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LANKA
GUAR
VO. 17 No. 10 September 15, 1994 Price R
AFTER TI ܓ PEACE : a new begi
the Army a
the problem
No India -
CONFLICT
Regional Autonomy; the
Mobilising the key
S S S S S S S S S S S S
OONSTITUTIO
Executive Presidency of
How a governor-gener
 

/മ
PD AAN
S.10.00 Registered at GPO, Sri Lanka QD/33/NEWS/94
HE POLLS
nning ?
- Mervyn de Silva
und the minorities
-- Sudha A5a/mac/ha/7d/ra/7
of Sinhala consensus
- S. Murarf
phobia
-- AP Jeyaram
H
RESOLUTION
only answer?
- Sunil Bastian
grOulips
- Kumar Rupasingha
NAL CHANGE
VVestminster model
– Radhika Coomaraswamy
a was sacked
- A. Jeyaratnam Wilson

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lackl
ftSyOui
 

sisuso. Laes

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Besides, the donors hawe another shared concern - refugees. If only the conflict was resolved, the Tamil refugees Could BB Sént Homé. The TOFCWTO STAF made its self-interest quite obvious When it Wrote in an editorial "STEPS TOWARDSPEACE".
"Canada-the recipient of thousands of Tamil refugees - should be offering this conciliatory leader a mediating hand...."
CHANGING MAGE
What the LANKA (GLARDAN tered EELAM WART 2, now accepted nomeinclature, made our big neighbour and its army, a vital factor. No more. The fate of the IPKF and the post-Rajiv changes in LLLLSLLLLLLaL LLLLLL LLLL LLLLL LH marginalise Delhi with its close contacts with Mr. Thorida Tarald Tore so With Mr. GaminiDissanayake, the staunchest defender of the Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Accord, Delhi was very Well placed. It had its UNP option and its P.A. option, an ideal position for the regional superpower.
C.W.C. FACTOR
And now Mr. Thondaman, generationa|ly challenged by the PA's Chandrasekeram, and ideologically challenged by the ex-CP'er Devaraja MP, has to adjust his strategy seeing that he is over 80 and this maybe his last Presidential election. What Sellasamy started, Chandrasekeram could finish. If Mr.Thondaman isto protect his real-estate (the CWC) and his grandson's inheritance, he must establish LK LLa LaLLS SLLLLLaa aa aLLS LLLL LLLLLLL durTip Mr. GarTriniDissanayake before he COrtests Prime MinisterСПапdrika KurПаratunge, And to justify. Such a de-linking (and prepare the ground for it) he must take up the Sinhala-Buddhist flag, an option by the way not open to his party riwal, Mr. RanilWickremasinghe who lost the UNP Parliamentary group contest for leadership by 2 or 3 votes.
In doing so, GaminiDissanayake will be back to the Jayawardenism of the post-Bandaranaike/Chelwanayakam Pact. but in a radically different situation, a situation in which the least powerful force in a strictly conventional Sense the LT TE can draw the maximum benefit. A born militarist, Welupillai Prabhakaran the weakest force ir i COr Wertioral terTTS, hlas known intuitively to maximise his advantage by exploiting the contradictions and conflicts of his enemies and of the objectiWe situation.
Challenge
Sudha Rannach
Il te la5t feW
Colombo believed a PA Victory, the tran: Tot be i SrTiOOlth, that F WOLld Tot allow the P TTTent but Would Ca the UNPtO dO SO, tha trigger off large-scale UNP sympathisers, a these fears were fortu and Mrs Chandrika Bandarnaike), who le has been sworn in as: Pri The Minister.
For the neaW PrinThe nges are formidable ahead will be eventful dden. Perhaps the Will be to keep the F Which consist of Coalil unstable and Sri Lar experiences of this. Wing cracks ever ( mpaign. Will Chandrik these Cracks front c And for how long?
So far the most sig Chandrika has emer own party, the Sri La (SLFP), which is the P partner, and ironical mily. Throughout th SerioLIS DOWêr StrLuggl PA, personified by поте гасical support whose leadership is Sirimaw o Bandarmalik servative Supporter:
While becoming Pr Chandrika has appoi Milister Without POt likely to play an advis ngt. The first IOUrd - by Chandrika but how the old guard in the F
Differences. Within other issues as Well. supporters are regar left-lea ning, and less nomic issues, there how she will adhere programme without allies. On this she hal the conservatives by: Treasurer, Mr Kingsle Minister of Trade, C but has retained COr important Finance po SLperWISIOn.
Then, there is the With thë President. Fr

es alhead for Chandrika
andran
Weeks, many in that in the event of sfer of power would President Wjetunga A to form the goveII on his own party, ta PA wictory would violence inspired by and so on. Many of nately prowed Wrong Kumaratunga (mee id the PA to victory, Sri Lanka'SEleventh
Minister, the ChalleEd e TOS andппауbe cгіsis-гіgreatest challenges A united. Regimes tions are notoriously ka has had earlier The PA began shouring the poll cacabe able to prevent ausing a collapse?
nificant challenge to ged from Within her Inka Freedom Party A's main Constituent y, from her own faB. Poll campaign a eraged between the Chandrika and her ETS, and the SLFP, personified by Mrs e and her Tore CO
ime Minister herSelf, inted HET TIOther as olio and the latter is iory role in the Cabihär häS běarl WOs long will it be before A revolt again?
the IPA i exted to
Chardrika adher ded as mirė radical, chauvinist. On ecois speculation as to to the liberalisation upsetting her leftist s sought to appease appointing the SLFP y Wickramaratre, as Terce and Food trol by keeping the rtfolio under her own
question of conflict or the first time since
the introduction of the Executive Presi
dency, Sri Lanka is confronted with a situation where the President and Prime Minister belong to different parties. Under the existing Constitution the President has tremendous powers and should a conflict arise between him and the Prime Minister, it will create problems for the latter. The crucial Defence portfolio is in the hands of the President and differences between
arise, especially in relation to the conduct of the WaT ir the North.
The PA has been in favour of Constitutional changeSand has promised to restoreparliamentary supremacy and end the Executive Presidency. But for this it requires a two-thirds majority in the House to push through an Amendment. It may be difficult for it to win this support.
The most intricate of all the challenges will be the handling of the ethnic crisis. Chandrika's record on the ethnic question
has so far been progressive. In 1986, she and her husband, the late Wijaya KurTiaratunga, met the Tamilmilitants in Madras and Were sympathetic to the Tamils and their grievances. Wijaya Kumaratunga even went to Jaffna and met the Tiger leaders. In 1987-88, they supported the Accord and were close to Tamil groups like the EPRLF.
During the recent poll campaign, Chandrika declared that she is willing to go to Jaffrmaander sterint0 UTCO1ditional talks with the LTTE leadership. This stance, however, was when she was in opposition. Today, she is the Prime Minister, at the head of a shaky coalition and dependent for political Survival on other parties. How far can she go now?
An attempt at negotiation will bring her under fire from Sinhala diehards. Any understanding reached with the Tamils will be attacked by the UNP as a sell-out of Sinhala interests. If she agrees to negotiate only with the LTTE, she will lose the support of not only the SLMC but of Tamil groups like the TULF and the PLOT, as well. Again, what deal can she strike with the LTTE which will be acceptable to SLMC? Moreover, the Army is unlikely to Welcome negotiations with the LTTE if the Government agrees to a ceasefire while the Tigers do not lay down aris.
The outlook on the ethnic question is bleak, not so much because the Prime Minister is unwilling to extend a conciliatory hand but because her hands are tied. Ms. Kumaratunga's problems hawe only just begun.

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Ceasefire essentia
Q – 7. Thig Prime Minister Chaldrika has announced that solving the Tamil problem will be one of her important priorities and that she would commence talks with you. Do you think that the necessary atmosphere is being Created for such talkS.
A 7. We are prepared for unconditional talks. We prefer to have these talks under a friendly and peaceful environment. The new government has relaxed the economic blockade. This is a goodwill gesture and we welcome this move. However the economic blockade has not been lifted fully and there are still sanctions oncertain important and essential items. Apart from this the routes for transport of people and goods continue to remain closed. As a result neither the economic conditions of the people will improve nor the suffering of the people will be alleviated.
Above all it is essential to create a peaceful atmosphere in the Tamil homeland. We hawe arounced that We are prepared for a ceasefire, But it appears that the government is reluctant to enforce a ceasefire. The atrocities of the Government forces stil continue, This is especially so by the navy. This will not be conducive to bring about a peaceful atmosphere. As a result of this state of affairs the Tani areas has not yet returned to
10[[Tal.
Though there is a sign of goodwill from the government a peaceful and satisfactory environment has not yet evolved. Therefore it is left to the government is create such an atmosphere,
Q 2. Previously you have agreed for Unconditional talkS. But mDW, WOL are laying conditions such as lifting the economic sanctions and Cea Sefire.
A2. We have not laid down any condtions for talks. We are only pointing out that a peaceful atmosphere is essential for peace talks. Without ceasefire there Can ble skirimisheS.ls there ay meaning in having peace talks while continuing with the war. Therefore what we say is that a ceasefire is essential for peace talks because it is difficult to hold peace talks with mutual goodwill as long as there is an economic embargo and a threat of War, If the new government will take this into account and agree for a ceasefire, we will take this as a sign of peace and goodwill on their part.
O 3. You are sayi should be a sign of is a general feeling forces of the gover is a ceasefire the T opportunity to stren What is your view o
A 3. This view amo of the government
From our military poir is not beneficial to strength depend on C ying the arms Of OU possible only if there it is not correct to CO. Will strengthen US.E why we like a ceasef реaceful епviroппег Secondly without ce: unexpected clashes lives. When Such inici it not seriously affect
Q 4. || You are de Ti for Tails. But Ch refused to accept th Hogland and thi NOrth 1 ESt. EL ward a proposal Oil altered boundaries, On this?
A 4. It is not only as a homeland for whole of TamilEela on this for generatic fact. The area C, thernand Eastem pri Tamil speaking peop and of both Tails, OUT Std. What Sil Chandrika takes on know. We also do plans she has forml not advisable to expl We examine her pr talks We will COThe to this issue and the M our opinion.
5. In the evert C апd the goveгппе other Tamil group:
di SCLISSIONIST?
A 5. TESe T3Ti having talks with th jointly or severally.
objections to that. government Would real representatives

il-H Prabakaran
ng that ceasefiere goodwill. But there апопg the arпесd Tent that if there igers will seize the gthen themselves.
ti57?
ng the armed forces is totally incorrect. tofwie Wa Cea Sefire us. Our growth and apturing and destror enemy and this is is a War. Therefore lude that a Cea Sefire ựem thET1 thB TEBSDT1 ire is to create a true it and nothing else. asefire there may be resulting in loss of idents take place Will
the peace talks?
anding a homeland andrika ha S firmly le concept of Tamil emerging of the ut she has plut fora North East. With What is your stand
I Who hawe insisted the Tamils, but the Thas been insisting ins. It is a historical ompassing the Norovinces belong to the E.E. It S. To DITEand Muslims. This is ard Prie Milister this i SSLJÉ, WE CdO mot mot know What nie W lated. Therefore it is "eSS Co Uri Wiews before oposals. During the knoW their stand Or e also could express
if talks between you nt Will you alloW the s to take part in the
groups are already Le government either We do пot have aпу But I bBlieve that the aVerealized Who the of the Tamil people
are, lar Sure the new goverrthert Would have realized who are really shedding
blood for the rights of the Tamil people.
Therefore as true representatives of the Tamils we would like the govern ent to have talks With US direct. Only such discussions will be useful and meaningful.
06: YOLI backed Outhalfway through the talks between you and the Premadasa government. Why should the present government trust you and enter into discussions Once again?
A 6. It is wrong to say that we disrupted the peace talks with the Premadasa government. We did not breakaway from the peace talks halfway through. The talks have been contiпшing foтпеariy two years. But during the two years of talks none of the basic problems of the Tamils Were taken upfor discussions/debate. The Premadasa government did not put forward definite proposals im respect of the Nationalproblemssissues ofthe Tamils. Therefore the talks becarterleaningleSS and dragged on until it became defunct. This is what really happened. It is a vicious propaganda to say that We have betrayed them. Imall the talks WE haWE alWays beẽT putting forward the full rights and Welfare of our people. We have reiterated that Our people should live peacefully with equal rights, honour and dignity. The talks had never succeeded because the Sinhalese government refused to accept our basic rights and fundamental freedoms and enforce justice. It is the Tamils who have been cheated by the successive Sinhalese governments. lt is the Sinhalese gOWErnments which has betrayed the Tamils by breaking pacts and agreements. No body can deny this historical truth. If the present government is determined to accept the resonable demands and dispense justice to the Tamil people, then it need not fear that the Liberation Tigers Would cheat the T1.
Q7. There are allegations that the Tigers are a hindrance for opening up of the transport routes between Jaffna and the mainland. What is your repo
Se to this?
A 7. There is no truth in these allegations. There are two land routes the Pooneryn and the Elephant pass between the Jaffna lagoon and the Northern mainland. The Sinhalese army has kept these two routes sealed with an intention of launching an attack on Jaffna. The army has

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prohibited people from using these passa: A 9 Jaffna is the
ges with the intention of am attacki õi
Jaffna. It is because of this, the people tra Welthrough Kilali Sea route. There has been numero US massa Cres by the Sinhala amed forces to prevent these Sea journeys. Enormous sacrifices and numerous acts of chiwalry by our sea Tigers hawe enabled Our people to travel safely through the Kilali sea route. Today Kilali İSUnder Our Complete Control. Ourpeople travel freely along this route under the protection of our forces. But it would be most Welcome if the government would open up a land route and fascilitate the transport of motor vehicles and people. People should be allowed to travel freely without any army checking and harrassment. In this respect it is definite that Our people will greatly appreciate if the government couldWithdraw the army stationed at Pooneryn, and opem the Sangupitty route.
Q5. You Could have taken partin the recent parliamentary elections. Why didn't you contest?
A 8. There should be a permanent solution to th1g TanTni| National ProblearTh... It is only then we could consider taking part in the elections, Tamils have been participating in parliamentary politics for a Very long time. But this parliamentary politics has not only failed to find a solution to the Tamil problem, but it is through the same parlament that mamy oppressive laws against the Tamils were passed. Forages, the Sri Lankan parliament has looked after the Welfare of the majority Sinhalese people, and have fulfilled there ambitions. It has been destroying the Welfare of the Tamils. Under such circumstances, we never felt that there will be any use in Tamils entering the Parliament once again. We did not wish to participitate in all election in the North and East that was conducted when people are under siege ard Were hot free to Wote.
Q9. Recently visited a Muslim refugee camp near Puttalam. All the Muslims (whom spoke to) who were expelled from Jaffna by you expressed Sorrow when they said that they have lived in great harmony and goodwill With the people of Jaffna and wished to return to Jaffna, if their safety is guaranteed.
if there is an amicable settlement will
you allow these people to return to their land-that is Jaffna.
people. Unfortunate mstances and irony bесаппе геfшgөвs, 8 a favourable situatio these people to retu of the War, ir - Jafi 300,000 refugees аппу is occшpying J. Island areas, and tr these people hawe le became refugees. A rtion of these refuge іп the агеas previош slims. If the Sinhale: the occupied territo refugees will be ab Willages. When such Will allow the Musir td. Jafla.
C. C. Mr Prabahs the Not Orit it is in the upperm people that this Wai end. Leaving aside message Would yol Sinhala people oft
A. We are aw Sinhala people dor peäCE. EWe this e conclusively shown реаCe.
It is our Wish tha permanent solution t there is everlasting War should be brough who brought about t people ITlust CONTE f{ tiÒ to ed the War.
The Sinhala lati there is no military : problerIl.
It is only by fulfil aspirations of the Ta bE. HT1 ETIL t[] thiš Eth
ltis the Sinhala pe the racist Sinhala po mbers of the armed We are not againstth love them.
This fS E fra Islaffe Sir Werferew W. rar, the LTTE. Ved has been carried in pers published In Ca

horneland of theses y due to certain circu
of fate these people and We regret this. If narises We will allow to Jaffna. Because na alone there are 3 lakhs). Since the affna, particularly the he Waligama in North, aft their ownland and considerable propoas have found shelter Isly 0CCLipied by MuSe artly Would leave Iriester the Tamil 1le to return to their a situation arises We T. refugees to return
Iran. Whether it is in East or in the South, ost thoughts of the r shouldCOThe to an the politicians What L, like to carry to the he So Luth.
are that the ordinary 10ti like War but Wat lection results i hawe
thi S. We al 50 Wat
there should be a othis problem so that }ea CE. Therefore this httÕar erd. WholeWEar his War on the Tamil Dr Ward tO firda Solu
In must realise that Sol Lutilo to the TiTi||
ling the reasonable mil people can there IIlie COIlflict.
Opole Who Tlust make liticians and the midforces to realise this. le. Sinhala people. We
offe, B.C. Tarr We/Lupiaj PrabakaDF, The TETIII WarGof Sorre Tam newspa
DfTED).
=
TRENDS
Crony diplomats recalled Friends and relations of formerpolf
fia WPs appointed to Sri Lanka's diplomatic missions abroad are to be
- seCased AfTOrg herr are sewEras
Ambassadors, High Commissioners and firsf SECrgfaris5. They do rof bgsorg fo sig Career Overseas Service. SoTee of them are sommer op lewe/ public servants who had been paid off for being helpful to the previous regs.
T.
Casinos are here again
Co/orTnbo's asirnos barnr necdiri 7990 beca LUse of the politically en TibarraSSrigactivities of ore Joe Sir, a cas7o king, are Creeping back quiety fa finglsts ar Sārtās fāls,
But a Municipal spokesman said ffafro MiCer?Čes had beer 7 SSL/EC, är Md a police spokesman said that the ban was stion.
More for paddy
In ore its first official acts, the gw PA GowerTħrTelf has irTCreased the Guaranteed Price for paddy. The Paddy Marketing Board will now pay farmers Rs 7.50 per kilo. In the lasť days of the UNPGovernment cultiwafors had been Cor77 mifting suicide, LunaEble fo sur Wweg On the fruis of theoir TabOLJr especially affer a fertiliser Subsidy had been withdrawn.
BFEFLY
Minister reassures investors
Labour Minister Mahinda Rajapakse reassured FreeTrade Zone investors at a meeting that the Taintenance of industrial peace Would receive the highest priority by the PA gove
Tet.
The minister said that there was no charge of policy by the government with regard to employer-employee relations in enterprises within the Zones. There has been a lot of misunderstaInding among investors about the goWernment's intentions, but the government gave the highest priority to employment generation and to industrial peace, the minister said.

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A vote for change
S. MLITari
he just concluded parliamentary
elections in Sri Lanka have not only brought about a change of government after 17 long years but also raised hopes of a new era of reconciliation. And Prime Minister Chandrika Kumaratunga, Who has steered the Sri Lanka Freedom Party-led People's Alliance to a narrow Wictory, has become the symbol of this new hope.
People have reposed faith in her because she is young, has a liberal image and is untainted by any past, unlike leaders of the previous generation. At her first press conference, she struck a conciliatory note by vowing to eliminate political violence. And she has every reason to do so, havinglostherfather and SLFP Prime Millister S.W.R.D. Bandaramaika ard her husband Wijaya Kumaranatunga to such Violence.
The PA's victory, though not outright, can be attributed to the fact that for the first time in 17 years, people were able to vote without fear and the elections were free and fair. The UNP's 17-year reign is a record for Sri Lanka. During this period, the country has undergone cataclysmic changes from parliamentary to presidential form of government, from the closed economy of the Sri Tnavo Bandaranalike ега of the seventies to an open есопопу and from the winnertakes all to proportional representationsystem forlocal, proviincial and parliamentary elections.
This period also saw the rise of Tamil militancy in the north after the 1983 islaindwide pogrom and the eventual politico-military intervention by India, leading to the revival of JWP rebellion in the South and the emergence of the LTTE as a powerful guerilla group in the north. That the UNP had become effete and corrupt and was fast losing support became evident even in the direct elections to the post Of President in 1988, when Mr. R. Premadasa Could defeat the SLFP's Mrs BandaPanaike by less than a one per cent ma
Tgs).
The presidential as well as the subsequent parliamentary elections then Were
held amid unpreced by the JVP in the sic the north againstith the parliamenlarу р garner only 125 oft SLFP SECLured Ower
The decline of the Premadasa Presid: not responsible for it the rot by getting the crushing the JWP in: hand, resulting in 60,000 youths, and several pоршlistрг grawe miscalculatior Too With the LTTE his life. His death, thic also freed the Count
Mrs Chandrika K. the Scene at a title w seething With anger rism - both by the rgents - resulting ppe arance of thous South and the assa der's like Mr Presilad ratne and Mr Lalith
The discovery off reWiwed memorie:S 0 JWP rebellion. When the streets. People mounting corruptior ces. Sensing the m ailing Mrs Sirimaw. pped aside and let party. The resultant Anura only helped cohesion in the par proved her mettle b Sedleft front called and winning the S. Provincial Council E
We President red snap parliam months ahead of sc tunga was more th challenge. Unlike N Srmissed the ethnic terrorist Tenace, M Sed the value of T Situation Where th

ted tuOil Caused ut and the LTTE in e IPKF presence. In olis, the UNP could he 225 seats and the
5) Seats.
UNP started with the cy, though he was In fact, he ster titled PKFout of the island, urgency with an iron the death of nearly wooing the poor With gra Times. His only was the brief honey for which he paid with ough widely mourned, гуfromfear.
Imaratunga canne оп when the people Were ower escalating terrostate and the isuin the death or disaands of youths in the ssimations of top lealasa, Mr Ranjan WjeAtulathTudali.
Tlass graves last year f the dark days of the deathsquadsгоаппеd were also fed up With 1 and ever rising priood for a change, the 0 BadäTämaike Stener daughter lead the i defection of her SOri bring about a greater ty. Mrs Kumaratunga уforming abгoad-bathe People's Alliance Luther and Wester
CtiOS.
D.B. Wijetunga ordeentary elections six hêdule, Mrs. KLITlaraan ready to meet the Mr Wijetunga, Who di: probleпn as a тhere rs Kumaratunga realiinorities' Support in a E Sirhala SÖLuth Wa:S
more or less evenly divided. She quickly brought into the alliance the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress of Mr M.H.M. Ashroff, which is the only representative party of the MusliirTS ir the ea St.
She also retained on her side the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation. Front (EPRLF) with which she and her husband Wijaya Kumaranatunga had a natural empathy because of its leftist orientation. Her strategy paid off with the PA winning 105 seats and the SLMC seven. The EPRLF's failure to secure even a single seat is attributable to the LTTE factor.
Mr Wijetungais nota charismatic leader like Mrs Kumaratunga nor does he hawe the pro-poor image of Mr Premadasa, If, despite such drawbacks, Mr Wijetunga has been able to secure 94 seats for the UNP, it is because he is not an autocrat like Mr. PreTadasa. The UNIP's operimarket policy also helped it more or less retain the support of the middle class and the rich.
By making peace with Ceylon Workers Congress leader Mr S. Thondaman, Mr Wijetunga managed to retain the plantation Tamils's vote. This is seen from the fact, that three of the six districts in which the UNP has ledare from the Central Hills. With Mr Wijetunga and Mr GaminiDissanayake hailing from Kandy and Mr Thondarman from NuWara Eliya, tħe Up COLI Intry has remained more or less a bastion of the UNP-CWC Combine.
The SLFP has been able to check a UNP sweep because the Bandaranaikas also hail from Kandy. The results show that the UNP, though voted out, cannot Ee Written off.
In the tenth Parliament, the UNP and the PA together account for 199 seats. Of the balance 26 seats, 25 are held by Tamil and Muslim groups, with the Eelam Pe0ple's Democratic Partyhawing mine, the SLMC. Seven, the TULF five and the DeOcratic National Liberation. Front, COmprising the PLOTE, EROS and TELO, having three. Even the lone independent from Nuwara Eliya is a Tamil, Mr R. Chandrashekharan of the Upcountry Tamils

Page 8
Front. The remaining seat has gone to Sri Lanka Progressive Front, a fledgling party of former JWP activists.
The PA-SLMC combine hasa one-Seat majority and has formed the government With the support pledged by Mr Chandrashekharan. The TULF, the DNLF and the EPDP, which together hawe 17 members, hawe also extended Support. But What is surprising is the support offered by CWC leader Mr S. Thondaman. A man who always knew the pulse of the people, the veteran leader has made a grave mistake for the first time in his political career in staying with the UNP. He has now quickly sought to undo the damage by writing to Mr Wijetunga that the seven CWC members, elected on the UNP symbol, will act independently.
Mrs Kumaratunga has won the support of the Tamil parties because she has adopted in the PA Inanifesto a proposal mooted by Mr Neelam Thiruchelvam of the TULF for the trifurcation of the eastern province as a via media between the Sinhalese and the Muslims, who are against the east's permanent merger with the Orth and the Tärnis Whose Tar demand is a homeland comprising the north and the east. She has promised to hold talks with all the parties om both sides of the ethnic divide, including the LTTE.
This is precisely what the Premadasa Government tried and failed. But Mrs KuTaratunga feels she has greater credibility among the Tamils than leaders of the UNP,past and present. She also feels the LTTE's claim to be the sole representatiWes of the Tamils need not hinder negotiations.
Ultimately, the successor failure of her peace initiative will depend on the unit of devolution and what powers she is Willing toto devolve On SUch a Unit, It rnUStbe noted that her mother Sirimawo, whom she has inducted into her Cabinet as a Minister Without portfolio with a view to ultimately making her a titular head if and when the executive presidency is abolished, was the root cause of Tamil militancy in that she introduced the Standardisation Act in the seventies to give preferences to Sinhalese over Tamils in admissions to Colleges. As recently as two years ago, the elder Ms Bandaranaike scuttled an accord at the Parliamentary Consultative Committee by vetoing a UNP proposal for
6
a federal Solution. Th nga is a liberal, she from her mother.
AS history has sho Solution unless arld U Sinhala parties agre prepared to offer the is also required for executive presidency Kumaratunga has all to retain the defence she is ready to Con Working arrangement res in NOWember.
Her plan, as spelt Minister G. L. Pieris, i. Stitutior ArTedmės ple of Tnonths to proV of the executive pres tting up of a constituel a new constitution.
The bill will also prov Commission to go into against MPs. If the b two-thirds majority, the people in the next p and seek a mandate to llve presidency.
CCII d'Ér
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ugh Mrs Kumaratus open to pressure
п, there can be по til the two principal on what they are TarTills. Conse SuS he abolition of the
The fact that Mrs wed Mr Wijetunga Ortfolio shows that e to some sort of until his term expi
out by her Justice to introduce a CoBill in the next COUide for the abolition idency and the seit Assembly to Write
ride fora permanent corruption charges ill does not get the a SLFP will go to the residential election abolish the execu
Her decision to appoint independent commissions of investigation to go into political assassinations like those of her husband Wijaya Kumaranatunga, Mr PreTadasa and Mr Lalith Athulathmudali will not be appreciated by the UNP. However, the UNP is in no shape to go in for a head-on confrontation with her as Mr Gamini Dissanayaka's attempt to capture the party and become the Leader of the Opposition is bound to lead to the revival of the factional feuds. The dissidents, principally Premadasa loyalists, may rally behind Mr Rani Wickremasinghe,
But it is difficult to split a party in the Sri Lankan systemas the short-lived revolt against Mr Premadasa led by Mr Lalith Athulathmudali and Mr Dissanayaka has shown. So Mr Pieris is naive in assuming that sections in the UNP, opposed to an all-powerful executive presidency, may gain an upper hand.
Mrs Kumaratunga has an uneasy period ahead and can get down to business only after the presidential elections, that too if the SLFP Wins.
(DH News Service)
Clowns Cantos - 7
Brains Trust
Walasa broke the Bred idn't Luork out the Luay The Master said. ultitude by the dying Sea rusk tuas, Ilot Galilee din Lair fform the Tiracle Fuats 2e Market loaues (and the FM sprats) I said that. Der 7 Marc LLoLula Sir agre LLUOLld bLubble & LUleels LoLld Lullīrir pling old Gods Luhile the sumurier Luent by y deadlea.Les stir in the Wirtusky BLIÉtergone Tancid, NeLu Ships gorte to List aslıump in the shares of the Haruard Trust,
U. Kaunatilake

Page 9
A critical balance
P. Jayaram
he post-poll curfew has lifted.
Life has returned to normat. And the Crackers that Went off to celebrate the People's Alliance (PA) victory over the 17-year-old political stranglehold of the United National Party (UNP) are now part of a distant memory. It is time for governance. Time for newly-elected Prime MiniSter Chandrika Kumaratunge to guard against a loss of faithin her administration. And more importantly — with 76 per cent of the electorate voting this time compared to 64 per cent in 1989 -- time to guard against a loss of hope.
"There is a tremendous amount of goodwill and several Tamil parties have come forward to support the Government." says G.L. Peiris, the new minister for external trade, justice and constitutional affairs. "The Governmenton its part hasto demoinstrate its efficiency and carry out its promises on several fronts, the foremost being a solution to the ethnic problem."
Nobody in their right minds expects the so-called "problem" which eats up to 20 per cent of the country's budget, to disappear soon. But what they are hoping for is political savvy and propriety from a prime minister whose parents have both been premiers of Sri Lanka. Mother Sirimavo Bandaranaike, infactisstillapotent - emotional, if not political - draw and continues to be the chief of both the PA and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), the Tiain Constituent of the Alliance. HoWever, that Kumaratunge carne from practically nowhere to become the prime minister and that she began her political balance act just two Tonths before the August 16 polls, is a pointer to her unde
standing of politics.
With the country's proportinal representation system making a sweeping victory impossible, the PA secured 105 seats, including 14 nominated ones. Its ally, the Sri Lanka Muslim Conference - whose
President M.H.M.A.: of shipping, ports ar reConstruction. H S TSG Sti|| ||Eftit PA
absolute majority in rlianTelt. KurTilaratur Up Country People secured a single Sea rity attained, she call Wijetunge and stak the Govertent, R impossible for hispa 94 seats, to ruster
to forma minority go agreed. Insiders say ble negotiations, Thai the President holds, defence portfolio, We ched on the SWearin net, which Wijetungɛ exe:Cutiwa President.
KumaratLunge's of tiating with Tarnilpa 17 Seats in total-in Tatil United Liberati Eelam People's (EPDP) and the Der beration Front, to ge tE OLISI 3 in Prilo mised help in initiatin LTTE t0 TESOWE tE "Our Thain intention start the de Ocratic at least in a smallway Douglas Davananda for that to happen." Siwasith ambaraith, from the outside, as be part of the officia sit as an independe ylon Workers Congr Thondammar, who: major chunk of the te of Indian origin and the UNP as a depen pledged Support tot red the President TETb5e5 Would foi

e of power
ShroffiS TOW. Tilister drehabilitatior ard ecured sewer seats. One seat short of an the 225-member Page then roped in the 's Front, which had t. The required majoed Oil President D.B. ed het clairn to for IT ealising that it was rty, the UNP, with just the required support Wernment, Wijetunge Only after consideranly over the portfolios including the critical is an agreement reagirm of the new CabiI Will stil head as the
1ercoupwasiппеgoArties — Which hawe cluding the Toderate on Front (TULF), the Democratic Party mocratic People's Liat their support from ment. They hawe proga dialogue with the north-east Conflict. in contesting was to process in the north, ," says EPDP leader "Stability is required TULF President M. promising Support Serts: "We shallot opposition. We will nt group." Ewen. Ceess leader (CWC S, se party Controls a a plantation Workers is counted upon by dable Wote bank, has h PA. H9 Sifo
hät E SEWEr CWC rm an independent
group in Parliament, not bound by the UNP whip.
These political factors will dowetail with the economic ones, in Sri Lanka's drive to become the premier economy after India in the region. Expecting political turmoil and suspecting the PA's left-leaning tendencies - owing to the SLFP's
Socialist past under Bandaranaike's '70s =
rule - the stockmarkets started sliding almost immediately after elections were announced. Had the Alliance not repeatedly assured that it would continue the liberal economic policies, the market Would have crashed, says a major Colombo broker. The positive thing, he says, is that blue chip cort panies are holding their ground in the market. Ke Balendra, chairman of John Keels, in fact, feels that Sri Lanka's "standing has gone up by a few notches after the elections." He aSSarts: "It's business as usual and the
THE WAYAHEAD
Kumaratunge has to deal with high expectations from the electorate and a demand for quick reSults.
A thin majority in Parliament and support from Tamil parties could swing, leading to a crisis.
A weakened UNP could be further weakened with a loss in the November presidential elections, a prime Kumaratunge goal.
The Allianca's future lies in effective dialogue with the LTTE and continuing with the liberal economic policies. This will ensure Tamil support, and strong business backing.

Page 10
mood is one of optimism. The World, and Sri Lanka, is very differe nt from what it was 20 years ago."
While all this is good news, what is Worrying is the PA's wafer-thin majority in Parlia|Thent. Harry Gooimetilleke, adviserto Bandaranaike, however, says: "Nobody Wants to upset Chandrika at this time, and with the Tamil parties extending their support, the Government can pass any bill With a majority of 20 or more." But he acknowledges that "the UNP cannot be wished away. They need only 19 more seats to topple the Government." If Kumaratunge doesn't Satisfy everybody, he Says, she Will hawe problems. "There Wi|| be two or three months of stability. After that, anything can happen." Support from Tamil parties is the key, and this underscores the point that if Kumaratunge wants to stay on as premier, she Will| hawe to score quickly on the issue most Sri Lankans wish would just go away.
The new Government, which has "restoration of democracy" and "resolution of the ethnic conflict" among its priorities, is expected to maintain continuity inforeign policy. Asked before the polls about her government's likely policy towards India if voted to power. Kumaratunge had Said she did not suffer from "Indiaphobia" like the UNP. She still says the same, and Indian diplomats believe that unless the north-east developments have aspill-over effect on India, relations would only be "strengthened". Foreign Minister LakshmanKadirgаппаг, the onlyTamiliпthe new Cabinet, has already said that close relations with India and other South Asian Countries would occupy the top spot on the priority list.
At this point the Alliance has many things going against it. For starters, it will hawe to deal with electoral promises of controlling inflation, increasing employ Tient opportunities, shooting nerves frayed by an increasing rich-poor divide and bringing down the price of essential Commodities. A top economic analyst in Colombo warns: The promised measures
Could cost the state
Lankan Rs 32-35 bill
And though the A Tmajority, it will hawe presidential election Cope With the piquant sition leader being bo technically, the head besides requiring skill may also delay itsk to supreme premiers Constitutional arend Junis Jaya Wardene's '80S Which Tade th There figurehead.
Politically, the good that the UNP is area a rift, with former p Wickremasinghe and mini Dissanayake bo of the leader of the Op ballot held on Augus an architect of the CO nka accord of July 19; margin. UNP leaders' in the party now, W election just aroundt SLuicidal.
Atternpls arealread tiLunge with another, ni date. The fact that W Walled On the PE:Sid
electoral Werdict and
form the Government
him. When the leaders Many leaders, having of office for the past 1 used to it to acceptre "The current situation Alliance," says politic: Uyangoda. "The UN differences between and Dissanayake hav ned the party. I don't tr the UNP's support to a tion. Their idea will be ntial elections and ha in every way overthel

} anything between
Wins, political punters give the Gove
:51 - - ion a year." Ernment a fair chance for a full six-year
Iliance now holds a
2 lo – at East til S in November - situatioпоfanopроth the President and of the Cabinet. This ful tightrope Walking, ey goal of reverting hip by Countering a Tentenacted during tenure in the early eprime minister a
WSOT E PAS dy showing sings of rie Tiister Rari former Tinister Gath vying for the post position. In a secret st 24, Dissanayake, trOVÉSial dO-La89, won by a narrow feel that any division ith the presidential he Corner, Would be
yon toreplace WijeOre popular CandiІсkremasiпghe prelent to respect the to allow the PA to may Well go against nipo ISS Leis decided. enjoyed the fruits 7 years, are still too inquishing it easily. is favourable to the alanalyst Jayadewa FS split and the | Wickremasinghe 'e Seriously Weakehink the PA will seek
Tend the Constituto Win the presideWe a clear majority JNP."If the Alliance
term. And if by a quirk of politics, Kumara
tunge Can't hold her team, together, in Parliament and through the Presidential elections, it will be back to basics for Sri Lanka: trouble.
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Page 11
FOREIGN REPORT
NEWCRISIS NUS-CUBAN RELATIONS Superpower's cast
Punyapriya Dasgupta
uring the years Cuba's President
Castro was holding backthose of his countrymen who were trying to leave for the United States illegally, he was accused by Washington of trampling the human and democratic rights of the Cuban people under communist dictorial boots.
Last Tonth, When the Cuban leader aLLL K LLLLLL LLL LLL LLLL LLLLLHH LLLLLL gloden glow on the American horizen over the Florida Straits, go if they wished, Washington made an about-face and charged him with exporting his problems to the US. President Clinton even alleged that Fidel Castro was trying to dictate US immigration policy.
Caught out
The world's most powerful country was caught on the Wrong foot by Cuba, its small impowerished neighbour. For 28 years, angered by Mr Castro's determined attemptatbuilding socialism on the closeby island, often called a US backyard, SUCCESSiWg US dTiristfältiOS in Washington offered and loudly advertised warious allurements to Cubans Who Would leave their homeland and denounce it as ullivable.
The Cubans were treated by the US administrationas exceptional immigrants. They needed no wisas. They were granted permanent residence if they could reach US shores somehow. A radio station in Florida, beaming its broadcasts to Cuba, kept on calling Lupon Cubans to make for the US, flouting their country's law, if пecessагу.
President Carter declared in 1980 that his country Would provide "an openheart and open arms to refugees seeking freedolfort cortunistdortinationard front economic deprivation brought about primarily by Fidel Castro and his government." But the same criteria for permission to enter and live in the US Were never applied to say, the Chinese and the Vietnamese who tried to сопеawayfгоп
"CCITTLIrist“ rL|B C Indian sub-continent to seek better econd America.
NOW the US ad its heart and arrom:S tC President Castro ha opening his exit gal The Cubans do not my is in pretty bad. of the Soviet Union trading block called t Cuba friendlass.
The Sowiet Supplie to a very low level coming has to be p, Currency of which C thing. For the last th been depending for tourism and remittal gres for their frienc behind at hole.
The US dogSitSE) Cubärs do Ille Islt embargo has been El Cuba, and not only nies but even for thei the US. Ships un Сшban ports - пау апywhere in the US,
In such a situation the conditions of life te day by day and t trying to leave for the cally. Some people a really desperates Would not try to cro: inflimsy boats and r,
OWald W1ic FC completing a safe S SrTall boats and Crafi Tissing and presur being Washed Up On
indefinite exile
President Castrof of open exit gates at guards to stop chil

rophobia
the those for the t, who were anxious dmic opportunilies in
ristration as Closed the Cubans as Well. as called its bluff by ES towards the US. leny that their econoshape. The collapse
and the COTTunist he COTheCon has left
Sofoil hawe dWimidled arld WhatEWEr is Stil aid for in Convertible uba has virtual y noree years Cuba has Foreign exchange, on пces by Cubaп епліis and relatives left
est to el Sure that the errational trade. An laced on trading with for American comparSubsidiariēSOLUtside loading cargoes in be denied berthing
it is no surprise that Cuba will deteriorahe number of people US Wil|| rise dramatimust hawe Come to itate. Otherwise they ss the Florida Straits afts fabricated someld slender hopes of ea voyage. Battered , with their occupants ned lost at Sea, are
the US Coast.
had to revise his policy it and Order his Coast dгеп апd teenagers
from embarking on perilous sea crossings.
President Castro is, undoubtedly, in a difficult situation. But so is the mighty United States. Its longstanding policy of receiving Cuban refugees with exceptionally wide arms has collapsed.
Those Cubans who were risking their lives to reach the "promised land" are being denied entry into the US, shipped to Guantanamo, a US military base in Cuba itself, and dumped there for a life in indefinite exile, near heavy minefields, away from home, and nowhere within sight of the promised land that had beckoned them. This by itself is now an interesting question of international morality.
Why the change?
The Cubans have always regarded US military occupation of Guantanamo as illegal and are now incensed at the use of this enclave to deposit those who were first promised and then denied residence in the US Mamy thousands of Haitian refugees were taken there first and now many thousands of Cubans hawe joined the in there for all ulcertain future. Which may even turn explosive at So the stage.
But why did the policymakers in Washiпyton have to encourage Cubans to leave their homes in the first place? Hawana alleges that the anti-Castro radio station in Florida was beaming propaganda 1,500 hours a Week inciting people to leave their Country and discredit it. The days when the US could argue with any degree of pola Lusibility that Cuba Wasanotan entirely inconsequential part of proselytising and expansionist communism led by the SoWiet Union, are low in the irrevocable past.
President Castro has himself been speaking of "rectification" of the systern in Cuba andheis indeed making Cautious experiments with liberalisation of Cuban Socialism. Cuba is in no condition to export revolution even if it. Wanted to. Its sole Concem today istoSave its Socialistgains
9

Page 12
- for instance, its famed system of univerSal education and the free medical Service for all, which even the US, everboastful of its Wealth and democracy, does not provide for its citizens.
Certainly Cuba has a right to do that. In any case, the Cuban struggle to keep up their socialism is no threat to the "American way of life" in the US. But Washington insists that Cuba must change and until that happens the pressure from the Superpower will be relentless. A US law provides for the embargo on trading with Cuba unless democracy and a free market are established on the island - or, in other Words, Mr Castro is renowed from
power and socialisr indubitably, interfere affairs.
The Cubans Conc has a right to trade Ses and not to trade по пghtto pressurist hawe CommerCe Wi mplain that the US a out to try to see th Cuba enters into with is cancelled. In the ngton has even banr to Cuba by Cubans Yet there is no sign ti late SOO.
The dismissal of a
For reasons of confidentiality, this account was never previousl.
A. Jeyaratnam Wilson
anuary (1962) was the cruellest
month for OEG and the top echelons
of the army and the police. The height of political folly was that the organisers of the failed coup, except for one, were Christians in a Buddhist polity. However the sawing feature was that the "Government of national safety" that the officers planned to put in place instead of the officiating PM, Mrs. B, was to be headed in the plotters' plan by none other than Dudley Shelton (the password was "Shelly") Senanayake (for the details, aWait Wolute II of De Silva's and Wriggins's JFJ of Sri Lanka).
The self-described son of a postmaster (as Sir Oliver sang his swansong) having made his way to the top, claimed incorrectly in private conversations that he had "faithfully served" several PMs as GG (a mistaken perception of the position since one of the GG's functions is to be "guardian of the constitution", not to do the bidding of PMs if it was unconstitutional).
He had gotten himself of his own free will enmeshed in the messed up attempt at a disorganised coup d'etat.
How did this happen? F.C. de Saram, one of the Senior military officers, Voluntarily took the rap. The rest Were caught like rats in a trap. Neither the PM mor the cabinet Were prepared to deal with this unexpected turn of events, except for the youngest and most inexperienced of thern all. Felix Dias Bandaranaike took charge of the investigations and subsequent dra
O
fting of legislation. Felix was unflinching
lders to book,
Where did Sir Ol High lewel politicos r Was conducting his was indeed a facade doubt in the aborativ
What evidence is Sir Oliver? B.P. Peiri the unimpeachable Secretary to the Ca competent top-level this Writer, Sorme tirT) With a promise that anything till he had Score.
Peiris one day re. from OEG: 'Look u constitutional law, Iw them, and let me know circumstances unde dismi SS a Prilla Miri: effect. Peiris did his TESSage WaS COL urgency. He consul tomes on the subjec to Sir Oliver the ru tion. Unfortunately foi was being tapped.
Whe the details obtained (the organi the GG but there We rsations), the next si Sir Oliver. For this, t Queen of Ceylon hac

abolished. This is. ICEin Cuba's internal
ide that Washington Iith Whoever it chodWith Cuba but it has | othernations Otto h Cuba. They coministration goes all it every transaction anyone in the World latest Towe Washied Cash renthitances residing in the US. at Cuba may capítu
The Clinto administration has been Compelled to signalits willingness toengage in talks with Cuba on the issue of the flood of Cuban refugees heading for US shores. But it still says that it is not prepared to discuss any lifting of the trade embargo.
More tension
This amounts to saying that Washington intends to continue its policy of Subversion of Cuban Socialism and Hawanashould reciprocate by ensuring that not too many Cubans leave their homes in the hope of finding better lives in the US. This Way Washington hopes, probably, to build up rmore tension inside Cuba.
Governor-General
үpublished. IfisпоwwгіїїепspeciallyfогtheLалka Gшагdїал.]
The 32-33 year old in bringing the offe
Për stand in all this? eported that the GG own inquiries. This 2. He was Without a в attempt.
there to incriminate s (now deceased) is source, Peiris Was binet and a highly civil servant. He told s in 1963, the facts, | should not publish
passed out of the
ceived a phone call p all the books on or Jennings among v the precedents and Which a GG Can ter," or Words t0, that homework Well. The ched in terms of ed all the possible t and phoned back chl=eeded inför TlaSir Oliver, his phone
of the coup were SerS did not irnWollwee e the taped conveep Was to question e permission of the to be first obtained.
Buckingham Palace responded that as long as Sir Oliver was the Queen's representative, nothing should be done to bring the high office into disrepute. Felix Dias knew what to do next. A messenger was despatched to London with a letter from
the PM requesting the Queen to replace
the GG. Once replaced, the GG would be an ordinary citizen and could then be investigated. The messenger was required to present the letter only on receipt of instructions.
Surprisingly the PM, Mrs. Bandaranaike was not too Willing to hawe Sir Oliver renTowed. Perhaps he had been her indispensable handyman. Felix kept pressing her to replace him (at this point my source becomes different from B.P. Peiris but is equally reliable.) Several names were Suggested. The PM would not change her mind. Then cate a brilliant flash to Felix. How about William Gopallawa (the PM's close connection) he asked her? I am not certain of the exact steps hereafter but a Second message was sent recorTimeinding that OEG be replaced by GopallaWa. This ended the career of one of Sri Lanka's williest states Ten.
A postscript to this bizarre episode might be interesting, "Citizen OEG' was questioned about the phone message to B.P. Peiris. Peiris told The that Sir Oliver was equal to the test. He replied: "someone may have imitated my voice and requested Peirisfortheinformation". There may be many gaps to this alibi but thereby hangs a tale.

Page 13
THE INDIAN EXERCISE
The anatomy of the ethnic co
Sunil Bastian
El Conflict SituatiÕ ir the CaSe
of Sri Lanka can be conceptualized as one of integrating a multi-ethnic Society. The most important aspect in this process of integration is the evolution of a political structure that can for a basis for the creation of a multiethnic society. The Sri Lankan society at present can be characterized as being in the process of this evolution. However, this process is accopanied by violent conflicts, having their own dynamics. Therefore this section of the paper will examine (a) the main issues related to the process of integration and (b) the dynamics of the conflict generated by it.
Regional Autonomy - the Principle Issue of Integration
Sri Lanka emerged into independence in 1948 with a unitary form of government having a status of a dominion within the Eritish Commonwealth. It Was based On a West inster Todel With two chambers, a Prime Minister Witha Cabinet of Ministers having executive power and an appointed GovеппогGeneral reппаining as the тергеSettiwe ofte British CITOW. I 1972 Sri Lanka introduced her first republican coInstitution. This dida Way With the links With the British Crown and replaced the appoirted Governor General with an appointed President. But the political structure remained a unitary one. In 1978 the constitution was changed to one with an elected President and an elected parliament. HoWewer the uritary character of the systemm retained intact.
In order to safeguard the rights of the minorities the unitary system depended on checks and balances at the Centre. Balanced representation in the parliaTent, a clause in the constitution and a syster of appointed The Tibers to the Senate and the parliament were the Tost important features of these checks and balances. Although ideas about regional autonomy were there before independence, they could not influence the formation of the political structure of independent Sri Lanka. At this time even the leadership of the minorities thought interns of checks and balances at the Centre.
History of independent Sri Lanka with respect to ethnic relations is a history of breakdown or non Working of these checks and balances at the Centre, Articulation of the political power of the majority through the political systern saw the brea
kdown of the check landmark was the people of Indian T people worked mo: and were brought te British period. The of independent Sri Verted ther to a S Was in 1949. It CF representation in second turning poir
EB|| || 1956 til language of the m only official langua Clause ir tħe3 COrl St in the face of the nu majority. Next came first republican con had little regard for Centralized powerii ted parliament ew representatives of ycotted the entire pr formation. Finally th of 1978 Concentral at the Centre.
With the break Contract arrived at, delce We find tE getting articulated regional autonomy. mid-1950S aSSOCia nce of a governmer la Nationālist İdeol of the Federal Pa ТЕПТЕ. ТЛЕ СЕПТВ system of governm the e actment of til Institution it escalal separate state, cow Eastër Pro WinCSS
In the dynamics Lanka this struct. tween the unitary political structure regional automortly While it WaS gW0|Wirl pendent period pi rtlands to separatis to resolve it through TWO · Pri IT - Milis entered into agreer mitatiwes of the Tam conflict peacefully autonomy arrange altemps Were thW opposition from the shortlived attempts of the Conflict.
(From Towards Conflict Resolution. Odited by Gorar
 

nflict - regional autonomy?
sandbalances. A first diselfrarchise Tert of aril dBSCÉt. TheSe stly in the plantations Sri Lanka during the new citizenship laws Lanka effectively cotateless position. This hanged the balanced the parliament. A it was the passage of it made. Sinhala, the ajority community the ge. It prowed that the itution was powerless merical strength of the 3 the e la Ctrlent of the stitution in 1972. This Thirll Cority dermand Sand n the Sinhala domina3 Tore. In fäcl the the Tamil minority boocess of Constitutional le Presidential System led pOWEr even mDre
own of the political at the time of indepehe minority demands through concepts of Developments in the ted With the emergeit dominated by Sinhapgy saw the formation ty by the Sri Lankan ld Was for a federal ent. Then in 1974 after he first republican coedito a demand of a ering the Northern and of the country.
of the conflict of Sri Iral Contradicio beform of the existing and the demand for " is the major issue. g during the post-indeJshing the Tamil dem, there were attempts political negotiations. "S ir 1957 ardir 1965 ments with the represeilpeople to resolve the through a regional fTEfll. Elul both thaSE arted due to political Sinhalese. They were at peaceful resolution
The еппегgeпce of the separatist deland in the Tid-1970s also SW the first political actions of militant groups that had taken to armed struggle to win the separatist demand. The response of the Sri Lankan government was state repression using highly Sinhalised armed forces. This process of violence and counteviolence was supplemented by ethnic riots and other forms of Violence against the civilian population. The anti-Tamil pogrom of July 1983 is very significant in this regard. It affected the Tamil population significantly. Close to 100,000 people fled to Tamil Nadu in neighbouring India as refugees, The Sri Lankan issue becane an important political issue in TamilNadu. The militant groups expanded and the Tamilissue began to geta Wide coverage internationally,
Sri Lanka is however a case where the escalation of the conflict into violentforms gives risetoaparalelnegotiation process. Again the July 1983 anti-Tamil pogromis a turning point. After this event we find a beginning of a process of discussion in order to find a way out of the situation. There Were and still Termairis Tary problems With this discussion process.There had been several rounds of negotiations SimCēJuly 1983. Some of therT1 had beem inconclusive and some even non-representative of the main actors of the conflict. But it is important to recognize this parallel process generated by the escalation of the conflict. From July 1983 India had participated in this negotiation process. Today the process has resulted in signing of a PāCO ACCOrd betWeg diad Sri Lnka. In this agreement Sri Lanka agrees to introduce a system of regional autonomy as a Way out of the ethnic conflict. The legislation to set up the Provincial Council System was passed through the Sri Lankan parliament in September 1987 and the first Provincial Council elections hawe been held.
Looking at these developments in the Sri Lankan case, it is possible to argue that the contradictions in the political System is resulting in the emergence of the Concept of regional autonomy as a Way Out of the situation. As alreadymentioned this had been proposed before but rejected. The escalation of the ethnic conflict has firmly put it back in the political pr0CeSS. Alth0Lugh there ispolitical opposition to it no other alternatives have been suggested. Therefore from a conflict reso
1 Lindgren and Peter Wallensteem, Uppsala Uniwersity.)

Page 14
lution point of view it is important to see about the viability of a system of regional autonomy.
The legislation that has been passed proposes to divide the country into nine poľOWICES. Each prowince Will hawe am elected Provincial Council, Head of the Provincial Council Will be a Chief Minister elected from the party enjoying majority political power in the Council. A Governor representing the Centre will be appointed by the President of the country for each Province. A certain degree of legislative power had been transferred to these Councils in specified areas,
At a general level one can argue that the proposed system can best be described as a proposal for "limited regional autonomy'. Powers deWolved are in no Way close to any form of Federalist. Power for the Centre to intervene is very high. This has been the reason for opposition from certain Tamil representatives to the propCSal. Cm the other side we find political manifestations among the Sinhalese Wh0 dO 10t Want t0 COrlicöde even this to the Tamils. In their extree chau Wimistic propaganda they see this as an attempt to divide the country.
On the other hand there is a considerable section of opinion cuttinga Cross ethnic and political groups of the left and the right accepting the proposed scheme at least as a starting point for the resolution of the Conflict. For the purpose of conflict resolution it is best to build on these opinions. But at the same time this derlands an objective look into the wiability of the proposed system in the long run.
As it stands today the viability of the proposed system of devolution will depend on the ability of the government t
a) concretely set up the necessary institutions for the Schee of devolution
b) ensure the long term viability of the system both in economic and political teTTS.
The first of these is related to the ITTEdiate task of deesCalating the Violent proCesses bothin the north and the South and getting the political process going. This We shall discuss in the next section under a different heading. The second issue is related to the question of resource availability for the Provincial Councils and ensuring its overall stability politically.
The question of resource availability is going to be extremely important for the wiability of the Provincial Council system. If enough resources are available for the
12
regions a systern O Could be Worked out If this gives a Sense regions, contending the limitations of the could be overcome.
if the Provincial Syst due to lack of resourc of the political system Thus, the economic: mes an important ar tion,
A cursory glance
ngements of the
ShOWS that 15 Pro" able to raise resour their areas. This is: Wëak €COIl'OTIC bas to uneven developm Se many of the mair will still be manage. makes the budgetar Centre the most imp for the Pro WinCES. IT formula for the alloc bëCOITiës a Crucialis
The question of lor system for regiona posed in general terr opposition of them the entire Scher Te, a there are political pa capital Out of this th the system is a realis that the legislation to Council had been in
det 0 til COS tiOrla S. Certaic Which Takes it di through constitution, With a long history c COStitLtiOS i Sri L an adequate guaran India's Wolvertenti through the Indo-Sri COTBS iri, This WE SE in a following section
Conflict ProceSSO: ReSOWg
In the previousse at the emergence of nalautonomy andes POVincia COUCi S issue for the resoluti ethnic conflict. Butt been accompanied that reeds tO de-eSC sections looks at th Conflict.
De-eScalation of the in the North and th
As already tentior of Sri Lankahas esc an ared conflict.

f regional autonomy in concrete practice. of self-reliance to the
issues arising from proposed structures But On the Otherland er is to break down es, the shortcomings m WillbeacCentuated. s of devolution becoea for COıflict TESOLU
at the financial arraPrOWincial COurcils vinces Will hardly be Ces frOT) taxation in partly because of the e of the regions due ent and partly becaueconomic activities by the Centre. This y allocations from the rtant source of funds hus, Working out the Etion of the Se funds
ELE,
g-term viability of the | autonomy can be ns. Given the political ajority community to ind given the fact that rties making political Ie political viability of stic question. It is true Set Up the Provincial Iroduced as är ar Teitution, The Constituecks and balances fficult to change it Ea ameldrert S. But if tampering with the anka, this Carlot be lee. It is at this point in the Whole process Lanka Peace Accord al Consideri detail 1.
S that hawe to be
ction We hawe looked the concept of regiotablishment of viable ystem as the major
Of the Sri Larka his development has by violent processes alated. The following lese aspects of the
2: Wiccolicent Pro CeSSBS E. SOLut
led the ethnic conflict alated to the level of There are five major
armed groups among the Tamil militants. All of ther have been involved in armed actions at one level or the other. The biggest of them, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has developed a reputation of a highly riotivated, Well-armed and Well-trained guerillagroup.The othermain groups are Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO), and Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (EROS). Of these militant group0StWO hawe openly supported the attempted peace process through the Indo-Lanka Accord and the proposal to devolve power to the regions (EPRLF and PLOTE). In fact they are now seeking to establish themselves as legal political parties. One of them has already Succeeded in this task (EPRLF). They seem to be keen to enterinto the peaceful political process to achieve their ends. The position of EROS and TELO) jS Sti|not Clear. The most importantissue, however, is the stand taken by LTTE, the largest and the strongest militant group. The initial respolse of LTTE to the Indo-Lanka and the peace process was positive, But later events cast doubts about whether they agreed to the position Willingly or under pressure from India. Although LTTE formed the biggest and the strongest militant group it was not inwolwd in the final negotiation process that led to the Accord. The Accord was signed between the two governments. Later events showed this major flaw in the whole peace process.
According to the Accord disarming the militants had been left to the Indian government. At the beginning it looked as if the Indian government had some sort of an agreement with the LT TE enabling them to participate in the peace process. Whaever agreer Tent there was at the time of the signing of the Accord it broke down by October 1987. On the 10th of October 1987 the Indian forces began large scale Tilitary operations against the LTTE. As these operations were conducted in heawily populated areas of the Northern Provirice, the hurt a costs Were tremendous. Civilian causalities and the destruction to the property Washigh. It had also resulted in a large number of people of the Northern Province becoming refugees.
Bringing LTTE to the political process, restoring normalcy in the Northern Provirice is essential for any kind of Provincial Council elections to be held in these areas. There Seems to be som flowes now in order to achieve the first task. But Complete disarmament is not going to be an easy task even if the LTTE enters into

Page 15
peaceful politics. The history of rivalry between armed groups and the murderous conflicts between ther makes all the groups feel Very Wulnerable if all the arms are given up. Resolving this issue is going to be cruial for the future of the peace process. Perhapsit isan area where Tuch of creative thinking is needed.
The de-escalation of the conflict in the Easter Province is the other area. Where the questions might be even more difficult. The Eastern Province is multiethnic. The population is divided among the Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims in almost equal proportions. The status of the Eastern ProvincЕ Паs bЕЕП left ШПСЕГtain in thЕ Peace Accord. In the proposed system of devolution the area is recognized as a separate Province. However it is to be amalgamated to the Northern Province temporarily fora period of one-year. Then, the people of the Eastern Province are to decide at a referedu either to continue as a single Province with the north or to Separate. This is the arrangement envisaged by the Accord. This uncertain situatio in the east had resulted in WariojLUS attempts at resettling and removing people from the area. These attempts at changing the ethnic composition of the area haWE TESLUlted im WicleTICE. Attack.S 0 villages, bombing of buses, setting off explosions have become frequent events. The situation in this Province presents a formidable task for conflict resolution.
Restoration of complete normalcy in the Northearr ard EastET PTOWinCES Where a civil war has been fought for several years is not an easy task. This not only requires work at a political level in which various actors have to be brought into the political process. It also has to take care of disarming militants, their rehabilitation, rehabilitation of the area, etc. But the important point is that all this need not await the resolution of the political issues in all its details. In fact the steps to normalize the lives of the civilians hawe begunto some extent. This work can be continued and it will help in the normalization of the other processes as Well.
There is a considerable political opposition in the south among the Sinhalese to the proposed scheme of devolution and to the Indo-Lanka Accord. Sote of this opposition has taken violent forms. It threatens to escalate into a process of violence and counterviolence by the state as it happened in the north. This is also taking place in an atmosphere when the legitimacy of the government in power is in question. This is due to some of the
LIICETOCratICBCtiDI
T Carried Out in Orde
Postponement of g. a referendum, har opponents, use of th rity to gerrymander for OWI ends are SOI tic Tethods thatha government. With t Sent grO Lupo ir pOWêr for the past ten ye; constitution both g Presidential electio of this year 1988. ctions and allowing process to function eller Tlert for the deflict situation it violent processes сап, become suppl events in the south
Presence of the In. Contradictions Ari
The signing of between India and S cant breakthrough i flict. ThịE ACCCITU Cũ|
a) The agreeme intertal Conflict of S
b) A letter of exch Sri Lanka relatiOS. the agreement caп wing four constituen
e A section layin nciples. Here S zed as a Tul certain parts inhabited by C historically.
Acceptance of tion for the N Provinces of S to the ethnic pr
Specification Lanka and Indi: to morth ad ea
A clear titleta
The lettET Of Exch Sri Lanka Teglations agree to not to allow used against their India undertakes to ry to be used bys Om her part Sri Lank rtakings about not a be used by foreign in a Way detriment:

is that the ruling group
to remain in power.
neral elections using assment of political e parliamentary majoWith the Constitution Tle Of the UnderTOCraWe been used by this hese пеans the prehad remained in office ars. According to the eneral elections and is are dug at the end Holding of these elleErÖFEICETOCrédic again is an essential escalation of the cohe south. If not, the of the north ard East er ented with similar as well.
dian Troops and the ising from it
the Peace Accord Sri Lanka was asignifirh the Sri Lankar1. CũTỉnsists of two parts.
2nt dealing with the ri Lanka.
hange regarding IndoThe first part forming be Considered as haelleetS. THESE TE
g down the broad pririLanka is characteritiethnic Society, with if the country being ertain ethnic groups
a Scheme of de WoluOrther and Eastern ri Lanka as a Solution
oblem.
if the tasks for Sri
a in restoring normalcy St.
le for this process.
ange is related to Indo... In this, both sides W their territories to be terests of the other. not to allow her territoaparatist поуements. a gives specific undelowing her territory to
intelligence services a to India's interests.
Finally there is a special clause regarding the port of Trincomalee in the east coast of Sri Lanka. This port is considered to be strategically important in the area. India had been anxious that it is not used against India's interests. In the letter of exchange Sri Lankan governmentagrees to develop the Trincomalee portas a joint WestLUTE EDEtWees lidia ard Sri Lanka.
The content of the agreement shows the TaliffactorSthat lêd to India's in WollWement. The first is the Cross border Complications arising from the internal conflict in Sri Lanka. Here again the July 1983 anti Tamil pogrom was a turning point. This resulted in a large number of Sri Lankan Tamils going as refugees to Tamil Nadu in India. Many of the political representatiWes of Tail also went to Tamil Nadu. From this point onwards it was not possible ewento begin negotiation without India B5 H, TTlE[]|B[[]f. AS thÊ CũflfllCl BSCälälÊ[i India's role grew from that of a mediator to a direct participantin the whole process,
If one looks closely at the negotiation process it is clear that both parties to the Conflict Wanted India aS SOTE SOrt of a guarantor to the agreement to settle the issue. This means the Accord can be looked upon as aguarantee for the stability of the Provincial Council. Thus India is now closely involved with the resolution of the internal conflict in Sri Lanka, to the extent it affects the Tamil people of the Northern and Easter Provinces.
The other concern of India is of course her own security. India has always been nervous about the unstable situation in Sri Lanka. The possibility of its repercussions In the State of Ta Til Nadu la 5 bEB One issue. The other are the interests shown by third parties and the possibility of their involvement once the situation changes. Through the Accord India virtually shuts out such involvements.
When the Accord was signed there was lot of hope for normalizations, although the situation had cortiplicated due to several factors. According to the accord India hoped to disarm the militants within 72 hours. Obviously this was very unrealistic. The later developments and Indian military operations has resulted in a large influx of Indian troops to Sri Lanka. The estimates of the number of troops wary from 70,000 to 130,000. This is threatening to become a major a political issue in Sгі Lanka both in the north and the south. Looking for Ways and means for withdraWall of these is therefore an essential eller Trent in Conflict resolution.

Page 16
DRU
Amendment to Drug Regulation No. 34 c. of Monday the 6th July 1992.
'No person shall dispense a prescriptio a drug.”
MSJ goes down in the history of Drug R to collaborate with the Government on Generic decades of Brand Manufacture for the biggest mult lo almost exclusive Generic Manufacture for the p. now serve a wide spectrum of Health Services fr remotest Govt. dispersary and General Practition,
There is no glamour in illness - not forth safe, rational treatment, not market incentives.
Illness does not spare either rich or poor,
The Bibile-Wickremasinghe drug reforms into therapeutics. Generic prescribing and Generic of Drug Rationalization Policy.
In Good Times and Bad Times, Epidemi from MSJ have been a dependable source of reli
M. S. J. Industri
Factory and
P. O.B.
ColOIl
 

f 1984 in Govt. Gazette Extraordinary No. 722/3
rt which does not specify the Generic Name of
ationalization in Sri Lanka as the first Company Manufacture. MSJ swiftly moved over from two ιιιαίίονται Drug Corημαηίες ομετατίτις ίτι ήίς νεgίο η eople of this country. Our range of Generic drugs om the big city Clinics and Base Hospitals to the er in the country.
e sick anyway. The sick need swift, cost-effective,
patiепt orphysician.
were designed and adopted to re-introduce ethics dispensing were the main levers of implementation
c and Disaster, War and Peace, Generic Drugs afin illness for over a third of this century.
es (Ceylon) Ltd., Laboratories
Ox 430
bo 15.

Page 17
ΡΑΡΤ2
Responses to conflict
Kumar Rupa singha
The end of the Cold War focused attention on a broad range of internal conflicts in which the stakes for governments and non-governmental organizations and the people they protect and Succo Lur hawe grown exponentially during the past four years. While there is broad agreement that the number of internal conflicts is likely to increase in the next decade and that their consequences will become increasingly dire, there is no consensus on how best to tailor preventive responses to emerging conflicts.
Governments have a particular obligation to assume a leadership role in shaping and implementing preventive responses to emerging conflicts. Interms of preventiWe diplomacy, it is governments which can effect the greatestamount of change most quickly. Buta global shiftin how effectively the international Community addresses wiolent internal Conflict will necessitate innovation, forceful leadership, the rewSion of priorities and the reallocation of resources at the political level.
Within the NGO sector, development agencies have not yet begun to invest resources in prevention or conflict resolution. These agencies face hard choices - Whether to divert resources to respond to man-made disasters or Continue With their existing developmental goals. Another hard choice is whether to sink funds into projects at the micro level, when those projects so often fall prey to violent conflict Caused by the fragmentation and disintegration of societies.
Humanitarian agencies currently are investing over $4 billion dollars annually to be able to better respond to emergency situations. Given the nature of the problèm, they hawe inCreasingly come to recognise the importance of investing reSources in preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution. However, this growing a WareneSShaSnot be entranslated into operational guidelines and action.
Despite the major advances in human rights standard-setting in recent years and the expansion of capabilities to promote governmental accountability, local and international hunan rights organisations are often been paralysed and unable to respond effectively to states of emergency
The aurici, a Sri Lankan scholar is SecretaryGarrera of the London-based INTERNATIONAL ALEFT
and When Wiolence conflicts. Clearly, ir Tiber of conflicts wi of indiwidual hurlar grave breaches of hL is a need for a gre to ensure complian rights standards and COCEtE LETTS, IL tions need to Wor humanitarianagenci
etworkS.
Fогthepeace mov med in opposition race, the extra Ordina rgy once directed E Wars and the spectri tİOT ITILISt TOW bei TE Warpbrewertiornard. Conflict resolution SLubStartial Contribu pment of strategieso tiation, Tediation E need t0 fOCUS Orth transferring their Col wledge in peacema pped by existing ori
The environ lent War, potentially viole Conflicts over Water sources, the funds protection and reha and a host of other is er WirOTEItalists prevention of violent
The UN and prever
Interest in the pr diplomacy has gain 1992, when Secret: Boutros-Ghai's bluЕ the UN it: Eft An Agenda for Peac
Boutros-Ghalidefi Tacy as "action top arising between par sting disputes from Inflicts and to i Titt When they occur". H TT 10 St desirable ar y Tient of diplomacy before conflict erupt t0 COntail it andre Causes".
Elaborating on the of conflict preven BOutOS-Ghali Stati

esCallatBS ir internal 1 the increasing nuhere gross violations rights overlap with Imanitarian law, there ater fusion of efforts Ce With both hurlan humanitarian law. In man rights organisak more closely with es ad Other TaleWart
Yer Tent Which blossoto the LUCET TITS Lry creativity and eneat Superpower proxy e of nuclear devastachannelled to foster preventive diplomacy. etWorks Which Thade tionSi to the de Welofпоп-violence, negoind facilitation, now Burgent necessity of dWar Skills ard kroking to societies griIncipient "hot Wars".
Ll damage caused by 2nt or already violent and other Scarce reOst to environmental bilitation through War sues all indicate that Vea high stake in the
Conflict.
tive diplomacy
eventive aspects of ad momentu Ti since ary General Boutros 2print for revitalising ath of the Cold War, e, was published.
ned preventive diplorevent disputes from ties, to prevent exieScalating into coa Spread of the latter also stated that the ld efficient emplois to ease tensions s and "to act swiftly Solve its Underlying
UN's role ir ters
tion and resolution, Bd:
CLIrär’s FTUSf be:
- To seek to identify at the earliest possible stagesifuations that could produce conflict, and to try through dipolloTacy to remove the sources of danger before violence results
- Where conflict eпшpts, fo engage in peacerraking arried at resolving the
SSL es thaf hawe sed to conflict
- Through peасе-keeping, to work to preservepeace, howeverfragile, where fighting has been halled and to assist іп ілpleтenting agreements achieved bу Іhe peаселakers;
- To stand ready to assist in peacebuilding in its differing contexts; rebuilding the Institutions adrid infrastructures of nations fornby civil Warandsfrife and building the bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly af war,
- And in the largest sense, to address the deepesif Ca Luses conflict; economic despair, social frustice and political орpressiол...
The principal instruments of preventive diplomacy were listed as:
1. Confidence-building measures, i.e. exchanges of military missions, risk reduction centres, information exchanges, monitoring of regional arms control agreeГТПёпtS;
2. Fact-finding, i.e. information gathering and a Willingness to act on information;
3, Early Warning, i.e. a Synthesis of UN environTental, nuclear accident risk, famine, disease and population movement Warning information with political indicatOrS and possible UN action:
4. Preventive deployments, i.e. the insertion of armed forces before a Crisis develops,
As can be seen from the types of meaSures envisaged. An Agenda for Peace placed the greatest emphasis on international military responses to potentially violent conflicts. The existing and potential non-military roles of both governmental and non-governmental organisations in preventing or resolving conflicts was largely ignored.
Since the publication of An Agenda for Peace, the optimism for the UN's role in the establishment of a new World order

Page 18
has largely turned to disillusionment, Failed attempts at diplomacy and peacemaking in the former Yugoslavia, Angola, Haiti, Somalia and noW Rwanda hawe demonstrated the UN's Current financial, logistical and political inability to effectively intervene in high-risk internal disputes.
As The Economist has pointed out:
Mr Boutros Glasffr Sefa Sackrdo Willedged that the World body has neither Thea will cort trid reso Lurces to interwer IE9 li а сїvїwаг. It can Ігуfодгоптоfе огkeер a peace but is not equipped, physically orппелlally, to enforce one. Though that hardy needed driving harma, the UN's prewarications in the Bosnia fragedy hawe armply dore So.
Regional inter-governmental bodies such as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Organisation of African Unity and the Organisation of American States, hawe also had their OWri share of failures: the CSCE attempts at mediation in the former Yugoslavia, the OAU's failed Arusha process for Rwanda; the OAS' response to the Haitian coup, are some examples.
However, despite the recent record of the UN and other intergovernmental b0dies, it should be borne in Tind that it is the failures of diplomacy that are prominently reported, not the successes. For instance, while the debacle in Bosnia Continues to command headlines, the recent treaty of reconciliation between Poland and Lithuania received little notice, nor does the quiet diplomacy of the CSCE's High Commissioner for National Minorities. In Africa, a regional diplomatic initiative was instrumental in establishing iridirect and thern direct Corri tacts between the Warring parties in Mozambique, which eventually led to the Rome peace accord of 1992.
On the non-governmental level, the Sustaimed dedication and COUrage of grassroots peacemakers in South Africa Still has not received the public attention it merits, or have the efforts of citizen peacemakers in the Philippines, those who helped facilitate the Israeli-Palestinian breakthrough and many others in all regions of the World.
Because of the complexity and Tultifaceted nature of many internal conflicts, there is evidently a need to involve a variety of non-governmental and governmental actors. In recent years, non-governmental organisations hawe played a constantly expanding role in the advancement of human rights, in organising and providing humanitarian assistance, in pro
16
moting adherence te fostering economic pment and conflict re syster" serves as a "We the peoples' of States ard the system.
The straitjacket o OrET"
A major paradox C international system guaranteepeace a lation-StatĒS H3S Col standards, mechanis to addreSS Wiolet ir their consequences. World of disorder, in tions, the remaining tional governments with the changing ch the institutionalarldir of the paramountCy Woven during the C.
In part because mational Self-interes increasingly obsole "absolute" sovereig tions of resources fr ргопоtion of peасё ingrtia, the internati components of that Wernments, intergow tions or non-governs in most cases have willing to react to E of effective capabilit strophic internal cont quences hawe been
At the Sang ting t mic and Cultural glob. of weak or wirtually rnments to protectth of their citizens and darity all dictate that t te sowereignty must
COTTO SESE |goverпппепtal and energies and resour Wities II WOLuld be a means of addressing responding to the C. conflicts after they e
Because of the CC Ceted mature of Irma there is evidently variety of non-gove lmental actors. In vernmental organis: constantly expandin ment of hurtiam right providing humanitar moting adherence

humanitarian law, and Social develoSolution. This "third primary link between the UN Charter ärld
inter-governmental
ք էիք "Old Wըrld
If Lufti iS tatte Which evolved to nd Security among developed effective rms or the political Will ternal conflicts and In this post-Cold War Jermational Organizasuperpower and паhawe not kept paCe aracter of War Orshed tellectual straitjacket of state Sovereignty ld War er3.
of narrowly defined ti deference to the ascent concept of nty, distorted allocaor the protection and and security, and nal System and the system, Whether goemmental Organisamental organisations, опly been able and avents. Development ies to prevent cataflicts ad their COr Sesorely neglected.
echnological, econo|alization, the inability r. non-existent govele basic human rights "Of humaritarian Solihe concept ofabsolube re-evaluated.
dictates that shifting non-governmental cesto preventive actimore cost-effective g internal conflict than onsequences of Such rupt in violence.
Implexity and multifainy internal conflicts, a need to in Wolve a rIrTental and goWe"ecent years, non-goations have played a grole in the advanceits, in organising and ian assistance, in proto hurramita riam laW,
fostering economic and social development and conflict resolution. This "third system" serves as a primary link between "we the peoples" of the UN Charter and states and the inter-governmental Systern.
Given the destructiveness of existing wars, what appears to be an increasing spiral of violence, and the current difficulties of international organizations Orindiwidual governments in effectively addressing these conflicts, it is of critical importance to develop сопріеппепtaгy approаches between NGOs, governments and intergovernmental bodies, as Well as to enhance co-operation among NGOs concerned with the prevention of internal COfflict arld Corfit träftsformalscJfl.
2. Towards a global conflict
prevention capacity
Just the other day werade a decision to contribute S35 TriMo additionard har 7 de 75 disa sfer (FWārda). Cr78 Worders if We had S 35 Tiffar7 fr | 79 previous Woyears We Couldhave done Something o avoid the ki/Frg. (J. Brian Atwood, head of the U.S. Agency for International Development, on the threat of famine in east Africa, Interiational Herald Tribune, June 1, 1994)
Repeated tragedies, lost opportunities, our knowledge of emerging conflicts and common sense all dictate that shifting governmental and non-governmental energies and resources to preventive actiWities Would be a Thore UThale and cost-effective Tears of addressing internal conflict than responding to the Consequences of such conflicts after they erupt in violence. This is of course true as Well when we are looking at how to foster and sustain development.
To quote Max van der Stoel, High COTissioner of National Minorities of the Conference on Security and Co-operation іп Europer:
Capital invested in conflict prevention is capital well spent. In humanitarian, financial and political terms, conflict prevenIіол is пшch cheарег fлал реасеkeeping or rebuilding societies after a violent conflict. (Keynote speech to the CSCE Seminar on Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy, Warsaw, January 19, 1994.
I would argue that to maximize the strengths of both the non-governmental and governmental communities in preventing violent conflict we must concentrate our efforts on the coordination and operationalization of preventive strategies in

Page 19
strategic alliances of various partners. This will take firm political and financial COTrittents, as well as commitments of human resources. These are the basic building-blocks for an effective and sustainable preventive system.
Parallels to effective approaches to prewentive diplomacy can be found in areas that wesometimes take for granted-fire prevention and preventive medicine, for example. In the case of the former, modem preventiwe Teasures began With the invention of stand-by fire brigades and horsedrawn equipmentin the 19th century and have since grown into what can only be described as a Culture of fire prevention. That Culture in WolveS Substantial public and private investment and is comprised of rigorous fire safety standards, modern firefighting equipment and techniques, public awareneSS campaigns, and, in the home, smoke detectors and fire extinguishers. It also involves different actors - governments, public services, business leaders, the media-all Working to get the preventive message across to publics and to implement and maintain preWentive measures. The lives and property Saved through prevention have bEEr isléslimable),
The development of preventive diploTacy as an effective instrustent for the peaceful and Constructive resolution and transformation of COTiplex and protracted interial Conflicts will also involve a sustained, Tulti-dimensional approach at both the national and inter Tational le Wels. Below, outline some of the possible general approaches which different elements of the international community may find useful in developing preventivestrategies and practices.
Early preventive actions
Based on early Warnings, non-military and non-coercive "emergency" resporises of governmental and non-gove
nmental organisations can include:
- international appeals;
- fact-finding missions aimed at framing the issues and exploring fora for dialogue and negotiation;
- informal consultations with parties to
conflict;
- lobbying of national governments and
intergovernmental biodies,
- logistical and technical supportforme
diation or negotiation efforts;
- expertifacilitation of negotiations;
- the deployment of non-governmental peacemakers to areas of potential co
flict.
Longer-term preve.
Longer-tem actic address Sources of nomic and Social dis rnment and non-gow and the enhanceme society. Essentially, global shift in thir approaches to confli ngly effective action catastrophic develop
Such preventive initi,
1. The develop всопomic packag building efforts,
2. Development conflict-prone area
3. Aid targeted conflict managem
4. Support in im goveГпапсе апсi . ciety;
5. Cross-cultural training and trainin 6. Broaderscher nal conflict preven
Other importanta tion of Iulti-Culturalis arena, the developm for the peaceful and tion Of clairtis for Self rational Alert is Cul viability of a non-go" Which Would deal W lational, ethnic, reli groups, and, in partic discrimination or gro of identity; self-gow and self-determinatic
Generating politica
AS Max Wa Der S pointed out: "Early only be as effective a S8. to it". Here, th is the generation of the national and inte
Any effective syst plomacy would be duals and Organisati de political decisionr nshapers with sufficit Inding disasters and h credibility to effective tO BC OäWErt SLIch d
Some of the key.gr Within an area of CO influence that conflict
- top political leade We Tart and oth

ntiVe actions
is should seek to Conflict such as ecoparities, weak goveBrflfflèrtal Structure5 it of eleTients of civil What is needed is a king and practical ct, by which increasipre-empts reaction to
tS.
atives could include:
Tent of integrative es to Sustain peace
aid targeted to S or regionis;
on development of ant mechanisTIs;
Drowing structures of support for civil so
conflict resolution Ig of local trainers;
mesto develop regiotion institutions.
reas are the promomand, in the political Tert of TechnaiSTIS
Constructive resolu-determination. Interently exploring the WETTE "FOL" it claims related to gious and linguistic tular claims involving up bias; recognition artment; autonomy;
Will
toeland others have Warning activity can is the political respoe essential problem political Will at both Tlational lewels.
2m of preventive diOmprised of indivions which can prowiTakers and decisio2nt warning of impeave the contacts and aly encourage them
SisterS.
oups and institutions nflict in positions to
Could include:
's within a given goer Political groups,
- mid-level political leaders; - business leaders;
- media:
- the military; - other institutions of civil society; - public opinion: - Cultural figures.
Based on timely and accurate analysis of the root causes of a particular conflict, the principalactors, and internal and external options for the peaceful resolution and transformation of the conflict, principled intervention can take a number of forms. Among these are efforts at influencing international measures to address a developing conflict, such as the promotion of dialogue and problem-Solving, Support in the establishment of channels of Communication, Worktowards the establishment of fora for negotiation.
Other approaches might include:
the use of special envoys, mediators Or arbitrators acceptable to all parties;
- public or private lobbying of specific target groups-themedia, unior leaders, religious leaders, other influential social and political actors - within a Society faced with violent internal conflict or the escalation of conflict;
- Working with international financial or developmental organizations or business consortia with interests in peaceful outcoTTSS
The particular challenge of ethnic Conflicts
Because so many of today's Violent conflicts can be characterised as ethic Conflicts, special measures to address these types of conflicts are necessary. Such measures could include the clarification of international law and policy regarding the rights of communal groups; cosistent enforcer Tient of international law and policy regarding communal minorities; establishment of systems for information gathering and early warning of imperiding Communal conflicts and humanitarian crises; strengthening of regional organizations in the South, as well as non-goWernmental Organizations to meet emerging ethno-political crises; and, an increasingly urgent need-in light of the humanitarian disasters in the former Yugoslavia, and now Rwanda-the establishment of internationally accepted criteria for humanitarian intervention, including the use of force in cases of gross and persistent violations of human rights.
To be continued)
7

Page 20
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Page 21
LET FOOLS CONTEST
Parliamentary Democrac
A Realist Approach
Radhika Coomaraswamy
he idea of democracy is today
part of a universal discourse om govement. But the COincetermanifestation Of this idea within institutional forms of governamca isas diverseas the history of the moderm World. Representative democracy is a near universal political goal, but the form of representative democracy and its effects in a particular Society are empirical questions of fact. Such an analysis cannot come from priori assumptions about structures of goveTrent but from the evaluation of actual historical experience.
This disjuncture between the idea of representative democracy and its concrete manfestation must be the starting point for our analysis". Some may argue against the proposition of representative government, but very few have put forward aviable alternative to such a form of government at the national level, Though we may want to foster indigenous traditions we must also recognise that a World heritage of ideas, institutions and practical experience have cracked open the internal processes of developing societies. The acceptance of representative democracy as a universal political goal is a manifestation of this dynamic, No serious actor on the Sri Lankan political scene is asking for its removal as the Cornerstone ideal for Our OW democratic system.
The debate about the choice between parliamentary democracy and presidential Systems currently taking place must be undeSto0d i this C0 text. At Orne lewel it is a debate about the perfect ideal institutiona positivist debate about Words and forms. At another level it is debate about structuring government and a contest about whose woice will be heard, whose voice will be privileged and what rights will be protected. In other Words it is also about the actual results of electoral hustings. The Constitution one supports must therefore reflect the values one places as important in a given society.
Since Constitutional advocacy is deeply affected by the values of the author, I will state my predispositions very clearly. An ideal constitution for Sri Lanka in my opinion muStbe OnB thät
a maximises checks and balances and therefore reduces arbitrariness in decision-making
b. Taximises sharing of power between the centre and the periphery so that as
many people a; public decisionC. maximises the E
services within mocratic set-up, the Welfare safe ciety, especially d. maximises proti and allows territ to fully determin their future in thË respect the right: duals and minor areas ārld Solon to a derinocratic
e. maximTises func ction, the Corner: nad Order: Which | Cracy at til Thas everyday life of
These are the card guide this paper in / should adopta Presii system. The paper.dk one of these system evils and the choice of a combination of anchored in the politi Society,
Checks and Balan Consciousness
In actual historical nces among the art COThe from those whi ntial system, The altı rliamentary democré formulation, sees the as the Central and SL reflects the will of th of governmental con nedby systems of ac ntions of parliament: any clearly articulate balarCES,
In other Words, chi seen to be necessa a powerful executiv checks were on the by an elected individ cracy, as a step aw: to be unbridled esp. the homogenous pop Wver ir Srī Lanka and its operation has

v the Presidential System
possible participate in making fficient delivery of state Te parameters of a deservices which must be by net of any given soa developing one iction of minority rights rial minorities the right a decisions which affect ir areasso longas they and privileges of indivity groups living in these gas they are committed prOCeSS.
lamental rights protestone of any constitutionot only ensures demoof election but in the people.
inal principles which will evaluating whether We ential or Parliamentary es not argue that either s are a panacea for all between them oras part both of thern must be cal realities of any given
ces - A Westminister
erms, checkSandbalans of government has advocate the Presidearrative tradition of pacy, in its Westminster
triumph of Parliament perior institution which 2 people. The restraint iuct Would be maintailountability and convery conduct and not by doctrine of checks and
cks and balances Was y only when one had presidency and the Jse of arbitrary power al. Majoritarian demoy from monarchy was cially in a society with lation of England. Hothe 1972 Constitution Irowed to us that parlia
mentary democracy, when the government has 23 of the MPs in its party, is as unbridled and as arbitrary as a presidential system. The tyranny of the majority results mot only in the repression of other political parties but also minority groups. Without effective checks and balances on the legislative process, there is as much arbitrariness as in the presidential system.
Checks and balances as defined by traditional Constitutional Wisdom is grounded in the premise of "balanced government". He says that this notion of balance comes from the anti-despotic idealism of Montesquieu but also from the practical shrewdness of the US drafters of the Constitution." In Sri Lanka we have not only inherited Westminster forms of government but also Westminster Consciousness. In other Words, unlike Mointesquieu or Jefferson, English leaders from Cromwell onward did not really believe in balanced government; they believed in the supremacy of parliament as the institutional Cornerstone from which everything follows. This supremacy of parliament coupled with leftist notions of people's assemblies and centralised party structure led to the 1972 Sri Lankan Constitution where even fundaTental rights, though formally adopted as an element of the Constitution, Was Watered down in the interest of the "National State Assembly".
Sri Lanka has therefore no accepted historical consciousness or practice with balariced government. At the same time this historical consciousness is absolutely necessary if a Presidential system is to avoid its most despotic phase. In fact the institutional system of checks and balances manifests itself by deliberately placing a check on the executive as well as the legislature by the judicial interpretation of Constitutions. For a system of checks and balances to Work, one hasto have a powerfulljudiciary anda legislature which issuspicious of presidential action and sees itself as a watchdog of the President. It is this mutual suspicion which gives the system of checks and balances meaning. In Sri Lanka we have neither the powerful judiciary which has the capacity to review legislation - only bills and executive action - and since the inception of the Presidential system, We do not have a practice of eternal legislative vigilance with regard to the practices, the finances, and the spending and appointing power of the President. The
19

Page 22
constant Wigilance, the Tutual suspicion is lacking.
Wat T LITETS WICH COLTIEDLut to this lack of suspicion and mutual accountability.
1.
20
The President as head of government is not accountable to parliament-only his mimisters. At the Samme tir The he ca hold portfolios so that in important areas he makes policy, is responsible for policy but remains Unaccountable. In the U.S. Fle Fresident 5 Dk ECLOLII tabEt FBrliament but the powerful legislative committees keep him under constant Scrutiny and his officials may be summoned at any moment for public hearings on any question. So the immunity of President from parliament in Sri Lanka is not compensated for by any effective machinery which allows for the policies and officials of the President to be subject to scrutiny. The machinery exists in the Sri Länkar Cortext but the realities of politics in Which both the executive presidents have enjoyed a docile parliarientary majority has prevented the effectiWe use of this Techanism.
The rather bizarre impeachment motion led by some members of parliament was the only exception to this docility of pariament with regard to the executive presidency. But impeachment is an extraordinary Teasure; an act of truly the last resort which has never been very successful ever in the United States. Since it is a move against an elected representative, most systėms - hawe acted with caution in bringing impeachment to book. In fact, it is more COmmonly used against the judiciary since judges are not elected and are therefore more accountable to the other institutions of government.
The fact that a docile parliament Would suddenly Towe againsta President in an impeachment movement points to something more fundamental in the body politic, Constitutions and parliaments are still seen in an instrumental sense - i.e., whether they will allow one Section to capture Slale pOWer and "anything goes" in that attempt. This is not the Weakness of any one political party but appears to be endemic to the Sri Lankan body politic. However, if there is no possibility of grabbing state power, then the only option is docility. The Whole middle ground of using parliament as a watchdog, of keeping a check on the day to day activities of the executive, of increasing the technical competence of parliament to deal with crucial issues of policy especially financial policy, are issues that hawe not been CLltivated Or developed.
ChEcks and balé сопcepts lп апy fх gανBπιΙΤΕΠt. Mμtι powerful bodies C Way toward hones Timent. It is espe We hawe a presic there is no preside parliament. If Sri L. Presidential Syste іпсгcase the powв. ding the Scope f legislation as Well
nisms whereby P. of party affiliation
thdog on an erra. on impeachment d life of politics.
In addition it lay 1970-1977 period the pitfalls of an ul the alternative sys democracy. It is the no matter What sy ther a presidential ntary system, it is Safeguards-aju legislation without parliament which Watchdog on the making. Without til On both the executi the gra of arbitrari unbridled power colonial political le laawe uS.
The other factor WF healthy mutual sus heart of checks a the Executive a been the propor system in relation
dent. The systern
sentation has had which is to allow of political parties that they hawe act prevented the pel cted by the first Which had charact with parliamentary ding to the tyranny
But the system, W objectives placing personality has li being concentrate political party. Th problems in the px se very few of the Larkahawa te Of of modern politica AWÉ Ofte o C associations whe псівs of the paгіy
clout than the inter Cition and election

ances are important IT of representative Jal suspicio amorg if government is one it and effective govecially important when idential system since Intial accountability to alka is to maintain a fl it WOLild have to r of the judiciary incluor judicial review of as to develop mechaarliament, regardless sees itself as a Want executive, not only ay butin the everyday
r be argued that the has also pointed to us nbridled legislature in item of parliamentary arefore imperative that stem is chosen, Whesystem or a parliamenecessary to hawa the diciary that Carl review fear Or faWÖLJr är dä is competent to be a
day to day policy1850 effective chcocks we and the legislature, iness, patronage and — Sri Lanka's posttgacy will newer really
ich haspravented the spicion, which is at the Td balances betWeen the legislature, has tional representation to ar executive presiof proportional repre| one salutary feature for the representation interns of the Votes ually polled. This has mdulum swings reflelast the post system erised our early years "democracy often leaV of the majority.
hich hädäS One of its the party over the ad to political power din thing hards of the is has led to major litical system, becaupolitical parties in Sri ganisational StrLucture il parties. llm fact, they häfBCBSEd BlS COSE Te thig Whir TSG ad fa|leadership hawe more Trnal processes of Selle
This has led to the development of party oligarchies, a condition which has been well analysed in Western political parties. As Michels Writes:-
"It is the party organisation which gives birth to the dor Tiation of the elected over the electors of the mandataries over the mandators, of the delegates ower the delegators, WhoSays organisation says oligarchy"
This oligarchy may be an intrinsic part of any bureaucratic apparatus in the modern World, but in Sri Lankathere are nominimum standards with regard to the Conduct Of Lhê interTalafaiFS of the political party. While we may have coTpany law with regard to private enterprise, there is nothing with regard to the conduct of political party business. In SörThe Sense, there Should rlÖt be a law which makes all political parties into similar organisations - in fact freedom of interial experimentation should be given Taxi Turn leeway, the party should not become an entreriched bureaucracy. And yet, there should be minimum standards with regard to the corldUCl Of DLISingSS tO ErISUre 3 TE3SUrE of integral democracy and financial accountability to the membership.
Whether We hawe a presidential system or a parliamentary system, this factor has to be underlined. In both institutions, the political party is the foundation, the Core of the system. Unless We devise strategies and policies to ensure the minimum Standards of democratic delberations within the party structure, the system itself will not be able to function. It is only a democratic and effective party system which will be the final check, either on an errant president, or a runaway parliament with an errant prime minister. It is also only an effective party system which will groom and put forward candidates who will be ourfuture political leaders. If there is some blockage. Within the party structures, then quality leaders will never emerge. In any system they are the final protectors of democratic WalUES.
To be Continued
Notes
R. Unger, Politics, Harvard Law School, 1981 p.83
S.D. Bär daranayaka in his spggchgs ir pärlament är din the PFB Sidential Electic CaTpaign af 1983B. SEE LLeSLLLTLLLLLLL SLLLLLLLLuLLLLL LLLLLLL LLLLLLKS Want for Sri Lanka", Law and Society Trust Newsletter July 1992
SaMLCCS LMM TeCMLMCeLLLCS CCCMGMCTTeeMML of Social Theory, Free Prass, New York, 1975 p.64
J, Uyangoda, "The President and Parliament in Sri
LLLLMMMLLS LLLLL euS LLDL LL LLLLMLLLLLLLL0LS L LLL
MMe CeLL OLOMM CS LMLL LeeLkMMeOCLSS Corriparaswa Study, Dehiwala, 1992. LLS LYekLkLYS LLeS euLLeLLLLL LLLLTLC ELL 000LS

Page 23
Why theres sou in this rusticto
There is laughter and light barter amongst these Turaliamsels Whar: LE5y 5rting cui lobacca leef i T1 a bT1, E is, ČT1 of the hurdreds of such bars spread out in the lid and upcounty inteIInediate zone where the arable land remains talkյա քuring thi: {}f:astón,
Here, with careful nurturing bacco grows as a lucrative cash crop and the green leaves turn to gald. to the value af over Rs. 250 million or more Arritually, för perhaps 13,000 Lurral folk.
 

ENRICHING RURAL LIFESTYLE
und oflaughter bacco barn.
Tobacco is the industry that brings eployet to the second highest nLimber ni Paople. And these people are the tobacco barri owners, the tobacco growers and those who work for then, or the lard and in the barns.
For ther, the tobacco leaf means meaningful work, a Comfortable life and a Secure future, A 300d enough reason for laughter.
CeylonTobacco Co. Ltd.
Sharing and Caring for our land and her people.

Page 24
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