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ს გვაზა కోకా。 。 * ప్తి ملايين" gం ܪ ܢ . .م
* ○
* s
VO 2 NO. 1973
HUMAN ENVIRONMENT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND THE
DEVELOPNG COUNTRES
GAMAN. COREA MODERNIZATION: SOME SOCOLOGICAL ISSUES
RALPHPERES THE RURAL-URBAN BALANCE AND DEVELOPMENT THE EXPERENCE IN SRI LANKA
GODFREY GUNATILLEKE INCOME, WAGES AND CONSUMPTION PATTERNS
N CEY LON
PETER J. RICHARDS THE EFFECT OF INCOME ON FOOD HABITS IN CEYLON
The Findings of the SocioEconomic Survey of Ceylon 1969/70
L. N. PEREIRA, W. S. M. FERNANDO BEARCE V DE MEL
AND T. T. POLEMAN
Pi: by MARGA INSTITUTE in association with
Hansa Publishers Limited Colombo

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Rs) S*貌
HANSA
SGN OF A GOOD BOOK.

M A R G A
Governing Council
GAMANI COREA (Chairman) M. RAJENDRA GoDFREY GUNATILLEKE (Vice Chairman) s. AMBALAWANA M. J. PERERA
Editor
GoDFREY GUNATELLERt.
Editorial Office 75, WARD PLACE, COLOMBO-7.
Published by M A R G A N S T T UTE
in association with HANSA PUBLISHERS LTD.,
COLOMBO,

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M A R G A
Vol. 2 No. 4 1973
GAMANI COREA 1.
RALPH PIERIES 24
GODFREY GUNATLLEKE 35
PETER J. RICHARDS 69
L. N. PERERA, W. S. M. FERNANDO, BEATRICE V. DE MEL AND
T. T. POLEMAN 81.
HUMAN ENVIRONMENT THE STOCKHOLM
'CONFERENCE AND THE
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
MoDERNIZATION: SOME SOCIOLOGICAL ISSUES
THE RURAL-URBAN BALANCE AND DEVELOPMENT THE EXPERIENCE IN SRI LANKA
INCOME, WAGES AND CONSUMPTION PATTERNS IN CEYLON
THE EFFECT OF INCOME
ON FOOD HABITS IN CEYLON
The Findings of the SocioEconomic Survey of Ceylon 1969/70,

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HUMAN ENVIRONMENT. THE STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES . GANIMAAW i GA7EA
The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment which was held in Stockholm from the 6th - 15th June, 1972, was a highly publicised affair receiving unprecedented coverage through the mass media. It is also now regarded as a relatively successful conference having broadly achieved the goals that were set for it by the Preparatory Committee of the Conference and the Conference organisers.
The main purpose of the present paper is not so much to describe the Conference but to outline some of the major concerns of the developing countries in respect of the environment issue. This is attempted in sections III, IV and V which deal with themes that sometimes go beyond the Stockholm agenda. The discussion is, however, prefaced by sections I and II which present a brief summary of the highlights and results of the Conference itself.
The Special Character of the Conference
The Stockholm Conference was, in many ways, unlike other U.N. assemblies. There were in particular three factors which helped to give it a special character. It was first of all a large conference comparable in size, though not in duration, to the UNCTAD meetings. Over 1200 delegates representing 113 countries were presentinStockholm. The Soviet Union, the countries of Eastern Europe, and Cuba did not attend - in protest over the non participation of East Germany. But China, Rumania, Albania and Yugoslavia were present together with the Western eountries and virtually all the developing countries. A second factor which gave the Conference its special character was its subject matter. What might have been a rather technical confere

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nce on pollution came to encompass the widest of issues concerning the state of mankind. As the U.N. Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim observed it was an occasion where, for the first time, the nations of the world met together to take stock of the results of 200 years of the Industrial Revolution. A third factor was the enormous public interest in the Conference. Representatives of 450 non-governmental organisations from all over the world were present in Stockholm as observers together with 1500 representatives of the mass media, Three non-official "conferences' on the environment took place concurrently with the official conference. Demonstrations, public meetings, lectures and news - sheets added to the Conference atmosphere giving individuals and non official groups an opportunity to express their views. All this reflected the "pressures from below' stemming from the interest of public opinion in the developed countries on the environment issue. The Environment platform attracted a variety of disciplines. Physicists, economists, biologists, demographers, agriculturists, physical planners, educationists, health specialists, nutritionists - these and the representatives of several other professions, all felt they had something to contribute.
The Conference procedure also set it apart from most other United Nations meetings. A vast amount of preparatory work preceded the Conference with a wealth of scientific inputs from governments, institutions, and individuals. But all this documentation was lodged in the Conference Library. The official conference documents themselves were limited to 6 papers covering each of the main subject areas of the Conferencehuman settlements; natural resources management; pollution; educational issues and cultural aspects; environment and development; and institutional matters. These papers contained the specific recommendations on which the Conference was called upon to act, recommendations presented on the responsibility of the Conference Secretariat after intensive consultations with the representatives of Governments.
The Conference itself was made up of a plenary and three committees of the whole. The general debate on broad issues was confined to the plenary alone; there was no debate in the

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Committees which got down to action straightaway voting on the recommendations or on any amendments that were proposed. Admittedly, something was lost by virtue of this procedure. There was little scope for the give and take of debate; little opportunity for delegates to display their oratorical skills. But there were also unquestionable benefits. A total of 109 Recommendations were adopted within the two week period covering the entire scope of the Conference agenda. There were many who felt that there was a lesson in all this for other U.N. assemblies where usually much time is lost in protracted debate and controversy over hastily prepared resolutions which are sprung upon delegates and which allow little time for reflection and consultation.
The Outcome of the Conference
As mentioned before, the main purpose of the present paper is to outline some of the major issues that concern the developing countries in the field of environment rather than to provide a detailed account of the results of the Conference. This is available in the Report of the Conference. (General Assembly A/Con fla8(14) and other documents. Nevertheless, a brief summary of the putcome is, perhaps, in place. The outcome of the Conference may be grouped under three broad headings: (a) The Declaration of Principles, (b) The Plan of Action and (c) The Institutional arrangements that were approved for carrying forward the work of the Conferencę.
(a) The Declaration
The Declaration on the Human Environment adopted by the Conference aims at setting out the guiding principles which should govern the commitment of the international community to the enhancement of the human environment. As Maurice F. Strong, the Secretary General of the Conference said of the Declaration: "What many sceptics thought would only be a rhetorical statement has become a highly significant document

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reflecting a community of interest among nations regardless of politics, ideologies or economic status." One of the most significant of the 26 principles adopted is that which acknowledges the principle of the responsibility of States for environmental damage beyond their borders. Principle, 21 states:
"States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to insure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."
It was felt that the adoption of this principle provides a strong basis for international negotiation and action on environmental issues.
Another significant feature of the Declaration is the clear assertion of the primacy of the development objective. The preamble of the Declaration as well as several of the principles underscore the close relationship between development and environment. For example, the preamble states: “In the developing countries most of the environmental problems are caused by underdevelopment. Millions continue to live far below the minimum levels required for a decent human existence, deprived of adequate food and clothing, shelter and education, health and sanitation. Therefore, the developing countries must direct their efforts to development, bearing in mind their priorities and the need to safeguard and improve the environment.”
Principle 10 of the Declaration stresses that for developing countries adequate earnings from primary commodities are essential for environmental management. Principles 13 and 14 refer to the importance of an integrated approach to

planning and to the role of planning as an instrument for reconciling the needs of development and of environment.
The drafting of the Declaration saw some of the most dramatic moments of the Conference. An earlier draft was set aside largely because the developing countries desired a stronger statement of their concerns. The delegation of the Peoples Republic of China made a number of suggestions for the Declaration, many of which were included in one way or another in the final version. The Declaration as it now stands is the World's Charter on the Human Environment. It is "the first international political consensus in preserving and enhancing the habitat of man.” "
(b) The Plan of Action
It is not possible here to attempt even a summary of the 109 recommendations that emerged out of the Stockholm Conference. The recommendations ranged over the subject areas concerned: human settlements; natural resources management; general pollution: marine pollution; educational, informational, and social and cultural aspects; development and environment; and institutional and financial arrangements. Many of the recommendations were addressed to national governments for action; others involved action at the international level.
However, out of the several recommendations of the Conference there emerged a discernible programme of activities that is refered to as the Action Plan. Only the highlights of the Plan can be indicated here.
The texts are as follows:
Principle 13: "In order to achieve a more rational management of resources and then to improve the environment, States should adopt an integrated and co-ordinated approach to their development planning so as to ensure that development is compatible with the need to protect and improve the human environment for the benefit of their population."
Principle 14: "Rational planning constitutes an essential tool for reconciling any conflict between the needs of development and need to protect and improve the environment.'

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The Action Plan is made up of 3 parts. The first is a world wide programme called "Earth Watch” - for the monitoring and dissemination of information on various aspects of Human Environment. The establishment of a world-wide network of at least 110 monitoring stations is envisaged. The second part comprises a series of environmental management activities and programmes supported at the international level. The third is a net-work of supporting measures in the form of education and training, and programmes for public information.
In his closing statement at the Conference Mr. Maurice F. Strong gave the following sample of some of the conclusions and recommendations falling under the several headings of the Action Plan. The Conference decided to set in motion machinery to:
- drastically curtail emission into the atmosphere of
chlorinated hydro-carbons and heavy metals.
- assist developing countries to cope with the urban
crisis and its related priority needs such as housing and
water supplies, notably through the creation of a special fund.
- intensify the preparation of conventions for the conservation and protection of the world's natural and cultural heritage.
- create an International Referral Service that will enable nations to exchange environmental information and knowledge. V−
- Study the financing of additional costs to developing countries, arising from environmental considerations.
- provide information about possible harmful effects
of various activities before these activities are initiated
- acclerate research to better assess the risk of climatic modification and open up consultations among those concerned.

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- stress the priority of education and information to enable people to weigh the decisions which shape their future and to create a wider sense of responsibility.
- initiate steps to protect and manage common resources considered of unique value to the world community.
- initiate a global programme to ensure gerletic resources
'for future generations.
- incorporate environmental considerations into the review of the development strategies embodied in the Second Development Decade.
- Pursue regional co-operation for purposes of financial
and technical assistance.
- prevent environmental considerations from becoming pretext to limit trade or impose barriers against developing country exports.
-emphasise opportunities that environmental concerns open up for developing countries including the possible relocation of industries to countries whose natural systems have been less burdened.
As indicated this is an illustrative sample of some of the decisions taken. The 109 Recommendations adopted cover many more issues ranging over a wide field.
(c) Organisational Arrangements
The establishment of institutional of machinery for follow-up of actionis another of the concrete results of Stockholm. Two major decisions relate to the creation of an Environment Fund and an Environmental Agency-both to operate on a continuing basis. The Environment Fund would be made up of voluntary contributions by governments and will finance all or part of the cost of new environmental activities undertaken by the United Nations

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and its Agencies-as well as by bodies outside the United Nations system. The activities include monitoring and data assessment systems, environmental quality management, research, public education and training and assistance to national and international institutions. A target figure for the Fund was not set up but on current expectations it would exceed U.S. S. 100 million over a five year period. Many governments had already pledged themselves to contribute to the Fund.
There would be a new specialised body to serve as a focal point of the United Nations activities in the field of Environment. It will be made up of a 58 nation Governing Council for Environmental Programmes and a small Environmental Secretariat headed by an Executive Director. The Secretariat has wide ranging functions. It will service the Council.co-ordinate the U. N. Environmental programme, set up medium and long range plans for U. N. activities, give advice, and administer the Fund.
All the recommendations of the Stockholm Conference have been presented to the General Assembly of the United Nations for ratification at its current 1972 Session. The General Assembly has already determined that Nairobi shall be the seat of the new organisation.
III
Development And Environment - The Challenge Facing Poor Societies
The concrete results of the Stockholm Conference represent only a beginning. No one can pretend that the environmental challenge facing "planet earth' could be met by a modest though encouraging action plan, a small supporting fund of U.S. S. 100 million or so, and a new international agency. Indeed, the relative success of Stockholm had probably much to do with the limited nature of the programmes that the governments were asked to endorse. But the true significance of Stockholm goes beyond the specific recommendations made. It reaches out to the intellectual and educational impact of the Conference and

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to its influence of future thought and action. The environment issue has opened up new vistas that can profoundly affect the future course of events in both the developed and the developing countries alike.
It is perhaps true to say that initially the developing countries were rather ஐடிஐ identified, in the popular mind, with industrial pollutions a
of primary relevance to the ri untries. In the poorer countries fuller stomachs claimed priority over
cleaner air. Nevertheless, in the course of the preparations for Stockholm there was a transformation in developing country attitudes. This had much to do with the debate and discussion on Development and Environment reflected in the "Founex Report'1 and in a number of Regional Seminars.
As the Founex Report emphasises, the developing countries are vitally concerned with the environment issue. But for them there is no basic conflict between the concern for environment and the commitment to development. This is because the epvironmental problems of the developing countries are basically of a different kind to those experienced by the industrialized countries. The problems of the latter arise out of a high level o development; the problems of the former reflect a lack of development. The major environmental problems of the developing countries are not pollution problems, but problems such as bad housing, poor water supplies, deficient e and sanitation Systems, sickness and disease, and vulnerability to natural disasters. These problems are not caused by development; on the contrary they could only be cured by development. The richer countries are concerned with environmental problems because they affect the "quality, of life.” In the poorer countries these problems are a threat to life itself.
The environmental problems-of the poorer countries age pot, of course, static ones. They are being aggravated by such
1. "Davelopment and Environment' - Report of aPಳ್ಗೆ of experts meeting in Founex, Switzerland, June 1971 - published in several editions particularly by Mouton Press. Also the Reports of the Regional Seminars sponsored by the U.N. Regional Economic Commissions meetings in Bangkok, Addis Ababa, Mexico City and Beirut.

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factors as the pressure of population growth. Already, in most
developing countries the u ituation is one of acute crisis. In many of them, population growth in the urban areas is twice as rapid as population growth in general. At the same timein some of them the shanty or slum population is growing twice as fast as the urban population. Rural systems are also under severe stress. Traditional systems of agriculture which had stood the test of centuries are unable to adjust to the pressure of population on land. Excessive subdivision of holdings and the depletion of forest resources are familiar consequences of this situation.
The environmental problems of the developing countries are not, of course, confined to the category of poverty problems. These countries also face a second group of problems - problems that are brought about by the process of deve opment itself. The developing countries are all endeavouring to industrialize, to transform their systems of agriculture, and to create
new net-works of transportation and communications. These processes could generate environmental side effects of an adverse
character. Industrial pollution, the toxic effects of weedicides and pesticides the environmental repercussions of large river
basin development schemes-these and many other phenomena can and do accompany the development process. Indeed, as development proceeds apace, this second category of problems will grow in relative importance. It is precisely in this realm that the developing countries can profit from the experience of industrialized countries and learn from their mistakes. With sufficient foresight, and by sound planning and regulation, the developing countries can avoid at least someofthe environmental disruption that the richer countries have witnessed. In this sense they have perhaps an unique opportunity to fashion a new and superior pattern of development different to that hitherto achieved by the richer countries. They can reap the benefits of being late comers.
The solution of the environmental problems of developing countries calls, however, for far reachin es in develop
gent strategies and in conventional approaches to planning.
In fact, one of the most important results that could flow out

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of the new awareness of environmental issues is a major transformation of the whole planning process in developing countries. It is true that the environmental problems of poor societies are those which could, in large part, be overcome by development. But at the same time it is apparent that these problems would not necessarily be solved by the mere acceleration of the rate of over all economic growth - as measured, for instance, by the increase in GDP - and irrespective of the pattern of development. A high rate of economic growth can well by-pass acute social and environmental problems such as housing, water supplies, sanitation and so on. In fact such problems could easily be aggravated in the process of growth as population increases rapidly in the cities and imposes increasing pressures on urban facilities that are already hopelessely inadequate. What is needed is a development strategy thatmakes a conscious and frontal attack on these problems. There can be no presumption that they would be solved automatically as a by-product of economic growth perse.
All this calls for basic changes in planning in planning gonਹੁੰਜਨਨੋan planning organisations and lanning personnel. A number of new issues arise. The problem is much more than one of including environmental criteria in the appraisal and evaluation of projects - although this is itself of considerable importance and requires a good deal of new work in the realm of methodology, there is also the more fundamental issue of incorporating a multiplicity of objectives into development plans and of reconciling the conflicts between them. The concern with environmental problems has arisen at a time when conventional planning concepts centering around the goal of raising GDP have become the subject of increasing
criticism. There is a growing recognition of the need to pay attention to such goals as 器 better income distribution, health, nutrition, education and so on. Environmental
goals needt ed to this list. But what is required is not so much a sacrifice of econmic growth in the name of social and environmental objectives. Rather the need is to evolve a "style' of developmenti ich economic growth is accompanied b
an improvement in Social and environmental conditions - as against a style where growth by-passes or even aggravates them.

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This implies a need to evolve development strategies which reflect the complementarities rather than the conflicts between economic and social goals. It also implies the need for a "unified
approach' to development and development planning which takes account of the essentially multi-dimensional character of the development process.
To some extent, some of the environmental problems of poor societies will be eased by development strategies which improve income distribution, health conditions and so on. But this is not all thatis needed. Thereis also a need to treat the environment as a distinct dimension of development policy and planning. There is a need, for example, to pay conscious attention to the urban and rural habitat, to assess the ways in which the habitat would be affected by the process of economic growth, the growth of transportation, the movement of population, industrialization, the growth of agriculture, and so on. The conventional long and medium term plans seldom pay attention to these questions. They seldom ask what the impact would be of the successful implementation of development programmes on the urban and rural situation. In fact economic planners are hardly qualified to make these assessmehts Ther need the assistance of physical planners, sociologists, and other types of expertise. Indeed, one of the consequences of the broaຜັກmg of the development concept is that planning must itself become more of an interdisciplinary affair. The incorporation of the environmental factor as an additional dimension in planning means that the planning process would need to draw on the services of a variety of disciplines. The human environment is not the exclusive preserve of any one of them.
Similar changes would be needed in respect of planning institutions. In many of the developed countries separate Ministries have already been created for dealing with environmental problems. Few, if any, developing countries have so far taken a similar step. In fact, the question of where to locate responsibility for the environment was one of the probelms facing developing countries in the context of the preparations for Stockholm. In several instances, the Ministries of Health had become the focal points for dealing with environmental

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issues largely because of the importance of water supplies and sanitation. But this is clearly too restrictive a solution. Environmental issues encompass the work of several Ministries and cannot, therefore, be centered on any one of them. As indicated earlier, the concern for the environment must be reflected in overall development strategy and in development planning. The handling of the broader environmental issues must, therefore, become an integral part of the planning process. Individual Ministries will no doubt administer environmental programmes in the areas of activity that fall within their purview. But in so far as environmental problems are looked at as a whole, and are a determining factor in the very style of overall development which a country decides to pursue, they need to be handled as a part of overall planning. This meansin effect that environmental policies must be dealt with either by the overall planning agency or by an agency that is closely associated with it. Of course much work still remains to be done on how to incorporate the environmental concern in overall planning. The Founex Report touched on some of the issues involved, but there is an urgent need for elaborating upon these and for working out the relevant methodological solutions. This is a field of work which must occupy the energies of development analysts in the period ahead. It involves changes in the existing frontiers of development theory as much as of planning techniqg
IV
The Environmental Conceros of ဦမျိုချီ £ønntrsés Implications For the Developing Countries
There is another aspect of the environmental concern that is of close interest to developing countries. It was highlighted in the Founex Report and was also reflected in both the debate and the recommendations of the Stockholm Conference. This relates to the possible impact on the developing countries of the environmental policies pursued by the developed countries themselves. There are in particular three areas where the developing countries fear that their interests might be adversely affected - the areas of trade, aid, and the transfer of technology. These fears were voiced at Stockholm and are echoed in many

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of the Conference recommendations. In the field of trade, for example, there are two possible developments that could react . adversely on the developing countries. One of these is the disruption of their exports as a result of the imposition by the developed countries, of stricter standards governing imports. The developing countries cannot, of course, question the right of importing countries to apply higher standards on grounds of health and environmental protection. But they do ask that when changes are introduced to existing regulations adequate notice be given so that they have sufficient time to adhere to the new standards and to adjust to the situation. The disruptive impact of the sudden imposition of such standards has already been illustrated in recent times by the case of exports of tuna fish and certain tropical products from Asian countries. The developing countries also feel that they have a strong case for compensatory financial assistance to help them undertake the necessary adjustments. A recommendation to this effect was passed at Stockholm, albeit with some reservations.
The other fear, pertaining to the area of trade is that vested interests in the developed countries may use the environmental argument as a pretext for erecting new barriers to trade. Industrialists in the richer countries are being obliged to incur additional investment costs in pursuance of regulations for environmental protection introduced by their own governments. They may cite such costs as an argument for obtaining protection against competing imports from countries which do not incur similar costs - often for the good reason that in these countries the environmental situation does not require parallel investments. Not so long ago, strong voices were raised in the developed countries for protection against competing imports from developing countries on the ground that these imports were the products of 'sweated labour'. The modern version of this argument could be a clamour for protection against the products of
"sweated environment'. The argument is, of course, invalid; but the developing countries must be on their guard againstits use as a pretext for ushering in a new wave of protectionism in the richer countries. This danger was indeed recognised in one of the Stockholm recommendations.

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There is also a fear that the environmental pre-occupation of the richer countries will react adversely on aid for development. It can be argued that the environmental concern should result in a substantial increase in aid to developing countries reflecting the sentiment underlying the slogan"Only One Earth'; and in recognition of the link between development and environment. But in practice the trend may be in the opposite direction. Environmental and other social programmes in the richer countries may compete with foreign aid programmes for budgetary resources and command more"grass roots' support from voters. Furthermore, aid priorities themselves may be unduly affected. At various times, the reigning intellectual fashions in the industrialised countries have closely influenced the character and composition of aid programmes. Infra-structure development, investment in human resources, population control, agricultural development - though not, it would seem, industrial development - has each, at one time or another, enjoyed its moment of glory. It may now be the turn of "environment' to occupy the stage. The developing countries may find donors more responsive to programmes and projects in the field of environment than to other programmes. It may prove easier to get aid funds to conserve wildlife than to grow rice. The fact that aid resources may be more readily available for environmental programmes is, of course, desirable in itself. But the developing countries would like to be assured that such aid is additional to the aid resources that would otherwise be available and that foreign aid supports programmes that reflect their own priorities rather than only the values and preferences of the richer countries. The principle of "additionality” was indeed embodied in one of the Stockholm recommendations.
The third area of concern of the developing countries relates to the field of technology. In their quest for development and modernisation these countries have little alternative but to import technologies from the industrialised countries, technologies that reflect conditions in these latter countries. The developing countries do not have a modern technology of their own-one that reflects, for example, the relative abundance of labour as against capital. The fear is that the environmental issue may further aggravate the problem of inappropriate tech

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nology. The richer countries in seeking to avoid or reduce environmental disruption may have recourse to even more costly and capital intensive production techniques. It has been said that the additional cost of introducing anti pollutive devices to existing plant and machinery in the richer countries ranges from 5 to 20 percent of total investment costs. Already in Japan, an estimated 7 percent of total investment inplant and equipment is accounted for by such antipollutive mechanisms. The developing countries may not require such costly and elaborate i equipment in the context of their own environmental situation. But yet they may have no choice in the matter if this equipment is all that is available in the future. In the long run, of course, they may benefit by the adoption of technologies that minimize environmental disruption. But the immediate consequence would be a further raising of the eost of industrialization.
Another issue in the field of technology centres round the future global distribution of industry. As industrial growth in the richer countries approaches the limits of the environmental "carrying capacity' of these countries, and environmental safeguards and regulations become increasingly costly and difficult to observe, industrialists may seek to locate new plants in territories outside their own borders where regulations are less severe or where the threshold of the limits of the environmental carrying capacity has not yet been reached. This could mean that further new investments in some of the high energy, high pollutive, and labour intensive industries may be made in the developing countries. But such a possiblity raises a number of important issues. Apart from questions relating to the role of foreign investments and of multi-national corporations in developing countries, there are issues that are directly relevant to the environmental question itself and indeed to the pattern of global development. Is the prospect of the movement of industry outside the industrialized countries something to be welcomed? Does it hold out the promise of a new global distribution of industry in which the present imbalance in the location of industrial capacity comes to be redressed? Or, does it portendanew type of neo-colonialism in the form of an "export of pollution' wherein the environmental disruption and degradation already afflicting the rich

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countries is now transplanted in the developing countries as well? The Founex Report considered these issues, and at Stockholm a recommendation called for detailed studies on the prospects for a new distribution of industry in a manner beneficial to the developing countries. The broad conclusion of the Founex
Report was that the movement of new industrial capacity into the developing countries could be desirable - provided that the new investments were made to conform to environmental standards and regulations devised and imposed by the developing countries. These standards would be based on conditions prevailing in these countries and would not simply be borrowed from the industrialized countries. They may, however, because of the different environmental situation in the developing countries, be less restrictive than in the richer countries and prove, for this reason, to be an incentive for investors from the latter.
Some Larger Issues
As already mentioned, the significance of the Stockholm Conference lies in the range and depth of the issues involved. It was not a conference on merely what should be done about specific instances of pollution, no matter how serious these were, It was a conference about much bigger issues. It is this which makes Stockholm an historic occasion. For the first time in history the nations of the world took part in a massive stocktaking exercise. There was certainly cause for concern over the present condition of "Planet Earth'. Even more, there was cause for concern over the future if prevailing trends were to continue. Two centuries of the industrial revolution presented a picture not of "One Earth', as portrayed in the motto of the conference but of a divided planet. One-quarter of the world's population lived in relative affluence. Their very prosperity was now posing a serious threat to the natural system and the "quality of life' that they enjoyed. The other three-quarters continued to live in poverty and deprivation. Over a billion people in the Third World remain under-nourished. For them it is poverty itself that threatens and despoils the environment.

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One of the features of the new awareness of the environment is that it inevitably brings the distributional issue at the global level into sharp focus. The very rhetoric of the grand debate on environment and ecology raises this issue. As the World Bank's President. Mr. Macnamara, told the Conference: “We have come to see our planet as "Spaceship-Earth'. But what we must not forget is that one-quarter of the passengers on that ship have luxurious first class accommodations and the remaining three-quarters are travelling in streerage. That does not make for a happy ship - in space or anywhere else.' But it is not simply the stock-taking that brings the distributional issue into relief. It is also brought up by the very intense debate that is now raging in the industrialised countries about the future. It is a debate between optimists and pessimists, between "ecodoomsters' and "growth addicts'. The doomsday school predicts that the ecosystem of the planet will collapse if present patterns of industrial growth continue for much longer. The optimists argue that these fears are exaggerated, that present distortions can be corrected or that science and technology can, as in the past, be relied upon to find a way out.
The most dramatic and comprehensive statement on the possibility of ecological catastrophe was made by a study commissioned by the “Club of Rome' from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology entitled "Limits to Growth'. The Club of Rome is an informal group of influential industrialists and scientists from the developed countries concerned about "the present and future predicament of man.'The Study sets up a computerised global model which traces the interactions, in the process of growth, of five major variables - population, fogd supplies, industrialisation, the use of non-renewable material resources, and pollution. It argues that the continued growth of these variables at the exponential rates they now exhibit would result, possibly within but a few decades, in the collapse of the entire global system. Exponential growth at a rate of even, say, 4 or 5 percent a year, means that the time taken for the relevant variables to double in size is relatively brief - 25 to 18 years in the case of the rates mentioned. As long as the agregates are small no serious problems are likely to arise because of their continued doubling. But once the aggregates are large sustained

9
exponcatial growth could very rapidly exhaust the physical possibilities for further expansion. The Study quotes the hypothetical example of the lily plant which doubles in size every day and would take thirty days to choke up the pond. As late as the twenty ninth day it would have filled only half the pond. But after that there is only one day left for saving the pond m
The analogy is applied to each of the variables mentioned above. The present world population of 3.6 billion is currently growing at a rate of just over 2 percent annually. It is expected to reach nearly 7 billion by the end of the century. The present rate of increase implies a doubling time of about 35 years. The Study argues that the continued growth of population at current rates will soon press against the physical limits to food production and on the availability of arable land. Similarly, continued industrial growth at current rates will rapidly use up the world's reserves of minerals and other non-renewable resources. It will also release pollutants in such large quantities that the carrying capacity of the ecological system would soon be exhausted. As mentioned, the Limits to Growth study uses a computerised global model with coefficients based on scientific and emperical data to prove its point. The study does not ignore the possibility of scientific and technological innovation; indeed it provides for it in its calculations. But it does not believe, even on assumptions that it considers most optimistic, that science would eliminate or push back the limits to growth fast enough. The Study is not, of course, intended to be a projection of what would actually happen. On the contary, it argues that the growth process would be arrested or reversed even before the limits are reached. But the essence of its theme is that unless remedial action is taken early enough the corrective process would be disorderly and disruptive and would result in a breakdown in human society.
The conclusion of the Study is that growth must be slowed down or halted altogether - deliberately and consciously, Society must re-examine its values and design a pattern of living that puts a stop to ecological abuse. The Limits to Growth study has already had a considerable impact on the industrialis

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ed countries. Strong and influential voices are being raised calling for a slowing down of growth-for even zero growth. But all this raises questions of the deepest relevance to the developing countries. Are the rich countries having reached the heights of affluence now asking everyone, rich and poor alike, to halt their efforts at progress in the name of ecological balance? Are the present global distribution of wealth and the benefits that flow from it to be stratified when three-quarters of the world's population still suffer a life of deprivation? Even if the rich countries were to slow down their growth on ecological grounds, what would be the consequences for the developing countries whose trade and resource needs are so vitally dependent on the buoyancy of demand in the industrialised world? -
The developing countries must make their voice heard in this debate. The question of whether or not the world is in danger of reaching the physical boundaries of industrial growth will doubtless remain a subject of acute controversy. The scientific validity of the global simulation model presented by the Club of Rome can be contested. It may be demonstrated that relatively, small, butnevertheless plausible variations in the parameters of the model would yield significantly less pessimistic results. Furthermore, a disaggregation of the model as between rich and poor countries, for example, may show that considerable growth in the poorer countries is still compatible with ecological needs. After all, as the Club of Rome study itself argues, it is the brief doubling time of large aggregates that matter. It is the richer countries whiéh are the largest consumers of energy, the largest users of non-renewable materials, the largest polluters of land, air and water. An accusing finger is pointed at the rapid growth of population in the poor countries. Most of the countries concerned are already committed to programmes of populae tion control but if their recent experience proves anything it is that the very success of these programmes depends on improvements in economic, and social standards. Furthermore, it is the consumption of the rich that imposes the heaviest burdens on the environment. An average citizen of the richer countries consumes about twenty times ás much as an average citizen of a poor country and his claims on energy and material resources and his contribution to pollution is of comparable proportions.

21
As the Club of Rome Study itself shows, the consumption of the average American uses up seven times as much of the nonrenewable resources of the earth as the consumption of the average citizen from the developing countries. At present levels of consumption, greater ecological damage is caused by population growth in the industrialised countries than in the poorer countries.
But no matter what the outcome of the argument about the limits to growth the developing countries cannot accept any prescription that implies a freezing of present patterns of distribution where 20 percent of the world's population dispose of some 80 percent or more of the world's natural resources, and, in the process, pre-empts their later use by others. There are two ways in which the distributional problem may be met in the context of the needs of the developing countries, if there is indeed any validity behind the ecological argument for limiting growth. One of these would be to slow down or halt altogether the growth of the industrialised countries. If this were to happen the question would then arise of the use that would be made of the immense resources that these countries are now devoting to growth - their investment resources in other words. Surely they would not all be released for further increases in consumption in these countries with all the ecological damage that this may involve? It would be more logical to devote a good part of these resources towards development in the poor countries. In that event, resource transfers to the poor countries could account for alarge share of the 15to20 percent of the Gross National Product of the rich countries that is now devoted to investment - as against the paltry 1 percent that is embodied in the current aid target. The second way, the second stage in fact, would be to slow down the rate of growth globally. Even themaintenance of the current rate of global growth if distributed differently with the assistance of massive resource transfers to the poor countries would be ecologically less disruptive than the present situation. But it may be argued that it would not be feasible for the whole of the world's population - particularly the total of 7 billion or so likely to be attained by the end of the century - to enjoy the present per capita level of living of the richer countries. Some see this as being ecologically impossible. In

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such a case it would be equitable once the limits to growth have been reached globally for the richer countries to reduce their per capita consumption levels and to redistribute resources to the poorer countries until there is greater equality amongst the peoples of the world. All this is a far cry from present day realities; but this is where the logic of the "limits to growth' argument leads. When viewed from a distributional angle.
The limits to growth argument has up to now been built up on ecological grounds. But it may be argued that the industrialised countries should slow down their growth on political and social grounds as well. Hitherto only limited progress has been made by the developing countriesin their efforts to increase employment and raise living standards. Yet the glaring contrast between the poverty of the developing countries and the increasing affluence of the richer countries will become increasingly untenable in an era of rapid communications and rising mass consciousness. By the end of the century the population of the richer countries will shrink to about 15 percent of the world's total. Would a further worsening of the présent disparities in income distribution between rich and poor nations continue to be tolerable in the world of the future? Would this not be a source of tension that can threaten international peace and stability?
The environmental issue, more than anything else, has brought these questions into sharp focus. But there remain a number of unresolved issues. For example, if the industrialised countries are to slow down their growth on ecological or other grounds how could the developing countries be shielded from the adverse impact of this? It is a fact that in the world of today commodity prices, exports, aid, and economic growth in the developing countries are markedly sensitive to expansion and recession in the industrialised countries. If the solution to this problem, as well as the distributional problem in general, is to be found in massive compensatory resource transfers from rich to poor nations, through what mechanisms could such transfers be brought about? There is increasing resistance today to the conventional mechanisms of resource transfer including foreign aid, whether bilateral or multilateral. Both donor and recipient are disen

23
chanted with aid. There is a need to search for new mechanisms. But what could these be? The link with Special Drawing Rights that is discussed so often now in the context of the debate on international monetary reform is one of the possibilities. But there are others as well. A tax on the consumption of non-renewable resources and the transfer of the proceeds to developing countries, and the channeling to these countries of the revenues from the exploitation of common property rights such as the sea bed and the ocean floor are examples of other mechanisms. But all these need to be studied and argued in the period ahead. The Founex Report was written before the publication of the Club of Rome Study on the "Limits to Growth'. It did not deal with the distributional issue. This and similar themes could well form the subject of a second Founex which could help outline the response of developing countries to these basic questions, Indeed, there are many who feel that it is only the environment issue, with the world-wide interest it arouses, that can bring about a break through in the current malaise confronting international co-operation for development.

Page 16
MODERNIZATION: SOME SOCIOLOGICAL ISSUES
ALA PIELIES
The utility of "modernization' as a sociological concept has been questioned because of its ambiguity. Some authorities have defined and studied certain aspects or manifestations of a process vaguely described as modernization, at times denying that other aspects are either important or relevant. The economic aspect has perhaps received greatest attention, it being asserted that industrialization (including agricultural innovation, transport, communication and other services) is the hallmark of modernity, that without the economic advance that goes with industrial growth, there can be no modernity. Others claim that there can be modernization without development, and cite Thailand as an illustrative case2. An useful distinction has been suggested, which we may adopt with profit, that "modernity” be confined to the "ideal” case of a society which has adopted all attributes of a modern society while “modernization in some sphere of life may occur without resultingin modernity.'3
Tradition and Modernity
A precise specification of the characteristics of full-fledged modernity is then imperative, and it is here that our most difficult problems arise. Sonue writers, often unconsciously, define aspects of their own societies as touchstones of modernity and since a great deal of the sociological literature on modernization emanates from North America, Anglo-American political forms are made "either inevitable or necessarily superior outcomes of political processes in new nations.'4 The "reversal' of governments in Burma, Indonesia and Pakistan, not to mention those of pre-war Germany and Italy, to authoritarian regimes,
A revised version of a keynote address delivered at the Third International Conference on the Modernization of Asia, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang, 4 September 1972

25
described as "a lower less-flexible level of political and social differentiation' is seen as a "breakdown' in the modernization process.5. Admittedly, it has more recently been questioned
whether traditional political forms hitherto considered the very opposite of those of modern states, might not in fact transform themselves into bases supporting modernizing. political frameworks. This belated recognition led to the ineluctable conclusion that many of the polarities in the study of modernity vis-a vis tradition were misplaced, and that even highly modern societies of western Europe preserved antique institutions, a conservation not necessarily dysfunctional, and encouraged by the recent boom in the tourist industry.
The reason for supposing that the United States represents the "ideal' of modernity is that all vestiges of tradition have become irrelevant to the mainstream of modern American life; the aboriginal populations which would not come to terms with modernity were confined to reservations and their cultures relegated to the obscurity of museums, or resuscitated artificially (as in the case of Hawaiian culture) to serve the tourist industry. It was Marx and Engels who consistently urged the need to abandon traditional institutions in the interests of material progress which would prove to be the basis of a cultural renaissance in the future. It is well however to remind ourselves of an underlying ethnocentrism in European evaluations of modernity, which made even radical thinkers unwittingly share the prevailing bourgeois contempt for Asiatic civilization, an undifferentiated area of darkness, and superstition, tradition and inertia. Thus Engels considered that the Persia of 1857 engrafted European military organization on what he called “Asiatic barbarity', but without success, being conclusively defeated in an encounter with a small Anglo-Indian force. But he conceded that "in a popular war the means used by the insurgent nation cannot be measured by the commonly recognised rules of regular warfare, nor by any other abstract standard,

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but by the degree of civilization only attained by that insurgent nation” (Engels 1857).6
There was no doubt in the minds of Marx and Engels that European civilization was superior to the Asiatic and must be the model for Asiatic7 follower societies. Military prowess was one element of European superiority, and enabled a British army of 600 inferior cavalrymen to sweep before them the whole Persian army of 10,000. Engels concluded that military education "on the modern European system' required a long time, and met with obstinate opposition from Oriental ignorance, impatience and prejudice.
The fact is that the introduction of European military organization to barbaric nations is far from being completed when the new army has been subdivided, equipped and drilled after the European fashion. That is merely the first step towards it. Nor will the enactment of some European military code suffice; it will no more ensure European discipline than a European set of drill-regulations will produce, by itself, European tactics and strategy. The main point, and at the same time the main difficulty, is the creation of a body of officers and sergeants, educated on the modern European system, totally freed from the old national prejudices and reminiscences in military matters, and fit to inspire life into the new formation (Engels 1857).8
In Marx's view, the "material foundations' of western society in Asia, that is the foundations of modernity, were being laid in India, and included, besides a free press, scientific education, and modern communications, "the native army which, organized and trained by the British drill-Sergeant was the simẹ qua mon of Indian self-emancipațion”9. Two years later Engels wrote
6. Contd. - The relevance of this statement in the analysis of the Vietnam War is fascinating, particularly the political and ethical constraints on the use of nuclear weapons by the invaders, despite other evidence of American "barbarity" revealed by the Bertrand Russell inquiry, Napalm bombing etc. is, according to the American "degree of civilization' allowable against Asiatics. Moral scruples did not deter Tippu Sultan's men in the incident of the black hole of Cacutta - their "degree of civilization' was such that all was fair in a war of liberation.

27
of the rout of the Persian army by a single charge of a single Anglo-Indian cavalry.
The Indian village community according to Marx, was the prototype of Asiatic barbarity, and sacrifice of the idyllic relations characteristic of it was a price worth paying for subsequent participation in the modern society created by the western bourgeoisie which, in the words of the Communist Manifesto "has accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts and Gothic cathedrals.. The bourgeoisie. ... by the vastly easier means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian nations, into civilization.' The goal of western civilization for underdeveloped countries was undisputed. In the preface to Capital, Marx had no doubts that the image of the future of underdeveloped countries was shown by the industrially advanced nations. Nor was that the ultimate goal. For Marx visualised that the working class revolution of his time would not look to the past for its inspiration:
The social revolution of the nineteenth century cannot draw its figurative embellishments from the past; it must create them anew out of the future. It cannot begin its work until it has rid itself of all ancient superstitions. Earlier revolutions had need of the reminiscences of historic pageantry, for thus only could they bemuse themselves as to their own significance. The revolution of the nineteenth century must let the dead bury the dead, for thus only can it discover its true meaning. In those earlier revolutions, there was more phrase than substance; in the revolution that is to come, there will be more substance than phrase.10
What was the substance of the revolution of his time that Marx envisaged? We have to look for the answer in desultory writings in which he lauded what was desirable, worthy of preservation and development, in bourgeois culture. Certainly the life of the future would not be one of drudgery- the antithesis between mental and physical labour will in fact disappear - or of puritancial asceticism of the miserly capitalist whom he denounced:

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The less you eat, drink, buy books, go to the theatre or to balls, or to the public house, and the less you think, love, theorize, sing, paint, fence, etc. the more you will save and the greater will become your treasure which neither moth nor rust will corrupt.... (Marx, quoted in Avineri 1970: 110). 12
Just as Marx and Engels assumed western European civilization of the mid-nineteenth century to be the zenith of man's historical endeavours, so also the dominant nations of the temporary world, in their arrogance of power, imagine that they are the beacons for the Third World. It would be a mistake however to identify the main features of North American society-the immigration society par excellence as the embodiment of modernity, and to assume that all countries will exhibit thesę same characteristics as they proceed on the road to modernity, or even that it is an ideal goal to be sought. For in settled societies it is impossible to devise a modernization programme on a clean slate, as it were. Pre-existing institutions and values may be jealously guarded against "corruption' by outside influences. It is not merely that forces outside our control impede modernization, but rather that traditional values have been consciously chosen in preference to modern ones. On the other hand in immigration societies, modernization can proceed on a clean slate. From the individual point of view biography is irrelevant - the fact of immigration is in a sense, a second birth, the immigrant being like the Indian Brahmin, twice-born." The naturalization certificate is the equivalent of a second birth certificate. It became easier for a selfmade man to prosper in a situation where he is not weighed down by obligation to a host of kinsmen, nor tormented by allusions to an imperfect biography13. This basic fact had its impact on every aspect of life.
It is in this sense that MacCarthyism was an aberration in America for it probed a man's biography, or demanded one unblemished by Communism. Involvement in communist activity made one "un American.'

29 III
Three Major Dimensions of Modernization
It is convenient then to distinguish three major dimensions of modernization, namely society, culture, and personality.
We include among the "social', economic, political and interpersonal relationships, the institutions related to them. As stated earlier, many writers have underlined the importance of changes in the economic sub-structure in that they are stimuli for transformations in other dimensions of life. Of the economic changes, pride of place has been given to industrialization. Marx perhaps was most conscious of capitalist production working with iron necessity towards inevitable results, to the extent that the country which is more developed industrially "shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future'14. He had in mind the momentous political and social transformations which we now associate with modernity that came in the wake of industrial development. The crux was the progressive divorce of people living under agrarian conditions, and not far above subsistence levels, and their absorption into new, nonagricultural occupations generated by industry. Whereas in the most highly industrialised countries 6 per cent of the workforce engaged in agriculture is able to produce the surplus of food for 'the majority divorced from the soil, in the least developed countries the reverse is the case, the bulk of the workforce being peasants, and the non-agricultural sector negligible.
Urbanisation as a Key Dimension
The consequential event of epoch-making significance was the increasing numbers of people living in towns - it was consequential in the historical sense that urbanization took place in the economically developed countries only after the advent of industry. England "was decidedly not an urban pountry before the arrival of industry'; prior to that little over 11 percent of the population lived in places which could be called

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urban in any sense.15 Lerner16 contends that urbanization is one of the key dimensions in the modernization process, and that there should be a critical minimum of 10 per cent of the population of a given country living in towns of over 50,000 for the "take off' phase in the modernization sequence. In Asia, Japan and Singapore are long past that goal, and others near there, if they have not already arrived, but it is not proposed to pursue these details because of the arbitrariness of settling for 50,000 as the size of an urban area. The assumption however is that urban dwellers being most exposed to the mass media (newspapers, radio and TV), being more literate than their country cousins, and being politically more active, tend to evolve a "participant style of life' which is the essence of modernity. If one-tenth of the population of a country are thus modernized, they constitute a critical mass sufficient to propel the process of modernization further to enable the country in question to reach the goal of modernity. "Put at its crudest, the haves can afford to give something away, and the have-nots can see improvements ahead even in the existing framework'17. The elimination of economic disparities is now widely accepted by the intelligentsias of developing countries as an essential ingredient of modernity." In the emphasis on distributive justice which dominates the politics of many new nations, 18 one crucial matter is frequently overlooked, namely the economic base in the absence of which a large part of the urban multitude are those pushed out of overpopulated villages, constituting a parasitic unemployed body dwelling in urban slums. This unfortunately is the case in many developing countries, and the stark facts of Asian cities like Calcutta must cause serious doubt on the validity of abstract correlations between urbanization and modernity.
... " If not in practice at least in resolutions at international conferences. In fact equality was the aspect of modernization considered to be of overriding importance in the final resolutions of the Conference on the Modernization of Asia at Penang 3- 8 September 1972. 18. In Ceylon election to power of pioneer radicals of colonial times accentuates a dilemma; while maximization of domestic product by employing the most appropriate technology (in a context of a large reserve of unemployed labour) is imperative, the erstwhile revolutionary is hard put to it to explain to workers why strikes which they sponsored and encouraged in the decade after independence are now taboo in the ိုမှိ new republic of Sri Lanka despite an ever- increasing cost of
1Ving,

31
Modernization and Interpersonal Relations
In the sphere of interpersonal relations, modernization in the west involved the atrophy of the extended family and, in the extreme case, the reduction of kinship to the bare frame of the nuclear family. In this process, the family divested itself of its earlier multifarious functions, handing over production to the factory and office, religion to the churches, administration of justice to courts, education to schools, medical care to hospitals, care of the aged to special institutions, and even part of what is considered to be the core function of the family, namely socialization and child care, to creches and nursery schools. Voluntary associations such as trade unions, special-interest associations etc. proliferated pari passu with the atrophy of extended kinship ties.
It must be added that the emergence of callously material interpersonal relationships were not always hailed as ideal substitutes for the security and warmth of human relations in pre-industrial societies. It is when we consider further the cultural and personality strains of modernity that we come to appreciate the current revolt of youth against the modernity offered by affluent societies today.
The Cultural Elements
Of the cultural elements that are associated with modernization, Lerner pinpoints literacy and media participation.19 Literacy is the product of ever-widening educational opportunities, a reflection of the fundamental democratization of modern western societies. It is characteristic of many premodern societies that their basic literacy levels are exceedingly low, while there is no dearth of highly educated persons, including university graduates, unable to secure employment. India is a case in point, the literate population being hardly onefourth the total, yet the unversities producing a surplus of gra

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duates. The majority of the peasantry however live an entirely oral life. They are not, however, completely isolated from
modern influences since media-participation does not necessarily
presuppose ability to read and write - the beholder of cinema and TV as well as the radio listener is not necessarily literate.
While the prospect for rapid improvement of literacy levels
for Asia as a whole seems bleak-the modest target of universal
primary schooling by 1975 has been set by Asian Ministers of Education in the Karachi Plan - few countries e.g. Japan and
Ceylon have literacy rates comparable to the most modernized
countries.
The culture of modernity is also a culture of relative affluence, and contrasts with the life-styles of pre-modern peoples which were circumscribed by the material limitations of subsistence agriculture. An "image of limited good' dampened their aspirations, and the restricted web of interpersonal relations possible in village communities, in the words of Marx "restrained the human mind within the smallest possible compass, depriving it of its grandeur and historical energies'. Modern societies have conquered the natural environment to enable a release from the harsh asceticism of their past and a subscription to a philosophy of life based on the premise that it is not sinful to enjoy the lengthened life-span made possible by modern medical science.
Undoubtedly there were European philosophers who had nostalgic memories of the traditional world they had lost to the demands of modernity, and some psychologists pointed to the strains caused by the deprivation of primordial affiliations. But by and large the compensations of the modernity offered by the Great Society were considered to be impressive enough to offset any losses, and represented indeed the zenith of European civilization from which there was to be no turning back. The Communist Manifesto claims that the modernity represented by the industrial bourgeoisie "put to an end all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations' leaving no bond between man and man other than naked self-interest and the callous cash-nexus. While it is indubitable that Marx and Engels provided us with no blueprint for the future society - and this is not to be expected for

33
they emphasised that it would be the outcome of experience, praxis, the Manifesto does give us vague hints of the social order that might emerge after the demise of bourgeois Society - "an association in which the free development of each is the condition of the free development of all.' The political, economic and cultural goods in such a society would apparently be shared by a society which, according to a famous phrase in Marx's Critique of the Gotha Programme (1875), leaving behind narrow bourgeois horizons of distribution, can "inscribe on its banners: from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.'
It must be mentioned that the model of modernity represented by the affluent society of North America does not necessarily capture the imaginations of the young as it did in the pioneer days of the New World. The hippie-complex is one path evolved by youngsters in the process of "experimenting desperately with new ways of growing up self-respectfully into a world they despise, calling for help' from radical adults who become their gurus.20. There is widespread dissent and a search for new values, a pursuit which takes many westerners to India - back to the "Asiatic barbarity' despised by European radicals of the last century - to learn the secrets of another civilization.
If this revolt against the lack of spontaneity and sense of participation is evident in modern societies, elites of many "follower' societies are often blind to the ill-effects of modernity. In fact recent evidence of "breakdowns' in modernization in many "follower” societies seems to indicate that the machinery of supposedly cumulative modernization is not working well. The capacity of certain nations to fulfil the hopes of their would-be modernizers seems questionable, and collapse looms larger than the possibility of their progress towards modernity.
REFERENCES
1 Rostow, W. W. (1971) Politics and the Stages of Growth (Cambridge)
2 Jacobs, Norman (1971) Modernization without Development Thailand as an
Asian Case Study (London)

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3 Bendix, Reinhard (1967) Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered (Con
parative Studies in Society and History IX/3)
4 Gusfield, Joseph (1967) Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced polarities
in the Study of Social Change (Amer. J. Sociol. 72/IV)p 352 5 Eisenstadt, S. N. (1964) Breakdowns of Modernization (Econ. Dev.
and Cultural Change, xxi/4) 6 Engels, F. (1857) Persia and China (in Marx & Engels) On Colonialism
(Moscow).
7 The expression "Asiatic" hardly used nowdays, had a derogatory connotation. "Asian' was commonly used only after World War II
8 Ibid. 9 Marx, Karl (1853) The Future Results of the British Rule in India (in
Marx & Engels: On Colonialism. Moscow ed.) 10 Marx, Karl (1888) Capital (London: Allen & Unwin. Moore - Aveling
Engels ed.) 11 Marx, Karl & Engels, F. (1848) The Communist Manifesto (English.
trans., 1888) 覧 12 Avineri, S (1970)The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx (Cambridge) 13 Gerschenkron, Alexander (1963) Economic Backwardness in Histrorical
Perspective (Harvard) 14 Marx, Karl (1888) Capital (London: Allen and Unwin. Moore Aveling
- Engels ed). 15 Laslett, Peter (1965) The Word we have Lost (London) 16 Lerner, Daniel (1958) The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe 17 Pollard Sidney (1971). The Idea of Progress (London: Penguin Books) 18 Roszak, Theodore (1971) The Making of a Counter Culture. Reflections on the Technocratic Society and its Youthful Opposition (London : Faber)
19 bid 20 Wells, Henry (1969) The Modernization of Puerto Rico (Harvard)

THE RURAL-URBAN BALANCE AND DEVELOPMENT THE EXPERENCE IN SRI LANKA . GODFREY GUMATILLEME
Urban growth in the framework of development
In the social and economic changes that have taken place in Sri Lanka, the transformation from rural to urban conditions has been a relatively insignificant element. The share of the urban population in the total population has increased by only 1.6 percentage points during a period of twenty five years. On the data available for the 1946 census it is estimated that the urban sector 1 contained approximately 20.5 percent of the total population. The two succeeding censuses held in 1953 and 1963 revealed that the increase in the share of urban population during a period of 17 years was approximately 1 percentage point. The Census held in 1971 records an urban population of approximately 2.83 million, which amounts to 22.1 percent of the total population. There has been no perceptible acceleration in the rate of urban growth in the period between 19631971.
It is worthwhile examining in some depth the combination of social and economic factors that have produced the somewhat unusual rural-urban situation in Sri Lanka. The patterns of rural and urban growth will often reflect the characteristics of the development that takes place; it will indicate among other things how the social and economic disparities between
1 Here "Urban Sector' is defined as towns with a population over 2000. There are numerous problems in regard to the classification of the urban population in Ceylon census data which are discussed in the later sections of this paper. To determine the trends in urbanisation the census data has been adjusted on the basis adopted by Jones and Selvaratnam in their paper "Urhanisation in Ceylon 1946-1963' Modern Ceylon Studies Vol. No. 2 - 1970, This is a revised version of the paper presented by the author at the regional seminar on "Population and Development' held at Pattaya Thailand, June 11 - 14 - 1972, organised by the South East Asia Development Advisory Group.

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the rural and urban population are either accentuated or reduced; whether the dualism between the traditional and modern parts of a developing society is being aggravated or progressively eliminated; and finally how the human environment is being protected or degraded. In the concluding portion of this article some basic issues are raised regarding the pattern of urbanisation appropriate to the social and economic transformation taking place in developing agrarian societies. The process of urbanisation in the advanced countries which transferred the mass of their population to the great industrial conglomerations will not be repeated in the same form in the developing countries. For several decades ahead, the large majority of
people in the developing societies will continue to live in a rural
سمبر
economy; the process of development will consist largely of the progressive upgrading, modernisation and transformation of that economy. In such a context, we need to inquire what type of urban and semi-urban growth would best bring the appropriate elements of modern living to the rural sector.
In the rural-urban growth that has taken place in Sri Lanka there is a quality of balance which has elements which are both positive and negative. The rate of urbanisation obviously serves as one of the indicators of economic growth. The expansion. and growth of towns and cities will reflect the process of modernisation and the shifts that take place from the non-modern
sector to the modern sector. The transformation from the rural
to the urban will therefore normally accompany the changes in the structure of the economy as manufacturing activity increases its share of the gross domestic product and agriculture correspondingly reduces its share. By this measure Ceylon's experience in regard to urbanisation should reflect a, relatively stagnant economy in which the structural changes if any were marginal.
Ceylon's actual economic performance during the last twenty five years does conform to these expectations. It could be said that there has been no major structural change in the economy. While there were marginal changes in the mix of the gross domes
tic product, these did not bring about any significant shift
in the pattern of economic activity or diminish the predominant role of the agricultural sector.

37
Agriculture's share in the national output which was 39.1 percent in 1959 was still 35 percent in 1970.2 Manufacturing output had increased its share from 11.6 percent to only 13.8 percent. The data available for the gross domestic product by industrial origin for the period 1950-1959 include the industrial processing of tea and rubber within agriculture, and are therefore not readily comparable with the data for the sixties, where the industrial processing of these two products is shown under manufacturing. If adjustments are made on provisional estimates that are available, the share of agriculture in 1950 would have been in the region of 41 percent and that of the manufacturing sector 12 percent3. During the period 1950-1971 the rate of growth of the economy as a whole was relatively sluggish. In the period 1950-1959 the gross domestic product increased at an annual average rate of approximately 4 percent. The sixties record a slightly higher rate of growth of approximately 4.5 percent. But adverse terms of trade during the sixties sharply reduced the value of this product and real national income grew only at about 3.9 percent.
The composition of the workforce and its growth during the twenty five years again clearly reflects the main economic trends. Agriculture contained 53.8% of the workforce in 1946; its share still remained at 51.6% in 1970. During the same period of 25 years, Manufacturing increased its share of the workforce from 10.1% to 10.6%.4
The low tempo of economic activity and the marginal character of the structural change that occurred between 1950 and 1970 therefore represent one aspect of the insignificant rate of urbanisation during this period. There is little evidence of the dynamic process of urban expansion that accompanies rapid economic growth. The expansion of Ceylon's economy was not adequate to absorb a rapidly increasing share of its population to the economically superior urban environment with higher standards of living.
2 Wide Table II (A) 1 - Annual Report, Central Bank of Ceylon 1971, p.17
3 Derived ಕ್ಲಿಲ್ಡm Table A-8 in D. R. Snodgrass' Economy in Transi
tion, p. 279 . -
4 Source: Census 1946, Socio-Economic Survey 1969/70, Dept. of Census
& Statistics.

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But when Sri Lanka's experience in regard to urbanisation is related to the comparatively poor economic performance, there are other significant features in the rural-urban setting in Sri Lanka. The expansion of the urban population and the migration from the village to towns and cities as it occurs in the developing world is not exclusively the result of structural change and the expansion of the modern sector. An economist commenting recently on Ceylon's unemployment problems makes the point that "Ceylon has thus far been spared the horror of those who cannot find workflocking to her urban centres.' He prefaces this observation with the following remarks: "Migration to town was formerly in response to sound incentives and an integral phase of economic and social transformation. The city with its concentration of capital, technology and commerce is the logical seat of non-agricultural employment affording higher wages and greater opportunities to the worker than farming. Today the movement rests on less solid foundations. Unlike the urban centres which developed in Europe and North America during the 19th century, most cities of the developing world have sprung up in advance of any fundamental changes in the local economy and its attendent stimulus to industrialisation....................."
In the developing countries the expansion of urban economic activity is seldom in balance with the inflow of migrants from the village to the city. Forces which act on the poverty of the traditional society create new stimuli for migration. The unprecedented expansion of population exerts new pressures on the resources of an agricultural sector which is still at a low level of technology. A rigid structure of property relations in land unresponsive to the social and demographic changes often results in an increase of landlessness and rural poverty. Systems of mass education tend to disintegrate the value system which held the village society together and new expectations are generated which are beyond its capacity to fulfil. The migration to the city then becomes not only the positive response to an expanding demand for labour in the urban centres but also includes the drift of large masses who are dissatisfied
5 Thomas T. Poleman, Food, Population and Employment - Ceylon's Crisis in Global Perspective - MARGA Vol. 1, No. 3, 1972 - p.40.

39
and uprooted from their impoverished environment, and are in search of new economic opportunities in the urban sectoropportunities that do not exist and cannot be created with the speed and in the number sufficient to absorb the inflow. In these circumstances the expansion of the urban population is accompanied by a rapidly rising level of urbari unemployment, a high incidence of crime and the proliferation of shanty towns and substandard housing.
In the Ceylonese situation one could identify many of the elements which might have led to such a disorderly expansion of the urban population. On the demographic front, the dramatic decline in the mortality rate commencing from 1947 led to a rapid upsurge of population, which has nearly doubled in twenty five years. It was followed by a similar expansion of the workforce. On the economic front, the slow growth of the economy resulted in high rates of unemployment which reached 13-14 percent in the late sixties. Universal free education ensured a relatively high level of educational attainment among the new entrants to the workforce. But yet in Ceylon's case the expansion of the urban population was more or less in balance with the expansion of economic activity in the urban sector. It could be said that the worst features of the rural - to - urban drift have been avoided. Urban unemployment rates are not appreciably higher than those of the rural sector. Although there has been an increase in shanties and substandard housing in the urban sector, it has not assumed major proportions.6 What are the factors which combined to maintain the low ruralurban equilibrium which seems to characterise Ceylon's development in, the last twenty five years?
II The demographic setting
Let us begin with the demographic setting. Table I sets out the changing pattern of population density for the 23 Administrative Districts of the Island.
6 Foreign expertson housing who have visited Ceylon have commented
that conditions in these housing units owhere approached the squalor
misery that is to be found in the slums and shanties in many other Asia cities.

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The largest concentration of population is in the 12 Districts in the South West and centre of Ceylon. In 1971 approximately 81.5 percent of the population were inhabiting these districts which occupy an area of about 9,500 sq. miles or nearly 38 percent of the total land area of the country. The balance 18.5 percent occupy approximately 16,000 sq. miles or 62 percent.
This distribution of population has to be seen in its historical setting. The settlers who migrated to Ceylon in the 5th century B. C. established themselves in the North Central plains which are today among the most thinly populated regions in the country. But during a period of over a thousand five hundred years when the ancient civilization of the Sinhalese flourished, we know that these plains supported a considerable population. The settlers were able to develop a prosperous agricultural
TABLE I Increase of Population by District - 1946-1971 (Number in '000)
Area Population Density of Population District
Sq. miles 1946 , 1971 1946 r. 1971 - CEYLON 25,332 6657.3 12747.7 263 503
Group A
Colombo 808 1420.3 2699.3 , 1758 3340 Kalutara 624. 456.5 729. 732 1169 Galle 652 459.7 733.2 705 124 Matara . 481 351.9 587.0 732 1220 Nuwara Eliya 474. 268.1 456.0 566 962 Kandy 914 711.4 1199.9 779 1313 Matale 77O 155.7 - 321.6 173 418 Badulla(1) 1089 372.23 662.6 275 530 Ratnapura 1251 343.6 662.6 275 530 Kegalle 642 401.7 656.7 626 1023 Kurunegala 1814. 485.0 1028.0 263 558 Jafna 999 424.7 701.7 425 703 Group B
Amparai 1775 Kuhn 277.1 156 Moneragala 2188 - 190.9 - 87. Hambantota ' 013. 149.6 342.1 148 338 Polonnaruwa 331 - . 150.0 113 Anuradhapura 2809 139.5 388.6 35 38 Puttalam(2) 1172 43.0 383.5 47 327 Mannar 964 31.5 77.3 33 80 Vavuniya 1467 23.2 95.2 18 65 - Trincomalee(3) 104.8 75.9 188.4 72 180 Batticaloa 1017 203.1 259.0 73 255 Chilaw 262 139.7 ܝ S33
(1) Badulla included Moneragala in 1946 and 1953. (2) Puttalam included Chilaw in 1963 and 1971, and has an area of
1172 sq. miles. (3) Batticaloa included Amparai District in 1946 and 1953.
Source: Census Data 1946, 1963 nd 1971.

41
economy based on an elaborate irrigation system constructed with a high degree of engineering skill. With the decline of this civilization and the eventual abandonment of this region the centre of gravity shifted to the centre and south of the Island. The withdrawal to the South and centre was followed by new developments. With the expansion of trade between Europe and the East, when Ceylon situated as it was on the main trade routes attracted the attention of European powers, it was the West Coast with its excellent natural harbour and its potential for trade which became the obvious point of entry. It was here that their trading centres and military outposts came to be located. Consequently it was in this region that the western colonial rulers initially made their investments for the improvement of the infrastructure, and it was the South West which was first exposed to the impact of the superior technology of the West.
From the 16th century onwards the South West became the spearhead of economic activity in the country. It is therefore not surprising that it is the South West and centre of the Island which today contains what could be described as the modern sector of the economy. Agro-climatically this region was best suited for the rich plantation economy which was developed in the 19th and early 20th century. During this period approximately 1,800,000 acres were planted in tea, rubber and coconut. This new plantation constitutes approximately 40 percent of the total cultivated land. The Districts in Group A which are the thickly populated regions with densities over 400 per sq. mile and which with the exception of Jaffna and parts of Kurunegala, Matale, Badulla Ratnapura, fall into the wet zone, contain nearly 75 percent of all the cultivated laad and almost the entirety of the plantation sector in tea, rubber, and coconut. A major share of the output of this part of the country is produced for export. In contrast, the agricultural activity in the Districts in Group B is mainly for domestic consumption. The pattern of production is based on peasant farming in small holdings, at a level of technology which is as yet relatively low although it is being speedily improved. This brief account underscores the dualistic charactor of the economy

Page 25
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which has been the subject of much discussion and comment.7 This dualism which is present within the Wet Zone itself is accentuated in the contrast between the thickly populated plantationbased economy of the Wet Zone, producing for world markets and the sparsely populated Dry Zone based on peasant farming producing for the home market.
For the Island as a whole, the demographic changes that occurred are shown in some detail in Table 1. Almost all the Districts in Group A have reduced their share of the total population8 as a whole. The Central and South West regions which had 87.9 percent of the total population in 1946 had 81.5 percent in 1971. The sparsely populated regions had increased their share from 12.1 percent in 1946 to 18.5 percent in 1971. The population in these areas had therefore grown at a rate appreciably above the national average. The least populated Districts such as Vavuniya, Anuradhapura, and Polonnaruwa had increased their population by approx: 300 percent during the twenty five years. From the data available at present it is not possible to give accurate estimates of the contribution made by the natural increase of population on the one hand and migration on the other. There are slight variations in the rate of natural increase in the different Districts but it is possible to get some approximation which gives a broad idea of the effect of migration if we assume the national average for the natural increases in the different Districts. Table II contains such a provisional estimate. One can safely conclude that the movement of population from the thickly populated Districts to the thinly populated ones continued uninterrupted during the 25 years under review.
7 D. R. Snodgrass op. cit.
8 The grouping of Districts has followed the administrative classification as the data is readily available only in terms of administrative districts. However some of the Districts in Group A have well-defined areas which Would normally fall into the thinly populated region (e.g. parts of Kurunegala) while Group B similarly contains Districts with densely populated areas (e.g. Chilaw).

TABLE Increase in Population - 1946-1971 Differences between National Average and the District Averages
Population Compound Difference
increase Percentage annual betwen
District between population rate of national
1946&1971 increase increase average &
District average Kalutara 272.6 59.7 1.90 -31.7 Galle 273.5 59.4 1.90 -21.0 Kegalle 255.0 63.4 2.01 28.0 Jafna 277.0 65.2 2.03 -26.2 Matara 235.1 66.8 2.09 24.6 Kandy 488.5 68.6 2.13 -22.8 Nuwara Eliya 187.9 700 2.15 -1.4 Colombo 1279.0 90.0 2.61 -1.4 Ratnapura 319.0 92.8 2.68 -1.4 Matale 165.9 106.5 2.95 +15.1 Puttalam 2008 109.9 3.01 +8.5 Kurunegala 543.3 112.0 3.13 420.6 Badulla/Moneragala 438.1 117.1 3.17 +25.7 Hambantota 192.1 128.6 3.35 +37.2 Mannar 45.8 145.3 3, 63 - 53.9 Trincomalee 112.5 148.2 3.70 +56.8 Batticaloa 333.0 163.9 3.93 +72.5 Anuradhapura/Polonnaruwa 399.1 286.0 5.56 --194.6 Vavuniya 72.0 310.3 5.90 --218.9
CEYLON 6090.4 91.4 2.63 w
II
The urban scene
It is within this framework that one should examine the growth that took place in the urban sector. The definition of the term "urban' as used in the Ceylon context imposes certain limitations on the analysis of the available data. In the classification of the data in the censuses all areas which come under the administration of Municipalities, Urban Councils and Town Councils have been included as urban areas. The Town Council is generally the smallest urban local government unit followed by the Urban Council and Municipality in ascending order. The rural local government unit is the Village Council. The Village Council is upgraded to a Town Council, on the basis of such considerations as population density, the size of the commercial area and the amenities available such as pipe-borne water and

Page 26
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power. Such criteria however have seldom been applied uniformly, As a result the urban sector as defined in terms of these administrative units contains towns with populations ranging from about 1,500 to over 500,000. At the same time some Village Councils as well as areas in the periphery of Town Councils, Urban Councils and Municipalities contain urban complexes of varying size which by definition do not get included with the urban population. To that extent the real situation in regard to urbanisation will be understated.
Information on the urban sector is further complicated by the fact that with each succeeding census the total population in the new Town Councils that have been created in the intercensal period gets recorded in the Urban sector. The 1963 Census included 15 new Town Councils with populations ranging between 2,000 and 33,000 which were established after 1953. The 1971 Census had 37 new Town Councils with a total population of about 420,000. These changes in the administrative status of the local government units are not specifically related to any well-defined criteria of urbanisation. For example, the new Town Councils which had been created between 1963 and 1971 contained populations ranging from, 1,962 to 43,764. The larger suburbs of Colombo which had been upgraded from the status of Village Councils and contained populations over 20,000 had for a long time possessed all the characteristics of small urban communities. The change in their administrative status and their inclusion in the 1971 Census tend therefore to distort the actual trend in urbanisation and reflect spurts of urban growth which in fact did not take place. Jones and Selvaratnam in their paper on urbanisation, attempt to correct this distortion.9 They project the population of the new Town Councils for the past period assuming a rate of growth higher than the average, and estimate 'their population for 1946 and 1963. The estimated population is then added to the urban population recorded in the censuses for these years. In the Tables III and IV a similar adjustment is made in respect of the new Town Councils included in the
f
9 op. cit.

45
1971 Census. No adjustment however has been made for any changes in the administrative areas of the old units.10
TABLE Distribution of Urban Population Classified according to Size of Town
Size of Town in Number of Town Population in "000
terms of W population 1946 1953 1963 1971 1946 1953 1963 1971 Below 2000 40 30 17 6 47 42 29 10 2000-5000 36 35 32 34 119 113 103 110 5000-10,000 30 29 29 27 222 216 209 191 10,000-20,000 19 25 29 34, 263 351 391 486 20,000-50,000 5 9 2 26 177 219 576 800 50,000-1000,000 4. 6 5 2 221 383 379 411
1000,000 and over 1. 1. 2 3 362 426 622 824
All towns with ಕ್ಲಬ್ಗtation above 95 105 118 126 1364. 1708 2280 2822
Size of Tಿಖ್ಖ in Percentage Share - Cumulative Percentage teÍTIS. O r population 1946 1953 1963 1971 1946 1953 - 1963 1971 2000-5000 8.7 6.6 4.5 3.9 8.7 6.6 4.5 3.9 5000-10,000 16.3 12.7 9.1 6.8 25.0 19.3 3.6 10.7 10,000-20,000 19.3 20.6 16.2 17.2, 44.3 39.9 33.8 27.0 20,000-50,000 13.0 12.8 25.3 28.3 57.3 52.7 56.1 S6.2 50,000-100,000 16.1 22.4 16.6 14.6 73.4 75.1 72.7 70.3 Over 100,000 26.6 24.9 27.3 19.2 100 100 100 100
Total 100 100 100 100
Percentage Share of the Urban Population in Total Population
1946 - 1953 1963 1971
Percentage share in towns above 20,000... 114 12.7 14.9 15.9 Percentage share in towns above 10,000... 15.4 17.0 18.6 19.7 Percentage share in towns above 5,000... 18.7 19.7. 20.S. 21.3 Percentage share in towns above 2,000... 20.5 21.1 2.5 22.1 .
Percentage share of total population in all towns including towns below 2,000 ... 21.3 21.6 21.8 22.3
10. It is possible to obtain more accurate information regarding actual populations in these Towri Council areas in the different census years but this would require analysis and classification of the original census data availas ble for these areas. It may be argued that the method, that has been used for correcting the distortion could have the effect of deflating the rate of urbanisation. The method tends to assume a continuity in the process of urbanisation and ignores the sharp discontinuities that are sometimes inherent in the expansion of the urban sector. In the Ceylon context however the method employed seems adequate as the data derived in this hateပြိုငspond to the general trend that is evident in the urban sector as a WO.

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On the administrative classification of the urban and rural sectors the urban has increased its share of the total population from 21.3 percent in 1946 to 22.3 percent in 1971. If the urban sector is defined to include only towns with the population above 2000 the respective shares fall to 20.5 percent and 22.1 percent. If the urban sector is further restricted to towns with populations of over 20,000 so as to conform to norms that are internationally acceptable the share of the urban sector is 11.4 percent in 1946 and rises to 15.9 percent in 1971. On any of these definitions, the rate of urbanisation remains low. If the minimum population size of urban units is takeri as 2000 or 5000, the increase in the share of the urban population has been altogether insignificant. If the dividing line is applied at 10,000 or 20,000 the urban sector shows a faster rate of expansion. The figures reveal that the most rapid growth has taken place in the towns between 20,000 and 50,000. However unless the ingredients of urbanisation are defined clearly a dividing line at 10,000 or 20,000, in the context of a relatively small population as in Ceylon could distort the trend. Many of the urban units on the border of these dividing lines may be indistinguishable from the towns which have crossed the lines as far as their specifically urban characteristics are concerned.
The limitations in the methods used for estimating the urban population should all the time qualify our conclusions. For example, if the tabulated information is examined by itself, an interesting pattern of urban growth can be observed. In 1946, the hierarchy of towns appear to be almost pyramidal in structure with the smallest towns at the base being the largest in number, and the number reducing progressively as, the towns increase in size. In 1946 the urban population was also distributed fairly evenly among the towns of different size with approximately 25 percent in the towns with populations below 10,000. In 1971 the base containing the smallest towns had contracted from 40 to a mere 6 and the share of the urban population in towns below 10,000 had fallen to 10.7 percent. This may indicate that towns with populations of 10,000 and over enjoyed certain economies of scale and certain efficiencies of urban organisation which enabled them to grow rapidly in a context in which the total population was expanding fast. On the other hand the data

47
available on towns below 10,000 is not sufficient to confirm our conclusions about such a pattern of growth. It is likely that between 1946 and 1971 there was a sizable increase in the number of small towns with populations below 10,000 and that these have not qualified for urban status on the criteria that are now being used For that reason the comparison of the urban components containing towns with populations below 10,000 in the years 1946 and 1971 may not be altogether valid. Furthermore if the method adopted is followed to its logical conclusion the urban population for 1971 may also have to be adjusted in respect of the Town Councils which enter the urban sector at a future date. These comments underscore the need for more detailed statistical information on the growth of urban and semi-urban communities in Ceylon. But while the refinement of data will bring us closer to the real situation, it is not likely that they will significantly alter the magnitudes and trends that emerge from the data already available.
The pattern of urban growth and the distribution of urban population presented in Table IV reflects a comparatively static situation. It is one where for the most part the existing urban sector expanded slowly in response to the increase of population. The salient features of the urban growth during this period can be elicited from the tabulated data. The main concentration of the urban sector is in the Colombo District which contained approximately 51.8 percent of the total urban population of the country. The intensity of the urbanisation of the Colombo District itself is seen in the fact that out of a total population of 2,700,000 in this District the urban population was approximately 1,400,000 or 54 percent. The Districts with the highest urban components after Colombo are Trincomalee with an urban share of nearly 40 percent, Jaffna with 32 percent and Batticaloa approximately 30 percent. The thickly populated Districts of Galle and Kalutara had urban sectors in the region of 22 percent while Vavuniya a district with one of the lowest population densities had an urban component of 21.6 percent. In the balance the majority had an urban component below 15 percent with some as low as 4 percent and 2 percent (Kurunegala and Moneragala.)

Page 28
TABLE IV The Shares of Urban and Rural Populations by Districts*
·(Population in thousands)
1946Percent- �1971Percent : 源 Distřict| Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural | Total Urban Rural Total Urban. Rural Colombo, , , 1420 · 7172O3 || 169.0 30.3 T정예TTTz的지TT정7위Tzz회TT원의원이「엔퍼니피「위해되었 Kalutara45690365 # 100.0 20.0 80.0729161567 | 100.0 22.1 77.9 Kandy71178632 | 100.0 11.0 89.01199148 1051 | 100.0 - 12.3 · 87.7 Matale15517138 | 100.0 11.4 88.632138283 | 100.0 11.9 88.1 Nuwara Eliya26813254 | 100.05.0 95.045621434 | 100.04.8 95.2 Galle45890368 | 100.0 , 19.7 80.3733157575 | 100.0 21.4 78.6 Matara35142309 | 100.0 12.0 88.058766511 | 100.0 11.5 87.5 Hambantota14916 - 133 | 100.0 (10.8 89.234233308 | 100.09.8 90.2 Jaffna424125299 | 100.0 29.5 70.5701· 230471 | 100.0 - 32.9 67.1 Mannar31426. I 100.0 15.4 84.6771166 | 100.0 14.4 85.6 Vavuniya25817 | 100.0 31.5 68.59520 , 74 | 100.0 21.6 78.4 Batticaloa972868 | 100.0 29.5 70.525969189 | 100.0 27.0 73.0 Amparai10512 ·93 | 100.0 11.5 88.5277 ·32 < 245 | 100.0 11.6 88.4 Trincomalee754827 | 100.0 64.5 35.518874113 | 100.0 39.7 · 60.3 Kurunegala48521464 | 100.04.4 95.6102843984 | 100.04.2 ( 95.8 Puttalam18223159 | 100.0 12.5 87.538352331 | 100.0 13.6 86.4 Anuradhapura991484 || 100.0 14.4 · 85.638839348 į 100.0 10.3 89.7 Polonnaruwa40 ,435 | 100.0 - 11.2 88.815016133 | 100.0 - 10.8 , 89.2 Badulla29717279 || 100.06.0 s 94.061951568 - || 100.08.3 91.7 Moneragala75| 174 | 100.01.5 98.51904186 || 100.02.2 , 97.8 Ratnapura34318325 | 100.0,5.3 94.766247614 | 100.07.2 · 92.8 Kegalke40118383 | 100.04.6 95.4656 , 45610 | 100.0)7.0 93.Q Ceylon6657 1413 5244 | 100.0 21.3 78.7 | 12747 2836 9911 | 100.022.3 77.7
ia soae Table follow the administrative classification and include all Town Councils. They have been rounded to the

49
'. In 1971 the urban complex of the Municipalities, Urban Councils and Town Councils.11 which include the main city of Colombo and its environs contained approximately 47.1 percent of the total urban population of the Island. During the 25 years under review Colombo's share of the urban population has remained more or less constant. The outward spread from the core city of Colombo to the environs has been progressive but it does not assume the character of a rapid dynamic advance towards urbanisation.
TABLE V
Percentage Increase of urban population in the City, Suburbs, and
District of Colombo (Average Annual)
Percentage Percentage Percentage 1946-1953 1953-1963 1963-1971
v Colombo City 2.4 1.9 1.2
Suburbs of Colombo 4.5 3.4 3.7 Colombo District 3.4 2.7 2.7 Sri Lanka 3. 2.8 2.6
It is to be noted however that in the general trend in which thickly populated districts lost some of their population to the Districts with lower densities, Colombo District itself which contained the main urban complex was able to maintain a rate of increase close to the national average. This is in contrast to most of the other thickly populated districts in the South West and Centre. For example, Kalutara, Galle, Matara, Kandy, Kegalle grew at a rate which was considerably below the national average. While there was some outward migration from the Colombo District to the less populated regions, this appears to have been more than offset by a sizable inflow into the urban sector in Colombo. The inflow originated both in the more rural parts of Colombo as well as in other parts of the Island particularly the coastal Districts of the Southwest. A detailed analysis of census data has established this trend for 1946 to 1953 and measured the migration flows into Colombo

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from the different regions, 12 During the period 1953 to 1971 the fairly rapid growth of the urbancommunities which encircled the core city indicate that the trend observed from 1946 to 1953 continued in the period that followed. Within the Colombo urban complex itself, the population in the main City of Colombo as defined by the Municipal boundaries, grew at less than the national average and at a declining rate. Communities in the environs expanded rapidly into a ring of densely populated suburbs from which people commuted to the centre. The suburbs therefore on the one hand appear to have absorbed the outflow from the centre which was becoming increasingly commercialised, while on the other they received an inflow from the less urbanised areas in the Colombo District and other parts of the Island.
However the changes in the urban scene reflected in these statistics are of a mihor character. The main elements in the urban setting remain unaltered. The primacy of Colombo, as a commercial, administrative and industrial centre continues at the same level as at the beginning of the period that has been selected for review. Today the Municipalities of Colombo and Dehiwela-Mt. Lavinia together contain approximately seven times the population of the next largest town, Jaffna, as they did in 1946.
With the development and expansion of the sparsely populated areas, new administrative and commercial centres have grown. Some of them have overtaken the towns in the thickly populated Districts as in the case of Anuradhapura which is today larger than Kalutara, Badulla or Ratnapura. Polonnawara and Hingurakgoda, the urban centres of another reséttled region of the dry Zone, today have larger populations than many coastal towns in the South West which in 1953 and 1963 ranked higher.
In this sense the spread of the urban sector has followed the major shifts of population that have taken place and consequently minor changes have occurred in the urban hierarchy.
12 S. Vamathevan - Internal Migration in Ceylon 1946-1953, Dept. of
Census and Statistics.

51
But the urban growth has followed the past pattern of administrative and commercial centres expanding with the increases and shifts of population. There has been no urban outcrop which has significantly changcd this pattern and brought parts of the country together in a new set of economic interrelations. No "counter-magnets' to Colombo have emerged to provide new growth poles for the modern sector in other parts of the Island.
V
Economic Activities and the low rural-urban equilibrium
What are the factors underlying the rural-urban setting in Ceylon which appears to have continued in a relatively static condition and at the same time maintained an equilibrium at a low level of economic activity and growth?
We could start with the factors that led to the steady shift of population to the thinly populated region during the period 1946 to 1971. It was a shift which eased the pressures of a rising population on the resources available in the densely populated areas. During the preceding hundred years, over 1,800,000 acres had been brought under production in the wet zone lowlands, the mid country and the uplands in the West, South West, and centre of the Island. This massive agricultural effort had well nigh exhausted the potential of the agricultural resources of this area at the level of agricultural know-how and technology available at the time. With the steep decline in mortality commeencing from 1947, the new demographic situation that emerged rapidly increased the density of population in these areas and sharply raised the ratio of population to cultivated land in this region as will be seen from the accompanying Table.
In this situation policy makers seized on one immediate possibility - the rehabilitation and resettlement of the arable land in the thinly populated Dry Zone of Ceylon. Several factors favoured this programme. There was a capital asset of immense value in the dry Zone - the ancient irrigation system. Although it had long fallen into disrepair, it was possible to restore it

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TABLE VI
Increase in Agicಖ್ಯಣ್ಣ! Land 1946-1962
". . 积IN
Population per acre of Agricultural Land
Agricultural land Increase Population per acre
(in acres) of of agricultural land 1946 1962, Decrease 1946 1962
Colombo 416,725 387,569 - 29,156 3.4 5.7 Kalutara 255,571 258,385 + 2,814 .8 2.4 Galle 233,384 228,853 - 4,531 2.0 2.8 Matara 216,132 212,443 - 3,689 1.6 1.9 Nuwara Eliya 170,883 173,258 + 2,375 1.6 1.9 Kandy 402,163 402,145 - 18 1.8 2,6 Matale 168,178 152,319 - 15,859 0.9 1.7 Ratnapura 305,815 330,333 + 24,518 1.1 1.7 Kegalle 335,488 318,318 - 17,170 1.2 1.5 Kurunegala 584,698 646,186 + 61,488 0.8 ... 3 Jafna 152,908 169,393 + 16,485 2.8 3.6 Batticaloa 92,998 109,907 - 16,909 1.2 1.8 Amparai 73,755 120,857 + 47,102 - 1.8 Hambantota 131,639 156,843 + 25,204 1.1 1.7 Badulla/Moneragala 265,912. 302,967 + 62,199 1.4 2.2 Anuradhapura/
Polonnaruwa 170,032 296,363 + 126,331 0.8 1.4 Puttalam 190,551 218,339 + 27,788 0.9 1.4 Mannar 37,750 42,720 + 4,970 0.8 1.4 Wayuniya 31,950 64,981 -- 33,031 0.7 1. Trincomalee 30,866 74,434 + 43,568 2.5 , 1.9
to efficient operation with a speedy programme of renovation. The rehabilitation of the Dry Zone also appealed to national sentiment. The Dry Zone was the centre of the ancient Buddhist civilisation and the prosperous agricultural economy which supported it. After achieving independence, national leaders foundinita symbolic link with the great indigenous achievements of the past. What was of fundamental importance however was the control of malaria which removed the greatest impediment to the resettlement of this zone. 13 For a long period after indépendence the restoration of irrigation reservoirs and the resettlement of the sparsely populated Dry zone became the cornerstone of government policy. The major share of the development outlay during the period 1946-1970 went to this programme. A summary of major developments during the period 1946-1971 . in the programme of restoration and re-settlement is given in Table VII. The colonization programme has been severely criticis
13 Deaths from malaria had been reduced from one thousand eight hundred
and thirty five in 1946 to a mere six in 1960.

53
ed for the low economic return it yielded on the heavy capital outlay that was made. It was conceived as a programme of peasant smallholder farming and was consequently geared to the low level of technology that was available in the peasant sector. There is no doubt that initially the colonisation programme did little more than transfer a low productivity agriculture to new settlements at very high cost. But a discussion of the alternative strategies that were available would take us beyond the scope of this paper. What is relevant for our discussion is that the land development policy of the period took off from the level of technology that was available; it was not seriously constrained by the lack of trained manpower and skills and all the concomitant probleems of the transfer of technology that an industrialisation programme would have encountered. It made use of a capital stock of immense value which was in disrepair and could have been speedily restored. The new rural sector in the Dry Zone thus became a counter to the established urban sector and drew the impoverished and the landless rural population away from the pull of the city where the sluggish expansion of economic activity offered few competing opportunities.
TABLE VIII Major irrigation Schemes and Acreage - 1946 and 1969
1946 1969
District No. of Irrigable No. of Irrigable Schemes acreage Schemes acreage
Colombo 5 359 5 7,739 Kandy 3 873 7 9,835 Matale 6 480 10 7,008 Nuwara Eliya 2 1,520 6 2,779 Matara . 5 9,433 9 8.10S Hambantota 5 25,199 12 32,055 Vavuniya 15 4,414 26 18,615 Jafna 1. 8,881 9 . 24,365 Mannar 2 19,102 6 26,933 Batticaloa 8 29,580 15 55,131 Amparai 10 32,901 9 68,551 Trincormalee 6 8,955 9 35,358 Anuradhapura 7 15,375 18 63,195 Polonnaruwa 2 4,203 7 52,802 Kurunegala 8 8,883 16 25,568 Puttalam 3 2,285 7 5,968 Badulla 12 2,396 19 11,079 Moneragala 11 3,606 21 8.322 Ratnapira : 9 2,259 14 8,854
Source: Administration Reports - Department of Irrigation.

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When we turn to the urban facet of the developments after independence, we find that the economic activities that would have given an impetus to urbanisation did not grow on a scale and at a pace which could have become a counterpart to the new rural sector in the Dry Zone. The manufacturing activity which is the main vehicle of urbanisation had to grow from a very small base.
The manufacturing component in tea and rubber which was by far the major component in the manufacturing sector was widely dispersed in the plantation sector and had no direct effect on urban development. Although the manufacturing sector doubled itself in the fifties in absolute terms its contribution to the economy remained too small to have a significant impact on either employment or urbanisation. During the fifties the main thrust in industrial development came from the State sector. Investments were made on several large scale industrial plants which included a cement mill, a plywood factory, a caustic soda plant, a paper mill, an oil and provender plant, and a ceramics factory; but these were dispersed as separate industrial units in different parts of the Island close to raw material sources, and did not serve as important foci for urbanisation. State investpnent in industry continued in the sixties at a higher level but with similar policies in regard to location. In the early sixties the new, industrial enterprises of the private sector based on import substitution and producing a wide range of industrial consumer goods, grew in and around Colombo. Most of them however had a high import content; the local value added remained small, and the spread effects of the economic activity generated in this sector were limited. In quantitative terms, industrial output including the industrial processing of tea and rubber doubled in the sixties and the manufacturing component other than tea and rubber nearly trebled. But the share of industry in 1970 in the national output remained at about 13 percent including tea and rubber, and about 10 percent excluding these products. It could therefore be said that the manufacturing activity had little effect in creating the industrial urban environment that goes with the modern sector.
Consequently, the urban sector was largely composed of centres of trade and commerce and other services. Colombo

55
which was the centre of the country's import-export trade and commerce suffered from the decline in the income from her principal exports - tea and rubber. As a result trading activity during the late fifties and the sixties grew slowly. The severe restrictions on imports which followed upon the country's balance of payments problems in the sixties combined with the effect of import substitution to act as constraints on the expansion of the city's trade and commerce. There was hardly any increase in the flow of goods through Colombo. For example, during the sixties the annual rate of increase in the volume of cargo handled in the Colombo Port was in the region of only 2.7 percent. However even though there was some increase in volume, the total value of imports and exports declined during the same period. In fact during the early part of the sixties the total tonnage handled in the port of Colombo declined. It picked up in the latter half, partly on account of the problems in Trincomalee port and the transfer of cargo to the Colombo port. The import substitution in agriculture had similar subsidiary effects. To some extent, it changed the pattern of transport, storage and internal distribution, as in the case of commodities such as rice, onions, chillies and potatoes. In respect of these commodities there was a dispersal of economic activity in the rural interior, and Colombo ceased to be the sole importer and distributor of these items.
The workforce and the rural-urban mix
The pattern of employment creation during this period confirms the arguments set out above. Table VIII sets out the distribution of the present workforce by the major industrial divisions according to a grouping of districts adopted for a socio-economic survey conducted in 1969/70. It provides a framework of reference for the discussion that follows.
Zones 1 and IV contain the districts with high population densities. Zone 1 includes the districts in the South West as well as the Colombo urban complex which contains nearly 50percent of the urban population. The more urbanised nature of Zone 1 is immediately reflected in the occupational profile which is very different from the employment pattern in the other 3 Zones,

Page 32
TABLE VIII Employment Population 5 Years and Over Classified by MajorOccupational Groups (Number in “000)
Zone I (*Zone IIZone IIIZone IV
· MajorColombo,Hambantota, . Jaffna,Kandy, Matara OccupationalKalutara,Moneragala,Mannar, · Badulla, o GroupメGalle,Amparai, oVavuniya,Ratnapura, Matara~Anuradhapura,Batticaloa,Kegalle, Polonnaruwa,Trinosomalee,Nuwara Eliya, Puttalam,Kurunegala -·Total% Total%Total%Total% Professional, Technicaland relatedworkers8046,221,5 5.415.24.7 57.53.7 Administrative, Executive, Managerial and-|-- related workers22.01.72.2,66.111.811.50.7 Clerical workers98.1 7.5 | 9,92,57.22.232.02.0 Sales workers~142.210.9 21.4.427.08.3(63.74.1 Workers in Agriculture, Forestry, -- - Hunting and Fishing| 351.427.0 · 249.762.964.250.51061.467.5 Miners, Quarrymen and related workers 8.90.7–| – --------8.60,6 workers inTransportand Communication .· Occupations84.06.5 :14.13.510.33.125.81.6 Service, Sports and Recreational workers| 127.29,816.64.229.39.092,25.9 Craftsmen, Production Process workers and Labourers n.e.c.- 387.029.761.315.5o 65.920.4213.7| 13.6 Unspecified0,60.0... •--->----|-5.403 Total*1301.1100,0396,5100,0325.1100.01571.9100.0
±rce: Socio - Economic Survey 1969/70 辩Not: of Census and Statistics.

57
Agricultural workers constitute only 27 ဦးကြီ႔ဖြိုးဝှိ%; 怒、
The majority of the craftsmen and process S are ln Zone 1. Zone IV which contains the largest concentration of plantation workers has the highest proportion of agricultural workers in the total workforce - approximately 67 percent. The agricultural component of the workforce in Zones 1 and II which are entirely in the Dry Zone amounts to 57 percent of the total regional workforce.
The employed workforce increased from 2.568 million in 1946 to 3.595 million in 1970. Of the million new jobs that had been created during the 25 years, approximately half(472,000) were in agriculture, and only about 120,000 came to manufacturing. Much of the additional employment in the tertiary sector - wholesale and retail trade, transport, storage and communicat tion - originated from the expansion of employment in the agricultural sector. The data in Table IX confirm the general conclusion that the increase in employment occurred in the agricultural component other than in the plantation sector. Domestic agriculture based on peasant farming increased its share of agricultural output rapidly during this period and grew at a faster rate than the plantation sector. The dispersal of economic activity in agriculture and the slow growth of economic activity in the urban sector converged to minimise the centripetal hold of the main urban complex in the country.
TABLE IX Composition of the Workforce in Agriculture
(Number in '000)
− 1946 1963 1970 Tea 536 576 576
Rubber 194 192 61
Coconut 67 85 67
Other. Agriculture
(including Fisheries) 584 839 1049
During the 25 years, the economy was able to create only about 1 million jobs whereas the workforce increased by about 1.55 million resulting in a massive backlog of unemployment. The information that is available for the workforce for the period 1946 to 1960 are not sufficient for making firm estimates of the unemployment trends for the entire period from 1946

Page 33
9.
to 1971. But when certain reasonable assumptions are made in regard to the rates of participation in the workforce the trend that emerges indicate that the rates of unemployment were insignificant in the period from 1946 to 1953.14 In 1952 when the economic mission of the I.B.R.D. reported on the prospects of economic development in Ceylon in 1952 they had this to say in regard to the incidence of unemployment:
".........Concerning the quantity of labour available for development work, there is at present no significant unemployment; that is, there is no substantial body of workers normally dependent on wages who are without work for any extended period. As in most countries in Ceylon's stage of development, however, there is a high degree of under-employment, especially in the rural areas.................. -
It is towards the end of the fifties and during the sixties that the overall rates of open unemployment have risen sharply. This was inevitable in a situation where the rapid expansion of population after 1947 was beginning to have its effect on the expansion of the workforce in the sixties. At the same time the modern sector of the economy both in manufacturing as well plantation agriculture was expanding much too slowly to absorb the workforce. While the rural sector that was created as a result of the resettlement programme contributed to employment during the fifties it was no longer adequate to provide opportunities on the scale required by the growing rural workforce.
14. On an estimated participation rate of 85 percent for males and 30 percent for females, the workforce over 15 years of age would amount to 2.506 million workers in 1946, and 2.913 million in 1953. The employed population according to the Censuses was 2,568 million in 1946 and 2.990 million in 1953. According to these figures there could not have been any significant unemployment during this period. In 1963 and 1970, rates of participation are lower due to a variety of factors, not the least of which was the higher rate of participation in the school system. On the participation rate of 82 percent for males and 27.5 percent for females y the workforce amounted to 3.445 million and 4.080 million for 1963 and 1970 respectively. The employed population for the corresponding years was 3.197 million and 3.535 million respectively. According to these estimates there were approximately 250,000 unemployed during 1963 and 555,000 in 1970. (Saurces Census data, 1946, 1953, 1963. Socio-Economic Survey, 1969/70. P. R. မှိုcု;rds: Employment and Unemploment, OECD 1971 pp. 50, 51.

59
Therefore during the sixties both the urban and rural sectors began to accumulate a large mass of young unemployed persons.
The backlog of unemployment at the beginning of 1970 has been estimated at 550,000. The distribution of the unemployed as between the developed wet zone and the developing dry
zone is given below.
V
TABLE X Distribution of Unemployed - 1970 (Number in '000)
(1) Total Employed Unemploy- Rate of Zone Work- ed Unemploy
force ent
1,552.1 1,301.9 250.2 16. IV 1,809.7 1,571.6 238.1 13.1 430.1 396.5 33.6 7.8 - 348.0 325.1 22.9 6.5
(1) For District composition of Zones see Table VII.
Source: Socio-Economic Survey 1969/70.
The highest rates of unemployment were recorded in the South West and Centre - the densely populated region. The districts with the lower population densities, and a fast expanding population had an unemployment rate less than half that of the South West and Centre. The distribution of the unemployed between the urban and rural sectors is tabulated below.
TABLE xI Urban-Rural Unemployed-1970 (in '000)
Total Workforce Employe Unemಙ್ಗy- Percentage
е Urban 685.1 570.7 15. 16.7 Rural 2,766.6 2,387.4 379.2 13.7
Excludes the workforce in the Estate Sector.
Source: Socio-Economic Survey 1969/70 - Dept of Census and Sta
tistics.
It will be noted that although the rate of unemployment in the urban sector is higher than that of the rural sector the gap is not so wide as to suggest a significant difference in the

Page 34
quality and intensity of the unemployment situation in the
urban sector. Even at the end of the sixties the retentive capacity
of the rural sector was such that there was no major shift in the
unemployed population from the rural sector to the towns and
cities. −
VI
Socio-Economic policies and the rural-urban balance
The retentive capacity of theruralsector owes much to the social welfare policies that were followed by the Government after Independence and the pattern of income transfers that took place during this period. Table XII shows the distribution of income among the three lowest income categories in the urban and rural sectors. In these income categories, the average household income was Rs. 196 per month in the rural sector and Rs. 235 per month in the urban sector. While the urban and rural disparity was sharper in the higher income categories the levels of living for those in the lower half of the income ladder were less sharply differentiated as between the urban and rural sector. These conditions no doubt contributed to the capacity of the rural sector to carry its own burden of unemployment.
TABLE XII Sectoral differences in Incomes in Households earning below Rs. 400 pm.
Urban Sector Rural Sector Income No. of 9%. Total % No. of 4 Total %. Groups House- Incomes House- Incomes holds (Rs. “000) holds (Rs. “000)
ALL 349,030 100 158,175 100 1,511.450 100 3994.5 100 Belowl00 12,160 3.5 904.6 6 142,500 9.4 10,671 2.7 100-199 61,940 17.5 9,497.5 6.0 554,800 16.7 82,138 20.6 200399 138,130 39.6 39,656.6 25.1 558,60 37.0 154,269 38.6
212,230 60.8 50,058.7 31.7 1,255.900 83.1 247,078 61.9
Average
Income per Household Rs... 23500 Rs... 19600 per month
Source: Socio-Economic Survey 1969-70-Dept. of Census & Sataticiss

61
The income support. Which the social welfare policies of the Government provided, contributed a great deal to this pattern of income distribution.15 The free medical services, the system of mass education which was again free at all levels, the consumer subsidies and pricing policies which stabilised the cost of living were all important elements in this social welfare package. In addition, the low income peasant farmers also enjoyed substantial producer subsidies - subsidies for his inputs such as fertiliser and seed paddy-and guaranteed prices for his products. The capital outlays by Government established a nationwide network of medicalandeducational institutions which distributed the benefits of the free services to all parts of the country and the equitable distribution of these facilities and other civic amenities reduced the disparities between the rural and urban living conditions.
Other conditions which have influenced the rural urban balance have been commented upon frequently by various writers.16 The slow rate of permanent migration to cities could be connected with the fact that travel within the Island is convenient, speedy and cheap. This has resulted in a kind of mobility which does not result in permanent migration. Persons seeking work in the urban sector could come to the towns and cities and if unsuccessful could conveniently return to their homes. The size of the country itself and the limited distances, the network of roads of reasonably good standard serving all parts of the country and the cheap public transportation system both rural and urban, heavily subsidised by government, have all contributed to this type of mobility.
In evaluating the various factors which restrained a rural to urban migration some significance has also to be attached to the entire strucuture of property relations and tenurial forms that prevailed in the peasant sector. A comparison
15 "Compared to urban income receivers who received 28.2 percent of the income in 1963, the rural masses received 60.0 percent of the total. In 1969/70, the share received by the urban class declined to 25.2 percent of the total income. The proportion had shifted in favour of the rural areas.' - W. Rasaputram in Changes in the Pattern of Income Inequality in Ceylon published in Marga Vol. 1, No. 4.
16 Gavin Jones and S. Selvaratnam op. cit.

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62
of the size of holdings for the two agricultural censuses held in 1952 and 1962 reveals that even for the wet zone where the population pressures were mounting rapidly the size of the operational holding has not diminished during this period. In fact for the holdings of the smallest size the average has even increased marginally. There has been no significant fragmentation of holdings on the one hand nor consolidation on the other. In certain. districts the pattern of operational holdings does in fact disguise the fragmentation of ownership that took placeduring this period. Various forms of joint ownership and cultivation in rotation has preserved the size of the operational holdings. But by and large the general picture which emerges is one of relative stability in regard to the size of the operational holdings. The relevant figures are contained in Table XIII.
The position that is set out in these figures reflects the nature of the property relations that prevailed. The peasant sector in Ceylon did not experience the worst features of land lordism prevalent in some other Asian countries. Some measure of land reform in the mid-fifties improved the position of the tenant-cultivatorinpaddylands. There has also been no significant capitalistenterprise in this segment of the rural agricultural sector in which peasant farming predominated. One did not have, the process of pauperisation or eviction from land which would have exerted a push effect in any outward migration towards the cities. The stability of the size of the operational holdings however would lead to another conclusion. In the absence of. fragmentation where even uneconomic holdings would have supported additional employment at reduced levels of income, and the absence of employment opportunities outside the rural Sector there would have been a growing backing of open unenaployment.17 This trend in fact became evident in the sixties.
Future Trends and Prospects
The future trends in urbanisation and the rural-urban relationship are not easy to predict. It is in the sixties that the
17 The educational system, the job expectation it created in the new entrants to the workforce, and the way in which it directed such expectations away from peasant agriculture may have contributed to this situation.

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burden of unemployment has been felt throughout the economy and has exerted its pressure in the rural sector and it is the seventies which will feel the full impact of this development. If rural unemployment continues to mount, then the socially disruptive forces that will be released will find expression in diverse forms. It will not be possible to maintain the rural-urban balance that has been described. It will be difficult to prevent a disorderly migration to the cities, a steep rise in urban unemployment and an increasing tempo of more organised violence and crime.
The employment objective of course is being given the highest priority in the country's development plans. The development strategy in the 5 Year Plan and the strategy for employment creation which flows from it will determine the patterns of urbanisation during the seventies. The ineScapable constraints within which the economy has to grow - the constraints of capital, the foreign exchange resources and the internal market - will dictate the strategy of development. They will impose severe limits on the expansion of the urban industrial economy. The main burden of employment creation will inevitably fall on the agricultural sector on the one hand and on the smallscale manufacturing sector on the other.
In the agricultural sector what is envisaged is the modernisation of the peasant sector, and the transformation of agriculture into a diversified, scientific and high-income activity based on improved cropping patterns and more intensive use of land. If these plans succeed, the type of scientific farming that will gradually develop will change the entire character of the economic activities in the peasant sector which are now organised round paddy cultivation. The monocrop agriculture of the past produced a pattern of income and expenditure with sharp seasonal peaks and troughs. The trade and other services generated in this sector partook of this seasonal character. The agricultural settlements in the Dry Zone therefore seldom provide the economies of scale for the sturdy and vigorous growth of small independent urban units. The settlements were linked to the principal district towns which served as the main urban centre for them, and it was in the district town that the main urban expansion occurred. With the diversification of peasant

65
farming, patterns of income and expenditure will change, and the seasonal peaks and troughs to some extent will be evened out. Conditions will then become more favourable for small scale urban development. Opportunities for self-employment in trade and services will grow. In these circumstances the response of the city based trader and his willingness to spread his entrepreneurial effort into the outlying settlements will play some part. But the small scale semi-urban growth visualised may come faster if local entrepreneurship is stimulated through soundly conceived policies of rural credit, financing, marketing and development of co-operative institutions. −
Apart from the diversification of agriculture itself, the small scale manufacturing sector which is given high priority in future development is another significant element in the effort to diversify the rural economy. It will have a important agro-industrial component based on such crops as mulberry, cassava, soyabean cashew, sugar, cotton, other fibres and oil seeds, and industrial processing on an employment intensive small scale basis will be an essential feature of the programme. The rural sector overlaid with a widely dispersed small scale manufacturing sector provides the conditions for the growth of small centres of a semi-urban or pre-urban character. It is necessary to recognise their importance for modernising the traditional sector, changing the pattern of wants and providing new stimuli for growth.
The development during the next decade also projects a new urban configuration for the country, if the potential that exists is vigorously exploited. The diversion of the country's largest river, the Mahaveli, will develop approximately one million acres in the Dry Zone of which 300,000 are already cultivated below optimum level. In the North East a free industrial zone is being planned in Trincomalee which with its excellent natural harbour probably offers the best location in the country for a new urban industrial complex. There is then the accelerated development of the Dry Zone under the Mahaveli Scheme with a significant shift of population from the densely populated regions resulting in the growth of new settlements in the North Central plains and the North East. In the development of Trincomalee in the North East corner, a new growth pole could emerge.

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There can therefore develop an urban and semi-urban continuum which will straddle the country from the South West to North East and have its spread effects on the development of the large hinterland. It will have a major impact on the economic interrelations between the Wet Zone and Dry Zone and the North and South and their relative economic roles. By drawing the Dry Zone into the mainstream of economic activity it could significantly alter the rural-urban mix in the economy,
After due weight is given to the relation between the low rate of urban growth and the low tempo of economic activity, the balance of rural and urban growth during the last twenty five years in Ceylon still provides some insight into the management of urbanisation in the process of change and development. The expansion of urban activity is unquestionably a necessary ingredient in the structural transformation of the economy. But the relative emphasis on industrialisation and the creation of the modern sector on the one hand, and the modernisation of the traditional rural sector and the improvement of rural living standards on the other, will determine the pattern of urbanisation. Strategies which concentrate heavily on the expansion of the modern sector and neglect the change and increase of productivity within the traditional sector will sharpen the dichotomy between the modern and non-modern sectors and deepen the social and economic inequalities between the two sectors. The rural to urban migration can then get magnified and urban expansion can become disorderly with its concomitant social and economicproblems. In such a situation the traditional systems of economic activity are broken down or impoverished at a pace which cannot be matched by the expansion of the modern sector and its absorptive capacity. If the process of change from rural to urban is to be managed without causing imbalances the creation of the new modern industrial sector and the modernisation of the traditional agricultural sector have to be in balance. The development strategy has to manipulate both elements sensitively to integrate the different sectors into the process of development and reduce sectoral disparities to the minimum.
But in any such development strategy it is inevitable that the key element in the process of development for the develop

67
ing societies will be the modernisation of the traditional sector in which the mass of the population lives. The process of urbanisation in the advanced countries where an increasing share of the labour force was steadily transferred from agriculture to industry and the tertiary sector will obviously not be repeated in the same pattern. In the different demographic situation in which developing countries find themselves “there is little hope for rapid structural change in these countries as a group, in the sense of a rising share of the labour force fully employed in the industrial sector. Nor is there hope that the absolute numbers engaged in agriculture will fall.'18-In such a situation the modernisation of the traditional sector will have to take a form different from the large-scale capital intensive agriculture of the advanced countries which released large surpluses of labour to the growing industrial urban sector. The major challenge of development in most developing countries will be the transformation of traditional low-income peasant agriculture into high-income scientific agriculture which is at the same time employment intensive. When the rural Urban problem is placed with in these development perspectives, there is little doubt that the large majority of the people in the developing countries will continue to live in the rural sector. In this context urbanisation and its role in the process of development assumes a new dimension.
The city is of course the physical manifestation of modern living. It is both the accompaniment and the lever of structural transformation. It is in the growth of urban centres that the economies of scale emerge for improvement of technology, modern trade and marketing, creation of new services, and the provision of other amenities for better living. Some of these constituents of modern living must form part of the process of modernsation that takes place in the traditional sector. That process of modernisation will have to be accompanied by itsl. own appropriate form and scale of urban growth which will be very different from the conurbations of the industrial society. The improvement in the quality of living that accompanies
18 Report on the meeting of Experts on Social Policy and Planning - ရွှီးဝိုlm. Sweden, 1-10 Septemker 1969 U. N. Paper (E-CN.

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modernisation will express itself among other things in a type of urban growth,a type of "intermediate urbanisation” which will proliferate in small units and in which the tertiary sector with services of different kinds-marketing, health education cultural activities, recreation entertainment, government administration - will predominate. But such units will have to be more than mere centres for consumer services; they have to be centres which will accelerate the transfer of technology, which will stock and disseminate the relevant scientific knowledge and method required to raise the level of rural technology, which will promote local research and innovation and which will stimulate the growth of small scale industry that will diversify the rural economy. Planners of developing societies will have to study the special problems that are involved and develop the necessary techniques for the physical and spatial planning of this growth which will widely disperse the spearheads of modernity and better living in the rural sector.
19 The term "rurban which has become current and is used to describe the spread of urban facilities to rural areas does not quite convey what is intended here.

INCOME, WAGES AND CONSUMPTION PATTERNs
N CEYLON
PE V. CHARDS
The pattern of income distribution is coming to play an increasing part in the thinking of economic planners. But there are a large number of conceptual problems to be tackled before we can even grasp at the nettle of achieving a desirable income distribution pattern. Are we interested solely in redistributing consumption goods, taxing those consumed by the rich and subsidising those consumed by the poor, as broadly has been the policy in Ceylon? Or are we interested in bringing about a pattern of productive activities that will almost automatically ensure a desirable distribution of income between households? Is the later a feasible goal for the long run, i.e. bringing about income redistribution through productive work, and not through "handouts' and "relief works'? This essay cannot answer all these questions but it tries to point out that a policy of redistributing consumption is unsatisfactory and that the achievement of a desirable pattern of income distribution should largely follow from the adoption of a rational output policy.
To begin, a threefold distinction must be stressed. There is firstly a primary distribution of income aceruling to individuals or households from work or from property ownership, secondly a distribution, of income after direct income taxation and after direct income subsidies and thirdly there is a distribution of real consumption and savings, i.e. after the subsidisation or indirect taxation of the purchase of various goods and services. In all these the government, in virtually any country, inevitably plays a very decisive role. Fornational income accounting purposes productive incomes are those accruing not only to households, but also to enterprises (but never paid out as profits, dividends or taxes) or directly to government (from its own enterprises) from work or from productive investment, i.e. profits, rents,

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dividends or interest on government debt. (Interest on private
debt contracted for purposes of consumption is not included). In Ceylon it can be estimated that some 86 per cent of National Income (net national product at factor-cost) actually passes to households, i.e. is not retained by enterprises or government.' The distribution of income thus defined is the "primary' distribution of income.
Government Policies and Income Distribution.
Although at first sight it might seem that this distribution is independent of government action, that is clearly not the case. Government subsidises not only final consumption but also intermediate goods, e.g. fertiliser, water, thus affecting agricultural incomes. Government sets tariffs, exchange rates and GPS prices, and, less obviously, by consumption subsidies for rice etc., government policy may have produced a lower wage level than. would otherwise have emerged. The ramifications of government policy on primary income distribution are therefore immense, they are also particularly hard to assess given the logical and other difficulties of comparing an actual with an (indeterminate) hypothetical situation. For our second definition, i.e. the post tax and post direct subsidy distribution of income in Ceylon, the effect of government policy is probably fairly weak, since, unlike in the western type of welfare state direct grants to households such as pensions, unemployment benefits, child allowances as well as direct income taxation are of very minor importance.
Government policy, however, in Ceylon is of major importance in determining the distribution of real consumption and, of course, it is on this element of income distribution that attention is usually focussed - subsidised (or taxed) food and drink, health, transport and education. Successive governments have relied on subsidised consumption as the means to equalise living standards and have not viewed the effects of government policy on primary income distribution in this light, although, for example, colonisation policy right from its inception, had a
• Calculated from “Economic Development 1966-68, Review and Trends" Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, 1967.

71
deliberate income distribution aim. It istதிர்ஷ்க்வீடு
realistic on the one hand to pursue a policy of achieving a certain pattern of output and to view the implications of this output pattern on income distribution as accidental, and, on the other hand, to pursue a policy of redistributing consumption and to view the implications of such a policy on production as accidental.
The Redistribution of Consumption:
To attempt to separate conceptually, two policies, one maximising output and the other redistributing consumption is of course to turn a blind eye to the linkages between them. Firstly redistributing consumption can naturally have some unfortunate effects on incentives which may run contrary to the aims of the production policy. Secondly redistributing consumption will clearly run up against problems of financing (or rather of government taxation capacity) and it cannot be simply assumed that government revenues must expand with output. Thirdly such a policy can simply be used to divert attention from more fundamental problems and leave the basic pattern of economic power untouched. Fourthly of course, a policy of working through consumption does nothing to restrain those forces, which may be inherent in the concurrent policy of maximising output, which may be reinforcing income inequality. Now these arguments could possibly be stood on their head to prove that redistributing consumption was beneficial because it allowed those intent on maximising output a free hand. But in reply it can be stated that (i) Ceylon's attempts at maximising output have not been so successful, (ii) that the . financing barrier remains and (iii) the preservation of the existing pattern of economic power may be even inimical to economic development.
These arguments lead to a naive reading of the political economy of Ceylon over the last 20-odd years, namely that by and large a concensus has been achieved by leaving the rich in possession of their property and their high primary incomes (and encouraging them to save and investin residential property) and by buying off the vocal classes, urban workers and better-off farmers by consumption subsidies. Funds for subsidies could

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be raised fairly painlessly in the past from the export and import sectors, albeit at the expense of plantation workers, plantation dividend receivers and purchasers of imported goods. This policy would appear to have successfully produced overall political stability, and what is more (and what is from the view point of preserving the structure of economic power, more important) have also achieved price stability.
Now, however, there is the great danger that, at the margin, the financing system required to operate this consensus is becoming regressive. Funds can only be raised by a system of taxation which relies much more on both general and selective sales taxes and it is possible that some lower income groups are losing through the government redistributive mechanism. The 1963 Consumer Finance Survey found that many of the urban poor could not afford even subsidised rice and the Taxation Inquiry Commission Report of 1968 stressed both that the children of the very poor often did not attend school and that the enjoyment of adequate health facilities varied greatly between ... urban and rural areas. Yet trends in the taxation system are inevitably going to pass a larger part of the financing burden on to these least privileged groups. -
Moreover the system has, at least until the present interest in land reform took shape, allowed the distribution of wealth to remain untouched." (The Paddy Lands Act may have confirmed some tenants in their permanent occupation but by and large it has not given security of tenure to agricultural operators or weakened the original owners' property rights). And it is the distribution of wealth which dictates the form of society and the pattern of economic power much more than does the distribution of income. This is not to imply that Ceylon is controlled by cabals formed in Colombo 7 but the very rich have an important influence on the actions and ambitions of the less rich not only on the way these latter spend their money but also on what they consider worth working for.
The basic hypothesis on the cumulative effects of economic growth on income inequality are that a relatively small group
వి course, much will depend on the system of compensation that is (CVOWCG

73
of high incomes permit, via high savings ratios, a high concentration of wealth which yields further high incomes and thus reinforces the inequality in the distribution of incomes. This effect is particularly difficult to measure through income distri-. bution studies since there may be every incentive for an increase in the value of owned capital to be substituted for an increase in income, so that the share of a particular group's wealth in the total could be rising much faster than the share of its income. Of course, in an economy like Ceylon, with many small land owners and small entrepreneurs this process of high savings ratios from current income (via land improvement or reinvestment in machinery out of profits) and subsequent higher incomes will not always be an income inequalising force since the beneficiaries may be distributed all along the income scale. Nevertheless it is a force by which large investors and capitalists must gain in relation to wage earners. In view of these dynamic effects of income distribution it is of no value to talk of "policy to achieve a certain pattern of income distribution' unless conditions are also satisfied which will preserve that pattern or even set in motion dynamic equalising forces. A reliance on income distribution through consumption can do nothing to fulfil such conditions,
The Production Pattern and income Distribution
If it can be concluded that the redistribution of consumption has had unfortunate effects on the structure of society and also can no longer be counted on as a satisfactory method to achieve equality in living standards then it is necessary to look more directly at the distributional implications of production targets and patterns. We can ask firstly whether we know what pattern of income distribution is likely to be conducive to rapid growth and secondly what sort of a target we can frame for income distribution? -
A reliance on intuition and introspection will not tell us the ideal income distribution to achieve growth. While it can be argued that an extreme degree of inequality is necessary in order to generate the savings required for faster economic growth it can also be claimed that an increase in incomes accruing to

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poorer households would at least prevent, their using other households' savings for consumption. In addition the investments made by higher income groups, frequently in residential construction, may be productive only in a narrow sense. Furthermore the groups whose savings should be encouraged may not always be the rich, so much as owner-occupying farmers and small businessmen.
On the other side it has been argued, by H. Oshima and by the Dudley Seers mission, that positive benefits would emerge from redistribution by causing a shift in the average size of industrial establishments towards smaller, and hopefully less capital intensive but more profitable, enterprises. Similarly redistribution could ensure a market for the products of industries with excess capacity. But this approach seems misplaced; is it not more important to create conditions where small industries will flourish (if they really have advantages)? And where. excess capacity exists should there not be a serious enquiry whether a policy of lower selling prices might not be socially beneficial?
Goals for Income Distribution
And when We come to framing a target for desirable income distribution can we ever produce a clear criterion for measurement? It is difficult to take decisions in terms of their effect on overall income distribution because it is by no means obvious what counts as an improvement. It is not, for example, simply a matter of as many households as possible joining the upper income groups. Thus if the top 10 per cent of households receive 50 per cent of total income and the rest is equally shared between the 90 per cent of households remaining, (and calling the two groups A and B), then, by keeping the same average household income in each group, as A is enlarged and B reduced, distribution does not automatically become more equal. On the contrary, on one form of statistical measurement it would not be until half of the households reached group A that distribution would

7s
inprove significantly." Thus it cannot simply be said that, for example narrowing pay differentials within government service will improve income distribution.
As an illustration, one can refer to the pattern of income distribution in Ceylon revealed in the 1969/70 Socio-Economic Survey, see Table I. (The data in this form are estimates so that the constancy of average income in the 5th, 6th and 7th deciles may well be illusory). As an example of the obscurity of the relation of income shifts in particular groups to overall income distribution it can be pointed out that whereas in the 1963 Income and Expenditure Survey of the Central Bank most estate workers' households fell in the 5th and 6th deciles, in 1969/70 they fell in the 4th and 5th deciles. Very probably this relative fall served to bring each of the lower deciles income share nearer to ten percent of total income, an equalising although . for the estate workers not an equitable shift
If to continue (by now on more shaky ground) the limits for each decile are taken as being set by the average of the decile averages - its own average and that of the decile immediately preceding it - then we can see which sort of households fall into which deciles. For example the income receivers in the 10th decile would begin at Rs. 318-(Rs. 251+Rs.385) - 2 = Rs.318. On this basis, the highest decile, would include even very many clerical employees with a number of years seniority. Other white collar workers' households would probably fit into the 9th decile; by and large industrial workers would fit into the 8th decile and most other urban workers into the 7th decile. This view of income distribution has considerable relevance. It is very valid to be reminded that rising industrial wages and stagnant government salaries could lead to a switching of frontier groups between the 8th and 9th deciles, probably again without effecting any overall improvement in income distribution and also to be reminded that many wage earners are in the top groups and many property owners in lower groups.
Measuring inequality as the sum (irrespective of sign) of the difference of actual income shares of each percent (decile) of household from ten percent

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N. B. The high ratio for India must.be in part because the efficiency of a factory worker receiving only the average worker income would be very low. In addition a larger difference between urban and rural price levels would raise the ratio (and vice - versa). Low ratios are likely to be associated with sucessful exporting countries.
However, in order to induce some movement towards the average it will be necessary to take steps towards increasing the degree of competition within the labour market, improving the access of other groups to capital funds and probably setting a limit on personal productive asset holdings (particularly land) so that the forces creating income inequality can be stemmed. If the situation continues where the labour market is rigidly stratified, by type of employer above all (so that the relation between pay and task performed is a matter of chance); where, for example, public sector incomes are largely set on a basis of comparability with leading, but in absolute terms very small, group of private sector employees and where access to capital is highly variable between different groups, then it will be difficult to achieve a more equal pattern of income distribution.
That the Ceylon labour market has its rigidities is obvious from for example, the Central Bank statistics which show average wages in manufacturing rising by an annual rate of nearly 9 percent from 1966-1971. (At such rates Ceylon would soon cease to be a relatively low wage country). If such high rates can be achieved in the face of unemployment then obviously competition between the employed and unemployed is being severely restricted. Furthermore in the manufacturing sector it would appear that the dominant influence on growth of wages in any sub-sector is the growth of output in that sub-sector, i.e. its "capacity to pay'. That is to say that each sub-sector manages to operate in a vacuum. To the extent that these rigidities reflect social characteristics of employers and workers, they will be very difficult to change. However, this system of "non-competing groups has implications for the rationality of the wage incentive system in the modern sector and as such, more fluidity would be a desirable long term aim.

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One, perhaps welcome, implication of the above, is that union pressure would not appear to be a dominant factor in causing labour market rigidities. Productivity growth seems to be the more important element. The clue to reaching an incomes policy. through improving competitive markets lies therefore in taking steps to restrict productivity increases in high productivity sectors, and to raise productivity in low productivity sectors. But, as noted it is not quite a simple agricultural-manufacturing dichotomy and probably it is not quite a small-scale enterprise - large scale enterprise dichotomy. This of course brings us squarely back to facing the distributional implications of output patterns and targets. If there is to be an incomes policy it must be the reciprocal of an output policy, and mot independent of it. And this again highlights the need to encourage small farmers, small entrepreneurs and where possible to encourage the adoption of labour intensive techniques.
This leaves one very important question unposed, namely what is the output reciprocal of public sector incomes? But here there is no alternative to 'comparability as a wage setting criterion; the public sector must act as a "tail” regardless of the relative size of the 'dog'. Ideally there should be a key link between public and private sector incomes, perhaps the average pay of a clerk-typist with certain educational qualifications, and the pay levels of all other grades (for some of which government is the only employer) should be set around this.
Such possibly is a long - term policy which would one day be a substitute to the present policy of redistributing consumption and which would not suffer from the latter's financing problems and which would not leave the distribution of wealth untouched. In the short run perhaps more direct controls would need to be exercised in the name of an incomes policy, annual wage guidelines for key pace-setting groups perhaps, a reappraisal of Ceylon's institutionalised wage determination procedures and some kind of subsidised employment for the very poorest. But we must try to frame long term policies which can achieve a reasonable degree of equality in the distribution of income from productive employment without which repressive direct control

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will be a very short lived. Side by side with this we must attempt to rationalise the payment from work so that it is the skill in performing his task which determines a man's income and not the employer for whom he works or the degree of capital intensity (and hence his employer's capacity to pay) in the Sub-Sector in which he works.

THE EFFECT OF INCOME ON FOOD HABITs IN CEYON
The Findings of the Socio-Economic Survey of Ceylon 1969/70
L. AW. Parera, W. S. M. Fernando, Beatrlos IV. do Mel
T. T. Poleman
It has generally been accepted, on the available evidence, that the food resources of Ceylon have been sufficient on the average to meet the nutritional needs of the people. Such evidence has been derived chiefly from the Food Balance Sheets prepared by the Statistics Department (1) and by others and these have consistently showed a per capita availability of about 2,100 calories and about 45 grams of protein per diem which, in terms of the recommended dietary allowance suggested by nutritionists, provides an adequate daily intake.
What, however, has not been made clear enough hitherto is what happens when this marginally satisfactory average picture on a per capita basis for the whole country is broken down over the different income groups within the country. It is obvious that what food problems do exist must be most acute among the lowest income groups, and evidence of inadequate nourishment among these groups has been equally consistently revealed by the regular and specialised dietary surveys conducted by the Medical Research Institute during the last 20 years. Statistically this evidence has nevertheless not been meaningful enough, as have also been the findings of the Consumer Surveys of 1953 and 1963 which, while providing useful information on the effect of income on consumer behaviour, have collected data only on expenditure and that too on a limited number of food items. ۔۔۔۔۔۔
This situation has now been remedied by the Socio-Economic Survey carried out in 1969/70 by the Department of Census

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and Statistics among nearly 9,700 households and so sampled as to be representative of the full income range. Among the data collected for each household was seven-day recall information on the quantities purchased and the expenditure incurred on no less than 111 food items.
This paper presents, largely in graphic form, a summary of the key findings.
1. The 1969/70 Socio - Economic Survey
Detailed descriptions of the survey may be found elsewhere; the Preliminary Report of the first two rounds was released in October 1971 (2) and the Department of Census and Statistics will publish shortly the results of all the four rounds, on which the present paper is based. Suffice it to say that the survey was carried out in four successive rounds, each of three months, beginning in November 1969. It amassed a wealth of evidence on living conditions of households with special reference to income and expenditure. Additional information on the demographic characteristics of the population, fertility and morbidity, employment and unemployment, educational levels and housing conditions was also collected.
The household was taken as the unit of investigation for the survey with the household defined as a group of two or more persons, related or unrelated, who combined to occupy the whole or part of a housing unit and jointly provided them: selves with food and other living essentials. Thus in the survey domestic servants were included as members of the household while persons living alone and those in professional boarding houses or other such institutions were excluded.
For the purposes of the survey the 22 Administrative Districts of Ceylon were stratified into Urban, Rural, and Estate Sectors. The Urban Sector comprised all Municipal, Urban and Town Councils areas; the Estate Sector included all estates over 20 acres in extent and having ten or more resident workers; the balance constituted the Rural Sector. The sample was made self-weighting at the sector level.

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A total of 9,694 households were interviewed, broken down by sector and income as shown in Table 1. It will be seen that only in the higher income groups in the Estate Sector was the number of households sampled sufficiently small to give rise to possible errors in extrapolation,
TABLE 1.
Ceylon Socio-Economic Survey, 1969/70 Number of Households sampled
and Estimated Households, by Sector and Income Class
All Urban Rural Estate Income Class Island Sector Sector Sector Under Rs. 200
Sampled 3,694 845 1,615 1,234 Estimated 892,270 72,085 668,453 151,732 Rs... 200 - 400
Sampled 3,653 1,597 1,391 66S Estimated 789,658 136,055 570,789 82814 Rs.. 400 - 600
Sampled 1,242 722 441 79 Estimated 251,131 61,570 179,795 9,766 Rs. 600 800
Sampled 487 336 136 5 Estimated 86,913 28,860 56,088 1,965 Rs... 800 - 1000
Sampled 248 205 40 3 Estimated 34,358 17,495 16,536 327 Rs. 1000 and over
Sampled 370 332 34 4 Estimated 42,407 27,850 14,022 535 All CLASSES
Sampled 9,694 4,037 3,657 2,000 Estimated 2,096,737 343,915 1,505,683 247,139
The figures on income distribution are believed to be reasonably accurate though it is the general experience in surveys of this nature that income tends to be under-stated. An attempt was made to incorporate income in kind as well as in money and the consumption of home-produced foodstuffs for example

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was valued at prevailing market prices and added as an income item. Excluded however was an imputed value for the one free measure of rice distributed weekly during the period of the survey. This omission is not without significance, particularly in the case of the lower income groups, where rationed rice figures most prominently in the family budget.
The income breakdown given in Table 1 implies that 43 percent of the households in Ceylon have a monthly income of less than Rs. 200, 37 percent between Rs. 200 and Rs. 400, 12 percent between Rs. 400 and Rs. 600, 4 percent between Rs. 600 and Rs. 800; 2 percent each for the classes between Rs. 800 and Rs. 1,000 and over Rs. 1,000. It is well to keep this distribution in mind when reflecting on the implications of the charts that follow.
Whereas most of the data collected during the survey had a month as its point of reference, daily information was obtained on the food and drink for a period of a week. In the case of those non-perishable food items - condiments, sugar, tea, coffee and the like - which households normally purchase in quantities in excess of weekly needs, consumption was estimated on a pro-rata basis. For example, if a household purchased 30 pounds of sugar a month then the weekly consumption was assumed to be about 7 pounds. In such cases daily entries were not made but only the total applicable to the survey week was recorded.
A similar procedure was adopted for commodities consumed during the week but purchased previously. Here the actual quantities consumed were recorded and value imputed. In the case of commodities purchased in small quantities by the poor - so many cents worth of leafy vegetables, for instance - the value was first recorded and quantities estimated from prevailing prices. The figures regarding the consumption of alcohol are inevitably not as trustworthy as the data collected on other items since respondents would doubtless have tended to understate their actual expenditure.
A further breakdown of the under Rs. 200 income class indicates that 8% of these households were within the urban sector, 75% in the Rural and 17% in the Estate sector respectively.

85
The weekly data on food and drinkwas then "blown up' to a monthly basis to render them compatible with the rest of the information gathered during the survey. Subsequently the information was converted to the daily per capita basis commonly employed by nutritionists and food economists. To this data, in turn were applied the nutritional conversion factors shown in Table 2, The first column of this Table shows the portion of the food which is edible, the second shows the unit by which the item is usually sold in Ceylon and in the third column is the gram equivalent of this unit. The remaining columns show the nutrient composition per 100 grams of the edible portion.
TABLE 2
ten Edible Unit Gran Calo Pro- Fat Calls Iron Vita Riboas purchased poro Equi- ries teina - cium minA flavin
tion valent per (per 100 g edible portion) Cen 忍 3. c inct 1. CEREALS
Rationed Rice 100 lb 454.4 345 6.8 0.5 10 3.1 ... O 60 Unrationed Rice 100 lb 454.4 349 6.5 0.4 9 4.0 O 90 Wheat four 100 lb 454.4 348 11.0 (0.9 23 2.5 12 70 Bread 100 lb 454.4 245 7.8 0. 7 1.1 - 53 Kurakkan 100 lb 454.4 328 7.3 1 . 3 - 344 6.4 ' 21 190 Maize dry 100 lb 454.4 342 11.1 3. 6 12 2.0 150 100 2. NUTS
Coconut 100 no 340,8 444 4.5 41.6 10 1.7 0 100 Ground Nut 70 no ... O 349 26.7 40.1 90 2.8 19 130 Gingelly Seeds 100 lb 454.4 563 18.3 43,3 1450, 10, 5 30 340 3. OLS AND FATS
Coconut Oil 100 bot 745.5 900 - 100 -- - - Gingelly Gil 100 bot 745.5 900 - 100 xmaros M Butter 100 lb 454.4 729 - 8.0 15 - 980 Margarine 100 lb 454.4 770 - 85.4 - 0.3 475
4. SUGARS *
White Sugar 100 lb 454.4 398 - a- 10 m - • Jaggery 100 lb 454.4 340 1.1 0.2 1638 un -
5. YAMS سمي
Potatoes 95 lb 454.4 97 1.6 0.1 10 07 , 12 10 Potatoes (Sweet) 85 h 454.4 120 1.2 0.3 46 0.8 3 40 Manioc 85 lb 454.4 - 157 0.7 0.2 50 0.9 - 100 Yams ordinary 85 lb 454.4 111 2.5 0.1 12 0.4 130 155

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TABLE 2 (Contd.) item Edible Unit Gram Calo- Pro- IFat Cal- Iron Vita- Ribo
as purchased por Equi- ries tein Cl min A flavin
tion valent •- a per (per 100 g edible portion) cent 8. g . I mig i 1 mg miCig mcg
б. Yಜ್ಜABLES LEAFY
ankun 70 bdl 170.4 - 31 2.8 - 110 3.6 990. 130 Mukunuwenna 70bd| 140.0 84 5.6 - 510 16.7 963 140 Gotukola 70 bd1 , 42.6 49 3 , 8 - 220, 68.8 920 50 Sarana 70 bd1 227.2 2 1.4 52 2.4 827 . 130 Thampala | 70bd1 85.0 20 3.8 - 397 24.2 2261 105 Nivithi - 70 lb 227.2 21 1.7 nrr 73 10.9 2790. 260 Kohila Leaves 70 bdil 113.6 21 1.8 - 155 2.4 1760 30
7. VEGETABLES (Seasonal)
Jak, tender 80 lb 454.4 51 2.6 0.3 30 1.7 0 40 Jak Seeds 80 lb 454.4 133 6. 6 0.4 50 1.5 17 110 Bread Fruit 702b 908.8 95 1.4 0.4 25 1.1 15 -- Drumstick 83 lb 454.4 - 26 2.5 0.1 30 5.3 55 70
8. UPCOUNTRY VEGETABLES
Tomatoes 100 lb 454.4 | 20 1.9 0.2 20 1.8 96 10 Cabbage 88 lb | 454.4 27 1.8 0.1 .. 39 0.8 ... 600 90 Carrots , 95 lb 454.4 48 0.9 0.2 80 2.2 945 20 Beetroot 85 lb 454.4 43 1.7 0.1 18 1.0 - 90 Radish 99 lb 454.4 17 0.7, 0.1 - 35 0.4 1 20 Beans 90 lb 454.4 35 2.1 50 1.7 66 60} Leeks 50 lb 454.4 77 1.8 0.1 50 2.3 9
9, VEGETABLE FRUIT
Ash Plantain 58 lb 454.4 64 1.4 0.2 10 0.6 15 20 Brinjalls 91 lb 454.4 24 1.4 0.3 17 0.9 37 110 Bandakkas 84 lb 454.4 35 1.9 0.2 66 1. ქ5 88 100 Cucumber 83 lb 454.4 13 0.4 0.1 10 - 1.5 AW Ash Pumpkins 67 lb 454.4 10 0.4. 0. 1 30 (0.8 10 Snake Gourd 98 lb 454.4 18 0.5 0.3 26 0.3 • 60 * Wattakolu 82 lb 454, 4, 17 , 0.5 0.3 18 1. 6 60 Bitter Gourd 97 lb 454.4 - 25 1.6 0.2 20, 1.8 63 90 Red Pumpkin 79 b. 454.4 35 1.2 0.2 20 0.8 900 90 Kohila'yams 96 lb 454.4 25 - 1.4 : 0.1 20 07 84 40
10. FRUITS
Plantains 74 no. 42.6 104 1.1 0.1 7 0.5 30... 50 Papaws 75 no. 908.8 32 0.6 0.1 17 O.S 333 250 Pineapple 60 no 1363.2 46 0.4 0.1 20 1.2 9 120 Oranges · 66 no 170.4 53 0.7 0.2 26 0.3 9 30 Mangoes 85 no 170.4 51 0.6 0. 14 1.3 1371. 50
11. PULSES
Dhall 100 lb 454.4 343 25.1 0.7 68 4.8 135 200 Green Gram 100 lb 454.4 348 245 1.2 124 7.3 47 390 Cow Pea 100 lb 454.4 327 24. 6 0,7 77 5.9 6, 200

87
TABLE 2 (Contd.)
tem Edible Unit: Gram Calo- Pro- Fat Cal- Iron Vita- Riboas purchased pora Equi- ries tein cium min A flavin
tion Wallent per (per 100 g edible portion) cent s & Π13 mcg - mcs , 12. MEATS
Beef 77 lb | 454.4 114 22.6 2. 6 10 0.8 18 40 Mutton 74 lb 454.4 118 21. 4 . ., 3.6 12 2.5 9 270 Pork 82 lb | 454.4 371 14. 0 35.0 10 2.0 0 200 Poultry 67 lb 454.4 109 25.9 0.6 25 O 140 3. FISH · ·
Large fresh fish 65 lb | 454, 4 155 19.1 7.8 351 4.6 -- Small fresh fish 60 lb 454.4 106. 20.7 2.2 363 3.8 Narni ы. Sprats dried fish 73 lb 454.4 245 50.7 4.0 1089 · 2.8 270 105 Dried fish 73 lb 454.4 245 50.7 4.0 180 2.0 15 240 Preserved fish 100 lb 454.4 204 42.2 3.9 180 2.1 15 240 Canned fish 100 lb | 454.4 - 172 21.0 9.8 200 2.0 45 150 14. MLK AND MLKPRODUCTS
Fresh Milk 100 Bot, 738.8 67 - 3.2 4.1 120 0.2 55 190 Milk powder 100 lb 454.4 496. 25.8 26.7 950 0.6 420 1360 Milk foods * 100 lb 454.4 496 25.8 26.8 950 0.6 420 1360 Cond, sweet milk 100 lb 397.6 317, 7.3 8.4 273 0.2 105 330 Eggs (1) 88 no 42.6 173 - 13.3 13.3 60 2. 660 400 15. BEVERAGES
Tea lb 454.4 38 9.8 30 - - 1.0 Coffee lb 454.4 46 4.5 - 30 - 1.0 Mineral water aerated bot 40ml nk -- - - a16. LIQUOR
Toddy coconut sweet bot 745,5 59 0.2 13 150 مسه man Coconut fermented bot 745.5 30 0 1 0,3 - 1. - Arrack bot 745. S 210 un- r 17. BETEL
Betel Leaves no 6.1 44 3, 1 0.8 230 7.0 2880 330 Arecanut no 35.5 248 4.9 4.4 50 1.5 5 Chew of betel (1 leaf and
piece of areanut) 8.9 25 0. 0.4 230 O.S 586 330 18. CONDIMENTS
Dried Chillies 100 lb 454.4 246 15.9 6.2 - 160 2.3 - 272 430 Green chillies 90 lb 454.4 29 2.9 O. 6 30 1.2 87 390 Red onions 100 lb 454 4 59 1.8 0.1 40 1.2 25 20 Bombay onions 100 lb 454.4 49 1.2 - 469 O.7 10 Pepper dry 95 lb 454.4 - 304 11.5 6.8 460 16.5 540 140 Garlic dry 85 lb 454.4 145 6.3 0.1 30, 1.3 O 230 Cummin seed 100 lb 454.4 356 18.7 15.0 1080 31.0 261 360 Mustard * 100 lb 454.4 541 - 22. 0 39.7 490 17.9 81 260 Mathe seed 100 lb 454.4 333 26.2 - 5.8 : 160 14.1 160 - 290 Coriander 100 lb 454.4 288 14.1 16.1 - 630 17.9 471 350 Limes 77 no. 21.3 59 1.5 1.0 90 O.3 - - Tamarind 100 lb 454.4 283 3.1 0.1 - 170 10.9 30 70 Maldive fish 100 lb - 454.4 204 42.2 3.9 180 2. 1 49 240

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These conversion factors were prepared by the Nutrition Department of the Medical Research Institute and were subsequently approved by the Nutrition Division of the FAO in Rome. . They can reasonably be used by other workers in this country with one note of caution. The figures for coconuts are based on an average kernel weight of 12 ounces. While this may not be an unreasonable figure (it reflects the results of several years' work at the Medical Research Institute) it seems quite evident that the average size of a nutcan vary from year to year and that different income groups may purchase coconuts of different sizes. Coconut looms large in the diet across the whole income range and if, in fact, the several income classes purchase nuts of different sizes our figures could be off the mark by plus or minus 100 calories per person per day. It may also be emphasised that coconut kernel is used for cooking in what is, as coconut milik, a fairly wasteful process since a quarter of the fat and half of the protein is not utilised.
2. Food in the Household Budget
The first of our charts shows the place of food in the Ceylonese household budget. The chart is noteworthy in several respects. First of all it brings out the overwhelming importance of food as an item of expenditure. Among households in the under Rs. 200 income group fully two-thirds of expenditure is for food and drink; if liquor is added the percentage rises to 71 percent. The average figures for all households are similarly high; 55 and 61 percent, respectively.
The importance of food persists throughout the income spectrum. As income increases it is to be expected that the relative magnitude of food expenditure will decline; a certain level of sufficiency in food consumption is reached beyond which, out of every further increase, a higher percentage is devoted to other goods and services, What is striking is the limited extent to which this familiar Engelian relationship operates here. Not until the Rs. 600 to Rs. 800 class is teached does food expenditure fall below 50 percent, that is, among only 8 percent of households.

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Two factors help to explain this pattern. One is that household
income in Ceylon is, to an appreciable extent, relative to size.
As Chart Ishows, the under Rs.200 group averages five persons
whereas the figure rises to over seven in the Rs. 400 to Rs. 600 class; that is, more people, more income producers. This
relationship does not of course carry through the full income range. The large size of upper incomehouseholds clearly reflects the presence of servants.
The other explanation of the comparatively modest dropoff in the importance of food with rising income, is that absolute per capita outlays for food are greater among the wealthier. Again the all-Island relationship is shown in Chart I. In the lowest income class per capita monthly food expenditure averages Rs. 30 but increases steeply over the next two classes to level out at about Rs. 55 among the wealthy. This suggests that substantial changes (and improvements) in feeding habits take place as income rises.
3. The effect of income on Diet.
Here again the changes are quite modest--at least by Western standards. Economic development has historically brought about substantial changes in food habits. Among the poor - whether for countries or individuals, diets are characteristically dominated by the starchy staple foods, the cereals and starchy fruits, roots, and tubers. This is because of their relative cheapness, whether expressed in terms of market price or production cost; as a general rule less land and less labour expenses are required to produce calories of energy value in the form of starchy staple than in the form of other foodstuffs. Rice is the premier starchy staple of monsoon Asia for obvious agronomic reasons just as wheat, maize and potatoes are for more temperate climates.
As countries or individuals develop and grow more wealthy the tendency is for the relative importance of the starchy staples in the diet to decline. More expensive foods can be produced and purchased; steaks, eggs, dairy products and vegetables progressively take the place of the cereals. A convenient indi

2. CEYLON SOCIO-ECONOMICSURVEY 1969/70.
APPARENT PER CAPITA DALLY CALORIE CONSUMPTION, BY MAJOR FOOO TEMS AND MCOE CASS.
须 Sugar All Other Food tens.
other Starchy Fods. El other Nuts and Oile. HDRice (outside Raion) Scoconut oil
Rice (Rotion) COCOnuts
2500- nuwur م
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Household incoFine (Rupeeas per Month)

Page 50
3. CEYLON SOCIO - ECONOMIC SURVEY 1969/70.
از تراژ 3 ،
APPARENT PER CAPITA DALY CALORIE CONSUMPTION,
BY FOOD GROUPS AND IN COME CLASS
i i Milk 8 -
Nuts TDMI Product Eggcondimente
E:Sugar N.Meat a Fish is E.
Areconuts Roots Tubers 8 Fruits 8 Liquor a Other Starchy Foods Vegetables Bwèrages
ØPulaes
OO
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93
cation of this adjustment is the starchy staple ratio: i. e. the proportion of total calories contributed by the starchy staples. In the United States this stood at about 70 percent a century ago. Today as bread and potatoes no longer bulk large in the diet it stands at about 25 percent. Similar transformations have occurred and are occurring throughout the world and are usually clearly visible across the income range in any country. This however is not so in Ceylon; the starchy staple ratio, which stands at a 55 percent average for all persons, ranges from only 56 percent in the lowest income class to 53 in the Rs. 600 to Rs. 800 class. Only in the highest class, two percent of the population, does it fall below 50 to 48 percent. Rice is all pervasive.
Yet certain changes in food patterns are discernible over the income range. Apparent per capita daily intake of calories is illustrated in Charts 2 and 3. It will be seen that there is a progressive increase in apparent intake as incomes rise, with the lowest income group having 2060 calories and the highest 2600. To what extent this difference reflects actual variation in intake we do not know. The figures represent "apparent consumption.' Between availability and actual ingestion a certain wastage takes place in the form of spoilage, cooking losses and plate waste. This will vary enormously, depending on the type of food, storage facilities, purchasing patterns and the like. FAO has suggested 15 percent as a global figure. It would certainly be much lower among the poor in Ceylon and even perhaps among the better-off as well.
Apart from this difference in total apparent consumption of calories little is discernible in these Charts other than that beyond the Rs. 200 threshold the purchase of rice outside the ration increases by about 100 calories per day and of sugar by about 50 calories. Other tendencies identifiable with rising incomes are a decline in betel intake and liquor consumption and a small increase in the fats, both animal and vegetable.
In the West, the general experience has been for animal protein to replace proteins of vegetable origin as wealth increases. As Charts 4 and 5 show, this does not happen in

Page 51
4. CEYLON SOCIO-ECONOMIC survey is69/70:
APPARENT PER CAPITA-PROTEIN CONSUMPTION, BY FOOD GROUPS AND INCOME CLASS
80j i 8. Socondimente
Beoring Nuts Milk Products
Beste 8 Suar N 光*”
ŠMeat a Fish Areconuts Roots,Tubers a Fruit Liquor a otherstarchy Foods Vegetables Beverages
Cereo 6 Pulses
5
O
i
4O
お
30
이 2OO 400 6OO 800 OOO 1200 All Groups
Household incomes (Rupees psr Month)
 
 

5. CEYLON SOCIO - ECONOMIC survey is 69/70; APPARENT PER CAPITA DAILY ANIMAL e VEGETABLE
PROTEIN CONSUMPTION, BY IN COME CLASS
Animo Protein
Vegetable Protein
Ο 2OO 4OO GOO 8OO IOOO i2OO All Groups
Household f nconne ( Rupees per Month )

Page 52
* 96
Ceylon because the principal sources of vegetable protein - rice, pulses and coconuts are eaten undiminished as income goes up, the animal proteins being merely added to them. The proportion obtained from animal foods is 13 percent in the under Rs. 100 group rising to 26 percent at the highest income level.
While the figures published in the Socio-Economic Survey show that the under Rs.200 income group as a whole does not suffer from a shortage of proteins it is clear, from supplementary data available, that the under Rs. 100 group does have an inadequate intake of this nutrient. Moreover as the utilization of dietary protein is influenced by such factors as calorie intake, level of minerals and vitamins and the quality of the protein itself, it is demonstrable that the whole of the under Rs. 200 group suffers from a protein-calorie deficiency.
Equally significant is the increase in the intake of milk, milk products, meat and fish when income rises. It is noteworthy that although more fish than meats are consumed at all income levels, at high income levels the increase in meat consumption is far greater than that of fish. It should be emphasised, however, that most of these improvements occur after the Rs.400 threshold is crossed; this is, among only 20 percent of the population. One important consequence of this is that, since calcium, iron, vitamin A and riboflavin are found in their most assimilable form in these animal foods, it follows that the bulk of the population lacks these nutrients as well (vide Charts 6, 7 and 8). Rice is very deficient in calcium and therefore insufficiency of calcium is one of the marked features of a rice-eater's diet. AS, milk, milk products and eggs supply nearly four times, as much calcium as any other food and since low-income groups are seen to consume less of these particular food items, there will be a tendency for their diets to be deficient in calcium. The habit on the other hand of chewing betel leaves smeared with slaked lime (calcium hydroxide) increases the intake of calcium and calcium ingested in this manner is utilised by the human body; this is not without significance as a source of calcium for pregnant and lactating mothers at lower income levels. - The calcium requirement in quantitative terms by man is not known with any degree of definiteness because there are no

6 CEYLON SOCO-ECONOMIC SURVEY (969/70. APPARENT PER CAPITA DALLY RON INTAKE
BY FOOD GROUPS AND INCOME CLASS
E:JFruits and Vogetabla : Milk and Milk Products ,
Z2 Pulses 20 Condiments
oils and Oil Bearing Nuts Botel and Areconuts | Carl als N. Meat and Fish
চিত্র টুঙ্কু 333 22 闇 熙 33 2O 333-323 2
- Fo 3. ጙ ges do s s cy 邵翻岗厝 N \ o Yo 凉 格
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O 200.400. Soo 809 OOO a oyer All Groups
Household lnconne ( Rupees per Month)

Page 53
7. CEYLON SOCIO - ECONOMO SURVEY 969/70:
APPARENT PER CAPTA DALY VITAM IN A NTAKE
BY FOOD GROUPS AND INCOME CLASS EMilk and Milk products oils a Oil Bearing Aut
(Butter)
condiments ::: Fruitin ond Wegetables eraals
Betel ond Arconuts
900
8OO
7OO
次
:::::
. c. 光学一
来 本 Хн 冰 米岑 米 *米 |激领| 、米 |米潜| |米料 、 Xk. 冰 米* 冰 Ο 米 |kk| || k *| |XkK|| xk 米米
о 2OO 4OO 6OO 800 OOO 8 Over Al Groups
Household income (Rupees por Month)
 
 
 
 
 

3. CEYLON SOCO-ECONO3C SURVEY 1969/70.
APPARENT PER CAPTA DAY RIBOFLAVIN NTAKE BY FOOD GROUPS AND NCOME CLASS
E: Fruits and vegetables Condiments
R Roots tubers and Othef N Meat ond Fish Illey" Hi Milk and Mitk Products oils and Oil Begrina Nute
Cereols. Pulses
BOO
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2OO
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V Wer Hcusehold income (Rupees per Month)

Page 54
100
signs and symptoms, ascribable to deficiency of calcium. Moreover man appears to be capable of adapting himself to low calcium intakes without any apparent deleterious effects. The recommended allowances for calcium should therefore be considered as only tentative.
From Chart 6, the Iron intake from vegetable sources is seen to be more or less the same throughout the entire income range. It is known, however, that there is a considerable variation in the rate of absorption of iron from different foods and therefore the amount of available iron will depend on the type of diet of the person. This rate is highest (9 to 25 percent) in diets which include a high percentage of animal foods, such as meats. The recommended allowances for iron are based, therefore on the type of diet where animal foods provide less than 10 percent of the calories. It is thus evident from that Chart that there is a deficiency of iron at low income levels and, conversely, an adequacy at higher income levels.
Almost 50 percent of the Vitamin A at low income levels is supplied by betel and, if the leaf is presumed to be swallowed, then the intake could be considered adequate. It could well be also that the figures for the intake of leafy vegetables in the Socio-Economic Survey were under-estimated. As much as 95 percent of this vitaminis in the form of carotene and the recom mended allowances for Vitamin A for Ceylon is determined on this basis.
Rice would appear to supply much of the Riboflavin throughout the whole income range but at higher income levels milk and milk products help to double this intake. The apparent inadequacy of riboflavin even at the highest income levels is probably due to a high margin of safety provided for in the riboflavin requirement.
Condiments are generally disregarded as a source of nutrients in the diets. Charts 4,5,6 and 7 nevertheless show that when compared to some of the other food groups, these condiments do supply appreciable quantitities of protein, iron, calcium, carotene and riboflawin, and it is worth noting that at low income levels they play a not inconsiderable part.

101
A summary of these findings is provided in the Table below:-
Percentage of adequacy" of some nutrients by income classes (all-island) socio-economic survey 1969-70
ဝှိpita INCOME CLASSES
Recomm- Below Below Rs. Ris. RS. Ris. Ris. AILL Nutrients ended Rs... Rs. 200 400 600 800 1000 Income
Allow- 100 200 Rs. Rs. Rs. Rs. and Classes
ance 399 599 799 999 over
for % % % %,% % % %
Ceylon
(3)
Calories ႕၀0 88 94 103 111 114 16 120 103 Protein (g) so 89 105. 20 130 135 38 147 20 Calcium (mg) #೨ (-) ( ) (-) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 72 Iron (mg) co (--) 83 86 93 94 97 97 86
vitamin A (mcg) Yá42 (-) 109 109 112 121 121 131 111
(retinol) (8) Riboflavin (mcg) i 1220 (-) 51 56 62 69 75 82 57
(-) Detailed breakdowns not available for computing adequacy
The adequacy of the diet in respect of any nutrient is determined by expressing consumption of the nutrient as a percentage of the recommended aliowances on a per caput per day basis. The recommended allowances for Ceylon are shown in the first column and the adequacy for each nutrient is given under each income class.
4. Nutritional Implications.
An assessment of the new and confirmatory evidence provided by the Socio-Economic Survey is hampered from the point of view of nutrition by two important gaps in our knowledge.
First, it has been suggested that we do not know accurately either the calorie or the protein requirements of the population. This ignorance, it is pointed out, is not unique to Ceylon, it is global but it demands nevertheless a new line of research to ensure reliable nutritional bench-marks for Ceylon. The present figure of 2200 calories and 45 grams of protein including 12-14 grams of animal protein, may well be adequate but it must nevertheless be reviewed in terms of activity patterns under tropical conditions and in terms of physical stature and adaptation. Is the physical stature of the population, for example, an adaptation to less food intake?

Page 55
Dietary Surveys
TABLE 3
Medical Research Institute Some nuitrient intakes per caput per day
RURAL Low INCOME
– Ceylon 1969 – 1971 –Départmentof Nutrition
| | }
Year of Survey 1969 s1970197019701971 '19711971 Name of VillageKudirip-Hirigol.Hiripitiyao i Kukulponeo | Katara- [ Kandalama* | Ganthiripuwaolagama*3gama*yagama* Calories헌| 2018 | 1979헌TT헌T|| Tauo || 193 Total Proteins (g)* 53| 455045, T3958 | 51 Animal Proteins (g)15.7 || ~ 7.8127 |4 |6 | 11 Range (g)625,124|2232-22 || 0-14 || 0-34 || 2-15 Calcium (mg)405 || 219 || 391280 || 354 |_| 347_s_357 Iron (mg)19 || 18 | 16司이TT터이 20 | 18 Vitamin A as retinol (mcg)455|286745494|626|| 510 ,|683 Riboflavin (mcg)650|544648sw | 618|882| 800
* 40 households random sampled out of about 200 householdsin each village.
ゆ

103
On the present standard, it would appear, on the findings of the Socio-Economic Survey, that there is no startling nutritional problem in Ceylon since the marginally adequate average picture of the Food Balance Sheet with which we started does not seem to break down completely among the poorer sections of the population. Nevertheless among the under Rs. 200 group, except on the estates, there is clearly a considerable degree of undernourishment, the worst affected being the urban poor. Even in the Rs. 200 to Rs. 400 group there would appear to be only a marginal adequacy.
The gap between them and the higher income group is still haunting. Thus, for example, does the difference of 200 calories and 8 grams of protein merely reflect less food wastage among the poor or does it in fact imply reduced activity rates and/or physical deterioration for them?
The nutritional findings derived from the socio-economic survey are found to be in general agreement with some of the specialized rural dietary surveys of the Medical Research Insititute (Ceylon) the results of which are set out for comparison in Table 3. It will be noted that these M.R.I. Surveys reveal a consistentinadequacy of calories, calcium, iron, and riboflavin, together with a generally low level of animal protein intake among the lower income groups of the rural sector. The assessment of the nutritional status of these groups confirm a protein calorie deficiency particularly in the vulnerable section of the lowest income group, and this was often found to be associated with a high prevalence of nutritional anaemia consequent chiefly on iron and folate deficiencies. Moreover a low consumption ofmilk and milk products and green leafy vegetables is reflected in the low calcium and riboflavin intakes. As long ago as the 1930's, (9) Nicholls and Nimalasuriya of the M. R. I. were adducing evidence that the small stature of the poor could well be the result of long-continued calcium deprivation. It might here be added that the latest M.R.I. Survey as well as the Socio-Economic Survey suggests that vitamin A intakes are now generally adequate. Vitamin A deficiency signs are nevertheless still occasionally seen in the school child. In addition it might be noted that the lowest intake recorded is always for riboflavin

Page 56
  

Page 57
106
REFERENCES
(1)
(2)
(3) (4) (5)
( (7)
(8)
(9)
(10) (11)
"Statistical Abstract of Ceylon, 1969' - Department of Census and Statistics, 1970-vide pp. 133 onwards for "Ceylon Food Balance Sheet' "Preliminary Report on Socio-Economic Survey of Ceylon in 1969/70'- Departrihent of Census and Statistics, Ceylon:
October 1971. Calorie requirements (1957) FAO Nutritional Studies No. 15 Protein requirements (1965) WHO Technical Report, Series No. 301. 路 requirements (1961) FAO/WHO Technical Report, Series
O.
6) Iron requirements (1970) FAO/WHO Technical, Series No. 452
(1968) Indian Council Medical Research; Special Report Series No. 60 Vitamin A and Riboflavin (1967) WHO Technical Report Series 362 Requirements “_خ Nicholls C. et Nimalasooriya A. (1939) Brits. J. Nutr. Food fortification (1971) WHO Technical Report Series
Endemic Goitre (1967). W.H.O. Report Ceylon.

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Page 63

Marga Volume 2, Issue No: 1
LIST oF NEW CONTRIBUTORS
L. N. PERERA - Deputy Director, Department of
Census and Statistics
W. S. M. FERNANDO - Statistician, Department of Census
and Statistics.
N.
BEATRICE V. DE MEL - Nutritionist, Medical Research
Institute, Colombo.

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ring (මු:
Trayel

Page 65
flestipa DRY-ORANGE-LEMON
the Man's drink
| SRI LANKA DISTILLERIES
WADD UW-A.

ܚܠܐ
MARGA INSTITUTE
PUBLICATIONS
POPULATION GROWTH AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SRI LANKA
NON - FORMAL EDUCATION
SYSTEM OF SMALL FARMER CREDITCOUNTRY STUDY
AN UNIFIED APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT ANALYSIS - SRI LANKA EXPERIENCE
POPULATION CHANGE AND AGRICULTURAL CHANGE IN SRI LANKA
WoRK MOTIVATION LAND AND EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITIES FOR YOUTH ON LAND IN SRI LANKA
THE READING PUBLIC IN SENHALA ASPECTS OF COMPANY FINANCIAL POLICY
ADMINISTRATIVE PLANNING AS PART OF
DEVELOPMENT PLANNING:
ADMINISTRATION FOR REGIONAL DEVELOP, , MENT WITH REFERENCE TO GALOYA WALAWE AND MAHAWEL PROJECTS.
THE SEERS MISSION REPORT - ITS SCOPE AND IMPACT.
Copies of the above studies and other publications
which consist lectures given at evening discussions, symposia of various Seminars, and indepedent research studies undertaken for international and local organisations are available in typescript for reference on application to the Librarian, Marga Institute, 75, Ward Place, Colombo. These studies are being translated into Sinhala & Tamil and at present are available only in English.

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