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

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

Black Knight

It's your move

BATTLE FOR THE EAST

The Muslim Factor

Mervyn de Silva

An incredibly gifted and unrepentant militarist, Velupillai Prabhakaran, the LTTE supremo, has no great faith in democracy but he appreciates the importance of popular opinion. He knows the armed struggle that he launched well over a decade ago is all about land and people. He is not impressed with "power" or authority in the abstract. From the very beginning, he has grasped the geo-political — the crucial role of the east, and externally, the vital importance of Tamilnadu. Both dominate his strategic thinking, except that one factor becomes more crucial than the other in a political-military struggle which he does not, and cannot, control.

What the LTTE leader fears most is a closely coordinated Delhi-Colombo policy. The Indo-Sri Lankan "peace accord" and the arrival of the IPKF was the moment of maximum danger. The JVP intervened to break that pact. When the JVP threatened the UNP regime by opening a "front" in the rear, UNP thinking was totally concentrated on the polls and the need to win. The SLFP, not the LTTE, became the main enemy. Opportunism opened the door to a UNP-LTTE *entente* where the IPKF was the common target for different reasons; for the UNP, the immediate need to rob the ultra-nationalist JVP of its rousing "deshapremi" rallying cry and for the LTTE to get the IPKF off its back.

Ideally, the UNP should have won the polls and retained power while allowing the IPKF to finish the job. But the situation on the ground did not permit such comfortable choices.

The IPKF presence was as much a threat to Sri Lanka's sovereignty as the LTTE's separatist armed struggle was a threat to the country's territorial integrity.

And now we are back to square one — the territorial issue — the main issue of EELAM WAR 2. [By the way, we note that top theoretician-spokesman Anton Balasingham now uses *L.G.* nomenclature.... EELAM WAR 2].

EASTERN PROVINCE

It is President Wijetunge who has put the Eastern province, not the North, in sharp focus. By doing so, he has also underscored the **territorial** imperative. Together with devolution (power) land is the vital question in all identity conflicts. And here is an extraordinarily interesting situation. First, identity. **In the history of the Sinhala-Tamil conflict, it was language that was the all-important issue and irritant — certainly after the 1956 Sinhala Only Act.** (The reasonable use of Tamil law could not defuse the tensions released in the post-56 years). The Muslims of the eastern province are Tamil-speaking .... unlike the Muslims in the rest of the (Sinhala-dominated) country.

If language had remained the main badge of identity, the Tamil strategy would have guaranteed majority support for the devolution demand. The Sinhala percentage is only 25%. The Muslims, a third, hold the balance. The Muslim community was caught in the new currents of post-Khomeini politics. The Iranian revolution is widely presented, certainly in the West, as the curtain-raiser to a new act in the political drama of the late 20th century — the Islamic revival. The events that have followed the Iranian revolution

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Prabha Ahead

The Sunday Times Defence Correspondent

In the aftermath of the Pooneryn disaster last November, the uneasy lull in the separatist war continues.

The major pre-occupation for the security forces in the next two weeks appears to be the upcoming local elections in the East on March 1. Without weakening their defences in North, a substantial strength of troops has been moved to the East to secure the area and ensure the smooth conduct of the polls.

As this went on last week, there was increasing evidence that the LTTE was making preparations to trigger off incidents not only to disrupt the polls but also to create confusion.

The infiltration of cadres from the North to the East continued last week. Security sources said the bulk of them was coming from the peninsula through the now well-known Kilali passage where the boat services are in full swing. There was also evidence that they were making efforts to move in supplies through the East coast, according to these sources.

The same sources said LTTE cadres had been busy in the past two weeks collecting data about the areas where polling booths are to be located and other related activities. This has already prompted the adoption of several counter measures. That has included protection for the candidates, their places of stay and venues where meetings are held.

A total of 762,930 (Vavuniya 12,604, Batticaloa 254,057, Ampara 315,101 and Trincomalee 181,158) will poll at 787 polling booths to choose 431 members. A total of 575 candidates are contesting to be elected to 40 local government bodies.

The delivery of poll cards to the voters will begin on February 16. More than 100 officials, most of them Assistant Returning officers, will travel from Colombo for election duty.

These developments were taking place in the backdrop of LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran leaving the Jaffna peninsula under heavy escort and moving into 14 Base, his hideout in the Wanni jungles.

But what is not clear is whether his exit from the peninsula was prompted by reasons of his own personal security or he came down to brief his Wanni area leaders about the Mahattaya episode.

Mahattaya alias Gopalaswamy Mahendraraja, his erstwhile deputy, is accused of collaborating with India's external intelligence agency, the RAW. He is charged with causing the death of one-time Jaffna 'Commander'.

have introduced the term "fundamentalism" to the global discourse. So much so, one of America's bestknown scholars, Samuel Huntington of Harvard has predicted a "clash of civilisations" as the next major trend of the post-Cold war era, the end of the ideological struggle between capitalism and socialism, democracy and totalitarianism. Today, BOSNIA is the frontline. The malign neglect and blatantly discriminatory policy on Bosnia (arms embargo) and U.N. indifference to the massacre of Bosnian Muslims — at least 40% of the population, and the largest community — saw the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and Turkey visit Sarajevo recently.

ISLAMIC FACTOR

Ever since President Clinton mentioned KASHMIR in his first speech to the UN General Assembly, South Asia's generic conflict, has returned to the regional agenda to claim an increasingly important place. Already it has introduced new tensions into relations between the world's most powerful democracy, and the world's largest.

Bosnia has done the same in the Christian and western world.

The sudden appearance of a "SADDAM HUSSEIN" village in the eastern province, as well as the appointment of a Muslim general to the IPKF's eastern command were the first signs that outsiders had recognised the special significance of the area and its cultural "mix".

It took Mr. Ashraff's Sri Lanka Muslim Congress to send the more important signal — the Muslim community had realised its electoral-political importance in a national contest where Sinhala-Tamil tensions had become an increasingly important issue. The Muslim community was asserting its own collective identity, its self-image.

Now the SLFP has nominated a Muslim, from Kalmunai, Mr. Uduma Lebbe Samsudeen to the parliamentary seat held by Mr. T.W. Rajaratnam, the former Supreme Court judge, a Tamil. Once the SLFP had decided on a Muslim rather than a Tamil, Opposition circles were certain that the seat would be given to Mr. Alavi Moulana, an SLFP stalwart from Colombo.

The East is crucial in every equation because the 1987 peace accord recognised the concept of a North-east merger; the question of territory, related of course to identity. Does one re-draw the map, attaching the Tamil part to the north? Does one reduce the number of provinces or increase the number.

Identity, territory and finally power. How much decentralisation and devolution? The JR Constitution centralised power in an executive presidency in the interests of rapid growth, does one re-distribute power in the interests of unity?

TRENDS

Gas shortage

Cooking gas was running out in Colombo and the suburbs. A gas company spokesman said that the shortage was due the delayed arrival of a ship bringing LP (Liquid Petroleum) gas. The Ceylon Petrolum Corporation produces 50 metric tons per day, but the island's requirement is 200 metric tons, comsumed mostly in the city and the suburbs.

The shipment awaited was bringing 10,000 tons.

BRIEFLY . . .

Brains is what it takes

Opposition Leader Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranaike told a pre-election (Provincial Council) rally in the South that to rule a country what was needed was brains. The ageing SLFP leader who was the world's first woman prime minister (when prime ministers, not executive presidents, ruled Sri Lanka) said: "Some people say that I cannot walk, but let me tell them that to rule a country one need not walk — what you need is brains"

Mrs Bandaranike was in the South to boost 500 candidates of the SLFP led People's Alliance.

Not afraid, says DB

President D.B. Wijetunga addressing rallies in Udunuwara and Gampola in the Central Province said that he was not afraid of sacrificing his life for the people. "The LTTE is asking for Eelam. That will never be given. They get angry with me when I say so. They may shoot me. I don't mind that ....", he said.

When the LTTE asks for Eelam the estate Tamil population will ask for the estate areas, are we too accede to that demand? Never, the President said.

President Wijetunga said that all Tamils were not terrorists. "The majority of them live with us and are our friends. There are *lingams* in my ministries. If we are communal minded all of them would have to be sacked. What we are facing is not communalism but terrorism. We pay Rs 536 million as pensions to those in the North and East", he said.

No unconditional talks

A *Sunday Times* report that the Government was considering talks with the Tigers (LTTE) sans conditions was contradicted by an unnamed 'top Government source' in a statement to the daily *Island*.

If the LTTE wanted the North East problem solved they must join the political mainstream, this source said.

No confidence

The Opposition SLFP is to move a no-confidence motion on the Government. Among the grounds: 1 inability to maintain peace in the country; 2 failure to bring down the soaring cost of living; 3 the airbus scandal; and 4 the transfer of the Bribery Commissioner.

Treason in the LTTE

The LTTE is investigating its deputy leader Gopalaswamy Mahendrarajah for treason. The charge is that he has links with India's RAW, and that he was trying to kill Tiger supremo Prabhakaran. Meanwhile Jaffna residents went on a protest march demanding that the Tigers either produce Mahendrarajah, a popular figure, or explain the allegations against him.

The LTTE is explaining, in a series of public rallies.

SLFP against change in presidential election

The SLFP does not want parliament to elect the President, Mrs Bandaranaike the SLFP leader told the media. The SLFP will not support such a move.

President Wijetunga recently announced that the ruling UNP had decided to change the presidential election procedure to allow parliament to elect the executive president instead of the people doing so. The president said that it would be cheaper.

They join UNP

The Liberal Party led by Dr Chanaka Amaratunga and the Sri Lanka Mahajana Paksaya led by Ossie Abeygunesekera have joined the UNP in the same way as the CWC has joined the ruling party. They will contest future elections on the UNP list and the UNP symbol.

FO top rankers warned

Following the surreptitious switching of names in a Geneva bound human rights delegation, three top staffers in the Foreign Office have been reprimanded. The switch was reversed by presidential intervention.

Former ambassador stabbed

Mr Badhrapala Wickrematunga, a one time ambassador to Sweden and a brother of Mrs Hema Premadasa, was stabbed to death in his Bambalapitiya home allegedly by a house guest who has since gone missing.

The U. N. — Its Achilles Heel

Horace Perera

Ms. Madeliene Albright, the U.S Representative to the UN in New York, considers the last General Assembly of the Organisation as one of the most encouraging of its sessions in decades. Among its achievements she mentions the acceptance, in principle, of setting up a high level office of an American-style Inspector General, as poor management is the Achilles' heel of the UN. She is obviously referring to the Organization's secretariat which has, in recent years, come in for consideble criticism in audit reports, in the more responsible media and the report which Dick Thornburgh, a former Undersecretary-general for Administration and Management submitted to the Secretary-General, Butros Butros Ghali.

The Secretariat

The establishment and the general functions of the Secretariat are laid down in Articles 97 — 101 of Chapter XV of the Charter. Article 97 declares that the Secretariat "shall comprise a Secretary-General and such staff as the Organization may require". The Secretary-General who is the "chief administrative officer" of the UN is appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. The staff is appointed by him and in doing so he is expected to give "paramount consideration" to "securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity". Due regard is also to be paid "to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible". While no one will question the first requirement, it is very unlikely that anyone will disagree with the second. As the appointment of the Secretary-General is the key to good management it is proposed to examine the procedure, or lack of it, in making this important appointment.

The Secretary-General

What is most surprising is that even as the UN reaches the 50th anniversary of its establishment there is hardly "any discussion of the Secretary-Generalship at higher levels of government, and even less higher consideration of the nature of the task, or the qualities, background and expertise to provide the best future leadership". Consequently "no rational alternative" has emerged to replace "the present haphazard, increasingly parochial and predominantly political process that now prevails". Thus the search for the best person to fill what the first Secretary-General called "the most impossible job in the world" and what to the international community is the most important office has become "a chancey and, to some extent, a self serving process"[1]

The situation was not too bad till 1970 when "campaigning for the office emerged further confusing and downgrading an already disoriented and unsystematic process" providing "a sad impression of a lack of top level government interest, inadequate high-level government consultation, opportunism, gossip, rumour, intrigue and a complete absence of record checking".[1]

While all this reveals a total lack of a sense of responsibility on the part of governments of Member States, particularly of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council, one can only breath a sigh of relief that distasteful, disagreeable and disgusting practices referred to above did not become a precedent for the election of those who came later, including the present incumbent of the office. Still the total absence of a rational and a democratic procedure for chosing a person to give leadership to the international community is disquieting, to say the least.

At the "22nd UN Issues Conference" held by The Stanley Foundation a suggestion was made as to how the process could be made more democratic and also rational. It was proposed that, well in advance, a panel of five internationally recognized persons, one from each region, be set up to act as a "research committee" not only to review candidates but also to look for suitable persons in their respective regions and submit a joint report to the Security Council, listing "the strengths and weaknesses" as measured by criteria set by the Council. It is surprising that Butros Ghali has invited Member States to make proposals for a "reapportionment" of the membership of the Security Council but for a more effective procedure for electing a Secretary-General. There is an opinion in some NGO circles that the Secretary-General should be appointed for one (and only one) term of seven years: the rationale being that the possibility of re-election can adversely affect the complete independence of the office; there generally being the understandable temptation to act, particularly on controversial issues, in such a way as not to lose the votes of Member States, especially of the "Big Five" at the next election.

The Staff-Recruitment, Promotion, Discipline

Article 101 of the Charter stresses the "paramount consideration" and another factor to be taken into account in recruitment of the staff. Unfortunately quite a few Member States, in spite of their undertaking "to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities", (Art. 100), have intervened not only in the recruitment process but also in promotions and in disciplinary procedures. Consequently while there certainly are many international civil servants who are competent, dedicated to the promotion of the ideals and aims of the UN and "unimpeachable integrity, there are also quite a few square pegs in round holes whose sole contribution to the Secretariat has been to lower the morale of the staff, reduce its credibility and draw scathing comments on the entire Secretariat even from the more responsible media. This situation has naturally provoked from Dick Thornburgh[2] the comment that "Recruitment has been undertaken on a more or less haphazard basis.... promotion exercises have become unduly complicated... and discliplinary procedures are encumbered by seemingly interminable appeals".

The Staff-Proliferation of Posts and "Nepotism"

There is more to come. Member States, and it is said even some senior officers in the Secretariat, have intervened on behalf on their nationals and even on behalf of members of their tribes or their ethnic groups to create additional posts, or even "non-posts". Some at rather high levels. It is not surprising that Butros Butros Ghali, as one of the "first and widely acclaimed acts"[2] of his tenure of office, eliminated some 25 percent of high level positions in the United Nations Headquarters bureaucracy. There also seems to be a kind of an "Old Boy" network or a form of "international nepotism" in the continuing practice of awarding "consulting" contracts to high level officials following their retirement or termination especially when, according to Dick Thornburgh, the Organization is "already burdened with an inordinate number of supe-

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The writer, a well known Sri Lankan teacher of history, is Honorary President (WFUNA). The views expressed are the writer's personal opinions, not the views of the World Federation of U.N. Associations.

rnumeraries — those serving on high paying permanent contracts without any specific job assignments"[2]

Fraud Waste and Abuse

Fraud, waste and abuse by staff members has recently been highlighted by the media. Accusations of this kind could have been dismissed had been made in the "tabloids". But they were made in the Sunday Times and what is worse have according to Thornburgh, been made in "reports of audit agencies". The present fragmented and inadequate structure for audit inspection, investigation and programme evaluation has to be made more effective. It is to deal with these and other abuses in the system that the United States, at the last General Assembly, urged the establishment of a new office of Inspector General. The proposal was accepted in principle. One can only hope that meaningful action will follow. No details have been given as to the lines on which this office will function. It is hoped, in some interested circles, that this office will report annually to the Secretary-General who would forward the report to the Security Council with his comments. This reports should then be studied in detail by "subsidiary organ" which the Council can establish as per Article 29 of the Charter. The report will next be reviewed by the Council as a whole, submitted to the following session of the General Assembly and also made available to the public. The only way of checking corruption, fraud, waste, abuse and nepotism in all its manifestations, is by boldly exposing their occurances and the perpetrators.

A procedure of the kind outlined above will, in addition to reducing malpractices considerably, have the salutary effect of protecting the reputation of the large number of dedicated, competent and hardworking officials who now are the hapless victims of general criticisms levelled against the Secretariat as a whole. One can only hope that Member States will have the moral courage to translate into action what they, under urging by the US, accepted in principle. The Secretary-General will, no doubt, with the initiative, sense of independence and diplomatic skills he has so far shown, use his good offices to promote General Assembly approval of, and secure budgetary provision for the establishment and effective functioning of this office. NGOs working nationally and internationally should pool their resources and mobilise public opinion to develop among governments the political will to take a positive stand on this issue when it comes up for consideratuion at the General Assembly this year. The United Nations should enter its second half century without any kind of Achilles heel.

NEXT: The Security Council

Notes

1. A World in Need of Leadership Brian Urquart and Towards a More Effective United Nations Erskine Childers.
2. Report to the Secretary-General — Dick Thornburgh, Former Under-Secretary-General for Administrative and Management who was "commissioned to the S.G. to make recommendation for streamlining and making the Secretary cost effective.

WAR AND PEACE : *Boutros Ghali speaks*

The Secretary-General: Thank you. Happy new year. I know that I am 31 days late, but still, happy new year.

As you know, there are a number of vacancies in the top echelon of the Secretariat, and I have decided to propose to the General Assembly for its approval the appointment of Ambassador Jose Ayala Lasso of Ecuador to the new post of High Commissioner for Human Rights.

I have also decided to appoint Ambassador Hans Corell of Sweden as Legal Counsel to succeed Mr. Carl-August Fleischhauer, who has been elected a judge of the International Court of Justice.

As you know, Mr. James Jorah will leave the Department of Political Affairs. The Department of Political Affairs, as agreed by the General Assembly, will be headed by a single Under-Secretary-General, Mr. Marrack Goulding. I have decided to appoint Ambassador Lansana Kouyate of Guinea as Assistant Secretary-General in the Department, reporting to Mr. Goulding.

Yesterday, I received General Bertrand Guillaume de Sauville de Lapresle, and I have decided to appoint him as Force Commander of the United Nations Protection force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia, replacing General Jean Cot. I still have to send a letter to the Security Council to receive its approval; in fact, I believe we have already sent the letter.

Those are the new appointments. Certain other posts remain to be filled. I have not yet been able to do this, but as soon as I do it I will inform you.

I am at your disposal to answer any questions.

Mr. Sills: I call on the President of the United Nations Correspondents Association, Mr. Svarzman.

Mr. Svarzman: We welcome you, Mr. Secretary-General, in this unusual circumstance; we don't see you very much, speaking with us. We would like to see you may be every month, if possible.

The first question is on a very difficult situation — the question of Bosnia. Since last year when the Security Council approved the resolution authorizing the use of military force, the air support, everyone thought the thing was very clear. But the more we ask, the more explanations we get, the more letters we see, the more everything becomes unclear. Who will decide, and why and when? Why the delay? Have you been hampered by certion pressures by permanent members of the Secruity Council?

The Secretary-General: First, I have sent a letter to the Security Council. This letter was based on a resolution that was adopted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit meeting on 11 January. At that summit meeting, NATO asked UNPROFOR to do a study on how to use air force — they used the words "air strikes" — in two situations: Srebenica and Tuzla. I have had many meetings in Geneva with all the staff to see what ought to be done and three days ago I presented a letter to the Security Council.

In that letter, we say that personally I am in favour of using air force to implement in the case that we should need to use air force. But to use air force, you must make a distinction between two cases. One is air support and the other is air strikes. In the case of air support, according to the decision taken by NATO, they have already given a mandate to the General who is dealing with this operation in Bosnia. Thus I gave mandate to any Special Representative, Mr. Akashi, who can ask NATO to use air support — air support being the use of air forces in the case of self-defence to help soldiers who are on the ground.

The second situation, air strikes, is different. It can be a preventive attack — destroying a bridge destroying an airport — or a punitive attack, which is one week or two or three days later, again to destroy certain basic infrastructure. Concerning air strikes, according to NATO's decision, they need a resolution adopted by the NATO Council. So even if you ask NATO tomorrow, "Please launch an air strike", it will have to take a decision which will have to be adopted by the NATO Council. And as you know, the Council takes decisions by unanimity.

So what we have done is to give mandate to our Special Representative on the ground, Mr Akashi, who will take into consideration the political situation, the humanitarian situation and the military situation, and can immediately ask for air support in the case of Tuzla and in the case of Srebrenica. This is what has been done, and the reaction of the members of the Council very positive. We received support from all the members concerning approach, or this plan, to Tuzla and Srebrenica.

Question: Mr. Secretary-General, what is your feeling regarding the war of letters between Mr. Denktash and Mr. Clerides, and how do you see the official prospects for negotiations in Cyprus?

The Secretary-General: I am optimistic. I believe that the two letters are positive letters. We hope that the Special Representative, Mr. Joe Clark will continue his negotiations in the next few days, and I believe that the two letters have a positive element. There is a breakthrough; there is the political will on two sides to adopt certain measures to build confidence between the two communities. The fact that they accept those measures does not mean that we will not discuss the substance concerning the future of relations between the two communities in Cyprus.

This may be a personal interpretation, but I am quite optimistic. I see that there is progress, that there is a breakthrough and that there is now the political will on both sides to begin the peace process again. The purpose of adopting as a first step certain measures to build confidence — among them, as you know, a very detailed programme for opening an international airport is Nicosia and the withdrawal of a certain presence in Varosha, which will be under United Nations supervision — is to allow the two communities to have direct contact. Those direct contacts between the younger generations of the two communities will help to promote peace, because it is useless to sign an agreement if the two communities do not know each other. The younger generations do not know each other, because during the last 17 years there has been no direct contact. The leaders of the age of Mr. Denktash or Mr. Clerides know each other, because they are old friends, but the younger generations do not know each other.

I believe that what is very important is that while nogotiations are under way we have to promote certain measures to build confidence between the two communities, so that once agreement is concluded, implementing it will be easy.

Question: Can I please take you back to the former Yugoslavia? You made the distinction between air support and air strikes. Do you still reserve for yourself the right to make a decision on air strikes if the NATO Council were to make a recommendation, or are you prepared to leave it to the NATO Council? Secondly, what is your view of the information now coming in of Croatian forces operating inside Bosnia? Are you personally in favour of moving towards sanctions against Croatia if a case is made for a military presence?

The Secretary-General: As to the first question, I have received a mandate from the Security Council to use air power: I have to give the green light. Thus, I still have this mandate concerning the use of air support. But the difference, as I mentioned, is that air support could be done automatically after I give my agreement, but, concerning air strikes, though I give my agreement I am not at the end of the chain of command. We still have to receive the agreement of the NATO Council in the case of air strikes. According to the mandate I received from the Security Council, I have to give the green light concerning air strikes.

On Croatia, yes, yesterday we received information that Croatians are in Bosnia — and this was confirmed by Mr. Chinnaya Gharekhan (Special Political Adviser to the Secretary-General), who gave this information to the members of the Security Council — and the decision has to be taken by the Security Council concerning what ought to be done in the light of these new elements in the situation in the former Yugoslavia.

Question (interpretation from French): There is currently a campaign in Haiti disseminating the idea that the referee throws the ball out onto the pitch, and then there is partiality on the part of the United Nations *vis-a-vis* certain situations, especially that of Haiti. In your view, has there been adequate impartiality, or has the United Nations really not asked for an amnesty for the military, as was done in the Governors Island Agreement?

The Secretary-General (interpretation from French): I think the United Nations strives to be entirely impartial. Let me add that the United Nations means, first of all, the Security Council, whose 15 members come from different parts of the world. Secondly, there is the Secretariat, which also tries to be as impartial as possible. And, thirdly, we have the Friends of Haiti, which is a group of four States. Hence, I would say that the fact that decisions are shaped by many States from different parts of the world and having different attitudes, some of them geographically very far from Haiti, gives one the greatest possible objectivity and impartiality in the solution of the problem of Haiti.

Question: Regarding the talks between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, are you satisfied that the good offices of Mr. Vance are getting any closer to a breakthrough? Is there going to be a meeting between the two parties after such a long time of nothing happening? Secondly, when would you submit report to the Security Council on whether this thing is going anywhere or whether it should just be given up?

The Secretary-General: I had a meeting last week with Mr. Cyrus Vance concerning the talks between The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Greece, and we had an exchange of letters. We hope to have a meeting between the two experts soon, and we are carrying on our mission. I believe that we are doing the best we can to find a solution to this problem. A few months ago we were on the point of reaching a solution, so there is no reason why we should not continue, and I hope that we will be able to find a solution that will take into consideration the points of view of both the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Greece.

Question: Can you be more precise on what you said about Croatians in Bosnia and Hezzegovina? Croatia said volunteers have been reported in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but not regular troops. So, according to the information you received, are regular troops or volunteers?

The Secretary-General: The report we received does not say exactly if they are regular troops or volunteers. They say that a certain number of Croatians have now penetrated Bosnia. But the report does not

tell us. Maybe in the next few hours we shall have more information, but the latest information does not say precisely whether they are volunteers or regular troops.

Question: On Somalia, Mr. Secretary-General, are you satisfied that you have the right number of troops and the right type of troops now, and are you satisfied with what you know will be the Security Council resolution that they will no longer disarm the factions, or do you see problems ahead after March?

The Secretary-General: Well, I don't know — the Security Council is still discussing the resolution, so I don't know what will be the resolution of the Security Council. This is question two.

On question one, I believe that we have taken into consideration the fact that we will not be able to have more than 22,000 troops, and on this basis we have established our plan. Our plan is to protect certain non-governmental organizations, to protect certain centres of distribution of humanitarian assistance and at the same time to continue the peace process, i.e. to continue the process of reconciliation between the different factions.

Yesterday I received a long telephone call from the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Mogadishu, Ambassador Lansana Kouyate, who is leaving for Nairobi to continue talks with the different factions, the 12 on one side and Aidid on the other. We are still doing our job and we are hopeful that we will be able to achieve the formation of, let us say, a provisional administration (Transitional National Council).

On the other hand, we have been very successful in creating a local Somali police, which is doing a good job, not only in Baidoa, but in other regions. So I will say that, in spite of all the difficulties, in spite of the departure of many troops from Somalia, we are hopeful that we will be able to continue our action in favour of peace, security and, at the same time the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Somalia.

Question: The crossing of the border of equipment from Serbia which had been seen by numerous reporters and other observers, is in direct violation of the United Nations sanctions to prevent the shipment of arms. In addition, if the reports are true of the use of Serb or Croat troops inside Bosnia, do you not characterize this as a direct violation of the United Nations Charter? And what kind of action would then have to be taken?

The Secretary-General: I don't want to avoid giving you an answer but certainly these decisions have to be taken by the Security Council. I will present to the Security Council the maximum of information received from different sources, and the Security Council will have to take the decision as to whether it is a violation on not. Two, the Security Council will decide if it is in the interests of the peace process to adopt sanctions or further sanctions; everything has to be decided by the Security Council

The last meeting I had with the Special Representative, Mr. Stoltenberg was yesterday. He has left for Moscow now. For the time being we believe that we must continue the negotiations, in spite of all the difficulties. We have no other channel but to continue the negotiations. Meanwhile, if the Security Council decides to adopt another approach — and certainly in the next few weeks we may have to have a general reassessment of the situation because many Member States are thinking of withdrawing their troops from Bosnia. But for the time being I believe that we must make the maximum effort to continue negotiations, hoping that we will be able to find a solution.

You will not solve the problem of Yugoslavia in a few weeks or a few months. It needs patience; it needs continuous negotiation. We might reach a solution and then an accident may happen; we would then find ourselves back at square one and we must continue, as long as the international community has not decided to use peace enforcement, and even if it does decide to do so, there are many experts who say that it will be useless.

So, for the time being, our only approach is to continue to negotiate, in spite of the atrocities which are being committed; in spite of the emotions of international public opinion; and in spite of the fact that it seems that we are not progressing and that we have one setback after another. We still must continue to negotiate.

We have now adopted many measures to use air force to obtain certain results on the ground. There is no reason not to use force. On the contrary, once we use force we give credibility to the fact that we say we will use it.

Question: Do you support the European initiative, which the Americans have not yet accepted, to pressure the Bosnian Muslims to accept peace now, even if they are not completely satisfied?

The Secretary-General: I believe that negotiations are going on between the Europeans and the Americans to find a joint position concerning what ought to be done. I know that the Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom is in Washington today, and he will certainly discuss a common position to be adopted by the major Member States involved in Yugoslavia and the fact that Mr. Stoltenberg went to Moscow. We are trying to obtain a consensus among the major Member States to see what ought to be done and what the new direction of the negotiations will be.

I can say nothing more because we are still working on this.

Question: Using the explicit language of Chapter VII of the Charter, Security Council resolutions call for implementation of the right of self-determination of the Kashmiri people, not of the Indians or Pakistanis. Why do your reports and statments focus on the interests of the potential beneficiaries of a Kashmiri plebiscite rather than on the self-determination of the Kashmiri people itself? Pursuant to Chapter VII, is it not essential for the Secretary-General to exercise his good offices to implement the United Nations resolutions calling for a plebiscite on Kashmir, irrespective of the interests of the potential beneficiaries?

The Secretary-General: No, because, first, we need the agreement of the two main protagonists in this problem: India and Pakistan. The two must ask the Security Council, the Secretary-General or the United Nations for mediation. Unless we have the agreement of the two, we will not be able to intervene.

Secondly, the Simla Agreement mentioned that negotiations have to continue between the two protagonists. Negotiations were held a few days ago between India and Pakistan. I do not know the results of those negotiations but both sides declared that they will continue to negotiate. Both sides therefore continue to negotiate on this subject and neither has asked the Secretary-General for mediation or even for the intervention of the United Nations. We need the agreement of the two sides if we are to play a role.

(To be continued)

"Post-77 change" was the final instalment of Professor Hettige's article on "Youth Revolt".

The vital US-UN relationship

Douglas Bennet

Building a vibrant and productive partnership between the United States and the United Nations "is one of the critical tasks of our time", says U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Douglas Bennet.

Speaking to the U.N. Association of the United States, Bennet outlined U.S. views on how to make the U.N. more efficient, help the world organization play a more constructive part in contentious political disputes, and the U.S. position on the U.N.'s increasingly difficult peacekeeping operations.

Bennet said the United States will maintain a "robust military and diplomatic capacity to act unilaterally" while having "workable alternatives for those occasions when unilateral action is unnecessary, insufficient or unwise".

The potential for the United Nations to play an influential role on the world stage is greater today than in previous decades, Bennet said. But he added that reviews to date on the U.N. performance "are mixed and the prospects are unclear. The U.N.'s commitment to genuine reform remains suspect... The durability of major power cooperation at the U.N. cannot be taken for granted. And there are inevitable limits on what an organization dependent for its mandate on the full diversity of world opinion is going to be able to do".

He said the Clinton administration's strategy for developing multilateral institutions includes:

— taking a new, more constructive approach to reforming U.N. institutions;

— breaking free from the East-West, North-South divisions that have traditionally hindered the U.N.'s work; and

— forging a strong bipartisan consensus in the United States on the U.S. approach to international peacekeeping.

Following is the text of Bennet's remarks:

Thank you for the invitation. I am delighted to be here. I will come right to the point. Building a vibrant and productive partnership between the United states and the United Nations is one of the critical tasks of our time. And I can tell you after some months as assistant secretary of State for International Organizations that — if you like roller coasters — it is also one of the more exhilarating tasks of our time. It is also a task in which the UNA/USA has long played a dynamic leadership role. For that and for all your good work — I salute you.

I suspect many of you saw the cover story in the Sunday Times Magazine this past week featuring a battered blue helmet and a discussion of the trials and tribulations of U.N. peacekeeping. That article — and the facts on which it is based — underlined again the importance of the U.S./U.N. relationship. It reminded us that the U.N. remains dependent upon the will and the resources of national governments, which in turn depend on collaboration through the U.N. to do things none of them can do alone. It told the story of an able and distinguished secretary-general doing a hard and at times thankless job. And it should compel us to respond to the advent of a new and promising historical age not by settling for what seems possible today, but by setting our sights on what may be possible tomorrow.

The U.S. Asst. Secretary of State addressed the U.N. Association of the U.S.

Let me start with two pragmatic policy propositions:

First, the United States should maintain a robust military and diplomatic capacity to act unilaterally. This is necessary because the world remains dangerous, and because we want to influence events in directions that reflect our interests and values.

Second, we need workable alternatives for those occasions when unilateral action is unnecessary, insufficient or unwise. That is why we are preserving vigorous alliances with our fellow democracies and long-time friends; and why we must put fresh energy into our commitment to the United Nations.

These basic propositions frame our approach in what pundits persist in calling the "Post-Cold War era". I note from your program that the UNA has a more useful label: "The global era". The distinction is by no means semantic, for as the president recently pointed out, post-Cold War tells us "where we have been, not where we are going". The Cold War prism also tells us little about the underlying forces of history which helped end the old era and are plainly shaping the new. These are indeed global forces. And only if we build policies and institutions that take them into account can we expect to succeed.

What are some of these forces?

— Economic interdependence is one. Labor, capital, production and markets have all been globalized.

— The information revolution — faxes, VCRs, satellites, CNN — have made people around the globe more aware, more demanding and more able to act independent of governing structures.

— Not only are money and ideas overrunning political borders, so too are refugees, immigrants, pollution, narcotics, armaments and disease. As a result, terms like national interest and national security are losing clarity. And national governments are less able, on their own, to satisfy popular expectations.

— At the same time, more and more non-state actors are moving onto the world stage. These include multinational corporations, environmental and human rights organizations, criminal cartels, ethnic minorities and individuals of broad public influence.

These and other forces are the essence of the post-Cold War world, and they are changing the international order beyond anything the statesmen and statecraft of the old state system ever contemplated. Long-stable institutions have been profoundly altered; some — including the United Nations — are acquiring new relevance; others — like NATO — are being redefined; still others are fading from view.

It should not surprise us, then, that Americans' own vision of global affairs is in flux. Clearly, economic and social problems — legacies in part of Cold War costs — occupy our attention here at home. A recent Los Angeles Times poll concluded from this that the general public: is inclined toward a new but unique kind of isolationism... They want a foreign policy that serves the domestic agenda of the United States and they would treat each global issue according to its impact on that agenda.

According to the pollster, the top foreign policy priorities of the American people are to stop drug trafficking, strengthen our economy, halt the flood of illegal aliens and protect the global environment.

To me, these priorities are not isolationist at all. On the contrary, they contain the seeds from which a new and revitalized consensus about our role in the world may grow. People are seeing that global forces do have a real impact on their lives and believe, not unreasonably, that a central purpose of a successful foreign policy should optimize these impacts.

The Clinton administration's focus on global economic growth is part of an emerging domestic/foreign policy synthesis. By enlarging the circle of market democracies and reducing barriers to trade, we create good jobs at home, while giving more and more states a vital stake in the international system. NAFTA APEC and GATT don't exactly roll off the tongue — and not everyone agrees about them, to be sure — but they reflect precisely the kind of domestically grounded multilateral initiatives that will serve our citizens well in a global era.

Against this background of a transformed and transforming world, we need to ask ourselves anew: What should we expect from the United Nations and other international institutions? Where do they fit in? What

can we do to limber them up? How can we develop robust options for collective action and burden-sharing when those alternatives appear to offer the best solution?

Clearly, the potential for international organizations to play an influential role on the world stage is greater today then in previous decades. If we are to fulfill that potential, we must forge international arrangements that complement, not compete with, the efforts of national governments. This is not a zero sum situation in which existing authority is simply reapportioned among national and international actors. All must make the strongest contributions they can.

For purposes of tonight's discussion, I will divide the Clinton administration's strategy for developing the kind of multilateral institutions we need into three general components.

First, we are taking a new and more constructive approach to reforming U.N. institutions.

As our superb Permanent Representative to the U.N., Ambassador Madeleine Albright, has pointed out: The bills of the (United Nations) are not paid by governments; they are paid by hardworking, taxpaying citizens — the largest portion by citizens of the United States.

Those citizens have a right to know that their dollars are being used wisely, efficiently and for purposes they understand and support.

We who are responsible for the United Nations cannot afford the luxury of bureaucratic bloat. There are too many important jobs to perform and, in key areas such as peacekeeping and emergency relief, far too few resources. We must now do what governments, businesses, universities, hospitals and other institutions are being asked to do: improve services while controlling costs.

In the recent past, the United States has pursued U.N. reform through micromanagement and interference in its innermost workings. The result was little reform and even less accountability. The current administration has charted a different approach. Instead of trying to micromanage in quest of micro-gratifications, we're trying to shift the focus to good governance — to setting broad objectives, to holding U.N. managers responsible and to evaluating results.

The global era is also a competitive era. As a contender for scarce public resources, the United Nations can neither be insulated from that competition, nor should it fear it. The U.N. brings to the table enormous assets of global legitimacy, a record of past accomplishment and a system of shared financing that multiplies each dollar contributed several times over.

Unfortunately, as former Ambassador Donald McHenry has said: The whole U.N. civil service got hijacked by the Cold War and decolonialization. Everybody, us included, started insisting on certain jobs within the United Nations and using them for defeated politicians.... Once you took on such an individual, you had to take on three other people (who could actually) do the job.

The United States is now trying to set an example by embarking on a higher road. We're working to identify outstanding individuals not only from our own country, but from around the world, to recommend for high-level U.N. posts. We're advocating a personnel system in which U.N. employees are hired, fired and promoted according to merit, rather than political pull. And we're pressing for reforms that will give agencies and programs a real chance to perform, with the understanding that we will back fully those that achieve results, and do our best to pull the plug entirely on those that do not.

The second element in our strategy at the United Nations is to take full advantage of the opportunity to break free from the east-west, north-south divisions that have traditionally hindered the institution's work. Here, with a massive assist from history, we are making dramatic progress.

For example, this past fall, the General Assembly voted to establish a U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights. This is something Americans have been pushing for, with greater or lesser degrees of energy, since the days of Eleanor Roosevelt. It is a true landmark in the life of the United Nations. It could not have been achieved during the Cold War, but this year every former Soviet Republic supported it, and regimes that abuse human rights were reduced to delaying tactics and weakening amendments that failed. The high commissioner is no panacea for human rights problems, but he or she can become a highly visible and influential champion for a cause that embodies both U.N. principles and our core values.

Arms control is another arena in which the Cold War chilled cooperation. But this past fall, at the General Assembly, Russia opposed the United States on only one of 53 arms control and security-related resolutions. The United Nations endorsed a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land mines. Meanwhile, the IAEA, with support from all major powers, is playing a key role combating unclear proliferation in North Korea and Iraq. These actions, too, accord with the fundamental purpose of the United Nations as a pence-preserving institution, and with the interests of our own citizens in a more stable world.

There is also a new attitude of the United Nations on what has historically been the most contentious of issues — the Middle East. September's Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles breeched deep and bitter divisions. For the first time, an Israeli was elected to a position at the General Assembly. Anti-Israeli rhetoric was toned down and action on some particularly divisive resolutions was deferred. Most important, the peace process was endorsed by a nearly unanimous vote, and there was broad support for economic and social projects in Gaza and the West Bank.

Let me cite briefly some other areas where U.S. leadership and a changed U.N. hold the promise of benefits for us and for others:

We are determined to make the War Crimes Tribunal for former Yugoslavia a meaningful instrument for establishing the truth about the atrocious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the Balkans.

We are welcoming and participating in the U.N.'s entry into the business of democracy-building and election-monitoring in places as diverse as El Salvador, Cambodia, South Africa and Mozambique.

We are working to follow up on the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio by making the concept of sustainable development a reality in people's lives, in our own country and overseas.

We have embarked on a joint effort with Japan to improve the coordination of the U.N.'s response to complex emergencies.

And the president himself has called attention to the heroic efforts of UNICEF and WHO to save children's lives. By using low-tech, low-cost, high impact techniques, these agencies have raised child immunization rates in cities like Lagos, Calcutta and Mexico City above those even in the United States. As a result, more than three million children who would otherwise die each year are now getting a chance at life. This to doubly important because we know that birth rates decline when parents are confident that the children they do bear will survive.

The key fact here is that without a general spirit of cooperation — to which the United States is contributing — theme initiatives and experiments at the United Nations would not be possible; and without experimentation, forward movement would not be possible. Today, the habit of cooperation has led the United Nations to the threshold of a New Age of Discovery. Like the European monarchs of 500 years ago, those of us responsible for international organizations are sending vessels to sea in search of the unknown. Like them, we can expect some of those vessels to turn back; some to sink; and some to find new worlds wholly beyond our prediction. The important thing is not that there are setbacks, but that we continue to sail outwards towards the horizon, rather than allow our resources to rust inexorably and uselessly in port.

The third element in our U.N. strategy is international peacekeeping. Why? Because if we do not wish to assume responsibility for containing overseas conflicts ourselves, we must look to the United Nations and regional organizations to do so or accept a future ruled not by the law of nations, but by no law at all.

Territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars and the total collapse of governmental authority in some states are now among the principal threats to international peace. Although many of these conflicts do not now

impinge directly on our security, the cumulative effects of continuing conflict include economic dislocation, humanitarian disaster, terrorism, regional political instability and the rise of leaders and societies that do not share our values.

We are working with Congress to forge a strong bipartisan consensus on our approach to international peacekeeping. Such a consensus must be guided by realism about what the United Nations can and cannot be expected to do, especially in the short term. It must be durable and disciplined enough to withstand the vicissitudes of this morning's headlines and tonight's network news. And it must be hard-headed enough to merit the confidence of the American people, including those who serve in our armed forces.

The elements of such a consensus may well include:

— First, agreement that U.N. peacekeeping capabilities must be strengthened in almost every area.

— Second, agreement that fundamental questions of need, mission, cost and likely duration must be asked before, not after, new U.N. obligations are assumed.

— Third, agreement that where it is in our interests, America should support and sometimes participate in well-planned U.N. peace operations. But the U.S. contribution will most often be in areas such an logistics, intelligence and communications, rather than combat.

— And fourth, under no circumstances will American servicemen or women be sent into combat in the absence of competent command and control; nor will the ultimate command authority of the president over U.S. armed forces ever be compromised.

A consensus on peacekeeping must also draw the right lessons from past successes and disappointments. The difficulties of peace operations in Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti demonstrate that traditional approaches are not adequate where government or civil society have broken down or where one or more of the parties is not prepared to end the conflict. Major operations must be planned not only with "best-case", but with "bad-case" and "worst-case" scenarios in mind. A clear understanding must exist not only of how an operation might begin, but also of how it can be brought to a conclusion within a reasonable period of time and at an acceptable cost. Finally, the complexity of modern peacekeeping missions underlines the importance of being very clear about what the mission is and how the mission is to be accomplished.

Certainly, the experience in Somalia underlines the importance of defining a mission clearly and of understanding the limits of what outsiders can do in the absence of an internal commitment to peace. At the same time, we should not forget that because of American and U.N. efforts, hundreds of thousands of Somali children are alive, crops are being planted and prospects for political reconciliation are real. No one can guarantee what Somalia will look a year or two from now. But it would be patronizing to assume that Somali leaders have not learned from past tragedies, or that chaos will inevitably ensue as the international presence is drawn down. Nor should we find it troubling that the fate of Somalia will be shaped primarily by Somali hands.

U.N. peacekeeping is not the only tool, but it remains a vital one, for responding to threats to international peace and security. Certainly, such threats will continue to arise. The world will continue to look to America for leadership. It will continue to be in our interests to provide that leadership, but we cannot and should not bear the full burden alone. We, and all those who share our stake in a relatively peaceful and stable world, will benefit if the United Nations becomes more capable of preventing, containing and ending international conflict.

Although it is true that the United Nations has moved to center stage of world affairs in recent years, the reviews to date are mixed and the prospects are unclear. The U.N.'s commitment to genuine reform remains suspect. Because of financial shortfalls occasioned, in part, by the United States, the U.N.'s logo seems sometimes less the dove of peace than the tin cup. The durability of major power cooperation at the United Nations cannot be taken for granted. And there are inevitable limits on what an organization dependent for its mandate on the full diversity of world opinion is going to be able to do.

But we would fail in our responsibility if we were to take too narrow and pinched a view of the opportunities that are now at hand. We Americans, living in an open democracy and a global economy, have a deep interest in a world where acceptable "rules of the game" are observed. For decades, we argued the merits of free markets, free elections, the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and human rights. During the depth of the Cold War, these issues were raised even when hopes for immediate progress were not realistic. Today, as the global era dawns, we have the chance to see real movement towards higher standards of international behavior, not overnight, but over time. International organizations, and especially the United Nations, can be central to this effort.

A couple of weeks ago, the secretary general met in Japan with the family of Atsuhito Nakata, a young U.N. volunteer who was shot to death in Cambodia last April. There was no bitterness. On the contrary, the young man's mother spoke of her son's deep love for the United Nations. The father, who has quit his job to become a U.N. volunteer himself, told the secretary general that "although my son's flesh has vanished, his spirit of service has survived".

Thanks in no small measure to you — the UNA/USA — this same spirit of service is alive and well in America. It is no accident that 71% of Americans said in a recent poll that the United States should cooperate fully with the United Nations. Because of your efforts, most Americans understand that the U.N. family is characterized less by the renowned slothful bureaucrat than by the health technician whose vaccines are saving small children; the election monitor aiding the cause of freedom; the convoy driver struggling to help the innocent survive; and the peacekeepers like Atsuhito Nakata and our own servicemen and women who have given so many victims a chance for what President Clinton has called "the quiet miracle of a normal life".

Forty-eight years ago, another president, Harry Truman, pledged to the first General Assembly that America would support the United Nations with all the resources we possess... not as a temporary expedient, but as a permanent partnership".

After decades of ups and downs, this partnership between the United States and the United Nations continues to contribute mightily to a global system more acceptable than anything either we or it could achieve alone. The financial cost is relatively small. The entire U.N. system, including peacekeeping, gets 0.7% of the $285,000 million the United States spends annually on international security. That translates into a price per capita for us, for everything from blue helmets for peacekeepers to polio vaccines for babies, of less than $7 a year — or the price of a ticket to see The Pelican Brief.

Those who expect the United Nations to solve all the world's problems are unrealistic; those who suggest it has ever had such broad pretensions are wrong. The United Nations was created by men and women who had just survived the second of two devastating world wars. These were not naive people. They understood, perhaps better then we, the frailties of humankind, and the yawning gap between how we would like the world to be and how it is; between promised behavior and reality. But they also understood the perils of missed opportunities and failed responsibility.

During Senate debate on the U.N. Charter, Senator Arthur Vandenberg replied to those who thought the goals of the charter unrealistic by saying that:

"You may tell me that I have but to scan the present world with realistic eyes in order to see these fine phrases.... reduced to a contemporary shambles.... I reply that the nearer right you may be in any such gloomy indictment, the greater is the need for the new pattern which promises at least to stem these evil tides".

The survivors of World War II understood quite well that although it was the better qualities of human nature that had made the United Nations possible, it was the lesser qualities that had made it necessary.

Jane Austen and History

H.L.D. Mahindapala

"This wide and universal theatre
Presents more woeful pageants than
the scene
Wherein we play in".

— AS YOU LIKE IT, William Shakespeare.

Emily Dickinson's intuitive preference for a selected society, away from the majority, away from the universal theatre of history was a theme that ran consciously through the novels of Jane Austen. Though their personalities, and consequently their creative talents, differed in many respects, both projected their respective selected societies with a sure grasp of detail, vision and individualistic style. Emily Dickinson made domesticities a vivid poetic idiom in much the same manner as Jane Austen turned domesticities into a felicitous universe of her own. Jane Austen discovered in convivial domesticities a medium to structure a whole new social and moral order. Both were innovative geniuses. These two transatlantic minds find their common theme expressed on the surface plane of a poem which Emily Dickinson wrote with characteristic economy in 1862:

The Soul selects her own Society
Then shuts the Door
To her Divine majority
Present no more.

This opening quatrain may very well serve as Jane Austen's brief answer (intoned, of course, with a touch of Austenian irony and pride) to some of her readers who felt that she merely ruffled the surface and ignored the contending forces of history in which all beings struggle to survive. The third and the last quatrain which follows could be a succinct substitute for her own ideal:

I've known from an ample nation
Choose one
Then close the valves of her attention
Like a Stone.[1]

Taken literally, bereft of its inner context, this love poem lends itself aptly to delineate the overall design of Jane Austen's novels. She too shut the door on the majority. She too was unmoved by her contemporaneous emperors and conquerors parading in the European theatre. She too closed the valves of her attention to the rest of the world. Above all, she too set out deliberately to select her own kind of society.

Jane Austen, though dwelling within her own little world, diffuses a generous warmth evenly and gaily most of the time. Her characteristic has been to guide the reader unobtrusively and deftly into the open spaces of her vision. She opens up possibilities inherent in a new moral order, seemingly far removed from conventional history. Mostly, it is this remoteness, ensconced as it were in a rarefied atmosphere, that befuddles her casual reader. And even some of her admirers seem to fancy that her characters dwell in a pleasantly sequestered haven located in a lost age of golden innocence.

Jane Austen is too much of a realist to take refuge in the conventional pastoral setting, or in external mannerisms of grace and charm. That would be futile escapism which, as will be shown later, would be contrary to the pragmatic vision of one of the greatest realists in English fiction. What she attempted, quite deliberately, was to extricate herself from the convulsions of history in order to lodge herself in a place that views only the even flow of time — time that has not trapped individuals wrestling perpetually in the rings of history. The genteel mannerisms merely highlight the absence of fangs and claws that had left history bleeding and torn in tatters. And her verdure landscape only adds enchantment to her selected society. In these surroundings she creates a cocooned world that comes to grip with the quintessence of subtle relationships and interpersonal forces that determine the character of a moral being. Detached from the painful thrusts of the mainstream of history her characters act and live out their lives in a decisive and creative history of their own making.

This tends to irk some of Jane Austen's critics. Charlotte Bronte literally clawed her when she wrote: *"She does her business of delineating the surface lives of genteel English people curiously well.... She ruffles her reader by nothing vehement, disturbs him by nothing profound".* Jane Austen's critics descend upon her primarily on the ground that she merely skims the surface. This misapprehension has arisen obviously from that fact that she has opted out of the feral fields of collisions which dominate the better part of history. Being out of history is to be in a world without catclysmic, or crushing collisions. And as collisions generate the central forces, themes, heroes and villains which populate most literature, a world without seismic eruptions, like that of Jane Austen's devalues the significance of her novels to some of her critics. For instance, they would tend to consider her world as a fancy society circle out away from the realities of life because it never confronts the negated man who is likely to turn into a demonic force to regain his lost humanity as in the case of Heathcliff; or because she does not probe the tenebrous depths of a primeval mind that drives a Raskolnikov — a haunted exile hovering on the perilous edge of society, having destroyed its most sacred possession: life. In short, it is a society that does not acknowledge the fallen man, the flawed (Shakespearean) man, or, for that matter, the Hobbesian man whose life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short".[2] Jane Austen's conscious decision to leave the historical man alone is made quite clear when she wrote: *"Let other pens dwell on guilt and misery. I quit such odious subjects as soon as I can, impatient to restore everybody, not greatly in fault themselves, to tolerable comfort, and to have done with all the rest".*[3] In fact, she had rather a dim view of the historical man as seen in the sketches of the history of England written in her teens. (More of it later.) The historical man invariably is a creature trapped in an eternal inferno unable to escape its perpetual, all-consuming flames. Jane Austen deliberately avoids the drama of hell-fire-and-brimstone that consumes the individual. Rather she begins at the point where man is placed in a quiescent state for the particular purpose of testing the inner moral core, untouched by the vagaries of historical movements and personalities. There are no pretentious claims to visualise the teleological end of history either. The underlying thread that runs through her novels projects only those

A veteran Sri Lankan journalist, the writer now edits the ***OBSERVER***

without "guilt or misery", without being "greatly in fault themselves" and without being soiled by "odious subjects" which give room for her to place them in "tolerable comfort". Perhaps, the implied conclusion is that the moral man does not need the grand Tolstoyan stage to make his stand: He can act in very limited circles and achieve the highest principles in the most basic and simplest of domestic situations.

This is, perhaps, the reason why she went out of her way to create her own "little social commonwealth"[4] where some ruled "laying down the domestic law at home, and leading the way"[5] even if it was only as far as to the chaise waiting outside the door. Jane Austen is the first to focus on the universal and the binding principles of the "little social commonwealth" in which we all live. The sensitive and, perhaps, the everlasting urge for "equality of alliance"[6] with those around us, or the "feeling" to be "willingly acknowledged as an equal"[7] in our own "little social commonwealth" are, perhaps, more meaningful and relevant to our daily lives than the loudly touted issues of liberty, equality and freedom in the hectic world of the slogan-shouting, grand-standing political class. The deep cry for the removal of "partialites and injustices",[8] or the demand for "justice and equity"[9] is not politicised or paraded in public demonstrations. Rather these issues are contained within the "little social commonwealth" and worked out domestically, on a person-to-person basis which, in the ultimate analysis, is the only pragmatic way the enduring principles of liberty, equality and fraternity can be assured and made relevant to the isolated individual. The "little social commonwealth" is the innermost circle which affects us directly. This unit, chosen "from an ample nation", constitutes the "divine majority" where we interact with our intimate associates, or that of our peers from whom we derive our accolades, approbation, recognition, acceptance, rejection, condemnation, social ostracism etc. Though the "wide and universal theatre" looms large out there, like the inescapable night sky hovering overhead, the common ground on which we act out our daily lives is the "little social commonwealth". Small as it is, it is not without its own moral dilemmas. Jane Austen delved into this sub-atomic universe and explored the binding and the repelling forces in depth. She was preoccupied with the search for an earthy moral plane as opposed to the perfected utopias of idealistic social scientists. Of course, the remote state has, from time to time, given various promises to the individual in questionable constitutional guarantees that vacillates uncertainly and vaguely from place to place. However, the ideals and principles denied or unattained by the state through administrative, legal, judicial or other institutional processes, could still be realised in a concrete manner within the "little social commonwealth" if the interpersonal relationships binding individuals are balanced and maintained on an energetic, unswerving moral plane. Perhaps, that is why her secluded, tiny world eschewed questions without answers that, for instance, swept the celestial and terrestial horizons of Dostoyevsky. In the Dostoyevskyian universe the central issues of immortality, liberty, equality and fraternity etc., were dramatised against a background of the either/or forces let loose in world of eternal conflict. Consider the following excerpt from THE KARAMAZOV BROTHERS which leads directly to some of his major concerns: *"Oh, Misha, his is a tempestuous soul! His mind is involved. He is in the grip of a mighty and unresolved thought. He's not one of those who seek millions, but is among those who seek solutions to their thoughts".*

"That's a piece of literary theft, Aloysha.... His article is ridiculous and absurd. You must have heard his silly theory: *'If there's no immortality of the soul, there can be no virtue, which means that everything is permissible'.... It's a theory that will be attractive to scoundrels... His entire theory is a piece of low chicanery.* ***Mankind will find within itself the strength to live for virtues even without belief in the immortality of the soul; it will find it in a love of liberty, equality and fraternity...'"***[10]

In hindsight this could be regarded as a prophetic statement that came to pass in the Marxist phase of Russian history which abandoned the church and embraced the Communist Party as the agent of delivering mankind from guilt and misery. Besides, in the 20th century Marxism was flaunted not only as the common man's sole way out of the socio-economic quagmire but also as the revolutionary prescription for all evils by the romantic intellectuals. Long before such mythical social panaceas became fashionable Jane Austen openly declared: *"Let other pens dwell on guilt and misery. I quit such odious subjects as soon as I can, impatient to restore everybody, not greatly in fault themselves, to tolerable comfort, and to have done with the rest".* There is, in this statement, a clear attitude of mind, a definite drawing of parameters, a practical delienation of the possibilities not only in her world but in the world outside. In short, this was her manifesto. Her pragmatism is in leaving the big, amorphous world out there severely alone ("to have done with all the rest", she says decisively.)

Jane Austen's unique achievement is in identifying the "little social commonwealth" as a universal heritage, a central unit, common to individuals of all cultures. This ubiquitous unit exists as the last refuge of the individual disconnected from the transient movements of history wrapped around trendy events or personalities. The individual, however concerned he/she may be with the overwhelming social forces, ultimately resides and maintains lively and meaningful relationships only with his/her immediate "little social commonwealth". In fact, the world out there is merely a conglomeration of unrecognised, self-contained, discrete "little social Commonwealths" which, when put together as a collective or conceptual whole, add up to the abstract world of history. One may escape the wide world out there but never "the little social commonwealth" — the centre and the periphery of each individual. The glorified main course of history belongs only to an extremely limited political class. The rest live outside it pursuing their own proclivities and programmes. What is more, the very physical limitations of the individual drags him/her out of the six billion inhabitants crowding the earth and, willy nilly, locates him/her in the "little social commonwealths". Jane Austen summed it up aptly when she wrote that "she must submit to..... the art of knowing our own nothingness beyond our own circle".[11] It is a realisation of the fact that the hard, harsh day-to-day realities are lived in the "little social commonwealths" than in the vague, debatable and recondite worlds of history. Jane Austen is the supreme

analyst of this concrete world of the individual, battling it out within the "little social commonwealths". Jane Austen's morality, her irony, her wit, the easeful domesticities, her characters, their animated chatter and the roles they play are woven together to portray the essence of this universal life located in "little social commonwealths".

Jane Austen posited a positive moral centre within her miniaturised world. Though her geography is limited and her history is virtually non-existent she has compacted into that circumscribed "commonwealth" the essence of a moral universe. Her characters, says D. H. Lawrence, are "human beings in the same category as ourselves" and are "social enough".[12] They are "round" (never two-dimensional) and are ready for an extended life "beyond the covers of the books",[13] says E. M. Foster. All those who have traversed Jane Austen's territory agree that she belongs physically to the English countryside. But because she moves out of history she seems to occupy a timeless zone. Her characters dwell in places where time is still and unperturbed by the transitory phases of history, especially from the cataclysmic forces that were thundering and reverberating in the European theatre dominated by Napoleonic feats. Creative minds of Europe responded to it, one way or another. Jane Austen was the rare exception.

It is certainly exceptional to ignore history when it dominates the contemporary air, particularly in the aftermath of the French Revolution which exploded in her early teens. It is even more bold to do so when the popular literary tastes of the time, set by Sir Walter Scott, was to write historical novels like WAVERLEY which was published in 1814 — the same year which MANSFIELD PARK appeared. However, her audacious and determined decision to leave the bigger forces alone is compensated by her equally audacious attempt to map the new contours of an unknown territory with, of course, arrows placed here and there to point the way. If so, in which direction did she proceed? Did she return to an idyllic past of chivalrous knights and damsels in distress? Or did she leave the past and her contemporary times alone? When one considers the fact that Jane Austen was wary about treading the same old historical routes it would seem incongruous for her to go back to any past laden with the burdens of history. Her vision, on the contrary, led her to eschew "old vulgarism" and the concomitant "ill breeding" in favour of "new gentilities" and "good breeding", to create a time where the "ceaseless tumult" of history has ended.

F. R. Leavis (though not popular among academics today) wrote that "like works of all great creative writer, gives meaning to the past".[14] He also noted the four features in the art of Jane Austen: Firstly, she is the originator of the modern man in fiction. Secondly, she sets in motion the trend for the development of the "great tradition" in fiction. Thirdly, she gives meaning to the past. And fourthly, she is intensely moral. Mr Leavis assertion that "....Without her intense moral preoccupation she wouldn't have been a great novelist" is a fundamental principle that exalts her writings. The inner core and the imaginative vision consisted of this burning moral intensity. She extended the meaning of the past by projecting new directions to a wholly new future. Lying hidden under her subtle art is a whole new social structure for an altered way of life. She visualised an altered society and actualised it in a fictional world woven out of values — a world that gained total expression in MANSFIELD PARK, as will be shown later. In that new world she has boldly attempted to restore everybody to a state of "tolerable comfort" and invested in it only the best and the pragmatic values derived from the known world.

At this point, it is necessary to emphasize that her total disregard for the historical man does not stem from indifference or misplaced idealism, or ignorance of the active principles operative in history or even a casual dismissal of its contents and meaning. On the contrary, she had a highly developed sense of history. "Her bent of mind", wrote Elizabeth Jenkins, "showed itself in her fondness for history taught as it was then with the emphasis laid upon the doings of men and women, their characters and influence rather than upon its economic aspects".[15] One of her earliest literary attempts, at the age of 15, was to write a HISTORY OF ENGLAND, FROM THE REIGN OF HENRY THE 4TH TO THE DEATH OF CHARLES THE 1ST, BY A PARTIAL, PREJUDICED AND IGNORANT HISTORIAN. Her irreverent treatment of history revealed glimpses of her early ironic vision that was to mature later. More significant than that was her disenchantment with the historical man. In her mature years, when she came to define and rely on her fundamental guiding principles, she invariably tended to disown men for "want of that higher species of self-command, that just consideration of others that knowledge of (their) own heart, that principle of right".[16] Obviously, her own reading of history would have confirmed the absence of these principles in the historical man and may have influenced her considerably not to wallow in it. She was quite content to retain only the atomic components of history built into "little social commonwealths". However, one salient feature common both to her history of England (quoted earlier) and the later novels was her predisposition to uphold the "heroism of principle"[17] rather than the heroism of action. Even as a fledgling historian her normal sympathies were with those who stood steadfastly by their principles though paralysed in action — e.g. Mary Queen of Scots. In comparison, Henry VIII, the symbol of the renaissance man of action, bears no redeeming features.

(To be Continued)

Notes

1 Second stanza reads:
Unmoved she notes the chariot pausing
At her low Gate.
Unmoved an Emperor be kneeling
Upon her mat.

2 LEVIATHAN — Hobbes, p.65

3 MANSFIELD PARK — Jane Austen.

4 PERSUASION — Jane Austen.

5 Ibid

6 Ibid

7 Ibid

8 Ibid

9 Ibid

10 THE KARAMAZOV BROTHERS — Dostoyevsky, Bk II, VII.

11 PERSUASION — Jane Austen.

12 Selected Literary Criticism — D. H. Lawrence, p. 120 (Heinemann)

13 Aspects of the Novel — E. M. Forster.

14 The Great Tradition — F. R. Leavis

15 Jane Austen — Elizabeth Jenkins, p. 22. (Cardinal).

16 MANSFIELD PARK — Jane Austen, p. 119 (Penguin).

17 Ibid — p. 271.

Nationalisms today: Western Europe and South Asia

S. Sathananthan

National movements vs ethnic struggles

National movements are one form of political struggle for State power (degrees of political autonomy including independence). The present essay is concerned with national movements of minor nations ("minorities") in multi-nation countries in which the State is controlled by dominant major nations ("majorities"). In each instance, because the State is identified more or less with the major nation, the national struggle for State power **superficially** appears to be an ethnic struggle between the minor and major nations. But ethnic struggles are issue-based confrontations between cultural groups (nations, ethnic groups castes, etc) which live within one country; and they usually arise out of competitive interactions between them and are justified in part by differences in cultural identities.

A further distinction between national movements and ethnic struggles is the different modes of their resolution. **National movements** seek political solutions through varying degrees of devolution or outright independence, which are designed to guarantee the collective **national rights** of nations **as** nations. Examples here are the creation of a federal system of linguistic states in India or the independence of Bangladesh. In contrast, **ethnic struggles** are resolved typically by institutional arrangements and legislative provisions to protect the **individual rights** of members of each cultural group **as** individual citizens. A case in point is the enactment of laws designed to protect individuals against religious discrimination.

The one often shades into the other and a given national movement may contain elements of an ethnic struggle. For instance, cultural symbols could be used to mobilize the respective populations; moreover, a resolution of a national struggle through power sharing could include anti-discrimination legislation. Consequently the two types of political responses have frequently been uncritically lumped together as "ethnic conflicts". But the distinction must be borne in mind for two important reasons. Firstly, collective national rights (e.g. territorial jurisdiction) of a nation are greater than, and qualitatively different from, the aggregate sum of individual rights (e.g. language rights) of its members. Secondly, the dimension of State power inherent in national movements but absent in ethnic struggles imposes conceptually different sets of analytical demands in the two instances.

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Western European national movements

There are more than forty (40) national movements of minor nations within Western European countries (and many more Europe-wide). A few of the better known national movements in Europe are those of the Irish (Northern Ireland), Scots and Welsh (Britain), Bretons and Corsicans (France), Flemings (Belgium) and Basque and Catalan (Spain). The rise of European national movements is an issue which concerned the November 1990 Paris Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Speaking at the Conference, Mikail Gorbechev warned European governments thus: "any attempt to impose a particular way of life on someone else as a precondition to be met before cooperation is envisaged is bound to breed suspicion, mistrust, militant nationalism and reckless separation". His observation was based on the then growing nationality crisis within the increasingly market-oriented USSR and it addressed the generally rising trend of nationalisms in recession-prone Europe. The Swiss response was to propose a structure within the European Community (EC) which would ensure "minority" rights. But France rejected the proposal on grounds that it would make its own minor nations "ungovernable". A French official explained: "What would we do if we were suddenly told the Corsicans, or the Bretons or the Basques or the Alsations had the right to teach in their own language, to govern in their own language. It would be very difficult" (*The Island*, 1990). In other words, the legitimate exercise of collective national rights by minor nations was seen as a threat to the stability of the French unitary State.

In Britain, Scottish and Welsh national movements have become increasingly militant. Until the late 1960s the Scottish national movement had been derided in England as "the hobby of people who enjoyed dressing up, learning Gaelic at evening classes, and remembering episodes of feudal butchery such as Bannockburn and Culloden" (*The Independent*, 1992b). But Scottish sentiments changed rapidly during the subsequent two decades: in a *Scotsman*/ITN opinion poll conducted in January 1992, half the Scottish electorate preferred independence from Britain.

The poll results shook the British Government and triggered a feverish debate on the political future of Britain. The Conservative Party had favoured devolution of power to Scotland and Wales on the eve of the 1979 parliamentary elections and its leader, Margret Thatcher, with an eye on Scottish votes, spoke glowingly of devolution as a necessary condition for preserving the British Union. But she abandoned devolution when Conservatives won the elections. After the 1992 opinion poll results, the bankrupt defence of the unitary State by Conservatives became even more strident: the Scottish Secretary, Ian Lang, speaking on a BBC television programme insisted that devolution to create a Scottish Assembly will not stem separatist tendencies but will merely jeopardize unity and inexorably lead to separatism (*On Scotland*, 9/2/92). He preferred "devolution of government to the people" and cited the decentralization of health and education services as examples of "devolution" carried out already by the Conservative government (*Channel Four News*, 24/2/92). Given time, the Conservatives may be able to come up with a more sophisticated package of "devolution to the people" rather than to nations, along lines similar to the late President Premadasa's *Pradeshiya Sabhas* in Sri Lanka.

The Labour Party supported devolution of power partly because a substantial proportion (about 40%) of its electoral support lies in Scotland. But the explicit advocation of a federal Britain would alienate many English voters and undermine Labour's chances of returning to power in Westminster. So, Labour members (like some Sinhalese liberals in Sri Lanka) avoided using the word "federal" and instead spoke delicately of "Home Rule" for Scotland. The average English voter (like the average Sinhalese voter) was quick to spot the duplicity. The Conservatives (like the Sinhalese right-wing) exposed the Opposition's political opportu-

nism: the party Chairman, Chris Patten, warned in 1992 that if Scotland won its own Assembly, its representation in Westminster will be reduced to prevent "over-representation" which "would mean abandoning all hope of ever having a Labour majority in the Parliament of the United Kingdom" (*The Independent*, 1992a).

To drive the point home, a liberal dose of communalism was administered. A former cabinet minister alleged that the Scots are "over-represented" in the Labour Party, and are steeped in "an almost Nordic Culture" and, therefore, somehow un-British. In an evident attempt at damage-limitation, a Scottish Member of Parliament, John Reid, conceded that the Labour Shadow Cabinet was "politically unbalanced" and cautioned that offering English voters "a government which consists of a Scottish Prime Minister, John Smith, a Scottish Chancellor, Gordon Brown, a Scottish Home Secretary, Tony Blair, and a Scottish Social Secretary, Donald Dewar, would be politically disadvantageous" (*The Independent*, 1993a).

The Scottish National Party (SNP) has campaigned for the outright independence of Scotland since 1934. In many ways similar to post-1983 strategies employed by Sri Lankan Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), the SNP too is committed to achieving its objective through constitutional processes, including seeking a Scottish electoral mandate for independence. Arguing that minor "nations throughout Europe are moving towards independent nationhood", the SNP has advanced historical, economic and political grounds for independence. A principal argument for the future economic viability of independent Scotland is the potential revenue from petroleum deposits found around the Shetland Islands, which contain about 80% of European oil reserves (*SNP*, 1992b).

The English establishment reacted by issuing naive threats. The Conservatives alleged that the financial costs of independence will be high for Scottish people because they would immediately lose 50,000 defence-related jobs and pay higher taxes to off set the loss of funds now allocated by Westminster. The warnings were supplemented by the proverbial "divide and rule" tactic (think of conflicts engineered between Tamils and Muslims in eastern Sri Lanka). Immediately following the 1992 opinion poll favouring Scottish independence, an article in *The Economist* explained that Shetland Islands had belonged to Denmark. When the Danish King Christian I married off his daughter to the Scottish King James III, he was unable to pay the dowry of 250,000 crowns. He offered the Shetland Islands as security until he was able to raise the money, which he failed to do; and the Scottish King retained the Islands, which became part of Scotland "by a quirk of history". The article provided a map to show how "Norway is nearly as close as Scotland. The nearest railway station to Lerwick [in Shetlands] is Bergen [in Norway]. The islands are as far from Edinburgh as Edinburgh is from London and they have almost as much in common with the Faroes, still Danish, as with the Hebrides". Because the Islanders voted against secession in the 1979 Scottish Referendum, the article alleged that "viewed from Lerwick, London looked remote but benign. Edinburgh was remote and threatening". And a veiled warning was delivered to the SNP that Westminster will not hesitate to pit Shetlands against Scotland: "On the face of it, a break with both governments might be more attractive for Shetlands" since the oil resources will then become the property of the Shetlands. Little short of instigating Shetlands to secede from Scotland, the warning was reiterated in the concluding sentence: "Any Scotsman blithely assuming that his country can float off to nirvana on a sea of oil revenues may have to think again" (*The Economist*, 1992:32).

The intransigence of Conservatives and opportunism of Labour increasingly discredited the moderate SNP's non-violent approach. Encouraged by the success of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland, the more militant sections formed the Scottish National Liberation Army (SNLA). The SNLA, like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), is committed to a national liberation struggle. The strength and capacity of SNLA is unclear; but in December 1993, a member of the SNLA was under trial in Scotland for allegedly attempting to overthrow the State.

The Welsh are not far behind. Plaid Cymru is seeking constitutional reform to introduce a Welsh Parliament as part of a two-stage drive towards "self-government" for Wales (*The Independent*, 1993b).

The brief discussion so far cannot even pretend to deal fully with the complexities of national movements within Britain and France, let alone the rest of Europe. Nor does it seek to oversimplify their militant defence of national rights. But it is sufficient to draw attention to the unresolved national question in Western European States which had been buried for a while under the prosperity generated by European colonial plunder. It also points to the consequent general crisis of legitimacy faced by unitary States, a crisis which has gripped some of the earliest modern States in Europe and which holds profound implications for the theories on nationalism and in particular to the processes of structural reform of post-colonial States in South Asia.

The Western national State: crisis of legitimacy

Some reflections on theory

The French and, for Sri Lanka, the more relevant British national movements occupy an important place in the sociological theories of nationalism, of nation-formation and State-building. The more important European analysts examined nationalisms (as ideologies) and national movements (as political processes) in different historical periods and among a wide variety of countries. But they abstracted the processes of historical formation of nations and political construction of States from the experiences principally of Britain and France (and to a lesser extent of Germany and Italy). These States were and are used as historical antecedents and in many ways as normative structures, imbued with "rationality" and products of "modernity". Indeed it was claimed that nationalists in Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa are seeking to imitate the "exemplar of a compact nation in the very heart of the prestigious West" (Smith: 1991:130). In the tradition of Orientalism, they were contrasted against the "other", namely, subsequent national movements and types of States primarily in non-European countries. The irrelevance of this methodology was comprehensively argued from the standpoint of political economy by Blaut (1987).

Inevitably the validity of sociological theories of nationalism and national movements hinge on the legitimacy of the Western European (British/French) State forms. But Western European nationalisms and national movements today suggest that all is not well with the "exemplar of a compact nation". The political shift to the right, intensification of national chauvinism/racism among major nations and the advocation of fascist aims by ultra-nationalist forces are some symptoms of political malaise. But the immediate focus of the present essay is the challenge posed by national movements of minor nations to their respective **national States,** i.e. States which could be either unitary or federal and contain more than one nation within their territorial borders. In a unitary national State minor nations are classified as "minorities", the members of which are entitled to political rights only as individuals. In a federal national State all constituent nations, both major and minor, are equally recognized as nationalities, which are guaranteed collective national rights as nations in addition to individual rights conferred on members of each nationality.

(To be continued)

Is the 3rd World marginalised ?

Samir Amin talks to Sumit Chakravarthy

SC: Now on one point some clarification is necessary. You want mutual adjustment of countries of a region among themselves or is it with a view to strengthen their bargaining power with the North?

Sa: Both. It would need, of course, visual adjustment within the regions but with a view to be in a more powerful position in negotiations with other regions.

This is my concept of mutual adjustment.

SC: You have conveyed this in different international fora. What has been the response?

SA: Well, it's difficult to say what the response has been. The response in our forum which we tried to develop basically through the Third World Forum in Asia, Africa and Latin America has been, let me say, positive with, of course, a lot of qualifications. For some people it still remains utopian due to a variety of factors — some of them put forward the new US hegemony, the only superpower, others put forward the enormous internal problems of any region and even of any big country or small country (political, cultural, ethnic, regional) all sorts of problems. I think that all these observations are correct by themselves but they should not prevent us from having the vision of an efficient strategic line to develop gradually knowing that there is nothing which succeeds one hundred per cent immediately in human action.

In the North when those ideas have been discussed sometimes the response in general has been much less enthusiastic, sometimes with the argument which, I think, is completely erroneous that the "Third World" has been marginalised in the global system. I think it cannot be politically. Even the raw materials and natural resources in the marginalised areas are limited and can be destroyed if this trend continues — this is one (but not a general) argument. Perhaps the people who understand it a little better than the others are some of the Europeans because they are also facing a problem of European construction with its own serious difficulties and, therefore, they are closer to the understanding of the type of difficulties that we would have in building regional systems in the developing world.

SC: Which are the European countries thinking on these lines?

SA: Not countries.

SC: You mean experts and others?

SA: Well, for instance, there is a European Unity Working Group on the Alternative Choices for Europe. This is a progressive group with which I had discussions and which I felt was quite close to understanding us.

SC: I wanted to ask you something in our context, that is, India. You see, there is a very strong lobby, especially in the Finance Ministry, plugging the World Bank line — that this is the only option, there is no other alternative to this whole theory of liberalisation, globalisation, marketisation. We feel that this is leading to some kind of dependency and erosion of the strategy of self-reliant progress we had been making in the past. Now, in the light of the argument "there is no alternative" to this course some of us who have tried to follow this problem very closely feel very frustrated. What is your view — is there no alternative to this course they are seeking to enforce on the developing countries?

SA: This is a very important and relevant question which you have raised. I call this the TINA (there is no alternative) syndrome which is always, by definition, I would say, nonsense. History is the choice between a variety of alternatives. Of course, we can relate the variety of alternatives perhaps to a certain extent to objective interests, short run or longer run, to the perception of those interests, economic, class or national, etc. It is a complex scene. But there are always alternatives — not only two ways, capitalist road or the socialist — but a variety of choices. And to say that there is no alternative is always nonsense.

But today it is not only in India but everywhere in the world including China we do find people supporting enthusiastically the idea of globalisation as it is offered to us. And it is those people who say that there is no alternative available to this type of globalisation.

Let us look at what is the core of that globalistion. Let us analyse the globalisation pattern which is offered to us.. What I am saying is that what is offered to us is a truncated integrated market, an integrated market at the global level, quasi-perfect for trade, gradual of course, but the idea of globalisation which is offered to us is free trade, total free trade. Second, a global integration of the capital market, including its financial dimension or perhaps even stock dimension, but here it is certainly not a global labour market which would mean free migrations, totally free migrations. I submit that this truncated globalisation of the market is bound to lead to polarisation. And that is what is offered to us.

Now why is it promotable and accepted by the ruling classes almost everywhere in the world? I don't think that this globalisation pattern is imposed upon us — in some cases may be through counter-revolution or military intervention — but in most cases it is promoted through an alliance with the ruling classes. Due to the historic weakness, the relative weakness, by definition, of the bourgeoisie of the peripheries as compared to the bourgeoisie of the centre, there has always been a big tendency in the ruling classes of the bourgeoisie... to accept, to inscribe their development perspective in a comprodorised system from a comprodorised position. We should view 'comprodorised' not as a form once and forever; but at each stage of capitalist expansion there is a comprador role. Industrialists can be comprador today, that is, those industrialists who are involved in this system of putting out — they are the comprador industrialists; the state itself can be a comprador state.

And the result of this globalisation, I think, would be catastrophic. Particularly for a country like India I am very much sensitive to the enormous danger facing it.

Now why do I think so? This globalisation process annihilates completely the national capacity and state efficiency. It is, therefore, a system of a kind of blind market, truncated, operating with no counter-force crystallised as a political national state. And therefore, it is bound to promote resistance. Since it is producing polarisation it is bound to create resistance among the victims. Since this resistance cannot find in the national state an efficient tool it promotes all sorts of societal splits, explosions in society. This phenomenon, in my opinion, is at the root of the revival of ethnicity, provincialisms, religious fundamentalisms, etc. etc.

For a country like India which is a large country, multinational, multireligious, such a policy which is developed under the slogan that 'there is no alternative' may well lead to destruction of the Indian Union.

SC: You mean to say that it may lead to dismemberment of the country in the political sense?

SA: Yes, exactly.

SC: You have had a broad understanding of Marxism, Marxist economy as such. Do you think that as a result of the recent upheavals worldwide, Marxism has really failed? Or is it just a temporary setback?

SA: I look at Marxism also as a historical process. It is not once and for all. It is not a discovery which is the end of knowledge. It is a method. It has carried out, I think, very fundamental, irreversible discoveries in the deep nature of capitalism. That historical Marxism — I would like to call it historical Marxism — had also its shortcomings — what I am stressing is that historical Marxism had underestimated the polarisation dimension of world capitalist expansion for a variety of reasons which are also historical.

The things which I am saying I do not think they are in contradiction with Marxism — they add to it. We should look at Marxism as something which is to be continuously developed and not to be considered as a dogma, the final word.

SC: How do you view the present state of the Russian economy? And do you think there is some future in terms of the paradigm which you are contemplating, of Russia moving towards that kind of a situation?

SA: Well, the easiest answer is: I don't know. But I would try to advance a little beyond 'I don't know'. What happened in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, in Russia is, I think, the normal evolution of what had been maturing for a long time. For that reason let us call it Sovietism instead of socialism. This Sovietism was building capitalism without the capitalists.

SC: You mean state capitalism?

SA: Yes, state capitalism. It was building *de facto* a bourgeoisie, a potential bourgeoisie through a nondemocratic political organisation and in the name of socialism; which had to lead to where we are. A bourgeoisie finally wants to have really existing capitalism. And, therefore, to move from collective property through the state to private property, it's very obvious that the bourgeoisie of tomorrow in most of those countries is going to come basically from the nomenklatura itself, that is, from the very class which carried through the building of so-called socialism.

In a way I expected what has happened. Of course, I don't want to be arrogant and to appear as a prophet. I absolutely did not expect it to happen the way it actually took place. I was thinking — wrongly — that the process of moving from socialism to real capitalism would be a relatively smooth process if only because those bourgeoisie could have, or could dream to have a strong position in the global system, particularly the Russians or the Soviets, due to their military capacity. And moving into the system as the real centre — another one, a new one — after Japan in the nineteenth century or as any latecomer after Britain, France and North America.

But it did not move towards the system that way. It moved towards that in a catastrophic way as has been seen — more catastrophic in some countries where nationalistic, chauvinistic positions prevailed: in the former Soviet Union (which had to split), in Yugoslavia (which split and faced civil war), in Czechoslovakia (split without war in a smooth way but still had to split). This was the outcome.

So the position of the new bourgeoisie, which is not yet totally established, is much weaker vis-a-vis the global system than it could have been or perhaps had dreamt to be. Therefore, the danger of a peripherialisation — being condemned to a new periphery — is very much on the agenda. I call it the Latino Americanisation of Eastern Europe and Russia.

SC: Both in terms of politics and economics?

SA: Yes. And we have a number of signs of that — the breaking down of whole sectors of the economy which perhaps have their own internal weaknesses, are not really competitive and could have been reshaped gradually.

SC: You don't envisage a social democratic revival there which will be a kind of reformed socialistic revival?

SA: It does not seem to me to be really possible. Because social democracy needs the society to occupy a very high position in the global system, it needs wealth, it needs a high level of competitiveness internationally. It has come in the history of capitalism very late and has been restricted to the most developed areas of capitalism. Those countries (of Eastern Europe and Russia) are objectively closer to the Latin American countries than they are to the West European states. Therefore, it is difficult to have a real social democracy in those countries.

There are perhaps illusions of that. Let's take the case of Poland. In Poland in the last four-five years we have had the most Rightist policies..

SC: Of Walesa?

SA: Yes... of adjustment, and that has led to the comeback of the former Communist Party which labels itself now as a social democratic party.

SC: The same thing happened in Lithuania, and the same thing might happen in many other countries of the East gradually. But we do find that those parties have no clear-cut programme as to how they would advance towards social democratic solutions of the problems facing them.

SC: That is a very vital point no doubt. But how do you look at the developments in China? The spectacular economic growth which they have been able to achieve within a one party system: what does it really presage?

SA: It must be acknowledged that there is certainly high growth in China now. But, I think that there has been high growth in the Maoist period, of a different type, and it is because of what I would say the solidity of what has been built in the Maoist period that capitalism could be so quickly successful. Therefore, we should qualify. It was not as if that the economy was stagnating and thanks to the opening up it is growing now. The basis was built in the Maoist period.

Until now the relatively controlled opening has indeed led to the high growth with, of course, very negative costs. One, the social costs — much more inequality, growing inequality. Two, regional costs — regional inequalities. And, therefore, there is a potential danger, and a growing one at that, of the building of a new comprador bourgeoisie which will want to move into more opening and dismantle the controls.

Now, the political choice of the ruling class in China is that this can be avoided by maintaining the one party system, this party being the so-called Communist Party.

SC: But here you don't think that there was a kind of state capitalism as in the Soviet Union?

SA: There was but less. There were aspects very similar to the Soviet Union.

SC: Including the nomenklatura?

SA: Yes, including the nomenklatura. But there were other aspects which were less negative due to the fact that there was what was called in the Communist jargon workers-peasants' alliance — real in the case of China while it had been completely destroyed by the process of collectivisation in the Soviet Union. The process of collectivisation in China was very different. And the historical background of the relations between the workers and peasants, because of the long armed struggle in the rural areas, popular peasant dimension of Maoism, etc. limited the bourgeois content of the nomenklatura in China.

On the strategy of the ruling calss that the process of moving towards that opening can be almost indefinitely controlled by the one-state party or one-party state system, I doubt its efficiency very much in the long run which incidentally can be quite short. The erosion of the party, the phenomenon of corruption are growing very fast. The cynicism, the loss of credibility of that policy with respect to the popular classes may also lead — and pretty quickly — to a catastrophic end. Well, whether it will take the form of the Soviet Union or not is speculative.

SC: Your paradigm you have presented very boldly. At the same time you point out that the social democrats in Russia have no alternative. The point which comes up even in India's case, is this: the proponents of the new economic policy tell us: you don't have any model, you don't have any success story anywhere as we have. What, in your opinion, should be the reply?

SA: Well, this is oversimplified. The Western model is offered as their model. But that assumes that capitalism is not polarising and that you can capture it; we started by discussing that.

We know we don't have a model, of course, but that doesn't mean that historical socialism — also Sovietism — achieved nothing. It achieved something gigantic. It turned those societies — not of Eastern Europe but of the Soviet Union — which were rural and backward, into modern industrial and military powers. In China, a more backward country, the Communist power has achieved tremendous things, including at the social level. If you compare China with India there are a lot of indicators which are in favour of China. So it's not as if that the formula has been discussed once and for all and completely while the internal contradictions of that model are constantly overlooked.

Tribute to a Judge

Neelan Tiruchelvam

Tellipallai Wanarajah Rajaratnam was born in December 21st 1920, the son of Proctor T.C. Rajaratnam, a highly respected member of the legal profession. Wanam as he was affectionately known was a student at Trinity College where he achieved distinction in the study of the classics and was awarded both the Senior Ryde Latin Prize, and the Prize for Greek. He read classics at the University College and was awarded an Honours degree. He later became an Advocate of the Supreme Court and was also called to the English Bar as a Barrister. He practised law for twenty two years during which period he acquired a reputation as a highly competent but somewhat maverik trial lawyer with a substantial criminal and labour law practice. He also appeared in several important election petition cases which are the most demanding of all litigation as they call for the discipline and tenacity of the civil lawyer and the ingenuity and intution of the criminal bar. He accepted an appointment as Commissioner of Assizes in 1970, an inevitable stepping stone to an appointment to the Supreme Court in 1972.

His six years in the Supreme Court were perhaps the most important years of his life, as he believed that every judge must fashion a judicial philosophy which enables himself to consistently resolve the difficult moral and social choices which arise in the process of adjudication. Not everyone agreed with his judicial philosophy which often required an explicit consideration of the issues of social and distributive justice in reconciling the interests of the individual with that of the state as a custodian of wider societal interests. He was unsympathetic to any attempt by what he perceived to be vested property interests to whittle down the impact of land reforms, agrarian reforms, urban land ceiling legislation, or progressive labour legislation. He believed that judicial activism on behalf of disadvantaged or vulnerable groups was entirely consistent with the obligation to dispense justice without fear or favour. His judgments were often elegantly crafted reflecting his broader training in the classics, and his uncanny ability to focus on the hard issues of law and equity which were at the centre of a case. He could not be swayed from a course of action which he believed to be just and correct.

At the age of 58, he had to face an unforseen crisis when the Supreme Court was reconstituted under the Second Republican Constitution. He faced premature termination of his judicial career and by law and convention could not revert to his practice. He remained defiant and became a lonely crusader for justice, and an advocate of 'unpopular causes'. He contributed frequently to the Saturday Review and the Tribune, and was the author of a Manual on Industrial Law and Plantation Workers Manual. He was a Visiting Lecturer at the University of Colombo, and was active in the Civil Rights Movement, and the Classical Association. He belonged to a small band of progressive lawyers and was knowledgable on ideological and political developments in the Soviet Union.

The trial of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was a watershed in his career. He requested a copy of the Supreme Court judgment and subjected it to meticulous analysis. His book on the Trial of Bhutto, called "A Judiciary in Crisis" was subsequently translated into Urudu and widely read within Pakistan. Lawyers and judges in Pakistan were amazed that a former member of the Sri Lankan judiciary should take the trouble to read 709 pages of the judgment of the Pakistan Supreme Court, and publish a critical analysis at his own cost. But to Wanam, "an injustice any where was a call to the just every where". On August 14 1989, the President of Pakistan conferred on him the highest civilian award for meritorious and invaluable contribution (Hilal-I-Quaid-E-Azam)".

He was appointed a Member of Parliament in 1989, and thereby became one of the very few to be both a Member of the apex court and the supreme legislature. He did not reach his full potential as a member of the legislature, as he was often incapcitated by ill health. When he spoke in Parliament, his interventions were thoughtful and reflective. He once wrote that, "when life's landmarks vanish, judges like ordinary mortals will be helpless as moths having to account for their deeds on earth". Wanam will be remembered for his simplicity, his legal learning, his passionate engagement with legal and political causes, and his abiding faith in the Majesty of the Law.

Hopeful Signs

Arden

The U.N.P. sitting member for Mulkirigala was unseated on an election petition and the government had no alternative but to hold a by-election. The Kalawana manoeuvre had been tried with disastrous consequences to the ruling party. So a by-election it had to be. The party renominated the unseated member, Ananda Kularatne; the S.L.F.P. nominated Chamal Rajapakse. The government decided to use the tactics it had so successfully used in the referendum. Busloads of thugs with guns were brought all the way from Colombo to the rural south-coast electorate.

On polling day, which was 12 September 1985, the voters of Mulkirigala, who had seen the way the referendum had gone, turned up in gangs at polling stations, some carrying guns. Thuggery and intimidation went on during the poll and there was some gunplay. At the end of the poll the U.N.P. had obtained 26,037 votes to the S.L.F.P.'s 24,708. But the voters of Mulkirigala had served clear notice on the government that in future thuggery would be met with thuggery. After the count the crowds became unruly and the government, using emergency powers, declared a curfew and sent in army trucks to rescue its strong arm men and the polling staff.

Mulkirigala being a single by-election, the government got away with it; but it was left to those with ambitions of winning elections by unconventional methods to wonder whether, in future, (if the voters of all electorates prepared themselves as had the Mulkirigala voters that day) a general election or referendum could ever again be won by impersonation and thuggery. On 26 April 1987 the U.N.P. held a seminar at Karandeniya. It was just five days after the bombing of the Pettah bus stand by E.R.O.S. killing 113 and wounding over 300. At the seminar President Jayewardene said: "There may be a need to go before the people again and seek a referendum to remain until terrorism is completely wiped out. General elections may be held only after the terrorist problem is completely resolved". (SUN 27 April 1987).

The president wondered "whether the Opposition parties which demanded a general election were supporting the terrorists, because the government had 5/6 of the mandate (sic), the capability and armed preparedness to fight terrorism, whereas any government coming into power in a general election could not get a 2/3 majority because of the P.R. scheme". (Ib.)

That Jayewardene could say such things after the report of the Commissioner of Elections on the Referendum and after the notice served on him by the voters of Mulkirigala, says something of his nerve. Although he claimed that his government should remain in power in order to solve the terrorist problem, the people remembered he had for years been promising to end it. Thus:

June 1984: "I will declare martial law if necessary".

Feb. 1985: "I will wipe out terrorists by the end of this year". (On Independence Day).

Oct. 1985: "Terrorists will be defeated within one year".

Feb. 1986: "On this day (Independence Day) I promise to all freedom-loving peaceful people of Sri Lanka that we shall, this year, overcome, destroy and eradicate terrorism in Sri Lanka in all its forms".

May 1986: "My patience is running out". (U.K. Sunday Times 11 May 1986)

May 1986: "I will unleash the troops". (U.K. Sunday Times 18 May 1986).

If the people were to give the president a mandate to govern the country as long as there was terrorism what incentive he would have to stop terrorism was not a question he provided an answer for that day at Karandeniya.

May Day was round the corner and Jayewardene decided to ban the traditional May Day procession and public meetings, using the Pettah bombing as an excuse. Several opposition parties publicly announced their intention to defy the ban and hold their rallies: At the end of May Day, two persons were dead and many wounded — some critically — by police shooting. The signs were clear that after Mulkirigala more and more people were determined to face police bullets to fight the government's lawlessness.

From all indications, ultimately it was going to be these developments — what Corazon Aquino called People Power — that would help Sri Lanka emerge from her desperate plight. As long as Gandhi was prime minister in India he would allow Tamil Nadu to help and arm the Tigers,* while pretending to be the honest broker. No help from that quarter. As long as Jayewardene was president of Sri Lanka he would be in the way of a fresh approach to a solution. There were those who thought that as one of the very few surviving democracies in the Third Would, Sri Lanka could expect the U.S.A. to save it from disaster. There two flaws in this reasoning. One that after Jayewardene took over the country Sri Lanka's resemblance to a democracy worn thin. The second was that the U.S.A. has not shown any great interest in preserving democracy outside its own borders. Washington took the line that India was the only possible mediator in the conflict in Sri Lanka. A Reuter report datelined 26 April 1987 from Washington said that American officials "saw no role for the U.S. in such mediation efforts" and went on to say that "India, whose relations with Washington have long been delicately poised, would feel such efforts an intrusion".

(SUN 27 April 1987).

Pakistan, which was not a democracy, was strategically important to the U.S.A. Washington would help Pakistan despite India's objections. To compensate, if the U.S.A. steered clear of Sri Lanka, India might be somewhat mollified. That seemed to be the position. Sri Lanka under Jayewardene was friendless in the world and on its own.

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* This position changed considerably after Prabhakaran broke with Gandhi soon after the Indo-Sri Lanka pact.

SRI LANKAN AMERICAN HONOURED

The "poetry of migration"

Joanne L. Nix

WASHINGTON

In a Washington bookshop this evening (February 1), the story of Sri Lanka's "lost paradise" will be heard in public readings by Indran Amirthanayagam, a new American poet of Sri Lankan descent and author of "The Elephants of Reckoning."

Amirthanayagam, a 1993 New York Foundation for the Arts fellow in poetry, is the latest in a crop of promising American authors of South Asian descent. Born in Sri Lanka, raised in Hawaii and London, and with degrees from Haverford College in Pannsylvania and Columbia University in New York, the writer again and again has turned to migration and travel as sources for his inspiration.

In an interview with USIA, Amirthanayagam noted that he was always fascinated by such faraway places as Jaffna, London and Honolulu. Describing himself as "a citizen of the globe, "he preferred community is naturally New York. a city of immigrants. "It's a kind of intellectual bezaar, "he says. "People from all over the world come to shop with their ideas."

However, he observes that in the United States the poet does not have "the seat at the table" he has in other cultures. "I am going to try to make sure that the table recognizes its poets and provides more seats at the table so that they can have some lunch, dinner and spending money for the next day."

Amirthanayagam's collection of poems, "The Elephants of Reckoning," was praised by the Indian poet A.K. Ramanujan as "a welcome new voice in Sri Lankan poetry — and in the poetry of migration." sometimes joyful, sometimes tragic, the poems depict not only the human inhabitants of Sri Lanka but also elephants, birds, fish and fruit trees. "Sri Lankan scenes are lovingly observed and bitterly remembered, once seen in childhood, seen again from New york, the landscape now bloodied by politics..."

In addition to "The Elephants of Reckoning," Amirthanayagam has published poems in "The Kenyon Review," "The Massachusetts Review," "The Literary Review" and other poetry magazines. His articles about theater have appeared in New York City newspapers.

Amirthanayagam began writing poetry in his teens after arriving in Honolulu, Hawaii, with his family. "Honolulu reminded me of that other island of my dreams," he said.

He explains that some of his poems could only have been written in New York's Manhattan, yet another island. "Both the distance from Sri Lanka and the closeness to the sea which Manhattan offered helped me to write the poems.

"There is also the issue of guilt, a sense of inadequacy, when you are writing poetry about early years. You are out and away. Somehow you want to return in your poems — to give something back to the landscape that gave you so much," he said.

"How do you rebuild with poems? By honoring the things you love about that land. The poems are a way out of the labyrinth of confusion and pain and suffering; the 'something to perfection brought' as Yeats had said. I write about roots — what causes love and what causes war. Sometimes the roots of war and love are the same thing. They are the human heart and mind."

Describing Sri Lanka as a paradise, Amirthanayagam says that his poetry "addresses the disappearance of that paradise."

The phrase "Elephants of Reckoning" refers to the elephants of Sri Lanka that, like human families, live in close-knit groups. "One of the problems of Sri Lanka is that the family has been divided," Amirthanayagam says. "The Tamils and Sinhalese, people who had lived together in peace are split by war. But the split can be fixed and accounts settled."

"In Sri Lanka you have a jungle that is disappearing. There is something eternal about the elephant for me. The elephant is connected to the idea of restoration. (It) is a majestic animal, and if allowed to live, it is very gentle. If you allow an elephant and its family to live you make sacred the land they live on. If you take that land away without some attempt to preserve both the elephant and its neighbor — i.e. man — you become less than human."

He notes too, that when an elephant is injured, he may become a marauding rogue, straying into human settements, destroying crops and killing human beings. Thus the "elephants of reckoning" symbolizes "both family ties and the terrible cost that results from being cast out"

Asked about his hopes for peace in his previous homeland, Amirthanayagam replies, "I have faith that there is a way for Sri Lankans to come together and make peace." He suggests that Sri Lankans living abroad can help. "Let us invite the burghers to return from Australia and the Tamil stowaways from the restaurants of Paris. Let us have a government of national unity," he wrote recently in the New York Times.

"We have gone in one or two generations from being villagers and farmers to global citizens," he says. "You can be born in Colombo and end up in far flung places on the earth. The war and the 20th century have brought this new world forcibly into being." In the last poem in "The Elephants of Reckoning," entitled "After the Monsoon," Amirthanayagam describes the Sri Lankas who are "leaving the garden of Eden for jungles beyond the sea":

In Eden the monsoon
has returned to the sea,
and the pen sleeps for a minute.

For a minute, Ceylon has defeated
England.

For a minute, rambutans are plentiful
and one rupee will buy a dozen.

For a minute, the elephant ambles back
to his wife and babies.

For a minute, the Sinha lion licks
the Tamil tiger's face on a bed
draped by plantain leaves."

Amirthanayagam has conducted poetry workshops and taught literature at The New School for Social Research in New York. Most recently, he joined the U.S. Information Agency in September 1993 "to concentrate on cultural exchanges." His first diplomatic assignment will be to Buenos Aires, Argentina.

(USIA)

Mick Moore's analysis on the J.V.P will be continued in our next issue.

ENRICHING RURAL LIFESTYLE

Why there's sound of laughter in this rustic tobacco barn....

There is laughter and light banter amongst these rural damsels who are busy sorting out tobacco leaf in a barn. It is one of the hundreds of such barns spread out in the mid and upcountry intermediate zone where the arable land remains fallow during the off season.

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