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LANKA
GUAR
Vol. 16 No. 23 April 1, 1994 Price RS.1 (
SOUTH: PREMI
I. M.
MAHINDAPALA, UANE
SOUT|
INDIAN, PAKISTANI
CLINTON'S APPF
ETHNIC TURI
MEDIA THE IMPORT
J.V.P.: DE-STABI
 
 
 
 
 

IDIAN
Registered at GPO, Sri Lanka QD/33/NEWS/94
ADASAISM BETRAYED
- Chanaka Ameratunga
F. and Minorities
- Mervyn de Silva
AUSTEN AND MORALITY
— Regi Siriuvardena,
H ASIA
SECURITY CONCERNS
- Betram Bastiampilai
ROACH - Pervaiz Cheelma
WOL :
Lynn Ockersz
ANCE OF CREDIBILITY
– Rohan Samarajiva
LSING THE REGIME
- Mick Moore

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WITH THE BEST
ELEPHANT HOUS
OUALITY AT AFFC
NO 1 JUSTICE
CCLC)

COMPLIENTS
E SUPERMARKET
ORDABLE PRCES
A. Il-KEBAR MWAWWA THA
NMEBO 2.

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NEWS BACKGROUND
DEEP SOUTH : La
Mervyn de Silva
was not the victory itself but
the margin of the Peoples Alliance polls Victory that explains the stunning impact of the Southern province election result. The percentage makes a stronger impression than the nurrber of Seats –53,3% to the UNP's 44.7%. The seats Won (32) includes the 2 bomLJSSEats. The UNP Wor only 23. If the PAVUNP gap (32/23 or even 30/23) does nonetheless make a strong impression, it is by contrast. Up to DeceInter last year, the PA Chief Minister Arnarasiri Dodangoda Could Only Counton the narroWest of majorities — ONE.. Hence the Scandalous - FRANCISCU affair. Mr. FranciscL crossed over to the government after his late-night"disappearance". Chief Minister Dodangoda had no claim to the post of Chief Minister any more. But if the C.M., lost his post, Franciscu lost all sympathy from the voters of the South - pro-PA or pro-UNP. No
GUARDAN
Wol. 15 No. 23 April 1, 1994
PTICO RS. O
Published fortnightly by Lanka Guardian Publishing Co. Ltd. No. 246, Union Place Colombo -2.
Editor. Mervyn de Silva Telephone: 447584
Printed by Ananda Press B25, Sir Ratnajothi Saravananuttu Mawatha, ColorTbo 13. Telephone: 435975
CONTENTS
Trends & Briefly A Turn in the South 3.
GOLA5
Security Concerns of India
Eard Pakist * US Model Not Right for
SOLuth Asia 구 " How Tiportant is South
Asia for the An Terican157 B "Separatist Movements in
South Asia O Mahir dapala and Mofality TITI Media - T. Prote
Credibility |1 WP 17
electorate, certainly TalLLTE S til Sri
dict" treated with SL Clear tattis Tart tās Bin the Guter thB COLUAÇI Was SL give the UNP anot Illing the province. T important after the Y the PA had capture CEES WÖll S, the Ni in the polls held af of President Premia
The Southern pr T1 Ost politically com: in the island With as Despite the dramati Marxist parties - Wickre'rnasinghe au Collwin, Willia Siliwa | Sm SLF WİVES. THE E in the 70's is the IT of an irrepressibler. Unlike the SLFP, thi the spirit and the g. UNIP, I this electio
W|E 1 LITEI majorities at this PC closer study, it is the ntary Seats lost by SLJirely Worry the Sri Simple projection o SCreen Show3 that of the 21-Constitue ring blow to UNP even more so whe Was Balapitiya, Pre ELTTCESLFE| 1OITTE.
PREMADASA PDF
PremadaSa Was the UNP polls camp fill Iriental blunder w. DASAISM OF PREM
Mr. PrerTadasa's the IMF-World Ek of the poor must be SEWE re Shocks and E. adjustment". He didi he did extract eno introduce "jamasawiy he dra Tatised his "c and the disadvantag presidential mobil Worked more outside city, despite the fact cker himself. The Col İncil Was Where the

OUD AND CLEAR
"nota constituency as Lankan, likes its "weIch contempt. It isnow OLJE? Wre left a very bad In Woter's ToLuth Wher Irrimarily dissolved to her chance at ControThe South is the most Vince. AndםWestern pr ld the Western proviorth-Western province ter the assassination dasa.
Ovince is one of the Scious ConstituencieS strong Leftist tradition. C decline of the official the C.P. of Dr. S.A. Tid thĒ LSSP of Dr. etc. Anti-UNPradicaTiergence of the JWP Iost striking evidence dical youth militancy. is militant Leftism has its to stand up to the 1, it did.
er of seats and the poli do deserve Tuch number of Parliathe UN P Which ITILIS i Kotha strategists. A in the Parliamentary tle UNP as lost 20 cies, That is a shatteSelf-Confidence. Ard In the only exception sident PreTadaSä's
ULIG||
hardly mentioned in paign. The Tore TOas to ignore PREMAA DASA POPULISM.
unending debate with Was that the poorest a protected from the urdens of "structural 1't win the debate but ugh concessions to 'a' etc. What's more, concern" for the poor ed by projects like the a Secretariat. He + Colombo tham in the that he was a city-silombo municipal Couyoung Premadasa
started his political career. However reluctantly, the World Bank and the IMF accommodated President Premadasa's insistent demands.
His electoral politics was based also on Working Coalition that was much broader than the majority Golgama-Buddhist-Sinhala (GBS, the Shawian) and certainly not confined to the K.G.B., Kandyan Goiga Tilla Buddhist. Sri Lanka did hawe a Kandyan as Governor-General, Mr. Wiliam Goppallawa but it was a ceremonial post. Power under the Soulbury Constitution and the 1972 (Colvin) Constitution introduced by the United Front was firmly placed in the hands of the elected prime minister. It was the 1978 JF Constitution that made Way foran all-powerful Executiwe Presidency.
DEEP SOUTH
President D.B. is the first Kandyan to be the Executive President. So We hawe two Kandyan leaders poised for the "Big Orne" im Nowember/December. It Was singularly unfortunate that Mr. Wijetunge had to fight his first major election battle in the deep south — south of the Bentara Ganga, as the phrase goes, The deep StյլIth,
This point was sharply dramatised When the frontpage of the national reWSpapers showed President DB flanked by DUNF leader and ex-UNP minister Gamini Dissanayake, and Dr. Sarath Amun Lugama, former Secretary, Ministry of Information. In the ears of the average Southerner, the "voice" was alien. This has little to do with President DB's political program or the economic policies his administration pursues. It is a matter of mass psychology, instinctive sympathies and prejudices.
So the two main contendersfor the "Big Cme" hawe now six months in Which to present a program and create an image that will win mass support. In the final analysis, the minorities - the Tamils, the Muslims, the plantation vote the Christians and non-goigama wote would prove the decisive factor.
IMF POLICY
Premadasa's populism did not meet ALL the challenges created by IMF 'structural adjustment' but it did give the poor and the deprived the impression of a

Page 4
leader who "cared". The cushioning effect of his powerty alleviation programs did keep a majority of the poor with the Prer Tadasa regime, although that Vote was steadily eroded. The PC polls result, which Was no great victory for the UNP, indicated that the burden of prices had begun to alirate the lower-Tiddle class, the Salaried public Serwant in particular.
Last year, World Bank Vice-president for Africa Edward "Kim' Jaycox made an extraordinary speech at the African-American Institute's annual conference, obseWes Ross Hammond. He reflected or the failures of the Bank policies and prograTimes in Africa. He said "We are OW insisting that the governments generate their own economic reform plans. We'll help, we'll critique, we'll eventually negotiate and We'll support those things which seem to be reasonably making sense but We're not going to Write these plans".
EPRLF against delinking
The EPRLF has asked the government to abandon any plans to delink the merged North and East. In a statement to the "Island" the EPRLF General Secretary Suresh Premachandran said: "We Wish to caution the government that the unilateral implementation of any decision to hold a referedun. Without the Consent of the Tamil people and their polity would amount to the rediculing of those Tamil Organisations which laid down arms and entered the de Tocratic mainstream.
He called upon all political parties, diplomatic missions and the international community to urge the government to withdraw its attempts to demerge the Norther and Eastern Provinces.
A Lankanmadam in Singapore
Amadam from Maradana is running a rent-a-maid racket in Singapore. Police arrestë dhe after three Sri Lankan housemaids complained of being "victimised" by the madam, named only Wasanthi and her two male accomplices. Police found more than a hundred Lankan passports belonging to housemaides On the Tadam's payroll, The Singapore Tedia has splashed the story as a "rent-a-maid racket".
TRENDS
Protection for FTZ girls
Working girls in the Karl Inayake Free Trade Zone are to be protected from echers, by the police. A plar includes "curative as well as preventive meastres". Аппопg therт: deferrent pшлishлал to those caught preying on FTZgirls (form of POLIrish TT777 Tot disclosed); strengthe
r769dpolice patro/in. bester Mighting fora// in the vicinity,
Ar) &larring fur ārlāde fer police срокesтал ,
Tab Ol
Following an NG to push through an för at F1 E FHLM 77ās Sessioл, Іле Sгї La decided to closely of all NGOs ope Tľ70.Lg) a di SCIOS LI arITOLII7CEd Isle III(IE wed Was of rewal
A Gower left "foreign eleTrents' WErE asSD behird
BattiCC TELO.
EEEE DOdds EPCiOFTS | Council was capture Group" formed by Corbined.
BRIEFLY..
BāSeintāc
Mr Cooray is mot UNP's humbling de
Proj Wii | CJ Li|
Muslim Co Wote S in th
thikar Wahi
SRI LANKA
EFAWUF FS
KAT TANKUL
A.HUNESCC) ) ||
* UNITED NA
"SRI LANKA
* Computed to TOTALW.
LESGS MU A.
M
37,048 Musli W to the owera|| per
The clear less
Votes pohled.

g of FIZ locality, and ays, Iалesалdbyways
mar o ITIONgStations BaSLITES ng CGSSary, a Fasil.
Tl NGOS
C) attempt at Geneva ārli Sri Lārikā ESCALRights Corrission nka goverrier has 770 rhif Ortheg a'Cf'''Wilia.5 rating in the island. Eg I d'Eg COL Se W35 rsity of the NGOsnwogd
spokesmar Said that ' Backing Zhe LT TE "F5 MGO.
a goes to | PLOTE
SigrT7 Pro Worl7Ca McCa/ з ВаІІicaloa Mшлicipal adbyan "Independent T TELO and PLOTE
t, says UNP
unduly upset by the afeat at the Souther
Election S. " Tus
ingress polled the highest Muslim
e East
MUSLIM CONGRESS
ND
Y FS |ND |
TIWU PS || ND |
TIONAL PARTY
FREEDOMPARTY
n Following basis ALD MUSLMWOTES
JSLIM VOTES POLLED BY SI MC ND MUSLIM IND. GROUPS
JSLIM WOTESPOLLED BY OTHERS
otes apportioned proportionately to UNP and SLFP according centage polled by the parties.
ge from the above is SLMC polled 61,85% of the total Muslin
emphasise that the UNP has not lost its base wote and the traditional UNP'ers hawe not deserted the party", the party's General Secretary Housing Minister Sirisena Cooray said. The SLFP-led People's AllianCE WOm With 54.52 per cent of the wotes, Collecting 32 seats in the 55 seat Council. The UNP had 43.91 of the votes and 23 SE at:S.
Had it been a parliamentary election under the old first past the post system the UNP Would hawe been reduced to One seat (Balapitiya), the only electorate it won in the Southern Province.
A new era dawns, says SLFP
After the convincing win at the mini election in the South, SLFP General Secretary Dharттnasiri-Senaпayake said in a media message: " (It) heralded the da Wn of a new era in Sri Lanka's political scene during this election year. It sealed the fate of a regime which had lost its Tandate long ago. It has paved the Way for a new order, ensuring democratic freedom and the right to live".
'Iran-Gate SCanda"
The Iranawila People's Solidarity Movement is circulating a 60-page book titled WCA-Iranawila, Sub titled ram-Gate Scandal, listing the threats to local life styles and environment. The church led agitation against the construction of this massive Voice of America station on this fishing Willage continues.
94,770 - 51.85%,
15,584 - 10.17%
3.438 - O2.24%
2,377 - O155%
27,348 - 17.85%
9,700 - 06.34%
153,217
153,217
116,169
37,048

Page 5
A Turn in the So
Chanaka Amaratuпgа
y title is borrowed from the
trawelog Le by W.S. Naipaul. The Sri Lankan South like its Arterican Counterpart has a distinct identity and to a significant degree its own political flavour. It seemed to me that during the past month When the good and the great of our principal political car Ips, aided by the not so good and the not so great of different political hues, descended on the South to seek its votes at the Provincial Council Election of 24th March 1994, its people reacted with a combination of pleasure, irritation, cynicism and amusement at the attention that was heaped upon thern. Now that the people of the South hawe giyen arı emphatic Werdict I Would like to indulge in some reflections on that verdict.
it was Adlai Stevenson Who said "God bless partisanship. It is democracy's life blood". I could not agree more. My own instincts are always deeply partisan, I am always inclined to take sides, to decide whichpoint ofwiew or Which personalities prefer and an deeply suspicious of those who clothe themselves in the slippery garments of a specious neutrality. But although neutrality is oftenanindefensible Course, objectivity is not always incompatible with partisanship. The intelligent partisan can and must view the object of his Support in the plain light of reality. One сап do one's cause поgoodif one саппо! recognize the truth and act on it - it is hardly possible to achieve any Worthy objectensconced in a fool's paradise.
It is no secret that the Liberal Party to which I belong, is allied with the United National Party and that some of my colleagues, Asitha Perera, Alexander Weeratne, Karnal Nissanka and actively campaigned for the UNP at the Southern Provincial Council Election. It is a fact that addressed twenty four public meetings in support of the UNP campaign. My Support and my sympathies were thus
With the UNPut deprive me of a de assessing this cart rhaps add that m' formed largely from meetings (since it. W. listen at People's except very briefly) tions With a Widia Cros:
WEES.
Tust COf355 St S0 Tary others inici rters of the PA got OW SSSITE. Wa: obtain a narrow Wict Tum of 30 seats and 28 seats.
What did occure, Tlated the negativ mpaign. For the Sou shicil Election was Io; than Won by the P phrase LuSed in rew PrĒrādā5 Wt of 1988 while Mrs beēr tha favourite, i UNP. Snatched dese victoгу.
HoW did this happ)
In reflecting on th understand the true
E5Lut, lite TS of Wol 43.9% attle Southe Election of March 19 47.1% it obtained in nCall COLCIElecti People's Aliance ot Wote now, as oppose in 1993. This repres UNP wote of appro: increase in the PA. W. 18%. While the dec though significant, de ntial, the increase in рћепопела.
TTTg yirtEffig MgRdé3"

Litin
hope this does not gree of objectivity in paign. I should pey impressions Were participation at UNP ias dificult for Ilg t0 Alliance meetings ard frOT COTVEISais section of Southern
aightaway that I, like luding ardent suppothis result Wrong. My S that the UNP Would Ory obtaining a maximore probably about
was that underesties of the UNP cāther Provincial Coust by the UNP rather A, in the celebrated arse When President Presidential Election Bandaranalike had on this occasion, the at out of the jaws of
en
is, it is necessary to di The Siors of this les the UNP obtaired
Il PVC Cli 94 as opposed to the
the Souther Prowin of May 1993. The taired 54.5% of tE d to 37.3% of the Wote ents a decline of the Kimately 3% and an ote by approximately ine if the UNP votes
DES TOt SeĒT Substathe PA Wote seers
of hig, Libra/Party.
FromTil this We arriweat the fir Sterreous assumption of the UNP campaign. President D.B. Wijetunge artid those who hawe identified themselves with him appear to hawe made the rather naïve assumption that With the divisions and confusion the Democratic United National Front and the return of its Leader Mr. GaminiDissanayake to the UNP, the DUNF Wote Which Was almost 14% in the South in 1993 would fall into the UNP pile. This super-optimistic assumption was not shared by serious UNP strategists and campaigners including most of the UNP MPs from the South WHO Estiate that 1/3 of the DUNF WOtE of 1993 would go to the UNP while 2/3 Would go to the Alliance. On a merely rational analysis this seemed to me too, to be a likely outcome. Contrary to the facile belief that the DUNF. Wote Was ar exclusively UNP vote the decline in the PA wote in 1993 (37.3%) as opposed to Wotes of the SLFP and left the 1991 local Election (44.0%) suggests that in the South the DUNF Wote had a substantial component of dissaffected SLFPers. It was also evident that in 1993 the DUNF obtained a high proportion of the new (youth) votes which are often votes of protest, Nevertheless, it Tust be admitted that the UNP and even those like me, did not imagine that the DUNF vote would go enbloc to the PA which is precisely what appears to have happened.
Even an amalgarn of the PA and DUNF Wotes Would hawe takem the PA, in 1994 to the 50.3% which they obtained together in 1993. A further 4% of the vote has been garnered by the victorious Alliance for which other explanations must be sought. These explanations are not unconnected to the failure of the UNP to obtain any
JNF WEES.
BEft" | address myself to these explanations, a Word must be Written about the magnitude of the UNP defeat. The UNP

Page 6
Wote at this election remains a substantial 44%. Newertheless, the anti-UNFP wote never reached the substantial proportion of 54.5% in any province outside the North and East in the past twenty four years. The enormity of this is ermphasised When One notes that in terms of the polling divisions that constitute the former parliamentary Constituencies the score was 20 for the PA and only 1 for the UNP. Te months ago the score was 12 polling divisions for the UNP and 10 for the PA. What has happened in this period to dra
natically effect the balance of forces?
There can be little doubt that such factors as the negative ir Tage of indiwidual UNP politicians at the Provincial and Well as the national level (from the area) did have a bearing on the result, But this factor which was present even in 1993 could not hawe been decisiwe.
The principal reason for the decline of the UNP in the South is that the absence of President Premadasa was sorely felt in a variety of Ways. In the Hambantota District this factor was, Crucial, in the Matara District decisive, and in the Galle District, significant. With the death of President Premadasa the energetic pursuit of de Welopment in the rural a reas and the deep commitment to Welfare measures ended. Midday meals for school students had ended, uniforms were no longer being distributed and Janasawiya has been delayed. People accustomed to seeing their President energetically pursuing improveTents to their lot at first hand. When the late President Was in office hawe reacted sharply against a remote and laid back Presidency removedfroппthe people and pursuing idiosyncratic goals which fail to touch the lives of ordinary people.
President Wijetunge's quixotic pursuit of ultra Sinhala nationalism bordering on racism, which was his exclusive campaign theme has been utterly rejected by the people of the South who (as I can testify as one who listened to Some of his speeches and observed the reactions of the Crowds to them) reacted to them in bore
dorm or bewilder II slogan pronounce "EelarT IS Tot to be (EelaT denna a me a subject of humour and the average att tings. An attitude E disastrous for nation the political prosper Lanka as a Whole, h in the South Where Small and Which Wa
of Sinhala flationalis President's exclusiv shadowed the Tort Sisiful the The Sof othe ding the Prime Minis ranaike on ECOO incompetence and E. Opposition, its lack c. ral de Tlocracy etc is the humiliation of the mmata Bhumiputra
famatical Sinhala rac splendid consequer WE.S FL FENSSP right of self-determin East, obtained 5.9% ma, the One Cons rating Wjtha Rohan: Gandhi) who led the his own party obtair in the SäTE COStitu
The Impression cr GOWErnment Was dis Work and the memor daSa Was alSO 3 mei addressed 24 pub South and having at I can say confident reference that drews seat UNP meetings ry reference to Presic abandonment by th significant electoral neously influenced party, contributed : UNP's undoing.
It should be recog Woters, particularly 1 young Were subst:

ant. The presidential i With such gusto given in this epoch' kape) SooTI beCaITE to UNP campaigners ender of public meeIt OICE iTTOra| ald all unity as well as for its of the UNP in Sri las uttery falled even The Timority Wote Was Sallegedly the home T, THEILTE If IE É theme, which owerrational and succe:r Carmpaigners incluterand Arm Lura BandaTiC issues, the Lutter aucity of vision of the Comitmett) libefurther confirmed by e Sinhalaye MahasaPakshaya, a party of ISm, OB of the möSt Ces of this election Which Stads for the ation of the North and of the wote at Ratgastituency of ex-naval a (Who attacked Rajiv a list of SMBP, while led O.7% of the vote
епсу.
eated that the Current tancing itself from the yof President Premagative factor. Having lic meetings in the tended several Tore ly that the one sure spontaneous applauWasa. Complementaent Prer Tadasa. The
e UNP leader of a asset, perhaps erroby the Critics of the Substantially to the
lized also that young the better educated antially anti-UNP. If
measures are not taken to overcome this, future elections too will produce bad reSults for the UNP and its allies. It Tust be recognized that there are many who feel that the UNP has abused power, that it has acted sometimes in an unfair, authoritarian and excessively partisan manner. This image must be addressed by the introduction of political reform. The open economy must becomplemented by open politics.
As the UNP General Secretary, Minister Sirisena Cooray has said in response to the results, the UNP has retaimed a substantial base vote at almost 44%. It is by no means impossible for it to recover before Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, But foritto do Soit mustreastablish the winning coalition of voters and parties which President Premadasa had So Successfully established. The UNP TlLIst Wirl back the minofities and demoinstrate that while it is the party of the market economy and enterprise it is also the party of generosity by restoring the Welfare and development priorities of the Premadasa era. Il must demonstrate that it and not a coalition of leftists, opportunists and feudalists, Will give the lead to an agenda of liberal democratic reform.
An this can only be done by a radical change both of priorities and of leadership. Only if this is done can the verdict of the South on 24th March 1994 ble prevented from extending itself to the Whole country.
Return
Spielberg'sjir Lexis broker. TFle forces Cre LITITTigride{L. TTLE2 horses tre L'illad again.
WELTET FILLUES Irl Lafru
For Tuy Heartis made Luarını By LL LLOP 7 Carl Uho ľuds Cor Te agair L.
Patrick Jayasuriya

Page 7
INDO-PAK SECURITY
An obstacle to South
Bertram Bastiampillai
mong the Vital Challenges that
SOLUthi ASia Will| hawe to Tliegt in the Coming years, most significant will be the challenges of alleviating poverty through economic development, Conserving the environment through intercountry cooperation in the subcontinent, and solving regional as Well as global problems such as as and nuclear proliferation. Both India and Pakista hawe a Critical and crucial role to play if the South Asian region as a regional entity is to contend With these formidable issues. But it is for the tensions that persist and preval between India and Pakistan Lihat an ir Tipediment to closer regional cooperation in South Asia, it is feared, could arise, Crucal to successful regional Cooperation will ble India-Pakistas relatio S.
An arms race in South Asia really exists only between India and Pakistan as also there exists a Thong thema race for nuclear superiority. A single but strong hindrance to regional cooperation and Cohesion Stells from "the One WCSUS the other" syndrome which has characterized and Continues to characterize India-Pakista relations. Unsurprisingly, hence it is in these two countries, specially and for long, that economic planners had been competing with military strategists and tacticians forscarceresources. Consequently security concerns have grown Worse, and stunted inter-state, and thereby regional cooperation.
More recently, there has also been another obstacle to regional collaboration that has become Violently manifestin India owing to a trend that has grown strong there. On earlier occasions too, religious unrest had erupted sporadically in the subcontinental Country, but it often had been contained Within the national boundaries Without much difficulty. But the religious disturbances of December 1992 caused following a group of Hindus destroying a mosque in Ayodhya led to Volatile repercussions in the bordering countries, particularly in Pakistan and Bangaladesh, both of which are overwhelmngly Islamic in population. The "fall out"
Thg a L'hor is Professor, Departirrent of History and Political Science, University of Colombo.
Was SC badas to lei of the annual sun Heads of Gowermer ASSOCliatio foTRE (SAARC) in Dhak. When the Heads of C. later the atmospher Cordial.
There is more t accounts for theim tās ben Charact WERE IT dia and Pa tWO COUntrie5 ETBI entities. But now the of the Hindus in Irls State, Hindufva, ha: to the suspicions, f. ncerns of those two the region, No doub South Asian neighb lant to ensure that d gious intolerance W. rther the existings region particularly Col a more meaningful cooperation.
Fortunately, Isla has not posed ath between the Countri One Cannot di SCO Un mē Hindu Te WiiWallisST) reactive Islamic ups Within and Outside Owing to security that Pakistan can only Co-operation betwet the region ever more ssed on February 2. States Seriate that Ween India and Pak the most probable pl of Weapons of mass1 nuclear weapons", i. rely Written off. After: | dia ad Pakista either to evaporate.e. ted soon by rational Suspicion of each ol of life for generatior is not likely to be ea:
In reviewing how hamper co-operatior India and Pakistan, i.

Asian Co-operation ?
ad to apostponement Imit meeting of the tSiin the SLA5a gional Co-operation a, Bangladesh. And SOverTTentSdid Teet E. Waslot. So WITO"
han One Cause that lacable mistrust that istically endemic bekiStar a Wer SCEthe "ged as independent threat from a Section dia to Set up a Hindu Sadded more Wenom 2ars and Security Coprincipal Countries of t, India as Well as her OUIS have to be wigETCStrations of reliould not increase fuuspicions within the Pakistan, and retard
growth of regional
micundarmentalis feat to the relations ES Öf S0 Luth Asia but the danger of extrein India triggering off urges and reprisals, dia, The the fers assailboth India and WOSEr arld obStruct
tle States a Also, the fear expre4, 1993 ir LFE United "the ErITS ra CE beistam poses perhaps O Spect for futura LISE Jestruction, including gain cannot be entiill the rivalry between is too deep rooted asy Ortobe eradicaolution. Hostility and her has been a way S and unfortunately ily obliterated.
fears over security especially between dWithout dia-Pa
kistan co-operation there is little prospect of South Asian Regional Co-operation, the record of relations in the immediate past betweep these two countries is as important as their relations since indepeindence in August 1947.
Of the South Asian countries, only Pakistan and India Were more directly affected by the Cold War. Although the Cold War had ended, and the military rivalry of the United States and the erstwhile Soviet Union had petered out the earlier arming of India and Pakistan, the allies of these tWOpOWers, had undoubtedly contributed towards aggravating their rivalry. And now it is 00:SSible, more ower, to Cortin Le that rivalry which had got stim Lulated by the added strength which the bequest of modern Weapons had certainly reinforced.
The post Cold War scene in South Asia in regard to India and Pakistan, no doubt, indicated a dismantling of the past equation of strategicalliances. Also, there folloWedi a change in the attitudes and practiCes of the powers and in the pQWers themselves that had lent political and military buttressing to both India and Pakistan. India Could no longer take for granted the former Soviet Union'ssure and certain diplomatic support at international levels or forus; there is now no such Soviet Union. More materially and vitally, India has also lost the earlier strategic support and defence supplies which the Soviet Union had provided her With. Neither the Commonwealth of Independent states nor will the Russian republic now Come to India's support in similar fashion, For instance, this became quite clear over the "rocket engine" issue.
True, there was a renewal in September 1991 for another 20 years of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed in 1971, but it is now not of much use. As a Commentator from Moscow remarked after the liquidation of the Soviet Union: "Officially the treaty is seemingly ineffect. But in practise, there is no one in our side to implement it. Indeed further negotiations With the Russian government had proved inconclusive, especially on Whether the Security clauses should be retained". India cannot hope to obtain the
5

Page 8
earlier "friendship prices" or "easy payment schedules" for her defence iTpots. As a result there has been a grawe handicap to India's readiness to engage in Combat to Ward off sudden contingescies. India's military potential and preparedneSShaSbeen SorTe What blurited, and this Consequence of the post cold War years could be an indirect blessing as it COLld CJT tribut to ISSE Pakista's apprehensions and Security concers wis-a-vis India, and be fore conducive to easen strains over security appreheLLLLaaaLLL LLLLHCLLLLaLLLLLL SLL LLLLSS
This however may be a prematшге соLLLLLL LLaLLLLL LLLLL LaLLL LLaLLL LLaLC in recent times towards the United States in order to find support. There indeed had been signs of such a stance even earlier WE Indira Gandhi Had Established frieindly relations with President Ronald Reagan during the Cancun Summit of 1981 On North-South relations. Moreover, the relations between Rajiv Gandhi and the other Prime Ministers of India With the United States had never badly plummeted Sir CEther). But India Flas Stilt C) defing the issues specifically related to the charaLLLLLL LLLLL LaLLLLL LL LLL LLLLtLLL LLLL LLLaLLL States co-operation in the defence and BCDIOIC argas. MOrg tiIle and EndeaWour Would be needed to forge a relationship with the United States before India could feel confident that she has foundan alErflätivBöll EformEr SowjEl Union from a strategic point of view. In the Contemporary thinking of the United States the chances of Such a relationship seems remote, and not So longago India.appeared lobe nottoo happy With the US views Om Kashmir.
Of course, in the rapidly changing current scene India could weigh other options available, such as forging closer relations with Europe, China, Japan, and even with the buoyant and lively econdmies of the Asia-Pacific region, No doubt, some trends in this direction are discernible but nothing tangible or promising has happened as yet. But evidently in the new international environment. India's propensity seems to be not to lean on one single nation Whether it be im Strategy, armis Supply Orin economic and trade relations. Nor Will she replace her old relationship With the forer Soviet Union. With her new relationship with the United States. More likely Will be a more active and earnest Tulti-dimensional foreign policy, including a further strengthening of relations with China so as to enhance India's image and position as a regional power. With China, recent developments indicate that relations are certainly turning to be strongly
Warner. Yet, just nov to be seriously anxio management of ht especially in regard South Asian region, changes in Indo-CE necessarily give to closer or early co-o two longtime hostile
Pakista | IS II a | indeed appears Wor: violently disturbed si poses сопсегп for Wild Of ES her Sole Solace in re, in the equation the strategic signific got sharply, althoug nted folloWing the b Viet Unit) || ald the | Gulf War. HETICEP without the ready as to be taken for gran
THE United Slate forgotten to a fair ext ty relations with Pak Pakista froTt UI stopped under the for October 1990. the United Stateshastakela diffEľEft
Pakistan howeve Salvage much of th and even important Pentagon, the State Congress would Wis nce With heralthoug alliance Could eWe
The United Stati stills that closer inevitably lead to WC the rest of South AS to ha WE3 ExCE3||let TE Tember Of the SAA We are shot intereste of new relationship Wedge between lind ntry in the subcontin
Washington seen nuing a new sort of! W Pakist TOW SSlerailed Tet Of EWidence of a transf relations has beer yet notable change Nations position or States has Tadë CÖLuld ha WE EJEET ft of the Simila Agreer India and Pakistar happened as a seg|

Windiastill has cause us with respect to the Pr SeClurity . Cor1Cerns O FokiS Will E Therefore the recent hiria relations do rot o much promise of eration between the neighbours,
O better situation; it SEB, TIT LI ICEritairland luation in Afghanistan Pakista e W Er if the viet Union had given mediately. FurthermoOf the United States ance of Pakistan has not totally, dis COUraak do Will of the SOCONSequenCeS Ճf the akista has been left sistance of a pastally
Ed.
ShoWevër has now entler earlier SeCurikistanı, Security aid to ited StateSad BEe P55 ATTI
Indeed, the future of Pakistan relationship turmimi pręSemit timēS.
has endeavoured to e earlier relationship, quarters such as the Department, and the h 10 presĒrWear alliah the character of the
be the sale,
as dismissed SuggeUS-India liaS WOLuld Irsening relations. With ia, "We are trying...... lationships. With every RC Community.... And din forming any kind Which Would drive a ia and any other cou
erit". (Griffin).
StO bebert Oil COntistrategic Co-operation lithstanding the Prenuclear proliferation. Orlation in the for Ther urnished by the slight in Stace in the United Kashti; the United clear that a solution Lund Withil the Egit
Et of 1972 EJ EtWIEC , although little had El to it. Also, Pakistar
has been told not to support the Kashmiri and Punjabi militants who are waging a War of Secession against the Indian state, While in turn India has been cautioned not to ignore human rights, especially in Ka5hrTir.
One step that Pakistan had taken to deal with the change wrought in the strategic relationship with the United States could be seen in her attempt to redefine the relations With the successor republics aa LLLL LaLLL LLaaLLLSS LSKLLLLLLL aaLLLLLL LL Central Asian Islamic states as the future arena of its diplomatic and economicinitiatives. It foresees a new economic region emerging in a network of Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey, and the Central Asian, Muslirion republics. lin November 1992 the Ecnomic Co-operation Organisation (ECO) which already comprised Pakistan, Iran and Turkey saw AfghaniStan arith E Central Asia Muslista BS Berter irto it. The interESL f' PakiStar ir the ECO can Tilean in turn a lessening of interest in the SAARC and above all pose a serurity concern to other States such as India because of the banding together of countries on a religious basis.
Russian support and the aid of other republics had been sought on issues Concerning Pakistan's security against India. The Vote on Pakistan's proposal for South Asiato be anucléair-armis fraëzOrlé in the United Nations, and the Russian "acknowledgment" of the proposal of Pakistan On Kashmir When Wice Presiderit Alexander W. Rutskowisited in December 1991 Carl Dereckor Ed Derhaps ES SCITIE Success in this respect. To add to this LLLLaaL La LHHLH L LaLLLLL LLaLaLLLLL LLL LL oficial of Lhe United States that Jam TIL and Kashmir Constituted "disputed territory". But it may really not meam any tilt irfEWOur Of PakiStar. NEW Earthlal2 S5 taris no doubt that all this prowes FOW seristiwe Kashmir is in India-Pakistan security asid politiCS.
But the prospects of such support forthcoming always in favour of Pakistan are uncertain and look bleak. It is more likely that the present Russian republics and the Central Asian republican partners in the Commonwealth would prefer to be not overtly or overly Supportive of Pakistanin the India-Pakistan dispute, The former Soviet Union had been forth right on proпошпсіпga regioпаlapproachto solve the non-proliferation of nuclear Weapons and the Kashmir issues. The Rutskoi-Ishaa Khan Statement too really reiterated the usualSoviet position of Wanting the issue resolved peacefully through negotiation.

Page 9
JAPANESE CHALLENGE WORLD BANK REC
US model not righ
Batuk Wora
ere is a development of immense
iriterest and importarice for the Indian e Como Tists and a Calderlicials i Wollwedir chalking oLt the Country's development strategy. The "structural adjustments" prescribed by the World Bank for Third World countries face a strong Japanese opposition - and for a fundamental realSon-inside the governing body of the World Bank Japan is the second largest CO Fitrio LutOTE FET the United State.S.
The Japanese stance results from the realisation that their kind of capitalism was different from the American one, contrary to their earlier understanding through the 19B05 tilat both WETE alikE3.
Better System
The Japanese are now asserting that their system is not only diferent but superior to the American style of economics, dominated as it is by the hard-core conservatives.
Јарап has staгled to reject the есопоTic advice that American academics and bank officials are giving to some Third World countries, including India. The structural adjustment loans, started by the World Bank since the 1980s require the recipient Countries to meet Cartain Corditions. These consist of eliminating tariffs and restrictions on foreign investment, privatising public banks, eliminating subsidies for local industries and removing any Control on credit and currency. This also gradually eliminates the active role of government in planning.
The World Bank primarily provided loans since 1945 for dams, schools, roads and other infrastructure projects in the Third World. It changed since the 1980s whenstructural adjustTentoansito deveoping nations were opened up.
The Japanese officials are arguing that these developing countries should look to East Asia rather than to the US and the
Great Britis for til development. The EtSitis EES stronger. The idea nSErVatiWESIS t0la|| tion - What fore t0 de SCribe as "tho
The Japanese b. after the East Eu ECOTOTTES CLITTbl. the World Banks rapy". The Bank's nger found the Jap to be dismissed. A leWel WaS (Bluctant JS äld UK direct public, The first tim bers annual meeti that Japan di SSE2 ntɛ
Japan's executiv Bank, Mr. Masaki campaigned for tr internal study repC new President, Mr. to publish only a ssioned a new pL Control of the Balk': of tactics was thus the Japanese.
The Bank has specially-commissi "The East Asia M the ConTentator, TF7675g TFr7735. Wee d0Cumentis Täde obfuscation of How factual accounts of are useful and a CC nOmists hawe Sup ideological perCEpoli
Fact5, 2 Waded
The Japanese sought to be dilut presenting a pletho LISEd to EWälde l: SLICLESS."

IPE
ht for South Asia
air Todel of Capitalist Tole of the govet Asiam Todel rentains of the Allerical COBarra hlasis On privatiSa"FreeSidest ELS LISSusandpoints of light."
Carl Thore assert We ropean and Russian durder the burden of OOITSIOrEd "Shock, LFEother directors lo loапеše argument easy study at the internal ly undertakan but the rS Opp0Sed to rmake it E, it Was in 1991 Octorig of the World Bank 2d.
e director at the World Shitatori, Vigorously le publication of that rt. Finally the Bank's Lewis Preston, agreed Summary and Commiblic study under the sdirectors. A new kind adopted to challenge
nOW published that oned study reportMiracle". According to մՃիlm Jutils of the I1 kly of Chicago, "this into a masterpiece in rildigiT gnt... Whila tra LFle differETht COurtries Irate, the Banks ECOerimposed their own [[]T15 CF ||.
argument has been ed and confused by ra of debating devices facts of East Asiam
By Comparing Hong Kong with South Korea, the Bank officials come to the conclusion that "there is no single East Asian model, as such." In reality, no one Would even suggest Hong Kong - a longtime British Colony and an outpost of London's financial district - as a model for Ukraine or Nigeria. Then they talk about a model all right, but given an example of Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia (South East Asia) as more relevant to other developing countries than the Success of Taiwan, Japan or South Korea (North Asia). They insist that these nations' success have nothing to do with "industrial policy" and government inteГуEntitr.
The study asserts that the Asian COLintries succeded because they paid attetion to the funda letals of fisiCal ald market discipline championed by the World Bank,
Disappointment
This assertion has already been challenged by the South Korean economist, Mr. Jenekwon. In a paper that Will appear in the journal World Development, Mr. Kwon shows that in South Korea, the industries that enjoyed the highest increase in Output, productivity and Sales Were those subsidised and overseen by the government, Japan and Taiwan present the 5ările KIrld of IG5Lț5.
Now the Japanese officials have expreSSed their disappointment With the report.
John Judis notes that at an October brea
kfast meeting at the Economic Strategy Institute, Japanese Finance Ministry offcial Eisuke Sakakibara reaffirmed Japan's conviction that America's and the Bank's "shock therapy"strategy was ill-suited for developing nations. Mr. Sakakibara, the author of an impressive new study Bayard Capitalism. The Japanesa Model of Market Economics, also attributed part of the upheawal im Russia to Mr. Yeltsin's
7

Page 10
acceptance of the dictums of the World Bank.
The Japanese had begun complaining about the Bank's aid policies in the early 1990s. They pointed out that Japan, Korea and Taiwan developed according to a far different rodel. In the East Asian "dragons', the governments worked closely. With business to develop strategies for growth. Nationalised banks gave low-interest loans and grants to Selected industries. Governments restricted foreign i'w Estrert to maitain Control ower the direction of economic development. Subsidies were granted to business - in exchaпge for specific performance requirements. Planners placed high priority on becomingcompetitive through highегргоductivityrather tham through lower Wages,
Those who followed the A Tierican -W573MS" בלח"י בלטרוSN לבלום לחלוטו" בשנאצ"ח (סלונסויוז Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Hong Kong and Thailand grew three times as fast as Latin American and South Asian Countries and five times faster than Sub-Saharan Africa.
A recently published Work, The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Poweredited by Wolfgang Sacks, Zed Books, London, throws enough light on this subject. Some of the contributors blast the idea that the US (and European) model represents the ideal end-goal of the historical process. The environmental Crisis reveals the failure of this model, more than anything else, "If all countries of the South Were to follow the industrial West, five or six planets Would be needed to serve as mines and waste dumps. WESLET Todel 5 Would BOB Tähef SĒrāS an aberration in the course of history", Wrote Mr. Sacks.
Lesson for India
The Japanese hawe not gone in their critique of the American model to this extent but their challenge touches a vital point of great debate - the role of the governments. Where does India fit in here? Indian economists, acader ticians and ministeries grappling with the Country's development strategy hawe to Wake up and take Cognisance of the Japanese lime and recast their development path now.
- P4
HoW in
for the
Pervaiz qbal C
ppearing before Relations Sub-C
Ea5t 51 and SC) Luth stant Secretary of St Affairs, Robin Raphel ca's Wital interests in halting proliferation o destruction and their promoting democratis eCOnomic reforTTis, er1 investment, develops nning and resisting E tion. Few days later W Asia Society she reit interests in South As terrorism and narco already announced
In both speeches linkage between the rēkā LU for SOLuth Aisar wing importance Col Americans. But she ssed that With the E regions such as SOL increased importarC ca's global concerns South Asia has beer rung on the Americ
dder?
Generally, South Tained an area of p. We Interests for the
AITEricains obtair1 fr
Carl be terred as nomy. Until recent in Westents or the the region was always, the mainCor USSouth Asia polic pursuits. After the C nuclear proliferation EDLULE LOW TOS the
COCTT 15 for SOLuth
TESLS. Wille St do Contribute tOSOT

portant is South Asia Americans ?
heeTia
the Senate Foreign
Tittee on Near Asian Affairs, ASSatë for South Asian stressed that Ameri
SOLL A5lā included
f Weapons of mass
means of delivery, iation, human rights,
couraging trade and "nent, population placological deteriorawhile addressing the
grated the AfTerican ia adding Combating tic trafficking to the ist.
she highlighted the creation of the BLAffairs and the grothe region for the
also forcefully Streind of the Cold War, Јth Asia have gained Er boed Cau:59, Of An Ter
DOES this Tarilha elevated to a higher an policy priority la:
Asia has always rearipheraland derivatiJS. There is little that om this region Which Crucial for their ecoly neither American WoluThe of trga de With1
Substantial. AT 10:St sideration governing y has been its global old War, the threat of seals to hawe Contrienhanced Aterican
ASİLa OtheTitleal E sted interests le degreetowards the
formulation of American South Asian policy, so the do more than others.
Robin Rapheľs list of American interests can be subdivided into two categories. Those which require immediate attention and those which are showpieces designed to Take America look good but not necessarily be pursued with vigour.
Among the real interests, the American commerical interests and the quest for a
поп-proliferatiопгеgimeseепtobeопtop
of the list, South Asia is the third largest recipient of Americam development aid and the WarīOLJS US adrTimistratiÕITIS ha WG poured in more than 26 billion dollars in the fOFIT) Of ECOrlOfThiC 355iStarCE Sir CE partition. Further, the post Cold War period is Witnessing wastly accelerated LLLLLLtL LaHLHHLGLaLLL LLaaaaL0L L aaLLa Asia. For obvious reasons, India gets the argest chunk of both investment and trading. To further expand the economic activities, the US Supports the Ongoing filla Cial and COITTEľCial refCOTTS. SICE the US commerce department has already desigпated Iпdia as one of the lеп big energing Tmarkets of the World, India is viewed by the Americansas the harbinger of economic growth in the region. Thus ir CreaSeed ECO OTC and COIIIIIlerCialia Citivities of the Americans in India are in order and understandable. But despite this, the LLLLLLL LaLLLL00L LLLL LLLLLL00LL0L aLL L a grown. The Indians recognise the benefits Of TCTE335ęd ATTEricar COTimercial actiw|- ties, but they give the impression that more is being done by the Indians rather than by the Americans to attain the current |BWG| Of COT || Tiercial inter Ediction BBTWB en
the LWO COLutri ES. THE SECÖrld afĒ Of AmeriCan interest revolves arOLIld ILclear non-proliferation. Ostensibly, this is an area to which President Clinto his accorded high priority. The US recognizes that both India and Pakistan are potential

Page 11
nuclear States and that the trend should be reversed. However their policy in this behalf is flawed. The Pressler Alendrinent which is meant to prevent Pakistan's drift towards nuclearisation has had the OppositeirTipact, thas. Het India Offithe hook. Prior to the application of the country specific Pressler Amendment to South Asia, the prevention of the area's nucleariStation Was Tot all that difficult. It has changed now, Pakistan has to increase its reliance on nuclear capability as its conventional capability is badly hit by this AFTEdTETE. THE TESLut is the Whole TEgion's slow drift towards nuclearisation. Does this serve the American objectives in the area? Certainly not.
The recent statement of US Under SeCretary of State International Security Affairs. Lynn Davis that US non-proliferation policy will look at both India and Pakistan equally see Tis to be a first step in the right direction. The recently announced even-handed unclear policy of the Americans has many important dimesissions. It seems that Pakistan Will sliot be single out on the nuclear issue. Either this of that punitive measures would be simutaneously applied to both India and Pakistan. It also appears that the US has more or less realised that the best approach towards South Asia's nuclear issue is one that is regional.
How much of this policy is different from the previous Americar policies in South Asia? During the 1965 Indo-Pak war, the US imposed arms embargo and justified this on the grounds of even-handed approach. They disregarded the fact that Pakistan's arms procurement dependency upon US sources was ower 80%, whereas India's arms procurement from America was less tham 20%.
With this in mind, we would like the the US to spell out what exactly it means that from now on its nonproliferation policy will took at both India and Pakistan equally? Robin Raphel's apprehension seems to Ee Well foLunded that the US leaded to navigate carefully in South Asian troubled Waters as there exists a 'deep reservoir of Suspicions and hostility between India
ard Pakista". It | necessary to clearly ters of this even-h: any confusion.
Among the Amer Asia that make the World, include its CrthU5ia.5Tald Su and democracies. speeches delivere officials, the them sanctity of hшman projected. But the that this stance ha bstance, The Tlassi tions in the occupie able to produce a policy aaction toch
Robin's Nove Which 5E ESSE3 tE recognise the inst provoked strong rea Her recent speech markedly different she had displayed i Terit. Her TildľEfa rment's 1993 riigi South Asia demons needs to be dorë Tellowing down of issue which, in tur "neutral' posture at SCUSSIOl Of UN HI SSO.
Also Americans to dërTOCTacies do the Third World. T reflects that the US like many other st interests. If the nat sited Supporting a easier for the USt
Wee Words and many exarflples frd LJS SLupportad, ins dictators.
In Sum, Robin F ches are an attempt that the South Asia an important policy it might yet to be :

OECOPTES EWET TOTS 'spellout the parameanded policy to avoid
iCarl interests in South : US look good in the "epeatedly expressed pport for human rights
In almost all major by Senior ATerican of respect for the rights is vociferously experience suggests S TOE froth thal SuWe human rights violadi KaShTirhawe to be SubStartiWÉ ATTIEfiCarl eck Indian repression.
per 1993 Speech in that the US did not rummet Ölf a CCESSO Iction froIII, the Indiam S. to Asia Society seems From the flamboyancy
1her NOV. 1993 State
"ence that "State depahts reports Covering fäléSHOWITlLIC TOTE "reflect Considerable the US stance of this fl Could Tlarlifest in H Genewa's Ongoing di-|mmסJman Rights C.
references of support not convince many in le past record clearly las always Supported, ates, its own national ional interests Warraemocracy, it become o bridge the gap bedeeds. But there are in the past when the talled and protected
aphel's recent speeto give the impression in region has become area for the US, while so in fact. They also
reflect that the US despite being "involved in the region is still treading cautiously. Perhaps the Americans are scared of being accused of demonstrating tilt toWards Pakistan. It will be some time, therefore, before So Luth Asia Witnesses bold and ingenious initiatives from the Americans on core regional probles.
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Page 12
SOLUTH ASIA
The eye of the eth
Lynn Ockersz
"From nation-making to nation-breaking" - this was how a political analyst described the intensifying ethnic turmoil in South Asia. This region's agonies couldn't have been expressed more cogently. Nation-breaking is indeed the order of the day.
Still, this question can be asked: Was nation-ITaking undertaken in earnest? Didn't self-interest and short-term political gain take precedence overnation-building in the thinking and policies of most of South Asia's political leaders and 'statesmen' in the post-colonial era? Even a Cursory glance at the political history of T1 Ost SOiLuth Asia Countries Wi|| Corwin Cea the obserwerthat the golden Lules of goweпnance were repeatedly, violated in the most Cavalier fashion; poverty of thought and political Tiyopia hawe Contir Lually maSqueraded as sound goverrirTent, one of the aims of this study is to lay bare these ill-Concealed "skeletons' of South Asia's Past,
Nation-breaking is being variously referred to today and the most favoured Catchwords are "Lebanonization' and "BaIkanization'. And again, the expressions COLuldn't hawe been more aptor suggestive. South Asian states are being ripped apart by spiralling violence and deeply-diVisive Conflicts. Ethnic groups are growing impatient With their lot. In almost every state in the region disadvantaged ethnic groups in increasing numbers are clamoring for more freedom, power and conteintment. They are calling for greater recognition and increased self-respect. They no longer like each other's company and are not hesitating to use borTıbs and bulets to prove their point. These men with guns are even ready to make the supreme sacrifice for the achievement of their aims. They are ready to kill and be killed in the name of ethnic group and community.
Minds are being brutalized and unprecedented bestiality unleashed, even in the name of religion, Tho Lusands of lives are being lost daily; people who tilled the soil for ages and occupied homesteads bequeathed to them by their forefathers are being turned into homeless refugees overight, Houses are being put to the torch; rape, arson and looting are fast be
The Writer is a Well known Sri Lankan Journalist
O
coming facts of life in multi-religious and n
Ethnic groups whi in perfect harmony teach other'S thropatS, and quiet SE em to by Volcanic, man-m Asia Seems to be di rEcognition,
How did this Cole identifiable processe the Socio-economic that led to SLCh är What impact do th WarslBWB Ös Inter-S! Asia? How do they the World-at-large? T questions to which a in this study.
There are a grea. of an ethnic nature Forthe sake of Coger Seness, this study W. On the separatist re. njab and Kashmir st ratist War ir Sri Lark, sing in Bangladesh boleT ir Bhutan. It i embody most of the South Asian separa focus Wilbe the pos
Diwide and rUle Br||
It is argued that the Werre firStSOWI ir Sol imperialists, Anti-ir the Third World intel by "dividing and ruling Tie S, the British triei render ineffectiwe ut ggles against their r Was to Ward off thre: pitting one Section of the other.
A study of the his Would substantiate although it should b explanation for the South Asia doesn't
actic of "divide and processes at work W. ethnicity and spark hostilities. More will SSes later. Right now to assess the manne

niC Storm
most of South Asia's ulti-ethnic states.
hiseemed to co-exist are today literally at Long years of peace ave been shattered ade Wiolence. South isintegrating beyond
about? Arethere any is at Work? What are and political factors explosive outcome? se Wasting internal ate relatio15 in South affect the West and hese are Some of the swers will be sought
Umber of Conflicts in South Asia today, cy, clarity and Conciill be focussing only JelliOS ir India''S Puates, the Tamil sepata, the Chakma Lupriand the ethnic pros believed that they essential features of tism. The period in t-Indira Gandhi efa.
tish style
Seeds of Separatism uth Asia by the British perialist sections of igentsia contend that 'in multi-ethnic colodi to Lunder Tine and liited natiorialist Struul. The British air ats to their reign by their subjects against
tory of colonial rule this contention, lead Titted that the
rise of ethnicity in nd here. Besides the rule' there are other hich tend to intensify
off inter-communal pe Said of the proceit would be relevant rir Which "diffWide and
rule' ignited the fuse of the time bomb of ethnicity.
Ethnicity broadly refers to an ethnic group's pursuit of power and dominance vis-a-vis other ethnic groups in a given body politic. An essential precondition for this is a feeling of one's distinctiveness in relation to others. This sense of 'separateness' could be based on a Social group's ethnic origins, language, Culture, religion or even special capabilities.
British colonial policy on the Indian subcontinent had the effect of promoting an ethnic consciousness or a feeling of 'separateness" among certain communities. One such community were the Sikhs.
In recognition of the loyalty of the Sikhs in the mid-nineteenth century, the British accorded them a special status in their army. For instance, Special Sikh regiments were established. To strengthen this devotedness on the part of the Sikhs, and to Consolidate theirinfluenc6 in the community, the British even patronised and protected the management of Sikh gurudwaras or religious shrines.
British policy in the twentieth century too had the effect of boosting the Sikhs' ethnic consciousness. The Morley-Minto Constitutional Reforms Comittee established in 1909 made provision for separate Muslim representation. Consequently, the Sikhs also demanded separate represertation. Under the Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935 the right to separate representation was granted to numerous religious communities in India. The Sikhs too benefited from this controversial
theasure.
"Divide and Rule' was proving effective in India's Madras Presidency in the early part of this century too. This unit of administration roughly corresponded to today's Tamil Nadu state. Political power was Concentrated in the hands of the Brahmins - he Ostpowerful Castegroup ir Indian Society. It was a time when middle-rung non-Brahmin castes were vying with the Brahmim5 for SOCio-GC010rmic adwan CBment. However, the dominant position of the Brahmins prevented these non-Brahmins from realising their aspirations. Political power was the only means through which parity of position could be attained.
To be continued)

Page 13
Mahindapala and Moral
Regi Siriwardena
博 likely that a fair proportion of readers of the LG, seeing the headings of Mr., H.L.D. Mahindapala's three articles On Jane Auster (Feb. 15, Mar, 1 and Mar. 15) and remembering the boredom of their adolescentreading of Emma or Mansfield Park, Would have turned the page over. Муршrpose here is to urge them to dig Lup) those back numbersandsee What they hawe missed. For my part, I found these articles fascinating - for the light they LLL LaLL aLL L LLLLaLL LLL LLL LLLLLS LLLLLLLLS pala himself.
Mr. Mahindapala is not just the editor of the Observer, he is one of the lost singleminded and most enthusiastic operators of the State propaganda machine. There are other journalists who occupy irTimportant positions in the State media but who give the impression that they are just "doing a job', and one suspects that their heart may not be in it after all. Not so with Mr. Mahindapala: whether he is singing hOsannas to the Government or promouricing anathemas on its opponents, he throws himself into it. With the devotion and WigJLIf Of the trLE believEf. So Wher Such a Writer who has served, not merely with fidelity but with servour, two successive regimes that have not been particularly distinguished by their morality, chooses to discourse on moral values (the main burden of his articles on Austen), one must surely listen to him with an attentiveness whetted by curiosity.
I am not concerned here to contest as a literary critic the high valuation that Mr. Mahindapala sets on Jane Austen. All I Will say on that subject is that I think that, as far as 19th century novels Written in English are concerned, one page of Wuthering Heights, Great Expectations, Pudd"read Wilso or New Gri Sree is Worth more than Austen's six novels put together. But what I really Want to do is to read Mr. Mahindapala's three articles as a revelation of his World-view, and to demonstrate their profound congruence
With his public and ther as a Confession
Täl, of the COTW ictio SL u Stair Tiri that ro in short, of what mal
Mr. Mahin dapala'; of Jare Austel is til the true Timoral Centr the little social Cortli friedSad Itinat Was the di Sorder i Austen's Wirtue was amorphous World aldrig" Hrld to lavECOCOOTEd World tha the quintessence of and interpersonals the character of all
With an unerring dapala fOCUSSES O Jane Austen that he for years to use in tea hÉT SOCİä ET TOT instance, the Senter the last chapter of other pensidwell on such odious Subject Like AUSten and her eulogist clearly feel. relief on leaving the stion and the Squal "the Orderliness, the nquility" of the COL Mansfield Park - i. from the turTultuoLS de World'.
| hawe Okrio Wled la's personal life, an st Of tfLISt lät in
COTTOWEat' of
asSociates he does SEel5Sitiwiti ES that he the total separation and the public real
is articles is an indi it possible for him to with the tone of do

ity: A Political Reading
political role; to take l, perhaps unintentioand motivations that e - a self-exposure, ES hir tick.
fundamental praise at she realised that Was to be found in Tonwealth' of family, associates. Outside if 'nagging history': to have left "the big, out there severely Om fined hier:Self to 'a t comes to grips with subtle relationshops }rCes that deterrThine oral being'.
precision Mr. Mahin just those parts of We been accustomed ching to demonstrate a complacency. For Ces at the opening of Mansfield Park "Let guilt and misery. I quit Sā5 500 ās Cā.
heroine Fanny, their s an almost physical ' poverty, the congeor of Portsmouth for noratone, the trantry-house World of haven far renowed Vulgarity of the outsi
ge of Mr. MahindapaId I am ready to take is OWI "little social family, friends and i practise the moral finds in Austen. But between the private is that he upholds in cation of What makes act as he does, and gmatic certainty and
self-righteousnessmanifested each week in his Sunday Observer middle pageantiCles.
It is Well known that in the Nazi concentration camps there were SS men who, after aday Spent gassing Jews, Would go HOTE, andread Goethe Orlistento BeethoWen- and no doubt many of them were fond of their children and lowed dogs. They too believed that morality was to be malItalréd in Önes "little Social CöfTTOnwealth' and not in that "big amorphous World out there'. Of course, Mr. Mahindapala hasn't gassed anybody; but is it very different, in point of moral integrity, to spend one's day covering up for the State and in the evenings to read Jane Austen and be nice to one's Wife children and friends?
The profound congruence' to which referred between Mr. Mahindapala the admirer of Austen and Mr. Mahindapala the political agent can be illustrated from just one of Tiany examples: a column written by him in the Sunday Observer of 20 February-just about the time he was beginning his Austen series. Ticking off those negative-minded intellectuals he loves to hate, Mr. Mahindapala claimed that Sri Lanka was actually a success story. Contrasting the Sri Lankan record of democracy with the one-party regimes and military dictatorships in several other Asian countries, Mr. Mahindapala went on to say: "In Sri Lanka, however, the UNP and SLFP have been alternating regularly, as most democracies do, until 1977". The intellectual dishonesty of this is evident from the fact that Mr. Mahindapala didn't ention that respectable democratic record was breached first in 1982 by a blatantly manipulated and illegally coпducted referendшпп — a rape of democracy that had a great deal to do with the disillusionment With the democratic process that enabled the JVP to get the degree of support it did in 1988-89. But let other pens dwell on guilt and misery:
11

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in command economies or in peripheral nations. This does not constitute ari endorsement of thern edia in market democracies as fearless conveyors of The Truth.
these media in getting their audiences to believe the T1. The possibility that the audiences are being hoodwinked into this belief is not excluded. Media in different peripheral countries exhibit differing degrees of success in achieving some for of Credibility. India in Asia and Senegal in Africa hawe generally dome better than others on this count, Admitting the possibility of Some general causes, it may still be Worthwhile to examine the reasons for the lack of credibility in Sri Lankan media. This article does not propose a complete anSWer. Il rnerely proposes a hypothesis Which, if nothing else, is likely to provoke a useful debate. The proposed explanation may be of applicability to a larger set of peripheral nations, but no claims of generalizability are made here.
The fundamental premise is that individual persuasion is secondary to group dynamics in Sri Lanka. Sri Lankan society has not been fragmented to the individualistic lewel as much as Wester Ti societies. We still tend to think and function interrils of group identities such as region, village, batch, caste, party, and soon. Despite fifty plus years of the Uniwersal franchise (a political mechanism preTilised on the individual as the elementary unit), we still do not fully participate in the political process as individuals. The electoral process Works in a way not fully explainable in terms of liberaldemocratic theory (Jiggins 1979; Jayan ntha 1992),
Sri Lankan group dynamics place great reliance on symbols. For example, many religious conflicts in the early part of the twentieth century were precipitated by symbolic violations of the territories of Specific religious groups (Rogers 1987). One group Would march in procession or engage in extra-loud tom-tom beatings or similar activities inside another group's territory or in front of a site of symbolic importance such as a temple or church. This would be interpreted as a challenge orasanappropriation of the territory which Would then be Tet with a counter attack or a Counter demonstration. There was little if any evidence that these activities had proselytization (Which includes persuasion) as the objective. They were Tore in the nature of extensions of territory and/or reinforcements of group CoheSO.
The blithe disregard of credibility by Sri
Lankan media,
government-control can be best explain usein group dynam a Sri Lanka Bröā reporter and news: Was that Tore Wei огder of presentatio President's speech CEdETIC OWEr the " Minister's speech E Tore newSWorthy)
Warious "stories" (th TT CE: Tham the PriT) get More thar the M Shipping, and so o perSuasive Content
"WES" TE has Very little Subst Was difficult to thir person Would thinkt siwe impact. Other Could hawe haddToT popular support for Were generally sq. irlane Ceremonial re. EWE E OS TE Originating from op: Cofid TOT LE rpretation is that thi
nery (this was partic the Jaya Wardana
mpting to extend/T "El Titorig5"El 5TE Coh65ion. Obserwat by the Warious "re factions, who earne employees of the C. this interpretation, T
oatirädgir the Dire in the presence of political factions W persuasion of the
Were posturing for
and for opponents, processionists of th
It must be emph claiming that indivi Credibility are corn TËdia S.Cele in Sri pointing to the existe neglected factors th Out" the importance sion, a foundational analysis in market c al Social Science ex SSion here is in terT Colitics attlert Causes. As an aside hypothesis can als

particularly the ed electronic media, ad in terms of Symbol CS.My experience as lcasting Corporation ditor in the late 1970s ht was given to the (the "story" with the Nasalways given prestory" with the Prime Wen if the latter Was and the length of the a President would get a Minister, who Would Minister for Trade and m), than to the actual of What Was Carried e ceremonial reports artitiwe content, and itk that any intelligent hey hadgreat persшаnews reports, which 3 efficacy in mobilizing government policies, Jeezed out by these ports. And of course, WSWorthy of reports position sources did ! newscasts, My inteB various groups that of the political machiularly the case during regime) Were attelaintain their political Ingthen internal group ion of actual behavior resentatives" of the d their base salary as orporation, Supported heir methods ranged Jest to alowy editor, actor-General's Office, third parties. These ere not engaged in listening public, but their own supporters just like the religious e early 20th century.
asized that I a Ti mot dual persuasion and
Lanka. I am merely nice of other generally at may be "Washing
of individual persuaassumption of media de TOC facies. As With planations, the discuS of te del CIGS and interms of absolute , the group-dynamics explain Sri Lanka's
traditionally high electoral participation (numerically, as Well asin intensity). Since participationin the political processprimarily occurs in group terms, the stakes are higher. Individuals are subject to pressure from within the group (e.g., extended family, caste, village) to participate since the group as a whole benefits from the victory or suffers from the loss in the political battle. The roads, post offices, and other projects that get built in particular villages and get stalled in mid-course in others as a result of particular election results bear testimony to the rules of this political gastle.
Credibility is important where individual persuasion is important. In a society that has not undergone complete individualistic fragmentation characteristic of capitalism (Where all relations are transformed into relations of money), group dynamics tend to take precedence over individual persuasion. Symbolic activity in the form of signaling and negotiation between groups tends to take precedence over persuasion, thus reducing the importance of credibility. The value of credibility is further reduced in societies. Where state power is Weak, where coercion takes precedence ower hegemony. Therefore, the conditions for Credibility have not been strong in Sri Lanka. As market relations spread through Society and weaken group identities, it is possible that the conditions for Credibility will strengthen. This is not to claim that the Cause of truth Will be advanced; only that audiences will believe more in the Veracity of what they see, hear Orfead.
FEfDrolles
1. Cox, R.W. (1987), Production, power and World order. Social forces in the making of history, New York: Coulmbia University FrESS.
2. Gitlin, T. (1980). The whole world is watching Tlass Tedia in the Taking & un-making of the New Left, Berkeley: University of California Press.
3. Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections from the prisori notebooks, Ed. and trans. O. Hoare and G.N. Smith, New York: International Publisher5.
4. Jayarintha, D. (1992). Electoral allegiance in SriLanka. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,
5, Jiggins, J. (1979) Caste and family in the Politics Of the Sinhalese, 1947-1976, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
6, Rogers, J.D. (1987). Social Tobility, popular ideology, and collective violence in modern Sri Lanka, Journal of Asian Studies, 45(3): 583-E.O.
7. Tuchman, G (1978). Making news; a study in the construction of reality. New York: Free Press,
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DRU
Amendment to Drug Regulation No. 34 of of Monday the 6th July 1992.
“No persoл shall disрелse a prescription a drLug.ʼʼ
MSJ goes down in the history of Drug Ra LLL LLLLHCCGLkLk HHt LT S LLLTLTCHLLGuCGHLL LCCC S LTTTLLTLTLT S decades of Braid Mangfacture for the biggest Lili to almost exclusive Generic Manufacture for the pe סלices.Jיוide SpecfrIrigfHerIIIi Serיוו edיו5erווo!ז renotest Govt. dispersary and General Practitione
There is no glamour in illness - not for the safe, rational treatment, not market incentives.
Illness does of spare either rich or poor,
The Bibile-Wickremasinghe drug reforms into therapeutics. Generic prescribing and Generic of Drug Rationalization Policy.
In Good Times and Bad Times, Epidemi from MSJ have been a dependable Source ofrelie
M. S. J. Industric
Factory and I
P. O. B.
Colom

GS 2.
1984 in Govt. Gazette Extraordinary No. 722/3
I which does not specify the Generic Name of
tionalization in Sri Lanka as the first CoF parly Manufacture, MSV Swifly moved over from two пагіопа! Drug Сотралies operating iл гhis region ople of this country, Our range of Generic drugs in the big city Clinics and Base Hospitals to the r in the courtry,
: sick anyway. The sick need swift, cost-effective,
σαίίεπί ο Γ' Ρίιννιαία η.
were designed and adopted to re-introduce ethics lispensing were the main levers of implementation
2 and Disaster, War and Peace, Generic Drugs fin illness for over a third of this century.
es (Ceylon) Ltd.,
Laboratories
Ο χ 430
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sister-in-law of ex-President Jayawardenie, Who Were reported to hawe Ordered their subordinate staff to defy JWP orders in relation to strikes of the boycotting of Indian goods.
() Most important of all, the exploitation of labour discontents to call major strikes with potentially-crippling economic impacts.' The JVP's capacity to use the trades union movement in this way requires a brief background explanation. It constitutes a great contrast with 1971, when the JWP completely lacked a trades union base or support. In the 1930s and 1940s an active, class conscious trades LiO TOWEITEL WES COSTLJCted in Sri Lākā ir 5 āSSociāli With Māris political parties. From the 1950s, when genero US trades Lunion and er Tployee rights were granted in both public and private sectors, the trades Union Towement became stronger innumerical terms, but increasingly fragmented, politicised,' and Weak. By the time the UNP was Elected c) pOWer in 1977, little remained of the autonomous de Tocratic left-in climedmovement of previous decades. The UNP rapidly, and for the first time in its history, established the dominance of its own union organization, the JSS. The JSS was notorious for corruption and thuggery. Its members Were bound to it by immediate self-interest and fear. Once the JWP had largely broken the back of the JSS in 1987 and 1988 through assassination and intimidation, they were able to exploit the vacuum created.' Previously, the JWP had no significant presence in the trades unior TOWEJ Tielt. It hade af TĘed the hatred of much of the Marxist-cum-trades union left when, while still legal and on the parliamentary path in July 1980, it had refUSed to backa major public sectorstrike that thegoveಡ್ತ! had Successfully Crushed.'The JWP did not exactly takeover the trades Union movement, but used intimidation, its reputation for effectiveness, and its excellent political intelligence System to exploitissues and turn organiZed labourinto its most effective Weapon. ASEriES of Strikë5 WEre Callad in differ Ent sectors of the economy, including the banks - leading to acute shortages of Cash — and in fugl distribution. ThEfTIOS significant Were in the public transport Sector, especially in the publicly owned bus companies." One peak of disruption was attained in November 1988; the JWP hoped that Victory Was at hand, but was disappointed. There was then something of a respite during which Presidential and Parliamentary elections were held. In early and mid-1989 the combination of a series of "genuine'strikes in the Sri Lanka Transport Board and supporting intimidal
18
tion of labouronpriva trains, brought the C of an ecoloric crisis. ctioпіп general wide export oftea, the maj BafT1Br, WAS WBrY ITll 1989, foreign exchar reduced that they COW imports.' At about JWP intensified a Ca pursuing a Tong the and succeeded for : in emptying the hos closing down all he ghout the island. St. to di Lullattendedir H fled in panicat calls fo appeared to provide incibility of the JVP.'
The fact that the such a flexible, fast political campaign to Te appearSet) ble | organizational factor abOWe; the existenCE and political Wings a of the military to the pi the JWP provides ac Таппll Tigers, who w COrıWBritional TLIral aedad SUCCBed territory in which ti supportive, and (b) military hara SS ment Lankan and Indian, Tigers had a single Structure in Which th almost totally, Wijew sought combat exp disguise in a relativ from Where he coul campaign, NOW, ast life, daring and Sur Which he wielded be evident that in Wiel the JWFP was not prim support. Indeed, it : CEd and alienated population. The ob Lunder Trine the regint tion at large became to begin to ignore JV
The Final BioW
The ultimate taskf 0 Strike the filla||EDION ned regime and co directly or through Coalition governmer then capture comple the Welleft Cart
tional Wisdot claim one big mistake. In Idened by all the suc ve, the JWP began

te buses, trucksand ountry to the verge Not only was produly disrupted, but the or foreign exchange Ich dalayed. In July IgE TESE WESWEE2 SO ered only a few days'
the same time the mpaign it had been health sector unions, a few days not only pitals but in Wirtually alth Services throLories of patients left hospital beds as staff Iran inmediate Strike vidence Of the IVi
YP WäSable to TIOLIrt nowing and effective Lundermine the regidue in large part to s already mentioned of separate military ld the Subordination olitical. In this respect lear Contrast With the vere fighting a more insurrection which ed in (a) controlling he inhabitants Were in defeating through both the arties, Sri sent against it. The military-cum-political e military dominated EETEdEdithar hlad TOT erience, but lived in ely qшiet гшгаІ агеa, d direct the political roughout his political prise Were Weapons ost skilfully." It wi|| lding these weapons, arily seeking popular severely inconvenielarge sections of the jective now was to Die before the populasufficiently desperate "PISTLICS,
aced by the JWP Was w agaiпstthe weakеThe to power, either being invited into a it which they could Lely. It Was here that 3 to grief, and conveSthat they made their August 1989, emboCESSES OLIttlied ab O
a major poster ca
Tipaign announcing to members of the amed forces that they had until the 20th of that month to leave their posts. If they failed to do so, their families. Would be |lable to b5 ki|| 3 d. ThiS W50idlig tilret: the JWP had already demonstrated its Willingness to hit at hated but protected politicians and policemen by slaughtering their kin. Given the continuing unreliability of the arried forces and their lack of zeal for the anti-JWP campaign, it was hoped that Tiany would desert, perhaps taking away their Weapons to protect their families, and that the army Would finally crumble away. But the JVP had mis-read the lood of the armed forces. Elements within the army immediately responded With a poster campaign of their own announcing the Same message to the JVP:"Giveupor yourfamilies Will bekled'. The threat to their families finally gawe the armed forces the stimulus they had so far lacked to move decisively against JVP suspects. Relying partly on the political intelligence systern that they had been bшilding up, and parily on the merest whiffs of suspicion, the army,' working closely with the various vigilante groups they had been sponsoring, set out to eliminate the JWP by eliminating anyone who appeared likely to be a JVPer. Even before the end of August there Was an intensification of attacks on the unprotected families of both пilitary personnel and (suspected) JWPers. By the end of September the JVP Was clearly badly battered. Within a few months almost the entire leadership, including Weweera, had beеп (captured and) shoէ"
The threat to kill military families is generally held to hawe been a "Himalayan blunder. The evidence, however, points to a different Colclusion. Imid-1989 the JWP appears to have felt obliged to do something further to push the conflict towards a final Conclusion. A bid to come to power in July 1989 On the back of popular demonstrations on the second anniversary of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord (i.e. the landing in Sri Lanka of India armed forces) had failed.' It was not adequate to Carry on the political campaign to keep government off balance. While favourable in some respects, time was also running against the JWP om two counts. One Was that the practice of assassination of JWP Suspects was beginning to bite deeper.' A combination of UNP and left politicians, El ETBrits frCITI Within the TTTed forces and, most importantly, relatives of people assassinated by the JWP, were countering terror With terror. More and more charred and burning bodies were being found on roadsides overnight; almost all Were JWP suspects.' That was a probler,

Page 21
although not yet a serious one for the JVP leadership as at this stage they Were largely untouched."*o Amore serious problem was that the campaign of economic disruption Wascosting the population very dear, and their enthusiasm for the JWP was clearly beginning to Waneo Obligatory strikes meant no income for casually employed workers. The general economic disruption meant that goods were often in short supply and scarce. The continual transport strikes made it difficult for many people to get to work. And the severe disruption of the medical system had shocked and alienated many people.
In a relatively integrated, commercialzed economy such as that of most of the Sinhalese areas of Sri Lanka, insurgency imposed much higher economic costs on the mass of the population than in more rural and agricultural areas. In the latter, a substantial degree of local food self-sufficiency and the lack of widespread dependence on public transport for Workpurposes provided a degree of insulation against the disruptions of Warfare. In the mainly-rural Tamil areas of Sri Lanka, the agricultural economy has kept ticking Over, and people have mainly managed to eat, during several years of continual Warfare.
That the JWP was acting according to the logic set out above appears to be confirmed by their behaviour in September 1989, after the armed forces Counter-offensive was beginning to bite. Only then did they begin a general campaign of economicsabotage, directed especially at the tea industry. In particular, the destruction of tea factories prevented tea from being processed. Such destruction threatened to cut deeply into the economy, reducing export earningsimmediately and causing many job losses. The damage would take years rather than months to restore. As targets they had been open to the JVP before. A major attack on the tea industry in July 1989, when the foreign exchange situation had been Critical, COuld hawe inflicted enOfTTOUS êCOrlOfThiC damage. The only plausible interpretation of the JVP's failure to attack previously is that they were well aware both of the particular issue at stake here - that such evident destruction of livelihoods Would lose them support - and of the more general issue - the two-edged nature of the sword of economic disruption in a "modern" есопomу. Such economies are vulnerable to widespread economic disruption from interventions concentrated on a few key points in the complex chain of economic interdependence. But populations adversely affected by such disru
ptions may tend to
of disruption. Perhi а пistake iп шsing
military families in nflict to a successf арреаг to have und knesses and the Sil tion, and the const SCbCio-eCOTOTİC er they were operating
Concluding Comn
Revolutions are ctions - attempts ΠΠΟΤΕ ΕΟΠΙΠΠΟΠ EHIII perspective, occur quency."*The JVP 1989 is in a statisti more to add to the g on that WäS mar degree of Savagery of deaths. Within a a short Space of tir of special interest b Senses particularly der' revolutionary Third World.
In the first place, in a Tlaterial and inst that Was "developed JWP's insurrection cteristics of a pea shared many of the Sed Tower Tients of re tries. It has almost Conventional Wisdot in recent years to se tions as essentially phenomena, While i corrective to the pli anticipate that only urban-based classe strike the sparks ofg 'revisionist' ruralist itself increasingly o particular becomes zed densely-popula Ed and Commerci may increasingly be lines followed by the example, the Vietc. ple's Army.
In the Second plac cially 'modern" beca the contemporагy in language of revolu Within Which the CO almost entirely loca flects a World in W European colonialis по longer exercise : nce Owerthe pattern vity. The significant JWP Were between

Irn against the agent is the JWP did make seats to the lives of der to bring the co
resolution. But they rstood both the Weaengths of their posiints imposed by the ironmEnt in Which
Bentos
infrequent. Insurreat revolution - are in long-run global with increasing freSurrection of 1987all sense simply one obal nurrbers, ableit (ed by a very high and a large numbers mall population and le.' It is, however, 2 CaLISE it WaS iri tWO :haracteristic of "moTowerTents in the
because it took place itutional es.wironment ", although poor, the ad few of the cha TaSant revolution, but eatures of urban-balatively wealthy coubecome part of the of revolution studies Third World revolu
гural and peasапt is has been a useful evious tendency to elatively 'advanced', 5 Would be able to nuine revolution, the paradigm may find utdated. As Asia in increasingly urbanited, formally educalized, insurrections organized along the JWP, rather than, for ng or the New Peo
!, the JWP was espese, although it used arnational (Marxian) on, the real arena ict Wasshaped Was and regional. It reche afteTath of and the Cold War predominantinflueif revolutionary actionflicts shaping the dia and Sri Lanka,
between ethnic groups within Sri Lanka, and between "excluded and "included" groups among the Sinhalese. The major dimensions of inclusion-exclusion Were: party political allegiance; caste; and status group membership - especially, among the middle classes, capacity in English. One looks in vain for any Way in which the JWP - its membership composition, its support base, its tactics, or its political programme - could be validated interms of the spirit of Marxian concepts of revolution. It has sometimes been suggested that one of Rohan Wijeweera's achievements was to produce a genuinely indigenous Sri Lankan Wariant of Marxism. It is perhaps more accurate to say that he indigenized it to destruction."*"
Notes
'In 1988 the JVP begana fairly successful campaign to block the distribution in many areas of newspapers printed by the government-owned Lake House group.
"Set in particular the account in footnote 59 of the Turder of Wijaya KumaranatLinga.
'Foreign aid continued to flow in relatively abundantly throughout thisperiod, and was indirectly of major political significance by permitting harsh economic policy decisions to be delayed until the end of 1989, wher; the JVP was already defeated. There was, hic WEWEar, no direct military support for the regir Tie, mainly because no other power had sufficient intergst in doing this that it was prepared to incur the displeasure of the Government of India, which had clearly reaffirmed that Sri Lankawas to be regarded as within India's geo-strategic dollain,
"Allie same time the heads of all the Buddhisturders issued a joint stater Trent calling on the guvernment LS LKL00OK LLLOLLLzLL LLLLLL aLLLLL LKLuLLLaL LLLLLL C caratakgrgawammEnt. This Wasne of the derTards of the entire opposition, including the JVP.
' There was no sign in Sri Lanka of a right wing, business-backed movement to crush the JWP forcibly and use lhe opportunity to instal a military-hacked govemment of an openly capitalist and repressive
ālurē.
"For example, he.attack of 1 November1988 on the Pannala Camp of the National Auxiliary Force, which is about thirty miles from the centre of Colombo, is Eestir Tated to hawa asted about tyWO hours. Three The Tibers of the Force had deserted with their Waapons the previous night. See Sunday Tires, 6 and 00L LLOLCLLH LLLLLL L00S LLLLLLLLuLOLLLLLLL LLLLLL on the Thimbirigasyaya Police Field Force Station in central ColonTribo on 2 August 1989. Tha attackers escaped, and it was later revealed that sorrecticers who should have been on duty there were absent at the tire
"Chandraprama, Sri Lanka:The Yaars of ТЕТОrpp. 27-9.
'M. de Silva, The "Phongy Peace" is Over-Protracled War Begins, Lanka Guardar, 12,5(1989), p.3.
"In the serise of being tied to a variety of political parties and Vulnerable to control by the party in power.
' Eld, p. 3, Leelananda, The Risa of the JWP- A Sociological Perspective", p. 9.
"The JWP's concarn was that involvement would expose their cadres to the police and threaten
19

Page 22
the future of the organization (Gunaratna, Sri Lanka: A Lost Revolution, p. 17).
'The JVP was able to make deep inroads into the Workforce of the Sri Lanka Transport Board in part because of major differences of strategy between senior politicians invulved in the dispula. "The government faced a major credit crisis, and found the largointernational banks, by thenverywary of any Third World involvements, unwilling to help. LLLLLLL LLLLC LL LL00 LLLLL LLLLLLL banks with a substantial stake in Sri Lanka.
Other examples of successful involver|Britin trades Union disputes include, for example, a pay gridvance of thig universities' Timor amployBe5 im Junia 1989. The JVP insisted that the unions take a first stand; a pay ríse resultad, Sunday Tirres, 11 June 1989. LLLLLL LLLLHHLLLLLLL L LLLLL L LL LLLC SLLLLS LLLLLLLHLLLL LLL LLLLLL unlons, seg Chandra prema, Sri Larika. Tie Years of Terror, ch. 38; and Gunaratna, Sri Lanka. A Las Fayu M1 pp, 51-5).
"Wije WEEra Wa5 fondof quoting Danton's favourile maxim':'ALIda City, Audacity, Andonca moröALudacity" (Leclamanda, "JWP Leaming from Wietnam", p6).
"Intelligence operations had originally been the responsibility of the polica, Theyfalgdcamplately, The amy asgurned responsibility for intelligence and propaganda in late 1988, and Wis far more effective.
"For details of the way in which the armed forces and vigilante groups climinated the JVP see ChandrapreLS L MMMS S M CCLLOL L TCLLSLLL K0S0L0S LLL Gurafatna, Sri Larika. A LD5ť F7EĻOlufar, pp. 274, 285-6 and 318-42. Success depended in particular in getting the amned forces out of barracks and into the streets and villages, operating in small groups, and equipped in particular with handguns and civiliar War.
"Itfailed parthybecausa thearmied forcas wara willing to fra an and dispersa erdyds of civilian demonstraLHHLLLLSSS LLCCC LLu GL0uuLu LaCLLLHCLLLLauuuLCCLLaLCCLL forced onto thig streels by thB JWP. Sgwaral Hundirgid Würt killed OWET TWO days.
"" (blad, ch, 45.
"F**Thig grössbrutality of thermethods of ITILITEdgr, Llorture and mutilation and display of corpses employed by both the JWP and their opportants is something that requires Tiention but no elaboration. It closely para lels the gory nature of nuch. JWP propaganda. The story of the creation of anti-JWP'vigilantes' is of more analytic interest. Most of the leading participants remain alive, and more details Tlay emerge gve ritually. For presert purposes it is adequate to rention a few keypoints. These units appear to have bleEn Created mainly through combining the equipirmient, information and resourcas available to Lha arTTed forces with the commitment, Selfabnegation and blood List of those who had lost close family Ternbers to the JVP. In the initial stages at cast, the physical and social space necdod to establish vigilanta Tivements when the JWP was feito be everywhere was provided through the failura of the JVP, this timoas in 1971, 1o generale SupportamOrg the relatively small but well-organized and influential Sinhalasa Christian CorĪTI Unities. ThB JWF Wa:Side= LL KLL LLLLL L LLLLL LLLLLLLLS LLLLL anti-JWP vigilanta groups Wera largely created in the predominantly Sinhalese Catholic argas north of CDomh.
'Up to this point only one current JVP PolitburomeTiber had been captured (and killed) (Gunaratra, Sri Lara: A Los Revolution, p. 341).
;288.ם,bitaו**" * Kowalewski,"Parphery Rewolutions".
2O
"The vast majority of de; suspected JWPers.
'One could say muchth Imporary FEWolutionary Ti much similarity to the JVPFU LLYTrinio5o) mawCment
havE LIsad indigerism to distinctively different front
Wel Adjarice TIL MOT Керthis FIETICE ti Orl Luli:
Hg disco IF Elf Trtirլsլtir Fr. THLIS tile FSSLLTEL Microchi Terror-p
Turotiri i Weg. King Art AS Pr Sir Cell Rela ng
The Fle WT Lo sp Li CIUed-r Nei LLUITEC
TŁUisting Wele : Seging L] Ticked
TTg:Pr"r FLOTT TE TrickleT As Carlo
TE GITGI Was Old Proulidir L. Fort

HEG WEB LhO5E of açLJall Of
Sa Tal of the Other COTEWester which bears
the Shining Path (SardaPeru. Both TowerTents Lild La Supportba5 at enjoyed by established
Y LLLLLL LLLLLLLLuuu LLLLLLL LLLL LLLLMCHLttt L0L L LLLLLLLCS LLL CLLLLLLL H L LLLLLL L LLL traitors in the service of foreign powers. Sea R.B. Davis, "Sendero Lurminoso and Paru's Struggle for Survival", Military Fawlaw 70, 1 (1990); and D. S. Palmar, "Rebellion in Rural Peru: The Origins and Evolution of Sendero Luminoso", Comparathog Falltics 18,2 (1986).
The Scholar’s Tale
Pat 12
erleu Cluilzclfsorlos 1977 di technologically to T56 from AK-47 oUirate's octop Luis Dhar Tuisticity Cairnetīrs trigeddeli Ir Hero lad In Lich mater for Research Fu Lis Post Doctoral Papers LiUerut beserk
Lered (he said the Herod Complex Surfacing E, legendard SerioLis chronicling g the Global four dimensions LLLTLLLLLLLLK LLLLLL LLL LLTLLLLLLL LLaLLLLLLL TTTLLLLLLLLS * Morto Luir Life's SoLL Ferroli Éric CLIFTzation.
led by Pardor drid hel Proscription pped ir to the Prograr TLT TLe qof Elimur Lation “opping the шhittled-off Constitution.
LL LLLL LLLLLT LLaY LLGLL LLL LLL LLLLLL se accelerated TechnologicalfocLLses
L5 ROLL Tel Lee II tent LL as sorte Lafa fake se Lulio arrived at Shallat by ballot 'd referended on a profilissary Eicket.
Te Uere [Fe2. MAJLILLUeli Merlins Il goldoLIta T'World Barukpa LLVT nings LittlJLTlels and Seeping dans prouïding hnologழ பாlorமய்ப்g
lorg researchLed data
| accelerator Mafia
LLLL the Tilliorul Lr Lette spill LUCI y doLLUT the drain a Tld the by-Uday
:iples of Trickle Economics
selor is filfered thur OL-glu to the Academics heory they found did lot sail tíort to Morietary blackrnaill.
di Vizierto the Executive Caliphate Littricke Led ’’CONTIC SCL (le SoEIACeric COSOCELfr). elected Aseculapplication.
(COILille
U. Karunatilake

Page 23
s
Why there's sc in this rustici
There is laughter and light baiter Titlist the:
rural di TT1:sils ĻĻho arg2 : List; Sorting put kåCCI) leaf in a bir TI, IT IS, CITIE: If the hundreds of such
barns spread tytut in thị: Tid artici Lipmuntry LLLLLLLLH KLLK HuuLLLLLL LlL aBLaLlL uLLLLL LLLLHa LS dallimi, di Iring the Coff 5:2:15 Cor.
Here, with careful nurturing, tobacco grows Fis a LLLLeOLL LLL LLLLCHC HLL LHLHL uuuLGLCL LtgtLLLLLaL LLLLLLLHHL L gold, to the value of Jir Rs. 250 million or more annually, for perhaps 143,000 rural folk.
 

ENRCHING FRURAL LIFESTYLE
und oflaughter tobacco barn.
Tobaccan is the industry that brings er TıployTIEmil tra
hic scienci highest numbe T uf people. Artici ThE:52 people are the colbarra barr, IowTiers, thia' trab.: CCC growers and those who work for the IT, on the land ariri irl, the barms.
For thern, the tobacco leaf means rearingful work,
a carnfortable hife àTird a ocure futura. s. FC
rough reason for laught ET,
CeylonTobacco Co. Ltd.
Sharing and caring for our land and her people,

Page 24
PEOPLE
Celebrating T
C
Dynamic
In 1961 People's Bank ventured out in the of only 46... and a few hundred Customers
Today, just 30 years later
People Resource exceeds 1 Customer Listings at a sta Branch NetWork in exCeSS
in Sri Lanka
In just three decades People's Bank has g in the Sri Lankan Banking scene. Their spec resources at their Command dedicated
dedication that has earned them the title
PEOPLE'S BANK
Banker to the Millions

'S BANK
Three DeCades
f
: Growth
challenging World of Banking With a staff
0,000 ggering 5.5Million of 328, THE LARGEST
rown to become a highly respected leader ;tacular growth is a reflection of the massive to the Service of the Common man - a
"Banker to the Millions'