Page 1
PRABHAKARAN - A
Let the War end - Gamini J.R.'s P.P.C. move and Oppo “HINDU’ on the TULF and C How Rupavahini's Newsroom
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Sri Lanka's Peace Movem
 

TALK WITH THE TIGER
- Prabhu Chawla
Sri Lanka QJ/72/N/86
s
Akmeemana sition's options - Mervyn de Silva olombo's 3-Track Policies
works - Jeanne Pinto seka on “Argument” nd Reagan and ent, Whither ILANGARATNE 2

Page 2
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PEACE MOWEMENT GROWS
After the BA NGA LORE Group L. G. May 1) the Irick-Larki Maithri Sargarzaj", a 710re brold -based people-to-people o "garisation that has brought together students, Portens group, religions persityvi 77 el, jour 777 list, s a rial SchroNirs. The Irida Liriki Milir i ri Sargā777 i so largely dari initiative ay" II Vase? I w') iradleft: rigatibi ? Ce') { ret for Society and Religio coworkers, Berr7ïdeel Silver tijd Fr. Tissé Bakistori', d’id their grgrgetic partner in these (ICffvir ses, Misley St Fričar je o 'Mr.
LLLLLYS ST SLSLLLLK SLLLaKLLLLS first started, the police, a Fry for sy orii ii s Ir Lucrilor's fror I fis political losses, calle di' heari'. Phari μί ή Ιτές PPC αντί Ιήί Πει propợSalf ori đi Pālitical oeffleF77 er 7 f, 'gi' irg FeiTc'' nlay well be the preVailing, even dormi i var roi Orad.
r, clitյritt:"
The SANGAMISANGAMAYA hopes to foster LirIdlers Taradini g a correr foi Trg persos arid groups ir India dari Sri Laka', and is corrrrritted to a "peacefril just end hof ourable resolutior of the PreserII etsinic conflicr'''.
S. L. M. P.
The first casualty of SILMP Feiers' Secrer, r' l-Vifaa." I RYFra raftige's ' is ir to Madras 11'a 3 SLMP leadership, Phile the Gerera Secretary dek filog wirft stir, wo Vice-Presseleriss (Claradrika Kur 77 r. 777' Trige T7 d Os sie Abeggsresekers) si8 Pre
庾凸
riderir (Trid 'ice Presiflerif yılıç) isra'el af PiCOPPIE — Mf". T. B. I !ariga:Ira! Fie T YI! Mfr", P°. f°,
KH lortifie — quit irl Sccession, the forrrer affer a short is Fell of Y Ferdiccal leave.
l'hile e pare er e.V-SLFF'er, S.I.M.P. "Fessages ir licet, ro-joir rhéir . Ilargara tre Seer; if eriding a poli ή ΙΙ εί είναι γιατί ταίρι ας α Ρμί ι srké se čer.
TEA P
d: rigs risis. Eel7 rei Afrir Fy” si Iιμ ΙΙ αίτια Ιται this year to
se Fries de 7&dly Γιέ {F}* '''t F) frow if any ci rt of the potre
של, צנtיוו "rrולrt{r}Tr ff Fir Fistfro& Er y' '' ήία εί ένεση μοί αντέι
Despite all Mfiri stry's checs gir-edge'' (II SS fra ze: 1475 stifject éé. sf ye! &7rif ca?,5 t ly" LWS porris, Theo
LANFA
GUAR
Wo. 9 No. 5
FFICE
Published fo
Lanka Guardian F
No. 248,
COLOM
Erlfur: Fler w
Telephane

ri S.L. F. P. fry." 1 1 I'hiro joined the
ser dirig frarric ing a lesire o ild party, Mr. שergיו שrh נו?) צוי Ιται ανεε, ήτII Ceir lly wir hi i Viris
o ser l'ice i rifer
RICES
* "Ne! Taif''' T.E.A.) thought πια, η Μίτητα ημ 3'e Sri Lrk
New Year gift ' i'r 75 'r'?'''{{#ify' i'r The gif rs forhing. A read that fie
F. & " " fa i'r
iiriit li tirreflic.
fiers,
Ιήέ Ραπταίοι και 13 (trid tests, (Irld F'i's, Sri Wirker ' ': 'Se, ex ferir sferior ca fall reser "&" si Ciri
rlatit: dra, ir S. L. feji :les iri the U.S érld Caristlfar fjars efs έτσι κι αriίτε εί αμ Ιν τιε ζαίικητέα d Fries. Sri Lyrka gor (7 aprc:- H"a punch in Jirrive 1 f'lier the US rifica de a dra sific cut ir 7fed at the Paris Feeling. (I Fe 9). Tsie f cfarl Fledges Way'''e'r ff?Flpred 700 rizilliar dal ľk7 rs, 23: ricore ir restas ferry, fra Fiz lasť year. However first fit is developer ail, (Trid Hathing carill riffser the losses accirilated through is ready 'irrading Prices of the Colonha auctions că used fargely Exy the als vertere riftty'3lig blij'ers Egypt a rád USSR.
Last vjeek fire US ref7 'eil rgstrict frit of SN. feas strid Iste ir Pīte ir pir rie cifos con JF e 25 W.s ect Figi Ig.
(Letter on page 24)
DAN
July 1, 1986
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CONTENTS
Newys Background
Island at War 5.
Ağı,ı || 5 || 3ıd In TLITTLD ||
Hoy le Battle for
Tricomalee was Won
Ethnic Gap Widens A Decision that Doesn't Seein Right 15
Frofile of a Tiger | Éi.
Foreign News
I Don't Want this War |
R.up71'w;ıhi mi — II 23
Lotte 고,
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Kissingerian “li Opposition's h opportunity
Mervyn de Silva
hen the UNP appeared to
Flave exhausted al its To YE5. and seemed increasingly besieged and helpless, its leader President J.R., Surely the most as tute tactician in Sri Lankan politics, has produced a brilliant politi tal manu gwrei. With his new de WCution package he has earned restrained praise from Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, kept the promises made to the Aid Consortium by his Finance Minister (his own previous Pledges for a negotiated settlement had not always been honoಆಳ್ವ and thus presented himself to these all-i Tıp ortant constituencies the "Toderate"peace-seeker. In doing so, he has also coopted the three-party alliance and other smaller parties and threatened to isolate his strongest challenger, the SLFP, giving it the difficult choice of either cooperating with the government or presenting itself to the Tamil community, to India and the domors as an un compromising
Sinhala-Buddhist party.
Although the TULF is not as wita | a Political factor as it was Pre-1983, it s ti|| || remains the parliamentary voice of the Tamils of the north and east. By offering a devolution scheme that the Indian government regards as good enough for the serious consider
atio of the Tamil caders, President JR has also forced the TULF into à corner. The Indian
press comments, including the editorial in the authoritative Madra5.b3 Sed FNC mak : 01E basic point: the TULF committed a grievous mis Lake in turning down the invitation to particiPate in the P.P.C,
It seems pret TULF is is iš: ship torn betw continue playing parlia Tentarist need not to caf especially the "1 hakaran has am his iristinctiwo With the ral dissident exped fully. Whether Will lead to a
I til TULF for of leadership is d; W;
President JR
stand. He will to the UNP på He wi || give t choice... and als 2tters of regi rèply to a que 5 R, de Silwa, yw that the lette pocket JR quip th è letter5 a e i If they agree,
anyone does no
leave. After a confident party how I don't thii
Presiderit JR of UNP suppor with his plans. how far, in ti Wii || his I rilate erroerent in fribri ta' other PPC 2 (For the the SLFP positi mined as a sep
Ths ärs war will depend lar non-SLFP oppo: 5ituation and t. government's E

inkage' - istoric
:Eу at that th: irray, its leaderem Chi desir to the role of the modorate and the fond the militants, Tigers'. Mr. Prabstratedחסוחly deב gift for dealing cirrant and the itiously and forcethe coming weeks closing of ranks a dramatic change a matter that 1rchad.
has take a firm present his plan rliamentary group.
HC MP5 : fFoo o their um da Lei gnation back. In
tion by Dr. Colvin Foi rridd him r5 W grg in His ped: "''' || s ce that in their pockets..." |'''| | be happy. If t, he is free to
Slight pa Lise, a Såder safd "Somgnk that'll happen'''.
perfectly sure then C., wi || Eo through The question is
li: first irħis ta rie ral now receive d actiwo backing
parties at the moment, at leist,
om must be exalarata is5ue). to that question
gely on how the iition analyses the he interprets the asic Political aim5.
NEWS.
BACKGROUND
If the 1978 constitution cotrali sed al II Power, the Refcrcndum of 1982 December mot only reinforced UNP hegemony but effectively closed the island's once wibrant ånd "opern" Political sy 5tem. The WEEKEND political columnist writing it mediately after the Referendum called it "a Constitutional Dictatorship'. The UNP's authoritarian grip was strengthened also by a divided and demoralised, SLFP, virtually leaderle55, and by an utterly enfeebled Left The unions had been battered into submission and all organised opposition groups had lost their TI"''.
1983 and After
Then came July 1983, and the political situation changed in a
manner that no pund it could
have anticipated.
Wiolence escalated; the insur
gency in the north and east
spread; the economy started to Serious signs of stres 5; || India entered the Sri Lankan political 5 Lage as a major actor,
While the Pressures an all front5 stea dily mounted, a LINP, quite alive to an increasingly restive electorate, resisted 1|| demands for a negotiated settlement, nervous that. Such a Settlement, which necessarily imply conce 55 i orns to the Ta,Tils, would inflam: Sinhala opinion. And so from APC (1984) to Thimpu (1985) to Bhandari (1985—1986) to Chidambaram, April 1986. The pressures, especially economic (tea prices, defence spending, debt-servicing near-collapse of tourism, shrinking investment and reduced foreign
3.

Page 6
exchange remittances from migrant workers) and the psychological and physical impact of the "war" in the north and "terrorism" in the South, became too se verë for an administration that looked so utterly inept to the average Simha lese wote ir thc: South,
The fact that Finance Minister Ronnie de Me then emerged as as the voice of reason ("We must concede with grace what we cannot hold with authority,' Gladstone's remark was his favourite quote) bcars its own special meaning in the fast-changing mational situation. The Once omnipotent UNP scomed totally be leagued, unable to advance either towards a military victory or towards a political settlement and peace.
The restoration of Mrs. B's civic rights is the other event that best dramatised the predicament of beseiged regime. The concession was a calculated risk, a move under pressure. But Mrs. B did not step out to help the
government. SF enemy's blood
ETıbol dicenced E Philippines and
ple of the { threw a new tions. The rcp
the easy use Emergency agait the South, incl. sers vā5 moving elections could
the political : Dec. 982 and
centration of p cutive president mand of a parl the UNP had 5
JR's reply w tactical gan i Lus. tinue 5, the U.N to hold occtio the Tisk of having its powd Better then to to the provin The et Tha Tami|| morth - tham large part of,
FOR MVEL OVER A.
ARISTONS
GLOBAL REPUTATION IN THE FIEL
ARISTON'S HAVE OPENED OUT F EXPORTS IN AN ENDEAVOUR TO CO
HEA)
ARISTO
ARISTONS TOURS No. 5, Gower Street, COLOMBO 5.
Phone:
Coles: TURNTIDE"
5, Gow Color
5 8 8 4 3 ፅ, 5 |

1 Sm | T ha cĮ In the water.
ly events in the the striking examCory Aquino she
cha llenge — elecression, especial y if the PTA and
חו S שוחט חבוקק5t Gו Jding SLFP organiSouthwards. Only help prise open .ystem closed in based an a conCYW Cr" if I exey with total com
ia ment in which
'6ths majority.
as a stroke of
lf the crisis conP Tay be forced 1S and thus run lo5 ing Power or It greatly reduced. de wolwe Power Ces — actually to derlands in the lose, or lose a he power at the
Centre. Power-sharing at the Periphery is obviously the far Tore desirable option.
Opposition Dilemmas
No' the di leTTla is that of the Opposition, the SLFP and the non-SLFP opposition.
|f the SLFP takas. Lh2 “1äthewite "National Front" road (Perhaps its knee-jerk roaction of the rightwing) it will isolate itself from the mainstream of politics, the peace process, and promptly alienate India and the West, without whose help no Sri Lankan government in the foreseeable future can Survive for long. If it joins the peace process, it will assist the recovery of a much weakened UNP to which all the gains of a successful setthe Tent will accrue. If it takes the first option, has it the organisational capability and dynamis T1 of the Aquino-led Demo
trati Frott ?
(Continued on page 7)
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Page 7
Island at
VVar
Tamil rebels mount a blo
Marguerite Johnson
Reported by Ross H. Munro, Colombo (T
he rice-growing settlement of
Siri Pura in Sri Lanka's Eastern province was in shock last week. Red-and-white-paper lanterns, strung up to celebratic Wesak, one of the Hclie5t Buddhist festi ya 5 of the year, lay in tatters on the grounds as Smoke rose from the ruim 5 of 25 thatcheid mud uts. At the trance to one, village women wept at the sight of the charred remains of a young couple who had been shot and left to die in their burning home. Down the road, baside an irrigation ditch, the bodies of ten other villagers, including several children, ay in a row where they had been gunned down. The day before, twelve people had been killed in nearby villages in the district of Tricotiago. The wictims in both attacks were Sinhalese, the major ethnic group in Sri Lanka, who had been sttil cd in the arca by the contral gow arm ment as Part of a controversial land development program. Their assailants were Tamil guerillas, members of an increasingly militant minority that makes up 12.5% of the island nation's 16 milion People. Outraged Tamils charge that the government's intent is to increase the number of Sinhalas e in areas that ate predominantly Tamil.
To the northwest of Siripura, on tha Jaffna Penis ull, Tails were also mourning their dead and wounded. Less than a week be forc, government force 5 US ing helicopter gunships and fixed-wing aircraft rockcted and 5 trafed the commercial center of the city of Jaffna. The Central bus terminal, several shops and six wards of Jaffna General Hospital were hit. "Miraculously,' reported a doctor
who was in the hospital during the bombing, "only one patient and two visitors worc injured
because whefin the we immediately gi under the Ecds ground floor, v. out of the line of being married in ral Were surpris Inded at their end of tho foursiwe, at cast guerri las were di Ces 53 id Thore were ki|| cd and al injured.
The governme. peninsula came.sh officials Had | cf capital of Colon had been atter round of talks i Pric Minist Cr F negotiations are a solution to th Tamil rebels I dominated gove dent. Juniu5 R. || the past three fabled island of so lowelly it wā: dip by Arab tr torn by ethnic shed that grow day. The inc between the CC Lini- Tami|s a Siae 5 ha 5 le ration cof a TT: eוחס up S. Sסgr: an Independer (homeland), to the Northern Winces, the Cou CF Ti | Cofi Tails, howeve 5 ette for soo no Tay that Wol tantial control a 5 ett le Thaf matters in the
The governm with an equal

lody campaign for justice
IME)
shooting started pt all the patients or down to the here they were fire.' A couple the city's catheded when a buet feet: At the ay military offen34 civilians and ad. Tai sorthan 60 people ... east 100 others
it attack on the ortly after Indian the Sri Lankan mbo, where they iding the latest Initia tÇd by || Indian Rajiv Gandhi. The
aimed at finding ë conflict between d the Sinha lese --
Irent of Presiayewardene, For years the once
tea and spice - nicknamed Serenaders - has been hatred and blooduglier by the easing animosity untry's 2 million 1d i L.s II Imillion d to a prolifeTamil guerrilla if them demand State, (Eelam) be established in nd Eastern Protry's main areas Centratior. Most ", would probably degree of autold give them subsower education, t and economic r regions.
-n. has responded deteГпiпeg effort
to suppress the rebellion. The island was led to a crackdown om ciwi|| || i Berties im Sri Lanka,
turned Jayewardene's once popular government into an increasingly authoritarian regime and sourcd normally placid relations with Incighbouring India. To bols ter its military efforts, Sri Lanka has sought support from such sources as Pakistan, Israel and former British SAS commandos. The U.S. ha 5 resisted Sri Lankan requc 5ts for more military aid, limiting assistance to training worth about $ 50,000 a year. Washington regards the war as primarily a domestic issue, but American officials applaud India's efforts to find a negotiated settlement. Says a State Department expert: "We
Sri Lanka in the world press
At a meeting in Colombo President Jayewardena held up a Copy of the TIME magarine with Sri Lanka on the
cover - the first occasion that TIME ha 5 made this country its cover story -
and spoke to the crowd of the impact of world press coverage not only on the island's image but on its economy. On June Ist, the L.G. published the main editorial in the internationally respected FINANCIAL TIMES of Londom entitled f’COLOMSOS NEED TO COMPRO
MISE.* In this i55 Lue of the LG we focus on this topic by publishing articles from
the U.S. and British press to which the average Sri Lankan reader ha 5 little
CCESS

Page 8
bolic we that neither side will be able to preva II militarily. ''
The war has taken a devasta ting tol | in human suffering, No one knows for sure how many hawe died in the conflict. The government puts the dead at 1,500, but pro-Tamil human rights organizations claim the number is closer to 10,000. Many more thousands have been injured cor left home les 5. In addition, more than 125,000 Tamil refugees have fled to the South Indian state of Tamil Nadu, where they share a common ancestry and language with India's 50 million ethnic Tamils. The cost to New Delhi of maintaining the refugee camps: S 3.6 million a year.
Despite Gandhi's attempts to bring both sides to the negotiating table, the intensity of the fighting has worsened in recent
months. At 79, Jayewardene is still a wily and unpredictable politician. Although he has gone
along with efforts to find a poli
tical settle lent to the crisis, Jayewardene talks orninously of imposing 'a military solution', Of the armed Tamil groups, he says, "They are called boys, militants, radicals, but they are simply murderers.' The government has 37,000 heavily ar med
troops arrayed against some 2,000 lightly equipped guerrillas, who frequently rely on homemade pipe mines filled with geligini te to keep the military at bay. Last February in a major escalation of the war, Jayewardene sent Italian-made attack aircraft on bombing raids of suspected rebel hideouts in the north of the Island. The bombardment missed many guerrilla strongholds, instead כוח חוcent civilians and destroying their
homes. An angry Indian External Affairs Minister, B. R. Bhagat, declared that the action 'Went beyond the realm of civilized behavior.'"
戟
AT the same time, in the
troubled Eastern Province, where Tamils make up 42% of the population, security forces acting Under a government-declared state of emergency have been setting
é.
up new militar
miles, bu || || dos and herding thi shacks, The
rounds up Tam them in camps Boosa prison, Lanka. A nu m are reported to Amnesty Interna rights organiza last February s the province's Ai round cd a rice P. a group of Tam rice. The troop 47 paddy work 13-year-old chil 5 trä w owcer thei therT on fire. port 15 Suad las nesty concluded Sri Larkan force and persistent. torture has beer against young T. to 25 held und wention of terri that some had
Until recently red Lc Hawa esc: cussions of the north and east. 3, a bomb expl Air Lanka jetlin ta romac at Sri Li nal airport, kill most of the II was gn tourists, and Four days later ripped through graph Office in do during tha Tori Fourteen people than 100 were inյ have yet been ma let officia || 5 ||
ists, Guerrilla | Ponsibility, tho group, tha Eela
Organization of told TIME that it the telegraph of
Late last we bomb went off, railway station inc
bo, on a train coa from Bät east. Authoritie
people were kill Only hours carli echoed through

y bases every few ing Tami | houses air occupants into litary routinely il Tales and holds like the notorious in southern Sri er of young men ha Wë disappeared. tional, tha human til says that ecurity forces in mpara i district suraddy form where ils Were thrashing is shot at east 2rs, including a d, then heaped r b o d i : 5 and " 5et In a previous ret October, Arnthal torturo by is is 'widespread '' It added that 1 U Sed particularly il, mil micn ages I7 er the 1979 PreOrism Act, and died as a result.
Colombo appeaaped major reperfighting in the Then, on May oded aboard an 2r sitting on the i ri ka's internatioling 16 people, åtion bound forejnjuring 20 others. another bomb he Central TeleWILOW ColorTo
ling rush hour. died, and morte Irod. No arrests
de, but gowernT12 Tarmi || torr2 ad Crs den y resJigh gorn e Tami || Ti Re w Lutiomar
Studcnts (EROS), had carried out
ce bombing.
k yet another this tima at a
theast of Colom
that had just icaloa, in the
said that eight d and 54 injured. a last häd he center of the
capital during the lunch hour when a bomb hidden inside a delivery truck exploded at a
soft-drink bottling plant, killing ten people. At least 15 others Were critically injured. Also late last week, a land mine ripped into a government military convoy
in the Eastern Province, killing 22 soldiers.
Following the Air Lanka and
Central Telegraph office bombings some government agencies and companies began laying off Tamil
employees. The move was said to be for the workers' Protection, but there seemed little doubt the real reason was that many
Sinhalese officials no longer trust Tamils, even those who work for the government. Many moderate Tamils are disturbed by the fact that there has been hardly a murmur of protest by civil libertarians. Says Neelan Tiruche vam, a noted moderate Tamil leader, "Individuals now and then speak out, but the Sinhalicise middle class remains un inwolwcd and uncommitted. There is no sense of outrage because it is not their sons who are dying the son 5 of Poor Sinha lese farrters'".
To those moderate Tamils who would like to see the conflict resoyed justly and peacefully, the layoffs and bombings underscored the widening gulf between Sinhalese and Tamils. Says Professor Karthigesu Sivathamby of the University of Jaffna: 'Separation is becoming a psychological reality." Historically, the two groups have seldom lived in harmony. It is believed that both the Simhälese, who are Buddhists of Indo-Aryan origin, and the Tamil 5, Hindus of Dravidian ancestry, had immigrated from India by tha third century B. C. The Simha les 2 cccupřed three-Quarters of the island, which they called the kingdom of Sinhale (Ceylon), including the bguntiful rice-growing regions.
The Tamils, largely traders and fishermen, lived mostly in the Jaffna Peninsula and along the East toilg t.
Successive conquests by colonial Powers - the Portuguese in the

Page 9
early 1500s, followed by the Dutch and then the British in the late 18th century - brought an end to the centuries of conflict betwecrı Sinha lese and Tami| kingdo T15, TT || 5 flou Tished der the British raj, the colonial administration on the subcontinent. They seized educational opportunities offered by the British and embraced English as the island's common language. After independence in |1948, howewer, Sinhalese politicians began to seek ways to reassert their dominance. In 1956 the legislature passed a law replacing English with Sinhala as the official language of government and education. The Tamils, suddenly finding themselves a threatened minority, were stur med and outraged. The journey down the road to the separatist rebellion had begun.
Strikes and campaigns of civil dIsobédén-5 followed, 5 g werä| times during the first three decades os independence, Tamil political leaders tried to reach accords with the Sinha lese about language and other issues. These efforts failed, discrediting moderate Tamil politicians. Wirtually all Englishlanguage schools disappeared, and schools were segregated by language, Sinhalese or Tamil. Today children of the two groups go to separate Schools right through university and rarely mix, even in Colombo and other areas where they live side by side.
The situation worsened in the 1970s when new university admissions regulations decreed by the government had the effect of requiring Tamils to score higher Chän Sinha 135 g on C:n trance exami
maticorn 5. At the sa me time, Sinhalese politicians made it more difficut for Tamils to obtain
government jobs. Blocked at home many Tam Els licft Sri Lanka and moved a broad, particularly to Britain and Australia. For those left behind, there were fewer and fewer educational or job opportunities outside the Jaffna Peninsula. Young Tamils who saw no future in Sri Lanka became increasingly resentful.
| n || 972 a Tami | tlccnager named Wilupillai Prabakaran started
a rebe|| gro LP th Liberation Tigers Three years late students in Lond ther organizatio fighting for a state. For years |ion consisted of only an occasio killing. By mid-1: Tigers had only
members, with gun a piece, Tart jected violence place their hope political system. liamentary clect Party, the Tami ation Front (TU victory in all 4 Proviriča and we of it. Wye 1 we | E That gawe the T: Qf |é,8 s Lat; in Pal thening demand: councils be s et a larger mca 3 Li re ment. Jay C war de National Party a a te, then abru
The Tamil rob garnest In July first major assat artbushed in art Jaffa Peninsula diers. The rep far-reaching. Th when the bodics capital, there W. of arti-Tami || ha turned to sla Lg Wick, an estim; nearly all of the killed by Sinhal wictim 5 w Tc, buri S ti || refr' to th Holocaust." Te of middle-class Madras, the capit A|| TULF M.F.5 of Pari; W. Et tak 2 am a T1t: (C) y er the MCXL tempts to reach ween the twc eth irn fa 1 ILI te A, 3 m fron Tamil expa iā, Britā ir ind Tilitants began and setting up
Today there ar Thed grou PS, all

at become the
of Tamil Eela T. T, sa Wora Taii | Ion for Ted anoIn committed to
seperate Tamil the Tä Tmni| ro belmuch tak, with
na bombing or ?83, Prabakaran's i 3 () fu l-tima far lešš tham Cộng i 15 generally remid ccm til Luced to s for change on
In the 1977 par
ions, the Tamil | Uited Liber|LF), swept to
seats in Northern in four Seats Out at CrI Provice. lmil party 8 out liarment, s trengthat regional up to give Tamils of self-governhe rid his United |greed to negoti3tly backed off.
ellion began in 983. In their Jlt, the Tigers ny patrol on the killing || 3 solercussiопs were C next cwen ing arri yed in the
as an outpouring rted that quickly hter. Within a ited 1,000 people im Tamils, were 25e mobs. Many ced a live. Tami || 5 riots as "the 5 of thousands Tamils fied to a I of Tami || Nadu. were forced out men they refused iseparatist oath. vear, se veral at
an accord bet - nic groups ended 1 onay poured in tria Les i A, u 5 tal
other countries, buying weapons
training camp5.
are five major with headquarters
In Madras. Trmi || Nadu also harbors 39 rebel camps, in which an estimated 3,300 guerrillas are undergoing training. New Delhi has not shut down the Fabel camps, but Indian authoritics keep
a sharp eye on the guerri||Illa organizations. Officials stand at dockside as rebels load their
boats with arms and ammunition for the 22-mic trip across the Palk Strait to Sri Lanka. Arms shipments that do not have the approval of Indian authoritics are seized. New Delhi has sought to limit the arms flowing to Tam il groups as a means of forcing the rebels to the barga ining table. In the same way, it apparently has tolerated the training camps in order to bring pressure om the Sri Lankan government.
Although the rebels initially benefited from a wave of symBy in Tami || Nādu, th cerc ha 5 een growing disenchantment over
their presence. Robbery, smuggling and extortion by rebels have become widespread. Parents
complain that their children are being sold drugs by the guerrillas. Several Indian 5 hawe been killed or wounded in cross-fire between feuding rebel groups. Perhaps the worst episode took place in August 1984, when a bomb was planted aboard a Sri Lankan airliner. It was intended to explode in flight but instead went off in
the Madras airport, killing 37 people.
The largest, oldest and most
discriplined rebel group is Prabakaran's Tigers. Most Tiger recruits are youths who struggled up the educational ladder only to find there were no jobs for
the II. Each wears around his neck a glass ampul containing potassium cyanide, to be used
in case of capture. The Tigers claim that IOO of their members have committed suicide by taking the poison after being cornered by gowern Tient security forces. Says one young rebel: "No human being can withstand torture, so to avoid letting out secrets we carry potassium cyanide."
The second-largest group, before the Tigers killed more than
7

Page 10
100 of its fighters in a battle in Jaffna five weeks ago, was the Tami || Eelam Liberation Organization, which was notorious for its violent internal power struggles and criminal activites. Prabaka ran, now the undisputed leader of the armed Tamil separatists, told TIME's Anita Pratap that the Tigers moved against TELO bacause its leader, Sri Sabaratnam, was planning to destroy the Tigers, "While we are engaged in fighting the armed forces', he said, "TELO was engaged in antisocial activities damaging the Elam liberation rowerment''. TELO's new leadership, while conced ing that the group is finished as a fighting force, says it will now focus on political atti Vitig.S.
曹 靡
TWO other groups, the Eelam Revolutionary Organization (EROS) and the Eelam People's Rewolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), were formed by Tamil students in London in the Tid-1970s, the the latter a breakaway group from the first. Their mombers tend to be better educatod than the Tigers and more ideological, espousing a Marxist-Leninist line. Both bricfly had use to Palestinian guerrilla organisations. The fifth group, the People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOT) is regarded as something of a mystery. It has training camps and bases in Tamil Nadu,
but its leader, Uma Maheswaram, çon demns the 'hit-and-run ta cttics' of the other four groups,
saying they lead only to retaliation against civilians by the military. PLOT says its ultimato ainn is to work with the Sinhallege |left to fom cant an islam dwi de Communist revolution. The group is regarded as most violent toward its own members. Rumors are widespread in Tamil Nadu that scores of PLOT dissidents and deserters hawe been murdere d.
As the rebel groups have grown in size and sophistication, Tamil modera Les im Sri Lanka hawe increasingly becn caught between militants and government. Family life, the contral value of Tamil
8
society, has bee as young men the guerrillas a prisoner by go Som c rebels ha', and extortion for weapons. radicals murder Ti || M. P. 5 Whi to Parliament : nomy platform. are repelled by fings' - rebel e pected Tamil in tied to posts, 5 die.
''|'' fear them| | | about a totally ciety'', confess
affna. '"Most and they see t thing they war guns". Three da of Tamil guerri the hospital whi killed a riva e 5 u ing gun batt waiting for an died in the cric the physician i. that 'the milita war for my ben my children."
Indeed, once c believe the gove into the hands ( with its bombin; Peninsula and ot halwe har Th 3d čiW attack occurred support for the Tamil communit When I woted Iп 1977," says " "there w Cre: cor tants. Now the
This govern mer agent for the r Professor Sivath; fore the bom ''there was a li that was draw Tilitants and t that limo has dis Some governmen
edge that the serious listake. military expert "Stupid. They out areas by gr aerial bombing.

In totally disru Ped ave left to join haya bcon taken ferrent forces. e turned to crime to obtain funds Last September, ed two former had been elected Il a Tl Tmi | auto
Ordinary Tamils o “lamp post ki|- xecutions of SLSformers who are hot and loft to
tants are bringing un disciplined sois a doctor in Lre fairly young, they can get anyit by using their Lys Carlier, a gang | las had invaded are he works and ader. In the enle, a magistrate electrocardiogram 35 S fire. Ewen, 5 o. S quick to add nts are fighting a efit and that of
onservative Tam 45 rnment has played if the guerrillas I of the Jaffna her atticks that ||ia 15. Tho latest åt a time wher
rebels in the y was cooling. for Jayewardene a Tamil lawyer, y 20 or 30 milire are thousands.
t is the recruiting ||itants,' Jafna's Thby agrees. BelJing, he says, e, hovever Lhin
1 between the e people. Now appeared." Even
officials acknowbombing was a Says a Western in Sri Lanka : hould be clearing Lind action, not he reason they're
bombing is that they don't have troops willing to go in.'"
The problem, says a Sri Lankar official, is that "'we haws 5ofThe of the Wor 5t armad forces in the world.“ To improve military training. Jayewardene has turned to some controversial sources of assistance. In 1984, a team of Israeli intelligence experts spent several Weeks in Sri Lanka advising the government on Counterinsurgency operations. Jayewardene also hired Kini Meeni Services Ltd., a firm incorporated in the Channel Islands that cmploys hardened veterans of antiguerrilla campaigns, almost all of whom are former British SAS commandos. In addition to giving counterinsurgency training to Sri Lankan forces, some Kini McCm | Ten have flown Bell 212 helicopter gunships in combat in the country. Much to India's dismay, Jayewardene has sent morc than 1,000 junior officers to Pakistan for training over the past year.
Sir
The military buildup has been costly the defence budget has has soared from S ĚĞ mi || iom in 1983 to S 325 million this year.
India is deeply worried about the turmoil plaguing its neighbor across the Pak Strait. New Delhi is also concerned about the number of Sri Lankan refugees that have been pouring into Tamil Nadu since 1983, although the influx has abated somewhat of late. Many hawa Tielted into Tamil Nadu Society, through refugees are legally barred from working. Others are confined to 17 refugee camps scattered around the state. Condtions are often squalid. In the Kovalam Cartıp, located in arı old cyclone shelter south of Madras, the living space is divided by sheets and sacking materia | hung from ropes. Most of the occupants arrived last year to escape what the describe as a reign of terror by Sri Lankan army units in two districts south of Jaffna. "So Tietimes we wonder why We carne," says a thin, dit Pirited farmer. "We thought it would be only for two months or so and then We Could return. We never chought |ife Here would be sic hard'".

Page 11
After the refugees dramatically increased last year, India began pressuring Tamil exile leaders to pursue talks with the Jayewar dene government about a political settlement that would give the Tamil community a degree of autonomy but stop Well short of creating an independent state.
New Delhi persuaded both sides to accept a cease-fire that, whic not completely successful, drastically reduced hostilities for soveral Tionths, Tamil leaders i 1515 told tha L Jayewardene was deceiving India by talking about a political settlement while pursuing 5 military solution. When the Sri Lanka military bombed Jaffna, it appeared that the exile leaders might be right,
Noretheless, Gandhi Serit a Tother delegation to Colombo last month. India has won a key concession frr:IT TULF tic barndor its de Tid for ån independent Eelā T1. New Delhi has also refused to support Tarih || derlarıds that Nörther'ı and Eastern provinces be merged into a Single state. The Indian delegation instead appears to hawe agreed in principle with Sri Lankan officials on the ngad for a dgcentralized federal-type system that would permit the largely power les s prowinces to elect governments of their own. There was agreement between Indian and Sri Lankan officials that futurc and 5 element should reflect "traditional ethnic Tiixes.' ' The Tami | fear that the government will continue to settle Sinhalese farmers in areas in which Tamils predominate.
ኯች
THE Sticking point, all sides agrec, is what to do with "the boys,' as the rebels are known. Disarming thousands of guerrillas
will be no cas y task. Moreower, Tamil caders want to control their own security forces and
impose limits on when the govern Inent can send troops into a Tamil-dominated province. The govern Tent wants as few rostrains as possible.
Western diplomats see some reas on for hope that an agreement
Çam be rė Hed ning to feel t ins LIrgency in in Westment and also cager to ex a costy and in Situation. EWer bakaran appears a sittlement. S whether the settle for anyth but if people å a T | Cirmative prepared to CøI tİw 2. After all | for the people. sight of what t
Perhaps the n is "the old Tan is frequently call to know what th Foreign ambass; å SS cciat, efter
Corsatio , h. h i tā the Wiolence, doing quite the back 5 the Tii de2na led a pro a Tamil-Sirhags have given Tami
5 i C15 har the today. More I Critics, he las
opportunities fc moest of the after his lands in 1977 and ag in July 1983.
At the Igl and his partly : strong favorites parliamentary el be called at any is growing uneas mic Policies ank the insurgency. T has not yet threaten ing, larg economic boori епјoүed iп rece Colombo journa | 252 ha'w been money to worr question."'
לן בו הון נוןFi חE.J Me | warm3 Lihat playing havoc w Soaring military helped push the d: Et to S 3.9 bill

Sri Lanka is beginhe effects of the reduced foreign to Luis T., India is : ta te i 52 | F FICT creasingly volatile the Tiger's Praready to accept ays he: "I doubt 1 a 55 es will gwer ing short of Eelam, re satisfied with formula, we are Sider the alteriawe are fighting We don't lose he people want.'
1ajor imponderable , ' as Jayewardene ed. Few Purport e President thinks. adors and close
come away from with Hitl ccm wiced ke steps to end only to find him
opposite. As far d—1950s, Jayewartest march against 2 accord that would 5 fant few er Concesy are ask ing for "ecently, say his thrown away two if a lasting settleCrisi5–im madiately de election victory in after the riots
ent, Jaycwardene Lire regard:d as the to win the next ections, Which Can tire. But there e about his econdhis handling of he disenchan Emert ecolle Politically gely because of the that Sri Lanka has ht years, Says à ist: “-sos. sinhatoo busy making y about the Tamil
1inister Romadde the insurgency is "ith the economy. expenditures hawe Country's foreign lion, up from S 2.8
billion a year ago. The annual 20% interest payments on that debt are Contributing to a 1986 budget deficit of nearly S billion. Tourism has fallen of dramatically, leaving many top hotels two-thirds empty. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Jayewardene won plaudits for pushing through sweeping economic reforms. Today, however, many Şri Lğı ilk:ırı5 wonder whı yetler" " "...hığı old man' has the will or to 21ergy to but together a 5 ett || 2ment to end the costly spiral of violence and provide a way for the Sinhales e and the Tami i 5 to together in peace in their island
aid.
- TIME
Kissingerian . . .
(Continued froT page #y
What of the Left The LSSP and CP do not need to be relinded of how 'bourgeois' partties use the Left and throws it out after it has outlived its usefulness. That's what the SLFP did to the LSSP in 1975, a few ears after it had helped the F to meet the JWP insurgent threat and muzzle the trade Lions.
The CP has too many examples from which o draw | es 5o15. The CP played an active role in pushing through a regional auto|ဲ{ plans for the Kurds in northern Iraq. The next year the CP was banned, and its caders those who did not flee to the socii list Countries – Yyere jailed.
While the SLFP sticks to its
elections dolland, the CP in its
: Stāment hs āgd "preliminary steps' - all in the direction of democracy and ci wil liberties. Will the Opposition spot the opportunities now opened before it and see its own future tactics in terms of Kissingerian "linkagg," de Yolution at the periphery together "Wit1 3 r"tur" to Sri Lanka's traditional demoCrati- norm5 at the Centre
We

Page 12
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Page 13
WEFWSWWEREFWY
An Island in Turmoil
Sri Lanka's sectarian strife again th
A. the Colombo airport last week, Sri Lankan workers picked through a mound of metal debris, bits of inflatable life Wests and other rubble-grim reminders of a bomb planted by Tamil separatists that blaw apart an Air Lanka jet on May 3. In the heart of Colombo, a powerful explosion ripped through the Crowded central telegraph office, gutting a section of the rambling colonia |- era building. By standers gawked at the jumble of beams and twisted
metal. Such sights are becoming all too common on this once idyllic island. The two bombs
killed 28 people and injured 53. And in the stri fetorn north, riwal factions of Itilitant Tamils clashed in a bloody power struggle. In
a single, wilolent week mørg tham 200 people died.
No one knows where the escalating conflict will lead or when it might end. Since gristy sectarian riots exploded in 1983, violence between Sri Lanka's Buddhist Sinhalese majority and the predo
Hindu Tamil minority has spirated viciously, claiming some 3,000 li Wes. The go wernment of
President Junius Richard Jayewardene blamed the two recent bombings on the Liberation Tigers of Tami || Eelam (LTTE). The LTTE is the most radical group of Tamils fighting a guerrilla war to establish Tami || Eelam, an autonomous homeland in the country's northern and eastern provinces, where Tamis outnumber Sinhalese. Now at east some members of a Welter of se Paratist groups seen to hawe targated foreigners and civillan Crowds In the capital itself. "The Tamils are playing wery rough," says a foreign diplomat in Colombo, "they're bringing the war home to the Sinha lese. This is real terrorism."
Rival faction: At a strength of roughly 2,500, the LTTE is the most disciplined and most doctrimaire of the five main separatis. groups. In the past three Wecks
its men haw C: riya | faction, til Liberation Organ and around the of Jaffra. Låst pitched Eun and LTTE ||ali med St. northern provinc TELO. The Tibers |leader Sri Sabar
Whoever plant Colombo, did t sion. In the air. rists found a Lanka's wall of 5e concea ling explo produce includi meat, which W stringently befo cinto the Plan: killed 7 people, headed for Wata A government bomb that Wro of the telegraph soph isticated " di Yi CE.
The timing of part of the Thess: almost exactly Tamil guerrillas has a grid fire shrinc in Amu significantly, the sic Cimicidad y Colombo by Indi: were holding ti II ent leaders on India has huga the 1983 wo Tamil exodus a
25 000 Tami southern Indian Nadu. from WF ancestors emigra includes up to 5 many of their quently strike a the 20-T ile—w Last Week İNE Delhi Special Co Mazumdat Yisit E in Madras. His
Outside the house on a su E young Tigers, si

treatens to spin out of control
clashed with a no: Ta Ti | E: la m ization (TELO) in orch II district week, following grenado battles, | Premacy ower the n after killing | 75 including TELO's all.
ë Ehe. Hömb3 in 1e job With precilane blast terroloophole in Air curity, reportedly sive ; in Parishabla Ing wegetables and 'as not inspected re being loaded 2. Tha explosion
mostly foreigners tior | Mia|diW25, official said the kad the interior building was a "Lebanon style'
the blasts was ge. They erupted
one year after
ki || || 4 & Sind on a Buddhist adhapura. More : Air Lanka explowith the Wisit to in mediators who Liks with gow Cern..he Tamil Problem. Scak 2 in the issu 2; nce triggered 'a
broad, and some headed to the 5 taito of Talli |
ich many of their ted. That number ,000 guerrillas and |2adirs, who frot Sri Lanka across id: Pak Strait. WSWEEK's No W irrespondent Sudip d the LTTE basic
геport.
yellow two-storey | ur bär Street, the me cf them 5 t || ||
in their teens, Sat chatting Unobtrusily. But they kept an alert eye on the passers-by, and some hid automatic weapons under their shirts. Inside, portraits of the Guevara and Lenin hung alongSide a dus ter of shocking photographs - what the tigers insist are evidence of Sri Lankan army atrocities against Talli civilians. A little girl, her ribcage 5 polit open. The unashed head of a teenager. A charred torso. "We are fighting a battle against hate terrorism and genocide," says Anton Balasingha T, an LTTE spokes man and theoretician. “JayeWardene wants to wipe out the
Tamils. We are ready to carry On the battle until we establish 3. Tari I lation.' (Acroci ties, How Sewer, hawe been astributed
to both sides).
Smuggling and piracy: Working out of their base in Tami || Nadu, the guerrilla groups hawe recruited young warriors from the links of the refugees. Some are devoted revolutionaries, but others are devoid of deology, indulging in smuggling and piracy. Easy access to Weapons, which are used in tra ining long desortod stretchcs of the Indian Sea,5hore, increases their treat. The Tigers also pose a huge problem for Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi Tamil Nadu is not only home to 50 million Indian Tamis, but is also an important power base in Indian politics. Rimmad in as iL. is by international political concorns and domesticipolitica realitics by Gandhi's efforts to broker somma: Scort of settlement hawe sic far yielded few results,
In the face of the laborious negotiations, Jayawardene and his military command hawe insisted that the Tamil agitation is tantamount to terrorism, requiring a 'military solution,' and the president wowed to crush the gurrillas by the end of the year. Security forces bombed and stra. fed areas around Jaffna, the nor

Page 14
thern most district the home to about half of the country's 2.7 million Tamils. The escalating conflict has peaked more and more funds into Colombo defense budget. Still, two months ago military commanders conceded that they could not guarantee a military victory no matter how much cash they get.
Some Sri Lankans had hoped the terrorist eruptions would jolt Jayewardene into tackling the Tamil Problem with greater шrgency. And in fact the day after the Air Lanka bombing, government representatives and the Indian mediators agreed upon the most concrete proposals yet for a political settlement, "The Indian gaГпе plan involves a substantial devolution of power Lo Tamil-SP caking areas, which would isolate Tamil extremists and encourage moderates and a couple of the guerrilla groups to give it a try," said one source close to the talks. Yet a similar flurry of activity followed the May 1985 massacre
at Anura dhapur met with Rajy Delhi, a cease-f and at secret t repra.5entatives fr for the first til Separatists. Wi th : cea 5 e-fire u negotiations fizz Sid Would berg
Too little, to about any gove CCL |d Prowe tog Jayewardene do TOT сопрго CPPosition party the flag of Sir natiՃna || 5 til if Hը At the same time dominant guerri LTTE, which is a menable to a Pol and the für the: Sphere of influen an effectiya yeto solution,'" said a "and is sending; nin C255age to a. Ili t
laye war dene h: tunc either. In
Sri Lanka's Killing Fie
A vengeful cycle of violence goes o
W; June 1 - a day in thë life of Sri Lank, Passengers in the castern port city of Trincomalco settle in for the long, hot six-hour bus ride to Colombo when a hidden time bomb explodes. Minutes later, only a hundred yards away, a second bomb rips through a bus bound for the town of Kontalai. The IWO : bla5t 5 ki|| || more than 20 Pico plė and injure at least 70 others. Later in the day another bombthis one hidden in a rickshawexplodes cutside a movie theater in Colombo; 3 more people are killed and 36 injured. Back in the north, Tamil separatists claim that they have killed 19 Sri Lankan sa lors in a Tortar attack. The
assault, they say, comes in retaliation for a reported massacre the Previous day in which they charge that Navy seamen murdered more than 20 Tamil fishermen.
2.
The day's ki || ir Cycle of violence
island into
every bit as dea and Punjab. Tan hawe been battlin ECWC III. It sil. Ealin last week Willing to terro with random bom for the creation o homeland in the of the country.
Jayewardene's in Soiled reputation its own. Neither Tuch genuine into ting a peaceful set the mediation eff Prime Finister Ri Reason to fear hope for an ear Sri Lankan terror Teason to f:är f "I think terrorists attenipts to expl

; Jayewardene
Gandhi in New c was declared lks in Bhutari,
3m Colombo met a with the Tani
in two Tonths ra velod and the d because neither
late? Now just rnment proposal little, too late isn't hawe much mise: the Strident S posed to wave ha lese Buddhist goes too far, the undisputable l group IS II' - ''' als o the Cast tical settle mont t from India's ce. ' "LT TE has on any political a.mi 1 spoke5man, no-compromise he players.'
isn't changed his response to the
bombings, last Week he app called once more to friendly countries for more aid and more guns to fight the guerrillas. Already more than 1,600 Sri Lankan securityforce members have undergone training in Pakistan. A handful of Israeli adviscrs instructed Sri Lankans in intelligence techniques Colombo also hired ex-commandos of the private British firm Keenie Meenie Services to provide adwancod counterinsurgency training, and Western fiercenaries from KMS were sighted last week commanding helicopter gunships. With the violence spinning nearly
out of control, some residents predicted that in a few years foreigners from various nations
might be struggling to keep the peace just as in other countries torn by hopeless strife, That could be overly Pessimistic. Stil, after last week Sri Lanka - called "Serendib' by ancient mariners - had tragically earned its new nickname - 'the Lebanon of South Asia."
- NEWSWEEK
|ds
in and on
g typified the that has turned a battilaground idly as Lebanon ni | eb els who the Colorbo 1983 showed that they are *ize th 2 måltion bings to press fan independent northern region President Junius itary has earned for excessos cof Side ha 5 shown : rcst in negotiatlement, despite forts of Indiam ւjiv Gand hi. : There is little ly end to the 15 m, and every or the future. will make Thore ode bombs at
places where people gather, such as hotels, railway stations, bus halts, government departments and big shops' National Security Minister Laith Athulath Tudali warned last week. The same day, 48 hours after the Trincoln lice bombings, a government helicopter flew over Tamil strongholds in the northwest and strafed two rebel trucks, reportedly killing 26 guerrillas Residents of the predominantly Tami village of Ilchichilliampatti also said that men dressed in Army uniforms had attacked them, killing 21 people and burning most of the homes. The government confirmed that the slaughter had taken place but said that the attackers may only hawe been posing as soldiers. That
seemed doubtful, but even if it were true, there is little doub: that Tamil rebels will Seizo ci
the murders as an excuse to seek revenge once again. - NEWSWEEK

Page 15
GWAFAID WAAMW
Humphrey Hawksley reports from Trinc Control over the region and clear out t
How the battle for Tr
|F Sri Larık 3'5 cİyi| yar has a. fr | i2 | 3 || it | 5 in the district of Trincomalee on the north-east coast. Five years ago, when Trincomalee's sweeping coral beaches wera being developed for the package to Lur industry, the Tamils, the Simha || 252 and the Moslems lived sida by side in roughly equal numbers in what seemed to be a find example of ethnic harmony.
Now a visitor only has to drive a few miles, passing through settlements of each community, to see what has happened: the Tamil Willages are deserted and the houses burnt. In a ruthless, but cffective campaign, the Government has diri Wen the Tamils out of their homes and into refugee camps or to the predominantly Tamil northern prowİnce,
"You havo to ask why has there been no campaign te win the hearts and minds of the Tamil people in this crisis," said one Tarimi II lawyer. It’s because the policy ha 5 been to Search, destray, and re-locate, and you can't hawe both. And when you look at it in the clear light of day the Governrent has won Trinicoralee."
There used to be about fifty Tami villages in the Trincomalco district. The only big ones remaining are Samball Livu and Ni la Welli, about ten miles north of TrincoTale i 5cf. The Seare Contro ed by Tami I guerri Illas.
Nilaweli has a atgut 3,000 || || 5 ha; 2,500 refugees most from the fishing Willage of Kuchchevili, another 5 miles north. A year ago, as part of a general sweep against Tamil Willages in the district, KuchchicWilli was destroyed,
population of
Cne of the refugees, a 48-year -old fisherman known as Tammy, said the solders arri yed with armoured cars, firing wildly. Then a helicopter appeared and started shooting. Several people were killed or Wourided, but hic did not know how many. He and his nine -year-old son ran into the jungle,
About 1,500 thoro witholic f said Tammy, th to go anywhere gradually disap ti *ākd to Ni l'ự: || Wri they have becn
Later, Tammy to his Willage. H by soldiers ther forget any ideas Kuch che veli agair Jaffa, ir the NI Wä5 where Lhe
Other refugees Crle said he hat being taken to H woulds treated. rating gashed th knife. A nother beater to death third asked for given a thick ri
In November, officer, Brigadic ratic, arri yed marking what a end to the steady of Til till i'w i i ci pli med Solider; and that tHe Ta "Et L T HITE. H the reports fro Fisher IIo.
Ha 53 || || || Sinhalese refuge did. There was between the squ except that ther of Scabios artir refugees and ther meta Offi
Li Tamil wä: mo m:dical helicopter flew camp the childr oric flew ow"
everyona instin fr :) Wr,
Brigadier Gur
lunch on the to blingalow at the basc overlooking

o on the ruthless campaign to win He Tali i habitantS
incomalee was won
cople were hiding Codod o It Water ard, ay were terrified . This huge band erd ooit of rough the jungle a for the past year
living in Camps.
" tri : d t te turi e said he was told 'e that he should
about li wiring irn i. He should go to orth, because that Tamils belonged.
te || .cf atrocities. d been told he was ospital to hawe his
Steld yä le Wound with a saw a boy being 1 in a bus A, water, and was ı edicine,
a new commanding ir Har Sh3 Gung
in Tricomage p paared to be an stream of killings 15. H2 said Lumdiswere punished mill refugees could e would look into m the Kuchchevali
äsab Wisit : e camp, which
it difference alor of the camps, : Ywa 5 " o ewid :m: ig thi : Simha lese: 2 was a perman 2nt
Scabics was rife: camps and there
fir. W. El ayer tha Sinha (3:50: in Wawed. Whn i | campווןthc Ta ctively scattered
I 15ן וו
רווח gawe ם חם ב־ן ים ו irrace of his large British-built nawa | China Bay - a
symbol of the Tamil campaign because the the guerrillas say thay need Trincoma lee's natural harbour, one of the firest in thic world to mäke their en wisaged hom cland of Tamil Eelam economically viable.
The 55-year-old brigadier has carried out three military operations against guerrilla strongholds EO 55rt his Contro Cwer Tricomalce sinca the boginning of thr: year. He said the arca - with 18 army camps - was now more Cor C55 Sc. cura, but admitted that Nį ||Y || || Wyli 5. ti || || guerrilla hands,
"We will Hawe to take that 5 apci", "" he said. "'But the rtě i 5 fic Inajor threat because they can neither Tigwe north or south froll there.'"
I asked him about the recent land mino attack on an army which killed 25 soldiers and five civilians.
"That was negligence," he said. "They should have been travelling at walking pace, checking the cu verts for landmiries."
| askad histi about the Tässä cre by Tamil guerrillas of 30 Sinhalese villagers the previous weekendthe Tamil attempt to keep Sinhalase settlers from mowing into the eastern Province. The brigadier said he was doubling the strength of the civiliar militia, known as the homeguard, from 2,500 to 5,000.
But could he say that Trincomalee was really under his control? "'You can Iower stop all the attacks. As long as there is a terrorist in the jungle they can strike. That is where: the politicians com2 in,' he said.
After Linch, I heard that Iller thought to be homeguards had murdered four members of a Tamil farming family, including a twoyear-old boy, in a midnight raid om a remote: farmhouse.
Mr. Kandaratnam Siya palin, a 65-year-old human rights worker, 蠶 that although the search,
(Continued on page 24)
|3

Page 16
WEW YORK TIMES
Ethnic gap wi
Barbara Crossette
COLONEO
AE" the People affected by the days and nights of vialence (in July 1983) was the poet Anne Ranasinghe, A German Jew who had fled Nazi rule as a child, married a Sinhalesa Scholar and come to live in Colombo. Mrs. Ranasinghe shocked by the ethnic violence, felt haunted again by her past. In a poem "July 1983'' she mused that she "used to Vonder about the Nazi klers
and those who stood and watched the killing".
She continued:
Forty years later
once more there is burning
the night sky bloodied, violent
drid abused . . .
The ethnic violence in northern Sri Lanka, illustrated by the Wednesday attack in Trincomalee that left more than 20 dead, is
touching the capital, Colombo, farther south.
The: rasu It is gro Wing fear.
Warniees between ethnic groups ha 5 bę en hoightened, shattering the confidence of a cos no Politan city that was once a model of Progress
and development for southern Asia,
But Colombo's residents Say the new climate of Wiolence, in which an airliner has been destroyed, a train bombed and 5. Weal
Public buildings da maged, may only be the latest TT traumatic stage of an alienation
process that began in this Indian Ocean port 30 Year5 ago.
"Even if the ethnic Ti Sinhale.5e conflict *orte 52 EE| 20 tomorrow," a Sinha lese resident said, "this city would real
deeply divided.'
Both Sinha lese and Tamils a tribure tha split to E0 W2 IMIT policies, especially the Official
arguage Act of 956 in W Sinhala replaced English as the
|
official to nguo, Say, Split rasid lines and rode link that might separation of e complete.
Tamils say th language act ani to eclipse their ghettoize their suffered greateг work and iri sc ha les e make up the city's popul
Children arc the language o Without excepti,
official gå i.
"In the slaga 24 hours," we guage, Engligh, ''' nalist Said. **TH di Wide that has years. Children
gated schools or Ta t 2 5 trea fis ir They don't get people of their unless they mee
Sinhala nationa duced by the Sr Party form cd in filion Balıdırara iki prime IT İrı İ5 tör fr His son is now leader.
A Sinhala-spea the policies b. nationalis I wer applied that in P2ging Simhalese Tarrils in Colom bush of an arm had voter-registr tifying Tarmi | famr
The 1983 attac Tam|| homes and least 500 lives and of more than half Til5.
The Tannis wF thc: process of reE difficult, lost of a dren. One father
.+7

dens
Such policies, they ents along ethnic 2d the Tinguistic
have mada the thnic groups less
e effect of the d other laws was languago and to Peoplc, who then discrimination at hool. Ethnic Sin80 percent of l Lior.
now educated in f their parents, S a Sri Lankar
1 'Sinhala in only ost our link lari. a Simha le 5e jourat began a great wid erioed over the rhow go to Segrestudy in sepathe same school. to know other CW m å ge group them outside."
lism was introi Lankar Freedom | 95 by Solo, Who Served as om | 35É ta. 1959. the OPPosition
king writer said *TT1 Cf Simhälä so Pervasively 1983, when rammobs attacked bo after the amy Patrol, they ation lists iderilies.
ks on Colombo's PLIS ET 255 C, tcst : led to the flight :he city's 200,000
to remained say suilding has be ch Il for the Hi
noted that chi -
dren quickly learn to switch off television programs broadcast in the "other' language.
Neelam Tiruchelwam, a Tami i lawyer and political leader who studied at the University of Ceylon and at Harvard in the United States, said the current generation of national leaders was the last to be educated in the elite secondary schools that were ethnically and linguistically integrated.
Royal College, his own school, produced the leaders who would head overy major political Party, including the Communists, he said. its graduates included |Eftists, rightists, Tamils, Simhalese and the people of mixed European and Asian descent known as Burghers,
"The richness of education we had as children, when our schoolmates came from every background, is gone,' Mr. Tiruchelvam said. "When you lose that, you lose something fundamental.'
About 20 percent of Colombo's three million people arc Christians. Priests and pastors say that their churches, as outsiders to the conflict between the Tamil Hindus and Sinhales e Buddhists, wage a continuing battle against polarization.
At the century-old St. Lucia's Roman Catholic Cathedral, a visitor can observe three priests saying mass as a team in Ta Till, Sinhala and English,
"We use the three languages in one mass because the people don't want separation, they don't want struggle," said the Reverend Cansius Moraes, a Sinhala speaker.
T.D.S.A. Dissanayaka, a Foreign Ministry official who soon will become Sri Lanka's ambassador tid Yugoslavia, said the Christian churches in Sri Lanka had to ---- with a difficult legacy after the country gained independence froBritain in 1948. Christianity was regarded as 'the religion of the conqueror."
(Continued on page || 8)

Page 17
WWNWADUW
A decision that doesn
he decision by the Tamil
United Liberation Front 13t to attend the meeting of registo rod political parties scheduled for Jun 25 in Colombo to receive and discuss the Sri Lankan Gowerment's proposal relating to the devolution of power at the proin the Norther and
Wicià l' | cy :| Eastern provinces of the Island does mot see Til the right one
either in Principle or as a tactical respons 2. The TULF has, in its telegram to the Sri Lankan President, Mr. J. R. Jaya werdene, elaborated on the considerations end i ogic that rade it är rive at this decision and ironically, it is the combination of factors referred to which argues that participttion in an open-minded way in political excrcise would be the sound courso. The TULF's objection to Mr. Jayawardene playing three or four tracks simultaneously is certainly valid. Track One is the continuance of the search for a negotiated political settleTent bg: Li Weem Lthe Sri Lankam Government and the Tamil organisations using India's good offices as the key. There are two basic or substantive experiences relewant to this track involving only the TULF, the 'moderates', the formar elected representiwes of tha Sri Lankan Tamils, in the first round of the negotiating oxorcisc; and bringing in the five major Tamil militant organisations along with the moderates directly into the process. Although the |:1EEE| CCU T552 seemed carry sonline a dwa ritages in that the 2ntire spectrum of Tamil political and military activity seemed now covered, the experience of thic "ceasÇfirci' and the Thimpu peace Confer Long in 1985 demonstrated the fa||acies of this approach from an Indian policy standpoint. Fram late-1985, India's good offices in helping Sri Lanka find a negotiated political way out of the Inalignant situation has returned to the approach of involving only the TULF in this round; the hope. of cour 5c, is that conca a decernt basis for a political settlement is identified and the gap on the
substantive issues Lior is to Wei can be underta
its gi w C: this packag L55 of Track firm c. 55 in th: position on the cc in the political Sri Liliki Tri floxible approach and ti Timg, a fit CCITT1 Tĩi LTTC Tit LC substam tiwe Solu cg ccm me 15 Lurë d. ing op Portuniti 25 work of a united objective or fair experience woul that it is the
Tinistratici and
this political t werted the pro T in late - 1983 w
C to del and t of building up aspirations that Tiflis. The late: 5ed it to New D (3 meant to k cep
The purs uit ol brutal military 5 in practice innoc fart Tigre thair underried the Colombo's profe negotiated politi outrage of the o 5 | we ii I : ħabirth act of bombing Ciyi ||ârl Jaffn:l f| the ignominiously to "conquer' were: the capit: Cina: my static: Ywai burnt and destroy completed the a Sri L&L TITI the is lind. Th · outrage Was ICC immediately Lupo Indian delegation Chidambaram, a to take forwar offices. The sigr another military c con the Jaffna, pe 1 Worrying — this particular specia Minister for N

't seem right
concerning devod, a serious effort ker to persuade o go along and e a cha ca3. THC: O PresuPբ Ճ5Ճs 2 Indian policy are issues figuring aspirations of the ls, a skilful arid to methodology l an unwavering a roderate but tion offering a ıf self-ad Tırı isterwithin the frilleSri Lanka. Any reading of the d make it clear Jayewardene adits handling of rack which subise that emerged ith the Annexure he opportunities
Ywards thir it offered thig : "" la rifica i 15'' hi are obviously Track On aiwg. * Track Two — à tra tagy tā rgeting 3: nt. Tämi || ...i williaris militants - has
credibility of ssions towards Cill Sout Gol. The 1ay military offenthe terroristic
thic heart of om the air and y bunglad effort it as though it all of a modic wal ting to be loot cd, red, angered and lienation of the component of e ti Thing of this able: it followed In a wis it by an ed by Mr. P. Union Minister, d India's good is that point to offensive centring ninsula are decply delusion is thc lisation of the ational Security,
Mr. Athuli th Tudali. sents a hawkish and completely un trustworth y element in Sri Lankan politics. New Delhi must make it clear to Sri Lanka arid the whole world that it will not any longer be a disinterested spectator to any new round of military atrocities against the Ta Tı ils for whom there is a strong and growing sense of Solidarity in this ration. What India can do in response to a military offensive taking on genocidal characteristics remains to be worked out in policy terms that break with the superficialities of the Rajiv-Bhandari approach of 1985 - which in a sense Iowered the credibility of India's role in relation to the Tamil guestion in Sri Lanka. The military 'solution' pursued by Colombo has, of course, proved wery, very costly to the people of the island, Sinhala, Tari and others. The fierce armed resistance by the Ti || ta ft 5 in the North, and their going for civilian 15 Wel as Illilitary targets in the East and the South, hawe made nonsense of the claim of Jayewardene, Athulathmudali & Co. that they are in the process of winning
who repre
the war against "'terrorism'. The induction of an assortment of reactionary elements, Israeli.
Pakistani and Western mercenary, into the military strategy threato m5 — a5i de frgFT1 the huma r1 rights consequences for the Tamils - to make further inroads into the independence of Sri Lanka's foreign policy. In all these ways, the impact of Colombo's actions militates against India's basic policy interest in the region of which it İS an importanıt part.
Track Three is the convening of the multiparty conference to presant thic latest official proposals on provincial councils in the North and the East and their specific powers and func
tions. The decision by the SLFP to boycott the exercise - even while arranging to look at the
forum - (Continued on page 23)
proposals outside this
5.

Page 18
WWDA TODAY
W. PRABAKARAN
Profile of a
MCNG the militant Tami |
groups battling for Eelam, he is airedy a legend in his Comparat|Wely short lifetime, a larger-than-life figure whose military exploits and derring-do have turned him into something of a folk hero. Tales abound of his unerring marksmanship and his ability to hit a cigaretto at a hundred paces with a pistol or
strip and reassemble a revolver blindfolded in seconds. To his ernemies, including riwa | Tami |
militart groups, he Is a ruthles 5 blood-thirsty, over-ambitious desperado, intent only on selfpromotion - and self-preservation. But in the context of Sri Lanka's increasingly bloody ethnic strife, Welu Pillai Prabakaran, 32, has become the predominant figure after the brief but brutal fratricidal
battle between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) which he heads, and the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation
(TELO), the Iwo most militar|y powerful Tamil groups. The TELO forces were virtually wiped out as was most of their top leadership, including Srisa baratnam, Pra bakarların 's archi-riyalı for the Tamil guerrilla leadership.
With TELO virtually out of the picture, the supremacy of
LTTE, popularly known as the Tigers' and its chairman, Prabakaran, is Unquestioned
particularly after they reconfirmed their near-total military control ower the island's northern peninsula, Prabakaran's writ now runs supreme in the north, with the LTTE not only collecting taxes from the locals but also controlling law and order,
Prabakaran remains something of an enigma. Stripped of the propagända hype that s Lurrounds him, he is still a Tystery man with a paradoxically low profile. His movements are a closelyguarded secret, but hic is known to spend most of his time shuttling between hideouts in
| 6
Tamil Nadu, s: the Palk Strait fatigues and Pe troops in comb
Born on Now Sri Laka’s Tor of We wetti thur: the fishing cast was al educ servant employ laid officer. was inspired by hertoe 5 like A12 and Napolean
Indiam freedor Bhagat Singh and Bosc. As he
studious boy in to reading bo When he was he was witnes Tio t5 of | 958 : up lista ning to brutalities comm Lärka army
population.
He was a began playing a Organi sing prc against the ( acquired a Marx he was 6, in the Government education polic tionary youth', his fellow-travi them 5 cl wees froi Tamil political the Revolutionar ti I.
Prāba karan W; joined the arr begå in learning F grenades and sma Qrı e y dergi Krı Hı "(200 |Wed 50 The in Cuba. What he rose rapidly hierarchy as expanded. II confident enough abilitics to form Tigers which he Liberation Tiger In 1976, appoir

Tiger
bric times crossing
to dari Hi5 battle rsonally direct his
l.
mber 26, 1954 in thern coastal town i, he belongs to though his father ited government cd as a district A5, a studert, he historical military xar det the Grcat Bonaparte and by in fighters like Subhash Chandra says: 'I was a school, confined cks at ho The."" four years old, 5 to the facia | nd virtually grew stories of the nitted by the Sri on the Tamil
whic hic active role in HL 25 t T CD 'W':left:5 govern Tent and ist irTage. When Protest against 5 discriminatory vi, the “ “ rewoILIas he describes 2 || Iers, distanced m the existing arty and formed y Youth Federa
Ludent
is 7 when he cd struggle" and how to use hand |-bore te wolwers. als it that He military training ever the truth, in the guerrilla the to Welt 1972, he was of his leadership I thic. Tami || Nawrw rena med as the 3 of Tami || Eelam iting himself as
chairman of the organisation's central cormited and commanderin-chief of its military wing.
As a ruthless guerrilla fighter dedicated to spilling "the last drop of blood' for Eelam, Prabakaran's name first hit the headinos in 1975 when he assassinated Jaffna mayor Alfred Duraia Pipa. He also personally led the group that ambushed a military convoy in 1983, ki || ing 13 soldiers and triggering off the 1983 Colombo riots. Says Tilakar of LTTE, à delegate to the Thimpu Laks: "He is always intensely alert. This has helped him in our fights against the Sri Lankan army. He has an un can ny hunch about impending military attacks helping him escape numerous attempts to capture him.'
Prabakaran is the chief architect of the highly-disciplined and wel -entrenched military set-up of the LTTE that has been nodced on Fide|| Castro's original guerrilla movement. It is a tightly -controll cd organisation that has
managed to keep its strategy and movements secret through public executions of alleged inforthers. All LTTE members
keep a vial of cyanida con their person in case they are captured and tortured. However, Prabakaran's war against TELO has been seen as part of his growing leadership ambitions. Says W. Balakumar, convenor of the Eela II Revolutionary Organisation: 'Ultimately, leadership is something
which will have to be conferred on you by the people. It is not right to think that your status will go up if you
artificially build an aura around ourself." Other militant groups criticised his recent penchant to i S5 u 2 institution5 Lo his men in the battlefied from the safety of his Tamil Nadu hidcouts and there are strong rumours that his military authority is beginning to be questioned by his district commanders.

Page 19
But in terms Prabakaran has always set a personal example. He doesn't drink cor sriticke, tea ar coffee are taboo and he is wery strict about field training and exercise.
cf discipline,
There is considerable mystery, however, about the source of LTTE's seemingly limitless funds. The Sri Lankam Gowernment
believes he is being funded by the coil Tunist Bloc which ho denies vehemently. But in the Current Cornflag ration, Prabakarari "5 destiny is linked in extricably with the Eelam struggle and the legend can only grow larger.
Dark-skinned, with close-- Cropped hair, a bushy Toustache and a di Sarming smile on hi5 thick lips, Prabakaran looks the altithesis of the legendary dreaded torrorist that he is supposed to be. He looks more like a prosperous and pleasantmannered family man, which, incidentally, he also is. His wife Madivadani has just given birth to their second child. Dwaraka, a week-old last fortnight. Prabakaran is not normally accessible to the media. Las E fortnight, however, he made an exception for IN DA TODAY when he agreed to speak to Assistant Editor PRABHU CHAWLA, ad Madras Correspondent S. H. WENKATRA, MAN in the LTTE's Indira Nagar coffice in south Madras for an interview. Excerpts:
C. What, in your view, wi II be the next chapter of the Sri Lankan problem?
A. Sri Lankan Presid cm. J. R. Jaye war dene (RJ) wil|| come to the negotiating table only if he been able to gain some military advantage. Till then, he will only be continuing the military option.
Q. Don't you think it is possible for the Sri Lankan Governrent with all its resources to ultimately militarily crush your mDWErmiert
A. J R J may think be can find a military solution to the ethnic problem. But he can only succeed in bringing about genocide on a large scale. We hawe with us
young boys whic die C2 af CC" ar able to achic wo
G. How do LTTE'S strengt Sri Lankan Arr
A. :AT1Ilf L I" secrets, but we h to send the ai assure you that of mobili sing on fg, the Sri |
Q. Do you time fra me foi independent T Eela?
A.. I can't say We Will attain will certainly at also to a certai On the internatic economic pressu faces and will our armed 5 tr. foreign supporte is not capable country together him. His guns, hawe not been ; from launching : si W e agimst his
el. But don't can negotiate settlenent with Government!
A. We We of being able to with || the fram Sri Lanka. We point of no ret to the Eelam it
e. What is territory you w as Eelam?
A. Eelam wä5 There was a di: |ard. We arte tc retriewe that
Gl. Have you tՒlբ fit: lt-l]
A. Yes, hay
a riu Tibe of 1i Ilm fatt, ir LI ha'ye ta.
G. What was tant military o

arc Willing to other IIi || We re our objective,
you estimate h wis-a-vis the y1רו
eveal any military ave the capability my out. I can LTTE is capable O Lugh 5 u Poport to - ankan årmy.
have a specific r achiewing an a Ti I state of
specifically when Eelam, But y ė :täin it. It wyi || In extent depend ծոal 5ituatigm, the res that Coloribo face because of uggle, Once his rsrcise that JR
of holding the they will desert bombs and tanks lb | e Lo de cert us 1 Sustaired offenregime.
you think you an honourable the Sri Lankan
crossed the stage wisualise a solution work of a united hawe come to a urn with regard leal.
the geographical vant to liberate
already existing. zirk Tam|| h gingnow trying only
yourself been on
e tak en Part in litary operations. group, all of us
your first imporperation?
A. My first major military encounciri wa 5 im || 9 W5 When | shot and killed the former mayor of Jaffna, Alfred Duraiappa. Subsequently | hawe taken part in a number of military actions of our group: I was very much there in the Ni lawel operations, and || |ed thc ambush on the military convoy that killed |3 Soldier 5 in Tinneveli
983.
Q. Can you tell us how many people you have personally killed in the course of military struggle?
A. Il carn mot tell you that, but | hawe beer in a number of our military actions, I can operate
every thing from a pistol to a rocket-ranger.
Q. What were tha rea5O15 for your waging a war on TELO? Don't you think disunity among the militants can only weaken your movement?
A. In our struggle we hawe to adopt a unified approach. Any disunity among us will be a weakness for the entire Tamil movement. But it is precisely this disunity that was developing. In my opinionthere must only be one dominant military group to lead the strugge. And it is we Tigers who were a Ele to foi Ehle Sri Lankar Army's offensives in many cases. And it is very dangerous for the
Sri Lankan Army to deal with a single unified movement. It is a single unified Tiger movement | lt | -
Q. But couldn't you hawe
brought about unity by discussons
A, How could we discuss anything with the other groups when
they were themselves hopelessly dis united Within?
Q. is eliminating the other
groups the only way to a unified
approach
A. We did mot Wipe out any Toweric L. We only Laught TELO a les son. TELO Was kiling our LTTE leadors, and if We had mot tackled them the Tiger movement would have gradually ceased to exist. You will appreciate that even when we had problems with

Page 20
thic Eelam People’s Rewolucionary Liberation Front, we were wer patient. Even in the Case of TELO, though around 100 militants were killed, we only took into custody over 400 TELO fighter and Scizod their arms and arti II unition. Tha only principle was that these people Iod not Wild arms if they Cannot fight the real enemy. Whilo our cadras wor: really keeping the Sri Lankan Army at bay, these other groups were iridu ging in an Ti5-cial àC Livs Lias. And Jaffna people said it was good for us to take total charge of the liberation movement.
Q. What do you say to Jayewat dene calling you terrorists?
A. Wo are not terrorists. We are the representatives of people who want to get out of the clutches of state terrorism.
Q. What is your reply to Jayewardene's allegation that you are getting arts from Communist Countries
A. If I was getting arms from Communist, Countries, I would have gi Wen you an interwiew in Tamil Eelari.
What political set-up do you visualise for Tamil Eelam?
A. It would be a socialist state of Tami || Eela III. Ard ther would be a single political party Supported by the people. I am opposed to the multi-party democracy. It is through the oneParty rule that we can develop the Eelam faster. III a Socialist set up people's needs are more Imբd rLanL.
Q. Would you have parliamentary democracy?
A. No, it would be a people's democracy, a model similar to that of Yugoslavia where people elect a single party.
Q. What kind of foreign policy would you like to follow?
A. We will definitely like to be closer to the socialist block because these are the ones who are helping Lus now.
Q. Do you go to Jaffna these days?
8
A. My movem But all my cadr lieutenants. The with me.
GA., LTTE H5 of having a conduct. . .
A. We do imp For example, W. rembers to r wouldn't allow don't allow our i and they genera Wee - engure al li
Π Ο Γ.Π. 15,
Q. Jayewarde of launching you gle from India you react to tl
A. Our strug
EEl T. "e a wat there. A
γν ΙΙΙ
31rig25 'W' 2 hawe mic desire here. We are
3 | || CCITThati Öıl paign and not t. 5 tru EE| Ε.
Q. Can you r countries which wat dere?
A. Rza İ3 aid Wernments like Sk tam, and Israel, SAS mercari 5
Q. What is y the Governmen
A. The Gow is sympathetic Our being allow also shows the the Indian Gow. been good enou o ai || LI T ex ii || E.
G. What is te GO WETTE mediatory effo
A. We fully su Tinent of India's We support Ind
Q. But Iıdi: tion with in th1E a United Sri you are bent om that mean yo purposes with

DE AT RA 5" (2 t., "es are my trusted у keep in rouch
tle strict
reputation code of
cos e a moral Coda.
y 2 - do all o W o Lur marry, but we to so morals. Wi.
Timbers to drink, |ly don't smoke. fs Within 5 Qcial
ne acCL1505 You r military strugTi soil. How do hat
gile is taking place re conducting the d when necessity
go there. We
to fight from here to carry on | political cart2 launch a military
ame some of the are helping Jaya
authoritarian goLith Africa, Fakisand of course the
our equation with it of India now
riffinent of India
s ved to stay Here
magnam i Tity of :rnment. India has gh to gi we refuge d political leaders,
your response to rt of India's rts
pport the Govern
peace initiatives: Lia's role fully,
Wants a solufra The Work Of Lanka. Whartels Eela. Doesn't Li : "2 3:Lt II" 0 55
India?
A. We are representing the political aspirations of our people. We don't think the Gow criment of India will go against the aspirations of our people, India's support. is important to us. But we also hawe a right to self— deter finiration.
Q. What will you do if Rajiv asks you to get out because he doesn't take kindly to terrorism?
A, We don't think Raji w wi|| ask us to pack our bags. But then if we arte asked to go we will hızı ve to go. Cour horTelları d ls, always waiting for us with open ar" rT15. BLI . Wg 31rga cori Winted tH1at he has full sympathies with the Tamil people.
- INDIA TODAY
Ethnic . . .
(Continued from Þage (4)
Taking a Wisitor Lo Colombo's new Anglican cathedral, where ha attend5 services, Mr. Dissanayaka said that Christian leaders had developed 'enlightened policics''' to meet the challenge, and had earned a liberal reputation as a rgs LE.
When the Archbishop of Canterbury recently visited the cathedral, Whigh i5 Eui in Sri Lanka 1 architectural style, Buddhist monks were given prominent places in the Congregation, he said.
Mr. Tiruchelvam, who represents a moderate Tä Tiil political movemet that would like to reach an acceptable settlement with the central goverlinent, acknowledged that pockets of ecumenis II and libera ir Siti || existed il Cambo.
But he said he feared that the
city's middle class, 'which supported these liberal qualities and gawe the city its cosmopolitan air," had changed.
"This very progressive, creative segment has become deeply polarized, almost filled with bigotry," He said. ""The educatad Tid = class5 at e the care takers of ou ccnScience. But they are fail ing to carry out that role."
- NEW YORK TIME

Page 21
Towards N. A. M. 8
South Africa r the NAM Cur
Thị tith summit of Nonaligned States op en 5 in Harare, the capital of Zimbabwe, in September. As usual the largest community of States outside the U. N. Wi || Lake upo questions that hawe
been on the NAM agenda for two decades, such as the cluster of issue covered by the Third
World"5 der Tızım d for :ı New Enternational Economic Corder. Eu tha focus of NAM "Sullit" is often determined by the urgencies of the moment. By a coincidcnco, World a [[ton tio is shar"- ply focussed right I'm CYW o hig struggle in South Africa which cf Ccourse is of the Tost direct concern and importance to the host of the 8th summit, Zimbabwe, one of the targets of a South African Air Force attack only a few months ago. Interestingly, another victim of South African aggression was Zambia, the host of 3rd SLImmit,
Pretoria's Prg text was that Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe Were sanctuaries for the African National Congress, the organisation spearheading the liberation struggle in A ZA NI A today Since support for national liberation TowerTents is as Illich a cardina Principle and commitfTert of Lha N.A.M. as much as the struggle against Racism, the South African IsSLJ2, which is in any case ha 5 a magnetic hold on International attention at the moment, Will inevitably over-shadow all other questions at the Hararc conference. In the run up to the Summit, the L. G., plans to publish commentaries on both general and specific issues.
Non-alignment, despite the word itself, is not so much an ideology as an international moveTent with some broad ideoloEl cal bases. The growth of the ovement, particularly the rapid T-Tease in numbers and the het 2
rogenity of the governments join
tion, has quitë buted to greater to rigidity. Mer
Towe Tert also dei foreign policy of state. But that
in practice of co by the governme try, and regimes
Contributing al bility - and in dynamism — of th the rich diversi which charactaris Thic. ::Lumlu at WC2. Er influcona 5 of ts whicle was ably Prof. K. P. Mifa School of th: Inte at Nahru Uri wors tribution to ii iTF Nonalignment".
nally recognised non-alignment, th Practico, Prof. I
""The SC CLI tri 5
cities a tur ād g nomic developme 5a, me, Ch C ir geo-E sions vary cons historical experien and above all, t political perspec ruling elite, though are fait from ident
Although Prof. observation On th tors that shape character of N. A til the indiwidia member-states ca. as walid, it is als Stress at the s; prevalence of id: helped not only mowerient alliw b its surprisingly Cohesion. The p, wrn contribution collection of essays

aises :ain
lation-states and ng the organisaogically Contriflexibility than nbership of the ines the declared cach memberforeign policy, Irsc is conducted
Int of Cach Coun
change.
to to the flexia sense to the e Towere is ty of cultures the N. A. M. mpact of all these to Wetle as all expressed by Dean of the national Studies ity in hi5 con e Principles of An internatiointerpreter of e theory and Misra abserved: belong to diffecultures, their of socio-eco1t is ct the iolitical Compuliderably, their ce is distinctiw: he international tiwe of chcir broadly similar, ica''.
Misra's general co affective facthe collective . M. and condi| behaviour of in be accepted o necessary to ame time the is which hawe to keep the LJT to mai imita i high degree of resent writer's to the same notes, Wis-a-Wis
the issue of 'de-colonising inforrimation'':
"But whatever the preoccupations of the movement at any given time or definable period, the non-aligned community has held on steadfastly to an aim which we must accept as its central or core value: an and to domination. Nothing illustrates this better than the basic documents which punctuate tha movement's history. '"Domination'' and associated idea 5 lika "subordination' and "dependence", together with connected phrases such as '" in a || its for T5 tot "in any form' or 'in all its Ilanifcstations "" hawe been worked and ro-worked into the mowament’s | iterature un ti | th 25, term5 have en tered the liturgical |exicon'". (PRINCIPLES OF NONALIGNMENT, THIRD WORLD CENTRE PUBLISHERS, London).
It is precisely because this historical phenomenon of dominance-dependence has now emerged as the main target of the Third World's aspirations for total emanicipation, that is emancipation beyond formal political independence, that the efforts by western theorists of nomalignment to impose a different orientation on N. A. M. hawe signally failed. Such western attempts, indirectly supported by a few nomaligned exponents from within the movement, hawe sought to distort the true meaning of nomalignment.
Yes, "NON-Alignment' by defnition means not aligned to...... To whom? To the superpowers. That is the broad doctrina position, a by-product of the global reality of two power blocs which existed when the non-aligned movement was for Ted,
However, in practice - and this constitutes the learning process of N. A. M., and the increasing
9

Page 22
naturity of its perception of the complexities of the global powerstructure — Third World dependence Continues, despite the transfer of political power, peacefully or violently, to the colonised by their imperial masters. The sorces of domination Were still the old metropolitan centres, and its agencies were the transnational firms.
Sovereignty was not fully meaningful without economic independence. That was the first step in self-awareness because political freedom had no substance if it could be translated in terms of a better life for the people. Thus, the demand for a new economic order grew. The second stage came when the Third LLL S S LLLLLLLHHL LL0L S LL0LL0LLaL S S LLL there was a third sphere of near-total dependence and exploitation - the field of ideology and culture, specifically communications. Again the owners and Contro er5 Were the Sama metropolitan centres, the agents the cort Tunication giants. In Algiers, and more clearly in Colombo (5th summit) the Action Program which Included "l|formation" bgcame the second front opened by NAM. In both fronts, NAM i 5 rrot at Wat With the Sowiet Union but with the US-led We25 term a lliance.
The at tempt to interpret 'nonalignment' by equating the two superpowers produced many concepts, including the Yugoslaw' equi-distance theory, and more lately the western notion of "genuine non-alignment', meaning again, NAM must attack both Superpowers equally as evidence of the genuinest of its nomalignIllet,
This introduces the latest idea of 'equal responsibility' i.e. the predicament of Third world nations, the burdens their peoples must bear, the conflicts and tensions in different parts of the world, can be attributed to both superpowers and the guilt apportioned equally to both.
Interestingly, this 'theory' accompanies the Reagan adminstration's own policy of trying to divide and weaken N. A. M. by dealing on a case-by-case basis, and rejecting multi-latcralism for
20
unilateralism, i with Third W. effect, it is a ps bribery, inti mida Using both 'c responsibility as umilaterali 5m W forces the Unu: US policy on N Mr. Reagan m White House.
It is always ew: that under III strateges and tag Like neighbouring Africa presents Tätor: || || berat| Iot just again mäster but ag garrison state, ; the vast majorit. do not enjoy st rights. Now how and his ideolgical Thatcher respond of apartheid - nomalignment of Equi-distant betw
Statg and the population, For in months, the a N. A. I. FE5 | Africa.
U. S., U.
nonaligne on Preto
The United St w ett Ed a resolut Security Coun 2Coloric Sctic A, fri Ç:ı. Frride = ; | other meer A, LIstralia arid for the propos fiw o nomaligned Ghana, Madagask Tobago and th Emirates. It was and Punish Sout June 5 attack Namibe in Ang
The T250 |uti suspension of all in and guarante to Pretoria, a contracts in the

m US relations ord states. In olicy of selective ion and coercion. .oncept5 - Equal ld case-by-case Washington reinually aggressive A. M. ever. 5ince wed into the
ints and actuality 3 mld Wreck Lical calculations. Nß,M|BAA, SLuth a case of a 2nstruggle pitted
st an imperial gainst a racist a state in which
y of the nativ e5 inimum political does Mr. Reagan,
$Qu|-TT1ate, *rg. to the barbāri ties - with genuing Chığİr" (), 1 ||&İnd! 'een the apartheid oppressed black the second time JS and JK Weto ed Li tiom on South
K. kill d move ria
"ITED NATIONS
25 ad Bri, iom in th 2. J. N. Ci| LO impose ins against South abstained and the Tibers, including
Denmark, WotCd a submitted by
States - Congo, ar, Trinidad and e United Arab
T. E.L. h Africa for the on the port of
la.
called fg
W i sets ed export loans Eon pri al Ihgw
: nuclear field and
restrictions in sports and cultural relations. A ban. On sales of Computer equipment and Krugger. rame 5 and all other coins minced in South Africa was also Proposed.
Arı earlier bid by the same five Countries for a selective embargo was vetoed by the U. S. and Britain on May 23. Last month, South Africa had her under fire for attacking Zimbabwe and other frontline neighbours.
The western powers' double -veto left Angola in "despair and frustration." The U.S. and
British delega Les gawe their usual explanations saying they wanted to end Pretoria's apartheid syste T, not bring down its economy.
Though a globa | conference on
Sanctions opened in Paris this week, the French Ambassador, Mr. Claude de Kergularia said
time was not opportune to apply obligatory sanctions against South Affrica
The vote came just minutes after the U. S. House of Representatives approwed a package containing similar Sanctions. But the U.S. delegate, Mr. Herbert Okun, said his government's long-held oppositil C mandatory sanctions "has not cha figed. Punitivo gconomic sanctions would represent an abdication of our responsibility to those socking a peaceful end to apartheid."
While deploring the violations
of the Angolan territory, Mr. Peter Maxcy, British delegate, said 'We remain opposed to
economic boycotts because
do mot work."
they
Anexasperated Angolan Ambas
sador, Mr. Elisia de Figuiredo, told the council that the history of South Africa will be written
in blood" because that was the only language the racists understood. He had a feeling of frustration about the usefulness of the Counci [ in Wii Wo gf Contin Lu 2d Luse of veto by the U. S. and Britain.
(Continued on page 24)

Page 23
don't Want
Garmini Alkme emana
ating wiðiemce is mot simply intelė Lu || Exèrcise, o
those who haven't actually been through a passage of violence - whether street Crime demonstrations that become bloody riots. ar war — a lecture—ha || Werdict that violence IS bad lacks a gut feeling. The shootouts always seem like fun.
Exhortations, or guided tours to the killing fields, only have very short term results. As the pragmatic Bertolt Brecht once said, war is like love. It always finds a way. This is not intel
lectual defeatism, finerely a la Comic acknowledgement of what is almost a sacred truth.
There is war, and there is also
ci wil war. In general, it is fullscale war that begets anti-war movement. People get together
and say "'We don't want another War.'" So Tiehow, we haven't seen
sa many placards saying, 'We don't wat another ciyi war. ""
(Though the Lebanese, once they get back their breath, just light
say that). The reason may be that a ci wil war is a Thairly do
mesti affair which, me thi : family quarrels are settled, no ore wants to retion the belief that such nasty things could never happen again could conceivably be Si Ce.
Our big bad thing is both war and civil War. We are not unique in having either. But we were unique in the belief that these things wouldn't happen to us. We li w c:d in para dise.
We no longer do. Now there is a macabre phenomenon im Colombo. When the latest bomb goes off, people throng the pavements that cad to the accident Ward of general hospital. They crowd the Cumbersome pedestrian bridge that is closeby. As the ambu lances scream past and screech to a halt, the faces show the result of a mental process which has
passed through be fear - and now sl.
And in that L the nature of Wi spark of rejectic vien tā d We don't Want us. It's the is tilti We ים וח Wi o lence,
Admittedly, i. from Jaffna. We what it is like casualty of an an tion there. Th the statistics, on to the cold-bloc Cf Illum error.
Whether the bormes and wis Cer at least it isn't a property апy r used to watch - people in El war, going throl separated friends tĪ w 25 || o5t — W Ft det mit is fio 'Y', of cur co w Xi
One thing no to forget; violenc To Lurm the oth well in theory, tioning of traditio of self-Preservati wise. We hate äls hät 2 Lhase L5, TH115 is tha wiew. Ard thos nation that War: Wori are Walking gerous minefield.
History is str ples of %၊႕ဝံdy`ပုံ to be in conclusi of today's warfa self-destructive. are right; in th that Tight be,
Fra Ti Cai Tibodia E! Salvador, thi
be the case.
And wHat if The Lorrorist, o|

this war
Wi derm erth t s r 24 gê2 w understanding.
inderstanding of lence is the n; If this is what to people, then it happening to leginning of an EITT agai "15 t
t is a long way
haw, rho ideä to be a civili in i-terrorist Operaere are always y comprehensible 3dgd al tio Lurita T1 E5
blood, broken a is here of the te nyone's exclusive more. What we con 5 creen and Frope going to igh war, families | brothers, relain such complacent the harsh reality TT:
one car afford e beget 5 wicolern ce. er cheek is very but the cordiand the iristinct 1 de Tard Cheryi col crice, but We who force it upon 5ull short-te
who feed the ; can always bé through a dan
own with examvars which Prowed W. The atur re is subt and The philosopers e end, whanever both sides lose, to Lebar com ad s is proving to
the wat is won? r freedom fighter
(your choice) is a remarkably obstinate man. Nothing will conwince him that his cause is lost, As long as he can go on killing people, left, right and centre, he is convinced that he is winning.
As someone put it succintly not long ago, so what are we to do, write poems? Poetry (which decries violence) has always been indigestible to the promoters of widence. The idea is that when real men go off to fight, the rest fa || back on poems and anti-war sentiments. This is the Inacho mentality that earned Spanish poet Garcia Lorca a but lot through the heart during the Spanish Civil War; which got American conscientious objectors branded as traitors during the Wiet Nam War,
The fact is that we are still far from a genuine anti-war movement. The feeling is there, but it also makes a tot of people feel uneasy. It makes people feel un patriotic. Children Who donate their pocket money to the good ca LJ se are given publicity in the press; so how could the grownups say it's bad and should be stopped
Our military growth is in its infancy. The country and its people hawe a massiwe inferiority com Polax about thair irability to defand themselves. The military deficiencies were glaringly evident during the 1971 insurrection, when foreign military aid had to be called in to stop bands of tomboys with weapons normally used for a rabbit-shoot. Ten years later, the military were again hard-pressed against bands of tomboys, this time equipped with a mind-boggling år senal.
aLS00 tLLL L S LLLL S LHHLLLLLLLLHHCSS We hawe come to a point where: people take pride in displays of new military strength and hardware (it makes them feel more secure). But they are also stunTed and b3wildared wher tha bombs go off. The government
(Cor) tinued on page 24)
3 |

Page 24
BITTERLEA മ മർ
s ()GEMIN: s Un matched in qu
NÅ VAVA VA NAN
 
 

D STORES LIMITED
ality food and drink
ܬܸܢܠ ܠܸܕ̇ܓ݁ܶܠ ܠܸܣܛܮܠ ܬܕܓܠ ܐܠܛܘܿܠ ܦܸܐܼܲܵ

Page 25
Part II
A close look at Rupa
Jeanne Pinto
Organisation of the News Room: Operating Practices
A. the Rupawahini newsroom is small, it does not need a top-heavy hierarchy: with an intelligent roster, key jobs can be assigned with fairness, and an easy movement within the unit established, for greater enthusiasm and officiency.
There are, however, two posts in any newsroom, print, radio or television, which aro permanento and must be assigned with carethe News Editor Director and Copy Editor/Chief Sub-Editor. TW, in particular, tends to go outside the organisation to fill these posts: and it cannot be reiterated often enough, that this is totally Wrong and witiating practice.
Here, first, is the definition of the role and requirements, based on international, uniwersal Standards, of the qualifications and role of the: News Director Editor
He must, above all, be a general reporter, with a solid background of news; he must have come up from the news."
He must work incredible hours, cover a variety of functions, have organisational ability, a wide network of contacts:-
Administrative functions
He must be responsible for: equipment; working rost crs; correspondence - especially letters to the editor; complaints, corrections - especially those likely to lead to libel actions; representing the newsroom (internally) - speak for his staff to administration, advertising, transport etc.: budgetary control. He must know what to delegate and when.
Management of personnel
Success in the newsroom depends on what can be got out of the staff: whether they are
properly motivated - and protected. Therefore, a Nows Editor) Editor must have a knowledge of the particular competence of Tembefs of his staff, station officials
and key Ministr. complete a knc market to conve staff. He rust together a varie with different p. ents, quirks; con "'acceptable way.' use staff strength - encourage rep. stories, seek out : sation; stand b management; be punishments for ci ponsibility - he ultimate deterre
(As this is a especially where concerned, the gui flexible and fair, verbal warning, th The wer" i film: Sus, Standard governi unusually harsh an cessary in an in presumes to be only incidentall: owned controlled)
The Ne WS Egito hawe the respec
And his import newsroom, with sources has been by every visi tir point about one ment, in 3 m i fi St by governmental the indiwidu all St ers, infecting til him intolerably: renow cd, it is
lation. Man whi done by his ince too long a time to
Copy Editor/Chi. Scriptwriter
This is anothic the TW newsroor it can do with of - Every news
sub-editing d qualified chi which every - Radio has a
editors to cw. share respon scripting of C
ΕΠ .

vahini
el: asחוper$or ץ 2wledge of the y to and convince b3 a. ble to hold y cof in diwiduals, er5ormalities, talWith C.C. Staff of am
of doing things;
not Waaknesses * riters to gamera te L reas of speciali2t Wilson & Eäff and
discret with 1Te 2:55, mass, i tresshould bin the
& fisitive arca,
young staff are delines should be - with, first a C2T a Witten : Persion perhaps, ment rules are d generally un nestitution which Cr2a, Clwe ard i 5
Y government
r/Director must
t of hi5 5 taff.
:ara liri a s Tall limited stıff Teunder rigd aften
g cxpart - the
Wrong appointtu tion influgmoted ractices, is that iys on and festè arga ar Ltd when he is finally it utter humie, the da mage m. pe:terce tak as
repair itself.
af Sub-Editor
key post that tendis to think
apor ha 5 a fu || sk, headed by a :f-sub, through
copy passes, inimum Of thres ry language who sibility for the very news bulle
- Television leaves the writing of copy to reporters with grossy un ev en skills in their particular language: and here's where selection on O-Level performance shows up InadeզաatԸ. The only way to ensure homogenei ty cof script i r a new s buI |- ictin is to assign one copy editor co each la ringuage, who must hawa: a sound knowledge of the language; a solid background in news; a special "feel' for writing for television - or specific training in this art.
(To be continuad)
A decision . . .
(Continued from page || 5)
has devalued the exercise before it has started. To add to the complications, the Sri Lankan Gowri Tent has announced, aim|essly, its Inten Lion to implement the proposals. ''unilatera ||y'. The situation on the ground is extremely mixed up reflecting the di sastros in terchange of military and political solutions - which, at best can prolong the bloody Stalenate at a certain low-grade, no-win level and, at worst, will Plunge tha island nation into å fot het Eo|cod bath that is Crtain to bring about the end of civil Society and any prospect of Sri Lanka surviving as a united entity. The TULF's decision, read along with the reasons adduced for it, appears to represent an insufficiently thought out and tactically weak response to the challenge ahead, Pressure Illust be excrted on all sides, and especially by India, on Colombo to halt and dismantle Track Two. But keeping an open and realistic mind on the substantive issues, going after half-chances and any opportunity to talk seriously about the basis of a political solution that might be acceptable to the Tamils (whatever suspicion orie antra ir 5 about the Totiwations on the other side) and maintaining a democratic political organisation's independence of line and tactics wis-a-vis militants who might hawe other ideas are equally important.
- - HINC
23

Page 26
don't . . .
(Continued from page 2)
says it is winning the war. And yet, factory workers, office workers and people who board public transport to get home after a hard day's work do not know whether di Cath or dics pair is furking for them in surroundings they take for granted.
It Is democracies, Tot hardline regimes, that hay gi wcn birth to anti-war Towerments. Such a row ment does not cosarily reflect defeatism. It's a sign of emotional naturity as
well as human decency. There is
3 belief, in 5-Té circ-l-s, thar anti -war movements are leftOrientge ånd airn to underning
the base of democracy. But isn't i Lt 31 fact thă: no tro ed Eble arti— war movement has emerged from or rath er survi ved in any ComTunist state? Ja på FN's strong IntiWwar 53Titi Terit become di Tiinant only after that country became democratic,
In today's uncertain geo-political climate, every state has the right,
and should have the capability, EO defarc Its Elf. That 15 1. To blow the military role out of Pro Portion is to create a Snowball - which is is what hap
per ed in the Philippines, Whose military strength grew ten sold in the Marcos era; advisers demanded more and more to put down the local in Surrections. But the Insurgents are still there, in ever larger numbers.
Whether the groans of the amputated are in Sinhala or Tamil, the message is the same. People do not want to live in constant fear. They do not want to feel strangers in their own country. | cnce walked into a poor man's house, får away, which had bcem Sct. ablaze in rcpris al to an attack elsewhere by some people
who did not leave their calling card.5 behind, The wa||5 w crc: blackened, the roof was gone.
Inside were the charred remnants of all that the family had possessed; a bicycle, a sewing machinc, a framed photograph, a pair of size four tennis shoes. I don't want this war to go on.
교
the military
How the Bat
(Continued
destroy and re been mostly w of it were still 500 people were them were bel past two week ments had bee was thought tha responsible.
Mr Siwa palan sons in the wi bludgeoned to mobs in å hos|| the corrurial Colobo. A through the he the gate of his weli a year ag on Tami || willag
In reas Ponsc: { Other III i'r "5 || rillas ble W LIP Each Hotc., a hoc for the so willage and init European touris drink out of th
"There's going spilt," said o TIL A "Y" yw'' a series of ninas
Letter
ARG
(Reply ti phoney
If you wish : Or7 g l a rtiftw / rLu Са// yoшгsa/f And give you Your pseudor
FC Cree
The title may ir 7 d'St Hir

:le for . . .
(3| טl pggזgr זf ''
!-locate project had ound down aspects
continuing. About 2 m i 5 sing. Many of i eyed dead. In thig is two Tani settlebut down. It t homeguards were
has lost his two C!grico, Cong W35 death by Sinhalese pital foyer during its f 83 ather was shot. art by a soldier at farmhouse in Nila) during the raids C5.
to that and Savon hat day, the guerthe Moonlinght favourite watering Eurity forces in the ially designed for t5, Elephants now ne swimming Pool.
to be more blood me residen. ""|5 we got here. It's Sacros.'
GUARDIAN (U.K.)
South Africa . . .
(Continued from page 20)
Before the resolution was put to Wola, India's permancInt representative to the U. N. Mr. M. Krishman 5aid "'r" weet Ha5, the chasm beat We en profa 5 Sed values and practised politics been greater or mora Li dicrous. Neyer hawo bolicf. universaily che rished and respected been 5 o casi y flou ICd by a Small Cotcrie of in Ironchad into rasts. Nower has I ha s tera o type så tire of the U.N. as a forum immensely capable of
speech but flaccid ånd shy of tLLLaLH LLLLLLaL LLLLL S aLLmL S SSS S LLLLLL chrofile cof it 5 fire in South
Africa.
"And let LS nat forget, never has thc chance to red cer our promise been greater than it is now, if we conly can su Tarmon the courage and united purpose we
ind.''
Soviet Union, China, Australia, Danmark, Venezuela, Thailand and Bulgaria all voted for the resolution besides the sponsors.
- M. de S.
UE WITHOUT LOS NG
D. W. P. W. and dedicated to the unlamented, Dr. Costa in de Vos and his other avatars)
fo arge ar 7d 7e Wer be a Mooser Se VOLI m List employ for no offar, Will do Sir by any name except your very own
rself a tita you cannot claim to own 7y 77s wil / fasade your r7an 77 e, class,
I år 77 Sir7S
Well give some point to views best deposited
S.
Carlo Fonseka University of Colombo,

Page 27
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Page 28
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guardians during your lifetime
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