal primarily in respect . bstantiWg aCCOuritabili element in this sche membership and a W to the terms of the CC
The implementatio the Code of Conduct zatiOTh5 C)Luld E}e mhC)r ttee comprised of re. organization concern could be elected by hopefully minimizing
Those organization take mer Tibership), WO extent that they woul. TE to this tės TTS ir CI Code,
(c) The Criminal Li
THE PE COB T for a perSOr entrust misappropriate it or Hérown LISE, in Violat of IqW' Or CitāCf. Ti ice as to criminal bre that scope now exis corruption as to the held by NGOs.
There is also the Created Which relate. a perSon to hand OWe that Carl ISO E LIS regulate activity and the Case of Cor Wictio Tent effect,
The availability o offenses (others incl rsonation) suggests

Icing disclosure reWher the trand is bility of disclosure xample, paragraph in Paper of October law Reform, by the іоп оп Сопрапу Luestions exist as to
C9 0f di SCIOSUITE er Words, by Whom Sa is information, tion with disclosure Dbātē ārld Csue may control the recommendations (iii) above.
| Of COT du Ct
ent of a Woluntary Sa Voluntary Systern in Within thing NGO Julid in Wolwe the prery code of conduct, ffilia Ciål Frid SLty and the Voluntary TE WÖLuld relate to illingness to adhere ide.
and execution of by member organinitored by a Commiresentatives of the Ed, Such TETES secret ballot, lus Factional loyalties.
ls that "Wolunteer' or uld do so only to the | Ludertak to EddEorporated within the
W
anders itan Offert Ce ed with property to Convert it for his or ion of any discretion 13. ExistGICE of Coffeacloft UStirldicatES its for the control of application of funds
offence of cheating s to actions causing грroperty toапоther, sed as a means to after punishment in l, function as a dete
the full gambit of ude cheating bypelät tETE IS OW 5
Teans to meet the fears of impropriety concerning financial misfeasance without the need for any other scheme.
6. Summary of Recommendations
Based on the analysis of the legislative fraflowork of NGOS Contaired in Section 4, the description of the funda Tental nature of the right of association presented in Sectio 2 and On the Collsideration of Wrong tri erotheris a regad foro reaforirT Set out im Sectio, 5, the fiTTT SLEDITissior is thät:
(a) There is no clear foundation for the existence of controls over and supervision of NGOs. Indeed, it becomes wholly unacCeptable for the state to infringe on the operations of certain NGOs, such as those working in the human rights area, by seeking to exercise measures as to supevision or even requiring the disclosure of
foratio.
(b) It is inappropriate and impracticable to establish a universally applicable framework for the supervision of all NGOs. A global approach ld regulation, in an envirobinment where among NGOs there is no uniformity in form and function, is sleither fe3Sible I1Or deSirable, ACCOrdingly, both the Bangladesh model for regulation, which involves a central supervisory agency, and the Indian model for control, which rewolves around a prohibition on the receipt of funds by a NGO except with State approval, must be reje:lati::
(c) The diversity of the activities of NGOs which includes key development Work, and the work of some NGOs, which inwov55, at tirnes, Criticis T1 and SGrutiny of Government policies and operations, is predicated on and necessarily an abseNice of TheasLures which threaten or impair the integrity and independence of NGOs.
(d) The goals of transparency and accountability can beachieved by the twin strategies of strengthening the existing legislative framework and the implementation of a voluntary codeuct, providing for provisions as to registration, a CCOLIntability, dispute resolution and the establi-ססוחסlHBBCוחחחסgCחriסltחסוחfaסtחeוחsh sed of NGO representatiwes.
ConfrïEL fors to the Paper
Sabila Kela at Dallaris Wickre Thesekera ARM FEIA Mili da GLatileke Neelan Tiruchel Wam Kanaga Dharmananda

Page 11
THE J. R. YEARS (18)
The State Depart
Arden
in a report to the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate, the State Department, in 1984, said:
"Matterspeaked on July 23 when Tamil ETTOristS a TibUSEdadkilled 13 Si Lankan soldiers (all of them Sinhalese) in the Jaffna peninsula. In a backlash of anger by the Sinhalese majority, there followed thG TOst Serio LuS and widespread violence directed against the Tamil community since independerice. On July 24, according to government figures, soldiers in Jaffna killed 51 Unamed Tamils. Violence against Tamils in the city of Colombo spread throughout the Sinhalese majority areas. At the end of a Week of killing, burning and looting by Sinhalese mobs, the government said that 387 people, nostly Tamils, Were dead, among them 53 COr victed prisoners and detaimees Who Were killed in prison by other prisoners. This figure also includes some 34 persons, mostly Sinhalese killed by the Security forces for engaging in looting ET ETS.
According to government figures, 116 Tamil or Indian-owned large busineSSes Were damaged, 38 of thern completely destroyed. As many as 3,100 Tamil shops were damaged or destroyed, and thousands of Tamil-owned or occupied homes were burned or looted. Four thousand vehicles were burned. At the height of the violence more than 100,000 Tamils sought refuge in camps set up by the government and tens of thousand of them, many with transportation provided by the government, fled to the comparative safety of the north
El til East. ( including the pres
embers of the
actively participal stood by unable
The evel
1983 cause
in World
nation fr
Jayewarde
TInlet an
Lanka itse
IIyrecovere time onwar
ratists cou
With murde
On July 25, 3: either CorwictE spects beingh Weltion of Te kil|dil || ; by other prisor ter, another 18 the sa Tejail W strate foundt homicides, and to investigate claimed the de sult of prison
guards had tr aleged that pr partially resp. deaths due to the governmen allegation and SOM WarderS,

tment Report
Government officials, ideant, adriit that sorTnel security forces either ted in the violence or brunWillingto stop it.
firear IIIs were themselves Ovepowered by rioting prisoners. Police are investigating.
In June the government promu
nts of July di a backlash
condem
"om Which ne's goveLd even Sri
if newer real
d-From that 'ds the sepald get away
5 Tamil prisoners, di terroristS o SUeld Lunder the Prerrorist Act, Were ade jail, reportedly hers. Two days laTarnil prisoners in "ere killed. A mage 53 deaths Were ordered the police
Prison officials Baths Were the reriots which prison ied to stop. It is ison guards were insible for these malfeasance, but tfirmly denies this insists that the priwho do not carry
gated emergency regulations that per TT1lit the artiled forCES to dispose of dead bodies without post mortems or inquests. The Civil Rights MowerTent of Sri Lanka fears that these powers Couldbe abused and Could faciltate the destruction of evidence in cases of deaths by torture, indiscriminate killings, and execution Without trial by security fo
Ce5".
Such reports are annually submitted to Congress by the State Department in respect of countries receiving aid from the U.S. This is a requirement of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 - as ameinded. The figures the State Department report cites are government statistics. Others hawe made estimates which greatly differ from them. Dissanayake says there Were 471 deaths and over 8,000 Cases of arson. (Op. cit)
The Tigers kept trying to provoke a repetition of July 1983. In doing so they slaughtered over three thousand civilians, some in the most brutal fashion. Small isolated villages in the jungle Were surrouInded by night and men, Women and children burnt, shot or axed. Dollar Farm, Kent Farm, Kokilai, Nayaru - the list is long. In May 1985 over 150 pilgrims in the sacred city of Anuradhapura Were gunned down by the Tigers in an attempt to provoke a Sinhala Buddhist retaliation oni innocent Tamils living amongst them. The Air-Lanka Tri-Star about to take off with

Page 12
a load of tourists was bombed killing a large number of foreigners. Other bombings included the Central Telegraph Office in the Fort of Colombo, the Ceylon Cold Stores Ltd., the Oberoi Hotel and a trainload of passengers at Weyangoda. In 1987 came the gunning down of 127 bus passengers at Habarana and the bombing of the Pettah bus standat rush hour - 113 dead, over 300 Wounded. In all these instances, the government by taking swift measures was able to prevent a Sinhala backlash against peaceful Tamils. This made people Wonder what had prevented the government from doing this in July 1983.
INDIAS ROLE
The West German Frankfurter Allegemaine Zeitung in an editorial, on 24 April 1987 said:
"It was a grawe mistake of Indira Gandhi to help Tamil guerrilla groups in the North of Sri Lanka to obtain weapons. India's help to rebels in a neighbouring country which had done Indiano harm is obvious, though India denies it, Sri Lankan Tamils have had ideal retreat and supply bases in India for years. Without the logistic relations on both sides they Would never hawe been able to fight the supposed oppression of the Tamil minority and for an independent state of Tamil Eelar.
It now occurs to Rajiv Gandhi, who has to carry therness his mother left behind, that his country is on a dangeroustack.
It is a Well-known strategy in Delhi to keep one's position strong by keeping the neighbours weak. The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. Seeled idea for this POUTADOSE.
The Indian P.M. cannot keep preteinding to be the honest mediator after all that has happened in the last few years. It will be difficit for the Indians to control the ghosts Mrs. Gandhi evo
10
keď" (Quoted in 1987)
What Was the Ger|
India's intelligenc Research and Ala and the Intelligence Gandhi Started a Thi direct control With the Cabinet Secretariat Agency was to cove Indian States Such : Rajasthan, Andhra P ka, and also one in Lanka, Indira Gand Agency in early 19: Chief Security Advis
Rajiv Gau
OLLS Illot t
Tamil Nadu
ced to havin positions in Sri Lanka’s problem whi ctly at varia Stand he ha tackling si blems in Pul
and elsewhe This freque him appearl and disinge
Mrs. Gandhi's daug Gandhi, in the Septe her magazine SURY
"M.F. Santook, e R. N. Kao and G.( R.A.W., with profes intelligence agenc

he Island 26 April
an editor on about?
agencies are the sis Wing (R.A.W.) Bureau (I.B.). Indira dAgency under her innocuous late of Security). The Third activities in several s Punjab, Kashmir, adВЕЋ and KarПаtаependent state, Sri started her Third 3 Lunder R. N. Kao, lir to the P. M.
ndhi, anxiO alienate , was redug to take up
respect of
separatist chare direlice with the
to take in milar pronjab, Orissa rein India. ntly made both foolish
LOLLS
hter-in-law Menaka Tiber 1984 issue of A told the story.
-Chief of R.A.W.
Saxena, Chief of sional help from the of a country. We do
not have diplomatic relations with, formed a new organisation.
The groundwork for the smugglingnetworkfor bringing in arms had been laid by Rabindra Ohri, Assistant Director in R.A.W. Chri was rewarded with a posting to Sri Lanka. B. Sarup for whom things got too hot in Colombo R.A.W. Chief had him shutled across to Kabul (sic). The R.A.W. Chief thought Sarup deserved a rest. After all, his work in Colombo had been brilliant. He had liaisoned with the Tamil terrorist groups in Sri Lanka and had been instrumental in establishing the first line of communication across Jaffna to Madras. After all. Punjab had done the trick (i.e. clinched the Hindu wote) in the North. Sri Lanka Would do it in the South.
Sarup was replaced by Rabindra Ohri, the man who had streamlined the gun running operation in Rajasthan. It was at Ohri's behest that the specialised training camp at Chakrana, north of Dehra Dun got under Way. TWO thousand Tamil terrorists were given training there, by the special security bureau of R.A.W. under Nagrani and Arjunan of Counter-Intelligence.
In November 1983 the men were picked up from Dehra Durn and transported in batches of 500 to Madras.
Thereupon the local line to Sri Lanka took over and the terrorists Crossed ower to Jaffna.
A massacre of Tamils by a brutal Sinhalese army, with India stepping in as saviour of the poor oppressed people was the scenario that had beenplanned in Bikaner House. The heroine of Bangladesh Wants a new role to play: The Dewi of Tamil Nadu'' will do just fine".
Many of the training camps the Indian government denied the existence of Were in Tamil Nadu. India Today of 30 March

Page 13
1984 gawe the following picture:
The camp near Kumbakonam, like the One ClOSe to MegaTibakkaT1 On the outskirts of Madras, is just one of the dozens set up by the Lankan Tamil insurgents deep inside Tamil Nadu, Where new recruits get ideological grounding from rebel theoreticlans and ellementary lessons in the use of firearms. Initial lessons over, they are split into small batches and sent for advanced training to the coast. Nearly two thousand armed men are now ready for battle; yet another 2000-3000 hawe been trained, but Wait for arms from foreign sources“, basically the Sowie
-backed leftist guerrilla groups like the
P.L.O. and Zimbabwe radicals. Armed With Kalashnikows and G-3 rifles and driven by a strong emotion of ethnicity With a dash of left revolutionary fervour, they are keyed up to strike".
Gandhi's Die TT1a
The Gandhi family's political base was in the South of India. The most powerful state in southern India is Tamil Nadu, which is the provenance of the Dravida Munethra Kazagam (D.M.K.) which spearheads a movement of Tamils allower the World. The D.M.K. leaders are very race-Conscious and have high ambitions for ethnic Dravidians. One such ambition is Tamil Nadu as an independent state, separated from India. It was to people with Such sentiments that the separatists of Sri Lanka appealed for assistance. Two rival Tail Nadu leaders M.G.Ramachandran, the Chief Minister and Karunanidhivied With each otherinespousing the Sri Lanka separatists' cause.
On 19 March 1987 All India Radio in its news broadcast said that the Indian government had indicated that it would not resume negotiations on the peace proposals With the government of Sri Lanka ti|| the latter agreed to lifting completely the blockade on Jaffna. (Reported in The
Island 20 March), C Was Carried in the D Today, about the decision to impose "The Indian governi a number of embarg With its stance II Tel
government's strate Separatist terrorists
The Origins of the
On 14 May 1972, y gQVernment Was pr COStitution Whicht rded with dismay, joined togetherata. It пnaleе. They were lf Tamil Congress an ylion Workers' Cong Care into existenc Front (T.U.F.) seekir United Sri Lanka, A Prabhakaran (b. 195 formed a group cal Tigers (T.N.T).
Four years later, Waddukoddai and Tali United Libera апd passed a reso separate state forth changed its name to of Tamil Eelam (L.T.
On 7 April, 1978: led by Inspector Ba and 1 Sinhaliese dri by the L.T.T.E. an Weapons Were captu sporadic killings by beginning With ther Taiappah, Mayor of J sh-killing of the pc. marked the beginnin nce in the fight for later Air Ceylon's Awr by the Tigers.
The Tigers split Werefored. The L.

In 20 March a report aily News, from India Indian government's blockade in Orissa; mert has reSOrted to pesoddly at variance tion to the Si Laika gy in its War against
Jaffa".
Tiger Movement
then the United Front eparing to enact its eTarmil leaders regathree Tamil parties |eeting heldin Trincole Federal Party, the d Thondaman's Ceress (C.W.C.). This e the Tati| Uitgid ng autonomy Withina teenager Velupillal i5), at the sama time ing itself Tamil New
the T.U.F. Tet at renamed itself the tion Front (T.U.L.F.) lution demanding a eTamils. The TNT. the Liberation Tigers T.E.).
a police party of four stamp||ai (3 Tamils Wer) Was ambushed d killed. The police Ired. There had been
the Tigers before, lLIrder of Alfred DLaffna, but the ambLlice party in 1978 g of OrganisedvioleEelar. Five months airliner Was burned
and splinter groups T.T.E. led by Prabha
karaп гепаіпеdthe principal group. The People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (P.L.O.T.E.) was started by Uma Maheswaran, a for Ter lieutenant of Prabhäkaran. The TaTi| EBlam Libération Organisation (T.E.L.O.) was led by Thangadorai and Kuttimuni, both of whom were killed later in the Welikade prison riot. it was this gruop that the T.U.L.F. Was closest to. AfterThangadorai and Kuttimuni had been arrested leadership was taken over by Sri Sabaratnam (Tali Sri) Who, in turn, was shot down and killed in 1986 on Prabhakaran's Orders.
The Eelam Research Organisation (E.R.O.S.) is a London-based Trotskyist group of ex-patriate Tamils led by E. Ratnasabapathy. The Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Fromt (E.P.R.L.F.) which contained within it the General Union of Eelam Students (G.U- .E.S.) was a students' group.
The Tarnil Eelam Army (T.E.A.) wasled by Thambipillai Maheswaran. In February 1984 T.E.A. robbed a bank in Batticaloa and got away. With fifty million rupees (nearly two million U.S. dollars at the rate then prevailing). It was T.E.A. that severely damaged Sri Lanka's tea export market in 1986 by threatening to introduce arsenic into tea packets,
There were a few smaller groups.
Both the L.T.T.E. and P.L.O.T.E. had a core of P.L.O. trained fighters, but Uma Maheswaran's connection. With the P.L.O. Was earlier and closer. He Was the first to take his men to Lebanon for training Under George Habash's People's Liberation. Front for Palestine (P.L.F.P.).
NOTE:
Mr. C. Mahendran's article om
EASTASIA will appearin our Iext iSS11e.
11

Page 14
JVP: Thoroughly mode
Mick MOOre
I. Introduction
The JWP (Janatha Wikmuthi Peramuna - the People's Liberation Front) first Care to the attention of the World Outside Sri Lanka When it launched an abortive insurrection in 1971. In 1987, the JWP made another bid to come to power by force of arms. The insurrection of 1987-1989 was better-prepared and more deeply-rooted than that of 1971; the huTan Costs and societal consequences of its extirpation were correspondingly greater. Although the JWP came close to achieving state power both in late 1988 and mid-1989, it was thereafter destroyed very rapidly.
This paper explains why the JWP became a serious insurrectionary force in the 1980s and Why it fell apart so rapidly in the Second part of 1989. The paper is especially concerned with the logistics of revolution: the nature of the WP's Cadres and Support base; the organizational forms adopted; and the tactics and strategy used to combat the state. The central thesis is that the Ileans the WP used in pursuit of state power Were shaped by and adapted to the environment-the economic, educational and occupational struсlшгes, demography and human geography—of the Sinhalesa a reas of Sri Lanka to which the JWP was confined. In sum, suggest that the JWP's insurrection was wery much formed by the fact that it took place in a relatively urbanized and coTercialized environment characterized by a high degree of interpenetration of Societal and state institutions. Although the JWP relied very heavily on claims to "indigenism', it was in fact wery different in organization and style from what might be considered the typical contemporary peasant-based Third World revolutionary movement. In order to illustrate this point, | dfHW SCITE: t:DFlfåsls bElWEET1 thE JWF" and the other insurrectionary movement Which hlas Wracked Sri Lanka ir reCerit years: that of the Tamil separatists in the North and East of the island. For, fighting the Sri Lankan armed forces mainly in relatively thinly populated agricultural areas With access to thick jungle, the Tamil Separatist guerillas were (and are) engaged in a campaign that in many respects
(Aspacial's! ол SолІh A5іал аїаїгs, Dг. Moora s a facturaraf the University of Sussex)
|
reSGITibles that of th Sant in Surrectionary.
My Understanding shaped by the Iппргt Social science literat Section Two, I exp relates to Some imp iterature, The Centri the linkages between terial and institution the WP's revolution tched Out in SCCitiO dals With the hist0 text, and Sections history of the JVP. tWeen the en Wir Onry Organization and str: detail ir Section SeW
... Socia Science
The study of revol. contempoгагуSocial
Table achie WETlElst by a whole series of r IEWolutions in the Thi TE O TEWolution haSE derably ower the past impressively, our the ptual understanding of related phenome ction, guerilla Warfa rgency - has impr The most significan literature, especially Ca LuSES of rewolutio interpretation of the here.
Firstly, and most lysis of Why revolutio t0 Shift fTOTT ESSET tīE Socio-economic) to As Goldstone explai tion of Studies offew informed by theoreti nly those published Efter th3 Bd Of WOT to animportant degrE lution, an eminently p Was interpreted in lar of reflection of even king place within the riorTnic: spheres: Tass disturbanCES: Societ Parsonian character competition resulting CofreW SOCIO-ECOTON in the course of econ

rn reVolutionaries
a characteristic pea轟
of thB JWP has beer Ssive contemporary Lure Orl revolution. Ir lain how this paper ortant issues in that all thesis concerning the Sri Lalkallaall enwir Orthir ment and lary practice is skeT. SectioFOL ical and political coFIW SIK WILL The Connections Eleent and the UWP's ategy are explored in B.
ad Re Volutio
ti0i5a figld in Which science has consideOdisplay. Stimulated ural in Surrections and rd World, the literatuxpanded Wery Consithree decedes. More Oretical and conceof revolution - and la SLCh a S ir SLUTTETE ad COLUfter-SLIoved considerably
Ways in Which this
as it related to the l, has informed my WP TE SLUTTETİZE
mportantly, the armaIS occur has tended illy societal (social or political explanation. ns,o the first generaolution to be strongly Cal COnCerTS - Tlaiin the three decades | WTTW - WETE EfEdLICtjGrlist.REVOolitical phenomenon, ge part as Some kind ts and prOCESSES talSocial or socio-ecoSocio-psychological al dysfunctions of a i poverty, or political from the emergence nic groups or classes omic change." A later
generation of theorists, prominent since the 1970s, shifted the focus of explanation to more directly political factors, especially to those generally termed structural the structures of state systems and of peasant COTTILJitiËS, the Cherr CBOT Weakle:SS of elites and armed forces; and the influence ofinternational economic and political pressures on the capacity and autonomy of states. The structuralists produced much stimulating work which tended to interpret revolutions primarily as aspects of "crises of the state'."
Secondly, the emphasis placedonstructural explantations of the originand cauгse ofгеvoluIіолgeneratedа паІшга/геасїіолfrom:scholars ІлсІлеd'Io emphasize the agency dimensions of political action: the motivations of revolutionary cadres and leaderships, and the nature of the choices open to ther. Such a reaction Was virtually inevitable in a situation in which, as evidenced by the abundance of ideological, political and military training facilities for aspirant revolutionaries in West Asia, in Communist Countries and in many universities Worldwide, revolution had become almost an established profession. Many Scholars now see that the structural and the agency perspective can be accommodated to one another. The terlSiO" betweer the Ti Wil|| 10 doubt Cotinue, in this field of study as elsewhere, but there is no reason to expect that this will prove intellectually paralysing.
My interpretation of the JWP is more polly thaпsociety-сепtred, апd lпсогроrates both agency and structural perspectives, albeit With emphasis on the former. To a considerable extent, interpret the JWP as an exercise in political entrepreneurship. An intelligent, creative and highly ambitious political leadership, dedi cated to the achievement of state power but blocked from achieving it by electoral means, exploited both the reservoirs of political alienation found Within Sri Lankan Society and its own long experience of revolutionary Endeavour to design political strategies and tactics that enabled the movement (temporarily) to achieve impreSsive results with relatively few resources and no external support. This emphasis on the creative role of the JVP leadership - and especially of the dominant individual leader, Rohana Wijeweera, who Created the TOWETEnt in the late 19605 and controlled it until he was captured and

Page 15
killed in November 1989-in seeking out and exploiting opportunities to make revolution as a means to achieve power Will no doubt seem excessively voluntaristic to those observers who would emphasize the structural features of Sri Lankan soclety which made revolution so attractive to many people, adhere to my view because of what appearstome to be a nabundance of evidence about the extent of opportunism displayed by Wijeweera during his long quest for power."
Thirdly, the shift of emphasis from societal to political explanation (see above) has gone hand in hand with an emphasis or the international dimensions of the CaUSES of Te Wolution. There is T0 unified theory or approach, anda variety of different kinds of international influences have been explored. For example, Gates has described the rather powerful processes, deriving from the considerable intellectuality" characteristic of most modern revolutionary movements, through which the lessons learned from one revolutionary experience are transmitted to and imbibed — notalWaystogood effect — by aspirant revolutionaries in other parts of the world." Structuralist theorists hawa argued the existence of more consistent patterms of Causation stemming from the "World system', conceived as a politico-e- Conomic mechanism incorporating rooted inequality between economically advanced, capitalist 'core' states and Various Categories of 'peripheral' states. Skocpol, for example, has demonstrated that revolutions tend to occur in the Countries occupying disadvantaged positions on the peripheries of the global politico-economic system.' More quantitative world systems theorists have pursued the notion of causal connections between the incidence of insurrection or revolution on the periphery of the World economy and the degree of instability in political and economic relations among the dominant nations at the core of the system. More eclectic scholars have argued the importance of the global geo-political context in the more conventional and visible sense of that term. Building on their work,' one can advance a few propositions about the changing relationship between the global geo-political situation and the nature of revolutions and revolutionary possibilities in the "periphery" since, say, the end of World WaT TWO:
1. The scope for anti-colonial revolutions-such as those of Angola, GuineaBiSSau, Mozambique, Wietnam and Zimbabwe-has declined as direct Colonialism has gradually been eradicated.
2. Correspondingly, the radical element
in revolutioпагy pro directed increasing elites, albeit they ar associated with pu foreign powers, as Cases of the United Cuba, Iran and Nica
3. The bi-polarity o in the early decades Was reflected in rew On the periphery:
Tents tended to bet both materially and express their objecti lar) socialist principl. tionary forces becat stern' and 'capitalist' of support, "o The si Cal Collapse of con 1980s and the cont Union's foreign polic to be leading toacon structured situation. War patterns had alr insiderable change, the Sinco-Soviet spli rative sources of ide SUSterlange for r: Scope for 'competiti between groups on 1
4. AS COTITUIlis Source of ideological for revolution, Islam
taken its place, alb proportion of the Wor is already Islamic, a for Which ebodic many different Islami Wasid:LIs Isla Tlic "chlur
5. In consequence above, revolution in is tending to becom more localized, in the singly reflects compe and institutions Couc a global level, and
competition within between adjacent st: SSedi terms of riva or religious groups.'
The JWP of 97 example of this proc the dynamics of rewo phery. The JWP was Union at the ideologi Some material Supp. ad took the Mai Todels of "peasantre logical reference po Communist Party, st Wiet Union, Was a The government against nched its 1971 coup

rarthrines tends to be I against indigenous e sometimes closely tatively neo-colonial for example in the States in relation to ragUa.
international politics after World War TWO lutionary alignments revolutionary movged to the Soviet Bloc, ideologically, and to Vesin tems of (secu3S, While anti-revolueidentified with "Westances and Sources multaneous ideologimunism in the late raction of the Soviet y pretensionSappear pletely new and less Theimmediateposteady undergone conotably as a result of t. This provided altehological and material 2Volutions, creating on in the revolution' he left.
has declined as a and material support has to some degree eit (a) only for that ld's population which bd(b) in a pluralistic es riwalries between CState:Sand betWGen ches'.
of the changes listed peripheral countries e more diverse and Sense that it de Creatition between ideaS ned and organized at increasingly reflects individual states, or ates, which is expretries between ethnic
provided an early SS of localization Of lution Within the perihostile to the SOWiet cal level," obtained Irt from North Korea, st and Wetlatlese Wolution" as its ideoints. The Sri Lanka upported by the SoTiber of the coalition Which the JWP lauattempt. The recent
insurrection was even more local in Orierotation:
1. Scarcely any external material SUpport was obtained, and that from non-SOcialist sources."
2. The socialist of Marxist elements in the JVP's doctrine and practice Were increasingly neglected in favour of a programme, style and tactics which were increasingly Sinhalese chauvinist and indigenist, and directed against both Tamil ethnic groups within Sri Lanka and against the Indian arried forces which Were occupying the Tamil areas of the North and East.
3. Some of the JVP's main targets, in the literal sense of the term, Were rival left parties, both the established Marxist parties and more populist groups - which provided more direct competition to the JVP for the support of low status social groups, The support given by these rival left parties to a negotiated solution to the Sinhalese - Tamil ethnic Conflict, including the presence of the Indian Peacekeeping Force in the North and East, provided the JVP with an opportunity to brand them a StraitOTOLUS.
It is explained in more detail below how the arrival in Sri Lanka of the Indian Peacekeeping Force in July 1987 provided the material upon which the JVP, having received only 4 per cent of the national wote in presidential elections in 1982, Wasable to obtain sufficient popular support to launch a campaign to take overpower by force. It launched that campaign against а геgime andа пnillaгy apparatus which had already been weakened through Indian support for armed Tamil separatists. The international dirTensions of the recent insurrection were therefore of great importance, And they were very much regional, South Asian, especially Indo-Sri Lankan issues, intertwined With ethnic and linguistic rivalries in both countries.' The outside World Was involved only indirectly.
While recognizing the importance of international issues, this paper focuses mainly on domestic dimensions of the JVP. For the central concern is to explore how structural features of the Sri Lankan economy and polity affected the Way in which the JVP set out to achieve power. The argument is summarized in the next Sectio.
III. The Material and Institutional COIt
It has long been Conventional to observe that the actual pattern of revolution in
13

Page 16
the twentieth century has been almost the reverse of the Marxian expectation. In particular, revolution has taken place in the backward rather than in the advanced countries, has been rooted more in the peasantry (in the loose sense of the term) than in the industrial proleteriat, and has been motivated by nationalism rather than international class solidarity. It has becoThe conventional to think of insurrection and revolution in tha peripheral countries as located principally in rural areas, albeit with external support to help overcome the acute obstacles to widespread collective action inherent in conditions of rural poVery.
The JVP of 1971 was largely a rural movement, especially in the Sense that it was only in rural areas that it managed to organize sufficient force to control territory and populations for a few days or weeks. In the 1980s it retained strength in many rural areas, but was also more rooted and powerful in many urban or quasi-urban areas, above all in smaller towns and in the suburbs and the densely populated semi-urbanized Surroundings of the capital, Colombo. To argue about labelling in rural-urban terms would not be very enlightening. The more important point is that the JVP (of the 1980s, in particular) differed very considerably from any concept of a 'peasant movement, where that implies some combination of (a) "rootedness' of cadres in particular localities; (b) dependence on knowledge of local physical terrain to Combat government forces; (c) the attempt to deny the state control of rural populations by excluding the state apparatus, substituting the revolutionary organization for the state in rural areas, and finally moving on into urban areas from the rura base (d) the creation of a mass political-cum-military organization to exploit force of numbers; and (e) the introduction of Socio-economic reforms in "liberated" areas. Which attract mass support by generating immediate benefits, One Could find some elements of all these features of a peasant movement in the JVP; they were, however, neither prominent nor characteristic. In Somewhat stereotypical terms, one could describe the JVP's campaign as a hybrid between the strategy and tactics of the peasant guerilla and those of the urban terrorist, where the latter implies a premiurn on mobility, flexibility, secrecy, inteligence; the penetration of state institutions for information purposes; the existence of a large penumbra of Supporters surrounding a Very small core of managers and skilled operatives; and above all, military operations which are designed
Very largely for the political iпрасt.
The e WideCe Ont tactics and strategy especially in Section diate concern here JWP, which Was aft poor and largely agri little in Colton W. peasant guerilla. The operating in an env fact relatively 'moden in many respects siпп advanced countries rist" (or"urbangueril become the charact ctionary activity.
Those aspects of" especially pronouncE We to its poverty) an present concerns are
(a) A high overall апd, in particulaг, а zed rural population.
(b) A relatively dive structure, including a cultural economy an combination, Within til of agricultural With ni rural With urban, inco
(c) A major structul blem of educated un from the expansion of school System in th long-run rate of ecor an environment in Wh lifications Were the hi rial and social impro the population.
(d) A relatively larg terms of personnel Widely ramified, stro the village level, and des assumed major : nSibilities.
(e) A relatively.com grated national eco part in the penetral employment relation ctors of the econom plantation era,
The more significa this relatively 'develo the pattern of revo WETE
(a) There are very орепspace —jungle swamps or deserts

psychological and
enature of the JVP's is presented below, Six. The Thore immeto explain why the г all operating in a Irian Country, had S0 hour stereotypical answer is that it was "Om Tent Which is in 'or"developed, and Iar to that of the more Where "Lurban tEITOa') movements hawe ristic form of in SLUTTE
modernity" which are din Sri Lanka (relatiSirectly relevant to
population density dense, semi-urban
}rsified occupational heterogeneous agrida high incidence of le Sarme hQUSëhold, Ion-agricultural, and
TE SOLITICES.
"al and political proemployment arising access to the formal Context a modest omic growth and in lcheducational qua= Storic route tOITlatewerTent for much of
a state, especially in amployed, which is gly represented at las for Several de Caocial Welfare respo
nercialized and inteIomy, originating in on of the capitalist ship into most se
during the colonial
it consequences of Ed'Environment for utionary enterprise
aw lightly-populated plains, mountains, available for nobil
zation, tralning or points of teпрогагу retreat and concealment. Revolutionary activities had almost always to be conducted in densely populated areas. One result was that the mobilization of large groups of fighters was both difficult and of limited strategic value, given the relative invulnerability of a modern state to a direct but Weak military challenge. Another was that the JWP were dependent for security On the Supportoracquiescence of SurrouInding populations, and thus Very vulnerable once this support Was Withdrawn and information began to be passed on to the security forces on a substantial scale. The emphasis was placed instead on political organization and the use of political methods to undermine the state. This implied a large organization, but one subordinated to the political leadership, and requiring considerable internal differentiation according to function and degree of individual involvement.
(b) The heterogeneity of the population interms of socio-economic categorization and interest Thade it difficult for the JWP to generate mass support through a precise programme of socio-есопотnic refor ITS.
(c) The most promising revolutionary material Were youth, both those informal educations and those frustrated by the failure of their educational qualifications to generate rewards which they considered reasonable. Finding a continuous supply of new recruits was relatively easy, but maintaining commitment and stability was problematic.
(d) Social networks arising from experiences in (higher) education institutions provided many of the sinews of revolutionary organization, and Were especially valuable in creating a national organization relatively free of the local particularism which tends to characterize pooragrarian societies.
(e) The classic rural revolutionaries'tactic of cutting the linkages between the people and the State apparatus Was neither feasible nor particularly desirable. The emphasis Was placed instead on penetrating the state apparatus.
(f) The highly commercialized and thus interdependent economy was Vulnerable to disruptive actions in pursuit of revolutionary goals. However, the Widespreadmaterial costs of these disruptions left the JWP Vulnerable to popular reaction, and thus created pressures to seize power as rapidly as possible.
Ng: Historiscal Cofa Nf

Page 17
Notes:
The following people are to be halked Without implication of responsibility, for their helpful cominents on an earlier draft of his paper. David Booth, W. Morris Jones, Bruce MILLHEWS, Erik Meyer, W. Ramakrishnanand, above all, Jräthäf Spencer.
Most of those who were active in tho recent JWP campaign, including the entire leadership, are dead. The JWP will never be able to tell its own story of the events of the late 1980s. The account provided here relies on several other sources. A specialist on Sri Lankan politics, I was resident in Colombo for three months in mid-1989 at the peak of the JVP's campaign and of the armed forces' Counter-offensive. It would be difficult, and in many cases unwise, to mention by namo all the people who provided useful information. A special debt is acknowledged to: the first-class journalism of RChan GLIT550kera of The Islaпапсуspaper (Cokombo); and to the written accounts of thO JWP produced by C.A. Chandraprena (Sri Lanka. The Years of Terror. Tha JVP Insurrector 1987-1 $]]89, Colombo, 1991) and Rohan Gunaratna, (Fr LEnka: A Los Revoluar? The Ingde story of tha JVP, Kandy, 1990). Gunaratna's work was prodшced very rapidly, is heavily descriptive, and depends alomst exclusively on military intelligenca sources. While useful, and not in factam anti-JWP tract, it cannot always be assumed to be fully reliable, Chandraprema is much more analytical and insightful, and had a more balanced portfolio of sources of information. It is, however, possible Lihat his history as one of the most active and long-standing political and ideological opponents of the JVF has coloured his interpretation.
* Itse ETs likely that'Only' two orthree thousand WFars or suspects wero killed in the repressor of the 1971 insurgency; six thousands the Tlax|- mum likely figure. By contrast, forty thousand is a likely order of magnitude for the recent kilings,
In most cases I refer in this paper to Tamil separatists' or Tamil guerillas'. Largely as a result of internecine conflict, one particular Organizatik, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (the LTTE, or Tamil Tigers') emerged as dominant, and was the only organization to fight against the "Indian Pacekeeping Force' when the atter OCCUOidth Tamil areas between August 1987 and March 1990. Whero appropriate, explicit reference is made to the LTTE.
* Thefullstoryլs, naturally, a little more complex than this, Tho ideological and organizational heartland of Tamil separatism is the Jaffna poninsula, which has a relatively dense population and dopends more heavily than other Tamil areas on non-agricultural sources of incorne. In addition, by 1991 the Tamil Tigers had developed a considerable Capacity to Wage Conventional warfare against tha Sri Lankan arTed forces. They had graduated from guerilla status to an army with territorial TВЕрип5bligЕ.
For a good review of the literature, see J.A. Goldstone, Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation', World Politics 32.3 (1980), pp.
5-53.
°凸范
This latter perspective is epitomized in the substantial debato, triggared by the publication of
Eric Wolf's book (Pea கோபர London, 19 which class or straturt intrinsically the Tostin emerging capitalism Was taken by Wol, a in thic debate, to be Central importante.
* An especially goox of Lhostructuralist pers dEtallad aralysis of Iht of the English state r (State Breakdown in NW Synthesis, Arne, 92,2 (1986), pp. 257-3:
° Theda Skocpol, til
structuralist theorists (, TSA ரேmparaig and China, Cambridge TECETit WirklfgwLlus focuses on thaissue of coalitions, gives consic entrepreneurial activitie
hary Organizations, of the agenda of the ag dwin and T. Skocpol, the ContemporaryThird ly 174 (1989).
"The most eloquan Eg to be found in Charli Years of Terror, esp. c. frust, however, bear hostility to the JWP (set Leelananda, The Risa Cal Perspective (3)", La 12, 18 (1990).
" J.M. Gales, Towa Coriparative Studies in (1986). The JWP provic process in the Way in W Constructed a "patriotic" alleripted to construct: CÜalition - modellad ci the Vietcong in the 196
"° Skocpol, Sirafos al 卓1,
* D. Kowalewski (E World-System Parspect 7pāräfva Pasifica Sud SOFT8 of this literaturg E indicate that there is a 5 t Weem instability at the 'cii
periphery'.
So
La; G
Pe

Sari Wars in the Twength 71), ower the question of among the peasantry was BVolutionary. The impact of in different peasant strata tid mary Other participants an Oxplanatory variablo of
example of the fruitfulness Spective is J. A. Goldstonig's 3 Cai LISES of tha breakdown the seventeenth century the English Rayolution: A rican Journal of Sociology 22,
The Tost prominert of the States and Social RevoluAnalysis of France, Russia 3, 1979), has co-authored Sir the Third World Wich Constructing revolutionary erable prominence to the sof profg:ssional reWolLutioThis implicitly adoptis much |ECW PCFSPECtiwa: J. GobiExplaining Revolutions in |World", Polítics and Socia
tStatement of this position dräprema, Sri Lanka: Tha S 3,4,.B.14 ald 5. Gre n mind Chandraprema's footnote 1). See also S. of the JVP-A Sociologinka Guardian (Colombo)
"da History of Rowolution",
Sociatу алd HisІогу:283 des an Illustration of this hich the mid-1980s they deological position-and corresponding patriotic' Osely on the practices of said 1970s.
ld Social Revolutions, p.
Periphery Revolutions in iwe, 1821 – 1985", Co195.24, 1,1991) i'r gwiews Lind presents data which itatistical association beDr"Andrewolution 101 thg
"See, for example, F. Halliday and M. Molyneux, The Ethiopian Revolution (London, 1981), ch,
This point applics particularly to the (early stages of the revolutions in North Korea, Cuba Wietnam, Cambodia, Mozambique, Guinea BiSSau, Angola, and Ethiopia.
"* The nationalist idiom may continuato be as important in mobilizing mass 5 LippOrt für revolutinary Incyements as it has been over recent decadeas. However, nationalisminis increasingly being interpreted interms of local differences.
" This was related to Wijeweera's EDITStrisil expēriencos as a student in the Soviet Union. Ha came into conflict with the authorities, and failed to complete is course,
"Insofar as the JVP did receive iny Exterial support in the 1980s, this appears to have been confined to limited amounts of cash from Iraq (Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terra, PP. 59-50).
" Indian support for the Tamil SEPEl ratists reflacted in part Delhi's persistent concerns about separatist sentiment among the Tamils of Tamil Nadu. To hawe failed to become involved would hawe risked thio creation of strong, independari Linkages between Tamils on both sides of the Palk Straits.
Evidence for most of the points in this list may be found in M. Moore, The State and Peasant Particis in Sri Lanka (Cambridge, 1985), one might note in particular the evidence there on բ.135 that, at the end of the 1970s, about one-third of the active labour force was employed in the state sector, Sri Lanka's superb record of high levels of education and literacy and low levels of mortality is widely known; seo, for example, P. serman, "Basic Neads: The Case of Sri Lanka, World Pavelopment 8, 8 (1980). A few relevant comparative statistics which are easily available are as follows. Theyare given inthg form of comparisons between Sri Lanka and the average of thirty-six other "low income economies' (excluding China and India) at Various points in the 1950s. (a) nur Inbar of personis per Square kilometre – 239: 32; (b) percent of Gross Domestic Production derived from agriculture-27:35, (C) infantmortality sate-35: 112: (d) population PÉT physici
7,460:17,350; and (e) percent of School-age children enrolled in school - 103: 70. See World Bank, World Developinent Report 1987 (Washington, 1987), pp. 202,206,258,260 and 262.
Attrition
Dr. Il be liberated. 'fes are debig.
g have they carried their vendetta, ring with the eye of the cobra. t my homest ruby out-glares the Serpent, тапent when their venom is spent.
Patrick Jayasuriya
15

Page 18
NATIONAL ISSUES
Fighting youth rev
S. Hettige
ri Laka il tle ECrt dCadeS
had witnessed a number of Serious Social Crises. The most recent and the most significant among thern have been the ethnic crisis and the mass youth rebelion in the late 1980's. While the for Ter is still growing in intensity in the form of an artTed Conflict belWeenthe StateforCes and the norther rebels, the latter has been virtually brushed under the carpet following the virtual elimination of its leadership and many of the youth directly or indirectly involved.
The two main social Crises mentioned above are not historical accidents. While the ethnic Crisis can be traced back to its deeper historical roots, youth rebellion in the south is of more recent origin. The circumstances that led to both these phenomena have now been fairly Well docuTerted. In other words, we are farmiliar With the historical, social, economic and political factors that directly or indirectly contributed to these crises. The way we have responded to both of thern however indicates that, as a society, We are not capable of formulating our responses to Such lationāli i SS Lues, Onthē) bāSiS of already accumulated knowledge on the subjects. What is behind this societal incapacity? In this short article, Wish to identify and describe the Tain factors that reduce our capacity to deal with national issues. In the present discussion, I will focus attention on the southern youth rebellion as an illustrative example.
As in many other post-colonial couintries, the state in independent Sri Lanka began to play a dominantrole mot only in the provision of basic services but also in generating economic growth and direct employment creation. The result was that the general population, particularly those belonging to lower social strata, pinned their hopes on the state, whether it is for subsidies, productive resources or even jobs. The major political parties competing
16
for State power in ti each other Tore 0 til offered to the elector policy packages. St. also instrumentalin r of the electorate S government could st ctations of all its supg that some of thern the Text election to government. This m sted Without Tuch CF the government elec sought to change th the burde of the S sector in many sphe
The transition in W significant Consequi with respect to ther plein the rural areas dependent on the st Ces as Wellas Whité for the educated y affected by the post do 35 tot Tlaan that || nce difficulties priort the situation becatl.
Post-1977 reforms Cted the educated rur cant Ways, Firstly, til State sector after employment opport th3. AS IS WE2|| kr 10 wate sector firms pre managernentstaff pe education. Such pi from urban middle The dismantling oft rprises which hithert for many upwardly virtually deprived the for social mobility.
The continuing ex 5ector ulti 1977 ndWork for the emer status stratification f

rotS
In tended to outwit lebaslsofpatronage ate than on longters in sch competition Was aising the aspiratious Luch So that 10 |ly satisfy the expeOrters. With the result bin the opposition at efeat the incubant ade of politics persilange ti||1977. It was led in that year which is pattern and share tate with the private T3S.
plved has had many ences, in particular Iral population. Pedwho were very much at for Warious servia collar employment outh Were adversy - 1977 reforms. This they did not experieo 1977. It is just that
Worse after 1977.
have adwersely affealyouth in two signifiG Contraction of the 1977 has reduced unities available to Wn, urban-based priser to TC2Cruit to their ople with an English ople usually come class backgrounds. ne many State enteprovideda Safty net mobile rural youth atter ofopportunities
pansion of the state brepared the grouJence of a system of Cused on the state
bureaucracy. On the one hand, the holding of a position within a state agency at Whatever level helped the holder of such position to distinguish himself or herself from those who did not occupy such positions. On the other hand, all those who belonged to state agencies in fact occupied distint positious within a system of status stratification depending on their qualifications, training and seniority. Since state agencies, Were bureaucratically organized, they were by and large guided by universal criteria Such as qualifications, performance and seniority. The adoption of such criteria in turn gawe ligitimacy to the system of social inequality involved.
With the continuing privatization of state enterprises after 1977, a parallel system of stratification focused on the growing private sector is currently in the process of being formed. The process of recruitment to positions within the new hierarchy tends by and large to leave out the educated rural youth. This is largely because the private sector establishments can be more pragmatic in the recгulпепt of реrsonnel and take into account non-universal factors such as social background, personal contacts, etc. Such pragmatism often favours the urbanites.
Given the above background, the eduCated rural youth today hawe limited opportunities for upward social mobility. This is particularly the experience of university graduates hailing from poor rural families, Most of til Earl Who Fire C0 Centrated i Liberal Arts Faculties of our universities still rely very much on the state for employment. If not for periodic mass recruitment of school teachers, most of these graduates are bound to remain unemployed for an indefinite period. On the other hand, the few graduates with a working knowledge of English often experience no difficu|ties in finding employment in keeping with their aspirations and qualifications. These

Page 19
lower middle class backgrounds. As far as the educated rural youth are concerned, the situation is unlikely to improve as the newly established private colleges and international schools are going to produce the kind of people demanded by the growing private Sector, Some of them already find it difficult to go home after graduation, let alone remaining unemployed for an extended period. Some graduates in desperation take upo Lunskilled mannual jobs. Soon after graduation hoping that they will eventually be absorbed into the public sector at least as trainee teachers.
The discussion so far might giwe the Wrong in pression that the educated rural youths are concerned only with their own advancement. In actual fact, there are also equally significant non-economic forces at Work. For Want of space I am Linable to discuss their detail. So What
Educated rural youths in Sri Lanka in general hawe always been concerned with national politics. This is largely due to the pioneering efforts of the Marxist political parties in politicising the masses. The national leadership of these political parties soon found their youthful support base snatched away by newly-formed leftist parties. This was largely due to the fact that the traditional left leaders could not live up to the expectations of the young largely generated by the revolutionary rhetoric of the leaders therselves. The elitist orientation of the leadership also contributed to the alienation of the rural youth from the traditional leftist parties.
Recent political developments hawe no doubt contributed a great deal to the growing sense of frustration among the politically Conscious youth in the country. Politically expedient manipulation of the electoral process that We Witnessed in the 1980's exposed the sharp gap between precept and practice in both national politics and Social policy. As is Well known, it was similar situation in the West that largely prepared the groundwork for the
Tlass youth protest mowerTent there.
Next: Post-77 Charge
CORRESPON
Towards a si
P
Tle two Short Sta the "La ka GLaar mber 1993, exhibit else, the tire Somer Complacency of an
come openness E shess of a critic WF free of strangulating
| suppose it Wil|| r ppropriate to take th further, because thi Was ano UmCed bet at the Public Library ble or Wisible fanfare to the seismic perfo With na SSiWe Fallis thousands at Galle optimistically led to b tion was just round parties hope to conv ben leading a prec the political fence di [огty years, and tho: far outside completel Cal and historical Tal discuss their errors ( freg of i||-defiled a jargon, and der Tol: Serious about their Scientific arddeTOC hear Of Internal COrre planned, which must a final mergerto for Socialist party. What
hat TrotskistS ha WEE Clment to Trotski Sri hawe been purged o they hope to coha other’s irre Cocila bolE Пere pronouncemer Tout to a actual d cal merger? Their enthusiast for an L. Wasarply manifeste gathering at the Lib total absence of a indicating even some the part of the left le it be feasible to hard Who call themselves Trolskites or Stalinist behalwedd SO SCaldal not only spawning parties claiming to b and disciples of Ma detrient of the WF engaging in Stupefyir r-party polemics, me -mergers, and splits enemies grew and fe
Wella WG || GENTUMB

DENCE
gle Socialist ty
аппепts appearing in of the 15th of Decemore than anything etoric and dogmatic insider", and the WeTid intellectual freo has fought himself Indimane party dicta.
it be altogether ina3 discussion a stage 'engagement' that Ween the two parties with hardly any audiWas in stark Contrast nances in the fifties
numbering tens of Face. When We Were liewe that the rewoluhe Corner. If the two |Ceth OS e Who ha We arious existance On Iring the last thirty or se Who Were Waiting y innocent of dialectierialism, they should openly in a language ld obscure Marxist strate that they are professions of being ratic. We have yet to active action taken or пecessarilyprecede mone homogenous quarante eisthereyet bandoned their attaTi, and the Stalinists their Stalis? Do bit tolerating each differences? Is the it of a merger tantaemonstratable politilack of a galloping Inbreakable alliance dinot only by the poor 'ary, but also by the y visible response 2 feeble optimism on aning public. Would VerpOWerto a group socialists, and not s, who in better times ously and recklessly half a dozen other E thè trug BBliéWErs Linx, but also to the ole left Overrent, gly destructive intergers, alliances, deon Which their Worst d?
rxistslogans relating
to the world Crisis, and the imminent collapse of capitalism, adnauseam, in sometimes technically brilliant academic studies, headlined in Marxist newspapers, factio= mal broadsheets, in thousands of ree= tings up and down the country especially during election time. Alas the messianic ргопоuпcements became feebler and feebler and less and le SS rele Want in a political battlefield where the only serious contenders appeared to be two parties the Marxists characterised as being enernes of the Working class. The two major Marxist newspapers collapsed even before the Eastern Europeans overthrew their dictatorial Marxist regimes. If there are now a few Marxistoriented countries still left, they prove their anachronistic nature rather than their viability. Large private foreign funded capitalistenterprises within a supposedly socialist milieu in China is about the last political and economic straw left for the hundreds of ineffective revolutionaries to clutch at before their ineveitable doorn in the World Capitalist watery grave. But even that straw is deeply flawed, and how long it will be capable of providing psychological sustenance is anybody's guess.
Tilak. A. GLula Wardham Dehiwala,
Human Nature
Other than the time spent on eating, relaxing, or sleeping, each and every minute of an adult's life is spent on trying to increase one's Wealth, Improve one's health, Create more avenues for Sexual contact or Enhance one's fame, influeneCe and power.
What Takes one human being different from another is not their alleged "Wirtues" or "principles", but their "strategies" in achieving the above objectives.
If and When any human being does anything that would seem to benefit another person or organisation, it is not done for any altruistic or otherselfless reasons. It is done primarily as part of the "strategy" to manipulate their sympathy, favour of other support to achieve one's own objectives.
This is equally applicable to all acts and omisions of organizations and countries too. After all, they arrive at their own policies and other strategies om the basis of the needs, Wants and aspirations of human beings having the same self centered aims and objectives referred to above.
Bernard Wijedoru Hong Kong,
17

Page 20
Ace Radio Cab
" Computerised meters " Can be summoned to wo " NO Call upo charqe with in City II m It's " Wehicle ac Receipts issued on request " Company credit ava
Call ED1EDք ED 15DB g|
ệAset
Another Aitken Spenc
 

Hurd O Oristep
Cess frOIT Gelected Stads
e

Page 21
The TNCS* Web of
| Richard J Barnet & John Cawanagh
glants.
A few hundred TNCs dominate the four intersecting W the World economy rests. Such TNCs exert a more pri than national governments who are increasingly finding it
The emerging global order is spearheaded by a few hundred corporate giants, many of thern larger than most sovereign nations. Ford's economy is bigger that that of Saudi Arabia or Norway, Philip Morris's anual SalES EXCE NEW Zalald's gross domestic product. The multinational согporation of 20 years ago carтied оп Separate operations in many different couintries and tailored its operations to local conditions. In the 1990s large business enterprises, even some smaller ones, hawe the technological means and strategic vision to burst old limits - of time, Space, national b0Lunda ries, language, Custom, and ideology.
By acquiring earth-Spanning technologies, by developing products that can be produced anywhere and sold everywhere, by spreading credit around the world, and connecting global channels of coTimunication that can penetrate any village Or neighbOUrh0Cd, these institutions We normally think of as economic rather thiar. Political, private rather thar p, Lublic, are becoming the World empires of the 21st Century. Thē architects and managers of these space-age business enterprises understand that the balance of powerin World politics has shifted in recent years from territorially bound governments to companies that can roam the World. As the hopes and pretensions of government shrink almost everywhere, these imperial Corporations are occupying public space and exerting a more pro
LLLLLL L LLLLLLL LLL LLaaL LLLL LLLKLLaaLSLKKCL (with Ronald E Mullor) and 10 other books. John Cavanagh co-directs the World Economy Project at Lha Institute for Folicy Studies.
foLund influECE OWE larger numbers of pE
A excerpt from forthcoming boo entitled Global rial Corporatio? World Order. T. published by Si ster im February
Global corporation institutions run by m Wonten) who thirik a scale. Things that me mal Compa nies drea are becoming reality thlt reach EIIlFrS | Citibank's credit car Nike's network for . sport shoes in facto relatively few comp; CCIE. I 15 (TII: Icting WebOS of globa on which the new W. TBSS: The G|OEE| G Global Shopping M rkplace; and the G
Work.
The World Wide Wë| ty have already ac global integration nE by any World empire driving force behind traced in large meas hundred corporate g terS ir til Lited Irmany, France, Swi

COntrC)
rebs of global Commercial activity on which the fate of 3found influence on the lives of the people of the World difficult to comprehend, still less control, these corporate
the Wes of Wer ople.
a chapter in a k by the authors Drearris: Imтде5 Lic g. Neu he Blok is to be rıncı and Schlılı
1994.
is are the first secular en (and a handful of ind plan on a global Imagers of multimatiomed of 20 years ago - Coca-Cola's ads in the same instant, ds for Asian yuppies, producing millions of ries other paid for. A les With WorldWide to the four interse| Commercial activity orid economy largely Cultural Bazaar; the all the Global Woilobal Financial Ng
OS COf ECONOTÍCaCtīWihieved a degree of war before achigved For nation-state. The each of the can be SLIre to the Sarthe fee W giants With headqua
States, Japan, Getzerland, the Nethe
Irlands, and the United Kingdom. The combined assets of the top 300 firms now Take up roughly a quarter of the productiWe assets in the World.
The Global Cultural Bazaar is the IlleWest of the global webs, and the most nearly universal in its reach. Films, television, radio, music, magazines, T-shirts, gапES, toys, апd thеппе рагќ5 аге the media for disseminating global images and spreading global dreams. Rock stars and Hollywood blockbusters are truly globalproducts. Alla CrOSStheplanet people are using the same electronic devices to Watch or listen to the same commercially produced songs and stories. Thanks to satellite, cable, and tape recorders, ever autocratic governments are losing the tight control they once had over the flow of infort nation and their hold on the fantasy lives of their subjects.
EWE in Culturally Conserwatiwe societies in what we stil Call the Third World, the dinner hour is falling victim to the television. In bars, teahouses, and Cafes andir living quarters around the World the same absence of ConVersation and human interaction is noticeable as family members, singly or together, sit riveted in front of a Cathode tube. As in the United States, Europe, and Japan, centuries-old Ways of life are disappearing under the spell of advanced communication technologies.
The cultural products most widely distributed around the World bear the stamp "Made in the USA' and almost any Ho|ywood film of Video is bound to ofend traditional WalLJES 50TWhere. SCEI es dE
19

Page 22
Fictirlg indEpärldent WOTEn, amDroLIS Couples, and kids talking back to parents upset all sorts of people across the globe as assaults on family, religion, and order. Bacause the steady streams of global Commerical products in many places, including parts of the United States, are feared as barbarian intrusions, they are proWoking local and nationalist backlashes, often carried out in the are of God.
The Global Shopping Mall is a planetary Supermarket with a dazzling spread of things to eat, drink, Wear, and enjoy. Dreams of affluent living are communicated to the farthest reaches of the globe, but only a minority of the people in the World can afford to shop at the Mall. Of the 5.4 billion people on earth, almost 3.6 billion have neither cash nor credit to buy much of anything. A majority of people on the planet are atmost Window-shoppers,
The Global Workplace is a network of factories, workshops, law offices, hospitalS, restaurants, and || Sorts of other places where goods are produced, information is processed, and services of very description are rendered. Everything from cigarettes to cars contains materials from dozens of countries pieced together in a globally integrated assembly line driven by the logic of the bottom line, Data proceSSors, law offices, advertising agencies and insurance CorTipanies hawe become global asse Tibly lines of a different sort. A WorldWide labo Lur market for Creatiwa merchandising ideas, computer knowle. dge, patient fingers, managerial knoW-how, and every other marketable skill Co-exists with a global labour pool in which more and more of us, from the chief executive officer to the Wastebasket grip tier, are swimming, Hundreds of miIlions more of the World's uprooted and dispossessedare desperate to jurTıp in.
The Global Financial Network is a coInstantly changing maze of Currency trainsactions, global Securities, MasterCards, euroyen, swaps, ruffs, and an ever more innovative array of speculative devices for repackaging and reselling money. This network is much closer to a chain of gambling casinos than to the dull gray
20
banks of yesteryea. day, trillions of dol World's major foreig SbitS Of data tra speed. No more the ring sum has anyth goods and services money has becom highly profitable g Keynes, who had chology might one the Service of O-r predicted the rise of as he called it. Yet haWebe COTE TOTE culative, the credit people and millions
TE TOTEL.
Viewed together, a picture very differe Willage, The Globa reaching the majori its global drea ITIS. M. are playing any rO networks that prod nice the World's gooi rhew World economi og Wegeftlg Eelfi ded and, as World Widerling.
The most disturb bāl systern is that | and mobility of glo undermining the eff governments to Cal cies on behalf of the lation-Stat3S a TE O introl over their OWIt More and more, the demands of the outs Outsiders are alrea BLI siness enterprise tE aCrOSS EJOTder:S pieces of territory in my that bypasses a political arrangeme! Tax laws intendedf tional Ways to cont interestrates, fulland old approache: pment and environ becoming obsolete irrellewart.

". Twenty-four hours a lars flow through the Jr-exchange markets welling at splitsecond un 10% of this staggeing to do with trade in . International trafficil e an end in itself, a аппе. Johп Маупагd Intimations of hOW teday ba harnessed in ecreational gambling, this 'casinoeconomy', as banking activities global and more spe
needs of billions of of small businesses
these four WebS offer int from that of a global Il Cultural Bazaar is ty of households with Much Smaller Lu Tibers le at all the tree ICE, market, and finadS and SerWiiCES. Ir the , there is a huge gulf claries and the exclupopulation grows, it is
ing aspect of this glothe formidable power ball corporations are ectiveless of national ry out essential poliair people. Leaders of Sing mUch of the Co3rritory they once had, ymust conform to the ide World because the dy inside the gates. S that routinely operaare linking far-flung Io a new World econoI sorts of established its and Conventions. or another age, tradirol capital flows and amployment policies, StOreSOLICE de VeloTental protection are , Lunenforceable, or
National leaders no longer have the ability to comprehend, much less control, these giants because they are mobile, and like the mythic Greek figure Proteus they are constantly changing appearances to suit different circumstances. The shifting relationships between the managers of global corporations and political authorities are creating a new political reality almost everywhere,
- Third World NetWork Fgafrg5
SUBSCRIPTION RATES
Air Mail
Catada WU.S.A.
USS 65/ for 1 year USS 45W for 6 months
圍 事
U.K., Ger IIlany, New Zealand, Allstralia, Netherlands, France. Japan, Holland, Philippines, Austria, Norway, Sweden, China, Irelarıd, Switzer"la Ildı. Nigeria, Belgium, Denmark, Pa Iris, LOIndJI1.
USS 55W for 1 year USS35W for 6 months
庫 事
Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia, Dubai, Baharirl, Arabia. Il GLll. Syria, Siпgapore.
USS 45W for 1 year USS 25W for 6 Inonths
塞
dia, PakisLa Ill.
USS 40W for 1 year USS 22W for 6 Tonths
蔓
Local
Rs. 250/- for 1 year Rs. 150/- for 6 months

Page 23
LON SHF
AGEN
GOLD STAR (H
REGULAR AND EF
TO and From:- EAST
P.O. E 3rd FLOOR, ASSOCIAT 185 3/1 UN
COL
Telephone:- 4:
4
Fax:- 4
Telex:- 2
Cable:- Ll

PPING LTD
TS FOF?
ONG KONG) LTD
FICIENTSERVICES
AND SOUTH AFRICA
OX812
EDMOTORWAYS BLDG, ION PLACE
MBO 2
4O66, 431394, 449 133 7543
18974
255 AVE LONSHIP CE
ONSHIP

Page 24
STILL LEADING Mr. William Thompson obtain and established the first Joint in this island On
01st June 1841.
He called it
“Bank of Ceylon That was 150 years ago, but that was not We. We opened our doors in 1939 only to capture our rightful place in Banking and are proud to say that Wes
LEAD
Over the years banking profession shared our expertise and BANK OF CEYLON
became Sri Lanka’s
SANDHURST TO BANKERS
Bank
Bank
 

ed a Royal Charter Stock Commerical Bank
till
of Ceylon
ers to the Nation