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LANKA
G 2 A. R EELAM
THE ILL-PREPAR
BROKEN PROM
RUSSIA
DELHIS
A/ASA/EACA
1985: BATTLES BE
PEACE ZONE AND SIRI IL
AUSTRALA AND THE INDI
FARMERS CNDER I.M.F.A
IS DEVOLUTION A SOLUTI
 

DAN
.OO Registered at GPO, Sri Lanka QD/33/NEWS/94
WAR III
F AMONK
- Mervyn de Silva
RED PRESIDENT
— Nirupama Subramanian
SES, LOSTIFAITH
- V. Prabhakaran
N SAMS
S OFFER
FORE PEACE ACCORD
— K. M. De Silva
ANKAN POLICY
— Humayun Kabir
AN OCEAN
- Gareth Evans
TTACK
- Kalinga Seneviratne
ON
- Dayalal Abeysekera

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OUALITY AT AFFC
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COMPLIENTS
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ORDABLE PRCES
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Page 3
TFENIDS
LTTE infiltrates city
Police suspect that the LT TE has LLLLaLaaT S THHLaLL LLL LTHtCLLLLLL and activists, including suicide Bombers, info Color77 bo. Orde suspeC'Èd sa 77āIE SW Wa S arresified or 7 May 73 at Sri Saranan kara Road, on the southern outskirts of the city. Sid Wis frid O Ed a rive of Majda thwl, Mr Jaffra.
Don't sell arms, EU told
The Eшгореал РагӀгтіалпеп! їпа recent resolution urged member States of Life, Europeari Urnion not to Seal arfois so File LT TE, TF72 Europвал Рагїїаплеп! also called оп SAAFC Our Isrg5 grld OffigfrläJTS of Ihe Iпdїап осеал геgion Io bгїпg pressure On The LT TE fo re/UFT (o.
File regolia fior) table,
SUBSCRIPTION RATES
Air Mail
CaIlda WU.S.M.
USS 65/ for 1 year USS 45W for 6 months
率
U.K., Germany, New Zealand, Alust Talia, Nethletlärlds, Falce, Japan, Holland, Philippines, Austria, Norway, Sweden. Child, Irela Ilıd, Switzee Tilialıd, Nigeria, Belgiturrı, Der Imark, Paris, Lolcloril
USS55, for 1 year USS 35 for 6 IIIDI this
Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia, Dubai, Baharin, Arabian Gulf Syria, Singapore.
USS 45W for 1 year USS 25W for 6 Iloits
塞 毒 毒
India, Pakistan.
USS 40W for 1 year USS 22W for 6 months
事 国
Local
Rs. 250/- for 1 year Rs. 150/- for 6 lionths
The Lori was Іhe peace efТогїs t. TheחBחחחwerסט TE PE LTTE'S LI
73 CEāgsre.
A War C
MOLES 2. Se With Woud 1 Leader Rail instead of the exi curity Council, is powerful persor rm ment, a CCCarding 5JET(J". TFTE WE being pushed by chief, according MC 5 feC5 With the gover ir reporting.
Editor
"Sшriday ТІгте! tпаІшпga has bet Afforrey Gerrera ration of Preside Idararaike KLT1: for läs Earl III, Lr 3
First Olt
Presider CF rike Karafur day during her r LE FT SÉ Lwa LTTE's SELT TE
Jakarar fada Եի յքt itյ իll I.Jր Mirossler Fav Ga
The Iпаѓал рге T75 Mya5 Pé firSI government h; Ebang Flag LTTE
77 Lurder.
Megar 7 WITWE, 7 grā5ālā heSlalon (Ely li T73 feiria/artid Othe
OCFLT ECG SSE af Fikir raff |

шrgad to SLрдаг" of the Sri Larika resolution deploMea FC) of
Ouncil?
L) a War" COL"r7Cl CILIda CDDoSírjon Wick remaising hie, Sting National Sebeing resisted by is in the goveg to a story iri "The Air COLTC Idea 5 a forer Air Force lo Illis пеwspaper. ly had differences War rews
in court
'e SRап changed by the WIFI Cris IIIrläIdgsarī Cīrīdrikā BaагаІшлga. The edi[iced to appeагіп
he hit list
rīdrīkā Bārda rānga fold India ToCerf brgf. WSsif fall S Or (Fle Top Of The e president also der Wesupillai PraIsraes) COM Tığrı İrlar. PTT]8 rl II:
25s fock role as Teg Sri Larka ad Categorically for RajvGandhi's
dia Today Іл ал Tara SFIOLETJE TO 7d7a) In pro widing tr help lø Sri Lanka TE. Reserring to the HCR OFF7eg Sri L3g gforsä Sald:
"Tag TISSINGS 1 The Fards of the Tani Tigers is not only a threat to Sri La rīkār frillary air coperations but Tlayalso endanger civil air traffic in Sri Lanka arid eyer II Tariil Madu".
Subsidies only for the пeedy
Donor rations at the Aid Group meering in Paris fasad Sri Lanka thāt subsidies should be targeted only fо Іле пеedy. Specїїcгеferencewas Tiade to the Wheat flour subsidy, reisā Valē ir 5 ārkāffē rschandthopooralikeat trigSubsidisedrate of Rs. 3.50 perloaf,
Following the Aid Group advice Іле goveглптепї is to re-Іhiлk subsidy.schengs to help only the poor,
GUARDAN
Wol, 18 No. 2 June 1, 1995
Price Rs. 10.OO
Published fortnightly by Lanka Guardian Publishing Co. Ltd. No. 246, Union Place ColjГПtjo. - 2.
Editor: Mervyn de Silva Telephone: 447.584
Printed by Ananda Press 825, Sir Ratnajothi Saravanariuttu Mawatha, Color TıbO 13. Telephone; 435975
CONTENTS
News Background Präbalakäär's Interwig W 晶
KEIT
门ā一母f止an晶石
FTITTI MMEditi t
Intervantion (2) 구 ALLStalia irid ta
Indian Ocean Region Fathers WS, Strictural
Adjustment 5
People, Power and Politics (3) 17 TG di Flori
Sri Lanka's Foreign Policy (5) 19

Page 4
NEWS BACKGROUND
THE LITTE’S TOT
Mervyn de Silva
though she launched an attack
On Some newspaper groups, it was an Unusually Subdued and serious President Chandrika who addressed the large gathering at the inaugural meeting of the National Media Centre. The killing of the much respected Dimbulagala monk, had stunned the nation. For all his seemingly eccentric Ways, the Venerable monk was a Syr Tubol. He Was Tore than a Colourful character. He was "the frontier Tolk" an undeclared War. The boundary beWeen the separate "EELAM" that the Liberation Tigers' fought to carve out from Sri Lankan territory, and the land ower Which Colombo's Writrari, Was the central issue. In a Way, the question had become frontpage news because Dr. Jayalath Jayawardena MP had raised it in the House.
Explaining the matter, the IGPFrank de Silva said that the special security had not been withdrawn. "It was replaced in accordance With a Defence Ministry policy directive. This directive related to the proWision of SeCL rity to indiwiduals and institutions hitherto Supplied by the Sri Lanka army. The Security duties were to be undertaken by the Police in order that as TyperSonnel be released for theiressential CombJät dLIliès".
While the explanation seems quite reaSofiable, it led to a bitter dispute between the P.A. government and the UNP-led opposition - a striking sign of how the War in the north-and-East Flas resulté d in another kind of civil war in the South, the traditional UNP-SLFP battle. This battle is no longer confined to Parliament.
It is everywhere and anywhere - in village or municipal Council, on all types of public platform, and on nearly every public question.
That many-sided War in the South has EDECOTIC Tore il CESSant and TLCh broader after the last parliamentary Elections. Most of the time, the UNP had a strong President and a secure, if no overwig
2
lming majority in the rned the country for With the advent of th ncy that things starte had come for Chang tion. It was made po divided SLFP, a fam the bitter family inSerius rifts, disco, albeit another Tieri “a new face", a pers known to be a dyna "Chandrika revoluti.
The parious cont. shment" party was decision of PESide from politics. This g fight for leadership |leader, Mr. Rai|| W the new challenger, yke - who had joir thmudali in forming PreTadāSa front. D TOLIITS, LETE WAS OTE National SEC rSOrnally led the Wad: Was assassinated b held him guilty.
If there were any assassination of Mr. ke, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi red these doubts si the NOWeilber Prest LUNPE3 de W53 ki Tarl Erin Wich Mr. mated — a Wortları : election meeting,
Mrs. Galini Diss: SeriOLIS rival to Mrs. Widow of SuperStar whose courageous: rial CILJEesticom" Filad W. admirers and angere Sinhala moveIIIght:5.
It is in Such a backg assassination of Mr. a presidential candid

AL WAR
} house. Andit gove17 years. It was only e Wijetunga Presided to change. The time le, a new administraSSible once a fiercely ily-based party where fighting had caused Vered a new leader, ber of the family but in With a cleanslate, Tic leader. Thus, the ."חג
ditiOT| 0"1g 35 tablii dramatised by the it Wielunga to retire |aWB Way 10 ar Open between the acting Wickremasinghe, and Mr. Gamini DisSamaed Mr. La litl. Alulathe D.U.N. F. an antiSpite the USLJal riulittle doubt that the Urity Minister whopearmaarachi Operation, y the move Tient that
lingering doubts, the Garnini Dissanaya's trusted friend, cleaaveral Weeks before dential polls. The new |lled in precisely the Galdri Wa5aSiSaSSsuicide-bornber at an
anayke was hardly a i. Kuriharatunga, the
Wijay Kumaratunga Sit & TC, O LE "Natiothousands of Tartil d the ultra-nationalist
round that the daring Wijay Kumaratunga, late, has to be placed
by students of southernor national politics in the past thirteen years, years in which the LTTE's dramatic interwentions have been a major shaping force of Sri Lanka's contemporary history. And in this, the dominant personality has been Welupillai Prabhakaran - second in importance only to President J. R. Jaya Wardere. And yetit Was Prabhakaran Who Trade Ourthe Jan. 1st 1990 cover. The L.G. had to choose between President J.R. and SUpremo Prabhakaran, The "past" Woited strongly for J.R., the past and the future suggested the LTTE leader. He continues to make history.
Military missions hawe visited Russia, Ukraine, China, Czechoslovakia etc. The defence vote, poor Prof. Pieris admits, will Soar. He had already reduced it from 27 billion to 24.7 billion rupees. He now fears it will exceed 30 billion rupees (600million dollars) two hundred and fifty million less than What the donor Consortium pledged in Paris for 1996. He promises not to print money or go to the Central Bank. So what Will he do? No Santa Claus is likely to knock on his door. New taxes, Subsidy Cuts, a Wage freeze or sell of State Corporationstoforeign inwestorSunderthe PERC SChEFrig.
In the meantime, anti-aircraft guns have been installed in Vital areas of the city, says the S.T. in its frontpage lead story. The parliarnentary complex, the President's official residence, Sapugaskanda and Kolonnawa oil refineries. The HINDU reported that the LTTE had been shopping for microlight aircraft, and had bought six in France. The buyer Was a sports firm. The short take-off and landing could prove lethal for suicide bombing, the report said.
Meanwhile the P.A. - U.N.P. "War", Once a low-intensity conflict shows all signs of a "no holds barred" battle that is likely to increase in intensity in the coming months. And that of course, Suits the LTTE strategists perfectly.

Page 5
Back to the Battlefi
As Sri Lankan jets pound Jaffna peninsula, the wheel h and the LTTE, with Colombo seeking international help
Nirupama Subramanian
or Chandrika Kumaratunga, the
transition from a dedicated peacerTaker to a determined fighter has been swift and decisive, but Certainly not painless. For a leader Who got elected on a onepoint agenda to bring peace back to strife-torn Sri Lanka, this must have been a terrible disappointment. Tougher still is the prospect of doing battle with a foe that seems to out-gun and out-think her armed forces by a considerable margin, bottling up a fifth of her armed forces in isolated garrisons and much emboldened after killing at least 200 of them injust a fortnight of onesided fighting.
The Sri Lankan President found hier:Self ill-prepared to Wage war as the LT TE unleashed the deadly surface-to-air Tissile on. April 29. Ina desperate image-boosting effort, she authorised her air force's tiny jet force on May 10 to bomb Jaffna peninsula despite the risk of civilian casuties. Even Sri Lankans, long used to the failure of peace negotiations, were taken aback by the quickness with which the process disintegrated this time round.
Despite the Government's persistence Over a negotiated settlement to the ethnic crisis, it was clear that Without the participation of the intransigent Tigers, such a settlement would be in vain. LTTE supremo W. Prabhakaran, on his part, claims Lihat HOStilities Were TEE WEId because te Government failed to live up to its promises to the Tamils, primarily the lifting of the economic embargo imposed by the previous government (see Interview).
"This Government has been trapped by the public promises it made. But it is now time for a clear rethink on how to prevent the country from being divided," says Kingsley De Silva, biographer of former president J.R. Jayewardene. As the GoVernment prepares forwar with the Tigers, Kumaratunge is being asked to separate the LTTE from the aspirations of the Tails in order to Sawe Sri Lanka's territorial integrity.
"For the Government to Take any hea
dway politically, it T. militarily, and comb ncement of its pol Suril Bastian, poli Colombo-based in: dies, AcCording to F devolves substantia minorities may ever to the negotiation ti ckage is in the offin the Gower left an tā|k5 With []thET TäTT
But divisions Wi over the political sorted outfirst. The the proposed. пегg the eastern provinc areas with pockets |éSé. In fact, the DU tuelts of the Ped rriment, has oper move, arguing that La Control of Orlearea and two-thirds case, Sinhalese lire
And it is clear th be complaining, "W like right now is a Si would once again c. til LTTE IS LE3|| EPRLF spokesГпа the end of the day, does manage to Ca there are more ser a DOCESS.
First, it will be r irTriplementitin the of the Tamils live. is Wirtually a quasiControl. Second, t jeopardise the pro the country too, E Prabhakaran's OLI tirTie and again its r Se Of HeaderS Who it - former presid Galdhi and K. EPRLF, for instanc
The Only hope t
 
 

ed
as turned ful circle in relations between the Government
to fight the Tigers
Stdéal WittlBLTTE it With Leo Lutical package," says ical analyst with the titute CF EC SLLim, apackage Which powers to the ethnic bring the LTTE back able. That such a pa g Washinted at when mouced it was having it groups and parties.
in the GWTIt Jackage hawe to be point of disagreement Er of the north Errl Wil B, both Tamil majority of Muslims and SillaNF, one of the Constiple's Alliance Gowely criticised such a it would mean giving ir of Sri Lāksā of its coastline. In this may Well be aroused.
at the LTTE Wouldn't What the Tigers WOLild flä|BSBBäckläsh häl Orvinte alITamilStilät only lifeline," says l. KathleeSWaral. At
even if Kumaratunge rry Sinhalese opinion, ous obstacles to such
lear om irmpossible to orth, where a majority At present, the region Et L. LET TE'S he LTTE could easily cess in other parts of specially in the east. tfit has demonstrated uthlass ability to disp)O-
Hawe tried to Sidelile ent Premadasa, Rajiv PE COf the
莺B。
at any peace process
sars the LTTE has of Success is if the Sri Lankansecurity forces are able to beat the Tigers in their own territory. Right now, that looks like a very tall order,
If the attack on the gunboats in Trincomalee harbour on April 19 demonstrated the efficiency of the Black Sea Tigers, the missile attack on the Avro plane carrying men and supplies to the northern base of Palai demolished the myth that the Country's air force was invulnerable. In its belated rush to overcome a shortage of rimen and material, tha Government hias embarked on a major drive to fill the shrinking ranks of the 100,000-strong army and to acquire military equipment overseas. What the military might still be short om, however, are inspiring leadership, strategy and motivation.
Unfortunately, the present set-up has evoked only dread and despair. Army Commander Gerry Silva is on record saying a military solution to the ethnic Crisis Is "mot possible". Though the statement is largely true, coming from the army chief it has had a demoralising effect. "If that is imdeed the Case, the ma In on the fir-riti wants to know what he is doing there," remarked a brigadier.
In the Coming days, morale Will play an important role for the army, Holed up in the Poomeryn canTip in Jaffna are OWer 4,500 soldiers, dependent for their supplies on air force transport planes. In Palali, there are another 15,000 men in a similar predicament. With the air force Virtually neutralised after the missile attack andthenavyapprehensiveaboutentегing the area, the troops are completely bottled up. After Squeezing the army's supplies, the LTTE may well launch an offensive the camps. LTTE has to weigh long-term implications of such a move since it would invite opprobrium from the international Community.
One thing that is clear is While the Government's peace agenda prompted the armed forces to go on a virtual hiatus, the LTTE used the time to build its

Page 6
strength. Its successful strikes in the east bear testimony to this - the LTTE had been more or less flushed out of the area in 1993 but iL used tha three Ti Onths Of ceasefire to make inroads into the area once again. After the renewal of hostilities, all its ambushes hawe OCCLUTTEed in this province.
However, it is the LTTE's possession of missiles - said to be Russian-made SA-7 missiles obtained from Ukraine - that has really got the Government Worried and strengthened the belief that the crisis can't be resolved by Sri Lanka alone. The recent meeting between Kumaratunge and Prime Minister P.W. Narasimha Rao in New Delhi during the SAARC Summit fuelled speculation on India's poSSible in WolwersTernt. It is beliewed that Kumaratunge raised the issue of a "common threat" to both Countries from the LTTE.
Indeed, there is a growing feeling that India could offer valuable assistance to the Government. "India cando a lot to help our country, Without stepping into Sri Lankan territory. For instance, patrolling the Waters to ensure that the LTTE does not get its supply of weapons," says Air Vice Marshal Harry Goonetilake, former air force chief. Ewen die-hard India-bashers, like Dinesh Gunawardene, president of the Sinhala nationalist Mahajana Eksath PerLUTlina, feel Sri Lanka reeds India's help. "It is no longer just a Sri Lankan issue. The problem concerns the boundaries of India as Well," he sayS.
But it is unlikely that India will be drawn into the conflict - considering the IPKF experience, and with the upcoming general elections and asserTıbly elections in Tamil Nadu - even though renewed fighting may step up LTTE activity in the state. Exterial Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee, in fact, has categorically denied that Sri Lanka asked India for military help and termed it an "internal dispute." The Indian Government, howewer, may be forced to change its mind if Sri Lanka were offered assistance by a third Country, say, Pakistan.
But with no international help imrTediately forthcoming, the pressure is on the Government to get its act together and formulate a consensual package for peace. Failing which, the alternative is another long drawn out battle in which the LTTE has been first off the blocks.
“We ha\
Anandhi Surya Prak In Jaffra within 48
renewal of hostifies IIшpillal Prabhakaral interviews fо Іле pr Flera FIFTE? Coffs Car7 With a black Cordiol Iе агошлd his песk, bodygшards, he reптi, rsisterit questioning de Cided o L7 illa fera, peace process. The In Tarmi, was record,
Q. Why did you from the peace neg Wher there Was hi be restored in ther
A. We made this tir me. When our peop In the beginning, we that the Tail nation, resolved through pol
The Tarnil people t( B1OrmOLJ5 Sufferir1 of the ECOTIC EITT äfldingblockadE Qn previous governrner thing other than there Instead of viewing til blems of the Tamil rtment took them as the LTTE. Furthermo any attempt to resol off military repercuss that the Continuation tions Would serve ( blems of our people Tle GovernTentaS: rETOWe the bans. W. diline by three Weeks. delayed the implem sions. It is because our people have lost Gowerment.
Q. Why did you de the peace negotia President Kumarat попnic епbargo al concessions?
A. Giving pledges those pledges are ty Strug that Preside

e lost faith
San Coffe BBC Was Lurss of 3 LT TE'S LT TE supremio Wewho rarely grants iss, agreed to meet OS. Ir Tillstary fa figue їпgacyanida capsшand Surrounded by іїпеd шпfazedbyреon why the LT TE уwїhdrawfrom the exCILISI weg irriferwiewi, dar fape. Excerpts:
2 Cide to Withdra W otiations at a time pe that peace will Orth?
airlful decision at a le had lost all hope. antertained the hope all question would be itical negotiations.
have been subjected gas a COriSequence Ibargo, fishing baris rafficimposed by the t. We requested noTowal of these banS. lëse isSLJES as pro
people, the Govespecific demands of re, We Were told that "ethern would spark tons. We pointed out pflhepeace negolia| purpose if the pro
Were not resolved. ured US that it would a extendēd our deaButte GOVETTE entation of tS deciof this that We and faitli Clar drika's
Cide to di SContinue ions even though Ingelifted the ecod ofo Ted Severa
and implementing o different things. It
Chandrika gawe us
– W. Prabakarar
pledges. But she has not taken constructi: we measures to implement them,
O. Shouldn't you have been a bit patient since the delay could have been caused by administrative hurdles?
A. We reached the brink of tolerance. The Government dragged its feet for more than six months. If there was a genuine Will, the Government would have lifted the bans and proceeded with the implementation within 24 hours.
C. What do you feel about the decision to reimpose these bans?
A. It has made one thing very clear as far as the Tamil issue is concerned, there is no funda Tental difference betWeen the present Government and the UNP regiT.
Q. Several foreign governments have condemned you for terminating the peace negotiations.
A. We are fully aware that the international community is genuinely concerned about the Tamil issue and wants a political settlement. Some foreign Countries hawe chosen to conder in the LTTE on the basis of the onesided story provided by the Government before studying the issue in depth.
C. Chandrika has made it clear that she is determined to pursue the peace process with or without the cooperation of the LTTE,
A. If it is practicable to achieve peace Without the cooperation of the LTTE, let her Continue her effort,
O. The International Secretariat of the LTTE in London issued a statement recently that the Tigers have not Closed the doors for peace. What Steps do you expect the Government to take?
A. Our doors for peace are still open. We are dissatisfied and disi||ILUSiOned With the Government approach but we haven't lost hope. If the Government makes favourable decisions On theissues We raised, We will be prepared to cease all hostilities and return to the peace process.

Page 7
On the prowl
5 President of Sri Lanka,
Chandrika Kumaratunga, was elected in November with a large majority partly by promising to bring peace to the Country. She is now bitterly contemplating the ruins of her quest. Not only have the rebel Tamil Tigers rejected her peace feelers, but the military advantage has swung in the TIgers' favour.
The government was rattled by the sinking of two naval gunboats which marked the resumption of the Civil Waron April 19th; but its reaction ten days later to the shooting down of two military aircraft Qwer Jaffna, where the Tigers aré strong, was more like panic. Regular flights to the army's isolated bases in Tiger-controlled areas HäWe not beën resurfled. MOW that the airforce has lost its confidence, a Tiger onslaught on the base of Poonareen, close to Jaffna, may be imminent,
Since the 100,000-strong security forces appear to be incapable of inflicting a de CİSİ W5 defeat 01 E TE JElf)TCC å LÈ LI of their size, the government has turned abroad for help. The defence attaches of friendly countries in the region have been invited to Colombo for talks and the goveLLLLLL LLLLCLL LLLCLLLLL LL aLaLL L0HH aLLL LaL
purchases. It is plan aircraft and armou nuber of Countries Chiriä arld RUSSia.
BL, EWEr with fie Werientis riot Corfi the Tigers alone. Itp: to help cut the Tigo Nadu, India's Southé Weaporis, fueland Ol smuggled across the Wounded Tigers are te hospitals in Tamil are Thadig in LF10 stad ppressing Such Serv like India to Shard in to agree to a jointna
What India is pre wEr is raller diffe refLSE to di SCl)SES th ssions held during Mrs Kumaratunga: peace effort Collaps Tigers fired their anti according to unco Indian prime minist raised the possibility Länkänärld│rdia T1CI the Tiger leader, We
LTTE missiles may be of Ru
Dinesh Kumar
indian defence and security agencies
are trying to trace the type, source and origin of the surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) used by LTTE militants in Sri Lanka recently since this could have a direct bearing on the Indian security SceTrio.
The LTTE had brought down two AWro aircraft belongiring to the Sri Lankam Air force in the Jaffna peninsula with hea-seeking SAMs on two consecutive days last Weekend. The issue was also discussed by leaders of SAARC, excepting the Sri Laikan Prince MinistCT WHO had Titurned earlier on. Although no consensus had emerged from the discussions, Prime Minister P. W. Narasimha Rao had while describing the weapon system as "frightening" observed that it was an issue of "SeriOLSOCE".
inforted sources say that this incident has added a new dimension to the security scenario since this is the first time that heat-seeking missiles have been used by a militant or guerilla group against flying
aircraftil LE SL-E. only Afghan mujah Used such missile: ghly-capable heat-S las had been suppli agencies to the mu amed for C-35 of the in Afghanistan.
PrESEl Catio FE LT TELS aré hawe probably bi Afghan mujahideer also been Some talk the Sei ThiSSile:S thľOL from Ukraine. Initial Hlad Said LHlät Sri Lal by the Ukrainian months ago that an Was heading to War Interestingly, follow had alerted Indian: nking that the Cons for LIse againts Indië LSF WHICH WS til talks With the LTTE
 

ning 10 by Wärships, Weitles from a among thern Israel,
Wequipment, the godelt thätit CT dëfält articularly Wants India 3.f5" |ife-ling to TarTil ern state. Supplies of heressentials are Sti|| Pak Strait to Jaffma. looked after in privaNadu. Tiger unifori:Tis tä. Il additir t0 SLiCES, Sri Lanka Would telligence with it, and walpatrol of the strait.
ared to offer, howerent, Both Countries a Substamce of diSCUWo visits to Delhi by one just before the d, the other after the -aircraft missiles. But, nfirmed reports, the er, Narasimha Ra 0, of a joint raid by Sri om rimaridos to Capture luplai Prabhakaran.
In an Election year, arresting the Tilar suspected of arranging the murder of Rajiv Gandhi, Mr Rao's predecessor, Would help Mr Rao. Snatching Mr Prabhakaran from hisjungle hideOut Would plaCate Rajiv loyalists in Congress and undercut Mr Rao's main rival, Arjun Singh, who looks to Rajiv's Widow, Sonia, for support.
But beyond sending a snatch squad, the signs are that India will not help. Once only too eager to get involved in Sri Lanka, it is now Wary of getting sucked back into the mess. Although a strike against Mr Prabhakaran himself might prove popular, co-ordinated action against the Tigers Would be deeply resented in Tamil Nadu, where the main Tamil parties sympathise - either operly or covertly - With the Tigers. And memories are stil fresh of 1987-90, when a 100,000-strong Indian peacekeeping force occupied the north and east of the island, but failed to tame the Tigers and suffered many casualties. Now, with the Tigers posing a more serious threat than eựer, the government in Colombo looks likely to be left to its own devices.
– ELLITGITIS
Issian origin
intinent. In this region hideenshawe So far S. But then, the hiseeking Singer missiadby US government jahideens to fight the for her Soviet Union
is are that the missiles of Russian Origin and een procured from groups. There has of the LTTE procuring gh unofficial channels reports, for example, kā lādēĒr Warī Ēd government some illegal arms shipment "ds the island nation. ng this tip off Sri Lanka Security agencies thignment was intended rather tha Sri Larka an engaged in peace
EBLJIt What Would also be of rela Wami CellC) Indiam SēCLufity agen CieS is the type of middlemen (if any), sourcing of funds, and the route taken by the LTTE in carting this lethal missile system to Sri Lanka. Insurgent groups in the north-east, notably the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), is krown to hawe established in international armis bazars In South East Asia as had even Punjab militants. There hawe been LunConfirmed reports of the LTTE establishing contacts with Punjab militats in Canada as also With the Peoples War Group (FWG).
Although no militant OrinSurgent group ildia has till OW used surface-to-air missiles, an Army patrol had recovered a Russian made SA-7 (Strella) close to the Line of Control in Kashmir's Kupwara border district in April 1994. The SA-7 compares similarly incapability and performance to the type of SAM used by the LTTE. "Asy Such WÊapjom System should be a cause of Concern.
- Tries or

Page 8
CON FLICT
Kashmir once more
In the age of identity, armed conflicts have a spill the flow of refugees to Tamilnadu that gave Delhith of Tamilnadu itself was carved out after a re-draw the force of linguistic nationalism and the threat o of Mahatma Gandhi, was forced to intervene to pre
the root cause of conflict,
Religion rather than language is the source of th became two states under the supervision of the depar conflict. Froll the LONDON TIMES.
Kashmir Flames
No solution in sight as Delhi drifts and Pakista,
Chrar-i-Sharif, a sleepy village in Kashmir was the scence of fierce fighting between Indian troops and armed Islamic militants, What is striking is not that there should be fires and bloodshed in an obscure hamlet, Kashmir and its civilians hawe Suffred more than their fair Shã TE of both in the Course of an intense civil War now in its sixth year. The arresting feature of the battle was that it was fought inside Indian-administered territory, against Indian soldiers by Pakistani guflmen.
As our South Asia correspondent reports from Kashmir, more than 60 Mujahidin aré ertranched in a Muslim Shrine in the village. The shrine was occupied by them - and immediately encircled by Indian troops - some months ago yet only now has it emerged beyond dispute that the majority of the occupiers are not local Kashmiris but heavily armed infiltrators from Pakistan. This Will have the effect of boosting the consistent Indian claim that separatist violence in the disputed proviince is "sponsored" by its neighbour, and of Weakening the consistent Pakistani protestation that its involverment in Kashmir comes only in the form of moral support to the area's beleaguered people.
The un masking of Chiar-i-Sharif Wi|| stri rnational dipilorTlatic shmir issue less diff it has been for SOME however, if it Were to ādā Call for KāS tion, to the Tlachinati irn Pakista T. There Is that many Kashmiris to accept their presE Citizens of the Indiar
Tary are un prepadre aCCESSidor li jif tir [d Pakistan, the only a Conflict Would be to that Would a CCom: quest for self-goverr
THg battle of Chira in yet another postpc elections in Kashmir riment. But these e ever held, to be the conflict virtually eve organisation has re arguing instead for nature of Kashmir's (or other Wise) with
But the force of

over effect. Identity does not respect borders. It was tright to be "concerned" and then involved. The state ng of borders because Pandit Nehru, confronted by suicide by Pottu Sri Ramalu, the respected friend 'ent a national tragedy. In Sri Lanka, language was
a region's generic conflict - Kashmir. British India ting colonial power. Here is a comment on the current
reddes
Pakistani fighters at aly make India's inteOffensive on the Kacult to conduct than title. Delhi Would err, attribute all Violence, imir Self-deletgr 11 imaons of the bogey Ten compelling evidence are now unprepared int political status as republic. Insofar as d also to accept the Spured province to sting Way to end the search for Solutions data til Kashmiri
Tet.
"-i-Sharif could result nement of provincial by the Indian Govetections are likely, if GOLITICE of EWE TOTE y Kashmiri political USed to participate referendum on the political association
dia.
dian public opinion,
as it now stands, makes it inconceivable that the Prime Minister, Narasimha Rao, Would even begin to address the question of Kashmiri Self-determination: to do so Would be tartamount political suicide and would play directly into the hands of the Hindu nationalist opposition Bharatiya Janata Party. Equally, the fragility of the GOWe Trentin Islamabjad hāS Tleant that Benazir Bhutto has had to be Tore Shrill on Kashmir than is helpful for the people Who IIWE , Lunder India ni adThiri StratČI. There is mounting evidence also, that Miss Bhutto has little Control over thosë Pakistaniagencies-such as the sinister Inter-Services Inteligence = which aid, abet and supply radical armed Islamic gro Lupus in Kashmir.
As events at Char-i-Sharif now demonstrate, such support is not confined to money and material. The Indian GoveTnmentisentitled to deliverasharprebuke to Miss Bhutto and to Call on Pakistan to stanch the flow of infiltrators into Indian-a- dTinistered Kashmir. Yet Delhi must not regard the crisis in Kashmir as a simple case of infiltration from across the border, the TOOLS of Kashi Tiri disaffection Still lite
firmly in Indian soil.

Page 9
PAR丁2
War Amic St PeaCe
K.M. de Silva
he increase in the ILIT ber of
spokesman for the Tamil minority had some predictable consequences, beginning naturally enough with a struggle among them for dominance, and a quest for the position of sole spokesmen. The TULF, the most moderate of the Tamil groups found itself edged out of any position of influence. Instead the lead went at Warious stages to other groups, with a bewildering range of acronyms, People's Liberation Army of Tamil Eelarin (PLOTE); the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), the Liberation Tigers of Tami|| Eelam (LTTE), and Eelar T1 People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) all of whom were assisduously cultivated by the Research and Analysis Wing of the Indian Prime Minister's office, Better known by its acronym RAW, it was the Indian equivalent of the CIA, RAW provided Tamil groups located in India with arms and training with the knowledge, if not under the aegis, of the Indian government. The TELO group Was a special favorite of the RAW. The LTTE awantually pushed ahead to a position of dominaince largely because of its strong and expainding base in Jaffna. The three leaders of the strongest of these groups, Prabhakaran, Urla MahESWararı, and Sri Sabaratırları", were som engaged in a bitter a ridirČrēasngly violant rivalry for the position of principal Spoke SFTI är of thė TarTii| CatSē. Prabhlakarar eventually won the day. But that is another slогу.
Two sets of talks between representatives of the Sri Lanka government and the Various Tamil groups, claiming to speak on behalf of their ethnic group took place in July and August 1985 at Thimpu, the capital of Bhutan. These talks did not yield any positive results, but Bhlar dari used the opportunity they provided to contin Lle negotiations With the Sri Lankan delegation in New Delhi. TBS läks Were refruitful. Tee agenda for ethnic reconciliation which an Erged from them yielded a framework for a realistic dewallution of power ir Sri Larika intended to meet some of the principal Tamil
ETTS.
One of the most significant features of this meticulously crafted agreement was that the urit of die Wolution was o be a prowinCE, 10 longer a district. Secondly, the powers to ba devolved on these provincial units Were
The writers Professor of History at the Paradriya L/ліyег5іїу.
much Witler thain tho: Sri Lärka gCWEerrirTE Til editOTS ET The complex news constituted a Tajor of the Sri Lankan Tarlds Of the TarT||: of the island, The dr to be known in offic Accord of August 1 ! consensus reached TULF's Views Were lmitialletj CT130 AUgLI: me the basis of all twem the two golwe Elhinic problēmSCOni rity.
The actual signin Bhandari hop Ed WOL, efforts Cofrosted a SILIFIS if Ill Es groups who were re give their Consent to Out Le Tore difficult to publicly commit it the formulation of W 1sulted and to Whi COICLITICE in Del
I DEETHEr 1984 support for the Delhi from their more aggr lar, thg LTTE. By the in early 1986 only remained committer chäd Brid initia|Ed Ir
Meanwhile spora violence, especialy the island, and clash forces and Tamil groups disturbedt Greatly improved re CCLures did text on the part of the prevent Indian territ guarrillas and terror indly neighbor, much training facilities an so much less dap Indiari political bas intent on taking approach than she di by Sri Länka's elhi options Tore limitĖ liked them to be, T ethnic politics of T guerrillas and terror have training facilit
The Tamil separt

Talks
se officerad earlier by the Fritir discussions With |Tarni representatives. tructures agreed upon concession on the part overnment to the de3 of the Orth and Cast it accord Willic care |al Circles a5 LIE DE|||| 385 was based on the that occasion and the part of that ConsenSUS. it this draftāCC3rd EÉCäfuture negolations beTitlerints com Sri Lanka's cerning the Tamil mino
g of the accord which uld crown his mediatory major obstacle in the L5ä| Of LE Cther TarTh| presented at Thimpu to it. The longer they held Egale of the TULF self to an agreement in hich they had been coth they hati glyeri their
5|le TULIF Withor BWits ACCOrdul dET POTESSLITE essive rivals, in particutitle Blidariest office the two governments to the agreerTent reaDigiFi.
dic Outbursts ofetinic İrn the mortlı alırıd. Ba Sit of Les between the Security Juerrillas and terrorists he peace of the island. EtiCS et E. LE WO and to any serious efforts Indian governTient to Dry being used by Tarnil ists for attacks CIA frialess to close down the di camps. Rajiv Gandhi, rldollt C.Il the SOLutherT) El thlas]] || lis filí ill I Eir, Eas I'll a Tor EWG-hladded lid to the problemsposed Hic conflicts, found his
that he WOLuld hal We 'he constraint ay in the Tamil Nadu, The TETI isls groups Continued to ES aild bases Lillerg.
atist groups in Sri Lanka
all had their supporters among the political parties of Tamil Nadu, the government and opposition parties alike, each of whom was LLLLaLLLLL a LLLLLaaaLLLLL tLLL LLL LLLLHHLaLS tert to thig, Sri Läkäri Tāṁi|| CäLISÉ WIS stronger than the other's. In locking themse|wes into the politics of Sri Lankan Tamil separatist agitation, they were also drawn into the fierce factionalism that was part of the Sri Lankan Tartill political Scene, None of the Ta Til Nadu political parties could keep the peace among the rival Sri Lankari Tarril groups Whose internecine Warfare ofen Look more Tamil lives than their frequent clashes Laaaa LLLLLaLLLL0LLLSLLLLLLLLHHHS nLJEed to SEWE three purposës: as a Sarictuary; as a base for training and Supply of arms; and as a source of funds. Thanks to the support they had in and from Tamil Nadu the Tamil separatist groups, and especially the LTTE and its ally the EROS group, had become a formidable guerrilla force, muth Strørlgär tham their |rldlam mữnlørs thought they would ever be.
The LTTE was also helped by a decision taken by the Sri Lanka government in July, 1985, as part of an understanding reached With India, that its forces in the Jaffna periInsula WCLuld be kapt within thugir barracks Or camps. Originally this arrangement was to last for two months, but it was later extended, in response to Indian pressure, for three Thoriths. The LTTE took advantage of this to mine all the roads leading out of the camps and proceeded thereafter to barricade them. LLLLLL LLLLLLLLLLaLLLLLLL0L LLLLCL LLLLLLaLLLL LLaL LLLLLLHtLaLL aLLLaLLLLLLLS LL GL0LL LHC0L LaL La LLLL LLLLLLLL LLLLCL LL LLLLaL LLLLLL the town of Jaffna if not the Jaffna peninsula itself, since the Sri Lanka army's movements were seriously hampered thereafter by these barricades. The units of the Sri Lanka army stationed in the fort of Jaffna could only be supplied by air.
The LTTE was emboldened by this shift in the military balance to embark on a wigPOLIS Campaign against the Sri Lankan forCES, and attacks On Softer Largöts: as wel aSa ruthless program of eliminating its Tartil rivals. They seldom directed their attacks against the security forces in open confrontations. Whey they did so their attacks were generally easily repulsed. But one of the consequences of such confrontations was that quite often civilians were killed, either caught in the Cross-fire or - On occasionby soldiers on the rampage seeking to awenge the loss of their comrades in land-mine blasts. The LTTE, for its part, began to

Page 10
choose easier and softer targets SLIch as an attack on the city of Anuradhapara in May 1985 in which 150 civilians were killed, or more frequently thereafter on Sinhalese peaSarts liri the romotar areas of the Orth-Central and eastern regions. These attacks became a major political embarrassment to the government.
The internecine Warfare between the SEparatist groups reached its peak between September 1985 and April 1986. On 1 September 1985 the LTTE assassinated two TULF stalwarts - two former MP's - Who had, unlike the bulk of the colleagues, continued to live in Jaffna. It was a move designed to compel the TULF in Madras and elsewhere to toe the line, that is to say, to refrain from signing the Delhi. Accord,
The Sri Lanka government beganto diwart an increasing proportion of its annual budget to the expansion and equipping of its armed forces, Alang with it there was ar Escalation of military action against the Tamil separatist groups in the north and east of the island. Tha Sri Larkan a TTTed foTCCS Ware NOW better equipped and better trained than before. Much of the training was domein Pakistan, while small groups of Israelis and British marcenaries honed the skills of Special Counter-terrorist Units in the army and police.
As clashes between the security forces and the Tamil separatist activists became more frequent and casualties increased in number India's mediatory role gave Way to a return to the Indira Gandhi policy of a diplomatic offensive against Sri Lanka; thus a propagarda Campaign was la Lunched through its embassies and High Commissions abroad, accusing the government of human rights violations, Sri Lankari and Indian diplomats clashed at the UN in New York and Geneva, all part of a policy of "moral" sanctions aimed at persuading Sri Lanka to return to the bargaining table. The Indian Embassy in Washington and the High Commissions in Ottawa and London, in the Theantima, continued to be conters of Support for Tamil separatist groups operating in those Countries.
Had the Indian government been more sensitiwa to the Sri Lankan government's difficulties, and made some unambiguous and noticeable effort to stop the use of Indian territory by the LTTE and others for their military activities, there may have been grea. ter political Support within Sri Lanka for a resumption of negotiations with the Tamil groups, or greater readiness to stop military action against the LTTE. The Sri Lankan government had treated the Delhi. Accord initialled on 30 April 1985 as an important step forward in reaching a settlement with the Tamil minority, and described it as "a reasonable basis for negotiation and Sattlemցրt."
Neither the TULFortheother Tarnilgroups
had responded positiv, tle Delhi. Accord. Itt. negotiations with the before the Indian gove official delegation to
discussions on poss |Tlodificatio'r 15 of the DC the delegation arrived lad left office. The de Milister of Statelgi mbaram, a young (40) Whoaspired to a Cong of Tamil Nadu, and
Gandhi's Minister o Affairs. The delegatio On 30 April 1936 andh c)Ver the next fiwa days With the LTTE's mass ders and the killing of COLIrSe of this clash,
For thë first title si began in late 1983 the for the Indian govern arld flot DLIľga LICratS departure of the Chi. On 4 May it was arr Lanka government ha ther concessions bey Dēli ACCCTC, "Tha de occasion Were publish
Billiardari'S SUCCEess
ry A.P. Venkatesware
pport With Rajiv Gand and greater sympathy CEILI59.
He placed his trusti ly pushëdthern into ta tiatics. With the Sri Lii TULF leaders living in not unWillingto play swarian had devised f terrified at the prospel more aggressive Tar SWaran Called represa groups to Delhi and th. TULF take the lea the Sri Lankan overni Field in Colombo later
Vēkā teSVārā lit the Delhi. Accord gre: Tar Tills by using the Ir a Todel for Sri Lanka'' TĒS, He beli EW Edithia|| theless significant trar Wolution package ne: would appeal to the T the Indian federal syst it would be acceptable rde ärid his aldwiSar government in India v. sful thar. In Most fedel was sufficient ambigui the Delhi. Accord Tia. to allow for bargainin and for more compror
By the time the TUL

rely to the proposals in jok several попths of Til by Indian officials
erituldse Sri Lakrift further ible adjustments and lhi Accord. By tha time Sr Lāka Bāri legation was led by a Lh3 Cabinigt, P. CHidaYears at the time) Tamil reSS-based leadership Natwar Singh, Rajiv | StäB for ExtErflä| marri WC2d im Color|150 eld wery interisive talks Their arrival Collied acre of thB TELOleaSri Satjara! Пап 1 in the
TCB Indiër Tigidiation a principal negotiators ment were politicians Cor diplomats. On tha Jambaram delegation HCLJICEed that "the Siri di agreed to Tllākie fu= Old E Erffs L1 flé isions reached on this Ed Ori 4 May 1985.
Jr. as Foreign SecretaLI FI TLI: 35 rahithan had Bandari, for tha Sri Lanka Tami||
the TULFI Willaking the leadin negorika government, Thie Ex|Ein Mädrä5, WBre he File: that WBlkiteJr them but they were it of antagonizing the Til grCLIPS. Wenkatastatives of these latter Crsuaded them to let in the di SCLISSiarl With rriënt Schleculed to be in the year.
pon the idea of giving it acceptability to the idian state system as S de Wolutionary SchiehSSLult 3SfŪTI Tlatior of thi E daotiated by Bhandari ULF baca Luise it used EIT äS H (TCIE, W|E to President JayewaS ble Cä LuSE itha Cerä asппшch more powealio 15, Basides thëra y in the refinement of e by Wenkateswarar
and give and take, St.
Farrived in Colombo
for negotiations with the Sri Lanka government in June 1986, President Jayewardene, had embarked on a new initiative, the Political Parties Conference (PPC) at which the Delhi Accord and the changes in it agreed to by the two governments April 1986, Would be discussed. Once again the principal opposition party, the SLFP refused to join the Conference, but seven other parties, including the vocal but uninfluential parties of the Marxistleft participated. The TULFjoined in the discussion at the Political Particas Conference, but even more important they had no fewer than 37 formal Teetings with President Jayewardene and his senior Cabinet Ministers between 13 July and 25 August 1985.
The negotiations between the government of Sri Larka adhe TULF,äide discssions and debates within the conference continued over three months. In general the Conference endorsed the proposals submitled for discussion by and through its commi: Lees, clarified some complex issues, and identified potential points of difficulty and ambiguities, all of which made it possible to widen the scope of the powers conferred on the provinces in the schemes of devolution SLubmitted for di SCLISSīOrl. These Ti Odifications and extensions were incorporated in the proposals sent to India, in September 1986, They included draft Constitutional amendments, a draft Provincial Councils bill, schedules setting out the "Reserved, Concurrent and Provincial" powers, as well as detailed memoranda dealing with law and Order, and and land settlement and education. The subjects of finance and administration were discussed in detail but no final LLaLLLLLLL LLLLHKLL LLCaLLLLSS TLL LLL LLLLLLLLS ment to this effect was issued by the Sri Lanka governmentan 26 November 1986.
It was widely recognized that there were no insuperable difficulties in the Way of realching agreement on the financial and administrative aspects of the scherile of devolution that had emerged from the discussions of the PPC. The real difficulty lay in the fact that the TULF and the Tamil separatist groups in general continued to press for the Creation of a single regional unit encompassing the northern and eastern province as a Tamil ethno-region. The Sri Lanka government Was Lur Willing to consider Hi5, much less to concede it because of its polítical implications. The opposition to this from large and W Cal Sections of the Sinhallēsē WOLuld hawe resulted in an extensive erosion of the goverrrriert's electoral base, leadingir turri ta a rapid undermining of its stability.
There was also another problem. Although both governments were anxious to treat the TULF as the main representatives of Tamil opinion in Sri Lanka, it was evident that there Was an eller Ternt of unreality in giving them this status. By living in Self-imposed exile they had CLIt themselves off from the Tail people. The separatist groups led by the

Page 11
LTTE had filled the vacuum caused by the TULF's absence. The longer they stayed away their chances of a political rehabilitation were more of a chillera than they already were. Thus the negotiations with thern Were exercises ir futility. The Crux of the problem that confronted the two goveTiments Was that the LTTE was in no mood to accept anything short of a separate state. Nor were they inclined to respect the new status conferred by the two governments on t3 TULF
Throughout the second half of 1986 Indian mediators were engaged in a sustained effort to break the deadlock caused by the TULF's in Sistër ICE OIT Lha Creation of a Tani| ethno-region linking the northern and eastern prowinces. Venkateswaгап came up with a proposal to divide the eastern province into three units, one Muslim, one Tamil and one Sinhalese, with the Tamil unit being linked to the northern province by a narrow land corridor. Wher this proposal W Om 10 Support, least of all from the Tamils, the Indian negotiators prevaled upor the Sri Lankam government to COI sider Life Excision of the Sinhlalesa parliamentary electorate of Ampara from the Batticaloa district of the eastern province so that the Tamil ethnic component there Would reach a level of parity. With the other ethnic groups. The LTTE, however, rejected the for Tula as wholly unacceptable. Nor was the Muslim minority who formed over 40 percent of the population willing to accept it.
The proposals agreed to in September 1986 formed the basis of negotiations between President Jayawardene and Prime Mirlisler Rajiv Ganghĩ when thay met in Bangalore at the summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) on 17 and 18 November. Indian officials were generally unhappy at letting Rajiv Gandhi get involved in the minutae of the negotiation process with the much more experienced Sri Lankan president whose grasp of the principles and details were much greater than his. They had succeeded up to this point in keeping the negotiations under their control, but now they could only watch, apprehensively, as the two heads of government began and continued the discussions on their own. These heads of government negotiations were accompanied and folloWed by di SCLISSions at a ministerialevel,
Rajiv Gandhi and his advisors were also engaged in frenetic negotiations to persuade the riwal Tarini|| || Separatist groups, är id im particular the LTTE, to accept the proposals that had emerged from several years of quiet diplomacy as the basis of a Workable frameWork of an honorable peace in Sri Lanka. Most of these groups were willing to accept these proposals or at least to give thern a try. The LTTE alone refused to do so.
The Indiari government showed its displeasure with the LTTE by imposing restri
Ctiofils On Sri Lankar ting from Indian terri time that such restrict despite Prime Minist familCes to Prasidert Delhi in 1985 in that
The progress mac sCuSsions oWed a gri intervention of the tw. They agreed on ater signing of an accord January 1987. Chid Singh wisited Colom| - On 24 Novemble with President Jaygy that the time-table for had to be readjustec the eastern provinc intractable problem. in regard to this, on When President Jay: ting of Muslim orga TOEf til disGCLISS LIFE province, their oppo the two provinces, Amparal electorate, district, was made a mbari and NatWar for the third title or " ssions. With the Sri La agreement was poss this contentious pro: Notasingle group sa ge in it. Muslim MP" of the Indian delegal opposition to any ch: of the eastern provi the northern provinc
There was noway Indian goverillent thakaran, then oper from leaving India fic död in this Luntil that Prabhakara and sirngham slipped ac the Jaffna peninsul: from there. As expe islandmarkEdLE E wist and violent phas batWEET LH e Tamil:S Sri Lankärl forces.
In early 1987 the be on the verge of m ration of independe island, Treating this move, the governm ments ir to til Cast mCBS With instructic of the LTTE and Contrary to expecte put up muoth of a fi Was anything but D Jaffna peninsula,
The Indian gover perturbed by this til Sri Lankan goverrill

Tamil activists operaory. This was the first ors had been imposed Ir Rajiv Gandhi's assuJayewardene in New regard,
a in the Bärgalore diat deal to the personal heads of government. ali. E tire-LaBiOrtTE by the two countries in mbaram ad NatWar 20 - thair SEC if it wisit
för Luther diSCUSSOTI Vārdē, BadiSSi thesigning ofan accord The political future of Eid til 3 TT105|| ohead Way Was Thade, this occasion as Well, Widele called a teeijf5 j T 1 DECOfutura of thig, gastēs sition to any merger of or an excision of the much less the Amparai Undantly clear, ChidaSingh visited Colombo 7 DÉCelter for di SCUInka government. While ble gol al|| Cathar i SSLJES, dified settleet, wiamy Osili Wea dwar talSW1. Gtte leaderS ion expressed their firm inges in the boundaries lice cor to liriking it With
uut of this impassa. The sought to pre Want Praating from Tamil Nadu, Dr Jaffna. They succeebeginning of 1987 when 3 LTTE ideologue Bala555 til FK StraitStr) a to continue their fight heleid their return to the eginning of a more actie in the Ongoing Conflict eparatist groups and the
LTTE was believed to aking a unilateral declaПСЕ П НЕ ПСПП Of HE as a gravely provocative ant sent troop reinforcean and northern provi15 LC clEär thịESE) a ľEāS ther separatist groups. Ilionis, Lihle LT TE did fit ght. The LTTE's retreat rderly, They fled to the
ment, apparently much III of events, urged the
L Tid" t35
military moves and to continue with a Search for a political solution. In response to this, the Sri Lankan government offered a cease-fire for the duration of the national holidays in April. The LTTE spurned this offer and responded with the Good Friday bus massaGre where 130 people were killed by machime-gun fire on the road fram Trincomalee to Colombo, and their allies, the ER OS group followed it up with a bomb explosion in LaaaaLaLL L HLLL aLLL LaLaa LLaa LCL a hundred people were killed.
Faced with the prospect of a serious erosion of political Supportas a result of these outages, the government decided to Take an attempt to regain Control of the Jaffrla peninsula. "Operation Liberation," which began on 26 May 1987 in the Wadamarachchi division in the Orth-eastern part of the peninsula, was directed at preventing the hitherto easy movement of men and materiel from Tamil Nadu. By the end of May Sri Lankan forces had gained control of this area. TFle LTTE, The TCSt formidable Tarril separatist group, had suffered a major sëtback and in a region they had dominated for a longtimB. It was this der Tonstration of the LTTE's failure as a fighting force that triggered off the chain of events that resulted ewertually in Indian military intervention in Sri Lanka's Ethic Conflict.
At this point India moved swiftly to prevent the capture of Jaffna by the Sri Lankan forces. The first move came from Tamil Nadu With a Well-publicized Tonetary grant of USS3.2 million to the LTTE and its allies, The Indian government, for its part, announced that it was sending shipments of food and petroleum products to Jaffna, which, it claimed, was facing a SEwere shortage of these iters through a blockade imposed by the Sri Lankan forces. Despite the refusal of the Sri Lankan goverTITient to accept this offer, or concede the need for it, a first shipment in a flotilla of about twenty Indian fishing-vessels was dispatched on 3 June 1987 but was turned back by the Sri Lankan nawy. When this Flappened, the Irldial air force inablatant widlation of interational law arid of the Sri Lankan airspace dropped food and Tedical supplies in Jaffna on the following day. All these actions constituted an uimistakable demostration of Ildial Support for the Tamil separatist Towermerlin Sri Lanka. The Indian supply of food to Jaffna continued over the next few weeks by sea with the formal but clearly reluctant agreeTerit of the Sri Larıkan gwernismert. The result was that by the end of June, Indo-Sri Larika relatiÖ15 Were Tiredim, T.LitLilial rğCrimination and deep suspicion, And the KLLaa Laaaa L0HLLa LLLLLLL LLCCLLLLLLL a prolonged and debilitating deadlock. Howewer, the LTTE had been saved from hurliliation by the interwention of India.
To be Continued

Page 12
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The Indian Ocean Region:
Australia and the Indian Ocean Region
I am currently on an elever day Wisit to eight countries around the Indian Ocean. | hawe just come from thë MaldiWes; after leaving India, I will move on to Pakistan, then Sri Lanka, the Seychelles, Madagascar, South Africa and, finally, Mauritius. Several years agothere Would not probably have beеп апy apparent шпifying rhyme or reason to such a visit. Such a Visit Would hawe been largely Seen as simply a collection of bilateral calls on a number of friends who happen to live LCLLLLL aa 0LLLLLHL L0L0L0aLLLHS LLLLL LLLaLLLL have been Tluch to talk about with regard to expanding regional cooperation or, even more grandy, building a regional Community.
Things are, as We all know, of course, changing. There are many people Who live around the Indian Ocean now starting to speak with a good deal of conviction about the possibility of building meanigful regional cooperation. In the past year or so, many Commentators, politiclans and academic experts have begun Lo speak of Indian Ocean regionalisri — orce a preserve of lonely Indian Ocean regional affairs scholars - in a key that has never quite been heard before. Some Flawe pLit forward Schelles for Such Cooperation, including a triangle of linkages between our two countries and South Africa. In an important first step at the inter-governmental lewel two months ago, Mauritius hosted a meeting of a small group of officials from Sewer countries - Australia, India, Kenya, Mauritius, Oman, Singapore and South Africa - at Wic broad agreement was reached to pursue the Whole question of regional economic cooperation. I am very enthusiastic about the possibilities, for reasons | Will spel|out in this address. One thing is clear from the outset however, it is now very conceiwable to plan and undertake such a visit as a regional visitin its own right, and as a visit With an organising and unifying theme - that of looking at Ways of building an indigenous Indian Ocean region-wide process of cooperation.
It is true that this area of the World, and of diplomacy, has not hitherto been the focus of Australia's international Outlook,
Which ha 5 Ej.:El CW tO OLIroorth and gas: North-WĖStaCTOSS til []E}{:T1 tPlE. F"#{{#if: [] associated with it
North-East Asiä, til North Arrerica - Our External atterti view this is hardly economic, political
nce of these regior perhaps also the re; is Were Australia foreign policy esta ntrated. However,
real interests, actu Indiar CDCean, andi rly- and no less Wi China.
Address by S Gareth EWarS Minister for India Interne New Delhi, 19
Cre Should OE, tle extent to which been neglected b extensive early CO Asian Sub-Continer |ink, ad hawe F through our mutua Tperial sports. We Carly years of posl in establishing the thefirstarld TOSt Su assistance ScherTE dediatorille Kashmir dispute, W Chief Justice of Lur appointment in 19 tions representativ stan, We hawe rilair in the concept of th ZСПЕ Оf Peace du far fruitless) yearso auspices on that to ntained good per SOLEH ASi: ||gader Others ese Where islands and littoral

An Australian Perspective
erwhelmingly focused t, TathET tham Westärld he Indian Ocean. It has
cean and the regions
- South-East Asia, e South Pacific and lät have Commanded on. From one point of
SLIPrising, giver The and Strateg|CİmpÖrtais to Australia - and ality that the east coast 's population (and its ablishment) is conce
Australia does have all and potential, in the ni South Asia particulaith India than, say, With
erator the Hon. QC, Australian Foreign Affairs, tional Centre, May 1995
of course, exaggerate this régic Ir has in fact y Australia. We had tacts With the South it through the Imperial lad Continuing links passion for certain Werre irriflL I Geritial, III ta -Colonial flationalism, Colombo Plan, one of ccessful development S. We Were active as early stages of the then Sir Owen Dixon, High Court, accepted 30 as the United Na3 for India and Pakitair higid a COS83 i'r terest 1g Indian OCEarl as a ring the long (and so discussion Lundef|UN oblic; and we have mlaSOrlal relatiol5 With S – ård i Liber of in the Indian Ocean -through the Commo
nWealth, Working very closely with India in particular during the long years of ca
Tipaigning against apartheid. However, if
trade statistics are any guide to the real intensity of relationships, the facts speak for their Odest Selves: in 1993 Australia's trade with India amounted to just S 1.3 billion - and with all South Asian COLntries together constituted just $2 billion, or 1,6 per cent of our total trade.
Notwithstanding that, Australia is an Indian Ocean nation, With considerable strategic and commercial interests in the region, Our trade with Indian Ocean coutries as a Whole in 1994 Constituted a more sizeable S 17.1 billion, or 18,4 per cent of our total trade. Our overall goal in discussing and advancing Indian Ocean regional policy is to ensure a stable and more prosperous Cooperative regional environment which provides the maximum scope for economic development and trade, and Where difficultiesare resoved peacefuly.
HOWVēr, tas bendific for Austrālia (or any other state in the region, for that Tatter) to bring any of its bilateral or Sub-regional Indian Ocean relationships Within a supportive regional institutional framework. Part of this comparative neglect of the concept of Indian Ocean regionalpolicyand regionalinstitution-building - an eur part, siad less than on that of others - is due to the fact that the Indian Ocean region is so diffuse. The orice "British lake' contains around it now a SCGre CrisTIOrë Of The W. States With little Or no apparent natural Contemporary cohesion. It contains, moreover, a variety of Sub-regions. Its ethic, Cultural and religious diversity is extraordinary, as is its economic disparity, not least when one extends the region - as one shouldto the Gulf littoral. It contains sovereign states ranging in size from India with over 900 million people, to Seychelles with fewer than 80,000 people. Econorities range in size from ower S US 250 bilion [t ar gur two countries, to less thar 5 US 400 Tillion for the Maldives and Comoros. Incorne lewels range from SUS 15,000 per capita in Australia and the United Arab Emirates to less than SUS 250 in Mozambique, Tanzania, Madagascar and Bangladesh.
11

Page 14
There hawe also Sometimes a risen, to DE frank Sharp difference-Sof wie Wärund the littoral on a range of international issues, including to do with global and regional peace and security. By and large, the Warious sub-regions around the littoral - Southern Africa, East Africa and the Horn, the Gulf littoral and the Arabian Peninsula, South Asia, the Indian Ocean portion of South East Asia and of course, LLLLLLKS LLLLLLaLaLLLLLLLaLLLLLLLaLLLL LLLLH affairs in the Indian Ocean region.
Indian Ocean Regional Cooperation: A Brief History
Before coming to whatever modern dynamics there may be to Support regional Cooperation in SLC1 a diffLISE regiori, we ought to remind ourselves that Indian Ocean régional Cooperation has also quitë ancierit foundations. For at least 4,000 years, the Indian Oceaп has been the scene of a thriving network of trade and people-to-people Iіпks Which, fог many centuries, gawe it a distinct regional identity. The World's earliest urban civilisations in the Middle East, the Gulf littoral and South Asia were linked by sea-borne COTT|lerce. The rise of LuTCrOuS e Tipiir ES acted as catalysts for the often rapid growth of trade and a complex network LL LCLLLL LLLLLL GLLLLLaL LLLL LLLaLLLL LLL MEditErrar Earl, the Indian OcEarl litlofal and the Western edge of the Pacific. Following this trade, peoples, ideas and beliefs spread throughout the Indian Ocean, leading to a cross-fertilisation of Cultures. Indeed, before the arrival of Europeans in the late fifteenth century, the economic, political and cultural world of the Indian Ocean was largely self-sustained and inter-Woven. The major stimuli for human movement and economic activity came from Within the region, and South Asian and Middle Eastern merchant diasporas spread from Mozambique to Souther Cll|rla,
As we all know, increasing European economic penetration - Spurred on by European commercial interest, which had changed by the eighteenth century front demand for relatively small quantities of the exotic (Spices and peppers, for instarice) to demand for large quantities of goods for mass Consumption (particularly textiles and tea) - combined with the decline of indigenous military power and the rise of great power rivalry to make the Indian Ocean an arena for European Co
12
mpetition. This led ti powers carving Out the Indian Ocean reg for self-sustaired Were-Brodedd Sthere ittra Word BtC))ri economies were res. to extra-regional ei most often as periph matBrialS fortleidu: NO. This tided to nalism that might oth during the colonial p
After the Second Wer riwalry was, foi persistent feature O strategic enwi rommer evolution of Cooperat ments, Security-rela The Indian OCEarl W years at least, Cons almost entirely in geo Wa5 EDECa LuSE it lieSat Ctill Of LľEE COI til topography is ideal Sub Tarine-based systems (at least tho: 1950s to the Early 1: Western World's pr Were and are still, l. its littoral, and its SL rried, and still carr
laterials and trade thë industrialised WO Sons, the Indian O. fundamental geo-s during the Cold War, We locations, a pi status devolvedupo and SOITE titles the region - for examp Socotra off Yelen. Eritish da OCEET rcia has been partic tE 19705 0 ||E UT in South-West Asia, pre-positioning, log El COITTL inición:
During this tijThe - the British presence subsequently. With a presence aimed, init tting Soviet ambitic Australia comforts balance-of-powerm Indian Ocean regior support for a Zone 1970s and subse

various European territorial empires in ion. Age-old sources ECOnomic Fictivities agion was integrated hy, and Indian Ocean tructured according conomic dynamics, eral suppliers of raw strialised areas of the fragmentany regioerwise have existed Brijd.
World War, Superpomany decades, a the Indian Oceal it, and inhibited the iwe regional arrangetEd and otherwise, as, in the Cold War ceived by everyone -strategic terms. This the strategic interseents; its underWater y suited for locating
strategic nuclear 5é in SérwiCE from the 380s); the bulk of the Duel Ci| IEEOLIICES Caled in recesses of rface WaterWay's ca, the Strategic raW products of much of rid. For all these realCarl Was accorded trategic ir portaCe Due to their respectiarticularly significant n many of the islands territories WiFi the le Djibouti, Reunion,
Tid, of Course, Ilha Territory: Diego Gaularly important SimCe ited States' strategy in terms of equip Tient istics, transportation
- prior to 1968 with "East of Suez", and growing US military ially at least, at offseIns in the region – bly accepted the odel of security in the I, notwithstanding our of Peace in the Tid quently, Particularly
under Labor's predecesSOr. Conservative govепment, Australiateпdedloseеіпthв. Indian Ocean instability and threat. In the Wake of the Sovietinvasion of Afghanistan in 1979, then Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser sought to attract greater US security interest in our strategic circumstances in the region: as is Well known, although the offer was not taken up, his Governlmért offérêd Cockburn Sound in Wéstern Australia as a homeport for United States naval Wessels at a time. When the United States was formulating its concept of a Rapid Deployment Force capable of ireWEgli il the Iridiä OCÈär littOTI.
The COld War Gr Wir OrlsTight Created a stalemate With regard to creative thinking about regional cooperation. This condition is Well illustrated by the protracted negoLLLLLL LLLLCL LLaL LLLLLLLGL LCCCL LLTLaLaa a Peace (ICOZCOP) proposal, which hawe been partly due to the difficulty in actually defining the Indian Ocean "zone", but more to the absence of any real consensus about basic objectives. The ICZOP proposal dates back to ideas originating in 1964 and to a Conference of on-algned states in Lusaka in 1970, which adopted at the urging of Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) a declaration calling upon all states to exclude from the Zone "great power rivalries and competition". The Whitlatl Labor Gover Tent took a positiWÈ : WiW (of the iritiativE, and ÉTSLJTËd Lur presence in the for LITs established to Considerit. Today, the UNAd HOC Cornirrittee, established in 1973 to consider the proposal, is no nearer its goal. While it has Citi Ēdel, itāS brī SālĒāli by the withdrawal from its deliberations of all Western states except Australia (We remain a wice-chair), and by differences of substantive wiews (often concealed within procedural arguments) armong regiomā| SitātēS.
Other regional consultatiwe processes Which have emerged more recently are thir OT the grO Lund, andra rrowly fCICLISEåd. There is no broad, inclusive grouping. The One regional Consultativebody embra Cing all of the major South Asian countries - the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) — does not hawe dialogue relationships with any outside countries, unlike the situation with dialogue partners in the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference, the Asia Pacific's most important political discussion body, Out of

Page 15
which has recently emerged the ASEAN Regional Forum. This does mot make SAARC Suited for carrying forward broader. Indian Ocean-Wide agendas, although its critical importance in enhaincing regional cohesion in and around the Sub-continent is value enough, Perhaps developing dialogue relationships is something the Countries of South Asia night wish to considerin future, particularly now that SAARC has gathered new momenumthis yearby acting to give substance and effect toits Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) by the end of 1995.
The Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), formed in 1982 as a result of a Corference in Mauritius with the general air in of fostaring economic development through regional Cooperation, has a membership confined to the islandentities of Mauritius, Madagascar, Seychelles, Comoros and Reunion. Whatever its early hopes may hawe been, it has not broaderedits reach and capacity to carry for Warda region-Wide agenda. The Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Cooperation Council (IOMAC) was initiated by Sri Lanka in 1985 and formally established in 1990 to provide a frameWork for dealing with Tarine resource, SCİĒTICĒ asid Ēl WirOfTTĒTiti SSLJES: Six Coutries are now for Ilal Ternbers (Sri Lamka, Pakistani, Mozar Tibique, Kernya, Indonesia, and Mauritius), but IOMAC has been slow to gather momentum, and it is not yet clear that it is an idea whose time HāS COIT,
The Basis for New Forms of Regional Cooperation in the Indian Ocean
So the tradition of formalised regional Cooperatior is rather Todest. There hawe been a number of recent changes, howewer, both in the region and externally, that may make the development of an Indian Ocean regional dialogue more of a proSpect now than it has been in the past. The emergence of the global economy and the global Tarket-place Tears that the Indian Ocean region will not return to S0The kirild of adlı Cilbert Be CrorThic Self-SLuffiCiency and internal cohesion. However, the economic revival and dynamism äpparent. In Some regional Economies (conspicuously correlated with the spread of market economic forces) and manifest potential for growth in intra-regional trade and Commercial interaction - coupled With the removal of Cold War-inspired
influences upon the ging an emergence COCpėration.
Three developm significant. First, th Wara d atterdants clearly removed as intra-regional Coo 5CE 1991 |dia F irTorSSiWE progräT ning of its econor T1) tion. And thirdly, S. Wg|COIT15 back irt: mmunity as a der potentially importar rtainly the sense
LETTER
J. R.’S Ch
J. R. haSchallering tiLunga to Cortest hii Electio" - tB C fwiew With "sca " every school child or seat in sold pu is really seeking is: d'OG5 notre Edt0 ch TE FLOTËT regard to the mann Cted the fäTOUS Taf the question of hQ opinion poll conduct WE.
Replying the pre: Ta Cterisation of Fir politicians' J. R. h. dirtiest of politician |lation-Wide electio my leadership didn Wide electio'.
This staterTGrt CE red. There is a cle, Why the U.N.P.Uni a single island-Wide hold a single pa election in the Ele he Was in power.
You cannot louse takeplace.
J. R. WOt: 198 having first takenth wing his most charis her civic rights. He

region - is encouraof interest in regional
ents are particularly e ending of the Cold шрегроwеггїvalгyhas significant obstacle to peration. Secondly, las eTibarked om a 1 of reform and opeto Outside participaLuth Africa has beer thig interlättilä | CC)- COCTEtic: 5tate artid a it regional player. Ceif community among
the Indian Ocean littoral and island states is still Weak when compared, for example, LO THE ÉCOJTiC did other ti55, that dľEW the Countries of the Asia Pacific together, and the Continuing difficulty of developing a dialogue on economic, Security or any other issues in the Indian Ocean region should not therefore ble LunderēStima lēd. Nevertheless, the prospects are now better than at anytime since the end of World War II for developing, in a low-key Way, Indian Ocean Cooperation, and it would be appropriate for inhabitants ofthe region to now start exploring more actively what might be possible in this respect.
(To be continued)
allenge
EPresident KuraraT1 ir "ad 1 isla Id-Wide ceptability of her inteday". An election, as krib WWS, is to airli Office blic body. What J. R. an opinion poll and he allenge the president, |Self. HC Wewer, hawing er in Which he coldETETLJITI tПЕТЕ W| НЕ W much Credence an led by him would recei
sident's reported chaT. E.S. "Le dires o ES Said: "If I ET FE show did win Tiary S? Te U.N.P. Le Old Seasingle island
innot be left unansweas and simple reason där J. R. did Tot ||0.55 Election: J.R. did not rliamentary general Ven years and more
elections that do not
2 presidential election Le precaution of de priSmatic riwal, Mrs. B. Cof alSO in TobiliSedler
ablest political adviser, Felix Dias, by depriving him, too, of his civic rights. To make assurance doubly suré, émergency laws Were passed Taking it an offence for persons deprived of their civic rights from SO much as supporting any candidate at the presidential polis. Wimming the presidential election in this Way Caribe Cor Tipared to beating MuhammedAli in the boxing ring having first shackled him hand and fool and blindfolded and gagged hiri. It Was not a perfor rance to be proud of.
As for the referendur, which, too, J.R. Won, it was according to the Commissioner of Elections, characterised by mass ir Il-personations and thuggery - GL Iris were brandished in polling booths by U. N. P. politicians and presiding officers threate
led.
J. R. held both the presidential election and the referendurn under emergency law in Contrast to the 1977 general election Which was under the normal law, Mrs. B. lifted the emergency long before the eleCLO.
If someone were seeking to substantiate the statement president is reported to have made about J.R. he could Scarcey hawe dore better that to cite thëse two deplorable "victories" which he won. One is bemused to find thern cited by J. R. in his own cause
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Page 16
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Page 17
Sri Lankan Farmers Vs. S
Kalinga Senewiratne
АшstгаЛалЈошrлаІІsfКаІІпgа Ѕелеv|- rafra Pyrkes fror Sri Larkas rige fагпілg heагїӀапd iп Galgаппшwа оп LLHHLHHL LaY LCLLLL LLLLHLLLLLLL L LLLLL LLLLLS sing to challenge the IMF's structural adjшstппелfроIIcles.
he election of President Chandrika
Kumaratunga and her Peoples Alliarice (PA) government has injected a new lease of life into this rice farming heartland of Sri Lanka. Although farmers here opertly express disappointment at the lack of action by the Six-monthold government to help solve their problems, their anger is increasingly been directed at the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
This area encompasses the ancient Sinhalese kingdoms of Anuradhapura and Polonnaru Wau, during which period Sri Lanka with its advanced hydraulic irrigation system was known as the "Gralnery of the East'. Today, the farmers here are fighting a do or die battle to make a living off the land. Thanks to the "Green Revolution' and more recently the IMF's structural adjust Tent programme (SAP), the rice farmers here are coming under increasing pressure to give uprice farming and transferto Cash Cropping Hke gherkins, peamts andtobacco for the export market. But, farmers are now questioning the advice giventothern bylocal agriculural officers and their foreign advisers, and are beginning to turn to the traditional farning of their ancestors in a bid to survive.
The agricultural policies forced on the government by the IMF and the World Bank have brought farmers to a stage where they hate farming' says Piyasiri Bulurmula, director of the non-gayeniment National Development FC Lundation's (NDF) district development prograTitle here. They are being taught thatrice farming is not profitable today in Sri Lanka, because, they can't take the type of hawest they used to take from one acre of
LMMMaa CL CCLLL LL LMMLLLLLSLLHLLLL LLLLtLLuuuS GCaLCMLS aCCLLLCLCL CCL LCLL LLLCLLCCLLLS He writes for the Inter-Press Service (IPS) news agerity arld leachles Development Journalism at the University of Technology, Sydney.
land. So governme sers tell them to gr. could be exported profitable'.
Bullumula argue not profitable here rnment has Syste SSiStäTC traditi Of and points out that land which Were ea wation under the M programme has по foreign transnation to grow gherkins f rice Fields Fla Webeel plaritation5.
|tis flot the lack Ol problem for farmer irti Creasir g COSt Coffa seeds and pestic these are always ge people who used in the fails don't They hawe been t: the hiring costs of SE SO LO SEES O adding that a majc dissillusta of government as: their produce.
In 1993, 11 färre PUWE COTTitted S could not payback their flawest. This preWİCLUS United Na WgsfTE's TLille 5:
İSSEL LO LIET IM policies. Over the farTloers FaWeg bigg! hawe disappeared red.
Thus it is nowle to feld for therlige ra, a remote farm krIEEES FOTO Jarl odhaya (people has set up a collect to Collect the prod
OW for sale, "Wha We Collected all th: farmers and gawe til that We Collected S. chillies or What We

tructural Adjustment
It officials and adviDW other crops which and thus be more
is that rice farming is
because the goveamatically withdrawn ally given to farmers th[]LJ83I1[]8 []Î 3CTES []f IIlarkgfrice Cultiahaweli development W begnitur Ted OWerto al Companies (TNCS) r export. Even some converted to gherkin
F. Water that is the main Sir the area, but the Tı İrıpuls like fertiliser, des. "The prices for Biring up andiri-addiliÖrı, ) h1éa W3 bJLI|IS t0 WOrk, hawe them am ymore. iught to LJŠe tractors, Which increase from Bulumula explains, Bir reason for farriers' is been the Withdrawal sistance in marketing
irs in nearby Polonnauicide because they their debts after Selling Wğ5S a refle:Cirri Cof Flege tional Party (UNP) goS Suppression of any Finspired agricultural last few years many arrested and Some Or, ha WEB EDESET TIL Jrd
ft to the poor farmers wees. In Maliyadewapuing hamlet about 20 äälliga "Tu Wa, the local as a Wakening) group Oncentre in the Village ICE and take it to the tWe did here Was that 2 produce of the local her in a receipt showing D many kilos of rice or r. The WE took it to
town and sold in the open market and gave money to the farmer explained M.G. Wijeratne, a member of the group. Their example of how to save the farmer from the Tiddle Tian FlaS er CC) Luraged Cother farmers in the area to for associations. There's already 9 such groups and very soon it will grow to 25 or 30' predicts Wijeratine.
However, Sarath Wickrelarate, Programme Officer of the Sri Lankan arm of Community Aid Abroad (CAA - an Australian NGO grassroot development aid agency-doesn't believe that the rural farmer could succeed in the long run Without government assistance. Howewer TLC the farmers mobilise to store their produce and fetchabetter price later, the question arises at Some stage as to Where to sellit. Without government inteLLLLLL S LLLLL L LLLLaHL C LLLLLLLHH aa LLL LLS Tiers problems. This I think is the reality in the Third World" he says.
Meanwhile the NDF and the CAA awe also opened up another frontin the mobilisation of the rice farmers. They are introducing them to organic farming techniques. While Wickremaratne admits that getting farmers to take up organic farming is like rehabilitating a drug addict, they HāWEE WEthele SS Tlet with Sofie reflärkable success judging by farmers' responSe to a pilot training scherine introduced by ther in recently.
G.K. Upawarisa founder of the Eco Conservation Organisation (ECO) and the holder of a postgraduate degree in agricuture, conducts a three day and one week training programmes for farmers, at his model organic farm in Nawalapitiya in the central hill country. "What we have learned for generations, we want to apply it back in the field' he explains.
During the last two years, assisted by CAA funding, Upawansa has trained over althousand people, "We train from farriers right uptoprofessors' he says, adding The number of professors who visit our farm has improved... for instance, the head of a training institute Once Said, that he Stil, can't understand why they are teaching what is being dare in other countries".
15

Page 18
Malkamthi Fulhiranage, a universitytralned Plant Cuarantine Officer With the Department of Agriculture, is now a convert to organic farming. She spends her Weekends and other holidays with the ECO, training farmers in organic plant protectior techniques. "We Hawe found over 35 natural pesticides in this area and in any forest area in Sri Lanka, at least 4 or 5 of these grow naturally she says.
Si Cefa TTTerShaWe bee LuSed to Chiemical fertilisers and pesticides, Puthiranage says that it is difficult to turn them arOUrld Straight a Way. Also, you hawe to be careful that once they start to use organic farming methods, their harvests are not reduced. "If that happens, the farmers may not accept organic farming," SHE Wä IF 15.
The farmers of Kellesiyabalawa, another rural hamlet nearby are taking up organic farming in a big scale after taking part in the pilot training project. "One of the reasons for taking up organic farming was the costs of chemical fertiliser and 5|50 til 5 di WdStatio oftB 5.Jill" Säid D.M. Karuna ratne, the President of the local Ja modhaya group. "We hawe been introduced to what is called Thodern Thethods but thēSÉ I are really Lunderdeweloped meHHHHLLLLSSSLLLLaHL LLLKLLLaaLLLLLLLaLLLL LLLLLL by Ourancestors Were more advanced'.
After WE) häWE|BH3 aby Luth W OUT ancestors farmed the land, What they used for farming, now We think that What We hawe been made to believe is a myth" added fellow Janodhaya member A.G. Jaya tilleka. "We Use chemical fertiliser and pesticides and poison the soil. If We don't go back to our ancestors' methods We will ourselves Erid up in the stail staigin'.
Jayatileka pointed out that last year, LLLLLLL LL LLLLLaLLL LaLLLLLLLaaaLaaLLLLLLL and acres of chillie plantations because no pesticide could kill the pests, "The reason is too much pesticides' he says, adding that every time a new pest appears, they find a new pesticide for it in the market. Observing that the chemical companies introduces a new product even before the pest arrives he says: "We are beginning to suspect a conspiracy ."Wםח
Jaya tilleka and his felloW farmers are now convinced that the Green Revolution technologies and the Mahaweli development scheme have only helped to destroy the self-reliant economic system
their ancestors have ECLrlornic, Hére's bE pmenteither' observ one thing is certain, ti developed. At the en see them buying 10 the money We shoul
Talking to farm grc clear that many oft realise that for their reed to make thers: on chermicalinputs. T[]0rations (TNCS) W. farmers have got a g agents and they adve radij апj EVET Gп Па field officers of the ag Faye ECO e B-a companies as Well. politicised farmers COWS in their own collect the cowdung growing Tore of the trees which they us Էյքftյrց:
In the first budget. in February the fertilis Ced. We asked O livelihood, local far a rECETilt COfTVE rt tO C. They can raise the
Or
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Er
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3 built i Lup. 'Not only enro social develoed Karunaratne, but la tradars Flere hawe dofewery season. We to 12 trucks, Tilt's d hawe got'.
ups in the area, it is hem hawe begun to Ing term Survival they Wesless de perdent The translational Co1ic SeltBSE to the OOdetwork of local artise heavily on rural til||tgl|Wigion. The |riculture department clo agents of these But the increasingly are now tying their gardens at night to or fertiliser. They are
COTipost producing E3 til CL-t a Lur
if the PA government er subsidy Was reduW this Will affect their her Wijerate who is Organic farming said: artiliser price further.
There's no problem at all. NoW, We hawe realised that we have enough fertiliser of OL OW OT OLIrlari.
To hear farmers say this is a big victory for us' says Wickremaratne, who argues that the main reason for this is that arriers can no longer afford the chemical inputs and they are looking for alternatives. "Realy this is not a new direction, its really going back to their traditional practices'.
"We Have Tore Gr IBSS Shaken the country within two years' claims Upawanasa and predicts, "in another two years time, it is the agriculture we promote that Will be adopted in Sri Lanka'.
Wickremaratne agrees that there's now a Whole pop Lular TowerTēnt of pÉCoples asSociations Working towards the goals of Colective action in the rural farming sector, But, if the PA government is notable to deliver on their election promises - which would mean challenging some of the IMF policies - Wickrellaratne is WOfried that this mobilisation may turn into a violent agitation against the government, as that which occurred with the JWP uprising in the South in the 1988-89 period, resulting in over 60,000 deaths.
- T. W. N. Fr.
ClOWI1S CallitOS - 12 Munich
le thing to be said sor CFLa FILberlaün
Fle d'idn't TouUlthis brol!
ric Lirds
Ling the Battle of Britair L. ICÉIL I Cally huis Class CITLICH It is solly OLight him to commit that act
Luis point (Irld To that
the Grace of Carterbury Lild" (Lie stopped History Lting him in the off repeated Tale
ΙHε Siπιαlefαπ, τΗία Μαπιίας, απα ΙHε
5 (rī
TU. KarLIII latilake

Page 19
PEOPLE, POWER AND POLITICS (3)
POitti Cian - Heal T
Dayalal Abeysekera
e Would like to propose that
the MPs take at least two of these seven days to visit oпsitethe погеіпроrtant development initiatives and have dialogue with the people who are either affected or benefitted by such initiatives, Once again, as wide a coverage over mass media should be given to such dialogue with a View to encouraging the questioning spirit and reinforcing the very eSSEICE of Civic Society. The Seine-TOnthly provincial sessions of the NP should seriously think of having a mobile national Secretariat running concurrently where all ministries/departments are represented and the people of that province could get
Fir Tittri ittriċi ).
Provincial Peoples" Commissions
It is also proposed that a continuously sitting Commission be constituted in each province of professionals of high calibre who will represent the people's will and Voice. Each recognized political party hawing at least one RP Within the provincial council will be eligible to nominate a maxiTUIT) of fOUT COTITISSiOners Wh0 W||| De drawn for their proven expertise in differet fields of activities as Well as for their record of public service. Some effort should be made to ensure that there is an ethno-linguistic balance between the commissioners nominated and the populations served by them. The Commission must have the capacity to function, trilngually in eachprovince. The Commissioners will have a dual role to perform. The people will be entitled to bring up their griewances of both an indiwidual and Socialcommunalnature Which Wilbe presented by th1e COITIrTıission to both the bureaucracy as well as the political machinery which will demand attention within a Specified period. The Second, and perhaps the more important role of these commissioners is to function as a pro-poor thirk CLurT1 . actiOrh tarhK. Th 3 re3SgrWbir of grievances of the people could function as potential stimuli for delving in-depth into the Sources of these community-based grievances and they Will be expected to formulate practicabile solutions to eliminate therm. Throughtheir closer links With the political parties, these proposed Solutions should recessarily find its Way into subseduEnt developmentagenda,
A special duty th: thĒSÉ COITTISSION monthly critical rew development initiati the province. This a || possible massբrTitant dialogue ar titled to CCCur. One Will conduct their I iпарагticularprovir Waluable EasЕ Та press for actional levels of power.
Locating Ministric
Yet TOT HE WOLld make is in Tinistries. Uriti│rlow pendent Sri Lanka äld froLF di ColÓT Writer dgES lgt S5 should not be dispo nine provinces. Aft TE TEt to SEWE do live in all miri e p (Why should it be Jaffna, Mäta Tä C: always to Come to Tatters attended Colombo is alway journey from horn Continual State of T ster hawington Lurse te (just like any oth in additionto persor duties, she begive to Work in his/here We propose that Under the purview situated in that pro hails. Likewise, th SSociated With ea be resident. Within t | dC mot See TLICH all (most?) publicsë ral State. This power elite of the O diferEntial dEVE these provinces an ry political and bu UPJOT POTESSUTE POC these elite begin t rsthand basis.thep teachers, buildings for their children, doctors and para prowincialWrural hos

hyself!
at Will be performed by Ers Will be a line aw of the full gamut of Wes Undertaken Within will be presented Ower -Imedia as a develold forum and Will be † WBek DefOľ8 til,8 MP line-monthly sessions ce. This could provide terial for the MPs to redress at the highest
S Provincially
a retical proposal We terms of locating the W ali Ministries liri in dehawe been situated im Tibo, Parsonaly, this 2e why the ministries essed through out the arall, these institutions the people and people rowinces of the Island.
that the residents of ir Morna raga la hlia We
Colombo to get their While the resident of s spared of this long a?) With the NP in a 1.obility, and each Tiiri= his particular electoraher RP), it is vital that Ting his/her Tinisterial la Tea Sorable CharlCe actorate as well. Thus, the ministries falling W cof any minister be WinCE from which she e entirë bureaucracy Chrslinistry Will have to lat particular province. I aprobler rinthis Since drwäfllsärêinatfälsfgwill at least push the Country to be mindful slopment situations in dbring in the necessara Lucratic Will to bear ints of action. When o experie rice On a filot-holed roads, lack of equipment in Schools Scarcity of medicines, Tadical personnel in spitals, lack of teleco
Tunication facilities pipe-borne Water, inadequate Sanitation facilities etc., the prOWir Ces arë bOLInd to réap a bOurtiful harvest of improvement in these areas due to the direct interwention of these elite on a personal basis.
National Panel Of Professional Expertise
Another commonly heard lament directed at the current state of political affairs in the country is the relative non-utilization of Wast reservoirs of human resource potential available within the country. More specifically, Why aren't the professional expÉrtise a wailable within the country hafflesse[] [[]. CCricewe, forTTlulalE!, plan and implement pro-poor development initiatiWes in a people and environment friendly Tanner? Sir Tilar to What We proposed at the provincial level, We propiose the establishment of a bank of such professional expertise at the national levelas Well who Will function on Call, as and when one's area of expertise is called into focus. The proposal is that each political party with at least two RPs in provincial councils nominate a professional of high calibre With a prowEn near-impeccable public service record for each of the ministerial Subjects dealt by the cabinet. For instarice, if a particular ministry is irrigation, power and highways, ther, there should be three professionals selected by each of the qualifying political parties for each of the subjectareas. These professionals can be nominated from Within the public Service, the corporate or private sector, the judiciary, foreign service, armed serv|- Ces or from those currently enjoying retirement. If they are currently in some situation of employment, such a person's employer will release the professional Cor Carried to the latio Orl a full-time basis (no pay leave) with no prejudice to the indiwidual CONCETTEd for the Entire duration of a particular assignment. During the period of assignment, the state Will prowide a good honorariu Ti to the professionals. If any political party Would like to oppose the nomination of a particular candidate on bona fide. grounds, they should file a case in an appropriate court of law and seek adjudication on the matter. It Will be obligatory on the part of the courts to deliver judgement on the matter within One month offiling the case,
17

Page 20
Thus, if aparticular issue is on irrigation, for example, and there are seven political parties qualifying to nominate professionals in a particular parliament, there will be seven experts looking into the issue from as many angles as possible. If a particular issue demands expertise from several disciplines, the need of the nation is to be fulfilled. The Cabinet Will set the ter ITIS of reference and areasonabletime period for undertaking investigations into the issue. At the penultimate stage of deliberations, the panel of professionals Will be called upon to present their recoTTendations and a debate should ensue among the professional wis-a-vis their points of disagreement over as many of the Tlass Tedia. The final reCOTTITendaLLLLLLL LLaLLa aaL Laa LaaLLLLLLLaH a points of divergence and dissenting notes to any aspects of the final report are to be encouraged if consensus is impossible to achieve. The professional nominated by the party in power will function as the chairperson and should strive to obtain a ConsenSUS on any point of disagreement. When this appears impractical, she should formulate the optimal consensus and request the dissenters to provide appropriate notes to be appended to the final report. The NP is expected to give Serijus ГЕСGgnition to these recommendations and the points of dissent and provide legal stature to these in the best interest of the latio.
Continuity of Supportive Role Played by Pradeshiya Sabhas in the Devolutiопагy Process
What of the Pradeshiya Sabhas? We feel that in the general thrust towards ushering self determination for the habitat (grarmarajyaya), the Pradeshiya Sabhas (PSS) will have a definite role to perform as it could further the devolution process of decision making and irriplerientation. However, the PSS should further strengthen the nobilization process of different ethno-linguistic and religious groupings as well as that of economic interest groupings. Provincial council electorates should not overlap across PSs and the RPs within the geographic area of a PS should coalesce to Work in cooperation LLLa LLLLL aaaLL a aLLLLLLLa aaK kLaHHHLHaS problems in the area. APS Seat should also not overlap across a provincial COLncil electorate and We proposa that there be 5 PS seats within a provincial council electorate, With approximately 3,000-4,000 voters to each seat. The RP and 5 PS members will be expected to function as the political core of change agents within the electorate and should strive their utmost to bury the petty party differences among themselves and Work
18
towards the gener: CostitutS.
DBfinste Tlächärll: OffL State PSS: in respect of work polars. The SaITE TE: nder Critéria Wa H should prevailin res nations to contest P. to the PSS should b 2 years from the da: provincial COLIITCilSE place after the neal been exercised. Sir thē prowincial CouTC are four years, the thus could be wie Wel referendum com Filė пce of the partу і prowide walUable in government to effe ttitirls,
Of PKS etc.
Perks for the repr at the Very minimur deter Tired Gr the si each proposal, Inre instance, We Would TTTErld Tore las F. member, a pick-up f be considered only The The TEEr Of El restricted constitue 4,000 people and a 20,000 voters. The Illing is mostly restric ctorate and or a r provincial Council. It PM W0 WF|| hawe til least on a monthly 4-wheel drive pajer. Should be provided t sentatives to purch eligibility at duty-fir installments deduct pay sheets so that One's tërhure of fol. hawe paid back at lE C.I.f. WalLJ3 Cof the W, could be paid outrig equal monthly inst the true ownership the person concerne We ceases to be COT option belirlig exercis Vehicle WilläUtoTäti government stores a paid back the moni the Vehicle on hispa fLjiel Erld Weicle riħa should also be porc Vehicles purchasad mot be p0SSible un ObjtäiľIEd.

betterment of their
STls for the allocation should be worked out ed Out development sidence, age and geWe proposed earlier pect of granting nonS seats. The elections E tid to CCCLUT after te of elections of the di Scheduled to take 'est recall option has Ice the tenure of both ils arld that of the PSS iming of PS elections Ed 35 83 kirildÖfrilational two years' performapower. This could outs for a concerned Cit Tid Course Corre
sentatives should be Til and at alltirTÉSBÉ Inctional necessity of Spect of tra risport, for be unable to reco| motorcycle for a PS ora RPanda Pajero il til CSE of EMP. PS as to serve a Cy of no Tore than חaחוז כוחםחח סח RP וחו lattear's official traWaited to Within the Elemonthly basis to the is the 50 MPs and the | tra Wel islād-Wide ät basis and herce, 51 35. Interest-free Carls o each of these repre3Se one'S Vehicle of ee price lewels and edmonthly on their by the end of each Іг увагs, they would last 75 percent of the rehicle. The balance ht or else paid in 12 allments whereupon Will be transferred to :d. If any representatie One due to the recall led by the people, the cally rewert back to the Indthe representative es deducted against y sheet. An adequate intenance allOWär]Ce Wided. Sale of such JIlderthi55Clelle W|| til true oWinership is
The bureaucracy too will be provided appropriate Wehicles under a Sir Tilar Scheme. Vehicle eligibility will be pre-determined according to functional necessity and responsibility attached to the position held and an interest-free loan provided which will be fully deducted on the pay sheet Within a maximum period of 8 years. Departments should possess an adequate pool of appropriate vehicles Which will be mobilized on the necessity of the terrain that needs to be Cowered Carl a indiwidual Wisitatiori basis.
Chances of Success for Adoption of "Heretical" Proposals
What are the realistic chances of these heretical proposals being adopted? If we are to take stock of the power wielded by the elite whether they be of the political, bureaucratic, mercantilist, religious or of any other dimension of Walid social status, the unequivocal answer Would be that these proposals are doomed to a stil birth. One can hardly find a social interest group Commandeering power of any social significance COTT Tiitting altruistic suicide om thë alter of social justice. But hope springs eternal in the human breast. The faintest of that glimmer of hope lies in the fact that though standing as the most unorganized sub-sector of society, the large majority of the people whose basic human rights are ridden rough shod over are the most lethal force in history that has precipitated changes of dramatic and significant stature. Undoubtedly these uphea walls hawe been few and far between. The question in our mind is whether at least a few 'enlightened" elite will perfor a historic role and give leadership to this social cleansing which is, to say the least, overdue. While most of us talk glibly of empoWerrilent in the economic real, we we in a blatantly repressive environment When We Scrutinise our political institutions, especially in terms of the functional Operationalization of these processes. With politics assuming the role of the most Critica instrulent Of individual and Societal liberation Within the comtext of the developing World, the rhetoric that most of US indulge in the day-to-day gesticulations assume cynically pathetic proportions of Self-deception. The Cardiñal question is if We have a Tongany of our elite, a hard COre of self-amalytical dynamism which is capable of standing up in the open and challenge all and Sundry to judge them for their performance rather than hide behind the weneer of What they hawe inherited. Proponents of many a heretical thought hawe also been incurable optiTlists. Perhaps this writer is no exception TOLETLE.

Page 21
It is the basic contention of this writer that the violence that has conspicuously escalated during the course of the last three decades is a joint function of the growth in aspirations on the one hard coupled with the growth in the non-realizability of same. These two potentially non-reconcilable processes give rise to a perception of denial of what is legitimately due. Within a developmental context where no magic Wands are available to be Wawed and utterances of abacadabra are incapable of unleashing the genie of mass prosperity, a more promising option to prevent a holocaustic catastrophe of an explosive kind is to bring in as many of those Who feel har Instrung by the "derial syndrome' within a sincere embrace of participatory social justice. There just might be a fighting chance of success for an Equally poterit perception of CONSCie= ntious participation to overcome the destructive forces of fission unleashed by a devastating perception of denial. It is this optimism that We Would like to belabour i 5 iter-Sts of a STOLET tri Sitio
SRI LANKAN CONFLICT (5)
of our society. Which at a point of no retur
T3 SO||Luter tot which has been high problem' does not, a political package NOrtheast aloré. Il Which is eminently length and breadtho |ly meaningful to the ple who are politica Without access topo nage. The Lultimateg mode of representa be to facilitate the dual within Society stake indefining one ty and to make awai operandi for a chie', denial of this basich majority of people absolute mockery . practiced Within Sr other developing na 3 dg TJ Crati trad
Balan Ce Of POVVer
Humayun Kabir
orging relations with the countries
Of ASİä WĒIS ar Čolher St Tard of Sri Lanka's foreign policy. After the British withdrawal of military bases from Sri Lanka, Bandaranaike's government accorded a high priority to a regional balance of power strategy. He genuinely attempted for an enlarged Colombo Powers organization, to be established in Colombo, to jointly voice their common concerns. Having received Scant response from the potential members of the proposed political Organization, Bandaranalike repeatedly called in 1958 and 1959 even for regional economic conferences to be called to deliberate on various regional economic problers, and devise Tears to overcome ther to the Tutual benefit of a concerTed. Although these attempts Were mot Crowned with SUCCESS, the essence reTaliri-S that 3 Trade effOrts to readreSS tie balance against India through seeking a regional counterpoise,
As part of its regional balance of power strategy Sri Lanka also attempted to forge close relationships with India's rivals, such as Pakistan and China. In the Context of Sino-Indian power rivalry in Asia, China appeared to Sri Lanka as a natural coшnterbalance to India. Under Prile Minister Sirima W0 Bandaranaike Sino-Lanka rela
tiOS 5 Came ITTE E pւյrբOSa-ճriEritted,
An apprehensive nger from India cont foreign and Security ranaike's governme ke, Parliamentary S daranaike, Stated i Lanka's Security did upon goodwill towe tOWärlds||dia asli äi Will never get ir India." Writings: of Nehru, Panikkar, Indian leaders and ( nued to be quotec Parliament, as the Sri Lankam leaders So, from a strategic importance to Sri L. COTSideraboli. Sri Lä its trade relations. Wit and rubber, the isla and export cornrod
In the light of th Compulsions, MSE her good offices to Sino-Indian border October 1962 andre as the aggressor,

appears to be almost
.
hê Current impasse lighted as the 'ethnic in our opinion, lie in of devolution for the must be a package applicable across f this Island, especiavast majority of pedly marginalized and tentSour CeS 0f patr0Qal of this pro-people tion package should eans for every indivio hawe am equitable 's desired social reali|able réalistiC T10 d'US /ing same. It is the uman right to the large Which has made ar. if the democracy as i Lanka (and many tions which boast of ition). The operant
Exten Siwe, Cordial and
ness of potential daLed to Condition the policy of Mrs Bandaht. Felix BaddriaSecretary to Mrs BaIl Parlament that Sri not "depend merely irds and friendliness r1 assumption that We to difficulties. With and pronouncements Appadorai and other pinio Takers COntii Г ПЕ Sri LafikaП isÉi still contributed to " threat perceptions. point of view, China's aflka COntinued TO De kafurther developed h China involving rice ld's two major ಗ್ದಗೆ ities respectively."
B abQWE wiews änd
Eldartike of TETE
Seek aned to Ele War that broke Out in fused to brand China stead, she took the
system is basically an oligarchic stranglehold on power by a microscopic minority of elite which is dressed up as a 5-star democracy through the exercise of universal suffrage at regular intervals. That suffrage loses its potent as soon as it is exercised is conveniently lost sight of.
These heretical proposals made by us is a first step towards transferring power back to the people. It is also attempting to recreate the representative of the people in the role of an ascetic who has renounced one's Crawings for Worldly aggrandizement and derives one's satisfaction through deliverance ofone's pegple to their promised land, a far cry from what it is as practiced today. In fact, what We are trying to say is, "Politicians heal thybody politic! Establish rules and regulationStorestrain your excesses and build up a syster of rewards and punishments that are regulated by your masters, the people."
Concluded
initiatīWE in Surin Toning the Colombo coinference of six non-aligned nations with a view to exploring Ways and Tears of bringing India and China to the conference table and Settling the boundary dispute. The proposals which emerged from this conference, together with their clarifications, Were personally explained in Peking by Mrs Bandaranaike and Subandrio of ndonesia in January 1963, and in New Delhi by her and representatives of Egypt and Ghana the same month.' India accepoted the proposalsim toto, while China did So with reservations. Although no conCrete achievement resulted from these proposals, Mrs Bandaranaike's initiative displayed her skillinavoiding giving offence to India While not Condemming China as the aggreSSOr.
Sri Lanka's relations. With China Were consolidated with the signing of a Maritime Agreement on 25 July 1963 between the two Countries, granting each other the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status. But Mrs Bandaranaike's government did not accede to the request of the Chinese Counterpart that Sri Lankashould use only ships by China for Sino-Lankan trade. What follows from the above is that Sri Lanka's policy of building a courterpoise against India is not to be at the
19

Page 22
expense of the island's national interests, and that the counter-balancing strategy should not be made too obvious to jeoparidise Colombo's friendship with New Dehi. This is the essence of the pilot fish policy.
Pakista ad i Sri Lāka ad COTTO threat perceptions as far as India Was Concerned. Sri Lanka looked upon Pakistan, a country which had the will if not always the means to challenge India's predominance, as a countervailing force against India. That explains why during the Bangladesh crisis in 1971 Sri Lanka was not so sympathetic to the cause of Bangladesh; the island-nation was opposed to an eventuality of Pakistan being dismembered. Following India's ban on Pakistan's overflight of its civilian aircraft, which transported Pakistani troops in civlian disguise from Karachi to Dhaka, Sri Lanka granted air transit facilities through Colomb to Pakista'S COTTETCial aircraft. Such Sri Lankan posturing indeed offended Indian susceptibilities. Under Such changed regional circumstances, Sino-Lanka relations acquireda more prominent role in Colombo's strategic calcuILUS. RelatiOS betW E3EI til EtW 0 Coultri:35 during Mrs Bandaranaike's United Front government (1970-77), therefore, becaTie Closer than Ever before, Ilolwith Stainding China's suspected complicity in the 1971 Guayarist insurrection of the JVP i Sri Lanka.o*
Nonalignment as Security Strategy
The nomaligned foreign policy of Sri Lanka has been another Tajor plank of hersecurity strategy since 1956. Although Bandaramaike's normaligned foreign policy was not always to the liking of the West, it was generally intended to ensure Security for the small island state by keeping itself aloof from both power blocs. With respect to India, Sri Lanka's nomalignment also served as a diplomatic instrument which was used to avoid provoking its northern neighbour. At the same time, this policy was intended to be pursued as a security insurance, as the island's meImbership in the Nona ligned Movement (NAM) was conceived as abroad security unbrella. This security dimension of Sri Lanka's membership in the NAAM Was highlighted by Mrs Bandaranaike herself in the NAM summit at Lusaka in 1970.".
Delilitarisation ald Peace in the Indial O'Cea E5 E GLIF atce Of Sri Lanka's Security
Due to its strategic location Sri Lanka has always been aware of dangers to its independence and security that may emaräts fröff the Indian OCEarl area. All the colonial invasions since the early 16th century by the then major European sea powers, such as Portugal, the Nethe
20
rands and Great Eri Indiari Ocean. In addi! powers, India, with its i taldia (OCBail TE a major Source of CC The British military pr: the 1950s acted as these perceived SOU Superp0WerpreSence Since the 1960s a ghtened the tension then demilitaising the guaranteeingреасеі a majorforeign and SE WE of Sri Laka, Sri L: policy has, therefore harici, to for TOWE, förČi from the area, partic
Tiponent, and to ensl. the resultant'power W. by a regional power. of this policy objective ntly shared by India, against its own Inc. symbolising a gap in tēvē dā rīd S.
| CCT 1971 F Minister, Mrs Band: bogfore the UN GENE sent the COPZ propi dOWI for the first time would meanin detail. was being consider COrittee tiere ar. tween the positions ol Sri Lanka's Proposalli SIWE IS i related a: forces of the littoral st of the outside poW against the Tilitary powers only. Followir pressures from India nghe, Sri Lanka's pel tiwe to the UN, a CCDr his proposal "...in de ctions expressed by December 1971, the passed the resolutio the OZOP, the tionsor this ISSLJe, Irl Isidias! Cliceas area E So Sri Lanka, Sri La ntually grew lukewart tion of its OWI brain proposal. This inhibit Wis India, combire dW emergence as more of the break-up of P the creation of Bangl: Colombo's softening Wards the West, part
Sri Lanka's fear nger When the latter May 1974 With a SUCI a nuclear device at F til St, TE ET poWer from among LF rall State Shadra di Call

tain, Cale from the ionto extra-regional Strategic aspirations agion, has also been ir Cerri to Sri Lalka. gis:Esslice of the island is a deterrent to both rCeS Of threat. The in the Indian Ocean di Considerably hei
in the area. Since Indian Ocean and the area has been acurity policy objectika's dia (OCEa beеп, оп the one gn military presence larly its nuclear coIre, Crh thE: {JthÉr, that ECULI'Waslot filled
While the first part |a5 EEE CONWETTEhe second part Went dian Ocean policy, Security perceptions ri Lanka.
ig , Sri Lakan Pri Tig агапаike, appeared "al Assembly to preSal. Here she laid what the peace Zone When the proposal ed il the UNIFirst Se differelCes beSri Lalkaard India. was fairly compreheTuch to the lawal atas a5 0 tille forCES ES.ELL di S resence of external behind-the-Scene o Shirley Amerasi"manent representadingly had to Todify ference to the restriCur Critig5."* On 15 General Asser Tıbly n on the proposal of COUTS 3 Cf delibėradia's intentions in the le came Crystal clear kan therefore, eWemto the implementaC||C – TH18 |OZOP on of Sri Lankavis-a- | B fi: C | I |35 powerful as a result akista 1971 ald HdE81 CGIllfibLIlE[[[0 of its attitude toicularly the USA.
diabGCITEStrOWeltruclear on 18 CSSL dētūāti of Pokhran in the RajalE:rgençë Ufa IIUClEar he Indian Ocean littoy changed the strate
gic landscape in the Indian Ocean. Consequently, the context of the IOZOP propoSal also changed after 1974, and Sri Lanka for Tally changed her position regariding the IOZOP vis-a-vis that of India. For example, Shirley Amerasinghe stated in the First CollTittee that "We do lot Wärt any great power there. By the sametoken, Wg do flot interld LHät Wg SFOuld drive Out Salarly Beelzebub and allow sole other powers Within the group of littoral and hinterland states to take the place of the superpowers." He had also stated on 11 NJWEITEjer 1974 that "if a gwW LICET power were to emerge in the Indian Ocean region, the de nuclearisation and also the dĒTiilitärisätiön of thë ai fa WÖLuld bČ Sriously jeopardised." Because of her concerns ab Out India's Indiari CCCarpolicy, Sri Lanka gawe her support to Pakistan's proposal in 1974 for a nuclear free zore in South Asia, and with the further mellowing of her attitude towards the West she permitted more US ships at Sri Lankan. Sri Lanka's Indian Ocean policy is, therefore, concerned not only with the Outside powers but also with the ambition and power of India.
To be Corsinued)
իվըtքs
00S S LLLLMLMT aHHOLS LMMHLS 0 LKLOLHHLHHLuuuLLL 000S Times of Ceylon, 14 November 1956. The StatesITiari, New Delhi, 15. November 1956. 00LS 0LLL L0SS CCLMLLGLGMMC S CCLLLLLLL GHMMHu LMMMM0S Information Division, Department of Broadcasting GMM MMLMLLLLMTS LLLCGMMLLLLLL LLLLCLLLSCLLMMHaS 1951.pp. 419, 413,455. 57. Ceyloni: HLR, Deballess, Wikil, 53, 29 August 1953, Col.
1յլք:
00S LLLL CLLLLLLLLKS LCMMML LLLL LLLCCLS L LKLS 0S 00 January 1954, Col. 2373; Siriwardene, ibid., Wol. 19, 21 January 1954, Cols, 11-13. 59. SEE for details, F.R.D. Bandarama'ke, Ceyloni: H. R.
DEbates, Wol. 4:9, F NIWEITıber 1952, Čl. 2112. EO, For interesting details of the mediation process see LCCMM LLOLOLLMLS MMS0aLMaH LLLCLLSS LMLMaLL LCCLSLLLLLLS London, 1972, pp, 459-55. LSS CL LMMSLCLLLLCS KLS SLCCCMCCC LLLLL CLLL LLLLLLMMH
Daily News, Colombo, 16 March 1963. Ceylon Daily NES, ColorTibo, 2 May 1954. Mrs Bandaranaike Was luck to diamis the alegation of any Chinese cortiplicity by stating in a broadE[5 ErEntit וו[IhalifEiחרaiiחthBםastlם LLLLLLLLlLLLLLLL L LL LLLLLLH aLLLLkLL LLtttLL LLLLLLLLDS Columbo, 25 April 1971; Cylon: Serials Debates, 1972, Wol.32, Col. 823, L0S LLLLL LLLaLLL LaLaLL a LLLLLL LGGauHLH KuL
Ceylon on the Lusaka Address of Mrs Sirinawa Bandar EmilEik B, SELEITEEr 1-?), p. 2. L00S LaTLaL LLukLkuCCS LLLLS 00S 0sLLHHLLMaaLS LLLLL 000KS
pp. 13-14: Ceylan Day NEWS, 13 Deliber 1971. GES, Philip Towle, Nawal Power in the Indian Ocean: Threats, Blulls and Fantasies. The Strategic and CCLLLLaC CLCMLLLTLLLLLLLLSS LMLLMLLLMLCLaLaaHkeS rsity, Canbefra, 1975, pl, E7. UN First Cornrittee, 1834 Meeting, 23 November
1971. BB. Cllicial Records of the Général A33Hffby (GÄCH), 25th Sessiri, Suppljinefit 29, Resculiari 2B32 XXVI, 16 Decgrt ber 1971, pp. 36-37. LLLLLS LLL aTMLLLLMLMCS LLesL KLLaS LSKS 00000S LLLkOEeS
Tibēr 1975, 3,
70, UNDo: AGPW, 2015, p. 12.
蠶

Page 23
s
Why there's sc in this rustici
There is laughter and light baiter Titlist the:
rural di TT1:sils ĻĻho arg2 : List; Sorting put kåCCI) leaf in a bir TI, IT IS, CITIE: If the hundreds of such
barns spread tytut in thị: Tid artici Lipmuntry LLLLLLLLH KLLK HuuLLLLLL LlL aBLaLlL uLLLLL LLLLHa LS dallimi, di Iring the Coff 5:2:15 Cor.
Here, with careful nurturing, tobacco grows Fis a LLLLeOLL LLL LLLLCHC HLL LHLHL uuuLGLCL LtgtLLLLLaL LLLLLLLHHL L gold, to the value of Jir Rs. 250 million or more annually, for perhaps 143,000 rural folk.
 

ENRCHING FRURAL LIFESTYLE
und oflaughter tobacco barn.
Tobaccan is the industry that brings er TıployTIEmil tra
hic scienci highest numbe T uf people. Artici ThE:52 people are the colbarra barr, IowTiers, thia' trab.: CCC growers and those who work for the IT, on the land ariri irl, the barms.
For thern, the tobacco leaf means rearingful work,
a carnfortable hife àTird a ocure futura. s. FC
rough reason for laught ET,
CeylonTobacco Co. Ltd.
Sharing and caring for our land and her people,

Page 24
PEOPLE
Celebrating T
C
Dynamic
In 1961 People's Bank ventured out in the of only 46... and a few hundred Customers
Today, just 30 years later
People Resource exceeds 1 Customer Listings at a sta Branch NetWork in exCeSS
in Sri Lanka
In just three decades People's Bank has g in the Sri Lankan Banking scene. Their spec resources at their Command dedicated
dedication that has earned them the title
PEOPLE'S BANK
Banker to the Millions

'S BANK
Three DeCades
f
: Growth
challenging World of Banking With a staff
0,000 ggering 5.5Million of 328, THE LARGEST
rown to become a highly respected leader ;tacular growth is a reflection of the massive to the Service of the Common man - a
"Banker to the Millions'