

LANKA

3

# GUARDIAN

Vol. 18 No. 4 July 1, 1995 Price Rs.10.00 Registered at GPO, Sri Lanka QD/33/NEWS/94

## WINNING THE WAR

— *Mervyn de Silva*

## STRATEGIC FACTORS

— *Humayun Kabir*

## THE IPKF EXPERIENCE

— *K. M. de Silva*

---

## PROVINCIAL COUNCILS

— *Neelan Tiruchelvam*

## FEDERALISM

— *V. Thirunavukkarasu*

---

## JAMES JOYCE

— *Regi Siriwardena*

## EXTRADITION

— *Pearl Thevanayagam*

---

## INDIAN OCEAN SECURITY

— *Gareth Evans*

## SMALL ARMS AND SOUTH ASIA

— *K. Subrahmanyam*

## CRICKET THE M.C.C. WAY

— *Teresa Mclean*

*WITH THE BEST COMPLIMENTS*

*OF*

**ELEPHANT HOUSE SUPERMARKET**

QUALITY AT AFFORDABLE PRICES

NO. 1 JUSTICE AKBAR MAWATHA

COLOMBO 2.

## BRIEFLY...

### Visit Lanka

The *New York Times* has urged Americans to visit Lanka. In a one-and-half page spread in its Sunday Travel Supplement the prestigious 1.5 million circulation newspaper says that visitors (who don't read the local papers) could come and go and know almost nothing of the war. The illustrated article says that the variety in the island is "stunning".

### Gallows again? No decision

No firm decision has been made to resume the hanging of death row prisoners, Justice Minister Professor G.L. Peiris has told Amnesty International, following a successful private member's motion in Parliament to reactivate the gallows which has not been used for many years.

## SUBSCRIPTION RATES

### Air Mail

Canada/U.S.A.

US\$ 65/ for 1 year

US\$ 45/ for 6 months

\* \* \*

U.K., Germany, New Zealand, Australia, Netherlands, France, Japan, Holland, Phillippines, Austria, Norway, Sweden, China, Ireland, Switzerland, Nigeria, Belgium, Denmark, Paris, London.

US\$ 55/ for 1 year

US\$ 35/ for 6 months

\* \* \*

Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia, Dubai, Baharin, Arabian Gulf, Syria, Singapore.

US\$ 45/ for 1 year

US\$ 25/ for 6 months

\* \* \*

India, Pakistan.

US\$ 40/ for 1 year

US\$ 22/ for 6 months

\* \* \*

Local

Rs. 250/- for 1 year

Rs. 150/- for 6 months

## DUNF wants Presidency out

The Democratic United National Front (Lalith Faction), a constituent partner of the ruling People's Alliance, wants the government leadership to discuss with it a time frame for abolishing the executive presidential system. The PA had earlier pledged to scrap the system by July 15, but indications now are that this deadline will not be kept.

## Plantations stir again

Hill country estate workers are being prepared for a token strike scheduled for July 11. A Joint Plantation Trade Union Centre spokesman said that this would be followed by "other agitational tactics". To win wage increases and other demands.

The JPTUC claims to represent 19 unions but the largest plantation union, PA Minister Thondaman's CWC is not participating in the campaign.

## Monks join army

Two young Buddhist monks in yellow robes joined an army recruiting centre queue and were selected. They signed up with the Second Gemunu Regiment at the Galle Fort in their original names, shed their robes and went into military training. "We are doing it to protect Buddhism; there is a threat to the country and to the religion," they said.

## Tigers raise war fever

The LTTE is whipping up war fever in the North while urging Tamil political parties who support the government to stop doing so.

The pro LTTE Jaffna daily *Udayan* said in an editorial that all Tamil parties in parliament should withdraw their support to the government, while the LTTE's official organ *Eelanadham* accused western nations that support the government of "helping to wipe out the Tamil nation from the North and the East."

## SLMC wants territorial army

Sri Lanka Muslim Congress leader M.H.M. Ashraff who is also Minister of Shipping, Ports, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation in the PA government wants a territorial army in the North and East. He told the state controlled *Sunday Observer* that he would recommend this to the government as a means of releasing the regular army from guard duties in these areas for full time action duty on the battle front.

The territorial army could be deployed to protect civilians in the North and East, he said.

## Tigers warn of July attack

The LTTE has alerted the people of Jaffna to prepare for a major attack by government forces in mid-July. The LTTE has recruited 5000 additional cadres to meet this attack, according to reports from Jaffna, quoted in the *Sunday Island*.

## LANKA

# GUARDIAN

Vol. 18 No. 4 July 1, 1995

Price Rs. 10.00

Published fortnightly by  
Lanka Guardian Publishing Co. Ltd.  
No. 246, Union Place  
Colombo - 2.

Editor: Mervyn de Silva  
Telephone: 447584

Printed by Ananda Press  
82/5, Sir Ratnajothi Saravanamuttu  
Mawatha, Colombo 13.  
Telephone: 435975

## CONTENTS

News Background	2
Extradition and Eelam War 3	4
Federalism	5
Devolution of Power and Provincial Councils	7
Sri Lankan Crisis (4)	9
The Menace of Small Arms	13
Indian Ocean (3)	15
Sri Lankan Conflict (6)	17
Joyce	18
Cricket	20

# THIS TIME WE CAN WIN...

Mervyn de Silva

The burden has proved far too heavy, the strain too severe. And the cabinet too inexperienced, its good intentions simply not good enough. Besides, the diversity of opinion, often an asset, could prove a liability when a 8-party coalition has been forced to wage a war against a formidable enemy — the Liberation Tamil 'Tigers' led by a remarkably gifted commander, Velupillai Prabhakaran.

And so President Chandrika Kumaratunga, well past six months in office has to accept a term-end report that is far from encouraging. A pity.

Take the issue of PRESS FREEDOM. In opposition, the P.A. and its NGO partners, the creatures many of them of what is styled 'The Washington Consensus', have now to live with a rather rude reminder from the President of the International Federation of Newspaper Publishers (FIEJ), of the P.A.'s "election pledges".

"On behalf of the Federation I must protest against the proposed censorship, and respectfully urge you to take every step necessary to ensure that no form of censorship is imposed on the Sri Lankan press" says FIEJ President Prescott Low. "In a separate case I must also strongly protest against action taken by your government against Upali Newspapers Ltd. Colombo. Complete and unrestricted press freedom as promised in your election pledge is a pillar and precondition of democracy". The FIEJ statement says that the government's "ban on the continuation of the construction of a building which was to house a new

rotary press for the group" could be seen as an act of "revenge".

Taking note of the appeal to the Supreme Court by the Upali newspapers the FIEJ President warns that " 'limitations' on the fundamental right will only damage your country in the international community". The threat on "Press censorship" on material that is "ethnically oriented" came from Media Minister Dharmasiri Senanayake.

In the meantime, a single question concentrates the mind — the mass mind as well as the mind of the opinion-making elite. Can we win the war? Is this the last chance? Colombo has isolated the LTTE, the P.A.'s top advisers, civilian and military as well as its international and DPL advisers, have noted with satisfaction. This isolation has been possible because of the Tamil political parties from respectably parliamentarist TULF to former militant EPDP, EPRLF, PLOTE etc. The Tamil middle class in the South, probably a much larger community than its counterpart in the North-and-east, has become pro-P.A. openly. (The Rajan Hoole phenomenon, as against the Dr. Sathanathan position).

The Army has been given a simple order — wipe out the 'Tigers' — and Deputy Defence Minister Anurudda, Ratwatte, the President's uncle is now in charge. The Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank and the Treasury, have had to accept a new 'structural adjustment'. Forget the peace, and the peace dividend, and adjust to the new realities. We have a war on.

And so, Professor G.L. Pieris, the deputy minister of finance and P.A.'s, all-weather pundit, was ordered to convey the sad tidings to the "peace constituency" and the masses. Back to the battlefield, friends, Sinhala, countrymen .... and five new measures, I am afraid, to raise 4.5 billion (about 90 million US dollars) to buy arms, recruit more men, and fight the good fight to defend the unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. (4,000 out of an estimated 25,000 deserters have returned).

The isolation of the LTTE in the larger Tamil constituency, here and overseas, the almost unqualified support of the U.S., the E.U., Japan and other donors, and the active involvement of a Rao regime, pressed by Sonia Gandhi, Chidambaram and Co., the Indian navy's stricter surveillance in the Palk straits, Israeli expertise etc are the more striking features of the new strategy of the P.A.. So can we defeat the secessionist Tamil Tigers? Or will they fight on? And one bright morning announce the new State of Thamil Eelam?

Even a casual reading of the four main English-language newspapers published Sunday confirms that this question is now the ruling elite's principal preoccupation. The top crust businessmen and professionals have sent their children and grandchildren abroad — to Britain or the US, Canada or Australia, where many are already well settled.

If many a tea or coconut plantation-owner, banker, surgeon or lawyer opts to stay at home, it is an entirely new mind-set that explains their critical choi-

ce: the perception that "this time we can win the war".

Chandrika Kumaratunga and her runaway (63 per cent) victory in the November presidential polls has shaped this dominant psychology, at least among the business and professional elite. The 63 per cent can only be explained in terms of minority voter behaviour. The Tamils living in the south, the Christians and Muslims in Buddhist (70 per cent) Sri Lanka recognised in Chandrika a candidate totally free from Sinhala chauvinist pride and prejudice.

In terms of tactics and strategy in this low-intensity conflict based on ethnic identity, the victorious candidate could take the moral high ground (she was no "racist") and isolate the violent extremists (The Tamil Tigers) since she had the parliamentary-democratic majority of the same Tamil community on her side. To strengthen her position further, President Kumaratunga had two other influential communities on her side — the local business community which prayed for political stability, and the international community, including the US, the EU, major donors like Japan, powerful neighbours like India, and agencies like the IMF and the World bank.

And yet today, barely seven months after her splendid victory, the Kumaratunga presidency is under siege. The "peace candidate" has to go to war. Far from disbursing a large "peace dividend", she has to place new burdens on the consumer. Professor G.L. Pieris has announced five new measures to raise Rs 4.5 billion to support the "war effort" till the end of the year. These include a one per cent rise in the defence levy.

The vast majority of Sinhalese voters may recognise the urgent need for enhanced defence spending and accept the burden, but on one condition: the government must win the war. These new

sacrifices can then be justified. This is the shared psychological response to the government's recent announcements.

**Can the government win this war?** Two eminent Indian analysts, one an IPKF general and the other an Indian scholar who has specialised in Sri Lankan affairs, think it can. But many Sri Lankans do not agree.

After the Jayawardene-Rajiv Gandhi "peace accord" of July 1987, General Ashok Mehta, who recently retired from the Indian army, was in charge of Indian Peace-Keeping Force in the island's Eastern province. Though the Jaffna Peninsula and the Northern province comprise the Tamil heartland (and the LTTE's main operational base), the Eastern "theatre" is, in a way, more strategic because of its explosive ethnic mix. And this is, after all, not just another war but an **ethnic** war. The Tamils constitute 42 per cent of the population in that province, the Muslims (Tamil-speaking) a third, and Buddhist Sinhalese the rest. Besides, the east is excellent agricultural land, whereas fishing is the main vocation in the arid north.

"[Velupillai] Prabhakaran is not the supremo he is made out to be," General Mehta said in an interview with the *Sunday Leader*. "There are people in the organisation who do not agree with him and under such circumstances in a guerrilla force there are bound to be pulls and pushes, and at some point of time in the very near future, they can quite easily pay for it."

Asked whether the LTTE will break up, General Mehta said Prabhakaran was a fighter par excellence, but did not have the "qualities of a politician". He was guided and tutored by theoretician Anton Balasingham and the LTTE's political wing. "He will remain a guerrilla leader as long as he is in the picture," the general added. The most significant

contribution made by General Mehta is on the critical issue of jaw-jaw vs war-war. He believes that a Sri Lankan government led by a personality like Chandrika Kumaratunga should not be provoked; the task before it is to prove to the Tamils of both North and East that its young new president "is carrying the military with her" in the endeavour to establish peace at any cost.

The former head of the Sri Lankan air force, Air Vice-Marshal Harry Goonetilleke, has a somewhat different view. His son, an SLAF officer, was one of the 92 servicemen who died when the LTTE used surface-to-air missiles for the first time to destroy two British-built Avros. In a letter released to the Press, the former SLAF commander reminded Deputy Defence Minister Anuruddha Ratwatte (the president herself holds the defence portfolio) that he had another son in the air force. Demanding a rigorous reappraisal of military strategy and strict "accountability" for battlefield reverses, he proposed a think-tank or planning committee that could mobilise all professional experience.

In an extraordinary exercise in soul-searching, Neville Jayaweera, retired civil servant and ambassador, has relied on his experiences as a government agent in the North and East — now strife-torn once more as the Tigers have slipped back into the East while talking peace to President Kumaratunga and her well-intentioned, if gullible, peace negotiators. Jayaweera identifies two basic mistakes. First, the assumption that the LTTE is the only voice of the Tamil people. The second, and more serious, error identified by him is the belief that the ethnic issue is reducible to the question of winning the fight with the LTTE. "Even if we annihilate the LTTE, the issue will remain," he argues.

(Continued on page 8)

# Extradition and Eelam War 3

Pearl Thevanayagam

The barber solicited the hands of the princess in marriage and explained his position in the following statement. "It has been 50 per cent successful. I want to marry her but the king would have none of it." Sri Lanka's consideration of the LTTE supremo Prabhakaran's extradition to India is somewhat the same. As a well-known attorney at law in the justice department put it, before the question of extradition, there are procedures to follow. Once the attorney general files the application in court on the authority of the defence minister, the respondent has to be produced in court and the preliminary hearing accepted. Then a warrant will be issued for the respondent's arrest. But as it stands today, the evasive Prabhakaran cannot be produced is simple derivative. Hence, if the corpus is not produced, arrest and extradition become merely legal jargons and could be said to have reached a stalemate.

"The whole exercise is an eyewash which India knows, Sri Lanka knows and even the man on the street-corner knows without being educated on the laws of the land," said the attorney.

The newly appointed attorney general Sibhly Aziz said the last extradition case in Sri Lanka was just 12 years ago when a Sri Lankan born American citizen charged with child molestation in the US circumvented US state department's attempt to apprehend him and sought refugee on Lankan soil. The Sri Lanka high court successfully extradited him to the US to stand trial although no extradition treaty existed between the two countries.

Again 12 months ago an Australian citizen Benwell who was charged with the embezzlement of funds in Australia was extradited by the high court in Colombo under provision for the extradition of fugitive persons to and from Commonwealth countries.

The uniqueness of Prabhakaran's extradition lies in the fact that the arrest of Prabhakaran alive is considered next to impossible. Sri Lankan forces are unlikely to be in a position to either capture or kill the LTTE supremo. Given the circumstances, the ruling People's Alliance government which exhausted all its moves to bring a peaceful settlement to the ravaging ethnic conflict has turned the tables to accede to India's request for Prabhakaran's extradition. Whether it will succeed or not, it certainly has aimed at least a psychological blow to LTTE's confidence to achieve a legitimate Eelam hitherto existing as de facto Eelam. Be that as it may, until the recent government move following the truce break-up on April 20 through a suicidal sea mine attack on two naval gunboats in the east, it has reiterated and announced the doors for peace are still open. Is the latest development a closing of that door and, if so, how do major political parties view this new situation?

Vasudeva Nanayakkara, the pro-Tamil Marxist politician and key member of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party has said point blank, "the progressive forces who want a settlement to the ethnic question should bring any factors or forces together to achieve this goal. One simply cannot say that Prabhakaran is not included. Presently he's opted out of it. This need not be the same in the new set of circumstances. Those who request the arrest and extradition are racist forces. Hence the question of Prabhakaran's extradition is not in the realms of reality."

The opposition United National Party politburo member Tyrone Fernando said that basically it is a matter for the government and that it was the first time that India had made such a request. The legality of the extradition is in order. India has served summons on Prabhakaran, Pottu Amman and Akila, the chief of the women's political wing. The UNP is prepared to co-operate with the government in this matter. But Mr Fernando criticised the

government for lowering its guard when dealing with the LTTE. "You don't talk peace by placing complete trust and relaxing all military measures. The government at this desperate stage should re-examine its past actions. The LTTE openly defied all efforts at negotiations by both the UNP government and the present one. What more lessons are needed? he queried.

It is interesting to note that members of the Special Investigating Team, probing the Gandhi assassination case had visited Sri Lanka in 1991 to collect evidence. Almost immediately after the Rajiv Gandhi assassination, the Sri Lanka high court had secretly despatched a witness from Batticaloa, the eastern stronghold of the LTTE, and home district of Pottu Amman, the chief of its intelligence wing. The marriage registrar of Pottu Amman who had succoured his wife during this period was sent to India at Indian government's expense to give evidence in the murder trial. So was another school teacher who was aware of Pottu Amman's moves.

"How can the government say it has not abandoned the peace moves? But the steps the PA government is taking are indeed welcome," Mr Douglas Devananda of the Eelam People's Democratic Front leader said.

With both Indian and other foreign interventions militarily, it is not impossible to apprehend Prabhakaran. Even if he is killed in the process, the man cannot stand trial but like the death of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna chief (JVP) Rohana Wijeweera, which brought the JVP uprising to an almost complete halt, the LTTE could also be immobilised or in the least weakened. This has been the case during any revolutions. It happened to the third reich, Pol Pot, and many other internecine war situations the world over. There may be liberation movements. But at least for a considerable period when such movements gather up strength to retaliate, the government "would have an edge over them," he pointed out.

A Sunday Leader staff writer, Pearl Thevanayagam contributed this article to the T.O.I.

Clearly, as far as the ground situation goes, the LTTE has been able to destabilise the military. There is no question about this. But military aid from foreign countries is pouring in and by August this year the military would be in a position to counter the LTTE head on.

The LTTE however, is not lying low. Reports reaching from Jaffna say that aerial practice sessions are in full swing in Kilinochchi in the north and sightings of the LTTE's aircrafts such as gliders have been reported.

Several countries are willing to lend technical assistance to the military. A team that visited some European countries to seek military aid has returned with positive results, according to defence sources.

Once a full-scale operation is commen-

ced the morale of the soldiers would once again be boosted. But the LTTE too is actively launching its tactics of diverting military attention to the south by placing random grenades, bombs and landmines in Colombo and its suburbs. The public pressure on the government to protect the capital from LTTE attacks would force the defence to deploy some of its forces to counter this situation which in turn would weaken the north east operation.

The LTTE, despite defence attache statements that a large number of LTTE members have been flushed out and killed, vehemently deny massive losses. Both sides are accelerating the recruitment drive. The army is recalling deserters and announcing fresh mobilisation drives while the LTTE is inducting school children.

The deputy finance minister G.L. Peiris last week announced the raising of the defence levy by one per cent from 3.5 per cent and has imposed between 30 to 40 per cent duty on luxury goods thus burdening the rich by sparing the "poor".

This move is expected to bring in Rs 2 billion almost 40 per cent of the war budget. Further steps would bring in another two and a half billion rupees which would give a cool half a million reserve which the minister said is a necessity to keep the war machinery rolling.

"These taxes are carefully adopted so that there would be minimal inflation. There will be no printing of money or borrowing from the central bank but to generally keep the country's economy on an even keel," he said at the cabinet press briefing recently.

---

## **FEDERALISM**

# **Chandrika: Arrogant and authoritarian**

**V. Thirunavukkarasu**

### **Let Federalism, too, be not too late**

Now, when the Federal Party began its campaign for federalism in the 1950s, it was misrepresented to the Sinhala constituency as a deadly separatist poison. The late F.P. Leader, S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, had expressly declared in one of his early statements that while a federal system would satisfy the aspirations of the Tamil speaking people of the North & East, it would also help preserve the unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka (then Ceylon). Even so, the anti-federalism misinformation campaign has gone on uninterruptedly to this day — that federalism would be a stepping stone for a separate state.

### **Federalism, no answer but a disaster — H L de Silva**

In his article titled "An appraisal of the federal alternative for Sri Lanka" written in 1991, President's Counsel H.L. de Silva argues that federalism is not the answer to the Tamil National question, and that it would really be a national disaster to concede federalism. There was a reprint of that article in the English print media in January this year. The eminent lawyer-turned UN Ambassador poses the question whether intransigence of one extremist group is sufficient for re-opening the whole question (i.e. to discuss the question of federalism) even before the 13th amendment and the Provincial Council system (PCS) has been given a fair trial. The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord was signed in 1987 by Rajiv Gandhi and J.R. Jayawardena and not by any of the Tamil/Muslim

Parties, even though it was brokered by the Indian authorities supposedly on behalf of the Tamil speaking people of the North & East in particular.

The PCS proved to be a white elephant without even the stated minimum powers being devolved by the Jayawardena and the subsequent Premadasa regimes. This in turn later led the North-East Provincial Chief Minister, on the eve of his departure to India along with the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to enact, a Declaration of Intent to establish a separate State with a one-year deadline or so, for some 19 conditions to be satisfied by the Colombo. This is what is misrepresented even by a man of the stature of Mr. H. L. de Silva as a Unilateral Declaration of independence.

---

*A politburo member of the N.S.S.P., the writer is the party's coordinator on the National Question.*

Mr de Silva maintains that "there had been an absence of broad-based or higher nationalism which at the best of times was a flickering flame, and which in the upsurge of ethno-nationalism in the post-Independence period has been all but destroyed, there is little hope for federalism; Federalism cannot be implanted in a soil which is not conducive or hostile to the growth of this kind of higher nationalism—a tender plant that is ever in danger of being choked by the noxious weed of ethno-nationalism. To establish a federal constitution in such a political and social environment is only to seek a chimera and hasten the disintegration of the State."

### **How mutually irreconcilable viewpoints set in**

Posing the question why the Sinhala and Tamil communities which have "lived in close association with each other, worked together in common enterprises, shared cultural traditions, have nevertheless failed to create that sense of solidarity as one nation leading ultimately to two mutually irreconcilable viewpoints", Mr H.L. de Silva continues thus: "On the other hand, it may be said that the majority among the Sinhala people, while professing national unity have not pursued it with sufficient seriousness, not shown much willingness to concede the existence of a genuine diversity among the ethnic groups as well as minority religious groups that goes beyond tolerance or a formal recognition of multiculturalism. Indeed, the post-Independence record of intercommunal relations have steadily worsened. The political leadership of the major Sinhala parties has been mainly concerned with the regeneration of the majority community and its rights through programmes of affirmative action, which has given rise to minority perceptions of discrimination and an accumulation of unaddressed grievances. On the other hand, the attitude of the majority that is in command and control over ultimate decisions, if it is to engender confidence in a minority, has to express itself in more

tangible terms and meaningful ways which ought to create by way of response a reciprocal sense of being part of one nation. It is impossible to evoke such feelings and spirit of generosity through artificial efforts or calculated propaganda, they must spring as a natural growth and arise spontaneously from within the heart."

### **Why ethno-nationalism?**

It is very clear then that Tamil ethno-nationalism is a product of the post-Independence period which saw the rise of Sinhala hegemony and continuous discrimination against the Tamils. But quite contrary to Mr de Silva's averments, it is the conceding of autonomous or federal powers to the North East that will help regenerate harmony and broadbased nationalism. When the "ethnic majority is in command and control of ultimate decisions" which are demonstrably inimical to the minorities only then does the process of disintegration of the State set in as the soil becomes so fertile for it, as indeed is the tragic and telling experience of Sri Lanka, and those who refuse to see it are the grave-diggers of the country's unity and territorial integrity.

As very rightly stated by Mr de Silva, the minorities are not prepared to live on the "concessions" or "privileges" handed out by the majority but enjoy their "right" and "legitimate entitlements" not dependent on the prerogative of the majority or as a matter of bounty as it is hurtful to them as a constituent part of the nation".

### **P.A. Government's approach**

It is well-known that President Chandrika pledged profusely during the Parliamentary and Presidential elections held last year that maximum priority would be afforded to resolve the Tamil National Question. In fact she maintained in May 1994, i.e. just after the resounding PA victory in the Southern Provincial Council Election (March 1994), anticipating a PA victory at

the then impending General elections, that the PA had a political package almost ready to resolve the Tamil national question but that it would be revealed at the appropriate time. In the general election manifesto itself, there were no concrete proposals except the broad statement that new administrative units would be created for devolution of powers — without any reference to the content of such powers. Having been returned to power in the August 1994 parliamentary election, and after the landslide victory in the Presidential election in November 1994, President Chandrika declared in her policy statement on January 6, 1995, that there would be put in place "maximum" or "extensive" devolution of power in order to resolve the national question. The Tamil speaking people have the inalienable a right to self-determination, to set up an autonomous regime in the North & East which, like the whole Island, constitutes a plural society. "Tamil Nadu" is the name of the Southernmost State of India. It is called the Government of Tamil Nadu. It is surely no separate state, although the term "Tamil Nadu" literally means Tamil State.

Dr Uyangoda claims that it was on his recent visit to Jaffna that he saw what he calls a quasi-State in existence, and goes on to say, "I think no President, Prime Minister, Minister or Army General told us about this." It is quite strange indeed that a person of the stature of Dr Uyangoda had not known for himself, that there has existed for sometime now a separate de-facto State in Jaffna, that is to say, with most of the trappings that go with a State, and President Chandrika made reference, time and again, during the election campaign to such a de facto scenario. And she chose first to hold discussions exclusively with the LTTE as the major player. Of late, however, there was a change in her attitude, in that she declared peremptorily that no group or organisation could issue ultimatums to an elected Government; her recent TV interview makes it all too clear that she is becoming increasingly arrogant and authoritarian.



# Devolution of Power and Provincial Councils

Neelan Tiruchelvam

Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict has been one of the most intractable internal conflicts in South Asia as a consequence of which the country has been besieged for decades by ethnic fratricide and political violence. Many commentators have noted that the failure to lay down the constitutional foundations of a multi-ethnic society based on equality, ethnic pluralism and the sharing of power has exacerbated the conflict. Several measures were introduced recently to redress the perceptions of injustice and discriminatory treatment felt by the Tamil and Muslim minorities. The first of such attempt was to address the residual issues relating to statelessness by the Grant of Citizenship to Stateless Persons Act No. 5 of 1986, and the Grant of Citizenship (Special Provisions) Act No. 39 of 1988. In the realm of language, Tamil was progressively made a national language in the second Republican Constitution in 1978, and subsequently made an official language in 1987. As a consequence of these changes, Sinhala and Tamil are the languages of legislation, administration and of the courts; although many problems remain with regard to effective implementation of the policy of bilingualism.

However the most significant measure to redress the imbalance in the relationship between the different ethnic groups in the country was the devolution of power to Provincial Councils by the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution. This scheme envisage the devolution of legislative and executive authority to eight provincial councils which were constituted within the country. The structure of the devolutionary system envisages the election on the proportionate representation

system of a legislative body known as a Provincial Council. Each province would have a Governor appointed by the President. The Governor holds office during the pleasure of the President but may be impeached by the Council if he intentionally violates the constitution or is guilty of misconduct or corruption. The Governor shall also appoint a Chief Minister who in his opinion is best able to command the support of the majority of the members of that Council. There shall in addition be a Board of Ministers of which the Chief Minister shall be the head. The executive power in respect of the devolved subjects shall be vested in the Governor, who shall however in the exercise of the functions act in accordance with the advice of the Board of Ministers unless he has been expressly required by the constitution to act on his own discretion.

The subjects and functions to be devolved on the Provincial Councils is set out in the 9th Schedule to the Constitution which is called the Provincial Council List. The subjects include police and public order, provincial planning, local government, provincial housing and construction, agriculture and agrarian services, rural development, health, indigenous medicine, cooperatives, and irrigation. In respect of subjects such as law and order, education and land, the scope of devolution is further defined in Appendix 1, 2 and 3. There is also a Concurrent List of subjects where the center and provinces enjoy concurrent authority. The Reserve List defines a sphere of exclusive authority of the center and includes areas such as defence and national security, foreign affairs, post and telecommunications, broadcasting, television, justice, foreign trade and commerce, ports and harbours, aviation, national transport, mineral and mines and elections. An unusual feature of the reserve list which has caused uncertainty is a provision that national policy on all subjects and functions shall belong to the center.

On the financing of devolution, it was envisaged that provincial councils would be financed through direct grants by the center, limited form of taxation, and revenue sharing arrangements. There is also a Finance Commission consisting of 5 members empowered to make recommendations with regard to allocations from annual budget funds adequate to meeting the needs of the province. The Commission has also the power to make recommendations with regard to making apportionment of funds between various provinces having regard to the objectives of balanced regional development in the country.

In addition, the devolutionary scheme envisages the establishment of high courts in each province to exercise original criminal jurisdiction and appellate and revisionary jurisdiction in respect of criminal matters. In addition, the Provincial High Court had been conferred the jurisdiction to issue prerogative writs such as habeas corpus, certiorari, and prohibition in respect of any matter set out in the Provincial Council List.

The political and constitutional contexts within which Provincial Council scheme was evolved has continued to constrain the effective working of Provincial Council. The scheme was an integral part of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord entered into on 29th July 1987 and signed by President J.R. Jayewardene of Sri Lanka and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India. The Accord endeavoured to provide a conceptual framework for the resolution of the ethnic conflict and to outline institutional arrangement for the sharing of power between the Sinhala and Tamil communities. The Accord declared that Sri Lanka was "a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual plural society" consisting of primarily of four main ethnic groups — the Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims and Burghers. It further recognised that the northern province and the eastern province "had been areas of his-

---

*Neelan Tiruchelvam is a Member of Parliament, and a Member of the Select Committee on Constitutional Reform. He is the Senior Partner of Tiruchelvam Associates, Attorneys-at-Law and a Director of the International Centre for Ethnic Studies and a Director of the Law and Society Trust.*

torical habitation of the Tamil-speaking population". Both these statements have been important ideological significance in framing the policies of bi-lingualism; the provincial council scheme; and the temporary merger of the northern and eastern province as the unit of devolution.

The framers of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord had hoped that they would present the political groups in the north-east and the south of Sri Lanka with a 'fait accompli' and that they would progressively build a consensus around the main concepts and ideas embodied in the Accord. These expectations however proved to be unrealistic. Both the LTTE, the dominant politico-military formation in the north-east and the JVP repudiated the Accord and questioned its legitimacy. A controversy surrounding the Accord ultimately led to an armed confrontation between the LTTE and the Indian Peace Keeping Force and to an insurgency in the south of Sri Lanka. These developments cast a dark shadow over the working of the Provincial Council system. Elections to the Provincial Councils were held in April and June 1988 but the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, the main Opposition party did not participate in this exercise. Similarly the elections to the north-east provincial council held in November 1988 were deprived of their legitimacy due to the opposition of the LTTE and the difficulties in conducting free and fair elections. The devolutionary experiment in the north-east was shortlived and lasted from November 1988 and mid March 1990. It remains a cruel irony that the north-east provincial council remains dissolved and all legislative and executive power is vested in the Governor of that province.

The Constitution framework also proved to be problematic. Section 2 of the Sri Lanka constitution entrenches a unitary state and this conception of the unitary state has influenced the outlook of the bureaucracy and the judiciary in the resolution of center-provincial disputes. The executive presidency inevitably led to a concentration of power and authority in the center, and constrained the meaningful devolution of power to the provinces.

The divisional secretariat system resulted in further extension of the authority of the center at the sub-district level.

Various disingenuous methods were employed to re-vest in the center powers relating transportation and agrarian services. The center also exercised an excessive degree of control over finances, and devolution of powers in the area of land and law and order were incomplete. These developments have led to concern that there was a reluctance on the part of the center to part with power and that there was consequently a lack of sincerity in implementing the scheme of devolution.

With the installation of a new government in August 1994, a Select Committee of Parliament has been constituted to engage in a comprehensive reform of the constitution including the possible repeal and replacement of the existing con-

stitution. At the center of this exercise would be a new package of proposals on a comprehensive devolution of powers. The Select Committee will reassess the existing constitutional framework relating to devolution, the possible transfer of all if not most of the subjects in the Concurrent List to the Provincial List and the framing of imaginative arrangement for the resolution of the center-provincial dispute. This exercise will also need to provide for assured means of financing devolution.

The devolution of powers is at a center of the contemporary political and constitutional discourse in Sri Lanka. It is critical to resolution of the most vexed problem facing Sri Lanka — the national question. Any approach to this problem must be predicated on the inextricable link between peace, ethnic reconciliation and development in Sri Lanka.

---

## This time we can win...

(Continued from page 3)

In an excerpt published by the *Sunday Times* Dayan Jayatileka, the author of a new work on Sri Lanka, *The Travails of a Democracy: Unfinished War and Protracted Crisis*, has posed a series of questions in offering his explanation of the LTTE's extraordinary success: "Why did Indira Gandhi's India support the LTTE and give them the best training and equipment rather than support all the groups equally...? Why did M.G. Ramachandran (MGR) support the LTTE (And EROS) over the others? Why did Karunanidhi, MGR's rival in Madras, also support the LTTE? Why was the LTTE allowed to function in Tamil Nadu and why did RAW (India's CIA) continue to have dialogues with the LTTE in Madras when Indian soldiers were being mauled by the Tigers in Jaffna? Why did Rajiv Gandhi have discussions with the LTTE just before his death, despite the IPKF-LTTE war and the humiliation of the IPKF withdrawal?"

In each case, says the writer, the LTTE successfully projected a certain profile of itself which convinced its target audience.

**"The audience was confused, misled, deceived, deluded. The LTTE was clear, conscious, determined and single-minded."**

India's best-known specialist in Sri Lankan affairs, Professor S.D. Muni of the Nehru University in Delhi, argues that India "cannot afford to let Mrs Kumaratunga fail in its own vital interests". That observation tallies with Prime Minister Narasimha Rao's comment in a conversation with President Kumaratunga: "If you resolve the Tamil problem, it is one problem less for me."

But Professor Muni cautions the Sri Lankan president against playing the Sinhalese deity of war. Prabhakaran was upset by the rising popularity of President Kumaratunga among the peace-hungry people of Jaffna, says the JNU scholar. Militarily, the Sri Lankan forces must hit the LTTE bases hard and fast, so as to neutralise the advantage of the LTTE's newly-acquired missiles.

# India moves in

K. M. de Silva

Once the government announced its decisions to hold elections to the newly established Provincial Councils, the SLFP joined the JVP in organizing a boycott of these. The JVP's hitherto sporadic violence against persons and property increased in a concerted bid at intimidating all parties supporting the accord and candidates of parties seeking election to the Provincial Councils. In February 1988 a new opposition force had emerged, an alliance, named the United Socialist Alliance (USA), consisting of the Sri Lanka Mahajana Pakshaya (SLMP) an off-shoot of the SLFP, the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP), the Communist Party of Sri Lanka, the Nava Sama Samaja Party, and (most notably) the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) from the north and east of the island. The USA group expressed full support for the peace accord, and participated in elections to the Provincial Councils. At the elections to seven of the Provincial Councils (elections in the North-Eastern Province were postponed) held in April and June 1988, in defiance of the JVP's sustained campaign of threats and violence, the UNP won a majority and effective control in all of them, while the USA emerged as the main opposition group. A "surprise" peace agreement in May 1988, between the government and alleged representatives of the JVP turned out to be a hoax. The government, however, decided to proceed with its decision to lift the proscription on the JVP imposed in 1983.

Apart from incorporating the new system of provincial councils, the 13th amendment to the constitution raised Tamil to the level of an official language (along with Sinhalese), with English given the position of a link language. Although there is some ambiguity about the position of English, its legal status appears to be on par with Sinhalese and Tamil. The provisions of the 13th amendment dealing with language, were clarified and consoli-

dated by the 16th amendment to the constitution which was certified on 17 December 1988 — it was more or less the last piece of legislation of President Jayewardene's administration.

In September 1988 President Jayewardene officially authorized the merger of the northern and eastern provinces within a single North Eastern province. In mid-November 1988 elections were held for seats in this provincial council. The politics of Tamil Nadu had a great deal to do with the timing of these provincial elections. The Indian High Commissioner J.N. Dixit pressed very hard to get them held and succeeded in his pressure, in the face of opposition of the Sri Lankan defence forces who argued against it on the grounds that such an election could not be free and fair so long as the IPKF was present in those regions. The Indian government was anxious that this election be held before the elections to the Tamil Nadu state legislature. They had their way, but the Congress and its allies lost the Tamil Nadu election anyway.

The pro-accord, and pro-Indian, Tamil groups, the EPRLF and the Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF) together with the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), emerged strongly from these elections in the holding of which the IPKF played a prominent and controversial role.<sup>23</sup> The poll was boycotted by the LTTE and the TULF, the latter involuntarily.<sup>24</sup>

The EPRLF won the elections — given the extent of support they received from the IPKF they were bound to win<sup>25</sup> — and nominated a regional ministry, in November 1988, to administer the new province. The IPKF had been drawn into the vortex of Tamil politics in the north and east of the island. From the outset the EPRLF was seen as creatures of the IPKF and India, and never succeeded in establishing themselves as an independent poli-

tical entity. The Indian government and the IPKF now found themselves saddled with a puppet regional government which they needed to sustain and protect against the LTTE. These problems became even more difficult when President Jayewardene decided that he would not contest the Presidential elections scheduled for late 1988.

## The IPKF in Sri Lanka — the Last Phase

The last few months of President Jayewardene's term of office saw almost as much violence and turmoil as July 1983. The source of the trouble was the same, Sinhalese intransigents, this time led and manipulated by the JVP. Political violence organized by the JVP reached unprecedented heights. In the first two weeks of November a series of politically inspired strikes and disturbances sought to bring the government down. The JVP had made another of its changes of policy: after agitating for over a year for presidential and parliamentary elections, it now demanded that the elections be postponed till the IPKF left the island. Their violence was directed at all political parties (including its erstwhile ally, the SLFP) contesting the elections. It required President Jayewardene's enormous reserves of political skill and shrewdness to hold the government and administration together in the face of this turmoil and violence, and to see that the elections were held. The presidential election of December 1988 was among the most violent ever held in a democracy. President Premadasa's narrow victory over Mrs. Bandaranaike did not lead to anything more than a temporary relaxation of the JVP's violence; it was resumed before the end of January 1989, and continued beyond the parliamentary elections of February 1989. Moreover, the renewal of the UNP's mandate did not guarantee a return to political stability. The new UNP president faced two formidable challenges. The first of these was from the JVP which continued its career of vio-

nce, ruthlessly and relentlessly, and showed no signs of a change of attitude to the government, despite the fact that he adopted a policy of conciliation to the JVP in the face of this violence which had left over 2,000 of his supporters dead. The JVP spurned his conciliatory moves.<sup>26</sup>

The second related to the Indian presence in the island, and the Tamil problem in general. As Prime Minister, the new President had never been enthusiastic about the Indo-Sri Lanka accord. As the UNP's Presidential candidate he had pledged to have it replaced by a friendship treaty more acceptable to Sri Lanka. He was also committed to ensuring a speedy departure of the IPKF. President Premadasa saw the early departure of the IPKF as essential to the restoration of political stability in the country. He scored an early but ambiguous success when the LTTE in a surprising *volte face* accepted his invitation to talks. These began in April 1989. Opposition to the IPKF's presence in the island had brought two old adversaries — the UNP government and the LTTE — to the bargaining table. The ambiguity lies in the fact that the LTTE was driven to the bargaining table because of a perceived weakening of its military strength, sapped in the course of a long and debilitating struggle against the IPKF.

This sudden change in the political situation was bound to have its impact on the affairs of the IPKF. With the departure of President Jayewardene from office, the commitment to the Indo-Sri Lanka accord at the highest levels of the Sri Lanka government was bound to ebb, especially because his successor had never shown much enthusiasm for it. The Indian High Commissioner J.N. Dixit himself left for his next assignment, to Islamabad, in April 1989 and with his departure the Indians themselves appeared to lose interest in their struggle against the LTTE; certainly the pace with which the IPKF pursued the LTTE began to slacken.<sup>27</sup> Moreover with President Premadasa's election to office in December 1988, the IPKF's continued presence in the island had become a point of contention between the Sri Lanka and Indian governments. The ensuing negotiations on the removal of the IPKF from the island were both long drawn out and acrimonious. Eventually the IPKF was withdrawn on a time-table determined by

the Indian government. The process was completed in March 1990.

The net result of all this was to increase anxieties in India and in the IPKF about the fate of the EPRLF government, and EPRLF cadres once the IPKF left. These anxieties drove the Indian government, and the IPKF to take a most short-sighted decision to create an IPKF-sponsored Tamil National Army (TNA) linked to the EPRLF, and to supply them with sophisticated weapons, all in the hope that the TNA could stand up against the LTTE in the inevitable conflict between them. Mistake followed mistake in the pursuit of this disastrous policy. The TNA succumbed to the LTTE literally without firing a shot, and leaving their arms to the LTTE. The Sri Lankan authorities, civil and military, were aghast at this new development, but their protests against establishing the TNA and arming it were not heeded.

The irony of it appeared lost on the Indian government. A peace-keeping force brought in to disarm Tamil separatist groups, not only failed to do so but, worse still, actually ended its stay in the island by arming a rag-tag force linked to its puppet regime. The principal beneficiary was the LTTE.

As we have seen, there was, by this time a surprising *rapprochement* between the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, drawn together by a common opposition to the IPKF, and in the hope that the animosities and hostilities of a decade could be overcome through negotiations.<sup>28</sup> These were cordial enough at the beginning and this brief period of peace (after May 1990) enabled the army to devote its attention to meeting the challenge posed by the JVP. It is grimly ironic but nevertheless true that the continued presence of the IPKF in the island, and the peace talks between the government and the LTTE helped the Sri Lanka security forces, and in particular the army, to meet and overcome the threat posed by the JVP.

Thus the IPKF's presence in the north and east of the island was not without its advantages to the Sri Lanka government. Sri Lanka's defence expenditure dropped noticeably after mid-1987. The Indian go-

vernment bore the heavy expenditure involved in the pacification — such as it was — of the north and east. This decline in defence spending on the part of Sri Lanka might have been more substantial if the threat posed by the JVP had not proved to be so serious.

In retrospect the IPKF's presence in the island and in such large numbers, has proved to be a self-defeating exercise.<sup>29</sup> Its size was variously estimated at between 75,000 and 100,000 at its peak, larger than the **whole** British army in the days of the *raj*,<sup>30</sup> more than half the size of the Soviet army in Afghanistan. Indeed the well-known Indian defence expert, Ravi Rikhye estimates the IPKF, at its peak, to have been as large as 150,000 if para-military forces were included.<sup>31</sup> And besides, it was all located within an area of about 10,000 sq. kilometers. The Indian policy seemed to be one of saturating an area by throwing in enormous numbers of troops into action, and seeking to submerge the LTTE that way. But this was only partially successful. The IPKF was not able to disarm the Tamil separatist groups, and especially the LTTE, one of the principal objectives of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord, even if one disregards the time-frame set out in it as hopelessly optimistic and therefore unrealistic. Nor did the IPKF succeed in eliminating the LTTE as a fighting force once it was decided to turn its guns on them, thus opening itself to the charge that it was incapable of doing that or that it was never intended to do so. The LTTE survived in the jungles of the north and east of the island, and even in Jaffna and peninsula — areas "pacified" by the IPKF and were under its control — it maintained a shadowy existence and compelled an adherence to its dictates through its cadres. Above all the LTTE maintained a presence in Tamil Nadu throughout the whole period of the IPKF's stay in the island and continued to use its safe houses there.

The IPKF exercise cost India something like Rs 50 billion (in Sri Lanka rupees) or \$ 1.25 billion. While it may be argued that a great deal of this money would have been spent on this force even if it had remained in India, the additional costs involved in moving troops to and from Sri Lanka and in maintaining them there would have been very considerable. Besi-

des over 1,000 Indian soldiers were killed, and over double that number were injured, many of them crippled by landmines and other improvised explosive devices in the laying and making of which the LTTE were experts.<sup>32</sup>

There is also that great intangible — the loss of prestige, and the sense of failure, in short a propaganda disaster. At the time the IPKF arrived in the island, only the Sinhalese were hostile and opposed to its presence. Within a short time of the IPKF's presence in the north and east, even the Tamils who originally welcomed them as liberators were alienated from it, all save the political groups associated with the marginalized EPRLF. The gains were few, if any.

When Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by the LTTE in May 1991 in Tamil Nadu the tragic failure of the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka which his mother had initiated and which he himself had raised several notches higher was underlined for all the world to see. At last India itself woke up to a realization of the full extent of the price she had been called upon to pay for the support extended to Tamil separatism in Sri Lanka. The LTTE had established a government within a government in parts of the Tamil Nadu coast; its smuggling enterprises included narcotics; it had infiltrated the Tamil Nadu administration; and it had introduced the culture of violence into parts of India which had not known it before.

On June 13, 1990, a LTTE execution squad operating in Tamil Nadu had raided a block of apartments in which the leadership of the EPRLF lived as refugees in Madras, and killed 13 of them including the Secretary General of the party and one of its MP's in the Sri Lanka parliament. The LTTE raiders had carried AK 47 assault rifles. While the immediate reaction in Tamil Nadu was one of shocked dismay, little was done to curb the LTTE's activities, until the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi compelled a re-appraisal of attitudes and policies.

Through all these experiences one bitter lesson emerges: it is often easier to end an international conflict than a civil conflict especially when the latter is essentially an ethnic one. It is difficult to fashion

an outcome that is intermediate between victory or defeat for one of the combatants. And yet conflict resolution requires an outcome that has something for everyone. Parties to the conflict cannot be expected to give up their claims without receiving some compensation, and this implies a willingness to compromise on some at least of the underlying issues. Then again, because civil violence is often less well organized than international war, conflict resolution requires an outcome that has something for everyone. Parties to the conflict cannot be expected to give up their claims without receiving some compensation, and this implies a willingness to compromise on some at least of the underlying issues. The LTTE, like the JVP, has never shown any readiness to compromise. Then again, because civil violence is often less well organized than international war, conflict resolution is much more difficult, since even a small number of unsatisfied participants can make it impossible to end the quarrelling. All these are lessons that emerged from the Sri Lanka conflict, and the Indian involvement.

Outside intervention in a civil conflict can take many forms. First of all, the intervenor could begin by giving aid to one or other of the participants, or cut off such aid. This assistance may be to encourage the continuation of the struggle, to compel or persuade one or other of the participants to alter its strategy, or even to encourage a settlement. Second, the intervenor may try to resolve the conflict itself by acting as a mediator, applying sanctions to one, some or all parties, or underwriting a settlement. Third, the intervenor may become the common enemy which unites the warring factions against it.<sup>33</sup> The Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan conflict has the unique distinction of taking all these forms.

#### (Concluded)

#### Notes

1. On Sri Lanka's ethnic conflicts there is a large and growing literature. The following works will be useful to the reader. K.M. de Silva, *Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka, 1880-1985* (Lanham, Md., 1986); S.J. Tambiah, *Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy* (Chicago, 1986); S. Ratnatunga, *The Politics of Terrorism: The Sri Lanka Experience* (Canberra, 1988).

2. For discussion of this theme see K.M. de Silva, "Decentralization and Regionalism in the Management of Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict," *International Journal of Group Tensions*, 14(4), 1989, pp. 317-38.
3. See, K.M. de Silva, "Traditional Homelands" of the Tamils of Sri Lanka: A Historical Appraisal, (Kandy, 1987).
4. H.A. Indorf, *Strategies for Small State Survival* (Kuala Lumpur, 1985).
5. For Senanayake's views on this see, Colonial Office Records London, CAB 129/18 CP (47) 144, Cabinet-Ceylon Constitution, 2 May 1947.
6. For a discussion of this concept in relation to India's borders see Steven A. Hoffman, *India and the China Crisis* (Berkeley, 1990).
7. On the politics of linguistic nationalism in India, see Marguerite R. Barnett, *The Politics of Cultural Nationalism in South India* (Princeton, NJ, 1976). Robert Hardgrave, Jr., *The Dravidian Movement* (Bombay, 1965). Eugene F. Irschick, *Politics and Social Conflict in South India: The Non-Brahman Movement and Tamil Separatists, 1916-1929* (University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969); and *Tamil Revivalism in the 1930s* (Madras, 1986).
8. The journal *India Today* published an adulatory essay on Prabhakaran in its issue of 30 June 1986. In an interview he gave to this journal he claimed that he "shot and killed the former mayor of Jaffna, Alfred Duraiappah [sic]". Durayappa was a member of the SLFP, the core of the then governing coalition, and the hostility to him flowed from that.
9. See K.M. de Silva "Decentralization and Regionalism in the Management of Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict," *International Journal of Group Tensions*, op.cit.
10. N. Tiruchelvam has reviewed G. Parathasarathy's role as a mediator in the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict in two short articles in the *Asian Wall Street Journal*, 6 August 1987 and the *Hindu*, 5 August 1987.
11. For a brief review of the problems relating to the voting rights of immigrant Indians in Sri Lanka see K.M. de Silva, *Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies*, pp. 105-10.
12. See *India Today*, 31 March 1984 pp. 84-99, see particularly the essay in investigative reporting entitled "Sri Lanka Rebels: An Ominous Presence in Tamil Nadu," also *The Sunday Times* (London), 1 April 1984, and Reuter reports on these bases published in Sri Lanka in the *Sun* of 23 May 1984, and the *Island* of 25 May 1984. See also the London-based journal *South: The Third World Magazine*, March 1985, pp. 14-15. See *Time International*, 3 April 1989, pp. 10-11, for a later account.
13. There is a large Tamil population in Bombay and its suburbs, and this has been the source

- of support to the Tamil cause. One of the key figures in this was an under-world boss, Mudaliyar, a Tamil. Sri Lankan Tamils are now very prominent in Bombay's underworld, and especially its drug trade. See the Indian journal *Sunday*, 31 July-6 August, 1988, which carried an article entitled "Sri Lankan Tamils in Bombay's Underworld".
14. One of the Indian delegates to the UN General Assembly was S. Ramachandran, a Minister of the Tamil Nadu State government. On 21 October 1983 he addressed the special Political Committee and raised the question of Sri Lankan refugees in Tamil Nadu. See the official publication issued by the Indian Mission to the United Nations, *Indian News*, 21 October 1983.
- Ramachandran's speech was on Agenda Item 74: International co-operation to Avert New Flows of Refugees.
- On 27 September 1984, Mr. Mirdha, an Indian delegate made much the same points in a statement on behalf of his country at a general debate at the 39th session of the UN General Assembly.
15. Official records of the UN Geneva office show that in 1983, 1984 and 1985 Indian delegates raised the issue of human rights violations in Sri Lanka at meetings of the Commission on Human Rights, and the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. Of particular interest in this regard is the speech of M.C. Bandhare, a member of the Subcommission of Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in Geneva, 21 August 1984.
16. K.M. de Silva, "Decentralization and Regionalism in the Management of Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict," *op.cit.*
17. For an assessment of the military situation in Sri Lanka at this time, see Colonel Edgar O'Ballance, "Sri Lanka and its Tamil Problem," in *Armed Forces*, vol 5 (12), December 1986, pp. 543-43. *Armed Forces* is published by Ian Allan Ltd. in conjunction with the Royal United Services, Institute for Defence Studies.
18. See the statement made by Dr. G.S. Dhillon, leader of the Indian delegation to the 42nd Session of the Commission on Human Rights, under Agenda item 12, on 5 March 1986. This brief statement was in response to a very comprehensive one made by Dr. H.W. Jayewardene leading the Sri Lanka delegation on 4 March 1986, setting out in detail the negotiations conducted between the two governments, and also details of attacks by Tamil separatist groups on civilians, and clashes between the Sri Lankan security forces and Tamil separatist groups.
19. For an account of this clash between the LTTE and the TELO group, see *The Hindu*, 13 May 1986.
20. A.P. Venkateswaran, interview with the author, 24 April 1990.
21. On the problems of the eastern province and its links with the concept of the traditional homelands of the Tamils see G.H. Peiris, "An Appraisal of the Concept of a 'Traditional Homeland' of the Tamils in Sri Lanka," *Ethnic Studies Report*, IX (1) 1991, pp. 11-39.
22. This document, a telegram, is in the J.R. Jayewardene Mss.
23. See M.S.S. Pandian's article, "The Election that was not" in *The Economic and Political Weekly*, 3 December 1988, where he points out that the election was rigged by the IPKF.
24. Thanks to the LTTE boycott, no election was possible in the districts of the northern province. The IPKF succeeded in securing the election of the EPRLF slate uncontested there.
25. In the eastern province there was an election of sorts in which the IPKF served, more or less, as election agents of the EPRLF.
26. See, C.A. Chandraprema, *Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror*, the JVP Insurrection, 1987-1989 (Colombo, 1991).
27. Dixit played a key role in the drafting of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord and later on as a co-ordinator of political aspects of the IPKF's operations in Sri Lanka.
28. It was often alleged by Indian critics of President Premadasa's policy of *rapprochement* that the Sri Lanka government had supplied arms to the LTTE at this stage, and that these were to be used against the IPKF. In September 1991, Premadasa himself had to acknowledge that arms had been supplied to the LTTE. On 17 December 1991 the *Hindustan Times* carried a news item to the effect that one of the young officers of the Sri Lanka army who had been ordered to transport these arms to the LTTE had testified that he was aware that they were to be used against the IPKF.
29. Less than a month after the accord was signed the criticisms began. The most critical and surprising — considering the source — was an article in the *Guardian* (London) Third World Review entitled "India the Big Bully!" It proceeded to describe the accord as the "The Infamous contract that is Sri Lanka's Munich." *The Guardian*, 21 April 1987. *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, in its issue of 13 April 1987, described the accord "Rajiv's Gunboat Peace."
30. This point was first made by Professor Ainslee Embree of the Southern Asia Institute, Columbia University, New York.
31. Ravi Rikhye. *The Militarisation of Mother India* (New Delhi, 1990), pp. 77-90. His estimate of the size of the IPKF is the largest we have.
32. There is a growing literature on the IPKF's operations in Sri Lanka: these include, S. Bhadhuri and Afsir Karim, *The Sri Lankan Crisis: Lancer Paper I* (Delhi, 1990); R. Kadian, *India's Sri Lanka Fiasco* (Delhi, 1990), as well as extensive references to them in Ravi Rikhye, *The Militarisation of Mother India, op.cit.*
- Two general officers who served with the IPKF in Sri Lanka have recently published accounts of their stay in the island's north and east: Lt. Gen. S.C. Sardeshpande, *Assignment Jaffna* (Delhi, 1991) and Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh *IPKF in Sri Lanka* (Delhi, 1991).
33. I owe some of the points here to professor Licklider of the Department of Political Science, Rutgers University and his unpublished paper, "Civil Violence and Conflict Resolution: A Framework for Analysis" from which they are derived.

## Waiting — 6

### Kumbukkana

*A lone fire fly in a kumbuk brings*

*Hunger for a remembered evening*

*When paper lanterns lit your loveliness*

*And in your eyes, flames beat their painted Wings*

U. Karunatilake

# The menace of small arms

K. Subrahmanyam

Delivering the Roskill Memorial lecture at Cambridge early this year Mr Mark Tully, celebrated former correspondent of the BBC in India, had warned that if the West did not stop the spread of portable weapons, "we could face threats to the unity of the two most powerful nations of what was once British India, with consequences which would have to be faced by the politicians of the West. What is more, that would be a tragic ending to the enterprise of bringing stability to south Asia which many of our forefathers saw as their role in life when they forged that link in India's unbroken chain."

Mr Tully drew attention to the Human Rights Watch's call to the American and Pakistani governments to investigate the allegation that the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan had siphoned off arms intended for Afghanistan. It had also asked for the findings to be published and legal action taken against the guilty. The organisation, Mr Tully said, wanted the U.S. to find out which arms remained in the ISI's hands and to take effective measures to recover or destroy them. The Americans have even failed to recover the Stinger missiles supplied to the Afghan Mujahideen, which could pose a threat to domestic civil aviation.

## No control

According to Mr Robert Oakley, the American Ambassador to Pakistan during the Afghan war, "After Zia, there was no effective control on the Pakistani side. The ISI in particular was answerable neither to the leadership of the Army, nor to the president nor to the prime minister... The result is that there has been no supervision of the ISI. Corruption, narcotics, and big money have all come in, complicating the scenario."

Therefore the spread of portable weapons in South Asia, which threatens the stability of this region should be assessed from all possible dimensions in the forth-coming policy level discussions between the Indian defence secretary and the U.S. officials. A joint task force of Americans, Pakistani and Indians would constitute a major confidence building measure since the spread of these man portable arms pose an equal threat to the stability of Pakistan and India. After all Americans introduced them on a massive scale into the region; Pakistan was the recipient, storage depot and disseminator; and India has been at the receiving end.

India has already taken the lead in drawing the attention of the world community to the threat posed by international terrorism being one of the major victims of that phenomenon. This threat unfolds in the extensive use of Kalashnikov rifles and high explosives, being used as demolition charges in various forms as well as land mines. The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) has carried out a detailed study on the impact of the American infusion of man portable weapons into Pakistan, to prosecute the mujahideen campaign against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and its effects on the sub continent. The Institute is to hold a workshop on the spread of man portable weapons and its impact on international security along with the Pugwash movement later this year. The American and British Purgwashites are particularly interested in this issue.

Mr Tully quotes the statement of Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, Director, IDSA, to highlight the Indian perception of what constitutes the gravest threat to international security. Air Commodore Singh said, "The proliferation of small

arms and minor weapons has not only become the most serious threat to national and international security but it cannot be addressed adequately without a global approach and international cooperation. This is a more acute problem than nuclear proliferation."

## American supply

According to Mr Chris Smith of King's College, London, the American supply to Afghanistan rose to 65,000 tons per year in 1987. Air Commodore Dikshit of IDSA estimates that the total supply of portable arms to the Mujahideen amounted to \$ 6 billions. The ISI is estimated to have retained up to 40 per cent of the Kalashnikovs which were purchased from China and poured into Pakistan. The supplies included Chinese heavy and light machine guns, 122 mm launchers and ground to ground rockets. The Americans bought them from China, since they were original Soviet design weapons and it could be claimed that they were captured from the Kabul forces. SAM-7s were purchased from Egypt, 122 mm mortars from Spain, Oerlikon-Buhrle anti-aircraft guns from Switzerland, Blow-pipe surface-to-air-missiles from Britain and rocket carrying cluster bombs, chemical grenades and stinger missiles from the U.S.

The Pakistani prime minister, Ms. Benazir Bhutto, recently highlighted that terrorism in Pakistan and the extensive use of weapons were offshoots of the Afghan war, hence the West must bear part of the responsibility. She is right. She should cooperate in having a joint U.S.-Pakistan-India study on the various dimensions of the problem and in evolving a comprehensive strategy to reduced and eliminate the threat of these sophisticated portable arms to the entire region. India should also initiate such a joint study.

## Ace Radio Cab

- Computerised meters • Can be summoned to your doorstep
- No call up charge within city limits • Vehicle access from selected stands
- Receipts issued on request • Company credit available

Call 501502 501503 or 501504



**Aset Ltd**  
Another Aitken Spence Service





# IFIOR and security issue

Gareth Evans

Particular security issues which seem appropriate for discussion at IFIOR include maritime resource protection; the safety of sea lanes and seaborne commerce; anti-piracy measures; the UN Agenda for Peace issues as they relate to the Indian Ocean context; and the experience elsewhere in developing patterns of security dialogue at the regional level, including the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Building on the experience of other regions, it may be that the Forum will want to encourage the development of consultative and research linkages among think-tanks, universities and institutes of international affairs and strategic studies in the region. Our experience in the Asia-Pacific region is that "second track" dialogue, embracing academics and officials in their personal capacities, has contributed to a greater sense of mutual understanding and, ultimately, a greater willingness to discuss and get progress on some of the more difficult security issues of the region. Progress may be very slow — and I fully expect it to be in the Indian Ocean region — but there is benefit to be gained from this approach and no reason why our positive experience in the Asia Pacific cannot be repeated in this part of the world.

Let me also say a little more about the whole question of "second track" dialogue structures, an approach not quite as familiar in this region as elsewhere. The essential nature of "second track" activity is simply that all participants in it attend in their personal — that is, non-official capacities. This allows for open and frank discussion, without the requirement that participants reflect national positions, and without participants being committed to outcomes. Generally, the "outcomes" tend to be in the form of a statement from the Chair to which no participant is committed: that is certainly the plan for our Forum. This approach allows for ideas to be fully explored; it allows officials to be exposed to a wide range of business and academic (and other officials' personal) ideas without feeling compelled to stake out firm positions, or resist some looming, binding outcome which is not agreeable. Such activities provide useful and creative ideas which can be accepted or rejected by governments when they find their way — as they often do — into "first track" processes. "Second track" dialogue is now a widely accepted feature of dialogue in the Asia Pacific region. For instance, meetings hosted by the tripartite Pacific Economic Cooperation Committee (PECC), or strategic studies think-tanks, have been able to explore what are someti-

mes thought to be adventurous options for economic and security policy development; this has been important both in the lead-up to the establishment of new structures (APEC and ARF), and in generating new ideas for those structures to consider.

In approaching the Perth Forum and all these issues, we have been very conscious of the need to ensure that IFIOR is fully consistent with the Mauritius-initiated Indian partnership. For our part, we have always understood the immense significance of India, and have tried on a number of occasions — so far not very successfully — to lift our bilateral relationship into the front rank where it belongs.

But there are now good signs that our relationship is at last on the move. Recent highlights have included Vice President Narayanan's very successful visit to Australia last year, during which he opened the India Today 1994 promotion staged by the Australia-India Council; the launch by my own Department of a major study of economic reform in India, *India's Economy at the Midnight Hour*, aimed at drawing the attention of Australian business to India's immense economic potential; and the leading by Trade Minister, Senator Bob McMullan, last February of the largest contingent of senior Australian business representatives ever to visit India. India has gained prominence as one of the focus markets at our annual National Trade and Investment Outlook Conference, now the most significant trade and investment conference in Australia, and one of the most important in the region. And late next year India will be the target for a major multi-million dollar Australian promotion, a co-operative venture between our Federal and State governments and the private sector: the priority we are giving to India is underlined by the fact that this promotion is only the fifth of its kind we have held, the previous ones being in Korea and Japan (our two largest trading partners), Indonesia (our near neighbour, with whom we have vital economic and security links), and Germany (our largest trade and investment partner, apart from the UK, in Europe).

All this demonstrates the importance we are placing on building a comprehensive economic relationship with India. That task is being helped by the processes of economic reform both countries have put in place. However, the level of two-way trade and investment is still nowhere near its potential, with India currently ranking only as Australia's 17th largest market and 20th overall among our trading partners. I think we will

see a rapid rise in the rankings by the end of this decade, once we start taking serious notice of each other and the enormous potential that exists for trade and investment between us. That potential lies not only in the traditional areas of commodity exports from Australia, and textile, clothing and footwear imports from India, but in sectors like telecommunications and information technology, multimedia and software generally, financial services, mining, infrastructure development, aerospace and aviation, food and beverages and health services. It perhaps needs to be emphasised that, for all the huge difference in our populations, Australia's economy — measured in familiar GDP terms — is in fact a little bigger than India's (\$US 284 billion as compared with \$US 252 billion in 1993) and — if we add our CER partner New Zealand — bigger than all six ASEAN countries combined. We may not have many consumers, but we have a lot of purchasing power!

The scope for building linkages extends well beyond trade and investment. The new perspectives brought by the end of the Cold War have produced an environment in which a more balanced, multi-standed and mature relationship is emerging. There is more frequent dialogue between us on international issues, a broader understanding of each other's viewpoints and a rapid increase in people-to-people contact, including through tourism, education and academic and cultural exchange.

Australia and India have already come far, in a very few years, in building a new, diverse and vibrant bilateral relationship. That is certainly cause for great satisfaction. And we both have been given now an exciting new opportunity to play a significant role in the creation of new cooperative arrangements in the Indian Ocean which washes both our shores — arrangements which offer significant advantages, and no disadvantages, for us both.

The emergence of Indian Ocean regional cooperation has only been made really possible, and only really makes sense, as a result of India's economic reforms and its interest in seeing the region as a whole develop. Those new arrangements will not come into being overnight, or without much patient, hard work. But I believe Australia and India are well placed, working in close collaboration, to provide the leadership, imagination and creativity which will certainly be required to start the Indian Ocean region along the path to that goal.

(Concluded)

*With Best Compliments*

*from*

**I C I B**  
**Industrial & Commercial**  
**Insurance Brokers (Pte) Ltd.**

INSURANCE & REINSURANCE BROKERS

Our Specialist Services Include

- ★ Complete & Independent Insurance Placement with all Insurers
- ★ Efficient Claims Recoveries
- ★ Risk Management Consultance
- ★ Insurance Consultancies
- ★ Financial Advice on Life Assurance
- ★ Insurance Portfolio Management

**Industrial & Commercial**  
**Insurance Brokers (Pte Limited)**

90, Union Place (First Floor)  
Colombo 2.  
Tel: 328640, 438222, 438226  
Telex: 22785 INSINT CE  
Fax: 438134

*An Associate Company of*

**FORBES & WALKER LIMITED**

# The international climate deteriorates

Humayun Kabir

It is clear from the foregoing that the position of those scholars who tend to argue that India posed no threat to Sri Lanka and that S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, as opposed to his predecessors, envisaged no threat to his country from the north, is difficult to sustain. To be sure, lack of hostility and at times even surface appearance of friendship between the two countries do not seem to explain away the threat perceptions that the governments in Colombo have held vis-a-vis India. Indeed, Sri Lanka's apprehension and fear of India, caused by their asymmetry in size and power, and by the island's strategic location as well as New Delhi's political ambitions in the region of South Asia and the Indian Ocean, has been the most fundamental preoccupation in the formulation and prosecution of Colombo government's foreign and security policy. The successive Colombo administrations had differed from each other only in the manner of expressing their threat perceptions and in devising strategies and instruments that were employed to neutralise such threats. The UNP governments were explicit about India as a source of potential threat and depended on the British military presence for Sri Lanka's security. Their successor governments professed friendship with India while maintaining as insurance links with Britain through the Commonwealth, and seeking regional counterbalance against India through regional grouping, and the cultivation of good relations with India's adversaries such as China and Pakistan.

## **Jayewardene Government's Non-Conformist India Policy, 1977-83**

J.R. Jayewardene of the UNP became Prime Minister of Sri Lanka after a landslide victory in the general elections of July 1977. He changed the country's Constitution and became first Executive President in 1978. There was a pronounced pro-American tilt in Sri Lanka's foreign policy following the UNP election victory in 1977, a harping back to the policy of the UNP regimes of the late 1940s and 1950s; this time, of course, the policy being more pro-US and obviously anti-Indian. Jaye-

wardene government's strategic centrifugality took place in circumstances vastly different from those prevailing during post-independence UNP rule. The Sinhala-Tamil ethnic problem then was not at all as acute as it had been since the late 1970s. Sri Lanka, although a primary products producer subject in its trade to the vagaries of international market, had up until 1956 a favourable balance of budget and trade. The island's performance on both counts assumed a staggeringly negative turn in the 1970s. In other words, President Jayewardene presided over the affairs of a country that had slid down to a much weaker position as an actor in the comity of nations.

On the other hand, India in the initial years of independence was busy making itself a nation-state out of a huge and diverse state-nation under the able leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru. Economically and militarily, India then was far below the level that would be commensurate with its potentialities. By the mid-1970s, however, India had become a formidable power of consequence in the South Asian/Indian Ocean region and even beyond.

During the early years of tight bipolarity and containment policy in the international system, Sri Lanka assumed greater strategic significance to the West as reflected, inter alia, in Great Britain's continued defence links with its former colony and in Colombo's virulent anti-Communism. India, during the time, earned the wrath of the West for its 'immoral' nonaligned policy. The global system became diffused in the 1970s and 1980s, spelling general uncertainty for small powers like Sri Lanka and according more leverage to regional great powers like India.

In the late 1970s, there was a rapid deterioration in the general global politico-strategic climate. The Sino-American normalisation, that began with President Nixon's historic 'rapprochement visit' to Beijing in 1972, was consolidated in the latter half of the decade. In South-east Asia, pro-Soviet Vietnam militarily intervened in Kampuchea in 1978. China then

invaded Vietnam and engaged in a short but bloody war. All this witnessed the intensification of the two superpowers' involvement in the region. In the Middle East, the events were more dramatic and significant. An anti-American, radical Islamic revolution swept Iran in 1978 representing a threat to the conservative Arab countries and marking an end to the monarchy of Reza Shah Pahlavi who made his country a bulwark of U.S. interest in the region. Then, hot on the heels of this change, came the episode of the American hostage crisis. Then followed the Iraqi aggression of Iran in September 1980. In 1978, there was a Marxist coup d'etat in South Yemen, constituting a serious threat to the conservative Arab regimes around and consolidating the Soviet position in a strategically significant place in the north-western quadrant of the Indian Ocean. Earlier in 1977-78, Moscow had gained another strategic foothold by switching sides from Somalia in favour of Marxist Ethiopia where the Soviet Union and Cuba deployed forces following their successes in Angola and Mozambique. As a result, the Naval Arms Limitation Talks (NALT), that began in Moscow in June 1977 concerning the Indian Ocean, were broken off by the United States in February 1978. Earlier, the Soviets sought naval facilities at Gan Island of the Maldives and was politely rebuffed by President Ibrahim Nasir.

But the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 broke the camel's back. The superpower detente, epitomised by the signing of SALT-I and the Helsinki Final Act in 1972 and 1975 respectively, came to a juddering halt. An "arc of crisis", in the words of Zbigniew Brzezinski, developed by the end of the decade of 1970s "stretching along the shores of the Indian Ocean" with a renewed intensification of the rivalry between the "Great Irresponsibles", who "find themselves locked into a kind of perpetual claim to a historical task historically justified in terms of the present and the future...".

*(To be Continued)*

# Joyce: The writer as exile

Regi Siriwardena

If you look at the last page of each of the three major works of James Joyce, you'll find a set of places and dates, telling you where and when it was written. At the end of *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*: 'Dublin 1904, Trieste 1914'; at the end of *Ulysses*: 'Trieste-Zurich-Paris, 1914-1921'; at the end of *Finnegans Wake*: 'Paris, 1922-1939'. These inscriptions tell their own story. Joyce left his native Ireland in 1904 and never went back, except for short visits on business. At that time exile of the kind Joyce chose was an unusual condition among English-speaking writers. Of course, there had been literary exiles writing in the English language among Joyce's immediate predecessors and contemporaries — Henry James, Conrad, Eliot, Pound. But James, Conrad and Eliot all assimilated themselves to the English milieu in which they had transplanted themselves, and Pound Italianised himself so much as to embrace Italian Fascism and broadcast for Mussolini during the Second World War. Even Lawrence, who was an exile from England, could write from Kandy, Ceylon: 'You won't find me going back on my Englishness.' Joyce's situation, however, was exceptional. The Anglo-Irish writers — Wilde, Shaw, and Yeats for a time — had moved from Ireland to England. Joyce, emigrating to the continent of Europe, remained for the rest of his life a wanderer and an alien in the cities between which he moved. As he is seen by Irish eyes unsympathetically as Shem the Penman in *Finnegans Wake*: 'He even ran away with himself and became a farsoonerite, saying he would far sooner muddle through the hash of lentils in Europe than meddle with Ireland's split little pea.'

That is why Joyce's condition as exile resembles not so much that of Conrad or Eliot as that of the writers who have become more numerous as the century wore on, those who have found themselves without a homeland. It is this fact that makes it impossible for us to fit Joyce into any comfortable national niche. What is he? — an Irish writer by virtue of his birth, an English writer because of the language he wrote in (for the most part, we have to add), or an European writer in terms of the environment in which he lived for the greater part of his life? None of these categories will do.

From the nineteenth century onwards, language has been central to the constru-

tion of political and cultural nationalisms, and literature has been annexed to that process. The institutionalisation of English literature as a university discipline and a school examination subject was part of the creation of a British national heritage, itself an adjunct of the imperial destiny. In fact, as Gauri Visvanathan<sup>1</sup> has shown, that institutionalisation took place first in India as part of the imperial civilising mission. To this day academic curricula of literature are for the most part compartmentalised by national frontiers. And even the literary past has been reconstructed in this light: it is often assumed that the great writer is one who is most firmly situated in his own national tradition, though in fact cultural hybridity isn't merely a modern phenomenon. But Joyce can't be domiciled in the literary traditions and canons constructed by any cultural nationalism. It isn't surprising that he is not one of those writers whose anniversaries are piously observed by the British Council; or that much of the best scholarly and critical work on him has been done not in British but in American universities, which are more hospitable to literary cosmopolitanism. In the 1970s, Richard Ellmann, the author of the great biography, on being appointed to a professorship at Oxford, said that he regarded it as part of his mission to bring Joyce to the English. It's interesting on the other hand that the Ireland that Joyce rejected has in recent years regarded him with something of the warmth extended to a prodigal son. In part this is due to the discovery that the Dublin places that Joyce represented in his books can attract literary-minded tourists. But there has been evidence of more serious interest too. Dublin radio has broadcast the whole of *Ulysses* in a series of readings, and the new Penguin editions of *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake* are both introduced by Irish critics who are deeply interested in the relationships of the books with Irish history and politics.<sup>2</sup>

It's also revealing that most of the outstanding writers in the English language who have been strongly influenced by Joyce have been Americans and other non-Britishers — from Faulkner and Dos Passos in the 'twenties and 'thirties to Vladimir Nabokov, Samuel Beckett, Thomas Pynchon and Salman Rushdie more recently. But Joyce's influence has extended far beyond the English language and its fiction. Gabriel Garcia Marquez, Jorge Luis Borges, and Umberto Eco must all be counted as being in his debt. Even contemporary Sinhala fiction has

incorporated the Joycean interior monologue in the writing of Ajit Tilakasena and Lakshmi Bombuwela. The mention of these two writers helps me to make a general point. I am sure that Mr. Tilakasena has read Joyce; I think it likely that Ms. Bombuwela hasn't. But as her case and that of several other writers elsewhere confirm, the Joycean presence is so pervasive in contemporary fiction that it's possible to absorb it without actually reading him.

Joyce as a literary exile wasn't in the same position as those German writers who sought refuge from Hitler, or the Russian writers who fled from or were pushed out by Lenin, Stalin or Brezhnev, or the host of others in many different parts of the globe who have been forced into exile since the Second World War. Joyce wasn't compelled, in the literal sense, to leave his homeland by any persecuting or repressive political regime; and it was only in the very last years of his life that the Nazi occupation of France made him go back to neutral Zurich. But exile was none the less a necessary condition for his artistic survival. In *A Portrait of the Artist* his other self, Stephen Dedalus, affirmed its imperatives:

I will not serve that in which I no longer believe whether it call itself my home, my fatherland or my church: and I will try to express myself in some mode of life or art as freely as I can and as wholly as I can, using for my defence the only arms I allow myself to use — silence, exile and cunning.

That is the fictional statement. Its validity is borne out by Joyce's actual publishing history. His collection of short stories, *Dubliners*, was delayed for five years, first, because the publisher wanted to expurgate it, and then because the printer burnt the sheets and destroyed the type. When the early episodes of *Ulysses* were serialised in an American journal, the publishers were prosecuted and their fingerprints taken. Thereafter no British or American publisher would touch it. It had to be brought out in Paris, but all copies sent to Britain or the United States were confiscated and destroyed by the Customs authorities in these two countries. It was not till more than a decade later that readers in the English-speaking world had free access to the book that many critics had declared to be the great masterpiece of modern prose fiction. Joyce's integrity and inflexibility in defence of his work were just as heroic in their own way as the

*This paper is based on a presentation made at the English Association of Sri Lanka.*

political commitment of some other writers. He steadfastly refused, in the face of appeals, to permit an expurgated edition of *Ulysses*, and he persisted with *Finnegans Wake* to the end in spite of the scepticism and discouragement of some of the admirers of his former work.

Few Irish nationalists, even, could have been as irreverent of Ireland's imperial masters as Joyce was: an unidentified voice in *Ulysses* lists the 'British Beatitudes' as 'beer, beef, business, bibles, bulldogs, battleships, buggery and bishops.' Yet Joyce was no nationalist. In *A Portrait of the Artist*, the violent argument that breaks out over the Christmas dinner between Stephen's father and the old lady known as Dante is a manifestation of the conflict between nationalism and the church for dominance over Ireland's soul. Yet Stephen grows up to reject both, as Joyce did. In the latter part of the same novel Stephen tells his fellow-student, the nationalist Davin:

No Honourable and sincere man...has given up to you his life and his youth and his affections from the days of Tone to those of Parnell but you sold him to the enemy or failed him in need or reviled him and left him for another. And you invite me to be one of you. I'd see you damned first.

And he goes on to say:

When the soul of a man is born in this country there are nets flung at it to hold it back from flight. You talk to me of nationality, language, religion. I shall try to fly by those nets.

For Irish nationalism, as for many other nationalisms then and later, language was crucial because some of the Irish people felt that their identity had been undermined by the imposition on them of an alien language. For Joyce too language was central to the creation of personal identity: the very first words of *A Portrait of the Artist* present the moment when the child Stephen recognises who he is and his relation to his family and his immediate world through the story his father tells him:

Once upon a time and a very good time it was there was a moocow coming down along the road and this moocow that was coming down along the road met a nicens little boy named baby tuckoo..

But the growth of Stephen involves the problematisation of this identity as he discovers, again through words, the contradictions of his world. During the discussion with the dean of studies Stephen thinks:

The language in which we are speaking is his before it is mine. How different are the words *home, Christ, ale, master*, on his lips and on mine! I cannot speak

or write these words without unrest of spirit. His language, so familiar and so foreign, will always be for me an acquired speech. I have not made or accepted its words. My voice holds them at bay. My soul frets in the shadow of his language.

One way out for the Irish writer who saw the English language as alien was to engage in the rediscovery of Gaelic. Linguistic revivalism was as fervent a movement in Irish as in many other nationalisms, and the Gaelic language movement, (founded, ironically enough by an English-speaking member of the Anglo-Irish Protestant elite) strove to revive the old national tongue. Another member of the same superior caste spent less than two years on one of the remote western islands and produced a synthetic idiom adapting peasant speech for theatre in the English language — that was J.M. Synge. Gaelic revivalism was, however, a lost cause from its beginning because the peasant regions where the language had been current had been massively depopulated by the famines and mass emigrations of the 19th century. Joyce, recognising the foreignness of the English language, nevertheless didn't opt for the nostalgic revivalism of the Gaelic language movement. We need only read the first chapter of *Ulysses* to know what Joyce thought about that. The Englishman Haines, who is staying with Stephen and Buck Mulligan in the Martello tower, addresses the old peasant woman who brings the milk in what he takes to be her language:

-Is it French you are talking, sir? the old woman said to Haines. Haines spoke to her again a longer speech, confidently.

-Irish, Buck Mulligan said. Is there Gaelic on you?

-I thought it was Irish, she said, by the sound of it. Are you from west, sir?

-I am an Englishman, Haines answered.

-He's English, Buck Mulligan said, and he thinks we ought to speak Irish in Ireland.

-Sure we ought to, the old woman said, and I'm ashamed I don't speak the language myself. I'm told it's a grand language by them that knows.

-Grand is no name for it, said Buck Mulligan. Wonderful entirely.

*Ulysses* was published in the year after the establishment of the Irish Free State, in which the nationalist government would try to foster the teaching and use of Gaelic — with little success. In *Ulysses* Joyce's view of Irish nationalism remains as critical as in the *Portrait*. The patriotic Citizen in the pub is even more fanatically anti-semitic than Mr. Deasy, the anglophile loyalist. Joyce's lack of sympathy with any form of militancy — either of oppressors or of liberators — is evident from many pages

of his books. Like his Stephen, Joyce would have said, 'I fear those big words which make us so unhappy.' When he wrote *Ulysses* as a modern counterpart of the *Odyssey*, he was really writing an anti-epic. Where Ulysses had returned to Ithaca to triumph as a hero by slaughtering the suitors, Bloom's conquest over Blazes Boylan, who has that very day slept with Molly in his own marital bed, is in the 'equanimity' with which he takes it. The only violence in this anti-epic is when the racist Citizen throws a biscuit tin at Bloom, and when one of the drunken British soldiers knocks Stephen down outside the brothel because his patriotism has been outraged. Joyce in fact not only made his hero a pacific character but also divested him of the accepted manly virtues. The gossips in the pub speculate about his sexual inadequacies, and indeed Bloom hasn't had normal intercourse with Molly for ten years.

It's not with the dominant political and religious currents of Irish national existence that Joyce's main interests in his art are aligned, but with those who are marginalised or excluded. The principal characters of Joyce's fictions are, like himself, exiles in one sense or another. Stephen Dedalus, even before he leaves Ireland, is an internal exile, rebelling successively against family, fatherland and church. Leopold Bloom is the son of a Hungarian Jew, and himself a Protestant convert, and therefore doubly alien in Catholic Dublin. He is the natural target of nationalist and anti-semitist hatred, as by the Citizen in the pub, or the fantasised accusers in the Circe episode. Molly Bloom is half-Spanish and, in her imagination, an exile from 'Gibraltar as a girl where I was a Flower of the mountain'. Joyce's only play titled *Exiles*, has as its central character Richard Rowan, who, out of the desire to be a free man, had left Ireland with his wife Bertha, as Joyce himself did with Nora Barnacle. In *Finnegans Wake* the name of the dream-figure, Earwicker, suggests that he is of Scandinavian stock. And his wife, Anna Livia, is also the mythical persona of the River Liffey which flows through Dublin, carrying its filth and debris with it, but looking towards its merging with the sea. The final sentence of her monologue and of the book is the voice of a homesickness for another, larger and desired identity. But the sentence remains unfinished because that homeland of desire can never reach definition or completion:

A way a lone a last a loved a long the

(To be Continued)

#### Notes

1. Gauri Visvanathan, *Masks of Conquest* (1989: Columbia University Press).
2. The critics are Declan Kiberd (*Ulysses*) and Seamus Deane (*Finnegans Wake*).

# Learning to play by the book

Teresa Mclean

I was amazed to find my 10-year-old son preparing for his match as captain of the local club's junior team by reading *MCC Masterclass: The New MCC Coaching Book*. At first his motive had been to learn how to captain successfully, by reading the book's piece on the subject, written by Mike Brearley. So enjoyable did this piece prove, he moved on to other pieces on other subjects.

The book was pronounced "brilliant, with excellent pictures". The results on the field of play were modest, and, out of curiosity, I started reading the book.

The secret of its readability lies in its variety of both cricket topics and authors. For instance, if you do not like Dennis Lillee's short, sharp style of teaching, as in "Do not run further than is necessary", you can turn to Illingworth's more elaborate advice. "Imagine you are a cartwheel. Your front arm is high and the head looks outside it at the batsman. If the wheel turns forward, and you are sideways to the batsman, it is impossible not to bowl a straight ball". Until I read that passage, I thought I was an off-spinner.

I am lending the book to the man coaching my son's cricket club, who was reassured that he would find most useful the practical advice offered by Hubert Doggart, a Cambridge University, Sussex and England Test cricketer famed for his batting, bowling and close fielding in the 1950s.

It will be interesting to see if it helps the club, which has some talented young players unable to produce good results.

So how much use is coaching? Some years ago, England left the field defeated

at Headingley, determined to rectify their technique and do better next time.

By contrast, Colin Croft, the West Indian fast bowler of the late 1970s and early 1980s, was not being boastful — merely matter of fact — when he said: "I never needed coaching. I had a natural way of bowling and tried to learn from my mistakes. Coaching would not have helped me".

That is the traditional West Indian attitude and it has not served them badly.

Watching England's batsmen swipe and heave in the first Test, I could not help wondering whether coaching is any more than a ritual, its pupils left with their natural abilities clumsy and undeveloped. Spontaneous cricket learns most from experience of play, as Croft and many other experts on the subject have pointed out.

So I was surprised that one of the most successful experts, Viv Richards, has written a short piece in the *MCC Masterclass* called "The Natural Approach to Batting". In it, he says he decided to write for a coaching book "because there is a balance between suggested methods, orthodox and well tried, and the priceless experience of the Masters".

For him the balance was obviously in favour of experience and he describes with relish how much he learnt, particularly in concentration and stroke-play, from his duels with Lillee. His article is short, high-spirited and, as he puts it, "not a technical matter".

He thinks the only time he may have learnt something from "orthodox" methods was in a brief visit to the Alf Gover

Cricket School when he first came to England. Even then, he believes the school's teaching on the correct positioning of his left elbow and shoulder was more confusing than helpful. "In fact all I learned — all I required to learn — was that I needed to play a little straighter".

For most batsmen, that is a valuable principle of play and most batsmen need more help than Richards in getting it right. He makes a sound point when saying that coaching is often too detailed and too intolerant of personal styles, yet he still joined Geoffrey Boycott and David Gower in writing a piece on "The Strokes".

He is much less technical than Boycott in his teaching, but he does have lessons to give. "Go right back or right forward. Use as much of the crease as possible. Let the ball come to you."

I like that sort of simple teaching, but I doubt if there can ever be a single ideal balance between the simple and the detailed, the natural and the technical.

English bowlers today, however, whatever their views on coaching, should revive at least one enjoyable verse from the great Hambledon Cricket Club's "old cricketing song," written in 1776, and follow its guiding principle.

"Ye bowlers, take heed, to my precepts attend,

On you the whole fate of the game must depend.

Spur your vigour at first, now exert all your strength,

But *measure each step, and be sure pitch a length.*"

 ENRICHING RURAL LIFESTYLE

## Why there's sound of laughter in this rustic tobacco barn....

There is laughter and light banter amongst these rural damsels who are busy sorting out tobacco leaf in a barn. It is one of the hundreds of such barns spread out in the mid and upcountry intermediate zone where the arable land remains fallow during the off season.

Here, with careful nurturing, tobacco grows as a lucrative cash crop and the green leaves turn to gold... to the value of over Rs. 250 million or more annually, for perhaps 143,000 rural folk.

Tobacco is the industry that brings employment to the second highest number of people. And these people are the tobacco barn owners, the tobacco growers and those who work for them, on the land and in the barns.

For them, the tobacco leaf means meaningful work, a comfortable life and a secure future. A good enough reason for laughter.

 **Ceylon Tobacco Co. Ltd.**  
*Sharing and caring  
for our land and her people.*



# PEOPLE'S BANK

## *Celebrating Three Decades of Dynamic Growth*

In 1961 People's Bank ventured out in the challenging world of Banking with a staff of only 46... and a few hundred customers.

**Today,** just 30 years later

*People Resource exceeds 10,000  
Customer Listings at a staggering 5.5 Million  
Branch Network in excess of 328, THE LARGEST  
in Sri Lanka*

In just three decades People's Bank has grown to become a highly respected leader in the Sri Lankan Banking scene. Their spectacular growth is a reflection of the massive resources at their command dedicated to the service of the common man — a dedication that has earned them the title "Banker to the Millions"

# PEOPLE'S BANK

Banker to the Millions

