Page 1
Vol. 18 No. 7 August 15, 1995 Price RS.
EXCLUSIVE
LAKSHMAN I
tal
Mark N
Mervyr
THONDAMAN'S DE
DEVOLUTION AS C
THE GREAT
The meaning
ETHNIC CONFLC
O Patrickc Jayasurių
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

BOAN
|O.OO Registered at GPO, Sri Lanka QD/33/NEWS/94
KADİRGAMLAR
ks to
sicholson
de Silva
VOLUTION PACKAGE
ON FLICT STRATEGY
- Ananda VMVelihena
PEACE HOAX
- S. Sathamanthas
of “REGION'
- Kanishka Jayasuriya
r: Where's the link?
– Rohan Jayaubardene
TOL O U... Korunloutiloukce

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tSyOUF
 

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Page 3
KADIRGAMMAR INTERVIEW
CHANDRIKA : SUR
Mark Nicholson and Mervyn de Silva
T赠 Sri Lankan government Will offer a "very substantial devolution" of power to Tamils in the island's north and east, in a political package according to Mr Lakshman Kadirgamar, the foreign minister,
Mr Kadirgartar said the government of Mrs Chandrika Kumaraturge Was confident it could forge a consensus around the package, which it hopes will form the basis of a political Solution to LL LKKL a LLLL LHLLSS SLLLLL LLLLLLaL aaaL
K LLLLSLLLLLLLL LHHLHLLLLLLL LL LLL LLLLLL and east has claimed more than 50,000 ||Wes in the past 20 years.
Mr Kadirgamar said in an interview that the government had in effect ruled out further negotiations with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the guerrilla group led by Mr Wellupillai Prabhakaran.
LTTE fighters, civilians and Sri Lankan troops have died in fighting since peace talks between Mrs Kumaratunge's administration and the LTTE broke down in April. Fighting has intensi: fied in the past two weeks as the LTTE launched a Counter-attack against a goWernment offensive to capture LTTEheld territory on the Jaffna peninsula. Officials said that government forces were "consolidating" their position in the
Orth.
Mr Kadirgamar blamed the LTTE for ending peace talks in April and said the TNOVE Flad "CEOSed the dOOr" On Turthiër direct talks. Direct negotiations have looked unlikely since Mrs Kumaratunge in May accused Mr Prabhakaran of masterminding the assassination of Mr Rajiv Gandhi, the former Indian prime
TillStar.
Stead Mr. Kadi Wernment aimed to ne the Tigers by support for its prop ckage. He believe mentary politicians Sures, and the Oppi nal party WOLld be object.
The package, W Said he had discu TarTill groups, Woul posals to de Wolwe : to the Orth Erld Ea5 Control Jwar land,
ElisiäTCE. "THEri which Will belong t reserve list of pc. central governmen
The package W. ders or precise terri tion, which should Order COIIllission long sought an all merging Jaffna an Ca With the COL"tr which includes bol malele adfertile fa
The package Wo Work'' which, if ba political parties, W. ents to the Const Would need the SL parliament and a r rgamar added. The til Etable in Tirid || ption of its forthcor al refereld UT. Om east. Tirning Would outcome of fighting

E OF CONSENSUS
rgamar said, the goiSolate and UndermiWinning cross-party losed devolution pai most Tamil parliaWOLuld back the meaosition United Natioa "hard pressed" to
hich Mr Kadirga mar SSed in Outlie Witi dcontain broad proOWE fror Colombo stin a reas emboracing
policing, education W|BElist ofärüäS o the regions and a Wers belonging to t".
ould lot define bor
Crial uitS. of dig WolU
| bg left to EWEtLJa S.Tamil groupS hawe OnOTOUS HOTelard d the northern prowy's eastern province, h the port of Trincomlands to the South.
uld be only a "frameIcked by Sri Lankan ould require armenditution to enact. This Ipport of twothirds of efered MKadi2 government had no fobr the . 8 WBe[1tLJaqI ad0Thing proposals or for ting TeaSure S r the partly depend on the gin the north,
He conceded that since the decision to ignore the LTTE as a political interlocutor, success in pushing through the proposed devolution measures would rely heavily on the Sri Lankan army managing to "enfeeble" the Tigers as a military force. Failure to shake the Tigers' stronghold in Jaffna would make it impossible for moderate Tamils in the north, or Supporters of the government's proposed devolution moves, to make their political Weight felt.
GUARDAN
Wol. 18 No. 7 August 15, 1995
Price Rs. 10. DO
Published fortnightly by Lanka Guardian Publishing Co. Ltd. No. 246, Union Place ClOTO-2.
Editor. Mervyn de Silva Telephone: 4,47584
Printed by Ananda Press B25, Sir Ratriajothni Sarawana ITL itti I Mawathia, CollOfTb70 13. Telephone: 435975
CONTENTS
The CWC Propas al5 The ALugust-1991 Conflict
Resolution Strategy The PBBCE Himax
Eti: Conflict --
Fat Fitti
Singapore: The Politics of
Regional Definition 13 Re-discovering Rawaria (2) 19 Boks 2O

Page 4
THE CWC PROPOSALS
Devolution Package Response of the Ceylon V
he Ceylon Workers Congress appreciates the effort
LLLLLL LLLLLL aLCCaaL LLaLLLLL a L0LLLLLC C aaLLmLLL LLLLL LCL0LLCL LL LLLLLL question, AS President of the C.W.C., I wish to command Your LTLLLauC aaaaLC LCLCLLL LaLLLLLCLLLLLLLLLLLLCCLHLLLLS LeLuLLLLL boldness that is evident in the current devolution package is rather Lunprecadanted. Perhaps the seriousness of the crisis has damarided an approach which did not have a parallel earlier. For the Government and the LTTE, to engage in a seriousand dispassionate discussion, the devolution package offers a worthwhile opporturity. However, political leaders of all shades may have to be sensitive to the reality that the content of devolution needs further LCCLLLLLLLLH HHHL LLLLCLL LLLLLLLL LLLLLLLH LLa LaaLLtLLLLLLS
It has been a harsh reality that the unitary Constitutions of Sri Lanka failed signally to build up unity. In the light of this experience, the idea of a Union of Regions is a Welcome departure. To recognise and to satisfy diverse concerns of a Tulti-ethnic society, such a Union offers the potential of success. A Union of Regions would presupposefull-fledged autonomy. It is in the nature of an aggrieved Tinority which has had an experience of exclusion to view the package with misgivings. To evoke credibility, even the faintest room for distrust reeds to be dispelled. The progressive features of the package need to be reinforced through the fullest clarity. Avoiding provisos and qualifications would remove wastiges of ambiguity and strengthen credibility. It would therefore be prudent to refire thię package through di SCUSSioms before presentation to the negotiating party,
For over six decades the Tamil problem has been of serious concern to all communities of Sri Lanka. The Tamil speaking people as the dominant population of the North-East demanded autonomy from the early fifties. Recognition of their special concerns in a clearly identifiable and contiguous territory induced successive Governments to formulate a special package of settlement to assuage their apprehensions and to satisfy their aspirations. The B.C. Pact of 1957 through to the devolution package of 1995 effused froT the same thinking. However, a disinclination to concede the reality of a special solution for a special probler has induced Successive Governments to extend the solution for the North-East Region to other Regions. When autonomy is contemplated for all Regions there is a nagging fear that the power of the Central Government Would inevitably be whittled down. This apprehension results in diluting the content of devolution. The resulting package of demented devolution is then offered to the people of the North-East. They become more prone to spurning such a package than considering it. Thereafter the response is either lukewarm or positively hostile. When the political package is rejected what the nation witnesses is "the extension of politics by other means" i.e: War. Four decades of recent Sri Lanka have seen a recurrence of this phenomenon. I am convinced that a radical departure and a b'Cold initiative Would spel||Success.
Sri Lanka is not large enough to extend autonomy to eight Regions. Except the North-East, the other seven Regions are not adequately large to receive autonomy. Six years of Provincial Council experiance has shown the experiment at devolution to be a failure. The C.W.C. would therefore suggest four units of devolution for Sri Lanka. They are:

Workers Congress
North-East North Central and North Wester Central, Uwa and Sabragamuwa Western and Southern
To these four Regions, full-fledged autonomy should be granted.
The C.W.C. in its earlier proposals stressed that the boundaries of the North-East Regional Council shall be the same as at the time of independence and shall not be changed except with the consent of the Regional Council. The devolution package says that the North-East Region would be constituted by rademarcating the existing boundaries of the present North-East Province. This proposal is said to be made with a view to reconciling Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim interests. The C.W.C. still insists on the acceptance of the original proposal to keep the boundaries inviolate. However, in the avanta redemarcation of boundaries is pursuad to reconcile Sinhala,Tamiland Musliminterests, the CW.C. urges strongly that by the same token, the interests of Tamils of recant Indian origin in the plantation areas be similarly considered and a viable politico-administrative structure appropriately constituted.
The Warring parties — the Government and the LTTE - hawe to become negotiating partners if the devolution package is to be accepted and implemented. Legal shape to the proposal is crucial. But no less crucial is an appropriate political structure to take on devolution, to implement it and to Consolidate the gains of autonorty. Political pragmatism Would suggest that a politico-administrative structure already in the North-East is the best machinery to implement the Government's effort at devolution. The LTTE which has relentlessly spearheaded the struggle for freedom for over twelve years is Well equipped to wield power, exercise authority and maintain law and order. The task of governance under the devolution package is therefore best entrusted to the charge of the LTTE. Tamils who seek success in a political arrangement have an obligation to concede the lead role of the LTTE in the fight for autonomy. The Government too is constrained to acknowledge the LTTE as the legitimate receipient of devolved authority. This authority should be entrusted to the LTTE for a period of five years. The LTTE has the obligation during its tenure of five years to build up the legal framework and to develop democratic institutions for the sharing of power and the exercise of authority. The Central Government has the responsibility of providing to the LTTE support for the steady evolution of the democratic process,
would consider it my obligation to mention that courage and states manship are demanded to granting autonomy and yet not diluting it. Annexure provides a list of subjects featuring certain grey areas. Annexure II contrasting centain C.W.C. Proposals and the Devolution Package highlights the need for circumspection.
I am most pleased to compliment Your Excellency for embarking on the most laudable but tortuous path of seeking to bring about ethnic harmony. I wish Your Excellency and the Government positive results and success in your endeavours.
S. Thioidaan President, Caylor Workers Congress

Page 5
LCLLLC LLC LLLLLL LLLLL LLLLLLLL aaaaLLLLLLL L LLLLa aL LLmaa Concurrent List has been dispensed with, the spectre of "concurrence tardy. A subject mentioned in the Regional List will be weighed dow noted below bring home the point,
REGIONAL LIST
1. Housing and Construction Collet: Authority over housing granted to the Regional Council is thwarted by reserving Specialised National housing Programmes for the Central Government. It is rational that housing should go over in told to the Regional Council.
2. Agriculture and Agrarian Services COTTITLE:Illt: Agriculture is inconceivable without Regional Council having authority over Research Development and Training. Under the Thirteenth Amendment, Research was wested with the LLLLYLLLLaaCCLLLLaaaLKLLL00LLLLaLLaLaL LLLLLaLLLSSLLLL LCLLC wested in the Central Department of Agriculture. The Devolution Package is not an advance on the Provincial Council System. With the argument of training as a central subject, even the School of Agriculture established by the North-East Provincial Council at Wavuniya was taken over by the central Department of Agriculture.
3. Health and Indigenous Medicine CCIIIIlierit: The totality of Health Administration is reserved for the Centre. The Regional Council cannot so much as get even Malathior sprayed. Indigenous Medicine alone is left to the Regional Council.
4. MIIOr PDrt Bn Harbours Collent: Trincorralee along with Kankesanthurai are the two harbours for the North-East Regional Council. But they come under the purview of LaCCCLLLCS LL LLEaaHLLLL LLLLLLaHLLLLHHLHHLLLLLaLLaeLHHLCLLLLLLLL control, the Toment it imports some onions from the Port of Madras since that would be international transportation.
5. ProTottin Luf TEJLIrigs
IlITII: Promotion of Tourism is a follow-upon Tourism Development, Development Proposals of a Region can be vetoed by the Centre as not being consistent with National Policy on TourisT. The Regional Council should have authority Ovar Policy, Development HTitl FrքmtյliԼյր,
S. Protectio Of the El Wret CÖTITlent: Evolving an Environment Policy appropriate to the Region in a particular development context should west with the Regional Council. Superwention of National Environment Policy can thwart any development programme of the Regional Council.
7. Takes - |Ill:DITIE
ENGIS Turlower are to be specified. C
The riced to be specific is imperative. On specifics depend the quantum of funds. ag: there may be no incorne tax since incomes have been destroyed over the last twelve years or more.
B. Taxes on Mineral Rights COITITient: There is alikelihood of the right of taxation being denied to the Regional Counci|| Simca mimerals coma Lunder the purview of the Centre.
9. Television COITITEnt: A ReSgrved Subject should rol Subwert a Subject of the Regional
Շtiլյritl

Alexure rial list and the Reserved List. One is left to conclude that though the 'is made to haunt the devolution process, Dual control is administratively In and scuttled when it its included in the Reserved List. The subjects
RESERVEDLIST
1. Specialised National Housing Programmes.
2. National Standarads relating to Research Developmentand
Training in the area of Agriculture.
3. National Health Administration inclusive of existing Special
Purpose Hospitals and Teaching Hospitals. Training, Education and Research relating to Health. Development of National Health Standards. Administration of all Spacial ProgramTimes: Eg: Anti-Malarla Campaign.
4. Airports, Harbours, Ports with International transportation
5. National Policy on Tourism
6. National En WIronment
7. Taxes - Excluding those devolved on the Region.
8, METHIS HIld Milles
9. TelevisiOI InstitutiOS

Page 6
1. Relief Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
COT Tent: The Reserved subject can deny to the Regional Council the authority over Public Utility infrastructure Development which Will be är major component in Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
14. Industries and Industrial Development
COITITlent: Industrial Development and establishment of industries are inconcewable without industrial research and training. To bifurcate them would be to scuttle industrial development. Thus Rasa arch and Training should be a Subject for the Regional Council,
16. Regional Financial and Credit Institutions - Regional Councils will have the power to set up their own financial Institutions
COTTlent:
A Stock exchange should be treated as a financial institution and
a Regional Council should have authority to establish one,
Regulation may be undertaken by the National Securities Commi
ՑՑ|DIT1:
17, International Borrowings
Comment: Concurrence of the Centre for borrowings above the prescribed limit would be a serious inhibition against serious and responsible negotiaticım,
18. Regional I.G.P. appointed by the Chief Minister in consulta
tion with the Governor of the Region
COITIT18 Illt:
This power of appointment should be exercised by the Chief Minister
in his unfettered authority.
19. Regional Police Commission

10. Public Utility, Infrastructure Development
11. National Rivers
COTT1 ent: Criteria should be spelt out to identiosy National Rivers and a list of such rivers should be specified in a schedule.
12. Labour Regulation and Standards COITITEint: Authority over labour should west with the Regional Councils.
13. Museums and Archeological Sites declared by law to be
of National importance
COITITlent:
Criteria should be awolved to identify those of National importance,
They should be specified in a schedule at the very outset. All others
should come under the purview of the Regional Councils.
14. National Industrial Research and Training
15, Inter-Regional Irrigation Schemes
COTT ment: When this is a subject in the Reserved List, the Regional Council is divested of all authority over development, maintenance, Water distribution and Tianagement ofagriculture. All such schemes currently in operation should be wested with the Regional Councils, Proposals for the future initiated by a Regional Council should have LaLLL LaLLaLLLLLLL0 LLL LLL LLLLLLLLS LLLLaLLLLLCLLLLLLL LLLLLL aLLaLL LLLLLLCLLu Regional Council or Councils. Proposals for the future initiated by the Central Government should have the concurrence of the concerned Regional Council or Councils.
16. Stock Exchange and Futures Market
17. International borrowings above a prescribed limit will requi
re the concurrence of the Centre
18. Appointment in Consultation with the Governor
19. Appointment by the Constitutional Council
COTT Teat: Appointment should be by the Chief Minister with clearance from a High-Posts Committee of the Regional Council. Appointment by the Constitutional Council is tantamount to extending the arm of the Central Government into the affairs of the Regional Council.
20. Nation Education COTSS ir
Composed of Representatives of the Centre and the Region entrusted with a) identifying national schools and universities in consultation with the Chief Minister, b) setting minimum standards with regard to training, examination, curriculum and employment of teachers.
Content:
Education should be fully devolved and a Regional Education Commi
ssion appointed by the Chief Minister should be entrusted with the
above responsibilities envisaged for the National Education Conmi
SSI.

Page 7
21. The Governor will appoint a Regional Attorney General
If a law is seen to be unconstitutional, the Regional Attomay LLLLLL LLLLL LHHLLLLLLLLHHH LHLCa LL0 LLetLCCCLaaaL LLLLLaLaLLLLL LLLLLL before the Supreme Court.
COTTignt:
It is not clear against Whorn action will be instituted. Is it the Chief
Minister?, the Board of Minister? or the Regional Council?
22. Regional Public Service Commission
COITTIgit: The Chief Minister should be wested with authority for the appointment of the Regional Public Service Commission. Appointment by ConstituHLLLL LLLLHHL aaaCHLL0L aL LLLLL LLmLLLLLLL LLLLL LaL LLCCLL LL LLLLLLCLLL of a Luthority ower the Public Service.
CMCPROPOSAL
1. Uit of DC Wolution The boundaries of the Regional Council shall be the same as at the time of independence and shall not be changed except with the consent of the Regional Council.
The powers deWolved to the Regional Council cannot be changed exceptat the request or with the Consent of the Regional Council.
2. Advocate General The Governor of the Regional Council in consultation with the Chief Justice (Judge) of the Region shall appoint a person who is qualified to be appointed a Judge of the High Court to be Advocate General for tha Ragion,
It shall be the duty of the Advocate General to tender advice to the LCaTaLLLLMLL aaLHH LaLLLLL LLLLLL CaLLLGL LLLLLLL MaLH aLaL LLLLL LaLLLL by the Chief Minister.
3. Financial Arrangements A Constitutionally guaranteed quantum of financial resources will be LLGL LL LLL LLL LLLL LLLLHCLL LHH LLaL LLLLLaLLLLLLLaLa LLL to the Regional Council,
The quantum may be determined on the basis of a percentage of the GNP or the Annual Budget.
The quantum may be determined annually with the budgetary exerciSE.
4. Financial Infrastructure The Regional Council shall| hawe the right to establish institutions for finance and investrTants. The following institutions are envisaged:
Barks
Foreign Bank Branches
Insurance Companies
Regsorial EPF
Regional ETF
Litterias
Regional BO
Stock Exchange

22. Appointment by Constitutional Council The Regional Public Service COTThission Will Consult With the National Public Service Commission in effecting transfers.
Alexure I
DEVOLUTION PACKAGE
1. Unit Of De Volution
One of the Regions Would be constituted by redemarcating the existing boundaries of the present North-East Province.
2. Regional Attorney General The Governor Will appoint a Regional Attorney General.
The Regional Attorney General Will advice the Governor an ing Constitutionality of the laws passed by the Regional Council. If a law LL L0CCH HH LLL HaHattmLLLLaLLLLSS LaLL LLL LLLLLLaL LLLLLLH aaLLL LaH Supreme Court.
3. Financial Arrangements
There willboa National Finance Commission entrusted with allocating grants to the Region.
4. Financial Infrastructure Regional Financial and Credit Institutions.
International borrowings above a prescribed limit will require the COCLITIC of the Centre,
Stock Exchange and Futures Market.

Page 8
| DEVOLUTION
The August-1991 Conflic
Ananda Wellihena
|E. first Ethic COffict TESolution
strategy of the Peoples' Alliance (PA) GowerTIngrl Carl Bg Linderstood in the context of the Package of Proposals presented by the Parliamentary select Comimittee (PSC) whose aim Was "to recormend Ways and means of achieving peace and political stability" in the country.
The PSC was initiated by the previous UNP regime on 9 August 1991, with a view, 1) to arriving "at a political solution to the question involving the devolution of power to the Northern and Eastern Provinces, 2) to preventing the disintegration of the also, the killing of innocent civilians,
LHHLHHHHHHHHLLLLLLL LLLr LHHLLLLLLL LLLLHLHaH L aLLLL00 LHHaaH LLL youth fighting for a cause, the increased militarization of the culture of violence, 3) to achieving peace and political stability and utilizing the reduced defense expenditure for rapid economic growth and mational development" (Har Sārd, C. 1270-1285, 9.8.1991).
The Report of the PSC together With the proceedings of the Committee and Minutes of Evidence Was handed over to the Speaker Mr. M.H. Mohammed and Parliament on 12.11.1993 (Hansard, C. 206, 12.1.1.1993).
The PSC came into being after the Totion was moved and seconded by two SLFP Opposition Members of Parliament. It received the support of the Speaker of the House and the late President Ranasinghe Premadasa.
OutcOITle
The outcotle of the PSC Was the Draft Interim Report which was called the majority consensus proposal, endorsed by the UNP, SLFP, LSSP, CP, SLMC and two MPs of Jaffna District, Mr K. Srinivasa and Mr Basheer Segudawood. The Tamil parties and the CWC responded negatively to this Report. They dissociated themselves from the PSC immediately after its presentation,
The process of the functioning of the PSC commenced With the receipt of 300 or more proposals which Were categorised into political parties, organizations
L HHHH LLGLLL LLLL YLLLLGLGL LLL LLLL LaLeLCCLC ML LLaH Uriversity of Peradeniya.
ad iridiWidLa TET that Was issued Was PAPER Which tro proposals providing wincial Council (CP another for the Ea. power was to be de Apex Assembly wa those of these two s. that they would hawl and plan for the er Provinces, which W. Regional Council, cerning devolution shiment of an Uppe TTET, DENOMulcan
Independenil Finan framework Wasexp: was called the OPT
The response o parties (EPRLF, TE PLOTE AND ACTC to this proposal was presented, instead Which was known : FORMULA Wich detailed proposals formulated (Tamil T It provided for
1) One politico-ad sisting of the Ni
2) meaningful de
PCs.
3) institutional
Muslims; and
4) The Sinhalese
have the Same hawe in the Ott
The second phas Was the Creation O' Which was differe It was known as th sal, Which include: the North and ano scheme of devoluti to that of the India However, Mr. Srini of his subsequent as Well as the East federal units. This by the six Tamil par latter Withdrew an

t Resolution Strategy
pers, The document addle CONCEPT Iuced a package of or come separate Profor the North and it to each of Which olved separately. An to be elected frost eparate Councils so power to deliberate tire Not and East uld then be called a Broader issues Con'eWealed the establiChaber of ParliaOTTYssion and as CE COTIFTSSion. Tills Inded With detallSand ON PAPER
Ffered by the Tamil ILO, EROS, ENDOLF, ) together with CWC, again negative. They their own proposal as the FOUR-POINT Summed up the hät LIFE TULF Hās Imas, 15 April, 1993).
Tinistrat|We Unit CO1orth and the East,
folution of powers to
arrangermentS for
in the North-east to ights as Tamils Would er provinces.
e of the PSC process a SC COId fra T1E3 Work from the earliest One. e Sriniwasan Propoone separate PC for Fēr for the East. Te in of power was similar quasi-federal system. aSal revealed in One letters that the North should function as full roposal was rejected ies and the CWC. The dissociated itself from
the PSC for it argued cogently for a merged North-East administrative unit endorsing the Tamil four-point formula.
The Srinivasan Proposa Was converted into a full report called the Draft Interim Report which the Chairman presented in Parliament. The Tamil parties met togetherto decide on their nextcourse of action. They issued a Stater Terit and dissociated therselves front the PSC. They stated that the report indicated a "majority consensus: that "it confirms the lack of will of the Sinhala polity represented in parliament regardless of whetherit is the ruling UNP or the major Opposition, the SLFP, to come to grips with the legitiпtate gпеvances and the aspirations of the Tamil people" (Lanka Guardar, 15.11, 1993, p. 5).
UNIP-SLFP Consensus
Another feature of the PSC Was the success arrived in reaching a Governmerel-Opposition consensus. This was a unique achievement and was regarded as one of the aims of the PSC, in the past, conflict resolution strategies hawe reaCheda dead Brid due to the failure of the UNPändSLFPLOrgachla COnSenSUS.The Opposition obstructed the implementation of past Peace Pacts. The BandaranaikeChelvanayagam Pact was opposed by the UNP and the Dudley-Chelwanayagam Pact was opposed by the SLFP. A conSensus between the Government and thg Opposition was essential to solve the ethnic problem. The credit goes to the UNP government for having stressed the need for this. The Chairman was pleased that a major historical breakthrough was possible. In his letter to the Speaker of the House he expressed his joy:
"The Committee has explored all avenues to find a solution that is acceptable to all parties concerned. Meanwhile, ampleased to report to you Mr Speaker that the Members of the Committee, representing the UNP, SLFP, SLMC. CP, and LSSPhave reached an agreement....." (TarT77|| Times, 15.01.1993, p.9)
However, the UNP and the SLFP were accused by the Tamil parties of lethargy and indifference regarding the need for

Page 9
urgency to submit their own proposals for the resolution of the ethnic conflict. They stressed the folly of the decision of the SLFP to boycott the sittings of the PSC at the Outset.
Response of Tamil parties
The third feature of the PSC Was the participatory role of the six Tamil parties and the CWC. Their presence facilitated the functioning of the PSC though its projected aim was not achieved. They observed the prevailing trends and decided to submit a four point formula. They did not Withdraw from their stand-points but critically responded to and rejected the proposals and arguments put forward by tg |PSC
Their participatory role was exercised On a Collective basis. It was founded on the Unity of all Tamil political parties except the LTTE. They were successful in receiwing the help of the CWC Which actually was always the first to assist the Tamil parties to launch their programmes. This COLIld be attributed to two Thain reaSOris: 1) the CWC enjoyed a favourable position as a government party in coalition in which Mr Thijf dalam Was a Cabinèt linister, and 2) it adopted a strategy to use this opportunity to establish Cordial relations With the Tamil parties by supporting their plans.
THE LITTE WES ES-t fra til OLLS. The chief reason was that they Were not represented in Parliament. Besides, they did not send representatives or proposals. They continued with their military option. However, the Tamil parliamentary parties adopted the strategy of negotiated Settlement. The negative impact Created by the Tamil parties on the PSC proposal reinforced the plan of the LTTE to underscore the urgency for a political solution. The Tamil parties addressed the issue of the escalation of War and LuSE edita San CD Ort= unity to articulate their interests in the four-point Plan.
The announcement of the Draft interiT Report did not bring thern any good news and they decided not to attend the PSC sittings. Their argument was that the Report Was an attempt to impose the unilateral views of the Sinhala people on the Tam|| parties and that it cannot be called
Siri-Tai COSESLS.
Future plans
The PSC episode is a lesson in ethnic Conflict resolution strategy for a government. Such an experience Would facilitate the formulation of future policy packages. The 5SECESS (Cof the extre Solution Strated =
gy is Contingent Up this process of expe rly about the limitat and criticisms which TECOSiderad förä Wii The following are
which require furthe
1) It is an urgent the quest or de-Terged ty cial Councils totally merg rth-East prow CrSide r a rT1 pting a new.f the existing only a British
2) It implies th ethnic group: MLSShaw, in the Nort F. North-east W and also apa Silda ärid regions Wil|| || cated tes Cultural ident
3) The quanturi
WE W|| HāW LETE TITLETE and the sub
4) The unit of C to be the R TՒlt tläriltitor of Sri Lälkä frrm ofa Uni re a unitary establishing ally integral, pendent Re
Criticist
Firstly, the PSC Y a government-OE This is inadequate teel Tuch or E WOrked hard to had TaTill CŪTISÉSUS, gnificantissues èT the deliberation WF the carpet. They're dressed, una tend focus Was eXCESS issue,
The CW devolu be located in this its experience. Th State is to do what and rectify the pitta experiences. It ha the PSC has stop past faults and fail

on the knowledge of rience, and particulaiOS, dissatisfactions ought to be seriously able desired solution. SOThe of the issues rthinking:
Eneed to look beyond Search for either a wo separated Provin(North and East) or a ed, ContiguQUSNOCE. It is essential to erged region boy adort of demarcation of boundaries Which is colonial legacy.
at zones based on of Tamil, Sinhala and E to be redeTlarCated -East province. The ill comprise the North rtofTriCOTaleB.The the Muslim dominated pe separately demarure their stability and ity.
1 of power to be de Wolto takià irt) a CCOLJrit ance Of la Warld Order Es f|Hfl.
de Wolutio Would ha WE Egional Council (RC). atic socialist Republic WCLuld hawe to take the on of Regions to ensu
Stelle Wt ä WäW C a sowereign, territoriUnited, fred ard indeJublic,
Was keer to obta ir Olly position consensus. , Its ir Should ha WE Toader: it should hawe We achieve a SinhalaSecondly, SeWeral silarged in the course of ich tflé FSC Bft und Br laightertUädgdt0 arti Urdoré. ITS Wely on the de-Tierger
tion proposals have to text EPSC and e responsibility of the has relained UdOITE ls, lilitations and other s to begin from where ped and learn from its ures. It is only then that
it can be closer to the winning post of a good Solution.
The new Devolution Proposals, issued by the PAGovernment on 3 August, 1995, after having introduced its content unoffcially through the mass media a few days ago, arrived after a lapse of four years since the PSC Report was presented. They were obviously framed With the abowe perspectives in mind. They indicate positive signs of a more enduring political solution. This is evident from the responses in favour of these proposals which are on the increase. They are from those who have a genuine interest in establishing peace and stability in the country, The meWproposals hawe achieved already the results which the PSC failed; the consensus of almost all the Tamil parties. All that is now required is a similar response from all the Sinhala Parties.
The new proposals reveal that the PA government has had a "take off from the PSC. The President, Madane Chandrika B. Kumaratunga in her Address to the Nation revealed her Gover Tient's new Devolution Proposals (CDN, August 04, 1995, p. 12) which "seek to redefine the constitutional foundation of a plural Society within a united and sovereign Republic
of Sri Lanka".
It will be based on the principles of living a life of safety, security, dignity and equality, by enjoying space to express the values of Culture, religion and language with freedom and basic human rights, for aaa LLLLLL LLLLLLL LLLLLLLLLLLLLS res will be provided in a new constitution through a scheme of devolution of power to the respective regions which Wi|| mot undermine but encourage the construction of a united, sovereign, stable and pluralistic democratic society (CDN, 04.08.95).
She emphasized that these proposals are being placed "With total sincerity of conviction aimed at a lasting political solution," and they are "not been arbitrarily or hastily for Tulated" but "in consultation with many responsible persons who hawe gained an insight into the current Crisis". Her Government has presented these proposals with awareness of all hitherto attempted ethnic conflict resolution strategies. She stated:
"In essential terms, they represent continuity. With sirTilar attempts which have been made in the past in many policy Tmaking fora. Each and every One of you will be afforded the opportunity of actively engaging in this exercise by articulating your wiews as The debate progresses" (ibid., p. 13)

Page 10
COME
VIS
TES'
VASA OF
207, 2nd C.
Colom

UTEP,
ON
TING
PTICIANS
OSS Street,
bO 11.

Page 11
The Peace Hoax
S. Sathananthan
Peoples Alliance and the Tamil Guestion
On 19 April the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) ended the cessation of hostilities. The LTTE had first set March 28th as the deadlit for the GowerTent to satisfy three conditions: closure of the Poomeryn Army camp, lifting the economic embargo on the Jaffna peninsula and eliminating restrictions on fishing. The fourth Condition-freedom of Owerrent for armed LTTE cadre in the East - Was not emphasised (Sunday Times, 19/3/95). It was hoped that the Government's pledges to remove the economic embargo and fishing restrictions would in turn induce the LTTE locompromise on the closure of Pooneryn camp. On the 27th LTTE extended the deadline to 19 April. Despite the Government's failure to implement its pledges, many political analysts in Colombo expressed shock and dismay at LTTE's withdrawal from the "peace proCESS".
The immediate response of these analysts was to condemn the LTTE for not giving the Government the 72-hour notice of termination as required under the Cessation of Hostilities AgreerTent (the Island, 7/1795), This legalistic apology masked the Government's crass neglect of the April 19th deadline, which was announced more than three weeks (23 days) earlier. It was followed by considerable breast-beating that President Chandrika Bandaranalike Kumaratunga had unwisely placed her trust in Mr Velupilla Prabhakaran. A newspaper columnist argued that Mrs Kumaratunga's mistake Was "not preparing for War while preparing for peace" (Sunday Times, 215795). Dr Jean Perera lamented that President Kumaratunga "trusted the LTTE. The LTTE in turn took advantage of the situation. Sri Lankans know this and the World knows it" (The Island, 211595).
The motion that "innocent"Mrs Kuraratunga Was Caught unawares by "Willy" Mr Prabhakaran is embedded in the belief that the Sinhalese are simple, honest people who are deceived and exploited by crafty Tamils (and others). This is a dangerous illusion. It has provided ideolo
gical justification fic ("Tamíls deserve it nomic discriminatic slins ("Simhalese in their own country of these chaLIWin Wie WS COLld be foi Amagarika Dharma
However it is beyond these bast to comprehend poli 20th century. At th recognise that a Sin be as devious (or from any other com
The Peoples AIF Sri Lanka FreedOFT ted the United Na capture power in th mentary elections. ratunga, the PA's ci Tember Of the SLF 1994 presidential fourth President of promises she mad Was to negotiate a TaITl| Cuestion.
Before and durin parlamentary ele Inga adopted an E stā WBārds Tā When influential Sil doubts Wetlar to SirālēŠē tr: reassure them. F. Week Review" ( noted the misgivin Buddhist Tolks W reported intention Solution to the TaTi opposed any Soluti model; they also r nent the temporary and eastern provin Province (NEP). med that the propi to lead to the ul Country"; and they COICETSare I Qt të Will be compelled country at the app
Within three d:

r anti-Tamil pogroms ) and social and ecoT of TTS arli MLrg third Class Citizens '). An early articulation st alE 19lh-CErllury ind in the Writings of Bala.
ecessary to go Well prejudices if We are ical realities in the late a very least We Trust halese politician could onest) as a politician munity.
ance (PA), led by the |Party (SLFP), defeational Party (UNP) to e August 1994 parliaPrie MillistēT KUITaandidate and a leading P. Won the November lection to become the Sri Laika. Ce of the a during the campaign political solution to the
gthe campaign for the tion 5 Mrs. KLITarallpparently conciliatory TS and MLSTS. ELt halese lobbies raised ir primary loyalty was sts, she was quick to is the "MidThe Island, 28.4/94) gs expressed by Some rith regard to the PA's to negotiate a federal Questic. The monks OBSEd Otheridiär jected making perma'merger of the northern Cg5 into the North-East The monks Were alarsed Solutionis "likely timate division of the | Căuţioned that If their ken into account, "they to take the issue to the ropriate tirme".
lys Mrs Kumaratunga,
speaking at the 1994 May Day rally, "solemnly promised to foster Buddhist rights in the event of her coming to power." It was explained further that she was responding to "sortie Ternbers of the Sangha (Who) had misgivings about her interest in and concern over the place of Buddhism in a future SLFP government." As regards rights of other Communities, "Mrs Kumaratunga hastened to add that the rights of other religionists will be guaranteed" (The Island, 5/5/94). She placated Tamil and Muslim voters by avoiding an outright rejection of the Indian model inclusive of the merged NEP.
But Colombo-based Tamil politicalparties promoted Mrs Kumaratunga as a peace-maker. Her statements in an interview to a Tamil newspaper, published coincidentally on May Day, Were Widely quoted by these parties to justify their elecloral Support for her, Møre than ome year ago We critically examined their arguments in the article "Broker politics: a betrayal of Tamil struggle" published in the Lanka GLardan (15/6/94). Torefresh memories, the relevant excerpts from the article are reproduced in the section ba
OW.
SLFP: a "new dispensation"?
The Wira kesari (29/5/94) reported that two prominent Sinhalese intellectuals are engaged in brokering an alliance between til SLFP and the Tämi|| United Liberatio Front (TULF) and Eelam Peoples Rewolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF). ACCOriding to Taraki, a political Columnist, the TULF and EPRLF believe (a) that Mrs Kumaratunga"will Stand firm" in resolving the Tamil problem and (b) that she is "unlike any other Sinhalese leader in the past or present". And Dr Neelan Tiruchewar, a Member of Parliament (MP) of TULF, reportedly asserted that she is "the best bet for Tamils" (Island, 29/5/94).
informal sounding revealed that some in the TULF are witually gushing over an alleged "understanding" reached Eldtween the TULF and Mrs Kumaratunga.
What is the basis of optilis T1? In her May interview published in the Virakesar
9.

Page 12
(1594), Mrs Kumaratunga offered nothing new, She merely repeated the folloWirrig Polatitudes:
1. A political solution to the Tamil problem could be achieved based on a form of decentralization of authority which includes an institutional mechanST forcentre-region interaction. Trarislated into simple language, she prefers to reduce the political autonomy of regional administration in Tamil areas and increase the powers of the Centre in order to minimise center-region friction.
2. Such a political solution Tust apply equally to all parts of the country. In other Words, she intends to ignore the Tari National Question in the tradition of Sinhalese politics.
3. The intransigence of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is the only obstacle to a negotiated peace. That is, under her leadership a future SLFP Government will pursue a military solution against Tamils in the NEP. Moreover, she has implicitly set up the LTTE as a com Venient scapegoat for har future inability or unwillingness to achieve a political solution to the Tamil Question.
4. Tamils in the NEP are virtually exhausted and wish an end to conflict. In other Words, she draws somfort from the mistaken belief that counter-insurgency techniques of collective punishment have Weakened the resolve of Tamils.
These banal observations Were widely quoted by many Tamil parties in Colombo as indicative of a new vision of ethnic reconciliation emerging within the SLFP, and as justification for Tamil support for the SLFP.
It is important to note the point omitted by Mrs Kumaratunga inherinterview. She spoke mysteriously of a proposal that is being evolved within the SLFP to solve the Tamil Question, This proposal is to be "placed before the people" (in the election manifesto). She failed to say that SLFP party policy will be changed to reflect the so-called new proposals. So the SLFP will not be bound by them. For those who are naive enough to have faith in election manifestos, they surely must remember the number of times past manifestos of Sinhalese parties have promised an end to the Tamil Question. More to the point, election Tanifestos Cease to hawe mea
O
ning after voting is o With which promises past Tanifestos W. b) Coğggle:S themind. Its the new proposals W gred to the dList bin
If thi5 a SSetijs arė to be tak Seri firstly must begin an of perception buildir to make a federal sy acceptable to the T1. lobby Within the SLF fundamental concer the new proposals policy. She has do Similar inclusion Wa mple, with respect Until she engages along these lines, a on the Tamil problem ly Es political posturi which carries note: of Which elections a
The TULF and TarTils to believe H: hawe reached al “ Mrs Kumara tunga, S as "new and improv She is the new gen
FRC)
S. ΟΙ
Af
No
Or By
Be fre

er and the regularity Coffered to Tamils ir re betrayed simply ould be obvious that ill similarly be consiafter elections.
f Mrs Kumaratunga susly by Tamils, she ition-wide campaign gamong Sinhalese stem of government Secondly, she must Pto incorporate the ts and principles of mto the official party he neither, although is effected, for exaO economic issues. in concrets actions ly positive comment muslbEtakêr ITEréng in an election year ining beyond the day fe held.
EPRLF Would like ut their organizations understanding" With he is being projected d". "New", because eration. "Improved",
because SLPF acquired a liberal sheen after a few Sinha lese intellectuals began Working with the party recently. All of which Tlade a Tamil academic in Colombo speak breathlessly of a "new dispensation" under future SLFP rule.
But the so-called "understanding" is with Mrs Kumaratunga in her individual capacity. Like other Sinhalese leaders before her, she also has NOT attempted to change policies of her party. Any assertion by Tamil parties that she could impose a change within the first nine months of an SLFP election Victory by voluntarily initiating (presumably through sheer altruism) OFFICIAL negotiations at GOVERNMENTAL LEVEL With the LTTE (and Tamil parties) is self-serving political fiction.
Mrs Kumaratunga has begun playing peace-maker. She is actively Wooing Tamils WITHOUT compromising the SLFP. But after the elections SLFP poliCie5 on the TasTI CILJEesti Om Will remaithe Säffleam CJthETäfT]|[]Llesti[]m W|| Continua to fester. The present as well as a future Government Will avoid negotiations with the LTTE and continue to seek a military solution in the NEP.
(To be Contin Lod)
Pianist
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Patrick Jayasuriya

Page 13
ETHNIC CONFLCT
Fact and Fiction
Rohan Jayawardene
SS Lanka has been ravaged by OaLLL LLaaaaa LLLLLLaL LLLLLLHHLLu a0L0LL LLL course of which failies and COTT unities of the South and the mortin-Chave been dewastalled by the loss of huTan lives that were so precious in the interest of their existence. It has been a repetition of a historical fact - that humans kill each other without too much hesitation in causes that are claimed to be both godly andMOT SĒCula T.
Ethnic strife is purely secular, but both varieties of conflict, the religious and the non-religious, may lle at the human reed for identity. In the case of religion, a person finds this sense of personal identity through acceptance and association with a philosophy (religion) that provides guidelines for a lifetime in the average Course of events. It therefore also serves as a strong underlying psychological Support because ethnical and Toral Values are identified with the philosophy (religion), and this serves both as a propulsion and as a fall-back factor throughout the person's existence. Any threat to this fundamental stabilizing fact-of-life in an individual or in a community is, in fact, a potential de-stabilizer of its phychological make-up during crises and generates a response that is usually emotional, even bordering om hysteria. In circumstances We hawe seen throughout hur Tari history, humans have fought a succession of disgraceful Wars causing millions of deaths, lots of thern in thenaries of gods and holy places. Which god Would approve of violence, brutality and killing in His (or Her) name? It is obvious that religions have been patently misunderstood by humans and served them poorly, Evidently. We need Resident Gods on Earth to ensure Correct understanding and practice
The other potentially divisive Source of personal or collective identity is the ethnic factor in hurlar life, ar dit is also the Other LLLa LLLLLaLLLLLLLa LLLLLLLT LLLLaLLCC mass-murders called Wars. In this insta
Cadditional ele such as loss of privi
ātā brīdri
In para one of reference to "violer Laikā Šilcē 1983 physical violence usually a high lewe greement which h Outbreak Of Wioler || necessary in the Cu i Sri Lanka to Comisi Wely a history of thi led to violent manif
Trofil.
It is absolutely ir that in Order to be cast aside unsubs Fiction – and Con Which are support tions, - the Subjec nality, should be hel vity - which arise Intelligence, oughl SiOS. If WEinsistor We and erotional, of Sentimental gut Tighty fine prOSp rnbers in CLIts, bru
many more years,
| LFB Sri Lafka are històrical fäCLÓ both Religion and l proposed here to past. The intention tB TOTE TECEt hi Cutbreak Cf Will.
It appears that th CÖTİĞİ İSİTÜBÜf|E: With LANGUAGE, language-related touch religious plac occasions, it Wast a Tong Tany ColhE ongoing violent de

lents come into play, leges/dwelling areas
his essay there Was t“ elf SrifS || 5 . However, prior to aking place there is Of il-Wit di Sas finally led to the Tanifestations. It is rrent context of things der calmly and objectie events which finally estations of disagree
important at this stage fair-rminded, e VeryOne ältlated StoriBS – Or Centrate On the Facts d by evidence, Emotive element of persodin check and Objectii te gård || |0 dBl|BITTine tur decl| being purely subjectiind be possessed only -reactions, there is a Dict Of Clari CCC ILises and Corpses for
ELTİC COfic: LETE 's Which are related to language, but it is not del We intote di Stat
Finbreirol is to establish story which led to the E.
he recent history of the SSexplicity Concermed the for Cerlet of issues. If violence did ces of Worship on stray erely one or more acts ars within a policy of TOnStratiOS
The recent history, so-called, of the dispute is based on Wo una voidably Connected language issues: the enforcement of official language policy, and at the same time the elimination of the link language factor-English.
The implementation of an official language, or more than one official lang Lage, is the preserve of politicians and One that needs application of practical considerations, discretion, and collective-wisdom. However, in a multi-ethnic society it is of paramount importance that, even if the divisive factors do indeed keep multiplying, the ethnic LINKS Which conLLLLLL L LLLLaLLL LaLLLLLLLaLLLLLLLaa LLLL aaa damagedor severed.
S S S LL S LLLLL S L LLLLLLaHH S S LLL Language-Link between Communities Was the best known international language spoken in the country, ENGLISH.
If, for example, I did not know Tamil whilst being proficientin my native tongue Sinhala, I could always talk with a purely Tamil-proficient friend in English, as indeed do even today. It is the link that Connects mythought processandemotioalreactions with his own processes, and by means of it understanding may be achieved between us.
Without the connecting link-language We could only Wonder about each other's thoughts, gestures and Totives, and perhaps reach absolutely wrong conclusions based only in suspicion
A link-language is additionally, a means of COLLECTIVE endeavour, wherein the language-medium provides a means for United Tlulti-ethnic effort.
Therefore, the factors which affect the present internecine wiolence have a recent history that is double-faceted -(a) |mplementation ofan officialpolicy and{b} Deprivation of a link. A brief factual history Of WritSSegrTStObe a SfollOWS:

Page 14
1944 - Mr J.R. Jayewardene probably
2
stated the official language policy
first. In May 1944 he proposed the following legislation in the State Council of Ceylon:
"Sir, the motion standing in my
are reads as follows:
a) That Sirhalese should be TAČIME FÉ TELT Off 75ÍFLCfor in a schools;
b) Taf Sirna lease SoLuld be made a compulsory subject Iп а!public examїпаІions;
c) Thał Legiska fior) should be їпІгоdшced fо реглпї Іhe bшSir ESS Of the Sale Coric/ ld be COrld Credir) SInhalëse also
d) That a Corrission should be appointed to choose for tranSassori arld to säIISIase irriportant books of other languages, into Sinhalese.
My notion seeks to displace English from the position which it has held for over 25 years as The officia/ sang Lage of filis country. Though English has been the official language for so папу уears, only 10 per cent of a population of over 6 Tission Speak and kлоw Ihe laпgшаge.
The tragedy that is enacted evayday in our Courts, in our Public DeparІтепlsand/пІhevery//ves Of our people is very wiwildly deScribed ir7. [Phraf farino Luis Ebook, Wisco ( WOL(d äswisé Hor. MaгтЕЈегs of Ілі5 СошлсII fo read, Called The Willage in the Jungle.
There, Sir, a Villager from a haTIET IT TFTa Har 77bārstā DiGri is brought Lp for trial in the Courts before an English Magistrate, and after a number of days of Irla, during which ha did not understanda single word of what passed between the Judge, couIsa and he other officials, as sentenced to a larg termofimpri. SO7 ment, and even at "Fat Stagg
OS FOI AF ret T ewen Today,
It is argued only Englist edUCaled Orl We displace Sir false a färg Lages, 1 OLIa large W וזחסח ILIFE|שלט YFIELYFIEITS! of ferature
ECOk fa 90 pÉ Wg Carl Jg yĖars of Er |language, т. 77e/TIS / EH Thaf Weina. We of Famous la judges and : ELLI r I II Science, afc er firely barre
WE Was Of 5 lang Lage w
Gower records at fs EäSf är. The shores
Jks
P
SL TILF
ATTC Elle
ATHLEL Re'r tir i'r
Will li
AF STE Or 1ւյt||
TLL Arld Pola Eyes th A Slee

}w wha! hadhapреägedy is CCCL rring
by those who know l, Who Flave Eiger Vy in English, That if English and frake TTI E OCI We Will be shutting Orld offeral read ()Lur pedpJ/e. They and flä läT World is already a closed PorcerT fofourpeopla. lay after sо папу glish as the official EāSLJrĒ ffS ACT seg WegS COLIrry. It is true produced arqumbar Wyers, doctors and possibly legislators, eld of ferature, of Lire, We hawe beer }" (JfäChlElựarmer"|
o Wilgri e Ilave as the language of ent. I think history Wisé rrer bot from i ha WGSi Caring ro f Larika la rağd İhğ Weгe preserved in
5äric Laffes Of The Buddhis! SaFiglā. Vs Cor 7e reads f'7 e fräi We/5 of Hsieri Tsang, Marco Polo and Fa Hien and The Wives of grea Western philosophers such as Dr. DF7a/ke, and Rhys Da Wres arīd others, we would find a contribution that this country made to World Mera reg Wher We Filad JLJr. O Worl7 3rg Lage as The Officia/ language,
It is said that many of the mysteries of Indian history were urrave/ed by the translation of the Mahavansa into English, but to: day our youths, after so rary уeагs of Bгіїish ru/e, ага пnore LLLLLLK K T aCL KLK a Henry VII Than In the historial 2 WETTS poscured fr7 EFTE Mälla WaIsa, they are more aware of the ПлаІегїalism preached by Wеslerr, pundifs, thar. In the Iri III is Which are ETEOded Irisha AEFdata. It is With a view - Changing This STILJa for 7, a situation which can only be changed by substituting the national lang Lages as the official languages, that I hawe Though I IT WISE
orroduce is roof.
(To be СолIIпшgd)
Waiting - 8
roposal Recollected
Er Eje LIFILIG?
e Lords TerTrain LITSpoker
* ST tile le le brité
2 Story that had hardly beg II.
LI Tier Irded,
Le for Carlotter to do the talking 2 (all the kisses [Flat I Finlau not Lake?
JOL rathler letme
TIL FAIT dis in the black Coils of yoLIT. Fuair Ce fru broLL (gairst LyoLr eues Latha. Le Seer beyond this pain CITIdkTOLUTI ter LisdorTT Territor LIs alone?
U. KaILIII Patilake

Page 15
Singapore: The Politics o
Kanishka Jaya,Suriya
he primary objective of this paper
is to da construct the political rationale underlying the usage of the concept of the "region'. Contrary to conventional approaches, it will be proposed that regions are socially constructed rather than natural entities. The critical point of difference between these perspectives is that the constructionist wiewpoint does mot posit an Esserial Core to a region as in Other per SCctivËS, ESPÉCIally those focusing on issues of regional cooperation. The constructionist perspective proposed in this paper demands greater sensitivity to the contingent nature of regional projects.
CÔf COLIIrSe, in COTWĘentional perSpactiWES, this essential regional core' can vary - it may be based on Culture, ethnic origin, geopolitics, "security complexes- but the point is that regions are inevitably reduced to these elements. The effect of this theorizing is to naturalize the region so that its definition LLLeLLL00 LL LLaaLLLL aL SL0LaHHHaH LLLLLLLLS S LLLLa example, this theoretical process of "naturalzation' makes it possible to identify "internal" and 'external' forces operating on regional entities - a process that enables regional dynamics to be viewed as a complex of internal and external forces. In this respect, Buzan's work on security complexes prowdes a paradigm case of this form ofundesstanding.
The essentialist view of regionalism is problematic for two main reasons. First, it presupposes an objective entity independent of the social construction of the region by subjects, AS Neumann notes:
the construct does not assert its authority as an "imagined community, a cognitive Construct shared by persons in the region themselves. Rather, it is the construct of one man-the allegedly sovereign actor."
Herein lies the problem: each essentialist construct Will produce its own "commonseSe regiorhitis not clear why any particular mode of regional definition or understanding of the region should be privileged. For example, Southeast Asia- understood as an "ECOnomic' region — is different from Sou= theast Asia as a region defind by geopolitical Dr. Security CCincarns. Therefore, as NeuTarr suggests, essentialist approaches to regional definition lead to the crucial politics of this process of definition being marginaliSed. This would suggest that the important analytical question should not be 'what is the region?", but, "Why is the region defind in this manner?" It is an approach to the study of regionalism that places great Emphasis ori the cognitive constructions of a region by political actors.
TMOHLLLOLL uutLLLTTC LLLL LLLLHmGOTMMLLLLLLLL CLLLOCCHLHHL as the National University of Singapore,
Secondly, the ess cause it takes there falls to locate the iTıp of regional discours ciety. Regional Coris define conceptions ta Sa illerititia S - lillare often fragment extent to Which mul exist will wary from : SOLutheast Asian CaS identities is particula rants further explor Lhal Lille State haS ( sometimes contradii tics, and that alth fragmentation Will W it gwartheless rema of regional discursiv. Asia. In the Singapo rice of Tultiple regio fore, by implication statė identity becom Lics of regional defin
paper.
T ES f conceptualizing this Critique of essell standings. Neur Tar account, argue:S that Benedict AnderSon immaginiad CorTim L Iriti On the basis of Selec It is the mobilization tiwas by political act lism a potent force, the rall Wärt fact IS Ed Cars Who decida W be considered politi should not'’ Regio they too are a produ "as part of some p. certain spatial and a region and di SS identity to others. standpoint, regional practices shaped b discoLrse, Which t сопCepis, пе[адло, how the region is défilé LHE actOrs ! excluded) within the ble the emergence identity. In many res. lysis shares much post-Thoides in appro: lations, o in that it pla: the Understanding cursive practice Wi interpretation.'' Ir provide a genealog
However, it is imp only how regional c But who producest case, we shal argu

if Regional Definition
entialist approach, begiOn a Sgiwen Ornatural, Jortance ofa multiplicity É:S Withirl State Brid SCtructions ofen Serveto fstate identity; however, ke personal identities - ed and multiple. The tiple regional identities state to state, but in the e, the existence of the Se arly important, and Waration. It will be argued onstructed multiplectory - regional identiLugh the externt of this ary frorT state to state, ins an irinfortant feall Ire e practices in Southeast Earl COTEx, E EXISTEnal identities, and therethe manner in which simplicated in the polfitin, is the fil-CLS of this
an alternative Way of notion are implicit in this ialist regional LInderin, in his perceptive it regions are similar to 's' view of nations as B5': māti[]ms C[]nstrucle[] WE historical TarrativE5. of these historical la faors that Take Satia
But, for CLI purposes, that it is "these political which similarities should cally relevant, and which is are Tuch the Sartle: ct of political actors who litical project imagine a chronological identity for erminate their imagined Frol this dissident ism is a set of Cognitive y language and political hrough the creation of 'S, analogiĒS, determinė defind; these Sewe to who are included (and regionard therebyenaof a regional entity and pects, this mode of arain COTTO. Wit recent aches to international reCes heavy emphasis on pf regionalism as a disth its own history and other words, it seeks to ty of regionalism".
portant to understand not efinitions are produced. nem. In the Singaporean e that while policy com
munities played some role in the management of Warious regional discourses, the production of regional identities has been pre-eminently a Stalesponsored project. Singapore is no exception. When gwer regional discourses hawe flourished in Asia thay hawa beer state organized and sponsored. Whareassocietal actors have played a major role in the process of European regional integration they are all but absent in Asia; this has profound implications for the structure and process of regional iristitutions in the geographical space of the Asia-Pacific region.
With this preamble, the paper proceeds to explore the politics of this regional understaInding in two parts. The first examines how regionalism has been defined in the Singaporean context; and the second part substantiates the view that regionalism is, in the main, a state directed project, and at the same time, explores implications of adopting this interpretive standpoint.
Singapore: A Multiplicity of Regions Economic Region
The discourse of economic regionalism has been of relatively recent origin. In this context, a key argument advanced is that there is no one dominant regional discourse and identity; rather, there is a plurality of regions which can be classified as "econdmic, 'security", or "cultural" regions. These multiple regional discourses are sometimes Symmetrical and Compatible, but often-like a jigsaw that does not quite fit - they sit uneasily together.
In the 1970s, the preferred analogy for Singapore Was Wenical It was seen as a global city, functioning as a pivotal trade and financial centre in the global economy. As a former foreign minister and deputy prime minister putit
We are Thore than a regional city. We draw SLIstenance not only from the region but also the international economy to which as a global city. We belong and which will be the final arbiter of whether We prosper or decline.
In the 1980s, while this global economic discourse had not entirely disappeared, the thrust had begun to shift towards a more distinctly regional economic perspective. Images of Singapore as the global city hawe been replaced by Singapore as a key regional centre embedded in the evolving regional .yוחםחםEC
This shift is evident in three major foreign policy economic directions:
e First, the creation of the "Growth Triangle' concept. The Growth Triangle involves Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, and seeks to take advantage of differences in factor gemidoWrTermits irnl these tirCC COLLIl
13

Page 16
tries.' While the Singapore-Malaysia leg of the triangle is largely market driven, Singapore has Tada Sigrificant Public investment in Indonesia, thereby supporting the Singapore-Indonesia leg of the triangle; all this reflects Singapore's politi cal commitment to the Growth Triangle."
Second, Singaporean foreign economic policy has been highly supportive of the ASSOCİEtiol of SDLut East Asi Nat05 (ASEAN) free trade area concept. 'In fact, despite initial strong Indonesian objections, the Creation of Sucha free trade area LLLLLLLLHHLLLLLLLLaLLLLLCLLLLLSS re of Singapore's foreign economic policy Within ASEAN.
Finally, Singapore, in recent times has beer highly supportive of the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum, indeed the siting of the APEC Secretariat in Singapore is in itself indicative of the degree of support for, and importance attached to, the APEC in Singaporean political and policymaking circles,
These changing policy parameters are therefore reflective of the increasingly dominant regional focus in Singapore's foreign economic policy, The reasons for this shift are complex and can only be briefly touched om in this essay. A major factoris the increasingly protectionist global environment that has forced Siпgарогеап policymakегs to look at regional markets, Similarly, the forTination of regional trädė blocs, Such as the LLaLLLLL LLLLLLL LLLLL S LLLLL LLLLLLaLLLL (NAFTA) has raised concerns in Singapore. LCa S SaLLLLLaLLLLLH LLL LCLLLLLLL aL LCLLLL LLLLLL investment Will make Mexico a formidable competitor for foreign investments because of its cheap abour and its proximily to the US market',' Perhaps, more importantly, Singaporean policymakers have realized the importance of a grouping such as APEC as a negotiating group for a small Country such as Singapore through which it can play an important role in influencing the foreign economic policies of the states in the Pacific Riri. 日TE担,
The changing domestic political economy in Singapore is an aspect that needs to be explored. As Rodan has argued, the globalization strategy that Singapore pursued in the LLaLLL LLa0L0LLaL LLLLLaaLaLLLLLLLaLLHHLLLLLLL betWEEr ställe and foreign Capital — ar alliance that, for largely political reasons, excluded the participation of local capital," With the rapideconomic groJ With in the AsiaPacific region, the local bourgeoisie which is predominantly located in the service and financial sectors, has bacome relatively more assertive. Especially significant in this regard is the fact that Singaporean banking institutions have not only acted as 'safe hlavëris' for overseas Chirlese capitālim Sou= theast Asia; they are also linked financially (as Well as through kinship networks). With Chinese groups in Southeast Asia. For example, the Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation (OCBC), a locally owned bank,
id:
14
skrCrig networks ar but by the early 197 Stīti trosts i top 100 companies
licative of the IT local capital in the Sing normy, for exarnple, is Curret Clair of OE Cibit Tir Star. Sir: Centre ofmany ragion: the increasing region: highlights the interest of the local bourgeois this is the increasing r of State or State influer as Telecom and Kepp ha Ve led Singapore's CÖLutries S.Lucht SWE thay hawa baan wery E
Cor Tiplementing thĘ factors has been ther Tic language that has Pacific" as a distinct reg innumerable journalis range of In-depth st economy of the Newly tries (NICs) has tran. all area. With a distin templ0 that has enabl regional economic llar understanding of Sing a regional rather tha order.
BLEVE HIS ESOrt economic language ambiguities and contré Singapore's economic Growth Triangle, AS theast Asia, or there CULJItГЕ; ОН АРЕС. А FECCIOfic: COItExil the economic region t but it is clearly a pro ambiguily and politic exar IIple, do the Unite form part of Singapor The mataphor that Si With this problem is regions as concent circles of linkage.' ' trade and industry mil that thESE Այfl:Eritri L: to be complemented E of stretc. across Cir Tetaphor is an impo understanding of re. circles unlike pyramic economic hierarchy. order of importance C. We note, in passing, t of regionalsThis of an to that in Malaysial thought is that even regitinal language car pore's multiple region
Security Region
The other regional c. Singaporean policyrт around security orient rather, insecurity—gi

d offices in Malaysia, "Os had acquired subthirty eight out of the in Malaysia.'
Ora aSSerti We role of Jap0rean politi CaleCOthat Dr Tony Tan, the CBC is a for Ther SerliOr" a local capital is at the rksסBhWח:itוחםחםal BC il ÉcolOT1iC diSCOLITSE s of important sectors ie. Anothar aspact of egional economic role cedenterprises, such el. These enterpriSeS investment push into train and China, and active in the region."
se political economy Targence of an econoConstructil "Asiagionale conomicentity, tic pieces as Well as a udies of the political industrialising CounSför Ted East Asia ir LO it economic beat and Ed the appe arance Of guage to facilitate an apore as a city within ni a global economic
to a dominant regional hides some revealing dictions, For instance, region can refer to the EAN, East ärld SOLagion bounded by the dmittedly, the political , as a rule, determines at is being advocated, cess marked by great a| Gosltraticlidsl5. FOT dStates and Australia e's economic region? |ga2O TE LISES t0 dBal revealing it proposes ric and overlapping Yeo-Cheow Tong, the mister, has pointed Out Circles of linkage hawe ly linkages that Verlap les'oriflerent in this rtant anTimbiguity in this giornali STT: CONCEen tric is do not constitute in It pla CBS ns0 particular In the various regions. hälthis LInderstanding entirely different order he point to emphasize at this economic level, serwe to mask Singaäl 201OTİC İdartitia5.
fiscourse articulated by lakars s COnstructed EdisSLIES. Security, Cor WBE CifLLIfflStarCES
of its formation - has been constitutive of Singaporean state identity. Unlike the economic rēgior With its problematically dalimealed boundaries, Southeast Asia is clearly defined as a discrete regional 'security complex. However, it is a region that is understood as an area that is constantly invaded intruded by"big powers, This has resultad in a Curious approach to regional defence Cooperation. Thus, while Singapore has sometimes looked upon organizations such as the ASEAN as a mearls of SECL-I rity, it Flas at times publicly questioned the effectivefless of the ASEANin the provision of Security to its members."
In this regard, the dominant approach to regionalism appears to be in tarms of a subordinate system, the dynamics of which are primarily determined by external factors outside the region. In other words, in this approach, the regionis Coristruedas a battleground for external powers. The construction of this idea of a Southeast Asian security region owes much to the Southeast Asian internalional relationsliterature.” The literature, in turn, borrows heavily from realist traditions in international relations. Concepts Such as 'security complex, 'subordinate systems, great power intrusions, find a deep resortance in both thE academic and policymaking bodias in ASEAN. In this regard, it confirms the post-modernist insight that literatura Om intamatical relatimis rol only "describes reality, but also helps to "manufacture' that reality, and in this case, a regional security system.
Therefore, Singaporean policy discourse about regional Security is a product of realist SOL theast Asian international relations literature. A relevant consideration in this context is that academics and influential poliCymakers ir Singapore hawe by and large been schooled in Australia and British academicinstitutions which boastastrongrealist tradition, līvariably, debates abu reginal policy have been moulded by the thinking of these practitioners of international relations, who have played an influential role in policymaking. There is no doubt that international relations, as an academic discipline, has COintributed dispropŮrtignately to the diSCLISSION Cf regiỜrialisSLJES in Singapore — perhaps more so than in many other ASEAN COL tries.
Realism has manufactured a conception of regional security that produces a "reality of Southeast Asia as a 'security complex, to use Buzan's terminology, but at the same time subordinates this security complex to the interests of 'big powers' - China, Japan and the United States. Against this background, it becomes difficult to thinkim terris of 'Southeast Asian' regional security institutions. For example, this domilarice of realism in Southeast Asia renders concepts like "Collective security' highly problematic, because from this realist perspective, whatever regiornal SECLUrity POTOCESSES emerge Will hawe to focus on the engagement of great or big powers. As With the economic discourse, a deep ambiguity lies at the heart of Singapo

Page 17
re's regional security language: an ambiguity that arises from the realist understanding of International relationsin Southeast Asia, and its consequent implications for models of regional saCurity,
Cultural Region
Interestingly, there now exists-alongside economic and security conceptions of the region - an emerging cultural notion of regionalism, which is gaining in salience, Indeed with the close of the Cold War, the opening up of China, the retreat of old ideological certainties, and the defeat of domestic leftist opponents, culturalist understanding of terrational relations and CCTıflict ha WE FEplaced anti-Communist interpretions of globall conflict, is this CLILass language that shows all the ha||marks of becoming mOFE strident in the post-Cold War era. In fact, this is beginning to owershadow the earlier domilance of "economic and security regional discourses. Singapore's important nei ghbours, Malaysia and Indonesia, have also begun to be prone to articulating an under standing of the region in culturalist terms.'
This cultural understanding, it should be clearly understood, addresses not only questions about the Social Construction of a region, but also speaks to the identity of states. While, as Neumann suggests,' this is importantly a part of the processes of "region building, it is, at the same time, not inconsistent with the development of stafa dan fity, Culturalist political language parformis a two-fold fufliction: first, it definias the region in terms of who is Culturally included and excluded; second, the language provides opportunities for the creation of a sense of State identity.
In the Immediate post-independence pleriod, states such as Singapore created a 'siege-state' mentality to shore upstates.Overignty. However, with the end of the Cold War, this garrison state strategy has bacorne redundant, and the resort to a form of cultural discourse provides a set of strategies around which new concepts of state identity can awolve. A doriant feature of these new identities is that they constitute the dangeroLuis 'other' interrits of GL/EL/ra/intereasts and, in addition, provide a set of strategies as a means of defending state soVereignty and authoritarian rule from both internal and external forces.'
Certainly, cultural strategies of regionalism are by no means unique to the Southeast Asian region. For example, in Western Europe, the exaggerated notion of a 'cornmion Cultural tradition" has porowed to be a valuable resource in building a European region. However, Southeast Asia differs in that cultural strategies are used to distinguish between the "civilisational distinctiveness" of the "East' and the "West'. It is this 'civilisationa' argument that is driving cultural definitions of the Asia-Pacific region. Consequently, much of the discourse is Centred around identifying the "West' as distinct from LLK LLLLLLSS S SK KLLLLL LLLLLLL aL LLLKLCLL orientalist." It follows that the central and
distinctive feature of "EST" Cultural Will Order frOT those of th
Hara, it is Worth qĻI: E'S FILE2 til forter use Chinese parlanc Luft|Eadar - Lee Taintaining that there such", argues that:
Asā societies ar TfLa Tental di stern concepts of Si and East Asian CC Eäst Asiaf15, | TT1åål Wietnam, as distin. which is a mix bat, Indian, though Iridi; siges Similar Wall Societies believë të ir the Cortext of
pristine and Separ of the extended fa aid the Wider SO govemment does
person what the fa
According to Lee CLultura||traits that ha' | ECGIll: 3LCCE:
| Link the World E job. It had 10 Wril complex series of: Cultural factors W. koLIced Owar, Whi ghtage. This woul complex study an. Catilo, but it WOLuli: rate explaining t Imple, between th war.
The appeal of this aLrthJritariga rLuler5 { they Lee Kuan YeW St Ilharto) - Stob Wici] Flieflt defa TCD of the { in Southeast Asia. elaborated below, "gstate": cjisGCOLIrSe, T cultural languagEarl 5 CETE LE CO: |treeds to be er pohlE cally and internati taken a strong lead this cultural project.
Nevertheless, det Singapore's deline: gion. Sometimes, it Y GW'.5 5tate|Ther lltir) luged Asia seeks its identity in Than in the geograf At othertimes, the C sses both geograph As With refere CES are deep ambiguitie are at the heart of Ti5, i5, il ire Witab geographical locati:
However, there i: between securityar

this language is that E5 dre of a Lifferet g"Wes".
ting in detail SingapO
primo minister, Orto, g = the Current paraKuan Yew, Who While is no "Asiam Todėl 3S
LITIKE W-Star OS. |Hargrice betWeen WWE3ciety and government Incepts - when li say i Korea, Japan, Chira, from Southeast Asia ween the Sinic and the an Culture also empha35 - is that Easter
at the individual exists his family. He is not ate, The family is part imily, and then friends liety. The ruler or the Ilot try to prowide for 3 mily best provides*
Kuan Yew, it is these e been responsible for is of East Asia:
karık hıada yery Clifficult ta up these wery, Wery Situati 15.EL erEE TE hich hawe beer lightly ch déSErwed morg WeidWE TEde it TOTE
ofeSSLIniversal applihaWE EDE TOTE CUCUle differences, for Exae Philippines and Tai
cultural language to the f Southeast Asia - be Mahathir Mohamad Car Js. It provides a conveoercive state apparatus It remains, as Will be redominantly a form of put it differently, it is a iculated by the state and stitution of state identity. sized that both domestionally, Singapore has in defining and initiating
aparmbiguities remain in til of the CLltural ľE
refers to, as Lee KLar plies, to East Cor. SinCOSingapore increasingly this Cultural area rather thical Southeast Asia." ultural region EricDmpacal South and East Asia. O'security region', there Sand contradictions that this culturalist analysis, le effect of Singapore's or and trading interests.
s a significant difference id cultural interpretations
of the region. Whereas the former draws on realist international texts to Construct its reas lity; the latter draws from a wider array of sources for its intellectual underpinnings, thegség in ClLu de "orientalist texts", Social Science modernization theory and Americanımanagement theory. The civilisational reading is deeply indebted to the classical texts of "Western" orientallisri, buti trewerses the positive and negative signs on such ideas as indiwidualism, and the importance of the group or collective; nevertheless, it remains entrapped in these orientalist diSCOLIIrSĒS. Modernization theory, particularly its cultural variants, such as those provided by Luciar Pye, is another source for the construction of international relations as civilisational, Tather than ideological, Finally, management theories which attributed the East Asian eCOnomic miracle to the impact of Confucianism have been taker seriously by both East Asian regimes and academics. The irony of a cultural interpretation, based largely on rather dubious "Wester' sources, is lost or the new found interpreters and defenders of "ESTET Cwili Sätilöf".
TO SUTTarie le diSCLSSO SOfa, "WE have suggested that regionalism is not a natural entity, but a social construction. However, there is no single dominant method of defining a region. In the Singaporean case, there is no single regional discourse, but a multiplicity of regions and languages," that define and articulate these regional definitions. In turn, the language of this regionalism is underpinned by a range of intellectual sources from realist international relations literature to modernization theory.
Politics of Regionalism
"Asian regional organizations such as APEC do not bear immediate comparison with regional organizations in Europe, eg, the European Union (EU). They represent diferent approaches to regionalism. For example, there is no inevitable logic that places APEC on the same path to integration as the EU. The differences between the two can be categorized as 'regionalism frOfTabOVE and "regionalism from below'. Though aspects of the TowerTents toward European integration were heavily elite driven," the European idea was shared and articulated by Societal actors such as business groups, intellectuals, and the bureaucracy. In other Words, the understanding of regionalism was, at east in part, society-centred. The massive literature on integration-be it neo-functioalist or based on epistemic communities and regionalism - reflects this perception of regionalism as being society-Centred. By contrast, im Aslam regionalism, the idea of ar "Asian" regionis a stafe-directed father than a society-centrad project. Thus, as previousy stated, the Warious for TT:s of regionalism - economic, security, and cultural that We hawe thus far diSCusgi hawe all beri statilitiated and State drial.
In the Singaporean case, while there is a large number of "think tanks' and policy institutes engaged in the pursuit of "regional"

Page 18
issues, none of these bodies are in any nister Brig-Gen. Ge. Significant Way independent of the state. As for TBT amba SS ador Rodan points out, the government allows Kee and Chang Her little of no space for independent non-gove- LČO TSI YLJI, III rnment groups. In this context those institu- mals, they beat the tions and policy communities - such as the alternative model.“ Pacific Economic Cooperation Committee (PECC), the Singapore institute of Internatio- The key Institution mal Affairs (SIIA), the Policy Studies Instituta SEAS. Under the di (PSI), and the Institute of South East Asian professor Sandhu, ISE Studies (ISEAS) engaged in regional build- deal of social sclerc ing exercises - tend to be state sponsored Asia. The work of thi bodies, highly supportive of government poli- institute Contributed.g cles. These institutions are not in themselves Prilent of a notion of agenda setters', but play an important role regional entity an asp in establishing support for the government's lopment of a Southea preferred approach to regionalism. It re- ntity. For example, in mains the Case, however, that ideas för Under the leadership regional organization and innovation mostly Dr. N. Akransareg, IS emanate from the bureaucracy or from within of information and Kns the cabinet. Indeed, many of these institutes Asian econories. This and think tanks function as parts of the state to argue and justify apparatus rather than as independent policy Collic Cooperatio entities. For example, Chang Heng Ched, SEAS has 9'er they the current director of ISEAS, was formerly sable expertise in tr Singapore's representative at the United studies much of Whic Nations. Similarly, a former ambassador, realist cast. The produ Tommy Koh, has gained a high profile in has contributed to the articulating and defending a culturalist unde. Kinds of approachest rstanding of the region.ine Overriding coni- blens, particularytho clusion is that the discourse on Asian regio- gurity through dlalgg nalism is a state rather thana society centred Möre recently, ISEAS project. Insofaras policy institutes and think "Cultural regional ager tanks such as PS and ISEAS have been the Current on-going P. involved, it has bot been as policy or ideas cracy. innovators but as 'cheer leaders for gowa- Apart frorn this rese
rnment policy. also been influential
It is not possible to sustain the idea of a scholars, academics policy network' because this assumes a ASEAN countriestow degree of state and societal interaction in the nices which have cont construction of policy networks. It requires ction of a highly distinc therefore a degree of societal autonomy, in nding, Particularly the Singaporean case the low levels of socio- ASEAN Roundtable tal autonority Tear that whatever networks bring together a rang exist, they are all highly state directed. Singa- private and public sec porean policy institutes and think tanks research agenda it has (including Tost academics) march to the we to the interests oft beat of the state drut. as Well as Singaporea
it has functioned as However, Singaporean policy institutes
anešimčiakšnằmoeilionysignifi Singaporeanstates ro cant. First, they providean institutional ampli- Liberalism, Regional fication of the state's regional discourse. In this sense, the cheerleading function is an From the foregoing important means of disseminating theian Sgin building proce guage of regionalism. More importantly, Southeast Asia eye Singaporean institutions perform a similar When 驚 Will function with regard to the international envi. Europetreate Pry ronment. Singaporehastraditionalybaenan ist 煙 the economic middleman — a tradingscentre at Tore Statist Toplul the crossroads of international trade, increa. Pagonal exper singly, Singapore institutions are performing deletely this role with respect to the 'selling of certain nalism Isa progess mi types of regional Understandings it has been Eabyelect especially active as vendor for the idea of the two ties in the fac anAsian Free Trade Area (AFTA) andmore gal".9n Europe recently engagedintheraficking oficultura coloro: definitions of the region. A recent Asiaweek relations. This liberal
ancho Ted Within a pa report on this issue makes the point that: territoriality. Liberal dE
Not Surprisingly, given Lee's influence, of collective identityar Tlarly of the outspoken new Weices come of apolitical rather thar from Singapore. They include Cabinet Mi- In more general term
བྱེ།།
 
 

orge Yeo, Yung Buon, 's Tommy Lou Thong ig Chee and academic Speeches and in joLdrum for Singapore's
in this regard is the rectorship of the late EAS pioneered a great 3 Work On SOLutheast is influential research reatly to the develo"Southeast Asia' as a ect critical to the devest Asian regional idethe 1970s and 1980s of a Thai Economist, EAS built up a stock Wedge on Southeast knowledge was used he need for regional 1. Equally important, arS acquired COinSide1e areāS COf 'Security" his cast in a strongly tion of this knowledge legitimation of certain ) regional security prose that emphasizeseue With big powers,
has been pursuing a da'best illustrated in roject on Asian demo
arch role, SEAS" has
in bringing together ind polieymakers from orkshops and Confereributed to thë Construtive regional understainteresting was the Instituted in 1980 to of Pಥ್ಲೀ ffOIT). Le to S, its coice of been highly respo Orsihe Slпgарогеanslate state elites. In effect, a lift EriocLLOT fOT, HE agional discourse.
is in and Sovereignty
it is evident that the SS in Singapore and als deep differences
Si Tilar processes in "idas a liberal regionalsian pattern which is t differently, the Euroence appears to be Whereas Asian regioanaged and organized sal (ifference betWar
that political Science ir integration is ernCount of international discourse, in turn, is rticular conception of }Tocratic conceptions e foulded On a Oti01 a cultural community. Ste liberal tradition
emphasizes the nation as a political community founded or citizenship rather than on the basis of fundamental cultural Values and interests. The liberal conception of political CGITrIILInity presupposes a distinction – a space - between state and society. It is the Construction of this public sphere that enables politics to be established as a purposeful human activity, Liberal governance is about managing and regulating this public space. Under thgSa Conditions the control of territorial Space bēCOfTheSless Central to the exerciSe Of SOVereignty and the activities of gove
TEt
From this standpoint, there is a constant tension between Tarket capitalism and territoriality. As market capitalist gained in strength territoriality it became less Central to the activities of government. As Barry points out:
Within liberal democratic societies government Tust be conducted 'at a dista rice' from the economic ard demographic proCESSEes of the Natio, ThiS dolas CL Tiëri that economic or social management is impossible, but that if it is conducted it must be done by enabling and encouraging the national capacities of its subjects - whether these subjects are understood as families, or indiwidual or enterprises, "o
This leads, in turn, to the insightful suggestion that European regionalism is 'directed at reconstructing the European space in particular form, anda means for establishing this spage as a possible object of government." The construction of this European Space as the object of government is depandent On the marginal role of territoriality in the activities of government. More specificaly it was the conflict between territoriality and "Space that mada possible, first, themational, and later, the European political and econdmic Community. It is the construction and governance of this regional spacethalmake European regionalisma fundamental y liberal project. In Understanding European regionalism it is important to recognize that techniques Of mational EconoTic regulation hawe been applied to ever widering areas goveTlance, because territoriality plays a marginal role in conceptions of sovereignty.
The Asian form of regionalism is significantly distinctive from this liberal brand of European regionalism. In Southeast Asia the control and organization of territorial space is constitutive of government and sovereignty. Territoriality is the central component in the East Asian understanding of sovoreignty. This understanding of sovereignty allows little or no room for space between Society and the state. It is not possible therefore to conceive of an "Asian' conception of economic and political space in the same way as in the European regional project. This statist understanding of sowereignty in which territoriality plays such a fundamental role makes an Asia-Pacific political, econdmic, or defence CommLInity an unlikely proSPECt.
Regional understandings are therefore

Page 19
historically contingent. European regionalism arises out of a liberal mode of governance that enables the construction of political and economic space. Asian regionalism, on the other hand, is distinguished by the predoiminant role of State and State power. Regionalunderstandings aretheresÖreimpOSed by the state froT'above' rather than front below. This state directed regionalism is reflected in the Words and COCEpots LJSÉd to de SCriba Asian regionalism. For example, instead of advocating an internal economic Community, Asian-Pacific political leaders use the largolago of "open regionalism“. Open regiona|isois, i esserice, a der Thand that East Asian States be allowed to Taintain their exportoriented and/or mercantilist economic strategies without a corresponding effort to deregulate and open their markets because the latter course WOLld entall a significant reduction in state power. Likewise, in the area of Security, the preferred language is for a dialogue with the "big powers rather than building a security or defence Commurity,
For Countries such as Singapore the Cultural language of Asian regionalis T1 erables thig construction of state identity in Cultural terms. Increasingly, in the post-Colonial period territorial control needs have tended to be conceived of in symbolic terms: the Cultural constitution of stateidentity in Singapore, which makes it appear as an "Asian' State allows territorial Control to be Tanifested in Cultural terrns, The paradox of this Singaporean, and, I think, South East Asiam, approach to regionalism is that it reinforces, rather than diminishes, state power. At a more general level, we need to be careful in the Way in which we apply theories based on European experience to region building in the Asia-Pacific region. The crucial distiLLLLLL LLL LLLLLL aL LLLL LLLLL LL LLLLLLLOLCCLL Statisland Societa"regional projects. The former allows little or no room for the policy Communities and networkstopursuearegional agenda independant of the state, The спIcial issue for political analysis of regionalism isto map the cognitive and institutional location of actors in various regional projects.
OLJr argument Suggests that Whereas European regionalism was concerned with the creation of regional space as an object of gQWgrnance, Asian regionalissT) is about using regionalism to consolidate state poWEr trEinförCES, fälfièrthär difflifishes, the Centrality of territoriality in the understanding of SOVereignty. It is in this Context that Singapore's current enthusiasm for Cultural definitions of the region must be located.
Notes
S LLC LS CLS SCCLHHLHCLOLHHtMH LLTeLeLaaL MHLH LLL Terra fira Systems (Chicago Chicago University PrE55, 1967); Karl Deutsch, PH, Cly OLH LE LLL LLLLLMeu u KLL SLLLLLLM LLLLLLLHHH University Press, 1957).
KS L MLLLLLL LL LLL LLLLCCCCGLLLLL LLLLCaCC LLaLaLLCL SLLaLLLLLLLS LLLLLL LLLLLLL D LLLLLL LLLLL L LTLM aL LLLLLL CCCaLMT LLMaLLLL LL LLLLL LHL define the regional Entity.
3. Barry Buzan, People, Sales and Friidr.arı Agarda
frr:fyrff SECILJr. War Era (HSmelhefTip: 1991).
EE FET: "I Northern Europe, Ray 1994, Wol. 20, p. 57.
Neuman, Arago-b.
Barletjet Andarsan, IT חוםהם haח חם 5חhbם {London: Flsw LElt Bot
7, 4 Blumann, 'A region 1-bryn.
B, Neumann, "A regir-b
1,
| .
3.
1.
TE
E[],
1.
한,
역.
5.
구.
from Anderson, Tagiri bg Eargued thill regioľ3 Tyhis to sistEirilli Ti. philical arga ihese myth JEITE CLILElli
Michael A. Shapir), LE standing the Politics Hayer: Yale Universi
Methodologically this ir Ia di Hergiggs bulWg. it suggests that Linf matur E of regionalisST. historical cofingent to
CLEITATItaly. Acha Tik:POLITIzdation5 of Sin lism to regionalism?", Chargas Guard New Y р 141
SBB, HDT Example, LBB" fihief Jallar-Sirigrware-F | riglitul I Brill:5
The growth triangle B catiors for Singapore E Iridorola flle af fller Tship With Singa CFE,
Āciārā ārld Rām: | 1.
II, p, 144.
Garry Rodar. The Fl 崎n凸凸靛由苗an、晶凸芷 CENTE LICITrdil: Ma Cr
Catherina Paix, The
en traprerieurial? How (ed], Siпgарагв Спаг
Fii: "E IITIE:lirii
Strail Tırtlü: (Singağı
Stephan Haggard, PE 量、晶情 rtries (Carrbridge, M. 1999); Fredric C. Dew tյf THE MEեւ 15եirl Intit: Wersity Press, 1987).
Tha Paint har is that | region; it is wery Tuch 1 FÜGET BOS,
Speech by the Trad Yeo-Chew Tonga PECC, Sri Times I p.2.
Strair TATTFs (Simfāpci
Is this Filihat may problems for Singapo
LKL JE T'E || || Cirilh:ğ:3ir:3; T.J g:gE
Philippe Regnier, Sir SEJLF EHG AG LO 1987.
SEE, lor example, Liri

ity. Studies in the PSI-Cold zEEHäLuft"E-IEEHf,
םach lסn-buildingapprםegi' law of Infantatinia Studies,
Jildirg', pp. 51-F-4.
agindComunita5; Reseand Spiraad of Mafii:Walis TT ks, 1983).
ിding, p. 58.
Lilding', p. 58, Following on EGG TIL riigis, il CTL'd also like: Tıği bizğınlığı, need higlioritical In Thi. Asian-Pacific geogräis are likely to be based on
8;,
|f|g|EggE Pi:'IrderDiscus Pric NW fi Prass, 19-B 1 ).
Tiplas a greater Sensitivity to fi wa filius riigirial prija:Lis. WE T55|Exploration about thB Canbededucedroomthese
TT|15, o regionalisi Tı.
ya and M, Rameşhı, "ECçıxmı0apore's SEÇurity; trom globalп G. Rodап (ed], 5їпgароге "ork;: St. Mantiris Pre:55, 1993),
:Trianglla חדwםחG ,חYuaםTBa Vā Espergrē (Singapore: A5;iar1 STLIdigg, 1991),
ECCiri-sidérable SECLurityiTiposy drawiring bulhi Malaysia artid dependent econditii: realit
'Economic fourtigliors, p.
tical Ecolorry of Singapore's Ia Sira ard Idri Mal millan, 19).
dom. Eistic bourgeoisie. How internatinä?", in Rexdari gs !,
Lurgeoisie', p5, 170, re), 23 March 1934.
H|hways fromп the Pariphary; Mew Mosfilised CLA: Harvard University Press, ed), The Political Ecrity Sirialis (Ithaca: Cornell Uni
his is rotariatural ecoloric El intellExchal product of Liftig
and Industry Minister, Mr 10th gengral mi Elating ol Singapore), 23 March 1994,
re), 13 March 1993, p.2.
ir the longter|Tipi5A difficill
『E.
E FAP hawe astutely proyed blish political dominarica,
hB (City Shila Imח - Hחביםga ridori. Hurst and Company,
Jrio Jock, Territorial power
E.
29.
37.
3.
.
1.
3.
4.
串5。
4日。
구.
domains: Southeast Asia and Chira (Singapore: GLMaLCC L u CC0MM LLLLLL LLOLL aCCMMLCCLS a0KS S MkLk LLLuaLLS S Tu LLLLuLuuuLHHH uH aeLLLLLDLDuKuuLKLOL York. Praeger, 1975); Michael Later, Dierina of Statehood in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Asia-Pacfic Pre-55, 1972); Edwin Martiri, Greg A5: ri China. FrıE End of ConlarınıEarf Bulder, CCO; WesSliwig yw Press, 1977).
CLL CCC HHHHHLLL HL LaH L e00LLMleL LaLaaaa LLLLLLaL by realis TT, SEIg Hedley Bull, Tria Ariarchical Sociaty (Lörıdörı: Macrtılları, 1977),
The Tijor Malaysian Indonesian and Singaporean LLMMMT HM aMLMLLLLLL LLLLLLLLMLLa Mk LLLu M aLLLkuLL uL DD LLLLLLDu LDLLLOOLOTLYSLL0LL TH LLL LLkLLu Ma LLLLLLL LMLL LuMLu LLLL L uuuLuL GL0L L0LLLLL aligned to the governments of these countries that it Cauld be argued that lihÈy är pärt if thig stEditë Bppafall|8.
Buzanı, Feople, Sfatas,
HLMLMCLLlLaLaHLS CLCC LLL LL0L LLLLCS LLLL LaLLa uL LLLLa definitions of the regionin Taiwari artid Suluh Korea.
NgLmlarını, "A FEgičn-building.
LLLLLL C LLLLLLLHHLHHLLLu L LL LLL LLLLHLHLLLLLLL L LL LLL LLLLLaLLS in relation to the state systernsee Alexander Wend, SCLMLLuCL LL LMCLLLLLLLLLLCCL0LLLLLLS kLLkLC LCC LHHLLML0S LLLHHLHHLLaHL ELTLHLuHuLMaS Wol. 4-ES, NO. 2, 1993, pp. 39 T-25,
FCF a definitive ACCOUnt of Westerri Orier"|||alistTI seg Edward W. Said, Originalist New York: Panthson, 19 FÉ),
Iri:Erwiërs with LEE KLJEarı "Yew, Sirra ir Tīrfes (Singapore, 11 March 1994, p. 32. Also sBa. p. 11.
bid, p.33
This was a significant and decisive shift in Singapore's foreign policy of the 1950s and 1970s. It should Els Espirit Ed Out that this has ir Tıplicatoris for the LLaaaaMLLLLLL LLL MMLL LMHL LLLLLLL LLMCCaLLLHS
Lucian Pya, Southeast Asia's Palirial Systern (New JErsay. Pr EritiCE Hall, 1987).
George Lodge and Ezra Wagg!. Kigalogyard Marig וחנPrrחינarחiחfם חד:arisחוזונEss: A ErחEיוחEhםלחםHICח L0HLMMMMLLLCLSLLLLLLHHLSL LLCCLL LLLCLLLLLLL0 0LSLuLHHLlLLLLLLL 1987).
ThErE is thE intriging possibility that ditHerefil partis of the state Tay initiate different regional caricopolis S. For Eri apprSch that highlight:5the Igle Clelites, See W. Sandholtz and J.2ystian," 1992: Recasting the Europari bargain world, World Politics, Wol. 4:2, No. 1, 1992, pp. 95-128.
Garry Rodar, introduction: chalergas for the New Guard and directions in the 1990s', in Garry Rodar (ed.), Singapore Chargi5 Gard M, Alkinson and W. Coleman, "Sororg slags and LMCLLuL uuuLLLLLLS LLLLLCLHLLLLHHLHHLLLLLLL LL CtOkkLLLeL LLLLMMMLL LCMLMLMLSCMHHOH S LaLkHLL KL LLOLLY Sclerice, Wol, 19, No. 1, 1989, pp. 47-57, "The Asian Way, Asla Week, 2 March 1994, p, 23.
Institute of South East Asian Studies, Arru:l FgpJr, Singaporë, 1981.
Andrew BarTy, "The European COITIITILInity and Europear government harmonization, mobility and spaÇE'I EGYarry Elfrid Socier, Wol. 22. No. 3, 1933, p. 31B.
_31B.ם .b{Hו
For an elaborator of this concept see Hugh Patric and R. Drysdale, "An Asia-Pacific Regional Economic Organisation: an Exploratory concept paper, Washington, Congressional Research Sigrico, Library of Congress, 1979, A. Elek, 'APEC: motive, LHMMMLeLCL0 LM LLLHHLLLLkuLukSLLLMMH aLMMCCC LS frientiational Affairs, Wolds, No. 2, 1992, pp. 1-7,
9

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Page 21
PART 2
The Metamorphosis of F
Sa Saka Perera
AŠ far as the Tamil imagination is Concerned, a sörnewhat similar proCeSS SENET to hawe taken place. While a "legendary memory" of Ravana did exist through folklorë his image Was not COinStrLJcted in the heroic model, But today all these hawe changed, Ra Warna has not only ceased to be a "bad guy", but he has also been appropriated and claimed as their own by Tamils. At least this is What evident at the level of political and nationalist rhetoric of 50The Sections of the Tarimil Timiddle Class, particularly those expatriates resident in We stern Europe and North America, What Were the circumstances under which this rather interesting metamorphosis took place?
Satchi Porma Tibala Ti, in his poleTical book, Sri Lanka. The National Question and The Tam Strugglemakesthefo||OWing obseTwa tills:
"The Mahabarata and RamayanlathetWO great Indian epics written in Sanskrit before the sixth century BC mention the Naga Kingdoms and their Conquest by Rawana, the Tamil Yakshaking of Sri Lanka." (Ponnambalam 1983:17)
"- According to tradition the Tamils of India and Sri Lanka are linea descendents of the Naga and Yaksha people. (According to Harry Williams) Nagadipa in the north of Sri Lanka was an actual Kingdom known to historians and the people who occupied it were all part of an immigrant tribe from South India, Tamil people called Nagars - The conclusions that could validly be drawn from the new historical data clearly establish that the ancestors of the present day Tamils were the original occupiers of the island long before 543 LLLLLLLLS KaaLLLLL LLLK LHHaLLLL LLL LLLL LaaL earliest human habitation of Sri Lanka." (Pomnambalam 1983:18)
The reasons for the use of the legendary Ravana and the Yakshas (and Nagas) as heroes and ancestors of contemporary Sri Lankan Tamils by both Ponrambalam and LLLLLLLLLLLLLGLLLLL LHH HLHLCLaSLLLLLLLS blish" an early presence for the Tamils in Sri Lanka preceding the legendary arrival of the Sinhalas, symbolized in the Contemporary Simhala imagination by the myth of Wijaya. Interestingly, in the context of deteriorating inter-ethnic relations, a new nationalist myth is constructed by giving an existing legend LS L LLLLLLH HHHHHHLLLLSS LaLLLLLLLaYLaLLLL OLLH LCLL HHH real ethnic value 20 years ago is suddenly wested with both ethnic and political value. He is no longer simply Ravana, who snaLHCLL LLLLL LLL 0LLLLLSS aaaSSSLLLLCLCLLCS LLCL Tamil Yaksha king who ruled Sri Lanka even before the arrival of Wijaya."
The construction, ction of such political 50. LE COtto Silice the l'Altaf Dir certain key elements mponents In the Sinh ESEEESCET d'EtS. of Aryan origin from Sihlaläs Were the fir arrive in the island. hawa al 50 EJČICÒPTE CC myth cluster explair Sinhalas. In the post athnicity this overal Lutilized by Tany Sil Ciarls to assert the S Tony ower the island to de-legitimize the V and other rinorities positions tend to SUg ir Srī Lākā TLC destructive invader: should hawe 10 righ be secondary to tho:
TLS the IEW Tafol TWth has beef1 t0 Col ted by Sinhala natior 2. W ta Silla to Wijaya, the Tamis by using their versic The tendency here Tari Sarriyediri Sri as and tilgrgføre til E more) rights With t demand for equalit notion of individual of Të Constructed Ty
Wit to retar among Tamils, theid ent features of Raw: Were ewidenti the : hawe been purged. It exist inter I thi5 SE153 thë Tä kers Seem to bg f activists attempted by attempting to hu kshas.
The Tamil approp war, has to bE pläC8 Thic ard exter Siwa | For instar Cē, the T TT||5. WE DE ET Sinfallas Flas bigaro antiquity of Tamil c. to the Mohenjedaro
"Thë Tamils of S people - it was Wlich fäCEd S. Mohenjedaro in 2,000 years bef 1985: 85)

Ravana in Tamil Society
at the recois Umythshas to be undef Sinhalamyth-making. t of the 19th century hawe been Wisible Coalaidentity. The SinhafWijaya, Whoisa prince North India, and the st "civilized" people to These Tythic strands imponents of the OWeral ing the origion of the dependence politics of myth cluster has been Thala mationalist politiSinhalas' political hegeand to a certain extent ery'existence of Tamils in the country. Such gest that Tamils arrived later, and that too as 5, and therefore they is or their rights should se of Sinhalas,
Latif the Rawal Inter the claims generaTallist myths of this laluas trace their ancestry racelers much further on of the Rawana Tyth. is clearly to assert that Lanka prior to the Sinhaay should have equal (or e Sinhalas. Here the y is not based on the rights, but on the basis
.
morphosis of Rawana erlöslicänd themalaWOana and Yakshas, which Sinhala popular tradition Or such features simply aw Tamil political myth. mil nationalistmyth-maollowing what the Hela te 1940S ad 1950S Tanize Rawama and Ya
Irid tir of RENWara 1 OWEdin a TLCh, Thore dyrarocess of myth Taking. lere Suggesti On that the ir Sri Lk. 30 til
inadequate. Thus the Wilization is traced back
CįIZEti:
Sri Lanka are as a Cient a Drawidian civilization origins to the people ol the Indus Valley around ore Christ." (Satyendar
The question that needs to be posed at this point is, to what extent are these new myths popularly accepted in Tamil society, Certain patterns are clearly evident. Most of the Writings that attempted these reformulation in the 1980s emerged from the West, and Were Written by predominantly English-educated middle class elements of the Tamil diaspora. However, the deteriorating inter-athrlic conflict and tha antrechmêrint of political violence Within this conflict SEET to hawe motivated someTanTills to a.CCēpt:SCme of these ideas,
ThLJS ewen in 1988, mamy Tamil-"The di Lum students and teachers whom interviewed were well aware of, and generally receptive to such political myths, despite the fact that at that time they were most readily available only in English (Perera 1992), Even though | could mot find any Tamil translations, it seers reasonable to assume that there Were many, given the widespread knowledge and belief in these myths among both students and teachers. It was also clear from the limited interviews conducted in 1988 that teachers were a significant channel for the transmission of these myths (Perera 1992). Recent interviews also suggest that in comparison to the general failure in popularizing the resurrected Rawana myth among the Sinhalas, the attempted resurrection of the Rawana myth and a whole range of similarly reformulated political myths se en to have been relatiwely more successful a Torg TaTills. While the exact extent of this SUCCESS remains to be seen, I Would suggest in conclusion that the relative success of the Tamil project was due to the fact that the attempts were made at a time. When there was adequate socio-political space for Such dissent, specifically in the context of the aggressive process of Sinhala myth-making. On the other hard until this point Tamils did mot hawe the kind of all-inclusive Origin myth LFle Simhala.5 had, ThLIS Lhere Was a 50 a relatively stronger political compulsion to construct such a myth cluster.
Bibliography:
Parera, Sasanka
1992, "Messengers of Peace or Creators of Chaos
LS LLLT LS LTLLLLLaL S 0La LLLSL LLLLaS S0aSS nflicL" Ir, Prawada Wolume 1, 11 (November and Wolume 1, 12 (December), Colorribo: SSA
Ponnambala, Satchi
0L0L0S OY YYYYYSS G HLLLLaHHOO 0L LLLLLLLLDLuHH GHH HLK Tamil Struggla. Londor: ZadBooks
Satyendra, N'
1985. "Legitimata Expectations." In, SIM, ed. LLLHHH LHELLGLLLLSLLLMHLLLLHMTkLSS LMLCLHLHHLLLLLLLLuuu ULTECHL
Senaviratna, Ariyada sa
000SS O LMMLL LLLHMGH LLMaMMHCCS LLLLLLLLuuLL uuLLLLS Sагтаyawardgriа.
19

Page 22
BOOKS
Trauma of Sri
THESRI LANKANTAMILS: ETHNICITY AND IDENTITY; Chelvadurai Manogaran and Bryan Pfaffenberger, Westview Press, Boulder. S 42.95.
This edited volume comprises nine essays by sever leading Sri Lankan specialists, Drawn front 1 Warious Social ScieFCe disciplines, the Contributors analyse the crucial issue of identity of Sri Lankan Tamils in the Context of the multi-ethnic fabric of the Island Republic. As Bryan Pfaffenberger highlights in the introductory chapter, the book is the "first sustained attempt to comprehend the ethnic identity of the indigenous Tamil community of Sri Lanka, as that identity has been formed, and finally forged in bloodshed and fire, through the Tamil community's years of change and Crisis." This academic exploration has enabled the authors to explain the phenomenon of Tamil militancy and the explosive issues relating to self-determination and separatism.
It is necessary to highlight the fact that the projection of Sinhalese and Tamils as tWO antagonistic identities, at War. With each other for several centuries, by Sinhalese/Tamil chauvinist Writers in an illustration of the Wal known Axion that truthard objectivity are the casualties in times of COfflict.
Distinguished anthropologists like Prof. Thambiah hawe pointed out that the Sinhalese and the Tamils share many "parallel features of traditional caste kinship, popular religious cults, customs and so on."Throughout the Colonial period, there Were no ethnic conflicts in Ceylon, except the Sinhalese-Muslim Conflict of 1915, in which strangely the Sri Lankan Tamil leadership took the side of the Sinhalese.
As Pfaffenberger points out "it is reading history backwards to suppose that today's problems stem from yesterday's divisions." The ethimic CÖrnflict is te result of post-independence Sri Lankan politics, an offshoot of the nation building experiTB Int, Wher the Similialese leaderS triEd
Lankar
to build the nation or Se language amd. Bu exclusiom of a II ni
In an interestinge basis for separatism scribes FOW from the autonomy, the Tami militant groups dew rious stages, the de state for Tamil Eela man Raja raya gamt riges that hawe taken pticorn ab OL-ut therTn Selw Writers probed the pa Ceirll Sri Lanka fror that they could justif are the authentic SO
In another essay insights into Various their political ideolog a framework and was able to dominate politics. Chelvadural the crucial issue of nature and extent as phic Composition in radically altered to Tar Tills. Prof. Wilsor divisions among the: Jaffna, Batti Caloa ar OW the effects of getting blurred and sl nationalism is emerg
The Sri Lankan Ta toget Considerables) from the international COTIT. Ural holocaus facing a great dilemri Writes, "In the areas
Tlassive and persists damental rights hav LTTE has sought to TUITOLUF Of di SSBIEfror te LTTE's "brutality able to get Tami su reasons: (1) Colomb devolve sufficient pol the East; (2) There is by supporting the Ta hawe not bēÉrable to SSiors from ColorT1b of a complete defeat mb0 "Would drop any Cof Caring to address

| Tam is
the basis of Sinhaleldhist religion, to the ity claims.
say on the "Material " Alita Shastri dede land for greater political parties and aloped, through waThand for a separate m. Dagmar — Hel|- di SCUSSES the Chaplace in Tamil percees and how the Tamil Sttofind Tamil presevery early times so y the claim that they 15 of the soil.
', Dagmar provides famil militant groups, |es, their organisatiohow finally the LTTE the Sri Lankan TanTill Mamogaram explores and Colonisation, its ld how the demograthe east has been he detriment of the surveys the broad Sri Lakan Tani||S- di ClOT1b0 -- and these divisions are owly a Ceylon Tamil
Ing.
mils, Who Were able impathy and support I community after the t in July 1983, are "1a. As Pfaffenberger Lunder LTTE. control, Int wiolations of fura 0CCurred as the suppress even the mits policies". Despiand fascis Th", if it is pport, it is for three o Will never agree to Wér to tfB TOrth and nothing to begained Til Toderates. Who obtain major conceand (3) in the event of the LTTE, Coloremaining pretence Tamil grievances".
Pfaffenberger's conclusions are Worth repeating in full: "Perhaps the cruelest irony of the Sri Lanka conflict is that, at the hands of Sinhalese hegemony, the Sri Lankan Tamils are well on the way to transforming their ethnic identity so that it mirrors the modern Sinhala identity in its equation of race, religion, language and territory.
But standing against this are many Sri Lanka Tamils who, like their counterparts among the Sinhalese, prefer to emphasise the incorporative and tolerant aspects of their culture, They fight, often at the cost of their lives, for the rights of all people of Sri Lanka. Only time will tell whether their heroic voices will prevail over those that call for ethnic cleansing, hatred and
killing".
W. Suryanarayan
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barns spread tytut in thị: Tid artici Lipmuntry LLLLLLLLH KLLK HuuLLLLLL LlL aBLaLlL uLLLLL LLLLHa LS dallimi, di Iring the Coff 5:2:15 Cor.
Here, with careful nurturing, tobacco grows Fis a LLLLeOLL LLL LLLLCHC HLL LHLHL uuuLGLCL LtgtLLLLLaL LLLLLLLHHL L gold, to the value of Jir Rs. 250 million or more annually, for perhaps 143,000 rural folk.
 

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