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LANKA
GUJAR
RED ALERT
PRABHA
LAUN EELAM
UNDERSTANDING
CHANDRIKA'S HEARTS AND MINDS WAR
- Mervyn de Silva
DEMARCATING ELECTORATES - Dayalal Abeysekera

) Registered at GPO, Sri Lanka QD/33/NEWS/94
 ി ഭ
. كثير
و بررسی کاری CHIES
INTERNAL WARS
- Kingsley de Silva - John Richardson
- Shinjinee Sen
SRI LANKA’S ECONOMY
- not “TIGER STYLE'
— Manik de Silva
DEFENCE CONCEPTS
— Humayun Kabir

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OUALITY AT AFFC
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CCLC)

COMPLIENTS
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ORDABLE PRCES
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LLLLaaLLLL S LaaLLC HBL aLaH LHTH LLLLLL LL LLL LSLSLLLLaS LLLL LLLLLS
Subscribers Will be informed about the June 1st issue.
BRIEFLY. . .
Tigers resume hostilities
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) broke their truce With the government on April 19 by blasting two naval gunboats anchored in the East Coast Trini CC.imalee, haistialLir, The cessasion of hostilities for on-going peace talks had held for a little over three months. A dozen sailors Were killed in the under-Water attack and two dozen Were injured. The boats were walued at 225 m|itյր,
The attack Carme IBSS than three Fours after the LTTE had informed the government of its intention to break off negotiations although the truce terms stipulated 72 hours not
[...E..
Another Tiger attack
The LTTE followed up its April 19 Tricoralee harbour attack With another, two days later, on an East coast army Camp killing nearly 50 Soldier5. ALEJO Luit, 80 m0re Were TepJ0rted missing. Seventy Tigers too Were reported dead in hard to hand fighting inside the саппріпа Пerce gun battle raging three hours.
Army reinforcements cleared the sitë later and TETOWE thë WOL
lded.
The LTTE began the attack with mortars and rocket propelled grenades at about 11 p.m, on April 21 suwiwers Said. The SoldierStick Cor the advancing Tigers and the battle raged non-stop till mear 3 a.m. the following Toring.
Serious crisis, says Srimai
Democratic United National Front (DUNF-Lalith Faction) leader and Transport Minister Srimani AthulaTh[[]LIdā| Sälä ||15. Lālith AthlulathTTILJdali CommerTIOration (Second death anniversary) message that the COu
ntry was facing a: the reakdow Ol tiatios.
The meassag (people's Alliance by President Ch malke KLITharaturı nuire effort5 tO : in Our land. Thu Concer that WE down of the pea North East issue. of Ce55.fir Sri L: confronted With ti Comflict...
"Today We are rious national Cri kdown of the pea
GO Werni
ре
The governme рLITELJE PJEHCE W LTTE, President Tarı ile KLT afat rally in the tradit thern district cap story had many who pursued pe said; if the peopl red for peace, Trilitartiš Filad to 1 the people's will.
The people of itle PA, and W the government was genuine, the
The City
PICE it:Sifi
COO Tiption of LTTE North 1 ESt E іпthe peасерго sand persons W ring in checks f.
Meanwhile R: Sidet Chädrik: maratunga telli Irudia: "We are in ELUt if the LT TE
STOP PRESS. "MISSILEATTACK! MISSILEATTACK's crashed. 52 dead. 19 soldiers killed at Arily point, Kayts.

ay 15 since the Ananda Press will be closed for a month,
serious Crisis after o the peace nega
: Said: "TE PA 1)Government led andrika Bandaraga has made gering about peace s it is with great face the break Ce processin the After three months anka is once again lethreat of Violent
faced With a Sesis. With the trealCe proCBSS".
ent Stifor
ECE
it Wil|| Cortir LUĞ to El Or Wit 1OLIt the CFloderika Eariaunga told a mass | Silala SOUital of Matar, HF
lessons for those ace, the President e of a country yea
armed groups of 20W, thigis hEadg to
LFB North has faith "ere convinced that S pursuit of peace
president said.
's security
led Security checks Ilowing the resuE 35Stilities li the Tidlig breakdOWT1 ESS, AOL ta thOLere held for ScreebrTigerinfiltrations.
auter reported PreBandarärlaike KUng The Times of interested in peace. treaks the Whole
thing and gives us signs they are not going for peace, We are strong enough to go to War".
Attempt to arrest Dr Swamy
Tamil Nadu State opposition Leader S. R. Balas Lubra familyar told a press conference in Madras that Chiëf Minister Jayalalitha had Ordered the arrest of her chief detractor Dr. Subramanian SWarny at the behest of LTTE Supremo W. Prabhakaram. Dr. Swany's Crime Washat he dubbed Prabhakaranan internaltional "pariah", ater Informerly used to referto "untouchables" in India.
Dons quit
Deans of University faculties quit their honorary posts damanding higher pay as teachers. They did not quit their paid teaching posts.
GUARDIAN
Wol, 18 No. 1 May 1, 1995
Price RS. TODO
Published fortnightly by Lanka Guardian Publishing Co. Ltd. No. 246, Urior PläCÉ Colombo -2.
Editor. Mervyn de Silva Telephone; 4.47584
Printed by Ananda Press 825, Sir Ratnajothi Saravananuttu Ma Watha, ColorTubo 13. Telephone: 435975
CONTENTS
News Background Economic Report |-
FrOTTI Mediation tO|TLETvertiori 4
Ethnic Contic and Development 11 FITT REVIEW 13
TE THFHJf. I
Sri Lanka's Foreign Policy (4) 14 People, Power and Politics (2)
houted the pilot.... his last words. The SLAF plane
Two gunboats suLInk.

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NEWS BACKGROUND
LTTE ECS Tru Cee
Mervyn de Silva
"new" War has commenced. Tostick to our own nomenclature, EELAM WAR 3 has begun.
Now the battle Will begin as a contest for the hearts and minds of the northern province Tamil, the Tamils in the East, the Tamils elsewhere in the island, and that very important constituency, the expatriate Tamil-London to start with, that is after Tamilnadu naturally, and from the US and Western Europe to Australia and New Zealand. It is to the P.A.'s credit that the state-owned media, spotting this window of opportunity, gave maximum publicity to an official statement on the current blitz by What the P.A. introdu CEOd as "the Eelam lobby" overseas. The statement in fact named five Countries US, Canada, Britain, France and Australia.
TWO Tamil leaderS Me SSirs, Tondaman and Douglas Devananda have already issued statements that will help the P.A's Agit-prop campaign. Agit-prop of course is a Weapon in this type of War, It is part of the overall strategy of isolating the LTTE by Winning over non-militant Tamil organisations, including some that were part of the secessionist armed struggle before the Indian intervention. HOW luch Clout these ex-militant groups now enjoy is anybody's guess. But We should remember that EPDP, ENDLF, EPRLF, TELO etc together with the respectably parliamentarist TULF hawe wotes in anassembly where the P.A. has no majority, having failed to win 113 seats at the August general elections for its near-50% popular wote.
Far more significant is the C.W.C. of Mr. Thorndaman, a minister in the Chandrika Kumaraturnga administration but hardly the figure he cut in the 17 year
2
U.N.P. administrat and Pretadasa,
In the first V WAR 3, the L nStrated a mil on land, and SE ty to limit the use of airpoW
Mr. Thondrian's TOUS action has be rise of young Mr. radical from the rar rkers. Infact, Mr. Ti Cut OL ut of the actio early 90's, Mr. Thic enough to initiate at mediation exercise may be called"pers
More Crucial to th effort are Mr. Ash Mrs. Srirman Athul - in that Order. Ast of the (East-based Mr. Ashraff has clo|| has 9MP's and ( eastern merger.
TEPresider'5 ngthened with the T the most important ntary parties, decla support for the P.A
This is apoliticalP.A. emphasisest leader Who improv mpressive Under-5 naway Victory at p. was "the peace can al TioritiËS I Wote

ins of President JR
reek of EELAM TE haS denoitary capability a and a capaci
S.L.A.F.'s free
.
capacity for autono}en restricted by the Chaпdrasegaram, а ks of plantation WoOndaman has been in altogether. In the 2ndaman felt strong independent CWC that included what onal diplomacy.
e President's peace raff's S.L.M.C. and thir Tudali'S DUNLF Lefounder-president
Muslim Congress, ut since (a) his party b) the future of the
and has been streULF, the oldestand of Tamil parliameing its Unequivocal 's "peace move".
lilitary struggle. The le first because its d'Or the P.A.'S UI* Wote With har ruesidential election, |date". All the latioCHANDRIKA. It is
more thanamatter of honouring pledges however. It is economics too, a Crucial factor in the Whole pre-polls equation Worked out by the P.A. brains trust - Prof. G. L. Pieris, Dr. Jayawardene, Dr. J. Uyangoda, and other Colombo Campus personalities and miscellaneous, heavily-funded think-tanks, and their US-EU patrons. Because their mentors Were Western, and also because thay did not wish to offend the LTTE, the P.A. strategists kept the Indians "out", in the cold. Or So it Was to the neutral eye. But President's recent visit to Delhi may have left a somewhat differentimpression on the strategistsin Jafna.
Apart from the P.A. - U.S. - Donor Coalition (the peace dividendis the cement) the other importantarm of the P.A. strategy is to co-opt the peace constituency in the North and thus isolate the hardline, militarist LTTE. One may call it an attempt to attack the main enemy, the LTTE front the rear. A third front is the Widely spread Tamil expatriate communities who collect money and do Very useful propaganda-publicity Workin the US, Canada, Europe and Australia and raise funds, Can the P.A. Which has the fullbacking of the US-led Western alliance mount enough pressure on Tarini communities to cut off funds, and cease political support and pro-LTTE publicity?
To what extent will the US government use its enormous power and influence to help the P.A..? If the answer depends on the Embassy's reports to the State Dept., Will the US reading of the situation change with a new Ambassador - an Ambassador who is quite familiar With the Sri Lankan Scene and is unlikely to rely on a charmed circle for his judgments?

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ECONOMY
The OlOOm iS Off
Malik de SiW
fter a decade of shifting from
crop exports to higher-value manufactured goods, Sri Lanka is stumbling in its attempts to Towe to tiger-style, export-led growth.
Industrial exports showed signs of weakrless l'ast year and une T1ployment and inflation are rising-as are the trade and Jdget deficīts. A Change of government has meanwhile raised worries about busirtess policies. Still, Overal economic growth remains quite strong, albeita touch slower.
The air cause for concern Was in textiles andgar Tients, which make up half of all exports. Shipments grew just 13% last year - quite a contrast from the previous year's 27% surge, Producers of Other goods took Lip SCITE of the slack, however, enabling manufactured exports as a whole to expand nearly 16%.
In addition, exports of Sri Lanka's famous Coconuts leaped 33%, and the WOrld bÓLught a Tecord 2A42 Tillion kilograms of Ceylon tea, a rise of 4% front 1993.
Overall, exports grew 14.7% to 158.6 billion rupees (S 3.3 billion). Il Tports, hoWeyer, grew by Tore than 21% to 236 billion rupees, leaving a Widened trade deficit of 77.4 billion rupees. The currentaccount deficit swelled to 5.9% of GDP, or 329 million rupees, from 3.6% in 1993.
Strength in trade wasn't the only petal that fell off an economy that had been South Asia's rosiest in 1993, ECOnomic growth fell to 5.5%last year after reaching a 16-year high of 6.9% in 1993, And gross domestic savings fell to 13.6% of GDP,
Wilfrid 17.7,
Inflation and unemployment help explain Why Sri Lankans hawe less to save. The Department of the Census and Statistics estimates unemployment at 133, inflation, meanwhile rose to 8.4% and isprojected to top 11% in 1995.
The government spent about S 18O million last yearon Welfare measuresSLich H5 Glidfar"S-LITlCl Subsidios. Hardduks such as these, prompted by a desire to please voters in last year's three elections,
helped push gove total of S 1.3 Ellio rnment is financing poping into the natio
In its budget, pres government projet: GDP for 1995, day vious year. But an: the projection "sli gging the deficitat
The prime rate is after jurnping to 1: While the Asian Dë the goverrir Tert's CrOWding out prival the goodnews is th: still corningin. Forē d'Orlesti: il Weste Of GDP.
President Chai appears to recogni rtance of private-SE LITIGris l'Ock the A left-leaning People a signal that the sympathy; in 1994 kers' physical con
Rao g
NEW DELHI: to his opponent (1) party after as
SOFTE 130 || a meeting here extended "Lil
"The support Rao was given general election:
TCWC stol that the Congre foreign capital a
A resolution. at the prime mi dissidents oppos
S3 Wara CWC Would StEG di S5
 

Trilent spending to a n in 1994. The goveg expenditures by dimal prowident fund.
sented in February, the ted a deficit of 7.5% of W rol 1 OoBot prealysts at W.I. Carr call ghtly optimistic", peEFOLITO 9%.
howering around 15% 3%, is late DeCerber Velopment Bank says domestic borrowing is It doTestic investors, at foreign investors are ign inflows arefuelling it that is close to 25%
1drika Kumaralunga ze the growing impoactor interests. Labour ugust election of her 's Alliance Coalition as | STES, WC || || IEEJOLIITILITESt ad Strifinement of business
executives had threatened to under Illine Priväle=Sector Confidelice. Indeed, busirıESS analysts expressed Concerin publicly.
But Kumaratunga recently assured busiressen that the labour Unrest has abated. Her government has also said it Won't tolerate labour wiolence, and it has arbitrated some wage settlements.
Kumaratunga says she would like to See a two-year moratorium on Wage inCréaSES-buther government Hasyêt to impose Orne. However, the government Continues to set prices on a range of goods, rice among them, it has pushed down prices of wheat-flour and kerosene, partly with subsidies to their consumers.
While the government is under pressurefrom exporters to devalue the rupee and make Sri Lankan goods cheaper on World markets, inflation fears are preventing it from increasing the supply of rupees. Money-supply growth slowed to 19.6% of GDP in 1994 from 23.5% in 1993.
(F. E. E. R}}
ets free hand to revamp Congress
Indian Prime Minister P.W. Narasimha Rao, in a stinging rebuke S, has been given a free hand to revamp the ruling Congress itring of humiliating election defeats.
ders of national and state chapters of the Congress who attended of the policy-making Congress Working Committee (CWC) ching support" to the 73-year-old Rao, a spokesman said.
was unanimous", the Congress spokesman said, adding that SWeeping powers to reorganise the crumbling party ahead of s due by the middle of next year.
utly defended Rao's economic reform programme and pledged SS government Would not slow down the opening of India to nd competition, the spokesman said.
assed at the ninehour Teeting which ended around midnight HistEarl's residence bola med the racë mit State Election losses o Sed to Rao's leadership of the 109-year-old Congress.
leaders demanded action against the rebels, saying a crackdown idence and restore unity to its ranks.- Reuter

Page 6
it
india-Sri Lanka:
Kingsley De Silva
1. Ultroduction
Few international relationships in any part of the World are quite as asymmetrical as that between India and Sri Lanka. Whether one considers population or physical size: India has nearly 50 times Sri Lanka's population of 17 million, and is a large SLubContine ital State While Sri Lanka is a Si Tallisland of 25,000 square miles. Imevitably therefore the Widerissues of regional power WerSLS Small power relationships figure prominently in, indeed dominate, any discussion and analysis of the theme of this paper.
Linked to it as the Second issue, are conflicting visions of the essentials of national Security from the time these two neighbors emerged from Colonial to independentstatus in 1947 and 1948 respectively. While this paper seeks to deal with this theme, the discussion Here is admittedly brief and is intended merely to explain Why certain decisions were taken by the WO Countries at various times since independence and especially in the 1970s and 1980s,
SriLanka's ethniCCOfflict of the midad late 1970s and 1980s provided India with the opportunity to intervene in the island's affairs. This paper Will not deal at any great length. With the complexities of the island's ethnic Conflict. It Will merely draw the reader's attention to Some of the recent Writings on the subject, and Will concentrate instead on sorTee of the ISSUES in the ConfisctwhichhawEabearing on the thema of our discussion in this paper. Two facets of this conflict are of special interest: the SiZe andr Ole Of Sri Lanka's Tartli||IThinOr|- ties and the question of devolution of DOWEF.
Šriānkālās vOTTTritiēS. Tā indigenous Tamilis who hawe lived in the island almost as long as the Sinhalese, i.e., over 2000 years, at present constitute 11 percent of the island's population, and the Indian Tamils as they are called, a Smaller group, about 5 percent of the population. The latter are comparatively recent immigrants brought to the island as
CTTTS LTTeuLCLLLL CLLL LLLLYHMH LLCLHMHLLLLH HHHuL LCHLLCL K DLL LLLLLLLLeLkmOuC LLLLYLLLLLLLH LLLeLeHHHO L LeeeLLLLLLLLCS L K SKT SIVa is Executive Director of I.C.E.S., Kandy.
from me
plantation Workers grantsto the Islandii se of the greater eci the island provided Southg Idia. Alth mon language, they not distinct groups geopolitical location Tents, and by cla rictions.
Throughout the 2C ruled India. Whether roys, or Indial politic ply interested in th community on the insisting that the bulk by Ceylon of Sri Lan controversies. Over been especially acri Agreement was rea a SettleTignt of thi India ärad Sri Lärka i it was only in 1988th stemming from the WEESEEdda" Eble T5 of Sri Laka'S is a TOE TEC-it de W that emerged and g. 19EDs,
This study of Indië Lanka's affairs in the is a Contributio tot on managing ethni divided societies, e. ment of rēgional po W. Several recent exar Turkey in Cyprus, is LEba). NO II dCLE mples will ermerge ethnic conflicts of Europe in the future a case study in the U se of accords and Eti: CofiiCL.
TWO issues figuri mediation of the SriL lution of power and t the post-independer änd tflB. dBFllard Oft -as distinct from Sri minority - for the ethno-region cover rthern and easter rstand why these is: nently in the debate

diation to interVention
by the British, or miBritish times becauOnomic opportunities
in comparison With Lugh they hawe acorT|- " аге 1Wo separale, if kept apart by the
of their rain settigSS E CISLE I disti
8th century those who they be British Viceіапs, have been deеgate of the Indian island, especially in of them be absorbed Kaas its citizens. The these issues awe TOOLS SICE 128. CE COI LE3 til TT55 of S question betWÉēm in 1964 and 1974 but at the residual issues
earlier agreements interest in the prolarger Tamil minority elopment, something rew in the 1970s and
’S ir Wolwet i Sri period 1987 to 1991 he growing literature C conflict in deeply specially the involveVers in Such disputés. nples spring to mind: rael and Syria in the | SeWeTal other exalFrom the burgeoning Central and Eastern 2. This paper is also sefulness of other Wi
treaties in mediating
a prominently in the ankan Conflict deWold re-Construction of Ice Sri Lankan polity; ne Sri Lanka Tails Larika's Indial Talli Creation of a Taill ng the island's noprowinces. To LundeSules figure so promi5 and discussions On
Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict it is necessary - indeed essential - to go back, briefly, into the island's troubled history.
Šihes ad tē Srī Lāk Tamils have sharply different perceptions of the nature of the Sri Lankan state; and diametrically opposed attitudes to decentralization and devolution of power to regional Units of administration. Although the early proponents of decentralization (fr) TT the 1920s onwards) were Sinhallëse, the situation has changed since independence. The main political parties of the Sri Lankan Tamilis have belcome the prinicipal if not sole advocates of decentralzation and devolution. These demands have provoked strong opposition from the Sinhalese, both in the mainstream political parties, as Well as pressure groups representing Sinhalese-Buddhist opinion, many of whom fear, if not believe, that schemes of devolution of power are likely to lead to political fragmentation of the island, and are therefore a potent threat to the island's territorial integrity through the re-emergence of a separate Tamil state and the linkage of such a state to Tamil Nadu ITN South India.
The processes of Centralization vigorously pursued by the British during their F'Lule in the Country (1796-1947) hawe proved to be a formidably stable political legacy, and one that post-independence regimes hawe been both relucta mit and unable to repudiate. These Centralizing processes Were initiated in 1815-18 with the Subjugation of the last independent Sinhalese kingdon, the Kingdom of Kandy, and the fusion of its territories With the narrow coastal strip the British had conquered from the Dutch. However it Was Tot Luti|| 1832, that a Lunified a dTlili= strative system for the Whole island Was set up, in the course of which the existing traditional regional and subregional administrative boundaries were eliminated and replaced by new provincial boundaries. The objective behind it was avowedly political to hasten the break-up of the Kandyan kingdom and to Weaken national feeling in the Kandyan areas. The Kandyankingdom had Successfully resisted Western invaders - the Portuguese and Dutch - since the middle of the 16th century and had defeated and destroyed a British Expeditionary force in 1803. In

Page 7
1832 the island was divided into five zones of administration in the form of provinces, When changes in these boundaries came in the Course of time between 1845 and 1889 they were mostly abelated recognition of some traditional boundaries. By 1889 there were nine provinces. With only minor adjustments to their boundaries introduced largely for purposes which can only be described as adriinistrative coWarlier C3, this structure las SL WiWeidt C) the present day. From the 1950s the district - a smaller administrative entity Within a province-replaced the province as the largest unit of administration, Ewen So the province Survived, bereft of all administrative energy and purpose, a reTinant of a British system that refused to fade away, until it received another lease Origil 1987-88.
The pressure for revival of the provincial structure is an integral part of Tamil separatistagitation. The Case for Tamil separation in Sri Lanka was built upon the modern doctrine of self-determination of peole, and linked With it came in time, the CClCept of the "traditional har Telands" of the Tails, "homelands" that needed to be protected from "outsiders," the 1stWes Citizens of the sa Tie Country. This Concept first emerged in the early 1950s. EWE ry Version of it since Lhatti Ta has been builton a foundation of pseudo-historical data. It was a clairn based on a hazy “historical" Të Tory of statehood in Centuries past, remembered and now interpreted (and generally misinterpreted) as a Continuous and continuing tradition of independent statehood and an unbroken TlatỉCFlä| CCT15CigUSF1ES5, lrt less tham a decade of its first enunciation, this theory - refined as "the traditional homelands" of the Tamils - has become an indispenSable and integral part of the political ideology of the Tamil advocates of regiomal automony and Separatism. The definitior of EO LIndarieas Carme in the Timid-195OS and it generally encompassed the northern and eastern provinces.
As a result of its overt separatist Connotations the concept of "the traditional homelands" of the Tamils has generated hostility from the Sinhalese. The eastern province was an integral part of the Kaidyan kingdom, and it contains the main ports of that kingdom: Trincomalee and Batticoloa, Besides, the Tamils are allnority in that province, and neither its Muslim population, nor the Sinhalese favor a linkage of that province With the Tamil-dominated northern province.
India has hadithri ethic Conflict. Thef Mrs. Gandhi's fëtU| Was that of a Cov, Lankam TaTill politic irl Irdia. TiS COWE until 1987. The Tar an important facetic in regard to Sri Lank a Constituent unit (E of one Country influe b) betWegnitaj argi the same intensity a tāt Tami|| || Nadu dit: il tha Case of Iridi Lanka. The India-T relationship is thus rational affairs. A role is a more Com reacting to the pr policies in Tamil Na Trn Tents hawe prowii separatist activists Fling årld bases, NC g0WerTl|Tlent Confliw tolerated the provisi and the existence Č Other parts of the c With Indira Gandhi, 8 that is to Say, Wel||bo 1983 i Sri Lk.
dis's role of MTS. Gari a 5 a sponse to the anti-T i Sri Laka ad Ci Gandhi himself. T active participant be COs liller i Fle TT) is quile Liricue in th in ethmic CC riflict: IE diator tak Oil the Ti the presumed guard rity's interests Wage Spa CtllOrS OF tattri ring State at that.
2. Conflicting Pel
Sri Lanka is by a Slale, "a localpOWer restricted to its OWI The island is at OICE and yet deeply isolat tfiere is LFieldial. Su from the island by at its narrowest poir wide. To the east lie the World of China; t is the Africal contine of West Asia. Ole Co til of Sri Laka Wł for there is moth|ng bị Antarcticallying thou
 

a roles in Sri Lanka's irst, which began with to power in 1980, fert supporter of Sri Cal activists Operating irl support continued Nadu factor forms if India's complex role an affairs. Seldot has a province or a state) anced the relationship ghboring country with sld lolla SarTE 5%tent and Continues to do ä’s Telations With Sri amil Nadu-Sri Lanka a unique one in inteirTittedly India's own lex one than merely SSures of domestic du. Tamil Nadu govedead Sri Lakan TTII With SäTlC{LJarles, traiit only did the central È in this, but it also Drl Of training facilities If саптпрs and bases in ountry. These began ind in the early 1980s, efore the riots of July
ediator began under alculated political reamil riots (of July 1983 antinued under Rajiv le third role, that of gain late 1987 and idle of 1990. That too a history of mediation wer before has a 13gle Of Combatarit, and iam of af ethnic Tim Oda biller war against rity, and in a neighbo
ception of Security
iny definition a small "Whose demands arë and adjacent areas." Strategically situated Ed. If Oleks til bContinent separated El Slä|W SEà Wlich it is a mere 22 miles s southeast Asia and O the West, far away, state Arab World Infronts the real isolaan one looks South, etWeen the island and sands of miles away.
The main point however is that Sri Lanka's geographical location emphasizes its proximity today as in centuries past to a large regional power or powers in the Indian sub-continent. The India of today is a much larger and more powerful political entity than any Indian state or states that impinged on Sri Lanka's affairs since the 16th century or earlier, With the single exception of the British ra. Despite its proximity to the Indian Subcontinet, Sri Lanka, or Ceylon as it was called then, Was never part of the raj Ceylon was administered by the Colonial Office as a CroWr colony.
This separation from the ray has had a profound impact on the political thinking of several generations of Sri Lankans, and especially its influential politicians. Thus Sri Lanka's first Prime Minister, D. S. Seranayake, based his strategy for his Country's Security in the post-independence situation on the assumption that the most likely threat to her independence Would Corne from a newly-independent India. For Semana yake no less than for Whitehall the defence agreements signed at the transfer of power in late 1947 - and which he had first suggested to the Colonial Office as early as August 1945 - Were part of the process of adjusting to the uncertainties of a new pattern of international politics in South Asia. With India asa independent State. For Witehall the defence agreements with Sri Lanka were important because of British strategic interests in the Indiam ocean, especially for securing her links with Australia and New Zealand. Senanayake believed that the agreements offered his Country security against any possible threat to her independence-froi India. This arrangement offered the country a free ride in defence and external security in the crucially important early years of independence. Sri Lanka had no credible defence capacity at the time of independeпce: no апту, по паvy and по аіПогce, All these Were built from scratch and under British supervision over the next decade.
Senanayake's policies survived his death (in 1952) but not the defeat of his party, the United National Party (UNF), in 1956. The time had come to think of a national defence policy, in the new strategic situation of the late 1950s and early 1960s. The central issue was the power Waculum created by Britain's abandoTent of her traditional role in the India Ocean region. The Sri Lankan governments of this period did little to develop

Page 8
even a modest defensive capacity against ary ExtErnal threat, or for that matter Ewer against Internal turmoil. And, more significantly, without gwēr considering the long-ter||Timplications of its actions or inaLLLH aa LLLLLL LtLLL LLLLLaLLLL LLLLL LH security system that Nehru's India Was in the process of Constructing.
But even if a small power like Sri Lanka could afford to ignore the external enviromert, India Could mot. She ha dinherited much the larger portion of the rai, after the partition, and was in the process of Consolidating it into a cohesive state, Nehru's LLLLLL 0LLL LLLL L LHHL0L0 LL HHHLLLLLLL from the raja belief in India's "natural boundaries." In its comittent to the defence of this inheritance, Nehru's India was assuming, tentatively at first, but with greater conviction with the passage of time, the strategic vision of the ra. This conviction grew stronger in time, especiaIly under Indira Gandhi.
Sri Lanka had begun taking shelter LLaLLL LaLLLLL L LLLLaL0 LLLHHLaLKL H LLLLL 1960s, as a purely Voluntary acl, con the rebourd, a Sit Werë, front Britairn'sa Jardnment of her traditional imperial role. In the 1970s With Indira Gandhi reflecting the views of the exponents of India's assuTiption of the mantle of the rai, India decided that Sma|| South Asiam neighbors |ikESri Laikalu Sttake Shelt5.T Lurder that Librella, and that a Search fora alteriative Would be regarded as an unacceptable, if not intolerable, challenge to the dominant regional power. This policy was made explicit with regard to Sri Lanka, for the first time, in 1983.
LLaLLL La LLLLLS 0LLaaL aLaSLL LLLLLL relations Were to be dominated by Indian responses to Sri Lanka's ethnic conflicts, Sinhalese werSUS Tails. The Ilid and late 1970s mark the beginning of the second pha Sê in the post-Indē pērdēñCewicolarice in the island. The first phase was in the Tid Hildalg 19505. At thal til E India Had treated it as a matter of Sri Lanka's doTigstic politics and therefore lot for diplomatic or political intervention. It Was the hayday of India's perception of itselfas the conscience of the Third World, and Nehru acted with a restraint in regard to domestic tufm[]| afflang India's Smaller neighbors (with the possible exception of Nepal) which his daughter and successor did not show. In the 1970s the situation had changed. After the intervention in East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh India LLLLLL L K LLLLLL LLLLLLLLSLLLLLLLL LLaLaLLS S LLLLLL debacle of 1962, When China hadirifligted
a humiliating defea been forgotten.
THE FEI fäls relationship betwee Was the Ti Tii|| Nad ir Tipact on the Sri Las the Indian union, ME as it became later, Centers of separatist The Tise of the Dra. ard atar iflg. Dravit gam (DMK) in the E the same powerful fo isir tatt li tirar of Sri Laikai LFE E and the DOMKI WETE E of the rights of Tami the Congress-dom Ilmets of Madras With TLICH ISS restr their Concer about the increasingly tur Lanka's Jafna pen Centration of the T. island) in the early treated as an integr politics of Tamil Na SLu Ft Asia LFLS HI a purely local irripact checked from pursui in India, took Vicari) EernCOLIragerTherit and tendencies among!
lika.
TIETE WES - UIT tion of Separatist ag 1975 as Well as a activity, of which the Prabhakaran, nowe Tigers of Tamil Eela Alfred Dufayappa, Mayor of Jaffna (the of the morthern pro significant incident, found tha Scarch fo troublellä kerS a frUS the local population help in apprehendir besides, When the chance of capture, t Pak Strait 5 to Ti Ti them as a refuge, for raids iriito the Jaf
IL WāS at this pe between Jaffna and —that Smugglers er as transport agents sources of readymo established on bol straits for the traditi Were noW put to tot

on India had long
Which influenced the 1 E TW CLIstri-5 | COTrlection and its kā 5ituāl. Will i dras, or Tartlil Nādu WIS OITE of the air
tendencies in India. sida Kazhagarm (DK) ja Murimetra Kazhaarly 1950s reflected Irce of linguistic natioisformed the politics ame period. The DK WEI TOTE COISCİOUS |Sir SC Luth Asia thā imated state govehad blaen, but acted aint in derTonstrating HESE, SOTILJCI SO that bulent politics of Sri insula (the main COamil population in the
1970s began to be all part of the internal idu, Tarfil politics in a regional rather than The DMK, effect Wely ng its separatist goals LIS olea SLI re in giwing Support to Separa tist the Tamils Of Sri La
Tistakable intensificagitation from 1974 to | TCTEase II). Le TOTISE shooting by Welupillai ader of the Liberation TI (LTTE) in 1975, of a fellow Tamil, the administrative Capital wince) was the Tost The security forces actual and potential trating experienceas Would not voluntarily ng theSe young men, re Was the slightest ey moved across the Nadu. Which Served and as a bridgehead fna peninsula.
oint - the passage the Tamil Nadu Coast tered the picture both for fugitives and as ley. The safehouses h sides of the Pak onal Sluggling tra de HET Iusas, as hawens
for men on the run, and as transhipment points for arms for the separatist cause. Wery. Soon the Tore politically conscious Smugglers and the terrorist groups had joined forces. Each needed and used the Other. There Was the inevitable metarПоphosis of the smuggler into "guerrilla" and "freedom fighter" and indeed some of the most dynamic and powerful leaders in recent times thrown up by this blending of clandestine trading activity and militant and violent political agitation were SmugglĒTS.
3. Indiaas Mediator: Mrs. Gandhi and
Sri Lanka, 1983-1984
The victory of the Janatha government LL LLLL KLLaLLLLL LLL 00YYS LLLLLaLLLL K aa two year period when India's relations with her neighbors improved remarkably. With the landslide victory of the United National Party (UNP) at the Sri Lanka general election of July 1977, the two septuagenarian leaders of India and Sri Lanka, Moraji Desai and J.R. Jayewardene respectiWely, established a very close understariding, and the two Countries, avery Cordial neighborly relationship. The situation chaпged dгапnatically опce theЈапаthacoalitior CLJITmblad and Indira - Gandhi returned to power in 1980.
Once she returned to power, she found herself at odds with President J.R. JayaWardene and his government on their Outlook, attitudes and policies on regional and World affairs. There Was, first of all, the Afghanissue on which the two governments adopted diametrically opposed policies: Sri Lanka, like Tost other SCLuth Asian states strongly condemned the Soviet invasion. India was out of step with the rest of South Asia on this issue. There was also Sri Lanka's futile attempt to SË ÇLIrë TerTibership of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). This was regarded as proof of the Sri Lanka government's general pro-Western attitudes Of Whichlatter, futher Evidence Was presumably provided in the expanded facilities granted to the United States for its Voice of America (VOA) relaying station in the island, and also in the choice of a Consortium consisting of Oroleum (Pvt) Ltd, Singapore, Oil Tanking, West Germany, and Tradiraft, Switzerland, to restore to commercial use a complex of oil-tank farms in the vicinity of the strategically illportant port of Trincomalee, India's concern With regard to this consortium lay in the supposedly coverl links between its COStitut fir S a U.S. iterests and the Suspicion that these commercial links

Page 9
had concealed political and strategic diLLaLaLaaLLLLSSSLLLLaLa LCLLaa LLLLLLLLSLLLLLLLL OLKL WETE, Sri Larka alle Of Third World countries backed Britain rather than Arge
tina.
Sri Lanka, for its part, found the new Indian government less than helpful With regard to Tamil separatist groups operating from Tamil Nadu. After the riots of 1977 a period of quiet and slow improvement in relations between the government and the principal Tamil party, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), had seen the passage of the District Development CoLuncils billin August 1980 and the establish Tert of a Secord tier of goverrir Tērt in the island. This was a major political achievement, considering that two previous attempts (in 1958 and 1968) had failed in the face of extra-parliamentary agitation and internal bickering within the than ruling party or coalition. There Were, nie Wertheless, occasional outbursts of ethnic violence (in 1981 for instance) and an ongoing conflict between security forces located in Jaffna and Tarnil separatist activists and terrorists. As in the past the latter Were using Safe houses, if not "bases", in Tamil Nadu.
Given this background, the anti-Tamil riots of July 1983 gave Mrs. Gandhia totally unexpected opportunity for intervention in the affairs of the Island. She wery Swiftly initiated the diplomatic moves which saw India assuming the role of an intermediary in Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict all Thost as soon as the riots erupted. It began With strongly Worded expressions LaLLLHaLLLLLLLaLaaLLLLLLLaLHLHLaaLLLLLLLaS in an avowed effort to put pressure on the Sri Lanka government on behalf of the island's Tamil minority. The Sri Lankan government was invited to accept Indian LLaLLaLLH SLa aLLLLL a LLLL LaaLL LLLLLLLLS LL LL0L LLLLL L HLHLLLLLLL LLLLL LHa aLLLL LLLLLLLLS The Sri Lankan governient was greatly, if temporarily, Weakened politically at horne, andrriore So interrationally, and Was thus in no position to refuse.
L LLLL LLLLL LaLLLC LLLLLL LLLLLLLCCLLLLL LL Indian "interwention" (a euphemism for invasion). While there Was no Supportfor this from the Indian government, Mrs. Gandhi made no public commitment to refrain from military intervention. The Sri Lankan government Was operating on the assumption that such an invasion could not be ruled out altogether. Tamil Nadu politicians were quoting the parallel of Bangladesh and the Indian intervention of 1971, in support of their demand. They
Were supported in
mainstream Tamil pi United Liberation F leadership had také Ower 35,000 Tamil 5ā5 tūTāTiādu i riots. Their UITibers about 125,000. Fort tary interwention the yet another parallelt Pakistan Which a Indiarli intervention
creation of Banglad
In intervening in a self appointed Ted COct. Mrs. Gal India's right, as a reg iri ta Sattle Terit actually) destabilizin a neighboring State, parties to the conflic —had linguistic, Cul|| with a neighboring սրign, the Conflict it: as a regional rathe one. TarThil Nadu opi Fit-Ti|Tos ir Gandhi could hardly her policies on the But there Was a pe With general electi ad HBr Electoral Eo parts of India, inclut ngholds in Southerr Was very anxious t opinion in order to re. her, and the Congr base there, This expr: the speed With Which the riots of July 1983 of G. PErtlSarat" the very significant of India's declared of Sri Lanka,
G. Parathasarath diplomat and adn being a trusted Con With the advantage He had, im additio being a South India that Tamil Nadu op TULF WEEre happy. W a reassuring choice
On previous occa in Sri Lanka, India Eeen abOLut the Saf dials resident in Indian citizens gene being largely plantal quite clearly a legit although the prese

this by Sri Lanka's litical party, the Tamil Front (TULF) whose in refuge in Madras. efugees crossed the the after math of the increased, intime, to the advocates of milirefugee problem Was Othesituation in East i paved the Way for and resulted in the
sh.
Sri Larikal affairs a:S |lator in a major Ethnic hii Was Lunderlining gional power, to a say if a potentially (and Ig domestic conflict in | BeCauSe One of the - the Tamil minority Lural and religious ties
state of the Indian self Was SEEri in India Is thari a purely local Imion Was inflamed by 1 Sri Lanka and lin dira ignore this in devising Sri Larki Situtis. SOrlal factor as Well. ins due in late 1984 ase егоdiпg in many ding SOFThe of herstro| India, Indira (Gardhi to mollify Tamil Nadu tail if not consolidate ess party's, electoral plains to a large extent She interwened Wher | broke Out the Choice ly as a mediator, and change in the basis interest in the affairs
y was an experienced inistrator as Well as fidar It Of Mrs. Gandhi of easy access to her. n, the advantage of Tari | Wici et inion as Well as the ith hiril. To them it was
Sions of ethnic conflict 's main concer had ety of the "stateless"
the island, and With rally, both Categories İOrl Work.Er.S. THIS WES iTlate Indiam interest, ce of the is of
plantation Workers with Indian citizenship WaS d'UE t0 E CONCESSiOn Tha de to the Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC) the main political party cut trade union of the plantation Workers-With the knowledge and approval of the Indian governmentby the UNP governments (of 1965-1970 and 1977 onwards) whereby they were partitted to remain in the island for the duration of their Working lives, (Under Mrs. Bandararaike's government such peSons were required to leave the island once their status changed from "stateless" to Indian citizen.) With Mrs. Gandhi, in power, in the 1980s, Indian interest in the affairs of Sri Lanka Was extended to cover the Tamils, in general, and not merely Indian Citizérls or "stateless" perSons of Indian extraction most, if not all, Of Whom Were alSO Tamils.
In the last five Tonths of 1983, Parathasa rathy trawelled frequently between Delhi and Colombo seeking to devise a set of proposals that would be acceptable to the three pārties in wolwed—the Ta Tills of Sri Lanka primarily, the Sri Lanka goverment, arıd to the Indian goverırtlarıt, As Mrs. Gandhi's special representative he negotiated directly with the Sri Lankan president. In addition he established close links with the TULF, with objective of Winning their support for a scheme of devolution of power, and other safeg|Lards, that WOLIld Bear acceptable alternative to a separate state in the north and east of the island for the Tails of Sri Lanka which Tiany of the Tamil groups, including the TULF, were not advocating Ir tir The ParathāSarathy's closelle SS to the LLLLLL aKLLLLLLL a LLLHHLLLLHL0 aLLLL LLL0KS dent Jayewardene and the Sri Lanka government had in him originally, and he carine to be regarded as an advocate of TULF policies.
Apart from the close links they had established with G. Parathasarathy, the TULF leadership were in constant touch with senior Indian officials Delhi dealing With Sri Lankar affairs, and on occasion they met Mrs. Gandhi herself. Thus the TULF was able to re-open the devolution of power in Sri Lanka. With the assurance of a Sympathetic understanding and support of their views at the highest levels of the Indian government. With ParathaSarathy's approval they formally withdrew their support for the District Development Councils established in 1981, claiming that these Were inadequate in meeting the needs of the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka as they perceived it in the context of the changed situation. They staked a claim
7.

Page 10
for a system of provincial councils, as the second tier of the governmental structure In Sri Lanka. Their main aimi Was to secure the Ostablihiment of a large régional COLricil, BercoTıp assing the rı örtherrı arid Bastern provinceSWhere the Tamils would be a dominant if not overwhelming majority, which they had advocated since the 1950s (through the Federal Party, which formed the core of the TULF established in the late 1970s).
When President Jayewardene visited Delhi in Nywer Tiber 1983, con fence-Tiriding trip for which the opportunity was provided by the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, hemet Mrs. Gandhi for the first time after the riots of 1983. He found that she had absorbed Parathasarathy's views on Sri Lankan affairs, espeCially LFE proposition that the unit of dewaUtiliCarl Shi Luld be a prawirice rather tha a district, and that the powers of such units Sh[]Uld EJB. TTILJch WidB.T tham LIm{def the District Development Councils. The meeting With Mrs. Gandhi served to underline the Weakness of his position in negotiating With the Indiam government of the resolution of the political crisis in Sri Lanka stemming from its ethnic conflict. He tertatively accepted a set of proposals embodied in a docuTent which came to be known as "Alslexure C" Wflere til få fra TigWork of a settlement with the TULF and Other Tamil groups was outlined. A key feature of this document Was the merger of the northern and eastern provinces into a single Tamil ethno-region. As a result, Something which Sinhalese opinion had steadfastly refused to accept as a politica|lly Wilable proposition Was Elewated to the position of a Cardinal principle of a political SELLETEIt With tha TaThills.
O his retur to the Island President Jayewardene set about the business of gaining the support of as wide a range of political opinion in the Country as possible for the terms of the settlement incorporaled "Alexure C". He called a Confergnce – the All Party Conference (ACP)– L0 disCUSS this anong Other proposas. The discussions began in January 1984. The UNP's election manifesto for the ge. neral election of 1977 had made reference to such a conference to Seeka resolution of the island's ethmic Conflicts, but OCe in office there Was marked preference for bilateral negotiations With the TULF. Now the scope of participation Was Widened to include not merely political parties but also representatives of religious groups as Well, including representatives of the Sangha (the Buddhistorder). The Sangha
Were generally hard SchEITES of devolul Freedom Party (SLF| sition party Could ni participate in the disc
fETEE.
While the ab Salci With APC of SITE lity, the fact that allot tE TULF and the participants ETCOLIra TproTise settlemen rathasarathy was ir SOE, oft 355 di SCL to Teat SDITE COf the i He Was encouraged representatives and to dispel the suspici and the proposals asSociated. This COrtilled VTS
& CITTSBISS WESTE importantissue of th toe dia wolyed to re Sanga representative for a second tier of go they had been Lin We tİTTE, NEW Ethel 355 til to Cortit të ITSel, provincial councils. achiewed in regardt issues Such as lang Wernment published : WE fra TEWork baser È: EEAP SChI ET E for E SECOTI basis of a settlement
the Tear til Et Ido-Sri-Lanka di SC decades — the politi resident and Working Well. On the Way to a the post-1977 perio. tion of the democrati Sri Lanka. Oe Of the | |- AFC D | E | | 94,000 stateless pe station Workers-bi citizenship. This rei accepted in principle Legislation for this pl 19867 and appro (through the Grant Stateless Persons 1988. With its adop rkers Of India Extra C Categories: Sri Lank: With dial citizenshi Islas I'd for the durati
Wes.
TESediSCUSS015

line opponents of all iOrl. Tla Sr| Larlka P) the principal oppoot be persuaded to Lissions of the Confe
a of the SLFP depriof its political credibiher parties, including Marxist parties were ged hop es of a Cobeing reached, Pathe island during ission and Was able delegates informally.
to talk to the Sarga di SJ but WSUITE ble ons they had of him with which he was LSSions at the APC of 1984. Eventually Chêdon the crucially e range of powers to gional bodies. The is accepted the need Wernment something Hing to do up to that ley Werestilreluctart "ES to a systenTill of Much progress Was 3. Otler. Controvérsial Jage policy. The goin elaborate legislati] (On the COr1Ser15gu5 - this included a id Charlber– Ste
at hardy perennial in Orci Ver the Stfiye Cal status of Indians in Sri Lanka - was licable Settlement in I through the Operac political process in One fruitful results was the decision that SOMS — Indian pla2 granted SriLankan Coredation Was by the government. urpose Was ready in wed by Parlilent the Citizenship to
Act of NO. 39 tion, plantation Wotion fell into two clear a citizls, and those p but resident in the or of their working
0 til ETTE:Charlig of
devolution took place against the backdrop of an increasing frequency of guefrilla attacks and terrorist incidents in the north of the island, and the extension of til BSE into the EastETT SBab Card: Thllë guerrilla forces were now much larger, much better trained (the training was largely in India), and much better equipped than they were before, The training and equipping of guerrilla forces in India and With the active support of Tamil Nadu had begun in the early 1980s, Wall before the riots of July 1993, but there is nomistaking the intensification of these processes as a rgSult Of the Wioler. Ce inflicted On the Tamils in July 1993. Tamil Nadu had always been a ready haven for these guerrilla forcess, but now the support they received Was strengthened immeasurably, as Was the extent of the protection thay enjoyed. Their morale was stronger. and their motivatörı köğrler after the Se riots than before, and by end of 1993 they demonstrated a greater Willingness to take risks, and greater resourcefulness and daring in their attacks on the security forces and on carefully chosen largets. Until about the end of 1985 they were in Tiany Ways better equipped than the small Security Services units stationed in the
Oth of the island.
The first reports on these training-camps and "bases" located in India appeared in Western newspapers in April 1984 atmuch the sarne time that comprehersive COverage of the camps and bases appeared in a prestigious Indiari Journal, India Today, And if more Solid evidence was required of the use of Indian soil by Sri Lankan guerrillas and terrorists, this was forthcoming when a section of the Madras International Airport Was accidentally blown up on 2 August 1984 by bombs due for transfer to Sri Lanka for the destruction of aircraft of the Sri Lankan National airline ält Colombo"Shtë frillä tional Airport: the explosion killed over two dozen Sri Lankan passengers in the tra Insit lourige of the Madras airport om this occasion. The Indian government genera|ly refused to acknowledge the existence of training-camps and facilities for Sri Lankan Tamil guerrillas and terrorist groups on Indian Soil, Instead it sought to divert attention from Sri Lankan charges and protests about these With Countercharges of human rights violations in Sri Lanka, attributing these quite explicitly to the lack of discipline arTrong the Sri Lankan security forces. In so doing they metan embarrassing fact with a half truth.
The factis that Sri Lankan Tami||guerri

Page 11
Illas and terrorists operated in Tami||Mladu with a freedom and publicity for which the only parallel is the PLO and its various factions in the Arab World. Quite apart from the public support they enjoyed in such large measure in Tamil Nadu, they engaged in fund-Falsing drives at public meetings in other parts of India as Well, in particular Bombay City. This double stadard on separatism and terrorism - to crush separatism ruthlessly. When it is seen to pose a palpable threat to the Indiari polity as Was dome in 1984 in the Punjab through Operation Blue Star, to protest Vigorously at the tolerance acCOrded to India extre lists and terrorist groups operating in the Western World (the Sikhs in Britain, Canada and the United States for instance), and yet to feign ignorance of the existence of traintng-camps and "bases" for Tamilguerrillas and terrorist groups on Indian soil was one of the great Stumbling-blocks to cordial relations between Indian and Sri Lanka during this period and on to 1987 or later.
India's policy in regard to the internatioGLLuuLaHH a LLL LL LLLLL LaLLLL S LLLLLL was a two-pronged affair. While discussions and negotiations. With the Sri Lankan government on asettlement of diffêrences between the government and the Tamil minority Were proceeding, With India in her role of mediator, India was using its for Tiidable diplomatic resources through its High Commissions and embassies in the West - in Ottawa, London and Washington, in particular-to accuse the Sri Lankari goverfilmentarlı dils affred forces of Violations of hur Tian rights in ättäCKS on Tärsi Civiliäns, il the COUrSe of or in the Wake of security operations L LLLL HLGL LaL L0aaLL a La LLLLLaLLS LLLLL LHaL United Nations Organization Indian delegates-generally a Tamil Nadu politician (a Tamil Nadu minister in 1983)- would Täis the Sri Lark is: SLIJE I ir til E3 CC) Lur:S of debates thedra. The Situation Was avEn Tore favorable to this diplomatic offensive at the United Nations Office in Geneva, and the sessions of the Human Rights Commission where the Indian representative Would either raise the Sri Lankan issue Dr! His CWr), Of more Oftarl Hack COurltries SLJIch as Argentina (smarting under Sri Lanka's support of Britain in the Falklands War) and Norway in raising the issue difficially. Since some of the Westesi nations — thig United States and Great Britan - were represented on the Commission by non-governmental organizations, and there was in addition the conspicuous presence of Hur man Rights groups, Sri
Lanka Was under T im GEmeựā thām. Im N
In the Teartirile was living in Self-imp as guests of the Tar This Was quite fros activists who also Conducted their cli and political campa and India, linking LIp spora groups living latter groups sought support froT Indian Commissions, in W mice, and Otta Wa, m.
Then again, while the provision of trail WiSS in Tar Na India) and the trans India to Jaffra, the Under Indif3 GHT || Western powers to Sophistica ted Weap for CBS. Sri Laka frt Pakistadt of China; Pakista the training, ard II Lufrid LO ISfäl för its forces.
4. Frւյm MEdiati ПЕН ПЕТ LHI
TE TULF'S SLI DJECEITIJEF 1984 U Of thĒ propÓSåls pol; has been the subjec A SO for that TTT) Barıt"S: de:CİSİOrı t Withdra Wing its Sup Sas atladberi OWEartWOTonths of вхplanations sugge Sion hawe f0CUSSe local politics. But of Tore plausible One, 15 la MTS. Gal a calculated TOWE Tiption that a fres under a new India WOLIldbe le SSCOITIrf TULF.
The impressions Sri Lankam politicial met him in the early -ministership had b raging. Among his Lankan affairs Was Sarathy aS the pri ROmesh Bhardari, lary, a move that W

Iuch greater pressure
EW York.
the TULF leadership JOSEedexile Fr Madra S mil Nadu government. I r Oriġ ratical Tar Til Wedin Madras and I ndestimle Coperations igns through Madras | With Well-fLJrded dia
ir tiġ West. TħeġSE and received political ernbassies and High Washington for instat 0 meti LOTO.
: persistently ignoring ling facilities to Tarinil Idu (and elsewhere in sfer of Weapons from Indiam gover T1grit hi used pressure on prevent the Sale of Onry to the Sri Lankan purchased Weapons he People's Republic also provided much of Til additior Sri Lanka aSSiStari Cea liri trainiirg
לוחםtiחםWחםtחI אם) וחם 1985-1989 ,kaך
lder dCiSiiOrl Ir attiċi announce a rejection accid before the APC it of Tuch speculation. latter Was the goveo react so quickly by Ort för a Set Of propr0to carefully developed hard bargaining. The sted for this latter de Cion the exigencies of le explanation, and a is that it was a respo's āSSāSSin läti Or, är id based On the BSSUh start was possible Prime Minister Who litted to supporting the
of Rajiv Gandhi that *ns ånd diplorThat's Who months of his primeeen positively encoшfirst decisions. On Sri to replace G. Parathaincipal mediator With India's Foreign Secreas clearly intended to
signal a search for new policies in a more cordial atmosphere.
At the til Tg Romesh Bhaldari tik Wer as India's principal negotiator on Sri Larika affairs, relations between the two countries had been soured by misundeStandingS and misapprehensions on both sides. On the Indiglish gilde there Wag the feeling that President Jayewardene had not tried hard enough to win support in Sri Lanka for the agreements between him and the Indian government negotiated through G. Parathasathy, over the last norths of 1983. As for Sri Laka Mrs. Gandhi Was saam — and kiri OWN — to be encouraging and manipulating Tamil Saparatist activists living in India to further India's Strategic advantage imits Cuest for regional dominance. In particular, her (and the Indian government's) failure to acknowledge the existence of "bases" and training facilities for Sri Lankan Tamil separatists in Tamil Nadu and elsewhere – indeedsheexpresslydenied the existence of such "bases" and facilities - was Wiewed aSa Cynical exploitation of separatist agitation in a neighboring country Wher a dia Tetrically opposite policy of harsh Measures Was being Pursued in the Punjab against Sikh separatists. Suspicion of her objectives in her mediation in the Sri Lankan conflict was compounded by ParathaSarathyoSpatentfailuretodistance himself significantly from the importunate TULF to give greater credibility to his
Oleas ediator.
When President Jayawardene Tet Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in New Delhi in June 1985, for the first time, their discussion took place in a greatly improved atmosphere. This was followed by the despatch of Bhandarito Colombo for talks With the Sri Laka Presidigt. These resulted in a major breakthrough when the latter Waspersuaded to let his government begin talks With the several Tamil separatist groups, Who Were engaged in violent confrontation with Sri Lankan security foTCēs, in addition to the TULF, the maistream Tamil party, with whom the government had negotiated hitherto. Up to this time the government had refused to talk to the other separatist activists on the grounds that doing so would give them a legitimacy they Weremot Entitled to hawe. The fact is that the TULF was rapidly losing ground to their younger rivals, and the decision to engage in discussions with them was a belated recognition of political rëalities.
MEXT: WMWAF AND PEACE TALKS

Page 12
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Page 13
Ethnic Conflict and deWe
John M. Richardson Jr and Shinjinee Sen
(School of International Service, The American University, Washington D
troductio
This paper asks how economic development in Global South nations can be better managed, so as to reduce the potential for violent ethnic conflict? To answer this, we must first ask Why is economic development so often accompanied by violent ethnic conflict?
Wiewing economic development and ethnic conflict as interlinked problets requires areassessment of two widely accepted views about the relationship between these two phEnomena, The first wieW, prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s during the decolonization of Africa and Asia, Was that economic development Would inevitably reduce the potential for violent COnflict, since growth would be rapid and the resulting benefits diffused through all levels of society. The first decade of So of post colonial independence SeerTed to bear out this theory. Beginningin lle late 1960s, however rising ethnic tensions in many new nations, and full-blown ethnic civil Wars in some, most notably Nigeria, cast doubts on this optimistic scenario, Moreover regionalist movements in Spain, Scotland and Wales, linguistic conflict in Belgiurn, a resurgent Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland and a ethnic terrorist movement in Canada' made itclearthat even modern industrialized nations Were not immune to potentia|ly violent ethnic cleavages.
The second view held mostly by regiorial and economic policy-makers, was that economic development policies and those relevant to "maintaining political stability" could be formulated in separate Compartments. Inparticular this WieWWas prevalent among World Bank staff members, möstly Economists, WHOSE wie WS réflécled a charter specifying governments as the Bank's clients and proscribing "political" Irl Wollwerinent, It Was not until the 1980 S that senior Bank officials began to take an increased interest in public administration - an area they attempted to depoliticize by labeling it "governance."
Political changes from the late 1960s through the mid-1990s have prowed both theories wrong. Even in developing nations that did Well economically, economic benefits did not diffuse to all segments of society or all regions. As a result, some ethnically diverse states such as Indone Sia, Malaysia and Sri Lanka implemented preferential policies intended to benefit some groups or regions disproportiona
tely. Preferential poli the dominant ethnic rities harshly.’’ Des cies, the beneficiar that they were losing ted grupS Ormore While thOSg discriTi they were being de economic develop partisan governmer
While govern mer al leders, ard d are becoming inc With how ecoloric gies may intensify S normists SUch as Je that economic polis from domestic polit differences are Luflit and Bolivian Cases provide useful exar take ethnic and account. Poland is mogeneous, but dis ning Jews and ex continues to be par lar CLultLIre, BoliWia, population, has bêt tifla titha S reali riġi its elders. HOWe' equalities between gions have been ig lenders and the stingly, Sachs trie Todel for Poland, LTS STATE the C foreign debt. While now stronger (pal forgiveness from cCeSS in JLITip-Star
COTE liit3d.
The Czech repu FlåWE COsldLICEd til political reforms, who were economi. comparisons with E claw Klaus and Fe economists Who position of chief exE nited Flash econ hawe, HOW e Wer, W publico Popular su form Will be partic because of racial gap between rich E
Many policy-mal Mexican governm Chiapas COm fict, dged that econor conflict managem

lopment
C)
cies tended to benefit group, treating minopitë preferential polisas Contin LIEd to fdel g out to better-educa: prosperous regions nated against felt that prived of the fruits of lent by an ethnically t
it officials, internatioevelopment scholars reasingly i COri Cerred ; deWelop Tient Strateocial cleavages, ecoffrey Sachs still insist зy can be separated ics, and that regional important." The Polish
of ECOTTIC TE FÖTT mples of this failure to agional diversity into almost ethnically hoLr Lust of the few remaiilled German settlers tofpolitical and popu
with its large Indian an a success story, in in goodstanding With wer, Boliwia's iri COIT 3 ethnic groups and renored by international government. Interei to USB Boliwia 35 3 arguing that both COUIII or burder of huge
Poland's economy is tly due to generous enders), Bolivia's Suting growth has been
blic and Brazil, which eir own economic and ed by administrators sts, provide interesting Boliwia and Poland, Warlando CardoSO, both nawe waulted into the +Cullwe, hawe implerTIÊOTic refor ITIS, Which on support from the pport for economic reularly crucial in Brazil divisions and the Wide іпdроог.
kers, Tost recently top ent officials facing the hawa CW ackr0Wlënic development and ant policies cannot be
separated. Moreover, the realization that development is inherently conflictual is now manifested indirectly in the World Bank's increasing concern With poVerty alleviation Schem55 arid gQWErlasse. This ha 5 lead to increased eTimphasis on consultation with non-governmental organizations from both donor and recipient countries. A small but growing body of policy-oriented literature also focuSES OM the social problems of in Tiplementing deweopment policies.' However conflict management, especially in ethnically diverse societies, has not yet assumed its proper role in development planning. For the
scope of development planning to be
broadened in this Way, the causes of ethnic Conflict and how some development strategies can exacerbate ethnic tensions leading to conflict must be better understood.
What causes ethnic conflict?
Violent conflict between riwal ethnic groups sometimes breaks Out Spontaneously, but "ethnic conflict" is mostly a Struggle between riwal organizations seeking to maintain or gain control of state power. To understand ethnic conflict, We must understand the role ethnicity plays in mobilizing, structuring, and managing such organizations. Further, We must understand how leaders use ethnically divisive strategies to mobilize the Support necessary for them to seek and exercise political pOWer.
The proximate causes of most ethnic conflicts are not difficult to grasp." In typical Scenarios, leaders of a SuperOrdiriate ethnic group gain political office and ther use institutions of state power to distribute eConOITIC and political bërnëfils preferentially to their ethnic"brothers" and "sisters". This is accompanied by discrimination against Subordinate group meTibers who are portrayed as inferior and therefore, less deserving human beings. To the degree that force of the threat of force is required to impose discriminatory practices and quel Subordinate group resistance, it is exercised by police and army cadres recruited almost exclusively from Superordinate group Tennbars, Who view themselves as "ethnic soldiers". In democratic Societies, the majority Woting power of a SuperOrdinate gTOLp may be Used to entrech di SCriminatory practices by legal or quasi legal means. When a superfordiria te group is in the minority, it simply imposes discriminatory policies by forcealthough, as in South Africa (and the
11

Page 14
former Nazi Germany) discrimination may be legitimized by cosmetic democratic Institutiting.
Subordinate group members will often andure discriTination for an extended period of time; however a sense of shared deprivation strengthens group bounds and pro WideSa basis for political Tobilization along ethnic lines. Before intergroup relation 5 polarize, "moderale" SL Bordirlate grOUp leaders Tay Seek al modus wiveİndi With their counter parts in the majority group. In some nations, notably Malaysia, |leaders hawe been able to Work Out a relatively stable accommodation, invowing trade offs between political and economic power. More typically the pleas of Subordinate group leaders for Some accommodation are ignored or judged to be "politically infeasible" by SuperOrdinate leaders, The more severe and inflexible the discrimination, the more probable that Subordinate group members will become radicalized. As radicalization proceeds, Subordinate group members shift support to militant leaders. These leaders for disciplined paramilitary Cadres Committed to Violent force as the only feasible strategy for ending discrimination.
The TOS COTTO Outcore of this SCenario is an escalating spiral of violent political conflict, ethnic polarization, Social disintegration and economic decline. This Scenario has been is all too prevalent in developing nations and, now, in for Ter Communistrations. Ethnic conflicts, once they flash into violence, become exceedingly difficult to resolve.' Indeed, sorne observers argue that physical separation of the protagonists is the only practicable solution. To Šince members óf superordinata and subordinate groups are Tost often economically interdependent and physically intermingled, this draconian "solution" seems only a slight improvement On protracted Conflict,
It is not difficult to understand Why Illembers of a subordinate group that experiences discrimination would use ethnicity as a basis for political mobilization and eventually turn to militant leaders who argue that "We have no choice" but violence. However, protracted ethnic conflict is, more often than not, a negative sum game in which both Superordinata and Subordinate groups lose. Lebanon, Sri Lanka, the former Yugoslavia, Sudan, Rwanda, Ethiopia and the Punjab provide just a few examples of conflicts. Where the long-term costs of discriminatory policies to almost all concerned far outweighed any conceivable benefits.' The more interesting question, then, is not why suErdriate respond to discrimination with violence, but why superordinale group leaders choose to implement discriminatory practices in the first place. Also, we need to know why such leaders typically
12
underestimate the p subordinate group
capacity to deal will intends that develop process of develop in many developing such miscalculations
Social and Culturi many ethnic groupsi provide a supportive of discrimination a described above. M. ther are historical: mentality of victimiz: shared deprivation. ethnic group memb sirTip listic appeals : and Encourage lea appeal5. Д Гт1уopic groups and ower optir cy of state power Where, particularly in stress, leaders IIlay discrirminatory policie ssing the consequer
To Be C.
Nils
1. Prepared for a Works! Marth 27.-29, 1995 in E Tal FE5Bārch project cu nisief Marigarrierf är Expgriалга ялгl Lв850 2. Chill Hilir:
A Flairs and Applied Sy: fra SELydig i SLrygg, TTE ÅrIIEsk: D.C., U.S.A Shirjinee al the Sillä Il rier II:
3. The view that ethnicity:
ti ES WOLuli:Tirff i||3|ill|'';|'; TitiT TIE IT WESTE
ril titjir lil ETI TTIJIET
STETT ETIDd Marxists religious, and all lif tribes and casts, whi 3.Cxcity, Would TILL SLUIT, ciety. Karl Marx argu: CCL3CILJESritissimild Lh WES DE ES Ed O'I ÇO Emile DurkhairTi, no M Tuligious Erld''' []ther trai Tipatible with Todam kimuridisites in Isar (1955), and throug kBTS 5.h il: "" | Кшапез 1971). Ева, а
The Frrier in the 19Els, never had 1, u E. Er :
El Tirili di El til English speaking pop
5. Economic poli-Takg
di KLIFTELS BEELTE rız. Bd, traditionalsÖcial. Бу сlваvagasпогвtyp: They were generalizing CE, in which national state-building, but ethir SSad States, or it it bу 5chсяг8.
6. Set: The World Barık
1992). A land Tarik B

robability of a violent response, and their h it. This paper coment policies and the ment, as they unfold lations, contribute to
Alattitudes, held by Ilulti-ethnications
climate for the cycle ld militant response Ost important among agacies of mistrust, a ation, and feelings of The Seattitudes make ers receptive to the if extrellist leaders der S til Take SUCI wiEW of SLEOrdinäle iSTatti ggffiCaCreate a social trap | titles of economic ormITit irrevocably lo 2S Without fullyasse
Ces.o
(םטשחווחכ
Top in Color Tibu, Sri Larika, Eclien With IIIril:Trlii - 1 Eff Cf|Ehr::- IL FEI liiiiit Irha fir Frar r15 for Central Europe.
is Professar of IETIBEil GfT18 AIIälysis and Director the School of International іп Шпlversity, Washingtoп, STIES E DICCtrl Cardia
li lil Sli: E.-
ITiid It Earsa Lura tarmi lill-Briti leg Willtir mil B.T. Edrichty Warris gezona. Hundamentaris
social scieteer 50CElias, BOLFIl'os Lorrl Tacholars beliewed fluglinic, Erditigual ida TolitiEE, SELull: 1153 ch Wf: art. Oltratical i'w EITT Ciri iritusiris 3d that religion was a fals |The Orly LIUE consciOLISITCSS ifics-class. Sociologist lirxist, also agreed th Bi the litir iriail is deiriltilis; Willis II, III :- Society (1964, 13E4). DLlUEn CBS Fars. ISTE 1llст, есопоплісpoicy-maHusu w 1971) and Singin
Griūtį 3, Egkh.
Lics, whichsrat | The Titärship of Tore than ties precipitated a Tajor reI5 boy :Gr1:qa":3; Frgrichi Brid lati T5.
"Siirid L'EOrists SL:n RDStyy Ehāt : Exxogies TodgrTTIEBq WagBS Wild EE repliCd acidustriali Ed Siria from the Western Experieism had been important in lic conflict had been repreExisted, had been ignored
1991) and Brauligam (1991 xampla of this fic: W CILITICETTI
1.
1.
5.
5. Jurid in tha Barık's 13B9 report, SLÈ-Sartā Fāri Africa. Fror Crisis fin Sustainable Growth. However 35 lata 15 1990, the linkaga bitw0:1 colic and development Wasa"nomissua."Paptır: FridmartıcıEurida Written by World Bank clicials rallect this birdress to interial politics, as Klitgard (1990) 55Er15 in Willrig about World Bank and AID loans to Bolivia. In that courtry, aven domestic policy papBr5 fallad tomerulior that the economic Imaquali Eigs Circided with Elhnic iriggualities, änd neither the government norinternatiuralleriders speculated about the effect of stabilization and adjuslrient program5 din tillgrent Ethnic grup5.
In Sri Lanka, the fact that ethnic Tartill had called HC LLLLLLLLLLLLL uLLL HLHHLLLLHtLLtLLLLMMMLL did not prevent them from being labeled "outsiders" by Ethnic nationalists in the majority Sinhalasa .ityחuוחוזfםלו.
In pārticular, SEE his DFWEkipiiriigi CCL rifry Die Eif and
fif Weird Ecgrrary (1939).
The lessor from these cases might be that given LL CLaLLLCL LLLLLLLLLLS LLLLLLLLS TLists cando The jobbatter than the importEd väriety. provided that they are willing and able to Explain Their pirUgrisTI ärld its ConsequiriiCs to the public, and if they are supported by State institutions.
For example, selligard (1991 and Jarrelson's ГЕСЕПt work tri lu polics of structural adjustment (1939, 1990). An early contribution to this thinking OLL LLMLLL HLLL H LLLLLL K LK aLLLuuLLLLLL LL LLL CCaaaLLL
Fichards, 1987).
LLLLLCLLLCLL LLLL LL LLL LLL LLLLLL LLL SLLaaLLL LLLelLM LLLLLSSLLLLLL LLLlHLLLLLLL LLLLLLL LLLLLL to theories of collective action proposed by Karl Marx, Parhaps the Ticat important contemporary scholar writing in this genre is Charles Ty (1978). Kerto (1982), prades a usofulcomparativa critique Coll resource Tobilization theory arid än alternative lhal plags grealaf Emphasis of Gorillietas a mass phenomenor, relative deprivation theory.
AnTonig geri Erial works om Ethirik: çarıflict, by far the HHaHLL kLkeLLLLLLLLLHHLLLL LLCCLLMLLLALLMMOuSL LLMLLOLL SLurvey, Effirmat Gross; iiri Cariffiicr [1985). Gurr (1993) äärid Gurr and Hart 1994) ar Torg recani general contributions to a growing body of ligrature. LL LLLLLLL LLLLLLa LLLLLL LLLL HHL LSltLLtLLLLLLLLSL participation in fumigrcus Workshops and sortir Lars LL LMM0 LT S LLLkLLLL aH L HHLLLLLLLaetLL LLLLGGL HLT MMMS aLMLLLLSSSSYLLL LLLLK LLLLLL LL LLLLLLLLmmLLLL Ciri Sri Lanka and the farmar Yugoslavia. ThEa discuLLLH mLLOO HLMLLLuS CLLa LLGGLHLHHH LCLMtaaa00L LLLL LLLCLH HH LLMM ttLLL LLLLL LL LLL LLGLLL LLLLLL
il.
This term was coined by Cynthia Enloe in an older, LLaLLLLL LLLLHLHLLLLHH LLLLLL LLLLCLL LLLLLLaL LLLLLaLLLL conflict (1930).
This Point seriphasized in works of the lala Edward Azar (1987, 1990) who labeled the phenomenon, Frris Mr.
This is soretiries termed "the greer line solution" GLLLLL L LLLLLL aLLLLLLLL LLLLLLaMS GLLLLL LLLLLLLL LLLLLL in Cyprus. A more extreme version of this approach has motivater“Ethnic clgarisirg"pplicies, Tiastwisby in nations of the former Yugoslavia. Edward LLeMLLSLS CMM LCMMMCMCCLLGM LkL LLLKLLHLLLLHLLYHH L LSLLLLS Mic (1990) and KLM, da Silva and S.W.R.D. SarnaLLLLaLCLCLL LLLLLL HLMLLLLSLLLLCOtLOEy LLLHHLLuL HHHHHHHHL Erin Carst's 1993) are arTonga number of works hat di5:L33 the glficulia5 al reso in altri
|
Several of the Essays in Samarasinghs and CouS LLLLLSS LLeHMM LMLLLCLOLOCLL LLGLCHGu LLLLCCTu 1991), dicLiterit this.
This Islar pirit E-dalapad in Richardson and Samarasinghg (1991) and in Joyce Francis' unpublished doctoral dissertation, War as a Social Trap, TELEGE If TF7F7F7.

Page 15
AMWWERSARY
Appeal
(Issued by the Russian Embassy)
Appeal to the peoples of the Tiernber-states of the Collowealth of Independent States and to international community on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Victory over Fascis Tn. (Adopted on February 10, 1995 at the meeting of the Heads of the CIS member-states).
The heads of the Tier big-states of the Commonwealth of Independent States address the peoples of their countries and the international community on the occaSion of the 50th Anniversary of the Victory OWET FISICIST.
The 9th of May, 1995 remains in the history of mankind as ther lost Ternorable and the most important date of the XX century - the day of triumph of the good, the day of the final liberation of peoples for the treat of fascist enslavelent.
The herois FTT of the Sowiet Army, partiSans and members of Underground organizations, persistent and Selfless abour of OLI people on the domestic front, Utter
courage, staurichne: Was the basis of this
An important contri against fascism was Forces, är ti-Fascistir Coultries of the art
The Victory has be king manifestation of Corribined spirit, Self and heroiSIT". Of indivic and safeguarded the and human dignity, the Capability of pie LIriita irl the f:C8 osa
The Victory has si and necessity of COO community members rial Security and to E VET,
We Will rleyer föl Sacrificas hawa bigg of peace, freedom: behalf of Our Corp; peoples of the CIS m World community to
FILM REVIEW
Nomiyena Minisun
In the multi-lingual "Normlyena Minisun" - four languages are spoken in the film, which is unique - one sees "Mr. Garrini For Seka' best qualities as an actor cur director, With deftir ESSET dur:Carniness, the war in the North-East is brought to our door-steps. The scenes depicting roaring War planes Strafing palmyrah trees snapping into two, explosions on the ground, Soldiers and civilians runninghelter, skeIter, are realistic and inspire awe. They make some of us to say: "Thank God, We are not placed there'. These scenes can challenge comparison With the bestin War films from U.S., Russia and Great Britain.
Inherbook "Three CamahorThe"— ar authentic story of the Japanese occupation of South East Asian Countries during the Second World War - Agnes Keith Writes: "In War time, we are trained by
nation propagandal otherwise, We are u killed. After the War, human beings again Mr. Gamiri Fonseka. to this philosophy.
He has expressed Sun", the deepestth frankly and sincerely a part of the country għer, ir Luirill and Luprox their hearts and Orr gnant to him. He a unifortunate happeni that he is a da LitlēS:
Mr. Galili Folge and Peace is cloSE pacifist апсірвасеa! ga Wa, a CON LEITTOTa
 

ss and frater Tity — great Wictory.
bution to the struggle made by the Allied
movement, by all the
Fascist Coalition.
COITIE til T10St Strialmighty force of the ESSTESS Of people S luals, Who defended air right for freedom the Tanifestation of ples of the World to deadly danger,
hown the possibility peration of the World to ensure internatiorevent a lew World
"gat that erior Tous | Tādē forth Ea Sake and democracy. On itriots We appeal to ember-states, to the honour the memory
of those who perished to carefully preserve everything it enshrined induly honouring the victory creators.
Striving for strengthening peace we Solemnly confirm the will of our people to Wider comprehensive cooperation in the Commonwealth of Independant States as Well as with other countries in the are of peace and prosperity.
We appeal to everyone to multiply their efforts in order to prevent new threats for peaceful life on Earth, to eliminate existing and prevent the possibility of new corflicts, whose tragic development can endanger the ideals of humanity and progress, faught With the risk of new disaStērS, dËStTLJCtiCJ aldblodshed.
Realizing our sacred duty to the heroes of the Great Wictory bith perished and alive, We appeal to the people of the Commonwealth of Independent States and to the Community tourite their efforts and Willin order to save future generations from the horrors of BW Wars.
S.A. Arte Tiew
oihate the enemy, as nWilling to kill or be
We might meet as "... It is apparent that | idejES not Subscribe
in "Noriyena Minioughts of his heart, l, on the flare up in - The resulting sila Luoting of people from es, are things repUgomize:S over these mgS and as shOWri Sandpure spirit.
ka's thinking on War Br to the Japanese jostle, Toyohiko Kay of Leo Tolstoy and
Mahatam Gandhi. On the futility of bruta force, Kagawa in his "Meditations" has said: "There are those who argue that brute force will Solve all problems. If force is such an important factor, it would be Well always to employ earthquakes and Volcaic eruptions. They ought to make a g[EalET, C0fllfl:LIlir Jf1 fC the Eựglution of human Society than Newton and Edison. The evolution of the social Order is not gOWEerled by ffilitarists, Tiilitaristic dictators or anarchists who rely on force.
"Social evolution is impelled upward by Tears of selection, ideals, exertion, invention and motives, which produce the highest good. World built by force will be destroyed by force. Ask frie rot to liwe in So precarious a World. I place no whatever In force, no matter What formittakes".
S. Sivagurunathan
3.

Page 16
SRI LANKAN CONFLICT (4)
Sri Lanka’s India Policy
Humayun Kabir
ndia, therefore, looms wery large
on Sri Lanka's security horizon. There a retWO Sets of opinio regarding this "India factor's first, there are opinions that India has never been a threat to Sri Lanka; and Second, Some tend to argue that under the SLFP-led government of S.W. R.D. Bandafaaike there Was no fear of India as security threat to Sri Lanka. Mendis, Nissanka and Manor, who hold the first Set of Opinion, are of the view that Sri Lanka had no enemy to be afraid of and, therefore, there was no basis for percewing a security threat from India. Kodikara Tairtains that Mr. Barda raraike Corrisidered India a friendly power and did not envisage a threat from her. He strongly repudiated any suggestions of Indian aggression against the island-state, While Pra5a di Writes that "Bandarä laikE regarded India as a very friendly Country...". This section argues, as Stated above, that India has been the prime Concern to Sri Lankan governments, regardless of their political coImplexion, informulating the Country's foreign and security policy. It will also be argued below that there is no evidence to sustain the position of Kodikara and Prasad, which is, in reality, based upon the surface appearance of Indo-Lanka relations after Bandararaike came to power and a misjudgment of his tactical position vis-a-vis India. And that applies to all other SLFP-led governients too.
Although Communism, occasional domestic violence and great power rivalry in the Indiair (OCEä Tara Were Other SOLJfCES of threat, the proximate giant in India was per Ceived by Sri Lankan policy and opinion Takers to a greater threat to their Small island-State. It Was implaterial to EHEIT Whetsher an actual Indiair attack Was inimemt; historicainterTries of reCLurrent Indian is i Wasions of Siri Lanka, the attitudes and pronouncements of the Indian policy Taking elite that Sri Lanka is integral to India's security, and the Tamil Nadu Collection of Sri Lanka's Beth RCT a Till Tirority appeared real enough to generate threat perceptions in the Sri Lankan mind.
While both the UNP and SLFP gove
rnments had percel from India, they ado glesto offset these o While the UNP gover 1948-56 had adopte policy, the succeedir StratiÕS sollOWE ith Wis-a-WIS India. The E policy was not to be the Wishes and Cor pLITSJea diwergentbol or deliberately troubt pilot fish policy, whic keeping close to the
eaten, was aimed imbalance of powe India. This policy Co acco Todation With
Sri Lanka had adol in relationto-India, op sly or independently administration in po the regional and in first, the balar CE3 Cof cond, the strategy of third, the strategy o Ocean a zone of pea
TCBC of POW
In thĪS EXECISE SI extra-regionallas Wel rpoise wis-a-vis India. gional propis were hi With Britain, while its intended to be obtair organizations as We ties. With India's ad Chima ad Pakistan.
Sri Lanka's Dicefor: Britain. On the Ewe O Sri Lanka signed, on a set of agreements rigdor T1 — the Externa the Public Officers' Defence Agreement. arises as to Why the FINITEt signed a defe: an OLItgoing colonial argue that it was a q. TELEWE till WM the Tiilitary bases foi nnings, for example,

1948-77
ved security threats pted different strateerarching concerns. nments of the period d the non-conformist ng SLFP-led adminihe pilot fish' policy SSECE of Fl8 JNP a CCO. Todative to cers of India and tot COffOELISt lesome policy. The h essentially means shark to avoid being at redressing the ro Without provoking ntained elements of out being conformist.
oted three strategies eratingsimultaneoudepending on the WEr in Colombo drld ternational settings: p0Werstrategy; seпоп-aligпment; and making the Indian CE.
ver Strategy
i Lanka has sought as regional CounteSri Lanka's extra-TEas close relationship regional Ones were led through regional as closer bilateral Wer:SariĖS, SLICH ES
!e Agreement with fherindependence, 11 November 1947,
With the United Kial Affairs Agreement, AgreerTent, and the Now, the question
Senanayake goveince agreement With tower. Some authors Jid pro quo arrangeYO COL JT tri3S, that IS, * independence, JE
holds the view that
the Defence Agreement was negotiated by Senanayake rather as an inducement to Britain to haster Sri Lanka's independencē.3o:Mendis maintains that it was "om to basis of the offer of defence and logistical facilities for Britain in this island that it was possible to clinch the deal for the immediate grant of full independence much earlier than intended before", while Nissanka stated that in signing the agreements D.S. Senarna yake and Sir Oliver Goonetilleke were followingapolicy of appeasement with the British. In my understanding, such views appear to be not exactly accurate owing to the fact that Various British concerns and compulsions in Sri Lanka gawe Señanayake enough nanoeuvring Space While negotiating with Whitehall for his country's independence. The unfinching loyalty of Senanayake and many of his party Colleagues to the British Crown;** Sri Lanka's strategic significance in erms of defence and other interests of Britain and har alli 35 in the Indian Ocean, East and South-east Asia, and Australia and New Zealand, and Britain's economic' and political inteTESLS in Sri Lanka gawe the UNP leadership enough leeway in driving a hard bargain for their country's independence
TOT I British ColorialisST.
In fact, it was mainly the fear of India that spawned the signing of the Defence Agreement. With Britain, thereby enlisting a COuntervailing power against the nothern neighbour, The threat that Was perceiweidin Colorimbo Wās då fir nature - one from government in New Delhi, the other being a parallel or alternative fear of a conjectural sovereign Drawidistan in South India and its consequences for the Tamils in Sri Lanka. Jennings stated that it was for this reason, interalia, that Serianayake concluded the Defence Agreement With the British governmento" Krishna. Shetty, an Indian scholar, also Wrote that it was because of a lurking suspicion about dia's intention in the Indial CCCeall area that the UNP ||Badership desired to have the protective Wing of Birtain.
Senanayake himself, conscious of hi

Page 17
Storical im Wasio 15 from the Indian Cortiment because of Sri Lanka's Vulnerability arising Out of its strategic situation, Warned that his administration should look ahead despite Indian denials that such a situation existed then. He referred to "an undercurrent of apprehension regarding the longterm possibility of Indian expansion invowing Ceylon", and thus Britain was Sri Lanka's greatest security." He also made it clear that "We consider India to be or he of the greatest nations in the World but We do not expect India to play the role of trying to establish rights where they have no rights, or privileges where they have no privileges, or trying to deprive other couintries of their rights."
Si OliwET GJOletilleke, Sri Lālkä'S Hot Minister who latter became the country's Governor General, expressed apprehension about Indian designs or Sri Lanka inter|Tills of the island's WLulnerability from within. Addressing the representatVes of the Indian Ta Tilsin the Sri Lankan parliament, he sarcastically remarked that "they think that they are right, that Jawaharlal Nehru is raging because little Ceyon had dared to make a Defence Agreement with England without Waiting for the day when at any rate one section of the people of Ceylon could deliver the TrincoTale base to hirin or wery favourable terms." Although Nehru attempted to reassure Sri Lanka by saying that "...there is no possibility of our trying to make Ceylon...a part of India," he subtly expressed concern about Sri Lanka's extra-regional counter-balance against India by stating that "...neither India nor Ceylon should take step which goes in the way of irTipa iring cordial ardfriendly relations" between the two neighbouring Countries.
Unlike D.S. Senanayake, Sir John KotäWaa, Sri Lakastid Prima Minister, was rather explicit, Questioned by the Parliamentary Opposition about the country's defence connection with the West, he replied: "What I am Worried about is that Mr. Panikkar has made several Sta LEFT|Erit 5 i COTE COf hi5 EC) Ok5 tillät lidia must have Trincomalee for her safety.
Väl50 ärdtät Mr. Pikkäis SLpposed to speak for Pandit Nehru. He is Supposed to know Pandit Nehru's thoughts and has said that India, Ceylon and Burma musthave a Monroe Doctrine, that India Will be the father of two children - Burma and Ceylon. We do not Want that fatherly advice northeir protection"." Sir John feared that India 'peace area'
policy Would place Sr position vis-a-vis ind blicly stated that althc aSTluchäSMr. Nehr With the Indiam leade rding a Monroe Doct of Asia"." Wriggins India should fly apart
TIL DI COLI: for SS läS bBBI än expansion in Centuri
The statellents O ders amply ShoWho" security perceptions met With the Unite in operation until 1 deemed to hawe b0EE nce policy wis-a-vis
Sri Laka's COTT Britain, 1948-56. S pport which the l consistently gawe to that is to say the CO TuStbi pārtially Ex CO5SidratioriS. TI assured an added
ssible counterpoise laid doWn a principol Great Britai Wä5 ; security,“o a principal time and in that of
the base of Sri La Sir John Was, how äbÖLut diä äS a S. ld remarked about "as her (Sri Lank againstany possibil| quarters closer hor explicitly when, in a declared that "t rised with English island would go unc
Sir Cliver alSC tre שוחחסWBalth Cחסוחחח a counterpoise to Ir economically, polit even attitudinally ti: Commonwealth. In TEOLJIC3d the foT CrOWI and Constitul public in 1950, tho Tiber of the COTT apparently for politic notic advantage S.
THE JOWE TEt Sri Lakan leaders
S|-|S (EfElLE
KSWith the United led a divergence с

|Lanka опапшпеasy ia and, therefore pLugh he "lowed peace u", he could not agree r's 'suggestion regarire for the Countries
Wrote that "even is a South India indepepea threat to Ceylon, area of South Indiam
es past"."
til Sri Lake= NIndia figured in their The Defence Agreed Kingdom that Was 957 was, therefore, in Sri Laka's i Sura= Indiä,
Wealth Links with Similarly, the firmTl SuNP PriTMiri5tgT5 the Commonwealth, nnection With Britain, olained by the ab Owe le COITITIOrlWëälth significance asapoto India. Senanayake e that friendship with Sri Lanka's greatest I that beġ Car Tile ir hliS his UNP Successors ka's foreign relations. vever, поге Specific jurce of threat When WealthחסךחוחסB Cךth ka's) first insurance ity of aggression from ne".' He put it quite public speech in 1955, 1e day. Ceylon dispeTen Completely, the
لااE التEF |ri
sated Sri Lanka's Co!ction With the UK as India.o' Sri Lanka was ically, militarily and d to the UK ad tE a on the other hand, lal jurisdiction of the ionally became a Reugh remained a meCWE:Ill Of Nat5 cal leverage and eco
ioned perceptions of
about India and the Eard COITTICOWE alth Kingdom demonstra: sfurderstanding and
response on many importantissues of the time between Sri Lanka and India. Wiews of the two CGLIrlries On international CDmmunism and the Sowiet Unio, and their Views and roles in the Korean and Indo-China conflicts visibly struck discordant notes. Sri Lanka's relations with the United States of America were generally close and cordial because of this ideological affinity while those of India Were at times rather strained.
Sri Lanka's CDITTO Weath links With UK after 1956. || S.W.R.D. BandaranlaikE was against Sri Lanka's Defence Agreement with Britain, CÓn his request, the British government withdrew its forces froTrincomalee on 15 October 1957 and from Katunayake on 1 November the same year. But Britain's military Withdrawal from Sri Lanka did not mean SeveraHLHL LL LLLLLLaL aaLaaL LLLLLaLLLH CCa Colomb0. Sri Lanka'S British COlection continued to be significant to the island's security as Well as its economic interests. The Agreement was not formally abrogated by Bandaranaike and has not been to date, Ewen after British withdrawal from the island, he welcomed Britain's continuing to assist Sri Lanka in the development and training of its armed forces.
Bandara malike Was always COinSCIOLIS of the fact that India was the most abiding factor in his country's foreign and Security policy. Long before he became Prime Minister, ha was a CLutely aware of the implication of his Country's strategic locatiom and its asymmetric POWEr balas CE With lidia, EWE bogforg, Sri Lanka'''Sidependence, at the Asian Relations Conferance held in New Delhi in 1947, the Sri Lankan delegation headed by BandaraGLLLLLLL L LLLLL LLLLLLLH aC aL LLLL LL LLLLLL LLLLLaLaL Laa LLLHHGaLaL LLLLLaL LLLLLLLGLLLLL from Asian big powers like India and China. Two years later in 1949, he was more Specific about his attitude towards India when he remarked that "although Ceylon is a Small country, its people hawe always been jealous of their sovereign rights for which they have always fought and striven. Having once again regained our freedom and sovereignty, it is not at all likely that the majority of the people of this country Will submit to the type of subordination which obviously Dr. Sitaramayya (of India) hasin mind." Bandaranaike Was averse to the idea of being a camp follower or trailing behind any individual country's foreign policy. He stated in 1954 that the foreign policy of Sri Lanka should neither be "anti-West" or "anti
15

Page 18
Communist" but it should be "proCeylon", that "...there is only one "pro" that We hawe, to be pro-Ceylon.""
МЕНГU aПј ВаТdaГапајkЕ Пај SITlar worldviews and common approaches to important international issues like the SuEz Criss änd HE Schwiel invasion of Hungary in 1956. But commonality of Outlookin international affairs along Was not good enough for tangible improveTertin bilateral relationship between the two countries. Their perceptions vis-a-vis each other retained the same; bilateral problems such as the "Indo-Ceylon" queStion, the demarcation of maritime boundary, and the ownership of the KachchalivU island in the Gulf Of Manmar had remained unresolved as before.
Unlike his UNP predecessors, Prime Minister Bandaranaike was subtle and diplomatic in his country's relationship with India. His India policy was to seek redress of the powerbalance against India without causing provocation. This was one of the greatest legacies that he left to the SLFP foreign policy orientation and Security perspective. In pursuance of his such policy, Bandaranaike professed frieindship with India and occasionally spoke LLL Saaa LLLLL0L a LLLLLLa LHH aaLaS aL L0S dress the balance against India, he contiLLaLLLLLL H HH LLLLL HHHL 0LLLHHHHLHHLLaLLa0S nection. With the UK and at the same time attempted to forge a regional balance through any regional groupings.
Fictis
25 Sea Wenon L. B. Meridis, Foreign Relations of Sri Lirik: From Earlies: TimTas i 1955, Tissara Prakasaka ya Ltd, Delhi Wiela, Sri Lanka, 1983, p.3H8; H. 0LLLLSLLLLLLLLuLaLLLL LSLLLLLLaLLLLLLLLlLLLLLlLLLLLLLLS B5), 1 DEcgmber 1947, Well, 1 Cgil. 503; James LLL MHCS CC LLTLMLL LaMMLS LMLMLMMML LLL Ceylon Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, P, 175,
OO00SS S 0SLSLeMMCOCCSMaCSCCLMMLCMMMLLC LLLCLLMLCCCLS ridence, The Ceylon Institute of World Affairs, Colo
Top
KKS LLLLLL LLauMLL LLLLLLLLSLLLLCLLeLLLLL LLLLLLLLuuLMLLuLk LUnidET that Bar Bara TaikE: A Politicul ATEulogës, A. Chand & Co., PW Ltd, New Delhi, 1973, p. 325.
00S LLL LLLLLKS S Ga LLLL LaLaLaL LL LLLLLLLLeeLLL LLLLLS tics" in August Schlu and ATeClaw (eds.), STlal LLGL MLLLLLLLLMMMMM LLLLLLLCS LLLLLLMOLL L MMH LLLS kili, Slackhart, FTP.33.
eLCS S L L LC CCaHLLM L LL LLLLLLLC CCLLLL LLLLCLL CLLLLS ylioni: Sessional Papar XII-1947, Thalndap:Endanca of Ceylon, November 1947, Document 2, AppendCES I,III & III; Wor Jammings, The Cristitutiti i Ceylor, Cxford Llriffersity Fress, Linden, 3rd Edri. 1953, pp. 137-14C; Sir Clivar GCometill EkE, Minister LL LLMLC MLMLLLLS LLLLTT MLLLLS L L LLMLa LLLLaaaLSS KKS K
OECETTEger 1947. Clols. 1971).
16
31,
3.
邵冒.
war Janinings, ThiF Apg CamTitridge, 1955, pp. :
Wğırmızğını LB3, Meğridi:55, o
H3S isik: 5ri Study in Normaligri Tigrill, Ltd, New Delhi, 1984,
J.L. Fermand, This EE. M.D. GurlStria, Colri
Sir Charles Jeffrias C nderita, Pal Mal Pr:: Sigfinārāyak, E. HEIrisErdi
CAE,
See Ceylon Year Book Cerylluri Ygair Eck 195 Ei::Eff Et:Hlur Titi F5',
Sir Sir Lakers parliarlier lay instituti. IsiChris for polertial di Sri Lanka, H.F. Debati Wol, 10, Colls, 154-55, --Ceylon Rialtlic"5","", rica, BOTibay, Jeruary also hiaid täny. Ofici Eurвашсгвсу. SввSiг || SEfläIE LEHäEs. Wel 1 Sir Wordainings, Natic mart in Ceylon, New
Sir War Jennings, The edn, Bombay, 1953, 2
K.P. KrisĦLITESHIgity, "C riging FabIET Col Pori-A. dias, Jaipur, TiB, Apr
Ban

OGMCLL aa LLLCSCLCetLLLLLLLLS 00S LLLLLeLMLL L S LLLLLLLLSS LLLL S aaKKS aLLS KKS LL 5-51, Hindu, Madras, BApril 1949.
. cit., p. 363. KLLS LLLLCHL LLSLLLS LLLLLLLLS LHHLS KS LMaMLL L0S LLLKS Länka's Forgigri Figlicy: A B52, LTOllCLLMLLHaLLLLL S SS S LCCCuHLLL SLLLLLuLLLLLL S LLSLKSKSKLLCCLLLCSLKS KKKS .. KKS SLLLLLLHHHS LtLLtLLLLLLLLCLCL0LS LLS 0S0LLtllLLLLLLL 000KS Prima Ministers o Caylor, C152, Tibu, 1953, p. 90. 43. Caylor Daily News, 16 May 1949,
lon-lhe Path to Indep
|| || F.5||-3. W 1950 է ԼՃntion, 1852 թ, 115:D.S.
LLS LLTLLLLLLLLS 000S KLLLS S S0S S LLLLLLLLuuuLu L L S LLLLLLLLS SLLLHHLS 00S S 00LLLHHCL SK00KS
LLI3. 51-5:
SS000KS LLLkLLlLllL0SS SK S LLLLLLLLS L0S LL LLLLLLaS LLLkLLCLS 0 LLLLLLuuLLHHLLL 0000S 盟 CoolTib. pp. 96-97 Far 47. W. Howard Wriggins, Ceylon. Dilemmas of a New fiew, 24 May 1962, p. 45. Nation, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New
yy||Els Eriti gli iriturgis ir Jersey, 1960, p. 378. LLLL0 L LL LL CCLCLCCLLLL S KKS LLLLLLCLLL LL LLLLLLCLS LHHLHS KSSELLLL S0LL0SSLSLSS Tia:li: CirTiturist irgilii EE 35, Vol. 6, Cols. 198-99 El Krishiria P. Mukhar, "Indo- KL0S LS SuuLLM LLekLLCLCLKSLLCHkHH G GL aLOeLLMLMLH arl of Political Sci- Asia", THE NEW Corlirio TWBalth, 4 April 1955, pp. March 1957, p. 43. Britain 3E-i LL LL LLL LLLL LLLLCHHC aHL S 0S LLLLL LLLL S uLL LCCCL 000S Ciwgr Gristille kg, CykJI: 2DECanber 1947, Col. 190; 51. 臀 DELEs, WLT2DECEITEel IETETTI ET Politic: JEWEIG- S. York, 195B, 27. 53. See for details, Asian Relations: Report of Procae: dings arid Docurrentation of the First Asian RelaCDIlstitutif : CECT. 3rd ဎွိါ” ByI01, tirs ConferEICH, NEW DEhi, 15:48, pp. 78-79.
N, F. r's Friigi Policy. Eme 53, CDN, Colombo, 23 April 1949 aaaaLLLLSSS0aLLLL LLLLLL 0LS S LS 0SLSLL 0S LLLLLLMLGGMLLLSS CCCOeHH LL S LLLL0S il 1966, p. 5. Wol, 19, 4 August 1954, Coll, 1434.
Waiting - 5
balapitiya Remembered
Tsley ccIne olII astille eLerling
To the gaslit LUaiting roon The rail drops gister led Lil their hair Their eyes Lere, fill of Triport
Lightning lif the edge of things The ses, LLCs restless il. The glool bLIf the boLITIďares of the PCIřr. Erded LL'here eye I let eye (gairl
Se dListed sea el riffitor terfee Her fill excited lissonT seet LLLLLYLK M LLLL LLLLaLL LLL LLL LLLLLLLaatLL Adle drizzle deeper led to rail WILÍle the LLC i fedsor the trein.
U.Kallntilake

Page 19
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Page 20
PEOPLE, POWER AND POLITICS (2)
The need for culturally hor
Dayalal AbeySekera
f para TOLunt iTport WB feel S
the modus operandi to be adopted When re-demarcating the electorates. It should never degenerate into a haphazard umping of 15,000 voters in a contiguous area. One must at all times not lose sight of the fact that this entire exercise is aimed at providing a realistic opportunity to the people to fashion their own destiny. A common focus of destiny for a group of people approaches reality when commonality rather than critically relevant diversity runs through the grouping. Commonality could have multi-dimensional axes but what is perhaps, most important to answer the question of "where do and my family Want to be 10, 15 or 25 years time"? is the commonality of the principal Source of income of the people. This is, perhaps, why caste Was an all-important principle of order during the hay-day of feudalism since caste denoted the principal occupation (source of Sustenance income). If the above question was posed to a fisherman, a farmer, a civil servant or a bus conductor, the assemblage of answers are bound to be diverse in terms of specific aspirations but 'general betterment' would undoubtedly be the common denominator. The critical point we want to emphasize herein is that this diversity of "I Would like to be." Cries have largely been inaudible (since adequately powerful megaphones were not provided), not listened to and driven roughshod over by the powers that be. Thus, this belabouring L LLK L LLLLL LLLL KLLLLLLL LLLLLL aaLLLL homogeneity of purpose.
If Wetake an example, during the re-demarcation, electorates of the Coastal belt should be stretching lengthwise rather than spreading into the interior of the land. This is because With the intrusio irland, the propensity for a family to derive its incorne principally from fishing begins to di Tinish. So,if the intent, as it should be, is to encourage the interest of the fisherTentObe reflected in the PC, thGTG5hOLIld then be adequate safeguards taken to ensure the representation of the will of the fishing community. In addition to the commonality of the principal source of income Other Culturally hornog Ernizing factors such as ethnicity, language and religion Tay be given adequate Weightage in the re-demarcation process.
It is possible that object to undertaki finding before there done on account of LuStha Stel t0 TETli there is a ten yearly the Census of popull: is Teant to yield this nately, the Census jeen take in 1991 probably due to the thEast of til E3 COL"tr" census data is obta tape) for a Unit cal Which Consists of a TOT tal 1 OC-15 data Would be in Wali ting the electorates a Tertioned factors, ātā cēSLS i should, ir Lur Oppiriol Barlie:St at le:St Out; the country.
Eligibility Criteria f of People
If We are to ensure tion of the aspiratio interests Within a pr to en Lunciate new grc the eligibility of pote Wi bēElectedā cal principle We like potential candidates as a RPreeds to jure resident within Wishes to represent This is in essee aspiring RP is actua: the community, haw to representing the mTl unity. If s/he is Outside the electora claim by wirtue of hÉ property within), it his/her claim to re. rl LuQUS SinCE 5/he ha of the electorate (ot LUIS Litable for Self-hl. aspiring RPisa resi if she has by other Il Strated that. FISTGr towards a reference ctorate, Such pro: should not be given ca party. Sending School child to a .
 

nogenous electorates
Some readers may ng this kind of fact -demarcation is to be impracticability. We di SLC TEDETS that | Exercise krown as ation Which generally type of data. UnfortuWhich should have Wä5 tot COnducted. Wiolence in the NOy. The lowest level of inable (on magnetic Ed "CBSLSblock ontiguous area of no ) ПОШSEholds. SLICh Jabolig in TE-dĒTar Caccording to the aforeThe conducting of a well overdue and be conducted at the side the Northeast of
or Representatives
3 til Ludile artiCLUllans of the diversity of wice, we also need illud TLES to gStablish rtial Candidates Who RPS. THE FirstHeartto propose is that all Wishing to be elected e a de facto ard de the electorate She for at least 5 years. O enSUse tilat the illy an integral part of ing a legitimate claim aspirations of the coa de facto resident te (but has a de jure awing one's ancestral is patently clear that OrĒSent is Täther tEis already taken flight viously defining it as abitation). Even if the dent of the electorate * Obvious acts demoorientation is already 3 Set Outside the Elespective candidates nomination by a politione's own primary Ch00 OutSide Olle's
electorate for schooling, for example, or sending one's child who is a non-recipient of an year 5 scholarship to a school outside the electorate should be adequate evidence to suggest that Such a person hāS already begunto abandon the electorate and has begun to find his/her sawation elsewhere. Such aperson would have no real stake in improving the quality of primary or secondary schools within the electorate, Very much the aspiration of the large majority of the Woters within the electorate.
(It Will not be too difficult to come up with a nationally acceptable scale of "relative integration into the constituency" that can bELISed by a II political parties a ta practicaly functional level which Will assist them in picking the most "electorate oriented candidate and eliminate the subjectivity and favoritism that now goes on which is, in fact, the beginning of the ascendance of the party dictate over the will of the people).
In effect, the potential candidate must literally be a prisoner of his constituency, primarily accountable to the voters and only secondarily to the party. In fact, we envisage a situation in the not-too-distant future, when the political parties having aspirations to regional/national represelntation will actually compete with each Other to gain the allegiance of candidates of high Credibility in the eyes of the voters (gained primarily through competence of performance) in order to improve on their Vote-garnering capacity and not give noTiinations to candidate due to their 'seniority" or hereditary conjugal clout within the party. In other Words, a party nomination should be granted to a potential candidate exclusively on his/her achievements and definitely not on aperson's ascribed statuSes (seriority, though a quasi achliewed status should be given lowerpriority wis-a- wis competence of current performance).
DEClaration of a SSES Will E a ITILSt for any potential candidate entering the fray in the hustings. It must be the right of every Voter to contest any such declaration and such contestations must be facilitated and legitimatized by the rule of law. If the RP (after election) is showing signs of selfaggrandizenment of an illegitimate calbre, voters should be provided with oppor

Page 21
tunities to confront the RP either in a civil forum or in a suitable court of a W. In other Words, the true leadership qualities and the efficacy of the RP's performance will be judged maximally if only the improvement of the quality of life of the latter closely approximates the average qualitative improvement of his 15-20 thousand electors. This Will demonstrate that s/he is leading the battle for common prosperity from the front and is not appropriating an unduly disproportionate share of the wealth created within (or Without) the community.
Age Structure of Candidates
Yet another Criterion that needs to be given due Weightage is that of the candidate's age. Needless to say, this factor assumes important dimensions. When one Witnesses the general over-representation of middle aged (40-60 year olds) in the legislature and raises valid questions of inequitable representation of the younger citizenry (18-39 year olds). The higher concentration of problems. Within the atter age group further accentuates the "unfairness of the currently prevalent pattern of representation. Furthermore, the witnessing of three rebellions (two in the south and one in the north) choreographed mainly by the younger citizenry in this country underscores the need for higher representation by the young. The implicit assumption being, of course, the higher the representation of the critical age bracket, the higher Will be the attertion provided to address their issues.
As such, we propose that one out of every three candidates nominated by any recognized political party must be one Within the age range of 18-35 years. (Since. We propose a maximum tenure of four years for the elected representatives, the cutting off at 35 years Will ensure that they are still below the critical 40 years at the end of that particular period of election.) Since the 18-39 age bracket at the last Census of 1981 stood at 36.4 percent of the population of Sri Lanka, the nomination of One third of the candidates Within this subset is quite justified.
Gender Preferences of Candidates
A similar, perhaps, even more conspicuous 'discrimination' exists against the equitable presence of female RPs in the House. It is possible that the powers that be may shrug their shoulders and say, "What can We do? there are no takes. We have not prevented any Women from seeking nomination."Whilethismaybepartialy true and the cultural biases also combneto accentuate the lack offermale preserice, it is also true that We have not taken any concrete steps to rectify this imbalance. This lack of Will can only be explained through a unwitting tendency on the part
of my male brethгеп ce of this hallowed a decade of Work V has convinced this perhaps much bett паgers of their (vегу TCes and are Willin efort (than males) txi from the dumps. So ning Women's liber not constitutionally space for Woment. role. After all, the pments of the Tale d of Sri Lankais quite
Thus, Our propios: political parties sho one female candid tādidātēs Olinā a political party iss very well grant no Taller that more of its candidates ar We might hasten to to entrench "rewers principle should reak third the Candidates one third females'.) this ideal frlay not bE that surfacing of can may need time. It i Tental set up and th that percolate in the this the political rei time. As such, our p done gradually. At t these proposals, the out of every five can Which WOLuld be 'OE the next hustings an out of every three election.
Needless to say, t criteria to be adople cal parties at an elle exclusive but inter: that the romination of 30 years will Satis requirements of bot
A. Bottom-up Elect Plan
The drawing up before a national ele in advance of such originate at the lewe Each potential cant carry out a baselir CenSUS SinCe infor each household With be sought) so that th demographic profile highlighted along wit tic: a reaS, CÒCe this: the potential card exterisiwa diSCUSSİ0 ctors on devising

ofosterthair dominainstitution. More than this the NGO SCOT riter that females are r organisers and maften, meagre) resouto put in that extra extricate themselves in this era ofburgeotion ideologies. Why provide an adequate perfor in their historic st record of achieveominated legislatures dismal, if not pathetic.
lis thatall recognized uld nominate at least te out of everythree ad for an election, if desirous, they may minations in such a 1än ong third the list a Women. (However, add that im Order Tot a discrimination', the as 'a minilium of One should be males and tisalsoperceivedthat reachable overnight, didates with potential s very likely that the le attitudinal ChangeS female Tind to make ality may take SÖrne roposal is that this be he time of adoption of Cutoffshould be "one didates to be female' 2 out of every four, at draised furthertCD "Orne at the subsequent
hese age and gender d by recognized politi:tion are not mutually secting. This means of a female candidate y the minimum quota
criteria.
orate Development
pf a party manifesto ction should Start Wg || am Welt and should of each electorate. idate is expected to B survey (in fact, a nation pertaining to in the electorate isto a socioeconomic and
of the electorate is 1 its critical problema
picture is revealed, date Wil|| Lundertake 15 With inforTÎle délghe most practicable
measures that can be taken to armeliorate and if possible to eliminate each critical problem. (The five Pradeshiya Sabhamembers Who hawe their Constituent5 Within the same electorate should, along with the potential candidate, from an integral part of these discussions — see pp. 27-28) These measures should always start with the default option, viz., "how do we tackle this problem if there are no funds forthcoming from the government'. There could be two other hypothetical projections on what the electorate could do on aparticular problem with 'modest and 'substantial governmental support. A well defined goal (and as measurable as possible) is to be setup in respect of identified problem area ear-marked for interwation. With Some demarcation of time targets that need to be surpassed during the four year period if the particular electorate is to be effective in tackling that particular problem. (Methods such as the logical Framework Approach or the Participatory Rural Appraisal or any other such appropriate method could be utilized in developing a thorough plan of intervention within each electorate), Thus, each electorate Will have a composite of its defined areas of intervention emanating out of the baseline survey and ensuing discussions along with time targets which can be built up into a provincial (regional) plan of action as Well as a national plan of action. This Will provide the basis for each political party to draw up its mainfesto.
Activation of sanctions by the People -The Recall Option
Well thought out consensual plans of intervention are meaningless in the absence of continuous nonitoring which are backed up by positive/negative sanctions that can be activated by the participating majority, viz., the electors. Our next heretiCal proposal is to institutionalize a biапnual (аппшal, if the people want to provide more space for the RPs) appraisal Techanism which has enough teeth to activate a "recall of the RP, if in Case one third of the electors feel that their chosen leader is foundering on their common mission. This appraisal should be made On a Voluntary basis with those so desirous Taking their Way to the appropriate Divisional Secretary's Office, Proving one's legitimacy (National identity Card) to partake in the appraisal and Casting Örlie's Wote of Confidence or no-Confide= nce, as the case may be. (Needless to say, each DS Office should be equipped With modern technology to facilitate this operation). If the balance of these Votes ends up with no-confidence votestallying more than Ore third the total nu Tiber of cast valid votes at the last election, then the Divisional Secretary as the nominee of the Elections Commissioner Will recoThend to the latter that the incumbent RP
19

Page 22
be relieved of his/her position and ellections be held Within 2 weeks of such d'Ecla fati Om.
(For example, if in a particular electorate there were 12,300 Walid votes cast at the last election, the critical one third cut-off Will be 4,100 votes, if at the bi-annual appraisala total of 8,000 voters cast their appraisal, 5,900 cast no-confidence appraisals and 2,100 cast appraisals of Confidence in their Cumbert RP, the Balaince Would be 3,800md-Confidence appralsals, insufficient for a recall of the RP, However, this should be construed by the incumbent RPasa close call and respond by increased energies to achieve the targets of the consensually accepted plan of action of the electorate. If in case 6,051 Voters cast their no-Confidence appraisal, there Would be sufficient grounds for recall of the incumbent RP.)
Bi-annual appraisals should perhaps bei Conducted at a fixed imE of the yEär and We propose that the end of June and December are as good as any other. The casting of appraisals could occur during the Working hours of the last two Weeks of June and December and the COunting begun at 4.30 p.m. at each venue on 30th and 31st June and December, respectively and the results proclaimed nationally on the same night over the national radio and TW. The public should be reminded of their civic duty of casting these appraisals during the last three Weeks of June December With appropriate messages over the radio and TW at one hour intervals. This should be Complemented With similar notices appearing in the print medium over national dailies in all three languages. (Printing and) Pasting of posters will be prohibited by law and prohibitive punishments legislated on grounds of LinCOnscionable wastage of public reso Lurces. This should be applicable at all elections as well. Only hand Written banners (no mechanical process such as silk-Screen printing etc. will be accepted) Will be displayable With these needing to be put up during daylight hours with the public being given a chance to witness who is putting them up. Those who put them up are bound by law to dismantle Such expressions as Soon as the occasion has passed with na damage to publicorprivate property.
The first appraisal by the voters should be held next June or December after giving the RPsafull six months since they began their new tenure (first day of Council sessions). Thus, if the first sessions were held on 30 June of 31st December, the new RPS will be given a maximal time of one year before their performance will be appraised by the voters for the first time. Thereafter the appraisal Will be biannually. In case an incumbent RP is
2O
relieved of his/her pos is elected, the Sartle its of the first and Sals. The temure of S ed When the COLIC spective of how long: electorate.
Engineering Attitud among the Represe
The proposed stra electorate-based fou plan backed up by a sed by the Collective E. suggest that the aspi surely being prograri Catalyticleaderandt ConstituEncy, anSWer butto iS bretrg. T dual purpose of grad Corrosive effect the Lanka has exerted Or for its own purpose : aðftig habitat itsēlf. C) electora teas the Colle Weightage to evolve purpose, goals and collerent Whole arid a diffUSedraSS of CI incomprehensible thi dewelopTert polar.
The aforemention the electorate's deWE dicatEd OT! the 3551 there is zero reSQL electorate from the g parlament), it Will stil of activity that will lite from its boot strings the crucial resource mpted at augmentati currently the RPs as: is only possible thr the government. En ingredient of the geni wing the quality of lif only possible to be jobs to behad fromt t FISYFEer" W"OtBFS OT t the assumption of th by the RP, literally coffers by demandir ring non-productive his enchmen. This the accumulation of rest of his electors incapable of pene coterie of privileged Tised COTTO Cd3W mes am Lunrealisaboli majority. While a res some ir diwidual Sol: rise to the country E. וסmOSIly unpr וחסfr (Henceforth, the RF ble to issue a Chi: behalf of Ome'S WOtE no right to issue E officer of the public C

iOI and a new RP rocedure Will apply subsequent appraiiuch a new RP Wil | S diSSchwed TEshe has served the
inal Chaпges rtatives of People
tegy of evolving an r-year development reca option CxerClIody of voters should ring RP is slowly but |med to bE both the le prisoner of his/her able not to the party his Should SEWe the ually weakening the party system in Sri dividing the habitat and not for the good Iլլիթ Other harid, the iction of habitats led its own identity of
aspirations into a mot ble Subjected 10 umbs tät fall Coff an ing Called a national
ed "default option' in lopment plan is preImption that even if rces coming to the overnment (national | have a prograппе rally strive to lift itself Attitudinally, this is that is being atteOn Sir Cel Wig feel that sert that development Jugh the largesse of ployment as a Vital aralstrategy ofimproe of the electorate is Colle if Ero EfE epublic sector given heir children, Hence, a role of Robin Hood plundering the state g, creating and oftejob opportunities to further exacerbates frustration among the who are solehow rating the restricted Herichlien. The proelopment goal beco3 illusion to the large tricted subset derive Ce but at great expëy derswing an inCOme ductive employment. "WMP Wil|| only be eligiracter certificate on TS ad SWhile Will hawe In "ultimatum'' to any ir private sector dema
inding the allocation of a job to any individual.)
With the delineation of the SocioeconoTic profile of the electorate and the mapping of the human and physical resourices, both available and potential, it is more than possible to work out a strategic modus operandi to mobilize these res OLrces within a mass-participatory frameWork. The whole realm of micro-enterpriSes (which should unequiVOCally Br1COmpassal agricultural initiatives) is available for imaginatiwe recharting and integrating into the national grid of development planning, not as hitherto pursued on an adhoc basis but on a decisively planned Tanner. The literally untapped Wast absorptive capacities of rural and urban low incoTE communities needs to be studies in-depth and linked up both in terms of production and Consumption.
Lest the reader begins to entertain WOrries of Our letting the government of the hook with no resources being pumped into the electorate, We must haster to assure that no such absolving is envisaged and that We Would briefly discuss the principles under which We propose the government SOLld dista Lurseits reSources to spadËd Lup) the development initiatives of the electoraLes guided by the RPs, This Will be atlempted when we evolve the proposals for setting up the new parliament. The 'default option' of the electoral development plan was meant to rekindle the faltering Spirit of self-reliance and latent potential of the cortunities. Within an electorate and not to eli Tinate the government fra Tipursuing an actively collaborationist role in the development march of all electorates. The envisaged interaction between the government and electorates is supremely complementary and inextricably symbiotic.
If a party manifesto is built up on the action plans developed in respect of ground conditions at the electorate level, there should be very mini Tal deviations in the substance of the manifestos of all parties. At the level of the electorate, there should hardly be any deviation in the definition of the problern but possibly some variations in the methods proposed for the armelioration of same. In fact, it might be a more cost efficient Way to conduct the base-line survey jointly by pooling the resources of all candidates affiliated to the several parties that may contest a particular electorate. From the point of view of the electors, all candidates aim is to improve the quality of life within the electorate and as such, the base point of departure is the same for all candidates in terms of generating proposals and modus operandi. This activity, it is hoped, will further attenuate the unhealthy party rivalry that has hitherto been perpetrated on the electorate.

Page 23
s
Why there's sc in this rustici
There is laughter and light baiter Titlist the:
LLLLLL LLLLLLLlLM gLLLLm GmmL LLLLLL 0LLLLLLLLD LLL LLrrClLL leaf in a bir TI, IT IS, CITIE: If the hundreds of such
barns spread tytut in thị: Tid artici Lipmuntry LLLLLLLLH KLLK HuuLLLLLL LlL aBLaLlL uLLLLL LLLLHa LS dallimi, di Iring the Coff 5:2:15 Cor.
Here, with careful nurturing, tobacco grows Fis a LLLLeOLL LLL LLLLCHC HLL LHLHL uuuLGLCL LtgtLLLLLaL LLLLLLLHHL L gold, to the value of Jir Rs. 250 million or more annually, for perhaps 143,000 rural folk.
 

ENRCHING FRURAL LIFESTYLE
und oflaughter tobacco barn.
Tobaccan is the industry that brings er TıployTIEmil tra
hic scienci highest numbe T uf people. Artici ThE:52 people are the colbarra barr, IowTiers, thia' trab.: CCC growers and those who work for the IT, on the land ariri irl, the barms.
For thern, the tobacco leaf means rearingful work,
a carnfortable hife àTird a ocure futura. s. FC
rough reason for laught ET,
CeylonTobacco Co. Ltd.
Sharing and caring for our land and her people,

Page 24
PEOPLE
Celebrating T
C
Dynamic
In 1961 People's Bank ventured out in the of only 46... and a few hundred Customers
Today, just 30 years later
People Resource exceeds 1 Customer Listings at a sta Branch NetWork in exCeSS
in Sri Lanka
In just three decades People's Bank has g in the Sri Lankan Banking scene. Their spec resources at their Command dedicated
dedication that has earned them the title
PEOPLE'S BANK
Banker to the Millions

'S BANK
Three DeCades
f
: Growth
challenging World of Banking With a staff
0,000 ggering 5.5Million of 328, THE LARGEST
rown to become a highly respected leader ;tacular growth is a reflection of the massive to the Service of the Common man - a
"Banker to the Millions'