

*Special to the  
Guardian*

# The Prospects for Peace

— *Pran Chopra*

**LANKA**

# **GUARDIAN**

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— *Mervyn de Silva*

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## VIOLENCE AND NO SECURITY

*P.T.A., Emergency regulations, Armed Reserves, Home Guards, STF, Foreign instructors, and a Ministry of National Security... but there is no security. Few persons of responsibility, whether government or outside it, appear to be fully alive to the astonishing spread of violence throughout the island in the very recent past. Not the military conflict or the terrorism or the private killing but altogether new types of violence, by small organised bands, most of them equipped with modern weapons.*

*Armed groups, not of any known political persuasion, seem to be quite active outside the north and east, the main theatres of war. The first signs of this phenomenon came with the disbanded Raja Rata Rifles. But then there was talk of other small numbers booted out of the forces for indiscipline. Next came news of deserters, who had taken to highway robbery. The private militias and the gangs are also part of a dangerously new scene.*

## SOCIAL COST

*Thanks to the Finance Minister (See 'IMF loan') the country has been rudely awakened to economic costs of war and the price the "liberalised economy" may have to pay (and therefore every consumer) if the peace effort collapses. What of the social costs of militarisation? While we are seeking to protect the nation and the religion, the dhammadeepa is being so rapidly transformed to a new kind of society where violence, like the Philippines in the 60's and 70's, becomes a way of life. And what of the moral costs? The incidence of violence involving young people, often from "respectable" families is not only shocking but menacing.*

## LAW ENFORCEMENT

*The increasingly urgent and slightly desperate appeals by the IGP for discipline is yet another*

*sign of the dry rot in old structures. Lawlessness, crime and corruption have spread into the agencies of law enforcement. The headline "Probe on Fraud at Police School" is symptomatic. These observations in an unusually hard-hitting SUN editorial represent a timely warning about a dangerous trend:*

*"Three recent shooting scandals involving indiscipline and criminally irresponsible policemen have spread fear and a reign of terror over innocent people who have to travel at night.*

*As the Morawewa Magistrate said after an inquiry on the double-killing at Mawarala, the Police have absolutely no right to kill. They have been given weapons, they have been given authority but they have not been given any right to use these irresponsibly or indiscriminately, the Magistrate ruled.*

*At Pepiliyana last Friday, an allegedly drunken policeman opened fire at a state van carrying Telecommunication Department engineers, after another policeman had checked their identities and told them to proceed. An innocent driver was killed by a crazy, cock-eyed cop who was supposed to aim at the tyres".*

(Continued on page 2)

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TRENDS  
+  
LETTERS

## Provincial Borders

In TRENDS column about 'Border Problems' there was a reference which was very interesting. It was "Prof. For Five Provinces". But no item was to be found on that subject. Could you please tell us who this Professor was and what five provinces?

Dr. W. P. N. Alahakone

Kandy

**Note by Ed.** Our mistake. The item which should have appeared in Sept. 15 issue is published in this number and is self-explanatory.

## Privatisation and Privilege

Much as been said and written about the recent confrontation between students of the State Medical Faculty and students of the North Colombo Medical College at the Neuro Surgical Unit of the General Hospital, Colombo. So far, however, the main issue at stake has conveniently been side-stopped.

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The issue here is whether students of a purely private institution should be allowed to enjoy the facilities of a State hospital at the expense of the Faculty students. The GMOA has already tasted the experience of what has gone on and is happening at present in the Ragama Hospital, due to the encroachment of this private entity into the hospital and exploiting its facilities. No wonder then the fears expressed by students of the Colombo Medical Faculty that what happened to the CTB and some other State-sponsored Corporations could ultimately happen to them too.

The GMOA is generally not against students of any particular type, but what it opposes is the fact that the said private Medical college is mainly State-sponsored in all spheres, except the recruitment of students, which is limited to criteria other than knowledge and qualifications, and also the fact that part of its staff are supposed

to be paid exorbitant salaries when compared to personnel employed by the State and Universities.

We have already protested to the Ministry of Women's Affairs and Teaching Hospitals on this issue where at present hospital minor employees have been deployed to guard these privileged students creating in fact a unique situation unheard of before. We have also requested the Ministry to refrain from compelling our members at the Neuro Surgical Unit to teach these students, which it has no right to do.

**Dr. W. M. S. Ratnapriya,**  
General Secretary, GMOA

### TRENDS . . .

*(Continued from page 1)*

*At Batapola, an innocent pedestrian was seriously injured*

*when police fired, perhaps blindly, at a suspect escaping from custody.*

*All three incidents occurred in areas which are relatively peaceful and where the gun should be, if at all, the last resort."*

*The corrosive effects of the post-1977 "institutionalisation of political violence" (the phrase is Princeton Professor Gananath Obeyesekere's) and militarisation of Sri Lankan society were tragically evident in the Trinco camp incident in August when a soldier killed two officers and another and then, reportedly, shot himself. On Sept. 24, a private in a Colombo camp was said to have killed a colleague and then shot himself. Is this not the enemy's (whatever identity we give him) real revenge on a once fairly stable and peaceful southern society?*

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# The Guns of September and... on to Round 3

NEWS  
BACKGROUND

Mervyn de Silva

In August 'peace' was the dominant tendency. The opposite was true of September. Between mid-August and end-August, when the TULF leaders returned to Madras after Round Two of the negotiations, the 'peace process' advanced steadily but between mid-September and the month's last days, it is struggling hard and is almost out of breath, trying to keep pace with the opposite process. The counter-current, decidedly stronger, has been re-inforced by two events: first: by the expansion of the anti-P.C.'s oppositional front, its increasing unity and its greater readiness for mass mobilisation, with actual capabilities however still to be tested; second, the intensification of the armed conflict and its sharp concentration on the strategic Trinco-Batticaloa region.

The first concerns the domestic political front, the domestic constituency or public opinion which is all important to the UNP government as it is for any regime. And Sinhala-Buddhist sentiment is the paramount factor. Especially in a democracy, no regime, unless it is seized by a death-wish, advances too far a field from its main support-base, its rank-and-file, its army without uniforms.

Ever since the SLFP became the alternative to the UNP, the Sinhala vote has been more or less equally divided between these two traditional rivals, with the UNP's irreducible minimum distinctly higher than the SLFP's. The SLFP has a potential well-over — 40 percent reach, with a 30% bottom line.

But the UNP starts with a hard-core 35% and, at the best of times, exceeds 50%. These are by no means exact figures but a general observation based

on electoral performance over a quarter century. Since the Tamil votes of the north went overwhelmingly against the UNP on the most recent occasions, Oct. 1982 (presidential polls) and Dec. 1982 (referendum), accurate readings of Sinhala electoral opinion right now are made more difficult. However there is little doubt that there has been an anti-UNP shift, for reasons other than the UNP's provincial councils plan — economic pressures, the 9 year fatigue factor, the smell of corruption, the arrogance of power, the desire for change by a notoriously self-assertive, ballot-power conscious constituency. From the day that the UNP pulled that gigantic con-trick called the Referendum on an intelligent, highly politicised electorate, the UNP's credibility has been on a slippery slope.

## CREDIBILITY CRISIS

With the Tamil youth, with the TULF and with even the Tamil middle class in the South, the loss of credibility is almost total. Among the Sinhalese, there has been a steady erosion of credibility within groups which could be identified as usually UNP-inclined and 'neutral' segments of society. The credibility crisis of a regime that has overstayed its welcome may not be a major factor in the ethnic conflict and national crisis but it is a very important consideration in the national effort to seek solutions to both.

For different reasons, diverse groups have joined the growing anti-UNP fold. These groups have quickly grasped the fact that the UNP's devolution scheme is a ready-made, highly welcome target of opportunity. It is the first big stick that has come within their reach to beat the once all-powerful,

and what's more, much feared UNP. They can smell the UNP blood in the water.

So it is just possible that far more people are anti-UNP than anti-Devolution but only scientific opinion surveys can offer final proof of what is a strong hunch or empirical exercises.

What we have seen in September is the in-gathering of these forces, with the conspicuous exception of the SLMP-LSSP-CP, as far as organised opinion goes, and of un-organised "progressive" and "liberal" sections of Sinhala society. Of course, the militant Sinhala-Buddhist is quite easily the dominant force, the emotional rallying point, the ideological hard centre. Thus, Kandy was selected as the symbolic scene; Kandy, the home of Malwatte and Asgiriya, sentinel of

## HOWARD ON STRATEGY

Our growing tribe of arm-chair strategists, both the military solution and political-settlement pundits, should mark well the comments of Prof. Michael Howard, eminent military historian, in his essay on 'The Forgotten dimensions of Strategy'. Based largely on Clausewitz' famous 'trinity' (political objective, operational instruments and social forces) Howard criticised those western strategists who ignored the interdependence of all elements and gave too much weight to the technological, to military superiority founded on weaponry. The societal dimension, he said, was dangerously neglected. "The attitude of the people upon whose commitment and readiness for self-denial we depend" was vital.

the Sacred Tooth, the seat of the last kingdom.

There the curtain was finally raised on a movement that had come into being in the past several months — the **Movement for the Defence of the Nation** (MDN). The MDN's co-leaders are the Venerable Palipane Chandananda Mahanayake of Asgiriya, the most formidable ecclesiastical opponent of President JR, and Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, a devout Buddhist and the only Kandyan to become Prime Minister of this country. The MDN embraces, the Maha Sangha, monks from as many temples as possible from the 17,000 in Sri Lanka, and thirty two lay Buddhist organisations. Prominent political and public figures are supporters but established political parties are not constituent members in any formal sense. The SLFP remains the main political force within the MDN.

Not as important as the S.L.F.P's 'main force' role but equally interesting is the colourful assortment of personalities now identified with the M.D.N. Some of them were present at the Kandy

rally, with a privileged place on the platform.

#### SPIRIT OF '56

These included long forgotten faces, and wellknown faces that had quietly withdrawn from the political scene; familiar faces but now in surprising company and a few faces from the island's fringe-politics today on centre-stage. Recognised as committed supporters or active sympathisers are the Mathews, Rajaratnas, Prins Goonesekeras, Iriyagolles and Neville Fernandos — all politically interesting since they represent a new coalition forged on the anvil of a single highly charged issue (the ethnic) and a convergence of disparate political forces and previously antagonistic groups and individuals. Over and above this is what one might call for want of a stricter term **"the Spirit of 1956"**.

There is Mr. K. M. P. Rajaratne, the "Bhasa" champion of an era when Sinhala Only was the most resonant rallying cry. He ended up however in the UNP-dominated contraption styled 'the Hath Havula' by the SLFP and the Left, and later retired quietly

from all politics to take up a full-time career as a lawyer. Then there is Mr. Prins Goonesekera, an ideological heir to the Phillipist dualism. Mr. Philip Gunawardene's fire-brand socialism of the first phase was overshadowed by his other Sinhala-Buddhist personality in the second post-1956 phase of B. J. B. Mettananda — N. Q. Dias politics. The direct descendant of course is his younger son, Mr. Dinesh Gunawardene, MP and MEP leader, whose consistency and personal integrity, are better admired outside his own circle of supporters than the M.E.P's ideological melange.

Both interesting and important was Mr. Cyril Mathew, who moved on to the platform at Kandy. Political analysts with a pronounced electoral approach (the Janice Jiggins school) focus mostly on his position as the unacknowledged leader of a caste that is counted as the second largest in national electorate. But the Tamil community and Tamil politicians know him better as the author of "Kauda Kotiya?" (Who is the Tiger?) just as all anti-UNP forces, the political parties, trade unions and other opinion-making groups, from the S.L.F.P. to the Left and 'liberal' ideologically, identify him as the deposed Sturmfuhrer of the J.S.S. He could be a considerable asset to the M.D.N. The proscribed J.V.P. was unrepresented but in Mr. Prins Goonesekera, the M.D.N. has a strongly sympathetic figure.

#### TWO QUESTIONS

Two basic questions arise. (a) Is the political situation and the mass mood such that "1956" can be repeated 30 years later? (b) Can the monks mobilise anti-government opinion in a manner that would make popular protest and agitation a serious problem for the UNP, render the South less governable and thus force the UNP to withdraw its P.C.'s plan?

To some observers, the UNP's response was a panic-button over-reaction. A top-ranking UNP'er said defensively: "Why should we take any chances?" Anyway, President JR is obviously ready to

### JR picks up M.D.N. gauntlet

At the Kandy rally, the Venerable Palipane Chandananda Mahanayake Thera issued a virtual ultimatum. According to an ISLAND report, the Asgiriya Mahanayake Thera reminded the government that it had persisted in ignoring all the memoranda submitted by the Maha Sangha on the proposed Devolution scheme. Unless the government withdraws its present P.C.'s plan, the M.D.N. will have to consider 'drastic but democratic' courses of action.

Appealing to 'patriotic elements' in the UNP, Mrs. Bandaranaike told those UNP'ers who do not vote for the P.C.'s Bill that they need not fear victimisation or harassment from a future government.

At the very next Cabinet meeting, the government decided to enforce an emergency regulation introduced during the 1971 insurrection. Anybody who is found guilty of trying to prevent by force or unlawful means the President, ministers and MP's from performing their lawful duties will face the death penalty or rigorous imprisonment up to 20 years or forfeiture of property.

The government will also appoint a Presidential Commission to investigate 'intelligence reports' about political agitators trying to incite violence. If found guilty, they can lose their civic rights. Mrs. Bandaranaike lost her civic rights for 6 years for "abuses of power". They were restored on January 1st 1986.

eye-ball the M.D.N. (See J.R. picks up gauntlet").

The less excited among the U.N.P.'s higher echelons take comfort from readings of the situation such as the following offered by a pro-UNP Central Province lawyer:

**There are up country-low country divisions and this is a more a Kandyan resurgence provoked mainly by what is seen as the Thondaman Threat, and the Maleya Nadu challenge. Caste-based nikaya differences and dependence of many a temple on state patronage should be borne in mind too. Buddhism is non-violent, pacifist; it does not have the violence-prone militancy of Islam or crusading Christianity."** (Newton Gunasinghe's brief study of the Sangha in this issue merits careful reading)

But President JR, taking no chances, has picked up the gauntlet boldly.

While the coming months will provide some answers to these questions, how should the M.D.N. development be situated in the larger national-political situation and in relation to the 'peace process' and the armed conflict?

The rise of the M.D.N., signifying the maximum mobilisation of anti-UNP, anti-Devolution forces, makes it extremely difficult for the government to yield more ground to the Tamils in the Third round of the negotiations. Colombo has sent the final document on the subjects to be devolved and the subjects to be retained in the "Concurrent List" to Delhi and the TULF.

### ARMED CONFLICT

With Indian help, can the government close the gap between its present position (no 'merger' or 'linkage' but promise of a boundaries commission in 18 months) and that of the TULF, let alone the gap between the TULF and the militants? That in-between ground can be broadly described as North-East linkage; merger, linguistic unit, structural linkage or functional linkage or whatever term is used.

It is this ground that has become the new 'front', the main theatre of war in the past weeks.

While the negotiators are trying to cover the gap between the two main positions, this same ground is being fought for physically, so that the situation on the ground can strengthen the Tamil negotiator's hand. What one physically controls or is not controlled by either combatant is then open to negotiation.

The obvious military objectives are not so important as the overall strategic aim, which is as inherently and profoundly political as military. According to the HINDU, the E.N.L.F. will not start the talks from fundamentals as they did at Thimpu, — Mr. Satyendra's "Four Principles" which includes recognition of the right of self-determination and 'the traditional homelands' concept. But no negotiator needs to raise theoretical or conceptual issues if the situation on the ground, the actual line of control or 'no man's land', places those fundamentals on the negotiating table as stark realities that have to be faced.

Thus Trinco where the military objective is both to crowd in the security forces in the port area and part of the city as well as to alter the ethnic balance, or in Tamil terms, to redress the imbalance effected by State land and settlement policies. The battle over the Morawewa 'corridor' is also dual-purpose — the north-east passage and physical pressure on Sinhala settlements in the adjacent areas to force Sinhala migration southwards. The primary target in Batticaloa was the airstrip, for obvious reasons, and the bridges-cum-culverts to make troop movements difficult, especially when most roads are land mined. As in the north, camps too are targets, with concerted efforts to prevent the opening of new camps. (The STF itself of course is very special target). New weaponry and new methods were also in evidence, the car bomb in Batticaloa, for example. The basic political-military objective of course is the de-stabilisation of Batticaloa which compelled the STF to increasingly involve the people in its confrontation with rebels.

(Continued on page 8)

### FINAL DRAFTS

The government has sent the India and the TULF its final documents on devolution. Besides a new 3 page, 25 para document on 'Education' the government has submitted its proposals on what subjects should be placed on a "Concurrent List" and what devolved to the Provincial Councils. Earlier, the Government and TULF agreed on the powers that should be reserved for the Centre. (The exercise follows the Indian constitutional pattern).

Just before their departure from Colombo after 'Round Two' the TULF submitted a seven page draft on subjects that should be devolved to the P.C.'s.

What the government has now done is to accept the subjects on Pages 1, 2, 3 and 4 with some minor modifications

and placed the subject headings on Pages 5, 6 and 7 of the TULF draft on the 'Concurrent List', that is subjects shared by Centre and Province. By adopting the Indian model on the general demarcation of subjects, Colombo has strengthened its tactical position vis-a-vis the Indian mediator. The key areas are Industry, Education and Health where power at the policy level will NOT be devolved to the P.C. The TULF would in fact prefer two lists, Centre and Provincial. Earlier the government had submitted its lists on drafts on inter-provincial coordination, law and order, land, and the preliminary constitutional amendments required together with a note on a Boundary Commission to review, and recommend changes in the present provincial boundaries.



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# Economic storm clouds gather

Like most Third World countries, Sri Lanka is being forced into debt, and therefore to the doors of the IMF, begging bowl in hand. A big drop in commodity prices and a steady decline in the earnings of Sri Lanka migrants form only part of the explanation, although that does qualify Sri Lanka for a special drawing from the Compensatory Finance Fund. But that's hardly enough. We need a SAF, a structural adjustment facility because Sri Lanka faces both a widening budget deficit as well as a yawning balance of payments gap. Soaring military spending and the drop in tourist income and investment after July 1983 account for the parlous condition in which the Finance Minister must conduct his crisis-management exercise. He wants 6.5 billion rupees. To do this however he must be prepared to undertake those "adjustments" that the IMF and World Bank ordain. And 'adjustment' is a euphemism for economic decisions which are bound to bring hardships to a wider segment of our society than those surviving on Food stamps — a large 40% stratum in any case.

So he has produced a three-year 'policy package' which he hopes will convince the IMF-IBRD of Sri Lanka's readiness to "adjust". What of the government, a regime embattled politically and militarily? Can he persuade his Cabinet colleagues that it is better to start taking the bitter pill now rather than closer to the 1989 polls? Can reason win?

For 9 years now, the UNP and the upper class lived in a style proper to the new rich. Can they adjust to austerity? Will the UNP eat humble pie and swallow the bitter pill?

Already, the Minister has disclosed some of the items in his package:

(1) Government Revenue to be maintained at a minimum of 20% of GDP throughout, resulting in —

Year	Revenue (in Rs. Mn)
1986 (Revised Budget estimate)	35,892
1987	41,064
1988	46,593
1989	52,394

(2) Government expenditure to be no more than as follows:—

Year	Govt. Expenditure	Amounts in Rs. Million
1986	32.2	57,786
1987	31.0	63,650
1988	30.0	69,889
1989	29.0	75,972

(3) The balance of payments to be so managed as to achieve a current account deficit of no more than —

Year	Current Account Deficit as % of GDP
1986	8.5
1987	7.1
1988	6.4
1989	5.3

## POLICIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) The minimum target of 20% of GDP to be kept in mind at time of preparation of each year's Budget, at which time the current year's revenue prospects are to be reviewed.

(i) Recurrent expenditure to be kept at a maximum of 18.5% GDP.

(ii) The rationalisation of public enterprises to be expedited.

(iii) The recommendation of the Committee appointed by the Secretary to the Treasury to review Advance Accounts to be expeditiously implemented by the Treasury.

(iv) The freeze on new staff and filling of vacancies to continue, especially in non-technical, clerical and minor grades. In other grades even filling of vacancies to be subject to Treasury approval.

(v) A Committee to be appointed to work out a scheme of severance benefits to redundant staff.

(vi) All new capital projects to be strictly subject to the priorities already laid down by Government as well as the three stage approval procedure.

(vii) The mere availability of aid should not be a criterion for including a project in the Public Investment Programme.

(viii) No supplementary estimates should be approved by Cabinet except for security purposes and for admission of additional aid.

(ix) Whenever a supplementary estimate is admitted for security purposes, an equivalent amount should be raised by additional revenue measures and/or reduced from votes of other Ministries so that the targets could be adhered to.

(xi) There should be strict adherence to advance account limits set for each year.

(xii) Public Corporations/Companies requiring financial support must not come to the Treasury for funds or guarantees. They must go to the development and commercial banks and to the market on the basis of their own viability.

(3) In order to manage the balance of payments within the current account targets set, an export-oriented and import-curtailing strategy to be implemented:—

(i) The exchange rate policy should be flexible.

(ii) The anti-export bias which still persists in the import tariff must be corrected;

(iv) The IMF Mission's report on the financial system to be examined by the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance and Planning with a view to quick implementation of recommendations.

(4) The 1987 Budget to announce the three-year targets.

## STRATEGIC TRINCO

# The Pulse of a Bitter Conflict

Barbara Crossette

For the people who try to go on living here, this picturesque port is Sri Lanka's most sensitive barometer of war and peace.

To the north, around the Jaffna Peninsula, the land is acknowledged ethnic Tamil territory. The city of Jaffna lives in armed equilibrium, with the rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam controlling the streets and the Sri Lankan Army, mostly ethnic Sinhalese, safe behind fortifications.

In the south, few people have to face the reality of civil war.

But Trincomalee remains the focus of a bitter contest between the minority Tamil Hindus and the majority Sinhalese Buddhists. When talks to end the country's ethnic strife progress, tensions drop perceptibly, according to residents of the town and surrounding district, also named Trincomalee. When talks falter, fears rise and violence returns.

Over the last few years of accelerating warfare between Tamil separatists and the security forces, thousands of refugees have fled in and out of Trincomalee, leaving the town crammed with dislocated villagers but empty of professional services.

When a team from the French voluntary organization Doctors Without Borders arrived here in August to offer help, they discovered that the town had no functioning surgical hospital and scant medical supplies. No Sri Lankan medical people want to work here, they were told.

The Tamils and the Sinhalese both say that the port, with one of the world's best natural harbors and an extraordinarily beautiful geographical setting that could make it a major tourist attraction, is what the Sri Lankan guerrilla war is all about.

Without Trincomalee, Tamil militants say, neither an autonomous homeland nor the independent state they are seeking would work economically.

With Trincomalee, Sinhalese nationalists say, the Tamils could pose a serious security threat. The harbor and port installations that might be developed could be offered to an unfriendly foreign power or serve as a supply conduit for an endless civil war.

If the ethnic strife is to be settled peacefully, moderates on both sides suggest, Trincomalee may have to be declared a special territory.

On the streets of this low-rise stucco town strung out along miles of clear white sand and waters in all shades of blue, the effects of the struggle for Trincomalee's future have been brutal. Residents say that if the politicians from Colombo, the capital, were forced to visit here, the dispute might be resolved faster.

Neighborhoods once shared by Tamil, Sinhalese and Moslem families are pockmarked with sacked and burned shells of houses and shops. Most of the destruction has been borne by Tamil families, whose sons and fathers have been detained by the hundreds, residents say. Local monitoring groups report 217 people missing since January of this year. As many as 80 percent of them are feared dead.

Although Tamil guerrillas have recently begun raiding uncooperative villages, relief workers say, many victims insist their attackers were members of the Home Guard, a locally recruited paramilitary force.

The Home Guards patrol the streets, spreading terror, one resident said. He said that electricity was often purposefully cut off to cause alarm and inconvenience and that guards pounded on doors at night to keep families in a state of tension.

Recent reports that 100 prisoners were about to be released from a camp near the country's south coast brought hopeful women to the offices of the Trincomalee Citizens' Committee.

There, where local volunteers try to keep track of broken families, the women thought they might learn if a son or father was among those to be freed.

But the government had not issued a list. The failure of the authorities to provide information is a major source of anguish, relief workers say.

Trincomalee, a British base in World War II, has Christian districts drawn from both Sinhala and Tamil peoples. Priests have been active in organizing what relief services are available to refugees in the town.

At the Eastern Human and Economic Development office of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Trincomalee-Batticaloa, a relief worker said nearly every house in town was being shared by two or three families. Hundreds of other people are crowded into makeshift camps.

Near the development office, an empty school building, hot and putrid with the smell of overtaxed latrines, is home to several hundred women, children and elderly people who sleep on concrete floors.

If and when the war ends, relief workers say, many of these people will have no homes to return to, and perhaps no income-earner. The rehabilitation of Trincomalee and countless rural villages around it will be a huge and costly task.

— *New York Times*

## The Guns . . .

(Continued from page 5)

In as much as these developments drive the government towards Round 3, they serve Delhi's basic diplomatic aims. At this point, Delhi's interests and the interests of the militants are not necessarily contradictory.

They run on parallel lines. But they could diverge if the militants are tempted in the same way the government was earlier this year—to go for the military option. It is however unlikely that the rebels have the military capability to mount their own "Operation Short-Shrift."

# The symbolic role of the Sangha

Newton Gunasingha

ONE of the complex areas of political analysis is to evaluate and account for the behaviour of apparently non-class forces and social groups which exhibit a degree of ideological coherence and intervene in the political domain where class conflict, even if at times dormant, is never absent. The Buddhist Sangha in Sri Lanka is such an apparently non-class social force which has attained a degree of ideological coherence. Why should one use the term, "apparently non-class"? The Sangha presents itself not as the representative of a single class, but as the representative of a single moral community, the moral community of Sinhala Buddhism. The laity of this moral community is ideologically pressured to perceive the monkhood as a homogeneous entity, as a sacred group which has taken the *moksha* oriented path and as the guardians of religious truth. But in reality, the monkhood is heterogeneous, divided into sects, not on the basis of doctrinal differences, but on caste and in addition, differentiated into hierarchical levels within the sects themselves. So one gets an internally differentiated social group, divided both horizontally and vertically, which nevertheless maintains an ideological coherence and is able to act surmounting the fragmentations earlier referred to. Hence, the apparently non-class character of the monkhood.

The overwhelming majority of the Sangha, irrespective of the caste/sect divisions, comes from the plebian lower middle layers in rural society. The only exception to this used to be the incumbents of the historic landed temples in the Kandyan areas who traditionally came from the landholding aristocratic lineages in Kandyan society. Hans-Dieter Evers, for instance, was able to establish avuncular transfer of incumbency for generations, from mother's brother to nephew in the Lankatilaka temple in Udunuwara. But even at this level social composition has significantly changed during the last two

decades, incumbency going to less aristocratic outer layers of the principal lineages, as the young men from such privileged social backgrounds are increasingly inclined to climb the secular ladder of success. The Sangha, by and large, emerges from the middle peasant—small cultivator layers of rural Sinhala society, but very rarely from the ranks of the landless rural workers.

diplomas and degrees. Wherever they are they maintain close links with one's senior teacher-monk as well as their families. A high percentage of young monks leave the order to become laymen, but only after having obtained some educational qualifications. The senior monks are well aware of the hazards involved and ensure by enrolling and training a number of young men, that the

**In militant Sinhala Buddhism, the Sangha play a highly symbolic role. The Sangha is not a group that has abandoned lay society in search of salvation as it was the case in classical Buddhism, but is a most vocal group — the ideologues of Sinhala Buddhism.**

Although in classical Indian Buddhism, the Sangha seems to have taken an intensely salvation-oriented, direction—which is captured in Weber's well-known definition of Buddhism as the salvation ideology of the mendicant monk—it is not so in contemporary Sinhala Buddhism. Except the small communities of the forest-dwelling monks who are not actors in the sociopolitical field of the bulk of the Buddhist monkhood resident at the temples have lost their *moksha* orientation long ago. The average monk has entered the robes not because he wished to be so but because his parents persuaded him to enter the robes even before he was in his teens, the general age cohort from which the novices are drawn happens to be the seven to twelve year group. For children coming from the small propertied plebian backgrounds in rural society who are generally subjected to financial hardship, becoming a novice is social mobility and also an opportunity to study and obtain

high drop-out rate will not necessarily eliminate all possible successors.

In militant Sinhala Buddhism, currently ascendant, the Sangha plays a highly symbolic role. The Sangha is not a group that has abandoned lay society in search of salvation as it was the case in classical Buddhism, but is a most vocal group—the ideologues of Sinhala nationalism whose essence is Sinhala nationalism. The Sangha is regarded as the "guardian of the nation" and myths of how the Sangha stepped forward whenever the Sinhala nation was in danger are daily recounted in the popular media. The self-perception of the Sangha is decisively affected by this mass media manipulation even more than the perception of the people at large.

## Political Role

How effective is the Sangha as a political actor? Will people follow what they preach today, especially in view of the fact that

all kinds of traditional authority structures are in decline and the Sangha surely is one constituent element of this traditional authority? Many a political scientist has highlighted the important role played by the Sangha in the 1956 political transformation. Although the political role of the monks in 1956 cannot be underestimated, one should emphasise that monks in 1956 formed merely one element of a larger social force — the so-called Sangha, veda, guru force (monks, ayurveda physicians and teachers) — which basically represented the rural petty bourgeoisie who were in revolt both against the landlord stratum in rural areas and in general against urban interests. Today, this social force is fragmented and no longer plays the same role it did in 1956. Further (as pointed out earlier), the younger monks today come from social strata less privileged than the rural petty bourgeoisie proper. The influence of the monkhood on rural society, owing to this social isolation, is probably less than what it used to be in 1956. But in mass politics, as manipulated by mass media, their level of visibility if anything is even more than it used to be. So here one comes across not the monk who preaches to his village congregation and patiently converts them to a particular point of view, but monks who act as symbols and appear to the masses on TV or the popular dailies with statements made by the hierarchs or the powerful monks. Thus the wave is not necessarily initiated or created, by the monks. Making use of the collective insecurity felt by the masses, certain vested interest groups manipulate the mass media in such a way as to initiate an upsurge or a molecular motion among the masses with the monkhood endorsed with high visibility riding the wave as if they really are initiators and controllers of the wave, which of course they are not.

With accelerated commercialisation within the previous decade or so, traditional Sinhala society has undergone far-reaching changes not devoid of tensions and strife.

The social status and the power of the monk, who essentially used to be a member of the traditional authority hierarchy, was bound to decline with these changes. Ethnic conflict reverses this flow: "the

nation is in danger", "it is the time for the guardians of the nation to step forward", Ideological discourse brings the monkhood back into an influential position.

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## Professor for five provinces

A reputed professor of political science proposed on Thursday the division of Sri Lanka into five provinces in place of the prevailing nine.

Prof. Shelton Kodikara told an SLAAS seminar on the current problem that the new units of devolution he preferred were: west, south-east, central, north-west and north-east.

He also suggested the areas that should fall into these provincial units. The western province should comprise the present western province and part of north-west and Sabaragamuwa. The south-east to comprise the present southern province and the Amparal district of the present eastern province.

He suggested the present central province to be expanded to include the Uva province and parts of Sabaragamuwa. The north central province to get parts of the north-western province. The north-east to comprise the present northern province and the Trincomalee and Batticaloa districts.

"There is nothing sacrosanct about the present provincial boundaries imposed on us by the colonial powers", Prof. Kodikara said.

He said his proposal was not based on linguistic considerations, though it would satisfy the Tamil demand for a linguistic unit.

His proposal was based mainly on viability, he said. It also helped meet some of the forceful criticisms

against the government's proposals of provincial councils. It would slash administrative expenditure. It would lessen interprovincial rivalry. It would also help resolve the current crisis.

Prof. Kodikara, an expert in Indo-Lanka foreign policy, also proposed that India should underwrite the peace accord and get involved in the implementation of the accord.

"India's co-operation and goodwill has to be a part and parcel of any peace accord, if it is to succeed", he said.

He said underwriting by India was essential to get over the misgivings both in the Sinhala and Tamil mind.

"The Sinhalese feel terrorism will not end even after the accord is signed. They feel that the Tamils may use the accord as a stepping stone to achieve their dream Eelam. The Tamils fear that the agreement may not be implemented. An Indian guarantee is the answer to both", he said.

Mr. Yogendra Duraiswamy who followed, endorsed both proposals. "I endorse both proposals. They will be fair by the Sinhalese and by the Tamils", he said.

He added: "India should endorse a settlement. It would allay the fear of the Sinhalese. It will allay the fear of the Tamils".

(Daily News)

# The Militant Mood

(An interview with  
V. Prabakaran)

N. Ram

**Q:** Let me ask you a frank question. There are several external perceptions of what you stand for. Many people see you as a disciplined capable leader who is able to summon the spirit of sacrifice from his ranks. On the other hand, they call attention to your "ruthlessness". For example, a recent despatch from Colombo published in the *New York Times*: "To the worlds roster of guerilla leaders whose strategic brilliance is matched by their ruthlessness, people here say they have added a new name... Velupillai Prabakaran." The implication is that your actions lack a humanistic or broad democratic content. How would you respond to this criticism?

**A:** To be frank, military discipline is ruthless intrinsically. In any country, military discipline has special attributes. Whether it is a 'communist or democratic' country, the regulations and rules for an army are of a nature apart. Look at any military activity: the objective of victory is valued more than the conse-

quences. Victory matters most in military affairs! On the other hand, we are authentic fighters for the people. Our critics point only to our ruthlessness towards the enemy. But can we afford to be peaceable in our ways in the face of a ruthless enemy? We certainly cannot, that's the truth. But you know we maintain high standards of discipline and morality in our practice.

When you have a school with a good standard of discipline and a principal who believes in this, the students acquire a good education and do well in life. You see this everywhere: there are certain schools which are rated as "good" because the teachers and, most important, the principal stand for discipline. You will find that batches and batches of students who studied under such a principal do well later on. The same principle applies to our activity. That is why we lay such stress on stern discipline. Ruthlessness in our organisation is manifested in the battlefield.

**Q:** Could you give us some examples of this discipline?

**A:** What is this discipline? Consider this in relation to anti-people, anti-social activities. When we keep a person in our organisation, he is by definition one who fights for the people. If he indulges in action inimical to the interests of the people or in anti-social activities and we support it or put up with it, then be sure that this struggle will lose its way and will be pushed in a quite different direction. Instead of standing out as a fighter for the people, he turns into the people's enemy. Consider also this aspect — the status of those under arms in society. Those who bear arms acquire and wield an extreme measure of power. We believe that if this power is abused, it will inevitably lead to dictatorship. That is why we keep our military organisation in such a strict state of discipline. But please note that we exercise our ruthlessness against the ruthless guys. Otherwise, we cannot win.

**Q:** But there have been instances of innocent Sinhala civilians killed by your organisation. The Anuradhapura massacre...

**A:** We have denied responsibility for that and we have condemned that.

## Special edge

**Q:** It has been reported that all your fighters carry cyanide capsules strung round their necks. Is this an exaggeration?

**A:** Yes, we have adopted this measure from the very start. As a consequence, many comrades have sacrificed themselves. You won't find people from our movement in jail — at any rate, not more than you can count on your fingers.... perhaps two or three persons, but even then not

## Fast to death by Tamil prisoners

Forty five terrorist suspects in the Welikada Prison are now on a fast to death campaign demanding the release of the Boossa detainees and better conditions for them.

They have told the Prison authorities that the detainees in Boossa should either be charged in a court law or be released instead of being kept in detention indefinitely. They have also demanded that the detainees be given better food and facilities.

An estimated 300 prisoners are said to be behind this move though only 45 are actually fasting, Prison authorities told *The "Island"*.

These sources added that the fasting prisoners were trying to draw in the rest too to support their campaign.

The fasting prisoners have been given medical treatment in the Prison hospital. An official said that if the fast continued the prisoners would have to be hospitalised.

Meanwhile it is stated that some lawyers in Jaffna are also boycotting courts in sympathy with the fasting prisoners and the Boossa detainees.

— *Island*

those involved in the inner circle of our activity. That is to say our fighters, through laying down their lives, protect our sympathisers and contacts and the people who give us support and assistance. Otherwise, the great mass of the people who support us and their families would be herded into jail. But that is not the only reason for this practice.

It is this cyanide which has helped us develop our movement very rapidly. Carrying cyanide on one's person is a symbolic expression of our commitment, our determination, our courage. For example, Kittu, our Jaffna area commander, has stated in an interview: "as long as we have this cyanide round our neck, we have no need to fear any force on earth!" In reality, this gives our fighters an extra measure of belief in the cause, a special edge; it has instilled in us a determination to sacrifice our lives and our everything for the cause. While attacking, our fighters don't count their lives. They will advance nonchalantly through an artillery attack of a hail of bullets.

**Q:** One final question. Could you give us an idea of your personal heroes in revolutionary struggles or liberation movements or in any sphere of life... people and experiences that have inspired you? And perhaps thereby give us some insight into your own political evolution from the time you were a schoolboy?

**A:** From my boyhood, the struggle that attracted me most was the Indian freedom struggle. The role of Netaji attracted me very much. I was brought up in an environment of strict discipline from childhood. I was not permitted to mingle freely with outsiders. I used to feel shy of girls. Great store was laid by personal rectitude and discipline. My father set an example through his own personal conduct: He would not even chew betel leaves. I modelled my conduct on his... he was a government officer, a

district land officer. A very straightforward man. People say in our area: "When he walks, he does not hurt even the grass under his feet, but his son is so..." Even while criticising me, they marvel at the fact that such a son was born to such a father! He was strict, yes, but also soft and persuasive. In my own case, he reasoned rather than regimented and his attitude was that of a friend... he would give me certain pieces of advice and discuss things with me. As I said, I grew up as a shy boy... especially in the matter of mingling with girls.

The life of Subhas Chandra Bose attracted me specially. Even as a boy. I would delve into Gandhiji's books on experiments with truth, on celibacy and so on. Subhas attracted me particularly since even as a boy he went in search of spiritualism and, finding the life of a recluse dissatisfying, returned (laughs). Yet repeatedly he retreated into spiritualism during moment of great difficulty and crisis. I followed this history and these stories with fascination. He became my special hero and some of his orations gripped me. For example: "I shall fight for the freedom of my land until I shed my last drop of blood." These words used to thrill me whenever they came to me. Then the story of Bhagat Singh fascinated me.

In other words, the biographies and histories of those who hit back at the perpetrators of injustice, those who counter attacked (the unjust foe) were my special favourite. Because in our land, the Sinhalese behaved so cruelly towards us we would hear stories about this and read about these cruel acts in books and newspapers.

Ours was a god-fearing society and the people were religious-minded. The widespread feeling was: when a priest like him was burnt alive, why did we not have the capability to hit back? That was one atrocity that made people think deeply.

In such moments, these heroic examples and models from the Indian freedom struggle came to

me. Magazines retold these stories on special occasions such as India's Independence Day celebrations... this practice continues. Consider another example. Tiruppur Kumaran—in his ahimsa there was a steely determination. If I was attracted by the experience of armed struggle against injustice, I was drawn by the moral force of ahimsa as well. I was inspired by examples of grit and determination. I began to think along these lines early in life...why can't we follow their example? why can't we start an armed struggle?

I used to read books on the rise of Napoleon and his exploits... this kind of history held special appeal in the Mahabharata, the roles of Bhima and Karna were specially attractive to me the spirit of sacrifice appeared crucial. People respond to characters in the Mahabharata in various ways. I value the character and role of Karna the most, on account of his readiness to make the ultimate sacrifice. I read some of Vivekananda's sayings and the urge grew in me to work towards a strong youth force. I plunged into this line of thinking. At what age? These feelings and ideas began to take shape when I was 16 approximately. I used to listen to the religious discourses of Kripananda Variar... I used to go to all these events... those connected with religion... I would go and observe political meetings... attend dramatic performances in my place, they used to enact plays on Socrates and so on.

So quite early on, we absorbed all these influences and the feeling grew in us that we must do something! Looking at our historical background, we had to take up arms to fight for our rights. The lesson was that they could do all this because we were defenceless and disarmed. Why should we remain so? We should take up violence to counter and overthrow their violence. Only after that did I engage in this movement.

**Q:** The impression among outsiders who have observed the development of the LTTE is that you — as its leader — have only recen-

tly begun to take a deeper or more detailed interest in politics... whereas earlier you used to live mainly in the realm of military ideas. (You were considered shy and did not meet people easily, which would make it difficult in politics.) Now they find you speaking out on a number of political issues. . .

**A:** In reality, it has always been clear to me that an armed struggle takes shape only against a political background. If I had been a man without political clarity... I went underground around 1973 and you know that leading an underground life is a very difficult proposition. I have led an underground life for a long time... between 1973 and 1983, it was a very difficult period for us, with the army on the rampage... to escape their net was very difficult. If we were able to go through this experience and are able to stand firm today, then surely you will concede that we could not have been political innocents or carried on without a political background!

But one thing is true, despite this political background. My natural inclination makes me lay less emphasis on words. In serious politics, it won't do to concentrate on talking; you must grow through action and then talk! You would have observed that only as we grew in our activities in the field did we come up to a position of meeting various people and explaining our ideas — only then did our words carry some value. Words must be matched and indeed preceded by content. This is crucial for our relations with our people. If people respect our fighters more, it is because of this extra discipline. Certain exemplary personal attributes, a certain personal rectitude — that is why our people are attracted to LTTE fighters. When you speak of a political outlook, people will respect you only if you prove yourself in action. Action gives your programme a political content. When we say during this period, "they will use the army to attack us, we will resist and counterattack

and we will protect you", well... only when we actually do it do we establish our political credibility and role.

That is why we have given due attention to military affairs in our organisation. You know the character of our struggle. In a situation where the Sri Lankan state feeds its army on racism and chauvinism and, through that army and through forced colonisation, tries to displace and subjugate us, only a political organisation with military strength is capable of effective resistance. Look all around the world... any real struggle has had a military

background. Even if the Indian freedom struggle was conducted on the basis of ahimsa. Netaji's Indian National Army had a special place... there is definitely a place today in Indian history for Subhas! His was an action-oriented political approach.

And take the Indian state today. If India is able to stand up in the comity of nations, it is in no small measure due to the strength of the Indian armed forces. Else, the Chinese would bring their frontiers up to Delhi!

**THE HINDU:** Thank you, Mr. Prabakaran.

## PILGRIMAGE IN WARTIME

*This peace is guilty, so the smoke  
Rising lazy from the felled scrub  
Silvered, sighing, in the drought  
And dry wind, now fallen, dying out  
So the frantic flowering grass  
Scattering seed that death might pass  
With the wind and this peace last  
Unreal and brittle. This sheen, wavelike  
But with mettalic clatter  
Recalls moving armies  
And our peace will shatter  
Though we scout the South in shrines  
Then move up into the holiday hills  
Guilt ridden in these bloody times.  
And see great mountains hang their heads  
Cloudless the sky that bares their shame  
In this hush that holds each scene  
Unreal and unredeemed,  
By the cruel fires that flare quiet pines  
And clutching hands in the temple squares  
Of children starving and displaced  
By wars they do not understand  
The war, remembered, flickers in the night  
Like the saffron line of blood tongued light  
Edging the charred slope, the troubled gums  
Which, White, this morning, flaunted silk soft trunks  
Unprepared for the fire and silent rape.  
But these are only reminders of pillage  
Peace rides the ravines, holds the curdled night  
In voices and bells from the myriad chirping valleys  
In chants, no cries of violence or of pain  
But this peace is guilty and the gulleys  
Flow with saffron in the guilty brain.*

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## Nonaligned condemn 'state terrorism' and racism, appeal for arms talks

While the N.A.M. declaration after the 7th summit in Delhi contained 30 'attacks' on the U.S., the resolutions at Harare had 54, wrote **Washington Post** Correspondent, Allister Sparks, from the Zimbabwean capital. The highlights of the 6th summit, the **Associated Press** noted were the onslaught on South Africa and its racist policies, the 'state terrorism' practised by the Reagan administration and an appeal to the US and USSR to hold a summit and 'agree on a permanent moratorium of nuclear tests.' The appeal was made in identical letters addressed to President Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. Why progress on such a measure has been blocked so far is explained in article by **Townsend Hoopes** in the **NYK Times**. The author, a former under-Secretary of the US Air Force, is a member of the Committee for National Security, an independent US body specialising in defence problems. **Excerpts:**

### Nonaligned Accuse U.S. of Terror

HARARE, Zimbabwe

The 101 member Nonaligned Movement ended its weeklong meeting early Sunday by accusing the United States of "state terrorism" because of its air raids on Libya in April and by appealing to super power leaders to stop the arms race.

The eighth such meeting, mainly of Third World leaders from Marxist and from capitalist countries also urged worldwide mandatory sanctions against South Africa.

At a news conference Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe described the meeting as a great success and said he expected "substantial aid" to flow from the Nonaligned Movement to South Africa's black-ruled neighbors.

"We are fully confident that from the Nonaligned Movement there is going to be some considerable kind of assistance in helping us in fighting apartheid," Mr. Mugabe said.

The resolution on Libya, contained in a 112-page political declaration, said the April 15 bombing raid by U.S. warplanes on the Libyan cities of Tripoli and Benghazi was "an act of state terrorism." It called on the United States to pay compensation and to end naval maneuvers in the disputed gulf of Sidra.

The Libyan leader, Moammar Gadhafi, had demanded that the raids be condemned. Washington has said the raids were in retaliation for Libya's support of terrorism.

Mr Mugabe succeeded Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India as chairman of the movement. The chairmanship change every three years.

Nicaragua's bid and a North Korean proposal that it be host of a foreign ministers' meeting in 1988 were opposed by pro-Western countries.

### U.S. Becomes a Clear Target at Nonaligned Summit

Allister Sparks

HARARE, Zimbabwe

The 101 members of the Non-aligned Movement holding their eighth summit meeting in an atmosphere of intensified anti-American feeling.

The Third World leaders are debating two draft declarations, on political and economic issues, that condemn U.S. policies in southern Africa, the Middle East, the Mediterranean and Central America. The drafts have been endorsed by foreign ministers of the nonaligned countries.

**The criticisms reflect a sharp deterioration in the image of the United States in the Third World. By contrast, there is only muted criticism of the Soviet Union.**

The drafts contain 54 attacks against the United States, compared with fewer than 30 at the last conference, which was held there years ago in New Delhi.

The criticisms reflect a sharp deterioration in the image of the United States in the Third World as a result of the Reagan administration's foreign policies.

By contrast, the drafts contain only muted criticism of the Soviet Union. On Afghanistan, the drafts call for a political settlement "on the basis of the withdrawal of foreign troops and full respect for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and nonaligned status of Afghanistan."

The conference, is being held on an ornate, \$100-million group of gold-colored buildings with purple furnishings that was built for the meeting. The center, which includes a luxury hotel, was built by Yugoslavs and is run on contract by the Sheraton chain.

The elaborateness illustrates the effort of the Zimbabwean prime minister, Robert Mugabe, to use the conference to make a mark on the international scene. Although Zimbabwe is one of the most developed countries in black Africa, it is still what Mr. Mugabe calls a "toddler nation," having gained its independence only six years ago after a bitter guerrilla war to overthrow white-minority rule.

Mr. Mugabe, in his keynote address to the conference touched on all the criticisms of the United States that are contained in the

draft declarations. But his language was more restrained.

He became chairman of the movement on Monday, taking over from the Indian prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi.

Harare is 350 miles (565 kilometers) from South Africa's northern border and lives in the shadow of South African military and economic power. The tension that that power creates is palpable. Only three months ago, South African commandos raided two African National Congress facilities in central Harare.

The Nonaligned Movement has 101 members, including 99 nations and 2 organizations: the Palestine Liberation Organization and the South-West Africa People's Organization.

Washington is denounced in the political declaration for its policy of "constructive engagement" with

Pretoria, its insistence on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a precondition for independence of South-West Africa, or Namibia, and its military aid to the guerrillas fighting against the government of Angola.

The draft denounces the aid to the insurgents as "an act of aggression against the Organization of African Unity and the entire movement of nonaligned countries."

Mr. Mugabe described the U.S. aid to the rebels and the American raids on Libya as "international bullying."

The economic draft declaration expresses concern at what it describes as growing pressure by developed countries on the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to attach political strings to the granting of loans to Third World nations. The draft does not name the countries. (A. P.)

## Reagan's Shattered View of Arms Control

### Townsend Hoopes

Two significant, facts about U.S. Soviet relations today stand out. One is the abundant evidence that the Soviet leadership wants to stabilize the relationship, wants to deal, wants specifically an arms control agreement that will halt the gathering arms race in space. The other is the Reagan administration's determined resistance on all of these points.

The evidence on the Soviet side includes Mikhail Gorbachev's lengthy interview with Time magazine last September; his comprehensive arms control proposals of Jan. 15; his offer this summer to reduce offensive missiles in return for a renewed mutual commitment to a strict construction of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which would keep "star wars" in the laboratory bottle for the next 15 years, and his fourtimes extended unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing.

The administration, on the other hand, is making every effort to

misrepresent these constructive proposals and to conceal its own purpose; to dismantle all remaining pieces of the arms control structure in order to clear the decks for an unrestricted arms race on earth and in space.

Speaking at the Communist Party Congress in February, Mr. Gorbachev developed the theme that national safety can no longer be secured by unilateral means, no matter how much is spent on military forces and new technology; that mutual vulnerability is an irremovable condition of our age; that strategic stability and avoidance of war therefore depend upon recognition that the superpowers share a problem of survival.

But Mr. Reagan and his entourage are not listening. In June, the president renounced SALT-2, the treaty containing clear-cut numerical limits on all major weapons categories that both sides have continued to observe. This was a decision driven by Pentagon civilians whose only vision is nuclear superiority, whose fascination is

with the fine-tuning of nuclear war-fighting strategies and whose preferred method is to run the arms race to infinity. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger said the SALT renunciation was necessary for America to "regain a modern, effective deterrent to war."

In announcing the first extension of the Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing, Mr. Gorbachev argued that, in the absence of a positive American response, Moscow has "every right to resume nuclear tests." But he emphasized that his purpose was to avoid being trapped in the dreary, futile action-reaction syndrome that has so long frustrated progress in arms control. "If one were to follow the usual 'logic' of the arms race, that presumably would have been the thing to do," he said, adding:

"It is precisely that notorious logic that has to be resolutely repudiated. We are making yet another attempt in that direction.

Otherwise the process of military rivalry will become an avalanche."

# TULF memo to Rajiv

## ANNEXURE — IIIA

### MAHAWELI GANGA DEVELOPMENT

The Master plan envisages the development under irrigation of 900,000 acres of land. The said extent of 900,000 acres is said to be made up of 246,200 acres of existing lands and 653,800 acres of new lands. The lands to be benefited are grouped under fourteen irrigation systems designated A to M. The lands to be benefited in the Eastern province are covered by systems B, A, and M and the land to be benefited in the Northern Province are covered by systems J, K, L and part of I. Details of the above are as follows:

#### EASTERN PROVINCE

Maduau Oya (Batticaloa District) (part of system B)	:	Existing Lands — 9,280 acr New Lands — 43,720 acr Total Lands — 53,000 acr
Kandakadu (Trincomlee & Batticaloa Districts) (System A)	:	Existing Lands — 14,000 acr New Lands — 56,000 acr Total Lands — 70,000 acr
Yan Oya (Trincomalee District) (part of system M)	:	Existing Lands — 1,500 acr New Lands — 18,500 acr Total Lands — 20,000 acr

From the above it would appear that the total new land available in the Eastern Province is 118,220 acres.

Of the above, around 9500 acres perhaps more, under system A (Kandakadu) is to be reserved for sugar-cane. This reduces the total extent of new land available to 108,720 acres. Portions of this land on the ground have already been occupied by members of the different ethnic groups — Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim — mainly by Sinhala, and on the basis that the lands so occupied would be about 10% of the new land available, the balance extent available for alienation would be around 98,000 acres.

Of the above schemes, considerable work has been done on Maduru Oya (part of system B) and some work in Yan Oya (part of system M). No work has yet been commenced in Kandakadu (system A). Alienation of land under the above projects has not yet commenced, though it is likely that preliminary work for alienation is in progress and that alienation could take place without much delay, in the completed schemes.

However, in respect of the land available in the Eastern Province, through the position reflected in the Master Plan is as above, the following further points need to be considered.

1. Both Maduru Oya (system-B) and Yan Oya (system-M) are reservoirs within the Eastern Province, each with its own independent catchment area. On restoration, each one of these reservoirs, independent of Mahavelli water could irrigate substantial extents of land — estimated to be about 40 to 50% of the total extent that would be brought under irrigation with the aid of Mahavelli water. Such extents, cannot be said to benefit from Mahavelli water.
2. Certain independent village tanks in the Eastern province by reason of their vicinity to the Maduru Oya (system-B)

have been incorporated with the Maduru Oya Scheme as part of the Mahavelli Project, and the extent of land independently irrigable under such tanks is now included in the total extent of land that will become irrigable under such Mahavelli Project. Instances of such tanks are (1) MEYANKALLUKULAM — once an itemised work now deleted (2) OMADIAMADUKULAM — once an itemised work now deleted and (3) VALAMUNAI on which further development work has been stopped — all of which are now treated as part of the Maduru Oya Scheme (system-B) in the Batticaloa District. The extents of land that would have been irrigated independently by such village tanks, cannot be said to be benefited by Mahavelli water.

3. The Land Use Survey Report of the Irrigation Department has raised serious doubts, in regard to the suitability for Paddy Cultivation, of a substantial extent of Land under Kandakadu (system-A)

The present indication is that a substantial extent will not be suitable and therefore not available for alienation. This factor will result in considerable reduction in the extent of land fit for alienation that would receive irrigation facilities, under Mahavelli in the Eastern Province.

The extent of Land that may eventually be available for alienation under the Mahavelli Scheme in the Eastern province, and that would benefit purely from Mahavelli water, could be much less than the estimated 100,000 acres.

(To be Continued)



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# Doctorship and Patientship : The Nemesis of Health Policy

Rapier

The grant of adult franchise after the Donoughmore Constitution made the upliftment of the poor a necessary strategy for aspiring politicians and in election posters of the 'thirties candidates advertised themselves as "friends of the poor". For the poor constituted the bulk of the electorate and, though unorganized, could have a decisive impact on election results, as shown in the election of LSSP candidates to the first state council. In the process of competitive vote-bidding palliative incrementalism through subsidised food rations and social services was imperative in order to secure the political support of the masses. Distributive justice beyond the country's economic capacity received high priority, and prominent among the populist measures evolved in colonial times was the free education scheme. Health services were widely distributed, although according to some authorities three-fourths of the population continued to patronize ayurveda. After World War II western health services came to be increasingly sophisticated, specialized, and expensive. Cardiac and other ailments required costly personnel and equipment to the extent that an ophthalmic ward could afford a laser unit, and the eye hospital declined an offer by WHO to gift one on the ground of inadequate water pressure for cooling the equipment. Despite these limitations, the Colombo hospitals, public and private, attracted patients from all over the country.

Clearly the demands for health services provided by the Centre to the rural periphery were limited by the cost factor. Crowding at the Colombo hospitals led to deterioration of the services offered, and the emergence of institutionalized corruption. If a patient was to ensure a place in the outpatient's queue for a few seconds examination, he had to

pay a low-level hospital employee, usually an attendant, a bribe to secure a low-numbered ticket, leaving those who had slept overnight on the street, far behind. For the lumpen bourgeoisie and those on the fringe of the middle class, dhamista policies evolved the "channel" system, by which private patients could be "seen" state medical specialists after working hours at private clinics. "Seen" is the appropriate word, since a specialist, as a rule could give only 5 minutes per patient. In a typical case a random check revealed that an ear nose throat surgeon "saw" 28 patients in 2 hours at a private hospital. The gross takings were  $28 \times 60 = \text{Rs. } 1680$ , of which the specialist netted Rs. 1400 after which he proceeded to his next channel venue. More cash accrues if further treatment is required. Three years ago the cost of 5 days hospitalization at a private nursing home was over Rs. 600 per day for a simple cataract operation, and the bill included entrance fee, nursing, drugs, visits by house officer (billed for 5 visits, but called only once) operation (Rs. 800) anaesthetist (Rs. 500), theatre fee etc. A "special attendant" was always at hand for an extra Rs. 35 per day.

The reason why there is no open protest against the system is that the great secret of successful doctorship is the creation of a mystified image of the healer reminiscent of the which doctor of tribal societies. Patientship involves an unquestioning faith in the mystique of the doctor's charismatic skills, there being no intelligent communication between the doctor and his client. The unwritten rule that the patient's illness, especially ailments like cancer, should not be disclosed to him, increases the dependence of his kith and kin on the magical powers of the doctor.


The channel system is considered to be the best possible even for

those who do not have the means, but can scrape together all they can by selling jewellery, mortgaging land, and borrowing from usurers, to avail themselves of an elite service. Some considerate surgeons have perfected a less expensive package for cataract operations — only 2 days hospitalization in a cubicle, local anaesthesia administered himself etc. Doctorship demands a hearless unconcern for the travails of the financially hard pressed patients. It is assumed that everyone who channels a specialist has unlimited cash flows for prolonged hospitalization in a private nursing home/although it may cost Rs. 1000 to 1500 per day. It is part of the role of patientship not to grumble at the cost for that would involve a loss of face, an important factor in the game of doctorship and patientship.

The social policy implicit in the dhamista health policy is to proffer a minimal service for an importunate but impecunious majority, a sizeable part that is, of about half the population, subsisting on food stamps, being virtually excluded from anything like adequate health care, though ostensibly provided with facilities in the state hospitals. Even here, especially in the rural periphery, corruption is rife. The peasant who is injured by a mammy while cultivating his fields, betakes himself to the nearest hospital, only to be told that the doctor-gentleman has gone home where he sees patients for a fee, having removed the basic drugs and dressings, but leaving a chit with the peon stating that he has taken ill, in case a government official turns up. The 'haves' help the 'haves' to consolidate their position vis a-vis the 'have-nots.' Social policy is oriented to the petrification of the prevailing class structure, with small numbers becoming enbourgeoisied from time to time. The only significant challenge to the established social order has been by rebels who *Lankapuvath* calls separatist (alias Marxist-oriented) terrorists. The growing travails of the lower

(Continued on page 22)

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# How Close to Peace ?

Pran Chopra

Considering the difficulties, the negotiations for ending the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka have made quite remarkable progress in recent months. Credit goes for this to the flexibility shown of late by the Sri Lanka government, despite the opposition of the hard liners; the courage with which, braving the displeasure of the Tamil militants the moderate Tamil party, the Tamil United liberation Front (TULF), has explored compromises and the pushing and cajoling behind the scenes by the Government of India which has kept the negotiations going and at the same time has won back for India the trust of both the negotiating sides, which India had lost for a time in the eyes of the Sri Lanka government.

The greatest credit, however, should go to the change of mood which has taken place in Sri Lanka, and to all factors, internal and external, which have caused the change. This has created a large body of opinion among both the major communities in Sri Lanka that the future will exact an unbearable price if through Sinhala obstinacy or through an excess of ambition on the part of the Tamils the country again misses, as it did in 1983, the present chance of a "reasonable" and "practical" settlement, and these words are now being defined by both sides with much greater tolerance than was the case before.

As a result, agreement has been reached in principle with regard to two major issues involved in the negotiations, and in details as well with regard to some aspects. The issues are

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the powers to be transferred downwards by the Sri Lanka government, especially powers relating to the maintenance of law and order and land settlement and the authorities to whom the powers should be transferred. There is also an agreed understanding about what the situation is likely to be on the ticklish issue of the functions of the Sri Lanka government, including Parliament, in relation to the powers to be transferred to these authorities.

Powers will now be transferred to provincial level bodies, not to district level bodies as was at one time proposed by the Sri Lanka government and rejected by Tamil representatives, although there is agreement now that district level bodies might also be set up, where needed, for further downward delegation of powers relevant to local governance. This device might prove handy for large and consolidated areas populated by one community in a province in which that community is a substantial minority. Most powers will now be transferred to the provincial council, and therefore to the elected chief minister and his cabinet, which will be responsible to the council and will not be transferred now, as was at one time proposed, to the provincial governor, who will be a nominee of the country's President. Only some limited powers will remain with the governor.

This device has proved very useful in finding ways of transferring certain powers. For example over land. In Sri Lanka land vests in the President, and vesting it in authorities other than him or those acting in his name was proving very difficult. At the same time it was recognised that the provincial councils would need

land for discharging some of their functions in relation to the powers to be transferred to them, for example over education, which will call for building schools, and over aspects of agriculture, which will need even more land. If the councils had to seek sanction for land from Colombo in every case there would not only be delays but a whitening down of the status of the councils and the chief ministers. But it has now been agreed that authority over land use will be delegated to governors in respect of the functions transferred to the councils, and they will exercise it on the advice of chief ministers.

The gap between the Sri Lanka government and TULF with regard to the transfer of powers for the maintenance of law and order has been largely bridged by making a conceptual distinction between the policing responsibility of the provincial authority and the security responsibility of the national government, and the functions of the law and order machinery with regard to these two responsibilities.

The trickiest problem at one time was the understandable apprehension in the minds of the Tamil negotiators that what the Sri Lanka government conceded to them today it might take back tomorrow. In the given political circumstances of Sri Lanka it has not been possible to make the present unitary constitution formally a federal one, and it was feared that in a structure formally unitary Colombo would always be able to resume powers transferred today to the provincial councils. While there has been no formal resolution of this problem, and in the given circumstances there cannot be, three new factors have helped the negotiators in by-passing the problem.

The first is the need felt all around, to which reference was made earlier, for bringing this dispute to an end. Any backtracking on the agreement by either side will be unpopular with large segments in both major communities. The second is that under the system of proportional representation which is being introduced now, no single party is expected to get the kind of majority it will need to undo the laws and constitutional changes which will have to be made now as part of the settlement. The third is the higher level of trust which each side now has in the intention of the other to end the dispute and not to subvert the settlement later.

Past history does not suggest that this change of mood and the level of trust can be counted on to be durable enough as guarantors of the settlement. But what can reinforce them is the growing belief in Sri Lanka now that it would go against the country's enlightened self-interest to earn blame in the eyes of other countries by wilfully violating today's agreements tomorrow. India has become a particular focus of this belief. It was surprising for me to see during a recent visit to Sri Lanka how readily how many people said, including senior government ministers, that it would be necessary for India to help in ensuring that neither side went back upon the agreement. It is obvious that too much load should not be put on India's help because everyone, including India, regards this matter as a domestic affair of Sri Lanka. But if it is invited with circumspection and used with sincerity, and so used by India no less than by anyone else, it can underwrite other factors for peaceful relationships in Sri Lanka thus ensuring time for bi-ethnic or even non-ethnic trends to grow in the island's politics.

A factor very relevant to such a consummation is the role of the Tamil militants and the role of India towards them. These roles are particularly important in respect of two issues. The first is the thorny one of the relations between the Tamil majority northern prov-

ince of Jaffna, and the eastern province, in which the Tamils are the largest single community but only slightly over a third of the population. At one time all northern Tamils demanded merger of the two provinces, but now TULF would agree that only the Tamil majority slice of the eastern province which is contiguous to the northern be merged with the latter. No agreement has been reached on this even in principle, and various propositions are being considered, such as a referendum in the Tamil slice of the eastern province (a point of disagreement on this being whether the referendum should be held first, as the government suggests, or the merger should come first subject to ratification later in a referendum, as desired by the Tamil side.) But a compromise on this issue is not going to be possible on the basis, as demanded by the militants, that the merger, whether of the eastern province or of the Tamil majority slice, is needed for making a "Tamil homeland" with the right of "self-determination." That is rightly regarded by the other side as a strategy for Eelam by instalment, and contrary to the Indian government's commitment to a settlement consistent with Sri Lanka's integrity. Fortunately, the Sri Lanka government accepts this Indian commitment to be genuine, and it is now for the militants to adjust themselves to it as best they may.

The second issue is even more thorny, and the role of the militants (and India's towards them) is even more relevant. This relates to cessation of violence. So long as mutual killings persist there will always be the danger that the negotiators will be sidelined. The centre stage will be occupied by the fighters on both sides. Tempers and intolerance will rise. It will become impossible to heal the wounds or bridge the gulf between the two communities, and the issue will become amenable only to the outcome of war. This is the last thing that suits Tamils or Sinhales, Sri Lanka or India, but suits the Tamils even less than anyone else. Ending the violence must therefore

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## Doctorship...

*(Continued from page 19)*

orders can be a matter of calculated policy. The Singapore Prime Minister, described as a "benevolent dictator", used the media and other resources at his command to implement a new eugenic policy for the intelligentsia, particularly male executives and bureaucrats with graduate wives, to be fruitful and multiply. Birth control, earlier advocated for all was now to be confined to the lower orders. The previous housing policy of the small nuclear family comprising parents, and one or two children, occupying a small apartment in a house-owning democracy, was reversed in the case of the upper stratum in favour of the Chinese ideal of a three-generation extended family. Apart from solving the problem of childcare for working parents in view of the scarcity of domestic servants, it also eased the housing problem by a re-definition of overcrowding. Singaporean social policy thus openly revived the discredited nineteenth century philosophy of social Darwinism which postulated that the fittest survived in a competitive process of natural selection, and once an upper crust was consolidated it was bolstered by appropriate social policies.

Social policies covertly designed to restrict the expansion of the lower orders include selective birth control campaigns and denial of health care to the poor. The life span of the affluent was prolonged, albeit expansively but the poor exposed to death, disease and decay. The thrust of Rapier's account of the burdens imposed on patients by Colombo's private-nursing homes will receive extensive documentation based on observations and experience of doctorship and patientship during the past three years. The nemesis of health care and the quality of death (which pays dividends to some) will be examined in detail.

This preamble will not be complete without some comments on the making of social policy. It has been a major concern of Rapier to establish an Institute of Policy Research which will analyse the forces, constraints and predisposi-

*(Continued on page 23)*



## Part II

# A Prison Without Walls :

A Review of a South African play

## Asinamali !

As each man, in turn, swirls the audience in a tide of richly imagined characters and scenarios, we see in very concrete terms how apartheid distorts both the oppressed and oppressors. Ngema's vision is not a black and white one. The Afrikaners who people the stage through the words and motions of the black prisoners are not so much evil as they are absurd. Sometimes this absurdity is comic as when, in the slickly performed court-room scene (that must be familiar to so many blacks by now), the proceedings have to be laboriously translated and retranslated between the official language, Afrikaans, and English, the language shared by most blacks. Another time, the absurdity of the Afrikaner's actions are deadly: he can shoot into a crowd of unarmed demonstrators. Similarly, Ngema's black characters (the prisoners as well as those friends and foes they invoke and impersonate) are neither saints nor devils. We meet not only the naive migrant labourers but also the various black officials who are caught imitating white power-games. This motley crew of prisoners are hardly heroes, or, for that matter, even political activists. Only one of the characters is in prison for a politically subversive activity. However, as **Asinamali!** emphasises again, and again, politics cannot be narrowly defined in South Africa. The very fact that most of the cells are full of those who have been charged with some very trivial misdemeanors, drives home the incontrovertible reality that in Black South Africa to strive to live like a human being is politically subversive.

If was surprising and also disappointing to discover that the only significant human beings in the play were men. Certainly women

were sometimes mentioned, even impersonated, like the migrant worker's four wives who are abandoned when their husband leaves the "tribal homeland" to find work and ends up in jail; or the utterly lascivious wife of the white pig-farmer who seduces her employee in the pig-sty. Perhaps the latter character, a caricature more than character, is probably "realistic" when considered in context. Until recently miscegenation was illegal and we may speculate that sexual stereotypes about the forbidden were certainly (for both sexes) fantastic. However, this explanation collapses if applied to the portrayal (or lack thereof) of black women. There are hardly any black women of consequence (referred to or impersonated) in the play, a glaring contrast to the reality that this play dramatises. South Africa certainly boasts strong and activist (black) women whether they are in the forefront of anti-apartheid protests (like the late Lilian Ngoyi, Albertina Sisulu and Winnie Mandela), languishing in jails or supporting their families.

In spite of this shortcoming, the production of **Asinamali!** is as relevant today, when the Botha regime has renewed forcefully its willingness to defend apartheid, as it was three years ago. It is a powerful play which moves even the most (politically) apathetic audience, with its ribald humour, scathing satire, exuberance and pathos. As one critic noted perceptively, "**Asinamali!** is not drama. It is too episodic, too raw and too close to reality." And even though that reality may seem rather far from our own, too grotesque to be real, we cannot help but also sense, however dimly, some general parallels, which may speak to our own reality.

## Doctorship . . .

(Continued from page 22)

tions contributing to the enunciation of social policy. There is always opposition to rational discourse on matters important to the public interest in this country. In contrast, the Malaysian government gives financial support to an Institute of Policy Research at the University Sains Malaysia in Penang, where government policy is subject to analysis, usually at the request of a Department or Ministry. Here the politician prefers to live in a fool's paradise, imagining that his pontifical speeches and exhortations are acceptable to the people concerned whose views are congruent with his. There is no evidence to support this assumption, no public opinion research, and when a government goes to the polls and is routed, it is taken by surprise, trying to explain away what happened by post-mortem analyses. To exhort the overworked and underpaid nurse that hers is a noble profession to which she must dedicate herself (despite ignoble salaries which negate any semblance of nobility or dignity) and to imagine that these utterances are taken seriously is to be guilty of misplaced romanticism, shattered only when unredressed grievances culminate in strike action. An important aspect of policy research is to determine the limits to the toleration of frustration. The declaration of a strike clearly indicates that the limit has been reached. Research could have foreseen this eventuality and enable advice on remedial policies, in the larger perspective of the social foundations of wage policy, and the context of budgetary constraints. It is not the opulent specialists who are in the forefront of GMOA agitation for wage hikes, improvement of accommodation, and provision of transport. It is the rank and file, the recently qualified doctor posted in mountain fastnesses for whom channel practice is a chimera. In a low-income area, he has to compete with the well-entrenched RMP. His ambition is to escape from this constricted environment.

# Simone de Beauvoir: loyal to the last

Paul Webster

For someone who created such an enormous international impact both through her political passions and her literary output, Simone de Beauvoir led an oddly restricted life. Nearly all the dramatic events during her 78 years were experienced within a few hundred yards of her first and last homes, off the Boulevard Montparnasse.

There was something edging on the courageous in the way she determinedly led a controversial lifestyle in spite of the middle class Catholic family made ill at ease by her feminist independence and her companionship with Jean-Paul Sartre.

Until a good and understanding biography of de Beauvoir is written (and there are two in preparation) it will not be easy to project a sympathetic portrait of a woman who has been seen too often by her enemies — particularly men — as a humourless semirecluse. The end of her life was marked by controversy over her editing of Sartre's love letters and diaries, making it seem that she was trying to fiddle history.

Most of de Beauvoir's fans are, not surprisingly, women as she favoured women writers researchers and activists who have cornered the interview and biography market. But being a woman was not enough to protect anyone from the cutting scorn if they fell below her standards.

A biography was brought out last year by two French women academics which de Beauvoir reviewed herself. She tore two pages out of the book and covered them with biting comments denying a series of statements and revolutions she was supposed to have made. The writing was colourful but the scholarship was weak; that precision was a throwback to her days as a Lycee teacher where she first tried out her ideas on women's liberation.

She was certainly not the dragon, though, that her enemies



liked to portray. Even men who went to see her, afraid of her sharp staccato voice, cold eye and forbidding turban, usually came away feeling they had misjudged her.

In fact, her fight for women's rights make her much more a figure of the 20th century than Jean-Paul Sartre whose political passions were usually linked to passing rather than universal causes. For him, women's rights were a bit of a joke. He did not even give de Beauvoir any encouragement when *The Second Sex* was published in 1949 to the horror of the supposed broad-minded group of men who had resigned over progressive French ideas from Saint Germain des Pres since the war.

Although she was leader of the French League of Women's Rights and the inspiration of several other powerful feminist movements, they may not be able to protect her from a posthumous merging in popular memory with Sartre. Now they are both dead, they again seem to be one person a two-sided manifestation of French social, political and cultural history.

Ever since they met in 1929, when she was 21, they supported

and challenged each other. Sartre wrote much of his work to impress Castor as he called her and she in turn spent her life both defying his influence and depending on his admiration. The mutual influence on their literary work was striking from the very beginning.

A few months ago the first Sartreography was published and that suggested that the philosopher fell out with his life-long companion just before he died.

She made things up with him by going to lie beside his body at the hospital and has lived the last six years watching over his grave and memory. Nobody can ever say that de Beauvoir was not loyal and faithful to the things that really counted in her life, both people and ideas.

(Guardian)

## How Close . . .

(Continued from page 22)

be made a high priority goal by all sides, and especially by those who really have the future of the Tamils at heart. Past record in this respect is bad, both of the Tamils and the Sri Lanka army. But notwithstanding that fact, every chance of an effective cease-fire must be seized by everyone, and by India no less than by anyone else.

If either the army or the militants offer not to fire unless fired upon, which is the minimum step required for ending the violence, India must use all its influence with the other side to get a matching response from it, and must use all its influence with both sides to get from both faithful observance of their offers. It is only by the satisfactory performance of this role that India can earn for itself the trust of both sides in such sufficient measure that both may turn to it for help in ensuring faithful implementation of any settlement that they may reach now.

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
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